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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/27270
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| Title: | Competing for Securities Underwriting Mandates: Banking Relationships
and Analyst Recommendations |
| Authors: | Ljungqvist, Alexander
Marston, Felicia
Wilhelm, William J. Jr. |
| Keywords: | Analyst behavior
Underwriting
Commercial banks
Glass-Steagall Act |
| Issue Date: | 8-Dec-2003 |
| Series/Report no.: | FIN-03-039 |
| Abstract: | We investigate directly whether analyst behavior influenced the
likelihood of banks winning underwriting mandates for a sample of 16,625
U.S. debt and equity offerings sold between December 1993 and June 2002.
We control for the strength of the issuer’s investment-banking
relationships with potential competitors for the mandate, prior lending
relationships, and the endogeneity of analyst behavior and the
bank’s decision to provide analyst coverage. We find no evidence
that aggressive analyst recommendations or recommendation upgrades
increased their bank’s probability of winning an underwriting
mandate after controlling for analysts’ career concerns and bank
reputation. Our findings might be interpreted as suggesting that bank
and analyst credibility are central to resolving information frictions
associated with securities offerings |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/27270 |
| Appears in Collections: | Finance Working Papers
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