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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26504

Title: Limited Partnerships and Reputation Formation
Authors: Kallberg, Jarl G.
Liu, Crocker H.
Srinivasan, Anand
Issue Date: 22-Nov-2002
Series/Report no.: FIN-02-060
Abstract: This paper analyzes the optimal quality decision of a producer in a multi-period setting with reputation effects. Using a unique database of returns on real estate limited partnerships (RELPs), we empirically examine alternative theoretical predictions of optimal producer strategy. In particular, we test whether the producers in our market invest in reputation building by initially selling high quality goods and then lowering quality. Using a variety of statistical tests, we find evidence for reputation building, both in the aggregate and for individual developers.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26504
Appears in Collections:Finance Working Papers

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