RATIONALES FOR TAX EXEMPTION --
A PALIMPSEST

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Introduction

This paper contains a brief description of various rationales which purport to justify or explain the granting of tax exempt status to certain organizations.¹ The aim is not to set forth a

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1. An organization may be wholly or partially exempt from a wide variety of taxes, e.g., federal income or excise taxes, state or local income or property taxes. This paper addresses only exemption from federal income taxes, although qualification for such exemption often also results in exemption from other taxes.

The principal focus here is on entities described in § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [hereinafter I.R.C.], i.e., "main stream" charities. Many other sorts of organizations are wholly or partially exempt from federal income taxation, either by virtue of being described in other paragraphs of I.R.C. § 501(c) or under a myriad of other provisions. For example, tax-exempt status is afforded to certain pension and profit-sharing trusts, farmers' and some other cooperative organizations, and foreign governments and their instrumentalities. Still other entities are generally free from income-tax liability because their shareholders, beneficiaries, or partners are instead directly taxable on the entities' income, e.g., so-called S corporations, most partnerships, simple trusts, real estate investment trusts, and registered investment companies. The examples, in all cases above, are illustrative, not exhaustive. See B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 28-29 (5th ed. 1987), for others.

Because this paper generally does not discuss membership and mutual-benefit organizations, it also does not set out the quite-separate rationale for exempting their receipts from income taxation. That rationale is: the income tax should not be asserted against the entity, since the entity is merely a combination, pooling, or conduit for the activities of the various members. Payments by a group of neighbors to build and maintain a swimming pool for their common use would not have been taxed (nor would they have been deductible to those making the payments). Thus, their payments to a pool association should not attract an income tax. One court put it this way:

"[W]here individuals have banded together to provide recreational facilities on a mutual basis, it would be conceptually erroneous to impose a tax on the organization as a separate entity. . . . No income of the sort usually taxed has been generated; the money has simply been shifted from one pocket to another, both within the same pair of pants. . . . [A]s to these funds the organization does not operate as a separate entity." McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 458 (D.D.C. (continued...))
thorough exegesis, but rather merely a precis, of these rationales. The risk of distortion through oversimplification is real.

Second, it will venture a few select observations or criticisms of some of the theories. Here, again, the goal is to be brief rather than comprehensive. For the sake of clarity, any observations or criticisms follow directly after the description of each particular rationale.

Rationales for Tax Exemption

The legal literature discussing tax-exemption rationales is not voluminous. A number of different justifications for exempt-

1. (...continued)

See Bittker & Rahdert, infra note 2, at 348-58; R. DESIDERIO & S. TAYLOR, infra note 2, at 4-16 - 4-18. This rationale is not free from problems. Indeed, it raises deep issues of why any entity which has members (i.e., shareholders, partners, beneficiaries) is subject to income tax. That line of inquiry would entail a discussion of so-called integration or imputation issues, and tax-incidence questions, which have been long debated with respect to the corporate income tax generally. Fortunately, it is outside the scope of this paper.


Several of the above articles are more centrally concerned (continued...)
ing nonprofit organizations from the income tax may be gleaned from a perusal of the principal writings. Five such theories are discussed briefly, in no particular order, below.3

First, tax-exempt status may be justified because the activities of the nonprofit sector are direct replacements for governmental obligations. The notion is that government should not tax organizations, thus reducing their ability to deliver goods and services by the amount of the tax, when that reduction merely creates a vacuum which must be filled by the government itself.4

2. (...)continued
with the policies affecting the deductibility of gifts to charities than with tax exemption of the charities themselves. The two questions are deeply intertwined. For example: "[T]he deduction allowed the donor is the counterpart of the exemption from income tax enjoyed by the charity itself [so that] the same policy decisions that justify the exemption for the charitable organization support the charitable contribution deduction." McNulty, supra, 3 VA. TAX REV. at 233; but see Hansmann, supra, at 72. Nevertheless, little effort has been made to plumb the depths of the relatively voluminous literature on the deduction. Furthermore, the scope of tax-exemption is not coterminous with the scope of the charitable deduction: many tax-exempt organizations are not eligible for tax-deductible gifts. The focus on legal literature reflects the background and training of the author, and should not be taken to suggest that other disciplines should be ignored; indeed, one of the main themes of this paper is that historical, economic, and other literature are often quite important.

3. The enumeration is not free from question: not only might the various theories mentioned be organized or subdivided differently, but other possible justifications could be added to the list.

4. This is the rationale mentioned in the final report of the prestigious Filer Commission:

"A frequently cited justification for tax immunities that affect nonprofit organizations is that government, in fact, would itself have to supply many of the services, fill many of the functions, of such organizations if they did not exist." REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, GIVING IN AMERICA: TOWARD A STRONGER VOLUNTARY SECTOR 103 (1975).

Compare the following formulation: (continued...)
Stated another way, a deal has been struck: tax exemption in exchange for the private fulfillment of governmental duties.

This theory may be criticized on several grounds: (1) it fails to explain why tax exemption is not granted to for-profit providers of the same goods and services; (2) it cannot explain the tax exemption of churches and religious organizations, since the First Amendment forbids government from intruding into those areas; (3) the amount of the tax-exemption benefit is not related

4. (...continued)

"Clearly then, the exemption for charitable organizations is a derivative of the concept that they perform functions which, in the organizations' absence, government would have to perform; therefore, government is willing to forego the otherwise tax revenues in return for the public services rendered." B. HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 5.

The same notion finds voice in Congressional reports, e.g.:

"The exemption from taxation of money and property devoted to charitable and other purposes is based on the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from other public funds . . . ." H. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1939).

Court decisions have also articulated this view, e.g., McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F.2d 448, 456 (D.D.C. 1972).

5. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 2, at 67-71.

6. The size of the church/religious sector is considerable. It accounts for almost half of the entire nonprofit universe, measured by amounts donated annually. See, e.g., AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, GIVING USA: ESTIMATES OF PHILANTHROPIC GIVING IN 1986 AND THE TRENDS THEY SHOW 61-62 (1987) (over $40 billion donated to religious organizations and agencies in 1986). Other possible measures of its size are problematical due to the inaccuracy of available statistics and the difficulty of obtaining data from many of the organizations in question. See, e.g., V. HODGKINSON & M. WEITZMAN, DIMENSIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR: A STATISTICAL PROFILE 106 (Independent Sector, 2d ed. 1986) ("The religion subsector presents a major problem for our estimates.") The zone proscribed by the First Amendment does not exhaust the areas in which the state would not act; there are many other sorts of (continued...)
to the value of goods or services provided, but rather to the amount of capital or retained earnings of the organization;\(^7\)
(4) the theory does not support tax exemption, but merely argues that tax exemption is one of two routes for the provision of the desired goods and services.\(^8\) Despite these criticisms, this first rationale remains the most "popular" and oft-repeated justification for tax exemption.

Second, tax-exemption may be justified because of the way nonprofit organizations contribute to pluralism. The notion is that such organizations provide goods and services for the public, but perhaps more efficiently and in any event with more diversity than the government.\(^9\)

6. (...continued)
entities whose functions would not be taken over by government should they cease to exist, yet to which tax exemption has always been afforded. See Belknap, supra note 2, at 2032-33:

"[T]he quid pro quo explanation of tax exemptions . . . is not adequate as a justification of the privilege in some of the most important segments of the general area under discussion. . . . [T]he tax exemption privilege has much deeper roots than the quid pro quo theory would admit."

7. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 2, at 71. A quite similar criticism, directed at the mismatch resulting from the use of property tax exemption as a means of encouraging educational activities, is put forth in Note, Alternatives to the University Property Tax Exemption, 83 YALE L.J. 181, 183 (1973).

8. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 2, at 332.

9. Belknap puts it as follows:

"[G]overnment has granted the charitable tax exemptions in order to encourage voluntary private organizations to carry out certain activities which by common understanding are agreed to rate among the highest in the scale of social values. The preference that these activities be carried out by voluntary private organizations is based upon two advantages that private action in these fields enjoys over government action.

"The first advantage is that voluntary private enterprise can often do the job better. . . .

(continued...)

Possible criticisms include: (1) it is not clear how to measure efficiency: some would dispute the claim that not-for-profit entities are more efficient than government, at least in all instances; lacking an agreed gauge, it is impossible to rely on that criterion;\textsuperscript{10} (2) the argument from pluralism proves too much, because for-profit firms could also claim it;\textsuperscript{11} (3) the justification does not provide useful guidelines for decision-makers trying to draw lines between various forms of and limits on tax exemption.\textsuperscript{12}

Third, tax-exemption may be explained by the inappropriateness of applying customary measures of "income" to not-for-profit entities.\textsuperscript{13} Critics could counter: (1) the difficulty of defining an

\textsuperscript{--9}. (...)continued

"The second advantage of private control ... lies in the effect of such control upon the overall pattern of our society. ... [T]he broad ramifications of freedom require a preference for private activity and diversity." Belknap, supra note 2, at 2035-36.

See also Stone, supra note 2, at 39-40.

10. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 2, at 332-33:

"Lacking a method for measuring these appealing but elusive virtues, one must perform rely on intuition in comparing the achievements of private charities with those of government, when they are performing similar functions."

11. We could require a conjunction of charitably-aimed public benefit and diversity, thus excluding, e.g., General Electric Corp. from the justification. Even so, the theory would not explain why for-profit hospitals, health clubs, and schools are not exempt from the income tax.

12. The rationale may be fairly close to the mark in explaining why, over time, various entities in the not-for-profit sector have been made tax exempt. To the extent that its very "fuzziness" encompasses the variety of our history, it correspondingly fails to be useful as a predictor of any particular issue’s outcome in the future.

13. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 2, at 307-16. For example:

(continued...
appropriate tax base argues for better or specially-crafted definitions, not exemption; (2) the problems may be overstated; at least a good portion of the receipts of non-profits respond fairly well to ordinary notions of "income."\textsuperscript{14}

Fourth, the exemption may be justified on the grounds that taxing the not-for-profit indirectly would impose the tax burden on its customers and beneficiaries, but without taking into account their ability to pay.\textsuperscript{15} Critics could respond: (1) tax rates imposed on entities, even in the business world, are not selected on the basis of the ability of the entities' customers to pay;\textsuperscript{16} (2) in many cases, the ability-to-pay criterion would be met: in the case of "donative" nonprofits by the joint "contributions" of donors and customers, and in the case of "commercial" nonprofits

13. (...continued)  
"[A]ll exempt organizations engaged in public service activities share one common feature: if they were deprived of their exempt status and treated as taxable entities, computing their 'net income' would be a conceptually difficult, if not self-contradictory task." \textit{Id.} at 307 (footnote omitted).

The authors also argue that, even if an appropriate tax base could be defined, it would be difficult to fix an appropriate tax rate to apply to it. \textit{Id.} at 314-16.

14. See, e.g., Hansmann, \textit{supra} note 2, at 59-62. In particular, Hansmann finds no problem in using traditional tax-base and tax-rate notions in the case of "commercial" nonprofit organizations:

"But Bittker and Rahdert overstate the difficulties. To begin with, many nonprofits receive little or no income from donations, but rather derive all or nearly all of their income from sales of goods or services . . . For such organizations it would be perfectly easy and natural to carry over the tax accounting that is applied to business firms . . . ." \textit{Id.} at 59.

Hansmann goes on to argue that Bittker and Rahdert exaggerate the definitional difficulties even in the case of "donative," as opposed to "commercial," nonprofits. \textit{Id.} at 61-62.

15. See Bittker & Rahdert, \textit{supra} note 2, at 314-16. This fourth theory, although listed separately from the third, is closely linked to the latter. Indeed, the authors viewed it as really part of the appropriate-tax-rate issue.

to facilitate the aggregation of capital in the nonprofit sector, where it may be retained, free from tax and other means of diffusion;\(^{24}\) (3) if the rationale were accepted, implementing legislation would almost certainly involve quite considerable complexity;\(^{25}\) (4) granting tax exemption to a industry because it has trouble raising capital seems likely to promote economic inefficiency; (5) Prof. Hansmann's argument accepts as a given that an entity-level tax on income is appropriate (or at least inevitable) for business corporations; that premise gives away so much theoretical ground that there is not enough footing left to provide adequate support for a justification for sector-specific entity-level tax exemption.

\(^{24}\) Consider, for example, the policies behind the adoption of I.R.C. § 4942, captioned "Taxes on failure to distribute income." See generally B. HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 526-43.

\(^{25}\) It is not possible to explore all of the reasons in this paper. However: (a) since not all industries would be characterized by contract failure, some workable definition of each "industry" would have to be provided; (b) mechanisms would be needed to prevent entities from flowing their excess capital out of intended industries directly or indirectly into other uses and industries; (c) some method would be required for periodic reviews to measure whether the desired capital build-up had been achieved, so that tax exemption could be withdrawn.