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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26271

Title: Mixed Bundling in Duopoly
Authors: Economides, Nicholas
Issue Date: Nov-1993
Series/Report no.: EC-93-29
Abstract: We present a model where producers of complementary goods have the option to practice mixed bundling. In the first stage of a two-stage game, firms choose between a mixed bundling and a non-bundling strategy. In the second stage, firms choose prices. We show that mixed bundling is a dominant strategy for both firms. However, when the composite goods are not very close substitutes, at the bundling-bundling equilibrium both firms are worse off than when they both commit not to practice mixed bundling.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26271
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers

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