Mapping the Relationship between Education Reform and Power-Sharing in and after Intrastate Peace Agreements: A Multi-Methods Study

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MAPPING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATION REFORM AND POWER-SHARING IN AND AFTER INTRASTATE PEACE AGREEMENTS: A MULTI-METHODS STUDY

Giuditta Fontana

ABSTRACT

To what extent does the adoption of consociational power-sharing affect the design and implementation of education reforms? This article maps this territory through rich and detailed interviews collected in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2012-2013. Insights from these interviews are corroborated by evidence from the first large-scale dataset of educational provisions in intrastate peace settlements (the Political Agreements in Internal Conflict [PAIC] dataset). There is strong evidence that the values and practices of power-sharing affect the implementation of education reforms: they constrain syncretistic (integrationist or assimilationist) initiatives and enable pluralistic reforms. Analysis of the PAIC dataset also suggests a relationship between the adoption of power-sharing and the inclusion of education reforms in peace agreements: pacts including power-sharing are more likely to also include pluralistic education reforms. Beyond their implications for the theory and practice of postconflict education reform, these findings inform research on peace agreements and on the factors conducive to successful power-sharing.

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INTRODUCTION

This article contributes to the mapping of the uncharted territory of how education reform is addressed in peace agreements and how it is implemented after their ratification. In the context of increasing adoption of consociational power-sharing¹ “almost as a panacea” (Binningsbø 2013, 89) for societies experiencing violent conflict (Bieber and Keil 2009; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003), this study addresses a fundamental question: To what extent does the adoption of consociational power-sharing constrain the type of education reforms included in peace agreements, and their implementation?

Previous efforts to “turn from the world of best practice to the world of political feasibility” (Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002, 3) in the study of peace agreements and their aftermath have focused on the inclusion and implementation of core political and security provisions (Wallensteen and Eriksson 2009; Hampson 1996; Walter 2002; Stedman et al. 2002; Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008) while overlooking the reform of social institutions, such as education.

Nevertheless, it is widely established that education systems reflect and reproduce conflict and inequality (Burdé et al. 2017; Smith and Vaux 2003). Recent research and policy reiterate that education reform is instrumental in promoting the transition out of intrastate conflict (Burdé et al. 2017; Dryden-Peterson 2016; GIZ 2014; Smith and Vaux 2003; UNICEF 2011). Several qualitative studies also suggest that constitutional structures affect education policy (Fontana 2016; King 2014; Shanks 2015). However, despite the growing body of research that explores the complexities of education reform in conflict-affected societies, important gaps remain in our understanding of the nexus between education, conflict, and peace-building (UNESCO 2016).

The existing comparative politics literature proposes how the adoption of consociational power-sharing (hereafter power-sharing) could impact education reform and how education reform may enhance the stability and legitimacy of power-sharing.² It suggests that education systems in societies adopting power-sharing will gravitate toward pluralism, in which separate institutions serve

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¹ As the literature review explains, consociational power-sharing includes four institutional mechanisms: executive power-sharing, veto rights, proportionality, and communal autonomy (Lijphart 1977; McGarry and O’Leary 2006a, 2006b; O’Leary 2006).

² This article uses “power-sharing” and “consociational power-sharing” interchangeably, as further explored in the literature review, despite the existence of many types of power-sharing (for other types of power-sharing, see Binningsbø 2013).
different and homogeneous groups, rather than syncretism, which is characterized by single institutions and overarching narratives, whether imposed or consensual (Lijphart 1977, 2008).

This study tests such expectations. It draws from interview data collected in 2012-2013 in three postconflict societies that have adopted power-sharing: Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (hereafter Macedonia). These data complement cross-tabulations of the first large-scale dataset of education reforms in intrastate peace agreements (Fontana et al. 2018).

The rich and detailed data presented in this paper indicate that the majority of peace agreements include syncretistic education reforms, regardless of whether they also include power-sharing. However, agreements that do adopt power-sharing are more likely to include pluralistic education reforms than those that do not. Moreover, there is strong evidence that the values and practices of power-sharing affect the implementation of peace agreements: they constrain syncretistic education reforms while enabling pluralistic initiatives. These findings add to the literature on peace agreements and on comparative education by showing that the adoption of power-sharing affects both the design and the implementation of the education reforms included in negotiated settlements. They also provide important insights into conflict management; they suggest, for example, that pluralistic education policies establish the legitimacy and stability of both liberal and corporate varieties of power-sharing, at least in the short term.

The following section provides a brief theoretical overview that locates this article at the intersection of studies of peace agreements, comparative education, and power-sharing. The article then presents the selection of case studies and methods. The fourth section explores education reforms in intrastate peace agreements and the fifth investigates the implementation of educational initiatives after the establishment of power-sharing. The concluding section maps avenues for future research.

**EDUCATION AND POWER-SHARING: WHAT WE KNOW**

Existing studies of intrastate peace agreements have identified a number of factors that influence their design, including the key issues at stake in the conflict, the presence of international mediators, the inclusiveness of the peace process, and

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3 The data in these 75 interviews informed some previously published studies, which, however, do not employ the quantitative evidence drawn from the new dataset of Political Agreements in Internal Conflicts.
the timing of the agreement (Wallensteen and Eriksson 2009). Similar factors also constrain the implementation of the political, military, and security provisions of peace agreements. Other factors that affect the implementation of negotiated pacts include the regional and international environment (Hampson 1996; Walter 2002; Stedman et al. 2002), the commitment of local actors and the presence of spoilers (Stedman et al. 2002), the strength of security guarantees (Walter 2002), and the quality of the peace agreements themselves (Stedman et al. 2002). However, previous studies have largely overlooked the inclusion and implementation of reforms other than core political and security provisions, including education system reforms.4

This omission has occurred despite the fact that mechanisms like education reform are crucial to the long-term resilience of peace. International documents present the provision of formal education as important to the transition out of civil war (UNICEF 2011; World Education Forum 2000; see also Burde et al. 2011), and previous studies suggest that peace agreements are no exception (Dupuy 2008). While it would be simplistic to assume that a lack of education leads directly to violent conflict (Smith and Vaux 2003), it appears that a lack of schooling can exacerbate animosities and pave the way for them to escalate into violence, as a lower level of education is correlated with an increased willingness to resort to violence in interpersonal conflicts (GIZ 2014). Recent studies have also suggested that increased access to education helps maintain peace (Burde et al. 2017; Ishiyama and Breuning 2012).

The kind of education provided is equally important. Formal education may perpetuate a conflict, as it can entrench and compound socioeconomic inequality and frustration by denying access to schooling, which can lead to an unequally qualified citizenry and divergent employment opportunities (Davies 2004; Gallagher 2005; GIZ 2014; King 2014; Novelli and Higgins 2016; Smith and Vaux 2003; UNICEF 2011). It can also nourish the mutually exclusive and intolerant identities that can be mobilized in a conflict (Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Davies 2004; GIZ 2014; Gallagher 2004; Niens and Cairns 2005). In postconflict societies, schools may continue to produce and reproduce antagonistic narratives and identities even after the conclusion of a peace agreement, thereby nurturing conflict “even after the initial, objective causes have become irrelevant” (Taush, Schmidt, and Hewstone 2009, 75; see also King 2014; Burde et al. 2017).

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4 The Peace Accords Matrix (Joshi 2015) provides some data on the implementation of 51 provisions in 42 comprehensive peace accords, including educational provisions, but these data were not analyzed comparatively to date. Dupuy (2008) provides a snapshot of the education reforms in 144 peace agreements (1989-2005), but she does not differentiate between intrastate and interstate peace agreements.
While there is broad agreement that the potential of education is not fully exploited in promoting peace (GIZ 2004; Novelli, Lopes-Cardozo, and Smith 2017; Smith and Vaux 2003; UNESCO 2016), the field is only starting to produce systematic and empirically tested overarching theories (most notably Novelli et al. 2017). A variety of case studies and policy papers do identify potentially important education reforms. For example, beneficial changes to an education system’s governance structures would address unequal access to education, promote mixing children from different backgrounds, and foster participatory and democratic decision-making (Niens and Cairns 2005; Paolini et al. 2004; Novelli et al. 2017; Burde et al. 2017). Reform of educational budgets and financing could make funding distribution more transparent and equitable (Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Smith and Vaux 2003), and the manifest and hidden curricula could be designed to teach minority languages and to educate students about plurality of identity, tolerance, the roots of conflict, and citizens’ rights and relationship to the state (GIZ 2014; Paulson 2015; Williams 2014; Novelli et al. 2017; see also UNESCO 2011; UNICEF 2011). Choices made in the immediate aftermath of violent conflicts tend to solidify quickly (Davies 2004; Dryden-Peterson 2016; GIZ 2014), and these studies identify a favorable window of opportunity for the development of conflict-sensitive education systems in the immediate postconflict phase.

However, successive calls for educational programs rooted in comprehensive conflict analysis and for the identification of political and economic influences on the implementation of educational initiatives are only starting to be addressed (UNICEF 2011; UNESCO 2016). Little is currently known about how political influences affect the design and implementation of educational programs (Smith and Vaux 2003). This gap is surprising, as it is well established that curricula, school structures, and schooling practices tend to reflect and reproduce the core principles and hierarchies of a state, thereby helping to legitimize and embed political systems (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990; Easton 1969). At the same time, widespread consensus about the legitimacy and the very existence of a state and its political system are instrumental to long-term stability and to the prevention of violent conflict (Easton 1969; Green 1997).

The present study employs a novel dataset and in-depth interviews to examine the extent to which the nature of the political system established by a peace agreement (consociational power-sharing) affects the adoption of specific education reforms in that agreement, and their ultimate implementation.
Consociational power-sharing provides an ideal model for examining political constraints on education reforms for two main reasons. First, the existing literature generates some clear expectations about power-sharing’s relationship with education reform (summarized in Table 1). Consociational power-sharing involves four basic institutional mechanisms: executive power-sharing (a grand coalition or cross-community government founded on the principle of joint consent); veto rights or weighted majority rule; proportionality in the electoral system, in the allocation of cabinet and parliamentary seats, and in the distribution of funding; and extensive autonomy for previously warring communities (Lijphart 1977; McGarry and O’Leary 2006a, 2006b; O’Leary 2006; for other types of power-sharing, see Binningsbø 2013). Recent advances in the practice and theory of power-sharing have identified two main varieties: corporate power-sharing, which accommodates communities according to predetermined, permanent, and internally homogeneous communal identities (O’Leary 2006; Wolff 2011); and liberal power-sharing, which “rewards whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic elections” (McGarry and O’Leary 2007, 675). As Table 1 shows, in accommodationist political systems based on power-sharing (McGarry and O’Leary 1994), education reforms are expected to gravitate toward pluralism (with separate institutions serving different groups) rather than syncretism (with mixed institutions and overarching narratives) (Lijphart 1977, 2008; see also Smith and Vaux 2003). Previous case studies of education reforms after a conflict suggest that this is the case (Fontana 2016).

Table 1: Education Reform and Power-Sharing. Expectations from the Literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace Agreement</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Peace agreement(s) that include power-sharing are more likely to include pluralistic provisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Present</td>
<td>Peace agreement(s) that include power-sharing are equally or less likely to include pluralistic provisions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Second, power-sharing is an increasingly common approach to the management of intrastate conflicts: the UN Peacemaker dataset (2018) confirms that about one-third of intrastate framework agreements finalized since the late 1990s contain provisions for political power-sharing, up from less than one-fifth of those finalized in the 1980s. Critics of power-sharing assert that it freezes and enhances the cleavages that underpin a conflict in the first place, thereby hampering long-term transition (Finlay 2010; Taylor 2006; Horowitz 2014; Binningsbø 2013). Proponents, however, argue that power-sharing, particularly its liberal variety, facilitates long-term conflict resolution and the emergence of overarching identities (Lijphart 1977; McGarry and O’Leary 2006a, 2006b; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Sisk 1996). Recent works have identified important determinants of the success of power-sharing as a conflict-management tool, including the quality of institutional regimes (Schneckener 2002), the balance of military forces (Mukherjee 2006), the determination of external actors and local elites (Bieber and Keil 2009), and the type of power-sharing adopted on the spectrum from liberal to corporate (Cammett and Maleski 2012; O’Leary 2006; Wolff 2011; McGarry and O’Leary 2007). These works have largely overlooked education’s potential contribution to successful conflict management through power-sharing, despite the implicit expectation that “voluntary self-segregation” into separate and equal schools may reduce the potential for intergroup clashes, improve communal cohesion, and enhance elite legitimacy (Lijphart 1977, 2008, 70). This study employs a new large-scale database and existing qualitative evidence to address this gap, and to identify implications for the broader research and practice into education and conflict.

METHODS

This article focuses on formal education reforms explicitly codified in peace agreements that establish power-sharing; it considers all educational institutions from primary school to university. Other studies have looked at broader postconflict education reforms in societies that have adopted power-sharing (Fontana 2016; Shanks 2015), but none has focused on the specific clauses mapped by the agreements. Without underestimating the importance of informal education for peace-building processes, this paper focuses on formal education, as it reflects the principal concerns of the academic and policy community (GIZ 2014; Smith and Vaux 2003).
Case Selection

This study is grounded in the analysis of a large-scale dataset of intrastate agreements and complemented by qualitative evidence from Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Macedonia. Education policies are notoriously slow to embed, so their implementation can only be investigated robustly where agreements have held for longer than ten years.\(^5\) According to the Political Agreements in Internal Conflicts (PAIC) dataset, of the 17 peace processes that included multiple dimensions of power-sharing and extensive education reforms, only seven lasted longer than ten years.\(^6\)

Lebanon’s Taif Agreement (TA), Macedonia’s Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), and Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement (GFA) are representative of these cases and of divided societies more generally in several respects.\(^7\) First, they are comprehensive agreements negotiated in the absence of a clear military victory. The three cases represent conflicts of different intensity and duration. Lebanon’s 1975-1989 civil war resulted in more than 100,000 fatalities—more than 7 percent of the Lebanese population. As much as one-quarter of Lebanon’s population was internally displaced or fled the country during the war (Makdisi and Sadaka 2002, 23). Northern Ireland’s “Troubles” affected the region between 1968 and 1998, resulting in approximately 3,500 fatalities (Sutton 2018). Macedonia’s ethnic conflict affected the country between February and August 2001, causing 150-250 deaths and approximately 140,000 internally displaced persons (Ripiloski 2011, 100-101).

Second, these constituencies’ ethnic, religious, and linguistic cleavages “are politically salient—that is, they are persistent markers of political identity and basis for political mobilisation” (Choudhry 2008, 5). In Lebanon, religious affiliation is paramount and political power is shared among 18 official religious sects. The

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5 The Peace Accords Matrix (Joshi 2015) traces the implementation of education reforms in 42 comprehensive peace accords and shows that—in contrast to political and military reforms that are typically implemented immediately—education reforms are typically implemented between three and seven years after the conclusion of the agreement (when they are implemented at all). The survival of an agreement for ten years would provide an opportunity to implement and embed some education reforms.

6 The seven cases in question are Angola’s 2006 Memorandum of Understanding on Peace and National Reconciliation in the Cabinda Province; Bangladesh’s 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord; El Salvador’s peace process ( Chapultepec Peace Agreement, New York Act II, Mexico Agreement, New York Act, Acuerdo Complementario del 22 de Diciembre de 1992 Acuerdo de la Reunion Tripartita, Timetable for the Implementation of the most Important Agreements Pending, Acuerdo Complementario del 5 Frebrero de 1993); Lebanon’s Taif Agreement; Macedonia’s 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement; Niger’s Accord établissant une paix définitive entre le Gouvernement de la République du Niger et l’Organisation de la Résistance Armée (O.R.A.); and Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement.

7 Northern Ireland’s “Agreement Reached in the Multiparty Negotiations” is also known as the Belfast Agreement and, perhaps most accurately, as the British-Irish Agreement. See O’Leary (1999).
salience of the Muslim-Christian divide (crucial until the end of the civil war) was recently overshadowed by mounting Sunni-Shia tensions (Beydoun 2007; Knudsen and Kerr 2013). In Northern Ireland, confessional affiliation overlaps with national and political cleavages, which creates two triadic identities: Protestant-Unionist-British and Catholic-Nationalist-Irish. In Macedonia, language and ethnicity (the primary markers of identity there) overlap with religious differences between Macedonians and Albanians (Republic of Macedonia State Statistical Office 2002). Consequently, the conflicts in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Macedonia can all be broadly identified as identity based.

Third, these cases represent different varieties of power-sharing: Lebanon is a case of corporate power-sharing, while Macedonia and Northern Ireland approximate liberal power-sharing. Including cases along the full liberal-corporate spectrum speaks to the debate about the long-term societal impact of different varieties of power-sharing (Horowitz 2014; McGarry and O’Leary 2006a, 2006b; Taylor 2006).

Finally, the substantial educational provisions in the TA, OFA, and GFA encompass the breadth of tools available for the reform of formal education in the aftermath of intrastate conflicts, from expanding access to reforming curricula to altering educational governance. These characteristics make Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Macedonia particularly suitable to a study of political constraints on education reform and make the present findings relevant beyond the three case studies.

**Research Methods**

Cross-tabulations of the PAIC dataset were used to place the qualitative evidence in a wider comparative context to determine whether a relationship exists between two dimensions of intrastate peace agreements, multi-dimensional power-sharing and different types of education reform. The PAIC dataset includes 293 negotiated agreements concluded between 1989 and 2016 with the intent to end or ameliorate a violent conflict through institutional reform. It includes both partial and comprehensive agreements but excludes simple ceasefires, pre-negotiation documents, procedural agreements, and unilateral declarations (for more details and descriptive statistics, see Fontana et al. 2018). In this sense, the PAIC dataset expands on existing efforts to map education provisions included in peace agreements but focuses explicitly on intrastate conflict (cf. Dupuy 2008).
To create the dataset, the available intrastate peace agreements (including the TA, GFA, and OFA) were read and coded into binary categories along the two dimensions of interest. In the power-sharing dimensions, those including multiple dimensions of power-sharing were coded 1 and those not including multiple dimensions were coded 0. In the education reform dimension, those including education reform were coded 1 and those excluding education reform were coded 0. The educational clauses were then coded into two further categories: syncretistic (S) and pluralistic (P). This coding follows previous categorizations of educational provisions and wider political systems (see, e.g., Smith and Vaux 2003; McGarry and O’Leary 1994; for a comprehensive overview of the PAIC coding protocol, see Fontana et al. 2018). After coding, the agreements were divided into four groups: those including no education reforms (0), those including only syncretistic education reforms (1S), those including only pluralistic reforms (1P), and those including both pluralistic and syncretistic reforms (1B). Using Excel, cross-tabulations for power-sharing and varieties of education reform were created for these data (see Table 2 for results).

Rather than taking the promises of peace agreements at face value, the second part of this article uses qualitative evidence to investigate the extent to which postconflict education policies in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Macedonia were either constrained or enabled by the core values and practices of power-sharing. The fine-grained analysis of education reforms implemented after the TA, GFA, and OFA was completed through 48 semi-structured interviews carried out by the author during research visits to the three countries in 2012-2013. Interviewees included government members, political party spokespersons, bureaucrats in the education ministries and management organizations, scholars and curriculum writers, officers in international organizations, members of NGOs, and journalists. They included members of all the main communities and political parties, as well as international observers (see Appendix 2 for more details).

The author listened to the recorded interviews and field notes, transcribed the interviews, and read the transcript multiple times to identify overarching and cross-case themes within a list of broader categories based on the existing literature on education and conflict (Miles and Huberman 1994). The author manually coded the interviews and analyzed them in parallel with the data collection. Quotations included in this article were chosen during a final read through the transcripts. This process was very time intensive, but it gave the author a full appreciation of the rich and complex data collected during fieldwork (Basit 2003).
EDUCATION REFORM IN PEACE AGREEMENTS

According to the PAIC dataset (Fontana et al. 2018), just over a quarter of all the intrastate peace agreements concluded globally between 1989 and 2016 addressed education reform (about 28 percent). The dataset also shows that peace agreements that included multiple dimensions of power-sharing were considerably more likely also to address education policy (50 percent). 8 In contrast, less than one-quarter of the agreements that included less than two power-sharing provisions also addressed education reforms (23.4 percent). The data suggest a relationship between the inclusion of constitutional reforms broadly identifiable as power-sharing and the mapping of education reforms. In other words, the PAIC dataset confirms that education reform is a useful complement to power-sharing (cf. Fontana 2016).

On the one hand, the evidence suggests that there is no statistically significant difference in the breadth and depth of education reform between agreements that include multiple dimensions of power-sharing and those that do not (see Appendix 1). On the other hand, the data indicate that power-sharing is associated with different types of educational prescriptions, on a spectrum from syncretistic to pluralistic initiatives. Most agreements that include education reforms include a majority of syncretistic provisions, regardless of their constitutional arrangements. However, agreements that prescribe multiple dimensions of power-sharing are substantially more likely to prescribe both syncretistic and pluralistic reforms than their counterparts (see Table 2). In other words, when agreements include extensive power-sharing they are also more likely to include pluralistic educational provisions.

Table 2: Number of Intrastate Peace Agreements Concluded between 1989 and 2016, Including Education Reforms and Power-Sharing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>None 0</th>
<th>Syncretistic 1S</th>
<th>Pluralistic 1P</th>
<th>Both 1B</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Multi-dimensional</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-dimensional</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 A peace agreement includes multiple dimensions of power-sharing if it addresses at least two out of the five categories of political, military, legislative, civil service, and economic power-sharing, as recorded in the PAIC dataset (Fontana et al. 2018).
A fine-grained analysis of the TA, GFA, and OFA corroborates the findings above. As mentioned, the agreements created to manage the conflicts in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Macedonia are examples of intrastate peace agreements that include multiple dimensions of power-sharing and extensive education reforms and have lasted longer than ten years. As such, they are ideal cases for testing the relationship between power-sharing and education reform in conflict-affected places. As Table 3 shows, the three agreements contain a number of pluralistic provisions that directly address the demands of the conflicting parties. This evidence corroborates the hypothesis that there is a relationship between the inclusion of power-sharing and the nature of education reforms in peace agreements. However, the TA, OFA, and GFA also map a number of syncretistic reforms (as do most peace agreements in the PAIC dataset; cf. Table 2). Fine-grained qualitative research helps make sense of provisions that contradict the pluralistic governance arrangements.

Table 3: Syncretistic and Pluralistic Educational Provisions in the TA, GFA, and OFA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syncretistic</th>
<th>Pluralistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen state control over private schools and textbooks</td>
<td>Freedom of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review and develop curricula to strengthen national belonging, fusion, and openness</td>
<td>Freedom of religious education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unify the textbooks for history and citizenship education</td>
<td>Protection of private education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide free and compulsory elementary education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform and strengthen vocational education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform and aid the Lebanese University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate and encourage integrated education</td>
<td>Freedom of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of religious education</td>
<td>Freedom of religious education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of private education</td>
<td>Protection of private education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniform standards for academic programs</td>
<td>Mother-tongue education in primary and secondary school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive discrimination for members of non-majority communities in university enrolment</td>
<td>State funding for university education in languages spoken by 20 percent of the population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonian language teaching for all pupils (Article 48)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Macedonia’s experience suggests that education reforms may signal a shifting intercommunal balance of power. The OFA’s pluralistic reforms were clear concessions to the Albanian insurgency, which during the 2001 conflict had explicitly demanded mother-tongue instruction at all education levels (Ripiloski 2011; Karajkov 2005; Rosůlek 2011). As the drafter of the Strategy for Integrated Education put it,

if I’m to exaggerate a little bit, most reforms prescribed by the Ohrid Agreement were already in the make. Minus language, which the Macedonians would never have agreed [to] . . . never, never, over the prime minister’s dead body. He said it like that. (Interview 15)

The agreement also leans in a syncretistic direction by entrenching the right to learn the official state language (Macedonian) at all levels of education and establishing quotas for the number of ethnic minority students attending Macedonian-language universities (Ohrid Framework Agreement [OFA] 2001). This compromise between the demands of ethnic Albanians and those of ethnic Macedonians echoes the accommodationist rationale of power-sharing and explains the inclusion of both pluralistic and syncretistic reforms in the OFA (see Table 3).

Lebanon’s TA also includes both syncretistic and pluralistic reforms to accommodate a shifting balance of intercommunal power. Muslims there had long advocated for the unification of history and civic education curricula and textbooks under state supervision (Interview 40). They largely blamed the private religious schools for promoting widely “different identities” (Interview 19). A Druze member of the advisory committee on history books drew a direct connection between the fragmented education system and the Lebanese civil war: “The main source of disturbance . . . was the huge diversity of public and religious schools . . . This created difference in the moral and ethical outlook of the Lebanese.” The temporary weakness of the divided Christian communities at the end of the civil war provided an ideal opportunity to advance this integrationist aim, thus the TA called for schools to “strengthen national belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural openness” through unified history curricula and textbooks and envisaged the establishment of state control over private schools. However, these syncretistic aims were tempered by clear concessions to the Christian communities and their longstanding advocacy for educational pluralism. Thus, as outlined in Table 3, the TA provides for the protection of “freedom of education,” “freedom of religious education,” and “private education” (Taif Agreement [TA] 1989).
Education is more marginal to the GFA, with a brief syncretistic pledge to “facilitate and encourage” integrated education (The Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations [GFA] 1998), promoted primarily by smaller mixed negotiating parties (BBC 2017). In contrast, the GFA’s pluralistic support of Irish-medium schools responded to the demands of Irish Nationalists (see Table 3).

In sum, analysis of the PAIC data shows that when peace agreements include education reforms they are most likely to be syncretistic. However, the agreements that include multi-dimensional power-sharing are more likely to also include pluralistic reforms. This finding partially corroborates the existing literature’s identification of a relationship between power-sharing and educational provisions that potentially leads to “voluntary self-segregation” across liberal and corporate cases of power-sharing (Lijphart 2008, 70).

The qualitative analysis above also suggests that compromises between negotiating parties explain the uneasy coexistence of syncretistic and pluralistic provisions in the same text. Education reforms are subject to the same bargaining processes as other communal interests during peace negotiations. As a consequence of the hard compromises involved in the establishment of power-sharing, education clauses in the three peace agreements analyzed reflect the aggregation of the diverse interests of previously warring groups, rather than their genuine synthesis.

**POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON POSTCONFLICT EDUCATION REFORM**

Stedman et al. (2002) suggest that peace agreements that have inconsistencies are less likely to be implemented. As seen in Table 3, the education reforms mapped in the TA, GFA, and OFA are rather inconsistent. For example, the TA vows to protect private education while at the same time establishing state control over all private schools. Analysis of the interviews collected in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Macedonia confirms that implementation of the education reforms postulated in the TA, GFA, and OFA is patchy. This section traces the implementation of selected education reforms in Lebanon, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland in order to identify common patterns across the three case studies.

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9 This article focuses only on the education reforms codified in the TA, GFA, and OFA. Other studies have looked at education policy more generally (Fontana 2016).
The Implementation of Lebanon’s Taif Agreement

In Lebanon, education reforms remain among the many unfulfilled promises of the TA. Whereas pluralistic provisions were largely implemented, this was not the case for the syncretistic clauses, including clauses that called for the drafting and dissemination of a unified history curriculum and textbook. A politician and member of the advisory committee on history books recalled that “before the Taif agreement the history book was biased [in favor of the Maronites], since the Lebanese president back then had many privileges.” He went on to explain that unified history books were key to “developing the national spirit in the Lebanese” (Interview 35). A former education minister similarly reflected that the TA’s education reforms aimed to disseminate “common principles . . . such as freedom, respect for others’ opinions, forgiveness, openness to others, equality, understanding of democracy . . . [and] the meaning of citizenship.” The minister asserted that a unified history curriculum would “help the Lebanese understand their history on the right foundations and not . . . [based on] political points of view” (Interview 41).

However, Lebanon to this day lacks a unified history curriculum, and different schools teach about the past based on more than 28 textbook series (Abouchedid, Nasser, and Blommestein 2002; Abouchedid and Nasser 2000). A former director of the Centre for Educational Research and Development (CERD) reflected that persisting political controversies over the history curricula are ultimately “about [politicians] having their share in history and being presented positively” (Interview 19). History textbooks consider history only up to Lebanese independence in 1943, effectively amplifying the institutional silence over Lebanon’s recent past, its civil wars, and its current political configuration. A local expert reflected that:

that gaping hole has allowed different interpretations of history and competing interpretations of that history to come in. And . . . because they’re being taught in a void, you have generations that . . . are learning a history that is . . . the perspective of their particular community and not the perspective of other communities. (Interview 23)

What explains the sidelining of the TA’s promise for unified history textbooks? The interviewees explained it primarily by referring to the values and norms of the politics of power-sharing. The promotion of “national fusion” (TA 1989) through education clashed directly with the logic of a pluralist political system founded on the autonomy of equal communities. Conversely, as Interview 23 underscores,
the institutional silence over Lebanon’s recent past legitimizes the autonomous histories of previously warring communities and furthers the socialization of children into separate and potentially antagonistic narratives. Abouchedid et al. (2002) demonstrate that teachers and textbooks portrayed past events such as the French Mandate differently, depending on their communal affiliation. Thus the pluralistic education system strengthens the previously warring political and religious communities of Lebanon (Interview 19; Interview 21). Interview 23 traced this process clearly:

Because there’s this gaping hole, it’s opened the door for these different communities to teach that particular history of Lebanon in the way they see fit. . . . So the result is . . . [that] we asked them [3,000 14-year-old students] two questions: who is your favourite political leader and who is your favourite historical leader. These kids could not tell the difference for the most part between what is a historic leader or a historic figure, and what is a political leader. . . . And the answer would be depending on their sectarian affiliation.

The sidelining of the TA’s syncretistic educational provisions appears to contribute to the entrenchment of the equality and autonomy of Lebanon’s communities, thereby embedding the core values that underpin power-sharing.

More implicitly, the evidence collected in Lebanon points to the decision-making structures and core practices of power-sharing as an important constraint on the implementation of syncretistic education reforms. In the aftermath of conflict, the inclusive structures of power-sharing were reproduced at most levels of the administration, including by committees in charge of education reforms. For example, committees that included representatives of all the main Lebanese religious and political groupings were tasked with producing the common history curriculum and drafting a unified textbook in 1999-2001 (Frayha 2004; Interview 19). As a former director of CERD admitted, “I’m not proud of it, it’s not pure academia” (Interview 19). In other words, he suggested that consensual and inclusive curriculum-drafting procedures may undermine the academic rigor of the textbooks. However, another former CERD director reflected that only a curriculum and textbooks that emerge with the consensus of all previously warring groups would be acceptable in every school (Interview 21).
Inclusivity was not sufficient. When the first common history textbooks were printed and distributed in 2001, controversy ensued over the portrayal of the events of 636 A.D. as an “Arab conquest” (Interview 19; Interview 35). As the then education minister said in an interview, “This is wrong; there was Arab existence in Lebanon, it was not a conquest” (Interview 34). Others who participated in the drafting process note that members of the drafting committee deeply disagreed about the interpretation of some past identity-sensitive events. A senior officer of CERD is one crucial example: “When I say that Jesus Christ was crucified, the Muslims don’t accept it, the Quran is different.” These controversies resulted in the withdrawal of all textbooks and of the common curriculum.

A new draft history curriculum was presented to the Lebanese cabinet in 2011. As in other societies that have adopted corporate power-sharing, the Lebanese cabinet is a grand coalition of representatives from all the main religious and political groups. One member of the advisory committee on history books reported that “every minister wanted to add points to the book to support his sect” (Interview 35). Negotiations broke down over the proper designation of the mass demonstrations following Rafic Hariri’s assassination, which led to Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 (Daily Star 2012). Tensions spilled over into violent street demonstrations. Unable to mediate an agreement, Prime Minister Najib Mikati declared a moratorium on the history curricula and textbooks (Daily Star 2012).

In both instances, the curricula and textbooks were expected to be formulated through inclusive and consensual institutions that enabled representatives of each community and political party to safeguard their core identity-forming narratives. Debates within these consensual institutions mirrored wider clashes over the identity of the Lebanese people and the contributions Lebanon’s various communities made to the state, reflected shifting political cleavages, and, ultimately, explained the deadlock over Lebanon’s history curriculum.

Lebanon’s experience confirms the expectations expressed in the literature (Lijphart 2008). In this case of corporate power-sharing, power-sharing affected the implementation of education reforms through its core political values and decision-making practices. It did so by entrenching consensual and inclusive decision-making practices and (implicitly and explicitly) reaffirming the equal legitimacy of communal narratives of the past.
The Implementation of Macedonia’s Ohrid Framework Agreement

If the attempt to formulate unified history curricula and textbooks in Lebanon epitomizes the difficulty in furthering a syncretistic agenda in a society adopting power-sharing, the implementation of the OFA's educational provisions exemplifies the ease in promoting pluralistic initiatives, even in a case of liberal power-sharing.

The OFA provided for the expansion of mother-tongue education in primary and secondary schools, and for state funding for Albanian-language university education (OFA 2001). These reforms were implemented swiftly and successfully. For example, by 2004, two state universities, the South East European University and the University of Tetovo, were teaching in the Albanian language. Combined with the introduction of quotas for students of ethnic minority background in Macedonian-language universities, this led to a threefold increase in the proportion of ethnic Albanian students in the state’s universities between 2001 and 2004 (Ragaru 2008). Successive power-sharing governments also expanded access to education for students of minority backgrounds by making secondary education free and compulsory and lowering the threshold for the number of children required to open an Albanian-language class (Interview 45; Myhrvold 2005). A former education minister also recalls that, “in order to attract more students we provided better opportunities . . . We built some buildings for the secondary schools in Tetovo, in Skopje. That infrastructure was lacking for secondary education” (Interview 46).

These initiatives were concrete testimony of the new political equality between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. However, the expansion of Albanian-language education and the creation of a full educational pathway in the Albanian language helped turn previously mixed-ethnicity schools into “parallel, non-intersecting communities” (Myhrvold 2005, 18; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] 2010). Oversubscription and some violent incidents encouraged schools to create separate shifts and satellite buildings for students studying in the two languages, and to separate students on the basis of their language of instruction (Lyon 2011; OSCE 2010). An official in an international mission explained the process, reflecting on its relationship with the wider politics of power-sharing:

What we’re finding is that we have schools that suddenly receive a petition from parents or teachers or students asking for the shifts to be organized by language . . . What are the reasons behind this? Preemptive strike, because maybe there
might be a fight . . . The concept is separate but equal. It’s not reconciliation, dialogue, and cooperation . . . There was a fight in a school yard, we don’t talk about it, we don’t discuss it, we don’t bring the parents, we don’t bring anyone in. We have video cameras, we have a security guard, and we separate the kids. So, yes, the fights might stop, but what kind of society are we creating that it fears dialogue . . . fears debate . . . fears confronting even something as silly as a school fight? . . . Many of these school fights aren’t even ethnic-based. (Interview 24)

The number of monolingual schools also expanded: the proportion of Albanian children studying in monolingual schools grew from about 65 percent in 2000 to about 70 percent in 2008 (UNICEF 2009). Thus, the implementation of the OFA’s pluralistic provisions has served to entrench and legitimize the cultural autonomy of the Albanian community in Macedonia while reproducing the “concept [of] separate but equal” (Interview 24).

In fact, the OFA and Macedonia’s constitution guarantee the right to learn Macedonian at all levels of education. However, children studying in Albanian, Serbian, and Turkish do not start Macedonian lessons until fourth grade, and then for only two hours per week. There is broad agreement that ethnic Albanians’ declining competence in the state language is potentially detrimental to their long-term employment prospects: one interviewee reflected that this is because “[minorities] don’t have their own economy” (Interview 38). Several other interviewees echoed this perspective, warning that mass unemployment can in turn destabilize interethnic relations (Interview 11; Interview 25; Interview 26).

In an attempt to implement the teaching of Macedonian outside the inclusive, consensual structures of postconflict power-sharing, the education minister announced in 2009 that every child would learn Macedonian beginning in first grade. He justified this unilateral decision by referring to a new, internationally sponsored strategy for integrated education. In fact, the drafter of the strategy reflected that introducing Macedonian instruction in first grade “was a little political stunt by the minister who made a major mistake . . . [He] hit a tsunami of resistance” (Interview 15). An education expert at the Open Society Foundation echoes this observation: “The bomb fell. In the middle of the school year the minister decided that the Albanians should learn Macedonian and . . . it was disaster” (Interview 37).
As an official in an international organization put it, when it comes to language learning, “nobody wants to be … given orders” (Interview 26). Ethnic Albanians interpreted the initiative as a “pure provocation based on ethnic dominance” (Interview 12). Parents and teachers protested and promoted a boycott of the Macedonian language classes. A government crisis developed between the ethnic Macedonian majority party and its ethnic Albanian coalition partner, while the ethnic Albanian opposition appealed to the constitutional court.

Koneska also asserts that “the problem was not in the contents of the measure, but in the manner in which it was being ‘rammed through’” (2014, 152). Specifically, the avoidance of inclusive and consensual institutions rang alarm bells among the ethnic Albanian community, as it appeared that education reforms were being used to change the rules of the political system. Indeed, by July 2010 the constitutional court issued a verdict declaring that all education reforms (including the introduction of Macedonian language classes) were subject to double-majority approval in Parliament (Marusic 2010) and that the minister’s decision was unconstitutional.

This overview of the implementation of the educational clauses in the OFA suggests that, as in Lebanon, power-sharing constrained the implementation of syncretistic education reforms while enabling the implementation of pluralistic provisions. More specifically, the attempt to implement the OFA’s provision for Macedonian-language instruction outside the new administrative structures of power-sharing were interpreted as a challenge to the political order and were contested both on the street and in court.

**The Implementation of Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement**

The GFA’s commitment to “encourage and facilitate” integrated (Catholic/Irish/ Nationalist-Protestant/British/Unionist) education stemmed primarily from pressure from smaller mixed political parties, like the Women’s Coalition, at the negotiating table (BBC 2017). Research findings on the social impact of integrated education are largely positive (McGlynn et al. 2004; McGlynn 2007; Paolini et al. 2004; Hansson, Bones, and McCord 2013; Niens and Cairns 2005). Moreover, demographic and financial pressures have been a further impetus for the promotion of integrated schools. The 2006 Independent Strategic Review of Education suggested that a single integrated education system could lead to savings of up to £79.6 million in the Northern Ireland education budget (Hansson et al. 2013), and by 2011-2012 the education department found that Northern
Ireland’s schools were not operating at full capacity: there were 82,472 empty spaces (Hansson et al. 2013; Torney 2012).

However, when asked about education reform since the conclusion of the GFA, a politician and member of the education committee in Stormont argued that there was a lot of “fiddling about with” education (Interview 28). Another politician reflected that “the systems haven’t changed much” (Interview 29), and a third argued that, “fundamentally, I think that most people on the street, if they were asked that question, would say that very little has changed in education since 1998” (Interview 27). The president of the Integrated Education Fund reflected on this issue:

It’s almost like there’s a whole lot of issues within the Good Friday Agreement that have never been fulfilled. And those are the issues we have to get, because they are what I would call grassroots issues. Like education . . . I think people were so grateful at the time just to get peace on our streets that it was accepted. (Interview 30)

The available data corroborate the interviewees’ perspectives: Irish-language schooling has expanded but there has been no significant increase in integrated education (Hansson et al. 2013; Interview 31; Interview 39). In fact, integrated education has remained only one of four equally funded education sectors and, according to a local expert, it’s “a small sector that’s very closed within itself” (Interview 36).

As in Lebanon and Macedonia, the reproduction of inclusive decision-making practices at all levels of the educational administration partly explains this. Immediately after conclusion of the peace agreement, the Northern Ireland Department of Education established a working group called Towards a Culture of Tolerance: Integrating Education. One of the members recalls that the committee was inclusive, comprising representatives of the three main education sectors (state controlled, Catholic maintained, and integrated), local authorities, and education experts (Interview 36). A member reports that a deadlock ensued at the first meeting, when the representatives of the Council for Catholic Maintained Schools called for the promotion of tolerance through existing school sectors rather than through the expansion of integrated schools (Gallagher 2005). The terms of reference of the working group were amended accordingly, resulting in loss of momentum and a limited long-term impact (Gallagher 2005). As in Lebanon and Macedonia, the inclusive institutional structures and decision-
making patterns established with power-sharing made it essential to gain the consensus of all the affected communities for any education initiative.

The core political values of communal equality and autonomy also help to explain the partial implementation of the GFA’s educational provisions. An expert reflected on the puzzle that “all the surveys show that most parents want to send their children to integrated education or integrated schools but in reality [they] don’t [send them to these schools]” (Interview 8). A senior official at the Education and Skills Authority said that “actually, when it comes to the decisions that the parents make, the vast majority continue to decide to educate their children in the school type which would represent their family background” (Interview 33). A politician reflected that this is because parents treasure the particular school sectors that “uphold their positive sense of identity” (Interview 27).

In fact, the integration movement’s success in creating a broad consensus over the desirability of “educating children together” (O’Connor 2002, 64) precipitated attempts to portray all education sectors as catering to a mixed student population. For example, immediately following the signing of the GFA, the Catholic Bishops of Northern Ireland affirmed for the first time that “Catholic schools are open to children of all denominations,” adding that “the presence of children from other denominations is seen as an enrichment of the education experience” (2001, 8). The Protestant/Unionist community in turn has maintained that controlled schools are non-denominational and open to all. As a Unionist politician and chair of the education committee put it, “I’ve maintained that the controlled sector is the vehicle that should be used for making shared education” (Interview 43). Other prominent political representatives have attacked separate education as “a benign form of apartheid” (*Belfast Telegraph* 2010).

Despite paying lip service to the syncretistic ambitions of the GFA, the main thrust of Northern Ireland’s education policy has been toward the enhancement of communal autonomy and equality in education (Interview 42). Successive election manifestos and government programs have confirmed a preference for “education policies that plan for separate development rather than structural change” (Hansson et al. 2013, 66). A 2014 high court ruling suggested that the implementation of initiatives like area planning and the entitlement framework created “a presumption in favour of the status quo” and accused the education department of failing to fulfill its statutory duty to “encourage and facilitate” integrated education (Northern Ireland Courts and Tribunal Services 2014). In this context, Northern Ireland’s schools continue to reproduce and crystallize the
boundaries between the ethnic and confessional communities that participated in the conflict and now share political power.

**The Implementation of Education Reforms**

This brief overview of the implementation of the educational provisions codified in the peace agreements of Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Macedonia corroborates the implicit expectations presented in the literature (Lijphart 2008). Power-sharing constrains the implementation of syncretistic education reforms while enabling the implementation of pluralistic provisions. Most education provisions in the TA, GFA, and OFA pointed in a syncretistic direction (as shown in Table 2). However, the core political values of power-sharing, particularly communal equality and autonomy, and its inclusive and consensual decision-making practices affected the implementation of education initiatives, sidelining syncretistic provisions while enabling pluralistic ones in cases of both corporate and liberal power-sharing. Wider studies of postconflict education policy suggest that this is also the case for provisions not explicitly codified in the peace agreements (Fontana 2016; Shanks 2015).

The establishment of political power-sharing in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Macedonia was paralleled by the reproduction of inclusive and consensual patterns of decision-making at all levels of the state administration. Walsh (2014) proposes that the legitimacy of decision-making and advisory bodies in postconflict societies is enhanced if their members represent the main communities that participated in conflict and that now share power. An analysis of education reform in constituencies that adopted power-sharing shows that inclusive committees and provisions for communal vetoes provide important safeguards that no reform will be enacted without the acquiescence of the previously warring parties it affects. Attempts to implement the peace settlements that bypassed the inclusive and consensual administrative structures were interpreted as a challenge to the new political order and were opposed outright, as in Macedonia. However, the inclusive and consensual approach to education reform did not foster swift decision-making or full implementation of the peace agreements, and syncretistic reforms such as Lebanon’s unified history curriculum were sidelined.

Successive power-sharing governments also refrained from implementing policies that would take the wind out of the new political system’s sails. Reforms were fully implemented when they complied with the core values of equality and autonomy that underpin legitimate power-sharing. This underscores the importance of
considering education reform in its broader political context in order to design effective interventions.

Finally, Lebanon is an example of corporate power-sharing, while Macedonia and Northern Ireland approximate liberal power-sharing. The literature suggests that corporate power-sharing is more likely to entrench and reproduce confictual identities than its liberal counterpart, which “rewards whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic elections, whether these are based on ethnic or religious groups, or on subgroup or transgroup identities” (McGarry and O’Leary 2007, 675). This study suggests that, while liberal power-sharing allows for more flexibility in electoral outcomes, it may still “have legitimized difference to the extent that [it] left little space for the articulation of any discourse of a common good” (Gallagher 2005, 431) in other fields, including the reform of education systems.

CONCLUSION

A growing body of literature is tackling the complex process of education reform in the aftermath of civil wars (Burde et al. 2017; Novelli et al. 2017). However, few studies have examined the complex relationship between education reform and constitutional and political structures (cf. Fontana 2016; Shanks 2015). To help map this uncharted territory, this article has examined the reforms of formal education explicitly codified in peace agreements that establish power-sharing. It explored the question, to what extent does the adoption of power-sharing constrain the type of education reforms included in peace agreements and their implementation?

The literature on power-sharing suggests that the expectation was that pluralistic educational provisions would be paramount while syncretistic reforms would be marginalized (Lijphart 1996, 1977). This article tested this expectation through a cross-tabulation of the educational clauses codified in all the intrastate peace agreements concluded between 1989 and 2016 and a qualitative investigation of the peace agreements in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Macedonia, and of their implementation.

This study found that peace agreements prescribing multiple dimensions of power-sharing are more likely to include education reforms, which suggests that this combination (power-sharing with education reform) may provide legitimacy and stability, particularly after identity-based conflicts. Analysis of the PAIC dataset
also suggests that peace agreements that include extensive power-sharing are more likely to include pluralistic educational provisions than those that do not (cf. Lijphart 1977).

The qualitative analysis of the TA, GFA, and OFA refined the findings from the cross-tabulation of the PAIC dataset and underscored the fact that peace negotiations embed both pluralistic and syncretistic provisions in the same pact. The uneasy coexistence of syncretistic and pluralistic education reforms in the same peace agreement implies that there is ongoing disagreement about how schools can best support conflict transformation among conflicting parties. In this sense, peace agreements reflect the aggregation of the diverse interests of previously warring groups rather than their genuine synthesis. This finding has important implications, as the literature suggests that vague and inconsistent pacts are less likely to be implemented (Stedman et al. 2002). However, future studies are needed to shed light on the factors leading to the inclusion of specific power-sharing and education reforms in peace agreements, including the nature and characteristics of conflict, the relative strength of conflicting parties, and the extent of foreign involvement. Research that explores the extent to which specific contradictions constrain the implementation of postconflict education reforms is also needed.

This article confirms the expectations expressed in the power-sharing literature (Lijphart 1977). The implementation of education reforms does not depend on the prominence of education in the broader peace agreement. Both the TA and the OFA devoted considerable time to education policy, but the TA’s prescriptions were all but neglected. Implementation also does not result from positive international pressure. For example, there was broad donor support for the introduction of Macedonian language learning from first grade, but this proposal was sidelined due to Albanian resistance. Finally, implementation does not depend on whether the reforms embody broad intercommunal consensus or are supported mainly by one community (Koneska 2014). Both the introduction of common history textbooks in Lebanon and the expansion of Albanian-language education in Macedonia drew strong support from one community (the Muslims and Albanians, respectively) and equally strong objections from others (the Christians and Macedonians, respectively). The latter was implemented, the former was not.

The qualitative evidence shows that syncretistic education reforms were severely restricted in all cases, whereas pluralistic education reforms were most likely to be implemented in societies that adopted both liberal and corporate power-sharing. Both varieties of power-sharing affected this implementation by altering
decision-making structures (i.e., by making reform bodies broadly inclusive of representatives of the previously warring communities) and by entrenching some core political values (particularly communal equality and autonomy). It will be essential to explore the complex interaction of these two factors in future research.

This study has three main implications for the literature and for practice. First, it represents a step forward in understanding the complex relationship between politics and education reforms (Smith and Vaux 2003; UNESCO 2016). If education reforms are to be subject to the same bargaining process as other communal interests, more attention should be devoted to their formulation during the negotiating phase and to their ultimate implementation. Moreover, the quantitative and qualitative evidence suggest that the adoption of certain constitutional structures affects the design and implementation of education reforms in places affected by conflict. Thus, the idiosyncrasies of different political systems should be considered in order to maximize the impact of educational initiatives.

Second, this work adds to the broader study of the design and implementation of peace agreements, which has overlooked the implementation of reform of social institutions. It confirms that the inconsistency of peace agreements complicates the implementation of specific reforms, and that the type of political system established at the end of a conflict can constrain the implementation of syncretistic educational provisions. This finding may be applied beyond the niche of education policy and should be further explored.

Finally, this study suggests that education fosters the legitimacy and stability of power-sharing by producing and reproducing its key political principles (cf. Fontana 2016). The PAIC dataset shows that agreements that include power-sharing are more likely to include education reforms. The qualitative evidence suggests that, rather than purposefully transforming the narratives and identities at the heart of violent conflict, formal education helps to crystallize the boundaries between the national, ethnic, linguistic, and confessional communities that participated in a conflict and are subsequently sharing political power. Unlike electoral prescriptions, education policies are remarkably similar across liberal and corporate cases of power-sharing. As suggested by the power-sharing literature, this may foster the short-term stability, legitimacy, and resilience of power-sharing (Lijphart 1977). However, education policies’ long-term impact should be investigated more critically.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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MAPPING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATION REFORM AND POWER-SHARING IN AND AFTER INTRASTATE PEACE AGREEMENTS


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APPENDIX 1: EXTENT OF EDUCATION REFORM IN PEACE AGREEMENTS

The following table provides a snapshot of the extent of education reform in different types of peace agreements, coded on a scale of 0-3. Peace agreements were assigned an index, depending on the number of aspects of education they address, with those scoring 3 having the most extensive approach to education reform.

To build the index, all the educational provisions in peace agreements were coded into three broad categories: Contents, Access, and Governance. Reforms addressing content map changes to the educational curricula, as in the case of clause F5 in Lebanon’s Taif Agreement: “The curricula shall be reviewed and developed in a manner that strengthens national belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural openness, and that unifies textbooks on the subjects of history and national education.” Reforms to access to education prescribe the expansion of educational provision to reach formerly marginalized communities or the introduction of quotas, as in the case of article 6.3 of Macedonia’s Ohrid Agreement: “The principle of positive discrimination will be applied in the enrolment in State universities of candidates belonging to communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia until the enrolment reflects equitably the composition
of the population of Macedonia.” Finally, reforms of the governance affect the funding, management, and overall structure of the education system. For example, Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement includes the intention to “place a statutory duty on the Department of Education to encourage and facilitate Irish medium education in line with current provision for integrated education.”

It becomes apparent that there is no statistically significant difference in the extent of education reform between agreements that include multiple dimensions of power-sharing and those that do not include power-sharing. Yet, as observed in the article, agreements including power-sharing are more likely to include some education reform. They are also marginally more likely to adopt a more comprehensive approach to education reform: most of the agreements including multidimensional power-sharing alongside both syncretistic and pluralistic reforms address the contents, access, and governance of education. This does not apply to the agreements adopting only a syncretistic or a pluralistic approach to education reform.

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<th>SD</th>
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW LIST AND PROTOCOL

The author conducted a total of 75 interviews with educational experts, policy-makers, and practitioners in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and FYR of Macedonia. They were asked slightly different follow-up questions, depending on their role and experience. This appendix reproduces a detailed list of the interviews cited in this article (48) and a sample Interview Protocol.

**Interviews Cited in the Article**

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<td>Albanian Historian</td>
<td>FYR of Macedonia</td>
<td>Skopje, September 14, 2012</td>
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<td>Interview 11</td>
<td>Journalist, Transitions Online, Edno Magazine</td>
<td>FYR of Macedonia</td>
<td>Skopje, September 9, 2012</td>
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<td>Interview 12</td>
<td>President of Civil - Centre for Freedom</td>
<td>FYR of Macedonia</td>
<td>Skopje, September 18, 2012</td>
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<td>Interview 13</td>
<td>Deputy Country Director Forum ZFD</td>
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<td>Interview 14</td>
<td>Policy Analyst, Centre for Research and Policymaking</td>
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<tr>
<td>Person ID</td>
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<td>Interview 15</td>
<td>Independent Consultant and Drafter of the Strategy for Integrated Education</td>
<td>FYR of Macedonia</td>
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<td>Interview 16</td>
<td>Professor of Education</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Beirut, June 18, 2012</td>
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<td>Interview 17</td>
<td>Expert on Citizenship Education</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Beirut, June 28, 2012</td>
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<td>Interview 18</td>
<td>Lebanese Association for Educational Studies Director and Curriculum Specialist</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Beirut, June 22, 2012, and July 13, 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interview 20</td>
<td>Senior Officer, Centre for Educational Research and Development</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Beirut, June 27, 2012</td>
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<td>Interview 21</td>
<td>Lebanese Academic and Former Director of the Centre for Educational Research and Development (1994-1999)</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Telephone Interview, September 6, 2012</td>
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<td>Interview 22</td>
<td>Project Manager, Youth for Tolerance</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Beirut, June 20, 2012</td>
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<td>Interview 23</td>
<td>ESCWA Regional Advisor</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Beirut, July 3, 2012</td>
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<td>Interview 24</td>
<td>Official in an International Mission</td>
<td>FYR of Macedonia</td>
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<td>Interview 25</td>
<td>Head of Sector for Professional Development, Bureau for Development of Education</td>
<td>FYR of Macedonia</td>
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<td>Interview 26</td>
<td>Official in International Organization</td>
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<td>Interview 27</td>
<td>Social Democratic and Labour Party Member of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Former Member of the Education Committee</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interview 28</td>
<td>Ulster Unionist Party Member of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Member of the Education Committee</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Stormont, September 19, 2013</td>
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<td>Interview 29</td>
<td>Independent Member of the Northern Ireland Assembly</td>
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<td>Interview 30</td>
<td>President, Integrated Education Fund</td>
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MAPPING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATION REFORM AND POWER-SHARING IN AND AFTER INTRASTATE PEACE AGREEMENTS

(cont.)

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<td>Community Relations Coordinator, Department of Education Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>Interview 33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interview 34</td>
<td>Lebanese Politician and Former Education Minister</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Beirut, June 27, 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interview 35</td>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party Member, Member of the Advisory Committee on History Books</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interview 36</td>
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<td>Interview 37</td>
<td>Education Program Director, Foundation Open Society Macedonia</td>
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<td>Interview 38</td>
<td>Officer in International Delegation</td>
<td>FYR of Macedonia</td>
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<td>Interview 39</td>
<td>Chief Executive, Council for Irish-medium Schools</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Telephone Interview, March 5, 2013</td>
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<td>Interview 40</td>
<td>Lebanese Academic and Political Analyst</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interview 42</td>
<td>Senior Education Advisor, Council for Catholic Maintained Schools</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Belfast, February 18, 2013</td>
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<td>Interview 43</td>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party Member of the Northern Ireland Assembly, Chair of Education Committee</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Stormont, February 27, 2013</td>
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<td>Interview 44</td>
<td>Alliance Member of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Minister for Employment and Learning</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Belfast, February 25, 2013</td>
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<td>Interview 45</td>
<td>Education for Development Specialist, UNICEF</td>
<td>FYR of Macedonia</td>
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<td>Interview 47</td>
<td>Officer in an International Donor Organization</td>
<td>FYR of Macedonia</td>
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<td>Interview 48</td>
<td>Project Manager, Nansen Dialogue Centre</td>
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INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Opening statements:

I would like to invite you to participate in this original research project. I am interested in how education evolves after the establishment of power-sharing. I am particularly interested in investigating whether power-sharing has an impact on priorities in educational reform, on the values and narratives underpinning education and on the way education is or is not employed as an instrument to transform conflicts and create social cohesion in divided societies.

Discussion of further issues you may deem relevant is welcome. Should you feel uncomfortable with any of the questions, you can avoid answering it.

I have invited policy-makers and academics from across Lebanon, Northern Ireland and FYR of Macedonia to take part in this study. It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw without giving a reason. If you do decide to take part you will be given an information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form.

The consent form asks for consent for:

- processing of personal information for the present research in accordance with the terms of the Data Protection Act 1998;
- the interview being recorded;
- disclosing personal details (or keeping them confidential).

Guiding Questions and Probes (to be adapted depending on the specific expertise of the interviewee):

1. What was the impact of the Taif Agreement/Good Friday Agreement/Ohrid Agreement on education?
   - Objectives of the peace agreement in regard to education;
   - Specific examples of implemented or sidelined reforms;
   - Sources for the inclusion of specific reforms in the peace agreements.
2. What are the most necessary education reforms in Lebanon/Northern Ireland/FYR of Macedonia?
   - Beneficiaries;
   - Champions of the reform.

3. What are the challenges to these reforms?
   - Obstacles with legislation (political);
   - Obstacles with implementation (teachers’ responses; resources; expertise);
   - Public reaction.

4. Does education contribute to peace and how?
   - Specific examples drawn from professional experience;
   - References to the existing education/political science literature if expert interviewee.