



University of Bergen

**STATE AND MEDIA INFLUENCE ON THE DRAWING OF ETHNIC
BOUNDARIES : KURDISH WORK MIGRANTS ON THE BLACK SEA COAST OF
TURKEY**

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ABSTRACT

In the Turkish Black Sea Region Kurdish agricultural workers and other ethnic groups interact and form relations. This study is focused on the effects of ethnic difference in the formation of these relations, groups' perception of each other and the issues that emerge out of these perceptions. Within the frame of this focus, this study problematizes the following matters: Do economic (advantageous or disadvantageous), social, ethnic parameters created by the ethnic difference between the groups form a threshold value? Do these threshold values get shaped by the discourses of state and media as well as economic, social, ethnic variables? Do these threshold values completely determine the relations and perceptions between Kurdish workers and the local public?

Barth's general approach assumes that the shaping of the relations between two ethnic groups and the borders that emerge between them accordingly are products of the interaction between the groups. Therefore he states that these borders are solely built on an interactional basis.

This research was prepared with the intention of emphasizing different mechanisms in the definition of borders between groups and it stands in opposition with Barth's argument. These mechanisms were designed to demonstrate that groups' perception of each other, content of their relations, and the borders between them are vulnerable to the effects of state and media. The main part of this research aims to demonstrate the effects of state and media formations which Barth has left blank while defining the emergence of the borders between ethnic groups.

Keywords: Immigration, ethnicity, Turk, Kurd, media, state

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

This research's context is the Province Ordu in the Black sea region of Turkey. It is focused on the relationships between the Kurdish seasonal agricultural workers who come to the region to gather hazelnuts and the local population of the region (including the state representatives and the producers). The main objective of this research is to shed light on the dynamics that drive, shape and give content to the relationships between these groups. Fundamental to these dynamics are; state and media discourses, which through their practice and politics, create the ethnic, economic, political, social and cultural variables of these relationships and this research aims to reveal their effects. With this objective, I did a field research in Ordu between August and September 2011 which was the season for gathering hazelnuts. Through participant observation and interviews I tried to understand the picture.

The borders between the seasonal Kurdish workers and the other groups in their work environment are very rigid. These borders get reshaped through the variables listed above and I believe they create a sphere which is worth to be studied anthropologically. The quantity of the seasonal workers in Turkey which is between 190-200 thousand according to the records also signifies the importance of this issue. The majority of these seasonal workers consist of Kurdish. Considering that seasonal workers work as a family, that their children also get involved with the work and that there is a significant amount of unrecorded labor force, agriculture experts estimate that their quantity is close to one million¹.

Although it doesn't enter the realm of this study, it has been observed that seasonal workers bring along their children to each city they work in. As a consequence, although indirectly, these school-age children get deprived of education opportunities and this lack of education is even strengthened with the bad living conditions they're exposed to. Within the last few years, state representatives took measures regarding the education of these children. Although they tried to enable these children to continue their education temporarily in the work place, these measures didn't create a lasting impact. Deprivation of these children of education

¹ Source: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalEklerDetayV3&ArticleID=1009782&CategoryID=42>.

opportunities is significant in the sense that in the long run they join the unskilled labor force just like their parents, and get obliged to continue this cycle.

Why was this research necessary? Especially within the last thirty years, there has been a radical economic and political transformation in Turkey. This transformation has reflected on one of the major components of Turkish society; Turkish-Kurdish relations. Some portion of this transformation has been surveyed in this research, particularly the issues related to the fact the relations between the two groups have transformed significantly as a consequence of the conflict between state and PKK². This relationship was relatively stable under the shadow of the denial and assimilation policies of the Republic³. However during the 1980s, through the conflicts that arose with the PKK, it turned into a low density war. These conflicts created effects in terms of the two parties' perception of each other. Although this situation created significant problems in the social and economic sphere, it also opened up a research sphere that is productive for the social sciences. The term "productive" shouldn't be interpreted as apathy for the agony people have gone through or as a conclusion devoid of humanistic perspective. At this point, anthropology is usually regarded as a social science capable of taking a side in terms of the social matters. In this respect, our acknowledgement is that these relations tend to be shaped within the frame of media and state discourses and this study aims to explain these processes.

In post-1980 Turkey's political sphere, the words Kurdish and Turkish were mentioned more than ever before. It's a conventional situation⁴ that this mentioning usually includes certain prejudices, exclusionist and chauvinist judgments. The relations between Turks, Kurds and the state have been and continue to be the subject of many studies both in the national and international sphere (including the academia). Through these studies, these relations have been analyzed ethnologically, etymologically, sociologically, demographically...etc and questions on the matter were tried to be answered accordingly. This issue which has a really dynamic structure has been an topic very frequently and has been analyzed in both local and international levels. The reasons behind these processes are the post-1980 war between the Turkish state and PKK and the consequences it created.

²PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party-Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan_Workers'_Party

³ Mesut Yegen, in an interview he made about his book; From Prospective Turk to Simple Citizen: Republic and the Kurds, talks about the beginning and the development stages of this issue. See <http://www.obarsiv.com/pdf/MesutYegen.pdf> For the book see also: Yegen, Mesut, Müstakbel-Türkten Sözde Vatandaşa: Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2009

⁴ The most distinguished examples of this matter can be seen in the website of the Turkish Left journal. See as an example <http://www.turksolu.org/sehit/6.htm>. This journal can be defined as the rightist corner in the "leftist" range in Turkey. In this article what is tried to be demonstrated is that eighty years old history of Turkey is the history of Kurdish invasion. This is tried to be enabled with a rough quantitative study.

Ethnicity engineering was introduced in the Late Ottoman Empire with the foundation of Ittihat ve Terakki (Party of Union and Progress). The Kurdish question, which is older than the eighty years old Turkish Republic, has been a product of ethnic, social, economic and political design process of Anatolia. It will be useful to discuss the historical background of this issue in detail in the following chapters. During the decade between the end of the eighties and end of the nineties, the conflict between the state and PKK was intensified. State forces cleared out thousands of Kurdish villages and a wave of extrajudicial executions and disappearances under custody was experienced⁵. As a consequence inhabitants of these regions migrated intensely to city centers in the same area such as Diyarbakir, Batman, Urfa and Antep as well as to western cities like Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin and Antalya. This process was an important determinant in the change that took place in the ethnic configuration of Turkey⁶.

The population living in the western parts of Turkey had seen parodies of the Kurds in Yesilcam⁷ movies, read about the Kurds in newspapers, magazines and novels. However as a result of these migrations, they had the opportunity to meet with the Kurds in the real

⁵ Several records Turkey Human Rights Association has published puts forth the cases of human rights violations in Turkey. Although it is assumed that there are many more cases than the recorded ones, these records give a sense about the severity of the situation According to the report association has presented to TBMM Human Rights Commission: The number of unidentified murders between 1990 and 2011 was 1901. Unidentified murders intensified during the years 1992, 1993 and 1994. The number of unidentified murders in 1990 was 11, in 1991 it was 31, and the numbers began to increase by the year 1992. In 1992 there were 362 cases, in 1993 there were 467 cases, and in 1994 there were 423 cases. By the year 1995 (166) number of unidentified murders began to decrease; in 1997 it fell to 65, in 1998 to 45 and in 1999 to 52. There were 13 cases in 2000, 24 cases in 2001, 8 cases in 2002, 16 cases in 2003, 8 cases in 2004 and 21 cases in 2006. The least number of cases were in 2002 and 2007, the number of unidentified cases in the preceding years is recorded as such: 2008 (30), 2009 (18), 2010 (9), 2011 (13). According to the report; the years in which extrajudicial executions, stop warnings and random fires were carried out the most were 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1996 respectively. Violation of right to life cases were 98 in 1991, 283 in 1992, 189 in 1993, 129 in 1994, 96 in 1995 and 129 in 1996. The cases in the preceding years are listed as such: 1997 (98), 1998 (80), 1999 (63), 2000 (56), 2001 (37), 2002 (38), 2003 (46), 2004 (35), 2005 (61), 2006 (49), 2007 (24), 2008 (37), 2009 (48), 2010 (29) 2011 (59). The number of people whose right to life has been violated through extrajudicial executions, stop warnings and random fires is 684. See

<http://sondevir.com/rakamlarlaturkiye/49832/son-30-yilda-kac-faili-mechul-cinayet-islendi.html?aType=kategori&kategoriID=47>. For the other reports ,see<http://tihv.org.tr>.

⁶ This issue has more severe consequences than a simple case of migration movement or replacement. Between the years 1980 and 2012, the situation of human rights in Turkey was tried to be brought forth through several reports, articles, conferences and similar hundreds of activities. By discussing these matters from all sides a consciousness was tried to be created. Looking at the reports in the site of Human Rights Association will help to understand the severity of the situation. See www.ihd.org.tr , http://www.ihd.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2484:zorla-yerinden-etme-uygulamasi&catid=47:makaleler&Itemid=125

⁷Yeşilcam is the name of a street in Beyoglu, İstanbul, which symbolizes the Turkish cinema. When someone talks about Yesilcam what they refer to is Turkish cinema. Yesilcam's approach to Kurdish question has always been adherent in a hygienic way. The Kurdish characters in the movies are represented as clueless, scanty, rude and with impolite speaking manners. Except a limited number of movies, Yesilcam as a whole looks at Kurds from the perspective defined by the state. Productions which have gone beyond this perspective were subjected to censorship, prohibiting and several other constraining practices. They were accused of not doing their jobs properly. For more information about Yesilcam see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cinema_of_Turkey.

sense⁸. Although this opportunity was without request and was enacted out of obligation, it opened up an important sphere for social sciences (Saracoglu, 2011:08).

It is fair to say that the entire corpus of studies of Kurdish includes two mainstream approaches: The first approach follows the state discourse has developed an antagonistic manner towards the existence of Kurdish ethnicity, its meaning, extent and structure. A big portion of the media, university society and intelligentsia are included to this approach⁹: Orhan Turkdogan, Mehmet Serif Firat (Firat, 2007) are some names among them. In the introduction of M. Serif Firat's book that was published post 27th of May coup d'etat; "Western Cities and History of Varto", Cemal Gürsel who was the head of the state at the time wrote "There is no such ethnicity on earth with independent identification that can be named as 'Kurds'". He is arguing that Kurds are actually "Eastern Turks" (Aksoy, 2012:436).

While Orhan Turkdogan (Turkdogan, 1998) was arguing that there is no such ethnicity as Kurds, Prof. Dr. Ahmet Buran¹⁰ was trying to include Kurds into Turkish lineage through Turkification of the word "Kurdish"(Baran, 2011). Prof. Dr. Yusuf Halacoglu¹¹, on the other hand, was arguing that Kurds were originally Turkomans.

The second approach belongs to those who prefer to answer questions rather than following the state discourse. The questions concerned are such as what is the Kurdish question, what are its components, what lies beneath it? They try to answer these questions in a manner that goes beyond official history's explanations(e.g. İsmail Besikci¹², Haluk Gerger (Gerger, 1995), Mesut Yegen¹³, Martin Van Bruinessen¹⁴ etc.).

⁸Cenk Saracoglu in his book called 'The City, Middle Class and Kurds: From Denial to "Recognized Exclusion"', explains how residents' perception and attitude towards the Kurds have changed after the Kurdish migration to Izmir resulted by the conflicts. See Saracoglu, Cenk, *Şehir, Orta Sınıf ve Kurtler Inkar'dan "Tanıyarak Dislama"ya*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2011

⁹The name of Orhan Turkdogan is important at this point; he sets an example which is symbolic of the interventions made against İsmail Besikci's criticisms to classical approach to Kurdish question. Orhan Türkdoğan denounced İsmail Besikci while he was an associate professor in Erzurum Atatürk University; as a consequence he was put on trial and discarded from the university. See http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C4%B0smail_Be%C5%9Fik%C3%A7i.

¹⁰Prof. Dr. Ahmet Buran Firat U. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, member of the department of Turkish Language and Literature

¹¹Prof. Dr. Yusuf Halacoglu is the former president of TTK (Turkish Historical Society). In his piece called "Anadolu'da Asiretler, Cemaatler, Oymaklar" he talks about the Turkman tribes who have become Kurdish; by talking about the tribes he tries to demonstrate that Kurds are a part of Turkish genealogy. See Halacoglu, Yusuf, *Anadolu'da Asiretler, Cemaatler, Oymaklar* 1453-1650 (6th cover), Turk Tarih kurumu yayinlari, Istanbul 2009.

¹² Mesut Yegen in his article called 'The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity' writes for his and Besikci's works: "The Pioneer of the view that the Turkish state discourse is an ideological narrative, which both misrepresents and conceals the true nature of the Kurdish question, is İsmail Besikci, whose reasoning had a defining impact on all critical accounts of the Turkish state discourse. In his numerous works Besikci advocated that the Turkish state discourse is an ideological narrative based on lie/falsity. See, for instance, Besikci's following works: *Kürtlerin Mecburi İskanı* [The Compulsory Settlement of Kurds], İstanbul: Komal, 1978; *Devletlerarası Sömürge Kürdistan* [Kürdistan: the Inter-state Colony], İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1990a; *Bilim-Resmi İdeoloji, Devlet - Demokrasi ve Kürt Sorunu* [Science - Official Ideology, State - Democracy and the Kurdish Question], İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1990b; *Tunceli Kanunu* (1935)

It is useful at this point to look briefly into the approach of those who side with the state discourse. After the foundation of the republic, the constitutions of 1921 and 1924 tell us two different things in terms of understanding the Kurdish existence. Due to its structure, the 1921 constitution constructed the citizenship of the republic devoid of ethnic emphasis. In the aftermath of Treaty of Lausanne¹⁵ this situation presents a totally different structure than the one in 1921. In the 1924 constitution the Kurds as a community wasn't even mentioned. With the introduction of the Law on the Maintenance of Order¹⁶ after the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925, the possibility of Kurdish demand for identity was obviated. The idea that there were no obstacles left on the way to become a nation state- with the confidence given by the Lausanne treaty-became the dominant discourse of Turkey in terms of Kurdish politics.

Classical Kemalism intentionally recognized the idea of a nation as a uniting principle which was beyond the Ottoman policy of uniting through religion. Until 1923, Mustafa Kemal was claiming that Kurds and Turks are in association and alliance. But after this point, the state discourse has changed. At the beginning, those whose ethnicity were Kurdish had the right to become members of the Turkish nation. After 1930s, this discourse was pushed one step further and it was argued that all Kurds and other Muslim ethnicities were Turks and descendants of Middle Eastern ancestors.

“The only blemishes on the nation were the non-Muslims, whom Turkey had to recognize and give certain rights under the Treaty of Lausanne. According to the Constitution, everyone

ve Dersim Jenosidi [The Tunceli Law (1935) and the Dersim Genocide], Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 1990c. Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasinin Programi (1931) ve Kurt Sorunu [The Programme of the Republican People's Party (1931) and the Kurdish Question], Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 1991a . Turk Tarih Tezi, Guneş- Dil Teorisi ve Kürt Sorunu [The Turkish History Thesis, The Sun-Language Theory and the Kurdish Question] Ankara: Yurt Yayinlarl, 1991b.” See Yeğen, Mesut, The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr., 1996), pp. 216-229. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283801>

¹⁵The Kurdish Question in Turkey: Denial to Recognition”, Marlies Casier & Joost Jongerden (eds.) Nationalisms and Political Islam in Turkey, (London: Routledge, 2010), Devlet Soyleminde Kurt Sorunu, Iletisim Yayinlari, 1999. etc most of his academic studies are devoted to this matter.

¹⁴Bruinessen, Martin van, Kurdish Ethno-Nationalism, Versus Nation-Building States. Collected articles. Istanbul: ISIS, 2000, Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Genocide in Kurdistan? The Suppression of the Dersim Rebellion in Turkey (1937-38) and the Chemical War Against the Iraqi Kurds (1988)’, in George J. Andreopoulos (ed.), Conceptual and historical dimensions of genocide, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994, pp. 141-70. Bruinessen, Martin van, Genocide of Kurds”, in: Israel W. Charny (ed), The widening circle of genocide [= Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review, vol 3]. New Brunswick, NY: Transaction Publishers, 1994, pp. 165-191. For the list of all these publications see <http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/>.

¹⁵ For the Treaty of Lausanne see http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lozan_Antla%C5%9Fmas%C4%B1.

¹⁶ This was a code which was prepared for the measures that will be taken after Sheikh Said Rebellion which started in mid February of 1925. This code was composed of three items and the first one was: “Any organization, promoters, supporters and publications aiming to create a reaction or rebellion, or violating the social order, peace and security can be subjected to prohibition solely with the signature of the president. The perpetrators can be also transferred to Independence Courts by the government. See http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Takrir-i_S%C3%BCk%C3%BBn_Kanunu.

with Turkish citizenship is a Turk, but in practice this is not the case for Christians and Jews. The very existence of minorities was resented as an imposition by the Imperialists. Turkey's official secularism has never meant equal rights for all religions – only Muslims had full rights, as long as they were not too religious.” (Bruinessen, 2009)

In order to widen the sphere of influence of this discourse, several academic and non-academic writers supported it. According to these writers; Kurds were Turks who lived on the mountains, and it wasn't possible to talk of a specific ethnicity defined as Kurds. Several studies were conducted in order to support this argument. The fact that the concept of “Kurdishness” was part of this issue was always ignored. The Kurdish question was defined through concepts such as regional backwardness and tribal rebellions and the issue's ethno-political characteristics were gone unnoticed.

Between the years 1920 and 1980, the Turkish state presented a position which denies the existence of any Kurdish ethnicity on its own land. Even with the presence of such a discourse built on politics of denial, there were still speculations regarding the Kurdish existence. Many books, articles and essays were published on this matter. The main argument of these publications was that Kurdishness of Kurdish question was being ignored.

Within the state discourse, when the Kurdish question was being discussed, they often referred to certain stereotypical phrases: reactionism, regional backwardness, lawless”, “tribal”, “religionist”, “economically insulated” and “positioned against Kemalist modernization project” (Demir-Zeydanlioglu, 2010). The phrases listed above were often called upon but the essence of the question in terms of ethno-political field was never spoken. It was expected of the texts and the “intellectuals” who produce those texts to make use of the terms listed above and conduct their interpretations accordingly. Most of the intellectuals made use of those terms without hesitation. Relying on this, state discourse denied the existence of Kurdish identity in a stronger fashion. Any Kurdish movement that emerged was defined as reactionism, tribal rebellion, smuggling and anti-modernist¹⁷.

Besides this denial, the state has prevented the Kurds from constructing a collective consciousness through forced displacements and assimilation policies which restrained the

¹⁷ For the article series Ayse Hur has published in Taraf Newspaper; Kurds and the State from the Ottoman Empire till Today, “The late birth of Kurdish Nationalism”, see. <http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/27464.pdf>.

continuation of their identities. Such procedures are still being implemented. The existence of Kurdish national identity was put out of sight in Turkey through politics of denial; this way claim against discrimination could still be maintained (Yeğen, 1996:217-218).

Within the approach built upon the state discourse described above; there is an apparent endeavor against Kurdish existence as an ethnic community. The other studies which tried to reveal the essence of the subject were mostly composed of sociological, historical and anthropological studies of Kurds and the Kurdish question and they tried to explain the relationships between Kurds and other groups. In this respect, even a brief literature review concerning how these relations were formed and under what conditions they developed, will produce hundreds of articles, book and documents. Bringing out and reviewing those studies which are relevant to this research was a process which required vigorous efforts.

The last thirty years was an era in which ethnic groups were finding themselves or were being forced to find themselves. As a consequence, in different parts of the world, ethnic conflicts and wars emerged. On top of the lack of confidence and chaos created by these conflicts, the resources of conflict areas were made ready to get easily exploited. This was one of the main objectives of the dominant economic discourse of the era; neo-liberalism. On the other hand, Kurdish question with its historical background presents a different appearance than the other similar conflicts. Even though the conflict is affiliated with the neo-liberal world order on the one side, it has long-established roots with its historical background.

The unemployment that emerged in Turkish cities as a consequence of the economic atmosphere created specifically by the post 1980 neo-liberal¹⁸ politics (Pelek, 2010) and its effects such as migration to the cities formed one part of the Kurdish question (Saracoglu, 2011:77). The economic condition created by the unemployment also reflected intensely on the social sphere. The Kurdish groups who migrated to cities mostly found employment in informal economic sectors, and this was an important determinant in city community's perception of Kurds. As a consequence of this sectoral segregation, Kurds began to be defined by the other groups as mafia, pickpockets and purse snatchers (Saracoglu, 2011:23-24). The other part of the question was composed of the oppression, violence, politics of assimilation

¹⁸Pelek, Deniz, "Seasonal Migrant Workers in Agriculture: The Cases of Ordu and Polatlı" Boğaziçi University Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History, Unpublished Master Thesis, Istanbul, 2010.

and denial Kurds were subjected to within the historical era which also includes the last century of the Ottoman Empire.

The nation state discourse which can be discussed on this background plays a fundamental role in this question. The history of the Turkish Republic is fundamentally shaped around the concept of nation state. The republic attempted to create a homogenous unity in terms of culture and ethnicity within its own borders. These politics were taken over by the rulers of Party of Union and Progress which was the ruling party in the last era of the Ottoman Empire¹⁹ (Ungor, 2008)(Dundar, 2001). These were accepted as the founding frame of the Republic and through similar policies a homogenous ethnicity based upon Turkishness was attempted to be created. All this history can be read by the social sciences as the history of politics of denial and assimilation directed towards the Kurds, and it creates a sphere which is worth studying for the social scientists.

From the Ottoman Empire till today, the engineering of public perception which emerged with the state discourse, stands as the most important issue left as a legacy to today's Turkey. Turkey is a migration society which includes a wide range of ethnic groups. Even though the politics of denial²⁰ came to an end with 2000s, politics of assimilation are still continuing at a rapid pace. This shows us that the consequences that may emerge out of this conflict are still not completely comprehended by the state authorities.

Since there was no separate public or community known as Kurds, the rage created by the low density war at West was to be directed towards possible "scapegoats" such as "terrorists" or "exterior focuses". Even though the war creates an abundant ground for popularizing the Turkish nationalism, there didn't emerge a discriminatory-exclusionist-nationalist discourse targeting the Kurds as a whole, no such discourse was popularized.

Within the last few years there has been a significant breakdown on this issue: The Kurds as a separate ethnicity were recognized gradually. Old arguments like "mountain Turks" turned into mockeries and lost their reputation and value.

¹⁹ For Ungor's article see <http://www.ejts.org/document2583.html>. For Ayse Hur's "Late Birth of Kurdish Nationalism" in Kurds and the State from the Ottoman Empire Till Today see <http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/27464.pdf>

²⁰Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat who has been the vice president of AKP(Justice and Development Party)during a period in which denial politics have ended, but assimilation still continued talks to Rusen Çakir from Vatan newspaper "Education in maternal language is a fundamental issue. President has said "we removed rejection, assimilation and denial" but I believe that rejection and denial have really been removed but assimilation is still ongoing. See <http://haber.gazetevatan.com/altinci-yilinda-kurt-acilimi-4/394232/4/Haber>

When we evaluate this fact on its own, it can be considered as a development which is pleasing. Developments such as recognition of the Kurds as a separate community, although indirectly, acknowledging that this population might have its own demands and these facts becoming discussable are surely pleasing matters. But there is also the other side of the coin: When the Kurds are recognized as an anomalous group at the social level, they also become potential “targets” for social rage.

...

Within the last years, especially in those areas in which Kurds who were forced to migrate have settled and even in areas where Kurdish seasonal workers work, this social potential became apparent. Several cases of “lynching” and attacks give a good amount of information regarding this potential and create anxiety²¹.

The main axis of the shift perception of Kurds is the recognition of Kurdish reality, but it also creates different perspectives regarding the Kurds at the societal level. Even a small friction between the groups; a small problem, could easily grow and become popularized.

While I was typing these lines, I came across a news report in several websites and I believe it presents a striking example which demonstrates the point above. In Emet district of Kutahya²², a crowded group argued that Kurdish workers at a construction site have “shouldered”²³ them and opened a PKK flag afterwards. This crowded group attacked and set on fire the tents in which the Kurdish workers were staying. The police raised the Turkish flag over the construction site in order to soothe the public. The governor of Kutahya felt the need to urgently go to the district and through his and the police commissioner’s and the city gendarmerie commander’s efforts the situation was put under control at the late hours same day. The Kurdish workers were removed from the region clad in police outfits. After the incident the governor made this striking explanation: *“At first we didn’t pay much attention to the incident but it has been carried towards different levels. Our investigation showed that the rumor that initiated the growth of the incident wasn’t real. These 16 workers have come here to work from Van and Ercis after the earthquake. When they arrived to our region we did security interrogations to them. Since we didn’t come across any negativite they started to*

²¹ “New Nationalist Mentality”, For the rest of the article by Foti Benlisoy see <http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/131613-yeni-milliyetci-zihniyet>.

²² It should be noted here that in December 2010 in Kutahya, Kurdish workers who have been working in TOKI (Mass Housing Administration) construction sites demanded their fees, but they were accused of being PKK supporters and their fees were not paid afterwards. See <http://www.firatnews.eu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=38132>.

²³Shouldering refers to the situation in which someone walking hits strongly someone else coming from the opposite side on the shoulder. The person who is shouldering does this action as a challenge with the intention of creating a fight.

*work. We removed these workers safely to Kutahya. So far only two young men from Emet made a complaint about getting shouldered. Three others who were involved with the incident at the beginning haven't made any complaints. The complaints are solely about the shouldering matter*²⁴. Here we can say that state representatives try to legitimize the “public’s” deliria. They do this legitimization by not giving voice to the nationalist and racist part of these reactions towards Kurdish groups. They either behave as though no such social reaction exists or try to legitimize the reaction²⁵.

Similar incidents that has taken place in Western Turkey provide significant clues in terms of understanding how these groups perceive each other and the determinants of these perceptions. The borders that emerged between these groups and the relations between them have a structure that is vulnerable to state politics rather than one that is developing on its own. Likewise in this study, we are arguing that the relations between the groups are directed and led by mechanisms which originate from state and media, until these groups interact in reality. Here our interest will be the manifestation of these relations. Our objective is to put forward the nature and structure of the relations between Kurdish workers who come to Ordu from a variety of regions for gathering hazelnuts, residents of the region and the state representatives. The attitudes and perceptions of these two ethnic groups towards each other and the borders between these groups are directed and led by certain mechanisms which are exterior to them. The most important and effective of these directing and leading parameters are the ones created through media’s influence or via state. Therefore according to us, state discourse and politics and media’s position towards these relations can be considered as the main determinants of the nature of these relations.

An anthropologically strong claim has followed me throughout this research. Fredrik Barth’s (Barth, 1998) argument on the borders between ethnic groups was a major influence for a

²⁴About these news reports, see

<http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1081694&CategoryID=77> and <http://www.sondakika.com/haber-kutahya-da-okul-insaatindaki-gerginlik-3446886/>.

There are wide news archives about similar incidents, for some of them see

<http://www.firatnews.eu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=47208>

<http://www.firatnews.eu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=47108>

<http://www.firatnews.eu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=54014>

<http://www.firatnews.eu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=39418>

<http://www.firatnews.eu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=38132>

<http://www.firatnews.eu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=30838>

<http://www.firatnews.com/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=35211>,
²⁵ A similar legitimization was experienced in March of 2008 in Beyoglu. An individual set fire with pump rifle on Kurdish groups who were protesting, and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan defended him arguing he was doing “self-defense”. He tried to legitimate the behavior. See

<http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=906612&CategoryID=78> Tanil Bora in his study called ‘Political Thought in Turkey-Nationalism’, puts emphasis on the determining role of state in nationalism being spread and getting popularized. He states that within the six barbs of Kemalism (Kemalism has six barbs: Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Etatism, Secularism and Revolutionism) nationalism is the most dominant one (Saracoglu, 2011: 15).

long time on this claim. This claim was about the directing parameters which balanced or imbalanced the borders between ethnic groups and how certain relation types such as potential conflicts or cooperation between these groups emerged. Barth's strong argument stated that the borders between the groups were shaped through the influence of the relations between them. According to him, the cultural and economic interactions between the groups were strong enough to shape the form and the content of these borders. In this respect, the borders which are created by relations that emerged out of economic competition or in the absence of competition could differ. But was this the real picture? Wasn't there any other determinant than the relations between the groups in determining the form and nature of these borders? At this point we put forward our claim against Barth's argument: the relations between the groups can be determined by many parameters which are exterior to the groups. Here we will conduct our research by focusing on parameters such as discourses and practices of media and state.

2. Objective and Motives

The main focus of this study is what goes on between Kurdish seasonal agricultural workers and other groups. It aims to explore why the ethnic relationship develops in this particular way, what are the determinants of the relations between Kurdish workers and other groups and, how these relations get mutually shaped and what affects them.

The reasons for choosing Ordu were the intense hazelnut agriculture in the region and the presence of Kurdish seasonal workers that are employed there. Furthermore with the arrival of the hazelnut gathering season in Ordu, conflicts frequently emerged between Kurdish agricultural workers and residents of the region. These conflicts were mostly nurtured by certain discriminatory practices of the local government and they constituted another reason for choosing Ordu as the research field. We chose Ordu with the assumption that picking a region in which problems frequently emerged will enable us to understand the problem more easily.

The process of putting forward the relations between Kurdish workers and other groups will include research methods such as in-depth interviews, observation and participant observation, literature review and review of news reports and their interpretations in certain press organs. Besides these methods, technical devices such as recorder and camera will be used throughout this research.

As a consequence of the conflict between PKK and state forces, Kurdish population was forced to migrate²⁶ by the state or had to migrate. Although most of them migrated to western part of Turkey, some of them migrated to city centers in Southern and Eastern regions. These migrations resulted with serious recessions in sectors such as agriculture and animal husbandry in Southern and Eastern regions. Accordingly unemployment rates at city centers increased and it created certain economic and social problems. The population which arrived to city centers through forced migration was subjected to serious economic constraints. Therefore this time, they started to migrate to work as seasonal agriculture workers²⁷ (Duruiz, 2009).

These people who have left their land through forced migrations are already unemployed and are lacking a steady income. A portion of this Kurdish population is migrating to Western, Northern and Southern regions of Turkey; particularly in summer and autumn, for gathering certain agricultural products (cotton, hazelnuts, peppers, oranges, tangerines, lemons, lentils and chickpeas..etc). They migrate to work sites based upon verbal agreements made with plantation owners through the intermediacy of the people they call “elci” or “dayibasi”(this naming is regional, and dayibasi is preferred in Aegean and Black sea regions). The orientation of these migrations is economic and they are seasonal. They are considered as an important source of income for these people who don’t have a steady income. They migrate with their families and save the earned money to cover family’s winter expenses.

These people mostly migrate from the regions in which Kurdish population lives and some of them are Kurds who have migrated to the West through forced migration. Problems begin with the transportation of these people with Kurdish ethnicity to the migration sites in terribly unhealthy conditions. They continue with these workers being forced to stay in inhumane camping sites in working areas which are similar to ghettos (every year in the migration period of the seasonal workers, tens of workers lose their lives in car accidents²⁸). Because of physical and psychological obstacles imposed on seasonal workers by state representatives,

²⁶ Here Deniz Yukseker and Bilgin Ayata used the term internal displacement whose frame was defined through the appointment of Francis Deng in 1992 as United Nations Internally Displaced Individuals Special Representative, to refer to forced displacement imposed on the Kurds by the state. <http://home.ku.edu.tr/~dyukseker/ayata-yukseker1.pdf>

²⁷ <http://home.ku.edu.tr/~dyukseker/ayata-yukseker1.pdf> , <http://bianet.org/biamag/bianet/100867-mevsimlik-isciler-zorunlu-goc-magdurlari>

²⁸ See <http://bianet.org/bianet/toplum/127453-25-liraya-mevsimlik-isciydiler-kazada-can-verdiler>.

police forces and local residents, their entrance to village, town and city centers is precluded²⁹.

The general situation of seasonal workers in work sites and living areas has a structure which is vulnerable to periodic political, economic, social and societal effects of Kurds' and Turks' perception of each other. The political atmosphere Turkey is placed in also has an effect on this situation. What are the economic, political, ethnic, social and communal components of these perceptions? How and to what extent do these components factors shape the relations between the seasonal workers and other groups in the area? Are these components capable of making an impact on configuration of these relations?

Do groups' historical backgrounds have an impact on their perception of each other? What shapes and leads the relations created by bilateral perceptions? What nurtures these perceptions which create forms of relations based on reciprocal impulsion and endurance? Are the relations between the groups solely shaped around economic dependency? Is it possible to talk about processes in which groups "other" each other? If such processes are present how are they grounded and given content? Does the political atmosphere shaped by the state play a role in these "othering" processes? What is the impact of this political atmosphere in groups' self-definitions? Is media (including press, visual, auditory and web media) effective in shaping these relations? If yes, what is the strength and extent of this impact? If it's possible to talk about such an impact, what nurtures media while it is leading, shaping and giving content to public opinion reflexes? What are the acknowledgments media's reposing on? What are the socio-political and socio-economic facilitators and obstacles that affect groups' perception, othering, exclusion and acceptance of each other?

²⁹ See <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/esitsizlik-cok-derin-kadinlarin-durumu-korkunc/devrim-sevimay/siyaset/yazardetay/19.07.2010/1265235/default.htm>
http://www.zaphaber.com/news_detail.php?id=7726
<http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=mevsimlik-isciler-fisleniyor--0708101200>

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Theoretical Framework

This research discusses how workers are perceived in migration sites and their relation with other groups there within the period that starts with the temporary migration of the Kurdish seasonal agricultural workers. Considering this as the theoretical base, this study will be focused and built upon concepts such as migration, ethnicity, ethnic identity formation and state and media's role in it.

Within the framework of this study, the concept of ethnicity has a fundamental importance. It is necessary to explain how the concept of "ethnicity" should be perceived and under which theoretical framework it should be discussed while studying the relations formed by two different groups' interaction. When we take into account the impact of ethnicity on the Kurdish seasonal workers' economic relations with other ethnic groups, the importance of this concept becomes even more apparent.

Jenkins questions what anthropologists mean when they talk about ethnicity. Or what does someone refer to when he/she mentions ethnicity?

"So, what do anthropologists mean when they talk about ethnicity? What does anyone mean when they talk about ethnicity? The word comes from ancient Greek ethnos, which seems to have referred to a range of situations in which a collectivity of human lived and acted together (Ostergerd 1992a:32), and which is typically translated today as 'people' or 'nation'." (Jenkins, 2008:10)

Abdurrahim Ozmen in his doctoral dissertation called *"Ethno-cultural Borders in the Example of Tur Abdin Assyrians"* states that two important questions should be answered in order to understand the emergence and sustainability of ethnicity. These are;

1. What is the nature of ethnicity? Is it inherited or constructed?
2. What determines being a member of an ethnicity or being identified through it? In other words what is the basis of ethnicity?

Moving on with these questions he states that ethnicity studies can be classified under four approaches. These are;

1. Primordialist Approach
2. Constructionist School
3. Instrumentalist School
4. Transactionalism

Primordialist approach argues that ethnicity is inherited from the ancestors and that it has a structure which cannot be changed. According to this definition kinship is an important relationship. Primordialists have a cultural approach as well as the kinship emphasis which signifies the importance of culture within this approach.

Primordialism falls short of explaining how ethnic identities change or how ethnicities emerge out of biologically different groups. Furthermore, primordialism ignores broad historical perspectives which strengthen/weaken or construct/deconstruct ethnic interdependence.

Constructionist school argues that ethnicity is socially constructed and it has a dynamic structure with flexible borders. According to this argument, ethnic identity is constructed which means that ethnicity is a reaction towards the changing social environment. Unlike primordialism, constructionist school doesn't point out to the importance of economic and political accounts in ethnicity construction.

Within the instrumentalist approach ethnicity is a device or a strategic tool for reaching resources. If the membership on an ethnic group is profitable, people would become members or stay as members. Ethnic groups are also groups of interest.

Finally, transactionalism regards ethnicity as a product of social conditions. Barth is the leading figure of this school and it focuses on the relations between ethnic groups rather than the cultural components which create the differentiation of these groups. The reasons for an ethnic group to form culture are group's interaction with different environmental factors and different forms of living and behavioral patterns that are developed as a consequence of this interaction. Ethnic groups survive as long as they can preserve their borders. Borders are not rigid but dynamic and flexible. Ethnic belonging is determined not through the objective differences but through the differences that are formed within the communal process. Considering this, the reactions groups give to environmental conditions and the interaction between the groups become very important (Ozmen, 2006: 69-78).

Ozmen states that the approaches mentioned above are practical for migrant communities in western societies. Considering the societies of Turkey and Middle East are natives of their lands, he finds an interscholastic approach necessary for explaining the situation of these societies. This approach is based on the idea that ethnic groups and their borders are constantly getting constructed by individuals, groups themselves, other ethnic groups and society. Genealogy, personal interests, economic, political and social interests constitute the basis of ethnicity's social construction (Ozmen, 2006:82).

Ozmen presents this interscholastic approach through Philip Yang's³⁰ chart.

Approaches	Primordialism	Constructionism	Instrumentalism	Interscholastic Approach
Overview	Imputed identity; qualities that are inherited by genealogy	Socially constructed identity	Social devices	Identity constructed by genealogy and society
Ethnic Boundaries	Stationary	Flexible	Flexible	Partially stationary but can be changed
Foundations	Ancestors/Genealogy	Society	Cost/Function	Ancestors, society, cost/function

Chart 1: Source: (Ozmen, 2006:83)

Suavi Aydın, in his work called *"Identity Conflict, Nationalism and "Turkish Identity"*, defines ethnicity as:

"Ethnicity is a communal/cultural and sometimes political formation which sets itself apart and is considered as "different" by the others through certain religious, linguistic, contextual and/or cultural qualities. It has a complete identity and culture process unique to itself. Through intermarriage group identity is preserved and group's persistence is enabled. One, some or all of the factors listed above can be important and they are prone to change by time and space. In this respect, ethnicity can be defined as a contextual phenomenon and within the historical process same group can be variant in terms of ethnic identities. Sometimes even though the name of an ethnicity persists throughout history, what it refers to can change"(Aydın, 1998:55-56).

³⁰See Yang, Philip Q. (2000) *Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches*, New York: State University of New York Press.

Within the realm of this research the concept of ethnicity will refer to the definition cited above and will be discussed accordingly. The main parameters which enable groups to code themselves and other groups as “us” and “others” are shaped through the axis of state and media. Putting emphasis on this matter is an important part of this research. Groups’ definition of themselves and others, their emphasis on differences and similarities are shaped by the same parameters which form the borders between the groups. In this research, state and media are considered as the main actors that shape the relations between the groups. Although this research doesn’t deny the importance of interaction and economic factors between the groups, it holds the perspective that what needs to be underlined is state and media in this context.

By referring to Bauman³¹ Ozmen states that ethnicity isn’t just a group’s essential difference from the others but also the way the group perceives and judges the “other”. He underlines the importance of authority, social inequality and conflicts of interests in shaping these perceptions and judgments. According to us, authority’s power’s capacity is accepted as important and emphasized in the perceptions and judgments of Kurdish seasonal workers and the local public in Ordu. Media can be considered as the maintenance of authority’s power. It presents itself as an important parameter in groups’ perceptions and judgments of each other.

Ana Marie Alonso draws attention to state’s role in shaping ethnicity;

“Nationalism is partly an effect of the totalizing and homogenizing projects of state formation (35). These projects produce an imagined sense of political community that conflates peoplehood, territory, and state. But state formation also generates categories of Self and Other within a polity. In contrast to nationalism, ethnicity is partly an effect of the particularizing projects of state formation, projects that produce hierarchized forms of imagining peoplehood that are assigned varying degrees of social esteem and differential privileges and prerogatives within a political community.”(Alonso, 1994:391)

The concept of race which was very popular until the Second World War left its place to the concept of ethnicity after 1950s (Ozmen, 2006:39). With the coming down of the concept of

³¹See Baumann, Gerd, *The Multicultural Riddle: Rethinking National, Ethnic, and Religious Identities*, New York – London: Routledge, 1999.

race, concept of ethnicity came with its emphasis on historical and cultural differences. According to Anthony Smith defining features of an ethnicity are collective name, genealogy myth, shared history, shared culture, identification through a specific space/land and solidarity. He also adds that these six components may not be present at the same extent in the same ethnicity and they are prone to change according to context and relations between groups (Ozmen, 2006:41-46). Ozmen also adds economic and political unity to these components. In the realm of this study, we also will frequently emphasize the economic and political aspects of the relations between the Kurdish seasonal workers and other ethnic groups.

Barth in the introduction of his collected work that was published in 1969; *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, states that cultural qualities can't be included into the definition of ethnicity. He adds that the focus of ethnicity researches shouldn't be the "cultural core", but the communal borders between the groups (Eriksen, 2009:372). The fact that the borders between the ethnic groups are dynamic and flexible makes the concept of ethnicity also open to change and dynamic.

"The critical focus of investigation from this point of view becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses. The boundaries to which we must give our attention are of course social boundaries, through they may have territorial counterparts... What is more , the ethnic boundary canalizes social life- it entails a frequently quite complex organization of behavior and relations"(Barth, 1998:15).

Eriksen in his study called *Ethnicity and Nationalism* writes that;

"For ethnicity to come about, the groups must have a minimum of contact with each other, and they must entertain ideas of each other as being culturally different from themselves. If these conditions are not fulfilled, there is no ethnicity, for ethnicity is essentially an aspect of a relationship, not a property of a group. This a key point."(Eriksen, 1993:12).

According to him, even the presence of two groups and the minimal relations between them are key points in defining ethnicity. It's similar to the example about not being able to clap with one hand.

Barth's general approach assumes that the shaping of the relations between two ethnic groups and the borders that emerge between them accordingly are products of the interaction between

the groups. Therefore he states that these borders are solely built on an empirical basis. Groups' cultural structures can change with different ecologic locations. Accordingly the group's cultural structure can't be regarded as a constant part of that group's ethnic identity. Accordingly he puts emphasis on the changeability of cultural aspect rather than the given cultural structure. He argues that the borders between the groups get shaped through mutual interaction and their perception and definition of themselves. According to him the borders between different ethnic groups are entirely determined by the relations between groups and he mentions no such exterior mechanism that could make an impact on these borders³².

This research was prepared with the intention of emphasizing different mechanisms in the definition of borders between groups and it stands in opposition with Barth's argument. These mechanisms were designed to demonstrate that groups' perception of each other, content of their relations, the borders between them are vulnerable to the effects of state and media. The main part of this research aims to demonstrate the effects of state and media formations which Barth has left blank while defining the emergence of the borders between ethnic groups.

Differing from the transactionalist approach, Barth's interest was on the relations between ethnic groups rather than the different cultural qualities. Within the societies with multiple ethnicities, it's possible to say that economy has an aspect that prevents conflict by bringing groups together. If groups' interdependence doesn't create a competition in terms of accessing the resources, it can be defined as an ethnic division of labor. In these divisions of labor, it is necessary for groups to live in different ecological locations. Barth defines the plural society as the society in which ethnic difference and economic interdependence unite (Kottak, 2001:69-70). The economic interdependence between the groups-only if it doesn't create competition in accessing limited resources-has a quality that prevents ethnic conflicts and divergence. But here it is necessary to mention an important factor which is shaping different ethnic groups' perception of each other. This factor emerges at nation state's approach to differences in its formation. Baskin Oran talks about two different approaches of the states in terms of ethnic identities. These are assimilation and integration. Integration presents a unity in society but at the same time respects the differences. In assimilation, state tries to destroy all ethnic, linguistic, religious differences and create a uniform nation. In societies with a wide range of differences, if the economic welfare level is low, assimilation heads towards violence. In such situations ethnic identities get sharper. When regional economic instabilities

³²Barht, Fredrik, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, Introduction. See http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic228815.files/Week_2/Barth%20Introduction%20Ethnic%20Groups%20and%20Boundaries%20.pdf

intersect with ethnic differences, it's possible talk about ethnic identities becoming prominent in disadvantageous regions (Tumtas, 2007:51).

The state formation mentioned above is the missing part of Barth's approach to ethnic identity. He doesn't emphasize the effects of state formation on groups' perception of each other and on the relations that emerge. This emphasis is a fundamental point in our study. Barth underlines the idea that the concept of ethnic group finds its meaning within the interaction between the groups and their contest areas (borders between them). He writes that ethnic groups' perception of themselves and other groups and their attitude towards them become apparent in these areas. But he overlooks the point that nation state formation or state structure has a position to intervene to ethnic groups' perceptions, attitudes and structures. He misses out their formative powers. Although Barth's main approach is very explanatory and useful, we shouldn't forget that he missed out the effects of "state" formation. Likewise, the relations between the Kurdish seasonal workers and other ethnic groups and their perception of each other, turned into its present form through getting nurtured by historical state politics. The other part of the research will be conducted through media which has also been shaped by state politics but still increased its power. Media's approach to the relations between the Kurdish workers and other groups and to the similar matters, reports it has published, comments it has made and its discourse play important parts in the emergence of the borders between the groups.

The legacy of Ittihat ve Terakki (Party of Union and Progress) to the Republic that was mentioned above; ideal of creating one single nation, brought forth politics of removing ethnic differences through oppression³³. Therefore; Turkish ethnic identity was defined as Republic's main fabric, and other ethnic identities were subjected to assimilation. State formation is worth to mention at this point since it determines both the economic relations that bond the seasonal Kurdish workers and the relations between groups. There's a nice saying in Turkish: "Kurdish migration improves gradually". Likewise, this research had to open itself up as a consequence of some of the findings we came up with in the field. Even though the importance of state's impact is indisputable for this research, we also give a lot of importance to the influence of media. The statement of Ozdem Sanberk, retired ambassador, on media's influence are important in this sense.

³³ For more information on this issue, see Dundar, Fuat, *Modern Türkiye'nin Sifresi Ittihat ve Terakkinin Etnisite Muhendisligi (1913-1918)*, İletişim Yayınları, 2010, Ankara.

Ozdem Sanberk in his article that was published in Radikal writes that today legitimacy has changed hands and shifted from politics and diplomacy to public opinion's sense and the media that represents that sense. He states that the tendency to perceive media's sense of truth as an indisputable reality has always existed and it manifested itself in cases such as Dreyfus Affair. He emphasizes that in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Somalia, Rwanda and Gaza the dominant factor that shapes countries' and international society's decisions is the power of communication technologies; particularly TV channels. He adds that although we all live in a democracy of public opinion today, all our perceptions are shaped by the press and visual media. He underlines that the extent of this power manifests itself the most in TV channels. Accordingly the context of a diplomacy war is constituted by the press, visual media and TV channels;

“But we shouldn't forget the two determining key powers that lay behind the press, audio and visual media, these powers and the media are in mutual interaction. The first of these powers is politics. But the powers that shape politics are knowledge and thought. Therefore the role of thought organizations in political sphere, in management of public opinion and particularly in public opinion diplomacy is critically important”³⁴.

The quotation about media's shaping nature which is cited above has a very explanatory content. Metin Kazancı in his article called *“Althusser, Ideology and the Unbearable Heaviness of Communication”* comes to this conclusion about the decisiveness of media;

“On the other hand, news organizations are both ideological products of material development and factors that contribute to the material development. The news which is the main function of these organizations is essentially materialistic. It is born within segments, develops and in the end leaves ideological formation as a trace. At this point, news which is a product of mass communication devices folds into a new identity. News becomes one of the constructive components of ideology”³⁵(Kazancı, 2002:67).

Suavi Aydın in his study called *“Identity Conflict, Nationalism and Turkish Identity”* (Aydın, 1988), defines ethnicity not as a basis for nation-state or a founding component of it, but contrastingly as a fictionalized product for nation state to legitimize its presence and to create a certain secular frame of trust. Therefore the ethnic identity that is referred to during the

³⁴For this article see <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=976533&CategoryID=99>

³⁵For the article also see <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/42/464/5297.pdf>.

emergence of nation state doesn't overlap with the real identities most of the time. Accordingly the main axis of nation state's politics of culture and education is shaped through the internalization of this identity. In conclusion, the subjective side of ethnic or national identity always weighs stronger. People's relations to an ethnicity or nation manifests itself not in their birth places, languages, religion, race and origin but within the rupture of the relationship between how they're perceived by the others and how they feel about themselves. At this rupture, it's possible to embrace other's perception as a reaction or in harmony, but it's also possible to completely deny it and stick to your own identification (Tumtas, 2007:32).

Concept of Migration and Turkey

When we look at the major transformations that took place within the history of civilization, it can be seen that they all took place as a consequence of a major migration incident: Migration from the east of Africa to Mesopotamia and other regions, Migration of Tribes, Geographical Explorations.etc.

Migration and issues related to it still constitute an important part of social sciences; particularly anthropology. Migration studies had an important role in the development of anthropology. In 1970s and 1980s, with the influence of Bath, ethnic identity was emphasized in the migration studies that are conducted in the realm of anthropology (Vertovec, 2007:962, 963). During 1990s, gender studies gained importance in anthropology as well as migration studies (Vertovec, 2007:962,963, 1994).

Even though in today's world migrations have a general tendency to emerge out of economic³⁶ reasons, migrations also emerge out of wars, violations of human rights, political unrest and rebellions that take place all around the world (Meissner, 1992:66).

The concept of migration has the capacity to create mutual change/transformation since it refers to mobility between two different spaces. The physical and social environment (political, ethnic, psychological) of the migrated place determines the extent and content of this process.

The most commonly applied approach in migration studies that are conducted in the international sphere is the pull-push factors. In this approach the country they have left

³⁶Cinar, Sidar-Lordoglu, Kuvvet, "Seasonal Agricultural Workers: From Sharecroppers To Paid Hazelnut Workers" see <http://www.sosyalhaklar.net/2011/bildiri/sidar-lordoglu.pdf>.

presents a distant appearance to immigrants in terms of their political, economic and cultural demands. On the other hand the country they've migrated to presents an attractive meaning to immigrants and they feel as though this country will meet their demands. While the country that is left holds repellent elements, the country they've migrated to holds attractive elements; therefore they get chosen accordingly (Caglayan, 2006). In this respect we can say that history of migration is shaped by a rational choice. Economic factors become prominent in the emergence of this choice (Mecin, 2004:19).

Marxist developmentalist approach binds migration to capitalist expansionism and argues that the route will be from the undeveloped or underdeveloped regions to the capitalist regions. They underline the inevitable nature of this process.

In general terms, migration has two types defined as internal and external. Internal migration occurs within the borders of one country and external migration exceeds the borders of one country. Both of them are affected by changing economic, ecological, political and individualistic parameters. Here we can discuss two subcategories under internal and external migration such as voluntary and involuntary (Tumtas, 2007:28). Voluntary migration can occur through people's desire to access better economic and social opportunities (workers' migration from Turkey to Germany), whereas in involuntary migration the decision to migrate occurs external to people's wishes (migrations that take place as a consequence of natural disasters, wars and political pressures). William Peterson (Peterson, 1958:261) defines involuntary migration as primitive and forced. Primitive migrations take place in relation to natural and geographic factors and forced migrations take place as a consequence of the pressures enforced by the state or opponent groups; violence and straining (Tumtaş, 2007:28)(Çağlayan, 2006:9). Peterson also establishes a middle category between voluntary migration and forced migration. He names this category 'compulsory' migration. Compulsory migration emphasizes the fact that immigrants have even a little say in the decision to migrate whereas they have none in 'forced' migration (Tumtas, 2007:29).

“According to Mecin (Mecin, 2004), reasons for forced migration can be generally discussed under four categories: those that are enacted by the state, those that occur as a consequence of political reasons, those that take place because of armed groups and those that occur because of trade relations and natural disasters.” (Tumtas, 207:29).

Turkey has witnessed most of the migration types that are listed above. Cenk Saracoglu points out to the presence of two main periods in terms of understanding the Turkish history and to

be used in studies about Turkey's social political structure and migration. He defines these periods as 1950-1980 and post 1980. He writes that the studies conducted in these two periods differ significantly in terms of theoretical framework, concepts and subjects. He also adds that the differences don't only originate from theoretical framework, concepts and subjects but also from the structures of academic and intellectual life in those periods. Therefore he says that such periodization constitutes a useful frame not only for the migration studies but also for understanding the academic transformation that took place in Turkey. Moving on from this point, he puts forwards the differences in migration studies between the periods of 1950-1980 and post 1980.

The period between 1960 and 1980, attempts to understand and explain the internal migration in relation to Turkey's general economic and social transformation. According to him, migration studies conducted in this era have a tendency to interpret migration as a process of capitalizing and modernization based on the facts that migrations were made from village to city at the national level.

He states that the perspective of analyzing migration in relation to capitalism/modernization at a macro level has been abandoned in the post 1980 period. He explains this change through the qualitative change that took place in the nature of migration and the epistemological shift that emerged within social sciences in Turkey. The qualitative change is related to migration processes being affected by neo-liberal politics and economics the Kurdish question³⁷. Between 1980 and 1990 migration was mostly shaped by the neo-liberal policies³⁸ (Seker, 1986:107) and in 1990 Kurdish migration was created through the cleansing out of villages in Eastern and Southeast regions by the state. Therefore the migrations that took place between 1960 and 1980 don't have the same qualities around the country and they create a fragmented picture. At this point Saracoglu adds that migration is not only related to country's economy but also to the political atmosphere; therefore it is given a political content.

However he writes that the academic studies that are conducted on this matter are far from understanding the social, cultural and economic structure of the cities. He explains this situation by the fact that this subject should be studied in relation to the Kurdish question

³⁷Cenk Saracoglu, *Turkiye Goc Calismalarinda 1980 Sonrası Paradigma Degisimi*,

³⁸ Seker M., "Turkiye'de Tarim iscilerinin Toplumsal Butunlesmesi", *Degisim Yayinlari*. Ankara, 1986.

which is a politically thorny issue. Therefore these studies that reviewed this matter attempted to define migration. They tried to describe the experienced migration through concepts such as “forced migration” and “forced displacement”. Considering that most of the researches in Turkey’s academic life are funded by European Union institutions, many researches moved on from the qualities of migrations in Europe and focused on issues such as refugees and immigrations which don’t coincide with the internal migration process in Turkey. Through studying the processes which don’t relate to Turkey’s internal migration process, they tried to research the truths.

At this point we prefer to define the experienced migration through the concept of “forced displacement”. This concept was defined by United Nations Human Rights Commission in 1998;

*“Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”*³⁹

In this respect, our perspective towards migration studies was restricted to this definition. We are trying to understand the migration in Turkey and seasonal workers’ migration in relation to it through focusing on its unique nature and its differences with international migration rather than the similarities.

The fact that the issue exhibits an ethnic quality and that it emerged in relation to the cleaning out of villages post 1990s or that it created the Kurdification of seasonal labor and the Kurdification process of labor in Turkey⁴⁰, make this issue unique. Accordingly, this research positions itself exterior to the approaches of modernizing migration and urbanization. The experienced process has unique notions that are beyond the explanations of modernization/capitalization or urbanization. It is shaped through the influence of state tradition in Turkey and it should be discussed in the frame of politics. The migration profile that comes out of the data found during the field study is discussed in relation to the points that are emphasized above.

³⁹ See Handbook for the Protection Internally Displaced Persons, <http://www.unhcr.org/4c2355229.html>

⁴⁰Saracoglu, Cenk, Sehir, Orta Sinif ve Kurtler Inkar’dan “Taniyarak Dislama”ya, Iletisim Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2011.

The land of Anatolia because of its geographical and strategic position had been constantly the stage of migrations from different ethnic groups and nations. As a consequence of these migrations Anatolia came to have a cosmopolitan structure. It is necessary to understand the migrations that took place because of a variety of reasons, in different sizes, throughout the history and those that are still taking place now in order to draw the economic, social, cultural, ethnic and communal profile of current Anatolia. These migrations have a key importance in terms of understanding the region.

Kemal Karpat argues that the main determinant of Ottoman Empire's and today's Turkey's migration policies is related to Islamic fundamentals. He writes that if this wasn't the case it wouldn't be possible to explain why a Bosnian and Pomak could freely migrate to Turkey whereas a Bulgarian living under Ottoman administration isn't as free as them (Karpat. 2010:70).

Ethnicity engineering was introduced in Anatolia especially by the staff of İttihat ve Terakki (Party of Union and Progress)⁴¹. This ethnicity engineering shaped Anatolia's demography and after the foundation of Republic party's policies were handed over to Republican staff. These policies were sustained and through ethnic replacements, forced migrations, deportations and populatings population's economic, political, social, psychological ethnic structure was shaped⁴². The fact that some portion of the population was always mobilized created mass movements of coalescence/conflict. Groups that migrate from one place to another usually can't completely adapt to the places they go. As a consequence sometimes tension and conflicts occur between the groups. Since 1990s, Kurds have been forced by the

⁴¹ Party of Union and Progress was established during 1890s, in Istanbul military medical school İttihat, by Dr Abdullah Cevdet, Dr İshak Sukuti and Dr İbrahim Temo for the restitution of constitutional monarchy. Within a short notice it has found members from medical schools, military college, civil service school and other environments, it was spread out. Party was particularly effective in the 3rd army in Rumeli which was composed of young army officers in the aftermath of Ottoman-Greek war in 1897. During those days in which the central authority was completely weak, Party of Union and Progress had better opportunities in Macedonia in terms of spreading out, since the palace and Bab-ı Ali were unable to control the situation. If we consider the economic, political and military wise situation of the Empire between the end of 19th century and the beginning of 20th century, we can see that Party of Union and Progress was fundamentally important for those intellectuals who have lost hope in the palace and the government in Istanbul. Shortly we can say that Party of Union and Progress represented Turkish nationalism during those days. But the party was disfavored in the aftermath of WWI since they were the ones who dragged the empire into the war. Through the decision taken in public congress they outlawed themselves and continued their activities under other names. After this point they were seen as blameworthy of all the disasters that followed.

The self-outlawing of the Party of Union and Progress shouldn't be understood as their disappearance from the political arena. Because Party was the dominating force even in the smallest lands within the boundaries of the empire and it was an organization prepared by privileged people. Although it was abolished within the law, it still had a strong organization. Since this was the case member of the Party of Union and Progress continued their activities with different names. They even joined the battle of independence by turning their branches in Anatolia into Defender of Law and similar other organization (<http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/45/812/10319.pdf>).

⁴² Tulin Suciyan, interview with Fuat Dunder <http://bianet.org/bianet/bianet/94274-ittihat-terakkinin-etnisite-muhendisligi>.

state to migrate from their villages in Southeast and East Anatolia. What they have been going through is a good demonstration of the tension and conflict that are mentioned here.

Some of this large population which has migrated began to work in informal sectors whereas some of them began to work as seasonal agricultural workers. Generally it stands out that the workers in these sectors have a disadvantaged position. Many studies conducted in U.S. shows that people working in these sectors are young Hispanics and Mexicans. Similarly African immigrants in Spain and Eastern Europeans in Norway work in these sectors⁴³.

Seasonal workers that are the subject of our study also have a disadvantaged position as a community. Some of them have migrated to Ordu post-1980s because of economic reasons and some of them are Kurds who were subjected to forced displacement post-1990s. The fact that these people have migrated to Ordu to become hazelnut workers demonstrates this research's interest in migration. Accordingly, concept of migration will be a concept we will often refer to throughout this study.

The need for seasonal workers emerged for the first time in Cukurova during the last century of the Ottoman Empire, as a consequence of the intense agricultural activity in the region. Through the effects of American Civil War, British textile industry began to supply their cotton demand from Egypt, India and Cukurova instead of U.S. (Karayakupoglu, 2006;27). In order to meet this demand it was necessary to carry out intensive cultivation and to leave traditional agricultural methods or subsistence economy.

The intensive agricultural production that emerged in Cukuorva in reaction to British demand for cotton, also created a demand for labor. Therefore the concept of 'seasonal worker' was born in the last century of the Empire. Seasonal workers came from Van, Erzurum, Diyarbakir, Musul, Antep, Maras, Sivas, Nigde, Kayseri, Konya, Antakya and Latakia. During the Second World War demand for seasonal workers decreased and agricultural production went into regression. A big portion of the peasant labor force was enlisted by the state and the shortfall in labor had an impact on the decrease of demand for labor (Pelek,2010:36-42). As it was previously mentioned, migration towards the cities began post-1980 through the effects of neo-liberal politics. This migration created a shortfall in seasonal workers and Kurds who were subjected to forced replacement filled this opening. Accordingly the network of seasonal workers became Kurdish. In relation to this process, the arrival of

⁴³Çınar, Sidar-Lordoglu, Kuvvet, "Seasonal Agricultural Workers: From Sharecroppers To Paid Hazelnut Workers" see <http://www.sosyalhaklar.net/2011/bildiri/sidar-lordoglu.pdf>.

first seasonal workers to the Ordu region coincides with the end of 1980s and it has continued increasingly from that time on.

CHAPTER 3

THE FIELD AND THE METHOD

General Properties of Ordu Region

City of Ordu is placed in the North of Turkey, in the middle part of Black sea shore Mountains and Eastern Black sea mountain chains. Central Giresun, Bulancak and Piraziz are located to its east; districts of Carsamba and Terme of Samsun are located to its west. Districts of Erbaa, Niksar, Resadiye of Tokat are located to its south and Koyulhisar of Sivas is located to its north. Surface area of Ordu is 6001 kilometer squares. According to the accurate results of the 2000 population census, Ordu's total population is 887.765. 416.631 people out of this population reside in cities, whereas 471.134 of them reside in villages.

Ordu has a mountainous structure which runs perpendicular to the sea and parallel canyons are very common. City is built upon a narrow land near a little bay between the coastal line and Black sea mountain chains which run in east-west direction and are higher than 3000 meters; hard to surpass. A typical Black sea climate is dominant in Ordu; winters are chilly and summers are warm. In every month of the year there are rainfalls which are normal for the season. It is a rich region in terms of rivers; all the canyons have rivers and brooks. The most important streams are Melet River, Bolaman Creek, Elekci River and Turnasuyu. The vegetation cover is composed of spruces, pines, redwoods, beeches, hornbeams, oaken and chestnut trees. Herb groups that are similar to Black sea lemur can be found in fields whose forest quality is lost. Hazelnut plantations are dominant within Ordu's agricultural lands.⁴⁴(Bektaş, 2006).

First settlement in the land of Ordu dates back to the 7th century B.C.. The first residential area known in the city center is Bozukkale (Kotyara) which is near to Kirazlimani Cemetery⁴⁵. Greek commander Ksenophon indicates that in 4th century B.C. while they were returning from a war around Iran, they stopped by Kotyora. They came across a tribe there and after staying there 45 days they continued down the road. Kotyora was a small colony. In 2nd century B.C., during the reign of King 1st Farnak of Pontus Empire the city was emptied and the local public was removed to Giresun.

⁴⁴Also see <http://www.belgeler.com/blg/2ge8/ordu-da-bir-muhacir-koyu-tongelduzu>.

⁴⁵See the article of Prof. Dr. Necati Demir; 'Ordu İlinin Eski Adi "Kotyora" ve Tarihi Altyapisi"<http://www.necatidemir.net/images/demir/bkosem/kotyora.pdf>

Since 675 B. C. Middle and Eastern Black sea regions which Ordu is placed in was ruled respectively by Cimmerians, Miletians, Persians, Alexander of Macedonia and his commanders. After these, region was dominated by Pontus Empire for 3,5 centuries (280 B.C.-63 A.C.). This empire was destroyed by the Roman Empire⁴⁶.

The town of Vona, its old name, was established by the Miletusians in 8th century B.C. In this era Vona was an important port town. It was placed in 13 kilometers to the west of Ordu and its history is similar to Fatsa's and Yason's. Since it couldn't get rid of the hegemony of different tribes and nations in any period, it didn't become an important part of history just like Unye and Fatsa. The region was captured by the Turks after the Battle of Malazgirt in 1071. Within the same century, Suleyman Bey from the tribe of Hacı Eminogulları captured the Black sea coast from Tirebolu to Terme and Vona's control was taken over by the Turks. Although during a brief period Pontics were dominant in the region, it was captured by the Ottomans in 1391. In 1402 Yıldırım Bayezid lost the battle of Ankara against Timur and Pontics invaded Vona region. After Fatih destroyed Trabzon Rum Empire in 1461, the region was taken over by the Ottomans (Bektas, 2006).

A variety of facts are known about Ordu at the beginning of 20th century: The first pharmacist of Ordu was Olmezoglu Artin Efendi and Salcioglu Dimitri was one of the tavern owners. Kotyora Rum School was established nearby the church in Tasbasi neighborhood which reaches towards the sea. Turks were mostly involved with farming whereas Rums and Armenians were involved with trade and small scale production. There were 93.139 Muslim, 13.736 Rum, 9.702 Armenian and 509 Protestant residents in the region. The population of Ordu is recorded in terms of villages and Muslim-non-Muslim division in the book called "Town of Ordu's Social History" prepared by Prof. Dr. Bahaeddin Yediyıldız through reviewing the Ottoman Title Writing Journals containing the years between 1455 and 1613. Similarly data regarding distribution of non-Muslim population between Samsun, Bafra and Unye (today a province of Ordu) is available in Mehmet Oz's book called "Canik District between 15th and 16th Centuries"⁴⁷.

Ordu became a provincial during the year republic was established. During those years Ordu had districts such as Fatsa and Unye. In 1933 the provincial of Sebinkarahisar was removed and its districts were distributed among neighbor provincials and Mesudiye was attached to

⁴⁶ See <http://www.ordu.gov.tr>.

⁴⁷ Kupçuk, Selcuk, Kurt Meselesinin Çözümüne Katkida Bulunabilecek Bir Çalışma Alanı: Karadeniz'de Mevsimlik Fındık İsciligi see http://www.hyd.org.tr/staticfiles/files/kurt_meselesi-mevsimlik_isciler-selcuk_kupcuk.pdf.

Ordu. Later on in 1936 Gulkoy, in 1945 Perseme, in 1954 Akkus, in 1960 Aybastı, Korgan, Kumru, Ulubey and in 1987 Gurgentepe were turned into districts (Bektas, 2006).

The historical background given above reflects more than just a brief look towards Ordu's history. What stands out from the historical information above is that Ordu has been home to many ethnically and religiously different cultures and civilizations. The coexistence of different ethnic and religious identities was preserved till the foundation of Republic. After this point a different demographic structure comes into the picture which is shaped by nation-state formation uniting all the differences under one roof. This new demographic structure was established through state politics cleaning non-Muslim population out of Ordu.

What I had noticed while I was going through Armenian and Rum villages with my informant was that things were similar to many other provincials in Turkey. The houses owned by Armenian and Rum minorities, buildings they used as school and church were passed into other hands and their functions were changed. In an ironical way, after sending away Armenians and Rums the neighborhood was named Zafer-i Milli (National Victory) Neighborhood in a self-explanatory fashion. They changed the name of the Armenian school as Fatih and put emphasis on the fact that neighborhood was conquered. Cleansing out of the city from ethnic differences was referring to a national victory and conquest. Although today's Ordu has traces of ethnic differences in a physical sense, it doesn't define itself through an ethnicity other than the Turkish one and doesn't emphasize any differences. The Georgians living in the city aren't regarded as different by the local public and aren't subjected to any discrimination.

When I first arrived to the city, the first question that stuck onto my mind was how such luxurious stores were established in this city although it didn't have an economy based on industry and trade and in the absence of creation or entrance of economic resources. It's surprising to see such luxurious brand stores in Ordu; a city with a limited economy, for a person who has little information about the economic structure of the city. Considering the fact that most of city's economy is shaped around hazelnut production, this becomes even more surprising. Although such constraints should have deactivated luxury consumption, local public of Ordu has a tendency to spend their incomes in this manner.

Hazelnut Productions in Cities (in tons)

City	2006	2007	2008
Ordu	188.060	140.300	210.583
Giresun	86.723	64.131	139.764
Samsun	79.412	37.714	115.706
Sakarya	113.988	88.295	115.262
Duzce and Bolu	78.493	71.213	90.972
Trabzon	55.006	42.491	74.307
Zonguldak	23.109	21.457	24.736
Kocaeli	12.342	14.659	13.595
Artvin	7.240	7.821	8.350
Kastamonu	5.895	4.519	5.396
Bartın	2.166	3.082	2.852
Sinop	1.322	1.758	1.615
Rize	1.415	1.322	1.408

Chart 1: Source: Hazelnut Sector Records. Prepared by: Esma DENİZ pg: 2/19. Europe Business Network- Black sea, 2009.⁴⁸

In general, economy has a structure that is dependent on hazelnuts. 25% of the hazelnut production in Turkey is produced here (See Chart 1). The second most important income source in the city is animal husbandry. Industry has a very small part in city's economy.

Outer to central Ordu within the districts of Gurgentepe and Ulubey there are Alawite villages. *Dayibasis* I met in Duzkoy and Bulancak told me that in these districts people behave closer and more intimate towards them in comparison to other districts and they believed this might be because of the religious difference of the districts. Alewites are subjected to certain prejudices in the Turkish society, they are considered as an Islamic heterodoxy and they have different rituals than the Sunni majority. There is no mosque or practices such as ritual worship, Ramadan, Sacrifice Holiday and Pilgrimage in Shiism. As a consequence of all these matters, Alewites constitute a group in Turkey which has potential to be subjected to discrimination and attacks⁴⁹. Considering that Alewites were excluded through being subjected to certain prejudices, they formed an emotional bond with the Kurds who also

⁴⁸ See http://www.blacksea-eeen.org/dosyalar/BB_sekrap/BB_sekrap-4-31.pdf.

⁴⁹ These cases can be regarded as massacres carried against Alewite citizens: 18 April 1978 in Malatya, 24 December 1978 in Maras, 20 May 1980 in Corum, 2 July 1993 in Sivas.

have been subjected to discrimination. This emotional bond and the fact that Alewites had a less conservative life style than Sunnis were the points emphasized by the interviewees.

The division between country and city becomes more prominent as one moves away from central Ordu and district centers. The uneven structure of geography makes it difficult to go to city center or district centers from the villages or to travel between the villages. Therefore, it is possible to say city-country division sustains its presence because of such difficulties. Accordingly, distant villages have introverted communities which are usually less tolerant towards the Kurdish workers. On this matter, AKP Ordu provincial head stated that the residents of Ordu have a city consciousness and this produced an antipathy towards the Kurds, he explained the presence of this antipathy formed in cities through the city-country division. The interviews and observations we made showed us that this perception is shaped through the city-country division; however the main determinants in this matter are state and media. By shaping the ethnic difference, state and media determines the attitude and behaviors of residents in central Ordu towards the Kurds.

The arrival of seasonal workers to Ordu dates back to 1988. Interviewees stated that Kurdish workers didn't come to the region before this date and the present labor force was sufficient in terms of hazelnut gathering. But later on as people from Ordu migrated towards larger cities, labor force decreased and the deficiency had to be fulfilled by the Kurdish workers. The two interviewees I had in central Ordu; one of them a hazelnut merchant, the other member of the National Hazelnut Display Council, gave me these explanations regarding the labor force deficiency and the arrival of Kurdish workers to the region.

The effects of seasonal migration of workers differs pre and post mid 1990s. Through the middle of 1990s number of seasonal workers began to increase and the conflict between the PKK and state forces intensified. The funerals of the soldiers died in this conflict, the discriminatory language used by the politicians and media changed the position of the seasonal workers within the city life: They were not regular seasonal workers anymore; discrimination with an ethnic emphasis was forming towards them.

In general the city doesn't manifest a conservative structure. Even in the month of Ramadan, it's possible to see a crowd in restaurants which sell alcohol.

The presence of an intention to create a nationalist channel throughout the Black sea region is often mentioned. This nationalist channel is seen as a barrier against the PKK and the Kurdish

political movement. All the Koy-Sen and Findik-Sen presidents I interviewed with told me that Ordu and Black sea region are intended to be turned into nationalist regions by the state. They also added that the attitudes against the Kurdish workers were affected by these politics.

3.1. Methods and Techniques Used in This Research

I decided to conduct this research during the years I was engaged in farming. While I was doing pepper cultivation, my interest on the subject increased through the seasonal workers that came to our region for the harvest, their living conditions, the other groups' perception of them and the relations that are formed/we formed with them. The problems these workers encountered within their relations with the environment, the news that were published about them in the media showed me that I had to approach the language that was 'othering' them anthropologically. Taking all these factors into consideration, the city of Ordu⁵⁰ in Black sea region was chosen for this research. The population of the Kurdish seasonal workers in the region, the news that were published in the media about their problems made me think that I can approach the matter in all its parts in this region. Ordu is placed in Middle and Eastern Black sea region, Giresun is located to its east, Samsun is located to its west. Cities of Sivas and Tokat are placed in the south of Ordu and at the north of it there is the Black sea. Ordu has a highland structure and Canik and Eastern Black sea Mountains are placed in it parallel to the coastline. It is usually chilly in winter and warm in summer, it has the black sea climate which rains in all seasons. Its economy is mostly dependent on agriculture and hazelnut agriculture is a fundamental part of it. Animal husbandry and beekeeping is practiced in uplands whereas fishing industry is mostly present in coastal regions.

In this research which was conducted in the city of Ordu, the research methods that are listed below were applied.

1. Observation and Participant Observation: These methods were applied through participating Kurdish seasonal workers' daily routine in their worksites, sometimes by getting involved with the work activities. Moreover, local groups that have relations with the Kurdish workers were contacted in their daily routines and certain parts that are related to this research were observed.

⁵⁰ For more information see www.ordu.bel.tr and www.ordu.gov.tr.

2. Interview and In-depth Interview: These methods were applied in the form of conversations with Kurdish workers, local public, state representatives in the region and representatives from certain non-governmental organizations. These interviews were mostly about daily habits of individuals and groups, relations they form with each other and the picture that occurs through these reciprocal relations. The conversation was composed of questions and answers, but mostly built on improvisation. Also a limited number of in-depth interviews were conducted with people who have extensive knowledge about the general situation, history and culture of the region. I conducted interviews with senior executives such as the mayor, AKP Ordu provincial head, Findik-Sen leaders, all Köy-Sen leaders, head of Beekeepers Association and with representatives from several NGOS and political parties. Apart from that, by conducting interviews and in-depth interviews with producers and sellers of hazelnut in Ordu, several civil servants, a lot of workers and dayibasis I completed my research.
3. Use of Technical Equipment: In the realm of this research some of the interviews were recorded with a recording device and visual materials were collected with a camera.
4. Visual and Written Documents: Under the frame of this research, I made use of conceptual and historical resources, researches and reports about the subject including the news in the press and visual media.

The methods that are mentioned above are applied under the frame of Barth's ecological approach, complying with the ethics of field research. Considering that the hazelnut gathering season is between August and September, the relations between workers and other groups were studied intensely during these two months (this period includes the months between August and September of 2011). The time period after that was mostly spent on the process of workers' return to their homelands, interviews conducted with representatives from NGOs and on literature review.

Apart from these, by staying in the region for a short period, attempts were made to conduct interviews with the local public. Shortly, this research took place between August 2011 and January 2012. During this research in-depth interviews and participant observation were applied in order to understand the critical impacts of state politics and practice and media on shaping the relations between Kurdish workers and other groups.

In order to understand these impacts, it's important to take into account the decisions taken by the state and local administration during the Kurdish workers' stay in the region, facilitative/aggravating practices towards Kurdish workers and the perceptions created through media's approach to the matter. Considering that this research was conducted in a politically and ethnically sensitive region-the period of my research coincided with post 2011 elections in Turkey and since consequence of the negotiations between the state and PKK can be partially seen in this period the situation becomes even more sensitive-some of my friends in the region tried to break the wrong perceptions Kurdish workers and local public had about me. Some of these misconceptions were being perceived as a government agent by the Kurdish workers and being perceived as a PKK supporter by the local public. I was perceived as a MIT(Milli Istihbarat Teskilati/National Security Organization) agent by the Kurdish workers and villagers in two of the villages I visited for interviews (Duzkoy of central Ordu and village of Uzunmahmut of Ulubey). I have to say that because of the influence of this perception I couldn't benefit from some of the interviews I conducted and the observations I made in the way I wanted. On the other hand, the fact that these data couldn't be collected can be regarded as a data under the frame of this research. It's important that people were behaving out of fear and anxiety, therefore stating constructed, idealized expressions and comments rather than telling what is actually happening. The fact that these people are hesitant to tell what they think or what they go through out of similar and different concerns, supports our argument that their perceptions and attitudes are being shaped. This issue will be analyzed further in the following chapters, how the problems that are encountered took place and in what ways they were surpassed will be discussed in detail. During the interviews I conducted for this research I came across two different perceptions regarding myself; me as a government agent and me as a PKK supporter. My friends in the region tried to break both of these perceptions. Throughout the research I stayed at the teacherage in central Ordu. One of my informants here was well-known and had connections due to the fact that he was a political party's provincial head of Ordu. I often felt his facilitative impact in the meetings I had and interviews I conducted. A second informant I have who has helped me in some of my meetings was also involved with politics. Another one who has worked as the editor of a national newspaper is also a well-known person in Ordu. The fact that my informants had broad connections has benefited me in terms of forming a bond of trust with my interviewees during the interviews. However, the political identity of the informant I went to Uzunmahmut village with made a negative impact on interviewees and prevented the creation of a

productive interview environment. The issue of trust that was created through the presence of me and my informant constitutes a data in itself for this study.

Considering the feudal barriers within the Kurdish ethnicity, a limited number of interviews were conducted with women during the part of this research carried within the Kurdish groups. This problem was tried to be surpassed by deepening the relations with male workers and by forming mutual trust. Within the frame of this research, the voice, image and comments of the interviewees will be reviewed without violating any of their personal rights. The interviewees were informed about this research and they took part in this research voluntarily. Similar issues of ethics were seized upon by us in a sensitive manner.

3.2. Structuring the Questions and Approach to the Subject

Every comprehensive research and investigation about Kurds that is conducted in Turkey, if it requires the questions to touch the essence of the matter, creates nervousness for the researcher and the people that are subjects of the research. This nervousness arises from the possibility of having difficulty with the police and judicial proceedings and ending up in jail. The examples that validated this process are present and definitely the most striking one of them is the case of Ismail Besikci⁵¹. The level of nervousness differs according to the political heaviness of the subject; it also limits down the number of informants in the field. The selection of the informants and questions provides social researchers enough data to conduct a separate research. If the interviewee is not satisfied with your identity and intention, the accuracy of the information he/she will provide will be arguable. The level of intimacy and trust between the researcher and the interviewee will affect the validity of the information provided. Interviewees will want to assure that the data gathered in the research can't be used against them. This is also affiliated with Turkey's particular political sensitivity that is mentioned above and potential consequences it can create.

Due to the reasons listed above structuring the questions were a very important part for us. Questions were structured by also considering the issues that may emerge because of region's

⁵¹ Besikci is well known for his researches on the Kurdish question. He has been jailed eight times and he spent 17 years of his life in prison. He was jailed in 1979 before the 12th of September coup d'etat and he was released in 1987. But trials against him have continued and he was sentenced till 1999. When he was released in 1999 as a consequence of a limited adjustment in law, he was sentenced to 100 years of prison and a bail that is worth 10 billion was given. 32 out of the 36 books he has published has been banned in Turkey. See http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C4%B0smail_Be%C5%9Fik%C3%A7i.

history and social fabric⁵². This should surely be seen as an attempt to avoid any damage that interviewees could get. We tried to avoid asking questions that could route us out of the essence of this research. In some cases, in order to break the politicized tone of the interview, questions and interviews were restructured by retracing daily simple matters. In some interviews, validity of the response was tested by asking the same question in a different way.

Even though we think that the victims in this matter could only be the workers, we put serious effort to avoid any harm in the interviews we made with the local public and field owners.

The subject of this research is constituted by perceptions, attitudes and behaviors that are created by these perceptions and the parameters that affect all of these processes. With such a subject at hand, it's very important to reveal the practical dimensions of the subject and come up with conclusions that can satisfy the readers. In this respect, I have to state that questions were constructed in a way that they could lead us to concrete examples. For example, in an interview about whether or not workers feel alien or nervous when they arrive to the region, attempts were made to reduce the answer to concrete examples. If the interviewee felt himself/herself alien or nervous, what we were looking for was to find out what sort of incidents or situations led him/her feel that way rather than abstract answers. If this feeling was bound with the prejudices in his/her head, then we tried to find concrete data regarding the sources that nurtured these prejudices.

3.3. Problems Encountered in the Field and the Solutions

Many researchers argue that they and their researches are objective and unprejudiced. There are also many discourses regarding how a social researcher should be neutral and objective, but I'm one of those who don't believe this is the case. Every researcher has certain perceptions and attitudes towards the things he/she comes across in the field. So the study usually doesn't go beyond an attempt that is unprejudiced, neutral and objective. Social scientists should avoid prejudices and their cultural backgrounds which may affect their reviews and they usually strive for this. However most of the time, there's something personal about the researcher within the research, it can be found if it's reviewed in detail.

What I knew about Ordu was based on what I have read and heard. Prior to this research, I've never been to Ordu, even to the Black sea region. All my knowledge about the region was

⁵²Selçuk Kupçuk's article in the site of Helsinki Citizens Assembly sets a good example in terms of explaining the adaptation of micro nationalism to Black sea and the social, economic, ethnic and political positions of the region and workers in the region. For this article see http://www.hyd.org.tr/staticfiles/files/kurt_meselesi-mevsimlik_isciler-selcuk_kupcuk.pdf.

gathered from what I heard from my friends, newspapers, magazines, newscasts and documentaries. Inevitably, through these resources I had an impression about the region and I brought that impression with me when I arrived there. For example, when I was in Ordu between August and September of 2011; the month of Ramadan, I thought eating and smoking might create serious problems for me. But a few days after my arrival, I realized that things weren't as I assumed it would be. Although Ordu was conservative on this matter, it has a much more open structure than the other provincial cities. Even though it was Ramadan there were bars, cafes and tea gardens that were open till late at night. The social fabric was unconstrained and let boys and girls stay out late at night. I have to admit that I had no idea about the presence of such a fabric before I visited Ordu. On the contrary, I thought Ordu was a classical conservative province, even though I knew it was placed on the coastal line. Inevitably I came across certain difficulties about the subject of my research, but I managed to resolve them with the help of my informants.

A more important problem was my nervousness regarding what the local public, workers and more importantly officials (officials here refers to security forces, police and gendarmerie) would think of me and my research and how they would behave towards me. I had no official permission about this research that I could show them, all I had was a letter of support about me and my research from my advisor Associate Professor Stale Knudsen. Although this letter was important, it wasn't going to mean anything to many officials. In overcoming these issues, I appealed to my informants who were well-known and involved with local politics in Ordu for a long while.

In order to establish an intimacy with the workers; I made use of my experiences in my own plantation⁵³ in our homeland Islahiye of Gaziantep. The fact that I knew a lot of things regarding their lives beforehand was my guiding light in establishing strong relations with them.

Considering the sensitive nature of the Kurdish question in Turkey's political sphere, we encountered several problems during the structuring of the research. These were problems which can be regarded as normal for researches with similar subjects. Choosing the interviewees who can shed light to the matter, and structuring the questions with the same objective were important parts of the research as well.

⁵³ Since I've been involved with pepper cultivation in Islahiye of Gaziantep, for more than 15 years, I had the chance to spend time with Kurdish worker and get to know them in person. I often made use of these experiences throughout the research.

When I went to the field, I put a lot of effort into structuring questions, choosing informants who will be intermediaries for my interviews with the aim of setting forth the issue as a whole. Although we started the research with this objective, there were times we doubted the accuracy of the information provided to us. For example, the first part of the interview we made at Duzkoy of Central Ordu with a *dayibasi* wasn't really conducted well because of the nervousness experienced by the *dayibasi* and the workers that were with him. During the second part of this interview which was conducted in the city, *dayibasi* expressed the nervousness he felt during the first part of the interview. He stated that he couldn't provide accurate answers to the questions during the first part because of his economic and political position in the village. The fact that the villages in which *dayibasi* and workers lived in were subjected to forced displacements is an important data in terms of explaining this nervousness. The workers believe that they need to move very carefully to avoid adding a new problem to the already present ones.

We experienced a similar situation in the interviews we conducted in Uzunmahmut village of Ulubey. When we arrived to the village it was around 9 pm at night, about the end of August 2011, all of the workers who were going to participate in the interviews had a noticeable nervousness. An obligatory hospitality was present in their manners, which was telling us that we needed to leave as soon as possible⁵⁴. Although I reminded them that I was a student and what I was doing was a research, they formed prejudices against the research and conducted their answers accordingly as an attempt to protect themselves. When we left the first group of workers and moved onto another group, we saw that the situation was the same. We realized that our preference of the night hours for the interview increased workers' anxiety. Our arrival after the day light must have strengthened their prejudices against us. After conducting a shorter interview with the second group of workers we left. In both of the interviews, it was obvious that the workers were trying to idealize the actual answers to my questions. They were saying that there were no problems between the Kurdish workers and local public, producers and state representatives except the occasional occurrence of some unimportant daily problems. By underlining that there was no conflict between the Kurdish workers and the state they were trying to avoid any potential danger that might come across them. I observed that they were anxious about having a safe time during their stay in the region. Considering that the workers came to this region because of economic difficulties, it is

⁵⁴After this interview I found out that the person we visited in Uzunmahmut village (the parents of the woman my informant's son has married) called my informant and said that I was a MIT agent. After the homeowner asked my informant why he has brought an agent to his house, my informant had a hard time convincing him.

perfectly understandable that they feared losing their jobs and having economic difficulties again. Probably, the money they save throughout their stay is their only resource for the winter. It is completely reasonable that they didn't want to risk this resource for a few sentences they would state in the interviews.

Our tendency in this research is to regard the misinformation provided in similar situations as data. Because we believe that information that is not given or wrong information that is provided out of certain reasons are as valuable data as accurate information provided in the interviews. There are several questions that need to be asked on this matter: Why didn't the interviewee provide the true information? What are the reasons behind this process? What are the parameters that affect this decision? Understanding this decision and putting it forward is regarded as indirect data.

I encountered many problems other than the ones listed above, but the help of my informants, my prior experiences and the time I spent with the workers guided me in resolving such practical problems.

CHAPTER 4

SEASONAL WORKERS AND THE LOCAL PUBLIC

I never liked an Arab or a Kurd

But he built his tent right across me (anonymous)

Part four is the part in which we will open up and put forward the essence of this research and lean towards proving our arguments. I believe a short reminder might be necessary in terms of not missing out what is actually being questioned. Tersely, our intention was to set forth the leading mechanisms behind the relationships between the seasonal Kurdish workers who come to Ordu to gather hazelnuts, other local groups and state representatives, how these relations get shaped, the effects of media and state discourses and practices and media's publication politics (which we think as the main determinants). With this aim and objective, data was collected during the field research we conducted in the region. These data was collected to serve the purpose of seeing the subject's essence and content in practice.

The research is mainly organized around state and media discourse, its effects and shaping nature, however it's possible to talk about the presence of other determinants and their effects (these determinants can be summed up as cultural and economic). In this study we will try to set forth these determinants in different chapters and I believe this will be beneficial in terms of understanding the matter as a whole and seeing the picture in complete.

4.1 Ghosts of the City: The Kurdish Seasonal Workers

When I first arrived to the city in August 2011, after founding my room in teacherage and settling in, the first question that came to my mind was "How come this city provides a big portion of Turkey's and world's hazelnut production?"⁵⁵. I found it strange that I haven't run across any workers who came there to gather hazelnuts, while I was walking down the streets.

"Workers must be gathering hazelnuts in the fields right now" wasn't a satisfying answer to my question. Because inevitably there would be workers who were free, who were waiting between two jobs, who were resting or wandering around that day. There were many places to visit, forests and seaside in central Ordu which is much different than the cities workers came from.

⁵⁵Turkey provides the % 75 of world hazelnut production and province Ordu provides % 25 of Turkey's hazelnut production. See http://www.orduhayatgazetesi.com/news_detail.php?id=5049

I met one of my informants in the cafeteria of the teacherage⁵⁶ I was staying in. The teacher he was with told me that the workers had no time or money to visit the city, but this also didn't change the question in my mind. Because the workers in Uzunmahmut village of Ulubey, Bulancak of Giresun, Maden and Uzunisa villages had already given me similar answers and told me that they came to the city to work and earn money and they had neither time nor money to spend. At the beginning of these interviews, the workers explained that they weren't going downtown because of lack of time and money. However during the following parts of the interviews, they mentioned that the main reason was the attitude of the local public and some shopkeepers towards them. Another informant I met again in the garden of the teacherage; a teacher⁵⁷ who is also the member of the Civil Society Platform⁵⁸, used the phrase "*Like ghosts*" to describe the Kurdish workers. They come to gather hazelnuts and leave without even going downtown.

A few days after my arrival to the region, there was a flood in Uzunisa campsite⁵⁹; this caused an important amount of material damage. After the flood,⁶⁰ workers were temporarily removed to the dormitory of a Science High School by the governorate. During the interviews I conducted in the camping site and in the dormitory they told me the situation wasn't just about time and money. They told me that the looks they were exposed to when they went downtown, the attitude of the people towards them in places they went to eat or to drink tea were derogatory. They mentioned that the presence of similar reasons restrained their relationship with the city. I interviewed a middle-aged worker in the dormitory of the Science High School. He told me that they went shopping downtown with a friend and while they were at a shoe store, they discussed whether or not they could afford a third shoe in Kurdish.

⁵⁶Teacherage is in central Ordu and it's a cheaper accommodation made for the teachers who are coming from other cities.

For detailed information see <http://www.orduogretmenevi.com/v2/>

⁵⁷30-35 years old, male, teacher, member of Civil Society Platform.

⁵⁸It's a platform formed by several civil society organizations in order to support the constitution draft that was prepared before the September 12, 2010 Constitution Referendum.

⁵⁹Uzunisa camping site is a camping site formed on 24.03.2010 by the Prime Ministry in relation to the notice published in 27531 numbered Official Newspaper; Ordu Governorate built it for the temporary agricultural workers who come to the region. In the camping site there are places for the workers' toilet and bathroom needs as well as little stoves for cooking. The site is fenced around and the entrances and departures are controlled by the security. The intentions of the visitors are also subjected to control. Identity cards of the workers who stay in the site are also controlled. During these controls if someone looks suspicious they won't let him/her stay in the site and departures during the night are not allowed. Other things that arouse attention in the camping site are the Turkish flag placed in a position in which workers who use the bathrooms can see clearly and a banner in the entrance which quotes Atatürk's dictum "From Diyarbakir, from Van, from Erzurum, from Trabzon, from Istanbul, from Trakya and from Macedonia, they are all the sons of one nation, all the veins of one jewel". The flag and the banner are placed in such a way that anyone who enters the camp can see; considering the ethnic identities of the residents in the camping site we see that the actual intention is to give a message to the workers in the site. This picture is a warning that is telling the workers to leave their ethnic identities where they came from and to feel Turkish.

⁶⁰For the details of the flood incident see

<http://www.cnnturk.com/2011/turkiye/08/19/orduyu.sel.aldi.goturdu/626602.0/index.html>

<http://www.ensonhaber.com/orduda-son-50-yilin-felaketi-yasandi-2011-08-19.html>

<http://zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1170913&title=uykuda-gelen-sel-ile-ordu-son-50-yilin-felaketini-yasadi>

When their Kurdish was heard, owner of the store yelled at them, swore and kicked them out. He reviled against Kurdish and the Kurds. In another interview I conducted in Duzkoy of Central Ordu, a *dayibasi*⁶¹ told me that the workers preferred to go to big markets for shopping to avoid similar attitudes of the shopkeepers.

“Where I shop, it doesn’t matter whether I’m Kurdish or Turkish. Because I shop at the big markets, everyone goes to those markets. A thousand people go to this market in one day and no one knows who they are.”

The relationship between the seasonal workers and the local public dates back to the end of the 1980s. This situation is explained with the labor force deficit that emerged after the migration that took place from Black sea region to big cities. The labor force deficit that emerged with the migration was tried to be met by the Kurdish workers, considering that they work for a low wage for long hours. The unemployed Kurds that were subjected to forced migration after the cleaning out of the villages by the state post 1990s were also added to the seasonal workers and their numbers continued increasing till today.

A *dayibasi*⁶² I met in the dormitory of Science High School who came to the region in 1988 said,

“Recently my brother went to a coffee house to drink tea. Anyway after he finishes his tea, keeper brings another one, after that is finished comes one more cup of tea. After drinking three to five cups of tea, my brother told the waiter that he no longer wanted tea. The keeper of the coffee house swore a blue streak and kicked him out”.

They said that if a similar incident happened in their hometowns they would react in a serious way, but since they were afraid in Ordu they couldn’t. Another worker told me that when he went to a coffee house near the bus terminal in Ordu, two young men entered and swore at all the Kurdish workers in the coffee house and left. He added that he could easily react to those men but he didn’t want to endanger his family and the money they were going to earn. Another worker⁶³ who I have interviewed with in Uzunisa camping site after the flood experienced a similar incident. He talks about the incident he came across while he was going downtown with a jitney;

⁶¹35-40 years old, male, comes from Nusaybin of Mardin

⁶²60 years old, male, comes from Urfa region.

⁶³35-40 years old, male, comes from Urfa region.

“Last year my mother phoned me, I talked to her in Kurdish. She doesn’t speak any Turkish. The one sitting in front of me told me to speak in Kurdish after I go down (meaning not inside the jitney, but when I’m out of it). I said what do you mean by saying speak Kurdish when you go down, is it prohibited to speak Kurdish?!”

He added that other people in the jitney intervened and soothed the situation.

One worker stated that at some regions they had difficulties even when they went inside the villages they were working in. During the interview I made with the *dayibasi* in Duzkoy in the cafeteria of the teacherage, he told me about the incident that happened to one of the young workers. The incident took place a few days before our interview in Duzkoy. The young worker who was in his twenties were washing his feet in the fountain of the village, a car stopped near by him and asked “Who the hell are you!?”. Young worker with the strength he got from youth and boyhood told his name and asked back “Who the hell are you!?”. The villager began to swear at the boy and the village headman who the boy was working for. Right before a fight started between them, villager went away with his car. The *dayibasi* added that because of this and similar incidents they try not to go inside the villages they were working in.

A lot of workers I interviewed in the dormitory of the Science High School stated that they couldn’t, they didn’t go downtown unless it was really necessary. They told me that sometimes they had the opportunity and money to go downtown and wander around, but they didn’t, they couldn’t. This decision was about the bad treatment they were going to encounter in the city. Considering the conflict between the state forces and the PKK, they were hesitant to go downtown because of the reactions they might get.

When we reframe the perceptions and the relations between the workers, producers and the local public exterior to political and ethnic determinants, we see that it includes a supply-demand balance in terms of labor and relations manifest themselves within this frame. However within their normal context, these relations are prone to be affected by the ethnic identity of the workers and Turkey’s political atmosphere. Relations and conflicts between the PKK, Kurdish political movement (BDP- Party of Peace and Democracy⁶⁴) and the state affect how the workers are perceived within the region.

⁶⁴Kurdish political movement was continuously subjected to repression and party closures in its integration to Turkey’s parliamentary system. This movement appeared on the political stage for the first time on 1990 with HEP (People’s Labor Party). Afterwards HEP and six other parties that were established were closed by the Constitutional Court, and now finally

The first day I arrived to Ordu, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a proclamation on the 10th anniversary of AKP⁶⁵ (Justice and Development Party) about the soldiers who lost their lives during the conflicts between the PKK and state forces: “We won’t keep quiet about the attacks, it’s not bearable anymore”⁶⁶. The effects of this proclamation created serious changes in terms of how the Kurdish workers are perceived in the region and in the country. In one of these conflicts⁶⁷ a specialist sergeant from Persembe of Ordu lost his life. After his funeral, security control points were established⁶⁸ on the highway entrances of the city by the gendarmerie and the police. These controls were only directed towards the Kurdish workers and the vehicles that were coming from Diyarbakir, Batman, Urfa; cities in which Kurds are the majorities. This example is significant in the sense that it shows to what extent state discourse affects how the workers are perceived and attitudes and behaviors towards them.

It’s necessary to discuss at this point state’s approach towards the village guard who has lost his life during the conflict between the soldiers and the PKK in Cukurca of Hakkari. In terms of understanding how this approach is effective on perceptions and how through these perceptions present discrimination gets nurtured and sustained, the case of the village guard who has lost his life during the conflict in Cukurca is very explanatory. The family of the village guard was one of the families who came to Uzunisa camping site to gather hazelnuts. When his wife and children heard that he has died during a conflict, they took the bus and came to Hakkari at a moment’s notice. It’s understandable that the local public wasn’t notified about the situation. However, although the state representatives knew about the situation they didn’t make any financial helps to the family for their return to Hakkari. Although the village guard lost his life while he was fighting for the state with the soldiers his funeral wasn’t respected like the other soldiers and was treated as though it was a worthless, disrespectful death. This is significant in the sense that it demonstrates the severity of the structure of discrimination and othering. By drawing a boundary between the soldier and the village guard, state has shown that they don’t regard the death of the two as equal. This attitude towards death which is othering also reflects on the approach of the local public and creates a

they are doing politics under the roof of BDP. About this see <http://www.yuksekovahaber.com/haber/kurtlerin-siyaset-mucadelesi-20007.htm>

⁶⁵Justice and Development Party (AKP): It came to power with general elections on November 3, 2002, it also won the election in 2007 and in 2011 and it’s still the ruling party in Turkey’s government.

⁶⁶For the proclamation of the President see

<http://www.cnnturk.com/2011/turkiye/08/14/basbakan.erdogandan.bdpve.sert.mesajlar/626084.0/index.html>

⁶⁷Specialist sergeant Samet Kilic who was registered in Persembe of Ordu lost his life in an attack organized by PKK on August 18, 2011 in Cukurca of Hakkari. For the details of the news see <http://www.orduolay.com.tr/news.php?id=6073>

⁶⁸For the news related to this see <http://www.orduolay.com.tr/news.php?id=6070>

complete structure. The way incidents are handled and reflected by the state provides significant data concerning how perceptions are created. The fact that the state authorities haven't made a proclamation regarding the family of the village guard can be understood in relation to the decision regarding whether or not to change the present discriminatory attitude towards the workers. In this picture, it stands out that they want to maintain the present discriminatory and othering discourse and attitude.

Under normal circumstances, workers were subjected to security controls in the work sites by giving out their identity cards. After this proclamation, they were also subjected to identity card controls while entering the city and this shaped local public's perception of the workers in a different way. After a 10 to 12 hours ride, more than twenty workers are taken out of the vehicles while entering the city and they go through long controls as if they were criminals. This created fundamental effects on the workers and the local public who have witnessed the situation. During these controls, workers question whether or not they are citizens of this country and think about why they are subjected to such a discriminatory treatment. On the other hand, local public thinks that this treatment is necessary since within the workers there could be terrorists who were trying to enter the region. These two perceptions are separated with sharp lines. Workers' reaction to this situation is usually explained by putting emphasis on the difference of their ethnic identity. The teacher who was also a member of the Civil Society Platform who I interviewed in the garden of the teacherage underlined that through the identity controls workers become 'clean', 'safe' therefore 'workable in the fields' in the eyes of the local public. This statement can also be read in this way, the Kurdish workers who are not subjected to identity controls are potential threats in the eyes of the local public and the state.

The *dayibasi* I interviewed in Duzkoy told me that in 2002, Kemal Yazicioglu who was the governor at the time banned the Kurdish workers' entrance to the city. As a reaction, *dayibasi* has collected the identity cards of the workers and went to the governorate. He declared that these workers weren't terrorists or dangerous, and he demanded that through the necessary controls they should be able to enter the city. Governor Yazicioglu gets really mad at this situation and kicks him out by swearing.

Me, "*Why did you feel the need to collect the identity cards and bring there?*"

Dayibasi, "*The guy (Governor) tried to say to me 'you are a terrorist', that's why he didn't let me in. And I said if I'm a terrorist, here are the ids, check them out. If there is a crime that*

has been carried out, all the workers are here, you can arrest the guilty ones whenever you want”.

Me, *“Did you feel like they were othering you? Was this situation a manifestation of that process?”*

Dayibasi, *“Yes it was, that’s what they did. I felt like the other, if I haven’t, I wouldn’t bring there the identity cards”.*

After I asked him whether or not identity controls made them feel alienated, dayibasi said;

“This is what I say to myself; I don’t belong here. A border gate is being built right now in our hometown. The guy who is constructing the border gate in our hometown is from Ordu. Why doesn’t he go through similar things in our region, why doesn’t he give his id card to anyone? His GBT⁶⁹ doesn’t get investigated so why does mine get investigated when I come here? They (local public and state representatives) already exclude me here. I feel like an outsider and they tell me that I don’t belong here.”

The fact workers were subjected to such a discriminatory treatment just because they were Kurdish leads their relations and perceptions towards the public throughout their stay in the region. They feel themselves alone and insecure, furthermore they feel nervous because of the potential attacks that may occur towards them. The dayibasi I interviewed in Bulancak Maden village of Giresun told me that after every attack of the PKK towards the state forces, they feel anxious about getting attacked.

During the second part of the interview I made with the *dayibasi* of Duzkoy, in the city, he told me about the things he has been through while he was working at a construction site in Erzurum, about the attacks that were made towards their tents.

Dayibasi, *“For example; I was working at construction sites in Erzurum before I came here. It was published in mass media; maybe you’ve heard of it. Kurdish workers in Erzurum were raided at a construction site; it was around two thirty to three at night”.*

Me, *“What was the reason?”*

⁶⁹General Information Retrieval (GBT) is a database in which Turkish Republic citizens’ criminal records are kept. This database can be searched by the security forces and public institutions when considered necessary. It only operates for the pursuit of the criminals. Therefore if a person’s GBT is checked, he is regarded as a suspect.

Dayibasi, *“There was no reason, they just made it up (meaning it was based on a made up news report). Someone came up (meaning a Kurdish worker) and said in the coffee house that we killed thirteen of your people, is such a thing possible?! Someone will go in public and say we killed thirteen of your people, is it possible?! After this incident a friend of ours was beaten on the street, his arm was broken. We rose up, and then came not the governor but district governor, commissary at the police station and provincial head. They investigated the situation, finally it turned out that it was a lie. Therefore the provincial head and the district governor apologized from the workers. They said you go on with your work, we will take care of them; they are bunch of drunks. Three days later molotov cocktails were thrown at the tents we were staying in”*⁷⁰.

He told me that later on the fight got bigger; local public and the workers turned against each other. At first their numbers were a few, but after a TV channel broadcasted news titled *“Kurdish workers attacked the town”*; their numbers increased and reached ten thousands. After things got serious, the governor and minister of internal affairs intervened. Through their orders, gendarmerie began to protect the workers.

The situation that is cited above includes striking components. The influence of state and media is clearly felt on the relations that are formed in the regions workers go for work. It is necessary to note here that since the effects of state and media are intertwined it's difficult to separate the contents of their discourses from each other. Especially main stream media strengthens the effects of state politics by being the spokesman of the state. The alternative media has a very limited influence in shaping perceptions which is relatively small to take into account in the frame of this research. The incidents within this example, state not taking measures about the life safety of the workers, workers being vulnerable to attacks, local public being tempted by a news in local TV channel and attacking workers suggest that the conflict that emerged had a source which was exterior to their relationship dynamics. This example is very explanatory in terms of showing that the relations between the local public and the Kurdish workers emerged/is formed out of a main impact which is exterior to those groups. This impact manifests itself in state's and media's approach to the matter.

⁷⁰After the attack President of Human Rights Association Siirt Branch Office Abdullah Gürgen spoke to Firat News Agency: "Can these lynching attempts that are nearly carried out all around Turkey be unorganized? Aren't indignation calls made recently by the President and government representatives influential on this matter? What and who can an internal conflict between the communities serve for? Can civil servants behave sentimentally while performing their duties? While the security forces are using TOMA vehicles, panzers and gas bombs even in the smallest public opposition, why weren't there any active aversive interventions in this incident? About this incident see <http://www.evrensel.net/news.php?id=10265> , <http://www.gazeteguncel.com/haber-sapla-samani-ayirmak-lazim-21568/> , <http://www.firatnews.eu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=47108>

As it can be clearly seen in the example cited above, the relations between the local public and workers in Ordu has a structure that is prone to be shaped by

1. Sharing different ecological locations
2. The presence of competition on the products that are released to the market
3. Ethnic division of labor which is produced by different groups providing different products and services to the same market (Karayakupoglu, 2006).
4. Relations that can be built on supply-demand balance

As well as the effects of state and media discourses. Barth argues that the relations; therefore the borders between the ethnic groups are formed within the frame of the situations listed above. The part that comes forward in Barth's argument is his emphasis on the economic reasons and cultural interaction in the formation of the relations and borders between the groups. Our findings throughout this field research showed that economic and cultural dimensions are important, but they are not the main determinants. It draws attention to different parameters. These parameters are the effects of state and media which we believe have a larger sphere of influence than the relations and borders formed by the economic determinants and cultural interaction. These two impacts don't follow a path which is different than the economic and cultural dimensions and don't destroy their effects. They only create a stronger influence on the perceptions between the groups, by uniting with other determinants.

4.2. Economic Dimension of the Formation of Relations

When two different ethnic groups encounter the general situation that comes out gets defined through the circumstances and the economic and cultural frame that created this encounter. In the collected work prepared by Barth; "*Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*", Karl Eric Knutson writes about the relations between Arsis and Lakis, and Arsis and Jilles in Rift Valley of Ethiopia. He writes that these relations were built on conflict, division of labor and providing products and services to each other and they were shaped by the economic relations they formed with each other in the region. Since the groups shared different ecological locations in the region, they provided different products and services to each other. These products and services prevented conflicts. Between the groups that were settled around the same ecological location there was always a competition for resources. This competition carried a potential for

the creation of conflicts. Within situations in which there is a reciprocal provision of products and services, relations tend to persist within the frame of reciprocal interest, despite the cultural differences. In sum, we can say that Knutson in his article attempted to explain the relations between the groups through limited economic fundamentals (Knutson, 1998).

The relations between two different ethnic groups constitute an important part of our research. However, our findings suggest that the determinants of the borders between the groups are beyond economic parameters.

Turkey has an important role in international hazelnut production. Most of the hazelnut production in Turkey is done around the cities of Ordu and Giresun in Middle Black sea region. One of my interviewees⁷¹ was an agricultural engineer who was also a member of the administrative body of National Hazelnut Advertisement Council. He told me that there were 310 thousand recorded hazelnut producers in Turkey and 220 thousand hectares of field were being used for hazelnut production in 14 different cities. Hazelnuts were being cultivated in three zones; 0-250 meters coast line, 250-500 meters the middle zone, 500 meter and higher high zone. Therefore workers worked in three different zones within the city. The harvest also differed between these three zones. Hazelnut harvest first begins in coast line and then comes to middle zone and finally comes to higher zone.

Although the number of hazelnut producers and output is really important for the regional economy, the income earned by hazelnut sometimes gets to be a side income for the local public.

A retired teacher and the production manager⁷² of Fiskobirlik⁷³ I interviewed in central Ordu told me that hazelnut production went to second place in region's economy which is parallel to the changing population structure. They added that this situation was nurtured by the price instability in the hazelnut market. Another factor that was emphasized was that hazelnut plantation areas which were falling short of providing resources for the increasing population and which were being divided through inheritance were no longer the main source of income

⁷¹45-50 years old, male, agricultural engineer, President of Ordu Chamber of Agriculture between 2003 and 2007. During the interview I made with him he emphasized that workers weren't subjected to any discriminatory practices, but his proclamations in *The Economist* contradicts with this statement. In his proclamations in *The Economist* he expresses his perspective towards the Kurdish workers: "People of Black Sea have a hard time showing sympathy to those who don't respect their flags". See <http://www.economist.com/node/16646014>

⁷²40-45 years old, male, Fiskobirlik production manager.

⁷³ Fiskobirlik (Hazelnut Agriculture Sale Cooperative Association) is a producer association whose main objective is to improve the hazelnut production market and the quality of hazelnut production. For detailed information about Fiskobirlik see <http://www.fiskobirlik.org.tr/default.asp?sayfa=anasayfa>

for a big portion of the local public. They were becoming sources of side income. Interviewees told me that most of the producers were doing other jobs such as trade and public service, their positions which used to be economically dependent on hazelnuts were changing. Besides most of the producers were living in big cities like Istanbul and Ankara and coming to the region only for hazelnut harvest. As the economic structure of the producers was changing, the labor deficit that emerged was being met with the Kurdish workers. This created the reciprocal economic dependency of the two groups. Producers express that they are aware of the fact that this labor deficit couldn't be met by any other group than the Kurdish workers. Similarly, the Kurdish workers express that they are aware that they couldn't find any other job in which they could work as a family. Seasonal workers who are usually not a part of the skilled labor force move with the assumption that they can find jobs in the agriculture sector which requires unskilled labor. Due to their present economic deficiencies and their unskilled labor, workers get dependent on the seasonal agriculture.

After the change that took place within the producers and the population structure we come across three types of workers. The first type of worker is referred as local worker and they usually come from Mesudiye, Gurgentepe and Golkoy of Ordu. These workers' daily fee is usually around 40-45 liras; and they are not preferred very often because of the expensiveness of their fees in relation to the other workers. These workers don't have hazelnut fields or have a small portion of land and they usually gather hazelnuts to support the family budget. The districts in which these workers live usually have high altitude, therefore they are places in which hazelnuts grow and are gathered the last. Therefore some of the field owners go to places with low altitudes to gather hazelnuts until their harvest is ready. Despite the highness of their fees, producers know that these workers have much more experience and expertise on gathering hazelnuts than the other workers.

Second type of worker is the one who comes from Georgia and works in the fields with fugitive status. Their daily fee is around 35 liras. Georgian workers are preferred more than the Kurdish workers because they don't bring along their children to the region, they only bring along those members of their families who are capable of working. Unlike the Kurds, Georgians don't bring all their children to the hazelnut fields, but only those that are dynamic adults, therefore they create less problem. The preference of Georgian workers over Kurdish ones is explained through this fact. Another reason behind this preference is that since Georgians are familiar with the climate and natural conditions of the region, people believe they can adapt more easily. Finally, another explanation brought to the issue is that people

believe Georgian workers are stronger than the Kurdish ones. Besides, the lobbying done for the Georgian workers by the President of Ordu Chamber of Agriculture who is also of Georgian origin affected the matter⁷⁴. This was expressed especially during the interviews I made with the local public. Interviewees stated that President of the Chamber of Agriculture was actively involved in the campaign which was organized in 2010, against the arrival of the Kurdish workers who come to the region to gather hazelnuts.

The third group is the most populated one and it is constituted by Kurdish workers who from cities like Diyarbakir, Adiyaman, Sanliurfa, Batman and Mardin in Southeast Anatolia. The only reason behind Kurdish workers being preferred over others is that they work for longer hours⁷⁵ for a lower fee. Their daily fee changes between 27, 5 and 30 liras. Kurdish workers explain why they get a lower fee for the same work done by the local and Georgian workers with the difference of their ethnic identities. Since their fees are lower, their perception of the producers is also different. The president of Findik-Sen⁷⁶ who I interviewed in the garden of the teacherage told me that this situation created a grudge (hostility, antagonism) against the producers within the workers' minds.

When we look at the Kurdish seasonal workers who come to Ordu, we see that most of them live in the centers of cities or provincials. Most of them have migrated to the cities within the last twenty years because of forced cleaning out of villages in the name of security matters and economic reasons. Facts such as they didn't have enough agricultural fields, they didn't make profit because of the lack of irrigation structure, agricultural input was increasing are some of the economic reasons. This situation was described during the interviews I conducted both in Uzunisa camping site and at Science High School. Although some of the workers owned fields that are thousands of square meters, they told me that because of the lack of irrigation possibilities they left their villages and migrated to city centers to find employment in different job markets. But their relationship to the city is very limited since they are not considered as skilled labor. They expressed that they could only find jobs in informal sectors such as construction worker, porter, and seasonal agricultural worker. This creates an obstacle against workers' adaptation to the city, because working as a seasonal agriculture worker means continuing their lives in the village within a different context. Their daily practices and relations show that they haven't moved beyond the boundaries of a village society and they

⁷⁴50-55 years old, male, President of Tum-Koy-Sen. Tüm-Köy-Sen (All Producer Villagers Union)

⁷⁵While the local workers and Georgian workers are working 8 hours a day, Kurdish workers work 12 hours a day. Kurdish workers work between 6 in the morning to 6 in the afternoon.

⁷⁶Findik-Sen: Hazelnut Producers Union

are distant from forming an urban consciousness. In this respect, daily life of a worker in the city is similar to his life in the village. They produce most of their needs on their own, like bread, wheat and tomato paste, just like they did in the village. Although I haven't been able to observe the lives of the workers in their hometowns, I believe the observations I made about the city lives of the workers in my own field are sufficient to explain some of the expressions made by the workers in Ordu. The fact that the seasonal workers who came to my field for the pepper harvest and the seasonal workers in Ordu came from the same region allowed me to make comparison between the two cases.

In comparison to workers *dayibasis* look more urbanized. Since they are more related to field owners and other groups in the city, they are more accustomed to routine operations of the city life. Since they are in contact with a lot of people, they have different life experiences than the other workers. By being the intermediaries between the workers and other groups, they become the primary witnesses of a lot of things that happen between the workers and other groups.

Within the worker types that are shortly described above, it is obvious that the Kurdish workers are the most disadvantaged ones. The fact that they work for longer hours for a low fee indicates that clearly.

“The central hypothesis is that ethnic antagonism first germinates in a labor market split along ethnic lines. To be split, a labor market must contain at least two groups of workers whose price of labor differs for the same work, or would differ if they did the same work. The concept “price of labor” refers to labor's total cost to the employer, including not only wages, but the cost of recruitment, transportation, room and board, education, health care (if the employer must bear these), and the costs of labor unrest.” (Bonacich, 1972: 549)

As it can be seen clearly in this picture, ethnic differences create imbalance between the workers who do the same job in Ordu. This imbalance turns against the Kurdish workers two times, they both take lower fees and work for longer hours.

The possibility of an ethnic tension between the producers and the Kurdish workers relatively decreased and turned into an advantage on producers' part. The ethnic dimension behind this process can be easily ignored because of the present imbalance on the fees and working hours. The producer's approach to the Kurdish worker is based on concerns such as hazelnuts would be left on the branches, they wouldn't be gathered properly. Economic profits are explicit in

the softening of the approach towards the workers. Producers have a certain anxiety about the matter and they tell themselves ‘if I don’t treat the workers well, they would leave my hazelnuts on the branches or they wouldn’t gather them properly’. Therefore we can say that there emerge two groups who are in an obligatory relationship and who have to endure each other temporarily. The *dayibasi* I interviewed in the dormitory of the Science High School explained this picture clearly;

“If there wasn’t the hazelnut case, they would already kick us out with sticks. Kurds are dirty, they came here, but it’s for the hazelnuts; only for one month, that’s why they put up with it. This is the guard, this is the laborer, and my hazelnuts shouldn’t be left on the ground, that’s why they take care of us. Otherwise no one would take care of us here. I’m not lying, I’ve traveled a lot, I’ve seen a lot. When you pass Adana we are not worth a thing. We know all these. But we don’t treat them like that. Instead we call it we, we are brother, we are one, our love and country is one, that’s why we work”.

At this point it is observed that the Kurdish workers’ perception of the local public is hidden behind economic factors. Workers try not to set forth their perceptions and attitudes towards the local public unless there are coercive factors. These factors are usually economic like producers not paying their fees or paying it partial and other attacks that might be carried against them. These factors were present when the *dayibasi* in Duzkoy didn’t explain to me his opinions about the local public and the producers during our first interview. He told me that the presence of a field owner during the interview made him nervous and that he had difficulty expressing his actual feelings. Besides the presence of the producer, his doubts about me being a state agent also influenced his hesitancy to tell about what he experienced with the local public and producers in Ordu. As it can be understood from the situation described above, there are certain obstacles against the Kurdish workers expressing their opinions about the Turks or the local public. Since we reached this conclusion out of the observations we made, we tried to avoid any precise statements regarding the perception of the workers.

Another parameter that emerges within producer-worker relations is the payment of daily wages⁷⁷. When producers don’t pay workers’ daily wages or don’t pay the full amount

⁷⁷In Ordu hazelnut wages were determined on July 13, 2011 by a commission established by the governorate which included the governor, deputy governor, representatives from Ordu Provincial Agriculture Directorate, Ordu Social Security Foundation Provincial Directorate, Chamber of Trade and Industry, Municipality Work Union and Chamber of Agriculture. See <http://www.orduajans.com/haber/guncel/findik-yevmiye-ucretleri-aciklandi/7173.html>. The fact that the worker representatives weren’t included to this commission brings out the question whether or not the wages will be to the workers’

sometimes certain tensions emerge. The interviews I made with a hazelnut merchant⁷⁸ in central Ordu and a *dayibasi* in Duzkoy provided me with examples of these situations. Hazelnut merchant stated that when the payment time arrives some of the producers don't pay the full amount of workers' daily wages or don't pay at all. He told me that producers try to legitimize their attitude by telling themselves "But they are killing our soldiers" and therefore tension between the groups emerge from time to time.

Here we see that producers are using the daily wages they are obliged to pay as ammunition. The producers who are either not paying the full amount of the wages or not paying at all are basing their approach on the political atmosphere of the country. Although this approach can be easily interpreted as driven through economic interests, the variable that triggers or legitimizes the producer's attitude is the political atmosphere. The fact that such disorder isn't being experienced during the payment of local workers validates this argument. As a consequence a second exploitation network emerges upon the workers who are already working for low wages as a consequence of their ethnic identities.

4.3 Position of the Beekeeper's Association: Let's Eat Sweets to Speak Sweetly

Ordu is a region in which beekeeping is very common. Honey production isn't just limited to Ordu and surrounding regions. Producers, just like the seasonal workers, travel to different regions of Turkey and gather honey by staying in these regions for different periods.

I believe it will be useful at this point to give an example which demonstrates how the local public/producer-Kurdish worker perception is kept away from turning into a conflict. Although the effects of the discourses of state and media on the relations are very important, the presence of the beekeepers association which has the highest number of members in Turkey has the power to prevent perceptions from turning into conflicts. In this respect, I think the interview I made with the president of Ordu Beekeepers Association is worth mentioning. President told me that there were 500 unrecorded beekeepers and around 4000 members. With their families these member constitute a group of around 20 thousand individuals and they go to many regions of Turkey to gather honey, especially Eastern and Southeast Anatolia. He mentioned with praise that during their travels, especially in Eastern and Southeast Anatolia people greeted beekeepers with hospitality and respect. By stating that unlike the majority he doesn't associate the word Kurdish with adjectives such as 'terrorist'

advantage. On top of that, sometimes workers are paid less than the determined wage and this creates conflicts between the workers and producers.

⁷⁸55- 60 years old, male, hazelnut merchant.

and ‘separationist’ he claimed that Beekeepers Association might have an important role in changing how Kurds are perceived.

I asked him;

“Did your perception change by going there and getting to know them? Did you see things that are different than what people have told you? Do you think getting to know them takes this relationship to a different level?” and he answered;

“Of course it does. Someone who has never been there might be afraid, he will never go there. He would think that they would kill him there, they would cut him there. That’s never the case! When you get to know these people you enter into a completely different world. You get to know what hospitality is and what attachment is. My perception changed significantly. My perspective surely changed a lot after hanging around with those people, it changed a hundred percent”.

The example given above demonstrates to what extent perceptions shape the relations. It shows that the local public’s perception of the Kurdish workers is solely nurtured by the mechanisms which are exterior to the groups. The created perception regards Kurds within the frame of violence and assumes that they always pose danger. But the relations that are formed between the groups through human interaction are capable of creating these perceptions and prejudices. In terms of showing the influence of reciprocal relationships, this example constitutes an important data which supports Barth’s argument. Although this influence is important, it doesn’t have the potential to go beyond the influences of state and media.

4.4. Position of the Civil Servants: We are Only Performing Our Duties

Another dimension of the relations and perceptions is state representatives’ approach towards the workers. Workers’ perceptions tend to be shaped through the discriminatory approach of these representatives which is again exterior to the inner dynamics of the relations. It is useful to begin by giving examples regarding this matter.

The relations between the workers and state representatives start at the identity card controls which are done at entrance points of Ordu. State representatives’ approach towards the workers during these controls is shaped around security matters. The security controls that are carried out others the workers by criminalizing them through discriminatory assumptions such as ‘potential criminal’ and ‘terrorist’. Although state representatives assuming workers to be

potential terrorists that are posing danger have a long history, the practices related to these assumptions are relatively new. The fact that these practices are being held exterior to the residency areas of these workers make workers relatively lonely and weak in the eyes of security officials and similar practices get sustained. The workers who already feel alien also feel nervous, scared and helpless through these practices. Since state representatives don't come across any reaction or complaint during these practices, they easily find the ground to practice this discrimination.

During the interview I made in Ordu industrial estate, my interviewee who is also the member of National Hazelnut Advertisement Council told me that he regarded similar practices as legitimate and necessary and claimed that they are situated in identity notification law. He added that when he went to a hotel in Ankara with his son they have to present their identity cards to the hotel administration⁷⁹. The fact that he found similarities between such a routine procedure that applies to everyone and the discriminatory attitude the Kurdish workers are subjected to while entering the city, by stopping their cars and making them wait for hours, should be understood as an attempt to create a legitimizing language for this procedure. Unless this is the case, it's difficult to equate the obligation to present identification at a hotel which is procedure done both in Turkey and throughout the world to the procedure that is only carried out towards the Kurdish citizens.

The local public perceives these controls as routine, mandatory and necessary for security. This perception exhibits a significant closeness to state's approach to the matter. One of my interviewees in central Ordu who was a member of CHP⁸⁰ told me that the workers didn't come to the region to work but to explore and prepare ground for the PKK's arrival. Interviewee stated that he and the majority of the public believed that the money workers earned in the region was being transferred to the PKK.

The approach of my interviewee from CHP (My objective in stating that he was a member of CHP is to draw attention on the fact that interviewee's statements are shaped by the founding ideology of the republic which structured the Kurdish assimilation project) was also shared by the dayibasi⁸¹ who I interviewed in Bulancak Maden village of Giresun. Dayibasi told me that the mother of the field owner said to him openly "*You are terrorists, you kill us and then you come here and work*". This statement is very clear in terms of showing how the producers

⁷⁹45-50 years old, male, agricultural engineer, 2003-2007 President of Ordu Chamber of Agriculture.

⁸⁰50-55 years old, male, member of CHP.

⁸¹55-60 years old, male, comes from Diyarbakir.

perceive the workers. In this example, the producer says her opinion right in the face of the worker rather than showing it through her attitude and behavior. She ignores the possibility that their hazelnuts might not be gathered properly by the workers and doesn't hesitate to express her opinion about the worker openly. When producer's perception of the workers is expressed orally, it gets ahead of the effects of economic variables. The 'terrorist' perception within the producer's mind goes heads off the possible economic loss and eliminates the economic determinants in the relationship.

The way local public, producers and state representatives look at their perception of the workers is completely different than how workers look at this perception. Dayibasi I interviewed in Duzkoy explained the discrimination he felt during his relations with the state representatives;

“Let me tell you something that happened to me. Seyit Poyraz lives in Uzunoren neighborhood in Uzunmahmut village (a village in Ulubey of Ordu), he is the uncle of Bahri Poyraz (dayibasi adds that he worked for long years in the hazelnut field of Poyraz family and that they are in a close relationship). His daughter was admitted to teacher's college in Adana and at the time I was living in Adana. I was newly married. When Seyit Poyraz's daughter arrived there (Adana), I didn't let her go anywhere since I was always on the run and never at home. I told her to stay at my house with my wife, you are two sisters and I'm mostly away. For three years she constantly came to my house.

One year when I came here (Ordu), we were waiting for her father (Dayibasi is telling that they were waiting for Seyit Poyraz with his daughter). Her father was working in a bank. While we were waiting for him we went down the beach. We were sitting in chairs and a young man passed by. He made a gesture (what dayibasi refers to here is a hand gesture which includes an intention of swearing or insult. Since such gestures are considered as harassment, dayibasi starts a fight with the man) which offended me. I don't remember how I beaten him at that moment. Police came, checked my id and they started yelling at me. Are you a bully, he asked, you came from there (Nusaybin) and you are terrorizing us here, he said. In the meantime the girl told the police that I was her fiancé. Later her father and her other relatives heard of the incident and they came. They scolded the commissioner and the police. Whoever's the case this guy is guilty, how can you ask him questions such as are you a bully, are you terrorizing us?! By experiencing this, I saw police's attitude”.

Although it looks as though there are two different approaches in this case, the main reason behind the producer's support to the dayibasi is the presence of a relationship built on interest and intimacy since dayibasi took care of Seyit Poyraz's daughter. Workers don't only encounter similar discriminatory procedures enacted by the police and gendarmerie, but also in hospitals when they get sick. In sum, they experience similar situations within spheres in which they come across civil servants. One of the workers I interviewed in the Science High School dormitory narrated a similar incident. After the flood, one day while the provincial representatives were distributing the food, a fight started between the workers. During the fight one of the policeman said to another one *"Don't intervene, these are Kurds, let them shoot each other"*, and they didn't intervene.

One of the workers⁸² I interviewed in Uzunisa camping site after the flood told me that when he told the medical team that his wife was having a hard time walking to the ambulance and requested them to check her, one of the nurses said *"We can't come there, you have to come here"*.

A similar incident was experienced again in Duzkoy. The dayibasi told that he took one of the workers who was sick to the hospital and the worker gave blood for blood analysis. Although the results of the patients who came much later arrived, they waited for a long time. Their results were given only long after when they complained about the situation.

A few examples concerning the interactions between the workers and civil servants are described above. More examples can be given on the matter but the main point will always be the same: Civil servants are openly exhibiting a discriminatory attitude towards the workers based on their ethnic identities. Approach of the civil servants, the implementers of state politics, towards the workers differs significantly from their approach to the local public. The workers say that they start feeling this from the very moment they enter the city. They explain being subjected to such discriminatory and arbitrary procedures with the fact that they are Kurdish. A worker⁸³ I interviewed in the Science High School dormitory verifies this;

"In any case we feel as though we are in a foreign country. When you sit somewhere everyone looks at you. They look at us because we are Kurdish; they already give us the evil eye".

Me, *"Do you think it's because you are Kurdish?"*

⁸²30-35 years old, male, comes from Urfa region.

⁸³25- 30 years old, male, comes from Urfa region.

“Of course!”

As we mentioned before, such discriminatory procedures carried out by the state officials are nurtured by the state tradition. State approach doesn't regard those people who have certain legal⁸⁴ bases as discriminatory or othering. Therefore since those officials who carry out these procedures don't get punished in any way, this situation gets rooted and becomes traditionalized. The discriminatory procedures the Kurdish workers encounter are regarded as common occurrences and neither local public nor the civil servants react against it. As a consequence discrimination becomes common and gets normalized.

Within the perceptions of the local public, effects of state and media make their presence felt. A 71 years old worker I interviewed in a cafeteria in the city makes his case very clear. Referring to the Kurdish workers he says;

“If it was my decision, I wouldn't let any of them in”.

After taking into account that by working for lower wages the Kurdish workers create an advantage on his behalf, his comments become softer and more reasonable. He regards them as acceptable since they provide cheap labor force. Within this frame, the economic dependency between the groups becomes the only sphere that makes the relations between the groups possible. However when we consider the structure and content of the relations, these economic parameters which make the relations possible stay in the background. At this point procedures of state politics surpass the economic variables. We observed that the interviewees

⁸⁴“Especially during the 1980s, assimilation policies in Turkey against the languages other than Turkish; specifically against Kurdish have significantly improved. In this period linguistic differences were regarded to be divisive/separatist for the national unity and for the first time languages other than Turkish were prohibited legally. Restrictions on the languages were sustained especially in relation to separatist terrorism.” Source: <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/23/666/8488.pdf>. Through the law 2932 that was introduced by the military regime in 1983; ‘Law about the Publications in Any Language other than Turkish’, speaking Kurdish was completely prohibited. Also through the campaign that was initiated by Istanbul University Law School’s Student Association in 1928; ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ , citizens were forced to speak Turkish in the public sphere and those who didn't were subjected to attacks. About this matter see Aslan, Sinem, “ ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ :A Nation in the Making”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics,13:2, 245-272, 2007. Also see <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537110701293500>. Surely, practices about the assimilation of Kurds didn't start with the foundation of Republic. Ethnical engineering of the Party of Union and Progress is really fundamental to the base of this project. Practices of Iskan-ı Asair which was founded in 1914 and Immigrant Directorate are also really important. Directorate started to translate the Kurdish geographical and settlement names into Turkish in 1919, and afterwards with the order of Talat Pasa (one of the founder of Party of Union and Progress, Grand vizier of Ottoman Empire in 1917, See http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mehmed_Talat_Pa%C5%9Fa) distributed the Kurdish population who has migrated to different places because of the World War into the Turkish population at 5 percent. The aim was to modernize them within a more ‘civilized’ Turkish population. Shortly, this was a Jacobean modernization project and it shows that Kurds were regarded as a pre-modern, uncivilized and primitive group before the foundation of Republic. See Ayşe Hur, Kurds and the State from the Ottoman Empire till Today, “Late Birth of Kurdish Nationalism”, <http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/27464.pdf>

who don't demand cheap labor force have a severe approach towards the arrival of Kurdish workers to the region.

At this point it is useful to mention the campaign which was organized against the arrival of the Kurdish workers to the Ordu region in 2010. Although this news wasn't officially approved, it was written in the media that in May 5, 2010 a meeting was organized in Giresun to which the governor and security officials of the district, security and military officials of Istanbul, Sivas, Dersim (Tunceli), and Bingol, and senior military officials and civil officials of Amasya, Sivas, Giresun, Ordu, Gumushane and Tokat have participated. Within this meeting certain decisions were made such as taking measures against the arrival of the Kurdish workers to the region, bringing hazelnut workers from Georgia instead of Kurdish workers to meet the labor force deficit and taking Kurdish workers to the region only after very strict controls and investigations.

Vice President of Giresun Chamber of Agriculture said on the matter;

“One of the reasons for preferring Georgian workers is the terrorist incidents that have taken place during the recent years. The workers coming from the Southeast who try to get into the region might be members of terrorist organizations. In order to prevent this we don't want the workers coming from the Southeast. Therefore we prefer Georgian workers only because they are cheaper and safer”. Through this explanation he expressed his support to the campaign held against the arrival of the Kurdish workers⁸⁵.

These rumors later turned into a campaign against the Kurdish workers claiming *“Workers shouldn't come from the Southeast, they should come from Georgia”*. During the interviews I conducted this issue was often mentioned. Likewise there were many news and discussions on this matter within the media⁸⁶. This campaign which was held against the arrival of the Kurdish workers from the Southeast was created as a reaction to attacks of the PKK and it was supported by the precautions taken by the security units.

⁸⁵For this news see <http://www.beyazgazete.com/haber/2010/6/11/giresunlu-findik-ureticileri-yonunu-gurcistan-a-cevir-di-981682.html> , <http://www.medya73.com/yazdir-1-248542.html>

Also for the news about the campaign that was started against Kurdish workers see http://www.idilhaber.com/anasayfa/haber_detay.asp?haberID=706 , http://www.birgun.net/actuels_index.php?news_code=1277712054&day=28&month=06&year=2010 <http://haber.sol.org.tr/mansetler/findik-irkciliga-ve-somuruve-iyi-gelir-haberi-31864>, <http://www.haberfabrikasi.org/s/?p=4171>

⁸⁶Related to this see <http://www.karasaban.net/findik-iscilerine-siki-denetim>

Protests were made by the intellectuals and artists⁸⁷ against this campaign which prevented the Kurdish workers from entering the hazelnut fields. They declared that they condemned this situation and their fields were open to Kurdish workers. The effects of this campaign on the workers were also mentioned during the interviews.

Here we see once again how effective created perceptions are in the relations between the Kurdish workers and the local public. The proclamation made by the Vice President of Giresun Chamber of Agriculture after the meeting which was supposedly held has shaped local public's perceptions and attitudes. This example is important in terms of seeing the power and effects of state procedures in shaping the relations between the two groups.

⁸⁷For the protest artists and intellectuals have organized against the discrimination of Kurdish workers see <http://bianet.org/bianet/bianet/123501-karadenizin-aydinlik-yuzleri-kurt-emekcilere-ayrimciliga-hayir-diyecek> , <http://bianet.org/bianet/toplum/123593-karadenizde-kurt-isciler-icin-cylem-dusmanliga-gecit-yok>

CHAPTER 5

RELIGION AND HYGIENE

5.1. Religious Life in Shaping the Reciprocal Perceptions

Although the two groups believe in the same religion, the local public argues that the Kurdish workers stink of sweat and they don't go to the mosques Kurdish workers go. This creates spatial segregation and it is closely related to local public perceiving the workers as dirty. The fact that the local public don't go to the mosques Kurdish workers go because the workers stink of sweat was mentioned during the interview I made in central Ordu with the member of Civil Society Platform who was also a teacher.

Beyond the effects of perception of cleanliness, it's necessary to mention the presence of different mechanisms which effect perceptions in religious life. In this respect the practices of Ali Kaban who was the governor of Ordu in 2008 are significant. In 2008 through his orders workers who came to the region to gather hazelnuts were stopped while entering the city and they weren't let in. He ordered removal of the tents of the workers which were temporarily built till they found jobs. Furthermore he banned the workers from entering the mosques for prayers⁸⁸. Through these instructions, imams of the mosques in Ordu warned the public before the Friday prayers saying "there might be PKK supporters within the workers". In this example, orders and practices of the state governor show their power even on the cultural and religious dimensions and we see that they have the position to shape and lead the perceptions of the public.

During an interview I made in Uzunisa camping site after the flood, a worker told me about how Kurdish workers are perceived in religious terms. He drew attention to the inadequacy of the helps;

"If we sent this call for help to another country, aid would be here long ago. Even though the guy is kafir (by kafir-non Muslim- he refers to foreign countries) he would look after us (take care of us) anyway. That is to say there is no Muslimism in Turkey (meaning the state and state representatives). If there was, we wouldn't be left in such a difficult situation, especially in the sacred month (he refers to Ramadan)".

⁸⁸For the news about the situation see http://www.birgun.net/worker_index.php?news_code=1217923787&year=2008&month=08&day=05

Worker is emphasizing here that people don't consider Kurds as Muslims. Otherwise he said aid would be provided for them during Ramadan which is the sacred month for Muslims and indicated that aid was necessary for them.

When we review the religious perceptions that are formed against the Kurdish workers we see that the conflicts between the state forces and the PKK are much more dominant than the common religious ground groups share. The interview I made in central Ordu with the member of Civil Society Platform who was also a teacher demonstrates this perspective, he told me that they postponed the aid they were planning to give during Ramadan because of the conflicts.

President of Tum-Koy-Sen commented on the effects of religious life on the perceptions between the groups;

“There is sympathy; even though it's at the local level, because of religion (he talks about the sympathy for the workers). But we can't say that it's really determining”.

Interviewee underlines that the main determining factor is the conflict between the state and the PKK which surpasses religion.

My interviewee at Science High School; a worker who is the prior provincial head of HEP, gave this example regarding the perceptions created about them by the media and through religion;

“We are subjected to the same kiblah⁸⁹, same prophet, same Allah. If we can listen to the same prayers, that's a peace message for us. The other day in Flash TV⁹⁰, they were saying that Suruc⁹¹vaaaz⁹² will be read in Kurdish and they are creating a wrong image of the Kurds by accusing them of changing even the Suruc prayer”.

The worker said that such procedures are very wrong and added that no one is capable of opposing religion. Through this example he poses the argument that although people think that the Kurdish workers make religious rules flexible or don't obey them, the Kurdish workers are Muslims who obey religious rules in reality.

⁸⁹Kiblah is the direction Muslims turn towards during prayers. The place they turn towards is Kaaba in Mescid-i Haram located in Mecca of Saudi Arabia. See <http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C4%B1ble>

⁹⁰Flash TV is a TV channel that broadcasts at national level in Turkey. See http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash_TV

⁹¹Suruç is a district in Sanliurfa.

⁹²Vaaaz is the speech mosque imams make to the community on religious matters.

Here we see that even within the frame of religious life discourses and practices of state and media have the power to shape the perceptions between the groups. This is the emphasized notion in the examples that are given above.

5.2. “Dirty Kurds”: Daily Habits and Hygiene within the Relations between the Groups

Within the cultural framework, the relations and perceptions between local public/producers and the Kurdish workers are similar to classical settled-nomad dichotomy. Generally nomads are always associated with obscurity and danger, since they are always mobile people assume they are dirty and they carry diseases. Considering they are not settled and their relation to civilization is very limited, they are usually perceived as illiterate. These perceptions are nurtured by the belief that nomads don't have rigid boundaries in terms of moral life like the settled communities. The effects of religion in their social lives are not subjected to strict rules of religious rituals. The rules and religious rituals are flexible according to the conditions while they are moving from one place to another. Because of this flexibility people often perceive them as faithless. They exhibit patterns of oral culture instead of written one. The relations between the Kurdish workers and other groups include all these components. But moreover these perceptions are often associated with Kurdishness and they are usually put together with Kurdish perception. Therefore the perceptions of the local public go beyond the settled-nomad dichotomy and attach adjectives such as illiterate, dirty and dangerous onto the concept of Kurdishness. Through these practices those perceptions get ossified and imbedded. Originally this approach should be understood as an expression of state ideology which defines the Kurdish question through phrases such as “regional backwardness”, “tribal rebellions” and “reactionism” (Yegen, 1996:217-218). State defines Kurds as illiterate and creates these perceptions. Similarly, shows that are broadcasted on STV⁹³ channel such as “*Compassion Hill*” and “*Only Turkey*” illustrate Kurds as ‘dirty’, ‘illiterate’ and ‘dangerous’ and influence the perceptions about Kurds within the public opinion. Under the normal circumstances, this situation should move the perceptions about the seasonal workers to an ontologically higher level. By attaching such general and historical perceptions (settled communities’ perception of the nomads) to an ethnic group, they objectify this historical perception and take it to the level of reality. In other words, local public turns its perceptions

⁹³Samanyolu TV is a TV channel in Turkey which broadcasts under the guidance of an Islamic sect called Nurculuk, with the leadership of Fetullah Gulen. This group is also known as Gulen Movement and they have the strongest positions in Turkey's state bureaucracy and administration, and in the business world. Therefore their potential to influence masses is really strong. Their broadcasting policies are shaped on nationalist-Islamist and separatist politics. Samanyolu others every structure that is exterior to the Islamic and nationalist frame and categorizes them as dangerous. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samanyolu_TV

into attitudes and behaviors and this turns potential into an object. Local public brings together the settled's perception of the nomad with the general perception of the Kurds and a more complex perception emerges. This new perception defines Kurds through a composition of adjectives such as terrorist, illiterate, dirty, disease carrier and uncivilized. This perception is composed of two different perceptions and it has much more effect than the other two have individually. For instance; terrorism wasn't included in settled-nomad dichotomy, but it was attached to the perception of Kurds, therefore it got included to this new perception. Bahar Sahin Firat in her field research called *"Identity Conflict, Perception of the Peace and Expectations during the Education Process"* writes that the education system is constructed around the secular, Sunni, middle-class Turkish image and all other groups are subjected to exclusion and discrimination (Firat, 2010:24).

"However when these positions intersect with Kurdishness, discrimination can become diversified and deepened". (Firat, 2010:24).

Firat indicates that these perceptions which are constructed by the state create much stronger ones by uniting with the perception of Kurdishness.

This perception is not unique to Ordu region and there are many examples that refer to its presence all around the Turkey. During the conflicts between the two groups, Kurds are often referred as 'dirty' and 'terrorist'⁹⁴. This perception has the tendency to move beyond the local level and get applied to all Kurds in the same fashion. During the tension between the groups the first sentences directed towards the Kurds usually include adjectives such as 'dirty, Kurdish, terrorist'. During her research, Bahar Sahin Firat interviewed with a teacher in a region to which Kurds have migrated. The interviewee stated that the parents of the non-Kurdish students were often complaining about the "dirtiness" issue;

"They are saying 'Kurds arrived and the school got dirty. Kurds arrived, now there are fights at school, children are drawing knives at each other. Kurds arrived, now there is swearing'" (Firat, 2010:36).

⁹⁴For example; a policeman in a hospital in Manisa said to a citizen who has come to visit his brother who has been wounded by the police: 'You dirty Kurds are ruining the order. You are all terrorists'. See <http://www.haberlink.com/haber.php?query=33583>. Likewise a woman in a bar in Ankara said to the group who was singing in Kurdish "Are you PKK members? You have found us even here, dirty Kurds". After he insults her boyfriend who was a policeman shot the singer Emrah Gezer. See http://www.birgun.net/actuels_index.php?news_code=1318323737&year=2011&month=10&day=11. During many similar incidents Kurds are insulted to be 'dirty and terrorist' and we can see that these two words create a united perception.

As it can be seen through the examples given above; by attaching the words ‘dirty’ and ‘Kurdish’ together, a negative meaning gets attributed to the word Kurdish and this perception becomes even more comprehensive. This transformation is created through media’s publications and state procedures (including the education policies).

The perception of hygiene is very important in groups’ perception of each other and in their daily interactions. For example; the eating and cleaning habits of the Kurdish workers are different from the local public’s habits. While the local public eats their meals on tables, Kurdish workers eat on floor tables. The difference between the table and floor table makes the workers even dirtier in local public’s eyes. The floor table is associated with both ‘dirtiness’ and with ‘being uncivilized’, they regard the Kurdish workers as uncivilized thinking they haven’t yet gained the habit of eating on tables. One of the workers I interviewed in Science High School talked to me on this matter;

Me, *“When you go back to where you stay after work, do the field-owners eat the things you offer to them? Or do you they sit and eat with you when you invite them to dinner?”*

Worker⁹⁵, *“Honestly, they wouldn’t eat our food”.*

Dayibasi, *“When I go to their house, I would drink anything I’m offered even when it is poison”.*

Me, *“But would they sit down to a meal with you?”*

Dayibasi, *“If we invite them over, they wouldn’t drink anything easily even if it was presented in a rose pot”.*

Worker, *“They regard us as stupid gypsies”.*

This examples demonstrates that the ‘dirtiness’ perception through its cultural notion limits the relations between producers and workers. The fact that the workers are cooking their food with the trash they gathered around the tent or with dung and the thought that they don’t clean their food enough before cooking nurture local public’s perception. Similarly, in Bulancak a worker offered us food; however the field owner’s mother didn’t find that food appropriate and persistently offered us the food she prepared. Although she didn’t express it openly, she didn’t want us to eat the food worker has offered and kept putting the food she cooked in front

⁹⁵40-45 years old, male, comes from Urfa region.

of us. It was as if she was implying that eating the food offered by the worker would be harmful to us.

“Dirtiness” perception gets even stricter through the way workers meet their needs to use the toilet. Nearly all my interviewees from the local public told me that workers were treating random places as toilets. They said that the workers go to the point that is available for their toilet need sat that moment which is sometimes close to the field owner’s or producer’s house. I observed that the field owners were very disturbed by the situation. They added they observed that workers don’t use the toilet even in some places in which the bathroom is available, and workers don’t clean themselves enough after they use the bathroom. They therefore approached the things workers touched or eaten with disgust.

The journalist⁹⁶ I interviewed in central Ordu told me about how this perception has emerged.

“Worker came to the field, of course he has to use bathroom, he is human after all. I sometimes can’t even use the bathrooms outside my own house. He (Kurdish worker) is just like me, what’s the difference? He is also a biological being. But what does he (Kurdish worker) do? He pees on the first stop he finds (while working in the field). He does something unique to him. Therefore we say that Kurds came and fucked up our hometown”.

Me, *“Do you think cultural differences are important?”*

Journalist, *“Yes they are, but the climate is also effective. I hold a grudge (meaning the pain caused by the death of the soldiers during conflicts). In my village there are many reasons to call Kurds useless men (here he says that he has many reasons to insult Kurds by emphasizing the soldiers killed by the Kurds during conflicts). I see these workers firstly within the employer-worker relationship, but aren’t they Kurds after all? How many people are laying there (meaning the soldiers in the cemetery)? Therefore it’s difficult, Kurdish workers come and work here but I don’t think the approach will be recovered. Because how should I put it; the guy has pain”.*

I believe it is necessary to interpret the comment given above from two different perspectives. Although the perception of the workers through their cultural differences (for example the situation about the bathroom habits) influences local public’s perception of the Kurds, the main determinant isn’t embedded in cultural variables. It is emphasized in this example that this determinant is exterior to groups’ relations with each other; meaning the conflicts

⁹⁶55-60 years old, male, local journalist.

between the state and the PKK. The journalist puts very openly that the main vein of the relations are formed by the effects of a higher mechanism-state mechanism-.The effects of cultural differences or the differences between the daily lives come after the effects of the conflict between the state and the PKK.

The fact that the state defines Kurds as “backward (or uncivilized)” also refers to the absence of hygiene consciousness within the Kurds. This perspective is effective in the formation of dirtiness perception, we can’t expect a backward group to have the daily cleaning and hygiene habits of a modern urban person.

Cleanliness perception is also effective on the common ground of the groups, religion. In this respect my interview in Ordu central with the teacher who was also a member of the Civil Society Platform is really important. He mentioned that during the month of Ramadan a portion of the mosque community who gather after iftar at mosques for tarawih prayer was disturbed by the workers who were coming to the same mosques and they started going to different ones. They complained that the workers didn’t bathe after gathering hazelnuts and came directly to the mosque, they started performing prayers while they were still sweaty and there was a smell within the mosque which disturbed the community. Because of these reasons he told me that they started going to different mosques. Here, even the religious life which is supposed to create a common ground between the two groups gets limited through the “cleanliness” perception created by the producers.

5.3. Seasonal Workers and the Gypsies

Gypsy plays, Kurd dances (anonymous)

During the time I spent in Ordu region, I had the opportunity to make certain observations and interviews which weren’t included in my research plan. The most important to these were the relations between the Kurdish workers and gypsy workers in the camping sites. In all of the previous chapters we mentioned the discriminatory perceptions, attitudes, behavioral patterns Kurdish workers are subjected to within the axis of media, state and local public, and the mechanisms that create such processes. Although Kurdish workers are subjected to different forms of discrimination, they exhibit similar discriminatory attitudes towards the gypsy workers in the working and camping sites. Although there is no political foundation, the relations between gypsy workers and Kurdish workers and the exclusion mechanism have rigid structures. The Kurdish workers in Uzunisa camping site don’t interact with gypsy

workers unless it is necessary. They don't let their children play with gypsies' children and they don't deal with them in any respect.

Especially during the interviews I conducted at the Science High School, I came to realize that the gypsies are perceived as a fluid identity devoid of morals, religion and social class and which moves completely based on conditions. The beliefs such as gypsies are non-Muslims and they can be flexible within male-female relations much beyond the societal borders are important elements which reduces the relations with gypsies next to nothing. Also the fact that people believe gypsies are always ready for robbery and pillage legitimizes the Kurdish workers' perception of them as dangerous.

Interviewees especially emphasized that they thought gypsies are careless and 'dirty' in their eating culture. According to the Kurdish workers, gypsies are a group who puts anything they find into their mouths and who don't care about the cleanliness of anything they eat.

In sum, the Kurds define and perceive gypsies through adjectives such as 'immoral', 'faithless', 'troublemaker', 'dirty', 'dangerous' and 'carrier of diseases'.

At this point it stands out that exclusion mechanisms operate from the dominating groups towards the exterior groups. While the Kurdish workers are being socially and economically excluded through a discriminatory language dominated by the state and the media, in the Ordu region in which they are not the dominating group, gypsies are subjected to the exactly same mechanisms by the Kurdish workers. A hierarchical stratification leaps out in the exclusion mechanism. The groups which are strong enough to exclude the other group have the tendency to use that power and position through certain excuses. While the local public is excluding the Kurdish workers by accusing them of being 'dirty', 'dangerous' and 'terrorist', Kurdish workers are excluding gypsies through similar accusations. Actually the local public excludes both groups by uniting them under the name of 'Kurds', because they can't tell apart a Kurd from a gypsy.

Under the light of all these matters; we can say that within the exclusion and discrimination between the groups there is an apparent power relationship. The stronger group is capable of applying the same discriminatory and exclusionary practices through the same adjectives they were also subjected to.

CHAPTER 6

THE FLOOD

6.1. Relations that Emerged After the Flood

During the first week of my arrival to Ordu, on September 19, 2011, it started raining cats and dogs. Black sea region is accustomed to summer rains and the climate is opportune to them. Late at night, it started pelting down. It was raining so heavily that when I went to my window to see rain, I saw that my floor was covered with rain which was leaking. The road that was going in front of the teacherage was completely closed and the cries of a few shopkeepers who were trying to save their shops from the water flood were breaking the silence of the night with the rain. I thought to myself that such a rain must have bad consequences and I went to bed.

Next morning when I went to the restaurant for breakfast, I saw that all the roads around were covered in mud up to knee high. After the breakfast I went to the internet café to check the news and later I went to meet with my informant. The news on the newspaper and on the internet were saying that it was the most extraordinary rain of the last 50 years; the city was turned into a slime sea. That day after conducting a couple of interviews in the city, I left agreeing to meet with my informant the next day to go to Uzunisa camping site.

During the first days after my arrival to Ordu, I went to Uzunisa camping site, made short interviews there and took photos of the camping site. I was thinking about how it was changed after the flood. On Saturday, August, 20, when we went to the camping site with my informant, the effects of the flood were very obvious. Camping site was destroyed. Except a few tents which the floods couldn't reach, there was nothing left. The clothes and supplies of the workers, pots which were already useless, plates and other daily products, and even some of the cars were spread around through the flood waters and they were stuck on mud. My informant and I were petrified against the severity of the situation. A camping site which had around 200 tents was destroyed. Since I came to the camping site prior to the flood, conducted interviews and took photos, I was able to compare the two situations.

When I started wandering around the camping site, I saw that some of the workers were looking for things in mud. When I asked them, I learned that some were looking for licensed

rifles, some were looking for money. Actually most of them were sorting out the daily products which are still usable for later use. The products which would be considered as trash under normal circumstances were considered as still usable by the workers. I even saw that some young girls were taking sacks of rice and lentils out of mud, drying them under the sun and sorting them out for later use. The situation was beyond what I presumed.

Was it a coincidence that this camping site was built on a stream bed in a region in which it rains all seasons and floods and earth sliding happen very often? I saw that the camping site wasn't coincidentally but intentionally built on a stream bed when I visited a camping site in Fatsa of Ordu which harbors a lot of workers from Uzunisa. Similar to Uzunisa, this camping site was also built on a stream bed. Workers looked completely unprotected against the possibility of a flood danger. When I walked from where the tents are built in Uzunisa towards the stream bed, I saw that old women and some workers were sorting out the pillows and blankets in the muddy river. They were laying out the pillows and blankets they took out of the mud on the rocks for drying. Workers' helplessness was apparent in all their behaviors. Since they were in their underwear, night gown or sweat suits in their beds during the flood, the mess in their clothes was standing out. Some were wearing clothes they found randomly under the mud. As they explained, there were no deaths, because since it was the month of Ramadan, the workers who woke up for sahur were awake. These workers woke the others up and helped them to run away from the flood region, therefore prevented the possible losses.

Although the camping site is situated only five-six kilometers away from the city, the arrival of aid to the workers from the state representatives took hours. Even though the security officer in the camping site persistently called the police and the gendarmerie, he couldn't prevent the delay of aid. Some of the workers who were running away from the flood wanted to take shelter in the empty cultural centre which is situated on the south of the camping site. However the gateman at the cultural centre locked the doors and went away from the centre and this further demoralized the workers. The workers I interviewed told me that they wanted to enter the cultural centre to protect little babies, but the gateman at the center locked the doors and went away, so one of their friends broke the window and entered. They added that they tried to enter the houses in the village, but no one helped them except the owners of one house.

They said that the gendarmerie and the medical officers who arrived hours later done next to nothing because the workers have already saved themselves on their own. Some of the

workers who were coming from Urfa said that they voted for AKP, and they were questioning why ten deputies of Urfa weren't doing anything about them. Another worker⁹⁷ was complaining about the president helping Somalia while he wasn't showing any interest when the Kurdish workers are the case. Another one⁹⁸ was questioning why the helping hand given to Syrian refugees wasn't extended to them.

Most of the workers were questioning why the government they have voted for and supported still haven't sent them aid. Another worker said that state has provided aid for the earthquake in Simav of Kutahya in seven hours and he was complaining about not having any aid except shelter although two days have passed. The despair and anger were written all over their faces. They kept questioning why the state wasn't concerned about them as much as the other citizens, even though they voted for AKP. They kept asking themselves whether or not they were citizens of this country. A young worker⁹⁹;

“If we sent this call for help to another country, aid would be here long ago. Even though the guy is kafir, he would take care of us anyway. That is to say there is no Muslimism in Turkey. If there was, we wouldn't be left in such a difficult situation, especially in this sacred month”.

Another worker¹⁰⁰ tells the medical team that he has a backache and asks for medicine. They tell him to go to pharmacy.

Worker, *“Which pill should I buy?”* he asks to the medical team.

Health officer, *“Go buy one that you want”.*

Worker, *“Don't you have pain killer vaccinations here? You could do it here?”*

Health officer, *“We don't have it here”.*

Although we don't want to, we accept their kind offer to drink tea for not upsetting them after their insistence. While we were drinking tea, we observed the camping site and continued our conversation. At this moment, a pickup truck enters the camping site. Half an hour later, another pickup truck enters. We learnt that the pickup trucks belonged to the villagers. After parking their trucks next to the stream bed, they began cutting the big tree pieces the flood has brought with chainsaws. They loaded the tree pieces onto their trucks in a hurry. I observed

⁹⁷30-35 years old male, comes from Urfa region.

⁹⁸25-30 years old, male, comes from Urfa region.

⁹⁹20-25 years old, male, comes from Urfa region.

¹⁰⁰35-40 years old, male, comes from Urfa region.

them for a while. I even went closer and looked at what they were doing with attention. They wanted to pick as much chocks as possible and their hurry was reflected on their moves. There was an invisible wall between the villagers who were picking up wood and the workers who were trying to take the left over things out of the mud. Villagers were acting as though the workers who have hardly survived the night before weren't there. When I asked the workers whether or not the villagers helped them during the flood or after the flood, they said that none of the villagers helped them. They added that the villagers didn't even say that they were sorry about what happened, in fact any conversation didn't take place between them. After I asked persistently *"Didn't any of the villagers bring you a hot bowl of soup in the sacred month of Ramadan?"*, they answered *"No"*. I was surprised by the distance between these people who believe in the same religion in the month of Ramadan in which people should help each other. For the month of Ramadan, state was helping the Syrian refugees and people in Somalia in the amount of millions of dollars. How could these people whose numbers were increasing with SMS messages be so ignorant of the despair that was being experienced in front of their eyes? I kept asking myself this question.

After they emptied the trucks they loaded with wood, villagers returned back to stream bed to pick up wood. Even though sometimes the villagers and workers get close enough to touch each other, they never communicate.

The flood incident provided me with opportunities to make observations regarding the visible parts of the relations and conduct interviews. I asked myself which is the parameter that brings the relations to the end of the line. President of Tum-Koy-Sen says about the state relations have reached;

"For example, here the language Tayyip Erdogan uses gets reciprocated at the same moment. That is to say there is a reaction even within the social democrats (The interviewee here states that even the most democratic segment; social democrats, are influenced by President's proclamations and they to have a reaction against Kurds)".

The interviewee here refers to the proclamation made by the President after PKK's attack on Silvan and the latter attacks during the month of Ramadan, about the death of the soldiers; *"The issue is at knife-edge now, the consequences will be too heavy"*. This proclamation was done on August, 14, 2001 and the flood happened on August, 19, 2011. Considering there is only five days between the two incidents, we can say that the effects of the President's proclamation are felt in such short notice.

The influence of the language used by the rulers of the state makes itself clear within the relations between the workers and villagers in the situation described above. This language moves beyond the religious importance of the month of Ramadan and the feelings of cooperation, and it builds a barrier between the groups. After President's proclamation, some columnists and journalists in the press remonetized the conflictual language of the 1990s. They have written that it was necessary to return to the politics with security axis. The impact of President's proclamation which was even strengthened through media's attitude was perceivable within the relations between the workers and villagers in Uzunisa camping site¹⁰¹. The fact that there was no cooperation or interaction between the workers and the local public after the flood also strengthens this observation.

With my interviewee in central Ordu who was a retired teacher, we discussed the state and media influence in taking the relations between the two groups to the end of the line. He said that the picture was different during the years between 1999 and 2005. In this period media didn't use the war language in the aftermath of Abdullah Ocalan's arrest in Kenya when the PKK attacks were ended. We have stated before that during this period, this interviewee was a deputy candidate of HADEP¹⁰² in Ordu and he was involved with the election campaigns. These two situations are important in terms of understanding the shaping and leading factors behind these relations between the groups.

For understanding this influence more concretely, the interview I conducted in central Ordu with the member of the Civil Society Platform was really important. Interviewee stated that prior to President's proclamation and increasing conflicts, although effects of the incident in Silvan were being felt, aid packages for the month of Ramadan were still being prepared for the workers. But after President's proclamation and the death of a specialist sergeant from Perembe of Ordu in Cukurca of Hakkari in a PKK attack, the aids were postponed in order to not to draw reaction. My interviewee added that after seeing the situation in the camping site, they decided to redistribute the aid packages despite the reactions that may come from the public.

¹⁰¹When we look at the headlines of the newspapers regarding this situation we see that the security discourse in the frame of the Kurdish question. The news and comments that come up in the media verifies this argument. For the newspaper headlines and comments see <http://haber.gazetevatan.com/silvandan-sonra-ne-yapmali/390229/4/Haber> , <http://bianet.org/bianet/diger/131474-gazetelerde-silvan-catismasi-ve-demokratik-ozerklik-ilani> , <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1056489&Yazar=CENGIZ-CANDAR&CategoryID=97>

¹⁰²HADEP (People's Democracy Party) was established in 1995 and was closed in 2003 with the accusation of being "the center for illegal practices". They listed the solution of the Kurdish question as a primary objective in their program. See. http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halk%C4%B1n_Demokrasi_Partisi

Here what stands out is that even the most humane interaction that is supposed to take place between the groups after the flood has the tendency to be directed by exterior groups. Even the common religious ground of the groups is under the same influence and it is shaped by the discourses of media and state. These discourses prevent the cooperation and solidarity between the groups even in the month of Ramadan which is sacred for Muslims.

6.2. Dormitory of the Science High School after the Flood

As group of eight to ten; journalists, political party representatives and volunteers who want to help the workers, we went to the Science High School¹⁰³ to which workers in Uzunisa camping site were removed by the governorate. We went there to see the situation and conduct interviews. Action force policemen were waiting for us at the school's door. Besides a bus full of action force policemen, there were also policemen with regular uniforms. Furthermore, groups of civil policemen were patrolling around the school. At first glance this building didn't seem like a place in which flood victims were staying. With the presence of this number of security officers, it looked more like a refugee camp.

School's garden was full of child workers and women who were wandering around. Some of the women were hanging the muddy clothes they could save from the flood in school's garden; some were just sitting in a corner and chatting. The despair and hopelessness regarding their experience were written all over their faces. We observed that some of the workers who have found jobs were loading their stuff to the trucks and preparing to go to hazelnut fields.

Since we arrived to the school as a crowded group, some of the workers thought we were state officers and started to express their demands. Although we weren't state officers, we told them that we would convey their demands to the necessary institutions. We talked with them about their demands and took notes. Some of them were demanding food distribution and some had complaints regarding bed and tent distributions. Workers' demands and complaints were implying that there was a serious disorganization regarding the distribution of aid.

A worker who thought that I was a journalist asked me furiously why there wasn't sufficient aid and why it didn't arrive on time. Without waiting for my answer, he answered his own question by saying they were subjected to this treatment because they were Kurdish.

¹⁰³Science High School is located in central Ordu in the north of Provincial Security Directorate. See <http://www.ordufenlisesi.k12.tr>

During the subsequent hours, we started chatting with a couple of workers in the school's garden. At first I felt that they were giving evasive answers to my questions, doubting who I really was. To my detailed questions they were giving vague answers and they were trying to avoid making any severe political comments. I realized that a big portion of this hesitancy was caused by the policemen who were continually wandering around. One of them asked me why there were so many policemen and for whose safety they were actually there for. Was it for the victims' safety or for the city residents' safety?

We started our discussion by asking the workers whether or not the aid has arrived on time and in adequate amounts. They stated that they weren't provided with adequate tents, beds, clothes and even food wasn't distributed in sufficient amounts. Another worker was complaining that the beds that are given to them were used and dirty.

After I addressed one of the workers with his name, he told me that he doesn't want to be addressed by his name during the interview. I believe this demand was partially caused by the fact that I was recording the interviews. I told him that I could give him the recording device, erase the records if he wants to or show him my id, but it wasn't easy to get rid of his doubts.

To relieve the worker's mind I kept talking about other matters for a while. Later on the worker¹⁰⁴ told me that he used to be HEP¹⁰⁵ (People's Labor Party) provincial head of Gaziantep, claiming that he had a political past. After a while, workers insisted on continuing our discussion by drinking tea upstairs in their rooms. I and my informant agreed and we went upstairs to the rooms workers were staying in the Science High School dormitory.

Since I formerly worked with seasonal workers in my farm in Islahiye of Gaziantep, I am accustomed to workers' daily routines and needs and this really helped me to understand the workers in Ordu. These workers were used to cooking their foods and baking their bread on the fire in front of their tents; therefore I understood that they were having a hard time meeting such needs on a camping cylinder in a room in Science High School dormitory. I remember spending long hours on diwans inside the tents many years ago.

The workers staying in these tents bring most of their foods from their hometowns and cook them using the wood pieces they gathered around and dung¹⁰⁶ in order to save money. Seasonal workers try to meet all their needs without spending money in order to save more

¹⁰⁴40-45 years old, male, comes from Urfa.

¹⁰⁵ For brief information about HEP (People's Labor Party) see http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halk%C4%B1n_Emek_Partisi

¹⁰⁶Dung is a type of fuel that is obtained through drying the cattle's feces. See. <http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tezek>

money. They don't regard their work places as a part of their lives, they rather see it as a temporary phase. Therefore they organize their daily lives in a way that will minimize their spending. Above all, they will need the money they earned in their hometowns. However most of the workers here go after the hazelnut season to Central Anatolia region, to cities such as Kayseri, Sivas and Yozgat for beet harvest. They later on continue to Mediterranean coast, to Mersin, Adana and Antalya for gathering citrus fruits, and they can only go back to their hometowns at the end of the year. Considering that they only spend 4 to 5 months in their hometowns and spend rest of the year migrating as a worker from one region to another; most of their lives are actually spent in their work areas. Since the workers see themselves as temporary in their work areas, they don't try to establish lasting relations in those areas. I believe that's why they don't react against being treated badly by the local public and some shop keepers. Considering they will leave the place in the short run, they try to avoid any dangerous situation that might emerge in their work areas and keep silent against the things that are done to them.

After the teas are served, we moved into a deep conversation which lasted long hours. Once in a while the door opened, couple of workers entered the conversation and left. Although their numbers changed frequently, there were constantly 7-8 workers in the room. Including the ones who arrived later, there were 10-11 workers.

We usually started the conversation by talking about the flood disaster. I asked them how they felt after the flood and most of them answered that they felt lonely and desperate. One of the workers in the room¹⁰⁷ said;

"I should tell you something. The youth here goes to the market in fear, that's how we feel around here".

Another worker¹⁰⁸ said; *"Since our region is a terror region, we are regarded as the source of terror around here, that's how we are perceived. Although we say that we are supporters of AKP, they see us as such. We want to live as first class citizens but they don't let us live freely".*

After a while a dayibasi¹⁰⁹ joined us. He said that this year he brought 50 to 60 workers to Ordu region. I asked him about his experiences after the flood. He complained about the

¹⁰⁷30-35 years old, male, comes from Urfa region.

¹⁰⁸35-40 years old, male, comes from Urfa region.

¹⁰⁹55-60 years old, male, comes from Urfa region.

miniskirts that arrived with the clothing help packages. He stated that torn and dirty clothes were sent to them and some of these were miniskirts. The worker underlined that the women have never worn miniskirts and never will, he tried to say that he thought these clothes were sent intentionally. He told that he felt belittled and treated like a beggar. Here the emphasis dayibasi puts on miniskirts demonstrates that workers regard themselves as more conservative than the rest of the city public. By stating that wearing a miniskirt is ‘dishonor’ and shameful, he is trying to underline that their women never wear miniskirts and they are honorable. Thus we see through his perspective towards Ordu that he regards the women here as fribble since they wear miniskirts. I asked him whether or not state had the means to provide help for the workers after the flood and he answered;

“They had the means, didn’t they? If they didn’t how come they managed to help the foreign states?!”

Me, *“So they didn’t provide aid for you?”*

Dayibasi, *“They didn’t, because we are Kurdish.”*

Me, *“Because you are Kurdish?”*

Dayibasi, *“ Yes.”*

Me, *“Did this occur to you?”*

Dayibasi, *“Yes, this occurred to me. This also occurs to them¹¹⁰.”*

Me, *“Do you think this also occurs to them?”*

Dayibasi, *“Of course. If I took the road right now, and a thousand cars of them would drive by me; even though they know that I would pay, none of them would take me in because I’m Kurdish. I’m Kurdish but if I had a car, I would take in even a thousand Turks. That’s how they discriminate.”*

The research report Mazlum-Der¹¹¹ Batman Branch Office prepared regarding the discrimination the Kurdish workers are subjected to is composed of interviews made with the workers. Seasonal hazelnut workers’ statements about the discrimination they are facing are similar to our findings. For example; a student named Fadime Kirbas says in the report;

¹¹⁰ With ‘them’ he refers to the state and everyone that exhibits discriminatory behaviors against them.

¹¹¹Mazlum-Der (Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed). See. <http://www.mazlumder.org>

“Sometimes employers treat us really badly. They say Kurds are dirty, Kurds don’t know how to gather hazelnuts, but we don’t care about them”. Likewise interviewee Z.G. says; *“There was discrimination. We; the workers who came from Batman and nearby provinces, were faced with discriminatory treatments. The residents of the villages we work in sometimes don’t even say hello back to us”*. These statements coincide with our findings from the interviews¹¹².

During our discussion one of the female teachers¹¹³ who came with us mentioned that there were actually people like her who wanted to help but they couldn’t because of the social pressure. She added that when they helped the workers they were accused of being Kurdish friendly, Kurdish lover and because of such social pressure a lot of people were repressing their desire to help. She said that she knew that she will be subjected to social exclusion because she came here, but she wanted to help the workers as much as she could anyway. Then my informant from Ordu said that he got strong reactions from the environment because he named his son Baran¹¹⁴. He told that he was warned against doing that but despite the reactions he abided by his decision.

Through these stories we can come up with the conclusion that any relations of empathy and solidarity people from local public form with the Kurdish workers are also subjected to discriminatory and exclusionary treatments of local public. The interior neighborhood pressure of the local public determines the borders between the groups. If anyone crosses those borders and get closer to workers, they are also subjected to social pressure and forced to stay inside the present borders.

At this point we see that the social positioning mechanisms are not only effective on Kurdish workers but also on those who get close to the workers or who show any interest towards them. This bilateral influence gets combined with state and media language and it increases its power. Therefore we see that discrimination, exclusion and othering mechanisms which are nurtured by different sources are not only directed towards the Kurdish workers, but also on those who show any closeness or interest towards the workers.

¹¹²For the report see http://www.mazlumder.org/haber_detay.asp?haberID=6016

¹¹³50 years old, female, teacher.

¹¹⁴Baran means rain in Kurdish and it’s a name that is often given to sons of Kurdish families.

CHAPTER 7

STATE AND MEDIA

7.1. The Influence of the Conflicts between PKK and State in Shaping the Perceptions between the Groups

First of all I have to say that until the hazelnut gathering season, direct contact with the workers is initiated by the producers. These relations are enabled by the intermediaries between the two groups; dayibasis. If there are workers and producers who are already familiar and content with each other, dayibasis continue to bring together same workers with the same producers (we have to note here that this doesn't happen very often). We can explain workers' contentedness through factors such as taking their wages on time, providing shelter and intimacy in their social relations. On the other hand producers' contentedness can be explained through workers not leaving hazelnuts on branches or on the ground during the gathering, workers being clean in working areas and intimacy in their relations. Actually one would expect that the main determinant in these relations should be economical. The relations between the workers and producers or the local public are based on reciprocal presentment of products and services. However we see that the main determinant of these relations tends to related to workers' ethnic identities. The decisiveness and influence of the ethnic frame presents itself in state's and media's approach towards the Kurds. This approach becomes concrete in the discriminatory discourses and practices of state and media.

Shortly, the general political atmosphere of the country is effective in the creation of this situation. What we mean here by Turkey's general political atmosphere is the conflicts between PKK and state forces and its influence on public opinion. This political influence affects the local public's vision of the Kurds. Media, through publications that support the proclamations of state representatives contributes to the creation of this political influence.

The political atmosphere that emerged in the aftermath of the PKK attacks that happened on July 14, 2011 in Silvan of Diyarbakir is a striking example. 13 soldiers lost their lives during the attacks and afterwards the President and some ministers made proclamations that targeted the BDP politicians. As a consequence of these proclamations many attacks were organized against the BDP buildings all around the Turkey; Kurdish workers were also involved with these attacks. After the proclamations of state representatives and media's approach to the matter attacks were organized against the BDP buildings in Konya, Elazig and Gemlik of

Bursa by the nationalist groups, Kurdish workers in Germencik of Aydin were attacked and Kurdish singer Aynur Dogan was protested by people throwing plastic bottles at her during her concert in Istanbul¹¹⁵. If any state representative has made any proclamation regarding the Kurdish question, if any soldiers have died during the conflicts between PKK and state forces, if there is an incident within the city that could put the workers, local public, producers and state representatives against each other; the economic dimension in these relations becomes of secondary importance. At this point, political dimension and state discourse, the atmosphere created by media's approach to the matter becomes the main parameter which direct the relations and perceptions.

In the year of 2010, in an attack organized by PKK in Akkus of Ordu, a specialist sergeant died and a sergeant and another specialist sergeant were wounded. Afterwards the local population started to threaten the seasonal workers in the city. A crowd was gathered in front of the hospital to support the wounded soldiers. The Governor Orhan Duzgun's speech for this crowd is important in terms of showing the sources that nurture this discrimination in practice. The Governor targets the workers by claiming that the number of attacks in the region has increased after the arrival of Kurdish seasonal workers. During his speech someone from the crowd complained that the workers in the region weren't searched, and the Governor stated that he will take the necessary measures and press the issue¹¹⁶. Governor defined the workers as the primary suspects of these attacks and this immediately affected the perceptions and attitudes of the public. This complaint about the workers not being searched enough shows that the state discourse and the public complete each other; they move and act in the same league. Governor's speech was reciprocated and the local public's frame of perception was shaped in the intended manner.

Likewise, government party Kirikkale parliamentarian of AKP Vahit Erdem made a speech in his hometown at a coffee house;

"Kurdish people work a lot now, they are starting to handle everything. Soon Turks will be the minority and people will say there used to be Turks. We have to open our eyes immediately. We have to work hard".

¹¹⁵For news reports related to this matter see <http://www.diyarbakirhaber.gen.tr/haber-2062-Kurtler-Hedef-Seciliyor.html>

¹¹⁶For details on the subject see http://www.sendika.org/yazi.php?yazi_no=31935

Through these sentences he is underlining the weakness and disadvantages that will be created by the economic supremacy Kurds are earning¹¹⁷.

The proclamations made by the state representatives can sometimes be traced in the attacks made against the Kurdish workers and in the discriminatory practices Kurdish workers are subjected to. However cyclical changes can create variations within the two groups' relations.

On this matter, the retired teacher I interviewed in central Ordu told me about the transformation of general political atmosphere of Ordu region in the aftermath of the arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan at Kenya in 1999 and his return to Turkey. The interviewee added that as a consequence of the relative absence of conflicts till 2005, local public's perception of the Kurdish workers and Kurdish question has changed. So much so that the interviewee stated that he has joined the parliamentary elections in 2002 as a candidate of HADEP¹¹⁸ (People's Democracy Party), he made election campaigns in the city and he didn't get any reactions from the public. The absence of conflicts, the difference it created on state discourse and media's approach are influencing public's perception of the Kurdish workers and Kurdish question and this example is a good demonstration of that process.

During the periods in which conflicts increase and media's and politics' decisiveness increase in a perceivable way and becomes provocative, public opinion; therefore the local public's perceptions and attitudes can be shaped and nurtured by these channels. Therefore during the periods in which there are no conflicts or problems except the embedded tension, relations become susceptible to exterior parameters.

At this point Barth's argument that the relations between the groups are formed by reciprocal interaction becomes weak. Instead of groups' reciprocal interaction, media and state influence which shape groups' approach towards each other enter the picture. This influence is nurtured by the workers' ethnic identity; by the fact that they are Kurdish. The possible losses during the conflicts between PKK and state make this influence even more perceivable. Likewise, the absence of conflicts creates a contrary effect and leads the relations towards a balanced and sustainable process. Therefore the political atmosphere created by the periodical political

¹¹⁷ For the whole of Yildirim Turker's article that was published in Radikal Newspaper see

<http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalEklrDetayV3&ArticleID=1009782&CategoryID=42>

¹¹⁸ The political party which defined the solution of Kurdish question as the primary objective was closed by the Constitutional Court on March 13, 2003 with the accusation of being the 'center of illegal practices'. See

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Democracy_Party

changes becomes the main determinant in the formation of producers' perception of Kurdish workers and producers' attitudes.

The dayibasis I interviewed in Bulancak Maden Village of Giresun and Duzkoy of Ordu; both regions which are affected by the political atmosphere, told me that before they arrived for gathering hazelnuts people warned them against going to Ordu. Dayibasis said that these warnings were caused by the attacks organized against the Kurdish workers in several regions, but despite the warnings they came because of economical reasons.

7.2. Mediocrity of Death: Representation of Kurds in the Media

In Turkey; influences of state and media are really important in the formation of relations between the Kurds and the Turks. State's and mainstream media's approach towards the relations between these two ethnic groups are fundamentally similar. The relations between Kurds and Turks have the tendency to be shaped in the way state wanted Turks to regard Kurds and through the comments media made on the matter. However in recent years there is a Turkish population who is fed up with the Kurdish political movement which is defined as "divisive" and the losses that happen during the state-PKK conflicts. A different approach is emerging against the mainstream one in Turkish population which says to Kurds "*We won't give even a span of our land*" (*Topraklarımızdan bir karış vermeyiz*), "*We won't let this country be divided*" (*Türkiye'yi böldürmeyiz*). This approach can be phrased as "*Give and pull through*"¹¹⁹ (*Ver kurtul*) and it aims to end the death of soldiers by the departure of Kurds through being separated from Turkey. They call themselves the "Separatist Turks" and they argue that the separation of Kurds would be better for the rest of the Turkey. The number of individuals in this group is increasing day by day and they wrote in the manifesto they put online that Kurds are not friends of Turks and they should be separated. They propose that after the separation of Kurds, the remaining Kurdish population in the Western regions should be banished to the new Kurdish state. Historically this approach can be understood as moving from "*We won't let Turkey be divided*" (*Türkiye'yi böldürmeyeceğiz*) to "*Let Kurds be*

¹¹⁹ For the manifesto "Seperatist Turks" whose number is increasing day by day have put online see <http://ayrilikciturkler.blogspot.com> For Tuna Kiremitci's article on this matter in Vatan Newspaper see http://haber.gazetevatan.com/Ayrikci_beyaz_Turkler/242708/4/Haber . Also the results of the research "Turkey's Perception of the Kurdish Question" which is made by Polimark with the request of SETA are really striking. According to the report %20-25 of the Turks want Kurds to be separated from Turkey. This percentage is lower between Kurds. In this sense number of seperatists have increased among the Turks. For the report see <http://www.setav.org/Ups/dosya/8523.pdf> . For the comments on the report see <http://www.setav.org/public/HaberDetay.aspx?Dil=tr&hid=9162&q=siyasetin-gettolasmasi> Also for the article in which Mine G. Kirikkakanat; journalist in Vatan Newspaper, has written that she doesn't want to live with Kurds and the number of people who think like her is increasing see <http://www.turkcebilgi.com/kose-yazisi/82669/mine-g-kirikkakanat-asalak-kardeslik>

separated and gone from Turkey”(Kürtler Türkiye’den bölünüp gitsinler). This approach is positioned against the death of soldiers during the conflicts between PKK and state forces. These people who believe that the thirty years long conflicts and the “*We won’t let Turkey be divided*” approach doesn’t get anywhere, think that the best solution would be Kurds to separate from the Turkish republic and establish a sovereign state. This approach¹²⁰ can be regarded as the end of the approach that presumes the relations between the groups and the unity of the two nations will be sustained. On the other hand, the overall acceptance of this approach has the potential to rule out the possibility of these two people living together.

The exasperation created by the conflicts between state and PKK caused the emergence of a different approach between Kurds and Turks groups’ integration. It reversed the common approach; “*Kurds want to be separated*”, into “*Turks want to be separated*”.

It is possible to observe the effects of the change of perception that is shortly summarized above within the relations between Kurdish workers and the local public. A Democratization Program was established by TESEV (Turkey Economy and Social Studies Foundation). In this program during the panel that was called “*Is Turkey going back to the beginning? 1990s and Today in Kurdish Question*”, Hasan Cemal; a journalist in Milliyet newspaper, said that the mainstream media’s approach towards the Kurdish question has failed and by being influenced by the state approach it closed its eyes towards the cleaning out of villages, burning out of villages, the incidents that took place in Diyarbakir Prison since the 1980s. Hasan Cemal added that the media’s approach was indisputably influential in the backwardness of Turkey’s democracy and law. He emphasized that the news reports about the Kurdish question that are published by media directors are guided by the state. He defined the meetings held by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and in 1990s by the National Security Council with the media directors on the subject of how to make news as good examples on the matter¹²¹.

¹²⁰This perspective is present in BDP representative Leyla Zana’s speech in a conference called “Building Peace” in Istanbul Bilgi University. Zana says that through a referendum Turks should be asked whether or not they want to live with Kurds rather than asking Kurds if they want to be separated. This point actually indicates that Turks are also beginning to experience the psychological rupture Kurds have experienced. Halil Dalkilic in his analysis in Yeni Özgür politics newspaper writes that the approach that reacted towards the Van earthquake as “they deserved it” points out to the psychological rupture that is being experienced by the Turkish side. See <http://www.yeniozgurpolitika.com/index.php?rupel=nuce&id=3384> Ertugrul Ozkok; one of the important columnists in Hurriyet Newspaper, writes that Turks and Kurds are not obliged to live together and this issue is no longer a taboo; with this article he talked for all the Turks who no longer want to live with Kurds. See <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=15234454&tarih=2010-07-06>

¹²¹ About Hasan Cemal’s proclamations see http://www.birgun.net/actual_index.php?news_code=1328962316&year=2012&month=02&day=11

The discrimination against seasonal workers in Andalusia region of Spain was beyond a local phenomenon between the groups and it was established by the support of institutional structures and mainstream media (Suarez-Navaz, 2007:218). The point emphasized by Suarez-Navaz is also apparent in the frame of our structure; with the collaboration of state and media a perception against the workers was being formed. She writes that the discriminatory languages become a whole with state practices and media's support and its effects manifest themselves in the local public's approach towards the workers.

“Unsurprisingly, the mass media have played an important role in creating and maintaining a negative public view about recent immigration, the predominant image being that of a ‘foreign’ invasion that threatens the limited resources available to the nation. Seen locally, this ideological transformation is the result of a reconfiguration in the village level class structure, a situation linked to concerns on the part of a new rural bourgeoisie about the possible loss of privileges recently acquired in the context of an equally new democratic state.” (Suarez-Navaz, 2007:218)

Similar examples regarding the approach of media were also mentioned during the interviews. It was claimed during the interviews that the way media represents the Kurds also reflects on the relation between the Kurdish seasonal workers and local public and producers. A journalist¹²² I interviewed in central Ordu emphasized the inadequacy of the aid for the workers during the press conference that was held in governorate after the flood, and he asked whether or not the aid will be increased. After the conference other press members reacted against him saying *“What sort of a question are you asking?!”*. He answered that the workers were fasting without eating at sahur¹²³ and that was a really sad picture. Then the other journalists have said *“That’s their life style, they are used to living like that”*.

The example given above is important in terms of understanding the press members' approach to the flood and to the victimhood of the Kurdish workers. In this example; the other press members regard living without eating or hunger as the life style of Kurdish workers and it stands out that they put Kurdish workers into another category than the other groups. Shortly, Kurdish workers are perceived to be different than the common people and people believe that the flood didn't create victimhood on workers' behalf. Considering that the workers' tents and all other food supplies became useless after the flood, we can see that this approach is

¹²²55-60 years old, male, journalist

¹²³Sahur, also called Suhoor, Sehri, Sahari and Sahur in other languages, is an Islamic term referring to the meal consumed early in the morning by Muslims before fasting, saum, in daylight hours during the Islamic month of Ramadan. The meal is eaten before fajr, or dawn. See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahur>

built upon a discriminatory logic. The fact that this perception manifested itself in a press conference organized in the governorate is important in terms of showing that how the similarity between the approaches of state and media is influencing the approach towards the Kurdish workers.

President of Findik-Sen and I discussed the media's role in relations between the groups;

Me, *"What are the obstacles against groups to understand each other?"*

President of Findik-Sen, *"Turkish society; specifically our region, watches TV a lot, they use media a lot. Television's language is the dominators' language. The dominant language constantly picks on these things in TV series, movies, commercials and life perspectives. It presents these things as concepts and it doesn't let you think in a different way. In other words, people can't imagine different relations. Different relations are present but people can't conceptualize it in their minds".*

My interviewee in the Science High School; the worker who used to be HEP provincial head, said on media's influence in the perception of Kurds;

Worker, *"These are exactly state politics. Let me give you an example: Was it Samanyolu or Channel 7 (another worker intervenes and says Compassion Hill) Compassion Hill, when people see Only Turkey they really get disgusted by us".*

Compassion Hill and Only Turkey are TV series that are shown in Samanyolu channel. These series personated Kurds as illiterate, primitive and terrorist and served to shape the perception of Kurds in a negative way. Celil Kaya; research assistant at Ankara University, mentions that Only Turkey, Compassion Hill and Sakarya-Firat (TV series shown in TRT-1) have an important role in the distortion of truth that is done through the media in the recent years¹²⁴.

Me, *"Do you think those shows are effective?"*

Worker, *"Yes, they are. They have an important function."*

The other worker,¹²⁵ *"That's a smear campaign against Kurds."*

Me, *"Do you think these TV shows affect people's perspectives?"*

¹²⁴For the whole article see

<http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalEklerDetayV3&ArticleID=1082292&CategoryID=42>

¹²⁵ 35-40 years old, male, comes from Urfa region.

Worker, *“Yes, it influences people’s perspectives and opinions. They mention this to us in a lot of places: We watch the TV shows; is this actually how you are? Do you live like that?”*

Me, *“Would people’s perspective change if media changed its language and arguments and used peace language instead?”*

Worker, *“It would create a big difference. If they see it in us and the media represents it in the same way, no one would be our enemy. If they could live our misery and happiness with us and if media represents it, believe me, there would be an important change”.*

There are no shows in the mainstream media that try to create a positive impression about the Kurds against the shows that are listed above which shape the Kurdish perception in a negative way. This point needs to be considered in terms of understanding the proximity between media’s broadcasting politics and state politics.

Gulsen Bicakci¹²⁶ writes that there was always an “other” in Turkey; for a period the other was those who wanted caliphate and kingdom, then it was the anarchists and after the 1980s the other was the Kurds and Kurdishness. Kurds are the imagined enemies of Muslim Republicans. (Yavuz, 1996). She writes that media positions itself next to the state in the creation of this “other” and it becomes a publicity device for dominant power. Gulsen Bicakci says on the matter of Kurdish politics;

“Every discourse of the Kurds who is the “other” for the media gets associated with PKK and gets emptied. We often see that the parties which define resolving the Kurdish question as their primary objective in their party programs; HEP, DEP, HADEP, DEHAP and finally DTP, are represented in the mainstream media through their “similarity with PKK” and their use of the “common language”.

“Every public meeting done by the Kurdish parties are represented in the media with the same headlines and contents. The public meeting in Van that was organized by DTP on November 18, 2007 was reported in Hurriyet newspaper with the headline “Public Meeting like a PKK Demonstration”. In the same meeting DTP Van minister Fatma Kurtalan said “Let’s make a democratic initiative to rejoin the PKK members on the mountains with their families”. Her words were reported with the headline “She wanted amnesty for her husband on the mountain””.

¹²⁶For Gulsen Bicakci’s article see http://www.sendika.org/yazi.php?yazi_no=27809

In this respect, media has a tendency to reduce everything Kurds demand for their ethnic identities in social life to an identical position with PKK and sum up under the title of “terror”. Bicakci writes that Kurds do not pose a “danger” in Turkish media and they have internalized the dominant culture. She adds that they have the right to be represented as long as they don’t demand anything regarding their human rights and those who don’t follow these rules are classified as the “other”.

The othering mechanism started with the identity card controls Kurdish hazelnut workers are subjected to at the entrance of Ordu and it was strengthened by the representation of Kurds in media and in TV series as “dangerous”, “terrorist” and “illiterate”. Through such images media shapes local public’s approach towards the Kurds. One of the workers I interviewed in Science High School talked about the power of this created image;

“For instance, when I watch a series like ‘Only Turkey’, even I get disgusted by the Kurds. Imagine what the people who are not familiar with Kurds can think”.

Dilara Sezgin and Melissa A. Wall explained this situation in their article called *Constructing the Kurds in the Turkish press: a case study of Hurriyet newspaper*”;

“In sum, the coverage has been discriminatory towards Kurds and used a degrading tone in describing them. It suggests that their culture is not worthy of respect and even constructed an image that it is arguable whether their language and culture are real entities. Representing a minority like this, which in turn influences people’s perception of that minority, creates an oppressive environment for that group and misleads the public. The news coverage is not serving to build bridges between different cultures but continues to reaffirm and reproduce prejudices, and helps maintain one group’s superiority over the other. The findings demonstrate that the coverage was an indirect tool of oppression rather than an agency of change that challenged the prejudices and hostility towards Kurds by the country’s elites.”¹²⁷(Sezgin-Wall, 2005:795)

These perceptions that are created against the Kurds in the media don’t only implicate the Kurds living within the borders of Turkey, but also targets Kurds that live in the north of Iraq. Through concepts such as backward, plotters (entrikacı), conspirators (komplocu), lawless (vahşi), plundering (çapulculuk) and pillaging (talancılık) they are othering the Kurds as a whole and contributing to the rooting of this image. Specifically the position of Hurriyet

¹²⁷ For this article also see <http://mcs.sagepub.com/content/27/5/787.full.pdf>

newspaper which is regarded as the flagship of Turkish press creates many similar examples (Demir, Zeydanlioglu, 2010).

Hurriyet¹²⁸ newspaper is published by Dogan Yayin Holding which is one of the biggest media companies in Turkey. Considering that this newspaper is read by hundred thousands of people every day and that it's the most followed newspaper, it is easy to estimate how powerful the perceptions created against the Kurds can become. In order to trace this perception that is created by the media and see how the relations between the Kurdish workers and local public in Ordu region are shaped, it is necessary to review the subject under the light of these findings.

Likewise, Derya Erdem in her article in Radikal newspaper (not a mainstream newspaper) draws attention to how media's representation of Kurds, Kurdish question and Kurdish political movement influences the perception of Kurds, Kurdish question and Kurdish political movement in the society. He writes that the media portrays Kurds in relation to "terrorism and violence" (terörizm ve şiddet) and within the frame of danger, threat and divisiveness. It nurtures the prejudices and restructures the issue around terror, divisiveness, foreign provocation and regional backwardness. By reproducing the hegemonic state discourse and the nationalist discourse it contributes to the unsolvable nature of Kurdish question¹²⁹.

In his article about the discriminatory discourse on the foreign workers in Canada, Bauder mentions how media shapes the discriminatory language. He writes that media goes beyond reflecting this tension and reproduces it (Bauder, 2008:106-107).

"The Canadian media frequently reflected and produced such anxieties based on perceived threats emanating from racial minorities and immigrants. These anxieties recently intensified in light of perceived threats of terrorism. With this background in mind, the argument made here is that media discourse not only reflects popular views about foreign workers, but that it also plays an active role in legitimating the offshore program." (Bauder, 2008 :105)

By referring to media's influence, Bauer discusses the language used in 181 newspaper articles that is found through search engines such as Newsscan, EBSCO, Elibrary, CBCA,

¹²⁸See <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/anasayfa>

¹²⁹For Derya Erdem's article see

<http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=993789&CategoryID=83> also see http://www.kongrekaraburun.org/eski/tam_metinler_2010/a_1/02_Derya_Erdem.pdf

Canadian and Newdisc between the dates of January 1, 1997 and May 6, 2002. He mentions that emotional terms, cultural differences and linguistic differences were emphasized in the articles about workers. He underlines that this emotional language includes discriminatory components and it portrays workers as prone to violence, criminals and dehumanizes them (Bauder, 2008:115).

Similarly Suarez-Navaz (Suarez-Navaz, 2007) writes that the immigrant workers in Andalusia region are classified in relation to crime, diseases and primitiveness. She puts emphasis on media's and politician's influence in the creation of this image and perceptions. In the frame of this research, Suarez-Navaz's observations are useful data in terms of understanding media's influence in shaping the relations, borders and perceptions between the Kurdish seasonal workers and other groups in the Ordu region.

Derya Erdem in her dissertation called "*Representation of Cultural Variation in the Media: Case of TRT*" refers to Althusser and emphasizes that the media is an ideological state apparatus for publicity. According to Althusser, this ideological apparatus functions both in public and private spheres through the use of dominant ideology.

"When we review it in the frame of ideological approach, the people who are alienated and subjected to manipulation by the media are easily leaded and put into intended thought and behavior patterns" (Erdem, 2008:33).

The dayibasi I interviewed in Bulancak Maden village argued that if the media reflected the realities regarding the incidents that took place in Diyarbakir or in Southeast region, the approach towards the Kurds would change in significant ways and the Black sea public would rebel against it after finding out the truths. He stated that if media made objective publications about the Kurds, public opinion's perception of the Kurds would change fundamentally and the relations would transform in a positive way. He added that if the media made objective publishing even for a week, Turkish public would badger the President, ask for a solution and call him to account.

The dayibasi I interviewed in Duzkoy drew attention to media's role in the attack organized against the Kurdish construction workers; including himself, in Ilica of Erzurum;

“Normally two people can talk comfortably in the absence of ethnic identities (dayibasi says that in situations in which ethnic identities are not an issue two people can easily relate to each other). But if I have an ethnic identity (and if it’s a problem for the other person) then the relationship is in danger. Turkish local channels and Turkish media haven’t supported the Kurdish-Turkish brotherhood”.

Me, *“Do you think media is influential in the emergence of this situation? Is politics influential too?”*

Dayibasi, *“Of course, it takes its source from the politics, from the Kurdish organizations, from the TR Prime ministry; but the media has the biggest role. Because the public listens to media. Whatever the media says, the public applies it, they mostly believe in it”.*

Me, *“Then, it brings the two communities against each other”.*

(...)

Dayibasi, *“Sure, always, not even sometimes. The majority of these incidents, majority of the incidents that take place within the public is caused by the media”.*

Finally, the proclamation made by the Minister of Internal Affairs Idris Naim Sahin on May 23, 2012 on NTV channel about the 35 Kurdish villagers who were killed by being bombed by the state airplanes in Uludere¹³⁰ of Sirnak is like a summary of the approach against the Kurds. He said that there wasn’t anything that the state should apologize about in the death of 34 villagers. By claiming that the dead villagers were PKK figurants, he emphasized that the villagers were guilty, not the state;

“34 of our people who were mostly young were only figurants of this incident. We need to see the bigger picture. The one who gave to those people the contrabands is PKK terrorist organization. The one who got the unearned income of this contraband is KCK terrorist

¹³⁰For Uludere Massacre see
<http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1074002&CategoryID=77>
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16352388>

*organization. BDP is also involved with the incident. We need to question these things: This is not an incident we need to apologize about. There's nothing to apologize about"*¹³¹.

According to the minister, the dead villagers were guilty because they made smuggling. Although he didn't have any evidence to show that the villagers were PKK supporters, he claimed that the dead villagers helped PKK. This claim demonstrates that within the state discourse perception of Kurdish and PKK are equated to each other.

The Prime minister¹³² supported the Minister of Internal Affairs' statements and said that the state has paid compensation to the families of dead citizens He added that the operation was carried out sincerely, and people should perceive it that way. In other words, the Prime Minister stated that compensation has been paid for the dead villagers and everything has been solved. Thus, according to state's approach, when the dead citizen is Kurdish, case can be closed through compensation.

Although 35 villagers were killed on December 28, 2011 at 21:20 through being bombed by warplanes, main stream media didn't make any news regarding the issue for twelve hours. They waited for the proclamations of state representatives and the issue was turned into news¹³³. Thus the main stream media's approach regarding the Uludere massacre coincides with state politics.

Alper Gormus draws attention to how Kurds are affected by media's approach;

"Although media regards itself as a part of the state, Kurds don't regard it that way, they don't want to. Since this is the case, when a disaster happens to Kurdish people, the silence of the media is interpreted as the silence of the brother Turkish community. When the Kurds see the TV channels after the disaster becomes uncontainable, what can they do other than becoming spiritually detached?"

¹³¹For the proclamation of Minister of Internal Affairs see <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/20616000.asp>

¹³² For the proclamation of the President see <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/20616951.asp>

¹³³ Alper Gormus; journalist in Taraf Newspaper defines this situation as state journalism and says that media has positioned itself next to the state as a fourth force. For Alper Gormus's reviews see <http://t24.com.tr/haber/uludere-ve-devlet-gazeteciligi/189861>

The news report that was published in Cumhuriyet Newspaper after the warplanes bombed Kurdish residential areas in 1930 Agri Mountain Rebellion shows that media's approach is nearly identical to state's approach.

“On the hills of Agri Mountain, our aircrafts bombs the rebels (haydutlar) severely. Agri Mountain keeps howling in explosions and fire. Turks' iron eagles are paying the account of the rebels. Zilan River was full of corpses”¹³⁴ (July 16, 1930, Cumhuriyet).

By claiming that the dead Kurds were rebels, they emphasize that their deaths were necessary. News report represents the death of the Kurds with a dehumanizing expression. Firat says in relation to this matter;

“Students don't form prejudices against Kurds in the sphere of education or they don't witness discriminatory practices here. However they are exposed to many negative images of the Kurds from different channels. These images come from online forums, TV and newspaper reports, discussion programs and particularly TV series and most of them are circulated around media or family or social environment” (Firat, 2010;73).

The examples that are given above include important detections regarding media's role and power in shaping the perceptions. Media positions itself under the umbrella of state politics and through the techniques and materials it uses it is capable of strengthening the effects of these politics. Therefore it stands out that media's arguments can be as effective as state politics. Although the relationship between media and state is a relationship of consent, the journalists and publishers who make comments or reviews that are outside of this frame are warned by state offices. Efforts are made to guide these journalists and publishers. With all that, we see that the perceptions of the public; are shaped by using especially the visual power of television. These discriminatory practices are not unique to Turkey and similar practices are seen in other countries such as Canada and Spain. However it is necessary to note here that because of the presence of Kurdish question, discrimination in Turkey has a political dimension. The common discrimination we see in other countries doesn't manifest a systematical and historical structure like the discrimination in Turkey. Unlike e.g. in Spain and Canada the situation in Turkey has become the politics of the state and many legal and

¹³⁴Kurds and the State from the Ottoman Empire till Today, “Late Birth of Kurdish Nationalism”, for Ayse Hur's article series that was published in Taraf Newspaper see <http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/27464.pdf>

martial arrangements were made for that. In this respect, discrimination in Turkey has a structure which has been systematized. Media positions itself as the sustainer and carrier of these thinned down and refined politics and it defines its publicity politics accordingly.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

The main concern of this research is to set forth the parameters which determine the relations and borders between different ethnic groups. With this objective, I went to the province of Ordu in the Black sea Region of Turkey and I used several research methods; primarily participant observation and interview to understand the relations between the Kurdish hazelnut workers and the local public. This chapter aims to interpret and to narrate the data that are described in the prior chapters as a meaningful whole.

This thesis has researched the parameters that determine the relations between Kurdish seasonal workers and local public/producers-state representatives and their perceptions and attitudes towards each other. Our main argument is that the main parameter that determines such relations and reciprocal perceptions is within the axis of state and media; within this frame the groups' perceptions and attitudes towards each other are shaped.

The flood incident that happened during the time I was in Ordu presented a very clear picture in terms of seeing what influences the relations. Under normal circumstances, we would expect that the Kurdish workers who became the victims of the flood would receive aid and attention from the local public. Especially in the month of Ramadan which is sacred for the Muslims, people attach particular importance to cooperation and solidarity and a humane interaction between the groups would be regarded as normal. However the attitude and behaviors of the local population in Uzunisa camping site after the flood indicated the presence of an insuperable wall between the groups. What was the obstacle that prevented the groups from coming together even in such a situation? Was it the cultural differences or the economic reasons? I emphasize the effects of cultural and economic reasons on the relations between the groups in the prior chapters. We observed that neither the cultural nor the economic parameters have the power or capacity to influence the content of the relations to this extent. The data we gathered indicated that the main determinants were discourses and practices of state and media.

Especially the interviews we made after the flood in Uzunisa camping site and in Science High School showed that the workers defined and perceived themselves in relation to the

discourses of state and media. While building their perceptions regarding themselves and the other groups, workers often referred to the importance of the influence of state and media. That is to say that the workers were aware that media and state were in cooperation to create the Kurdish worker perception the local public and producers behold and that as a whole they shape the relations. During our interviews we made with the local public we gathered data that supported this opinion. Kurdish workers were described by them with adjectives such as ‘illiterate’, ‘dirty’, ‘divisive’ and ‘terrorist’. We mentioned in the previous chapter that these adjectives were created and practiced in the frame of the discourses of state and media. The created perception has the power to shape the attitudes and behaviors of the groups that it targets. The perceptions and attitudes that emerged against the Kurdish workers in the region are nothing but the continuations of those that are created by the state and media.

The influence of the political structure of the nation state discourse that homogenizes the ethnic and cultural differences is apparent in state’s approach towards the Kurdish groups. Politics of denial and assimilation were applied effectively in the Republican Ideology; including the prohibition of Kurdish language. These politics stand as an ordered whole. The Eastern Reform Report that was prepared by the Second President of the Republic Ismet Inonu in 1935 has items that set forth state’s approach towards the Kurds very clearly.

Public Inspectorship was established through the report prepared by Inonu and Abidin Ozmen was appointed as the first public inspector. In a report prepared by Ozmen in 1936, state’s politics towards the Kurds were described in detail. It is obvious in this item that every detail was calculated for Kurds to be subjected to a systematical assimilation:

*“By transferring three thousand people to the western regions every year, this community should be removed in a program of 15 to 20 years”*¹³⁵ (Ozturk, 2005;109-110).

¹³⁵Some items regarding the assimilation policies in this report are important in terms of understanding state’s approach.

“Kurds in the region should be either assimilated or the old situation should be preserved under the control of the security forces; the first alternative should be chosen when the internal and foreign politics are (p.102). This should be sustained until those who work for Kurdishness won’t be able to find any Kurds around, (p.103).

Turkish entrymen should be placed on the railways in Eastern provinces, Van Lake region, Mus Plain, Malazgirt and Bulanik districts(p.103).Commissions should be established on this matter andsettled villages should be built,

Ambitious teachers who would inspire Turkishness should be employed in the region. Ozmen; “..We have to make those we want to integrate speak Turkish instead of Kurdish...” (p.104) for this boarding schools are necessary.Special curriculums should be followed in these schools,

Veterinarians and Agriculturists should do publicity in Turkish in the villages, (p.106)

Medical services should be valued in the regions, doctors should be prohibited to takeexamination fees,

Land should be given to those who come from the Western regions, marry with a Kurdish girl and settle down in the region, (p.108)

Civil servants in public offices should be prohibited to speak Kurdish, (p.109)

Civil servants shouldn’t try to understand the villagers who don’t speak Turkish, a translator who is not a civil servant should be provided to the villager this way everyone should be forced to speak Turkish, (p.109)

The speech Second President of the Republic Ismet Inonu has made on April 25, 1925, sums up the state position on Kurds and other “foreign” ethnicities in Turkey;

“We are openly nationalist and nationalism is the only vein that unites us. Other elements are not important next to the Turkish majority. No matter how, we will Turkify those who live in our country, and we will destroy those who oppose Turks and Turkism”¹³⁶.

The homogenization or the assimilation of other ethnicities project that started within the last century of the Ottoman Empire and that was sustained by the Republican staff was most effective on Kurds. The laws and practices that were introduced on this matter shaped the other population’s perceptions, attitudes and behaviors against the Kurds through the support of the media and intellectual community. The created perception defined the ethnic boundaries between the two groups and nearly removed the influence of cultural reciprocity in Barth’s argument. Today, these parameters are felt in how the people in Ordu region perceive the Kurds. The interviews I conducted, observations I made and the data I gathered throughout this research indicated this view.

What Kurdish workers feel about their representation in the media and about how these representations affect the perceptions against them is significant. Beyond this, main stream media’s approach to the Kurdish question and the discriminatory language it uses have an important role in shaping the perspective towards the Kurds; therefore towards the seasonal workers in Ordu region.

In the study that Barth argues that the borders between the ethnic groups are not given but created through the relations between the groups (Barth, 1998), he writes that the presence of the borders between the groups is related to processes of social exclusion and inclusion. Groups maintain their presence as long as they can preserve their borders. Since they can

Sanctions should be imposed on civil servants who speak Kurdish from warnings to being fired, Those who exploit the Kurds (like sheikhs and landlords) should be located and removed from the region, Community centers should be strengthened and newspapers and magazines should be read here to the community, Turkish concerts should be given in the villages,

In the first item of the Kurdish report, it is suggested to build highways to go anywhere in any season to get rid of Kurdishness.

Ozmen states that only %20 of the Kurds is recruited for the army, and he suggests taking Kurds into labor battalion, making them build the highways and teaching them Turkish.” (p.111)(Öztürk, 2005)

¹³⁶Ismet Inonu’s speech on April 27, 1925 in Turkish Society Congress. Source:

http://www.mavidefter.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=636:bir-etnik-temizlik-mimari-ismet-inonu&catid=69:otekitarih&Itemid=101

change through time, cultural features are not deterministic in the sustainability of groups' presence. The borders that are shaped around the groups' exclusion and inclusion mechanisms are regarded as the assurance of groups' permanence. He writes that these borders can be defined through groups' core values and value judgments, languages, clothing, residential manners and general life styles. Personal belonging and collective exclusion mechanisms shield over these features that change through time and they strengthen the borders between the groups.

Throughout his study, Barth doesn't make a satisfactory explanation regarding the emergence of the feeling of personal belonging in groups' members and the sources that nurture the collective exclusion processes. In contrast to Barth's approach, my findings suggest that the main determinant for the emergence and maintenance of these borders is the influence of state and media.

Especially the homogenization process of the nation state project and what a powerful actor media (an ideological state apparatus of the modern state structure) can be in shaping the social perceptions, attitudes and behaviors were manifested over the relations between the Kurdish workers and other groups in the Ordu region.

The point Barth has left blank and we persistently emphasized is that the state formation and the media influence in cooperation are capable of determining and shaping the borders between different ethnic groups. Otherwise, it wouldn't be possible to explain the picture that emerged between the groups after the flood in relation to cultural or economic parameters. We need a stronger base beyond cultural, economic or social parameters to explain the unrelatedness and contactlessness that was observed after the flood.

Especially during the period after PKK's Silvan attack, the language used by the state representatives and media's exaggeration of the incidents through a discriminatory language made the relations between the groups even tenser and the borders between the groups were strengthened. It is no coincidence that the borders between the groups lost their permeability after the media began to use rigor language and particularly after the President made his proclamation "It's not bearable anymore". In this sense, the flood incident gave use the opportunity to make poignant observations regarding the relations between the groups. On this basis, we came to the conclusion that the borders between the ethnic groups are shaped by

factors which are exterior to personal belonging and collective exclusion mechanisms. These factors are influences of state and media which Barth has left missing.

According to the results of the field research “*Perceptions and Expectations in the Kurdish Question*” done by KONDA Research Company in 2010, Turks’ perception of the Kurds are shaped through politics with state and security axis whereas Kurds’ perceptions are shaped through demands of equal citizenship and liberty. It becomes prominent in KONDA’s research that Turks’ perceptions are similar to state’s official policies. Therefore, within the realm of this research there are conclusions regarding that the borders between the groups are generally defined through this perception opposition (KONDA, 2011). At this point, when we question the parameters that shape the demands of liberation and the security based view, we come across the influence of the conjuncture that is exterior to the groups. While the security oriented politics are based on the state practices, demands of liberation are products of these security oriented politics.

Anthropologically, this research was positioned to fill the missing part in Barth’s strong argument. We saw to what extent media and state formation can be influential on the borders between different ethnic groups, and that these influences have the capacity to determine nearly all of the borders between the groups. The conclusion of this research is that the groups’ perceptions of themselves and other groups can be shaped through mechanisms exterior to economic or cultural relations between the groups and it is done through the accomplishments of state and media.

In this world order in which the nation state is still preserving its power, we can talk about a relative improvement regarding the groups’ rights and minority rights in comparison to the beginning of 20th century. But we are still living in the times in which identity struggle is preserving its importance. Therefore, we live in an order in which the state and big companies are capable of manipulating the media and creating a public opinion, shaping the perceptions and designing people’s opinions. The power of this manipulation is preserved and it increases day by day. The tendency of monopolization¹³⁷ that is present in the media gathers the power

¹³⁷ “Western industrialized countries are also the biggest television shows sellers and two thirds of these shows are the monopolies of USA. The leading companies in the media sector operate in USA and nearly ninety percent of the sector is dominated by 24 big monopolies. Monopolization is so extensive that several big companies which operate at international level (CBS, NBC, ABC, RTL, SAT-1 etc.), control more than eighty percent of the worldwide media. Furthermore three of them belong to General Electric and two of them belong to Westinghouse monopoly. News agencies that are known as “five

of this manipulation in few hands and enables it to be used arbitrarily. As a consequence, directed and shaped public opinions are produced.

There appear public opinions and groups of people who think and behave in the desired way. Gokce Basaran Ince in her article called “*Media and Social Memory*” writes that collective memory is an important base for the building of nation and national identity and that it legitimizes the present socio-political order. In this sense, she emphasizes especially television’s memory building feature next to other media organs (Ince, 2010:12).

“Television and other mass communication devices, community building symbolic incidents and nation building myth (Smith, 1991) and rituals that are defined by the state, repeat themselves in a cycle and enable the community to ‘imagine’ themselves in the same meanings and codes” (Ince, 2010:23).

Ince writes that within the late nation building projects, each type of memory is repressed and censored in different degrees. She adds that mass communication internalizes this censorship as self-censorship and it positions itself as the configurator of official history perspective (Ince, 2010:23-25). Considering that Turkey was subjected to late nationalization, it’s easy to understand media’s position. Media positioned itself as the volunteer configurator of the social structure that is built by the state and it took on the task of being the volunteer sub-contractor of the state policies. When we consider its contribution to the maintenance of official politics and its power in shaping the masses’ perceptions, we can say that media is an effective player in the creation of the borders between the ethnic groups in Turkey.

In this sense, the field research we conducted showed that the state and media were historically and are today in cooperation and by manipulating the differences and shaping the masses’ perceptions they are trying to create an ideal national identity. By shaping the perceptions between the local public and producers in Ordu region and the Kurdish agricultural workers under these influences, ethnic borders were created between the two groups.

majors” and that are monopolies in their own field;AU, UPI, Reuters, AFP and TASS, produce and distribute 90 percent of the news in the whole world. Source:<http://www.atik-online.net/2010/06/medya-ve-kurt-sorunu-uzerine-guncel-notlar>

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APPENDIX

1. Photos



Photo 1. Before the flood, Uzunisa camping site(Ordu)



Photo 2. Hazelnut worker is cooking meal (Uzunisa camping site-Ordu)



Photo 3. A view from the tent (Uzunisa camping site-Ordu)



Photo 4. Worker is making bread (Uzunisa camping site-Ordu)



Photo 5. Before the flood, Uzunisa camping site (Ordu)



Photo 6. Baths and toilets in camping site (Uzunisa camping site-Ordu)



Photo7. Poster of Atatürk's dictum in Uzunisa camping site: "From Diyarbakir, from Van, from Erzurum, from Trabzon, from Istanbul, from Trakya they are all the sons of one nation, all the veins of one jewel"(Uzunisa camping site-Ordu).



Photo 8. After the flood Uzunisa camping site(Uzunisa camping site-Ordu)



Photo 9. Workers are cleaning their daily stuffs in the river. (Uzunisa camping site-Ordu)



Photo 11. Researcher is in the Uzunisa camping site after the flood (Ordu)



Photo 12. Conversation with the workers after the flood (Uzunisa camping site-Ordu)



Photo 13. Cooking places in The Uzunisa camping site after the flood (Uzunisa camping site-Ordu)



Photo 14. Villagers are collecting wood from riverside after the flood (Uzunisa camping site-Ordu)



Photo 15. Turkish flag in the entry of Uzunisa camping site (Uzunisa camping site-Ordu)



Photo 16. Workers are collecting hazelnuts (Village of Maden/ Bulancak/Giresun)



Photo 17. The garden of Science High School (Ordu)



Photo 18. Children of workers (camping site/Fatsa/Ordu)




Photo 19. A worker's child (camping site/Fatsa/Ordu)

2. Maps



Map 1. Ordu map



Map 2. Ordu map

