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|Title: ||Mixed Bundling in Duopoly|
|Authors: ||Economides, Nicholas|
|Issue Date: ||Nov-1993 |
|Series/Report no.: ||EC-93-29|
|Abstract: ||We present a model where producers of complementary goods have the
option to practice mixed bundling. In the first stage of a two-stage
game, firms choose between a mixed bundling and a non-bundling strategy.
In the second stage, firms choose prices. We show that mixed bundling is
a dominant strategy for both firms. However, when the composite goods
are not very close substitutes, at the bundling-bundling equilibrium
both firms are worse off than when they both commit not to practice
|Appears in Collections:||Economics Working Papers|
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