Archive@NYU

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Zebra Dentine

Wed, 07 Mar 2007 17:13:09 GMT

Title: Zebra Dentine

Bromage, Timothy

Description: Images are provided for assessing and consideration for exhibition.Images may be opened individually, or they may all be viewed in anavailable PowerPoint presentation.

Youth, Adolescence, and Maturity of Banks: Credit Availability to Small Business in an Era of Banking Consolidation

Thu, 09 Oct 1997 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Youth, Adolescence, and Maturity of Banks: Credit Availability to SmallBusiness in an Era of Banking Consolidation

DeYoung, Robert; Goldberg, Lawrence G.; White, Lawrence J.

Abstract: This paper address the relationship between the aging process at new andrelatively young banks and the tendency of banks to make loans to smallbusinesses. Defining small business loans as C&I loans that areunder $1 million in size, we analyze a sample of banks that had assetsof less than %500 million in assets for the years 1993-1996 and thatwere 25 years of age or younger.

You Can't Take It With You: Sunset Provisions for Equity Compensation When Managers Retire, Resign, or Die

Tue, 29 Aug 2006 22:58:59 GMT

Title: You Can't Take It With You: Sunset Provisions for Equity CompensationWhen Managers Retire, Resign, or Die

Dahiyaa, Sandeep; Yermack, David

Abstract: Company stock option plans have diverse “sunset” policiesfor modifying terms of options held by managers who exit the firm. Inour S&P 500 sample, these forfeiture, vesting, and expirationprovisions are less generous in companies characterized by fast growth,dependence on skilled human capital, and high strategic interaction withcompetitors. We show that these features of firms’ option plansdirectly impact management turnover, early exercise of stock options,and the availability of data about early exercises. For CEOs over age60, companies’ sunset rules generally imply large discounts tooption award values and estimates of total compensation. The authorsappreciate helpful comments from Manuel Ammann, Patrick Bolton, JenniferCarpenter, Don Chance, Stephen Choi, John Core, Joan Heminway, TracieWoidtke, and seminar participants at Georgetown University, MannheimUniversity, University of St.Gallen, University of Tennessee, and theGerzensee European Summer Symposium in Financial Markets.

You Can't Take It With You: Sunset Provisions for Equity Compensation When Managers Retire, Resign, or Die

Wed, 28 Nov 2007 22:58:59 GMT

Title: You Can't Take It With You: Sunset Provisions for Equity CompensationWhen Managers Retire, Resign, or Die

Dahiya, Sandeep; Yermack, David

Abstract: Company stock option plans have diverse “sunset” policiesfor modifying terms of options held by managers who exit the firm. Inour S&P 500 sample, these forfeiture, vesting, and expirationprovisions are less generous in companies characterized by fast growth,dependence on skilled human capital, and high strategic interaction withcompetitors. While these results apply for workers who retire at the endof their careers, almost no variation exists in the treatment of workerswho resign with the possibility of working elsewhere. We show that thesefeatures of firms’ option plans directly impact managementturnover. For CEOs over age 60, companies’ sunset rules implylarge discounts to option award values and estimates of totalcompensation. The authors appreciate helpful comments from ManuelAmmann, Patrick Bolton, Jennifer Carpenter, Don Chance, Stephen Choi,John Core, Joan Heminway, Tracie Woidtke, and seminar participants atChinese University Hong Kong, Fordham University, Georgetown University,Mannheim University, University of St. Gallen, University of Tennessee,and the Gerzensee European Summer Symposium in Financial Markets.

Yanks are not coming

Mon, 06 May 1940 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Yanks are not coming

xty

Wed, 14 Dec 2011 21:21:03 GMT

Title: xty

WWW sivujen tietosis¨all¨on louhiminen

Sat, 29 Dec 2007 22:58:59 GMT

Title: WWW sivujen tietosis¨all¨on louhiminen

Vuorinen, Matti; Blomqvist, Kati; Ahonen, Veli-Pekka; Tani, Antti; Jokinen, Sakari

Would Stricter Capital Requirements Raise the Cost of Capital? Bank Capital Regulation and the Low Risk Anomaly

Fri, 15 Mar 2013 20:17:04 GMT

Title: Would Stricter Capital Requirements Raise the Cost of Capital? BankCapital Regulation and the Low Risk Anomaly

Baker, Malcolm; Wurgler, Jeffrey

Abstract: Capital requirements for banks must balance a number of factors,including any effects on the cost of capital and in turn the ratesavailable to borrowers. Standard theory predicts that, in perfect andefficient capital markets, reducing banks’ leverage would reducethe risk and cost of their equity but leave the overall weighted averagecost of capital unchanged. We test these two predictions empirically. Weconfirm that the equity of better-capitalized banks has both lowersystematic risk (beta) and lower idiosyncratic risk. However, over thelast 40 years in the United States, lower risk banks have higher stockreturns on a risk-adjusted or even a raw basis, a pattern consistentwith a stock market anomaly previously documented in other samples. Asimple calibration using historical data suggests that a tenpercentage-point increase in Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assetswould have increased the weighted average cost of capital by between 60and 90 basis points per year. In competitive lending markets, a changeof this magnitude would have doubled or tripled spreads, because bankasset betas implied an average risk premium of only 40 basis pointsabove Treasury yields over that same period.

Working Together Introduction Audio Clip

Thu, 06 Dec 2007 04:27:54 GMT

Title: Working Together Introduction Audio Clip

Daniel, Lindsey

WORKFLOW AND ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT: AN EMPIRICAL COMPARISON OF ANALYSIS PERSPECTIVES

Thu, 29 May 1986 22:58:59 GMT

Title: WORKFLOW AND ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT: AN EMPIRICAL COMPARISON OF ANALYSIS PERSPECTIVES

Sasso, William C.

Abstract: Many processes, techniques, tools, methodologies, and approaches claimto facilitate the process of information systems development, but littleempirical validation in support of these claims has been publiclyreported. This research addresses this shortcoming in two ways. First,it develops and applies a promising experimental design for thecomparison of systems analysis techniques. The design's objective was toexternal validity of experimental findings while maintaining highdegrees of control and comparability. Secondly, our design, the"transcript experiment," was used to evaluate two versions ofan analysis procedure. This paper both presents and evaluates thetranscript experiment as a research design and reports the results of anactual experiment. The study we report investigated the impact of aparticular factor in the systems analysis process, which we termanalysis perspective. After elaborating a (partial) theory of systemsanalysis enabling us to predict the impact of different analysisperspectives on (1) the analysis process, (2) the content of reports itproduces, and (3) the utility of the analystsâ recommendations,we compared the influences of two particular perspectives, the workflowperspective and the organizational unit perspective. We observedsignificant differences in subject behavior in acquiring informationduring the analysis process, but the data were inconclusive with respectto our predictions concerning the content of reports and the utility ofsubjectsâ recommendations. Finally, we noted a strong negativecorrelation between the number of recommendations produced by a subjectand the degree to which he documented the current system. We term thiscorrelation the descriptive/prescriptive tradeoff, and feel it deservesfurther study, as it may invalidate a number of widely-held assumptionsconcerning the systems design process.

Workers at Fresh Kills Landfill Examine Material From Ground Zero

Wed, 07 Nov 2007 18:27:36 GMT

Title: Workers at Fresh Kills Landfill Examine Material From Ground Zero

Unknown, Unknown

Abstract: JPEG image of DSNY clean-up following September 11, 2001 disaster.Created: October 25, 2001. Image named "wreckage3" onoriginal DVR labeled "10/26/01 WTC Photos DSNY." Size: 492 KB.

Description: Image depicts landfill workers in protective gear and dog at Fresh Killslandfill looking through rubble from Ground Zero.

Word of Mouth and Taste Matching: A Theory of the Long Tail

Sun, 29 Oct 2006 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Word of Mouth and Taste Matching: A Theory of the Long Tail

Hervas-Drane, Andres - Columbia University and Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: I present a model to assess the impact of demand-side factors on theconcentration of sales within large product assortments. Consumers facea search problem within an assortment of horizontally differentiatedproducts supplied by a monopolist. They may search for a product matchby drawing products from the assortment or by seeking word of mouthrecommendations from other consumers. Product evaluations prior topurchase and word of mouth are shown to arise endogenously, and increasethe concentration of sales. I show that taste matching mechanisms suchas recommender systems, which allow consumers to obtain productrecommendations from others with similar preferences, reduce salesconcentration by generating a long tail effect, an increase in the tailof the sales distribution. Insights are derived on the mechanismsdriving concentration in artistic markets and their strategicimplications for the firm. The model is suited for experience goodmarkets such as music, cinema, literature and video game entertainment.

Women's Petitions in Late Antique Egypt

Wed, 29 Oct 2003 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Women's Petitions in Late Antique Egypt

Bagnall, Roger S.

Wombat

Wed, 07 Mar 2007 17:13:09 GMT

Title: Wombat

Bromage, Timothy

Description: Images are provided for assessing and consideration for exhibition.Images may be opened individually, or they may all be viewed in anavailable PowerPoint presentation.

Withholding Tax on Payments to Foreign Persons

Mon, 29 Oct 1979 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Withholding Tax on Payments to Foreign Persons

Dale, Harvey P.

Wireless Carriers’ Exclusive Handset Arrangements: An Empirical Look at the iPhone

Tue, 17 Jan 2012 22:03:19 GMT

Title: Wireless Carriers’ Exclusive Handset Arrangements: An EmpiricalLook at the iPhone

K. Chintagunta, Pradeep; Liu, Hongju; Zhu, Ting

Abstract: Since the Apple iPhone’s first launch in 2007 with an exclusivearrangement with AT&T, it has garnered overwhelmingly positiveresponses from consumers and from the media. With its success, exclusivecontracts between handset makers and wireless carriers have come underincreasing scrutiny by regulators and lawmakers. Such practices havebeen criticized by regulators, by the media, and by“locked-out” consumers, due to the fact that a consumer hasto subscribe to a particular service provider if he or she stronglyprefers one handset to others. In this paper, we empirically examine theimpact of handset exclusivity arrangements on consumer welfare. First westudy consumers’ purchase decisions in mobile services thatinclude the choice of a handset and of a service provider. We do so bycombining survey data on consumers’ purchase decisions withsupplemented data on prices and features of common handsets. Next,assuming a Stackelberg leader-follower relationship between the handsetmanufacturers and the service providers, and using our demand estimates,we recover the marginal costs for the players in the market. We thensimulate what would have happened in the counterfactual scenario whenthe iPhone is available from all carriers. Our results suggest that, ifwe take into account price adjustments from handset manufacturers andservice providers in response to the change in market structure,consumer welfare will increase by $326 million without the exclusivearrangement. We view our analysis as a starting point to a more completecharacterization of consumer behavior and the complex relationshipsamong players in this industry.

Will Outsourcing IT Security Lead to a Higher Social Level of Security?

Sun, 29 Oct 2006 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Will Outsourcing IT Security Lead to a Higher Social Level of Security?

Brent Rowe

Why Wait? A Century of Life Before IPO

Tue, 31 Dec 2002 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Why Wait? A Century of Life Before IPO

Jovanovic, Boyan; Rousseau, Peter L.

Why Pay More? Why Charge Less?

Wed, 29 Oct 2003 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Why Pay More? Why Charge Less?

Xue Bai

Why Imposing New Tolls on Third-Party Content and Applications Threatens Innovation and Will Not Improve Broadband Providers' Investment

Thu, 29 Oct 2009 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Why Imposing New Tolls on Third-Party Content and Applications ThreatensInnovation and Will Not Improve Broadband Providers' Investment

Economides, Nicholas - NYU Stern School of Business

Abstract: In this paper, I consider the impact of a departure from this currentsystem. I examine the possible impact of last-mile broadband providers'imposing "termination fees" on third-party content providersor application providers to reach end-users. Broadband providers wouldengage in paid prioritization arrangements – that is, applicationand content providers could pay the broadband provider to have theirtraffic prioritized over competitors' services. I argue that thesearrangements would create inefficiency in the market and harminnovation. Because the last mile access broadband market isconcentrated and consumers face switching costs, these concerns areparticularly significant. Broadband providers insist that imposingthese new charges will greatly improve network investment, and thusthese charges are beneficial. I argue that this is not the case.Possible higher revenues from discrimination may simply be returned toshareholders and not invested. Additionally, evidence suggests networksinvest more under non-discrimination requirements, and paidprioritization schemes would divert money towards managing scarcityinstead of expanding capacity. Paid prioritization could even create anincentive for broadband providers to create congestion to increase theprice of prioritized service.

Why Has House Price Dispersion Gone Up?

Mon, 30 Oct 2006 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Why Has House Price Dispersion Gone Up?

Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn; Weill, Pierre-Olivier

Abstract: We investigate the 30 year increase in the level and dispersion of houseprices across U.S. metropolitan areas in a calibrated dynamic generalequilibrium island model. The model is based on two main assumptions:households °ow in and out metropolitan areas in response to localwage shocks, and the housing supply cannot adjust instantly because ofregulatory constraints. In our equilibrium, house prices compensate forcross-sectional wage differences. Feeding in our model the 30 yearincrease in cross-sectional wage dispersion that we document based onmetropolitan-level data, we generate the observed increase in houseprice level and dispersion. The calibration also reveals that, while abaseline level of regulation is important, a tightening of regulation byitself cannot account for the increase in house price level anddispersion: in equilibrium, workers °ow out of tightly regulatedtowards less regulated metropolitan areas, undoing most of the priceimpact of additional local supply regulations. Finally, the calibrationwith increasing wage dispersion suggests that the welfare effects ofhousing supply regulation are large.

Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?

Thu, 20 Jul 2006 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?

Gabaix, Xavier; Landier, Augustin

Abstract: This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs havedifferent talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignmentmodel. In market equilib-rium, a CEO’s pay changes one for onewith aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of hisown firm. The model determines the level of CEO pay across firms andover time, offering a benchmark for calibratable corporate finance. Thesix- fold increase of CEO pay between 1980 and 2003 can be fullyattributed to the six-fold increase in market capitalization of large UScompanies during that period. We find a very small dispersion in CEOtalent, which nonetheless justifies large pay differences. The databroadly support the model. The size of large firms explains many of thepat-terns in CEO pay, across firms, over time, and between countries.(JEL D2, D3, G34, J3).

Why Does Capital Structure Choice Vary With Macroeconomic Conditions?

Thu, 30 Nov 2000 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Why Does Capital Structure Choice Vary With Macroeconomic Conditions?

Levy, Amnon

Abstract: This paper develops a calibrated model that explains the pronouncedcounter-cyclical leverage patterns observed for firms that access publiccapital markets, and relates these patters to debt and equity issues.Moreover, it explains why leverage and debt issues do not exhibit thispronounced behavior for firms that face more severe constraints whenaccessing capital markets. In the model, managers issue a combination ofdebt and equity to finance investment by weighing the trade-off betweenagency problems and risk sharing. During contractions, leveragedmanagers receive a relatively small share of wealth, resulting in arelative increase in household demand for securities. Securities marketsclear as managers that are not up against their borrowing constraintsincrease leverage while satisfying the agency condition that theymaintain a large enough portion of their firm’s equity.

Why Does Capital Structure Choice Vary With Macroeconomic Conditions?

Thu, 30 Nov 2000 22:58:59 GMT

Why Does Capital Structure Choice Vary With Macroeconomic Conditions?

Thu, 30 Nov 2000 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Why Does Capital Structure Choice Vary With Macroeconomic Conditions?

Levy, Amnon

Abstract: This paper develops a calibrated model that explains the pronouncedcounter-cyclical leverage patterns observed for firms that access publiccapital markets, and relates these patterns to debt and equity issues.Moreover, it explains why leverage and debt issues do not exhibit thispronounced behavior for firms that face more severe constraints whenaccessing capital markets. In the model, managers issue a combination ofdebt and equity to finance investment by weighting the trade-off betweenagency problems and risk sharing. During contraction, leveraged managersreceive a relatively small share of wealth, resulting in a relativeincrease in household demand for securities. Securities markets clear asmanagers that are not up against their borrowing constraints increaseleverage while satisfying the agency condition that they maintain alarge enough portion of their firm's equity.

Why Do Security Prices Change? A Transaction-Level Analysis of NYSE Stocks

Tue, 29 Oct 1996 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Why Do Security Prices Change? A Transaction-Level Analysis of NYSE Stocks

Madhavan, Ananth; Richardson, Matthew; Roomans, Mark

Abstract: This paper develops a structural model of intraday price formation thatembodies both information shocks and microstructure effects in aninternally consistent, unified setting. The model allows us to betterunderstand the observed intra-day patterns in bid-ask spreads, pricevolatility, transaction costs, as well as the autocorrelations oftransaction returns and quote revisions. For example, the modelsimultaneously sheds light on why, over the day, (i) the variance oftransaction price changes is U-shaped while the variance of ask pricechanges is declining, (ii) the bid-ask spread is U-shaped althoughinformation asymmetry and uncertainty over fundamentals is decreasing,and (iii) the autocorrelations of transaction price changes are largeand negative, yet the autocorrelations of ask price changes are smalland negative. In addition, the model’s parameters also provide anatural metric of price discovery and effective trading costs, which mayprove useful in future studies.

Why do Online Product Reviews have a J-shaped Distribution? Overcoming Biases in Online Word-of-Mouth Communication

Sun, 29 Oct 2006 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Why do Online Product Reviews have a J-shaped Distribution? OvercomingBiases in Online Word-of-Mouth Communication

Why do Interest Rate Options Smile?

Sun, 29 Oct 2006 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Why do Interest Rate Options Smile?

DEUSKAR, PRACHI; GUPTA, ANURAG; SUBRAHMANYAM, MARTI G.

Abstract: We address three questions relating to the interest rate options market:What is the shape of the smile? What are the economic determinants ofthe shape of the smile? Do these determinants have predictive power forthe futures shape of the smile and vice versa? We investigate theseissues using daily bid and ask prices of euro (€) interest ratecaps/floors. We find a clear smile pattern in interest rate options. Theshape of the smile varies over time and is affected in a dynamic mannerby yield curve variables and the future uncertainty in the interest ratemarkets; it also has information about future aggregate default risk.Our findings are useful for the pricing, hedging and risk management ofthese derivatives.

Why Do firms Merge and Then Divest: A Theory of Financial Synergy

Wed, 07 Oct 1998 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Why Do firms Merge and Then Divest: A Theory of Financial Synergy

Fluck, Zsuzsanna; Lynch, Anthony

Abstract: This paper develops a theory of mergers and divestitures wherein themotivation for mergers stems from the inability to finance marginallyprofitable, possibly short-horizon projects as stand-alone entities dueto agency problems between managers and potential claimholders. Aconglomerate merger can be viewed as a technology that allows amarginally profitable project, which could not obtain financing as astand-alone, to obtain financing and survive a period of distress. Ifprofitability improves, the financing synergy ends and the acquirerdivests assets to avoid coordination costs. Since it is the project'sability to survive as a stand-alone that causes the divestiture,divestiture decisions are interpreted as good news by the market in ourmodel. Further, our theory is able to reconcile two important butseemingly contradictory empirical findings: 1) mergers increase thecombined value of the acquirer and target (Jensen and Ruback (1983),Bradley et al. (1988) and Kaplan Weisbach (1992)): and, 2) diversifiedfirms are less valuable than more focused stand-alone entities (Bergerand Ofek (1995), Lang and Stulz (1994), and Servaes (1996)).Diversification adds value in our model by facilitating the financing ofpositive net present value projects that cannot be financed asstand-alones. At the same time, because these same projects are onlymarginally profitable, diversified firms are less valuable than stand-alones.

Why Do CEO's Reciprocally Sit On Each Other's Boards?

Mon, 15 Jan 2001 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Why Do CEO's Reciprocally Sit On Each Other's Boards?

Fitch, Eliezer M.; White, Lawrence J.

Abstract: The reciprocal interlocking of chief executive officers (CEOs) is anon-trivial phenomenon of the composition of boards of directors and ofcorporate governance: among large companies in 1991, about one companyin seven is part of a relationship whereby the CEO of one company sitson a second company's board and the second company's CEO sits on thefirst company's board. We are aware of no previous efforts to explainthese reciprocal relationships. We hypothesize that reciprocal CEOinterlocks are (a) more likely when a board has more outsidedirectorships, (b) less likely when a CEO has more of his total annualcompensation paid in the form of stock options, (c) less likely when acompany's board is more active and holds more meetings, (d) less likelywhen a CEO has a larger ownership share of his company, and (e) morelikely when there are more CEOs from other companies as outsidedirectors on a CEO's board. Using a sizable sample of large companies in1991, we employ simple probit and step probit models to test thesehypotheses, with the use of control variables that encompass othercompany, board, and CEO characteristics. These multivariate analysessupport our first three conjectures but do not support the remainingtwo. Since there is considerable academic and policy debate concerningboard composition and the effectiveness of interlocking directorships ingeneral, investigations focusing on reciprocal CEO interlocks, whichlink the highest ranked executives of two different firms, represent asignificant contribution to the knowledge base in this field.

Why Did so Many Poor-Performing Firms Come to Market in the Late 1990s?: Nasdaq Listing Standards and the Bubble

Tue, 29 Mar 2005 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Why Did so Many Poor-Performing Firms Come to Market in the Late 1990s?:Nasdaq Listing Standards and the Bubble

Klein, April; Mohanram, Partha S.

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of Nasdaq Listing Standards on thecomposition of new listings in the late 1990s. The Nasdaq has two typesof listing standards: one based on profitability and the second basedexplicitly or implicitly on market capitalization. Specifically,unprofitable firms are allowed to list if either their pro-forma nettangible assets, which include the anticipated proceeds from their IPO,exceeds $18 million or their market capitalization exceeds $75 million.We show that as the market bubble accelerated in the late 1990s, a vastmajority of firms entered under a market capitalization based standard,and these firms became a substantial portion of the Nasdaq.Subsequently, these firms performed the poorest both in terms offinancial performance, stock return performance as well as involuntarydelistings, while firms that listed under the profitability standardperformed much better. In addition, firms that entered under marketcapitalization standards also exhibited the greatest return volatility.These results illustrate the importance of a profitability standard andthe danger of a market capitalization based standard (explicit orimplicit) in a market that is in, what ex-post turns out to be, a bubble.

Why Did FDR’s Bank Holiday Succeed?

Sun, 29 Jul 2007 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Why Did FDR’s Bank Holiday Succeed?

L. Silber*, William

Abstract: After a month-long run on American banks, Franklin Delano Rooseveltproclaimed a Bank Holiday beginning March 6, 1933 that shut down thebanking system. When banks reopened on March 13, 1933, depositors stoodin line to return their hoarded cash. This paper traces the remarkableturnaround in the public’s confidence to the Emergency BankingAct, passed by Congress on March 9, 1933. Roosevelt used the emergencycurrency provisions of the Act to prod the Federal Reserve to create defacto deposit insurance in the reopened banks. The contemporary pressconfirms that the public recognized the implicit guarantee, and as aresult, believed the President’s words in his first Fireside Chaton March 12, 1933, that the reopened banks would be safe. The publicresponded by returning more than half of their hoarded cash to the bankswithin two weeks and by bidding up stock prices on March 15, 1933, thefirst trading day after the Bank Holiday ended, by the largest everone-day percentage price increase. The Bank Holiday and the EmergencyBanking Act of 1933 reestablished the integrity of the payments systemand demonstrated the power of credible regime-shifting policies.

Why are Options Expensive?

Thu, 29 Jan 1998 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Why are Options Expensive?

Subrahmanyam, Marti G; Franke, Günter; Stapleton, Richard C.

Abstract: Many valuation models in financial economics are developed using thepricing kernel approach to adjust for risk through the equivalentmartingale representation. Often it is assumed, explicitly orimplicitly, that the pricing kernel exhibits constant elasticity withrespect to the price of the market portfolio. In a representative agenteconomy this would be close to assuming that the representative agenthas constant proportional risk aversion. The elasticity of the pricingkernel has also implications for the pricing of options. This papershows, first, that given the forward price of the market portfolio, allEuropean options would have higher prices if the elasticity of thepricing kernel was declining instead of constant. Moreover, a volatilitysmile-effect is generated. Second, the paper shows that the standardgeometric Brownian motion underlying the Black/Scholes model requiresconstant elasticity of the pricing kernel . Third, if the price of themarket portfolio at the expiration date of an option is lognormallydistributed, then declining elasticity of the pricing kernel implies astochastic process which is characterized by higher volatility andnegative autocorrelation. Thus, declining elasticity of the pricingkernel can explain several empirical findings.

Why are dividends disappearing? An empirical analysis

Wed, 13 Nov 2002 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Why are dividends disappearing? An empirical analysis

Baker, Malcolm; Wurgler, Jeffrey

Abstract: We investigate the causes of time-series fluctuations in the propensityto pay dividends, including the post-1978 decline documented by Fama andFrench (2001). We consider explanations based on fluctuations individend clienteles, agency problems, information asymmetries, executivestock options, catering incentives, tax code awareness, and short-livedidiosyncratic factors. To evaluate these explanations, we conduct threestyles of analysis. First, we count and classify influences on thepropensity to pay that were noted in the financial press. Second, weexamine time-series relationships between the propensity to pay andproxies for the driving influences in the candidate explanations. Third,we assess whether the candidate explanations are theoreticallycompatible with related time-series patterns involving dividend policy.Overall, the results are most consistent with the catering explanation.Notably, catering incentives, as measured by the stock market"dividend premium," roughly line up with the four trends inthe propensity to pay between 1963 and 2000 and are able to account forthe observed magnitude of the post-1978 decline. There is also evidencethat idiosyncratic factors, including the Nixon-era dividend controlsand the recent growth in options, affected the propensity to pay inspecific periods.

WHY ARE DIVIDENDS DISAPPEARING? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Wed, 13 Nov 2002 22:58:59 GMT

Title: WHY ARE DIVIDENDS DISAPPEARING? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Baker, Malcolm; Wurgler, Jeffrey

Abstract: We investigate the causes of time-series fluctuations in the propensityto pay dividends,including the post-1978 decline documented by Fama andFrench (2001). We consider explanations based on fluctuations individend clienteles, agency problems, information asymmetries, executivestock options, catering incentives, tax code awareness, and short-livedidiosyncratic factors. To evaluate these explanations, we conduct threestyles of analysis. First, we count and classify influences on thepropensity to pay that were noted in the financial press. Second, weexamine time-series relationships between the propensity to pay andproxies for the driving influences in the candidate explanations. Third,we assess whether the candidate explanations are theoreticallycompatible with related time-series patterns involving dividend policy.Overall, the results are most consistent with the catering explanation.Notably, catering incentives,as measured by the stock market"dividend premium," roughly line up with the four trends inthe propensity to pay between 1963 and 2000 and are able to account forthe observed magnitude of the post-1978 decline. There is also evidencethat idiosyncratic factors, including the Nixon-era dividend controlsand the recent growth in options, affected the propensity to pay inspecific periods.

Whose and What Chatter Matters? The Impact of Tweets on Movie Sales

Tue, 17 Jan 2012 21:47:42 GMT

Title: Whose and What Chatter Matters? The Impact of Tweets on Movie Sales

Liu, Yizao; Rui, Huaxia; Whinston, Andrew

Abstract: Social broadcasting networks such as Twitter in the U.S. and\Weibo" in China are transforming the way online word-of-mouth(WOM) is disseminated and consumed in the digital age. We investigatewhether and how Twitter WOM aects movie sales by estimating a dynamicpanel data model using publicly available data and well known machinelearning algorithms. We nd that chatter on Twitter does matter, however,the magnitude and direction of the eect depends on whom the WOM is fromand what the WOM is about. Measuring Twitter users' in uence by how manyfollowers they have, we nd that the eect of WOM from more in uentialusers is signicantly larger than that from less in uential users. Insupport of some recent ndings about the importance of WOM valence onproduct sales, we also nd that positive Twitter WOM increases moviesales while negative WOM decreases them. Interestingly, we nd that thestrongest eect on movie sales comes from those tweets where the authorsexpress their intention to watch a certain movie. We attribute this tothe dual eects of such intention tweets on movie sales: the direct eectthrough the WOM author's own purchase behavior, and the indirect eectthrough either the awareness eect or the persuasive eect of the WOM onits recipients. Our ndings provide new perspectives to understand theeect of WOM on product sales and have important managerial implications.For example, our study reveals the potential values of monitoringpeople's intention and sentiment on Twitter and identifying in uentialusers for companies wishing to harness the power of social broadcasting networks.

Whom You Know Matters:Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance

Tue, 19 Apr 2005 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Whom You Know Matters:Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance

Hochberg, Yael; Ljungqvist, Alexander; Lu, Yang

Abstract: Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships andnetworks, rather than arm’s-length, spot-market transactions. Weexamine the performance consequences of this organizational choice inthe context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfoliocompany investments, using a comprehensive sample of U.S. based VCs overthe period 1980 to 2003. VC funds whose parent firms enjoy moreinfluential network positions have significantly better performance, asmeasured by the proportion of portfolio company investments that aresuccessfully exited through an initial public offering or a sale toanother company. Similarly, the portfolio companies of better networkedVC firms are significantly more likely to survive to subsequent roundsof financing and to eventual exit. The magnitude of these effects iseconomically large, and is robust to a wide range of specifications.Once we control for network effects in our models of fund and portfoliocompany performance, the importance of how much investment experience aVC has is reduced, and in some specifications, eliminated. Finally, weprovide initial evidence on the evolution of VC networks.

Who's who in networks. Wanted: the key group

Mon, 29 Oct 2007 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Who's who in networks. Wanted: the key group

Temurshoev, Umed - University of Groningen

Abstract: Ballester, Calv ́o-Armengol, and Zenou (2006, Econometrica, 74/5, pp.1403-17) show that in a network game with local payoffcomplementarities, together with global uniform payoff substitutabilityand own concavity effects, the intercentrality measure identifies thekey player - a player who, once removed, leads to the optimal change inoverall activity. In this paper we search for the key group in suchnetwork games, whose members are, in general, different from the playerswith the highest individual intercentralities. Thus the quest for asingle target is generalized to a group selection problem targeting anarbitrary number of players, where the key group is identified by agroup intercentrality measure. We show that the members of a key groupare rather nonredundant actors, i.e., they are largely heterogenous intheir patterns of ties to the third parties.

Who, if Anyone, Reacts to Accrual Information?

Thu, 25 Jan 2007 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Who, if Anyone, Reacts to Accrual Information?

Battalio, Robert H.; Lerman, Alina; Livnat, Joshua; Mendenhall, Richard R.

Abstract: We confirm and extend prior research that suggests accrual levelspredict future returns, even after controlling for earnings surprise. Wethen document abnormal buying behavior around 10-K/Q filing dates thatcorrelates with accrual level. Specifically, we extend Collins andHribar (2000) by showing that the accrual anomaly persists for a sampleof firms followed by analysts after controlling for analyst earningsforecast errors and using exact 10-K/Q filing dates. We then show thatlarge traders, those who initiate trades of at least 5,000 shares, tendto trade in the correct direction in response to accrual informationreleased in SEC filings after preliminary earnings. This tendency islimited, however, to cases where earnings conveyed favorable newsinitially. Investors who use accrual information apparently ignorestocks whose earnings convey unfavorable news or believe that accruallevel is not informative for these firms. We also provide some evidencethat the smallest traders react to accrual information, but in the wrong direction.

Who You Know Matters: Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance

Tue, 07 Dec 2004 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Who You Know Matters: Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance

Hochberg, Yael; Ljungqvist, Alexander; Lu, Yang

Abstract: Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships andnetworks, rather than arm’s-length, spot-market transactions. Weexamine the performance consequences of this organizational choice inthe context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfoliocompany investments, using a comprehensive sample of U.S. based VCs overthe period 1980 to 2003. VC funds whose parent firms enjoy moreinfluential network positions have significantly better performance, asmeasured by the proportion of portfolio company investments that aresuccessfully exited through an initial public offering or a sale toanother company. Similarly, the portfolio companies of better networkedVC firms are significantly more likely to survive to subsequent roundsof financing and to eventual exit. The magnitude of these effects iseconomically large, and is robust to a wide range of specifications. Ourmodels suggest that the benefits of being associated with awell-connected VC are more pronounced in later funding rounds. Once wecontrol for network effects in our models of fund and portfolio companyperformance, the importance of how much investment experience a VC hasis reduced, and in some specifications, eliminated.

Who You Know Matters: Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance

Tue, 07 Dec 2004 22:58:59 GMT

Who You Know Matters: Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance

Tue, 07 Dec 2004 22:58:59 GMT

Who thinks about the competition? Managerial ability and strategic entryin US local telephone markets

Mon, 29 Oct 2007 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Who thinks about the competition? Managerial ability and strategicentryin US local telephone markets

Goldfarb, Avi - University of Toronto; Xiao, Mo - University of Arizona

Abstract: This paper examines how manager and firm characteristics relate to entrydecisions in US local telephone markets. To do so, it develops astructural econometric model that allows managers to be heterogeneous intheir ability to correctly conjecture competitor behavior. The modeladapts Camerer, Ho, and Chong's (2004) Cognitive Hierarchy model to areal-world setting. We observe the industry in 1998, shortly after theTelecommunications Act of 1996 opened up the market. We find that olderfirms with older, more experienced managers have higher estimated levelsof strategic ability. Managers with degrees in economics or business,and managers with graduate degrees, also have higher estimated levels ofstrategic ability. We find no evidence that university quality isrelated to ability. We repeat this exercise using data from 2000, 2002,and 2004. While the core results do not change, the overall level ofmeasured strategic ability increases substantially by 2004. Theestimates of strategic ability are also correlated with survival: thosefirms with lower estimated levels of ability are more likely to exit theindustry early.

Who Buys and Who Sells Options: The Role and Pricing of Options in an Economy with Background Risk

Wed, 04 Sep 1996 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Who Buys and Who Sells Options: The Role and Pricing of Options in anEconomy with Background Risk

Franke, Gunter; Stapleton, Richard C.; Subrahmanyam, Marti G.

Abstract: In this paper, we drive an equilibrium in which some investors buycall/put options on the market portfolio while others sell them. Also,some investors supply and others demand forward contracts. Sinceinvestors are assumed to have similar risk-averse preferences, thedemand for these contracts is not explained by differences in the shapeof utility functions. Rather, it is the degree tow which agents faceother, non-hedgeable, background risks that determines their risk-takingbehavior in the model. We show that investors with low or no backgroundrisk have a concave sharing rule, i.e., they sell options on the marketportfolio, whereas investors with high background risk have a convexsharing rule and buy these options. A general increase in backgroundrisk in the economy reduces the forward price of the market portfolio.Furthermore, the prices of put options rise and the prices of calloptions fall. Investors without background risk then react by choosing asharing rule with higher slope and concavity.

Who Buys and Who Sells Options: The Role and Pricing of Options in an Economy with Background Risk

Thu, 29 Jan 1998 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Who Buys and Who Sells Options: The Role and Pricing of Options in anEconomy with Background Risk

Subrahmanyam, Marti G.; Franke, Günter; Stapleton, Richard C.

Abstract: In this paper, we derive an equilibrium in which some investors buycall/put options on the market portfolio while others sell them. Sinceinvestors are assumed to have similar risk-averse preferences, thedemand for these contracts is not explained by differences in the shapeof utility functions. Rather, it is the degree to which agents faceother, non-hedgeable, background risks that determines their risk-takingbehavior in the model. We show that investors with low or no backgroundrisk have a concave sharing rule, i.e., they sell options on the marketportfolio, whereas investors with high background risk have a convexsharing rule and buy these options.

Who Buys and Sells Options: The Role and Pricing of Options in an Economy with Background Risk

Sun, 03 Dec 1995 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Who Buys and Sells Options: The Role and Pricing of Options in anEconomy with Background Risk

Franke, Gunter; Stapleton, Richard C.; Subrahmanyam, Marti G.

Abstract: In this paper, we derive an equilibrium in which some investors buycall/put options on the market portfolio while others sell them. Also,some investors supply and others demand forward contracts. Sinceinvestors are assumed to have similar risk-averse preferences, demandfor these contracts is not explained by differences in the shape ofutility functions. Rather, it is the degree to which agents face other,non-hedgeable, background risks that determines their risk-takingbehavior in the model. We show that investors with low or no backgroundrisk have a concave sharing rule, i.e., they sell options on the marketportfolio, whereas investors with high background risk have a convexsharing rule and buy these options. A general increase in backgroundrisk in the economy reduces the forward price of the market portfolio.Furthermore, the prices of put options rise and the prices of calloptions fall. Investors without background risk then react by choosing asharing rule with higher slope and concavity.

Who Benefits from Online Privacy?

Mon, 29 Oct 2007 22:58:59 GMT

Title: Who Benefits from Online Privacy?

Taylor, Curtis R. - Duke University; Wagman, Liad - Duke University

Abstract: When firms can identify their past customers, they may use informationabout purchase histories in order to price discriminate. We present amodel with a monopolist and a continuum of heterogeneous consumers,where consumers can opt out from being identified, possibly at a cost.We find that when consumers can costlessly opt out, they allindividually choose privacy, which results in the highest profit for themonopolist. In fact, all consumers are better off when opting out iscostly. When valuations are uniformly distributed, social surplus isnon-monotonic in the cost of opting out and is highest when opting outis prohibitively costly. We introduce the notion of a privacy gatekeeper— a third party that is able to act as a privacy conduit and setthe cost of opting out. We prove that the privacy gatekeeper onlycharges the firm in equilibrium, making privacy costless to consumers.

White Wing Sweeping with Hand Broom

Mon, 15 Oct 2007 19:24:48 GMT

Title: White Wing Sweeping with Hand Broom

Abstract: Black and white photograph of White Wing worker sweeping with hand broomnext to collection vehicle and carrying cart. Civilians standing by andwatching him at work. Photographer unknown.

Description: 5" x 7". Unmounted. Found in a folder with other sanitationphotographs compiled for the DSNY. Image originally removed by RobinNagle in 09/07. Damage to bottom right side of photograph.

White Wing Street Sweeper

Fri, 12 Oct 2007 20:11:19 GMT

Title: White Wing Street Sweeper

New York Department of Sanitation

Abstract: Black and white picture (5 x 7 in.) showing one of George Waring's WhiteWings in uniform. The man is posing with his broom and carry can. In thebackground, stores, a man smiling to the camera.

White Truck Sewering Snow, 1928

Sun, 14 Oct 2007 18:02:53 GMT

Title: White Truck Sewering Snow, 1928

Abstract: Black and white photograph of sanitation worker from Department ofStreet Cleaning sewering snow in New York City, 1928. Civilianssurrounding vehicle. Photographer unknown.

Description: Unmounted. Date unknown. Sticker on back has ID#: 325, as well as"OFFICIAL PHOTO, Courtesy New York City Department of SanitationPhoto Unit." Image came from a black folder containing other snowplowing photographs. Image originally removed by Robin Nagle in 09/07.

White and Orange Trucks in Ticker-Tape Parade

Tue, 16 Oct 2007 22:09:37 GMT

Title: White and Orange Trucks in Ticker-Tape Parade

New York Department of Sanitation

Abstract: Color picture (4 x 6 in.) showing an orange truck carrying trash inorder to deposit it into the container of a collection truck. This isthe cleaning in a Yankees ticker tape parade in year 2000.

Description: The picture is part of a series that shows cleaning tasks in a Yankees'parade. The stack is labeled 'parade' and is found in Robin Nagle's collection.

Which Came First, IT or Productivity? The Virtuous Cycle of Investment and Use in Enterprise Systems

Mon, 10 Nov 2008 21:31:30 GMT

Title: Which Came First, IT or Productivity? The Virtuous Cycle of Investmentand Use in Enterprise Systems

Aral, Sinan; Brynjolfsson, Erik; Wu, D.J.

Abstract: While it is now well established that IT intensive firms are moreproductive, a critical question remains: Does IT cause productivity orare productive firms simply willing to spend more on IT? We address thisquestion by examining the productivity and performance effects ofenterprise systems investments in a uniquely detailed and comprehensivedata set of 623 large, public U.S. firms. The data represent all U.S.customers of a large vendor during 1998–2005 and include thevendor’s three main enterprise system suites: Enterprise ResourcePlanning (ERP), Supply Chain Management (SCM), and Customer RelationshipManagement (CRM). A particular benefit of our data is that theydistinguish the purchase of enterprise systems from their installationand use. Since enterprise systems often take years to implement, firmperformance at the time of purchase often differs markedly fromperformance after the systems “go live.” Specifically, inour ERP data, we find that purchase events are uncorrelated withperformance while go-live events are positively correlated. Thisindicates that the use of ERP systems actually causes performance gainsrather than strong performance driving the purchase of ERP. In contrast,for SCM and CRM, we find that performance is correlated with bothpurchase and golive events. Because SCM and CRM are installed after ERP,these results imply that firms that experience performance gains fromERP go on to purchase SCM and CRM. Our results are robust againstseveral alternative explanations and specifications and suggest that acausal relationship between ERP and performance triggers additional ITadoption in firms that derive value from their initial investment. Theseresults provide an explanation of simultaneity in IT value research thatfits with rational economic decision-making: Firms that successfullyimplement IT, react by investing in more IT. Our work suggests replacing“either-or” views of causality with a positive feedback loopconceptualization in which successful IT investments initiate a“virtuous cycle” of investment and gain. Our work alsoreveals other important estimation issues that can help researchersidentify relationships between IT and business value.