| Thumbnail | Number | Issue Date | Title | Author(s) |
| S-CDM-04-04 | Mar-2004 | A LENDER-BASED THEORY OF COLLATERAL | Inderst, Roman; Müller, Holger M. |
| FIN-04-028 | Nov-2004 | A Lender-Based Theory of Collateral | Inderst, Roman; Mueller, Holger M. |
| FIN-04-027 | Nov-2004 | Benefits of Broad-Based Option Pay | Inderst, Roman; Mueller, Holger M. |
| S-DRP-04-04 | Nov-2004 | Benefits of Broad-Based Option Pay | Inderst, Roman; Müller, Holger M. |
| CLB-06-022 | Dec-2006 | CEO Compensation and Private Information: An Optimal Contracting Perspective | Inderst, Roman; Mueller, Holger M |
| S-CDM-02-13 | Nov-2002 | Credit Risk Analysis and Security Design | Inderst, Roman; Müller, Holger M. |
| FIN-02-059 | Nov-2002 | Credit Risk Analysis and Security Design | Inderst, Roman; Müller, Holger M. |
| S-FI-02-13 | Nov-2002 | Credit Risk Analysis and Security Design | Inderst, Roman; Mueller, Holger M. |
| S-FI-04-09 | Jun-2004 | Credit Risk Analysis and Security Design | Inderst, Roman; Müller, Holger M. |
| FIN-02-010 | Feb-2002 | Distributional Conflict in Organizations | Inderst, Roman; Muller, Holger M.; Warneryd, Karl |
| FIN-05-014 | Jan-2005 | Incentives for CEOs to Exit | Inderst, Roman; Mueller, Holger M. |
| FIN-01-062 | Dec-2001 | Internal vs. External Financing: An Optimal Contracting Approach | Inderst, Roman; Müller, Holger M. |
| FIN-05-034 | Sep-2005 | Keeping the Board in the Dark: CEO Compensation and Entrenchment | Inderst, Roman; Mueller, Holger M. |
| S-CG-02-02 | Jan-2002 | VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS AND MARKET STRUCTURE | Inderst, Roman; Mueller, Holger M. |
| S-FI-02-01 | Jan-2002 | Venture Capital Contracts and Market Structure | Inderst, Roman; Mueller, Holger M. |
| FIN-02-002 | Jan-2002 | Venture Capital Contracts and Market Structure | Inderst, Roman; Mueller, Holger M. |
