|
Archive@NYU >
Stern School of Business >
Economics Working Papers >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26120
|
| Title: | Something to Prove: Reputation in teams and hiring to introduce uncertainty |
| Authors: | Bar-Isaac, Heski |
| Keywords: | Reputation incentive
teams
overlapping generations
up-or-out |
| Issue Date: | Apr-2004 |
| Series/Report no.: | EC-04-07 |
| Abstract: | Agents work for their own reputations when young but for their firms
when old. An individual with an established reputation cannot credibly
commit to exerting effort when working alone. However, by hiring and
working with juniors of uncertain rep- utation, seniors will have
incentives to exert effort. Incentives for young agents arise from a
concern for their own reputation (and the opportunity to take over the
firm) but older agents work for the reputation of their firms (and the
opportunity to sell out to juniors). An important theoretical
contribution is an example of a mechanism that endogenously introduces
type uncertainty. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26120 |
| Appears in Collections: | Economics Working Papers
|
All items in Faculty Digital Archive are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.
|
