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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26122
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| Title: | Imperfect Competition and Committment |
| Authors: | Bar-Isaac, Heski |
| Issue Date: | May-2004 |
| Series/Report no.: | EC-04-09 |
| Abstract: | The degree of competition that a rm faces affects its ability to commit
to good behavior. However, the relationship need not be monotonic since
competition affects the pro ts when committed to good behavior (such as
efficient high quality) and bad behavior as well as the short-term
profits from "cheating". We demonstrate that as a result
competition (using two different measures of competition which show
qualitatively similar effects) might have non-monotonic effects on a rm
s ability to commit. In particular, a firm might choose to operate in a
more competitive environment. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26122 |
| Appears in Collections: | Economics Working Papers
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