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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26014
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| Title: | Bargaining Over New Ideas: Rent Distribution and Stability of Innovative Firms |
| Authors: | Baccara, Mariagiovanna
Razin, Ronny |
| Issue Date: | May-2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | EC-08-06 |
| Abstract: | We analyze a model of bargaining over new ideas. The model accounts for
the problem of information leakage, i.e., the diffusion of information
about the idea before and after the idea is implemented. We analyze the
effects of information leakage on the distribution of rents within firms
and the firms’ stability to the introduction of innovation. In the
model, the distribution of rents in a firm reflects the distribution of
information about the idea. We show how the balance of power between the
innovators and their collaborators depends on market conditions and
firms’ size. The model also provides a formal link between the
organization of firms and their stability: the model predicts that, a
larger firm will tend to be less stable to the introduction of innovation. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26014 |
| Appears in Collections: | Economics Working Papers
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