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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26531

Title: IPO Allocations: Discriminatory or Discretionary?
Authors: Ljungqvist, Alexander P.
Wilhelm, William J. Jr.
Keywords: Initial public offerings
Bookbuilding
Underpricing
Intermediation
Issue Date: 29-Aug-2001
Series/Report no.: FIN-01-002
Abstract: We estimate the structural links between IPO allocations, pre-market information production, and initial underpricing and find that • allocation policies favor institutional investors, both in the U.S. and worldwide • increasing institutional allocations results in offer prices that deviate more from the premarketing price range • constraints on bankers’ discretion reduce institutional allocations and result in smaller price revisions, indicating diminished information production • initial returns are directly related to information production and inversely related to institutional allocations Our results indicate that discretionary allocations promote price discovery in the IPO market and reduce indirect issuance costs for IPO firms.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26531
Appears in Collections:Finance Working Papers

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