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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26076
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| Title: | Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition |
| Authors: | Veldkamp, Laura
Hellwig, Christian |
| Issue Date: | 12-Mar-2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | EC-06-14 |
| Abstract: | We explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of
strategic models. When a large number of agents play a game with
strategic complementarity, information choices exhibit complementarity
as well: If an agent wants to do what others do, they want to know what
others know. This makes heterogeneous beliefs difficult to sustain and
may generate multiple equilibria. In models with substitutability,
agents prefer to differentiate their information choices. We use these
theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent
price-setting models and to propose modeling techniques that ensure
equilibrium uniqueness. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26076 |
| Appears in Collections: | Economics Working Papers
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