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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/28410
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| Title: | Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction |
| Authors: | Fox, Jeremy T. - University of Chicago & NBER
Bajari, Patrick - University of Minnesota & NBER |
| Issue Date: | 2004 |
| Series/Report no.: | NET Institute Working Paper;04-15 |
| Abstract: | FCC spectrum auctions sell licenses to provide mobile phone service in
designated geographic territories. We propose a method to structurally
estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations and apply it
to the 1995-1996 C-block auction. We base our estimation of bidder
values on a pairwise stability condition, which implies that two bidders
cannot exchange licenses in a way that increases total surplus. Pairwise
stability holds in many theoretical models of simultaneous ascending
auctions, including some models of intimidatory collusion and demand
reduction. Pairwise stability is also approximately satisfied in data
that we examine from economic experiments. The lack of post-auction
resale also suggests pairwise stability. Using our estimates of
deterministic valuations, we measure the allocative efficiency of the
C-block outcome. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/28410 |
| Appears in Collections: | NET Institute Working Papers Series
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