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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26227
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| Title: | The Microsoft Antitrust Case |
| Authors: | Economides, Nicholas |
| Issue Date: | 2-Apr-2001 |
| Series/Report no.: | EC-00-009 |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the law and economics of United States v. Microsoft,
a landmark case of antitrust intervention in network industries. The
United States Department of Justice and 19 States sued Microsoft
alleging (i) that it monopolized the market for operating systems of
personal computers and took anti-competitive actions to illegally
maintain its monopoly; (ii) that it attempted to monopolize the market
for Internet browsers because such browsers would create competition for
operating systems; (iii) that it bundled its browser (Internet Explorer)
with Windows; and that it engaged in a number of other anti-competitive
exclusionary arrangements with computer manufacturers, Internet service
providers, and content providers attempting to thwart the distribution
of Netscape’s browser. The District Court Judge found in most
points for the plaintiffs and ordered the breakup of Microsoft into two
companies, one with all the operating systems software, and one with all
other products of the company. The District Court also imposed a number
of severe restrictions on the business conduct of Microsoft. We analyze
the economic issues related to liability. We also analyze the
applicability and effectiveness of the remedies imposed by the District
Court and contrast them with other potential remedies. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26227 |
| Appears in Collections: | Economics Working Papers
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