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PERMANENT MISSION OF ISRAEL
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
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של ישראל לאומות המאוחדות

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STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR YOSEF TEKOAH
SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
16 SEPTEMBER 1971

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

Mr. President,

In the Dark Ages, when Europe was still covered with primeval forests and marshes, when superstition was rampant, and the law was in the hands of robber barons, the Jewish people conquered by foreign invaders and uprooted from its homeland found itself dispersed in various lands where Jews became bearers of an ancient but advanced civilization, forerunners of medicine, science, finance. In those days when disasters of war, flood, famine or plague befell the local population, it was not unusual for rulers to try and divert the grief and wrath of the populace by directing it against the Jews in its midst. It seems that the Hashemite Kingdom is not adverse to resorting to such retrograde methods. Apparently its rulers believe that their internal difficulties, the bloodshed which has engulfed the land, the conflict with other Arab states, the armed clashes with the Syrian army, the closing of borders and the severance of diplomatic relations can all be offset by a show of hostility toward the Jewish state. This is an old primitive method. It has never succeeded in concealing the real problems and calamities. It has always brought only disrepute upon those who resorted to it.

The Jordanian Government can hardly expect that a frivolous complaint against peace and progress in Jerusalem would camouflage the malaise Jordan finds itself in at present.

From atop the Judean hills, Jerusalem has watched and lived three thousand years of history. It has known peace and war, destruction and rebuilding. It has seen a multitude of conquerors pass through its gates and settle within its walls. Throughout all times, however, it has been the center of life of only one nation -- the Jews. It has been the capital of only one state -- the Jewish state. There would have been no Jewish people without Jerusalem; no Jewish culture or religion without Jerusalem. There would have been no rebirth of Israel without Jerusalem. Equally there would have been no Jerusalem were it not for the Jewish people. Eventually the city acquired a spiritual sanctity for Christianity and Islam. With its Holy Places it became the seat of numerous churches and mosques and religious institutions. However, only in the history of the Jewish people has it held at all times an unrivalled national and religious primacy making Jewish life inseparable from Jerusalem.

Throughout history Jerusalem has preserved its unity and integrity. Except for the transitory occupation of its eastern sector by Jordan, it has always been one; in its fate, its glory and in its sacredness. In an existence encompassing millenia there were nineteen years of forced,

tragic division. They are gone, a grim, painful episode in the life of the Eternal City. Once ended, this dark episode of warped languor can no longer overshadow the city's natural state and its normal life. Jerusalem is its true self again.

It is for this Jerusalem that Israel stands. It is of this Jerusalem that I speak.

Universally revered for its Holy Places, Jerusalem is at the same time a living city. It is the home of close to 300,000 inhabitants, three fourths of whom are Jews. These citizens are following the proceedings in the Security Council with understandable wonderment. Indeed, it is a cause for amazement that the state which had brought so much suffering upon the city, should find it possible to try and harass Jerusalem again. Jordan which invaded Jerusalem in 1948, in violation of the Charter and United Nations resolutions, seized its eastern sector, destroyed the entire Jewish Quarter of the Old City and uprooted all its inhabitants, is now trying to invade the city's right to normal existence, to reconstruction and development. Jerusalem's citizens categorically reject this intrusion. No one can question their right to natural growth, to the clearance of slums and the construction of new housing, especially not an aggressor state guilty of grave crimes against the city. Jerusalem's citizens are not pawns to be trifled with in a game of international belligerency in which the welfare of their city and the rights of its population are cynically brushed aside. They will not be sacrificed on the altar of Jordan's internal political squabbles. The men, women and children of

Jerusalem have the same rights as the citizens of any other city in the world. They refuse to have their lives tampered with and dissected by those who had mercilessly trampled them into dust.

They do not consider the Security Council, or other organs of the United Nations, as forums appropriate for the examination of questions concerning the city's life. The United Nations, its General Assembly and the Security Council have displayed a singular disinterest in Jerusalem's welfare at the most trying and crucial moments. When the Arab states invaded Israel in 1948 and besieged Jerusalem, the United Nations abandoned them to their own resources and left them to fight for their lives alone. When Jordanian and Egyptian guns rained fire and death on the city, endangering the very existence of its Holy Places, the Security Council did not evince much concern. It remained silent when the Jordanians eliminated the Jewish population of the Old City and razed to the ground all its Jewish houses of worship and institutions of learning. The Security Council did not lift a finger when the ancient Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives was defiled and destroyed and its tombstones carted away for the construction of sidewalks and latrines in Jordanian army camps. Where was the Security Council when, during nineteen years, Jordan, in breach of its explicit international undertakings, prohibited access to the Holy Places of Judaism and barred Israeli Moslems from sites holy to Islam? Where was it when the Jordanian troops of occupation subjected Jerusalem to a reign of terror, repeatedly opening fire and killing innocent residents

and visitors in its western sector? Where was the Security Council when in June 1967 Jordan used the occupied part of Jerusalem to launch an assault on Israel? There have been no Security Council sessions to prevent or stop Jordan's crimes against Jerusalem's peace, sacredness and integrity. There was no Security Council action to protect Jerusalem's citizens from armed threat and attack.

Now that the city is no longer divided by barbed wire and minefields, now that it is secure and peaceful, the Security Council is mobilized in an attempt to advise Jerusalem to stop healing its wounds, to bar progress, to stifle growth.

For generations Jerusalem's Jewish majority and its Arab minority lived side by side. With the removal in 1967 of the barriers which had separated the two communities during the period of Jordanian occupation, Jews and Arabs again live and work together. Arab and Jewish labourers are employed in the same enterprises. Thousands of Arab workers have become members of the Israeli Labour Federation -- the Histadrut. They are no longer exploited as they had been under Jordanian rule. Joint Arab-Jewish commercial and industrial ventures are being launched all the time. There are joint cultural and sports clubs; joint artistic performances. Jewish and Arab citizens alike participated in the municipal elections of 1969. The number of Arab voters was 3 times greater than in the elections organized by the Jordanian authorities.

There is freedom of the press to a degree unknown in the Arab states. Two Arabic dailies are published in East Jerusalem. In Arabic schools, the pupils have the choice of preparing themselves for Jordanian or Israeli matriculation examinations.

The Qadi, Moslem Religious Justice, of Ramallah, a town on the West Bank in the vicinity of Jerusalem, reacted on 27 May 1971 to the Jordanian attempts to distort the situation in Jerusalem. He declared:

"Doesn't the Jordanian Government realize that Jerusalem is practically a united city, that commerce is flourishing and Arab businessmen make a lot of money, that thousands of Arab workers work in Israel, apply to Israeli courts and join the Histadrut?"

An impressive reflection of the situation in Jerusalem is to be found in the number of tourists who visit the city annually. In 1967 291,000 of visitors to Israel toured Jerusalem; in 1968 - 432,000; in 1969 - 410,000 and last year 437,000. Moreover there are tens of thousands of Arab tourists from neighbouring Arab countries who come to Jerusalem. This summer the number of visitors to Jerusalem from Arab states was more than 100,000.

Is this a situation that threatens international peace, as alleged by Jordan? Could there be an allegation more baseless?

As in every large city, especially one with a heterogenous population, Jerusalem has its occasional public security problems. These, however, are rare and the measures adopted to cope with them -- most infrequent and limited as compared with police measures in other parts of the world or with Jordan's recent actions against its citizens and with the

extreme acts of repression which the Jordanian authorities had been in the habit of carrying out before 1967 to maintain order among the all Arab population of eastern Jerusalem. Thus, for instance since 1967 only 9 Jordanian agents who tried to encourage and organize violence were ordered to leave the city and join their masters in Amman. The last time such a step proved necessary was two years ago. Two of these persons have in the meantime been allowed to return to the city. Nine houses used as terrorist bases have been demolished in accordance with laws in force since the British Mandatory Administration. The last demolition took place in May 1969 -- and none have occurred since.

The Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem still remember the treatment meted out to them by the Jordanian occupation forces. They remember for example how the Jordanian authorities handled the frequent strikes and demonstrations. They have not forgotten how in April 1963 the Jordanian army and police dispersed a demonstration by killing 11 and wounding 150 residents, including 17 girl students. They remember how in another demonstration on 24 November 1966 at least 20 were killed and many more wounded by the Jordanian forces. They know that the Jordanian authorities regarded themselves as occupation authorities and acted throughout the entire period brutally and mercilessly. They are aware of the fate of their brethren in Jordan today.

Jerusalem is a living, throbbing metropolis. It cannot be cordoned off from the world. Its natural growth, its municipal needs, its economic dynamism cannot be artifically garroted. Its normal development cannot proceed in some fields and be unnaturally arrested in others. City planning and construction are a normal and indispensable element in such development. They are proceeding in several directions. Essential services such as sanitation, public health, electricity, water, roads, etc. have been assured to all parts of the city. Slum reconstruction has begun, with tenants receiving in each case new housing or compensation adequate to acquire new housing. The concern for the social and esthetic attributes of the city is not confined to slum clearance. The minefields which used to divide Jerusalem have become attractive parks. Under Jordanian occupation eastern Jerusalem did not have a single park or playground for children. Today it has six parks and four playgrounds.

As for building activities, the most important work is that of the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter destroyed by the Jordanians. The Quarter had always been inhabited by Jews. At the beginning of this century approximately 15,000 Jews lived in it. None remained after the Jordanians occupied it in 1948.

Abdallah el-Tal, the commander of the Jordanian forces which captured eastern Jerusalem described its fate in his memoirs published in Cairo in 1954. He stated:

"The Jewish Quarter was destroyed... For the first time in more than a thousand years not a single Jew remained in it."

The Catholic Archdeacon of Oxford, C. Witton-Davies wrote in The Tablet of 12 June 1971:

"It was the Arab Legion that advanced on the Old City... What followed? The senseless and shocking destruction of Jewish houses that could have been used temporarily for Arab refugees, and the obscene desecration of Jewish synagogues, some of them of great historical value and sanctity, simply because they were Jewish".

Were the Israeli authorities to leave this revered area in state of ruin and degradation? In the name of what principle, on the basis of what law was the barbaric ravage of the Jewish Quarter to be preserved?

The ruins of the Quarter and the slums that had grown upon it, including the Moghrabi houses, have been cleared. The Arab tenants affected were offered new housing and compensation. All of them, all without exception, have as a result of this relocation improved their living conditions. In letters to the Municipality they have expressed their appreciation for the manner in which this was done.

The area contained more than 60 synagogues and numerous religious institutions. Some of them were not only ancient but also magnificent in their architecture. Their restoration is an act of manifest merit and propriety.

Second only to the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter in historic, cultural and humanitarian significance, comes the reconstruction of the

Hebrew University campus and the Hadassah Hospital on Mount Scopus. When Jordan invaded Jerusalem in 1948 and occupied a part of it, it failed to dislodge Israel from Mount Scopus. Under the Armistice Agreement of 1949, Israel retained possession of the Mount which dominates the eastern district of the city. Jordan undertook to ensure free access to the humanitarian and cultural institutions on Mount Scopus and the resumption of their normal activities. The Jordanian Government refused, however, to implement this undertaking. The University and the Hospital remained skeletons of structures guarded by Israeli units. Today these institutions are functioning again. The buildings have been restored. Some new ones have been added. The hospital will have 700 beds and will serve the entire Jewish and Arab population of the eastern and north-eastern part of the city.

In accordance with Jordan's international obligations this should have been the situation even in the period preceding 1967. Are we to be told that now that Jordan's violations of its international obligations can no longer interfere with the normal operation and development of the University and the Hospital on Mount Scopus, Israel should nevertheless keep this area in a state of devastation and neglect? Jordan has proved during nineteen years its contempt for learning, science, medicine at the service of humanity. Is anyone at all to give serious regard to views sanctioning this contempt; views opposing the establishment of a new hospital wing, the construction of housing for doctors and nurses, professors and students, the creation of the International Truman Peace Center? How far should disregard for human values be allowed to run wild?

The third area in eastern Jerusalem where building activities are taking place is Neve Yaakov. This Jewish-inhabited district was overrun by the Jordanian forces in 1948 and turned into an army encampment. Jews are now returning to it, building new homes, constructing new roads.

Then there is the construction of housing for Arab residents who lived in slums or in the ruins of the Jewish Quarter. Some of them have found housing in existing buildings. Others are settling in newly constructed houses. Under Jordanian rule there had been no public housing in eastern Jerusalem. Today there are several projects under construction. One is underway in Wadi Joz where a number of Arab families have already settled. Another is about to begin in the Beit Hanina district. The contractor and the architect are members of distinguished Arab families.

Other projects are destined to accommodate the growth of Jerusalem's population, Jewish as well as Arab. For this purpose 4,402 acres have been acquired in the last four years by the Government and the municipality. This was done in accordance with the "Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance No. 24 of 1943" which remains in force since the British mandatory period. A parallel law was in force under the Jordanian rule -- "Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Law -- No. 2 -- 1953" (In Arabic: Qanun Istimlak el-Aradi lilmasalih el-Aama).

1,180 of the owners of the land thus acquired were Arabs and 2,140 Jews. The Jewish owners were actually affected more than the Arab ones. Though special care was taken to acquire land that was completely

vacant, nevertheless there were on it 270 structures owned by Jews as compared with 35 Arab-owned structures. The latter were in a deteriorated condition. They were inhabited by 40 Arab families numbering about 240 persons. The Jewish structures were occupied partially by 485 Jewish families consisting of more than 3,000 persons and partially by stores, garages and workshops which provided living quarters for an additional 300 families.

The owners of the land, Arabs and Jews, are being paid full compensation. The tenants are being relocated.

It is to be observed that housing construction is pursued largely on the basis of plans elaborated by the British administration during the Mandate period and suspended after the Jordanian invasion of 1948. However, contrary to the Jordanian allegations there is no Master Plan. Construction is carried on in the conviction that following the termination of Jordan's invasion, the development of Jerusalem must once more proceed on its normal course, interrupted by war and subsequent bisection of the city.

In view of the universal interests in the city, the Mayor of Jerusalem has invited an international group of outstanding individuals in the fields of theology, architecture, art and letters, philosophy, archaeology, social sciences, and law to form an advisory board which would aid the Municipality of Jerusalem and the Government of Israel in planning future development and especially housing construction. It was named the Jerusalem Committee.

The ~~first~~ Original 34 members of the Jerusalem Committee first met in Jerusalem in July 1969, and by December of that year the founding group had swelled to about 70 members. The discussions were lively and the first statement published by the Committee stated among other things:

"We found the city already deeply engaged in rehabilitation and reconstruction work as well as in archaeological exploration, with people of all ages from all over the world, contributing their knowledge and their energy to the task... Our visit to Jerusalem convinced us that much of the work to be done is long overdue. To delay any longer the rehabilitation of the Wall, the clearance of slums and the protection of sites would do irreparable harm. The many essential values involved require immediate study and prompt action. The preparatory work of the authority is both valid and farsighted... We believe that we must not succumb to the temptation of using the extraordinary wealth of tangible reminiscence of the past to make the City a museum or a stage set. Jerusalem must be kept a living city... We suggest that the Municipality of Jerusalem be empowered to create an office of coordination to reconcile the divergencies and implement whatever plans it adopts. Past mistakes, such as the construction of a hotel on the top of Mount Olives, the construction of a hospital on the ridge of Mount Olives and the construction of a church which blocks the beautiful view of the Kidron Valley from the bridge, (all three took place during the Jordanian administration of East Jerusalem) are sad examples

of building in the wrong location and should help us to prevent similar mistakes in the future. Now that Jerusalem is, at last, freely accessible to all, we call upon all cultural and spiritual groups throughout the world to come here as we did for meetings and exchanges of views and join in the challenging and great adventure which lies ahead."

Among the founding members of the Jerusalem Committee were:

France

Pasteur Marc Boegner, Past President, World Council of Churches, U.S.A.; Reverend W. G. M. Brandful, President, Christian Council of Ghana; Prof. Jacques Courvoisier, Theologian and Former Rector, University of Geneva, Switzerland; Prof. Oscar Cullmann, Former Rector, Basel University, Switzerland; His Eminence Diangenda, Chef Spirituel de L'Eglise, Kinshasa, Congo; Reverend Th. M. Hesburgh, President, University of Notre Dame, U.S.A.; Mr. Jorge Amado, Author, Brazil; Mr. Oskar Kokoschka, Artist and Author, Switzerland; Mr. Jacques Lipchitz, Sculptor, U.S.A.; Henry Moore, O.M., Sculptor, U.K.; Mr. Isamu Noguchi, Sculptor and Landscape Architect, U.S.A.; Mr. Thomas Hoving, Director Metropolitan Museum of Fine Arts, U.S.A.; Mr. John Pope-Hennessy, Director, Victoria & Albert Museum, U.K.; Dr. Willem Sandberg, Former Director, Municipal Museums of Amsterdam, Netherlands; Lord Goodman, Chairman of the Arts Council of Great Britain, Mr. Ernesto Sabato, Author and Philosopher, Argentina; Mr. Ignazio Silone, Author, Italy; Mr. S. N. Tagore, Author and Political Thinker, India; Mr. Luis Borges, Author, Argentina; Mr. Geoffrey Bawa, Architect, Ceylon; Prof. Torgny Segerstedt, Rector Magnificus, University of Uppsala, Sweden; Mr. Manuel Aguilar,

Publisher, Spain; Maestro Pablo Casals, Puerto Rico; The Hon. Carlos Garcia, Former President of the Philippines; Sir Robert Menzies, Former Prime Minister of Australia; H.E. Vittorino Veronese, Former Director General, UNESCO, Chairman Italian Committee for Human Rights, Italy.

The town-planning sub-committee includes: Buckminster Fuller, Sir Philip Hendy, Louis I. Kahn, Isamu Noguchi, Sir Nikolaus Pevsner, Luigi Piccinato, Moshe Safdie and Bruno Zevi, and many other luminaries of architecture and town planning.

A declaration adopted on 10 June 1971 at a Conference of Catholic, Protestant and Evangelical leaders of the United States described the construction projects in Jerusalem as follows:

"Our inquiry into the question of public housing in the Old City and environs has convinced us that the construction of these buildings is a legitimate effort on the part of the Israeli government to effectuate a renewal of certain slum areas of the City, to rehouse in new apartments Arabs from these quarters, to provide living space for a Jewish population increased by immigration, and to re-introduce a Jewish presence into the Old City from which it had been forcibly barred after the war of 19[illegible]. The development plans are in no sense designed to oust the Arabs, or to 'suffocate' the Christian and Muslim population. While we are concerned about the sacred character of the City, we believe that this housing is sufficiently removed from the holy places to avoid the charge of diminishing the sanctity of the City."

In addition to housing projects carried out by the authorities, Arab private building as well is proceeding on a considerable scale. Thus it is estimated that since 1967 more than 300 housing units have been constructed by private Arab builders without assistance from the authorities. There could be no better evidence of the fact that housing construction is taking place in accordance with the natural needs of growth and development in the city.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Abba Eban declared in the Knesset on 30 June 1971:

"...the city's development will be planned with an eye to all the inhabitants and taking into consideration the urgent requirements of a lively, variegated and increasing population which is absorbing additional residents in a city whose rate of natural increase is among the highest in the world, and particularly high among the Arab residents. The city is open to the constructive initiative of Jews, Christians and Moslems the world over in the furtherance of its development, especially of its cultural and spiritual assets, and in increasing the number of institutions and enterprises testifying to the city's historical uniqueness and special mission of promoting faith, progress and peace.

"Should Christian and Moslem circles, to whom Jerusalem is dear, manifest initiative of their own, it will be welcome and they will benefit from Government support, just as they have been benefitting up to now."

The Government of Israel addresses itself with special respect and consideration to the universal religious interests in Jerusalem.

This could have hardly been said of the Jordanian authorities which, in addition to their infamous destruction of Jewish sacred places, have left behind a record of anti-Christian actions. In fact so callous had their disregard been for religious and historic values that even venerated Moslem sites have not escaped desecration.

On 27 June 1967, the Knesset passed a law for the protection of the Holy Places. On the same day, the Prime Minister made the following declaration to the religious leaders in Jerusalem: "All the Holy Places in Jerusalem are now open to all who wish to pray in them and to the faithful of all religions without discrimination. It is our intention to place the internal management and arrangements for the Holy Places in the hands of the religious leaders of the communities to which these places belong."

In pursuance of this policy the Waqf is responsible for the management of El-Aqsa, the Dome of the Rock, and all the Moslem institutions, cemeteries and mosques. The Chief Rabbinate has jurisdiction over the Western Wall and other Jewish Holy Places, synagogues and Jewish cemeteries. The various Christian communities maintain jurisdiction over their respective Holy Places and religious institutions, according to the accepted tradition.

Israel has concluded and carried out compensation agreements for war damage with all church institutions. This refers to damage sustained from 1948 to 1967 as a result of the wars initiated by the Government of

Jordan and other Arab Governments. Such compensation has been paid to seventeen Christian institutions (to the amount of six million Israeli pounds). The Government also encourages pilgrimage by the faithful of all denominations to the Holy Places. This welcome movement takes place in an atmosphere of peace, freedom and safety. Christian and Moslem pilgrimage grows from year to year. Many religious leaders, have borne positive witness to this policy.

In addition, the Israeli authorities and the municipality of Jerusalem have aided churches and Christian institutions in the furthering of spiritual activities, art and culture, and for the promotion of strong and efficient construction. Institutions benefitting from administrative, material or technical assistance include: the Armenian Patriarchate, St. Peter in Gallicante of the Assumptionist Fathers, the Sisters of Zion, the Franciscan Order, the Greek Catholic Patriarchate, the White Sisters, the Knights of Malta, the Evangelic Lutheran Church of Reformation at Beit Jolla, Notre Dame de Sion and St. John's Monastery in Ein Karem, a new Roman Catholic Church and community centre in Beit Hanina, and the American Institute of Holy Land Studies.

A Roman Catholic Ecumenical Research Institute, the first of its kind in the world, is about to be completed on a hill near Jerusalem, following an idea put forward by Pope Paul VI. Father Hesburgh, President of the University of NotreDame in Indiana and Chairman of the World Union of Catholic Universities is in charge of the project. Professor Charles Moeller of the University of Louvain, Belgium will be the first

dean of the Institute. As envisaged by the Pope, the Institute will bring together the great theologians of all Christian churches and persuasions in researching the history of schisms in Christianity.

A Greek Orthodox Church just outside the Old City walls, which had stood unfinished for several years under Jordanian rule has now been completed by the community. Half a million Israeli pounds have also been set aside for repair work on the Rockefeller Museum.

Since the reunification of the city repairs and renovation work have been carried on the Armenian Church on Mount Zion, on the Monastery of the Cross, and on the Armenian Church of the Holy Sepulchre. The foundation stone has been laid for a new Armenian Theological Seminary in the Old City. Christian churches benefit from reductions in matters of taxation.

The right of every religious community to maintain its own schools and, unlike the situation under Jordan's rule, to set its own curricula is also guaranteed and preserved.

The Moslem Holy Places, houses of worship and religious institutions enjoy similar conditions. The situation since 1967 was described as follows by Mr. Ghazi Alam El-Ain in an article published in the Arabic daily of east Jerusalem Al-Anba on 8 August 1969:

"The Islamic Waqf Bureau continued to supervise all Islamic places of worship in the Holy City, and especially the Haram e-Sharif compound (which includes the Dome of the Rock and El-Aqsa), remaining in charge of the preservation of its holiness and cleanliness.

"The Waqf Bureau carried out repairs and renovations necessary to maintain the buildings of the holy Haram compound. It also undertook the repair of all Islamic holy places which were damaged as a result of the June war. All this was financed by the Islamic Waqf funds and with no outside help. Among the places which the Bureau repaired was the minaret. Bab al-Asbat (The Tribes' Gate), which was damaged during the fighting. It also repaired the Dome of the Rock, which was then slightly damaged. The Bureau also repaired the main gate of the blessed Aqsa mosque, restoring it to its previous condition. The Bureau carried out and supervised all these repairs.

"Entrance to the venerable Holy Place is controlled by guards appointed by the Bureau. These guards stand at all gates leading to the courtyard of the Holy Place except at Al-Maghariba Gate. The Bureau pays salaries to all the guards appointed by it from the Islamic Waqf treasury. The Islamic Waqf Bureau levies entrance fees from tourists visiting the venerable Haram compound at all the gates leading to the courtyard of the Holy Place. It is forbidden for non-Moslems to enter the venerable Haram e-Sharif on Fridays, and the regulations regarding this are applied. With the help of Arab and Jewish police, the guards appointed by the Waqf

Bureau enforce the regulations and orders prohibiting non-Moslems from entering the holy compound. Posters which set out rules concerning behaviour in holy places are displayed at conspicuous places.

"The Egyptian architect, Abdel Munim Abdel Wahab, supervised the repair works of the noble Rock and its Dome. Repairs have been carried out in the galleries of the domes, the minarets and all areas of the Holy Places damaged as a result of the war. The damage at the blessed El-Aqsa mosque itself principally affected the main gate and some of the windows, including the artistic colored glass, the Waqf Bureau believes that it is necessary that the same architectural office undertake this repair work. The Waqf Bureau did not hesitate to work on repairing the central gallery of El-Aqsa mosque straightway after the war, thus avoiding the dangers that might have threatened the building itself as a result of the penetration of rain-water. As a result, every Moslem can enter the Haram Sharif and freely perform his religious rites. Moslem circles in Jerusalem believe that it is the duty of every Moslem to obey the call of the blessed El-Aqsa mosque, so that it is filled with worshippers at the five daily prayer times, at the Friday noon service and on other blessed Islamic religious occasions.

"There are a large number of mosques and Moslem places of worship in Jerusalem. The number of mosques, in addition to the Dome of the Rock and El-Aqsa, is 34; 27 of them are within the wall in the Old City, and

seven are outside the wall, in the modern part of the city; a small number of these mosques are no longer in use. There are also eleven small mosques (prayer rooms) in Jerusalem, into which the pious, the strangers on Moslem pilgrimage and the orthodox belonging to different sects may retire.

"Moslems have many cemeteries in Jerusalem, of which some were used in the past and, with time, have become obsolete; others are still in use. There are twenty such Islamic cemeteries.

"In Jerusalem there are not a few Islamic public fountains, built by Moslem kings and sultans hundreds of years ago. Owing to their great age, they have suffered some damage. However, the Waqf Bureau renovated them, at its own expense, after the June War. The Waqf Bureau took heavy costs upon itself in rebuilding and repairing these public fountains, because of meticulous and lengthy technical work which was required as is the case with any archaeological monument.

"The Waqf Bureau carried out repairs at other buildings owned by the Waqf, which were damaged as a result of the June War, especially the buildings on Salah ed-Din Street.

"No radical change has occurred in the administration of the Holy Places during the period of Israeli rule as compared with the situation under Jordanian rule.

"As to the Islamic Museum adjacent to the blessed El-Aqsa mosque, it is still as it has been. Foreign tourists and other visitors frequent this

museum and view its collection of Islamic antiquities. The museum receives visitors throughout the week, except Fridays, against an entrance fee."

It is to be noted that the damage caused in 1969 to the El-Aqsa mosque by fire is being repaired by the Moslem authorities. A new mosque was built earlier this year on the Mount of Olives. Another was dedicated recently in the Silwan district of the city.

Particular regard for Jerusalem's spiritual attributes is reflected also in the archaeological excavations which aim at revealing the ancient history of the city. These excavations center today in the area to the south and west of the monumental wall built by King Herod the Great in the latter part of the first century B.C. They are conducted in an area in which there are no cultural or historic monuments.

Captain Warren, of the Palestine Exploration Fund, commenced these excavations some one hundred years ago. They were continued under Jordanian rule by the British archaeologist, Miss K. Kenyon and by the French scholar and archaeologist, Pere R. De Vaux.

Not only has there been no damage to Moslem cultural property but these excavations have unearthed, inter alia, interesting Moslem Umayyad remains. Arab workers are employed in the excavations, Arab students join the volunteer workers who assist the archaeologists and Arab visitors to the excavations include members of the Moslem Council in Jerusalem.

The excavations present no danger whatsoever to Moslem religious buildings. Subsequent to the Six Days War some dilapidated houses near the excavations' site were pulled down, for safety reasons, but they included not one historical or cultural building. No demolition of any Moslem cultural building or monument has been, or is being, contemplated. The excavations are conducted in a most scientific and careful manner and will undoubtedly contribute much to our knowledge concerning Jewish, Christian and Moslem culture of many centuries.

Similar care is also undertaken in the clearing of refuse and debris which have accumulated through the centuries under the arches built by King Herod to support the bridge connecting the Temple Mount to the Western Hill. The clearing of the refuse stops at the level of the pavement in front of the Wailing Wall. Already Charles Wilson of the Royal Engineers discovered over a hundred years ago the original construction which today bears his name -- "Wilson's Arch". Scholars have been anxious for years to continue the exploration of this monument and, as late as 1966, Professor William F. Stinespring of Duke University Divinity School, conducted archaeological excavations in the area. No danger whatsoever exists neither to this monument nor to the buildings above it.

UNESCO's Commissioner General for Cultural Property, Dr. Karl Brunner in a letter addressed to Mr. R. Maheu, Director General, UNESCO on 6 October 1970 stated inter-alia:

"The excavation of Professor Mazar has not threatened the safety of the temple-area and he is now working in a direction further away from the mosque complex".

Dr. H. J. Reinink, UNESCO's Special Representative entrusted with reporting on the compliance with the Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, declared in a letter addressed to the Director-General of UNESCO on 13 April 1971:

"It is important that you should know the exact character of the work done by the Ministry of Religions in subterranean Jerusalem. There is no question of excavating in the ordinary sense of the word. No new tunnels are being made that could threaten the safety of the buildings above, but constructions that were built hundreds and thousands of years ago are being cleared of ancient debris and cleaned. Every precaution is taken to protect the subterranean areas and the streets and buildings above.

"Everyone who hears of the extensive works that are being done under an important part of the Old Jerusalem must think that great risks are taken; that many buildings, streets, market places, and especially the monuments, must be threatened. This is therefore, the place to remind everybody concerned that already a hundred years ago archaeologists, especially the renowned Charles Wilson in circumstances very much more difficult than exist today, uncovered part of the original construction, particularly the celebrated Wilson Arch. As late as 1963 and 1965 and 1966, Professor William F. Stinespring of Duke University Divinity School conducted archaeological excavations in the area.

"The present clearance is being done in close collaboration with the Israel Institute of Technology and the University of Haifa, by an expert engineer, Dipl. Eng. Josef Schonberger (Darmstadt). Furthermore, the Ministry of Religions is not being allowed to engage in any form of archaeological exploration and excavation. The engineer-Architect of the British School of Archaeology, Mr. Archibald Walls, I.R.I.R.A., A.R.I.A.S., M. Sc., declared in the presence of the Director of the School, Mrs. Christal Benett and of the famous archaeologist Pere Roland de Vaux of the Dominican Ecole Biblique de Jerusalem, that in his opinion, this part of the work done in the center of Jerusalem does not bring with it any risks of damage for the buildings above."

Information disseminated by certain elements, according to which there has been in the last four years a diminution of the Christian and Moslem populations of Jerusalem is not in accordance with, and is even opposed to facts. On the other hand there is also no truth whatever in the allegations contained in the Jordanian complaint that Israel contemplates the extension of the city's municipal boundaries to include neighbouring Arab towns and villages.

The phenomenon of Christian emigration from the Middle East has existed for over one hundred years. This process, with regard to Jerusalem, intensified during the 19 years of Jordanian occupation. Since 1967, however, it has ceased. What is actually occurring is the normal process of exit and entry in conjunction with the disappearance of the tendency to emigrate from Jerusalem.

The best illustration of the situation of the Christian and Moslem communities in Jerusalem is to be found in the statistics relating to the growth of the population. There was a sharp decrease in the number of Christians in Jerusalem under Jordanian rule which followed the Jordan occupation in 1948.

The figures are as follows:

YEAR	JEWS	CHRISTIANS	MOSLEMS
1948	100,000	25,000	45,000
1967	195,000	10,800	54,963
1970	215,000	11,500	61,600

It appears then that the heavy emigration of Christians during the Jordanian occupation -- about 14,000 left during this period -- ceased as of 1967. It also appears that the Moslem population has actually increased since 1967.

The gratuitous and malicious nature of Jordan's assault on Jerusalem's right to lead a normal life, to grow and to develop is illustrated by the charge that the city's character is being changed, that Jerusalem is being "Judaized". The significance of the charge is clear. Jerusalem may be the center of the Jewish people's existence, civilization, unity. Jews may have constituted the majority of the city's population for generations, but Jews, according to Jordan, should not be allowed to supply the town's municipal services, Jews must not beautify the city, Jews must not build, Jews must not multiply.

There is a sinister echo in this attitude. We still remember Hitler's maniacal campaign against the so-called "Judaization" of German life. We have not forgotten how this campaign developed into the genocide of six million of our brethren.

Does the Jordanian Government, or for that matter any other Government, believe that it is possible to revive the spirit of the anti-Jewish laws and to establish a "numerus clausus" against Jews, in Jerusalem of all places? Does anyone expect the Jewish state to become party to anti-Jewish prejudices and pronouncements?

The Israeli authorities can be expected to, and will ensure that the universal religious interests in Jerusalem are meticulously respected and that the city's life and development are carried on in an orderly manner. They cannot be expected to lend themselves to Arab belligerency and to impose anti-Jewish restrictions on the city that has throughout history been the heart of the Jewish people's existence.

On what does Jordan base its claims and charges? From what does it derive its pretensions? Jordan's association with Jerusalem was of one kind only -- through its invasion of 1948, in violation of the Charter and of United Nations resolutions, and through the subsequent illegal occupation of the city's eastern sector. This occupation does not accord Jordan any rights, especially now that it has been terminated. It had never been recognized by any of the States Members of the United Nations. It cannot serve as a basis for invoking international conventions and instruments. Obviously it cannot be used as a lever to oppose Jerusalem's integrity and development.

While firmly rejecting any claims, based on aggression against Jerusalem and the city's former illegal division, Israel will continue to be guided by the legitimate rights and interests of Jerusalem's citizens irrespective of nationality and faith and will scrupulously ensure the sanctity of the Holy Places, freedom of access to them and the jurisdiction of the various religious communities over them. In pursuance of this objective Israel maintains a constructive and detailed dialogue with representatives of universal religious interests.

The United Nations' inability to deal impartially with the Middle East situation by means of public debate and resolution is a matter of record. This is due primarily to the structure and voting procedures of United Nations organs. The world is aware of the fact that Israel's case cannot receive a fair hearing in our organization or be judged here on its merits.

Israel, however, cannot forego its rights simply because the Security Council, the General Assembly or other organs are inherently weighted against it. The merits of its position cannot be affected by the fact that it is a small nation, solitary in its Jewish civilization and Hebrew heritage, a nation that does not belong to the power blocs which dominate the outcome of voting, and that consequently it is outvoted time and again. Being a minority is not new to Jewish experience. The Jewish people's strength seems to lie in its success to preserve through the ages, its values, ideals and traditions despite the hostility of others.

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/271 (1969)
15 September 1969

RESOLUTION 271 (1969)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1512th meeting on 15 September 1969

The Security Council,

Grieved at the extensive damage caused by arson to the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on 21 August 1969 under the military occupation of Israel,

Mindful of the consequent loss to human culture,

Having heard the statements made before the Council reflecting the universal outrage caused by the act of sacrilege in one of the most venerated shrines of mankind,

Recalling its resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 and the earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, respectively, concerning measures and actions by Israel affecting the status of the city of Jerusalem,

Reaffirming the established principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969);

2. Recognizes that any act of destruction or profanation of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Jerusalem or any encouragement of, or connivance at, any such act may seriously endanger international peace and security;

3. Determines that the execrable act of desecration and profanation of the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque emphasizes the immediate necessity of Israel desisting from acting in violation of the aforesaid resolutions and rescinding forthwith all measures and actions taken by it designed to alter the status of Jerusalem;

4. Calls upon Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and international law governing military occupation and to refrain

/...

from causing any hindrance to the discharge of the established functions of the Supreme Muslim Council of Jerusalem, including any co-operation that Council may desire from countries with predominantly Muslim population and from Muslim communities in relation to its plans for the maintenance and repair of the Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem;

5. Condemns the failure of Israel to comply with the aforementioned resolutions and calls upon it to implement forthwith the provisions of these resolutions;

6. Reiterates the determination in operative paragraph 7 of resolution 267 (1969) that in the event of a negative response or no response, the Security Council shall convene without delay to consider what further action should be taken in this matter;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the Security Council at the earliest possible date.

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/267 (1969)
3 July 1969

RESOLUTION 267 (1969)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1485th meeting, on 3 July 1969

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 252 of 21 May 1968 and the earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967 respectively concerning measures and actions by Israel affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem,

Having heard the statements of the parties concerned on the question,

Noting that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions Israel has taken further measures tending to change the status of the City of Jerusalem,

Reaffirming the established principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

1. Reaffirms its resolution 252 (1968);

2. Deplores the failure of Israel to show any regard for the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions mentioned above;

3. Censures in the strongest terms all measures taken to change the status of the City of Jerusalem;

4. Confirms that all legislative and administrative measures and actions by Israel which purport to alter the status of Jerusalem including expropriation of land and properties thereon are invalid and cannot change that status;

5. Urgently calls once more upon Israel to rescind forthwith all measures taken by it which may tend to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, and in future to refrain from all actions likely to have such an effect;

6. Requests Israel to inform the Security Council without any further delay of its intentions with regard to the implementation of the provisions of this resolution;

7. Determines that, in the event of a negative response or no response from Israel, the Security Council shall reconvene without delay to consider what further action should be taken in this matter;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution.

NITED NATIONS

ECURITY
OUNCIL

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/252 (1968)
21 May 1968

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RESOLUTION 252 (1968)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1426th meeting, on 21 May 1968

The Security Council,

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967,

Having considered the letter (S/8560) of the Permanent Representative of Jordan on the situation in Jerusalem and the report of the Secretary-General (S/8146),

Having heard the statements made before the Council,

Noting that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions, Israel has taken further measures and actions in contravention of those resolutions,

Bearing in mind the need to work for a just and lasting peace,

Reaffirming that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

1. Deplores the failure of Israel to comply with the General Assembly resolutions mentioned above;

2. Considers that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status;

3. Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution.

68-11751

2253 (ES-V). Measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in Jerusalem as a result of the measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City,

1. *Considers* that these measures are invalid;

2. *Calls upon* Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on the situation and on the implementation of the present resolution not later than one week from its adoption.

1548th plenary meeting,
4 July 1967.

2254 (ES-V). Measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967,

Having received the report submitted by the Secretary-General,[8]

Taking note with the deepest regret and concern of the non-compliance by Israel with resolution 2253 (ES-V),

1. *Deplores* the failure of Israel to implement General Assembly resolution 2253 (ES-V);

2. *Reiterates* its call to Israel in that resolution to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the situation and on the implementation of the present resolution.

1554th plenary meeting,
14 July 1967.

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[8] A/6753. For the printed text of this document, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1967*, document S/8052.

אגף מרדיערן / מח' מחקר

344/מ

ה' אלול תשל"ב
15 אוג' 1972

עותק מס' 37
מסמך זה מכיל 14 עמ'

סאל"ט ופרוק חימוש - נתוני רקע

(לבקשת ועדת חוץ ובטחון)

כ ל ל י

1. תוצאותיה של מלחה"ע השניה, על רקע היריבות הרעיונית-פוליטית בין ברה"מ והמערב, הביאו להתהוותם של שני גושים עוינים במערכת העולמית - הגוש המזרחי בהנהגת של מוסקבה, והגוש המערבי בהנהגת וושינגטון. יחסי הכוחות הכלכליים, הטכנו-מדעיים והצבאיים, בין שני המחנות העוינים היו מלכתחילה לטובת הצד המערבי.

2. יתר על כן, היישגיה הצבאיים של ברה"מ, שנבעו בראש וראשונה מעוצמתן המרשימה של צבאותיה היבשתיים, איבדו בהרבה מערכן המעשי במאזן הכוחות ביבה לבין ארה"ב, משהפגיבה זו האחרונה בסיומה של המלחמה את עליונותה הצבאית המוחלטת, עת הטילה באוגוסט 1945, לראשונה בהסטוריה, את שתי פצצות האטום על הירושימה ונגסקי. ברה"מ היתה שרויה בחוסר בטחון ממשי מול המונופול של יריבתה הגדולה והרחוקה על הנשק הגרעיני. המנהיגות הסובייטית האמינה אז כי מעתה מאיים עליה, ורק עליה, נשק האימה האמריקאי, ומשום כך לא היה מנוס, מבחינתה, מהירתמותה לרכישת הידע לפיתוח ויצור עוצמה גרעינית נגדית.

3. בספטמבר 1949, ערכה ברה"מ את הניסוי הגרעיני הראשון שלה, ומרגע זה ואילך ברור היה כי המערכת העולמית נכנסה לשלב איכותי חדש במירוץ החימוש, ולעידן חדש ביחסים הבינלאומיים - עידן האימה הגרעינית:-

א. במירוץ החימוש:-

1) אוקטובר 1952 - בריטניה ערכה את הפיצוץ הגרעיני הראשון.

2) נובמבר 1952 - ארה"ב ערכה את הפיצוץ המימני הראשון.

3) אוגוסט 1953 - ברה"מ ערכה את הפיצוץ המימני הראשון.

4) מאי 1957 - בריטניה ערכה את הפיצוץ המימני הראשון.

5) אוגוסט 1957 - ברה"מ שיגרה את הטיל הביביבשתי הראשון.

6) פברואר 1958 - ארה"ב שיגרה את הטיל הביביבשתי הראשון.

7) פברואר 1960 - צרפת ערכה את הפיצוץ הגרעיני הראשון.

8) אוקטובר 1964 - סין ערכה את הפיצוץ הגרעיני הראשון.

9) אפריל 1966 - ברה"מ הציבה מערכת טילים נגד טילים ראשונה.

10) יוני 1967 - סין ערכה את הפיצוץ המימני הראשון.

11) 1968 - ארה"ב החלה בפיתוח מערכת טילים - נגד טילים ראשונה.

12) אוגוסט 1968 - צרפת ערכה את הפיצוץ המימני הראשון.

ב. <u>ביחסים הבינלאומיים</u>:-

1) התגבשה ההכרה כי במלחמה גרעינית לא יהיה מנוצח ולא מנצח, אלא כליה לאנושות כולה. לכן הצטיירה הבנה מצד המחנות היריבים, השולטים בנשק גרעיני, למנוע התלקחות מלחמה כוללת, ובכל מקרה להימנע משמוש בנשק גרעיני.

2) מאידך, המאבק האלים בין שתי מעצמות-העל, והמעצמות הגרעיניות האחרות, לא נפסק אלא הועתק לזירות מוגבלות במערכת העולמית (תת-מערכת) כשהשתתפותן בו היא עקיפה או חד-צדדית.

3) ככל שגברה עוצמתן הגרעינית של ברה"מ ו-ארה"ב, בוצר מצב של ביטרול הדדי המאפשר חופש פעולה של כוחות ביניים בזירה העולמית. גם מסיבה זו החל תהליך של מעבר ממסגרת בינמעצמתית דו-קוטבית למערכת קב-מוקדית.

4) עלייתן של מעצמות-ביניים באירופה ובאסיה המחישה את הסיכון שבהפצת הנשק הגרעיני, מצד אחד, ואת החשיבות בהבטחת היציבות האסטרטגית העולמית, מצד שני.

בהיותן אחראיות על העוצמה הגרעינית המכרעת, מצאו עצמן ברה"מ ו-ארה"ב מחויבות לפעולה משותפת לצמצום הסיכונים לבטחון העולמי, בראש וראשונה ע"י קידום ההבנה וההסכמה ביניהן בתחומים רגישים אלה.

פירוק הנשק

כללי

4. כבר בראשיתו של העידן הגרעיני העדיפה ברה"מ להרתם להתעצמות גרעינית שתבטיח לה בעתיד, לפחות שוויון (Parity) עם ארה"ב. עד אז צריך היה לצמצם חופש הפעולה של ארה"ב ולהגביר היסוסיה, ביחס לשימוש אפשרי מצידה בנשק גרעיני, את זאת עשתה ברה"מ בדרכים של הפעלת לחצים פסיכו-פוליטיים על יריבתה: מול המונופול הגרעיני של ארה"ב, התרכזו הסובייטים בסוף שנות ה-40, במערכת תעמולתית עצפה (אליה נרתמו גרורותיה, ידידותיה, המפלגות הקומוניסטיות, מפלגות שמאל וחוגים אינטלקטואלים רבים במערב). בה צויירה ל-ארה"ב תדמית של מעצמה "מחדרת מלחמה" לעומת ברה"מ כמנהיגת המדינות "שוחרות השלום".

5. לעומתם, בהיותה המעצמה החזקה ביותר בעולם, הרשתה ארה"ב לעצמה לצאת ביוזמות מדיניות שנועדו להבטיח פירוק נשק גרעיני, מלא או חלקי, או לפחות צמצום מרוץ החמוש האסטרטגי. משרכשה עוצמה גרעינית מרתיעה, נכונה היתה ברה"מ לטפל ביוזמות המערביות ולהגיש תכניות משלה, כשבמקביל התאמצה מוסקבה להבטיח שכל הסכם בתחום זה לא יפגע בשאיפתה להגיע לשוויון איסטרטגי עם ארה"ב.

תכנית ברוך (1946-1953)

6. ההצעה המשמעותית הראשונה לפירוק בשק בתקופה האטומית הוגשה ע"י ארה"ב לפני 25 שנה, שנה אחת לאחר הירושימה, ב-14 יוני 1946. תמצית ההצעה, שנודעה כ"תכנית ברוך" היתה ש-ארה"ב תוותר על אחזקת בשק גרעיני ועל כל אמצעים גרעיניים אפילו לצורכי שלום, בתנאי שמדינות אחרות יסכימו לבעלות בינלאומית על ההתפתחות בתחום הגרעיני וליצירת גוף עליון מפקח שבו לארצות החברות לא תהיה זכות וטו.

7. חמישה ימים מאוחר יותר, ב-19 יוני הציעה ברה"מ הצעת-נגד. ברה"מ דחתה את עקרון הפיקוח הבינלאומי, כנוגד לעקרון הריבונות הלאומית וקראה לכינוס ועידות בינלאומיות בענין הבשק הגרעיני. ב-1947 מיתנה ברה"מ את עמדתה והציגה נוסחה חוזרת של תכניתה שהכילה מצע לשיטת פיקוח, הצעות אלה נדחו ע"י המערב.

8. ב-נוב' 1948, אימצה העצרת הכללית של ה-או"מ את תכנית "ברוך" שנקראה אז "תכנית ה-או"מ" וקראה למגעים נוספים בנושא. ב-1949 פיצצה ברה"מ את הפצצה האטומית הראשונה שלה, ובאביב 1950 היא יצאה מועדת פרוק הבשק של ה-או"מ בגלל אי-הצבתו של בציג מסין הקומוניסטית בגופים אלה. זמן קצר לאחר מכן פלשו כוחות צפון קוריאה לדרום קוריאה.

גישה חדשה לפירוק בשק (1953-1962)

9. השינוי היחסי בעקבות מות סטאלין במרץ 1953, נתן דחיפה חדשה לשיחות פירוק הבשק, אבל השינויים שנוצרו כתוצאה מהעובדה ש-ארה"ב אבדה את המונופול הגרעיני הצריכו צורות חדשות של משא ומתן. בסתיו 1953, זמן קצר לאחר פיצוץ פצצת המימן הסובייטית, הוצע ע"י העצרת הכללית של ה-או"מ ש"בציגי הכוחות העיקריים המעורבים יחפשו פתרון מתאים בינם לבין עצמם" וידונו לועידה לפירוק בשק שהוקמה זה מכבר. ב-אפר' 1954 הקימה הועידה לפירוק בשק, תת ועדה של 5 מדינות (ארה"ב, ברה"מ, בריטניה, צרפת וקנדה) אשר עליה הוטל לבדוק מחדש את מכלול בושא פירוק החימוש. תת ועדה זו פעלה כגוף המנהל מו"מ עד 1957.

10. ב-יבו' 1957 העלתה ארה"ב הצעה בדבר הצורך להגיע להגבלתם, ובשלב מאוחר יותר, להפסקתם של הניסויים הגרעיניים. ביוני הציעה ברה"מ ארכה של שבתיים לניסויים שיעשו תחת פיקוח ועדה בינלאומית. כאשר בראה היה שעמדות ארה"ב ו-ברה"מ מתקרבות, גיבשו הכוחות המערביים ב-אוגו' תכנית מקיפה לפירוק הנשק. תכנית זו נדחתה ע"י ברה"מ.

11. העצרת הכללית של ה-או"מ קיבלה אותה שנה את התכנית המערבית ברוב של 57 קולות לעומת 9 עם 15 המנעויות. ברה"מ יצאה מהדיונים לפירוק נשק, השיחות הרשמיות חודשו רק ב-1960. ביבתיים במשכו, מאחורי הקלעים, מגעים לאסור על ניסויים גרעיניים. במאי 1958 קיבל חרושצ'וב הצעה אמריקאית שמטרתה לבדוק את אפשרויות הפיקוח על איסור הניסויים. ב-אוק' נפתחה בג'נבה ועידה על איסור הניסויים הגרעיניים, במקביל הודיעו ארה"ב ו-ברה"מ על דחיות ניסויים, לתקופה של 3 שנים.

12. במרץ 1960 בעקבות הקמת ועדת פירוק נשק של 10 המדינות חודשו, על בסיס רשמי, המגעים לפירוק נשק. ברה"מ ובנות בריתה הציעו תכנית ל"פירוק נשק כללי ומחלט". מעצמות המערב הציעו את הצעות הנגד שלהן, בהן הודגש הצורך באימות ובהסכמה בכל שלב. לא הושג כל הסכם. מעצמות המערב ראו את ההצעות הסובייטיות כבלתי קונקרטיות ולא מוגדרות. ברה"מ הביעה אכזבה מהעובדה שהמערב לא קיבל את עקרון פירוק נשק כללי מוחלט כתנאי מוקדם לכל מגע נוסף. במאי, הוכשלה הפסגה בפריז, כאשר חרושצ'וב סירב להתחיל בשיחות עד אשר יתבצל אייזנהאור על תקרית היו-2. חודש לאחר מכן עזבו חמשת הצירים הקומוניסטיים את הישיבה של הוועדה, ללא כל הודעה מוקדמת.

13. אחרי כשלון המאמצים ב-או"מ להגיע להסכם על חידושם הקרוב של המגעים פתחו ממשלות ארה"ב ו-ברה"מ בשורת שיחות בילטרליות שמטרתם לצאת מן המבוי הסתום. ב-20 ספטמבר 1961, חתמו מקלוי וזורין על הצהרת "עקרונות מוסכמים לדיוני פירוק הנשק", אשר לא הצליחה אף היא לגשר על הפער בסוגיית הפיקוח הקיים בין שני הצדדים.

14. ביוני 1961 הגיש חרושצ'וב לקנדי תזכיר שדחה את רעיון חתימת החוזה על איסור הניסויים הגרעיניים, אלא במסגרת פרוק נשק כללי ומוחלט. בספטמבר 1961 נסתיימה תקופת הדחייה בת שלוש השנים של ברה"מ על הניסויים הגרעיניים ההיא החלה בסידרה חדשה של ניסוי נשק הגנה גרעיני. ארה"ב נקטה בצעד דומה שבועיים לאחר מכן.

15. השיחות לפירוק נשק חודשו לבסוף במרץ 1962. ועידה חדשה בת 18 המדינות החלה את עבודתה (במקום ועידת 10 המדינות שהפסיקה פעולתה ב-1960). שבעה חודשים מאוחר יותר התקיים המאבק הגרעיני הראשון (ע"י"הפגנת שריריה) באיים הקריביים (משבר קובה).

<u>הסכמים ראשונים להגבלת נסויי נשק גרעיני ומניעת הפצתו (1963-1968)</u>

16. משבר קובה השפיע חיובית גם על דיוני פירוק הנשק שהחלו ביולי 1963. בדיונים אלה עסקו בנסיון משותף לנסח חוזה בדבר פיקוח חלקי על איסור הניסויים הגרעיניים. ההסכם נחתם כעבור עשרה ימים במוסקבה (5 אוגוסט). ב-פבר' 1964 הציעה ארה"ב ל-ברה"מ לחתום על חוזה לאי-הפצתו של הנשק הגרעיני.

17. בינתיים חלו תמורות ב-ברה"מ: הערכת מצב מחודשת בעקבות המשבר הקובני, סילוקו של חרושצ'וב, פיצוץ גרעיני סיני ראשון והגברת המתיחות בגבול עם סין ביאזור סינקיאנג.

18. ארה"ב ו-ברה"מ המשיכו בדרך שהותוותה ע"י ההסכם לאיסור חלקי של הניסויים הגרעיניים, שעה שהדיון על פירוק הנשק עצמו, לאכזבת מדינות קטנות ולא גרעיניות, קיבל מקום משני בלבד. הדיונים התרכזו עתה בדרכי הפיקוח על מירוץ החימוש וייצובם של "יחסי ההרתעה". ב-19 דצמ' 1966 אישרה העצרת הכללית של ה-או"מ את החוזה, שנחתם בין ברה"מ ו-ארה"ב במסגרת ועדת או"מ, המגביל את השימוש בחלל החיצון רק לצרכי שלום, האוסר את השימוש בנשק השמדה מאסיבי בחלל. ביוני 1968 אישרה העצרת הכללית של ה-או"מ חוזה לאי הפצתו של הנשק הגרעיני.

שיחות סאל"ט Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

19. בשנות ה-60 נוצרה מעין הבנה בלתי כתובה בין שתי מעצמות העל בדבר אחריותן הבלעדית ליציבותו של המאזן האסטרטגי העולמי. עלייתו של גורם נוסף למועדון הגרעיני, סין העממית, על רקע יריבותה עם ברה"מ, עוררה דאגה באשר להשלכות העלולות לנבוע מכך על אמיתות ההבנה הבלתי-כתובה בין ברה"מ ו-ארה"ב בתחום רגיש זה. היה בכך הדחף העיקרי לקיום דו-שיח ביניהן להשגת הבנת כתובה, אך לא היחיד. מחירו של המירוץ הפך להיות יקר מדי, בעיקר בוכח התחרות הטכנו-כלכלית של מעצמות-ביניים מצד אחד, לצרכים הדומסטים הגוברים, מצד שני. היה זה גורם דחף חשוב נוסף להשגת הסכמה-כתובה להגבלת מירוץ החימוש הגרעיני.

20. בשל עליונותה במאזן הכולל של יחסי הכוחות, היתה שוב ארה"ב הגורם היוזם לפתיחת הדו-שיח. כבר בשנת 1964 שיגר הנשיא לינדון ג'ונסון, באיגרת לוועידה לפירוק החימוש בג'נבה, הצעה ל-ברה"מ וליתר המעצמות להקפיא את פיתוחו וייצורו של הנשק האיסטרטגי הגרעיני במסגרת של התחייבות הדדית כוללת. משלחת ארה"ב בג'נבה קיבלה הוראות להעלות נושא זה לדיון מעשי, אך כיתר הנושאים שהועלו באותה ועידה, העלתה גם הצעה זו חרס. ואולם, הצעד הדיפלומטי המעשי הראשון שבעשה ע"י ארה"ב היה מששיגר ג'ונסון ב-27 יונ' 1967, איגרת למנהיגי הקרמלין ובה הצעה לפתיחת דו-שיח אמריקני-סובייטי לוויתור מוסכם מצד שתיהן על פיתוחן של מערכות הטילים-נגד-טילים. איגרת זו באה בעקבות גילוי טילי ה"גאלוש" הסובייטים על ידי שירותי המודיעין של ארה"ב. המגעים בין וושינגטון ומוסקבה לבירור אפשרויות פתיחתו של דו-שיח זה נמשכו ללא מוצא מעשי, והעידה על כך פגישתם (העקרה?) של קוסיגין-ג'ונסון בגלסבורו ביוני 1967, בעקבות מלחמת ששת הימים.

21. בעת חתימת החוזה לאי הפצת הנשק הגרעיני ב-11 יולי 1968 בישר הבית הלבן על הסכם סובייטי-אמריקני לפתיחתו "המהירה" של דו שיח על הנשק האיסטרטגי. ואולם, מאורעות אוגו' 1968-הפלישה הסובייטית לצ'כיה - שיבשו את התוכנית, שכן ארה"ב במצאה במצב של משבר בין מזרח למערב, שחייב אותה לדחות את המפגשים למועד מאוחר יותר, בלא קביעת תאריך.

22. משנודע לסובייטים על בצחון הרפובליקנים בבחירות לנשיאות ב-ארה"ב, ב-נוב' 1968, החליטו להציג בעצרת ה-או"מ עמדה חיובית לניהול שיחות איסטרטגיות עם ארה"ב, ואישרו את המלצת הוועדה המדינית של ה-או"מ לפתיחת שיחות על הגבלת החימוש, זאת כמובן, לאחר שהמלצה זו זכתה בתמיכתן של יתר המעצמות, פרט לצרפת. עם העלאת הנושא מעל בימת ה-או"מ הכריז גרומיקו, שר החוץ הסובייטי, כי המדובר ב"חילופי דיעות" על "הגבלה הדדית" של החימוש האיסטרטגי. מייד עם היכנסו לבית הלבן, ובהסתמכו על הצהרת הנכונות הסובייטית לקיים עם ממשלו דו-שיח בנושא רגיש זה, הפליג הנשיא ניכסון באופטימיות בהכריזו, כי "תם עידן העימות והחל עידן ההידברות" בין שתי מעצמות העל.

23. לאחר שהמועצה לבטחון לאומי של ארה"ב קבעה את עמדתה, ולאור המלצותיה של ועדת שרים אמריקאית שהוקמה על ידי הנשיא, הציע הנשיא ניכסון ב-19 יוני 1969 ל-ברה"מ את פתיחת השלב המכין לדו-שיח הסובייטי-אמריקני בין 31 יולי ל-15 באוגו' באותה שנה, כדי "להתחיל בפרק חדש ביחסים בין מזרח למערב". הסובייטים נענו להזמנה זו רק ב-20 אוק' 1969, והציעו כי סיבוב השיחות הראשון יתקיים בהלסינקי ב-17 נוב' 1969.

24. מאז ועד לביקור ניכסון במוסקבה, במאי 1972, התקיימו 7 סיבובי שיחות על הגבלת החימוש הגרעיני בין שתי מעצמות-העל לחילופין בהלסינקי ובוינה:-

א. הלסינקי - 17 נוב' עד 22 דצמ' 1969 - המושב הסתיים עם פרסום הודעה משותפת אשר בישרה כי שתי המעצמות הגיעו לידי הסכם "לגבי מכלול הנושאים שסביבם יתנהלו חילופי הצעות העתידים".

ב. וינה - 16 אפר' עד 14 אוג' 1970 - לא פורסמה כל הודעה רשמית, הדבר העיד על אי-נכונות הדדית לכל התחייבות פומבית.

ג. הלסינקי - 2 נוב' עד 18 דצמ' 1970 - הדיונים החלו על רקע אוירת מתיחות רבה בין שתי המעצמות והתנהלו בזהירות מרובה וללא כל סימנים מעידים להתקדמות מעשית.

ד. וינה - 15 מרץ עד 28 מאי 1971 - שלב זה הסתיים בהסכמה אמריקאית -סובייטית לדון בהגבלת סוגי נשק הגנתי והתקפי כאחד.

ה. הלסינקי - 5 יולי עד 22 ספט' 1971 - הושגה התקדמות מתונה, דבר שהתאשר מהתבטאויות המשתתפים. יתר על כן, השיחות בערכו בצל אוירת ההפשרה הכוללת ואמנם הושגו שני הסכמים זוטרים בענייני פרוק הנשק האיסטרטגי (שכלול התקשורת בין הבית הלבן והקרמלין וההסכם בדבר הצורך לנקוט צעדים למניעת שואה גרעינית).

ו. וינה - 17 נוב' 1971 עד 4 פבר' 1972 - סביר שהתגלו קשיים מסויימים בעיקר במישור הנשק ההתקפי. הדיונים התנהלו על רקע האוירה הנוקשה שנוצרה עקב הרגישות שאפיינה את יחסי ארה"ב-ברה"מ לקראת ביקור ניכסון בפקין.

ז. הלסינקי - 28 מרץ עד 26 מאי 1972 - הושגה נוסחה בין שתי המשלחות, שאפשרה למנהיגי שתי מעצמות-העל לחתום ב-26 מאי 1972 על אמנה על הגבלת נשק הגנתי והסכם ביניים להגבלת מספר סוגי נשק התקפיים.

25. ב-26 מאי 1972 נחתמו במוסקבה בין ארה"ב ל-ברה"מ שני הסכמים בדבר הגבלת הנשק האסטרטגי: אמנה להגבלת מערכות טילים נגד טילים (ABM); הסכם ביניים בדבר הגבלת מערכות נשק אסטרטגי התקפי. ביסודם של שני הסכמים אלו מונחת ההכרה בדבר הקשר בין נשק אסטרטגי הגנתי והתקפי, כאשר מובעת התחיבותם של שני הצדדים להמשיך בשיחות מעשיות להשלמתם. כצעד מעשי בכוון זה יקימו הצדדים ועדת קבע מייעצת. להבטחת ביצוע המתחייב בהסכמים אלו ישתמש כל צד באמצעי אימות טכניים בדרך התואמת את הכללים המוכרים ע"י החוק הבינ"ל. כל צד זכותו לפרוש מכל אחד משני ההסכמים, תוך הודעה חצי שנה מראש, בעת אשר נראה לו כי ארועים מיוחדים הקשורים בנושאי ההסכמים מסכנים את האינטרסים העליונים שלו.

26. האמנה להגבלת מערכות טילים נגד טילים איננה מוגבלת בזמן אולם כל חמש שנים ממועד כניסתה לתוקף ייבחנו סעיפיה מחדש בהתאם לשינויים הצפויים במישור זה. אמנה זו נחתמה מתוך הכרה כי הגבלה על מערכות טילים נגד טילים תשמש כגורם עיקרי לבלימת מירוץ החימוש בנשק אסטרטגי התקפי. על פיה:-

א. שני הצדדים מתחייבים עפ"י ההסכם לא לפרוש סה"כ יותר מאשר 200 משגרים נגד טילים, 200 טילים נגד טילים ו-26 מערכות רדאר לטילים נגד טילים לפי החלוקה הבאה:-

1) 100 משגרים נגד טילים, 100 טילים נגד טילים ו-6 מערכות רדאר לטילים אלו, יפרשו ברדיוס של 150 ק"מ סביב הבירה.

2) 100 משגרים נגד טילים, 100 טילים נגד טילים ו-20 מערכות רדאר יפרשו ברדיוס של 150 ק"מ. (מסביב לבסיס I.C.B.M.)

ב. כל צד מתחייב לא לפרוש, לבחון, או לפתח מערכות טילים נגד טילים המוצבים בים, באויר, בחלל, או שהינם ניידים.

ג. כל צד מתחייב לא לפתח, לבחון, או לפרוש משגרי טילים נגד טילים המסוגלים בעת ובעונה אחת לשגר יותר מטיל אחד.

27. הסכם הביניים בדבר הגבלת מערכית בשק איסטרטגי התקפי ישאר בתוקפו 5 שנים, אלא אם כן יוחלף במועד מוקדם יותר ע"י הסכם כולל יותר להגבלת נשק איסטרטגי התקפי לפיו:-

א. הצדדים מתחייבים לא להתחיל בבנית משגרים נוספים לטילים בין-יבשתיים אחרי התאריך 1 יולי 72.

ב. הצדדים מתחייבים לא להחליף את המשגרים לטילים בין-יבשתיים "קלים" או אלו המיועדים לדגמי טילים ישנים שנפרשו לפני 1964 במשגרי טילים לטילים בין-יבשתיים "כבדים", או לכאלו שנפרשו לאחר 1964.

ג. הצדדים מתחייבים להגביל את קספר המשגרים לטילים בליסטיים המשוגרים מצוללות ואת מספר צוללות הטילים הבליסטיים המודרניים למספר אלו שהינם מבצעיים ותחת בניה בתאריך החתימה על ההסכם.

ד. בהתחשב עם הוראות הסכם ביניים זה ניתן לבצע מודרניזציה והחלפה של טילים בליסטיים איסטרטגיים התקפיים ומשגרים הנכללים במסגרת הסכם זה.

נתונים השוואתיים של העוצמה האיסטרטגית-גרעינית

א. בשק איסטרטגי במסגרת הסכם סאל"ט:

מס סד	סוג הנשק	ארה"ב המצאי	ארה"ב גידול מכסימלי	ברה"מ המצאי	ברה"מ גידול מכסימלי
	א	ב	ג	ד	ה
1.	טילים בליסטיים ביבשתיים (ICBM).	1000 מיניטמן* 54 טיטאן.	שיבויים איכותיים בתחום ראשי החץ המתפצלים (MIRV).	1510 (SS-7) (SS-9,SS-11, SS-8).	מספר הטילים העומדים להיכנס לפעילות מבצעית היבו 108. בכך יגיע מספר הטילים ל-1618.
2.	טילים בליסטיים משוגרים מצוללות (SLBM).	**656	***704	440	*950
3.	צוללות בושאות טילים בליסטיים	****41	44	61	**62
4.	טילים נגד טילים (ABM).	0	200: 100 יגבו על וושינגטון, ו-100 על בסיס טילים ביבשתיים בצפון דקוטה.	64 מדגם גאלוש	מותר לפתח עד 200 טילים נגד טילים כאשר 100 יגבו על מוסקבה הבירה, ו-100 נוספים על אחד מבסיסי הטילים הביבשתיים.

הערות:

* 150 מיניטמן 3 (מירוו').
850 מיניטמן 1 ומיבטמן 2.

** א. בכל צוללת מדגם פולאריס 16 משגרי טילים חד ראשיים.
ב. בכל צוללת פוסיידון 16 משגרי טילים (כל טיל בושא 10 ראשי חץ גרעיניים לפחות).

*** ארה"ב רשאית להחזיק" ב-סה"כ 1710 כלי שיגור כלומר, הורדת 54 הטיטאנים במקרה של הכנסת SLBM חדישים (סה"כ 1710 משגרים: 710 SLBM ו-1000 ICBM).

**** 31 צוללות פולאריס.
10 צוללות פוסיידון.

* ברה"מ רשאית להחזיק ב-סה"כ 2359 אמצעי שיגור, היינו, הורדת טילים ביבשתיים מלפני 1964 במקרה של הכנסת SLBM חדישים. (סה"כ 2359 משגרים: 950 SLBM ו-1409 ICBM).

** א. 20 צוללות גרעיניות SSBN כ"א עם 16 טילי SS-N -6 (חד-ראשי).
ב. 10 צוללות גרעיניות SSBN , כ"א עם 3 טילי SS-N-5 (חד-ראשי).
ג. 31 צוללות דיזל:-
1) 16 עם 3 טילי SS-N -5
2) 12 עם 3 SS-N -4
3) 3 עם 2 SS-N -4

ב. נשק איסטרטגי מחוץ למסגרת הסכם סאל"ט:

סוג הנשק	ארה"ב	ברה"מ
א	ב	ג
טילים בליסטיים לטווח ... ביניים (IRBM) וביבוני (URBM)	-	700 (IRBM Skean - 100 SS-5) (Samdal - 600 SS-4 MRBM)
מפציצים כבדים לטווח ארוך	445 -52 B	140 (100 Tu 20 BEAR) (40 Mya BISON)
מפציצים כבדים לטווח ביבוני	70 -111 FB	1000: 700 במסגרת חיל אויר איסטרטגי: 500 -16 Tu ו-200 -22 Tu . 300 -16 Tu במסגרת טייסת הצי.

ג. הערות כלליות:

1. ל-ארה"ב בסך הכל כ-7500 ראשי נפץ גרעיניים וטרמו גרעיניים ואילו ל-ברה"מ כ-5600 ראשי נפץ. העוצמה הכוללת עולה כנראה על 5000 מגטון בכל מדינה.

2. ל-נאט"ו באירופה יש כ-7000 ראשי נפץ גרעיניים טקטיים הניתנים לשיגור מטילים קצרי טווח או מתותחים, וכ-2250 "מתקני שיגור" שונים. כן נמצאים ברשות נאט"ו מוקשים גרעיניים.

3. ל-ארה"ב יש 5700 ראשי חץ גרעיניים לעומת 2500 ראשי חץ כאלו ל-ברה"מ.

נספח ב'

מילון העימות הגרעיני

-ABM (Anti Ballistic Missile)

טילי הגנה - טילים המיירטים טילים. יש להם השפעה מערערת איזון, באשר הם פוגעים בכושר המכה החוזרת. מערכת טילי הגנה סמיכה, בעלת יכולת עקרונית להשמיד את מרבית טילי האויב, יכולה לבטל את כושר המכה החוזרת שלה. כתוצאה מכך, עשוי הוא להעדיף להיות הראשון המבחית מהלומה גרעינית. במקביל לכך, הצד שבבעלותו מערכת הגנה יעילה זוכה ביתרון למקרה שירצה להבחית מכה ראשונה.
האמריקאים משתמשים במערך הגנה שכינויו "סייף-גארד" שעה שהסובייטים מבססים את הגנתם על הטיל הסובייטי "גאלוש".

-BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense)

כולל את כלל מרכיבי מערך ההגנה מפני טילים בליסטיים - ה-מכ"מים המחשבים ומרכזי הפיקוד והשליטה, מרכזי הקשר והמשגרים.

- SRBM (Short Range Ballistic Missile)

טילי בליסטי קצר טווח - פחות מ-800 ק"מ.

- MRBM (Medieum Range Ballistic Missile)

טיל בליסטי לטווח בינוני 800-2400 ק"מ.

- IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile)

טיל בליסטי לטווח ביניים 2400-6400 ק"מ.

- ICBM (Inter Continental Ballistic Missile)

טיל בליסטי בין יבשתי. טווח הטיל הינו מעל 6400 ק"מ.

- SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (s))

טילים המשוגרים מצוללות.

- FOBS (Fractional Arbital Bombardment System)

הפצצה משולי מסלול בחלל, פיתוח שיטת הפצצה ע"י הסובייטים שעיקרה ריחוף ראש חץ של טיל גרעיני המקיף את כדור הארץ בגובה נמוך בחלל (160 ק"מ).

- MIRV (Multipde Independently Guided Re-Entry Velicle)

(ראשי תיבות של מרכב עם ראשים בעלי הנחיה עצמאית). טיל הנושא ראשי חץ אחדים (3 או יותר) המונחתים ממנו בעת מעופו בזמנים נפרדים ומכוונים למטרות רחוקות זו מזו. טילי מיר"ון נחשבים ל"מילה האחרונה" בטכנולוגיה של הטילים האיסטרטגיים והם מקנים לבעליהם כושר השמדה שהוא כפל של המרכב (הטיל) וראשי החץ הנישאים עליו.

- UWMS (Under Water Long Range Missile System)

תוכנית פיתוח של הצי האמריקאי שעיקרה פיתוח צוללת שתישא 24 טילים בינבשתיים בעלי טווח שלמעלה מ-6000 מייל ושבו כל טיל ישא בין 10 ל-14 ראשי חץ מתפצלים. התוכנית נקראת גם טריידנט ותיכנס לשירות מבצעי ב-1978.

- SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks)

השיחות לצמצום הנשק הגרעיני אשר נפתחו בהלסינקי בנובמבר 1969 בין נציגי ארה"ב ו-ברה"מ.

PRESIDENT NIXON IN MOSCOW

A SUMMARY OF MAJOR STATEMENTS AND AGREEMENTS DURING PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION, MAY 22-30, 1972

AN OPENING EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

Dinner Honoring the President

Text of Toast by Nikolai V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., at a Dinner Hosted by Soviet Leaders in Granovit Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace. May 22, 1972

Esteemed Mr. President, esteemed Mrs. Nixon, ladies and gentlemen, comrades:

Let me, on behalf of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet Government, greet you, Mr. President, your wife, and all those who accompany you, on your visit to the Soviet Union. This is the first official visit by a President of the United States of America in the history of relations between our countries. This alone makes your visit and meetings between you and the Soviet leaders a momentous event. The results of the talks will predetermine in many ways prospects of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Their results will, apparently, have an effect on the further development of the international situation either toward a lasting peace and stronger universal security or toward greater tension.

We proceed from the fact that personal contacts and frank exchange of opinions between the leaders of states help search for mutually acceptable decisions in line with the interests of the peoples and of preserving peace, and overcome difficulties caused by factors of different origin and character.

Therefore great importance is attached in the Soviet Union to Soviet-American talks which should cover a wide range of questions. We approach these talks from realistic positions and will make every effort in accordance with the principles of our policy to achieve positive results and try to justify the hopes placed in our countries and beyond them in the Soviet-American summit meeting in Moscow.

We expect a similar approach from the American side.

Mr. President, you already had today a meeting with L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, during which an exchange of opinions was started on the problems of Soviet-American relations and the present international situation.

The principles of our policy in international affairs and in relations with other states, the United States of America included, are well known. They were recently set forth again most definitely and clearly in the decisions of the 24th Congress of our Party and the just closed plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee. We have been guided and intend to be guided unswervingly by these principles in our practical activities. The Soviet Union, together with the countries of the Socialist community and all other peace forces, comes out consistently in defence of peace, for the deliverance of the present and

future generations from the threat of war, from the disasters of a nuclear conflict and for the elimination of hotbeds of war.

We stand for a radical turn toward relaxation of the existing tensions in all continents of the world, for freeing the peoples from the heavy arms burden, for a peaceful political settlement of problems through negotiation and with due account taken of the aspirations and will of the peoples and their inalienable right to decide their destinies themselves without interference and pressure from outside.

As far back as in the early years of the young Soviet state, its founder V. I. Lenin substantiated the objective need for and possibility of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems. Today, as before, the Soviet Union is prepared to develop and deepen relations of business cooperation and mutually beneficial ties with states of a different social system.

This fully applies to the relations with the United States also in the sense that peaceful coexistence must not be limited to absence of war. When we say that there is no exception for the United States in our policy of peaceful coexistence, these words are backed by our actual striving for the improvement and development of Soviet-American relations. The Soviet Union deems it possible and desirable to establish not merely good but friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, certainly, not at the expense of any third countries or peoples.

It stands to reason that the differences of social systems, the divergence of the positions of our states on a number of very important aspects of the world politics create serious complications in Soviet-American relations and we do not underestimate them, by any means.

But even though there exist principled differences, there are objective factors that determine similarity of interests and require that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. should act in such a way as to ward off the danger of a global war, to remove the vestiges of cold war from Soviet-American relations and as far as possible to rid their relations of all that complicated them in the past and burdens them even now.

The Soviet Union and the United States are the powers that are most advanced in science and technology, have vast economic potentials and rich natural resources. Our peoples made a weighty contribution to the treasury of world culture. All this serves as a solid foundation which, given mutual agreement, makes it possible to establish Soviet-American cooperation in the most varied fields, to implement large-scale projects worthy of the level which the Soviet Union and the United States have reached in the world of today.

The peoples of our countries have traditions of mutual respect and friendship. Our joint struggle in the years of the Second World War against Hitler Germany and militarist Japan lives in the memory of the Soviet people. The fact that our countries were allies in the two World Wars is very important in itself.

Under the United Nations Charter, the Soviet Union and the United States as permanent members of the Security Council are called upon to play an important role in maintaining international peace together with other members of the Security Council. Experience confirms that whenever our countries succeeded in ensuring by joint efforts the sane balance of interests both of our two countries and other states concerned, opportunities opened for solving acute conflicts and situations and concluding important international agreements and treaties.

In other words, cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the United States in the spirit of goodwill, the improvement of Soviet-American relations was always favourable for the cause of peace. We proceed from the view that Soviet-American talks will promote the solution of the urgent international problems to the benefit of the Soviet and American peoples, the peoples of all the countries, in the interests of world peace.

We believe, Mr. President, that your visit will enable you and Mrs. Nixon to see more of our country, to become aware of the scope of the great plans of Communist construction which the Soviet people are bringing into life, to feel the rhythm of their constructive work, to get convinced once more in the Soviet people's adherence to peace.

I would like to propose a toast to the success of the talks, to their serving the interests of the peoples of our countries, the interests of peace and international security.

To the health of Mr. President and Mrs. Nixon.

NOTE: As printed above, this item follows the advance text made available by the TASS News Service. For the President's toast, see the following item.

Dinner Honoring the President

Text of the President's Toast at the Dinner Hosted by the Soviet Leaders in Granovit Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace. May 22, 1972

I would like to express my appreciation for the hospitality you have shown Mrs. Nixon and myself, and all the members of our party, on this, the first visit of an American President to Moscow.

The courage of the Russian people, who generation after generation have heroically defended this city from invaders, makes this vivid point: The only way to enter Moscow is to enter it in peace.

All of us can feel the history in this great palace. Here, as comrades in arms, Russians and Americans met together to work out some of the key decisions of World War II, setting an example of wartime cooperation it has taken us too long to follow in peacetime. Here this week, we meet within these walls to make decisions that could help pave the way to peace for all the world.

The United States and the Soviet Union are both great powers. Ours are both great peoples. In the long history of both of our nations, we have never fought one another in war. Let us make decisions now which will help insure that we shall never do so in the future.

The American people want peace. I know the peoples of the Soviet Union want peace. My fervent hope is that we, as representatives of our two peoples, can work together to ensure that all the people of the earth can enjoy the blessings of peace.

Summit meetings of the past have been remembered for their "spirit"; we must strive to make the Moscow Summit memorable for its substance.

Over 2 years of careful preparation have proven our common seriousness of purpose and brought us to this meeting prepared to make concrete agreements.

Not so long ago, our attention centered on our relative positions of strength. But in a nuclear age, when there is no such thing as security in a preponderance of strength, great powers have learned this fact of life: Agreements based on exploiting the presumed weakness of one party only cause it to redouble its efforts to catch up, but agreements based on mutual respect and reciprocity have a far greater chance of enduring.

Because we are both prepared to proceed on the basis of equality and mutual respect, we meet at a moment when we can make peaceful cooperation a reality.

To make the most of this opportunity, we should recognize that while many of our differences are fundamental and profound, we have a powerful common interest in peace and security.

We should recognize that great nuclear powers have a solemn responsibility to exercise restraint in any crisis, and to take positive action to avert direct confrontation.

With great power goes great responsibility. It is precisely when power is not accompanied by responsibility that the peace is threatened. Let our power always be used to keep the peace, never to break it.

We should recognize further that it is the responsibility of great powers to influence other nations in conflict or crisis to moderate their behavior.

Let me outline what I believe we both want to see take place this week.

First, we want to complete work on the matters that years of patient negotiations have brought to the decision point:

Bilateral matters will serve as our point of departure: Our two nations can work together in the exploration of space, the conquest of disease, the improvement of our environment.

Progress in economic cooperation will benefit both our nations. The two largest economies in the world now exist in relative isolation. The opportunity for a new commercial relationship opens up a strong potential for progress for both our peoples.

The attention of the world is primarily directed to the possibility of an initial limitation of strategic arms. For the first time, major nations would put restrictions on a range of their most significant weapons systems.

An agreement in this area could begin to turn our countries away from a wasteful and dangerous arms race and toward more production for peace.

With a positive attitude shown on these bilateral matters, fresh impetus will be given to the resolution of other issues in other areas of the world.

A few minutes after I took my oath of office as President of the United States, I told my countrymen that the time had come for us to move from a period of confrontation to an era of negotiation.

This week can prove that the era of negotiation between the two most powerful nations in the world has begun. There is hard negotiating ahead, and statesmen dealing with real differences will have their share of obstacles.

We will have our different interests and our different approaches and neither of us will be reluctant to point them out. But the foundation of healthy competition must be a willingness to cooperate and reciprocate on matters of overriding importance.

Therefore, we do not just meet in an atmosphere of good will, which I know we shall have; we do not just meet to conclude agreements, which I hope we shall conclude; we meet to begin a new age in the relationship between our two great and powerful nations.

Looking toward that future, let me reaffirm the American commitment:

The United States is ready to work closely with all nations in the establishment of a peaceful world in which each nation determines its own destiny.

Our two peoples learned to admire each other when we joined together to defeat a common enemy in a time of war; we learned to respect each other as adversaries in a time of tension after the war; let us now learn to work with each other in a time of peace.

Let us remember as we begin to lift the burden of armed confrontation from both our peoples, we shall lift the hopes for peace of all the peoples of the world.

Never have two peoples had a greater challenge or a greater goal. Let us be worthy of the hopes of the Soviet people, the American people and all the people on this earth as we work together toward the goal of a peaceful world.

NOTE: As printed above, this item follows the text of the White House press release. For President Podgorny's toast at the dinner, see the preceding item.

Environmental Protection

Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. May 23, 1972

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Attaching great importance to the problems of environmental protection;

Proceeding on the assumption that the proper utilization of contemporary scientific, technical and managerial achievements can, with appropriate control of their undesirable consequences, make possible the improvement of the interrelationship between man and nature;

Considering that the development of mutual cooperation in the field of environmental protection, taking into account the experience of countries with different social and economic systems, will be beneficial to the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as to other countries;

Considering that economic and social development for the benefit of future generations requires the protection and enhancement of the human environment today;

Desiring to facilitate the establishment of closer and long-term cooperation between interested organizations of the two countries in this field;

In accordance with the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural, and Other Fields in 1972–1973, signed April 11, 1972, and developing further the principles of mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Parties will develop cooperation in the field of environmental protection on the basis of equality, reciprocity, and mutual benefit.

Article 2

This cooperation will be aimed at solving the most important aspects of the problems of the environment and will be devoted to working out measures to prevent pollution, to study pollution and its effect on the environment, and to develop the basis for controlling the impact of human activities on nature.

It will be implemented, in particular, in the following areas:

—air pollution;
—water pollution;
—environmental pollution associated with agricultural production;
—enhancement of the urban environment;
—preservation of nature and the organization of preserves;
—marine pollution;
—biological and genetic consequences of environmental pollution;
—influence of environmental changes on climate;
—earthquake prediction;
—arctic and subarctic ecological systems;
—legal and administrative measures for protecting environmental quality.

In the course of this cooperation the Parties will devote special attention to joint efforts improving existing technologies and developing new technologies which do not pollute the environment, to the introduction of these new technologies into everyday use, and to the study of their economic aspects.

The Parties declare that, upon mutual agreement, they will share the results of such cooperation with other countries.

Article 3

The Parties will conduct cooperative activities in the field of environmental protection by the following means:

—exchange of scientists, experts and research scholars;
—organization of bilateral conferences, symposia and meetings of experts;
—exchange of scientific and technical information and documentation. and the results of research on environment;
—joint development and implementation of programs and projects in the field of basic and applied sciences;
—other forms of cooperation which may be agreed upon in the course of the implementation of this Agreement.

Article 4

Proceeding from the aims of this Agreement the Parties will encourage and facilitate, as appropriate, the establishment and development of direct contacts and cooperation between institutions and organizations, governmental, public and private, of the two countries, and the conclusion, where appropriate, of separate agreements and contracts.

Article 5

For the implementation of this Agreement a US-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection shall be established. As a rule this Joint Committee shall meet once a year in Washington and Moscow, alternately. The Joint Committee shall approve concrete measures and programs of cooperation, designate the participating organizations responsible for the realization of these programs and make recommendations, as appropriate, to the two Governments.

Each Party shall designate a coordinator. These coordinators, between sessions of the Joint Committee, shall maintain contact between the United States and Soviet parts, supervise the implementation of the pertinent cooperative programs. specify the individual sections of these programs and coordinate the activities of organizations participating in environmental cooperation in accordance with this Agreement.

Article 6

Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prejudice other agreements concluded between the two Parties.

Article 7

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for five years after which it will be extended for successive five year periods unless one Party notifies the other of the termination thereof not less than six months prior to its expiration.

The termination of this Agreement shall not affect the validity of agreements and contracts between interested institutions and organizations of the two countries concluded on the basis of this Agreement.

Done on May 23, 1972 at Moscow in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:
Richard Nixon

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
N. V. Podgorny

Medical Science and Public Health

Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Field of Medical Science and Public Health. May 23, 1972

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Realizing the significance which medical science and public health have for mankind today;

Recognizing the desirability of joining in a common effort to promote their further development;

Desiring to promote the broadening of cooperation in this field, and by so doing to promote a general improvement in health;

Desiring to reaffirm the understanding reached in the Letters of Agreement between the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare of the United States of America and the Ministry of Health of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed February 11, 1972;

And in accordance with the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural, and Other Fields, signed April 11, 1972;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Parties undertake to develop and extend mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of medical science and public health. By mutual agreement and on the basis of reciprocity, they will determine the various directions of this cooperation, proceeding from the experience acquired by the Parties in the course of previous contacts, visits, and exchanges.

The Parties agree to direct their initial joint efforts toward combating the most widespread and serious diseases, such as cardio-vascular and oncological diseases, because of the major threat they pose to man's health, toward solving the problems associated with the effects of the environment on man's health, as well as toward the resolution of other important health problems.

Article 2

The cooperation provided for in the preceding article may be implemented specifically in the following ways:

—Coordinated scientific research programs and other activities in health fields of mutual interest;
—Exchanges of specialists and delegations;
—Organization of colloquia, scientific conferences and lectures;
—Exchange of information;
—Familiarization with technical aids and equipment.

Article 3

The Parties will encourage and facilitate the establishment of direct and regular contacts between United States and Soviet medical institutions and organizations.

The Parties will also encourage and facilitate exchanges of equipment, pharmaceutical products, and technological developments related to medicine and public health.

Article 4

The Parties will continue to provide assistance to international medical organizations, specifically the World Health Organization, and will afford these organizations the opportunity of drawing on the knowledge gained by the Parties, including knowledge gained in the course of their joint efforts.

Article 5

The Parties will delegate the practical implementation of this Agreement to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Committee for Health Cooperation. The Joint Committee shall periodically work out specific programs of cooperation, creating working subgroups whenever necessary, and shall be responsible for supervising implementation of these programs.

Article 6

Cooperation shall be financed on the basis of reciprocal agreements worked out by the Joint Committee, using the resources of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare of the United States of America and the Ministry of Health of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as the resources of institutions participating in direct inter-institutional cooperation.

Article 7

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for five years, after which it will be extended for successive five-year periods unless one Party notifies the other of the termination thereof not less than six months prior to its expiration.

Done on May 23, 1972 in Moscow in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

WILLIAM P. ROGERS
Secretary of State

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

BORIS V. PETROVSKY
Minister of Health

Cooperation in Space

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. May 24, 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Considering the role which the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. play in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes;

Striving for a further expansion of cooperation between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes;

Noting the positive cooperation which the parties have already experienced in this area;

Desiring to make the results of scientific research gained from the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes available for the benefit of the peoples of the two countries and of all peoples of the world;

Taking into consideration the provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, as well as the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space;

In accordance with the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural, and Other Fields, signed April 11, 1972, and in order to develop further the principles of mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries:

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The parties will develop cooperation in the fields of space meteorology; study of the natural environment; exploration of near earth space, the moon and the planets; and space biology and medicine; and, in particular, will cooperate to take all appropriate measures to encourage and achieve the fulfillment of the Summary of Results of Discussion on Space Cooperation Between the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. dated January 21, 1971.

ARTICLE 2

The parties will carry out such cooperation by means of mutual exchanges of scientific information and delegations, through meetings of scientists and specialists of both countries, and also in such other ways as may be mutually agreed. Joint working groups may be created for the development and implementation of appropriate programs of cooperation.

ARTICLE 3

The Parties have agreed to carry out projects for developing compatible rendezvous and docking systems of United States and Soviet manned spacecraft and stations in order to enhance the safety of manned flights in space and to provide the opportunity for conducting joint scientific experiments in the future. It is planned that the first experimental flight to test these systems be conducted during 1975, envisaging the docking of a United States Apollo-type spacecraft and a Soviet Soyuz-type spacecraft with visits of Astronauts in each other's spacecraft. The implementation of these projects will be carried out on the basis of principles and procedures which will be developed in accordance with the Summary of Results of the Meeting Between Representatives of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences on the Question of Developing Compatible Systems for Rendezvous and Docking of Manned Spacecraft and Space Stations of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. dated April 6, 1972.

ARTICLE 4

The Parties will encourage international efforts to resolve problems of international law in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes with the aim of strengthening the legal order in space and further developing international space law and will cooperate in this field.

ARTICLE 5

The Parties may by mutual agreement determine other areas of cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE 6

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for five years. It may be modified or extended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

DONE at Moscow this 24th day of May 1972 in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

RICHARD NIXON
President of the United States

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

A. N. KOSYGIN
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Science and Technology

Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Fields of Science and Technology. May 24, 1972

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Recognizing that benefits can accrue to both countries from the development of cooperation in the fields of science and technology;

Wishing to assist in establishing closer and more regular cooperation between scientific and technical organizations of both countries;

Taking into consideration that such cooperation will serve to strengthen friendly relations between both countries;

In accordance with the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural, and Other Fields, signed April 11, 1972, and in order to develop further the mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Both Parties pledged themselves to assist and develop scientific and technical cooperation between both countries on the basis of mutual benefit, equality and reciprocity.

ARTICLE 2

The main objective of this cooperation is to provide broad opportunities for both Parties to combine the efforts of their scientists and specialists in working on major problems, whose solution will promote the progress of science and technology for the benefit of both countries and of mankind.

ARTICLE 3

The forms of cooperation in science and technology may include the following:

a. Exchange of scientists and specialists;
b. Exchange of scientific and technical information and documentation;
c. Joint development and implementation of programs and projects in the fields of basic and applied sciences;
d. Joint research, development and testing, and exchange of research results and experience between scientific research institutions and organizations;
e. Organization of joint courses, conferences and symposia;
f. Rendering of help, as appropriate, on both sides in establishing contacts and arrangements between United States firms and Soviet enterprises where a mutual interest develops; and
g. Other forms of scientific and technical cooperation as may be mutually agreed.

ARTICLE 4

1. Pursuant to the aims of this Agreement, both Parties will, as appropriate, encourage and facilitate the establishment and development of direct contacts and cooperation between agencies, organizations and firms of both countries and the conclusion, as appropriate, of implementing agreements for particular cooperative activities engaged in under this Agreement.

2. Such agreements between agencies, organizations and enterprises will be concluded in accordance with the laws of both countries. Such agreements may cover the subjects of cooperation, organizations engaged in the implementation of projects and programs, the procedures which should be followed, and any other appropriate details.

ARTICLE 5

Unless otherwise provided in an implementing agreement, each Party or participating agency, organization or enterprise shall bear the costs of its participation and that of its personnel in cooperative activities engaged in under this Agreement, in accordance with existing laws in both countries.

ARTICLE 6

Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted to prejudice other agreements in the fields of science and technology concluded between the Parties.

ARTICLE 7

1. For the implementation of this Agreement there shall be established a US-USSR Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Meetings will be convened not less than once a year in Washington and Moscow, alternately.

2. The Commission shall consider proposals for the development of cooperation in specific areas; prepare suggestions and recommendations, as appropriate, for the two Parties; develop and approve measures and programs for implementation of this Agreement; designate, as appropriate, the agencies, organizations or enterprises responsible for carrying out cooperative activities; and seek to assure their proper implementation.

3. The Executive Agent, which will be responsible for assuring the carrying out on its side of the Agreement, shall be, for the United States of America, the Office of Science and Technology in the Executive Office of the President and, for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Science and Technology. The Joint Commission will consist of United States and Soviet delegations established on an equal basis of which the chairmen and members are to be designated by the respective Executive Agents with approval by the respective Parties. Regulations regarding the operation of the Commission shall be agreed by the chairmen.

4. To carry out its functions the Commission may create temporary or permanent joint subcommittees, councils or working groups.

5. During the period between meetings of the Commission additions or amendments may be made to already approved cooperative activities, as may be mutually agreed.

ARTICLE 8

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for five years. It may be modified or extended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

2. The termination of this Agreement shall not affect the validity of agreements made hereunder between agencies, organizations and enterprises of both countries.

DONE at Moscow this 24 day of May, 1972, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
WILLIAM P. ROGERS
The Secretary of State

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS:
V. A. KIRILLIN
Chairman of the State Committee
for Science and Technology

Incidents at Sea

Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the Sea. May 25, 1972

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Desiring to assure the safety of navigation of the ships of their respective Armed Forces on the high seas and flight of their military aircraft over the high seas, and

Guided by the principles and rules of international law,

Have decided to conclude this Agreement and have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

For the purposes of this Agreement, the following definitions shall apply:

1. "Ship" means:

(A) A warship belonging to the naval forces of the Parties bearing the external marks distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government and whose name appears in the navy list, and manned by a crew who are under regular naval discipline;

(B) Naval auxiliaries of the Parties, which include all naval ships authorized to fly the naval auxiliary flag where such a flag has been established by either party.

2. "Aircraft" means all military manned heavier-than-air and lighter-than-air craft, excluding space craft.

3. "Formation" means an ordered arrangement of two or more ships proceeding together and normally maneuvered together.

ARTICLE II

The Parties shall take measures to instruct the commanding officers of their respective ships to observe strictly the letter and spirit of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, hereinafter referred to as the Rules of the Road. The Parties recognize that their freedom to conduct operations on the high seas is based on the principles established under recognized international law and codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas.

ARTICLE III

1. In all cases ships operating in proximity to each other, except when required to maintain course and speed under the Rules of the Road, shall remain well clear to avoid risk of collision.

2. Ships meeting or operating in the vicinity of a formation of the other Party shall, while conforming to the Rules of the Road, avoid maneuvering in a manner which would hinder the evolutions of the formation.

3. Formations shall not conduct maneuvers through areas of heavy traffic where internationally recognized traffic separation schemes are in effect.

4. Ships engaged in surveillance of other ships shall stay at a distance which avoids the risk of collision and also shall avoid executing maneuvers embarrassing or endangering the ships under surveillance. Except when required to maintain course and speed under the Rules of the Road, a surveillant shall take positive early action so as, in the exercise of good seamanship, not to embarrass or endanger ships under surveillance.

5. When ships of both parties maneuver in sight of one another, such signals (flag, sound, and light) as are prescribed by the Rules of the Road, the International Code of Signals, or other mutually agreed signals, shall be adhered to for signalling operations and intentions.

6. Ships of the Parties shall not simulate attacks by aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes, and other weapons in the direction of a passing ship of the other Party, not launch any object in the direction of passing ships of the other Party, and not use searchlights or other powerful illumination devices to illuminate the navigation bridges of passing ships of the other Party.

7. When conducting exercises with submerged submarines, exercising ships shall show the appropriate signals prescribed by the International Code of Signals to warn ships of the presence of submarines in the area.

8. Ships of one Party when approaching ships of the other Party conducting operations as set forth in rule 4(C) of the Rules of the Road, and particularly ships engaged in launching or landing aircraft as well as ships engaged in replenishment underway, shall take appropriate measures not to hinder maneuvers of such ships and shall remain well clear.

ARTICLE IV

Commanders of aircraft of the Parties shall use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other Party operating on and over the high seas, in particular, ships engaged in launching or landing aircraft, and in the interest of mutual safety shall not permit: simulated attacks by the simulated use of weapons against aircraft and ships, or performance of various aerobatics over ships, or dropping various objects near them in such a manner as to be hazardous to ships or to constitute a hazard to navigation.

ARTICLE V

1. Ships of the Parties operating in sight of one another shall raise proper signals concerning their intent to begin launching or landing aircraft.

2. Aircraft of the Parties flying over the high seas in darkness or under instrument conditions shall, whenever feasible, display navigation lights.

ARTICLE VI

Both Parties shall:

1. Provide through the established system of radio broadcasts of information and warning to mariners, not less than 3 to 5 days in advance as a rule, notification of actions on the high seas which represent a danger to navigation or to aircraft in flight.

2. Make increased use of the informative signals contained in the International Code of Signals to signify the intentions of their respective ships when maneuvering in proximity to one another. At night or in conditions of reduced visibility, or under conditions of lighting and such distances when signal flags are not distinct, flashing light should be used to inform ships of maneuvers which may hinder the movements of others or involve a risk of collision.

3. Utilize on a trial basis signals additional to those in the International Code of Signals, submitting such signals to the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization for its consideration and for the information of other States.

ARTICLE VII

The Parties shall exchange appropriate information concerning instances of collisions, incidents which result in damage, or other incidents at sea between ships and aircraft of the Parties. The United States Navy shall provide such information through the Soviet Naval Attache in Washington and the Soviet Navy shall provide such information through the United States Naval Attache in Moscow.

ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force for a period of three years. It will thereafter be renewed without further action by the Parties for successive periods of three years each.

This agreement may be terminated by either Party upon six months written notice to the other Party.

ARTICLE IX

The Parties shall meet within one year after the date of the signing of this Agreement to review the implementation of its terms. Similar consultations shall be held thereafter annually, or more frequently as the Parties may decide.

ARTICLE X

The Parties shall designate members to form a committee which will consider specific measures in conformity with this Agreement. The committee will, as a particular part of its work, consider the practical workability of concrete fixed distances to be observed in encounters between ships, aircraft, and ships and aircraft. The committee will meet within six months of the date of signature of this Agreement and submit its recommendations for decision by the Parties during the consultations prescribed in Article IX.

Done in duplicate on the 25th day of May, 1972 in Moscow in the English and Russian languages each being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

JOHN W. WARNER
Secretary of the Navy

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

SERGEI G. GORSHKOV
Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy and Deputy Minister of Defense

Commercial Relations

Communiqué Regarding Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission. May 26, 1972

In order to promote the development of mutually beneficial commercial relations and related economic matters between the two countries, Soviet leaders and the President of the United States Richard M. Nixon have agreed to establish a US-USSR Commercial Commission.

The US-USSR Commission is to:

Negotiate:

—an overall trade agreement including reciprocal MFN treatment;

—arrangements for the reciprocal availability of government credits;

—provisions for the reciprocal establishment of business facilities to promote trade;

—an agreement establishing an arbitration mechanism for settling commercial disputes.

Study possible US-USSR participation in the development of resources and the manufacture and sale of raw materials and other products.

Monitor the spectrum of US-USSR commercial relations, identifying and, when possible, resolving issues that may be of interest to both parties such as patents and licensing.

Sessions of the Commission will be held alternately in Moscow and Washington. The first session of the Commission is to take place in Moscow in July of this year.

A SECOND EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

Dinner Honoring Soviet Leaders

The President's Toast at a Dinner at Spaso House Hosted by the President and Mrs. Nixon. May 26, 1972

Mr. General Secretary Brezhnev, Mr. Chairman of the Presidium, Mr. Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and all of our distinguished guests:

This house which is the American Embassy is greatly honored tonight by the presence of our Soviet guests.

I say this not only because of your rank, the leaders of the great Soviet people, but also because of the boundless hospitality you have extended to all of us on our visit to Moscow. We look forward to the time when we shall be able to welcome you in our country and in some way respond in an effective manner to the way in which you have received us so generously in your country.

This has been described as the visit of the summit. But as we all know, there are many summits in the world. This is the first meeting. There will be others.

And now, this is, of course, an evening that will always be remembered in this house for another reason: Tonight at 11 o'clock there will be signed an historic agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States.

It is an agreement which will limit strategic arms between the two most powerful nations in the world. It is

The Soviet people and the American people demonstrated over 25 years ago how they could fight together to win a war. And now in our meetings this week, and particularly culminating in the signing of this agreement tonight, we shall demonstrate to the world how these two great peoples, the Soviet people and the American people, work together to build a peace.

an enormously important agreement but, again, it is only an indication of what can happen in the future as we work toward peace in the world. But I have great hopes on that score.

Every leader of a nation wonders at times how he will be remembered in history. But, as I have met with the top Soviet leaders—with General Secretary Brezhnev, with Chairman Kosygin, with Chairman Podgorny—I am convinced of this fact: We want to be remembered by our deeds, not by the fact that we brought war to the world, but by the fact that we made the world a more peaceful one for all peoples of the world.

It is in that spirit that here in the American Embassy that we all proudly raise our glasses to the leaders of the Soviet peoples and to the great cause of peace—peace between our two countries and peace for all peoples to which we think this visit, this meeting, has contributed and will contribute in the future.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9:25 p.m., local time, at Spaso House in Moscow, USSR.

As printed above, this item follows the text of the White House press release.

Dinner Honoring Soviet Leaders

Text of Toast by Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., at a Dinner at Spaso House Hosted by the President and Mrs. Nixon. May 26, 1972

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, esteemed guests:

On behalf of the Soviet guests present here I would like to express gratitude to President Richard Nixon and his wife, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. and his wife who have invited us here to the Embassy to mark this memorable occasion.

Today is the end of the working week which was devoted to talks between the President of the United States and the Soviet leaders—the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev, the President of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet N. V. Podgorny, the Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. Like the President, we positively assess the work done, it will be continued.

The talks held made it possible to reveal more precisely both the fields in which it is possible to develop cooperation and the fields where the stands of the two states are at variance, since the U.S.S.R. and the United States objectively represent different social economic systems in the world. It seems to us that both sides realistically appraise possible prospects of cooperation.

A number of Soviet-American agreements, bound to serve peaceful aims, have been signed these days. We have agreed, specifically, on pooling the efforts of our countries in environmental protection, in peaceful exploration and mastering of outer space, in cooperation in the fields of science and technology, medicine and public health.

We are having an exchange of opinions of questions of development of trade and other economic ties between the two countries. It is obvious that realistic solutions can also be found here, solutions which would reflect mutual interest in normalization and widening of economic exchanges in keeping with the generally accepted international practice.

Today the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev and the President of the United States Richard Nixon are to sign in the Kremlin joint documents on the limitation of strategic arms. Agreement on these questions, we hope, will go down in history as a major achievement on the road towards curbing the arms race. It has become possible only on the basis of strict observance of the principle of equal security of the sides and the inadmissibility of any unilateral advantages. This is a great victory for the Soviet and American peoples in the matter of easing international tension, this is a victory for all peaceloving peoples, because security and peace is their common goal.

Whether peace becomes stronger as a result of our talks, concerns, of course, not the Soviet Union and the United States alone, however great their influence in the world, but will depend on all other peoples and states as well. Of little worth would be the decisions about which we have agreed or may agree, were they contrary to the legitimate interests of other states, the interests of their security and independence. It is not to decide for other peoples and countries that we are meeting with the President of the United States at the conference table.

During these talks the Soviet Union and the United States are seeking approaches to a settlement of international problems bearing directly on the two states, in the interests of the peace and security of the peoples. We are making serious steps in this direction, but in order to advance confidently towards the goal of a lasting peace, everything possible should be done to eliminate the existing hotbeds of war in Vietnam and in the Middle East on the basis of strict respect for the rights of the peoples to independent development, to noninterference in their internal affairs, to the inviolability of their state territories.

We would like to express the hope that stronger peace for the people of the Soviet Union, for the people of the United States of America, for all the peoples of the world, will be the main outcome of the Soviet-American talks.

How effectively the agreements and understandings reached are translated into life and serve peace will be, of course, of great importance. Any agreement, any treaty only then leaves a trace in history when its proclaimed principles and intentions become the content of the practical activities of states. So, may the agreements we reached be just such agreements.

We would like to express our deep respect for the great people of the United States of America with whom the Soviet people want to live in cooperation and peace. We ask President R. Nixon, upon returning home, to convey that this is our sincere and earnest desire.

May I ask all those present to join me in this toast to the American people, to the President of the United States of America, to Mrs. Nixon and all those accompanying the President, to peace and cooperation among the peoples.

NOTE: As printed above, this item follows the text made available by the TASS News Service. For the President's toast at the dinner, see the preceding item.

Strategic Arms Limitation

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. May 26, 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

Article II

1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode:

(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

(a) operational;
(b) under construction;
(c) undergoing testing;
(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
(e) mothballed.

Article III

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.

Article IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

Article VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes:

(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory and not to test them in an ABM mode; and

(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

Article VII

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

Article VIII

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

Article IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

Article X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

Article XI

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

Article XIV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVI

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America
Richard Nixon
President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Leonid I. Brezhnev
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

Strategic Arms Limitation

Interim Agreement Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. May 26, 1972

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Taking into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.

Article II

The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.

Article III

The Parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and in addition launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines.

Article IV

Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by this Interim Agreement may be undertaken.

Article V

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article VI

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in accordance with the provisions of that Article.

Article VII

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations.

Article VIII

1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices of acceptance by each Party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless replaced earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It is the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Interim Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies each in the Russian and English languages, both tests being equally authentic.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Leonid I. Brezhnev
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

For the United States of America
Richard Nixon
The President of the United States

May 26, 1972

Protocol

To the Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on certain limitations relating to submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines, and to replacement procedures, in the Interim Agreement,

Have agreed as follows:

The Parties understand that, under Article III of the Interim Agreement, for the period during which that Agreement remains in force:

The US may have no more than 710 ballistic missile launchers on submarines (SLBMs) and no more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines. The Soviet Union may have no more than 950 ballistic missile launchers on submarines and no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines.

Additional ballistic missile launchers on submarines up to the above-mentioned levels, in the U.S.—over 656 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, and in the U.S.S.R.—over 740 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, operational and under construction, may become operational as replacements for equal numbers of ballistic missile launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or of ballistic missile launchers on older submarines.

The deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted against the total level of SLBMs permitted for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Interim Agreement.

For the United States of America
Richard Nixon
The President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Leonid I. Brezhnev
The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

THE CLOSING WORDS

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS

Text of the "Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." May 29, 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Guided by their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and by a desire to strengthen peaceful relations with each other and to place these relations on the firmest possible basis,

Aware of the need to make every effort to remove the threat of war and to create conditions which promote the reduction of tensions in the world and the strengthening of universal security and international cooperation,

Believing that the improvement of US-Soviet relations and their mutually advantageous development in such areas as economics, science and culture, will meet these objectives and contribute to better mutual understanding and business-like cooperation, without in any way prejudicing the interests of third countries,

Conscious that these objectives reflect the interests of the peoples of both countries,

Have agreed as follows:

First. They will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Differences in ideology and in the social systems of the USA and the USSR are not obstacles to the bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage.

Second. The USA and the USSR attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations. Therefore, they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. They will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means. Discussions and negotiations on outstanding issues will be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit.

Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives. The prerequisites for maintaining and strengthening peaceful relations between the USA and the USSR are the recognition of the security interests of the Parties based on the principle of equality and the renunciation of the use or threat of force.

Third. The USA and the USSR have a special responsibility, as do other countries which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions. Accordingly, they will seek to promote conditions in which all countries will live in peace and security and will not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs.

Fourth. The USA and the USSR intend to widen the juridical basis of their mutual relations and to exert the necessary efforts so that bilateral agreements which they have concluded and multilateral treaties and agreements to which they are jointly parties are faithfully implemented.

Fifth. The USA and the USSR reaffirm their readiness to continue the practice of exchanging views on problems of mutual interest and, when necessary, to conduct such exchanges at the highest level, including meetings between leaders of the two countries.

The two governments welcome and will facilitate an increase in productive contacts between representatives of the legislative bodies of the two countries.

Sixth. The Parties will continue their efforts to limit armaments on a bilateral as well as on a multilateral basis. They will continue to make special efforts to limit strategic armaments. Whenever possible, they will conclude concrete agreements aimed at achieving these purposes.

The USA and the USSR regard as the ultimate objective of their efforts the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of an effective system of international security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Seventh. The USA and the USSR regard commercial and economic ties as an important and necessary element in the strengthening of their bilateral relations and thus will actively promote the growth of such ties. They will facilitate cooperation between the relevant organizations and enterprises of the two countries and the conclusion of appropriate agreements and contracts, including long-term ones.

The two countries will contribute to the improvement of maritime and air communications between them.

Eighth. The two sides consider it timely and useful to develop mutual contacts and cooperation in the fields of science and technology. Where suitable, the USA and the USSR will conclude appropriate agreements dealing with concrete cooperation in these fields.

Ninth. The two sides reaffirm their intention to deepen cultural ties with one another and to encourage fuller familiarization with each other's cultural values. They will promote improved conditions for cultural exchanges and tourism.

Tenth. The USA and the USSR will seek to ensure that their ties and cooperation in all the above-mentioned fields and in any others in their mutual interest are built on a firm and long-term basis. To give a permanent character to these efforts, they will establish in all fields where this is feasible joint commissions or other joint bodies.

Eleventh. The USA and the USSR make no claim for themselves and would not recognize the claims of anyone else to any special rights or advantages in world affairs. They recognize the sovereign equality of all states.

The development of U.S.-Soviet relations is not directed against third

countries and their interests.

Twelfth. The basic principles set forth in this document do not affect any obligations with respect to other countries earlier assumed by the USA and the USSR.

Moscow, May 29, 1972

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RICHARD NIXON
President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
LEONID I. BREZHNEV
General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Text of the Joint United States-Soviet Communiqué Issued at the Conclusion of the President's Visit. May 29, 1972

By mutual agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the President of the United States and Mrs. Richard Nixon paid an official visit to the Soviet Union from May 22 to May 30, 1972. The President was accompanied by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, and other American officials. During his stay in the USSR President Nixon visited, in addition to Moscow, the cities of Leningrad and Kiev.

President Nixon and L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, N. V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR conducted talks on fundamental problems of American-Soviet relations and the current international situation.

Also taking part in the conversations were:

On the American side: William P. Rogers, Secretary of State; Jacob D. Beam, American Ambassador to the USSR; Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Peter M. Flanigan, Assistant to the President; and Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

On the Soviet side: A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; N. S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade; V. V. Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; A. F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA; A. M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU; G. M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

The discussions covered a wide range of questions of mutual interest and were frank and thorough. They defined more precisely those areas where there are prospects for developing greater cooperation between the two countries, as well as those areas where the positions of the two Sides are different.

I. BILATERAL RELATIONS

Guided by the desire to place US-Soviet relations on a more stable and constructive foundation, and mindful of their responsibilities for maintaining world peace and for facilitating the relaxation of international tension, the two Sides adopted a document entitled: "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," signed on behalf of the US by President Nixon and on behalf of the USSR by General Secretary Brezhnev.

Both Sides are convinced that the provisions of that document open new possibilities for the development of peaceful relations and mutually beneficial cooperation between the USA and the USSR.

Having considered various areas of bilateral US-Soviet relations, the two Sides agreed that an improvement of relations is possible and desirable. They expressed their firm intention to act in accordance with the provisions set forth in the above-mentioned document.

As a result of progress made in negotiations which preceded the summit meeting, and in the course of the meeting itself, a number of significant agreements were reached. This will intensify bilateral cooperation in areas of common concern as well as in areas relevant to the cause of peace and international cooperation.

Limitation of Strategic Armaments

The two Sides gave primary attention to the problem of reducing the danger of nuclear war. They believe that curbing the competition in strategic arms will make a significant and tangible contribution to this cause.

The two Sides attach great importance to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms concluded between them.

These agreements, which were concluded as a result of the negotiations in Moscow, constitute a major step towards curbing and ultimately ending the arms race.

They are a concrete expression of the intention of the two Sides to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of confidence between states, as well as to carry out the obligations assumed by them in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Article VI). Both Sides are convinced that the achievement of the above agreements is a practical step towards saving mankind from the threat of the outbreak of nuclear war. Accordingly, it corresponds to the vital interests of the American and Soviet peoples as well as to the vital interests of all other peoples.

The two Sides intend to continue active negotiations for the limitation of strategic offensive arms and to conduct them in a spirit of goodwill, respect for each other's legitimate interests and observance of the principle of equal security.

Both Sides are also convinced that the agreement on Measures to

Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the USA and the USSR, signed in Washington on September 30, 1971, serves the interests not only of the Soviet and American peoples, but of all mankind.

Commercial and Economic Relations

Both Sides agreed on measures designed to establish more favorable conditions for developing commercial and other economic ties between the USA and the USSR. The two Sides agree that realistic conditions exist for increasing economic ties. These ties should develop on the basis of mutual benefit and in accordance with generally accepted international practice.

Believing that these aims would be served by conclusion of a trade agreement between the USA and the USSR, the two Sides decided to complete in the near future the work necessary to conclude such an agreement. They agreed on the desirability of credit arrangements to develop mutual trade and of early efforts to resolve other financial and economic issues. It was agreed that a lend-lease settlement will be negotiated concurrently with a trade agreement.

In the interests of broadening and facilitating commercial ties between the two countries, and to work out specific arrangements, the two Sides decided to create a US–Soviet Joint Commercial Commission. Its first meeting will be held in Moscow in the summer of 1972.

Each Side will help promote the establishment of effective working arrangements between organizations and firms of both countries and encouraging the conclusion of long-term contracts.

Maritime Matters—Incidents at Sea

The two Sides agreed to continue the negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement on maritime and related matters. They believe that such an agreement would mark a positive step in facilitating the expansion of commerce between the United States and the Soviet Union.

An Agreement was concluded between the two Sides on measures to prevent incidents at sea and in air space over it between vessels and aircraft of the US and Soviet Navies. By providing agreed procedures for ships and aircraft of the two navies operating in close proximity, this agreement will diminish the chances of dangerous accidents.

Cooperation in Science and Technology

It was recognized that the cooperation now underway in areas such as atomic energy research, space research, health and other fields benefits both nations and has contributed positively to their over-all relations. It was agreed that increased scientific and technical cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit and shared effort for common goals is in the interest of both nations and would contribute to a further improvement in their bilateral relations. For these purposes the two Sides signed an agreement for cooperation in the fields of science and technology. A US-Soviet Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation will be created for identifying and establishing cooperative programs.

Cooperation in Space

Having in mind the role played by the US and the USSR in the peaceful exploration of outer space, both Sides emphasized the importance of further bilateral cooperation in this sphere. In order to increase the safety of man's flights in outer space and the future prospects of joint scientific experiments, the two Sides agreed to make suitable arrangements to permit the docking of American and Soviet spacecraft and stations. The first joint docking experiment of the two countries' piloted spacecraft, with visits by astronauts and cosmonauts to each other's spacecraft, is contemplated for 1975. The planning and implementation of this flight will be carried out by the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the USSR Academy of Sciences, according to principles and procedures developed through mutual consultations.

Cooperation in the Field of Health

The two Sides concluded an agreement on health cooperation which marks a fruitful beginning of sharing knowledge about, and collaborative attacks on, the common enemies, disease and disability. The initial research efforts of the program will concentrate on health problems important to the whole world—cancer, heart diseases, and the environmental health sciences. This cooperation subsequently will be broadened to include other health problems of mutual interest. The two Sides pledged their full support for the health cooperation program and agreed to continue the active participation of the two governments in the work of international organizations in the health field.

Environmental Cooperation

The two Sides agreed to initiate a program of cooperation in the protection and enhancement of man's environment. Through joint research and joint measures, the United States and the USSR hope to contribute to the preservation of a healthful environment in their countries and throughout the world. Under the new agreement on environmental cooperation there will be consultations in the near future in Moscow on specific cooperative projects.

Exchanges in the Fields of Science, Technology, Education, and Culture

Both Sides note the importance of the Agreement on Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural, and Other Fields in 1972–1973, signed in Moscow on April 11, 1972. Continuation and expansion of bilateral exchanges in these fields will lead to better understanding and help improve the general state of relations between the two countries. Within the broad framework provided by this Agreement the two Sides have agreed to expand the areas of cooperation, as reflected in new agreements concerning space, health, the environment and science and technology.

The US side, noting the existence of an extensive program of English

language instruction in the Soviet Union, indicated its intention to encourage Russian language programs in the United States.

II. International Issues

Europe

In the course of the discussions on the international situation, both Sides took note of favorable developments in the relaxation of tensions in Europe.

Recognizing the importance to world peace of developments in Europe, where both World Wars originated, and mindful of the responsibilities and commitments which they share with other powers under appropriate agreements, the USA and the USSR intend to make further efforts to ensure a peaceful future for Europe, free of tensions, crises and conflicts.

They agree that the territorial integrity of all states in Europe should be respected.

Both Sides view the September 3, 1971 Quadripartite Agreement relating to the Western Sectors of Berlin as a good example of fruitful cooperation between the states concerned, including the USA and the USSR. The two Sides believe that the implementation of that agreement in the near future, along with other steps, will further improve the European situation and contribute to the necessary trust among states.

Both Sides welcomed the treaty between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany signed on August 12, 1970. They noted the significance of the provisions of this treaty as well as of other recent agreements in contributing to confidence and cooperation among the European states.

The USA and the USSR are prepared to make appropriate contributions to the positive trends on the European continent toward a genuine detente and the development of relations of peaceful cooperation among states in Europe on the basis of the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers, non-interference in internal affairs, sovereign equality, independence and renunciation of the use or threat of force.

The US and the USSR are in accord that multilateral consultations looking toward a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe could begin after the signature of the Final Quadripartite Protocol of the Agreement of September 3, 1971. The two governments agree that the conference should be carefully prepared in order that it may concretely consider specific problems of security and cooperation and thus contribute to the progressive reduction of the underlying causes of tension in Europe. This conference should be convened at a time to be agreed by the countries concerned, but without undue delay.

Both Sides believe that the goal of ensuring stability and security in Europe would be served by a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments, first of all in Central Europe. Any agreement on this question should not diminish the security of any of the Sides. Appropriate agreement should be reached as soon as practicable between the states concerned on the procedures for negotiations on this subject in a special forum.

The Middle East

The two Sides set out their positions on this question. They reaffirm their support for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242.

Noting the significance of constructive cooperation of the parties concerned with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Ambassador Jarring, the US and the USSR confirm their desire to contribute to his mission's success and also declare their readiness to play their part in bringing about a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. In the view of the US and the USSR, the achievement of such a settlement would open prospects for the normalization of the Middle East situation and would permit, in particular, consideration of further steps to bring about a military relaxation in that area.

Indochina

Each side set forth its respective standpoint with regard to the continuing war in Vietnam and the situation in the area of Indochina as a whole.

The US side emphasized the need to bring an end to the military conflict as soon as possible and reaffirmed its commitment to the principle that the political future of South Vietnam should be left for the South Vietnamese people to decide for themselves, free from outside interference.

The US side explained its view that the quickest and most effective way to attain the above-mentioned objectives is through negotiations leading to the return of all Americans held captive in the region, the implementation of an internationally supervised Indochina-wide ceasefire and the subsequent withdrawal of all American forces stationed in South Vietnam within four months, leaving the political questions to be resolved by the Indochinese peoples themselves.

The United States reiterated its willingness to enter into serious negotiations with the North Vietnamese Side to settle the war in Indochina on a basis just to all.

The Soviet Side stressed its solidarity with the just struggle of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia for their freedom, independence and social progress. Firmly supporting the proposals of the DRV and the Republic of South Vietnam, which provide a realistic and constructive basis for settling the Vietnam problem, the Soviet Union stands for a cessation of bombings of the DRV, for a complete and unequivocal withdrawal of the troops of the USA and its allies from South Vietnam, so that the peoples of Indochina would have the possibility to determine for themselves their fate without any outside interference.

Disarmament Issues

The two Sides expressed their positions on arms limitation and disarmament issues.

The two Sides note that in recent years their joint and parallel actions have facilitated the working out and conclusion of treaties which curb the arms race or ban some of the most dangerous types of weapons. They note further that these treaties were welcomed by a large majority of the states in the world, which became parties to them.

Both sides regard the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction, as an essential disarmament measure. Along with Great Britain, they are the depositories for the Convention which was recently opened for signature by all states. The USA and the USSR will continue their efforts to reach an international agreement regarding chemical weapons.

The USA and the USSR, proceeding from the need to take into account the security interests of both countries on the basis of the principle of equality, and without prejudice to the security interests of third countries, will actively participate in negotiations aimed at working out new measures designed to curb and end the arms race. The ultimate purpose is general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under strict international control. A world disarmament conference could play a role in this process at an appropriate time.

Strengthening the United Nations

Both Sides will strive to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations on the basis of strict observance of the UN Charter. They regard the United Nations as an instrument for maintaining world peace and security, discouraging conflicts, and developing international cooperation. Accordingly, they will do their best to support United Nations efforts in the interests of international peace.

Both Sides emphasized that agreements and understandings reached in the negotiations in Moscow, as well as the contents and nature of these negotiations, are not in any way directed against any other country. Both Sides proceed from the recognition of the role, the responsibility and the prerogatives of other interested states, existing international obligations and agreements, and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter.

Both Sides believe that positive results were accomplished in the course of the talks at the highest level. These results indicate that despite the differences between the USA and the USSR in social systems, ideologies, and policy principles, it is possible to develop mutually advantageous cooperation between the peoples of both countries, in the interests of strengthening peace and international security.

Both Sides expressed the desire to continue close contact on a number of issues that were under discussion. They agreed that regular consultations on questions of mutual interest, including meetings at the highest level, would be useful.

In expressing his appreciation for the hospitality accorded him in the Soviet Union, President Nixon invited General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman N. V. Podgorny, and Chairman A. N. Kosygin to visit the United States at a mutually convenient time. This invitation was accepted.

THE PRESIDENT REPORTS

ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION

The President's Radio and Television Address. May 28, 1972

Dobryy vecher.

I deeply appreciate this opportunity your Government has given me to speak directly with the people of the Soviet Union, to bring you a message of friendship from all the people of the United States and to share with you some of my thoughts about the relations between our two countries and about the way to peace and progress in the world.

This is my fourth visit to the Soviet Union. On these visits I have gained a great respect for the peoples of the Soviet Union, for your strength, your generosity, your determination, for the diversity and richness of your cultural heritage, for your many achievements.

In the 3 years I have been in office, one of my principal aims has been to establish a better relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Our two countries have much in common. Most important of all, we have never fought one another in war. On the contrary, the memory of your soldiers and ours embracing at the Elbe, as allies, in 1945, remains strong in millions of hearts in both of our countries. It is my hope that that memory can serve as an inspiration for the renewal of Soviet-American cooperation in the 1970's.

As great powers, we shall sometimes be competitors, but we need never be enemies.

Thirteen years ago, when I visited your country as Vice President, I addressed the people of the Soviet Union on radio and television, as I am addressing you tonight. I said then, "Let us have peaceful competition, not only in producing the best factories, but in producing better lives for our people. Let us cooperate in our exploration of outer space. . . . Let our aim be not victory over other peoples, but the victory of all mankind over hunger, want, misery, and disease, wherever it exists in the world."

In our meetings this week, we have begun to bring some of those hopes to fruition. Shortly after we arrived here on Monday afternoon, a brief rain fell on Moscow, of a kind that I am told is called a mushroom rain, a warm rain, with sunshine breaking through, that makes the mushrooms grow and is therefore considered a good omen. The month of May is early for mushrooms, but as our talks progressed this week, what did grow was even better. A far-reaching set of agreements that can lead to a better life for both of our peoples, to a better chance for peace in the world.

We have agreed on joint ventures in space. We have agreed on ways of working together to protect the environment, to advance health, to cooperate in science and technology. We have agreed on means of preventing incidents at sea. We have established a commission to expand trade between our two nations.

Most important, we have taken an historic first step in the limitation of nuclear strategic arms. This arms control agreement is not for the purpose of giving either side an advantage over the other. Both of our nations are strong, each respects the strength of the other, each will maintain the strength necessary to defend its independence.

But in an unchecked arms race between two great nations, there would be no winners, only losers. By setting this limitation together, the people of both of our nations, and of all nations, can be winners. If we continue in the spirit of serious purpose that has marked our discussions this week, these agreements can start us on a new road of cooperation for the benefit of our people, for the benefit of all peoples.

There is an old proverb that says, "Make peace with man and quarrel with your sins." The hardships and evils that beset all men and all nations, these and these alone are what we should make war upon.

As we look at the prospects for peace, we see that we have made significant progress at reducing the possible sources of direct conflict between us. But history tells us that great nations have often been dragged into war without intending it, by conflicts between smaller nations. As great powers, we can and should use our influence to prevent this from happening. Our goal should be to discourage aggression in other parts of the world and particularly among those smaller nations that look to us for leadership and example.

With great power goes great responsibility. When a man walks with a giant tread, he must be careful where he sets his feet. There can be true peace only when the weak are as safe as the strong. The wealthier and more powerful our own nations become, the more we have to lose from war and the threat of war, anywhere in the world.

Speaking for the United States, I can say this: We covet no one else's territory, we seek no dominion over any other people, we seek the right to live in peace, not only for ourselves, but for all the peoples of this earth. Our power will only be used to keep the peace, never to break it, only to defend freedom, never to destroy it. No nation that does not threaten its neighbors has anything to fear from the United States.

Soviet citizens have often asked me, "Does America truly want peace?"

I believe that our actions answer that question far better than any words could do. If we did not want peace, we would not have reduced the size of our armed forces by a million men, by almost one-third, during the past 3 years. If we did not want peace, we would not have worked so hard at reaching an agreement on the limitation of nuclear arms, at achieving a settlement of Berlin, at maintaining peace in the Middle East, at establishing better relations with the Soviet Union, with the People's Republic of China, with other nations of the world.

Mrs. Nixon and I feel very fortunate to have had the opportunity to visit the Soviet Union, to get to know the people of the Soviet Union, friendly and hospitable, courageous and strong. Most Americans will never have a chance to visit the Soviet Union and most Soviet citizens will never have a chance to visit America. Most of you know our country only through what you read in your newspapers and what you hear and see on radio and television and motion pictures. This is only a part of the

real America.

I would like to take this opportunity to try to convey to you something of what America is really like, not in terms of its scenic beauties, its great cities, its factories, its farms, or its highways, but in terms of its people.

In many ways, the people of our two countries are very much alike. Like the Soviet Union, ours is a large and diverse nation. Our people, like yours, are hard-working. Like you, we Americans have a strong spirit of competition, but we also have a great love of music and poetry, of sports, and of humor. Above all, we, like you, are an open, natural, and friendly people. We love our country. We love our children. And we want for you and for your children the same peace and abundance that we want for ourselves and for our children.

We Americans are idealists. We believe deeply in our system of government. We cherish our personal liberty. We would fight to defend it, if necessary, as we have done before. But we also believe deeply in the right of each nation to choose its own system. Therefore, however much we like our own system for ourselves, we have no desire to impose it on anyone else.

As we conclude this week of talks, there are certain fundamental premises of the American point of view which I believe deserve emphasis. In conducting these talks, it has not been our aim to divide up the world into spheres of influence, to establish a condominium, or in any way to conspire together against the interests of any other nation. Rather we have sought to construct a better framework of understanding between our two nations, to make progress in our bilateral relationships, to find ways of ensuring that future frictions between us would never embroil our two nations, and therefore, the world, in war.

While ours are both great and powerful nations, the world is no longer dominated by two superpowers. The world is a better and safer place because its power and resources are more widely distributed.

Beyond this, since World War II, more than 70 new nations have come into being. We cannot have true peace unless they, and all nations, can feel that they share it.

America seeks better relations, not only with the Soviet Union, but with all nations. The only sound basis for a peaceful and progressive international order is sovereign equality and mutual respect. We believe in the right of each nation to chart its own course, to choose its own system, to go its own way, without interference from other nations.

As we look to the longer term, peace depends also on continued progress in the developing nations. Together with other advanced industrial countries, the United States and the Soviet Union share a twofold responsibility in this regard.

On the one hand, to practice restraint in those activities, such as the supply of arms, that might endanger the peace of developing nations. And second, to assist them in their orderly economic and social development, without political interference.

Some of you may have heard an old story told in Russia of a traveler who was walking to another village. He knew the way, but not the distance. Finally he came upon a woodsman chopping wood by the side of the road

and he asked the woodsman, "How long will it take to reach the village?"

The woodsman replied, "I don't know."

The traveler was angry, because he was sure the woodsman was from the village and therefore knew how far it was. And so he started off down the road again. After he had gone a few steps, the woodsman called out, "Stop. It will take you about 15 minutes."

The traveler turned and demanded, "Why didn't you tell me that in the first place?"

The woodsman replied, "Because then I didn't know the length of your stride."

In our talks this week with the leaders of the Soviet Union, both sides have had a chance to measure the length of our strides toward peace and security. I believe that those strides have been substantial and that now we have well begun the long journey which will lead us to a new age in the relations between our two countries. It is important to both of our peoples that we continue those strides.

As our two countries learn to work together, our people will be able to get to know one another better. Greater cooperation can also mean a great deal in our daily lives. As we learn to cooperate in space, in health and the environment, in science and technology, our cooperation can help sick people get well. It can help industries produce more consumer goods. It can help all of us enjoy cleaner air and water. It can increase our knowledge of the world around us.

As we expand our trade, each of our countries can buy more of the other's goods and market more of our own. As we gain experience with arms control, we can bring closer the day when further agreements can lessen the arms burden of our two nations and lessen the threat of war in the world.

Through all the pages of history, through all the centuries, the world's people have struggled to be free from fear, whether fear of the elements or fear of hunger or fear of their own rulers or fear of their neighbors in other countries. And yet, time and again, people have vanquished the source of one fear only to fall prey to another.

Let our goal now be a world free of fear. A world in which nation will no longer prey upon nation, in which human energies will be turned away from production for war and toward more production for peace, away from conquest and toward invention, development, creation. A world in which together we can establish that peace which is more than the absence of war, which enables man to pursue those higher goals that the spirit yearns for.

Yesterday, I laid a wreath at the cemetery which commemorates the brave people who died during the siege of Leningrad in World War II. At the cemetery, I saw the picture of a 12-year-old girl. She was a beautiful child. Her name was Tanya. The pages of her diary tell the terrible story of war. In the simple words of a child, she wrote of the deaths of the members of her family: Zhenya in December. Grannie in January. Leka then next. Then Uncle Vasya. Then Uncle Lyosha. Then Mama. And then the Savichevs. And then finally, these words, the last words in her diary, "All are dead. Only Tanya is left."

As we work toward a more peaceful world, let us think of Tanya and of the other Tanyas and their brothers and sisters everywhere. Let us do all that we can to insure that no other children will have to endure what Tanya did and that your children and ours, all the children of the world can live their full lives together in friendship and in peace.

Spasibo y do svidaniye.

NOTE: The President spoke at 8:30 p.m., Moscow time, in the Green Room at the Grand Kremlin Palace. His remarks were broadcast live on radio and television in the Soviet Union and simultaneously, via satellite, in the United States.

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

The President's Address to a Joint Session of the Congress at the Conclusion of His Trip to Austria, the Soviet Union, Iran, and Poland. June 1, 1972

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the Congress, our distinguished guests, my fellow Americans:

Your welcome in this great chamber tonight has a very special meaning to Mrs. Nixon and to me. We feel very fortunate to have traveled abroad so often representing the United States of America. But we both agree after each journey that the best part of any trip abroad is coming home to America again.

During the past 13 days we have flown more than 16,000 miles and we visited four countries. Everywhere we went—to Austria, the Soviet Union, Iran, Poland—we could feel the quickening pace of change in old international relationships, and the people's genuine desire for friendship for the American people. Everywhere new hopes are rising for a world no longer shadowed by fear and want and war, and as Americans we can be proud that we now have an historic opportunity to play a great role in helping to achieve man's oldest dream—a world in which all nations can enjoy the blessings of peace.

On this journey we saw many memorable sights, but one picture will always remain indelible in our memory—the flag of the United States of America flying high in the spring breeze above Moscow's ancient Kremlin fortress.

To millions of Americans for the past quarter century the Kremlin has stood for implacable hostility toward all that we cherish, and to millions of Russians, the American flag has long been held up as a symbol of evil. No one would have believed, even a short time ago, that these two apparently irreconcilable symbols would be seen together as we saw them for those few days.

But this does not mean that we bring back from Moscow the promise of instant peace, but we do bring the beginning of a process that can lead to a lasting peace. And that is why I have taken the extraordinary action of requesting this special joint session of the Congress because we have before us an extraordinary opportunity.

I have not come here this evening to make new announcements in a dramatic setting. This summit has already made its news. It has barely

begun, however, to make its mark on our world, and I ask you to join me tonight—while events are fresh, while the iron is hot—in starting to consider how we can help to make that mark what we want it to be.

The foundation has been laid for a new relationship between the two most powerful nations in the world. Now it is up to us—to all of us here in this Chamber, to all of us across America—to join with other nations in building a new house upon that foundation, one that can be a home for the hopes of mankind and a shelter against the storms of conflict.

As a preliminary, therefore, to requesting your concurrence in some of the agreements we reached and your approval of funds to carry out others, and also as a keynote for the unity in which this Government and this Nation must go forward from here, I am rendering this immediate report to the Congress on the results of the Moscow summit.

The pattern of U.S.-Soviet summit diplomacy in the cold war era is well known to all those in this Chamber. One meeting after another produced a brief euphoric mood—the spirit of Geneva, the spirit of Camp David, the spirit of Vienna, the spirit of Glassboro—but without producing significant progress on the really difficult issues.

And so early in this Administration I stated that the prospect of concrete results, not atmospherics, would be our criterion for meetings at the highest level. I also announced our intention to pursue negotiations with the Soviet Union across a broad front of related issues, with the purpose of creating a momentum of achievement in which progress in one area could contribute to progress in others.

This is the basis on which we prepared for and conducted last week's talks. This was a working summit. We sought to establish not a superficial spirit of Moscow, but a solid record of progress on solving the difficult issues which for so long have divided our two nations and also have divided the world. Reviewing the number and the scope of the agreements that emerged, I think we have accomplished that goal.

Recognizing the responsibility of the advanced industrial nations to set an example in combatting mankind's common enemies, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to cooperate in efforts to reduce pollution and enhance environmental quality. We have agreed to work together in the field of medical science and public health, particularly in the conquest of cancer and heart disease.

Recognizing that the quest for useful knowledge transcends differences between ideologies and social systems, we have agreed to expand United States-Soviet cooperation in many areas of science and technology.

We have joined in plans for an exciting new adventure, a new adventure in the cooperative exploration of space, which will begin—subject to Congressional approval of funding—with a joint orbital mission of an Apollo vehicle and a Soviet spacecraft in 1975.

By forming habits of cooperation and strengthening institutional ties in areas of peaceful enterprise, these four agreements, to which I have referred, will create on both sides a steadily growing vested interest in the maintenance of good relations between our two countries.

Expanded United States-Soviet trade will also yield advantages to both of our nations. When the two largest economies in the world start trading with each other on a much larger scale, living standards in both nations will rise, and the stake which both have in peace will increase.

Progress in this area is proceeding on schedule. At the summit, we established a Joint Commercial Commission which will complete the negotiations for a comprehensive trade agreement between the United States and the USSR.

And we expect the final terms of such an agreement to be settled, later this year.

Two further accords which were reached last week have a much more direct bearing on the search for peace and security in the world.

One is the agreement between the American and Soviet navies aimed at significantly reducing the chances of dangerous incidents between our ships and aircraft at sea.

And second, and most important, there is the treaty and the related executive agreement which will limit, for the first time, both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Three-fifths of all the people alive in the world today have spent their whole lifetimes under the shadow of a nuclear war which could be touched off by the arms race among the great powers. Last Friday in Moscow we witnessed the beginning of the end of that era which began in 1945. We took the first step toward a new era of mutually agreed restraint and arms limitation between the two principal nuclear powers.

With this step we have enhanced the security of both nations. We have begun to check the wasteful and dangerous spiral of nuclear arms which has dominated relations between our two countries for a generation. We have begun to reduce the level of fear by reducing the causes of fear, for our two peoples and for all peoples in the world.

The ABM Treaty will be submitted promptly for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification and the interim agreement limiting certain offensive weapons will be submitted to both Houses for concurrence. Because we can undertake agreements as important as these only on a basis of full partnership between the executive and legislative branches of our Government.

I ask from this Congress and I ask from the Nation the fullest scrutiny of these accords. I am confident such examination will underscore the truth of what I told the Soviet people on television just a few nights ago—that this is an agreement in the interest of both nations. From the standpoint of the United States, when we consider what the strategic balance would have looked like later in the Seventies, if there had been no arms limitation, it is clear that the agreements forestall a major spiraling of the arms race—one which would have worked to our disadvantage, since we have no current building programs for the categories of weapons which have been frozen, and since no new building program could have produced any new weapons in those categories during the period of the freeze.

My colleagues in the Congress, I have studied the strategic balance

in great detail with my senior advisers for more than 3 years. I can assure you, the Members of the Congress, and the American people tonight that the present and planned strategic forces of the United States are without question sufficient for the maintenance of our security and the protection of our vital interests.

No power on earth is stronger than the United States of America today. And none will be stronger than the United States of America in the future.

This is the only national defense posture which can ever be acceptable to the United States. This is the posture I ask the Senate and the Congress to protect by approving the arms limitation agreements to which I have referred. This is the posture which, with the responsible cooperation of the Congress, I will take all necessary steps to maintain in our future defense programs.

In addition to the talks which led to the specific agreements I have listed, I also had full, very frank, and extensive discussions with General Secretary Brezhnev and his colleagues about several parts of the world where American and Soviet interests have come in conflict.

With regard to the reduction of tensions in Europe, we recorded our intention of proceeding later this year with multilateral consultations looking toward a conference on security and cooperation in all of Europe. We have also jointly agreed to move forward with negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in central Europe.

The problem of ending the Vietnam war, which engages the hopes of all Americans, was one of the most extensively discussed subjects on our agenda. It would only jeopardize the search for peace if I were to review here all that was said on the subject. I will simply say this: Each side obviously has its own point of view and its own approach to this very difficult issue. But at the same time, both the United States and the Soviet Union share an overriding desire to achieve a more stable peace in the world. I emphasize to you once again that this Administration has no higher goal, a goal that I know all of you share, than bringing the Vietnam war to an early and honorable end. We are ending the war in Vietnam, but we shall end it in a way which will not betray our friends, risk the lives of the courageous Americans still serving in Vietnam, break faith with those held prisoners by the enemy, or stain the honor of the United States of America.

Another area where we had very full, frank, and extensive discussions was the Middle East. I reiterated the American people's commitment to the survival of the state of Israel and to a settlement just to all the countries in the area. Both sides stated in the communiqué their intention to support the Jarring peace mission and other appropriate efforts to achieve this objective.

The final achievement of the Moscow conference was the signing of a landmark declaration entitled "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the United States and the USSR." As these 12 basic principles are put into practice, they can provide a solid framework for the future development of better American-Soviet relations.

They begin with the recognition that two nuclear nations, each of

which has the power to destroy humanity, have no alternative but to coexist peacefully because in a nuclear war there would be no winners, only losers.

The basic principles commit both sides to avoid direct military confrontation and to exercise constructive leadership and restraint with respect to smaller conflicts in other parts of the world which could drag the major powers into war.

They disavow any intention to create spheres of influence or to conspire against the interests of any other nation—a point I would underscore by saying once again tonight that America values its ties with all nations—from our oldest allies in Europe and Asia, as I emphasized by my visit to Iran, to our good friends in the third world, and to our new relationship with the People's Republic of China.

The improvement of relations depends not only, of course, on words, but far more on actions. The principles to which we agreed in Moscow are like a road map. Now that the map has been laid out, it is up to each country to follow it. The United States intends to adhere to these principles. The leaders of the Soviet Union have indicated a similar intention.

However, we must remember that Soviet ideology still proclaims hostility to some of America's most basic values. The Soviet leaders remain committed to that ideology. Like the nation they lead, they are and they will continue to be totally dedicated competitors of the United States of America.

As we shape our policies for the period ahead, therefore, we must maintain our defenses at an adequate level until there is mutual agreement to limit forces. The time-tested policies of vigilance and firmness which have brought us to this summit are the only ones that can safely carry us forward to further progress in reaching agreements to reduce the danger of war.

Our successes in the strategic arms talks and in the Berlin negotiations, which opened the road to Moscow, came about because over the past 3 years we have consistently refused proposals for unilaterally abandoning the ABM, unilaterally pulling back our forces from Europe, and drastically cutting the defense budget. The Congress deserves the appreciation of the American people for having the courage to vote such proposals down and to maintain the strength America needs to protect its interests.

As we continue the strategic arms talks, seeking a permanent offensive weapons treaty, we must bear the lessons of the earlier talks well in mind.

By the same token, we must stand steadfastly with our NATO partners if negotiations leading to a new détente and a mutual reduction of forces in Europe are to be productive. Maintaining the strength, integrity, and steadfastness of our free world alliances is the foundation on which all of our other initiatives for peace and security in the world must rest. As we seek better relations with those who have been our adversaries, we will not let down our friends and allies around the world.

And in this period we must keep our economy vigorous and competitive if the opening for greater East-West trade is to mean anything

at all, and if we do not wish to be shouldered aside in world markets by the growing potential of the economies of Japan, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China. For America to continue its role of helping to build a more peaceful world, we must keep America number one economically in the world.

We must maintain our own momentum of domestic innovation, growth, and reform if the opportunities for joint action with the Soviets are to fulfill their promise. As we seek agreements to build peace abroad, we must keep America moving forward at home.

Most importantly, if the new age we seek is ever to become a reality, we must keep America strong in spirit—a nation proud of its greatness as a free society, confident of its mission in the world. Let us be committed to our way of life as wholeheartedly as the Communist leaders with whom we seek a new relationship are committed to their system. Let us always be proud to show in our words and actions what we know in our hearts—that we believe in America.

These are just some of the challenges of peace. They are in some ways even more difficult than the challenges of war. But we are equal to them. As we meet them, we will be able to go forward and explore the sweeping possibilities for peace which this season of summits has now opened up for the world.

For decades, America has been locked in hostile confrontation with the two great Communist powers, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. We were engaged with the one at many points and almost totally isolated from the other, but our relationships with both had reached a deadly impasse. All three countries were victims of the kind of bondage about which George Washington long ago warned in these words: "The nation which indulges toward another in habitual hatred is a slave to its own animosity."

But now in the brief space of 4 months, these journeys to Peking and to Moscow have begun to free us from perpetual confrontation. We have moved toward better understanding, mutual respect, and point-by-point settlement of differences with both the major Communist powers.

This one series of meetings has not rendered an imperfect world suddenly perfect. There still are deep philosophical differences; there still are parts of the world in which age-old hatreds persist. The threat of war has not been eliminated—it has been reduced. We are making progress toward a world in which leaders of nations will settle their differences by negotiation, not by force, and in which they learn to live with their differences so that their sons will not have to die for those differences.

It was particularly fitting that this trip, aimed at building such a world, should have concluded in Poland.

No country in the world has suffered more from war than Poland has—and no country has more to gain from peace. The faces of the people who gave us such a heartwarming welcome in Warsaw yesterday, and again this morning and this afternoon, told an eloquent story of suffering in the past and of hope for peace in the future. One could see it in their faces. It made me more determined than ever that America must do all in its power to help that hope come true for all people.

As we continue that effort, our unity of purpose and action will be all-important.

For the summits of 1972 have not belonged just to one person or one party or to one branch of our Government alone. Rather they are part of a great national journey for peace. Every American can claim a share in the credit for the success of that journey so far, and every American has a major stake in its success for the future.

An unparalleled opportunity has been placed in America's hands. Never has there been a time when hope was more justified or when complacency was more dangerous. We have made a good beginning. And because we have begun, history now lays upon us a special obligation to see it through. We can seize this moment or we can lose it; we can make good this opportunity to build a new structure of peace in the world, or let it slip away. Together, therefore, let us seize the moment so that our children and the world's children live free of the fears and free of the hatreds that have been the lot of mankind through the centuries.

Then the historians of some future age will write of the year 1972, not that this was the year America went up to the summit and then down to the depths of the valley again—but that this was the year when America helped to lead the world up out of the lowlands of constant war, and onto the high plateau of lasting peace.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9:40 p.m. in the House Chamber at the Capitol, after being introduced by Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives. The address was broadcast live on radio and television.

APPENDICES

Strategic Arms Limitation

Statements by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, at Their News Conference on the Treaty and the Interim Agreement.
May 26, 1972

DR. KISSINGER. Gentlemen, I thought that the most useful thing I could do was to give you a general background of these negotiations and of the President's view of the treaty, and Ambassador Smith, of course, who has conducted the negotiations and brought them to this conclusion is in the best position to go through the details of the agreement.

Let me make a few general observations before I turn this over to Ambassador Smith.

Nothing that this Administration has done has seemed to it more important for the future of the world than to make an important first step in the limitation of strategic arms.

All of us have been profoundly convinced that to arrest the arms race is one of the overriding concerns of this period. Now it is a subject of enormous technical complexity, and for the two great nuclear powers to make a beginning in putting their armaments under some restraint required political decisions and an enormous amount of technical work.

It is a process that has continued for many years. It started with extensive technical studies in Washington. It went through 2½ years of negotiations alternating between Helsinki and Vienna. It has been brought to a conclusion because both governments decided that in an agreement of this kind the stakes were larger than the simple technical issues; that what was at stake was a major step toward international stability, confidence among nations, and a turn in the pattern of postwar relationships.

This is why at various crucial moments in these negotiations there had been direct contacts between the President and Soviet leaders, which led by mutual agreement to breakthroughs—the first on May 20 of 1971, in which there was an agreement that broke the deadlock that had developed between the Soviet insistence that an agreement cover antiballistic missile systems only, and our view that an agreement involved as well the offensive weapons.

The compromise was that the initial treaty would deal with ABM's, and that this would be accompanied by a freeze on certain categories of offensive weapons. The next deadlock developed over the issue of what offensive weapons should be included, whether it should be confined to intercontinental ballistic missiles or whether submarine-launched ballistic missile systems should also be involved. The answer—this deadlock was broken at the end of April and in large part by direct contact between the Soviet leaders and the President and it has finally resulted in the present agreement which Ambassador Smith has just brought back from Helsinki and which will be signed at 11:00.

Ambassador Smith is in the best position to explain the provisions of this agreement, but I wanted to make a few general observations about its significance and how it should be looked at.

The first point to make is that in an agreement that involves the central armaments on both sides, it is foolish or shortsighted to approach the negotiations from the point of view of gaining a unilateral advantage. Neither nation will possibly put its security and its survival at the hazard of its opponent and no agreement that brings disadvantage to either side can possibly last and can possibly bring about anything other than a new circle of insecurity. Therefore, the temptation that is ever present when agreements of this kind are analyzed as to who won is exceptionally inappropriate.

We have approached these negotiations from the very beginning with the attitude that a wise proposal is one that is conceived by each side to be in the mutual interest and we believe that if this agreement does what we hope it will, that the future will record that both sides won.

Secondly, let me make a few observations with respect to the freeze of offensive weapons which has perhaps some of the more complicated provisions and the anticipation of which has aroused some anticipatory comments in the United States.

First, the freeze concerns only two categories of offensive weapons; that is to say, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine launched ballistic missiles. It does not include the number of warheads, nor does it include bombers, nor does it include, obviously, other systems based elsewhere than at sea or in the territory of each country.

Secondly, in assessing the significance of the freeze, it is not useful to analyze whether the freeze reflects a gap between the forces that are being frozen.

In the two categories that are being frozen, that is to say ICBM's and submarine launched ballistic missiles, the facts are these: The Soviet Union has more intercontinental ballistic missiles than the United States. The Soviet Union has been building intercontinental ballistic missiles; the United States has not and has no such program at the moment.

The Soviet Union has been building submarine launched ballistic missiles at the rate of eight submarines a year. The United States has at this moment no submarines under construction.

Therefore, the question to ask in assessing the freeze is not what situation it perpetuates, but what situation it prevents. The question is where we would be without the freeze. And if you project the existing building programs of the Soviet Union into the future, as against the absence of building programs over the period of the freeze in either of the categories that are being frozen, you will get a more correct clue to why we believe that there is a good agreement and why we believe that it has made a significant contribution to arresting the arms race.

The weapons are frozen, as we pointed out, in categories in which we have no ongoing programs. Now, having said this, however, I am not implying that we gained a unilateral advantage because it is perhaps true that in the ABM field we had the more dynamic program which is being arrested as a result of these developments.

What I am saying is that this agreement has been made through a long process of negotiations; that this week, while our delegation was working around the clock in Helsinki, the President met with the Soviet leaders extensively and some members of the American delegation had extensive talks with Deputy Prime Minister Smirnov and Foreign Minister Gromyko to resolve those issues that required a primarily political decision.

The reason it was possible to achieve such an agreement is because we are confident it will be seen to be in the common interest of both countries and in the common interest of humanity. That is what I wanted to say on behalf of the President.

I would like again to express our appreciation to Ambassador Smith, who has borne up under great strain and who has details of the agreements before him.

AMBASSADOR SMITH. I understand I am going to have an opportunity later to go into greater detail with you all about the specific provisions of the treaty and the interim agreement, so perhaps at this time I should limit myself to trying to make some general observations and then later on try to answer your questions and even later on than that go into any specific provisions that are of special interest.

First, let me say perhaps the obvious, that these documents are the product of long, careful, complex and exhaustive negotiations. As a matter of fact, we were not finished with the last detail after we got on the airplane this evening in Helsinki. We flew back. I invited some of the Soviet delegation, including the Chief of the Delegation, Minister Semenov, to join us and we continued to work on our way here to Moscow. So this is about the freshest treaty that I have ever talked about.

I think that in sum, these documents, when you look at them carefully, will demonstrate a solid, concrete, yet first step in the problem of controlling strategic arms. They are not the end of the road by any means, but I think that they are a very solid step forward.

You know we have an obligation that sometimes people forget under the Nonproliferation Treaty of some years ago to get on with trying to limit strategic arms and get on with disarmament. I think as a general proposition these documents will show that we are not lax in that respect. We are conscious of our responsibilities.

Now, as Henry said, there are two basic documents here, the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement which, in effect, is a negotiating freeze arrangement to hold the situation, to permit us to hopefully negotiate a treaty to match in the offensive field the treaty that we have succeeded in negotiating in the defensive field.

In the defensive field, I would urge you to look very carefully at the language of Article I which looks very general but to my mind is a most significant step forward in relations between two great powers.

In effect, it says that neither side is going to try to defend its nationwide territory. This is an admission of tremendous psychological significance, I believe, recognition that the deterrent forces of both sides are not going to be challenged.

When you think of the concerns that we have had for the last 25 years about first-strike and counter-force, it seems to me a general recognition by both countries that they are not going to field a nationwide system is of first importance, political, psychological, and militarily.

In addition to that, the countries are going to agree not to lay the base for such a nationwide system. That got us into all sorts of radar problems which some of you people perhaps felt we took too long in solving, but much of the time we have spent was in trying to wrestle with this radar problem to prevent the possibility of a nationwide system arising.

In addition to that, the two nations have made commitments not to even try for a thick or regional defense in one part of the country except as specifically permitted under the agreement; that is, to defend one's capital or to defend a relatively small number of ICBM silos.

So, although Article I looks like sort of a general statement, to my mind it is one of the most significant articles in the whole agreement.

Now, Article II defines what we are talking about and has a very important bearing on the whole question of what we call future ABM systems. This treaty has as a most significant aspect that it not only limits the present situation, but has a choking off effect on future systems which, under the terms of the treaty as we have reached understandings, will not be deployable unless this treaty is amended.

Article III is the heart of the treaty and deserves a great deal of study. I think we spent more time trying to wrestle with Article III than any other part of the treaty.

I will go into details later if you like, but it says both sides can have two sites with no more than 100 launchers at each site, with radar sharply limited; one site for the defensive capital and one for the ICBM's. The Soviets will agree to deploy the ICBM site well away from the capital

site, so the possibility for a base of a nationwide system is very poor.

In addition to the numbers, we have had to work out problems involving test ranges, numbers of test launchers, the question of modernization, the question of how you verify this treaty, and one of the significant conclusions that we have reached is that this treaty can safely be verified by national means of verification, that is, without on-site inspection. This is largely a limitation on numbers of relatively large objects which we are confident can be monitored, if you will, without on-site inspection.

As a matter of fact, if I had my "druthers" and could have on-site inspection instead of our present national means, there would be no question in my mind that we would be much better off with national means of verification.

In addition to that, we will have commitments from the Soviets not to interfere with those national means of verification and not to take measures to conceal their operation so as to prevent the workings of national means of verification. I think you ladies and gentlemen can realize the psychological significance of a nation making such a commitment as that.

We are going to set up a joint consultative commission which will, in effect, act as a surveying agent that will watch over the operation of the agreement, to which ambiguous situations can be referred, which will be a forum for further discussion of the possible amendments to see how this treaty is working, and to make sure that it stays viable over the years.

This treaty will have indefinite duration, but if it doesn't work, if our supreme interests are jeopardized, there is a provision that on short notice either side can escape from the binding obligations under the treaty.

Turn, now, for a minute to the offensive side. As Henry said, what we are trying to do is to set up a useful device that will hold the situation while we negotiate, hopefully, a matching treaty; that is, to match the treaty in the ABM defense field. I think that the measures that we have succeeded in spelling out in this interim agreement with the Russians will do just that. There will be a commitment on their part not to build any more of these ICBMs that have concerned us over the years. That commitment will extend to not building such things as SS-9s, and there will be provisions that if the sides want to increase their submarine missiles, which, if you can say so, are a more benign form of weapons system than ICBMs, they may do so, but only at the price of a substantial reduction program in other weapons systems.

Keep this in mind when you think about the possibility of increasing SLBMs. It is not for free. It is at a very substantial price in terms of reductions of other weapons systems. Reductions have never before been successfully negotiated, so I think this ought to be considered a great accomplishment.

Basic Principles and Joint Communique

News Conference of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. May 29, 1972

Two documents are being promulgated today. One is a communiqué. The other is a Declaration of Principles. The Declaration, which states the basic principles which should govern the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, will be signed at 2 o'clock by General Secretary Brezhnev and by the President. The communiqué will be in the usual communiqué form.

Let me first say a word about the communiqué, which you have not seen. It basically summarizes the agreements that were signed this week. It states in rather strong and positive language the expectations that both sides have with respect to the further evolution of their discussions on strategic arms and on disarmament in general, and the contribution which they believe that the agreements that have been signed this week have made to a general improvement of the international climate. This is in the first part of the communiqué, which lists the agreements that were reached during the week.

In the second part of the communiqué there is a discussion of the negotiations and deliberations that went on this week with respect to various areas of the world. There is a somewhat lengthy section about Europe, in which the two sides express their satisfaction with the general relaxation of tensions that has developed in Europe, and express also the view that with the ratification of the German treaties, the imminent signing of the quadripartite agreement on Berlin, conditions now exist in which exploratory conversations with respect to the European Security Conference can begin between the parties concerned, and express their readiness to participate in a European security conference as soon as these preparatory discussions, which should be carefully conducted, will be concluded.

The two sides also express their view that a reduction of arms and armed forces, to begin with in central Europe, could make a contribution to this general process, and they have agreed to begin immediate explorations of the procedure which could most effectively bring this about, the general idea being that simultaneous negotiations would take place on European security and what we called mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe in two forums, the European security conference, of course, being the larger one, and the mutual balanced force reductions forum being confined to the countries primarily concerned or directly affected.

There is a section on the Middle East which calls on both sides to contribute what they can to bringing about a general settlement, and indicating that such a settlement would also contribute to a relaxation of the armaments race in that area.

There is a section on Vietnam in which both sides state their views, which are not exactly identical, but I would say that the issue between us on Vietnam is not whether we have identical views, and it would be an insult to anybody to pretend that we do not have completely different conceptions of the nature of the problem, but the issue before us is whether, given these different conceptions, it is possible for both sides to work to bring about a rapid end to the war on a basis that is fair to all sides, and with respect to that last issue, I believe it is events which will determine what have or have not been achieved, and not a formal statement of the formal points of view in the communiqué.

With respect to disarmament, we affirm our continued willingness to participate in measures, in disarmament negotiations in addition to the one on strategic arms. And the communiqué confirms what the statement of principles maintains, that regular consultations between the two sides should continue.

I would like, with respect to the communiqué, to make two points, one concerning the section on trade, which expands on the proposition that an Economic Commission will be created, part of whose functions will be the establishment of the negotiation of a trade agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that the related issues of lend-lease, extension of credit facilities, and most-favored-nations will be dealt with as a joint package in the subsequent negotiations.

Now I have seen a great deal of speculation in the press about the alleged deadlock in trade negotiations. I want to assure you, ladies and gentlemen, that the basic intention with which we came here was to set up the Economic Commission which would then, in turn, settle most of these issues. And all these speculations that I have seen about the linkages between trade and other political problems happen to be quite wrong.

The section in the communiqué on trade is about what the tentative draft contained before we came here. Therefore, in our negotiations we are about on the schedule that we had set for ourselves.

Secondly, I think it is fair to point out that many of the agreements, for example, those on space, health, and environment that were signed in the early part of the week, were obviously not negotiated in detail here. Nevertheless, it is equally a fact that the imminence of the summit gave those negotiations an impetus which they would otherwise not have had. And many of the technical problems that developed in all of these negotiations could be pushed to a level which would normally not concern itself with the refinements of such issues as how you measured distances in an incident-at-sea negotiation, and therefore in the very real sense the summit, even those of these negotiations that were not in detail covered in the discussions among the leaders here, received a tremendous impetus from the imminence of the summit.

Now let me turn to the Declaration of Principles. The whole postwar period has been characterized by the seemingly unbridgeable conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, a conflict enshrined doctrinally on both sides of what came to be called the Iron Curtain. The foreign policy of most countries in the world has been characterized by this consciousness.

Now, what we have attempted to do, as some of you will remember we stressed to you before, is to attempt to move forward in our relations with the Soviet Union on a very broad front on many issues, some of which were related and some of which were not related, partly because of the intrinsic merit of these negotiations and of these issues, but also partly because we thought that this would create on both sides so many vested interests in a continuation of a more formal relationship that apart from any of the policy considerations there would henceforth be a different attitude in the conduct of the foreign policy of both sides.

Now, we have no illusions. We recognize that Soviet ideology still proclaims a considerable hostility to some of our most basic values. We also recognize that if any of these principles is flouted, we will not be able to wave a piece of paper and insist that the illegality of the procedure will, in itself, prevent its being carried out.

As in every document, this document indicates an aspiration and an attitude, and if either the aspiration or the attitude changes, then, of course, as sovereign countries, either side can change its course. Nothing in this document entitles us to give up our alliances or would justify lowering the efforts that have brought us to this point; but at the same time, it is an event of considerable significance that the countries whose seemingly irreconcilable hostility has characterized the entire postwar period, and the two countries which, between themselves or, indeed, individually have the capacity to destroy humanity are making an effort which would state some principles which would reduce the dangers of war and which would enable them to promote a more stable international system.

Of course, these principles have to be implemented. If there is bad faith on either side, the aspirations expressed here cannot be realized. Speaking for our side, I can say we will attempt to implement these principles in the spirit in which they were promulgated. We have no reason to suppose that this will not be done by the leaders of the Soviet Union, but if events should prove these hopes on either side to be incorrect, then we will, of course, both of us, have to draw the appropriate conclusion.

I believe that most of these principles are self-explanatory. They call attention to the need for peaceful coexistence. They state that both sides will attempt to their utmost to avoid military confrontation, and that neither will attempt to take unilateral advantage in situations, recognizing that the great nuclear powers cannot be pushed in a position that jeopardizes their basic survival without noting it and therefore recognizing that the attempt of traditional diplomacy to accumulate marginal advantages is bound to lead to disastrous consequences in the nuclear age.

The two countries have also said they will try to prevent situations in other parts of the world that will involve

them in direct confrontation, and the two countries have said in no part of the world do either of them claim special privileges, and that neither of them is prepared to give up its existing friends for this period of relaxation or, to put it in a more constructive way, that this relaxation of tensions is in the interests of all people and is not directed and will not be implemented against the interests of any other country.



In Moscow, President Nixon addresses the people of the Soviet Union, May 28 (above). On his return to Washington, the President is welcomed by members of the United States Congress meeting in joint session, June 1 (below).

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SERIES

– A SELECTION OF IMPORTANT POLICY MATERIAL OF CURRENT INTEREST

דוח סיסקו לועדת החוץ של הקונגרס

NO. III

Statement before House Foreign Affairs Committee

by

Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

March 20, 1972

SISCO STATEMENT BEFORE HOUSE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Following is the full text of a statement by Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee March 20.

(Begin text)

Mr. Chairman:

In a statement I made to this committee almost a year ago I said that the Near East and South Asian region was one "where the search for peace must be relentless. The goal is an elusive one, the obstacles to be overcome to reach it formidable. And yet there is no alternative to persevering, for to pause is to court the risk of recourse to force."

The events of the past year have demonstrated just how elusive the goal of peace is. But we continue to persevere, ever mindful of the dangers of failure.

There would be no more satisfying experience than being able to come before you to report that our sustained effort to help bring about the peaceful resolution of regional disputes was completely successful. Unfortunately, that is not possible. War, despite our energetic attempts to avert it, did break out in South Asia. In the Middle East a peace settlement remains a hope rather than a reality although, on the plus side, the cease-fire, arranged on our initiative over a year and a half ago, persists.

Let me review briefly where we stand in some of the more important areas.

The Middle East

In describing the situation in the Middle East, we must be mindful of the dangers. Only recently President Nixon noted that "the greatest threat to peace and stability in the Middle East remains the Arab-Israeli conflict." While remaining fully alert to the dangers, we cannot lose sight of the element of hope. Our policies have incorporated both factors.

Within the past few weeks, military activities by Israel inside Lebanon sparked by attacks on Israel by Arab irregular forces, provided ample evidence of the dangers that must be reckoned with so long as the dispute between Israel and its Arab neighbors remains unresolved -- so long as ways are not found to reconcile Israel's search for security with the Arab search for recovery of territory occupied in 1967 and for a just settlement for the Palestinian refugees.

But what has given the Arab Israeli dispute its most dangerous dimension has been the deepened direct involvement of the Soviet Union. It has continued to furnish large amounts of modern weapons to certain of the Arab countries. And in Egypt it has established a substantial physical presence with large numbers of Soviet personnel in operational as well as advisory capacities.

Since the USSR has been unreceptive to U. S. suggestions for the exercise of restraint in the supply of military weapons to this volatile area, we have taken steps to maintain the arms balance.

The arms balance may not be a guarantee of peace. It is not a substitute for negotiations or an end in itself. But it is a deterrent to war -- to a war which has the potential for escalation.

So long as peace remains an inspiration rather than a reality, the U. S. has an interest in assisting those countries which accept peace as the objective to be attained. We are providing assistance to both Israel and certain Arab states. They must be able to defend themselves against forces which represent threats to their own stability and survival and ultimately to an Arab-Israeli peace settlement.

One has only to recall that a year and a half ago Jordan was the scene of a battle for survival. Civil war and invasion occurred simultaneously. This episode was instructive. It demonstrated that people with a will to survive can do so, but they need the wherewithal to do so. Today Jordan's security situation is much improved. But the traumatic events of September 1970 are a powerful reminder that it cannot afford to relax its vigilance or preparedness.

In addition to assuring that our friends in the area have the means for their legitimate self-defense, we have an interest in helping them remain economically strong and viable. In the case of Israel, recognizing the heavy defense burdens it bears and the additional strain on its resources resulting from the increased immigration of Soviet Jews, we have this year included in our FY 73 budget presentation a request for 50 million dollars in supporting assistance.

The Middle East is not without its hopeful signs. The cease-fire along the Suez Canal has held. Fragile though it has been, its existence has made it possible to save lives on both sides. Its continuation is in the interests of both sides; but it is not enough. A meaningful, viable, active diplomatic track is needed.

Ambassador Jarring has resumed his consultations with the parties under the mandate given him by Security Council Resolution 242 to promote agreement between the parties on the terms of a just and lasting peace. He has our full support, and we continue to hope he will be able to give fresh impetus to a dialogue. Complementary to this effort, the U. S remains available to the parties to pursue further the matter of an interim Suez Canal agreement.

Greece and Turkey

These two countries, NATO members, form NATO's southeastern flank, and occupy strategic positions in the eastern Mediterranean. As NATO members, both countries have responsibilities to contribute to the military strength of the alliance. Both have demonstrated loyal support to the alliance.

Burdensome as their military expenditures have been, Greece and Turkey have felt it necessary to make them. The U. S. provided substantial assistance to them so that the military burdens would not weigh excessively

on their economies. Greece's progress was rapid enough to permit the termination of U. S. economic assistance several years ago, and in more recent years, we have been able increasingly to replace grant military assistance with credit. In Turkey, devaluation of the currency and a brisk demand for Turkish workers in western Europe have measurably strengthened Turkey's economic position. As a consequence, we now believe it possible that Turkey will be able over a period of time to make a gradual transition from military grant assitance to credits.

The friendship we have had with these two countries has been a durable one -- it has stood the test of time. Changes of administration in this country and of governments in Greece and Turkey have not altered that. Friendship has rested on a base of mutual respect, shared concerns and common interests. We have not had a complete identity of views with either country; it would be unreasonable to expect it.

But friendship has bred close cooperation, and in no area has it been closer than in security matters. Cooperation over the years has been of mutual benefit.

Today the military forces of both countries need further modernization so that their contributions to NATO's overall strength will be more effective. Neither country has reached the point where it can achieve modernization without U. S. assistance. I believe it important that the Congress provide us with the funds essential to enable us to furnish that assistance.

In the highly dynamic world we live in, new problems are constantly arising. To the extent that they impinge on our relations with other countries, it is of great and obvious advantage if our relations with others are firmly rooted in friendship.

No problem in recent years has exceeded in its concern to the American people the growth of drug abuse. President Nixon has made it a foreign policy priority.

Turkey has been one of the world's most important suppliers of opium. For the Turkish farmer, this has for years been a prime source of income since the poppy has had many uses other than as a base for opium and heroin. But as the Turkish Government became more keenly aware of the human ravages caused by opium and heroin, it acted decisively and boldly. It banned the planting of the opium poppy after the harvest in June of last year.

This was not an easy decision for the Turkish Government; it was a product of statesmanship and courage, and one that well merits the applause of the U. S. and the world community. We intend to provide 35.7 million dollars in grant assistance over the next 3-4 years to offset legitimate foreign exchange losses and to help the Turkish Government to deal with problems they will confront in establishing alternative economic activities in the area affected by the poppy ban.

Cyprus

The failure of the two communities -- Greek and Turkish -- to reconcile their differences has produced violent shockwaves in the past which carried far beyond the shores of the idyllic island of Cyprus. In 1968 a negotiating process was established through international diplomacy to try to promote peaceful reconciliation of views. Three years of intercommunal talks failed to produce agreement, and in 1971 the specter of a collapse in negotiations emerged. International diplomacy was set in motion to head off a dangerous impasse, and early this year there appeared the hope that negotiations would resume under a new formula prepared by the Secretary General of the United Nations.

More recently, new difficulties have arisen -- this time the result of differences between the governments of Greece and Cyprus. This has made it impossible to launch the new effort at negotiations suggested by the U. N. Secretary General.

We hope that these differences will be resolved by the governments concerned and that progress toward a satisfactory solution of the intercommunal problem on Cyprus will be made.

The Persian Gulf

1971 was a year of transition for many countries of the Persian Gulf region. The British protective mantle was withdrawn and three new political entities emerged -- Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. The U. S. promptly recognized them.

These three small countries now confront the challenge of beginning to consolidate their newly acquired independence. The area in which they are located is of major strategic and economic interest to us. It is a major source of oil for Europe and Japan. American companies have sizable participation in the oil industry in the peninsula. And, we are interested in orderly political

of oil for Europe and Japan. American companies have sizable participation in the oil industry in the peninsula. And, we are interested in orderly political and social evolution in the area. We believe that these states are capable of meeting the challenges of independence and that cooperation among themselves as well as with their larger neighbors will best ensure that.

Our own direct and formal relations with these states begin with what we regard as a fund of good will on both sides. This augurs well for our future, and, for our part, we hope to enlarge the area of our cooperation with these states. Friendship and cooperation have been the hallmarks of our policy in this area in the past. We intend that they should remain so in the future.

South Asia

In his foreign policy report to the Congress, President Nixon has said, "the 700 million people of the subcontinent deserve a better future than the tragedy of 1971 seemed to portend. It is for them to fashion their own vision of such a future. The world has an interest in the regional peace and stability which are the preconditions for their achieving it." Constructing the foundation on which that better future may be built is the priority task which lies ahead.

The problems that must be dealt with are immense in scope and pressing in their urgency.

Pakistan recognizes that it must undertake major political and economic adjustments flowing from the effects of the war. An outline for political and constitutional reconstruction has recently been announced. Recognizing that these are matters of Pakistan's internal affairs, we nevertheless welcome any developments that increase Pakistan's stability and strengthen its capacity to meet the problems which have arisen from the recent crisis.

Bangladesh faces the formidable task of relieving the massive human suffering caused by the events of the past year at the same time as it begins to rebuild a shattered economy and to create a viable political structure. We have indicated to the authorities in Dacca that we are prepared to assist in a major multilateral relief effort under U.N. auspices.

Our relations with India were subjected to serious strain as a result of developments in South Asia in 1971. India has indicated a desire to renew better relations with the United States and on our part we reciprocate this desire and are ready for a dialogue with India on subjects of mutual concern. The pattern of our future relations will be shaped by the outcome of our discussions with India. We hope for fruitful results.

Thus the year ahead will be one of readjustment and reconstruction on which we seek to develop mutually beneficial relations between ourselves and the countries of South Asia. In addition, the President has indicated his intentions of seeking a more constructive approach to great power relations in South Asia in his discussions in Moscow.

(End text)

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משרד החוץ

אירופה א'

שמור

ירושלים, י"א בכסלו תשל"ב
29 בנובמבר 1971

ועידה לבטחון אירופה וצימצום הדדי ומאוזן של הכוחות

(א) תולדות הרעיון

הרעיון של כינוס ועידה אירופית לבטחון (להבדיל מועידה לבטחון אירופה) הינו "סוס מלחמה" סובייטי ישן. במשך כל השנים התייחס המערב לרעיון זה אך ורק כאל חלק מהמסע התעמולתי הסובייטי שכן הקריאות היו מלוות בגינוי מדיניות ארה"ב ו"חוגים מיליטריסטיים ונקמניים בגרמניה המערבית", בתוספת הצעות חשודות כגון: פיזור כל הבריחות הצבאיות, חיסול בסיסים צבאיים זרים, הקמת אזורים מפורזים מנשק גרעיני במרכז אירופה, הבלקנים ומדינות הדנובה.

החגברות השאיפה לדטנט במערב

בערך בשנות 1965-1966 החלה לנשב באירופה רוח של הרגעה והתפייסות עם הגוש המזרחי. בין הסיבות שיצרו אוירה של רצון לדטנט אפשר לציין: המצב הכלכלי הפורח בארצות מערב אירופה, ההרגשה שביחוד נוכח המלחמה הבלתי פופולרית בוייטנם אין לסמוך אך ורק על נבונות המדיניות האמריקנית, המדיניות הגוליסטית של התקרבות אל מוסקבה, הנטיה שהלכה והתפשטה לבנות את אירופה (המערבית) כגורם עצמאי, אם לא בשטח הצבאי, לפחות בשטח הכלכלי והמדיני. ההתערבות הצבאית הסובייטית נגד הונגריה בשנת 1956 נשכחה, קם דור חדש שלא ידע את המלחמה ואת תוצאותיה ועל כן לא רצה להאמין בעינים עצומות ללקחים של המלחמה. החלה לחדור האמונה שסכנת התוקפנות מהמזרח עברה ונשמעו קולות רבים שטענו כי אין יותר צורך בקיום נאטו.

תרגיל הרמל

באוירה זו נתכנסה מועצת נאטו בפאריס בדצמבר 1966 ועל פי הצעת ממשלת בלגיה החליטה "לערוך ניתוח רחב של ההתפתחויות הבינלאומיות מאז חתימת חוזה נאטו ב-1949". מחקר זה שקיבל את הכינוי "תרגיל הרמל" על שם שה"ח הבלגי שהציע את הרעיון, ערך שנה שלמה ובמושב מועצת השרים של נאטו שנתקיימה בבריסל בדצמבר 1967 אושר ע"י הארגון תחת השם "דו"ח הרמל". הדו"ח שמחיימר להגדיר את "תפקידי הבריח בעתיד" חוזר ומדגיש את הצורך להביא לידי דטנט באירופה בין המערב לבין הגוש המזרחי. אם כי הדו"ח מזכיר את התפקיד הצבאי של הבריח והצורך לשמור על עוצמה צבאית שתבטיח הגנת חברותיה מפני תוקפנות, הוא מציין גם ש"מאחר וההתפשטות הקומוניסטית באירופה נעצרה במידה רבה אודות לבריח נאטו, העולם הקומוניסטי הפסיק להיות מונוליתי והדוקטרינה הסובייטית של "דו-קיום בשלום" שינתה את אופיו של העימות עם המערב". הדו"ח מדגיש כי בטחון צבאי ומדיניות של דטנט אינם ההליכים מנוגדים זה לזה כי אם הם משלימים זה את זה. הדו"ח המליץ כמו כן על הגברת קצב לימוד הבעיות הכרוכות בפירוק נשק וחיפוש אמצעים מעשיים לפיקוח על הזיון כולל האפשרות של צימצום מאוזן של כוחות - כל זאת כדי להוכיח את רצון בנות הבריח להגיע לדטנט יעיל עם המזרח.

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יצויין כי המלחמה שפרצה במזרח התיכון ביוני 1967 לא השפיעה כמעט בכלל על הרוח הכללית של "דו"ח הרמל" שהסיף לדסנט. "דו"ח הרמל" הסתפק בציון ש"בנות הברית יבדקו בתשומת לב מיוחדת את בעיות ההגנה של exposed areas כגון האגף הדרום מזרחי. בהקשר זה המצב הנוכחי בים התיכון יוצר בעיות מיוחדות, בהתחשב בעובדה שהמשבר הנוכחי במזרח התיכון נופל בתחום אחריותו של האו"ם".

קריאת נאטו ברייקיביק לצימצום כוחות

ההמלצות שבדו"ח הרמל מצאו ביטוי מעשי במה שנוגע לצימצום הכוחות במושב הקיץ של מועצת שרי נאטו שהתקיים ברייקיביק ב-24-25 ביוני 1968. הסעיף המבצעי בהצהרה שפורסמה בתום המושב מציין כי "השרים הסכימו שרצוי להתחיל בתהליך שיביא לצימצום כוחות הדדי. למטרה זו הם החליטו לעשות את כל ההכנות כדי לפתוח בדיונים עם בריח המועצות ומדינות אחרות במזרח אירופה להזמינן להשתתף במאמץ להתקדם לקראת שלום".

קריאה ישירה זו מצד נאטו אל בריח המועצות לדון בצימצום כוחות כדי להביא להרפיית המתיחות באירופה - נשארה ללא מענה במשך קרוב לשלוש שנים. יצויין כי חברות נאטו לא דיברו כלל על ועידה לבטחון אירופה אלא אך ורק על נושא צימצום הדדי של כוחות.

הפלישה לצ'כוסלובקיה

הגישושים לדטנט בצורת ועידה כלל אירופית או צימצום כוחות קיבלו מכה קשה עקב הפלישה הסובייטית לצ'כוסלובקיה באוגוסט 1968. אולם לא עברו תשעה חדשים ומוסקבה חידשה שוב את הקו של הטפה למען טיפול כלל ארופי בבטחון של אירופה.

הצהרת בודפשט

מועצת בריח ורשה שהתכנסה בבודפשט ב-17.3.69 פירסמה קריאה לכינוס ועידה כללית אירופית על-מנת לדון בבעיות של בטחון אירופה ושיתוף פעולה של שלום. למטרה זו קראה "הצהרת בודפשט" לערוך כינוס של נציגי מדינות אירופה המעוניינות על מנת לקבוע הסידורים הנוהליים וסדר היום של הועידה.

אם כי "הצהרת בודפשט" היתה כתובה בסגנון מתון יחסית ללא התקפה על מדיניות החוץ האמריקנית וללא איזכור של ה"נקמנות" הגרמנית היא ציינה שתנאי מוקדם לקיום בטחון אירופה הוא שמירת הגבולות הקיימים באירופה כיום כולל הקו אודר-נייסה, הגבול בין שתי הגרמניות, הכרה בגרמניה המזרחית וקביעת העובדה שברלין המערבית אינה שייכת לרפ"ג ויש לה סטטוס מיוחד.

מושב מועצת השרים של נאטו שהתכנס בוושינגטון ב-10-11 באפריל 1969 לא הזכיר ישירות כלל את ההצעות שבהצהרת בודפשט. על בנות ברית [illegible] בה [illegible] הקודמת באירופה [illegible] [illegible] ומדינות אחרות אילו בעיות קונקרטיות עלולות [illegible] נושא [illegible] מוקדם". השרים הטילו על המועצה להכין רשימה של בעיות כנ"ל ולהגיש דו"ח על כך למושב הבא בדצמבר 1969.

3./.

בהודעה לא נאמר איפוא דבר על ועידה לבטחון אירופה ואף לא הוזכרה הצעה לצמצום כוחות הדדי כי אם נאמר במשפט אחד שבנות הברית ימשיכו ללמוד את השאלה. ההודעה הדגישה כי "שמירה על הגנה יעילה הנו גורם מייצב ותנאי הכרחי למדיניות יעילה של דטנט".

הזמנת פינלנד לערוך הועידה על אדמתה

למרות תגובה בלתי מעודדת זו המשיכה מוסקבה לגלגל נושא הועידה האירופית ובהשראתה שיגרה ממשלת פינלנד במאי 1969 לכל מדינות אירופה, כולל שתי הגרמניות, ארה"ב וקנדה ולמזכ"ל האו"ם, תזכיר בו הציעה להיות המארחת של הועידה לבטחון אירופה.

הצהרת פראג

ב-30-31 באוקטובר 1969 התכנסו בפראג שרי החוץ של ברית ורשה ובהצהרתם המשותפת המליצו לקיים ועידה כלל אירופית בהלסינקי במחצית הראשונה של שנת 1970. השרים המזרחיים הציעו כי בטחון אירופה יהיה מבוסס על:

1. ויתור על שימוש או איום בכח ביחסים בין מדינות אירופה;

2. פיתוח יחסי מסחר והקשרים בענינים מדעיים וטכניים כהקדמה לקראת שיתוף פעולה פוליטי בין מדינות אירופה.

הסכמת נאטו לדון בנושא ועידה לבטחון אירופה

מועצת נאטו הקבועה המורחבת שנתכנסה בבריסל ב-5-6 בנובמבר היתה בדעה שאלה נושאים לחעמולה גרידא המצביעים על כוונותיה האמיתיות של ברה"מ. עם זאת, קבעה המועצה, שמבחינה פוליטית אסור לנקוט עמדה שלילית לגבי רעיון ועידה לבטחון אירופה ויש לשחק את המשחק בהנחה שאולי בכל זאת אפשר לצעוד צעד כלשהוא בכיוון לדטנט. המועצה סיכמה רשימת הנושאים לליבון עם המזרח והגישה אותה למועצת שרי נאטו שנתכנסה בבריסל ב-4-5 בדצמבר 1969. מושב חורף זה של מועצת השרים של נאטו עבר בסימן של המשך חוסר אימון בכוונות ברה"מ מבחינה צבאית. המושב קבע כי "עד שלא יהיה הסכם בין מזרח למערב על צימצום הדדי ומאוזן בהיקף ובזמן של כוחות, נאטו תבטיח כי לא יהיה צימצום ביכולתה הצבאית. שרי נאטו ציינו כי הצעתם ברייקיביק ביוני 1968 שהוזכרה בוושינגטון (אפריל 69) בנושא צימצום כוחות נשארה ללא תגובה.

מאידך בנושא הפוליטי הקשור לועידה לבטחון אירופה חלה התקדמות ראויה לציון. בנפרד מההודעה הרשמית הרגילה פורסמה הצהרה מיוחדת בת 15 סעיפים, שהוקדשה ליחסי מזרח-מערב, כולל נושאי פיקוח על הנשק ופירוק הזיון, גרמניה וברלין, פיתוח יחסים בשטח הכלכלה, הטכניקה, המדע והתרבות. בפעם הראשונה התיחסה נאטו מפורשות לנושא של ועידה לבטחון אירופה ולהצעה המזרחית לכנסה בהקדם. שרי נאטו ציינו כי יש צורך בהכנות מוקדמות ומדוקדקות ושהסיכויים לכינוס ועידה או ועידות לבטחון אירופה תלויים בהתקדמות במגעים ובמו"מים הבילטרליים או המולטילטריים בין המדינות המעוניינות משני הצדדים. נאטו גם תרצה להבטיח שכינוס כנ"ל לא יהיה מכשיר לאישור חלוקת אירופה הנוכחית ושישתתפו בו כל המדינות הנוגעות בדבר.

הכוונה לארה"ב וקנדה שביחס להשתתפותן בועידה כלל-אירופית עמדת ברה"מ היתה מעורפלת ואף שלילית. ידוע היה שבתחילה הרוסים התכוונו ששתי המדינות הצפון-אמריקניות ישתתפו לכל היותר כמשקיפות. הרוסים ניסו ליצור גם פירוד בקרב ארצות אירופה ע"י הצעה בלתי רשמית כי ענין השתתפות ארה"ב ידון ויוכרע "ע"י מדינות אירופה עצמן", אולי אפילו בועידה עצמה אחרי פתיחתה. חברות נאטו נתנו להבין בבירור למוסקבה שלא יסכימו בשום אופן לכינוס ועידה בלי השתתפותן בזכויות מלאות של ארה"ב וקנדה.

במשך שנת 1969 מסרו נציגי רומניה והונגריה בבירות אירופיות שונות שהנושא לא יהווה מכשול ושהרוסים יהיו מוכנים להסכים לתביעה המערבית. בסופו של דבר הודיעו הרוסים רשמית כי הם מסכימים להשתתפותן של ארצות הברית ושל קנדה בועידה המתוכננת.

ביחס להשתתפות שתי הגרמניות, לא היתה בעיה בנושא זה מלכתחילה. רפ"ג לא עוררה מראש כל קשיים ביחס להשתתפות גרמ"ז בועידה. בון רק ביקשה כי תינתן לה אפשרות, עד כינוס הועידה, למצוא הסדרים בילטרליים עם גרמ"ז תוך מו"מ ובלי ההערבות גורמים זרים.

שיפור האוירה הפוליטית באירופה - הצהרת רומא

מושב האביב של מועצת השרים של נאטו שהתקיים ברומא ב-26-27 במאי 1970 נפתח בסימן של ניגודים בין האירופים מחד והאמריקנים מאידך. האמריקנים טענו שאין ללכת מעבר להודעת נאטו מדצמבר 1969 כלומר: כל מו"מ לדסנס תלוי בהודעה רוסית על נכונות לדון בנושא צימצום כוחות מאוזן ובנושאים ספציפיים-קונקרטיים אחרים ולא על עקרונות כלליים כפי שהוצע בהצהרת פראג. האירופים מצדם טענו שיש להיענות בצורה יותר מוחשית לקריאות מהמזרח להפגת המתיחות. יש לזכור שבינתיים רפ"ג החלה בשיחות עם ברה"מ, פולין וגרמ"ז, שארבעת המעצמות חידשו שיחותיהן על ברלין, ששיחות סאלט התפתחו ושהסכם על אי הפצת נשק גרעיני נכנס לתקפו. בסופו של דבר האמריקנים קיבלו, בדרך כלל, את עמדת האירופים. הודעת מועצת השרים:

1. הביעה נכונות חברות נאטו להקים מגע בילטרלי או מולטילטרלי עם המדינות המעוניינות כדי לבדוק מתי אפשר יהיה לכנס ועידה או ועידות לבטחון אירופה - זאת במידה שתהיה התקדמות ביחס לגרמניה וברלין.

2. כללה בין נושאי הועידה שנים מאלה שנקבעו בהצהרת פראג - דהיינו, העקרונות שצריכים להנחות את היחסים בין המדינות כולל ויתור על שימוש בכוח ופיתוח יחסי המסחר והכלכלה. מחוץ מניעים מובנים הוסיפו שרי נאטו שיש לדון גם בתנועה חפשית של אנשים, ידיעות, רעיונות וכן שיתוף פעולה בשטחי התרבות המדע והטכניקה וסביבת האדם.

3. הטילה על שר החוץ האיטלקי אלדו מורו להעביר רשמית בצינורות הדיפלומטיים את הודעת נאטו למדינות המעוניינות ובכך לעשות צעד רשמי לקיאת המזרח.

4. להעביר את ההודעה בצינורות הדיפלומטיים גם למדינות נייטרליות ובלתי מזדהות. (מסחרי שהכוונה לספרד, שוויץ, יוגוסלביה, פינלנד ושבדיה).

5. חזרה על ענינה בפירוק נשק באירופה ובצימצום מאוזן והדדי של כוחות ורשמה כי להצעתה בנושא זה עדיין לא היתה כל תגובה.

5./.

תגובה מעודדת של ברית ורשה - איזכור ראשון של נושא צימצום כוחות

תגובתה של ברית ורשה לא איחרה לבוא והיא היתה בדרך כלל ברוח חיובית. מושב שרי החוץ של ברית ורשה שהתקיים בבודפשט ב-21-22 ביוני 1970 הביע סיפוק "מהתקרבות העמדות בענין כינוס ועידה אירופית" והצהיר:

1. ששתי הגרמניות ישותפו וכן, מפורשות, ארה"ב וקנדה;

2. שידונו בנושאים שהוזכרו בהצהרת פראג וכן בהרחבת הקשרים המסחריים הכלכליים, המדעיים-טכניים והתרבותיים בכוונה לפתח שיתוף פעולה פוליטי בין מדינות אירופה. (תצויין התעלמות מהצעת נאטו על חופש תנועת אנשים, דעות, ידיעות וכו');

3. שיוקם גוף שיעסוק בשאלות הבטחון ושיתוף הפעולה באירופה;

4. ובפעם הראשונה נגע בשאלת צימצום הכוחות בציינו כי לימוד נושא צימצום הכוחות המזוינים הזרים החונים על אדמות מדינות אירופה יכול לשרת ענין הדטנט והבטחון באירופה.

במערב נחשבה הצהרת בודפשט זו כצעד קדימה שכן סוף סוף מסכימים הסובייטים להזכיר את נושא צימצום כוחות אם כי בצורה המוגבלת של "כוחות זרים" שמשמעותה ברורה.

נדמה היה שהודעות נאטו וברית ורשה פתחו תקופה של התקדמות לקראת דטנט. ואמנם ב-12.8.70 נחתם במוסקבה הסכם בין רפ"ג לבין ברית המועצות וב-18.11.70 נחתם הסכם בין רפ"ג לבין פולין.

עיכור האוירה - קיפאון בשיחות ברלין

אולם בד בבד עם צעדים אלה התרבו הסימנים של הקשחת עמדת הסובייטים. שיחות ברלין נכנסו לקיפאון, שיחות סאלט דרכו במקום, החדירה הסובייטית לים התיכון גברה. פרשת הזזת הטילים לעבר תעלת סואץ, פעילות צבאית ימית סובייטית באיזורי קובה, הקאריבים והאוקינוס ההודי שוב העלו חשדות כי מנוי וגמור עם הסובייטים להמשיך בהתפשטותם במימדים גלובליים. במועצת שרי נאטו שנתכנסה בבריסל ב-2-4 בדצמבר 1970 גברה העמדה שיש לדבר עם הרוסים בטון תקיף ולהמנע מלהגרר אחרי התמרון התעמולתי הסובייטי בענין סיכויי הדטנט. כך, במקום עמדת מועצת נאטו הקודמת לפיה מוכנים לבדוק אפשרות של מגעים מולטילטרליים במקרה ותהיה התקדמות בשיחות על גרמניה ועל ברלין, הצהירה הפעם המועצה בצורה ברורה ולא ברמזים, כי תנאי מוקדם לכל דיון על כינוס ועידה לבטחון אירופה הנו השגת פתרון משביע רצון של בעית ברלין. יצויין כי בין הבעיות הפוליטיות ששרי החוץ של נאטו יחסו אליהן חשיבות מיוחדת והזכירו אותן בהודעה הרשמית, מופיע גם "המצב בים התיכון" ביחד עם בעיות מרכזיות כגון שיחות סאלט, ההסכמים בין רפ"ג וברה"מ ופולין, היחסים בין שתי הגרמניות ובעית ברלין.

באשר לצימצום כוחות, המועצה הזכירה שוב את הצעתה מלפני שלש שנים (רייקיביק) על צימצום הדדי ומאוזן וציינה כי הצעה זו נשארה ללא מענה. עם זאת וכמחוה של רצון טוב, הביעה מועצת נאטו (פחות צרפת) נכונות לדון בצימצום כוחות זרים (כפי שהציעה ברית ורשה) אולם כחלק מדיון על צימצום כוחות כולל, דהיינו, זרים ומקומיים כאחד. הסובייטים הרגישו כי חל שינוי לרעה באוירה בנאטו ושמו לב לסגנון התקיף שבהודעה. על כן בניגוד לפעם הקודמת חזרו למנהגם להחקיף את תוכן ההודעה ואת "מחרחרי המלחמה".

הודעת ליסבון

בששת החדשים שעברו עד לכינוס המועצה הבאה של נאטו בליסבון ב-3-4 ביוני 1971 לא הורגשה כל נטיה סובייטית לרכך את עמדתם או לעשות מחווה הקטן ביותר שיאפשר לחסידי הדטנט במערב להיחלות בו כדי לחדש את המסע לטובת הועידה לבטחון אירופה. כינוס שרי החוץ של ברית ורשה שהתקיים ב-18-19 בפברואר 1971 בבוקרשט התריע נגד "החוגים שאינם מעוניינים בדטנט, ובמתנגדים לכינוס ועידת בטחון פאן-אירופית והקושרים את הועידה עם פתרון בעיות אחרות דבר שיהווה מכשול רציני בדרך כינוסה".

כך היה המצב עד לזמן קצר לפני כינוס מועצת נאטו בליסבון. נראה שמוסקבה החליטה שהם עלולים להפסיד בשני מישורים אם יתמידו בקשיחותם:

1. במישור דעת הקהל - יפסיקו להופיע כיוזמי הדטנט.

2. במישור הכנסת פירוד בין חברות נאטו.

באוירה זאת נאם ברז'ניב בטיפליס (ב-13.5.71) ואמר כי במערב שואלים מה בעצם הצעת המזרח ביחס לצימצום כוחות, אם מדובר בצימצום כוחות לאומיים או כוחות זרים, אם מדובר בכוחות קונבנסיונליים או גם נוקליאריים. לאנשים הסקרנים האלה הוא רוצה להשיב בפתגם הרוסי האומר כי:"כשבאים לדון על הטעם של היין - אין להסתפק בצורתו החיצונית", ועל כן על המערב לנסות את ההצעה ע"י זה שיתחילו לנהל מו"מ.

דברים אלה של ברז'ניב נתנו אפשרות חברות נאטו מסויימות להשפיע בכיוון בעת נכונות להתקדם בהודעה שפורסמה בתום מועצת השרים של נאטו בליסבון.

ההודעה ממליצה על המשך המגעים הבילטרליים בין מדינות המזרח והמערב כדי לברר האפשרויות לפתוח במו"מ ביחס לצימצום כוחות. מועצת השרים אף החליטה לכנס מושב מיוחד של המועצה הקבועה בהשתתפות סגני שרי חוץ ובו יסוכמו תוצאות המגעים הבילטרליים, והביעה נכונות למנות נציג מיוחד שינהל שיחות בירור עם הסובייטים וממשלות מעוניינות אחרות.

בענין הועידה לבטחון אירופה, הדעה הכללית היתה ש"עוד חזון למועד". עם זאת, ובהשפעת שר-החוץ הצרפתי שומאן, שחזר מביקור במוסקבה מלא תקוות על הכוונות הטובות של הסובייטים, הוחלט לרכך את עמדת המערב ולהמנע מלפגוע בסובייטים ע"י כך שלא יחזרו על התנאי שפתרון בעית ברלין חייב להקדים כינוס הועידה. הפעם הסתפקו שרי נאטו בהצהרה שהם יראו כל סיום מוצלח של השיחות על ברלין כסימן מעודד לרצון הסובייטים לשיפור היחסים בין מזרח למערב.

שיפור באוירה הפוליטית והסכם הארבעה על ברלין

בניגוד לזהירות ולפסימיות הנ"ל חל שיפור ניכר באוירה הפוליטית באירופה בחדשי הקיץ ובסתיו. שיחות ארבעת המעצמות על ברלין נסתיימו בהצלחה ב-3.9.71 והחלו שיחות ענייניות בין שתי הגרמניות. ברנדט ביקר אצל ברז'ניב בקרים. גברה האופטימיות ביחס לסיכויי כינוס ועידה לבטחון אירופה. המועצה המיוחדת של נאטו שנתכנסה ב-5.10.71 החליטה למנות את מנליו ברוזיו - מזכ"ל נאטו שסיים את תפקידו ב-1.10.71 - כשליח למוסקבה, ואולי גם לבירות מזרחיות אחרות, כדי לברר מה הכוונות של הסובייטים בנושא צימצום כוחות, וכיצד אפשר להתקדם כדי לפתוח במו"מ עניני.