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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26063
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| Title: | Horizontal Merger Antitrust Enforcement: Some Historical Perspectives,
Some Current Observations |
| Authors: | White, Lawrence |
| Keywords: | Antitrust
Merger Enforcement
Merger Guidelines
Coordinated Effects
Unilateral Effects |
| Issue Date: | 19-Jan-2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | EC-06-01 |
| Abstract: | The DOJ-FTC Merger Guidelines were developed for and best deal with
horizontal mergers where the theory of harm is “coordinated
effects”. The Guidelines deal awkwardly, at best, with mergers
where the theory of harm is “unilateral effects”. The broad
body of evidence – from profitability studies, from pricing
studies, and from auction studies – indicates that seller
concentration matters. But these studies do not provide adequate
guidance as to whether current antitrust enforcement is too strict or
too lenient with respect to mergers. Research on the consequences of the
“close call” mergers that were not challenged might well
provide such guidance, as might a “meta analysis” of the
extant price-concentration studies. New procedures are needed for
inquiry and enforcement where the theory of harm is “unilateral
effects”, as is a market definition paradigm for monopolization cases. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26063 |
| Appears in Collections: | Economics Working Papers
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