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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/28461
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| Title: | When Proof of Work Works |
| Authors: | Liu, Debin - Indiana University
Camp, L. Jean - Indiana University |
| Issue Date: | 2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | NET Institute Working Paper;06-18 |
| Abstract: | Proof of work (POW) is a set of cryptographic mechanisms which increase
the cost of initiating a connection. Currently recipients bear as much
or more cost per connection as initiators. The design goal of POW is to
reverse the economics of connection initiation on the Internet. In the
case of spam, the first economic examination of POW argued that POW
would not, in fact, work. This result was based on the difference in
production cost between legitimate and criminal enterprises. We
illustrate that the difference in production costs enabled by zombies
does not remove the efficacy of POW when work requirements are weighted.
We illustrate that POW will work with a reputation system modeled on the
systems currently used by commercial anti-spam companies. We also
discuss how the variation on POW changes the nature of corresponding
proofs from token currency to a notational currency. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/28461 |
| Appears in Collections: | NET Institute Working Papers Series
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