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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/31315
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| Title: | Mobility and Conflict |
| Authors: | Deb, Joyee
Bhattacharya, Sourav
Kundu, Tapas |
| Keywords: | conflict
inter-group mobility
political competition
resource allocation |
| Issue Date: | 16-Nov-2011 |
| Abstract: | We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of
conflict. In our setting, society comprises two groups who compete in
every period for political power, i.e. the right to allocate economic
resources between the groups. Individuals can move from one group to
another at a cost: this cost of mobility is the index of inter-group
differences. Since mobility is costly, the group in power can keep a
larger share for itself. The extent of such economic exclusion is
limited by two constraints: excessive exclusion reduces the
opposition’s opportunity cost of engaging in political conflict
(conflict constraint) and, if a group keeps too much for itself,
individuals switching from the other group will dilute the per capita
share of resources (mobility constraint). In determining the optimal
group size by attracting switchers, the incumbent faces a trade-off
between low per capita surplus and high political strength. We
characterize the resource allocations, group membership decisions and
conflict decisions that arise in equilibrium. The two mechanisms of
conflict and mobility act as constraints to expropriation, and the
optimal sharing is dictated by which constraint binds. The extent of
sharing turns out to be non-monotonic in the cost of mobility. We show
that the limited commitment with respect to switching can lead to
inefficient conflict in equilibrium. We also derive several testable
predictions about when conflict will arise. Specifically, we show that
conflict may arise when the cost of mobility is moderate, but may not
necessarily emerge when the cost is high. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/31315 |
| Appears in Collections: | Economics Working Papers
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