Love as a Moral Emotion*

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INTRODUCTION

Love and morality are generally assumed to differ in spirit. The moral point of view is impartial and favors no particular individual, whereas favoring someone in particular seems like the very essence of love. Love and morality are therefore thought to place conflicting demands on our attention, requiring us to look at things differently, whether or not they ultimately require us to do different things.1

The question is supposed to be whether a person can do justice to both perspectives. Some philosophers think that one or the other per-

* The theme of this article was suggested to me by Harry Frankfurt’s “Autonomy, Necessity, and Love” (in Vernunftbegriffe in der Moderne, ed. Hans Friedrich Fulda and Rolf-Peter Horstmann [Klett-Cotta, 1994], pp. 433–47). I first attempted to state the theme in a paper entitled “Frankfurt on Love and Duty,” written for a conference organized by Rüdiger Bittner in the spring of 1996, at the Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung, in Bielefeld, Germany. Some of that paper is reproduced here. Also contained here is material from a commentary on Henry S. Richardson’s Practical Reasoning about Final Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); my commentary was presented at a session of the Society for Informal Logic at the 1995 meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA) Eastern Division. Earlier versions of this article were read to the philosophy departments at Arizona State University; Harvard; Princeton; University of California, Los Angeles; University College London; and to a discussion group that meets at Oriel College, Oxford, under the auspices of David Charles. This article was presented at the 1997 meetings of the APA Eastern Division, with commentaries by Harry Frankfurt and Thomas Hill. It has also had the benefit of comments from Neera Badhwar, Marcia Baron, Paul Boghossian, Linda Wimer Brakel, Michael Bratman, Sarah Buss, Jennifer Church, Stephen L. Darwall, Elizabeth Fricker, Richard Heck, David Hills, Robert N. Johnson, Christine Korsgaard, Elijah Millgram, David Phillips, Peter Railton, Connie Rosati, Tamar Schapiro, Michael Smith, Michael Stocker, and Alec Walen. Work on this article was supported by a sabbatical leave from the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts, University of Michigan, and by a fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities.

1. I will not be concerned in this article with the possibility of practical conflict between love and duty; my sole concern will be the supposed psychological conflict—which I have called the conflict in spirit. For the claim that love and duty conflict in practice, see Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), p. 86. Slote’s example is discussed by Marcia Baron in “On Admirable Immorality,” Ethics 96 (1986): 557–66, pp. 558ff. An alternative version of Slote’s example appears in Susan Wolf, “Morality and Partiality,” Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 243–59, p. 253.
spective will inevitably be slighted—that a loving person cannot help but be inattentive to his\(^2\) moral duty, while a fully dutiful person cannot help but be unloving.\(^3\) Other philosophers contend that a person can pass freely between these perspectives, tempering either with insights drawn from the other and thereby doing justice to both.

**A Problem for Kantian Ethics**

The latter arguments have been especially effective when pressed by consequentialists.\(^4\) Consequentialism makes no fundamental demands on an agent’s attention: it says that an agent ought to think in whatever way would do the most good, which will rarely entail thinking about how to do the most good. Although the consequentialist standard is impartial and impersonal, its satisfaction allows, and probably requires, partial and personal attention to individuals.

Kantian moral theory cannot efface itself in this fashion, because it makes fundamental demands on an agent’s practical thought. What morality demands of an agent, according to Kant, is that he act on a maxim

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that he can universalize—or, roughly, that he act for reasons of a type that he could regard as valid for anyone in similar circumstances.\(^5\) Because Kantianism thus demands that an agent be able to take a particular view of his own reasons, it requires him to be morally minded and not just morally behaved.

This moral theory is sometimes misrepresented by those who claim that it conflicts with the spirit of love. For example, Kantian ethics has been said to require that one accord others “equal consideration” in a sense that entails “giving equal weight to the interests of all,” which would seem incompatible with caring about some people more than others.\(^6\) Yet equal consideration in Kantian ethics consists in considering everyone as having equal access to justifications for acting—which amounts to considering everyone’s rights as equal, not everyone’s interests. Caring about some people more than others may be perfectly compatible with according everyone equal rights.\(^7\)

Even so, Kantian morality seems to require an agent to live with a nagging reservation, insofar as he is to act on no maxim that he cannot universalize. This reservation threatens to interfere with some of the motives and feelings generally regarded as essential to love. The Kantian moral agent cleaves to his loved ones only on the condition that he can regard cleaving to loved ones as reasonable for anyone, and he thereby seems to entertain “one thought too many” for cleaving to them at all.

This formulation of the problem comes from Bernard Williams, discussing the case of a man who can save only one of several people in peril and who chooses to save his own wife. Williams remarks, “It might have been hoped by some (for instance, his wife) that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be the thought that it was his wife, not that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one’s wife.”\(^8\)

As Kantian moralists have hastened to point out, however, their

\(^5\) Here I am glossing over many exegetical issues in order to state a version of the Categorical Imperative that seems both intuitively plausible and faithful to Kant. I defend this version of the Categorical Imperative in my “The Voice of Conscience,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 99 (1999): 57–76.


\(^7\) A similar reply can be made to the following remark by Robert C. Solomon: “On the Kantian model, the particularity of love would seem to be a form of irrationality—comparable to our tendency to make ‘exceptions’ of ourselves, in this case, making exceptions of persons close to us” (“The Virtue of (Erotic) Love,” *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 13 [1988]: 12–31, p. 18). The Kantian model forbids only those exceptions by which we act for reasons that we couldn’t make generally accessible. It does not forbid differential treatment of different people. (This point is also made, e.g., by Marcia Baron in “Impartiality and Friendship,” *Ethics* 101 [1991]: 836–57, p. 851.)

\(^8\) Williams, “Persons, Character, and Morality,” p. 18.
theory allows an agent to act without expressly considering whether he could universalize his maxim, provided that he would notice and be deterred if he couldn’t; and the motivational force of love not only can but should be conditional to this minimal extent. Although Kant’s impartial morality can never fully remove itself from the deliberative process, they argue, it can make itself sufficiently inconspicuous to allow for intimate personal relations. Conscience can stand by in the role of chaperone, and love need not feel inhibited by such unobtrusive supervision.

Effective as this solution may be, it concedes too much to the supposed problem. To argue that conscience can leave room for love by withdrawing into the background of our thoughts is implicitly to concede that it would interfere with love if permitted to share the foreground. A conflict in spirit is thus admitted but shown to be manageable, through segregation of the conflicting parties.

If love and morality were even potentially at odds to this extent, then love would have to be, if not an immoral emotion, then at least non-moral. But love is a moral emotion. So if we find ourselves segregating love and morality in order to keep the peace, then we have already made a mistake.

We have made a mistake, I think, as soon as we accept the assumption of a conflict in spirit. Love is a moral emotion precisely in the sense that its spirit is closely akin to that of morality. The question, then, is not whether two divergent perspectives can be accommodated but rather how these two perspectives converge.

Possible Solutions

One way to bring them into convergence would be to reject the Kantian conception of morality as impartial. Lawrence Blum endorses the view, which he attributes to Iris Murdoch, that “the moral task is not to generate action based on universal and impartial principles but to attend and respond to particular persons.”


of spirit between love and morality, according to Blum, is to allow for
greater partiality in our conception of morality.

I think that this view is the opposite of correct. The way to bring love
into convergence with morality is not to stop thinking of morality as im-
partial but to rethink the partiality of love.

Here there is a danger of falling into “righteous absurdity,” as
Williams calls it, by getting too high-minded about love. I’ll try to
avoid absurdity, but I won’t entirely avoid the righteousness, I’m afraid,
since I think that moral philosophers could stand to be more rather than
less high-minded on the subject. The account of love offered by many
philosophers sounds to me less like an analysis of the emotion itself than
an inventory of the desires and preferences that tend to arise in loving
relationships of the most familiar kinds. Once we distinguish love from
the likings and longings that usually go with it, I believe, we will give up
the assumption that the emotion is partial in a sense that puts it in con-
fl ict with the spirit of morality.

I can foreshadow my conclusion by pointing out that Murdoch’s ethic of
attending to the particular is not necessarily at odds with the ethics of
impartiality. On the contrary, Murdoch emphasizes that the attention re-
quired is “impersonal” and “an exercise of detachment.”

To be sure, Murdoch equates attending to individuals with a form
of love for them, and a morality based on love might naturally be as-
sumed to differ from any morality that is impartial. Yet the attention that
embraces love, in Murdoch’s view, is strictly objective and fair-minded:

Should a retarded child be kept at home or sent to an institution?
Should an elderly relation who is a trouble-maker be cared for or
asked to go away? Should an unhappy marriage be continued for

tingham, “Ethics and Impartiality,” Philosophical Studies 43 (1983): 83–99; Annette Baier,
“The Moral Perils of Intimacy,” in Pragmatism’s Freud: The Moral Disposition of Psychoanalysis,
ed. Joseph H. Smith and William Kerrigan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
(1986): 439–56; Seyla Benhabib, “The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohl-
berg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory,” in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder
McFall, “Integrity,” Ethics 98 (1987): 5–20. See also various contributions to a symposium

12. For a related attempt to rethink the partiality of love, see Jennifer Whiting, “Im-
14. “Prayer is properly not petition, but simply an attention to God which is a form
of love”; “the capacity to love, that is to see”; “attention to reality inspired by, consisting of,
love” (ibid., pp. 55, 66, 67).
the sake of the children? . . . The love which brings the right answer is an exercise of justice and realism and really looking.\textsuperscript{15}

In Murdoch’s language of impersonality, detachment, realism, and justice, there is no suggestion that particularity entails partiality.

Let me extend these remarks on Murdoch by noting that her term for that which constitutes love—that is, ‘attention’—can be translated into German as \textit{Achtung}, which was Kant’s own term for the motive of morality.\textsuperscript{16} This is a punning translation, of course, since \textit{Achtung} can denote not only attention but also a mode of valuation, and the latter is the meaning intended by Kant.\textsuperscript{17} But these two meanings are not independent: there is a deep conceptual connection between valuation and vision—a connection evident in words like ‘respect’, ‘regard’, and even in Kant’s synonym for \textit{Achtung}, the Latin \textit{reverentia}.\textsuperscript{18} If love is indeed a mat-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 91.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Iris Murdoch herself draws this connection in “The Sublime and the Good,” in \textit{Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature}, ed. Peter Conradi (New York: Penguin, 1997), pp. 205–20. In this essay, after asserting that “love is the extremely difficult realisation that something other than oneself is real” (p. 215), Murdoch says that this “exercise of overcoming oneself . . . is very like \textit{Achtung},” adding: “Kant was marvelously near the mark” (p. 216). To be sure, Murdoch’s primary concern in this essay is to criticize Kant for being “afraid of the particular” (p. 214). But I think that Murdoch underestimates the extent to which the object of Kantian \textit{Achtung} can be a universal law embodied in a particular person, or the object of love can be a particular person as embodying something universal. In short, I think that Murdoch underestimates how near Kant was to the mark.
ter of “really looking,” then it ought to resemble other instances of valuation-as-vision, including Kantian respect.

My aim in this article is to juxtapose love and Kantian respect in a way that is illuminating for both. On the one hand, I hope to show that we can resolve some problems in our understanding of love by applying the theory of value and valuation that Kant developed for respect. On the other hand, I hope that this application of Kant’s theory will show that its stern and forbidding tone is just that—a tone in which Kant stated the theory rather than an essential characteristic of the theory itself, which is in fact well suited to matters of the heart.

RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS

A potential obstacle to this project is that Kantian respect is, in the first instance, respect for the law, an attitude whose object is widely assumed to consist in rules of conduct, or (in Blum’s phrase) “universal and impartial principles.” An attitude toward rules or principles would seem to have nothing in common with love for a person.

I shall argue, however, that Kantian respect is not an attitude toward rules or principles. It is rather an attitude toward the idealized, rational will, which qualifies as a law because it serves as a norm for the actual, empirical will—thus qualifying, in fact, as that law which the will is to itself. This rational will, in Kant’s view, is also the intelligible essence of a person: Kant calls it a person’s true or proper self. Respect for this law is thus the same attitude as respect for the person; and so it can perhaps be compared with love, after all.

pp. 267–353). The psychoanalytic literature offers an especially vivid instance of love as a form of attention. It is D. W. Winnicott’s image of the mother’s face as a mirror (“Mirror-Role of Mother and Family in Child Development,” in his Playing and Reality [New York: Routledge, 1989], pp. 111–18). Winnicott imagines that the good-enough mother (as he calls her) expresses in her face the feelings that she sees expressed in the baby’s face, thus presenting the baby with an expression that mirrors both its face and its state of mind. The mother looks at the baby in a way that enacts her unclouded perception of what it feels: hers is a look that visibly sees. This image of “really looking” is also, unmistakably, an image of motherly love. (On the application of Murdoch’s views specifically to maternal love, see also Sara Ruddick, “Maternal Thinking,” in Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy, ed. Marilyn Pearsall [Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1986], pp. 340–51, pp. 347ff.)

Winnicott’s image may explain why Freud imagined the psychoanalyst as offering his patient “a cure through love” while doing no more than holding up a mirror to him. (For the former notion, see Freud’s letter to Jung, December 6, 1906, in The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974], pp. 12–13; for the latter, see Freud “Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psycho-Analysis,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey [London: Hogarth Press, 1958] [hereafter cited as S.E.], vol. 12, pp. 111–20, p. 118. This connection was suggested to me by Nina Coltart’s essay “Attention,” in her Slouching towards Bethlehem [New York: Guildford, 1992], pp. 176–93.)
Even within the confines of the *Groundwork*, Kant speaks of the law in several different senses. The English word ‘law’ is normally used to denote, first, particular rules of conduct; second, an abstract form or status that some rules exemplify (when, as we say, they have the force of law); and third, the associated social institutions that apply them (when, as we say, we call in the law).

Kant uses *das Gesetz* in something like the first sense when referring to the output of universalization, the “universal law” into which one must imaginatively transform one’s maxim in order to test its permissibility. He also refers to the Categorical Imperative as a law in this sense.\(^\text{19}\)

To my knowledge, however, Kant never holds up the law in this first sense as the proper object of respect or reverence. The moral agent who imaginatively transforms his maxim into a universal law may subsequently act out of reverence for the law, but this reverence is not directed at the particular law he has imagined; nor is it directed at the rule requiring this imaginative exercise. Rather, the agent’s engaging in this exercise—and his thereby obeying that rule—manifests his reverence for the law in some other sense.

Kant speaks of the law in something like the abstract, second sense when he gives this derivation of the Categorical Imperative: “For since besides the law this imperative contains only the necessity that our maxim should conform to this law, while the law, as we have seen, contains no condition to limit it, there remains nothing over to which the maxim has to conform except the universality of a law as such; and it is this conformity alone that the imperative properly asserts to be necessary.”\(^\text{20}\) Here the law to which the Categorical Imperative requires conformity is law in the abstract sense—the universal form of law—rather than any particular law, which would need some “condition to limit it.” *Das Gesetz* in this context is the abstraction that’s described in an earlier passage as “the idea of the law in itself.”\(^\text{21}\)

In that earlier passage, Kant seems to say that the idea of the law in itself is the proper object of reverence and hence the determining ground of the good will. But then he goes on to ask, “What kind of law can this be the thought of which . . . has to determine the will if this is to be called good absolutely and without qualification?” In reply, he offers a more subtle formulation: “Since I have robbed the will of every inducement that might arise for it as a consequence of obeying any particular

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law, nothing is left but the conformity of actions to universal law as such, and this alone must serve the will as its principle.” 22 The English version fails to make clear that what is said to determine the will, in this passage, is not the idea of the universal law but rather the idea of the conformity of actions to that law—the idea of “the universal-law-abidingness of actions” (die allgemeine Gesetzmaßigkeit der Handlungen). And shortly thereafter, Kant says that the object of reverence is “a possible enactment of universal law”—a Gesetzgebung, not a Gesetz. 23

What determines the good will by commanding respect or reverence, then, is not exactly the idea of law in the abstract but rather the idea of law’s being laid down for, and taken up in, a person’s actions. This object of reverence remains as yet obscure, Kant says—and we can only agree. 24 We can seek clarification, however, by considering other senses in which Kant speaks of the law.

Kant says that the will is a law to itself. 25 In what sense is the will a law?

Kant explains: “The proposition ‘Will is in all its actions a law to itself’ expresses . . . only the principle of acting on no maxim other than one which can have for its object itself as at the same time a universal law.” 26 This explanation is less than satisfactory, since it fails to make clear how “will is a law to itself” can express the principle of acting on lawlike maxims. Perhaps the connection is that the will is a law to itself insofar as it gives itself lawlike maxims on which to act, thereby functioning toward itself as a law-giving authority, which is the third of the senses canvassed above for the English word ‘law’.

Yet there is a further respect in which the will is a law to itself. Kant says that when an agent considers himself as an inhabitant of the intelligible world “he is conscious of possessing a good will which, on his own admission, constitutes the law for the bad will belonging to him as a member of the sensible world.” 27 Kant is not here envisioning one will causally governing another: after all, the intelligible and the sensible are supposed to be two different aspects of one and the same thing. Rather, Kant is envisioning the purely intelligible will as a paradigm or ideal established for the sensible will. The will is a law to itself in the sense

22. Ibid., 4:402.
23. Ibid., 4:403. See also 4: 436.
24. Ibid., 4:403.
26. Ibid., 4:446.
27. Ibid., 4:455. Also relevant here is this passage from Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), 5: 32. “One need only analyze the sentence which men pass upon the lawfulness of their actions to see in every case that their reason, incorruptible and self-constrained, in every action holds up the maxim of the will to the pure will, i.e., to itself regarded as a priori practical.” Here the process of submitting a maxim to the test of the Categorical Imperative is equated with holding it up to a conception of the will itself, as a faculty of a priori practical reason.
that its own intelligible or noumenal aspect serves as an ideal for its sensible or phenomenal self. In its capacity as an ideal, the noumenal will qualifies as a law in a fourth sense that is somewhat foreign to the English word.

The ideal will is one that acts on lawlike maxims, and this ideal is what commands our respect: “Our own will, provided it were to act only under the condition of being able to make universal law by means of its maxims—this ideal will which can be ours is the proper object of reverence.”

Reverence for the law is therefore reverence for that intelligible aspect under which our will is an ideal, or law, to its empirical self. Since the intelligible aspect of the will is to give itself lawlike maxims, reverence for this ideal is also reverence for the will as a self-governing authority; and under either guise, it counts as reverence for the law. But reverence for the law, so understood, is directed neither at lawlike maxims nor at the Categorical Imperative, considered as a rule. Its object is rather that ideal which is held up to us by the Categorical Imperative—namely, the intelligible aspect of our will as a faculty of acting on lawlike maxims.

We can now understand why Kant said earlier that the proper object of reverence is a possible enactment of universal law, or the idea of actions conforming to universal law, rather than simply universal law itself. These notions of law-giving and following are Kant’s first approximations to the notion of the rational, self-governing will, which is indeed the proper object of reverence. Reverence for this object can also be called reverence for the law, but not because it is reverence for a rule, a body of rules, or even the abstract form of rules.

28. Kant, *Groundwork*, 4:440. See 4:435: actions performed from duty “exhibit the will which performs them as an object of immediate reverence”; ibid., 4:436: “The law-making [Gesetzgebung] which determines all value must for this reason have a dignity—that is, an unconditioned and incomparable worth—for the appreciation of which, as necessarily given by a rational being, the word ‘reverence’ is the only becoming expression”; Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 5:73: “Since this law, however, is in itself positive, being the form of an intellectual causality, i.e., the form of freedom, it is at the same time an object of respect.” In this last passage, the moral law is an object of respect insofar as it is “the form of an intellectual causality”—i.e., a conception of the free will. See also Kant, *Groundwork*, 4: 410–11, where Kant explains how “the pure thought of duty, and in general of the moral law, has . . . an influence on the human heart so much more powerful than all the further impulsions capable of being called up from the field of experience.” The explanation of this influence is that “in the consciousness of its own dignity reason despises these impulsions and is able gradually to become their master.” Here the influence exerted by “the pure thought of the moral law” is equated with an influence exerted by reason’s “consciousness of its own dignity.” The motive by which we are influenced in contemplating the moral law is thus a response to an ideal conception of ourselves.

29. As should already be clear from my survey of how Kant uses the term das Gesetz, I do not mean to deny that individual rules or the abstract form of rules plays a role in Kantian moral theory. In particular, the abstract form of rules plays a crucial role in the procedures followed by the will in living up to its self-ideal of being an autonomous legal authority. My interest, however, is focused exclusively on the law as the proper object of
reverence for the law because it is reverence for the authoritative self-ideal that the will’s intelligible aspect constitutes for it, which is precisely its aspect as self-governing legal authority.³⁰

Thus, respect for the law is an attitude toward the rational will. And a person’s rational will must “think itself into the intelligible world” as the bearer of freedom, which cannot be found in the sensible order.³¹ Rational will therefore constitutes the person as he is in himself rather than as he appears; it is, as Kant says, “sein eigentliches Selbst.”³² So if reverence for the law is in fact reverence for rational will, then it is reverence for that which constitutes the true or proper self of a person.

The result is that reverence for the law, which has struck so many as making Kantian ethics impersonal, is in fact an attitude toward the person, since the law that commands respect is the ideal of a rational will, which lies at the heart of personhood. This result puts us in a position to consider how Kantian reverence might resemble another moral attitude toward the person, the attitude of love.³³

Achtung. And I find strong textual evidence for the conclusion that the proper object of Achtung is not the abstract form of law but rather the idea of a will that constrains its dictates to be compatible with that form.

³⁰. This reading seems not to fit a statement in the footnote attached to Kant’s initial discussion of reverence: “All reverence for a person is properly only reverence for the law (of honesty and so on) of which that person gives us an example” (Groundwork, 4:400). My interpretation says, on the contrary, that all reverence for the law is properly only reverence for the person.

The context of this statement is important to its interpretation. In the present footnote, Kant is forestalling an objection to the effect that reverence is “an obscure feeling” rather than “a concept of reason.” Kant’s answer to this objection is that “although reverence is a feeling, it is not a feeling received through outside influence, but one self-produced by a rational concept.” He is therefore at pains to emphasize that reverence is a response to something in the rational order rather than to anything in the empirical world.

Kant’s statement about the object of reverence must be read in this light. It is meant, I think, to rule out persons as proper objects of reverence insofar as they are inhabitants of the empirical world. Their serving as objects of reverence in their purely intelligible aspect, as instances of rational nature, is compatible with the point that Kant is trying to make. It is precisely in this aspect that persons embody the law that is the object of reverence, according to my interpretation. Thus, “the law . . . of which that person gives us an example” is one and the same with the rational nature of which he gives us an example. (See also the material at 5:76ff. of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, which appears to support this interpretation.)


³². Ibid., 4:457–58. See also 4:461.

³³. My approach bears similarities to that of Gregory Vlastos, “Justice and Equality,” in *Social Justice*, ed. Richard B. Brandt (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1962), pp. 31–72. Vlastos draws a connection between love and the principles of social justice, as being jointly grounded in the “individual worth” of a person. My approach also resembles that of Dillon in “Respect and Care,” although I differ from Dillon in trying to retain a Kantian conception of respect. Finally, I also find similarities to Weil’s “Human Person-
THE CONATIVE ANALYSIS OF LOVE

“Love . . . looks different after one has read Freud,” says Richard Rorty. It looks different, according to Rorty, because it has come to appear “morally dubious.” If we are to rethink our conception of love, as I have proposed, then we might as well begin with Freud.

Freud’s Theory of Drives

One might think that Freud renders love morally dubious by reducing it to sex. Even brotherly love, of both the literal and figurative varieties, is regarded by Freud as “aim-inhibited” libido, consisting of drives that “have not abandoned their directly sexual aims, but . . . are held back by internal resistances from attaining them.” Yet I think that what makes love morally dubious, when so conceived, is not that it is fundamentally sexual but that it takes the form of a drive.

Freud conceives of a drive as a constant, internal stimulus that the subject is motivated to remove, whereupon he attains a temporary, repeatable satisfaction, toward which the drive is said to aim. In addition to this aim, a drive also has an object, “the thing in regard to which or through which the [drive] is able to achieve its aim,” but its attachment to this object is purely instrumental. The object “is what is most variable about a [drive] and is not originally connected with it, but becomes assigned to it only in consequence of being peculiarly fitted to make satisfaction possible.” Hence a drive is not in any sense a response to its

ality,” in which the disparagement of “the person” and “rights” strikes me as aimed at un-Kantian versions of these concepts, and hence as Kantian in spirit.

34. Richard Rorty, “Freud, Morality, and Hermeneutics,” New Literary History 12 (1980): 177–85, p. 180. This passage is quoted by Baier, p. 93. Murdoch says that Freud “presents us with a realistic and detailed picture of the fallen man” (Sovereignty of Good, p. 51). My discussion of Freud is an attempt to make clear and explicit what is implicit in Murdoch’s brief allusions to him (pp. 46–51).


37. ‘Drive’ is the literal translation of the word (Trieb) that is translated in the S.E. as ‘instinct’. For a critique of the latter translation, see Bruno Bettelheim, Freud and Man’s Soul (New York: Vintage, 1984), pp. 103–12.


object. It is a preexisting need, individuated by its aim, to which the object is an adventitious and replaceable means.

The conception of love as a drive can have various unfortunate implications. One implication embraced by Freud is that love tends to cloud rather than clarify the lover’s vision. For Freud, love is anything but an exercise of “really looking.”

In Freudian theory, the satisfaction of a drive is entirely internal to the subject, because it consists in the removal or modification of an inner irritant. A drive therefore focuses on an object only insofar as it can be used as a source of inner relief—a scratch for the subject’s felt itch. And an itchy mind has a way simply of imagining objects to be scratchy.

The consequence is that Freudian love, far from an exercise in perceiving the beloved, is often an exercise in misperceiving him. Misperception becomes extreme in the state of being in love, which is typically marked, according to Freud, by overvaluation and transference. In overvaluation, we project onto our object various excellences borrowed from our ego ideal, setting up “the illusion . . . that the object has come to be sensually loved on account of its spiritual merits, whereas on the contrary these merits may really only have been lent to it by its sensual charm.”

In transference, the affection we feel for one object is merely a repetition of feelings originally felt for other objects, so that we relate to our beloved, as one commentator has put it, “through a dense thicket of absent others.” Freud emphasizes that a patient’s transference-love for the analyst regularly arises “under the most unfavourable conditions and where there are positively grotesque incongruities.” Yet he believes that the same mechanism of misdirected affection is at work not just within the analytic relationship but whenever we are in love.

Of course, the love that we feel when we are in love is that which is proverbially said to be blind. Overvaluation and transference are simply the

40. Freud himself offers the word ‘need’ for the motivating stimulus of a drive (ibid., pp. 118–19).
42. Freud, “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,” pp. 122–23: “[The object] may be changed any number of times in the course of the vicissitudes which the [drive] undergoes during its existence; and highly important parts are played by this displacement of [drive].”
mechanisms by which Freud explains the blindness of romantic love. And I do not want to claim that blind, romantic love has any special kin-ship with morality. When I say that love is a moral emotion, what I have in mind is the love between close adult friends and relations—including spouses and other life-partners, insofar as their love has outgrown the effects of overvaluation and transference.

Unfortunately, however, Freud offers no reason why the forces condu-cive to misperception in the case of romantic love should lead to any clearer perception in their aim-inhibited manifestations as love between parents and children, or as love among siblings or friends. Aim inhibition just is a matter of pursuing something other than what one really wants, and so it is similar to those mechanisms by which “spiritual merits” are substituted for “sensual charms,” or one love object for an-other. Freud’s explanation for the blindness of romantic love thus gives us reason to expect love in all forms to suffer at least from blurred vision. Loving someone, we bring to bear on him our infantile needs and all of our imaginative resources for casting him as a source of their satisfaction. But we needn’t see or be moved to see him as he really is.

I believe that it was by clouding the eyes of love in this fashion, not by uncovering its genitals, that Freud undermined its moral standing. As Murdoch says, “The chief enemy of excellence in morality . . . is personal fantasy: the tissue of self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and dreams which prevents one from seeing what is there outside one.” Freud em-bedded love deep within the tissue of fantasy, thereby closing it off from the moral enterprise.

Analytic Philosophers on Love

Analytic philosophers might be expected to differ from psychoanalysts on the subject of love, and they have fulfilled this expectation insofar as they have de-emphasized the sexual. But they are in unexpected agree-ment with Freud on the psychological form of love, since they tend to conceive of it as having an aim, in the manner of a Freudian drive.

Here are some examples. Henry Sidgwick: “Love is not merely a desire to do good to the object beloved, although it always involves such a desire. It is primarily a pleasurable emotion, which seems to depend

47. See, e.g., Freud’s explanation of parental love as a form of narcissistic overvaluation: “Parental love, which is so moving and at bottom so childish, is nothing but the parents’ narcissism born again” (“On Narcissism,” p. 91).
upon a certain sense of union with another person, and it includes, besides the benevolent impulse, a desire of the society of the beloved.” Laurence Thomas: “Roughly (very roughly), love is feeling anchored in an intense and nonfleeting (but not necessarily permanent) desire to engage in mutual caring, sharing, and physical expression with the individual in question or, in any case, some idealized version of her or him.” Harry Frankfurt: “What I have in mind in speaking of love is, roughly and only in part, a concern specifically for the well-being or flourishing of the beloved object that is more or less disinterested and that is also more or less constrained.” Gabriele Taylor: “If x loves y then x wants to benefit and be with y etc., and he has these wants (or at least some of them) because he believes y has some determinate characteristics \( \psi \) in virtue of which he thinks it worth while to benefit and be with y.” William Lyons: “For X to love Y, . . . X must not merely evaluate Y as appealing . . . , but X must want certain things in regard to Y as well. X must want to be with Y, to please Y, to cherish Y, to want Y to return the love, to want Y to think well of him.” Patricia Greenspan: “Attachment-love is picked out as such by the justificatory completeness of its analysis, with personal evaluations taken as needed to support its characteristic desire: the desire to be with another person.” Robert Nozick: “What is common to all love is this: Your own well-being is tied up with that of someone (or something) you love. . . . When something bad happens to one you love, . . . something bad also happens to you. . . . If a loved one is hurt or disgraced, you are hurt; if something wonderful happens to her, you feel better off.” John Rawls: “Love clearly has among its main elements the desire to advance the other person’s good as this person’s rational self-love would require.” Alan Soble: “When x loves y, x wishes the best for y and acts, as far as he or she is able, to pursue the good for y.”

The common theme of these statements is that love is a particular syndrome of motives—primarily, desires to act upon, or interact with,
the beloved. Before I elaborate on what these statements share with Freudian theory, I want to register my dissent from the statements themselves.

In my opinion, the foregoing quotations express a sentimental fantasy—an idealized vision of living happily ever after. In this fantasy, love necessarily entails a desire to “care and share,” or to “benefit and be with.”

But, surely, it is easy enough to love someone whom one cannot stand to be with. Think here of Murdoch’s reference to a troublemaking relation. This meddlesome aunt, cranky grandfather, smothering parent, or overcompetitive sibling is dearly loved, loved freely and with feeling: one just has no desire for his or her company. The same ambivalence can occur in the most intimate relationships. When divorcing couples tell their children that they still love one another but cannot live together, they are telling not a white lie but a dark truth. In the presence of such everyday examples, the notion that loving someone entails wanting to be with him seems fantastic indeed.

There is only slightly more realism in the suggestion that loving someone entails being moved to do him good. In this case, the authors quoted above seem to be thinking of a blissful family in which caring about others necessarily coincides with caring for them or taking care of them. Certainly, love for my children leads me to promote their interests almost daily; yet when I think of other people I love—parents, brothers, friends, former teachers and students—I do not think of myself as an agent of their interests. I would of course do them a favor if asked, but in the absence of some such occasion for benefiting them, I have no continuing or recurring desire to do so. At the thought of a close friend, my heart doesn’t fill with an urge to do something for him, though it may indeed fill with love.

In most contexts, a love that is inseparable from the urge to benefit is an unhealthy love, bristling with uncalled-for impingements. Love becomes equally unhealthy if too closely allied with some of the other desires mentioned in these passages—the desire to please or to be well-thought-of, and so on. Of course, there are occasions for pleasing and impressing the people one loves, just as there are occasions for caring and sharing. But someone whose love was a bundle of these urges, to care and share and please and impress—such a lover would be an interfering, ingratiating nightmare.

Nozick diverges somewhat from this trend, but not very far from it. Nozick thinks that love yokes together the welfare interests of lover and beloved, but these interests are also formulable in terms of motives—if not the motives that the parties actually have then the ones that they rationally would or ought to. Nozick goes on to speak about these motives in much the same terms as the other authors.
At this point the philosophical mischaracterization of love can no longer be set down to sentimentality: a deeper philosophical error appears to be at work. Let me offer a tentative diagnosis.

Suppose that one were committed to a conative analysis of love, as a motive toward a particular aim. And suppose that one were unwilling to accept Freud's conative analysis, in which the aim of love is sexual union. What other aims might love be a motive to? Caring and sharing, benefiting and being with, are the obvious candidates. One is hard pressed to think of other aims motivation toward which might plausibly be identified with love.

These philosophical accounts of love can thus be read as aim-inhibited versions of Freud. They retain Freud's commitment to a conative analysis, in which love impels the lover toward an aim; they merely replace the sexual aim identified by Freud with the aims of desexualized charity and affection.

The error in all of these theories, I think, is not their choice of an aim for love but their shared assumption that love can be analyzed in terms of an aim. This assumption implies that love is essentially a pro-attitude toward a result, to which the beloved is instrumental or in which he is involved. I venture to suggest that love is essentially an attitude toward the beloved himself but not toward any result at all.

59. Why might philosophers be committed to a conative analysis of love? My suspicion is that this commitment reflects the extent to which the practical syllogism has come to monopolize moral psychology. Philosophers who are unduly impressed with the power of belief-desire explanation, and the associated instrumental reasoning, would like every psychological state or attitude to be analyzable as either a belief or a desire, or perhaps as some combination of the two. An especially clear case of this philosophical bias (as I would call it) can be found in O. H. Green, The Emotions: A Philosophical Theory (Boston: Kluwer, 1992), and “Is Love an Emotion?” in Lamb, ed., pp. 209–24.

60. Indeed, Freud names “such features as longing for proximity, and self-sacrifice” as characteristic of aim-inhibited libido (“Group Psychology,” pp. 90–91).

61. Compare Scruton, pp. 101–2. Scruton considers and rejects the claim that love approaches its object with no aim. My argument for this claim will draw on Michael Stocker’s “Values and Purposes: The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship,” Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 747–65. Stocker’s version of the claim reads as follows: “There are no ends, properly so-called, the seeking of which is, as such, to act out of friendship” (p. 756). Note that in denying that there is any particular aim attached to the motive of friendship, Stocker uses the term ‘end’ instead of ‘aim’. I prefer to distinguish between ends and aims, however, because I want to say that acting from friendship does involve an end—namely, one’s friend, who serves as one’s end in the sense that one acts for his sake. Of course, the idea of a person’s serving as an end comes straight out of Kantian moral psychology, as I shall explain below. In this application of Kantian theory, I am drawing on Elizabeth Anderson’s Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), chap. 2. The departure from classical moral psychology in which I thus join Stocker and Anderson bears some resemblance to the departure from Freudian drive theory that was taken by objects-relations theorists, who asserted the priority of libidinal objects over libidinal aims. See especially the essays in part 1 of W. R. D. Fairbairn’s Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality (London: Routledge, 1990).
HAVING AN OBJECT BUT NO AIM

Kant makes a similar claim about the moral motive of reverence, when he says that it orients the will toward ends consisting of persons rather than results to be achieved.\(^\text{62}\) Kant’s notion that the end of an action can be a person rather than an envisioned result is the model for my suggestion that love can have an object but no aim.

_Persons as Ends_

The notion of persons as ends is puzzling to many philosophers, because they think that an end is an aim simply by definition.\(^\text{63}\) Yet the concept of an end is not in fact equivalent with that of an aim, as becomes evident when philosophers attempt to nail down this equivalence. For example:

> An end is an aim of action. It is something for the sake of which an action is to be done. . . . “Why did the chicken cross the road? To get to the other side!” “In order to get to the other side,” we might explain, just in case someone did not get it. An end, in this broad sense, states a goal.\(^\text{64}\)

There is a slight incongruity in this passage. If an end is anything _for the sake of_ an action is to be done, then it shouldn’t have to be something that the action is done _in order to achieve_. Perhaps you ought to attend church or synagogue this weekend for the sake of your dear departed mother, or just for old times’ sake. Old times aren’t something that you act in order to achieve; neither is your mother. So ‘for the sake of’ and ‘in order to’ are not interchangeable constructions.

Perhaps some paraphrase with “in order to” can be cobbled together for every mention of a “sake.” We might say that you ought to attend church or synagogue in order to fulfill your late mother’s wishes, or in order to revive the memory of old times, rather than for your mother’s or old times’ sake. We shall then have identified an achievement corresponding to each of the “sakes” for which we described you as acting. But note that each of these achievements can in turn be re-expressed in terms of a “sake,” since we might equally say that you ought to attend religious services for the sake of fulfilling your mother’s wishes, or for the sake of reviving the memory of old times. And the question then arises whether these “sakes” are the same “sakes” with which we

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63. David Phillips has directed me to this quotation from Sidgwick (p. 390n): “The conception of ‘humanity as an end in itself’ is perplexing; because by an End we commonly mean something to be realised, whereas ‘humanity’ is, as Kant says, ‘a self-subsistent end’.”

64. Richardson, p. 50.
began. Is attending services for the sake of fulfilling your mother’s wishes the same as attending services for the sake of your mother herself?

Not really. In doing something for the sake of fulfilling your mother’s wishes, you would be acting on a motive that was once shared by all sorts of people—car mechanics, telephone operators—who didn’t have any feelings for your mother herself. A stranger might have offered your mother his seat on the bus for the sake of accommodating her evident desire to sit down, but he needn’t thereby have acted for her sake. His guilty awareness of a desire that he ought to accommodate need not have included any personal feelings about its subject. He might just have been in the habit of deferring to the wishes of elderly ladies.

Of course, you also want to fulfill a wish of your mother’s: if she had never wanted you to attend religious services, you would never think of doing so for her sake. In this respect, you have a motive similar to that of the stranger on the bus. But you have an additional motive that he lacked, in that you want to fulfill your mother’s wish for her sake, whereas he acted without any thought for her. He had no further end than to do what your mother wanted; but you have a further end for which you want to do what she wanted—namely, your mother herself. So when you act, you act with the proximate end of fulfilling her wish, but ultimately for her sake.

If one is to act for the sake of a person, the person himself must be the object of a motive operative in one’s action: he must be that with a view to which one is moved to act. ‘That with a view to which one is moved to act’ is nearly equivalent to ‘that for the sake of which one acts’, and either expression can serve as the definition of an end. Hence every “sake” belongs to an end. By the same token, however, not every end is an aim—not, that is, if one can be moved to act, for example, with a view

65. Of course, he might have had a further end—e.g., if he deferred to the elderly out of respect for his own mother, who taught him to do so. In that case, he might have given up his seat for the sake of his mother, not yours.

66. One of these proposed definitions is not quite right. An end is that for the sake of which one acts, but it is not exactly that with a view to which one is moved to act; it is that with a view to whose (positive) value one is moved. Because I have not yet discussed the value of a person, I temporarily gloss over this particular wrinkle in the concept of an end. This wrinkle becomes important in cases of motivation by negative attitudes—at least, under some conceptions of those attitudes. I myself am inclined to think that hate, e.g., is not the mirror image of love because hate, unlike love, really is a drive: hating someone is not a response to his (negative) value but rather a matter of adopting him as the object of one’s aggression. On this view, to act out of hate is to be motivated, in the first instance, with a view to an aggressive aim, not with a view to the person hated. But one might think, alternatively, that hate is the mirror image of love, in that it is a response to the disvalue of its object. On this view, actions motivated by hate are motivated with a view to the hated person. Yet they still aren’t done for the sake of that person, nor with the person as their end, because they aren’t motivated with a view to the positive value of anything. So conceived, hateful actions would be utterly pointless.
to a person, in being moved by an attitude that takes a person as its object.

Kant is emphatic in insisting on this possibility. His reason for insisting on it is his belief that a will actuated with a view to results cannot be unconditionally good, because the value of results is always conditional. If an unconditionally good will is to exist, Kant believes, there must be “something which is conjoined with my will solely as a ground and never as an effect”; there must be “a ground determining the will” that is “not an expected result.”

Kant’s first candidate for this role is “the idea of the law in itself,” but as I have already argued, this abstraction is quickly replaced in Kant’s account by the rational will, which is both a law to itself and the true self of a person. Kant distinguishes this end from others by saying that it “must . . . be conceived, not as an end to be produced, but as a self-existent end.” That is, the rational nature of a person already exists, and so taking it as an end doesn’t entail any inclination to cause or promote its existence. When Kant says that rational nature “exists as an end in itself,” he is emphasizing that it is an end whose existence is taken for granted.

The existence of this end is taken for granted, in particular, by the motivating attitude of which it is the proper object. Because ends are motivational objects, what distinguishes some of them as self-existent lies in the distinctive relation by which they are joined to their associated motives. Self-existent ends are the objects of motivating attitudes that regard and value them as they already are; other ends are the objects of

68. Ibid., 4:400–401.
69. Ibid., 4:437. Paul Guyer notes that the word translated by Paton as ‘self-existent’ is selbständig, which can be translated idiomatically as ‘self-sufficient’ or ‘independent’ (Paul Guyer, “The Possibility of the Categorical Imperative,” *Philosophical Review* 104 [1995]: 353–85, pp. 373–74, n. 17). According to Guyer, rational nature is selbständig only in the sense that it is “independent of particular, contingent ends.”

I don’t think that my interpretation of Kant rests on the translation of this term. What supports my interpretation is that it respects the sharp distinction that Kant draws between ends in themselves and ends that are the potential results of our actions. Guyer’s interpretation tends to collapse this distinction, by treating ends in themselves as things that we are obliged to “promote” and “preserve.”

Although my interpretation of Kant doesn’t rest on the translation of this term, I still find Paton’s translation preferable to Guyer’s. Selbständig can perhaps be translated as ‘self-sufficient’ or ‘independent’, but it is not strictly equivalent to either of these expressions. The literal German equivalent of ‘independent’ is unabhängig; the literal equivalent of ‘self-sufficient’ is selbstgenügsam. The root word ständig means ‘fixed, constant, standing’—as in ‘a standing committee’. Selbständig therefore suggests that an end so described is already in place, “standing” on its own two feet, not needing to be brought into existence. That’s why selbständig is contrasted in this sentence with “to be produced.” The translation ‘self-existent’ conveys this contrast while also echoing Kant’s earlier statement that rational nature existiert als Zweck an sich selbst (*Groundwork*, 4:429).

70. Ibid., 4:429.
attitudes that value them as possibilities to be brought about. The fact that a person is a self-existent end just consists in the fact that he is a proper object for the former sort of attitude. Specifically, he is a proper object for reverence, an attitude that stands back in appreciation of the rational creature he is, without inclining toward any particular results to be produced.

71. Kant draws this connection in ibid., 4:428.

72. I thus disagree with interpretations that treat respect for rational nature as requiring “the preservation and promotion of freedom,” or efforts to “help others set their own ends and rationally pursue them.” (The first quotation is from Guyer, p. 372; the second is from Thomas E. Hill, Jr., “Humanity as an End in Itself,” in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992], pp. 38–57, p. 54.) Insofar as we regard rational nature as something for us to promote, preserve, or facilitate, we regard it no differently from happiness, and our motive toward it is no different from desire. Hence these interpretations assimilate ends-in-themselves to ends that are projected results of our actions, collapsing a distinction on which Kant repeatedly insists.

I grant that these interpretations seem to gain some support from the passage in which Kant applies the Formula of Humanity to his standard examples (Groundwork, 4:430). Here he says: “It is not enough that an action should refrain from conflicting with humanity in our own person as an end in itself: it must also harmonize with this end. Now there are in humanity capacities for greater perfection which form part of nature’s purpose for humanity in our person. To neglect these can admittedly be compatible with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the promotion of this end.” Yet I do not think that we can draw conclusions from this passage until we have attempted to reconcile it with the numerous passages in which Kant denies that humanity is a result to be produced. Consider, e.g., how Kant expands upon this denial only a few pages later: “The end must here be conceived, not as an end to be produced, but as a self-existent end. It must therefore be conceived only negatively—that is, as an end against which we should never act” (4:437). How can these two passages be rendered consistent?

In the earlier passage, the first sentence says that our humanity, regarded as an end, requires us not only to avoid acts that would “conflict” with it but also to undertake acts that “harmonize” with it. I regard this statement as consistent with the later statement that humanity must be conceived negatively, as an end against which we mustn’t act. The reason why we are required to undertake positive steps in cultivating our talents is that the alternative would be to neglect them, which would be to act against our humanity. The duty of self-cultivation, like all imperfect duties, is the positive requirement that results when some omission is forbidden—in this case, the omission that would constitute self-neglect. Thus, the fundamental requirement is the negative requirement not to act against our humanity by neglecting our talents.

The question is whether self-cultivation also entails promoting our own humanity, as the final sentence of the first passage seems to say. A problem in reading this sentence is that Kant applies the Formula of Humanity, like the Formula of Universal Law, via the notion of a system of nature, which is “analogous” to the system of morality (Groundwork, 4:437). In the present case, nature is said to have a “purpose (Zweck) for humanity in our person,” a purpose that is at most analogous to the end (Zweck) consisting of our humanity itself. I think that Kant then glosses over the distinction between these two Zwecke. The sentence consequently abbreviates Kant’s view, which is that promoting nature’s purpose for humanity is an analog, or image, for the positive steps that we must take in order to avoid acting against our humanity as an end. What is to be promoted, then, is nature’s purpose for humanity, not the self-existent end of humanity itself. (Paton gives a similar reading of this passage in his “Analysis of the Argument,” [in Kant, Groundwork, p. 31],
One might contend that such an attitude cannot motivate action except by way of a desire, whose object would then be some envisioned result. This contention implies that acting out of respect for a person entails having not only the person as our end but also an additional end that isn’t self-existent.\footnote{For this point, see Michael Smith, “The Possibility of Philosophy of Action” (unpublished manuscript, Australian National University, n.d.).}

I could accept a version of this claim, by conceding that self-existent ends such as persons must always have subordinate ends consisting in desired consequences—that they must always be ends for the sake of which one wants to accomplish some result. Yet even if I conceded that self-existent ends must always have subordinate ends consisting in desired outcomes, I would still deny that the one sort of end can be reduced to the other. Perhaps you cannot act for your mother’s sake unless there is some outcome that, for her sake, you want to produce. Even so, your desiring the outcome for her sake entails your having a motive over and above simply desiring the outcome, or even desiring it under some description that mentions her.\footnote{We can say that wanting to produce an outcome for her sake consists in the fact that a reference to her in the description of the outcome is motivationally relevant: you want to produce the outcome, say, as something that mattered to her, in particular. But what explains the motivational relevance of this reference to her in the description of the desired outcome? What explains it, I claim, is that you have some attitude toward her, out of which you desire the outcome.} It entails your having a motive that takes her as its object and that motivates your desire for the outcome, to which she consequently stands as an ulterior end. Your wanting the outcome for her sake consists in your wanting it out of this further attitude toward her.

Kant thinks that respect is an ulterior motive in this sense, but he thinks that it has a negative rather than positive relation to the motives subserving it. When considering the motivational force of respect, he says that its object “must . . . be conceived only negatively—that is, as an end against which we should never act, and consequently as one which in all our willing we must never rate \textit{merely} as a means.”\footnote{Kant, \textit{Groundwork}, 4:437. See also 4:428: “Their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves—that is, as something which ought not to be used merely as a means—and consequently imposes a limit on all treatment of them (and is an object of reverence).” This aspect of respect is discussed by Darwall in “Two Kinds of Respect.”} In other words,
respect can motivate us, if not by impelling us to produce its object, then by deterring us from violating it; and the violation from which we are thus deterred can be conceived as that of using the object as a mere means to other ends.

Kant offers a further hint about the motivational potential of reverence. “Reverence,” he says in a footnote, “is properly awareness of a value which checks my self-love.”76 Now, ‘self-love’ is a term that Kant uses for motivation by empirical motives and the associated prudential reasoning.77 Such motivation aims at achieving empirical results, via the use of necessary means. As we have seen, reverence for a person exerts its negative motivational force by placing a constraint on our use of him as a means to desired ends. That’s why it can be said to check our self-love: it arrests some of our empirical motives—in particular, the motives in whose service we might be tempted to put the person to use. Such a motive against having or acting on another motive is a negative second-order motive.78

The Beloved as an End

Could this model of a negative second-order motive apply to love? Let me return to Kant’s description of reverence as the awareness of a value that arrests our self-love. I am inclined to say that love is likewise the awareness of a value inhering in its object; and I am also inclined to describe love as an arresting awareness of that value.

This description of love seems right, to begin with, as a piece of phenomenology, just as the conative analysis of love seems implausible, to begin with, on phenomenological grounds. Love does not feel (to me, at least) like an urge or impulse or inclination toward anything; it feels rather like a state of attentive suspension, similar to wonder or amazement or awe.

If respect arrests our self-love, as Kant asserts, then what does love

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76. Kant, *Groundwork*, 4:400. I have substituted the verb ‘checks’ for ‘demolishes’ in Paton’s translation. The verb used by Kant is *Abbruch tut*, and *Abbruch* means ‘a breaking up’ or ‘breaking off’—a rupture. Causing an *Abbruch* to self-love would fall short of demolishing it. Compare Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 5:73: “Pure practical reason merely checks selfishness . . . . But it strikes down self-conceit.” The expression that Beck here translates as ‘checks’ is once again *Abbruch tut*, which is expressly contrasted with the more decisive ‘striking down’ in the next sentence.

77. See Kant, *Groundwork*, 4:406. See also Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 5:22.

78. Some might argue that even this motive must be a desire, such as a desire not to use another person merely as a means. But I would reply, as before, that one can want not to use others, and consequently be moved not to use them, without so wanting or being so moved for their sake, since one can want and pursue such restraint for one’s own sake, or for the sake of restraint itself—a project that is hardly moral. The moral project is to abstain from the use of others for their sake, which requires that one take them as an end, by virtue of having a motive, such as respect, that takes them as its object.
arrest? I suggest that it arrests our tendencies toward emotional self-protection from another person, tendencies to draw ourselves in and close ourselves off from being affected by him. Love disarms our emotional defenses; it makes us vulnerable to the other.

This hypothesis would explain why love is an exercise in “really looking,” as Murdoch claims. Many of our defenses against being emotionally affected by another person are ways of not seeing what is most affecting about him. This contrived blindness to the other person is among the defenses that are lifted by love, with the result that we really look at him, perhaps for the first time, and respond emotionally in a way that’s indicative of having really seen him.

According to this hypothesis, the various motives that are often identified with love are in fact independent responses that love merely unleashes. They are the sympathy, empathy, fascination, and attraction that we feel for another person when our emotional defenses toward him have been disarmed. The hypothesis thus explains why love often leads to benevolence but doesn’t entail a standing desire to benefit: in suspending our emotional defenses, love exposes our sympathy to the needs of the other, and we are therefore quick to respond when help is needed. The resulting benevolence manifests our heightened sensitivity to the other’s interests rather than any standing interest of ours.

The responses unleashed by love for a person tend to be favorable because they have been unleashed by an awareness of value in him, an awareness that is also conducive to a favorable response. But these responses need not be exclusively favorable. Love also lays us open to feeling hurt, anger, resentment, and even hate.79

The present hypothesis thus discourages us from positing necessary connections between love and desires for particular outcomes. It applies to a lover’s aim what Freud says about his object—namely, that it “is what is most variable about” his love “and is not originally connected with it.”80 Only vague generalizations can be drawn about what love can motivate the lover to do.

I suspect that those who see particular motives as necessary to love are simply imagining the lover in a narrow range of stereotypical situations, to which love has made him especially responsive. In reality, I think, love can occur in a far wider range of situations, calling for a wider range of motivational responses.

For example, I think that love naturally arises between student and

80. Quoted at n. 39.
teacher, but that when it opens one’s eyes to what the other really is, one sees that he is one’s teacher or student, who is to be dealt with professionally. Students and teachers may of course feel desires for intimacy with one another, but such desires are unlikely to be an expression of true love in this context; usually, they express transference-love, in which the other is a target of fantasies. When I say that I have had the good fortune to be loved by some of my students, I do not mean the students who have shown a desire to get next to me. Students who want to benefit and be with me seem not loving but confused, just as I do not strike myself as loving when I feel a desire to treat students otherwise than as students. Here is a relationship in which true love can manifest itself in an inclination to keep one’s distance.

THE PARTIALITY OF LOVE

I have suggested that love is an arresting awareness of value in a person, differing from Kantian respect in that its primary motivational force is to suspend our emotional self-protection from the person rather than our self-interested designs on him. Yet if love is a way of valuing persons, then in loving some people but not others, we must value some people but not others. The upshot seems to be that love really is partial in a sense that conflicts with the spirit of morality, which insists that people are equally valuable.

How We Want to Be Loved

This difficulty is best appreciated from the perspective of the beloved. That human beings are selective in love matters more to us in our capacity as objects of love than in our capacity as subjects. We want to be loved, and in being loved, to be valued, and in being valued, to be regarded as special. We want to be prized, treasured—which seems to entail being valued discriminately, in preference to or instead of others. The love that we want to receive therefore seems to be precisely that discriminating love which threatens to conflict with impartial morality.

Notice, then, that when philosophers are trying to impress us with the supposed conflict between love and morality, they tend to shift from the perspective of the lover to that of the beloved. The perspective of the lover is where the conflict is supposed to arise, between two potential sources of motivation. So when philosophers tell us about the problem in the abstract, they speak to us in our capacity as lovers, by saying that morality threatens to interfere with our loving particular people. But when they want to get us worried about the problem, to make us feel what’s problematic about it, they speak to us in our capacity as aspiring objects of love, by warning that morality threatens to interfere with our being loved. Thus, for example, the “one thought too many” that Wil-

81. I discuss other differences between love and respect below.
liams detects in the husband of his story is, more specifically, one too many for the wife: it interferes with her being loved in the way that she would hope.82

One of the merits that I would like to claim for the present hypothesis about love is that it helps to explain why and how we want to be loved. There is little attraction in the prospect of being cathected by another’s libido; but having another heart opened to us by a recognition of our true selves—well, that seems worth wanting. Yet if my hypothesis has captured what makes love desirable to receive, mustn’t it also have captured the very partiality that sets love in conflict with morality?

I think that the question how we want to be loved provides one of our first exposures in childhood to that air of paradox which, for some of us, eventually condenses into philosophy. We are told by adults who love us, and who want us to feel loved, that we are special and irreplaceable. But then we are told by the same adults, now acting as moral educators, that every individual is special and irreplaceable. And we wonder: If everyone is special, what’s so special about anyone?

Adults often confuse us further by saying that we’re special because no one else is quite like us—as if the value attaching to us, and to everyone else as well, was that of being qualitatively unique. This explanation seems to invoke scarcity as a standard of value, but it is easily defeated by the very same standard. How valuable can our uniqueness make us if everyone is unique? We sense a similar paradox in attempts to elicit our childish awe at individual snowflakes, of which (they say) no two are alike. Why get excited about any one unprecedented snowflake, when its lack of precedents is so well preceded?

Matters only get worse if adults start to detail the personal qualities for which we are loved, since these qualities fail to distinguish us completely, and they consequently feel like accidents rather than our essence. We are like the girl who wants to be loved but not for her yellow hair—and not, we should add, for her mind or her sense of humor, either—because she wants to be loved, as she puts it, “for myself alone.”83 What is this self for which she wants to be loved? What can it

82. See also Stocker’s example of the hospital visit in “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” p. 462.

83. The reference is to Yeats’s poem “For Anne Gregory,” in The Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats (New York: Macmillan, 1956), p. 240. Note that by Anne’s reckoning, the husband in Williams’s example entertained, not one thought too many, but two. Since Anne wants to be loved for herself alone, she would have no use for either one of the premises adduced by a husband who reasoned “that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one’s wife.” She would no more want to be loved for being someone’s wife than for her yellow hair. Yet Williams is surely right that the husband’s first premise—that it was his wife—was appropriate in the circumstances, and that only the second was potentially problematic. Perhaps, then, the motivating thoughts that are appropriate in such cases aren’t thoughts of love at all. I shall return to this possibility at the end of the
be, if not her particular bundle of personal qualities, which include the color of her hair?

By now it should come as no surprise that I find an answer to this question in Kantian moral theory. Kant’s theory of value reveals the philosophical error behind our confusion about being loved.

The Value of Self-Existential Ends

Kant says that the value of a person is different in kind from the value of other things: a person has a dignity, whereas other things have a price. The difference is this: “If [something] has a price, something else can be put in its place as an equivalent; if it is exalted above all price and so admits of no equivalent, then it has a dignity.”

The distinction between price and dignity, in Kantian theory, corresponds to the distinction between ends that consist in possible results of action and ends that are self-existent. The former ends are objects of preference and choice, which are comparative. Among the various outcomes that we could produce by acting, we must choose which ones to produce, given that we can’t produce all of them. We therefore need a common measure of value for these ends, so that we can combine the values of those which are jointly producible and then compare alternative combinations. Values that allow for comparisons among alternatives also allow for equivalences, and so they qualify as prices in Kant’s terminology.

Yet a self-existent end, which is not to be produced by action, is not an alternative to other producibles. Its value doesn’t serve as grounds for comparing it with alternatives; it serves as grounds for revering or respecting the end as it already is. What Kant means in calling this value incomparable is that it calls for a response to the object in itself, not in comparison with others.
Kant’s view is that the incomparable value of a person is a value that he possesses solely by virtue of his being a person—by virtue, in fact, of what Kant calls his rational nature. Do I mean to suggest that love is an awareness of this same value?

I don’t want to say that registering this particular value is an essential feature of love, since love is felt for many things other than possessors of rational nature. All that is essential to love, in my view, is that it disarms our emotional defenses toward an object in response to its incomparable value as a self-existent end.89 But when the object of our love is a person, and when we love him as a person—rather than as a work of nature, say, or an aesthetic object—then indeed, I want to say, we are responding to the value that he possesses by virtue of being a person or, as Kant would say, an instance of rational nature.

Before balking at this statement, recall the following tenets of Kantian theory: that the rational nature whose value commands respect is the capacity to be actuated by reasons; that the capacity to be actuated by reasons is also the capacity to have a good will; and that the capacity for a rational and consequently good will is that better side of a person which constitutes his true self. I find it intuitively plausible that we love people for their true and better selves. Were we to speak of the yellow-haired girl in German, we might well borrow Kant’s phrase and say that she wished to be loved for “ihr eigentliches Selbst.”

Remember, further, that the capacity to be actuated by reasons is a capacity for appreciating the value of ends, including self-existent ends such as persons. For Kant, then, people have a capacity whose value we appreciate by respecting them; and that capacity, at its utmost, is their capacity for respect. I am suggesting that love is an appreciation for the same value, inhering in people’s capacity to appreciate the value of ends, including self-existent ends such as persons. For me, then, people have a capacity whose value we appreciate not only with respect but also sometimes with love; and that capacity, at its utmost, is their capacity not only for respect but also for love. I find it plausible to say that what we respond to, in loving people, is their capacity to love: it’s just another way of saying that what our hearts respond to is another heart.

The idea that love is a response to the value of a person’s rational nature will seem odd so long as ‘rational nature’ is interpreted as denoting the intellect. But rational nature is not the intellect, not even the practical intellect; it’s a capacity of appreciation or valuation—a capacity to care about things in that reflective way which is distinctive of self-conscious creatures like us. Think of a person’s rational nature as his

89. Kant himself says that “morality, and humanity so far as it is capable of morality, is the only thing which has a dignity” (ibid., 4:435). He thus seems to rule out the possibility of responding to objects other than persons as self-existent ends. I am inclined to differ from Kant on this point. See also Anderson, pp. 8–11.
core of reflective concern, and the idea of loving him for it will no longer seem odd.

I can now summarize my view of the relation between love and Kantian respect, as follows. The Kantian view is that respect is a mode of valuation that the very capacity for valuation must pay to instances of itself. My view is that love is a mode of valuation that this capacity may also pay to instances of itself. I regard respect and love as the required minimum and optional maximum responses to one and the same value.

Respect for others is required, in Kant’s view, because the capacity for valuation cannot take seriously the values that it attributes to things unless it first takes itself seriously; and it cannot first take itself seriously if it treats instances of itself as nothing more than means to things that it already values. That’s why the capacity for valuation, when facing instances of itself, must respond in the manner constitutive of respect, by restraining its self-interested tendency to treat them as means.

In my view, love for others is possible when we find in them a capacity for valuation like ours, which can be constrained by respect for ours, and which therefore makes our emotional defenses against them feel unnecessary. That’s why our capacity for valuation, when facing instances of itself, feels able to respond in the manner constitutive of love, by suspending our emotional defenses. Love, like respect, is the heart’s response to the realization that it is not alone.

**Being Valued as Special**

We now have both halves of a solution to our childhood puzzle about being loved. One half of the solution is that being loved does not entail being valued on the basis of our distinctive qualities, such as our yellow hair; on the contrary, it entails being valued on the basis of our personhood, in which we are no different from other persons. Of course, this half of the solution is by itself no solution at all, because it leaves us wondering how being valued on so generic a basis is compatible with being valued as special. But that’s where the second half of the solution comes in. The second half is this: being valued merely as persons is compatible with being valued as special because our value as persons is a dignity rather than a price.

90. Here I am smuggling Kantian universalization into my account, by speaking in the abstract of a capacity for valuation, and then speaking about the attitude of this abstract capacity toward particular instances of itself. I would need to offer a fair amount of argumentation in order to earn the right to this manner of speaking.

91. Note that this formulation of Kant’s view treats the value of persons as one that rational nature doesn’t find in but must project onto instances of itself. See Christine M. Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 122–25.

92. Thanks to Richard Heck for suggesting the first sentence of this paragraph, and to Christine Korsgaard for suggesting the last.
As we have seen, the distinction between price and dignity rests on a distinction between the responses that constitute their proper appreciation. Preference and choice belong to one mode of appreciation, which is warranted by that kind of value which Kant calls a price. Dignity is a different kind of value because it warrants a different mode of appreciation, consisting of motives and feelings in which we submit to the object’s reality rather than strive toward its realization.

This distinction between modes of appreciation relies, in turn, on a prior distinction, between appreciating the value of an object and judging it to have that value. When Kant says that an object with dignity “admits of no equivalents,” he is speaking about how to appreciate such an object, not how to judge it. Kant himself believes that each person has a dignity in virtue of his rational nature, and hence that all persons should be judged to have the same value. What he denies is that comparing or equating one person with another is an appropriate way of responding to that value. The value that we must attribute to a person imposes absolute constraints on our treatment of him, thus commanding a motivational response to the person in and by himself. And the constraints that it imposes on our treatment of the person include a ban on subjecting him to comparisons, which would implicitly subordinate his value to some ulterior or overarching value.

Thus, the value that we must attribute to every person requires that we respond to each person alone, partly by refusing to compare him with others. The class of persons just is a class whose members must be appreciated as individuals rather than as members of a class.

There is a tendency to assume that attributing value to people as members of a class is incompatible with appreciating them as individuals. For example:

Although the Kantian formula of persons as ends in themselves is claimed to regard persons as irreplaceable, there is a sense in which Kantian respect does in fact view persons as intersubstitutable, for it is blind to everything about an individual except her rational nature, leaving each of us indistinguishable from every other. Thus, in Kantian-respecting someone, there is a real sense in which we are not paying attention to her—it makes no difference to how we respect her that she is who she is and not some other individual. 

93. This way of understanding the distinction is due to Anderson: “Things that differ in the kind of worth they have merit different kinds of appreciation” (chap. 1, p. 9).
94. Ibid., p. 2. I am using the verb ‘to appreciate’ where Anderson uses ‘to value’.
But this reasoning confuses judgment and appreciation. In respecting someone, we are “blind to everything except her rational nature” only in the sense that we are responding to a value attributable to her on the basis of that nature, which is shared by others. But our response to a value attributable to her on a shared basis can still consist in “paying attention to her” in her own right.

For the same reason, we can judge the person to be valuable in generic respects while also valuing her as irreplaceable. Valuing her as irreplaceable is a mode of appreciation, in which we respond to her value with an unwillingness to replace her or to size her up against potential replacements. And refusing to compare or replace the person may be the appropriate response to a value that we attribute to her on grounds that apply to others as well. The same value may be attributable to many objects without necessarily warranting substitutions among them.

Of course, some values do warrant substitutions among the objects that share them: that’s the definition of a price. To assume that something will be irreplaceable only if it is uniquely valuable is thus to assume that its value is a price rather than a dignity.

No wonder, then, that we were suspicious of adults who said that we were irreplaceable in their love because of being qualitatively unique.

96. A similar point is made by Cynthia Stark, pp. 483–84.

97. Versions of this thought can be found in many of the works quoted at nn. 49–57, including those of Taylor, Lyons, and Greenspan. Nozick is a complicated case. In Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic, 1974), p. 168, he said: “An adult may come to love another person because of the other’s characteristics; but it is the other person, and not the characteristics, that is loved. The love is not transferable to someone else with the same characteristics.” But when Nozick seeks to understand the nontransferability of love in The Examined Life, he falls back on “the particularity of the qualities that you come to love.” Nozick now explains that love isn’t transferable because “no other person could have precisely those traits” (p. 81). Here Nozick expresses the view currently under discussion, that someone is valued as irreplaceable only if he is valued under a description that fits him uniquely. See also Kapur, “Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best,” p. 483. In the text I criticize this view as involving a confusion between value judgment and appreciation. Other confusions are common in the literature on this subject. One confusion is between “the basis and the object of love,” as Alan Soble puts it (The Structure of Love [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990], pp. 225ff.). In this case, loving someone for his qualities is equated with loving the qualities themselves. Another confusion is between the basis of love and the way in which love picks out its object. In this case, the qualities by which love picks out an object are assumed to be the same as those for which it values that object—as if it couldn’t pick out an object by one set of qualities while valuing him for another. Love is therefore said to have as its object all of the people who share the qualities on which it is based. (See, e.g., the quotation from Badhwar in n. 95.) See also Robert Kraut, “Love De Re,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 413–30; Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, “The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love Is Not Love Which Al-
These adults were implying that we would indeed be subject to replacement by anyone who shared the qualities grounding their love, and hence that our irreplaceability depended on our possessing qualities that no one shared. They were in effect conceding that their love for us established criteria of equivalence to us; they were merely asserting that these criteria were too narrow for anyone else to satisfy, like a job description so specific as to fit only one applicant.

But if there are criteria of equivalence to something, then it has a price. Extremely narrow criteria may make the price unaffordable, so to speak, but they cannot transmute it into what Kant calls a dignity. For they cannot prevent the thing’s being replaceable in principle; they can only ensure that there will be no replacements in practice. What makes something truly irreplaceable is a value that commands appreciation for it as it is in itself, without comparison to anything else, and hence without substitutions.

If you were lucky, you were one of those children who learn about their worth from that Kindergarten Kantian, Dr. Seuss:

> Come on! Open your mouth and sound off at the sky!
> Shout loud at the top of your voice, “I AM I!”
> ME!
> I am I!
> And I may not know why
> But I know that I like it.
> Three cheers! I AM I!”  

According to Dr. Seuss, your sense of deserving love needn’t rest on any flattering self-description (“I may not know why”). It rests solely on your individuality as a person, your bare personal identity, as expressed in the statement ‘I am I’.

The fact that you are you is just the fact that you are a self-identical person—that you are an “I,” or as Dr. Seuss says elsewhere, a “Who.” This fact makes you eligible to be loved in just the way that you want to be loved, for yourself alone. To be loved for yourself alone is to be loved

99. Lest you feel tempted to celebrate being yourself instead of some other person, Dr. Seuss makes clear that being yourself is rather to be contrasted with being “a clam or a ham or a dusty old jar of sour gooseberry jam”—or, worse yet, being a “Wasn’t.” Being yourself is thus to be contrasted, not with being someone else, but with failing to exist as a person at all.
just for being you—for your bare individuality as a person, which you express by saying “I am I.”

In being a self-identical person, of course, you are no different from anyone else: everyone can say “I am I.” But Kant’s theory of value reveals that being valued as a person is not a matter of being compared with others, anyway. If you assimilate Kant’s insight, you will realize that being prized or treasured as special doesn’t entail being compared favorably with others; it rather entails being seen to have a value that forbids comparisons. Your singular value as a person is not a value that you are singular in possessing; it’s rather a value that entitles you to be appreciated singularly, in and by yourself.

In this sense, everyone can be singularly valuable, or special. The specialness of each person is a value of the kind that attaches to ends in themselves, which are to be appreciated as they are in themselves rather than measured against alternatives. It is therefore a value whose possession by one person isn’t prejudicial to its possession by any other.

Once you realize that someone’s love can single you out without basing itself on your distinguishing characteristics, you are in a position to realize, further, that the latter sort of love would in fact be undesirable. Someone who loved you for your quirks would have to be a quirk-lover, on the way to being a fetishist. In order for his love to fit you so snugly, it would need so many angles as to be downright kinky. Of course, you may hope that love would open a lover’s eyes to everything about you, including your quirks, and that he would see them in the reflected glow of your true, inner value. But if you learned that they were themselves the evaluative basis of his love, you would feel trivialized.

THE SELECTIVITY OF LOVE

Why, then, do we love only some people? And why do we say that we love them for their distinctive qualities, such as their senses of humor or their yellow hair? Let me answer both of these questions by pointing out an important respect in which love differs, in my opinion, from Kantian respect.

101. See Whiting’s complaint against “the fetish concern with uniqueness characteristic of modern discussions of friendship” (p. 8). Those moved by this concern sometimes go so far as to suggest that love for someone should be based not only on his merits but also on his flaws, because his flaws help to individuate him. (See, e.g., Gregory Vlastos, “The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato,” in his Platonic Studies [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973], pp. 3–42; Martha C. Nussbaum, “Beatrice’s ‘Dante’: Loving the Individual?” in Virtue, Love, and Form: Essays in Memory of Gregory Vlastos, ed. Terence Irwin and Martha C. Nussbaum [Edmonton: Academic Printing & Publishing, 1993], pp. 161–78.) While I agree that we want to be loved warts and all, as the saying goes, I don’t think that we want to be loved for our warts. Who wants to be the object of someone’s wart-love? What we want is to be loved by someone who sees and isn’t put off by our warts, but who appreciates our true value well enough to recognize that they don’t contribute to it.
Kant says that respect is produced by the subordination of our will to a mere concept or idea. Our respect for a person is a response to something that we know about him intellectually but with which we have no immediate acquaintance. According to my hypothesis, the value to which we respond in loving a person is the same as that to which we respond in respecting him—namely, the value of his rational nature, or personhood. But I have not said, nor am I inclined to say, that the immediate object of love is the purely intelligible aspect of the beloved. Love of a person is not felt in contemplation of a mere concept or idea.

The immediate object of love, I would say, is the manifest person, embodied in flesh and blood and accessible to the senses. The manifest person is the one against whom we have emotional defenses, and he must disarm them, if he can, with his manifest qualities. Grasping someone’s personhood intellectually may be enough to make us respect him, but unless we actually see a person in the human being confronting us, we won’t be moved to love; and we can see the person only by seeing him in or through his empirical persona.

Hence there remains a sense in which we love a person for his observable features—the way he wears his hat and sips his tea (in the lyrics of the jazz era), or the way he walks and the way he talks (in the lyrics of rock and roll). But loving a person for the way he walks is not a response to the value of his gait; it’s rather a response to his gait as an expression or symbol or reminder of his value as a person.

Unfortunately, the philosophical tradition of reducing all motives to propositional attitudes has left us with no generally accepted vocabulary for describing most of the ways in which the value of one thing can be reflected in or refracted through another. This tradition treats all value as emanating from states of affairs, and as radiating only to other states related to them as means. The ways in which the value of a person can infuse his persona, and the ways in which we can respond to his value through that persona, are consequently beyond our ordinary powers of philosophical description. Maybe we need a language of “valuing as,” analogous to our language of “seeing as,” to describe how we respond to a person’s looks or acts or works as conduits rather than sources of value. We might then feel more comfortable with the idea of appreciating these features as expressions or symbols of a value that isn’t theirs but belongs instead to the inner—or, as Kant would say, merely intelligible—person.

The desire to be valued in this way is not a desire to be valued on the basis of one’s distinctive features. It is rather a desire that one’s own
rendition of humanity, however distinctive, should succeed in communicating a value that is perfectly universal. (In this respect, it’s like the desire to be found beautiful.) One doesn’t want one’s value as a person to be eclipsed by the intrinsic value of one’s appearance or behavior; one wants them to elicit a valuation that looks through them, to the value of one’s inner self.

One reason why we love some people rather than others is that we can see into only some of our observable fellow creatures. The human body and human behavior are imperfect expressions of personhood, and we are imperfect interpreters. Hence the value that makes someone eligible to be loved does not necessarily make him lovable in our eyes. Whether someone is lovable depends on how well his value as a person is expressed or symbolized for us by his empirical persona. Someone’s persona may not speak very clearly of his value as a person, or may not speak in ways that are clear to us.

Another reason why we discriminate in love is that the value we do manage to see in some fellow creatures arrests our emotional defenses to them, and our resulting vulnerability exhausts the attention that we might have devoted to finding and appreciating the value in others. We are constitutionally limited in the number of people we can love; and we may have to stop short of our constitutional limits in order to enjoy the loving relationships that make for a good life.

We thus have many reasons for being selective in love, without having to find differences of worth among possible love objects.\(^\text{103}\) We know that people whom we do not happen to love may be just as eligible for love as our own children, spouses, parents, and intimate friends. In merely respecting rather than loving these people, we do not assess them as lower in value. Rather, we feel one emotion rather than another in appreciation of their value. Loving some but not others entails valuing them differently but not attributing different values to them, or even comparing them at all.

*Other Grounds for Partiality*

Perhaps I can illustrate this point by returning briefly to Williams’s story of a man who can save only one of several people in peril and wants to save his wife. Williams recognizes that the Kantian moral agent would save his wife, as any husband would. The problem, for Williams, is that he would save his wife only after reflecting impartially on the permissibility of doing so—a second thought that Williams regards as unloving. But I think that Williams overestimates the partiality that love would require of the agent in this case.

I do believe that the man’s love for his wife should heighten his sensitivity to her predicament. But I cannot believe that it would leave him less sensitive to the predicament of others who are in—or perhaps alongside—the same boat. My own experience is that, although I may be insensitive to suffering until I see it in people I love, I cannot then remain insensitive to it in their fellow sufferers. The sympathy that I feel for my wife’s difficulties at work, or my children’s difficulties at school, naturally extends to their coworkers and classmates.

The idea that someone could show love for his own children by having less compassion for other children strikes me as bizarre. Whatever caused someone to favor his own children in this manner could hardly be love. Of course, a person’s love for his children shouldn’t necessarily lead him to love other children. Ideally, he will find his own children especially lovable—that is, especially expressive, in his eyes, of an incomparable value. But when his children awaken him to that value as only they can, they awaken him to something that he recognizes, or ought to recognize, as universal.

Of course the man in Williams’s story should save his wife in preference to strangers. But the reasons why he should save her have nothing essentially to do with love.

The grounds for preference in this case include, to begin with, the mutual commitments and dependencies of a loving relationship. What the wife should say to her husband if he hesitates about saving her is not “What about me?” but “What about us?” That is, she should invoke their partnership or shared history rather than the value placed on her by his love. Invoking her individual value in the eyes of his love would merely remind him that she was no more worthy of survival than the other potential victims, each of whom can ask “What about me?”

No doubt, the man also has nonmoral, self-regarding reasons for preferring to save his wife. Primary among these reasons may be that he is deeply attached to her and stands in horror at the thought of being separated from her by death. But attachment is not the same as love. Even a husband who long ago stopped loving his wife—stopped really looking or listening—might still be so strongly attached to her as to leap to her rescue without a second thought.

CONCLUSION

Maybe that’s what Williams imagines the wife to be wishing for: a blind attachment, to which any critical reflection would be inimical. But then the wish that is disappointed by the Kantian agent in this story is not the wish for a loving husband; it’s more like the wish for a trusty companion.

104. This way of putting the point was offered to me by Peter Railton, in a very helpful conversation about an earlier draft of this article.
Insofar as the wife wants to be loved, however, she will want to be seen for the priceless creature that she is. She will therefore want to be seen, not in a way that tips the balance in her favor, but rather in a way that reveals the absurdity of weighing her in a balance at all.

Illustrating this absurdity is all that lifeboat cases are good for, in my opinion. These cases invite us to imagine situations in which we feel forced to make choices among things that cannot coherently be treated as alternatives, because their values are incomparable. Love does not help to overcome the absurdity in these cases: it doesn’t help us to compare incomparables. On the contrary, love is virtually an education in this absurdity. But for that very reason, love is also a moral education.