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http://hdl.handle.net/2451/28460
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| Title: | Bundling and Collusion in Communications Markets |
| Authors: | Baranes, Edmond - University of Montpellier |
| Keywords: | Bundling, Collusion, Differentiation |
| Issue Date: | 2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | NET Institute Working Paper;06-17 |
| Abstract: | This paper deals with competition in communications markets between an
incumbent and an entrant. We analyze the effect of bundling strategy by
a firm who enters an incumbent market. This market dimension has
profound implications on the sustainability of collusion in an
infinitely repeated game framework. We show that the bundling strategy
of the entrant might hinder collusion. Futhermore, we consider a setting
in which the entrant uses a one-way access that the incumbent possesses.
In such situation, we show that when the entrant bundles its products, a
low access charge for call termination on the incumbent network might
increase the feasibility of collusion. This result has an important
policy implication. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/28460 |
| Appears in Collections: | NET Institute Working Papers Series
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