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Finance Working Papers >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/27086
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| Title: | Contract Renegotiation and the Optimality of Resetting Executive Stock Options |
| Authors: | Acharya, Viral V.
John, Kose
Sundaram, Rangarajan K. |
| Issue Date: | 9-Dec-1998 |
| Series/Report no.: | FIN-98-088 |
| Abstract: | Recent empirical work has documented the tendency of corporations to
reset strike prices on previously-awarded executive stock option grants
when declining stock prices have pushed these options out-of-the-money.
This practice has been criticized as counter-productive since it weakens
incentives present in the original award. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/27086 |
| Appears in Collections: | Finance Working Papers
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