|
Archive@NYU >
Stern School of Business >
Salomon Center >
Corporate Governance >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26724
|
| Title: | THE FOUNDATIONS OF FREEZEOUT LAWS IN TAKEOVERS |
| Authors: | Amihud, Yakov
Kahan, Marcel
Sundaram, Rangarajan |
| Issue Date: | 20-Aug-2003 |
| Series/Report no.: | S-CG-02-04 |
| Abstract: | We provide an economic basis for permitting freezeouts of non-tendering
shareholders following successful takeovers. We describe a specific
freezeout mechanism based on easily verifiable information that induces
desirable efficiency and welfare properties in models of both
corporations with widely dispersed shareholdings and corporations with
large pivotal shareholders. The mechanism dominates previous proposals
along some important dimensions. We also examine takeover premia that
arise in the presence of competition among raiders. Our mechanism is
closely related to the practice of takeover law in the U.S.; thus, our
analysis may be thought of as analyzing the economic foundations of
current regulations. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26724 |
| Appears in Collections: | Corporate Governance
|
All items in Faculty Digital Archive are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.
|
