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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26016
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| Title: | Interrogation Methods and Terror Networks |
| Authors: | Baccara, Mariagiovanna
Bar-Isaac, Heski |
| Issue Date: | 10-Mar-2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | EC-08-08 |
| Abstract: | We examine how the structure of terror networks varies with legal limits
on interrogation and the ability of authorities to extract information
from detainees. We assume that terrorist networks are designed to
respond optimally to a trade-off caused by information exchange:
Diffusing information widely leads to greater internal efficiency, but
it leaves the organization more vulnerable to law enforcement. The
extent of this vulnerability depends on the law enforcement
authority’s resources, strategy and interrogation methods.
Recognizing that the structure of a terrorist network responds to the
policies of law enforcement authorities allows us to begin to explore
the most effective policies from the authorities’ point of view. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26016 |
| Appears in Collections: | Economics Working Papers
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