
2. P. E. Griffiths, What emotions really are: the problem of psychological categories (Chicago 1997) 200: we need a model of ‘how concepts would evolve if the only aim of those using them were scientific understanding’.


5. M. Kundera, The book of laughter and forgetting (London 1996) 166-9: ‘Litost is an untranslatable Czech word . . . I have looked in vain in other languages for an equivalent, though I find it difficult to imagine how anyone can understand the human soul without it.’ Litost is ‘a state of torment caused by the sudden sight of one’s own misery’; it ‘works like a two-stroke engine. Torment is followed by the desire for revenge. The goal of revenge is to make one’s partner look as miserable as oneself.’

Cf. D. L. Cairns, Aidōs: The psychology and ethics of honour and shame in ancient Greek literature (Oxford 1993), dustjacket blurb: ‘Commonly rendered “shame”, “modesty”, or “respect”, aidōs is notoriously one of the most elusive and difficult Greek words to translate’.


7. Iliad 22. 104-10:

“νόμον δ’ ἐπεὶ ὄλεσε λαὸν ἀτασθαλίην ἐμῆιν, 
αἰδέομαι Τρώως καὶ Τρῳάδας ἐλλευσθόλουσι, 
μὴ ποτὲ τὰς εἰπήμοι κατώτερος ὄλλος ἐμείο: 
Ἐκτισθ’ ἡμὶ βίῳ παθήσας ὄλεσε λαόν. 
ὡς ἐρεύσατος: ἔμοι δὲ τὸ τ’ ἀν πολὺ κέρδιον εἶπ’ 
ἀντίνη ἢ ἄριστα καταστείναστα νέεσθαι 
ἡμὶ κεν αὐτῷ ὄλεσθαι ἐπικλεῖος πρὸ πόλημος.”

‘Now, since by my own recklessness I have ruined my people, 
I feel shame before the Trojans and the Trojan women with trailing 
robes, that some baser person than I will say of me:”
‘Hektor believed in his own strength and ruined his people.’
Thus they will speak; and as for me, it would be much better at that time, to go against Achilleus, and slay him, and come back, or else be killed by him in glory in front of the city.\(^1\)

8. Iliad 10. 234-9:

> “Τυδείδη Διόμηδες ἐμῷ κεχαρισμένε θυμῷ τὸν μὲν δὴ ἔτορόν γ’ αἰρήσεια ὄν κ’ ἐθέλησθα, φαίνομένον τὸν ἄριστον, ἔπει μεμάκαι γε πολλοί.
μηδὲ σὺ γ’ αἰδώμενος σήμερον ὄφει τὸν μὲν ἀώδιον καλλίεισιν, σὺ δὲ χείρον’ ὀπάσοσιν αἰδοὶ εἰσιν ἐξ γενείῃ ὀρόον, μηδ’ εἰ βιασυνέτερς ἔστιν.”

‘Son of Tydeus, you who delight my heart, Diomedes, pick your man to be your companion, whichever you wish, the best of all who have shown, since many are eager to do it. You must not, for the awe that you feel in your heart, pass over the better man and take the worse, giving way to modesty and looking to his degree – not even if he be kinglier.’

‘Getting/receiving aidôs (and timê)’: bards, at Od. 8. 480, war heroes at Tyrtaeus 12. 39-40 W), a lover/mentor at Theognis 253-4.

9. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4. 9, 1128b10-35:

Shame (aidôs) should not be described as a virtue; for it is more like a feeling (pathos) than a state of character. It is defined, at any rate, as a kind of fear of dishonour, and produces an effect similar to that produced by fear of danger; for people who feel disgraced blush, and those who fear death turn pale. Both, therefore, seem to be in a sense bodily conditions, which is thought to be characteristic of feeling (pathos) rather than of a state of character. The feeling (pathos) is not becoming to every age, but only to youth. For we think young people should be prone to the feeling of shame [i.e. be aidêmôn] because they live by feeling (pathos) and therefore commit many errors, but are restrained by shame (aidôs); and we praise young people who are prone to this feeling [i.e. are aidêmôn], but an older person no one would praise for being prone to the sense of disgrace [for being aischynetêlos], since we think he should not do anything that need cause this sense. For the sense of disgrace (aischynê) is not even characteristic of a good man, since it is consequent on bad actions (for such actions should not be done; and if some actions are disgraceful in very truth and others only according to common opinion, this makes no difference; for neither class of actions should be done, so that no disgrace (aischynê) should be felt); and it is a mark of a bad man even to be such as to do any disgraceful action. To be so constituted as to feel disgraced (aischynomai) if one does such an action, and for this reason to think oneself good, is absurd; for it is for voluntary actions that shame (aidôs) is felt, and the good man will never voluntarily do bad actions. But shame (aidôs) may be said to be conditionally (ex hypotheseôs) a good thing; if a good man does such actions, he will feel disgraced (aischynomai); but the virtues are not subject to such a qualification. And if shamelessness (anaischynia) – not to be ashamed (aideomai) of doing base actions – is bad, that does not make it good to be ashamed (aischynomai) of doing such actions.

10. ‘Shame’ + ‘respect’ in a single term: see e.g. L. Abu-Lughod, Veiled sentiments: Honor and poetry in a Bedouin society (Berkeley and LA 1986) 103-17 (on Arabic ḥasham).

\(^1\) Translation by R. Lattimore, The Iliad (Chicago 1951).


13. *Cicero, De officiis 1. 99*:

   Adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia aduersus homines et optimi cuiusque et reliquorum. Nam neglegere, quid de se quisque sentiat, non solum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti. Est autem, quod differat in hominum ratione habenda inter iustitiam et verecundiam. Iustitiae partes sunt non violare homines, verecundiae non offendere; in quo maxime vis perspicitur decori.

   Towards other people, therefore, we should show a certain respect (*reverentia*) – not only towards the best, but towards others as well. For indifference to what others think of us is the mark not merely of the arrogant person, but rather of someone who is utterly dissolute. There is, moreover, a difference between justice and *verecundia* in one’s relations towards others. It is the function of justice not to wrong them; of *verecundia*, not to insult them; and it is in this that the essence of *decorum* (honour/propriety) is especially evident.