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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/27383

Title: Competition and the Structure of Vertical Relationships in Capital Markets
Authors: Asker, John
Ljungqvist, Alexander
Keywords: Investment banking
Securities underwriting
Competition
Bank deregulation
Bank entry
Glass-Steagall Act
Commercial banks
Issue Date: 1-Apr-2008
Series/Report no.: FIN-06-003
Abstract: We document that firms appear disinclined to share underwriters with other firms in the same industry. We show that this disinclination is evident only when firms engage in product-market competition. This leads us to suggest that concerns about information leakage may motivate the patterns we see in the data. We discuss how these effects help us understand how the investment banking industry is structured, how banks compete, and how prices are set. At each step we exploit sources of exogenous variation that correspond to specific margins on which the effects of interest directly influence incentives and choices.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/27383
Appears in Collections:Finance Working Papers

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