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http://hdl.handle.net/2451/25999
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| Title: | Simple “Market Value” Bargaining Model for Weighted Voting
Games: Characterization and Limit Theorems |
| Authors: | Owen, Guillermo
Lindner, Ines
Feld, Scott L |
| Issue Date: | 2007 |
| Series/Report no.: | CLB-06-026 |
| Abstract: | Feld, Grofman and Ray (2003) offer a bargaining model for weighted
voting games that is a close relative of the nucleolus and the kernel.
They look for a set of weights that preserves winning coalitions that
has the property of minimizing the difference between the weight of the
smallest and the weight of the largest Minimum Winning Coalition. They
claim that such a set of weights provides an a priori measure of a
weighted voter’s bribeworthiness or market value. Here, after
reviewing the basic elements of their model, we provide a
characterization result for this model and show its links to other
bargaining model approaches in the literature. Then we offer some limit
results showing that, with certain reasonable conditions on the
distributions of weights, as the size of the voting body increases, the
values of bribeworthiness we calculate will approach both the weights
themselves and the Banzhaf scores for the weighted voting game. We also
show that, even for relatively small groups using weighted voting, such
as the membership of the European Council of Ministers (and its
precedessors) 1958-2003, similarities among the usual a priori power
scores, bribeworthiness/market value, and the weights themselves, will
be quite strong. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/25999 |
| Appears in Collections: | NYU Pollack Center for Law & Business Working Papers
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