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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26178
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| Title: | An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy |
| Authors: | B. Cabral, Luis M. |
| Keywords: | Merger policy
Repeated games |
| Issue Date: | 26-Sep-2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | EC-03-25 |
| Abstract: | treat international merger policy as a repeated veto game. I show that
there exists a unique efficient equilibrium within a particular class of
trigger strategy equilibria. I then consider a series of comparative
statics and extensions: (a) if for some exogenous reason one of the
countries becomes more lenient towards mergers, than the other country
becomes more lenient as well; (b) merger remedies increase the
probability that a merger is approved and increase total welfare; (c)
the effects of a merger wave are magnified by the equilibrium approval policy. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26178 |
| Appears in Collections: | Economics Working Papers
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