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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2451/31409
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| Title: | Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting |
| Authors: | Ganglmair, Bernhard
Tarantino, Emanuele |
| Keywords: | patent holdup; patent disclosure; standard setting organizations;
industry standards; disclosure rules; conversation; asymmetric
information; Bertrand competition. |
| Issue Date: | 21-Dec-2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | NET Institute Working Papers;11_15 |
| Abstract: | We present a model of industry standard setting with two-sided
asymmetric information about the existence of intellectual property. We
provide an equilibrium analysis of (a) rms' incentives to communicate
ideas for improvements of an industry standard, and (b) rms' decisions
to disclose the existence of intellctual property to other participants
of the standardization process. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/31409 |
| Appears in Collections: | NET Institute Working Papers Series
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Files in This Item:
| File |
Description |
Size | Format |
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| 11_15.pdf | NET Institute Working Paper 11_15 | 514.82 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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