|
Archive@NYU >
Stern School of Business >
Economics Working Papers >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26084
|
| Title: | Properties of Scoring Auctions |
| Authors: | Asker, John
Cantillon, Estelle |
| Issue Date: | Aug-2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | EC-06-22 |
| Abstract: | This paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy
differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of
the good (price, level of non monetary attributes), and these are
evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of
equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when suppliers private
information is multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium
behavior and expected utility equivalence). In addition, we show that
scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for
buying differentiated products, including menu auctions, beauty contests
and price-only auctions with minimum quality thresholds. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26084 |
| Appears in Collections: | Economics Working Papers
|
All items in Faculty Digital Archive are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.
|
