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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/28383
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| Title: | Network Interconnection With Competitive Transit |
| Authors: | Gilo, David - Recanati Graduate School of Business Adminstration
Spiegel, Yossi - Recanati Graduate School of Business Adminstration |
| Keywords: | Interconnection, access pricing, transit, telecommunication, 'billand keep' |
| Issue Date: | 1-Jan-2003 |
| Series/Report no.: | NET Institute Working Paper;03-05 |
| Abstract: | We examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g.,
two LECs) and a third network (e.g., an IXC) seeking access to their
customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with both LECs or
interconnect with only one LEC and transit calls to the other LEC via
the first LEC's network. We show that there is a wide set of cases in
which competitive transit could justify partial or even complete
deregulation of access to a network’s customer base. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/28383 |
| Appears in Collections: | NET Institute Working Papers Series
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