|
Archive@NYU >
NET Institute >
NET Institute Working Papers Series >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/29461
|
| Title: | Intense Network Competition |
| Authors: | Stennek, Johan - Gothenburg University and CEPR
Tangeras, Thomas P. - Research Institute of Industrial Economics |
| Keywords: | networking competition; two-way access; mobile termination rates;
network substitutability; entry deterrence |
| Issue Date: | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | Net Institute Working Paper;08-36 |
| Abstract: | First, we demonstrate how unregulated price setting in mobile
communications may lead to monopolization even when networks are highly
substitutable. Second, we demonstrate that a menu of structural rules,
including (i) mandatory interconnection, (ii) reciprocal access prices
and (iii) a ban on price discrimination of calls to other networks may
restore competition. This regulation requires neither demand data nor
information about call costs. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/29461 |
| Appears in Collections: | NET Institute Working Papers Series
|
All items in Faculty Digital Archive are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.
|
