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Economics Working Papers >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26022

Title: A Note on Optimal Allocation Mechanisms
Authors: Skreta, Vasiliki
Figueroa, Nicolas
Keywords: mechanism design
optimal auctions
bunching
Issue Date: 1-Apr-2008
Series/Report no.: EC-08-13
Abstract: This paper studies revenue-maximizing allocation mechanisms for multiple goods where the buyerís utility can depend non-linearly in his type. We point out that despite strictly increasing virtual utilities, the allocation rule obtained via pointwise optimization may fail to be increasing and thus it may violate incentive compatibility. More importantly, the revenue maximizing allocation may involve randomizations between di§erent allocations.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26022
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers

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