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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/31396

Title: Network Neutrality and Network Management Regulation: Quality of Service, Price Discrimination, and Exclusive Contracts
Authors: Economides, Nicholas
Tag, Joacim
Keywords: Network neutrality, Internet price discrimination, exclusivity, quality of Service, network management, congestion, AT&T, Verizon, Google.
Issue Date: 20-Dec-2011
Series/Report no.: NET Institute Working Papers;11_02
Abstract: We compare four approaches to network neutrality and network management regulation in a two-sided market model: (i) no variations in Quality of Service and no price discrimination; (ii) variations in Quality of Service but no price discrimination; (iii) variations in Quality of Service and price discrimination but no exclusive contracts; and (iv) no regulation: the network operator can sell exclusive rights to content providers. We compare the equilibrium outcomes explicitly accounting for dynamic incentives to invest in improving the Quality of Service offered to each content provider. We provide a ranking Quality of Service and network operator profits across regimes.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/31396
Appears in Collections:NET Institute Working Papers Series

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