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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26023
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| Title: | Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment |
| Authors: | Skreta, Vasiliki |
| Keywords: | mechanism design
optimal auctions
limited commitment |
| Issue Date: | Dec-2007 |
| Series/Report no.: | EC-08-14 |
| Abstract: | This paper characterizes revenue maximizing auctions for a Önite
horizon version of the standard IV P model of Myerson (1981) for a
seller who cannot commit not to propose a new mechanism, if previously
chosen ones fail to allocate the object. We show that a revenue
maximizing mechanism in the Örst period assigns the good to the
buyer with the highest virtual valuation, provided that it is above a
buyer-speciÖc reserve price. If no buyer obtains the good in the
Örst period, the same procedure is repeated in the second
period, where virtual valuations are calculated using the
posterior distributions and the reserves prices are lower, and so forth,
until we reach the last period of the game. This is the Örst paper
that characterizes optimal mechanisms in a multi-agent environment where
the designer behaves sequentially rationally. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26023 |
| Appears in Collections: | Economics Working Papers
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