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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26024
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| Title: | Optimal Auctions with General Distribution |
| Authors: | Skreta, Vasiliki |
| Keywords: | mechanism design
optimal auctions
ironing
Dirac’s delta functions |
| Issue Date: | Oct-2007 |
| Series/Report no.: | EC-08-15 |
| Abstract: | This note characterizes revenue maximizing auctions in a single unit
independent private value environment when buyers’ distributions
of valuations can be discrete, continuous, or any mixture of the two
possibilities. The procedure described is applicable to many other
single or multi- agent mechanism design problems with transferable
utility and single-dimensional types. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26024 |
| Appears in Collections: | Economics Working Papers
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