

56 א'

ממשל ארה"ב

ב-31/12/78 - 31/12/78
לממשל, קא-ג' - 16.7.76

16.7.76

נפתח:

20.12.78

נסגר:



שט וניק: משנה למנכ"ל ח. בר-און - ממשל ארה"ב -
בז'נינסקי - מונדייל

חצ-7082/9

טווח פיו

מזהה בריט: 000b4fq

תאריך הדפסה: 05/12/2018

סנובת: 3-312-3-6-1

954/911

טיוטא מס' 3
מבטל טיוטא מס' 2
(נא להשמיד)

27.6.78

תכנית ביקור
וולטר מונדייל, סגן נשיא ארצות הברית

יום ו' - 30.6.78

נחיתת מטוס מס' 2, בנתב"ג	- 13.45
נחיתת מטוס האורח	- 14.00
ק"פ ע"י רה"מ ויו"ר הכנסת	-
ברכות ע"י רה"מ	-
תשובת סגן הנשיא	-
יציאה לירושלים	- 14.35
הגעה למלון	- 15.15
יציאה מהמלון לכותל	- 16.20
יציאה למלון	- 17.00
פגישה עם סגן רה"מ, במלון	- 17.15
סיום הפגישה	- 18.00
לינה - מלון המלך-דוד, ירושלים	

יום שבת - 1.7.78 (ביקור פרטי)

יציאה לתל-אביב	- 11.00
פגישה עם הגב' ג. מאיר, בביתח	- 12.00
יציאה לירושלים	- 13.00
הגעה למלון	- 14.00
פגישה עם ח"כ ש. פרס - שג' אמריקה מטפלת בזמון (טעון אשור)	- 19.35
ק"פ של השגריר ואגודת הידידות ישראל-ארה"ב, במלון המלך-דוד	- 20.00
לכ-400-500 איש	
סיום קבלת הפנים	- 22.00
(21.30-22.00) - האורח יעזוב את קבלת הפנים	
לינה - מלון המלך-דוד, ירושלים	

יום א' - 2.7.78

פגישת עבודה (טעון אשור)	- 08.15
יציאה מהמלון למשכן הנשיא	- 08.55
ביקור אצל הנשיא כ-50 איש	- 09.00
יציאה לכנסת	- 09.30
משמר כבוד והנחת זר	- 09.40
ביקור אצל יו"ר הכנסת	- 09.50
מנוחה (הכנסת תדאג לחדרים מתאימים)	- 10.15
יציאה למנחת	- 10.25
המראה לשדה בוקר ובאר-שבע	- 10.30
(זמני הביקור בשדה בוקר ובבאר-שבע יסוכמו ע"י תת-אלוף פורן, האמריקאים... וכו')	
הגעה לירושלים למלון	- 13.30
יציאה למשרד רה"מ	- 15.50
ישיבת עבודה אצל רה"מ	- 16.00
סיום ישיבת העבודה	- 17.00
התעכבות עם עתונאים	- 17.15
חזרה למלון	- 17.30
יציאה לכנסת	- 19.50
ארוחת ערב מטעם ראש הממשלה	- 20.00
חזרה למלון	- 23.00
לינה - מלון המלך-דוד, ירושלים	

יום ב' - 3.7.78	
יציאה מהמלון	- 08.00
ביקור ביד-ושם	- 08.15
חזרה למלון	- 08.45
פגישה עם צוות האמריקאים	- 09.00
יציאה לבית רה"מ	- 09.50
פגישה עם רה"מ, בכיתו	- 10.00
הצטרפות הגב' מונדייל וביתה לבית רה"מ	- 11.00
חזרה למלון	- 11.30
מפגש עם עתונאים	- 12.00
יציאה מהמלון לנתב"ג	- 13.00
הגעה לנתב"ג	- 13.45
המראה	- 14.00

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מזכר

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התאריך

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Shed / 2000 10/10/10

: סאת

תיק בוס'

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 3. 2×10^3 10^3 10^3 10^3 10^3
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 6. 2×10^3 10^3 10^3 10^3 10^3
 7. 2×10^3 10^3 10^3 10^3 10^3
 8. 2×10^3 10^3 10^3 10^3 10^3
 9. 2×10^3 10^3 10^3 10^3 10^3
 10. 2×10^3 10^3 10^3 10^3 10^3

2-27
H. 10-11

אל:	מר 'הוצא' אדני / מאור	התאריך	29/6
מאת:	מנצח	תיק מס'	
הנדון:			

הצעת אגרים לשמירת קנין

אודות הצעת אגרים לשמירת קנין
המאגן שבו הוצא אגרי
דיקורס 88 הנקרא מנצח ו
המאגן שבו הוצא אגרי
על הקבוצה משה ואלו צ"ח
האמריקנים.

גרייב
אגרי אגרי

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, בולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות דשמיים),
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת השגר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

ש מ ר

מס 517
נשלח 281630 יוני 78
התקבל 290113 יוני 78

מ י י ד נ

ל
מ
ר

אל: המשרד
מאת: וושינגטון

מעת, ארד

הפצ לשכת העתונות, פתיר לשכת רחמי.

ביקור מונדייל. לשלנו הגלוי 512.

מפגים חשובות לבכמ לדמה הבכירה של העתונאים המלווים את סגן הנשיא
בביקורו בארץ. פרט לאורחים כמו מרטינ פרצ ופיליפ גילינ (עליו הברקנו
בנפרד) נמצאים שם כמה מבכירי הכתבים המדיניים באהב.

רצוי מאד לנצל שהותם בארץ של כתבים אלה כדי לארגן להם סיורים ותדרכים
כאשר סגן הנשיא עסוק בשיחות או כאשר לוח הזמנים שלו מאפשר זמן
פנוי לעתונאים.

נושא שהיינו ממליצים לשים עליו את הדגש הוא תדריך בענייני יושי,
במי ווד האיםפלקציות הבטחוניות של אפשרות השמטת השליטה על אזורים אלה
מידיו. כדאי להביאם לשם כך לקליפליה או לשול כרם כדי להמחיש להם
רוחבה של מדינת ישראל לפני 1967.

ודאי תעלו עוד רעיונות וככל שתרבו כן יהיה משובח.

פזנר.

למנהל המשרד
למנהל המשרד
למנהל המשרד
למנהל המשרד

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

528 *צמח

נשלה 291400 יוני 78

שמר

5177

אל: המשך

מחנה: 10 ש"ל 100

אל: מכל רדמי.

העתק: מכל משהח.

ביקור מונדיאל.

להלן רשימת הפמליה כפי שנמסרה לנו ממחמד:

OFFICIAL PARTY TO ISRAEL WITH VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE,
THURSDAY, 29 JUNE 1978.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE

MRS. MONDALE

ELEANOR MONDALE

AMBASSADOR AND MRS. SAMUEL LEWIS

STUART EIZENSTAT

ROBERT LIPSHUTZ

DAVID AARON

HAROLD SAUNDERS

MICHAEL BERMAN

JIM JOHNSON, EXEC. ASS'T TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

DENNIS CLIFT

ALBERT EISELE, PRESS SECRETARY

DR. WILLIAM QUANDY

YOSSI GAL. 198.146

הנה זהו סוג של תגובה כימית

מס: 512

נשלח: 281600 יוני 78

התקבל: 281310 יוני 78

אל: המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון

מידי

מעת ארד הפץ לשכת עתונות פוזר לשכת רוחם.

ביקור מונדייל, לחלן רשימת הכתבים שילוו את סגן הנשיא בעת ביקורו בארץ:-

1. HENRY BRADSHAW WASHINGTON STAR
2. JAMES DUVALL C.B.S. NEWS
3. PHILIP GEYELIN WASHINGTON POST
4. KAREN HOUSE WALL STREET JOURNAL
5. HERVERT KAPLOW A.B.C. NEWS
6. DOUGLAS KIKER N.C.B.C.
7. CHRIS OGDEN TIME MAGAZINE
8. ROBERT SHOGAN LOS ANGELES TIMES
9. TERRY SMITH NEW YORK TIMES
10. SCOTT SULLIVAN NEWSWEEK
11. JAMES WIEGHART NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
12. MARTIN PERETZ NEW REPUBLIC
13. DOUGLAS WATSON BALTIMORE SUN

26 כ"א

פ"א

אנא איז אפאד אפאד אפאד אפאד, פ"א-אפאד

מס: 510

נשלח: 281600 יוני 78

התקבל: 282254 יוני 78

דקור מלכוד

אל: המשרד

מאת: וויטבגסון

מיון

מצבא לשכת רווחה.

ניקור מונדייל.

משרדו של סגן הנשיא פרסט אהוז את רשימת האישים שילוו אותו בליקורו בארץ.

להלן הרשימה :

HYMAN BOOKBINER - WASH, DC, REPRESENTATIVE, AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

DAVID BLUMBER - PRESIDENT, D'NAI B'RITH, WASH, DC

G. HARRISON DOGOLE - BUSINESSMAN, PHILADELPHIA

DAVID FLEEMAN - BUSINESSMAN, MIAMI

CHARLOTTE JACOBSON - CHAIRMAN, WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION

BURTON JOSEPH - PRESIDENT, ANTI DEFAMATION LEAGUE, MINNEAPOLIS

MAX KAMPLEMAN - ATTORNEY, WASH, DC

E. ROBERT KINNEY - BUSINESSMAN MINNEAPOLIS

ARTHUR KRIM - BUSINESSMAN, NEW YORK

ESTHER LANDA - PRESIDENT NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN

RICHARD MAASS - PRESIDENT AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

THEODORE R. MANN - CHAIRMAN-ELECT, CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF
MAJOR JEWISH ORGANIZATION, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL JEWISH COMMUNITY
RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL

STUART MOLDAW - BUSINESS MAN SAN FRANCISCO

ARNOLD PICKER - BUSINESSMAN MIAMI

REV. DAVID PREUS - PRESIDENT, AMERICAN LUTHERAN CHURCH

RABBI BERNARD RASKAS - TEMPLE OF AARON, ST. PAUL

SAMUEL ROTHBERG - PRESIDENT, DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION FOR ISRAEL

R/...

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HOWARD SAMUELS -BUSINESSMAN NEW YORK

ED SANDERS-ATTORNEY , LOS ANGELES

RABBI ALEXANDER SCHINDLER -CHAIRMAN, CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF
MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

JERRY SHESTACK-ATTORNEY , PHILADELPHIA

WALTER SHORENSTEIN-BUSINESSMAN, SAN FRANCISCO

BERNICE TENNENBAUM -PRESIDENT , HADASSAH, NEW YORK

RABBI SAUL TEPLITZ -PRESIDENT, SYNAGOGUE COUNCIL OF AMERICA

LOU WASSERMAN-BUSINESSMAN, LOS ANGELES

EVERLYN WASSERSTROM -PRESIDENT, B'NEI B'RITH WOMEN , KANSAS

GLENN WATTS- PRESIDENT, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA

COLEMAN YOUNG -MAYOR, DETROIT

לד כ"ו

פ"ד

לד (ה) נורה שגם אגל אמל טמנף אומים
 מרפא אגל טמנף גמדי

ED SANDERS-ATTORNEY, LOS ANGELES
HARRY ALEXANDER SCHINDLER, CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PRISONERS OF
MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATION
HARRY SPETACK-ATTORNEY, PHILADELPHIA
WALTER SHOUHESTEIN-BUSINESSMAN AND FINANCIAL
SERVICE ENGINEER-ARMY FIRST LIEUTENANT, KANSAS, 1917-19
HARRY S. REPLITZ-PRESIDENT, SYRACUSE, DUNCEY, IN AMERICA
ALBERT H. BROWN-DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, KANSAS
ALBERT H. BROWN-DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, KANSAS
ALBERT H. BROWN-DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, KANSAS
ALBERT H. BROWN-DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, KANSAS
ALBERT H. BROWN-DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, KANSAS

10038

25

ALBERT H. BROWN-DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, KANSAS
ALBERT H. BROWN-DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, KANSAS

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון) המדינה
יחסי' חוק' וסודות (רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

סודי

מברק נכנס-מסווג

אל:המשרד

מאת: ורשין גטרן

מצפ"א אירופה ב"י

ביקור מונדיאל

1. פגשתי את קוואנדט בסעודת ערב בביתו של יועץ שגרירות בריטניה

שנערכה לכבוד עמיתו MICHAEL Palko העובד בקרוב להיות
מס' 2 בשגרירות הבריטית בתיא

2. קוואנטש סיפר כי מונדייל מתכוננ סעט באופן יסודי ביותר לקראת ביקורו. מאז סוף השבוע האחרון מקיים מונדייל שתי ישיבות תדירונ יומיות ובסך הכל 3 עד 4 שעות ביום. בישיבות אלו בהן משתתפ סגל מצומצמ של מומחים, מציג מונדייל שאלות או נושאים שלדעתו עשויים לעלות בזמן השיחות בישראל ומבקש לשמוע מהעוזרים מהי התשובה המתאימה שעליו להשיב. מונדייל התכוננ באופן דומה לפני סיורו בדרמיז אסיה ולמד יפה את הנושאים.

3. קוואנדט, אמר כי הנאום המרכזי שאותו ישא מונדייל בארצ
יהיה בסעודה חגיגית בבנין הכנסת. טיוטת נאום זה עברה
ידיים רבות וכעת מתגלגלת והטייטה הדביעית או החמישית.

תורגמן

מיון
21/1/78

ירושלים, כ"ב בסיוון תשל"ח

סודי

27 ביוני 1978

אל : מר א. רובינשטיין, סמנכ"ל, לשכת שה"ח

מר ז. טווח, מנהל לשכת הסנכ"ל

מאת: מנהל המח' הבינ"ל, ממ"ד

הנדון: פונדזיל

לקראת ביקורו של סגן נשי ארה"ב בארץ, מצ"ב:

1. מעמדו, החומי פעילותו והשקפותיו המדיניות של האורח.

2. קורות חייו.

3. צדור התבטאויות.

הסקירה והחומר הוכנו ע"י גב' א. חדר.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

יחזקאל ברנע

העתק: ראש המרכז

1. מנהל מצפ"א

2. השגרירות, וושינגטון

DATE

RECEIVED BY

TO

BY

FOR

AMOUNT

REMARKS

DATE

REMARKS

DATE

REMARKS

DATE

REMARKS

DATE

REMARKS

1. סגן הנשיא מונדייל

- א. תפקידו הפורמלי היחיד של סגן-הנשיא הוא ישיבה בראש הסנט (החוקת מאפשרת לו במקרים נדירים ומיוחדים במינם לחטיל את קולו בהכרעה כשיש הצבעה תיקו). לבד מזאת, נתפשה המשרה בעבר כעמדת המתנה ייצוגית בלבד, עד שאירע ובשנים האחרונות נקרא סגן-הנשיא שלוש פעמים לתפוש את מקום הנשיא (פורד, ג'ונסון, טרומן), ואף נקרא נשיא זמני לאחר בירת קפצואל סגן הנשיא ומועץ שיתוף יושר מאשר יושרה ו"33".
- ב. כאשר התווה קארטר את סגנון ממשלו, בעת מסע הבחירות, הוא הבטיח שלסגן-הנשיא שלו יהיו סמכויות ושסחי-אחריות ביצועיים נרחבים ורציניים מאלה שהיו מקובלים בעבר. קארטר הסביר שחשוב למקרה הצורך שתמיד יעמוד בראש המדינה אדם מיומן ומעורה בבעיות הממשל, וגם בימים רגילים יש לחלק את נטל ההנהגה בין הנשיא לסגנו. (קארטר אף תבע שמשרדו של מונדייל יהיה סמוך לשלו ובבית הלבן ולא בבית סמוך ובנפרד מהצוות). כמו כן הודיע הנשיא לצוות העובדים כי עליהם להתייחס לסגנו כאילו הכל פתוח בפניו וזכותו לברר ולייעץ בכל נושא.
- יש לציין שהנשיא עמד בהבטחותיו ומעמדו של מונדייל, הן בציבור והן בתוך הבית-הלבן שונה ונכבד ממעמד קודמיו בתפקיד.
- ג. עיקר כוחו של מונדייל נובע מכך שהוא "היועץ" הראשון במעלה והנשמע ביותר בצוות הנשיא. בגלל תכונותיו האישיות, נסיונו הפוליטי הרב וקשריו עם הקונגרס, נשמעת עצתו אצל הנשיא ועוזריו בכל הנושאים הנידונים בשאלות פנים וממשל.
- למונדייל מעמד מכובד ואיתן בקרב החוגים הליברלים בקונגרס ובציבור, (שהם גדולי אויביו הפוטנציאליים של קארטר בשאלות מהותיות ומעשיות). כמו כן הוא מקובל במיוחד על האיגודים המקצועיים ועל הקבוצות הפועלות לזכויות אזרח ומיעוטים מקופחים.
- גם בנושאי מדיניות החוץ מביע מונדייל דעתו בדיונים הפנימיים המצומצמים (או בישיבות עם הנשיא אותו הוא רואה בקביעות מידי יום). הוא מונה לרכז במיוחד את המאמצים של הממשל בבעיות דרומה של אפריקה והעברת השלטון לשחורים, וידוע שעסק גם בשאלות כמו צמצום הפצת נשק גרעיני, סאל"ט והמזח"ת ולאחרונה היחסים עם אסיה.
- ד. מונדייל נחשב לאדם מבריק, אינטליגנטי וידידותי ביותר אך מתואר כחסר EGO חזק מספיק כדי לעשותו למנהיג לאומי. תכונה זו עצמה היא הנותנת לגבי הצלחתו כסגן-נשיא ציועץ חכם ונוח-לבריות שאין לו אויבים ואינו מאפיל או מתחרה בנשיא עצמו.
- מונדייל מוכשר במיוחד כ"פוליטיקאי" מקצועי ואינו שש להסתכסך עם אנשים, גופים ציבוריים או בעלי השפעה. הנשיא קארטר אמר עליו ש"אין איש יכול להגיע למקומו ולחשיבותו לגבי, קרבתו אלי ויכולתו לבצע משימות מיוחדות תוך כדי אמוני המוחלט" (3.10.77).

ה. תפקידים מדיניים:

הנשיא קארטר הטיל על מונדייל לייצגו (הן מבחינת המעמד-האישי והן מבחינת השליחות והחשיבות הפוליטית של הנשיא) כבר בשבוע הראשון לתמשלו:

(1) המסע לאירופה (23.1.77) לפגישה אישית עם מנהיגים (בריסל, רומא, פאריס, לונדון, ברלין) כאות למדיניות החדשה שפניה לש"פ אמיץ עם אירופה. כסמל נוסף למדיניות החדשה נסע מונדייל משם לטוקיו.

(2) מסע נוסף (14.5.77) לפורטוגל, ספרד, ויוגוסלביה שבמהלכו התקיימה פגישה עם רה"מ פורטור מדורם אפריקה בוינה (19.5) ואחריה דיון עם שה"ח אוואן בבריטניה, שמהם צמחה תיזמה האמריקנית-בריטית בנושא רודזיה.

(3) מסע לאסיה (פיליפינים, תאילנד, אינדונזיה, אוסטרליה, ניו-זילנד) 30.4.78 שנועד לחזק את המחויבות ארה"ב לבטחונה של אסיה ולהוכיח את המשך המדיניות של ש"פ וסיוע (ותחזקת הבסיסים).

(4) סיוע לנשיא בהשגת קולות בסנט לאישור אמנת תעלת פנמה בראשית השנה.

(5) הופיע בעצרת המיוחדת לפרוק-הנשק, כשם הנשיא (24.5.78).

ו. תמזה"ת

(1) השרות הגדול ביותר אותו עשה ועושה מונדייל לנשיא נמצא בתחום יחסיו

המיוחדים עם הקהילה היהודית וקשריו הארוכים והטובים עם ישראל ומחנה אוהדיה בארה"ב. יוקרתו האישית ומעמדו האיתן כידיד ישראל שימשו לא אחת כמכשיר בידי הממשל להרגיע דאגות וחששות ממדיניות לא-מאוזנת או שלילית לעמדות ישראל ומיזמות ארה"ב בנושא פתרון הסכסוך.

לאחר הרושם הקשה שעשו דברי קארטר (לפני ואחרי הבחירות בישראל) הוזעק מונדייל לתקן ולרכך את המשמעויות של תכנית הממשל (ועמדתו בשאלת הפלסטינים), ועשה זאת בנאומו בסן-פרנציסקו (17.6.77). מכאן, וככל שגברו חששות הקהילה היהודית ועם התרבות ההצהרות של אנשי ממשל והנשיא עצמו, כך נקרא מונדייל לשכנע ולהרגיע אותם. בזמן מסויים נראה כאילו מציג הממשל את מונדייל כקוטב השני, המאזן והאוהד לישראל ועמדותיה, כנגד בז'ז'ינסקי, שהואשם בעוינות כלפי היהודים ובחוסר תבונה לעמדות ישראל.

(2) סגן הנשיא קיים ביזמתו שיחות ארוכות עם מנהיגי הקהילה ועם סנטורים וחברי ביתנ"ב מאוהדי ישראל. הוא פעל בעיקר בשטח חיזוק ואישור-מחדש של המחויבות של ארה"ב לישראל, שלמותה ובטחונה. כחלק ממסע שכנוע עקיף, הצליח מונדייל להפעיל לחץ אפילו על המפרי הנוטה למות, להביאו לכתיבת (ופרסום) מכתבו לרה"מ בגין בדבר הצורך בגמישות וויתורים.

1. General

The purpose of this report is to provide information on the progress of the work done during the period from 1 January to 31 March 1964.

(1) The work done during the period from 1 January to 31 March 1964 has been divided into three main parts: (a) the study of the properties of the system, (b) the study of the properties of the system, and (c) the study of the properties of the system.

(2) The work done during the period from 1 January to 31 March 1964 has been divided into three main parts: (a) the study of the properties of the system, (b) the study of the properties of the system, and (c) the study of the properties of the system.

(3) The work done during the period from 1 January to 31 March 1964 has been divided into three main parts: (a) the study of the properties of the system, (b) the study of the properties of the system, and (c) the study of the properties of the system.

(4) The work done during the period from 1 January to 31 March 1964 has been divided into three main parts: (a) the study of the properties of the system, (b) the study of the properties of the system, and (c) the study of the properties of the system.

(5) The work done during the period from 1 January to 31 March 1964 has been divided into three main parts: (a) the study of the properties of the system, (b) the study of the properties of the system, and (c) the study of the properties of the system.

2. Results

(1) The results of the work done during the period from 1 January to 31 March 1964 are as follows: (a) the study of the properties of the system, (b) the study of the properties of the system, and (c) the study of the properties of the system.

(2) The results of the work done during the period from 1 January to 31 March 1964 are as follows: (a) the study of the properties of the system, (b) the study of the properties of the system, and (c) the study of the properties of the system.

(3) The results of the work done during the period from 1 January to 31 March 1964 are as follows: (a) the study of the properties of the system, (b) the study of the properties of the system, and (c) the study of the properties of the system.

(3) כושרו המיוחד של מונדייל התגלה לאחרונה, כאשר נכנס הממשל למאבק של יוקרה ועקרון עם הסנט בשאלת עסקת המטוסים המשולשת. כישוריו וקשריו הרבים של מונדייל איפשרו לו לקחת חלק פעיל במסע-השכנוע והלחצים על חברי ועדת-החוץ בסנט (ובמקביל אצל סנטורים ומורשים בכלל). המקרה הידוע והפומבי ביותר הוא פרשת שיחתו הממושכת, ערב ההצבעה, עם גב' מ. המפרי (שירשה את מקום בעלה בסנט) עליה הפעיל לחץ כבד ביותר הן כידיד המשפחה והן כיורשו של בעלה ו"ממשיך דרכו". לאחר עסקת המטוסים ברור לחלוטין כי לסגן הנשיא אין עמדה או השקפה פומבית משל עצמו. פעולתו בפרשה זו אינה בהכרח מצביעה על הסכמתו או אמונתו במדיניות הממשל, אבל מעל לכל ספק הובהר שמונדייל הוא "מספר 2" יעיל ממושמע ומקבל מרות. בכל התבטאויותיו הוא פוליטיקאי מקצועי שתפקידו להסביר ו"למכור" את השקפת הנשיא (אם גם במילים שנונות וברוח טובה יותר). בשנים בהן היה סנטור, נחשב מונדייל לתלמידו ונאמנו של המפרי גם בכל מה שנוגע לעמדות (ליברליות) בענייני פנים. ככל הידוע לנו לא התבלט מונדייל כחתבטאיות מיוחדות בשאלות חוץ בזכות עצמו ונחשב, גם בכך לבן-חסותו של המפרי.

רקע אישי

וולטר פרידריק (פריץ) מונדייל (Fritz) Mondale - סגן הנשיא

1. נולד ב-5 לינואר 1928 בציילון, מינסוטה, כצאצא למשפחה שמוצאה בנורבגיה. שרת כ-מש"ק בצבא (Army), פרסביטריאני.

2. בעל תואר במשפטים, אותו רכש באוניברסיטת מינסוטה.

3. התוודע לפוליטיקה כעוזר לחמפרי, החל מ-1948, ושימש כתובע כללי במינסוטה בשנים 1964-1960.

4. מונדייל כיהן בסנאט החל מ-1965 (תפס את מקומו של המפרי, כשזה החל לכהן כסגן נשיא) היה מסיים כהונתו 1979, אלמלא מונה לסגן נשיא (1976). בין השאר, היה חבר בוועדת הסנאט לכספים ולחקציב, בוועדת העבודה והרווחה הציבורית, ובתפקיד מפתח בוועדת צ'רץ' לנושאי המודיעין; מונדייל עמד בראש תת-ועדה לענייני מודיעין פנימי (ובראשות תת-ועדות לבעיות "נועד וילד", "פרישה ובעיות הפרס", "מיסוי מדינתי וסחר בינמדינתי").

5. מונדייל נודע בתמיכתו המובהקת בישראל ובמאבקו למען זכות ההגירה של יהודי ברי"מ; הוא נחשב כליברל וכמי שחיה פעיל להגנת האינטרסים של הצרכן האמריקני, וזכויות המיעוטים. בעבר תמך במדיניותו הויטנאמית של ג'ונסון, בין הצבעותיו בקונגרס יש לציין לאחרונה את:

א. בתחום הצבאי - נגד ייצור המפציץ B-1 ובעד קיצוץ במערכת טילי ה"טרידנט", בעד קיצוץ כוחות ארה"ב באירופה ב-40%. הביע התנגדותו, עם רבים אחרים, למכירות נשק למפרץ הפרסי (10.9.76).

ב. בתחום יחסי החוץ - נגד מעורבות ארה"ב באנגולה, נגד הגבלת חסיוד הצבאי לישראל, נגד הקמת בסיס צבאי בדייגו-גרסייה.

ג. בתחום הרווחה ותסעד - בעד תכניות ליצירת משרות, בעד הפחתה במסוי המוטל על פרטים והכבדתו על בעלי-העסקים, בעד הקצבות נוספות לתכניות בריאות, נגד קיצוצים בסוכנויות למלחמה בעוני.

ד. בתחום החקיקה - בעד מערכת לאומית של בטוח-רכב, בעד הקלת החקיקה בנושא השתתפות פועלים פדרליים במערכות בחירות פוליטיות, בעד הרחבת התחולה של החוק לחרות המידע, בעד הידוק תפקוד על סוכנויות לאיסוף-מידע כגון האפ.בי.אי., בעד הסעה לבתי"ס אינטגרטיביים, נגד חידוש עונש המוות, נגד הפחתת סמכויותיה של הועדה לשוויון הזדמנויות בתעסוקה, נגד הסרת ההגבלות על קרנות הבחירות.

27.6.78

ס ו ד י ב י ו ת ר

התבטאויות מונדיאל בנושאי ההסדר

מתוך נאומו בסן פרנציסקו 17.6.77

א. מחוייבות ארה"ב להסדר במזה"ת.

to a genuine and lasting peace demonstrated by concrete acts to normalize relations among the countries of the area. The first prerequisite of a lasting peace is the recognition of Israel by her neighbors. Israel's right to exist permanently... that means that over a period of months or years that the borders between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Egypt must be opened up to travel, to tourism, to cultural exchange, to trade, so that no matter who the leaders might be in those countries the people themselves will have formed a mutual understanding and comprehension and a sense of a common purpose to avoid the repetitious wars and deaths that have affected that region so long...

We believe that we have made some progress in getting Arab leaders to recognize Israel's right to exist and to recognize - however reluctantly - that this commitment is essential to a genuine peace.


That peace must be structured in such a way that it can survive even if some leaders were to nurture aims to destroy Israel.

ב. בסיס העמדה האמריקנית

It was unlikely that an agreement on a lasting peace could be achieved at one stroke. U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which is supported by all the parties, provides a basis for the negotiations which are required if there is to be a settlement. But Resolution 242 does not by itself provide all that is required. We, therefore, decided to work with the parties concerned to outline the overall framework for an enduring peace. Our concept was to use this framework as the basis for a phased negotiation and implementation of specific steps toward peace.

ג. שני תנאים לשלום בר קיימא בהקשר הבעיה הפלסטינאית:

First, there must be a demonstrated willingness on the part of the Palestinians to live in peace alongside Israel. Second, the Palestinians must



משרד החוץ
המרכז למחקר
מדיני



- 2 -

be given a stake in peace so that they will turn away from the violence of the past and toward a future in which they express their legitimate political aspirations peacefully.

In the context of a peace settlement we believe the Palestinians should be given a chance to shed their status as homeless refugees and to partake fully of the benefits of peace in the Mideast, including the possibility of some arrangement for a palestinian homeland or entity preferably in association with Jordan. How this would be accomplished and the exact character of such an entity is, of course, something that would have to be decided by the parties themselves in the course of negotiation.

ד. על תפקיד ארה"ב

America can try to help establish the basis of trust necessary for peace. We can try to improve the atmosphere for communication. We can offer ideas, but we cannot, in the end, determine whether peace or war is the fate of the Mideast. That can only be decided by Israel and her Arab neighbors...

...As we go forward in our mediating role, we will have to expect from time to time to have differences with both sides. But these will be differences as to tactics. Our overall objectives will be those that we believe are now shared by all sides: a permanent and enduring peace in the ME.

מונדייל מדבר על האחריות ההסטורית החובעת מירב התמיכה האפשרית של העם האמריקני.
תמיכה זו תספק לנו את העוצמה הדרושה לעודד את הצדדים להתגבר על פחדיהם
... put trust in their hopes for a genuine and lasting Mideast peace -ו



ה. מהות השלום (שיחת מונדייל-דיניץ 7.6.77)

1. הנשיא עומד על כך, שהשלום יהיה שלום מהותי על כל מרכיביו ולא שלום הצהרתי או שלום שמשמעותו רק הפסקת המלחמה. בנקודה זו הבהיר עצמו פומבית ואף לחץ קשות על כל מנהיגי ערב. הוא, מונדייל, סבור, שהערבים עדיין רחוקים מאד מקבלת הקונספציה של השלום כפי שתובע הנשיא. לדעתו של מונדייל לא יתפשר הנשיא בנקודה זו שבה הוא רואה יסוד מרכזי ועקרוני ליישוב הסכסוך.
 2. הנשיא מאמין שתמורת שלום כזה (שלום מהותי על כל מרכיביו) תצטרך ישראל להחזיר את מרבית השטחים וכי בגבולות 67 יתכנו שינויים קלים. הנשיא לא הגדיר מהות השינויים או היקפם ובמשך כל השיחות נשאר vague בנושא זה.
 3. הנשיא סבור שבמסגרת פתרון כזה (שלום מהותי/נסיגה ישראלית ממרבית השטחים של 1967) צריכה להיות מולדת לפלסטינאים, אך הוא לא קבע בשום מקום שזו תהיה מדינה וברור שהעדפתו היא שהדבר יהיה במסגרת ירדן. הנושא כולו חייב להיות נדון במו"מ בין ישראל וארצות ערב. אמר שהנשיא לא השתמש במונח מדינה וכי הדגיש כי המולדת זה דבר שצריך לנהל עליו מו"מ לגבי צורתו, זיקתו וכו' וכן הביע הנשיא עדיפותו להסדר במסגרת ירדן.
 4. כל זאת, הסדר הכולל שלום על כל מרכיביו, נסיגת ישראל מרוב השטחים, מולדת לפלסטינאים-עדיף במסגרת ירדן, אי-כפיית פתרון, ג'נבה מוסכמת כמובן במסגרת מחוייבותה הבלתי מעוררת של ארה"ב לבטחון ישראל, לשגשוגה ולשמירת עצמאותה. בנושא זה קיימת אצל הנשיא מחוייבות יותר עמוקה מאשר אצל כל נשיא אחר.
- ו. מדוע שותקת ארה"ב לנוכח הצהרות פרובוקטיביות של סאדאת 14.7.77 (מונדייל בתשובה לשאלת גב' טננבאום, 14.7.77, בפגישה עם ראשי הקהילה היהודית).

Denied that there has been any silence. He said that in no sense are we backing off and in no instance did Carter fail to press that issue-the full definition of peace -(and Vice president Mondale repeated:)
"I underline press" with the Arab leaders..... the Administration recognizes there is an asymmetry in that Israel is being requested to give up tangible things in exchange for intangible things.



ו. בעיית זכויות הפלשטינאים.

מונדייל מחזק דברי קארטר בקונגרס היהודי 1.11.77.

It is important to observe there - and I support his policies - that he is talking about rights and not national rights.

It's a very significant concession/ Carter also pointed out that what those rights are will not be in derogation to Israel's rights and will be defined in the process of the negotiations at the Geneva conference.

...I think you are referring to the old code word- legitimate national rights which implied an independent state. The president has indicated he would prefer that there be no such state.

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בסחוף המדינה
יחסיחוף וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

ברק נכנס-מסוג

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11/12/20

[illegible]

9928

אל: תמסר

מאת: [ד"ר חגי גוטמן](#)

סקל דייל

לשמונ כל, מצפא.

בִּיקוּר סֵגוֹן חֲשִׁיאַ

אבקש לדאוג לי לחזור במלון חמלך דוד לתקופת ביקורו של סגן הנשיא בארץ.
דיניץ

מנכ"ל גור ארית מצפא

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מברק נכנס-מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

שמו

מיד

אל:חמש

מאת: רושינגטון

טקס

שלכם 496, מחנות לס / הנשיא.

ממליצים לשקולכם מחנה של מטה קמיקה של אולי או לרושל ים לסגן הנשיא (מוכך במסגרת באותה) או תמונת נוף חדשה, לגבי מובדיל מציעים במחנה קמיקה מודרנית (גב' מובדיל עוסקת בעצמה בקמיקה) או עבודת צורך מודרני.
כדי לחשוב גם על מחנה לבת, מציעים לשקולכם הנשיא מעבודת כסף מוחלים לבעיה בגיל זה, ליתר המלווים חייבו מציעים מחנה טפרים עם הקדשה.

בר און

מנכל ממנכל טקס מצפה

מ/א

כל המוסר חוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

מס. 480

נשלח 271100 יוני 78

תקבל 271726

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסיחוק וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

סרדי

מס: 454

בשלה: 251500 יוני 78

בתקבל: 260053 יוני 78

אל: המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון

מייד

13/14

מנכל.

ליין קירקלנד אמר לי אמש בארוחת ערב כי מונדרייל הזמין ג'ורג' שישי האחרון להצטרף אליו
במסעו לישראל ומצרים. קירקלנד דחה ההזמנה.
קירקלנד אמר לי כי לא רצה שגטיעתו תתפרש כאילו הוא תומך במדיניות הממשל במצח.
דפיה

שהח... ש/רמ שחבט מנכל ממנכל מצפא מזחים חקר דנו אנב
מב/מ

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

1402

שמו

אל: ווט, נד: 496, מ: המשרד
נח: מ, סג: ש, תא: 260678, וח: 1230
נד: מונדייל

מידי/שמו

השגריר

הבריקווא בחוור המלצותיכם ביחס למתנות למונדייל רעייתו וכן
האם לדעתכם ישנם אורחים נוספים הראויים למתנות ומאיוה סוג?
טקס.==

תפ: מנכל, ממנכל, טקס, מצפא

N

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

אל: המשרד

מאת: וואשינגטון


ס ו ד י מס. 417

נשלח : 221830 יוני 78

מ י ד י החקבל: 230110 יוני 78

משרד החמי, מנכ"ל משרד החמי, דע מנכ"ל




ביקור סגן הנשיא מונדייל, שלכ 431. 

1. אינ לנו הערות מיוחדות לחב"ית אך יתכן ורצוי לשקול שמה נחב לערוך את הביקור ביד ושם כבר ביום אי בבוקר עוד לפני בקור אצל נשיא המדינה. כנ יתכן ונתח לחזקתה על שאלת הבקור במרכז קליטה עי ככ שיוצע שרק גבי מונדייל תבקר במקום.

2. לגבי ההעלות והשאלות ולא ברורות, באם הנכם מעוניינים בכך נוכל אנו מסמך לנסות ולבדוק כמה מן הנושאים. נוזה על הנחיותיכם.

הנל ע"י דעת השגריר הנמצא מחוצ לעיר.

כי און. 

שהה חנה סלמה לנש לאנש אנפלו חלומיה טקס
שלמה 330

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

1001

632

מל: נוש, נד: 431, מ: המשרד
דח: מ, סג: ס, תא: 210678, וח: 1800
נד: מונדייל

מיידי/סודי

העתק מנכ"ל משרד החוץ.

השגריר
ביקור סגן הנשיא מונדייל.

לוח זמנים לא חוזר לא סופי.

יום 1' 30.6

15.00 מגיע לנתבייג. ראש הממשלה מברך וסגן הנשיא משיב
הטיירה עולה לירושלים האזרח מתאכסן במלון המלך דוד.

בניסח השבת. צאת השבת.

הביקור נושא אופי פרטי סגן הנשיא אורחו של שגריר ארה"ב.
יתכן שיתקבל על ידי הגב' מאיר בתל-אביב בשבת אחה"צ.
מוצאי שבת 1.7

השגריר כואיס עורך קבלת פנים וארוחת ערב קלה.
יום א' 2.7

9.30 מתקבל על ידי נשיא המדינה.

10.15 ביקור אצל יושב ראש הכנסת.

11. יציאה במסוק לבאר שבע, ביקור באוניברסיטה והסרת הלוח
מטל שלט לזכרו של יו"ר האמפר.

13.00 יוצא לסדה בוקר, ארוחת צהריים.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

14.30 יציאה במסוק לירושלים.

1600 מתקבל על ידי ראש הממשלה.

17.00 חזרה למלון.

20.00 ראש הממשלה ויושב ראש הכנסת עוזרים ארוחת ערב באולם שאגל בכנסת. נאומי ראש הממשלה וסגן הנשיא.
הערה: העדפנו לתת את הארוחה ביום אי ולא במוצ'יש כפי שהיה מתחייב על מנת לא לגרום לחלול שבת.

יום ב' 3.7

האירועים המתוכננים: יד ושם, ביקור במרכז קליטה במושרה ציון, ישיבת עבודה, מסיבת עיתונאים, ארוחה קלה, ספיל קפה עם נציגי אגודת הידידות ישראל-ארה"ב.

14.00 יציאה לנתבי"ג

15.00 המראה.

הערה: ימספר האירועים כאן גדול מדי ומאחר ושעת ההמראה לא ניתנת לשינוי הצענו להוריד את הביקור במרכז הקליטה. האמריקאים שוקלים אפשרות לדחות היציאה בשעה אחת.

2. הערות.

א. הצענו שהאורח יסייר ליד הכותל המערבי ביום ו' בין השעות 5.00-6.00 לפני בניית השבת. טרם קיבלנו תשובה. אין ספק שהאמריקאים מתחבטים בשאלה לאיזה אירוע יירושלמי הם יכולים להסכים.

ב. טדי קולק מוכן לקבל את האורח במבואות הבירה בלחם ומלח אבל טרם הצענו את זה על מנת לאפשר לאמריקאים את הבחירה בין זה לבין ביקור ליד הכותל. אם ב' מתקבל על הדעת, שגם הצעה זאת תגרום להתחבטויות. הם לא הסכימו לקבלת פנים בבית העיריה, למרות שנאמר להם שיוברט האמפרי התקבל שם.

ג. רמזנו כי אנו מעדיפים שבמוצאי שבת יעבור סם לואיס את ארוחת הערב במלון המלך דוד ולא בביתו בהרצליה ועל כך טרם קיבלנו תגובה.

ד. ידוע לנו שראש פירסט המליץ לגיוון שאם האמריקאים לא יסכימו לשום אירוע יירושלמי, לא יתנו לאורח נכבדים.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

יהודים.

3. פעמליה.

א. טרם קיבלנו מסלולותיה של גבי מונדייל המלווה על ידי בתם, אם כי נאמר לנו שהן תבקרנה ביחד עם סגן הנשיא בבאר שבע, ביד ושם ובמרכז הקליטה.

ב. טרם קיבלנו רשימת הפעמליה, המתכוזים היהודים והעתונאים.
4. אשמח לקבל דעתך והערותיך.

בן אלישר.

תפ: שהח, רהמ, סרהמ, מוכל, ממוכל, ארד, מצפא, אורחים, טקס, שמורה

מברק נכנס-מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

ס ו ד י

מס 378

נשלח 211700 יוני 78

אל: משרד

מאת: רושין: טון

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מ. רביב

גב סטאר מזבית חלבן סיפרה כי היום עמדו להחליט בבית חלבן על רשימת המנהיגים
היהודיים שיזמכו לתלוות אל סגן הנשיא מונדייל בביקורו בישראל, אמרה כי לקראת
הישיבה ביקשו ממנה להמציא רשימה של כ-100 מנהיגים יהודיים מתוך קבוצות היהודים שביקרו
בבית חלבן בשנה האחרונה. גב סטאר אמרה כי בקרב המנהיגים היהודים רבה ההתרוצצות על הזכות
לחתפה אל מונדייל במסעו. הוחלט כי ליפשיץ יתלוות אל מונדייל.

בנצור

יחזק רחם כרחם מנכל ממנכל מצפא

רע

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
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יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוק

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

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ס ו ד י

א"ל: המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון

מס 334

נשלח 192100 יוני 78

החקבל 200408 יוני 78

ד ח ו י

א"ל: מנהל הצפא.

סו הלפרינ, מומחה יהודי לעניני חינוך בווישינגטון, סייע בעריכת
החלק שהוקדש לחינוך בסיורו של סנטור מונדייל בישראל ב-1973
ועמד עמי אותה עת במגע בושא זה.

בעקבות סיורו הנל הציע מונדייל הקמת קרן משותפת אמריקנית -
ישראלית למחקר חינוכי. מונדייל אף עיבד טיוטת חוק בדונג ואולם
הוצעה לא הגיעה לידי דיון של ממש בסינאט.

עזה מסר לי הלפרינ כי עוזרי סגן הנשיא מונדייל החקשרו עמו לאחרונה
וביקשו לבדד עמו פרטים הקשורים בהצעה הנל.

הלפרינ החליט שעוזרי מונדייל - או אפ סגן הנשיא עצמו - שוקלים
אפשרות שמונדייל יחזור ויציע בעת ביקורו בקרוב בארץ הקמת קרן חינוך
משותפת כנל.

זכור לי כי בשעתו טיפל בושא זה הרצל פישמן ממשרד החינוך.

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מנהל משרד החינוך

לרה רהא סרהא משה משה משה

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
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יחסית) וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

סודי

מברק נכנס-מסווג

א; המשרד

מאת; רוט

מנהל מצפא

ג' סיקה טקמן סיפרה לי כי הירדנים התלונבו על שאין מונדייל בא לבקור גם בירדן.
הירדנים שאלו בתועימות ' עד מתי תמשיך ארחב להגויג יום העצמאות השלושים של
ישראל ?

רפיה

שהח רחמ ס/רחמ מנכל שהבט ממנכל סמנכל מצפא מנחל ס חקר רוט אנן

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NAME: _____
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מברק נכנס-מסווג

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על חוק לתיקון
חוק העונשין (בתיקון המדינה
יחסי חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

מלחמה
נאמח ורש

אל: מצפא.

משיחה עם סמית/ישראל/מחמד.

מ
11/11/57
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ביקור מונדייל.

1. אמר כי מצרים הביעה בפני ארהב מורת רוחה על שאין סגן הנשיא מונדייל מבקר גם במצרים. המצרים היו מוכנים להסתפק בחניית ביניים וזהו רחם מדגישים הערכ הסימלי שבביקור זה. הוסיף כי המצרים רומזים שאי ביקור של מונדייל במצרים יגרומ לסאדאת מבושת מה. עם זאת אין המצרים מסתייגים מעצם ביקורו של מונדייל בישראל ומדגישים הצורך בהדדיות בלבד. סמית אמר כי ארהב מסבירה למצרים כי בשל לוח זמנים וחוסר לא יוכל מונדייל לקיים חגיגה במצרים. סמית הטעים כי מנורי וגמור עם המימשל לקיים הביקור במחכונת ובאופי שיועדו לו במטרה להדגיש ידידותה העמוקה של ארהב לישראל שהיא מעל ומעבר לחילוקי הדעות בנושא תהליך השלום.

2. סמית טען כי לו ולשגריר ולואיס חלק מכריע בייזום ביקור זה של ייצוג טובים. אמר שמאז שדולציין העביר הזמנה למונדייל באמצעות ולואיס, שקדו הוא ולואיס לממש הרעיון כשכל אחד דוחף העניין מתקפה שלו עד אשר הרעיון קרם עור וגידים.

במצור =

שהיה כהה סויה שהם אכלו אולם סמית יצא מזה
הני רמז

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

בלתי מסווג

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אל: המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון

מצפא. העתק לשכת רחמ.

לתלן הודעה מטעם הנשיא קרטר שפורסמה היום על ידי הבית הלבן:

"I AM PLEASSED TO ANNOUNCE THAT VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE HAS ACCEPTED THE INVITATION OF PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND KNESSET SPEAKER SHAMIR TO VISIT ISRAEL AS PART OF THE CELEBRATION OF ISRAEL'S 30TH ANNIVERSARY.

THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL CONVEY MY CONGRATULATIONS AND THOSE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO ISRAEL ON THIS IMPORTANT ANNIVERSARY.

HIS VISIT UNDERSCORES THE DEEP AND ENDURING TIES OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF THE U.S. AND ISRAEL."

סוף

שהו ורחמ טרחמ שהבט מנכל ממנכל סמנכל מצפא מעת הסברה הקודר הסטורית אורחים חקר רם אמן

ד. ח"כ

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news release

JUNE 14, 1978

PRESIDENT CARTER ANNOUNCES VISIT TO ISRAEL

BY VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT CARTER WAS RELEASED BY
THE WHITE HOUSE JUNE 14 AT 10 A.M., 4 P.M. ISRAEL TIME:

"I AM PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE THAT VICE PRESIDENT
MONDALE HAS ACCEPTED THE INVITATION OF PRIME
MINISTER BEGIN AND KNESSET SPEAKER SHAMIR TO
VISIT ISRAEL AS PART OF THE CELEBRATION OF
ISRAEL'S 30TH ANNIVERSARY. THE VICE PRESIDENT
WILL CONVEY MY CONGRATULATIONS AND THOSE OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE TO ISRAEL ON THIS IMPORTANT
ANNIVERSARY. HIS VISIT UNDERSCORES THE DEEP
AND ENDURING TIES OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE
PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL."

NOT FOR RELEASE BEFORE 4 P.M. LOCAL TIME

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

ג' באייר תשל"ח
10 במאי 1978

י.א.מ.
מ

ש פ ו ר

אל : המנכ"ל
מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

הנדון: סגן הנשיא וו. מונדייל

למכתבך מיום 17 באפריל 1978. סגן הנשיא נמצא בטעס מחוץ לארצות
הברית. עם שובו נחזור ונטפל בהזמנה.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

שמחה דינץ

העתק : מנהל סג"א

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

ג' באייר תשל"ח
10 במאי 1978

יחסי
מ

ש מ ר

אל : המנכ"ל
מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

הנדון: סגן הנשיא וו. מונדייל

למכתבך מיום 17 באפריל 1978. סגן הנשיא נמצא במסע מחוץ לארצות
הברית. עם שובו נחזור ונטפל בהזמנה.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

שמחה דיניץ

העתק : מנהל מצפ"א

RECEIVED
JAN 11 1967



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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למנהל
ד"ר

ירושלים, י' בניסן תשל"ח
17 באפריל 1978

ט ו ר

אל : השגריר, וושינגטון

הנדון : סגן הנשיא וו. פונדזיל

יו"ר הנהלת הסוכנות היהודית, ד"ר א. דולצ'ין,
שהוא גם נשיא האגודה ליהדות ארה"ב - ישראל,
סיפר לי ששלח הזמנה לב"ל בשם האגודה לבא כאורחם
לישראל ליום העצמאות האמריקני ב-4 ביולי 1978.
דולצ'ין ביקש את סיועך במימוש ההזמנה.

אנא הערוחק והמלצותיך.

כ ב ר כ ה,

אפרים עברון

העתק : מנהל מעפ"א

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

ג' באייר תשל"ח
10 במאי 1978

י.א.מ.
ל

ש מ ר

אל : המנכ"ל
מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

הנדון: סגן הנשיא וו. מונדייל

למכתבך מיום 17 באפריל 1978. סגן הנשיא נמצא במטע מחוץ לארצות
הברית. עם שובו נחזור ונטפל בהזמנה.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

עכחה דיניץ

העתק : מנהל מצפ"א

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

7.10.77

381

אל: מר מ. רביב, מנהל מצפ"א ✓
מאת: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

הזמנות יו"ר הכנסת לסגן הנשיא מונדייל
וליו"ר בית - הנבחרים נתקבלו ונמסרו לתעודתם.

נבוא עמם בדברים בהקדם ונודיעכם הכניותהם.

בברכה,

צ. רפיח

WASHINGTON, D.C.
JULY 10, 1977



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

186

7.10.77

TO: MR. A. D. GORDON, NEW YORK
FROM: MR. A. D. GORDON, NEW YORK

RE: "The New York Times" article
dated July 10, 1977, regarding the
"The New York Times" article.

Enclosed for the New York Times are two
copies of the "The New York Times" article.

Yours,
A. D. GORDON

A. D. GORDON

Jerusalem, Tishri 6, 5738
September 18, 1977

Mr. Vice-President,

It is my great pleasure on behalf of the Knesset to invite you and a group of your colleagues of the Senate to pay an official visit to the Knesset.

The members of the delegation of the Knesset headed by my predecessor, Mr. Yisrael Yeshayahu, deeply appreciated your warm and generous reception when they were your guests in November 1975, and we look forward to reciprocating your hospitality.

We feel that the relationships between the legislative bodies of our two countries as well as the friendship and understanding existing between our peoples will be greatly enhanced if you are able to accept this invitation. I am forwarding a similar invitation to the United States House of Representatives.

We look forward to receiving your affirmative response and to greeting you in Jerusalem at a mutually agreeable time.

To you and your colleagues, we extend our very best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Yitzhak Shamir

The Hon. Walter Mondale
Vice-President of the
United States of America
WASHINGTON

העתקים: שגריר ישראל בוועינגטון
מצפ"א, משרד החוץ

Washington, D.C. 20540
August 10, 1957

Mr. Vice-President

It is my great pleasure on behalf of the American people to
with you and a group of your colleagues of the Senate to pay an official
visit to the Congress.

The members of the delegation of the Congress are
my distinguished Mr. Richard B. Russell, Jr., Senator from Georgia, and
my distinguished Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States, and
my distinguished Mr. Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice President of the United States.

We feel that the relationship between the legislative
branches of our Government is of the utmost importance and understanding
of each other is essential to the proper functioning of our Government.
We are sure that your visit will be a most profitable one for all of us.

We look forward to receiving your attentive response
and to having you in Washington on a mutually beneficial trip.
To you and your colleagues, we extend our very best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Richard B. Russell, Jr.

The Honorable
Vice-President of the
United States of America
Washington

1000 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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יוסי גל - איטי.

מברק 317, 424.

קדישאי מסר ללשכת המנכל שאינם זוכרים איזה אבנים נתנו
למונדייל ועל כן אינם יכולים להשיב על השאלות. תמצא דרך לצאת
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מצפא ==

תפ: שהח, מנכל, מצפא, פתיר



Simon J.S. / date

backgrounder

JUNE 22, 1978

JOAN MONDALE -- CATALYST FOR THE ARTS

JOAN ADAMS MONDALE IS A CATALYST FOR THE ARTS. POPULARLY KNOWN AS "JOAN OF ART", SHE IS RECOGNIZED AS THE LEADING SPOKESPERSON IN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION FOR THE ARTS.

IN HER BOOK, "POLITICS AND ART," THE WIFE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, WROTE:

"ART BRINGS A VERY SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT DIMENSION TO OUR LIVES. IT IS A REFLECTION OF WHO WE ARE, WHAT WE ARE. THE ARTIST CAN PAUSE TO LOOK AT THE SUNSET WHEN WE ARE MUCH TOO BUSY. HE CAN LOOK AT THE SMALLEST GRAIN OF SAND AND FIND SOME MEANING IN IT. I THINK WE NEED FOOD FOR THE SPIRIT AS WELL AS FOOD FOR OUR BODIES."

HER INTERESTS RANGE ACROSS THE SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL LANDSCAPES. SHE IS AN AVID READER. SHE IS A POTTER. SHE IS AN ACTIVIST AS HONORARY HEAD OF THE FEDERAL COUNCIL ON THE ARTS AND HUMANITIES, A HIGH-LEVEL, INTER-AGENCY GROUP THAT REVIEWS U.S. CULTURAL POLICY.

JOAN MONDALE APPEARS TO BE THE RIGHT PERSON IN THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE RIGHT TIME AS FEDERAL ACTIVISM ON CULTURAL MATTERS GROWS.

SHE IS INVOLVED AND ACTIVE ACROSS MANY FRONTS THROUGH:
PUBLIC APPEARANCES AND ADDRESSES BEFORE ARTISTS AND ART ADMINISTRATORS.

PRIVATE MEETINGS THAT BRING ARTISTS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TOGETHER.

TOURS AROUND THE COUNTRY TO SAMPLE ITS CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND TO SPEAK OUT ON BEHALF OF THE ARTS AT THE "GRASSROOTS" LEVEL.

SHE PRACTICES A LIVING COMMITMENT TO THE INDIVIDUAL ARTIST -- THE PAINTER IN NEW YORK, THE POTTER IN NORTH CAROLINA, THE WEAVER IN TEXAS AND THE SCULPTOR IN CALIFORNIA.

SHE FEELS THAT FEDERAL FUNDS -- (FUNDING OF PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS AND ARTISTS THROUGH THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS -- A CONDUIT THROUGH WHICH 123.5 MILLION DOLLARS PASSED THIS YEAR) SHOULD GO NOT ONLY TO ESTABLISHED ARTISTS AND INSTITUTIONS, BUT ALSO TO THE STRUGGLING ARTISTS AND LOCAL CRAFTSMEN.

ONE DAY SHE PAID A VISIT TO THE OFFICES OF JAY SOLOMON, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY EMBRACES THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW FEDERAL BUILDINGS AND RENOVATING OTHERS. THEY SPOKE ABOUT ART, DESIGN AND THE ENVIRONMENT.

(MORE)

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WHEN SHE LEFT HIS OFFICE, MR. SOLOMON ANNOUNCED THAT HIS AGENCY WOULD INCREASE THE CONSTRUCTION COSTS FOR THE NEW AND RENOVATED BUILDINGS BY ONE-HALF PERCENT, AN INCREASE IN FUNDS DURING 1978. THAT WILL BE USED TO FINANCE 42 NEWLY COMMISSIONED WORKS OF ART AT A COST OF 2.5 MILLION DOLLARS. SHE HAD ALSO PERSUADED MR. SOLOMON TO USE THE WORKS OF MORE LOCAL ARTISTS IN THE FEDERAL BUILDINGS.

ONE RESULT WAS IN OKLAHOMA CITY WHERE 30 PIECES OF LOCAL ART WERE COMMISSIONED IN WHICH OVER ONE-HALF OF THE ARTISTS WERE WOMEN AND MEMBERS OF MINORITY GROUPS. DISPLAYED IN THE BUILDINGS WERE CRAFTS, WEAVINGS, CLOTHS, METALWORK, WOODWORK AND A HUGE COLLAGE OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE CITY'S RESIDENTS.

FOLLOWING A MEETING WITH CECIL ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, LOCAL CRAFTS WENT ON SALE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS.

OTHER GOALS THAT MRS. MONDALE HAS IN STORE FOR THE ARTS ARE LIBERALIZING THE TAX LAWS TO ENCOURAGE ARTISTS AND CRAFTSMEN TO DONATE THEIR WORK TO MUSEUMS AND THE USE OF MORE FEDERAL FUNDS TO HIRE ARTISTS AND CRAFTSMEN. ALSO, TO BROADEN THE UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS TO THOSE IN THE ARTS.

MRS. MONDALE IS A GREAT BELIEVER IN VOLUNTEERISM.

BEFORE BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY ART VOLUNTEERS, SHE SAID:

"VOLUNTEERISM KEPT ME ALIVE IN THE ART WORLD, WHEN I HAD SMALL CHILDREN AND COULDN'T TAKE A FULL-TIME JOB. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IN LIFE IS A CHANCE TO SERVE. UNDERSTANDING YOURSELF COMES WITH SERVING YOUR FELLOW MEN.

"I THINK THAT'S WHY WE WERE PUT ON THIS EARTH. THAT'S WHAT I'VE BEEN TAUGHT. I DON'T THINK IT DENIGRATES ME. YOU FIND YOUR LIFE GIVING IT TO OTHERS."

MRS. MONDALE HAS TURNED THE NEW HOME OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT -- A TURRETED VICTORIAN STRUCTURE ATOP A HILL IN NORTHWEST WASHINGTON -- INTO A MUSEUM OF CONTEMPORARY ART.


WORKING WITH FRIENDS, SHE BORROWED PAINTINGS AND SCULPTURES BY 45 ARTISTS FROM 17 MIDWESTERN AND EAST COAST MUSEUMS. ALL REFLECT THE ART TRENDS OF THE SECOND HALF OF THIS CENTURY REPRESENTING -- AMONG OTHERS -- THE WORKS OF ROBERT RAUSCHENBERG, LOUISE NEVELSON, EDWARD HOPPER AND ROBERT MOTHERWELL.

MRS. MONDALE HAS BEEN INTERESTED IN THE ART WORLD SINCE CHILDHOOD. HER FATHER, A MINNESOTA CLERGYMAN AND BIBLICAL SCHOLAR, TOOK HER ON HER FIRST MUSEUM VISIT IN PHILADELPHIA WHERE SHE SAW RELICS FROM THE ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIAN CITY, UR OF THE CHALDEES. SHE WAS A REGULAR VISITOR, AS A UNIVERSITY STUDENT, TO THE CINCINNATI, OHIO, ART MUSEUM WHERE HER UNCLE WAS A DIRECTOR FOR MANY YEARS.

JOAN ADAMS MONDALE WAS BORN AUGUST 8, 1930 IN EUGENE, OREGON. SHE SPENT HER CHILDHOOD IN PENNSYLVANIA AND OHIO. THE FAMILY MOVED TO MACALESTER COLLEGE IN ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA WHEN HER FATHER WAS NAMED CHAPLAIN OF THE COLLEGE.

AT MACALESTER, MRS. MONDALE STUDIED HISTORY, ART AND FRENCH. SHE SPENT ONE SUMMER IN FRANCE STUDYING ARCHITECTURE. WHILE ATTENDING COLLEGE SHE CATALOGUED PRINTS AND TAUGHT CHILDREN'S ART CLASSES AT THE MINNEAPOLIS INSTITUTE OF ARTS. SHE HAS WORKED AS A PROFESSIONAL AND A VOLUNTEER IN ART MUSEUMS IN MINNEAPOLIS, BOSTON AND WASHINGTON D.C.

THE MONDALES, WHO MET DURING A BLIND DATE, WERE MARRIED DEC. 27, 1955. THEY HAVE THREE CHILDREN, TEDDY, 19, ELEANOR JANE, 17 AND WILLIAM, 15.



backgrounder

JUNE 26, 1978

MONDALE, THE VICE PRESIDENT

-- THE GENERAL CONSENSUS IN THE UNITED STATES IS THAT VICE PRESIDENT WALTER F. MONDALE IS THE MOST ACTIVE AND MOST VISIBLE VICE PRESIDENT OF MODERN TIMES, AND FROM ALL ACCOUNTS HE HAS THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE OF PRESIDENT CARTER.

THE FORMER SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS HAVING AN "OPEN AND GUILLESS MANNER WHICH REFLECTS HIS MIDWESTERN BACKGROUND." BUT IT IS A POLITICAL FACT THAT IN A CITY WITH EVER-SHIFTING POLITICAL TIDES, THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE PRESIDENT WORK TOGETHER HARMONIOUSLY.

WHAT IS THE MONDALE ROLE AS THE VICE PRESIDENT SEES IT?

ACKNOWLEDGING THAT IT WAS DEPENDENT ON HIS PERSONAL ASSOCIATION WITH THE PRESIDENT, MR. MONDALE SAID RECENTLY:

"I AM NOT A SUBSTITUTE OR DEPUTY PRESIDENT. I UNDERSTAND THAT. I DON'T HAVE THAT KIND OF SEPARATE INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND I UNDERSTAND THAT. IT'S ONE OF THE ASPECTS OF THE VICE PRESIDENCY. THE PRESIDENT'S NAME IS CARTER, NOT MONDALE. I UNDERSTAND THAT.

"BUT IN A DIFFERENT WAY, I MAY HAVE MORE INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENT THAN I EVER HAD IN THE SENATE BECAUSE OF MY ROLE WITH THE PRESIDENT. IN OTHER WORDS I CAN BE HEARD ON ALL THESE ISSUES. I KNOW WHAT THE INFORMATION IS. I'M ABLE TO BE HEARD ON ANY MATTER I WANT TO BE HEARD ON. AND THAT IS A DIFFERENT FORM OF INFLUENCE AND INDEPENDENCE FROM BEING A TOTALLY INDEPENDENT PERSON LIKE A SENATOR."

BASICALLY, MR. MONDALE ALSO SEES HIMSELF IN THIS LIGHT:

"I SEE MY ROLE AS GENERAL ADVISER ON ALMOST ANY ISSUE, HE SAID, "AS A TROUBLESHOOTER, AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT IN SOME FOREIGN AFFAIRS MATTERS AND AS A POLITICAL ADVOCATE OF THE ADMINISTRATION."

MR. MONDALE SAYS THE ROLE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT IN THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION "IS DEEPENING AND BROADENING EVERY DAY." HE AMPLIFIES:

" I MEAN THERE ARE ALL KINDS OF DECISION-MAKING FLYING AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE. I'M AUTOMATICALLY INCLUDED IN WHAT IS CALLED 'BEING IN THE LOOP.' I'M AUTOMATICALLY INCLUDED IN THINGS, INVITED TO THINGS."

THE CLOSENESS OF VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE TO PRESIDENT CARTER IS FURTHER ILLUSTRATED BY THE VICE PRESIDENT. HE HAD THIS TO SAY ABOUT HIS RELATIONSHIP TO THE PRESIDENT:

"HE (CARTER) SAID, "FIRST, I WANT YOUR HELP AND YOU CAN'T HELP ME UNLESS YOU'RE WITH ME. 'SECONDLY, IF I'M NOT HERE, I DON'T WANT YOU TO SPEND SIX WEEKS TRAINING TO BE PRESIDENT. I WANT YOU READY." AS A RESULT, HE IS THE FIRST VICE PRESIDENT TO HAVE WORKING QUARTERS IN THE WHITE HOUSE DEVOTING HIS TIME AND TALENT TO SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND NOT TO MERE CEREMONIAL EVENTS.

(MORE)

B2

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE IS DRAFTED TO CONFORM WITH THE PRESIDENT'S WHICH IS DRAWN UP IN TWO-WEEK CYCLES. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE TRADITIONAL PRESIDENT VICE PRESIDENT RELATIONSHIP IS MR. MONDALE'S ACCESS TO WHITE HOUSE PAPERS WHERE HE HAS ACCESS TO VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING THAT GOES IN AND OUT OF THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE. IT IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS, AND FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT TO MAKE HIS OWN COMMENTS.

HE ALSO EXERCISES HIS OPEN PRIVILEGE TO SIT IN ON ANY PRESIDENTIAL MEETING AND OFTEN SPENDS TWO TO FIVE HOURS DAILY IN SUCH SESSIONS. REGULARLY SCHEDULED MEETINGS ARE WITH THE PRESIDENT, SECURITY ADVISER BRZEZINSKI, DOMESTIC CHIEF JORDAN, CIA HEAD TURNER AND SECRETARY OF STATE VANCE.

OF HIS FOUR OFFICES -- IN THE WHITE HOUSE, THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING, THE CAPITOL, AND THE SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, MOST OF HIS TIME IS SPENT AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

PRESIDENT CARTER FEELS THAT WHEN HE SENDS THE VICE PRESIDENT ON A TRIP, THE FOREIGN LEADERS KNOW THAT MR. MONDALE IS HIS PERSONAL EMISSARY AND THE AGENDA IS THE SAME AS IF THE PRESIDENT WERE MAKING THE JOURNEY.

IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AREA, MR. MONDALE IS REGULARLY INCLUDED IN ALL POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING SESSIONS AT THE WHITE HOUSE. HE RECEIVES THE SAME BRIEFINGS AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS AS THE PRESIDENT. AS A RESULT, HE IS CONSIDERED A SERIOUS TROUBLESHOOTER.

HE HAS BEEN GIVEN SPECIAL JURISDICTION OVER U.S. POLICY IN AFRICA. HE HAS MADE TRIPS TO WEST EUROPE AND JAPAN TO REINFORCE U.S. COMMITMENTS TO ITS ALLIES; TO SPAIN, PORTUGAL AND AUSTRIA, DURING WHICH HE MET WITH SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER VORSTER TO EMPHASIZE THE U.S. POSITION ON SOUTH AFRICA'S RACIAL POLICY; TO MEXICO AND CANADA AND TO NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA, THAILAND, INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES TO DISCUSS MUTUAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC ISSUES.

AT PRESENT HE IS LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS TRIP TO ISRAEL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CELEBRATION OF THAT NATION'S 30TH ANNIVERSARY.

THE VICE PRESIDENT, DURING HIS SENATE CAREER, UNSWERVINGLY SUPPORTED ISRAEL.

AFTER THE START OF THE OCTOBER, 1973 MIDEAST WAR, ISRAELI AMBASSADOR SIMCHA DINITZ RECENTLY RECALLED BEFORE AN AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE BANQUET AUDIENCE THAT MONDALE WAS THE FIRST SENATOR TO TELEPHONE HIS EMBASSY. HE QUOTED MONDALE AS SAYING: "IF THERE IS ANYTHING I CAN DO FOR ISRAEL, LET ME KNOW, BECAUSE WHEN ISRAEL BLEEDS I AM WITH YOU."

IT WAS DURING A SPEECH TO AMERICAN JEWISH LEADERS IN NEW YORK THAT MONDALE REMINDED THE AUDIENCE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER PLEDGED "AN ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT" TO ISRAEL FOREVER.

URGING THAT THERE BE NO PROLONGED RECRIMINATION OVER THE SALE OF JETS TO EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA AND THAT NO ONE CHALLENGE THE SINCERITY OR GOOD FAITH OF THE ADMINISTRATION, THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID:

"NO ONE ISSUE -- AND NO LOSS ON A SINGLE QUESTION -- WILL EVER DEFLECT STRENGTH OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL. A DEMOCRACY WHICH REFLECTS AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES."

HE HAS SPOKEN OUT IN SUPPORT OF SOVIET JEWRY AND IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE SPOKE OF THE "SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP" THE UNITED STATES HAS WITH ISRAEL -- NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRESENT COMPLEXITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

"MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE REGARDLESS OF ANY NEGOTIATING DIFFERENCES," HE SAID. "IT WILL CONTINUE NOT AS A LEVER TO FORCE ACCOMMODATION BUT AS A FUNDAMENTAL COMMITMENT TO THE STRENGTH AND SURVIVAL OF A FREE DEMOCRACY. IT WILL NEVER BE USED AS A FORM OF PRESSURE AGAINST ISRAEL AND IT WILL ALWAYS REFLECT A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP -- WHICH WILL ALWAYS REMAIN SPECIAL."



backgrounder

JULY 23, 1978

BIOGRAPHY OF 'MONDALE THE MAN'

THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS A SOFT-SPOKEN UNASSUMING PERSON, WHO MODESTLY SAYS, "WHAT INTERESTS ME IS POWERLESSNESS." HIS CONCERN FOR THE "LITTLE MAN," HAS NOT BEEN ERODED BY HIS OWN RISE IN THE WORLD.

WALTER FREDERICK "FRITZ" MONDALE, WHO RECENTLY TURNED 50, IS THE 42ND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. HE ATTRIBUTES HIS SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS TO HIS FATHER, A METHODIST CLERGYMAN, AND HIS MOTHER, A SOCIAL ACTIVIST WHO WAS A PART-TIME MUSIC TEACHER.

FROM HIS PARENTS, HE RECALLS, HE INHERITED "THE SPECIAL ATTITUDES THEY HAD ABOUT HUMAN JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS AND DECENCY. MY EARLY ENVIRONMENT HAD A GREAT DEAL TO DO WITH MY INTEREST IN THESE ISSUES AND WITH GETTING INTO POLITICS."

WALTER F. MONDALE IS TRIM AND YOUTHFUL LOOKING. HE STANDS FIVE FEET ELEVEN INCHES AND WEIGHS 165 POUNDS. HE HAS BROWN HAIR STREAKED WITH BLOND AND DEEP-SET PALE BLUE EYES. TO RELAX HE READS MAGAZINES OF GENERAL INTEREST AND BOOKS ON GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OR WATCHES VINTAGE MOVIES ON TELEVISION, ESPECIALLY THOSE OF W. C. FIELDS OR THE MARX BROTHERS. HE ENJOYS SKIING AND TENNIS. WHENEVER POSSIBLE HE GOES HUNTING OR FISHING IN CANADA. "IT'S MY ALTERNATIVE TO PSYCHIATRY," HE EXPLAINS.

WALTER F. MONDALE WAS BORN IN THE VILLAGE OF CEYLON, MINNESOTA, ON JANUARY 5, 1928, THE MIDDLE SON OF HIS FATHER'S SECOND FAMILY. HIS ROOTS GO BACK TO THE NORWEGIAN VILLAGE OF MUNDAL, FROM WHICH THE FAMILY TOOK ITS NAME. HIS GREAT GRANDFATHER EMIGRATED TO THE UNITED STATES IN 1857.

HE IS REMEMBERED IN ELMORE, A VILLAGE OF 910 PERSONS, WHERE HE ATTENDED HIGH SCHOOL, AS A FUN-LOVING, SOMEWHAT MISCHIEVOUS YOUTH WHO LOVED ATHLETICS BUT WASN'T TOO KEEN ON STUDY.

UNDER HIS PICTURE IN THE SCHOOL YEARBOOK IS THIS OBSERVATION BY HIS CLASSMATES: "A LITTLE NONSENSE NOW AND THEN IS RELISHED BY THE BEST OF MEN."

THE VICE PRESIDENT CONCEDES THAT HE WAS NOT ALWAYS SERIOUS. "A MINISTER'S BOY HAS TO FIGHT AGAINST THE DANGER OF BEING TAKEN FOR A DANDY," HE POINTS OUT. "PREACHERS' KIDS TEND TO OVERCOMPENSATE A BIT.

(MORE)

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AS A RESULT, HE BECAME A STAR ATHLETE IN FOOTBALL, BASKETBALL AND TRACK. HE FOUNDED THE "REPUBLICRATS," A STUDENT POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. HE BECAME A TALENTED SINGER WINNING AN "A" RATING IN THE STATE MUSIC CONTEST. HE EARNED POCKET MONEY SINGING AT WEDDINGS AND FUNERALS. HE DESCRIBES HIS VOICE AS "A SCREECHING BARITONE."

FOLLOWING HIS GRADUATION FROM HIGH SCHOOL IN 1946, HE ENROLLED AT MACALESTER COLLEGE, A SMALL LIBERAL ARTS INSTITUTION IN ST. PAUL.

TO PAY FOR HIS TUITION, HE WORKED AT ODD JOBS AND SPENT HIS SUMMERS TOILING IN THE FIELDS BESIDE MIGRANT FARM WORKERS. IN 1949 HE DROPPED OUT OF SCHOOL FOR ONE YEAR FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF HIS FATHER. AS SOON AS HE SAVED ENOUGH MONEY, HOWEVER, HE ENROLLED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA. IN 1951 HE RECEIVED A B.A. (BACHELOR OF ARTS) DEGREE CUM LAUDE.

IT WAS WHILE HE WAS AT MACALESTER THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT BECAME ACTIVE IN STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS HELPING FORMER SENATOR AND VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT H. HUMPHREY AND GOVERNORS ORVILLE L. FREEMAN AND KARL F. ROLVAAG AND OTHERS IN THEIR STRUGGLE TO EXCLUDE ULTRA-LEFTIST ELEMENTS FROM THE NEWLY MERGED DEMOCRATIC-FARMER-LABOR PARTY. IN 1948 HE HELPED MR. HUMPHREY, THEN MAYOR OF MINNEAPOLIS, TO WIN ELECTION TO THE UNITED STATES SENATE BY SUCCESSFULLY MANAGING HIS CAMPAIGN IN A TRADITIONAL REPUBLICAN DISTRICT STRONGHOLD.

IN 1951, MR. MONDALE ENLISTED IN THE U.S. ARMY, SPENDING THE NEXT TWO YEARS IN THE CREW OF AN ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE, THEN AS A SPECIALIST IN EDUCATION PROGRAMS. FOLLOWING HIS DISCHARGE IN 1953 HE ENTERED THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LAW SCHOOL AND WAS GRADUATED IN THE TOP QUARTER OF HIS CLASS WITH AN LL.B DEGREE IN 1956. HE WAS ADMITTED TO THE MINNESOTA BAR LATER THAT SAME YEAR AND PRACTICED LAW PRIVATELY UNTIL 1960.

MR. MONDALE WAS ELECTED ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MINNESOTA IN 1960 AND AGAIN IN 1962.

HE BECAME A NATIONAL FIGURE IN 1964 WHEN THE ELECTION OF SENATOR HUMPHREY TO THE VICE PRESIDENCY LEFT MINNESOTA WITH A VACANT SEAT IN THE U.S. SENATE.

AT MR. HUMPHREY'S URGING, THE MINNESOTA GOVERNOR APPOINTED MR. MONDALE AS SENATOR. HE WAS ELECTED ON HIS OWN IN 1966 AND THEN RE-ELECTED IN 1972.

DURING HIS SENATORIAL YEARS HE BECAME KNOWN AS A DEFENDER OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND A SUPPORTER OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S "GREAT SOCIETY" PROGRAMS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT. HE SERVED AS FLOOR MANAGER OF THE SENATE FOR THE 1968 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT WHICH BANNED RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC HOUSING. HE WAS A STRONG ADVOCATE OF SCHOOL BUSING -- TRANSPORTING PUPILS TO SCHOOLS WHERE, IT WAS HOPED, THEY WOULD GET A BETTER EDUCATION THAN IN THEIR OWN NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS.

HE ALSO WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN THE DRAFTING AND PASSING OF LEGISLATION TO IMPROVE HOUSING, EDUCATION, CHILD CARE AND NUTRITION.

HE IS MARRIED TO THE FORMER JOAN ADAMS, AN ARTS ENTHUSIAST. THE MONDALES LIVE IN A TURRETED VICTORIAN MANSION, THE OFFICIAL HOME OF THE VICE PRESIDENT ON A HILLSIDE IN NORTHWEST WASHINGTON. THE MONDALES HAVE THREE CHILDREN, TEDDY 19, ELEANOR JANE 17, AND WILLIAM 15.

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לחלץ קטעים המונעים למז'ת ולישראל סיווך הנפקהו של סגן הנשיא מוכויל בתכנית -

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MEET THE PRESS

MONROE: MR. VICE PRESIDENT, WHAT DO YOU MEAN WHEN YOU SAY THE PRESIDENT HAS SHOWN A GREAT DEAL OF COURAGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST? VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: WELL, I THINK THAT ANY PRESIDENT WHO TRIES TO STEP INTO THAT HIGHLY EXPLOSIVE AREA, WITH THE TRADITIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANTAGONISMS AND FEARS, ABSENCE OF RATIONAL DIALOGUE, IS ASKING FOR TROUBLE. I THINK IT'S THE KIND OF DECISION THAT ONE MAKES OUT OF THE INTERESTS OF THIS NATION, BUT MORE THAN THAT, OUT OF INTEREST OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PEACE IN THE WORLD. IT IS VERY CONTROVERSIAL, AND WE ALL KNOW ABOUT IT. HE IS TOTALLY COMMITTED TO THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AND OF THE OTHER STATES, BUT IT TAKES A GREAT DEAL OF COURAGE TO STEP IN THE WAY HE HAS TO TRY TO BRING A PEACE THERE.

MONROE: ARE YOU REFERRING TO HIS SUPPORT FOR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS FOR THE PALESTINIANS, AS IT HAS BEEN PHRASED, WHICH HAS IRRITATED SOME ISRAELI LEADERS AND SOME AMERICAN JEWISH LEADERS?

MONDALE: WELL, I'M REFERRING TO HIS POLICIES IN GENERAL. HE GAVE A SPEECH THE OTHER DAY TO THE WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS IN WHICH HE SPELLED OUT THE TOTAL POLICY IN DETAIL, AND I WAS GLAD TO SEE THAT IT WAS EXCEEDINGLY WELL RECEIVED AND SENATORS SUCH AS ABE RIBICOFF WARMLY ENDORSED IT.

BUT I DON'T THINK IT TAKES MUCH DESCRIPTION TO REALIZE THE DIFFICULTIES OF TRYING TO BRING ABOUT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THERE ARE MANY OTHER PROBLEMS HE'S TAKEN ON, I THINK COURAGEOUSLY, TO TRY TO LEAD THIS COUNTRY TOWARDS SOLUTIONS THAT ARE NEEDED.

MONROE: DO YOU HAVE ANY PERSONAL RESERVATIONS ABOUT WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID ABOUT THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS?

MONROE: IT'S IMPORTANT TO OBSERVE THERE -- AND I SUPPORT HIS POLICY -- THAT HE'S TALKING ABOUT RIGHTS AND NOT NATIONAL RIGHTS. THE OLD FORMULATION WAS NATIONAL RIGHTS, BY DELETING THE WORD NATIONAL, IT'S A VERY SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION.

HE HAS ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WHAT THOSE RIGHTS ARE WILL NOT BE IN DEROGATION TO ISRAEL'S RIGHTS AND WILL BE DEFINED IN THE PROCESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE.

HE HAS ALSO MADE AS CLEAR AS ANY PERSON COULD THAT HE'S TOTALLY COMMITTED TO A SECURE AND PERMANENT JEWISH STATE OF ISRAEL.

SPIVAK: MR. VICE PRESIDENT, ON THE QUESTION OF THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, THOSE ARE CODE WORDS TO BOTH THE ARABS AND TO THE JEWS ALL OVER THE WORLD AND IT MEANS SOMETHING VERY SPECIFIC TO THEM. NOW, WHAT EXACTLY DOES IT MEAN TO YOU?

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MONDALE: I THINK WHAT YOU'RE REFERRING TO -- THE OLD CODE WORD WAS I LEGITIMATE NATIONAL RIGHTS, BECAUSE...

SPIVAK: LEGITIMATE RIGHTS.

MONDALE: WELL, LEGITIMATE RIGHTS IS A NEW FORMULATION. THE OLD FORMULATION WAS LEGITIMATE NATIONAL RIGHTS, WHICH IMPLIED AN

INDEPENDENT STATE, I ASSUME ON THE WEST BANK. THE PRESIDENT HAS INDICATED HE WOULD PREFER THAT THERE BE NO SUCH INDEPENDENT STATE THERE.

* SO I THINK THAT WE'RE REFERRING TO, AND WHAT WE ARE FERRING TO THERE IS THE LONG-FESTERING AND EXPLOSIVE PROBLEM OF DISPLACED PALESTINIANS IN THAT AREA THAT HAVE BEEN A SOURCE OF CONCERN, A SOURCE OF CONTROVERSY, AND INDEED A SOURCE OF WAR NOW FOR MANY YEARS. AND WHAT THOSE RIGHTS ACTUALLY MEAN, THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN VERY CLEAR TO POINT OUT, ARE NOT DEFINED. THEY ARE TO BE DEFINED IN THE PROCESS OF DEALING WITH THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE.

SPIVAK: I KNOW, BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS ALSO SPOKEN ABOUT A HOMELAND. NOW, THESE HAVE SPECIFIC MEANINGS TO BOTH THE JEWS AND TO THE ARABS, AND THEY SOUND LIKE NEGOTIATING WORDS SO THAT EACH SIDE CAN TAKE WHAT IT WANTS, BUT NOBODY HAS MADE IT CLEAR FROM THE ADMINISTRATION WHAT THEY MEAN BY A HOMELAND AND WHAT THEY MEAN BY LEGITIMATE RIGHTS.

NOW CAN YOU MAKE CLEAR? WHAT DO YOU THINK LEGITIMATE RIGHTS ARE?

MONDALE: THAT'S THE REASON FOR NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR AND THE PRESIDENT'S MADE CLEAR, AS I'VE JUST DESCRIBED, WHAT HE'S REFERRING TO IN TERMS OF THOSE PALESTINIANS PROBLEMS. THAT'S THE REASON FOR A GENEVA CONFERENCE, TO EXPLORE HOW THOSE ISSUES WILL BE RESOLVED. IF HE SAID...

SPIVAK: WELL, AREN'T YOU KIDDING BOTH SIDES? AREN'T YOU KIDDING BOTH SIDES WHEN YOU USE THOSE WORDS?

MONDALE: NOT AT ALL. IF WE WERE TRYING TO NEGOTIATE HERE -- THAT IS, THE UNITED STATES WERE TRYING TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST -- WHICH WE ARE NOT. WE'RE TRYING TO GET THE PARTIES TOGETHER FOR THE PURPOSE OF NEGOTIATING -- THAT WOULD BE ONE THING.

WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID IS THAT THERE ARE THREE CENTRAL ELEMENTS ESSENTIAL IF WE'RE GOING TO HAVE A SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ONE IS A FULL PEACE, THE OTHER IS THE BORDERS, AND THE OTHER IS THE RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. I THINK THAT'S A VERY RATIONAL AND WELL-UNDERSTOOD DESCRIPTION OF THE BASIC PROBLEMS. IT'S CONSISTENT WITH U.N. SECURITY RESOLUTION 242 AND I THINK IT'S A RESPONSIBLE POSTURE, AND I WAS VERY PLEASED TO SEE THE RESPONSE TO HIS MESSAGE AT THE WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS AND BY LEADERS IN THE CONGRESS.

AD KAN.

PAZNER==

שני דוחות ש'רחה שהבט מוביל ממכללסמככל מוצא מעט חסברה מחזית חקר דים אמן מעוד אילסר

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Copy for

news report

OCTOBER 3, 1977.

VICE-PRESIDENT MONDALE FILLS UNIQUE ROLE

BY ALEXANDER M. SULLIVAN
IPS WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENT

("THERE IS NO ONE WHO WOULD APPROACH HIM IN HIS IMPORTANCE TO ME, HIS CLOSENESS TO ME AND ALSO HIS ABILITY TO CARRY OUT A SINGULAR ASSIGNMENT WITH MY COMPLETE TRUST." PRESIDENT CARTER, OF VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE, SEPTEMBER 29, 1977.)

WASHINGTON, SEPT. 30 -- AMERICANS ONCE REGARDED THE VICE PRESIDENCY AS THE HIGHEST-RANKING ELECTIVE SINECURE IN THE LAND.

TO ILLUSTRATE THE PERILS OF ACCEPTING THE POST, THEY WOULD RECOUNT THE TRAGIC STORY OF TWO BROTHERS: ONE RAN OFF TO SEA, THE OTHER WAS ELECTED VICE PRESIDENT, AND NEITHER WAS EVER HEARD FROM AGAIN.

POLITICIANS HELD THE OFFICE IN ONLY SLIGHTLY HIGHER ESTEEM. PRESIDENT EISENHOWER WAS NOT BEING UNKIND IN 1960 WHEN HE SAID HE WOULD THINK OF SOME USEFUL THING VICE PRESIDENT NIXON HAD DONE IN OFFICE IF THE QUESTIONER WOULD GIVE HIM TWO WEEKS TO REFLECT ON THE MATTER.

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UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE

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Jerusalem 19, Keren Hayesod Street, Tel. 222376

FOR IT IS THE NATURE OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM THAT THE VICE PRESIDENCY IS AS MEANINGFUL AS THE PRESIDENT WANTS IT TO BE.

THE CONSTITUTION PLACES ONLY ONE DEMAND ON ANY VICE PRESIDENT -- HE IS TO PRESIDE OVER THE U.S. SENATE AND, IN THE RARE CASE OF A TIE, CAST THE DECIDING VOTE.

BUT ALTHOUGH THE VICE PRESIDENT IS ALSO THE MAN IN WAITING -- OR, PERHAPS, BECAUSE HE IS -- FEW PRESIDENTS HAVE CHOSEN TO INVEST THEIR VICE PRESIDENTS WITH MEANINGFUL ROLES OR MUCH RESPONSIBILITY.

STILL, SINCE FOUR TIMES IN THIS CENTURY A VICE PRESIDENT HAS TAKEN THE REINS OF THE PRESIDENCY FROM A CHIEF EXECUTIVE WHOSE TERM WAS INTERRUPTED BY DEATH OR RESIGNATION, PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES HAVE MADE IT A PRACTICE TO SAY THEIR VICE PRESIDENT'S SITUATION WOULD BE DIFFERENT.

LAST DECEMBER, WHEN PRESIDENT CARTER OUTLINED HIS CONCEPTION OF THE VICE PRESIDENCY, HIS IDEAS SEEMED PRACTICAL, YET SO RADICAL, AS TO CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE OFFICE; ACCORDINGLY, MOST REPORTERS AND POLITICIANS RAISED AN EYEBROW, LET LOOSE A CYNICAL CHUCKLE, AND WENT ABOUT THEIR BUSINESS.

NINE MONTHS LATER, VICE PRESIDENT WALTER MONDALE HAS PROVED HIMSELF MR. CARTER'S MOST HIGH-POWERED ADVISER, MOVING EASILY FROM SUCH THORNY DOMESTIC MATTERS AS INCOME TAX REFORM AND CIVIL RIGHTS TO THE EQUALLY VEXING PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, RACING TENSION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE COMPLEX ISSUES OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

"THERE IS NO ASPECT OF MY OWN DAILY RESPONSIBILITIES AS PRESIDENT," MR. CARTER TOLD HIS SEPTEMBER 29 NEWS CONFERENCE, "THAT IS NOT SHARED BY THE VICE PRESIDENT."

THAT WAS A STATEMENT THAT CAME AS NO SURPRISE TO THOSE WHO KEEP TRACK OF THE PRESIDENT'S PUBLIC SCHEDULE; MR.

MONDALE'S NAME APPEARS ON IT SEVERAL TIMES A WEEK, EITHER FOR PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH MR. CARTER OR AS PARTICIPANT IN MR. CARTER'S MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN LEADERS AND WITH U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS.

MR. MONDALE RECALLS LONG HOURS DISCUSSING THE NATURE OF THE VICE PRESIDENCY WITH MR. CARTER DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND INAUGURAL DAY. THE TWO MEN CAME TO AN AGREEMENT THEY HOPED WOULD AVOID THE PITFALLS OF PAST RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT.

OUT OF THOSE TALKS CAME MR. CARTER'S ORDER THAT MR. MONDALE WOULD HAVE AN OFFICE WITHIN THE WHITE HOUSE, AS WELL AS HIS TRADITIONAL OFFICE QUARTERS IN THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING. THE PRESIDENT TOLD MEMBERS OF HIS WHITE HOUSE STAFF THEY SHOULD REGARD THE VICE PRESIDENT AS A SECOND BOSS. SUCH WAS THE TRUST BETWEEN HIM AND MR. MONDALE, HE TOLD MEMBERS OF HIS PROSPECTIVE CABINET, THEY SHOULD REGARD THE VICE PRESIDENT AS HIS ALTER EGO.

HOW HAS IT WORKED, NINE MONTHS INTO THE FIRST TERM?

"BETTER THAN I'D HOPED," MR. MONDALE SAYS. AN ANALYSIS OF HOW MR. MONDALE SPENDS HIS WORKING DAY, HE NOTES, SHOWED HIM SPENDING "A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF EACH WEEK WITH THE PRESIDENT. THE HIGHEST PERCENTAGE TO DATE WAS IN JULY, WHEN 48 PERCENT OF TOTAL OFFICE HOURS WERE SPENT WITH THE PRESIDENT."

"FRITZ AND I," THE PRESIDENT SAID THE OTHER DAY, "LISTEN TO THE SAME PRESENTATIONS AND WE FORM OUR IDEAS TOGETHER. ON 30 MINUTES NOTICE, I WOULD BE PERFECTLY WILLING TO SAY, 'FRITZ, I CAN'T GO TO THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE OF SOME REASON, WOULD YOU GO AND DO THE SPECIAL FINAL ARRANGEMENTS IN

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THE S.A.L.T. NEGOTIATIONS WITH (SOVIET PRESIDENT) BREZHNEV.' HE HAS COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT AND OF MY POSITION."

MR. CARTER, IN FACT, DID SEND MR. MONDALE ON THE FIRST DIPLOMATIC MISSION OF HIS ADMINISTRATION, A JOURNEY TO EUROPE AND THE FAR EAST. LATER, HE SENT MR. MONDALE ON A SECOND TOUR TO PORTUGAL, SPAIN, YUGOSLAVIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, WITH A MEETING IN AUSTRIA WITH SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER VORSTER.

THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN GIVEN SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY BY MR. CARTER FOR FORMULATING U.S. POLICY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA. IN HIS MEETING WITH MR. VORSTER AND LATER WITH BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN, MR. MONDALE IS CREDITED WITH PROVIDING THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE PRESENT BRITISH-AMERICAN INITIATIVE ON SOLVING RHODESIA'S RACE PROBLEM.

MR. MONDALE'S HAS BEEN AN INFLUENTIAL VOICE AS WELL IN U.S. MIDEAST POLICY, WHERE, AS MR. CARTER NOTED, HIS CONTACTS IN CONGRESS AND THE JEWISH COMMUNITY HAVE GIVEN THE ADMINISTRATION CREDENTIALS OTHERWISE LACKING.

ONE WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL, QUESTIONED ON THE REACH OF MR. MONDALE'S WRIT, RECALLED MR. CARTER'S DESCRIPTION OF LAST DECEMBER: "HE'S (MR.) CARTER'S PRINCIPAL ADVISER," THE OFFICIAL SAID. "NO ONE ELSE SPANS BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS AS HE DOES."

MR. CARTER AND MR. MONDALE HAVE APPARENTLY DEVELOPED A COMFORTABLE PERSONAL AS WELL AS WORKING RELATIONSHIP.

NOT TOO LONG AGO, A DEADPAN MR. CARTER TOLD A CABINET MEETING THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD EMBARRASSED HIM AND THE ENTIRE ADMINISTRATION BY APPEARING AT A RECEPTION FOR WEST GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WITH TUXEDO TROUSERS TOO SHORT TO SUIT THE FASHION CRITICS.

"THOSE PANTS," MR. MONDALE PROTESTED, "FIT ME WHEN I ASSUMED OFFICE." THEN, WITH A GRIN, HE ADDED, "BUT I'VE GROWN A LOT." --ITEM

ההסתדרות הציונית העולמית

המחלקה ליחסי-חוץ
ירושלים

WORLD ZIONIST ORGANISATION

EXTERNAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
P. O. B. 92, JERUSALEM

בבקשה לקבל את הלוחה

WITH COMPLIMENTS

הנ"ל / י"ס



Handwritten: *AB*

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

Handwritten: *W. F. Mondale*

August 29, 1977

Rev. Lawrence N. Caraway, Chairman
American Christian Holy Land Committee
Redeemer Baptist Church
10792 National Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90064

Dear Rev. Caraway:

Thank you for your comments concerning U.S. policy toward Israel.

As I stated recently, while peace cannot be imposed from the outside, America has a special responsibility and a special opportunity to help the parties directly involved bring peace to the Middle East. This comes about first of all because of our unique and profound relationship with the state of Israel since its creation more than a generation ago. Our sense of shared values and purposes means that, for Americans, the question of Israel's survival is not a political question but rather stands as a moral imperative of our foreign policy.

I very much appreciate your concern.


With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Walter F. Mondale
Walter F. Mondale

Busy Mondale Is a Full Working Partner of Carter

By MARJORIE HUNTER
Special to The New York Times



WASHINGTON, July 19—"Could I have everybody's attention, please," President Carter said as members of his Cabinet took their seats around the long table. "As you know," he said, "we had a very distinguished visitor in our midst last week, Chancellor Schmidt. And we will have another distinguished visitor this week, Prime Minister Begin."

"In spite of all our efforts, a very serious thing occurred," the President went on with mock gravity.

Vice President Mondale, he said, had gone to a German Embassy dinner here last week "in formal clothes with his trousers up to his knees" (an allusion to a fashion designer's criticism that Mr. Mondale's tuxedo trousers were too short.)

"It embarrassed me and the Cabinet and Bob Strauss in Europe and . . ." the President said, trying not to laugh.

"Mr. President, wait a minute," Vice President Mondale tried to interrupt.

"I'll represent you," Attorney General Griffin B. Bell told Mr. Mondale.

"I'll take up a collection," said Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal.

The Growth Factor

"Those pants fit me when I assumed office," Mr. Mondale assured the Cabinet. "But I've grown a lot."

"Up until this week," the President said, laughing.

"The Vice President has grown a lot in his feet but not in his head," said

Robert S. Strauss, the President's special trade representative.

And so, on this note of levity, began another Cabinet meeting, the second encounter yesterday between the President and the man he has made a full working partner.

Before leaving the White House in late afternoon, Walter F. Mondale would meet with the President three more times, helping to shape diplomacy, legislative strategy and Government reorganization plans.

Unlike most of his predecessors, who complained that they did not have enough to do, Mr. Mondale puts in a full day's work, little of it merely ceremonial.


"I read virtually everything the President does; I get invited to all the meetings," he said. "If anything, our relationship gets stronger as it goes along. And we have a lot of fun together."

To keep up the pace as "assistant President," Mr. Mondale rises at 6:45 A.M., eats a light breakfast of bran flakes and then, as he sips his coffee, reads The New York Times and The Washington Post.

"It gets you started right," he said yesterday as he sat at one end of the large dining table in the Victorian mansion assigned to the Vice-Presidential family.

Just after 8 A.M., he stepped out of the cool of the house into the heat of the morning and, accompanied by his 15-

Continued on Page 59, Column 5



The New York Times/George Tames

Vice President Mondale bowing in prayer before having lunch with President Carter, sharing a light moment during a cabinet meeting, and returning from work with his 15-year-old son, William.



Busy Mondale Puts In Full Days As a Working Partner of Carter

Continued from First Page
Second Section

year-old son, William, an errand boy this summer for a downtown law firm, was chauffeured in a Chrysler Imperial, followed by a van of Secret Service agents, to the White House. William was carrying his own lunch in a brown paper bag.

After a few minutes at his desk in his large office down the hall from the Oval Office, the Vice President joined the President for an 8:30 meeting of the senior staff.

Next came the Cabinet meeting which, after the few moments of joking over Mr. Mondale's short trousers, dealt with such matters as the shooting down of an American helicopter over North Korea, trade negotiations, reorganization plans, New York City's blackout, welfare fraud, hospital costs, the farm bill and Prime Minister Begin's visit to Washington.

After leaving the Cabinet room, the Vice President spent an hour in his office, signing mail, returning telephone calls and preparing for his regular Monday luncheon meeting with the President.

"That's the one time in the week when we're alone," he said. "I can bring up whatever I please."

Dining Under a Tree

The temperature had already climbed into the 90's, but the President decided he wanted to eat under a shady willow tree on a stone terrace outside his private office.

"It's an old Southern tradition to sweat in your food," Jody Powell, the President's press secretary, informed the Minnesota-born Vice President.

As stewards hovered with luncheon trays of turkey sandwiches, vegetable relishes, potato chips vanilla ice cream and iced tea, Mr. Carter gave the blessing.

Later, as they ate, the two men discussed the Begin visit, reorganization of intelligence agencies and legislation pending in Congress.

"Here's a book you should read," the Vice President told the President, handing him a copy of Barbara Tuchman's "Bible and Swords," a history of the claims on Palestine that led to the Balfour Declaration, opening the way to establishment of a Jewish national home. Mr. Mondale had finished the book the night before and "found it fascinating."

After lunch, he went to the Roosevelt

Room to swear in Robert Scott, a former North Carolina Governor, as Federal co-chairman of the Appalachian Regional Commission. Then it was back to his office to meet with Harry G. Barnes, a Minnesota man who is Ambassador to Rumania.

Briefing From Justice Aides

In mid-afternoon, the Vice President returned to the Cabinet room where he and the President received a briefing by Attorney General Bell and aides on revitalizing the Justice Department's organized-crime strike force.

Later, Mr. Carter and Mr. Mondale spent 40 minutes in the Oval Office with Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's assistant for national security affairs, reviewing last-minute plans for the Begin visit. Then Mr. Vance and Mr. Brzezinski accompanied Mr. Mondale back to his office and were closeted for a few minutes.

"Cy and I had a historical dispute over the mandate establishing Palestine," the Vice President said later, without explaining exactly what the dispute involved.

"Who won?" he was asked.

"I believe the Secretary of State did," he replied, a bit chagrined.

In late afternoon, as the temperature reached toward 100, the Vice President crossed West Executive Avenue to his other, largely ceremonial office in the Executive Office Building.

'Tougher but More Satisfying'

Does he like his job? he was asked.

"Yes," he replied. "It's tougher but more satisfying than I expected."

The hours are perhaps a little shorter than those he spent as a Senator, but the pressure of the White House is "almost difficult to describe," he said, adding, "What the President and those around him go through you can't know until you experience it. It's an awesome thing."

Jumping up from his chair, he walked over to his desk and opened a drawer.

"Look at this," he said, beaming.

Inside the drawer of the mammoth mahogany desk used by Presidents dating back as far as Theodore Roosevelt, five Presidents and Vice Presidents—Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard M. Nixon, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Harry S. Truman and Nelson A. Rockefeller—had scribbled their names.

So far, "Fritz" Mondale has resisted the temptation to add his own.

Wednesday, June 22, 1977

MOSHE

Begin



in his White House office.

By R. Norman Matheny, staff photographer

Mondale: 'hopeful' about progress toward Israeli-Arab settlement

Mondale defends policies on Mideast, in interview

By Godfrey Sperling Jr.
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington
Vice-President Walter F. Mondale strongly denies that the Carter administration intends "to force a plan" of settlement in the Mideast and asserts:

"We are not going to condition our commitment to Israel or our supply of essential security needs on our policy. This [the settlement] is something for the parties to decide by negotiation."

Responding for the first time to criticism

of his recent West Coast speech on Mideast policy, both from Jerusalem and from within the U.S. Jewish community, the Vice-President, in an interview with the Monitor, added "we are hopeful" that President Carter's coming meeting with Israel's new Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, "will be productive."

He indicated the Carter administration has seen new signs to buoy that hope.

Before any territory should be given up by Israel, Mr. Mondale said, a condition should be fulfilled:

*Please turn to Page 6

this could be important

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התנאים המדיניים*

Mondale defends policies on Mideast, in interview

"We place a high priority on the proper and comprehensive definition of a peace that would set into play those kinds of people-to-people contacts, trading opportunities, and commercial relationships which, we think, would help to bring about a reduction of tension and a long-term understanding which is really the best guarantee of peace."

"We've indicated," he said, "that that condition should be a condition to give up territories."

Asked what he meant by "minor modifications" when he and the President had said that Israel should return to its pre-1967 borders with "minor modifications," in exchange for peace with its Arab neighbors, Mr. Mondale replied:

"That's for the parties to decide. This is [only] a general suggestion. And we won't go beyond that general suggestion. We don't have a map, and we're not pretending or trying to design a settlement."

He emphasized that not only acceptance of boundaries by both sides was essential to a settlement, but there also must be acceptance by the Arabs of "the permanence of Israel."

"Defensible borders"

To the charge from Jewish circles that the settlement the President has in mind may not contain "defensible borders," the Vice-President said:

"We made it very clear that we think security arrangements should be considered by the parties that would be in addition to the boundaries that are acceptable. In other words, one requirement is not just boundaries, but acceptance of those boundaries."

Mr. Mondale was asked at this point why there were "these persistent fears" coming out of Jerusalem . . . about what you have in mind in the Midwest. He chose to reply in this way:

"Well, let me put it differently. I was very pleased by Senator [Abraham] Ribicoff's response. I was pleased that other senators who participated in that colloquy were very supportive, all of them long-standing friends of Israel, as I am."

"I was pleased by Senator [Hubert H.] Humphrey's comments the other day following his luncheon with the President. And now we are shortly going to have the new Israeli Prime Minister here. And I would hope that now we could sit down and have a meaningful, respectful dialogue with the new leaders."

No new ground

Of his California speech and criticism that it did not offer anything new, Mr. Mondale said:

"Well, it is true, that this was not an effort to plow new ground. But it was an effort to state in one speech comprehensively, in a balanced way what the administration's policies in the Middle East were. We did not indicate

that this was a new policy - but it has not been stated this comprehensively before."

Moving into another aspect of foreign affairs now in the spotlight, the Vice-President responded to the question - "Doesn't the stressing of human rights complicate the making of foreign relations?" - in this way:

"Well, in one sense it does and in another sense it finally gets foreign relations on the basis that it should be on."

"In other words, if the pursuit of human rights is a complication, maybe it's a long-overdue complication because what should foreign policy be all about?"

"It should be, it seems to me, about the need for stable international institutions and societies, but it also ought to reflect the values of the American people. And it ought to be identified with those kinds of basic human aspirations of people everywhere."

Progress, not confrontation

He continued:

"We're learning better every day how to make our case and to make it in a way that's helpful and promotes progress rather than confrontation. But sure, there are some complexities with it. But there is also a lot of evidence that it's a valuable emphasis."

"On my recent trips through Spain and Portugal, I was told innumerable times that they really appreciated the President's emphasis on human rights. It strengthened them; it strengthened their will for democracy."

Here Mr. Mondale was asked: "What about the SALT talks? Is human rights emphasis a deterrent to an agreement there?"

"We don't think so," he said. "I don't think it was a problem with [Secretary of State] Cy Vance and his talks with [Andrei] Gromyko and earlier with Mr. [Leonid] Brezhnev."

"In other words, I think the problem with SALT is that we're trying to go into a different generation of agreements that go beyond these policies of simply agreeing to outer limits."

"I consider the Vladovostok agreement, although I supported it, to be a situation in which our country simply took the two lists of everything they planned to do, stapled them together and called it an agreement, a breakthrough."

"Well, what we're trying to do is go beyond, from just putting outer limits on things both countries are planning to do, to a next-generation pact of actually reducing our armaments levels. I mean that will bring real stability. And that's what's taking the time."

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The Mondale Speech

Vice President Walter F. Mondale delivered a major address on the Middle East last Friday. It was widely heralded as an attempt to allay concerns over the disconcerting drift in U.S. policy. However, his speech disappointingly turned out to be a reiteration of a number of previous Administration positions. (See *File for the Record* for text.)

Because the speech gave added credence to the growing impression that the United States is enunciating an overall plan for a Middle East settlement, it actually reinforced fears both here and in Israel. The speech, which was essentially prepared by the National Security Council, was drafted so as not to offend the Arab world. The objective was certainly achieved; the Arab states now have added reason to believe that the United States will work to satisfy nearly all of their demands—especially on the issue of territory.

By reiterating the position that Israel should eventually withdraw to the pre-1967 armistice lines with only "minor modifications," the speech further undermined Israel's negotiating position. How can Arab states be expected to agree to anything more than "minor modifications" if the United States denies Israel the opportunity to negotiate for defensible boundaries? The 1967 lines, even with "minor modifications," are indefensible, and invite further Arab aggression.

The Administration's concept of differentiating between recognized boundaries and separate, undefined "security" lines does not fulfill Israel's defense requirements—nor those of a stable peace. The creation of additional demilitarized zones, early-warning stations, UN-patrolled buffers, and, perhaps, superpower guarantees, cannot substitute for defensible borders—a key phrase that the Vice President failed to mention.

The underlying theme of the speech was that the Arab states are ready to live in peace with Israel—an assumption that is highly questionable. There is scant evidence that the Arab states have abandoned their ultimate goal of destroying Israel. Yet Mondale declared: "We believe that both sides want peace." He insisted that the Arab leaders, during their talks with President Carter over the past several weeks, indicated a willingness to consider negotiating the type of peace agreement Israel would like to have. "We found that the Arab leaders did not insist that this kind of peace is something that only future generations could consider," he said.

But skepticism is justified because the Arabs still refuse to meet directly with Israel—publicly or privately. The Arab leaders continue to insist that a real peace must await future generations, notwithstanding their whispers to Washington. (See box on page 105.) Up until this moment, no Arab leader has ever declared that Israel has a right to exist, although some of the more "moderate" leaders have agreed to accept Israel as a fact—an undesired fact, and not necessarily a permanent one.

The "Jordanian Option" Preferred

While the Vice President did state the Administration's preference that any Palestinian "homeland or entity" should be established "in association with Jordan," it was also clear that the other option—the creation of a separate, independent Palestinian mini-state—was not being ruled out completely, as it should have been. And the introduction of the word "entity" seems to take the vague concept of a "homeland" one step further. (*Webster's Dictionary* defines "entity" as an "independent, separate or self-contained existence.")

The Vice President asserted that the Administration would never impose a settlement, adding that the United States does not "intend to use our military aid as pressure on Israel." He then said that the United States and Israel may have some differences over military aid and could eventually have some differences over "diplomatic strategy."

Although the speech did praise Israel's accomplishments and did reiterate Carter's March 16 call for real peace, it must be viewed as a disappointment to Israel's friends, who had hoped to hear directly from the President—and, in any event, expected Mondale to deliver one of his traditionally supportive speeches.

Administration attempts to stimulate Congressional expressions of support for the speech's contents resulted in a laudatory statement by Senator Abe Ribicoff (D-Conn.). Other Congressional friends of Israel reserved judgment—for the time being.

NEAR EAST report

Washington letter on
American policy in the Near East

Vol. XXI, No. 25, June 22, 1977

Viewing the news



Israel's Premier

Menachem Begin was sworn in as Israel's sixth Prime Minister on Monday. Addressing the Knesset, he declared: "Our prime concern is prevention of a new war in the Middle East. I call upon King Hussein, President Sadat and President Assad to meet with me—whether in our capitals or on neutral soil, in public or away from the spotlights of publicity—in order to discuss the establishment of true peace between their countries and Israel."

Begin, however, warned that "should this plea encounter refusal, we shall make a note of the Arab intransigence." He pointed out that earlier appeals for negotiations by Israeli Governments had always been turned down by the Arab states.

The new Prime Minister promised to maintain close ties with the United States. He said Israel would endeavor "to deepen the friendship between ourselves and the United States of America." He also pledged to try to improve ties with France and to normalize relations with the Soviet Union.

"I wish to declare that the Government of Israel will not ask any nation, be it near or far, mighty or small, to recognize our right to exist," Begin asserted. "We were granted our right to exist by the God of our fathers, at the glimmer of the dawn of human civilization nearly 4,000 years ago."

He called upon the Arab states to recognize "the mutual need for a life of peace and understanding."

Here is the new Israeli Cabinet, as announced by Begin on Monday: Defense, Ezer Weizman; Foreign Affairs, Moshe Dayan; Education, Zevulun Hammer; Agriculture, Ariel Sharon; Construction and Environment, Gideon Patt; Energy Resources, Yitzhak Modai; Religious Affairs, Aharon abu-Hatzeira; Absorption, David Levy; Finance, Simcha Ehrlich; Interior and Police, Yosef Burg; Com-

(Continued on page 105)

Senate Passes Foreign Aid Bill

The Senate on June 15 approved the International Security Assistance Act for fiscal year 1978, including \$1.785 billion in military and economic assistance for Israel. The vote was 67-to-18.

The bill, which authorizes \$4.7 billion in worldwide military and economic aid, earmarks \$1 billion in military loans for Israel, repayment of one-half of which is to be forgiven, and \$785 million in economic supporting assistance. The legislation also contains \$750 million in economic supporting assistance for Egypt, \$90 million for Syria and \$223 million in military and economic assistance for Jordan. These amounts are the figures recommended by the Administration. Last month, the House of Representatives approved a bill with identical figures for the Middle East.

Sen. CLIFFORD P. CASE (R-N.J.) said it was "important to emphasize that the President's policy on coproduction for Israel and on the restatement of the special historical relationship with Israel is shared fully in Congress." It is "clearly American policy that Israel should be allowed to coproduce military equipment and to buy U.S. components," he said, adding that Israel ought to be permitted to bid on NATO contracts "which are made available to foreign bidders." Case called Israel "a valuable defensive asset" for the United States and pointed out that NATO strategic and tactical planning "relies on the Israeli capability to hold the balance of power in the Middle East and not to require the massive input of American forces in the area."

It is "essential that Israel can rely on itself and at the same time can perform an essential balancing role in the Middle East which includes holding off . . . advanced Soviet-type weapons," he said. To maintain a "good defensive posture" and "defense capabilities," Israel must have U.S. assistance—not in the "form of grants and credits alone, since these are inadequate to finance the huge costs associated with Israel's defense requirements. She has to be able to manufacture a good part of what she needs because this is a financially sounder approach and because it allows Israel to tailor her military equipment to her specific needs."

Case urged the Administration to "move rapidly to clear up the backlog of dozens of requests by Israel for coproduction which have been held up or blocked" by bureau-

crats in the Departments of State and Defense.

The Senate also approved an amendment to the aid bill by Senators LLOYD BENTSEN (D-Tex.) and SPARK M. MATSUNAGA (D-Hawaii) prohibiting military sales, credits and guarantees to nations which aid or abet international terrorists. Matsunaga stated that the "U.S. policy of no negotiation with terrorists is a correct one."

"But," he continued, "I believe we must do more in an effort to meet the problem of foreign governments which continue to harbor terrorists." This amendment "will serve notice to all nations that the United States will not countenance acquiescence to terrorism . . ."

Stone: Begin to be Flexible

Sen. RICHARD STONE (D-Fla.), just back in Washington following a swing through the Middle East, said last Thursday that the next Israeli Government will be flexible and will negotiate issues "on all fronts," including the West Bank.

At a press conference, Stone said: "I met with Prime Minister-designate Begin twice. He assured me on both occasions of his flexibility and willingness to be forthcoming in negotiations on all issues, on all fronts."

"When I asked him does everything mean everything, he assured me it did. When I told him that when he arrived (in the United States) he would then be asked by the press, does everything include being willing to negotiate about the West Bank, he assured me that that was included within the concept of everything."

Stone went on to point out, however, that Begin will be taking a different negotiating style than did the outgoing Israeli Government. "He (Begin) does not choose to reveal his cards in advance or possible concessions in advance, but that does not provide a rational basis for concluding that Prime Minister-designate Begin will not be a reasonable negotiator."

Stone, who also met with the Arab leaders of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, said that they had been "very interested and even fascinated" with Begin's personality. "I do not think . . . that his personality will be an obstacle to the negotiations."

In his opening statement, Stone, who is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Near East, called for

immediate consultations between Israel and Arab states to reach "working agreements" on various issues.

"These unstructured consultations should take place without deadlines and without delay at the working levels . . . to try to reach agreements about important, practical problems as well as the major decisive issues such as borders," he said.

"At this working level, ambassadors, their deputies, and other officials have no advance public rhetoric of their own to harden their positions," the Senator added, pointing out that high-level talks involving heads of government might not succeed because of the public positions taken by the various leaders.

"The most difficult, most long-term, most delicate negotiations are always those at the highest levels—where positions have been staked out in advance, where there has been open rhetoric on all sides, and where a nation is most vulnerable to losing face," he continued. "Why should we limit discussion to those issues on which the nations disagree, or only to the highest levels of office?"

He suggested that the role of the United States "is to act to bring the parties together for these working-level discussions."


The Senator said that these talks could take place at Geneva or anywhere else, but the important thing was to get them started right away. He proposed such issues as water sharing, family reunification, industrial development, and transportation as worthy of such discussion—as well as the "major issues."

Packwood on Begin Victory

Sen. BOB PACKWOOD (R-Oreg.) has countered U.S. "muttering" that the election of Menachem Begin as Israel's Prime Minister threatens stability and peace in the Middle East. He said Begin's selection "does not significantly change the chances for an Arab-Israeli peace" and added: "Suggestions that Mr. Begin's election may 'stall' the peace process are made with ignorance or with malice."

"In fact, the absence of a settlement has never been due to any imagined Israeli 'intransigence.' For 29 years, the Arab states have refused to sit down and negotiate with Israel," he continued. "They have refused to meet face-to-face. For 10 years, the Arab states—the instigators

(Continued on page 105)



Mideast Policy Outlined by Mondale

The following are excerpts from an address last Friday by Vice President Walter F. Mondale before the World Affairs Council of Northern California in San Francisco:

Just as respect for human rights is central to our foreign policy values, so progress toward a just and lasting Middle East settlement is essential to the prospect of a more peaceful world. The President has asked me to describe what we are trying to do to achieve peace in the Middle East. We want the American people to have the fullest possible understanding of our approach, for your support is crucial to its success.

President Carter has now met with the leaders of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The President met with Prime Minister Rabin of Israel and we hope that we will soon meet with the new Prime Minister.

With the exception of the meeting with President Assad, which was held in Geneva, I have participated in all of them and have sensed these leaders' great desire for peace, and their longing for the benefits that peace can bring to nations too long mobilized for war. Yet at the same time, we also found deep fears and suspicion which must be overcome if peace is to be achieved in that strategic and troubled region of the world.

Essential American Interest

A genuine and lasting peace in the Middle East is of essential interest to all Americans. Confrontation there carries the threat of a global confrontation, and runs the risk of nuclear war. As we have seen, war in the Middle East has profound economic consequences. It can, and has, damaged the economies of the entire world. It has been a tragedy for the nations of the region. Even short of war, continued confrontation encourages radicalization and instability.

Genuine peace is needed by all parties to the conflict. The Arab nations need peace.

Israel, above all, has a profound interest in peace. There is no question about that. For almost three decades, Israel has borne the burden of constant war. More than half its entire budget is dedicated to defense. Its citizens bear the highest average tax burden in the world—more than 60 percent of their income goes for taxes.

And yet, what of the future? Is it a future in which Israel's three million people try by force of arms alone to hold out against the hostility and growing power of the Arab world? Or can a process of reconciliation be started—a process in which peace protects Israel's security, a peace in which the urge for revenge and recrimination is replaced by mutual recognition and respect?

America has a special responsibility and a special opportunity to help bring about this kind of peace. This comes about first of all because of our unique and profound relationship with the state of Israel since its

creation more than a generation ago. Our sense of shared values and purposes means that, for Americans, the question of Israel's survival is not a political question but rather stands as a moral imperative of our foreign policy.

And yet, our special relationship with Israel has not been directed against any other country. We have been able to enjoy the friendship of much of the Arab world where we and our close allies have important interests.

It is precisely because of our close ties with both Israel and her Arab neighbors that we are uniquely placed to promote the search for peace, to work for an improved understanding of each side's legitimate concerns, and to help them work out what we hope will be a basis for negotiation leading to a final peace in the Middle East.

New Approach Necessary

When this Administration entered office on January 20, we found that the situation in the Middle East called for a new approach. The step-by-step diplomacy of our predecessors had defused the immediate tensions produced by the war in 1973. But it was also evident that it would be increasingly difficult to achieve small diplomatic concessions when the ultimate shape of a peace agreement remained obscure. At the same time, it was unlikely that an agreement on a lasting peace could be achieved at one stroke.

UN Security Council Resolution 242, which is supported by all the parties, provides a basis for the negotiations which are required if there is to be a settlement. But Resolution 242 does not by itself provide all that is required. We, therefore, decided to work with the parties concerned to outline the overall framework as the basis for a phased negotiation and implementation of specific steps toward peace.

A major impediment to this approach lies in the fact that the positions of all sides were frozen. The words and phrases used by the parties had become encrusted with the fallout of countless diplomatic battles.

We have tried to regain momentum in this process. We have encouraged Arabs and Israelis to begin thinking again seriously about the elements of peace and not to remain committed to particular words and formulations.

To this end, the President has tried to describe our understanding of what the key elements of an overall framework for an agreement might be:

- A commitment to a genuine and lasting peace demonstrated by concrete acts to normalize relations among the countries of the area.
- The establishment of borders for Israel which are recognized by all and which can

be kept secure.

- A fair solution to the problem of the Palestinians.

The President has set forth these elements not to dictate a peace or to impose our views but to stimulate fresh thought.

President Carter has gone further than any of his predecessors to stress with Arab leaders the essential point that peace must mean more than merely an end to hostilities, stating as he did in Clinton, Mass. last March:

"... the first prerequisite of a lasting peace is the recognition of Israel by her neighbors. Israel's right to exist; Israel's right to exist permanently; Israel's right to exist in peace. That means that over a period of months or years that the borders between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Egypt must be opened up to travel, to tourism, to cultural exchange, to trade, so that no matter who the leaders might be in those countries, the people themselves will have formed a mutual understanding and comprehension and a sense of a common purpose to avoid the repetitious wars and deaths that have affected that region so long. That is the first prerequisite of peace."

We have found that the Arab leaders did not insist that this kind of peace is something that only future generations could consider. Some leaders, such as King Hussein, during his visit to Washington, have made clear their commitment to a "just and lasting peace—one which would enable all the people in the Middle East to divert their energies and resources to build and attain a better future."

Reluctant Arab Recognition

So we believe that we have made some progress in getting Arab leaders to recognize Israel's right to exist and to recognize—however reluctantly—that this commitment is essential to a genuine peace. That peace must be structured in such a way that it can survive even if some leaders were to nurture aims to destroy Israel. Still we have a long way to go; the Arabs have been insistent that Israel withdraw from the territories it occupied in the 1967 war. We have made clear our view that Israel should not be asked to withdraw unless it can secure in return real peace from its neighbors.

The question of withdrawal is, in essence, the question of borders. For peace to be enduring, borders must be inviolable. Nations must feel secure behind their borders. Borders must be recognized by all.

A crucial dilemma has been how to provide borders that are both secure and acceptable to all. It is understandable that Israel, having fought a war in every decade since its birth, wants borders that can be

defended as easily as possible. But no borders will be secure if neighboring countries do not accept them.

The problem is that borders that might afford Israel the maximum security in military terms would not be accepted as legitimate by Israel's neighbors. Borders that Israel's neighbors would recognize, Israel has not been willing to accept as forming an adequate line of defense.

For this reason, the President has tried to separate the two issues. On the one hand, there must be recognized borders. But, in addition, there could be separate lines of defense or other measures that could enhance Israel's security. The arrangements in the Sinai and in the Golan Heights provide models of how Israel's security might be enhanced until confidence in a lasting peace can be fully developed.

We would urge all the parties to think realistically about security arrangements to reduce the fear of surprise attack, to make acts of aggression difficult if not impossible, and to limit the military forces that would confront one another in sensitive areas.

This approach recognizes the fact that there is a profound asymmetry in what the two sides in the Middle East are seeking. On the one hand, a principal Arab concern is to regain lost territory. On the other, Israel wishes peace, and recognition. Territory is tangible, and once ceded, difficult to regain short of war. Peace, on the other hand, can be ephemeral. Peaceful intentions can change overnight, unless a solid foundation of cooperation and a firm pattern of reinforcing relationships can be established to ensure that all have a stake in continuing tranquility.

Separating the Issues

We believe that separating the imperatives of security from the requirement of recognized borders is an important advance toward reconciling the differences between the two sides. It is in this way that Israel could return to approximately the borders that existed prior to the war of 1967, albeit with minor modifications as negotiated among the parties, and yet retain security lines or other arrangements that would ensure Israel's safety as full confidence developed in a comprehensive peace. Thus, with borders explicitly recognized and buttressed by security measures, and with the process of peace unfolding, Israel's security would be greater than it is today.

A further major issue is that of the future of the Palestinian people. It has been the source of continuing tragedy in the Middle East. There are two prerequisites for a lasting peace in this regard. First, there must be a demonstrated willingness on the part of the Palestinians to live in peace alongside Israel. Second, the Palestinians must be

given a stake in peace so that they will turn away from the violence of the past and toward a future in which they can express their legitimate political aspirations peacefully.

Thus, if the Palestinians are willing to exist in peace and are prepared to demonstrate that willingness, by recognizing Israel's right to exist in peace, the President has made clear that, in the context of a peace settlement, we believe the Palestinians should be given a chance to shed their status as homeless refugees and to partake fully of the benefits of peace in the Middle East, including the possibility of some arrangement for a Palestinian homeland or entity—preferably in association with Jordan.

How this would be accomplished and the exact character of such an entity is, of course, something that would have to be decided by the parties themselves in the course of negotiation. However, the President has suggested that the viability of this concept and the security of the region might be enhanced if this involved an association with Jordan. But I emphasize that the specifics are for the parties themselves to decide.

This leads me to a further crucial aspect of our approach—the necessity of direct negotiations among the parties concerned. We cannot conceive of genuine peace existing between countries who will not talk to one another. If they are prepared for peace, the first proof is a willingness to negotiate their differences.

Geneva This Year

This is why we believe it is so important to proceed with the holding of a Geneva conference this year. That conference provides the forum for these nations to begin the working out of these problems together, directly, face-to-face. We have a continuing objective to convene such a conference before the end of this year.

Underlying this entire effort to promote the process of negotiation is our determination to maintain the military security of Israel. There must be no question in anyone's mind that the United States will do what is necessary to ensure the adequacy of Israel's military posture and its capacity for self-defense.

We recognize that America has a special responsibility in this regard. In fact, in promulgating our overall policy to curb the international traffic in arms, the President specifically directed the government that we will honor our historic responsibilities to assure the security of the state of Israel. Let there be no doubt about this commitment by this Administration.

We do not intend to use our military aid as pressure on Israel. If we have differences over military aid—and we may have some—

it will be on military grounds or economic grounds, but not political grounds. If we have differences over diplomatic strategy—and that could happen—we will work this out on a political level. We will not alter our commitment to Israel's military security.

Hopes for Fresh Ideas

Let me conclude by saying that we hope the concepts I have been discussing here today—concepts which the President has advanced at talks with Israeli and Arab leaders—will stimulate them to develop ideas of their own. We realize that peace cannot be imposed from the outside and we do not intend to present the parties with a plan or a timetable or a map. Peace can only come from a genuine recognition by all parties that their interests are served by reconciliation and not by war, by faith in the future rather than bitterness over the past.

America can try to help establish the basis of trust necessary for peace. We can try to improve the atmosphere for communication. We can offer ideas, but we cannot, in the end, determine whether peace or war is the fate of the Middle East. That can only be decided by Israel and her Arab neighbors.

We believe that both sides want peace. As the President has said, "this may be the most propitious time for a genuine settlement since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict almost 30 years ago. To let this opportunity pass could mean a disaster not only for the Middle East, but perhaps for the international political and economic order as well."

As we go forward in our mediating role, we will have to expect from time to time to have differences with both sides. But these will be differences as to tactics. Our overall objectives will be those that we believe are now shared by all sides: a permanent and enduring peace in the Middle East.

This is obviously a difficult task and there is always the possibility of failure. But it is an historic responsibility that requires the fullest possible support of the American people.

I believe we have this support. And as we go through the difficult days ahead, this support will sustain us. It will provide the strength we need to encourage all parties to put aside their fears and put trust in their hopes for a genuine and lasting Middle East peace.

John Kennedy once described the formula for peace not only in the Middle East but throughout the world, and I would like to close with his words.

"If we all can persevere, if we in every land and every office can look beyond our own shores and ambitions, then surely the age will dawn in which the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved."

of the 1967 Six-Day War—have demanded that Israel retreat from territories which the Arabs used as bases of attacks. Since Israel's birth, the Arab states have refused to talk of reconciliation or to normalize relations. How then, by any rational standard, can Israel be considered intransigent?"

He urged a "forceful American policy which insists that face-to-face negotiations finally begin. Ambiguity in American policy only encourages the Arab belief that our nation will acquiesce in the isolation of Israel, or will pressure Israel into a precipitate retreat." Packwood called such pressure "a formula for war, not peace," and said: "It would be a disaster for our country if we were to act in such a fashion. This country must make that crystal clear to the Arab states, who even today plan on an American squeeze on Israel, and thus justify their refusal to meet and compromise."

Packwood said Begin's West Bank policy has "been shown to be flexible." He also said Begin "has asked a question which needs to be asked: 'Why should Jews not be allowed to live in their ancient homeland?' Whatever future is negotiated for the West Bank, it should not once again be off-limits to Jewish citizens." Noting that "Israel today is home to nearly 500,000 Arab citizens," Packwood added: "Simple equity demands that Jews, like any other people, be allowed to live freely where they choose."

Yes on Reactors

A Senate delegation that investigated Israeli, Egyptian and Iranian requests to purchase U.S.-made nuclear power plants has recommended that the proposed sales be approved.

The 12-member delegation, which visited those countries last November, was headed by Senators ABRAHAM RIBICOFF (D-Conn.) and HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr. (R-Tenn.). With respect to the sales to Egypt and Israel, the delegation, which issued its report on Monday, said: "The controls on the specific items requested for export to Israel and Egypt under the proposed Agreements for Cooperation are adequate."

The report suggested, however, that ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by Israel and Egypt, "and the placement by Israel of its Dimona facility under IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards, would provide added reassurance. Nonetheless, the delegation believes it would be counterproductive to require such measures as a precondition to the pending sales."

Sen. JOHN GLENN (D-Ohio) disagreed.

He issued a dissenting opinion, stating that the "failure to insist upon safeguards for the Dimona reactor as a condition to the supply of American nuclear material to Israel is bound to adversely affect our non-proliferation objectives." He added that in addition "to leaving a major facility unsafeguarded, it would undermine our credibility in future attempts to acquire safeguards under future agreements."

Glenn stressed that his views were not "a policy directed against Israel and certainly

Assad's "Moderation"

Syrian President Assad has reiterated that Syria will not recognize Israel, even if it withdraws completely to the pre-1967 lines.

Speaking to Danish reporters visiting Damascus on June 14, Assad declared that recognition "is a matter of sovereignty to every state in the world. There is no international law, international charter or international norm that forces a state to recognize another state. He charged that Israel's request for a genuine peace agreement is "merely aimed at obstructing the road to peace." Assad maintained that UN Security Council 242 merely required Syria to end "the state of war"—not to make real peace with Israel nor to recognize Israel.

And Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein recently said: "I think you will find that . . . the Arabs will be the first to seek a humanitarian solution. But we will never recognize the right of Israel to live as a separate Zionist state."

not against Egypt, whose spokesmen assure us that they will agree to new safeguard provisions if the Israelis will do the same. Rather, it is a policy that will apply to all nations who, in the future, seek American nuclear assistance."

Sen. JOHN C. CULVER (D-Iowa), another member of the delegation, said that the trip to the Middle East "did not provide adequate information" to reach any particular conclusion.

Other members of the delegation were Senators HOWARD W. CANNON (D-Nev.), THOMAS F. EAGLETON (D-Mo.), WENDELL H. FORD (D-Ky.), DALE BUMPERS (D-Ark.), JAMES B. PEARSON (R-Kans.), and PAUL LAXALT (R-Nev.).

The nuclear sales to Egypt and Israel were proposed by former President Nixon in 1974. The agreements were initialed during the Ford Administration, but no final decision has been made by President Carter. The Administration must submit proposed agreements to the Congress for approval.

viewing the news...

continued

merce and Industry, Yigal Hurwitz; and Health, Eliezer Shostak. Three Cabinet positions—Justice, Social Welfare and Communications—are being temporarily kept open in case the Democratic Movement for Change decides later to join the Coalition.

Begin's first official act as Prime Minister was to order an Israeli ship that had picked up 66 Vietnamese refugees to come to Israel with the refugees since several countries in the Far East had refused to grant them permission to land. The Prime Minister recalled that during World War II, Jewish refugees in Europe were similarly stranded on the high seas because no country was willing to accept them.

Report on Assassination: A thorough investigation of the slaying in Beirut last year of U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, Francis Meloy Jr., and an aide, has convinced American officials that the assassination was a carefully-planned Palestinian terrorist operation that probably relied on an intelligence source inside the Beirut U.S. embassy, according to a report in *The Washington Post* (June 19).

"Unofficial evidence implicates a left-wing Lebanese splinter group known as the Socialist Labor Party—the Lebanese wing of an underground pan-Arab leftist movement headed by George Habash, who also is the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine," the report said.

The motive of the attack is now believed to have been to provoke the United States into a reaction that would have sidetracked efforts then underway to end the Lebanese civil war. The attack, it appears, was the product of detailed planning and involved systematic surveillance, telephone monitoring and several contingency plans for exploiting expected opportunities to assassinate Meloy, it was reported.

Another Plot Against Hussein: An alleged assassination plot against Jordan's King Hussein reportedly was foiled when the Soviet Union tipped off the Jordanian Government. *Al Thawra Mustammera*, a weekly publication of George Habash's PFLP, gave details of the military coup plot and indicated that the alleged plotters had approached the Soviet Union in an attempt to secure diplomatic recognition of a new government. The Soviet Union informed Syria, which reportedly passed the information to the Jordanians.

Amman denied knowing of a coup attempt, but a radical Palestinian journal reported that more than 120 officers and non-commissioned personnel in the Jordanian army were arrested after the discovery of the planned coup. The publication said tank units in a parade held on Jordanian Independence Day, May 25, were to have fired on the viewing stand where King Hussein and others were located.



The Changing Post

Newspapers do change their editorial minds.

On March 25, 1971, *The Washington Post* strongly attacked the Nixon-Rogers-Jarring "peace" initiative. The *Post* then declared that "not without reason" Egypt has "evidently concluded that the United States is so intent on quickly tying up a Mideast package . . . that Egypt does not have to negotiate a settlement; it need merely sit tight while Washington imposes the so-called Rogers Plan on Israel."

There is scant difference between the Rogers Plan and Arab perceptions of the Carter initiative. Indeed, Israelis now fear it is a greater threat—that it will heighten pressures for a separate Palestinian state on their frontier.

The *Post's* current editorials uncritically endorse the Carter parameters. In "The Israeli Mess" on May 19, the *Post* depicted Menachem Begin as a "primitive" and, apparently impatient with Israel's election results, the newspaper observed that the "Israelis could have been under no illusions, when they voted, that President Carter would not continue down that track."

Oblivious to the intemperate threats which stream from the PLO—the *Post* rarely prints them—the *Post*, on March 22, insisted that "the Palestinian mainstream continues to move in the right direction, toward explicit acceptance of Israel's right to exist," and it rebuked Israel, in January, for refusing "to show the degree of hospitality to Palestinian moderation that would give the moderates the help they need to turn the still predominantly radical Palestinian movement around."

In fact, Israelis have been most hospitable and empathetic to hundreds of thousands of Arab visitors crossing from Jordan, as well as to wounded refugees from the Lebanese civil war.

The 1971 *Post* called for negotiations first. That has always been Israel's position. Her adversaries, regrettably, still insist, and labor under the impression, that it is up to the United States to impose a settlement.

Presumably, the *Post* fails to realize that none of Israel's past leaders—not just Begin—would have accepted Carter's proposal for minor adjustments in Israel's pre-1967 lines.

Fortunately, not all commentators accept such editorial misjudgments. On May 22, columnist Joseph Kraft observed that "the results of the President's public

diplomacy have not been brilliant. By stating the issues in the most bald form and by then measuring the different leaders by his standards, Carter quickened Israel's worst fears without making any diplomatic progress . . . It is far better to move toward settlement in quiet ways that do not set up in neon lights a public scoreboard of winners and losers."

On June 5, George F. Will wrote: "Israel has a claim upon the conscience, not the calculations, of other peoples. So Begin must walk and talk softly; merely being right is a weak reed on which to rest a nation."

In *The Washington Star*, on June 6, columnist John P. Roche declared that "Begin is anything but the town arsonist." Noting Begin is willing to negotiate a genuine peace without pre-conditions or formulations imposed from outside, Roche recalled that this was "precisely the posture taken by Ben Franklin and his associates in negotiating . . . with the British . . . Let's hope that President Carter . . . abandons 'Great Power' schemes of Salvation."

Press Survey

In a private press survey of 40 leading newspapers, the ADL disclosed that 12 dailies reacted negatively to Israel's election, seven were disturbed but faintly optimistic, 14 were basically disturbed but hopeful, six were generally optimistic, and one—*The Wall Street Journal*—merely noted that Israel's electors preferred free enterprise to socialism.

—I. L. KENEN

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NEAR EAST report

Washington letter on
American policy in the Near East

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דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסייחוק וסודות דשמיים),
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התקשר ארתור גולדברג ומסר שבזזינסקי צלצל וביקש ממנו לקבל התחשמויותיו
על נשיא סגן הנשיא מונדייל. ארתור אמר שישמח להעלות השגותיו בכתב.
גולדברג הקריא לי את המזכר שעומד לשלוח לבזזינסקי עם העתק למונדייל.
א. המזכר מתעכב ארתור על הנקודות הבאות:

1. הדגשה מספקת על החלטת 242 כבסיס היחיד לניהול המו"מ
המשפט הנוסף שייאין ההחלטה עצמה מספקת את כל הנדשים עלול להחליש
את הבסיס המוסכם. בדרך שבמו"מ נ"ת להעלות כל השאלות אך אסור לפגוע
במעמד המיוחד של החלטת 242.

2. גולדברג שולל במזכרו את ההפרדה בין גבולות שהם
ובין גבולות שהם
SECURE RECOGNIZED

החלטת 242 מאחדת את שני מושגים אלה והגבולות הבטוחים הם גם
הגבולות המוכרים.

3. גולדברג חוזר על פרוש הנסיגה בהחלטת 242 וחוזר טוען שהשימוש
במ"נוח
MINOR ADJUSTMENTS
אינו קביל.

4. גולדברג חוזר על שליחתו את מונח ה-
HOMELAND
ב. תכתי אותו על הניתוח והצעת שי וסיפ בסוף שכל האלמנטים יחד
יוצרים סטיה מהבסיס שהיה מוסכם למו"מ, מחבליים ביכולת המו"מ
החופשי בין הצדדים, מגבירים ציפיות הערביים וגורמים להקצנת עמדותיהם.
גולדברג הבטיח שי וסיפ הסכום הנל וישלח לי העתק מהמזכר.

דיני צ ==

שהח רותם מנכל שהבט מנכל הדס ריון ריון ארגוב אבידד מצפא מאור ב הקר רם אמן
מב/קא



official text

JUNE 20, 1977

(TEXT) MONDALE SPEECH BEFORE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL
OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO, JUNE 17 -- FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF VICE PRESIDENT
WALTER F. MONDALE'S SPEECH AT THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF NORTHERN
CALIFORNIA JUNE 17:

(BEGIN TEXT)

IN THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS, I'VE UNDERTAKEN TWO EXTENDED FOREIGN
TRIPS ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT TO EUROPE AND JAPAN. THE MORE I TRAVEL,
AND THE MORE NATIONS I VISIT, THE MORE I COME TO BELIEVE THAT THE PEOPLES
OF THE WORLD ARE NOT REALLY SO DIFFERENT ... THAT ALL OF US DREAM THE
SAME DREAMS FOR OUR CHILDREN ... AND THAT THE REAL KEY TO PEACE AND CO-
OPERATION IN THE WORLD LIES IN BETTER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN PEOPLE.
DIPLOMATS AND HEADS OF STATE AND ELECTED OFFICIALS MUST PLAY A ROLE, BUT
WE SHOULD NEVER UNDERESTIMATE THE POWER OF IDEAS AND EDUCATION AND GREATER
UNDERSTANDING TO BREAK DOWN THE BARRIERS OF SUSPICION AND FEAR THAT TOO
OFTEN SEPARATE THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD.

YOUR PROGRAMS IN THE SCHOOL SYSTEM, ON TELEVISION, THE LECTURES AND
SEMINARS YOU HOLD, YOUR CONFERENCE FOR MODEL U.N. STUDENTS ARE ALL AN IM-
PORTANT PART OF THAT EFFORT. AND I'M PARTICULARLY PLEASED TO SEE THAT
YOU'RE JOINING TOGETHER WITH A NUMBER OF GROUPS INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN A NEW WORLD AFFAIRS CENTER HERE IN SAN FRANCISCO AND I WISH
YOU EVERY SUCCESS IN THAT VENTURE. AND SO THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF AN
ORGANIZATION SUCH AS YOURS TOWARDS INCREASED UNDERSTANDING IN THE WORLD
ARE REALLY CRUCIAL, NOT ONLY TO THE FOREIGN POLICY EFFORTS OF THIS NATION,
BUT TO THE SEARCH FOR PEACE.

WITH THE WORDS OF HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS, PRESIDENT CARTER IDENTIFIED
AT THE VERY OUTSET OF HIS ADMINISTRATION THE GUIDING SPIRIT OF THIS
NATION'S FOREIGN POLICY:

"OUR NATION CAN BE STRONG ABROAD ONLY IF IT IS STRONG AT HOME, AND
WE KNOW THAT THE BEST WAY TO ENHANCE FREEDOM IN OTHER LANDS IS TO
DEMONSTRATE HERE THAT OUR DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM IS WORTHY OF EMULATION. TO
BE TRUE TO OURSELVES, WE MUST BE TRUE TO OTHERS."

(MORE)

01

UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE

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AND, HE ELABORATED ON THE BASIC PREMISES OF OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS IN HIS SPEECH AT NOTRE DAME THIS MAY:

-- OUR POLICY MUST BE ROOTED IN OUR PEOPLE'S BASIC COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS.

-- OUR POLICY MUST BE BASED ON CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE WESTERN INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES. WITH THEM WE SHARE BASIC VALUES; WITH THEM ALSO WE SHARE A RECOGNITION THAT GLOBAL PROBLEMS CANNOT BE SOLVED WITHOUT CLOSE COOPERATION AMONG US. THIS WAS THE MESSAGE THE PRESIDENT HAD ME TAKE TO EUROPE AND JAPAN IN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE ADMINISTRATION, AND THIS WAS THE SPIRIT WHICH GUIDED THE PRESIDENT AND HIS COLLEAGUES AT THE LONDON SUMMIT LAST MONTH.

-- OUR POLICY MUST SEEK TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA. IT MUST DO SO IN A BALANCED AND RECIPROCAL WAY, WHILE WE MAINTAIN A STRONG DEFENSE.

-- OUR POLICY MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE CLEAVAGE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH IS AS IMPORTANT AS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. WE MUST REACH OUT TO THE WORLD'S DEVELOPING NATIONS, SEEKING TO NARROW THE GAP BETWEEN RICH AND POOR.

-- FINALLY, OUR POLICY MUST PROVIDE INCENTIVES FOR ALL NATIONS TO RISE ABOVE IDEOLOGY OR NARROW CONCEPTIONS OF SELF-INTEREST AND WORK TOGETHER TO RESOLVE REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND TO MEET GLOBAL PROBLEMS THAT CONFRONT ALL PEOPLE.

AS AN ADMINISTRATION, WE ARE ONLY FIVE MONTHS OLD. HOWEVER, THESE MONTHS HAVE BEEN A PERIOD OF INTENSE ACTIVITY. WE ARE COMMITTED TO SHAPING EFFECTIVE POLICIES THAT TRULY REFLECT AMERICA'S VALUES AND OBJECTIVES -- AND WE ARE COMMITTED TO IMPLEMENTING POLICIES WITH OTHER NATIONS SO AS TO SHAPE A MORE PEACEFUL AND STABLE WORLD.

ONE OF OUR FIRST TASKS HAS BEEN TO ENSURE THAT OUR FOREIGN POLICY REFLECTS THE COMMITMENT TO BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS THAT WE AS AMERICANS SHARE. THAT COMMITMENT TO THE INHERENT DIGNITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL IS AT THE HEART OF THE AMERICAN TRADITION. FROM IT FLOWS THE DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES THAT WE CHERISH -- SUCH AS THE RIGHT TO WORSHIP FREELY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, OF THE PRESS, OF ASSEMBLY, AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THOSE ARE THE BASIC STRENGTHS OF OUR NATION.

WE HAVE SURVIVED AS A FREE NATION BECAUSE WE HAVE REMAINED COMMITTED TO THE DEFENSE OF FUNDAMENTAL MORAL VALUES WE CHERISH AS A PEOPLE. AND UNLESS OUR FOREIGN POLICY REFLECTS THOSE VALUES IT WILL NOT EARN THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. WITHOUT THAT SUPPORT, NO FOREIGN POLICY, NO MATTER HOW BRILLIANTLY CONCEIVED, CAN SUCCEED.

I BELIEVE WE HAVE RESTORED THAT COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS. I AM PROUD THAT THE UNITED STATES TODAY STANDS AMONG THOSE WHO UPHOLD HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE WORLD. I AM PROUD THAT NO FOREIGN LEADER TODAY HAS ANY DOUBT THAT THE UNITED STATES CONDEMNS TORTURE, POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT AND REPRESSION BY ANY GOVERNMENT, ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD. WE BELIEVE THAT BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSCEND IDEOLOGY. WE BELIEVE ALL NATIONS, REGARDLESS OF POLITICAL SYSTEM, MUST RESPECT THOSE RIGHTS.

JUST AS RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IS CENTRAL TO OUR FOREIGN POLICY VALUES, SO PROGRESS TOWARD A JUST AND LASTING MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROSPECT OF A MORE PEACEFUL WORLD. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME TO DESCRIBE WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE WANT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO HAVE THE FULLEST POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDING OF OUR APPROACH, FOR YOUR SUPPORT IS CRUCIAL TO ITS SUCCESS.

(MORE)

01

PRESIDENT CARTER HAS NOW MET WITH THE LEADERS OF EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA. THE PRESIDENT MET WITH PRIME MINISTER RABIN OF ISRAEL AND WE HOPE THAT WE WILL SOON MEET WITH THE NEW PRIME MINISTER.

WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASAD WHICH WAS HELD IN GENEVA, I HAVE PARTICIPATED IN ALL OF THEM AND HAVE SENSED THESE LEADERS' GREAT DESIRE FOR PEACE, AND THEIR LONGING FOR THE BENEFITS THAT PEACE CAN BRING TO NATIONS TOO LONG MOBILIZED FOR WAR. YET AT THE SAME TIME, WE ALSO FOUND DEEP FEARS AND SUSPICION WHICH MUST BE OVERCOME IF PEACE IS TO BE ACHIEVED IN THAT STRATEGIC AND TROUBLED REGION OF THE WORLD.

A GENUINE AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS OF ESSENTIAL INTEREST TO ALL AMERICANS. CONFLICT THERE CARRIES THE THREAT OF A GLOBAL CONFRONTATION, AND RUNS THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR. AS WE HAVE SEEN, WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS PROFOUND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES. IT CAN, AND HAS, DAMAGED THE ECONOMIES OF THE ENTIRE WORLD. IT HAS BEEN A TRAGEDY FOR THE NATIONS OF THE REGION. EVEN SHORT OF WAR, CONTINUED CONFRONTATION ENCOURAGES RADICALIZATION AND INSTABILITY.

GENUINE PEACE IS NEEDED BY ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, THE ARAB NATIONS NEED PEACE.

ISRAEL, ABOVE ALL, HAS A PROFOUND INTEREST IN PEACE. THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT. FOR ALMOST THREE DECADES, ISRAEL HAS BORNE THE BURDEN OF CONSTANT WAR. MORE THAN HALF ITS ENTIRE BUDGET IS DEDICATED TO DEFENSE. ITS CITIZENS BEAR THE HIGHEST AVERAGE TAX BURDEN IN THE WORLD -- MORE THAN 60 PERCENT OF THEIR INCOME GOES FOR TAXES.

AND YET, AT THE SAME TIME, THIS VALIANT NATION HAS MANAGED TO CREATE A MIRACLE IN THE DESERT. WITH INGENUITY, HARD WORK AND SKILL, IT HAS CREATED A LAND THAT COULD BE A MODEL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOR POLITICAL LIBERTY TO BE EMULATED THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. DEMOCRACY HAS THRIVED IN ISRAEL DESPITE THE KIND OF ADVERSITY THAT HAS CRUSHED FREEDOM IN OTHER LANDS.

AND YET, WHAT OF THE FUTURE ? IS IT A FUTURE WHICH ISRAEL'S THREE MILLION PEOPLE TRY BY FORCE OF ARMS ALONE TO HOLD OUT AGAINST THE HOSTILITY AND GROWING POWER OF THE ARAB WORLD ? OR CAN A PROCESS OF RE-CONCILIATION BE STARTED -- A PROCESS IN WHICH PEACE PROTECTS ISRAEL'S SECURITY, A PEACE IN WHICH THE URGE FOR REVENGE AND RECRIMINATION IS REPLACED BY MUTUAL RECOGNITION AND RESPECT ?

AMERICA HAS A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND A SPECIAL OPPORTUNITY TO HELP BRING ABOUT THIS KIND OF PEACE. THIS COMES ABOUT FIRST OF ALL BECAUSE OF OUR UNIQUE AND PROFOUND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE OF ISRAEL SINCE ITS CREATION MORE THAN A GENERATION AGO. OUR SENSE OF SHARED VALUES AND PURPOSES MEANS THAT, FOR AMERICANS, THE QUESTION OF ISRAEL'S SURVIVAL IS NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION BUT RATHER STANDS AS A MORAL IMPERATIVE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

AND YET, OUR SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL HAS NOT BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST ANY OTHER COUNTRY. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ENJOY THE FRIENDSHIP OF MUCH OF THE ARAB WORLD WHERE WE AND OUR CLOSE ALLIES HAVE IMPORTANT INTERESTS.

IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF OUR CLOSE TIES WITH BOTH ISRAEL AND HER ARAB NEIGHBORS THAT WE ARE UNIQUELY PLACED TO PROMOTE THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, TO WORK FOR AN IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING OF EACH SIDE'S LEGITIMATE CONCERNS, AND TO HELP THEM WORK OUT WHAT WE HOPE WILL BE A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION LEADING TO A FINAL PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

WHEN THIS ADMINISTRATION ENTERED OFFICE ON JANUARY 20, WE FOUND THAT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST CALLED FOR A NEW APPROACH, THE STEP-BY-STEP DIPLOMACY OF OUR PREDECESSORS HAD DEFUSED THE IMMEDIATE TENSIONS PRODUCED BY THE WAR IN 1973. BUT IT WAS ALSO EVIDENT THAT IT WOULD BE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE SMALL DIPLOMATIC CONCESSIONS WHEN THE ULTIMATE SHAPE OF A PEACE AGREEMENT REMAINED OBSCURE. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT AN AGREEMENT ON A LASTING PEACE COULD BE ACHIEVED AT ONE STROKE.

UN SECRETARY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY ALL THE PARTIES, PROVIDES A BASIS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE REQUIRED IF THERE IS TO BE A SETTLEMENT. BUT RESOLUTION 242 DOES NOT BY ITSELF PROVIDE ALL THAT IS REQUIRED. WE, THEREFORE, DECIDED TO WORK WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO OUTLINE THE OVERALL FRAMEWORK FOR AN ENDURING PEACE. OUR CONCEPT WAS TO USE THIS FRAMEWORK AS THE BASIS FOR A PHASED NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIFIC STEPS TOWARD PEACE.

A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO THIS APPROACH LAY IN THE FACT THAT THE POSITIONS OF ALL SIDES WERE FROZEN. THE WORDS AND PHRASES USED BY THE PARTIES HAD BECOME ENCRUSTED WITH THE FALLOUT OF COUNTLESS DIPLOMATIC BATTLES.

WE HAVE TRIED TO REGAIN MOMENTUM IN THIS PROCESS. WE HAVE ENCOURAGED ARABS AND ISRAELIS TO BEGIN THINKING AGAIN SERIOUSLY ABOUT THE ELEMENTS OF PEACE AND NOT TO REMAIN COMMITTED TO PARTICULAR WORDS AND FORMULATIONS.

TO THIS END, THE PRESIDENT HAS TRIED TO DESCRIBE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE KEY ELEMENTS OF AN OVERALL FRAMEWORK FOR AN AGREEMENT MIGHT BE:

-- A COMMITMENT TO A GENUINE AND LASTING PEACE DEMONSTRATED BY CONCRETE ACTS TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS AMONG THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA.

-- THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BORDERS FOR ISRAEL WHICH ARE RECOGNIZED BY ALL AND WHICH CAN BE KEPT SECURE.

-- A FAIR SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIANS.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SET FORTH THESE ELEMENTS NOT TO DICTATE A PEACE OR TO IMPOSE OUR VIEWS BUT TO STIMULATE FRESH THOUGHT.

PRESIDENT CARTER HAS GONE FURTHER THAN ANY OF HIS PREDECESSORS TO STRESS WITH ARAB LEADERS THE ESSENTIAL POINT THAT PEACE MUST MEAN MORE THAN MERELY AN END TO HOSTILITIES, STATING AS HE DID IN CLINTON, MASSACHUSETTS LAST MARCH:

".... THE FIRST PREREQUISITE OF A LASTING PEACE IS THE RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL BY HER NEIGHBORS. ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST; ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST PERMANENTLY; ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST IN PEACE THAT MEANS THAT OVER A PERIOD OF MONTHS OR YEARS THAT THE BORDERS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, ISRAEL AND LEBANON, ISRAEL AND JORDAN, ISRAEL AND EGYPT MUST BE OPENED UP TO TRAVEL, TO TOURISM, TO CULTURAL EXCHANGE, TO TRADE, SO THAT NO MATTER WHO THE LEADERS MIGHT BE IN THOSE COUNTRIES THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES WILL HAVE FORMED A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COMPREHENSION AND A SENSE OF A COMMON PURPOSE TO AVOID THE REPETITIOUS WARS AND DEATHS THAT HAVE AFFECTED THAT REGION SO LONG. THAT IS THE FIRST PREREQUISITE OF PEACE."

WE HAVE FOUND THAT THE ARAB LEADERS DID NOT INSIST THAT THIS KIND OF PEACE IS SOMETHING THAT ONLY FUTURE GENERATIONS COULD CONSIDER. SOME LEADERS, SUCH AS KING HUSEEIN, DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON, HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR COMMITMENT TO A "JUST AND LASTING PEACE --

ONE WHICH WOULD ENABLE ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO DIVERT THEIR ENERGIES AND RESOURCES TO BUILD AND ATTAIN A BETTER FUTURE."

SO WE BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS IN GETTING ARAB LEADERS TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND TO RECOGNIZE -- HOWEVER RELUCTANTLY -- THAT THIS COMMITMENT IS ESSENTIAL TO A GENUINE PEACE. THAT PEACE MUST BE STRUCTURED IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT CAN SURVIVE EVEN IF SOME LEADERS WERE TO NURTURE AIMS TO DESTROY ISRAEL. STILL, WE HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO; THE ARABS HAVE BEEN INSISTENT THAT ISRAEL WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORIES IT OCCUPIED IN THE 1967 WAR. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR OUR VIEW THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT BE ASKED TO WITHDRAW UNLESS IT CAN SECURE IN RETURN REAL PEACE FROM ITS NEIGHBORS.

THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL IS, IN ESSENCE, THE QUESTION OF BORDERS. FOR PEACE TO BE ENDURING, BORDERS MUST BE INVIOABLE. NATIONS MUST FEEL SECURE BEHIND THEIR BORDERS. BORDERS MUST BE RECOGNIZED BY ALL.

A CRUCIAL DILEMMA HAS BEEN HOW TO PROVIDE BORDERS THAT ARE BOTH SECURE AND ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT ISRAEL, HAVING FOUGHT A WAR IN EVERY DECADE SINCE ITS BIRTH, WANTS BORDERS THAT CAN BE DEFENDED AS EASILY AS POSSIBLE. BUT NO BORDERS WILL BE SECURE IF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES DO NOT ACCEPT THEM.

THE PROBLEM IS THAT BORDERS THAT MIGHT AFFORD ISRAEL THE MAXIMUM SECURITY IN MILITARY TERMS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED AS LEGITIMATE BY ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS. BORDERS THAT ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS WOULD RECOGNIZE, ISRAEL HAS NOT BEEN WILLING TO ACCEPT AS FORMING AN ADEQUATE LINE OF DEFENSE.

FOR THIS REASON, THE PRESIDENT HAS TRIED TO SEPARATE THE TWO ISSUES. ON THE ONE HAND, THERE MUST BE RECOGNIZED BORDERS. BUT, IN ADDITION, THERE COULD BE SEPARATE LINES OF DEFENSE OR OTHER MEASURES THAT COULD ENHANCE ISRAEL'S SECURITY. THE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SINAI AND IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS PROVIDE MODELS OF HOW ISRAEL'S SECURITY MIGHT BE ENHANCED UNTIL CONFIDENCE IN A LASTING PEACE CAN BE FULLY DEVELOPED.

WE WOULD URGE ALL THE PARTIES TO THINK REALISTICALLY ABOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO REDUCE THE FEAR OF SURPRISE ATTACK, TO MAKE ACTS OF AGGRESSION DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, AND TO LIMIT THE MILITARY FORCES THAT WOULD CONFRONT ONE ANOTHER IN SENSITIVE AREAS.

THIS APPROACH RECOGNIZES THE FACT THAT THERE IS A PROFOUND ASYMMETRY IN WHAT THE TWO SIDES IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE SEEKING. ON THE ONE HAND, A PRINCIPAL ARAB CONCERN IS TO REGAIN LOST TERRITORY. ON THE OTHER, ISRAEL WISHES PEACE, AND RECOGNITION. TERRITORY IS TANGIBLE, AND ONCE CEDED DIFFICULT TO REGAIN SHORT OF WAR. PEACE, ON THE OTHER HAND, CAN BE EPHEMERAL. PEACEFUL INTENTIONS CAN CHANGE OVERNIGHT, UNLESS A SOLID FOUNDATION OF COOPERATION AND A FIRM PATTERN OF REINFORCING RELATIONSHIPS CAN BE ESTABLISHED TO ENSURE THAT ALL HAVE A STAKE IN CONTINUING TRANQUILITY.

WE BELIEVE THAT SEPARATING THE IMPERATIVES OF SECURITY FROM THE REQUIREMENT OF RECOGNIZED BORDERS IS AN IMPORTANT ADVANCE TOWARD RECONCILING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. IT IS IN THIS WAY THAT ISRAEL COULD RETURN TO APPROXIMATELY THE BORDERS THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO THE WAR OF 1967. ALBEIT WITH MINOR MODIFICATIONS AS NEGOTIATED AMONG THE PARTIES, AND YET RETAIN SECURITY LINES OR OTHER ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD ENSURE ISRAEL'S SAFETY AS FULL CONFIDENCE DEVELOPED IN A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. THUS, WITH BORDERS EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZED AND BUTTRESSED BY SECURITY MEASURES, AND WITH THE PROCESS OF PEACE UNFOLDING, ISRAEL'S SECURITY WOULD BE GREATER THAN IT IS TODAY.

(MORE)

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A FURTHER MAJOR ISSUE IS THAT OF THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. IT HAS BEEN THE SOURCE OF CONTINUING TRAGEDY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE ARE TWO PREREQUISITES FOR A LASTING PEACE IN THIS REGARD. FIRST, THERE MUST BE A DEMONSTRATED WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE PALESTINIANS TO LIVE IN PEACE ALONGSIDE ISRAEL. SECOND, THE PALESTINIANS MUST BE GIVEN A STAKE IN PEACE SO THAT THEY WILL TURN AWAY FROM THE VIOLENCE OF THE PAST AND TOWARD A FUTURE IN WHICH THEY CAN EXPRESS THEIR LEGITIMATE POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS PEACEFULLY.

THUS, IF THE PALESTINIANS ARE WILLING TO EXIST IN PEACE AND ARE PREPARED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WILLINGNESS, BY RECOGNIZING ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST IN PEACE, THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT WE BELIEVE THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD BE GIVEN A CHANCE TO SHED THEIR STATUS AS HOMELESS REFUGEES AND TO PARTAKE FULLY OF THE BENEFITS OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME ARRANGEMENTS FOR A PALESTINIAN HOMELAND OR ENTITY -- PREFERABLY IN ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN.

HOW THIS WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AND THE EXACT CHARACTER OF SUCH AN ENTITY IS, OF COURSE, SOMETHING THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATION. HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE VIABILITY OF THIS CONCEPT AND THE SECURITY OF THE REGION MIGHT BE ENHANCED IF THIS INVOLVED AN ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN. BUT I EMPHASIZE THAT THE SPECIFICS ARE FOR THE PARTIES THEMSELVES TO DECIDE.

THIS LEADS ME TO A FURTHER CRUCIAL ASPECT OF OUR APPROACH -- THE NECESSITY OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES CONCERNED. WE CANNOT CONCEIVE OF GENUINE PEACE EXISTING BETWEEN COUNTRIES WHO WILL NOT TALK TO ONE ANOTHER. IF THEY ARE PREPARED FOR PEACE, THE FIRST PROOF IS A WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE THEIR DIFFERENCES.

THIS IS WHY WE BELIEVE IT IS SO IMPORTANT TO PROCEED WITH THE HOLDING OF A GENEVA CONFERENCE THIS YEAR. THAT CONFERENCE PROVIDES THE FORUM FOR THESE NATIONS TO BEGIN THE WORKING OUT OF THESE PROBLEMS TOGETHER DIRECTLY FACE-TO-FACE. WE HAVE A CONTINUING OBJECTIVE TO CONVENE SUCH A CONFERENCE BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR.

UNDERLYING THIS ENTIRE EFFORT TO PROMOTE THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION IS OUR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THE MILITARY SECURITY OF ISRAEL. THERE MUST BE NO QUESTION IN ANYONE'S MIND THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE ADEQUACY OF ISRAEL'S MILITARY POSTURE AND ITS CAPACITY FOR SELF-DEFENSE.

WE RECOGNIZE THAT AMERICA HAS A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS REGARD. IN FACT, IN PROMULGATING OUR OVER-ALL POLICY TO CURB THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS, THE PRESIDENT SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED THE GOVERNMENT THAT WE WILL HONOR OUR HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITIES TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL. LET THERE BE NO DOUBT ABOUT THIS COMMITMENT BY THIS ADMINISTRATION.

WE DO NOT INTEND TO USE OUR MILITARY AID AS PRESSURE ON ISRAEL. IF WE HAVE DIFFERENCES OVER MILITARY AID -- AND WE MAY HAVE SOME -- IT WILL BE ON MILITARY GROUNDS OR ECONOMIC GROUNDS, BUT NOT POLITICAL GROUNDS. IF WE HAVE DIFFERENCES OVER DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY -- AND THAT COULD HAPPEN -- WE WILL WORK THIS OUT ON A POLITICAL LEVEL. WE WILL NOT ALTER OUR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S MILITARY SECURITY.

LET ME CONCLUDE BY SAYING THAT WE HOPE THE CONCEPTS I HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THERE TODAY -- CONCEPTS WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAS ADVANCED

(MORE)

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AT TALKS WITH ISRAEL AND ARAB LEADERS -- WILL STIMULATE THEM TO DEVELOP IDEAS OF THEIR OWN. WE REALIZE THAT PEACE CANNOT BE IMPOSED FROM THE OUTSIDE AND WE DO NOT INTEND TO PRESENT THE PARTIES WITH A PLAN OR A TIMETABLE OR A MAP. PEACE CAN ONLY COME FROM A GENUINE RECOGNITION BY ALL PARTIES THAT THEIR INTERESTS ARE SERVED BY RECONCILIATION AND NOT BY WAR, BY FAITH IN THE FUTURE RATHER THAN BITTERNESS OVER THE PAST.

AMERICA CAN TRY TO HELP ESTABLISH THE BASIS OF TRUST NECESSARY FOR PEACE. WE CAN TRY TO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE FOR COMMUNICATION. WE CAN OFFER IDEAS, BUT WE CANNOT, IN THE END, DETERMINE WHETHER PEACE OR WAR IS THE FATE OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THAT CAN ONLY BE DECIDED BY ISRAEL AND HER ARAB NEIGHBORS.

WE BELIEVE THAT BOTH SIDES WANT PEACE. AS THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID, "THIS MAY BE THE MOST PROPITIOUS TIME FOR A GENUINE SETTLEMENT SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT ALMOST 30 YEARS AGO. TO LET THIS OPPORTUNITY PASS COULD MEAN A DISASTER NOT ONLY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT PERHAPS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORDER AS WELL."

AS WE GO FORWARD IN OUR MEDIATING ROLE, WE WILL HAVE TO EXPECT FROM TIME TO TIME TO HAVE DIFFERENCES WITH BOTH SIDES. BUT THESE WILL BE DIFFERENCES AS TO TACTICS. OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVES WILL BE THOSE THAT WE BELIEVE ARE NOW SHARED BY ALL SIDES; A PERMANENT AND ENDURING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.


THIS IS OBVIOUSLY A DIFFICULT TASK AND THERE IS ALWAYS THE POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE. BUT IT IS AN HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITY THAT REQUIRES THE FULLEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

I BELIEVE WE HAVE THIS SUPPORT. AND AS WE GO THROUGH THE DIFFICULT DAYS AHEAD, THIS SUPPORT WILL SUSTAIN US. IT WILL PROVIDE THE STRENGTH WE NEED TO ENCOURAGE ALL PARTIES TO PUT ASIDE THEIR FEARS AND PUT TRUST IN THEIR HOPES FOR A GENUINE AND LASTING MIDDLE EAST PEACE.

JOHN KENNEDY ONCE DESCRIBED THE FORMULA FOR PEACE NOT ONLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST BUT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, AND I WOULD LIKE TO CLOSE WITH HIS WORDS:

"IF WE ALL CAN PERSEVERE, IF WE IN EVERY LAND AND EVERY OFFICE CAN LOOK BEYOND OUR OWN SHORES AND AMBITIONS, THEN SURELY THE AGE WILL DAWN IN WHICH THE STRONG ARE JUST AND THE WEAK SECURE AND THE PEACE PRESERVED." (END TEXT)

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Mideast Policy Outlined by Mondale

The following are excerpts from an address last Friday by Vice President Walter F. Mondale before the World Affairs Council of Northern California in San Francisco:

Just as respect for human rights is central to our foreign policy values, so progress toward a just and lasting Middle East settlement is essential to the prospect of a more peaceful world. The President has asked me to describe what we are trying to do to achieve peace in the Middle East. We want the American people to have the fullest possible understanding of our approach, for your support is crucial to its success.

President Carter has now met with the leaders of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The President met with Prime Minister Rabin of Israel and we hope that we will soon meet with the new Prime Minister.

With the exception of the meeting with President Assad, which was held in Geneva, I have participated in all of them and have sensed these leaders' great desire for peace, and their longing for the benefits that peace can bring to nations too long mobilized for war. Yet at the same time, we also found deep fears and suspicion which must be overcome if peace is to be achieved in that strategic and troubled region of the world.

Essential American Interest

A genuine and lasting peace in the Middle East is of essential interest to all Americans. Conflict there carries the threat of a global confrontation, and runs the risk of nuclear war. As we have seen, war in the Middle East has profound economic consequences. It can, and has, damaged the economies of the entire world. It has been a tragedy for the nations of the region. Even short of war, continued confrontation encourages radicalization and instability.

Genuine peace is needed by all parties to the conflict. The Arab nations need peace. Israel, above all, has a profound interest in peace. There is no question about that. For almost three decades, Israel has borne the burden of constant war. More than half its entire budget is dedicated to defense. Its citizens bear the highest average tax burden in the world—more than 60 percent of their income goes for taxes.

And yet, what of the future? Is it a future in which Israel's three million people try by force of arms alone to hold out against the hostility and growing power of the Arab world? Or can a process of reconciliation be started—a process in which peace protects Israel's security, a peace in which the urge for revenge and recrimination is replaced by mutual recognition and respect?

America has a special responsibility and a special opportunity to help bring about this kind of peace. This comes about first of all because of our unique and profound relationship with the state of Israel since its

creation more than a generation ago. Our sense of shared values and purposes means that, for Americans, the question of Israel's survival is not a political question but rather stands as a moral imperative of our foreign policy.

And yet, our special relationship with Israel has not been directed against any other country. We have been able to enjoy the friendship of much of the Arab world where we and our close allies have important interests.

It is precisely because of our close ties with both Israel and her Arab neighbors that we are uniquely placed to promote the search for peace, to work for an improved understanding of each side's legitimate concerns, and to help them work out what we hope will be a basis for negotiation leading to a final peace in the Middle East.

New Approach Necessary

When this Administration entered office on January 20, we found that the situation in the Middle East called for a new approach. The step-by-step diplomacy of our predecessors had defused the immediate tensions produced by the war in 1973. But it was also evident that it would be increasingly difficult to achieve small diplomatic concessions when the ultimate shape of a peace agreement remained obscure. At the same time, it was unlikely that an agreement on a lasting peace could be achieved at one stroke.

UN Security Council Resolution 242, which is supported by all the parties, provides a basis for the negotiations which are required if there is to be a settlement. But Resolution 242 does not by itself provide all that is required. We, therefore, decided to work with the parties concerned to outline the overall framework as the basis for a phased negotiation and implementation of specific steps toward peace.

A major impediment to this approach lies in the fact that the positions of all sides were frozen. The words and phrases used by the parties had become encrusted with the fallout of countless diplomatic battles.

We have tried to regain momentum in this process. We have encouraged Arabs and Israelis to begin thinking again seriously about the elements of peace and not to remain committed to particular words and formulations.

To this end, the President has tried to describe our understanding of what the key elements of an overall framework for an agreement might be:

- A commitment to a genuine and lasting peace demonstrated by concrete acts to normalize relations among the countries of the area.
- The establishment of borders for Israel which are recognized by all and which can

be kept secure.

- A fair solution to the problem of the Palestinians.

The President has set forth these elements not to dictate a peace or to impose our views but to stimulate fresh thought.

President Carter has gone further than any of his predecessors to stress with Arab leaders the essential point that peace must mean more than merely an end to hostilities, stating as he did in Clinton, Mass. last March:

"... the first prerequisite of a lasting peace is the recognition of Israel by her neighbors. Israel's right to exist; Israel's right to exist permanently; Israel's right to exist in peace. That means that over a period of months or years that the borders between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Egypt must be opened up to travel, to tourism, to cultural exchange, to trade, so that no matter who the leaders might be in those countries, the people themselves will have formed a mutual understanding and comprehension and a sense of a common purpose to avoid the repetitious wars and deaths that have affected that region so long. That is the first prerequisite of peace."

We have found that the Arab leaders did not insist that this kind of peace is something that only future generations could consider. Some leaders, such as King Hussein, during his visit to Washington, have made clear their commitment to a "just and lasting peace—one which would enable all the people in the Middle East to divert their energies and resources to build and attain a better future."

Reluctant Arab Recognition

So we believe that we have made some progress in getting Arab leaders to recognize Israel's right to exist and to recognize—however reluctantly—that this commitment is essential to a genuine peace. That peace must be structured in such a way that it can survive even if some leaders were to nurture aims to destroy Israel. Still we have a long way to go; the Arabs have been insistent that Israel withdraw from the territories it occupied in the 1967 war. We have made clear our view that Israel should not be asked to withdraw unless it can secure in return real peace from its neighbors.

The question of withdrawal is, in essence, the question of borders. For peace to be enduring, borders must be inviolable. Nations must feel secure behind their borders. Borders must be recognized by all.

A crucial dilemma has been how to provide borders that are both secure and acceptable to all. It is understandable that Israel, having fought a war in every decade since its birth, wants borders that can be

defended as easily as possible. But no borders will be secure if neighboring countries do not accept them.

The problem is that borders that might afford Israel the maximum security in military terms would not be accepted as legitimate by Israel's neighbors. Borders that Israel's neighbors would recognize, Israel has not been willing to accept as forming an adequate line of defense.

For this reason, the President has tried to separate the two issues. On the one hand, there must be recognized borders. But, in addition, there could be separate lines of defense or other measures that could enhance Israel's security. The arrangements in the Sinai and in the Golan Heights provide models of how Israel's security might be enhanced until confidence in a lasting peace can be fully developed.

We would urge all the parties to think realistically about security arrangements to reduce the fear of surprise attack, to make acts of aggression difficult if not impossible, and to limit the military forces that would confront one another in sensitive areas.

This approach recognizes the fact that there is a profound asymmetry in what the two sides in the Middle East are seeking. On the one hand, a principal Arab concern is to regain lost territory. On the other, Israel wishes peace, and recognition. Territory is tangible, and once ceded, difficult to regain short of war. Peace, on the other hand, can be ephemeral. Peaceful intentions can change overnight, unless a solid foundation of cooperation and a firm pattern of reinforcing relationships can be established to ensure that all have a stake in continuing tranquility.

Separating the Issues

We believe that separating the imperatives of security from the requirement of recognized borders is an important advance toward reconciling the differences between the two sides. It is in this way that Israel could return to approximately the borders that existed prior to the war of 1967, albeit with minor modifications as negotiated among the parties, and yet retain security lines or other arrangements that would ensure Israel's safety as full confidence developed in a comprehensive peace. Thus, with borders explicitly recognized and buttressed by security measures, and with the process of peace unfolding, Israel's security would be greater than it is today.

A further major issue is that of the future of the Palestinian people. It has been the source of continuing tragedy in the Middle East. There are two prerequisites for a lasting peace in this regard. First, there must be a demonstrated willingness on the part of the Palestinians to live in peace alongside Israel. Second, the Palestinians must be

given a stake in peace so that they will turn away from the violence of the past and toward a future in which they can express their legitimate political aspirations peacefully.

Thus, if the Palestinians are willing to exist in peace and are prepared to demonstrate that willingness, by recognizing Israel's right to exist in peace, the President has made clear that, in the context of a peace settlement, we believe the Palestinians should be given a chance to shed their status as homeless refugees and to partake fully of the benefits of peace in the Middle East, including the possibility of some arrangement for a Palestinian homeland or entity—preferably in association with Jordan.

How this would be accomplished and the exact character of such an entity is, of course, something that would have to be decided by the parties themselves in the course of negotiation. However, the President has suggested that the viability of this concept and the security of the region might be enhanced if this involved an association with Jordan. But I emphasize that the specifics are for the parties themselves to decide.

This leads me to a further crucial aspect of our approach—the necessity of direct negotiations among the parties concerned. We cannot conceive of genuine peace existing between countries who will not talk to one another. If they are prepared for peace, the first proof is a willingness to negotiate their differences.

Geneva This Year

This is why we believe it is so important to proceed with the holding of a Geneva conference this year. That conference provides the forum for these nations to begin the working out of these problems together, directly, face-to-face. We have a continuing objective to convene such a conference before the end of this year.

Underlying this entire effort to promote the process of negotiation is our determination to maintain the military security of Israel. There must be no question in anyone's mind that the United States will do what is necessary to ensure the adequacy of Israel's military posture and its capacity for self-defense.

We recognize that America has a special responsibility in this regard. In fact, in promulgating our overall policy to curb the international traffic in arms, the President specifically directed the government that we will honor our historic responsibilities to assure the security of the state of Israel. Let there be no doubt about this commitment by this Administration.

We do not intend to use our military aid as pressure on Israel. If we have differences over military aid—and we may have some—

it will be on military grounds or economic grounds, but not political grounds. If we have differences over diplomatic strategy—and that could happen—we will work this out on a political level. We will not alter our commitment to Israel's military security.

Hopes for Fresh Ideas

Let me conclude by saying that we hope the concepts I have been discussing here today—concepts which the President has advanced at talks with Israeli and Arab leaders—will stimulate them to develop ideas of their own. We realize that peace cannot be imposed from the outside and we do not intend to present the parties with a plan or a timetable or a map. Peace can only come from a genuine recognition by all parties that their interests are served by reconciliation and not by war, by faith in the future rather than bitterness over the past.

America can try to help establish the basis of trust necessary for peace. We can try to improve the atmosphere for communication. We can offer ideas, but we cannot, in the end, determine whether peace or war is the fate of the Middle East. That can only be decided by Israel and her Arab neighbors.

We believe that both sides want peace. As the President has said, "this may be the most propitious time for a genuine settlement since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict almost 30 years ago. To let this opportunity pass could mean a disaster not only for the Middle East, but perhaps for the international political and economic order as well."

As we go forward in our mediating role, we will have to expect from time to time to have differences with both sides. But these will be differences as to tactics. Our overall objectives will be those that we believe are now shared by all sides; a permanent and enduring peace in the Middle East.

This is obviously a difficult task and there is always the possibility of failure. But it is an historic responsibility that requires the fullest possible support of the American people.

I believe we have this support. And as we go through the difficult days ahead, this support will sustain us. It will provide the strength we need to encourage all parties to put aside their fears and put trust in their hopes for a genuine and lasting Middle East peace.

John Kennedy once described the formula for peace not only in the Middle East but throughout the world, and I would like to close with his words.

"If we all can persevere, if we in every land and every office can look beyond our own shores and ambitions, then surely the age will dawn in which the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved."

MR. MICHAEL RON, COORDINATOR
RESEARCH AND POLITICAL PLANNING CENTER
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ה. נינון אהלו ליטול את מוכניו וזו כפי ואלו הם טעמים.
 ז. פתרון הוון לזה הכלליים.

מנצח מנצח כי תהא :

The President has set forth these elements not to dictate a peace or to impose our views but to stimulate fresh thought.

- הווא (סידה וסל מנצחין אלו מנצחין) :
 אלו המכניו אל הקפדן שסל לא תהא אלא אלא
 גבולות המנוח שלם אלא מנצחין.

הווא המנוח : אלו (מנצחין) אל כל המנצחין אלא המנוח
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- מנצחין אלו הווא המנוח כי וסל יכלה (could return)
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- קיום "ש" (entity) המנוח המנוח המנוח המנוח המנוח המנוח
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- מונצית אומ כי הם יכבדו את ההתחבולות ההסתאולג
להבטח את הטחון מפניג ישמח.

שלו יהיה ספק אדני התחבולג לו ע"י ממעל זה.

לדבריו: אנו לא מתכוונים להשגח בסיוע הצבאי שלנו

כחלף על ישמח. (א"י 56)

אם יש לנו הבדלי השקפה אדני סיוע צבאי - ויש לנו כאלה

זה יהיה על בסיס צבאי או כחלף אק לא על בסיס כחלופי.

אם יש לנו הבדלי השקפה אדני, אסטרטגיה היפואמטיג וזה יכח

רק כחלף אנו ^{נכחלף על} ~~הוא~~ בונה הפולטיג.

אנו לא נשקף התחבולתנו אטחון הצבאי על ישמח.

- מונצית אומ: אנו מוכדים (Realize) שהשגח לא נ"מ שיכח

מחולף ואנו לא מתכוונים להצב ^{הוא} אצבדיוס על תכניה או לא-

אנו או מנה.

השגח וכו' אבוא רק מהכרה אמיגה על כח הצבדיוס

שאניטרכיוס שחם וסוג על השלמה/הפסולג ולא ע"י מלחמה.

L1
MR. MOSHE RAVIV
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COMMENTS ON VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE'S SPEECH
BEFORE THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL, JUNE 17, 1977

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General

The tone of the speech is compulsively "even-handed." It credits Arab leaders with peaceful positions which they have never publicly expressed to their own peoples. It assumes their definition of "peace" is the same as America's and Israel's.

While Mondale explains that his speech is being made at the request of President Carter, the President is the more appropriate spokesman. Following recent remarks by the President advocating a Palestinian homeland, Israel's return to the 1967 borders with only minor border modification, and compensation for Arab refugees, friends of Israel were disappointed that the President himself failed to make the statements necessary to allay their fears.

Specific Points

Page 2. Mondale reports that he has "sensed these [Arab] leaders' great desire for peace." In fact, however, there have been no tangible actions to this effect by any Arab leader toward Israel.

Page 4. Mondale states that "we have found that the Arab leaders did not insist that this kind of peace is something that only future generations should consider." But this is precisely what Arab leaders continue to repeat on numerous occasions.

Page 4. Mondale states that the Administration believes it has made "some progress in getting Arab leaders to recognize Israel's right to exist..." To date, however, no Arab leader has ever publicly stated recognition of Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state.

Page 4. Mondale observes "That peace must be structured in such a way that it can survive even if some leaders were to nurture aims to destroy Israel." While admitting this real possibility, throughout the rest of the speech he states that the Arabs want peace.

Page 6. Mondale repeats the President's prescription for Israel's withdrawal to the 1967 borders "with minor modification." These borders, he says, would be "buttressed by security measures." These security measures, however, are never defined. Historically, however, measures such as international guarantees, UN forces, or Big Power guarantees have proven worthless. Defensible borders (which are not mentioned in the speech at all) are the only real guarantee for peace and Israel's security.

Page 6. Mondale discusses the "arrangement for a Palestinian homeland or entity." The word "entity" is a new Middle East codeword, and connotes the establishment of some form of Palestinian unit very much akin to a state. (Webster's Dictionary defines "entity" as an "independent, separate, or self-contained existence.") An independent Palestinian state is a dangerous threat to both Israel's and Jordan's security. Mondale suggests the entity's "association with Jordan" as an afterthought.

Page 7. Immediately after stating that there should be "no doubt" about the Administration's commitment to Israel, Mondale, in effect, equivocates on that commitment by suggesting the United States and Israel will have differences over military aid and diplomatic strategy. (Note: there is no mention of differences with Arab states.) The Administration's commitment, in fact, is in doubt by the failure of the Administration to take positive action on Israeli requests for advanced weapons - as was recently promised by the President to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Page 7. Mondale states his belief that "all sides" share the objective of a "permanent and enduring peace." This is a basic fallacy. Arab actions do not bear this out. Their refusal to negotiate directly with Israel implies refusal to recognize Israel's national existence.

Obvious Omissions

No mention is made of Israel's need for defensible borders, the Administration's position on the PLO, or Jewish refugees from Arab countries (which more than equals the number of Arab refugees).

Conclusion

The Administration contends it is not seeking to impose peace. But by stating the positions advocating Israel's withdrawal to 1967 borders with minor modification and the establishment of a Palestinian entity, the Administration is actually predetermining the outcome of any future peace conference.

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WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA.

להלן תקטע המדתי מנאדם סגן הנשיא היום לפני ה-

WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA.

JUST AS RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IS CENTRAL TO OUR FOREIGN POLICY VALUES, SO PROGRESS TOWARD A JUST AND LASTING MIDEAST SETTLEMENT IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROSPECT OF A MORE PEACEFUL WORLD. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME TO DESCRIBE WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN THE MIDEAST. WE WANT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO HAVE THE FULLEST POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDING OF OUR APPROACH FOR YOUR SUPPORT IS CRUCIAL TO ITS SUCCESS.

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PRESIDENT CARTER HAS NOW MET WITH THE LEADERS OF EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA. THE PRESIDENT MET WITH PRIME MINISTER RABIN OF ISRAEL AND WE HOPE THAT WE WILL SOON MEET WITH THE NEW PRIME MINISTER.

WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASAD WHICH WAS HELD IN GENEVA, I HAVE PARTICIPATED IN ALL OF THEM AND HAVE SENSED THESE LEADERS' GREAT DESIRE FOR PEACE, AND THEIR LONGING FOR THE BENEFITS THAT PEACE CAN BRING TO NATIONS TOO LONG MOBILIZED FOR WAR. YET AT THE SAME TIME, WE ALSO FOUND DEEP FEARS AND SUSPICION WHICH MUST BE OVERCOME IF PEACE IS TO BE ACHIEVED IN THAT STRATEGIC AND TROUBLED REGION OF THE WORLD. A GENUINE AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDEAST IS OF ESSENTIAL INTEREST TO ALL AMERICANS. CONFLICT THERE CARRIES THE THREAT OF A GLOBAL CONFRONTATION, AND RUNS THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR. AS WE HAVE SEEN, WAR IN THE MIDEAST HAS PROFOUND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES. IT CAN, AND HAS, DAMAGED THE ECONOMIES OF THE ENTIRE WORLD. IT HAS BEEN A TRAGEDY FOR THE NATIONS OF THE REGION. EVEN SHORT OF WAR, CONTINUED CONFRONTATION ENCOURAGES RADICALIZATION AND INSTABILITY. GENUINE PEACE IS NEEDED BY ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT. THE ARAB NATIONS NEED PEACE.

ISRAEL, ABOVE ALL, AS A PROFOUND INTEREST IN PEACE. THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT. FOR ALMOST THREE DECADES, ISRAEL HAS BORNE THE BURDEN OF CONSTANT WAR. MORE THAN HALF ITS ENTIRE BUDGET IS DEDICATED TO DEFENSE. ITS CITIZENS BEAR THE HIGHEST AVERAGE TAX BURDEN IN THE WORLD — MORE THAN 60 PER CENT OF THEIR INCOME GOES

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- 2 -

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AND YET, AT THE SAME TIME, THIS VALIANT NATION HAS MANAGED TO CREATE A MIRACLE IN THE DESERT. WITH INGENUITY, HARD WORK AND SKILL, IT HAS CREATED A LAND THAT COULD BE A MODEL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOR POLITICAL LIBERTY TO BE EMULATED THROUGHOUT THE MIDEAST. DEMOCRACY HAS THRIVED IN ISRAEL DESPITE THE KIND OF ADVERSITY THAT HAS CRUSHED FREEDOM IN OTHER LANDS.

AND YET, WHAT OF THE FUTURE? IS IT A FUTURE IN WHICH ISRAEL'S THREE MILLION PEOPLE TRY BY FORCE OF ARMS ALONE TO HOLD OUT AGAINST THE HOSTILITY AND GROWING POWER OF THE ARAB WORLD? OR CAN A PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION BE STARTED - A PROCESS IN WHICH PEACE PROTECTS ISRAEL'S SECURITY, A PEACE IN WHICH THE URGE FOR REVENGE AND RECRIMINATION IS REPLACED BY MUTUAL RECOGNITION AND RESPECT?

AMERICA HAS A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND A SPECIAL OPPORTUNITY TO HELP BRING ABOUT THIS KIND OF PEACE. THIS COMES ABOUT FIRST OF ALL BECAUSE OF OUR UNIQUE AND PROFOUND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE OF ISRAEL SINCE ITS CREATION MORE THAN A GENERATION AGO. OUR SENSE OF SHARED VALUES AND PURPOSES MEANS THAT, FOR AMERICANS, THE QUESTION OF ISRAEL'S SURVIVAL IS NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION BUT RATHER STANDS AS A MORAL IMPERATIVE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. AND YET, OUR SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL HAS NOT BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST ANY OTHER COUNTRY. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ENJOY THE FRIENDSHIP OF MUCH OF THE ARAB WORLD WHERE WE AND OUR CLOSE ALLIES HAVE IMPORTANT INTERESTS.

IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF OUR CLOSE TIES WITH BOTH ISRAEL AND HER ARAB NEIGHBORS THAT WE ARE UNIQUELY PLACED TO PROMOTE THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, TO WORK FOR AN IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING OF EACH SIDE'S LEGITIMATE CONCERNS, AND TO HELP THEM WORK OUT WHAT WE HOPE WILL BE A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION LEADING TO A FINAL PEACE IN THE MIDEAST.

WHEN THIS ADMINISTRATION ENTERED OFFICE ON JANUARY 20, WE FOUND THAT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDEAST CALLED FOR A NEW APPROACH. THE STEP BY STEP DIPLOMACY OF OUR PREDECESSORS HAD DEFUSED THE IMMEDIATE TENSIONS PRODUCED BY THE WAR IN 1973. BUT IT WAS ALSO EVIDENT THAT IT WOULD BE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE SMALL DIPLOMATIC CONCESSIONS WHEN THE ULTIMATE SHAPE OF A PEACE AGREEMENT REMAINED OBSCURE. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT AN AGREEMENT ON A LASTING PEACE COULD BE ACHIEVED AT ONE STROKE. UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY ALL THE PARTIES, PROVIDES A BASIS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE REQUIRED IF THERE IS TO BE A SETTLEMENT. BUT RESOLUTION 242 DOES NOT BY ITSELF PROVIDE ALL THAT IS REQUIRED. WE, THEREFORE, DECIDED TO WORK WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO OUTLINE THE OVERALL FRAMEWORK FOR AN ENDURING PEACE. OUR CONCEPT WAS TO USE THIS FRAMEWORK AS THE BASIS FOR A PHASED NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIFIC STEPS TOWARD PEACE.

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TO THIS END, THE PRESIDENT HAS TRIED TO DESCRIBE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE KEY ELEMENTS OF AN OVERALL FRAMEWORK FOR AN AGREEMENT MIGHT BE:

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PRESIDENT CARTER HAS GONE FURTHER THAN ANY OF HIS PREDECESSORS TO STRESS WITH ARAB LEADERS THE ESSENTIAL POINT THAT PEACE MUST MEAN MORE THAN MERELY AN END TO HOSTILITIES, STATING AS HE DID IN CLINTON MASS., LAST MARCH:

"... THE FIRST PREREQUISITE OF A LASTING PEACE IS THE RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL BY HER BEIGHBORS. ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST PERMANENTLY. ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST IN PEACE. THAT MEANS THAT OVER A PERIOD OF MONTHS OR YEARS THAT THE BORDERS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, ISRAEL AND LEBANON, ISRAEL AND JORDAN, ISRAEL AND EGYPT MUST BE OPENED UP TO TRAVEL, TO TOURISM TO CULTURAL EXCHANGE, TO TRADE, SO THAT NO MATTER WHO THE LEADRS MIGHT BE IN THOSE COUNTRIES THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES WILL HAVE FORMED A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COMPREHENSION AND A SENSE OF A COMMON PURPOSE TO AVOID THE REPETITIOUS WARS AND DEATHS THAT HAVE AFFECTED THAT REGION SO LONG. THAT IS THE FIRST PREREQUISITE OF PEACE."

WE HAVE FOUND THAT THE ARAB LEADERS DID NOT ISIST THAT THIS KIND OF PEACE IS SOMETHING THAT ONLY FUTURE GENERATIONS COULD CONSIDER. SOME LEADERS, SUCH AS KING HUSSEIN, DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON, HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR COMMITMENT TO A "JUST AND LASTING PEACE -- ONE WHICH WOULD ENABLE ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE MIDEAST TO DIVERT THEIR ENERGIES AND RESOURCES TO BUILD AND ATTAIN A BETTER FUTURE".

SO WE BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS IN GETTING ARAB LEADERS TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND TO RECOGNIZE -- HOWEVER RELUCTANTLY-- THAT THIS COMMITMENT IS ESSENTIAL TO A GENUINE PEACE. THAT PEACE MUST BE STRUCTURED IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT CAN SURIVE EVEN IF SOME LEADERS WERE TO NURTURE AIMS TO DESTROY ISRAEL. (STIL), WE HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO. THE ARABS HAVE BEEN INSISTENT THAT ISRAEL WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORIES IT OCCUPIED IN THE 1967 WAR. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR OUR VIEW THAT ISRAEL

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FOR THIS REASON, THE PRESIDENT HAS TRIED TO SEPARATE THE TWO ISSUES. ON THE ONE HAND, THERE MUST BE RECOGNIZED BORDERS. BUT IN ADDITION, THERE COULD BE SEPARATE LINES OF DEFENSE OR OTHER MEASURES THAT COULD ENHANCE ISRAEL'S SECURITY. THE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SINAI AND IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS PROVIDE MODELS OF HOW ISRAEL'S SECURITY MIGHT BE ENHANCED UNTIL CONFIDENCE IN A LASTING PEACE CAN BE FULLY DEVELOPED.

WE WOULD URGE ALL THE PARTIES TO THINK REALISTICALLY ABOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO REDUCE THE FEAR OF SURPRISE ATTACK, LIMIT THE MILITARY FORCES THAT WOULD CONFRONT ONE ANOTHER IN SENSITIVE AREAS.

THIS APPROACH RECOGNIZES THE FACT THAT THERE IS A PROFOUND ASYMMETRY IN WHAT THE TWO SIDES IN THE MIDEAST ARE SEEKING. ON THE ONE HAND, A PRINCIPAL ARAB CONCERN IS TO REGAIN LOST TERRITORY. ON THE OTHER, ISRAEL WISHES PEACE AND RECOGNITION. TERRITORY IS TANGIBLE, AND ONCE CEDED DIFFICULT TO REGAIN SHORT OF WAR. PEACE, ON THE OTHER HAND, CAN BE EPHEMERAL. PEACEFUL INTENTIONS CAN CHANGE OVERNIGHT, UNLESS A SOLID FOUNDATION OF COOPERATION AND A FIRM PATTERN OF REINFORCING RELATIONSHIPS CAN BE ESTABLISHED TO ENSURE THAT ALL HAVE A STAKE IN CONTINUING TRANQUILITY. WE BELIEVE THAT SEPARATING THE IMPERATIVES OF SECURITY FROM THE REQUIREMENT OF RECOGNIZED BORDERS IS AN IMPORTANT ADVANCE TOWARD RECONCILING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. IT IS IN THIS WAY THAT ISRAEL COULD RETURN TO APPROXIMATELY THE BORDERS THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO THE WAR OF 1967, ALBEIT WITH MINOR MODIFICATIONS AS NEGOTIATED AMONG THE PARTIES, AND YET RETAIN SECURITY LINES OR OTHER ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD ENSURE ISRAEL'S SAFETY AS FULL CONFIDENCE DEVELOPED IN A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. THUS, WITH BORDERS EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZED AND BUTTRESSED BY SECURITY MEASURES, AND WITH THE PROCESS OF PEACE UNFOLDING, ISRAEL'S SECURITY WOULD BE GREATER THAN IT IS TODAY.

A FURTHER MAJOR ISSUE IS THAT OF THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. IT HAS BEEN THE SOURCE OF CONTINUING TRAGEDY IN THE MIDEAST. THERE ARE TWO PREREQUISITES FOR A LASTING PEACE IN THIS REGARD. FIRST, THERE MUST BE A DEMONSTRATED WILLINGNESS ON THE PART

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THIS APPROACH RECOGNIZES THE FACT THAT THERE IS A PROFOUND ASYMMETRY IN WHAT THE TWO SIDES IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE SEEKING. ON THE ONE HAND, A PRINCIPAL ARAB CONCERN IS TO REGAIN LOST TERRITORY. ON THE OTHER, ISRAEL WISHES PEACE AND RECOGNITION. TERRITORY IS TANGIBLE AND ONCE CEDED DIFFICULT TO REGAIN. SHORT OF WAR, PEACE ON THE OTHER HAND CAN BE EPHEMERAL. PEACEFUL INTENTIONS CAN CHANGE OVERNIGHT UNLESS A SOLID FOUNDATION OF COOPERATION AND A FIRM PATTERN OF REINFORCING RELATIONSHIPS CAN BE ESTABLISHED TO ENSURE THAT ALL HAVE A STAKE IN CONTINUING TRANQUILITY. WE BELIEVE THAT SEPARATING THE IMPERATIVES OF SECURITY FROM THE REQUIREMENT OF RECOGNIZED BORDERS IS AN IMPORTANT ADVANCE TOWARD RECONCILING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. IT IS IN THIS WAY THAT ISRAEL COULD RETURN TO APPROXIMATELY THE BORDERS THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO THE WAR OF 1967, ALBEIT WITH MINOR MODIFICATIONS. AS NEGOTIATED AMONG THE PARTIES, AND YET RETAIN SECURITY LINES OR OTHER ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD ENSURE ISRAEL'S SAFETY AS FULL CONFIDENCE DEVELOPED IN A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. THUS, WITH BORDERS EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZED AND BUTTERESSED BY SECURITY MEASURES, AND WITH THE PROCESS OF PEACE UNFOLDING, ISRAEL'S SECURITY WOULD BE GREATER THAN IT IS TODAY.

A FURTHER MAJOR ISSUE IS THAT OF THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. IT HAS BEEN THE SOURCE OF CONTINUING TRAGEDY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE ARE TWO PREREQUISITES FOR A LASTING PEACE IN THIS REGARD. FIRST, THERE MUST BE A DEMONSTRATED WILLINGNESS ON THE PART

- 5 -

OF THE PALESTINIANS TO LIVE IN PEACE ALONGSIDE ISRAEL. SECOND, THE PALESTINIAN S MUST BE GIVEN A STAKE IN PEACE SO THAT THEY WILL TURN AWAY FROM THE VIOLENCE OF THE PAST AND TOWARD A FUTURE IN WHICH THEY CAN EXPRESS THEIR LEGITIMATE POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS PEACEFULLY.

THUS, IF THE PALESTINIANS ARE

WILLING TO EXIST IN PEACE AND ARE PREPARED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WILLINGNESS, BY RECOGNIZING ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST, IN PEACE, THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT WE BELIEVE THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD BE GIVEN A CHANCE TO SHED THEIR STATUS AS HOMELESS REFUGEES AND TO PARTAKE FULLY OF THE BENEFITS OF PEACE IN THE MIDEAST, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME ARRANGEMENT FOR A PALESTINIAN HOMELAND OR ENTITY - PREFERABLY IN ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN. HOW THIS WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AND THE EXACT CHARACTER OF SUCH AN ENTITY IS, OF COURSE, SOMETHING THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATION. HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE VIABILITY OF THIS CONCEPT AND THE SECURITY OF THE REGION MIGHT BE ENHANCED IF THIS INVOLVED AN ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN. BUT I EMPHASIZE THAT THE SPECIFICS ARE FOR THE PARTIES THEMSELVES TO DECIDE.

THIS LEADS ME TO A FURTHER CRUCIAL ASPECT OF OUR APPROACH - THE NECESSITY OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES CONCERNED. WE CANNOT CONCEIVE OF GENUINE PEACE EXISTING BETWEEN COUNTRIES WHO WILL NOT TALK TO ONE ANOTHER. IF THEY ARE PREPARED FOR PEACE, THE FIRST PROOF IS A WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE THEIR DIFFERENCES. THIS IS WAY WE BELIEVE IT IS SO IMPORTANT TO PROCEED WITH THE HOLDING OF A GENEVA CONFERENCE THIS YEAR. THAT CONFERENCE PROVIDES THE FORUM FOR THESE NATIONS TO BEGIN THE WORKING OUT OF THESE PROBLEMS TOGETHER DIRECTLY FACE TO FACE. WE HAVE A CONTINUING OBJECTIVE TO CONVEENE SUCH A CONFERENCE BEFORE THE DN OF THIS YEAR, UNDERLYING THIS ENTIRE EFFORT TO PROMOTE THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION IS OUR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THE MILITARY SECURITY OF ISRAEL. THERE MUST BE NO QUESTION IN ANYONE'S MIND THAT THE US WILL DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE ADEQUACY OF ISRAEL'S MILITARY POSTURE AND ITS CAPACITY FOR SELF-DEFENSE.

WE RECOGNIZE THAT AMERICA HAS A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS REGARD. IN FACT, IN PROMULGATING OUR OVERALL POLICY TO KURB THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS, THE PRESIDENT SPECIFCALLY DIRECTED THE GOVERNMENT THAT WE WILL HONOR OUR HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITIES TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL. LET THERE BE NO DOUBT ABOUT THIS COMMITMENT BY THIS ADMINISTRATION.

WE DO NOT INTEND TO USE OUR MILITARY AID AS PRESSURE ON ISRAEL. IF WE HAVE DIFFERENCES OVER MILITARY AID - AND WE MAY HAVE SOME -

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OF THE PALESTINIANS TO LIVE IN PEACE ALONGSIDE ISRAEL. SECOND, THE PALESTINIANS MUST BE GIVEN A STAKE IN PEACE SO THAT THEY WILL TURN AWAY FROM THE VIOLENCE OF THE PAST AND TOWARD A FUTURE IN WHICH THEY CAN EXPRESS THEIR LEGITIMATE POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS PEACEFULLY. THUS, IF THE PALESTINIANS ARE

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- 6 -

IT WILL BE ON MILITARY GROUNDS OR ECONOMIC GROUND, BUT NOT POLITICAL GROUNDS. IF WE HAVE DIFFERENCES OVER DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY - AND THAT COULD HAPPEN - WE WILL WORK THIS OUT ON A POLITICAL LEVEL. WE WILL NOT ALTER OUR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S MILITARY SECURITY.

LET ME CONCLUDE BY SAYING THAT WE HOPE THE CONCEPTS I HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THERE TODAY - CONCEPTS WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAS ADVANCED AT TALKS WITH ISRAELI AND ARAB LEADERS - WILL STIMULATE THEM TO DEVELOP IDEAS OF THEIR OWN. WE REALIZE THAT PEACE CANNOT BE IMPOSED FROM THE OUTSIDE AND WE DO NOT INTEND TO PRESENT THE PARTIES WITH A PLAN OR A TIMETABLE OR A MAP. PEACE CAN ONLY COME FROM A GENUINE RECOGNITION BY ALL PARTIES THAT THEIR INTERESTS ARE SERVED BY RECONCILIATION AND NOT BY WAR, BY FAITH IN THE FUTURE RATHER THAN BITTERNESS OVER THE PAST.

AMERICA CAN TRY TO HELP ESTABLISH THE BASIS OF TRUST NECESSARY FOR PEACE. WE CAN TRY TO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE FOR COMMUNICATION. WE CAN OFFER IDEAS, BUT WE CANNOT, IN THE END, DETERMINE WHETHER PEACE OR WAR IS THE FATE OF THE MIDEAST. THAT CAN ONLY BE DECIDED BY ISRAEL AND HER ARAB NEIGHBORS.

WE BELIEVE THAT BOTH SIDES WANT PEACE. AS THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID - "THIS MAY BE THE MOST PROPITIOUS TIME FOR A GENUINE SETTLEMENT SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT ALMOST 30 YEARS AGO. TO LET THIS OPPORTUNITY PASS COULD MEAN A DISASTER NOT ONLY FOR THE MIDEAST, BUT PERHAPS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORDER AS WELL."

AS WE GO FORWARD IN OUR MEDIATING ROLE, WE WILL HAVE TO EXPECT FROM TIME TO TIME TO HAVE DIFFERENCES WITH BOTH SIDES. BUT THESE WILL BE DIFFERENCES AS TO TACTICS. OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVES WILL BE THOSE THAT WE BELIEVE ARE NOW SHARED BY ALL SIDES: A PERMANENT AND ENDURING PEACE IN THE MIDEAST.

THIS IS OBVIOUSLY A DIFFICULT TASK AND THERE IS ALWAYS THE POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE. BUT IT IS AN HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITY THAT REQUIRES THE FULLEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. I BELIEVE WE HAVE THIS SUPPORT. AND AS WE GO THROUGH THE DIFFICULT DAYS AHEAD, THIS SUPPORT WILL SUSTAIN US. IT WILL PROVIDE THE STRENGTH WE NEED TO ENCOURAGE ALL PARTIES TO PUT ASIDE THEIR FEARS AND PUT TRUST IN THEIR HOPES FOR A GENUINE AND LASTING MIDEAST PEACE.

JOHN KENNEDY ONCE DESCRIBED THE FORMULA FOR PEACE NOT ONLY IN THE MIDEAST BUT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, AND I WOULD LIKE TO CLOSE WITH HIS WORDS-

" IF WE ALL CAN PERSEVERE, IF WE IN EVERY LAND AND EVERY OFFICE CAN LOOK BEYOND OUR OWN SHORES AND AMITIONS THEN SURELY THE AGE WILL DAWN IN WHICH THE STRONG ARE JUST AND THE WEAK SECURE AND THE PEACE PRESERVED."

AD KAN

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AD KAN

GAL 3-11-67

THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

10/1/67

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

סודי

אל : המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים),
תשי"ז-1957.

מס. 166

בשלח: 131800 יוני 77

תדמור - סן פרנסיסקו (העבר).

דע מצפא ✓

WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL

ביום שישי 17 דנא יופיע סגן הנשיא מונדייל בפני

בטן פרנסיסקו. יש סברה ובנאום יהיו קטעים מזתיים. אודה את תדאג

לכיסוי האירוע על ידי ידידים ולדווח מהיר.

נבון

מנכל ממנכל עברון ארגוב מצפא

מב/פח

Handwritten signature/initials in blue ink.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

דף מספר _____ מתוך _____ דפים

עותק מספר 15 מתוך 33 עותקים

סודי ביותר

מס' 165

נשלח 131800 י"ג י 77

אלו המשרד

מאת: ורשינגטון

אריאל

אל: עברון. מ. רביה

שנעתי היום מידיד יהודי על שיחה שהיתה לו עם סגן הנשיא מונדייל. השיחה הביע הידיד דאגת הקהילה היהודית ממגמות מסתמנות בבית הלכך כלפי הנשיא המזתי. בשיחה הדגיש מונדייל שעליו כמוכח להתאים עמדתו לזו של הנשיא, וחדד את במסגרת זו יוכל לומר דברים שיעזרו. ידידנו אוד ליטג הנשיא ב"נ השאר, שחשוב להדגיש מחדש את נושא מהות האלום, כי ידי לא שמענו על כך ואז הופעת ה נשיא בקלינטון מסצוסטס. כנ הדגיש ידידנו שודאי היה זה מועיל לו הדגיש מחדש שהב"ס היחיד לזום ב"נ הצדימ הוא החלונות מועביט 242 ו/338. מונדייל שרשם חברים אמר שנדמה לו שלא תהיה לו בעיה באזכור הנקודות הנל ונראה שהודים יבואו לכלל ביטוי ביום ויהקדוב בהופעת סגן הנשיא ב- World Affairs Council בסן פרנציסקו. אם כי הנאום בפני פורום זה אמור להיות בנושאים בינלאומיים כלליים, אני מתייב ניהיו בו קטעים מזתימ לא מבוטלים

נבונ-

שהח רהמ מנכל ממנכל עברון מ. רביב י. רביב רס ו/אמן

מב/פמ



~~א. ח. ח. ח.~~

אל: מצפא

מאת: ד"ר אהרן

בברכת
שגרירות ישראל
בושינגטון

SEN. WALTER F. MONDALE'S SPEECH ON BEHALF
OF ISRAEL INDEPENDENCE DAY

MAY 7, 1976

#26

FINAL

TEMPLE ISRAEL
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

It is an honor to speak here, in celebration of the founding of Israel. The State of Israel occupies a special place in the affections of the American people which is almost unlike any other country. There is no treaty of alliance between the United States and Israel, and yet the bonds are stronger than with many of our formal allies.

It's appropriate therefore to consider the reasons for this extraordinary friendship which has existed for 28 years.

I think the basic reason for our strong ties to Israel can be seen in the letter Dr. Chaim Weizman sent to President Truman on May 13, 1948. In part, it said this:

"Tomorrow midnight, May 15, the British mandate will be terminated and the provisional government of the Jewish State will assume the full responsibility for preserving law and order within the boundaries of the Jewish State, for defending that area against external aggression, and for discharging the obligations of the Jewish State to the other nations of the world in accordance with international law."

Dr. Weizman then went on to urge the United States recognize Israel and he then concluded by saying:

"The world will regard it as especially appropriate that the greatest living democracy should be the first to welcome the newest into the family of nations."

To our everlasting credit, within 48 hours, the United States had announced its recognition of Israel.

Since Israel's founding, scores of new states have come into the world. Most of these states have called themselves democracies; but few

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have lived up to the test of individual liberty and social justice required for a true democracy. Despite the turbulence and tragedy of the last 28 years, Israel has lived up to that standard and has fulfilled the promise expressed in Dr. Weizman's letter.

In explaining the depth of our relationship, some like to emphasize the strategic importance of Israel; the need for a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the Middle East. I have no quarrel with those reasons. Indeed, I think they're sound.

But I don't think we should be hesitant about saying what I believe lies at the heart of our commitment to Israel's security: it is a commitment to the concept of democracy, and to its survival in the face of adversity. I'm proud to say that America feels bound to Israel by ties of culture; by philosophic tradition; by history. I share the American people's profound sympathy for the democratic system which exists in Israel, for the enormous effort which the people of Israel have made to achieve social justice, and for the incredible sacrifices and valor the Israeli people have shown in defending their nation and, indeed, their very survival. In short, our commitment to Israel resides not just in our heads, but in our hearts.

ADVERSITY

That Israeli Democracy should be as strong and as vibrant as it is today is truly remarkable. Woodrow Wilson feared to take the United States into the First World War because he felt that full-scale war would be the end of our democratic traditions. If he feared for the strength of American democracy in the face of war, let's look at the pressures on Israel:

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--It has fought four wars since its birth in 1948. It has never known true peace. The last war alone cost the equivalent of a year's gross national product -- \$8 billion. In US terms that is equivalent to costing us more than a trillion dollars.

Right now, Israel shoulders the largest per capita defense burden in the world: 30% of its GNP goes for defense compared to 12% in the Soviet Union and 6% in the United States. Proportionately, if the US had the Israeli Defense burden, we would be spending \$400 billion on defense, about 4 times what we do now.

--To these external pressures on Israeli democracy, one must add the incredible social challenges:

Absorbing millions of new settlers from enormously varied cultures, the construction of an economy of great productivity wrought from the desert. Despite the enormous defense burden Israel still manages to devote 60% of its budget to civilian needs. As a result, Israeli's have an average tax rate of 60%-- the highest in the world. But they are determined to avoid the choice so often posed in this country, of protecting national security or educating school children.

And yet, despite these pressures, Israel continues to move forward to provide justice on the social level, liberty on the individual level, and democracy on the political level.

(over)

WHEN I FELL IN LOVE WITH ISRAEL

I have traveled and met with leaders in Europe, Asia and the Soviet Union. And I also visited Israel. Almost everywhere, political leaders were exclusively concerned with global politics, strategic balances, and so forth.

Only in Israel did top leaders such as Golda Meir take the initiative to talk of human issues such as the importance of educating the young. Only in Israel did I find a deep concern for the children, for giving them all an equal chance at life, for helping those with handicaps, for encouraging those with talent. In Israel they understand that our children are 100% of our future.

What I admire most about Israel is that its people and its leaders are not satisfied with their amazing record. They know there are still problems and they crave the opportunity to solve them.

That's what makes the present situation so tragic, so painful for them and for us who wish them well. If, despite the endless war and tension, there has been this much progress in economic development and education and health and social equality, how much more Israel could have achieved if it did not have such a heavy defense burden and had not suffered such horrendous waste in war.

What a tragedy -- that that gallant, pioneering, creative tiny land of Israel hasnot during these past 28 years been permitted to make the full contributions to its own and world progress that it was prepared and anxious to make.

But what of the future of our relationship? How many more birthdays -- a few or thousands? I'm told there is increasing concern in Israel over the durability of the American commitment. This concerns me because I want to emphasize my personal commitment to Israel and my conviction that the Congress and the Senate stand solidly in support of Israel's security.

The diplomacy required in the near future to move towards a more stable peace in the Middle East requires that the stability and durability of the American commitment to Israel's security be made crystal clear -- to Israel and, most important, to its Arab neighbors.

I believe that the United States, as well as Israel, should seek to develop better relations with the Arab states surrounding Israel. But I do not believe that we can afford to become neutral; or lukewarm or that we can afford to develop those relationships at the expense of our relationship with Israel. Nothing could be more counterproductive to peace than to provide a false impression that somehow America was no longer so concerned about Israel's future.

And I do believe that this is a fundamentally false impression. But in world affairs impressions are very critical. If the Arab leaders, if the Soviet Union, if the Third World, if our own Western Allies believe that the United States is fudging its commitment to Israel -- they will act accordingly.

(over)

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In recent years, too many things have happened to encourage speculation about American commitment to Israel: the Public scolding of Israel for alleged intransigence after the initial failure to arrange a Sinai disengagement; the unseemly haggling over funds to Israel for the transition quarter; the start of a military supply line to Egypt and the evident limitless sales of arms to Arab nations still hostile to the existence of a secure Israel; and the on-and-off again positions of support for Israel in the United Nations; and in the last few days uncontradicted stories that the United States may soon press Israel to accept the PLO as a legitimate spokesman for the Palestinians; and, just today, the Presidential veto of military credits and assistance to Israel..

All of these issues are complicated. But together -- absent unambiguous declarations and actions regarding our basic commitment to Israel's security -- these have started to give the impression that the American-Israeli connection is not what it used to be. Israel must have a committed America and it must be clear to all.

Perhaps the most unfair charge levelled against Israel in recent years is that of "intransigence." Tough, yes. Cautious, yes. Suspicious, yes. Why not -- in light of the past 28 years? But intransigent? The record eloquently refutes the charge.

The Israelis made significant territorial withdrawals in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War and then, last year, abandoned oil fields and strategic passes and even more territory in order to demonstrate its good faith. I flew over those passes. This is not a record of intransigence.

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Today, Israel pronounces its readiness to make further major territorial concessions, on all fronts, for Arab agreement to "end the state of war" -- not for a final peace agreement, not for full diplomatic recognition, but for a symbol of Arab willingness to abandon hostilities while that full peace is pursued. Intransigent? I don't think so.

If America's good offices in the Middle East negotiations are to be effective, these kinds of charges must stop. The feeding of speculation about our intentions must end. The value of our good offices in-pursuit of peace depends above all upon the strength of our relationship with Israel. It must be made clear that we are unswerving in our support for Israel's right to exist at peace within secure borders.

The Administration must realize that being wishy washy or neutral is the same as being against Israel. America is Israel's only true friend which is in a position to help. No other country is willing or can provide the backing required for a fair solution to the problems of the Middle East and for Israel's quest for a just society.

Can anyone disagree with this picture of the future in the Middle East held by Golda Meir:

"I want my grandchildren to live in an Israel that is part-and-parcel of this entire area. But I don't want them to live in an Israel that will always be complimented as the only democratic state here, the only developed state. I want Israel to be part of a highly developed culturally advanced Middle East with much co-operation between its peoples. Each people maintaining its individual characteristics and yet a region that lives together. Above all, I hope that Israel will become the Ideal, just society of which we dreamed."

It is that kind of vision and that kind of spirit that will make America's commitment to Israel endure.

(over)

8 Temple Israel

In public life, one is so often confronted with challenges which are morally ambiguous or hazardous. The cause of Israel is not of that kind. We can be proud of our support of Israel. For it is the cause of justice, decency and freedom.

Happy Birthday!

* * *



official text

MAY 16, 1977

MONDALE WILL REAFFIRM U.S. POLICIES ON MISSION TO EUROPE

BY PETER KAREGEANNES
IPS STAFF WRITER

WASHINGTON, MAY 13 -- THE PURPOSE OF VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE'S VISIT TO EUROPE BEGINNING MAY 14, IS ESSENTIALLY TO REAFFIRM AMERICA'S HISTORIC SUPPORT OF DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND TO FURTHER THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL PEOPLES.

THIS GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE MONDALE MISSION'S PURPOSE WAS MADE MAY 13 BY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS. THE VISIT WILL TAKE THE VICE PRESIDENT TO LISBON, MADRID, VIENNA, BELGRADE, AND LONDON. THE SPECIFICS OF HIS MEETINGS WITH THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND CHIEFS OF STATE WILL BECOME CLEARER AS THE VISIT UNFOLDS, THE OFFICIALS SAID.

THE VISITS TO LISBON AND MADRID CONSTITUTE VISIBLE SUPPORT AT A HIGH LEVEL -- AS PRESIDENT CARTER HAS DESIRED IT -- OF PORTUGAL'S RETURN TO DEMOCRACY AND OF SPAIN'S EFFORTS TO BUILD, IN THE WORDS OF THE PRESIDENT -- "A TRUE AND JUST DEMOCRACY." VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE, IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT ANTONIO EANES AND PRIME MINISTER SOARES, AND WITH KING JUAN CARLOS AND SPANISH PRESIDENT SUAREZ, WILL TALK ABOUT THE SUPPORTIVE ROLE OF THE U.S. IN THESE EFFORTS, THE OFFICIALS SAID.

PRESIDENT CARTER, IN ANNOUNCING THE MONDALE MISSION ON MAY 3, SAID THAT "I BELIEVE I SPEAK FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHEN I SAY HOW VERY DEEPLY ENCOURAGED WE ARE BY THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY IN PORTUGAL AND BY THE STEPS SPAIN IS TAKING TO BUILD A TRUE AND JUST DEMOCRACY."

THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL GO FROM LISBON AND MADRID TO VIENNA, WHERE, AFTER MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KREISKY TO HEAR HIS VIEWS ON A NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, HE WILL CONFER WITH SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER JOHN VORSTER. PRESIDENT CARTER NOTED IN HIS ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MONDALE TRIP THAT MR. VORSTER, "LIKE OURSELVES, HAS AN INTEREST IN MEETING TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA." HE SAID THAT MR. MONDALE WILL, IN THESE DISCUSSIONS, "STATE OUR VIEWS ON THE CRUCIAL ROLE WHICH CAN BE PLAYED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IN BRINGING NEEDED CHANGES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA."

(MORE)

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IN THEIR DESCRIPTION OF THE PURPOSES OF THE MONDALE MISSION, THE ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS NOTED THAT ALL ISSUES CENTERING AROUND SOUTHERN AFRICA WILL BE DISCUSSED AT VIENNA. THEY SAID THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS ARE CRITICAL TO THE WHOLE AREA. THE U.S. IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF POLICIES WHICH RAISE THE POSSIBILITIES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE DAMAGE THAT CAN RESULT IN THE AREA, THE TEMPTATION TO OUTSIDE NATIONS TO INTERFERE IN AFRICA, AND THE IMPACT THAT A LACK OF SOLUTION CAN HAVE INTERNATIONALLY.

THE U.S. BELIEVES, THE ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAID, THAT SOUTH AFRICA MUST UNDERSTAND THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD THAT COUNTRY, WHICH MR. MONDALE WILL EXPLAIN ON VIENNA. U.S.-SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS ARE AT A PIVOTAL POINT, THEY SAID; PRESENT SOUTH AFRICAN POLICIES ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. AND THIS FACT UNDERSCORES THE NEED FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO CHART NEW POLICIES. IF SOUTH AFRICA CAN DO THIS, THEY SAID, IT WILL HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE U.S. IF IT CANNOT DO THIS WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME, THEN THE U.S. WILL PURSUE ITS OWN COURSE, A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA PROBLEMS WILL BE ALSO TO THE ADVANTAGE OF SOUTH AFRICA, THE ADMINISTRATION'S OFFICIALS DECLARED.

IN HIS VISIT TO BELGRADE, PRESIDENT MONDALE WILL MEET WITH PRESIDENT TITO TO HEAR THE YUGOSLAV LEADER'S VIEWS ON SUCH ISSUES AS EAST-WEST AND NORTH SOUTH RELATIONS, AND ON THE STATE OF THE NONALIGNED WORLD. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT WILL UNDERSCORE U.S. SUPPORT OF YUGOSLAVIA'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, THE OFFICIALS ADDED.

IN LONDON, MR. MONDALE WILL MEET WITH PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN IN WHAT WILL BE CONTINUED AND CLOSE U.S.-U.K. CONSULTATION ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO SOUTH AFRICA.

* * * * *

5.5.77

על
מחשבות

אז: מי רביה, מנחם מצפון.
מחשבות מיוחדות פילוסופיות.

להלן פירוט ביקורת של סגן נגיד ארבע מונות באירופה.

16.5.77 - פגישת מונות בליסבון מ להנה הפורטוגלית -
SOARES והנשיא EAMES.

17.5.77 - מחברות. פגישת עם החלק חזק חזק חזק
והנשיא SUAREZ.

18.5.77 - פגישת בנין עם הקנצלי קרייסקי,
(הנשיא בנין חשבויות - כהדבר קרייסקי)

21.5.77 - "פגש" בהאגה מ נשיא יאסלובה טיסו.

23.5.77 - פגישת מונות בלונדון עם להנה הבניית
והנה ד. אואן.

~~מחשבות~~

Sp
Fritz

Raviv

MJA
KW

F. Mondale

find out which government agency had been leaving its heavy boot prints in the nation's private cabbage patches. We had to admit there were all too many possibilities: the Agriculture Department, the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, perhaps the Comptroller of the Currency. The people at Mobil said they didn't know. They had lifted the anecdote from an editorial in the Fall 1976 edition of *Progress*, the house organ of FMC Corporation, an agricultural concern in Chicago. You would think that FMC would be on top of the cabbage situation, but it turns out they borrowed the story from the May 5, 1976, issue of *NAM Reports*, published by the National Association of Manufacturers here in Washington. The editor of that publication said she got it from an NAM director, whose name she could not remember, who had it printed on a card he carried around with him (presumably for whatever inspiration can be derived from constant reminder of the number of words in various inspirational texts).

There is no such regulation and there never was. By some miracle, the federal government apparently does not specifically regulate the sale of cabbages at all. But the story of the phantom cabbage regulation, along with the comparison to documents of greater nobility but shorter length, has surfaced hundreds of times, usually in right-wing or business-oriented publications. (Both major publications of Dow Jones, Inc., *The Wall Street Journal* and *The National Observer*, have fallen for the hoax.) Max Hall, a research director at the Harvard Business School, has traced the story back as far as July 28, 1951, when it appeared in a farm journal called *New England Homestead*. At that time it included the Ten Commandments (297 words) instead of the Lord's Prayer, and attached itself specifically to the regulations of the Korean War Office of Price Stabilization. Mr. Hall claims that as an oral tradition the story can be traced even further back, to World War II when it was applied to the Office of Price Administration. In recent years the story has detached itself from any specific agency and become an indictment of big government in general.

Mr. Hall has conducted a 26-year crusade against the cabbage lie. It began when he was public affairs director of OPS, trying to cope with the bad publicity. In 1954 he wrote an article about it in *The Reporter*. In 1965 he wrote a lengthy study of the phenomenon for the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. Over the years various publications have exposed the hoax, including the *New York Times*, which unwittingly repeated it last week. But the cabbage myth never has lost its grip on the imaginations of the American business community. The number of words allegedly in the Declaration of Independence has varied from as low as 300, in the 1951 *New England Homestead* story, to a reported high of 3000, in *NAM Reports* last May. There have been smaller variations in the count of the Gettysburg Address. But the number of words in the cabbage regulations is

always precisely the same: 26,911.

But it isn't true. Free enterprise survives in the cabbage industry. Meanwhile the oil industry wants to get rid of the regulations it doesn't like and to keep the ones it does, an understandable sentiment and one we'd like to see expressed a little more forthrightly in Pipeline Pete's column and in all the other thousands of words Mobil Oil Corporation—self-appointed industry spokesfirm—puts out in its ads.

White House Watch

Mondale At Work

One of the meetings with department heads and White House assistants at which President Carter put together his national energy policy began at 3:30 and ended at 7 p.m. At around 6 o'clock, when people were getting fagged and bored, Vice President Walter F. (Fritz) Mondale announced that he had something else to do and was leaving. He stood, leaned across the table and whispered to the President, and walked casually out of the Cabinet Room. A mid-level assistant who wouldn't have dreamed of leaving before the President closed the meeting cited the incident later as evidence of the extraordinary relationship that has developed between the President and his Vice President. A senior assistant who also witnessed the departure said it wasn't all that remarkable; he or anyone else at his level who had a compelling engagement would have felt free to go. But he agreed after reflection that the episode was a sign of this Vice President's confidence and assurance in a role that has humiliated and saddened many of his predecessors.

As a reporter who derided President-elect Carter's claims that his Vice President was going to be his "chief staff person" and to have serious and substantial responsibilities, I acknowledge that the Mondale vice presidency so far has worked in ways that I didn't believe it could and that, so far as I know, no previous vice presidency ever has. White House evidence and staff testimony to that effect are convincing. The sole caveat offered here is that the same evidence and testimony establish that the Carter-Mondale relationship depends totally upon the President. Behind that ivory glow of his, Jimmy Carter is said by a good many people who know him well to be harsher, more demanding, less patient with people who work with and for him than he tries and is made to appear to be. Vice President Mondale makes a point in interviews of saying with pride that he may spend as much as four or five hours a day with the President, alone and in groups,

and that he has a standing invitation to barge in whenever he pleases upon the President's meetings and conferences in the Oval Office. He also has said, and others verify, that he and the President like and trust each other and enjoy each other's company and that this affinity is the basis of their official and working relationship. Granting all that, human nature and the long history of dissonance between Presidents and Vice Presidents suggest that there could come an end or at least a limit to President Carter's welcome and enjoyment of Vice President Mondale's counsel and company.

Inquiries during the preparation of this report indicate that the Vice President is acutely aware of the possibility. He misses no opportunity to minimize his role, whenever doing anything else would suggest that he is trying to preempt the President's role and authority. His simultaneous eagerness and endeavor to maximize his own role and the extent of the responsibilities delegated to him by the President entail some contradictions, but they are minor. The subject of the remainder of this account is how the Carter-Mondale relationship was defined and its results in terms of the services rendered by the Vice President.

According to Mondale, the basis of the relationship was laid when he visited Plains for the personal scrutiny that he and other aspirants for the vice presidential nomination underwent before the 1976 Democratic convention. He says he told Carter that he'd be interested in the job only if it was to be a substantive job with solid and serious responsibilities. Carter is said to have told Mondale that he wouldn't want a Vice President who didn't require that assurance. After he and Carter were nominated in New York, Mondale talked at length with Nelson Rockefeller, President Ford's frustrated Vice President, and with Mondale's Minnesota patron, Senator Hubert Humphrey, about the humiliations that he endured when he was Lyndon Johnson's Vice President. Still according to Mondale, Rockefeller and Humphrey did not as I'd understood tell him that no vice presidency could work as he and Carter were saying they intended this one to work. But they were skeptical. They told Mondale that the essential requirement was that he be assured of being in "the flow of information" to the President and that he know all that the President knew, so that he could aid and support the President with advice that could come only from complete knowledge of the President's problems and of what others were telling the President. Rockefeller told him in bitter detail of how a hostile presidential staff could frustrate and isolate a Vice President. Humphrey urged him to insist upon a specific, continuing area of responsibility—such as for federal relationships with state and local governments and officials. Members of Humphrey's staff advised him to avoid that kind of assignment as if it were the plague: Humphrey, they said, had been driven frantic by the resultant demands

upon his time and energies. It happens that Mondale's press secretary is Al Eisele, a Minnesota journalist who in *Almost to the Presidency*, a well written and widely unread book about the careers and disappointments of Humphrey and Eugene McCarthy, recounted Humphrey's tribulations as Vice President in scarifying detail. So Mondale was well instructed in the hazards of the office before he took his oath on January 20.

Mondale thought over all that he'd learned about recent and past vice presidencies and set down his conclusions in a memo to Carter in December. It amounted to a description of the job as he wanted it to be. Its primary thrust was that his greatest usefulness to his President would be as an adviser on broad policy and strategy, domestic and political and foreign. He hoped to be left free to study, think, rove from area to area and problem to problem, without narrow assignments that would deprive him of the time and energy to qualify himself to be the overall adviser he wanted to be. He had concluded that past vice presidents got themselves into trouble by seeking or accepting either of two sorts of assignments: to major problems and situations that brought them into conflict with the executive departments, or to petty tasks that they took on so that they'd appear to be busy. Carter is said to have responded that this conception of what his vice president should and shouldn't be exactly fitted his own ideas and that Mondale's way was the way it was going to be.

So far, it's largely turned out to be Mondale's way. He has prudently minimized and in some instances concealed the nature and extent of his assignments while, as previously noted, making the most of them when he could without endangering his rapport with the President. This has been particularly true of his assignments and work in connection with foreign policy and national intelligence problems.

Twice a week on the recent average, the President's appointments list has shown meetings in the Oval Office with Mondale, CIA director Stansfield Turner, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the adviser for national security affairs. The purpose of these meetings is to review and direct, largely under Mondale's supervision, a continuing study of the entire national intelligence system that the President announced some weeks ago without reference to the Vice President. Mondale has also been asked to conduct, and up to this writing has conducted in secrecy with the help of NSC, State and Defense department staffs, a wide-ranging review of half a dozen foreign policy positions inherited from past administrations. On the trip to western Europe that he made the week after the inauguration, he performed specific tasks that he deliberately understated or didn't mention at all during and after the journey. He asked and persuaded the heads of government whom he visited to withhold declarations of either joint or individual policies toward the Middle East until the

Carter administration had time to define its policy toward Israel and the Arab states. He similarly asked and persuaded them to avoid any new declarations of economic policy involving trade and other relationships with the US until the new administration had its ducks in a row. With notably less success, he asked the West German and other governments to forego any further exports of nuclear industrial technology until the Carter administration had worked out its nuclear export policy (which turned out to be a generally unpopular effort to prevent the spread of the capacity to produce weapons-capable plutonium). Finally, and this was publicized at the time, he worked hard to prepare the way for the President's trip to London in May for an economic summit conference at which Mr. Carter intends, as Mondale forewarned his hosts, to introduce a broad range of subjects.

Mondale's contribution to the preparation of the Carter position on strategic arms limitation presented in Moscow and rejected by the Russians in late March was more substantial than he cares to acknowledge or certainly to emphasize. A White House assistant who should know what he was talking about said that Mondale urged the President to make his elaborate, drastic and revolutionary "comprehensive proposal" for reductions in previously agreed nuclear armament levels—the proposal that the Soviets abruptly rejected—first in priority among the two alternative proposals submitted to the Russians before the Vice President knew how Mr. Carter stood on the matter. When this report was mentioned to Mondale, he said with discernible disturbance and alarm, "There is absolutely no truth to that. The comprehensive proposal was HIS," emphatically meaning Jimmy Carter's and nobody else's. He said that President-elect Carter made it clear in November that he intended to find out with his first and principal SALT proposal whether the Russians are interested in reducing rather than merely containing the present levels of nuclear arms. The Vice President readily confirmed, however, that he urged the President before the Moscow talks opened to stick with his proposals for substantial reductions in the levels agreed upon by Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger at Vladivostok in 1974, in the event that the Russians initially rejected the proposals as of course they did. If my information to the effect that Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin has been saying in Washington that his government absolutely will not discuss or negotiate any agreement on the basis of the Carter comprehensive proposal is correct, Mondale's advice could be among the worst advice the President has received on any subject. But Mondale is proud of offering it and at this writing expects the President to heed it, come hell or a renewed nuclear arms race.

Vice Presidents are by law members of the National Security Council, so there is nothing unusual in Mondale attending NSC meetings when he is in

Washington. What is unprecedented is that he attends most of the meetings of the working NSC committees that review general policy matters and that authorize and oversee, among other things, covert intelligence operations. As the second-ranking Democrat on the Senate select committee (the Church committee) that investigated CIA and other intelligence abuses, Mondale got a look at what one of his assistants calls "the underside of foreign affairs." When Senator Church was campaigning for the Democratic presidential nomination and Senator Philip Hart of Michigan was dying of cancer, Mondale ran the investigating committee and so qualified himself for the intelligence operations study he is supervising for the President. This assignment and his review of major foreign policy positions might be supposed to bring him into conflict with Brzezinski. The sight of the Vice President and Brzezinski wandering easily between and into each other's adjoining offices and chatting chummily in the corridors of the White House West Wing supports the story that they work together in harmony.

In the person of present and former assistants and because of their present assignments, Mondale is all over the Carter scene. Brzezinski's deputy is David Aaron, a former NSC assistant to Henry Kissinger and for a while Mondale's foreign affairs specialist on his Senate staff. Richard Moe, Mondale's chief of staff—interestingly enough, a term that Mondale uses and President Carter refuses to use—attends the daily meetings of the President's senior staff, the "political staff" meetings that follow each morning, and a weekly staff meeting at which the Carter and Mondale schedules are reviewed and coordinated. A Mondale assistant, Gail Harrison, works with the Domestic Council staff headed by Stuart Eizenstat. Mondale's executive assistant, Jim Johnson, works with Tim Kraft, the President's chief scheduler. Mike Berma for years administrative assistant to Senator Mondale and now a senior assistant to Vice President Mondale, is the contact man with Robert Lipshutz, the President's chief counsel and a White House figure with ever-increasing influence and responsibilities. One of the few continuing, more or less permanent responsibilities that Mondale has taken on is to block out preliminary, tentative priorities and agenda for the President in three and six-month segments. Press Secretary Jody Powell and his deputy, Rex Granum, recently irritated Mondale by conveying the impression that he in effect is the President's chief scheduler. That he is not.

"So far, I think it's working pretty well," Mondale said with great contentment the other day. He was sitting in his West Wing office, a few seconds' walk from the President's office and across West Executive Avenue from his alternative downtown office in the Old Executive Office Building. "I think it's working well," Mondale continued, "particularly because I'm over here. If you're over there"—pointing disdainfully

to the other office, which can be seen from his West Wing window—"you might as well be in Baltimore." He ain't in Baltimore, that's for sure. Or in Minneapolis, for that matter.

John Osborne

On the CIA, Robert Vesco,
human rights and corruption.

Don Pepe

The following paragraphs are distilled from tapes and notes from several hours of conversation between José Figueres, former president of Costa Rica, and TNR politics editor Ken Bode. The meetings took place in the week following the recent primary elections, first at Figueres's San José office and later at his ranch, La Lucha, 50 kilometers outside the capital.

For a time during the 1940s, "Pepe" Figueres was Costa Rica's only political exile. He led the 1948 uprising prompted by the failure of the legislative assembly to honor the results of that year's presidential election, then headed the revolutionary junta that governed Costa Rica for the next 18 months. He is a founder of Liberación Nacional, the nation's largest political party. He was twice the party's nominee for president (1952 and 1970) and was elected both times. Figueres has left his mark on his country's constitution, on its economic system and on party and electoral procedures. At 70, he is probably the most colorful political figure in Costa Rica and one of the most widely respected social democrats in the hemisphere.

Last year, a group of Figueres's followers in the National Assembly attempted to change the presidential succession law to clear the way for "Don Pepe" to run for president once more in 1978. No one doubts that were he eligible to run again, he would have won the Liberación primary this year. But the effort was rebuffed when opposition factions were joined by younger Liberación deputies who thought it time for a generational change in the party's leadership. Luis Alberto Monge, the party's current presidential nominee, joined in the rebuff, prompting speculation that Figueres and his supporters might split with Liberación in next year's election. Instead, Figueres accepted the party's chairmanship during the primary period and subsequently has announced his intention to back Monge.

Here is some of what Figueres had to say:

On Figueres's personal relationships with the CIA: Now that the CIA is under fire, it would be cowardice on my part to join the chorus of criticism, when I know they have done many more good things than things I don't approve of.

The CIA in my opinion is simply a part of the defense forces of the United States. I reject the idea that they have had an independent foreign policy of their own—

except of course in questions of detail.

I tried my best to get the United States and the CIA involved in the politics of Central America at a time when social democrats in the region were threatened by Communists on one side and the military on the other. The Soviet Union was involved in cultural and educational and political programs, but the leader of the free world was not. I was closer to the CIA than most, I suppose, and with their help, we financed a labor center in Costa Rica, a center for democratic leadership training and a social democratic magazine, which was edited by Luis Alberto Monge, [the presidential nominee of the Liberación party for 1978].

During my first presidency [1953-1957] the top representative of the CIA in Costa Rica enjoyed all the confidence of my government—so much so that sometimes he was even present at cabinet meetings. Well, not actually present, of course, but, you know, he was always in the corridor and we would invite him to come in and join us for a cup of coffee. I trusted the CIA more than the ambassadors sent to me by the State Department. The CIA was aware of any conspiracies, any negotiations, but not the ambassadors. At the same time of course, the CIA man was reporting all of our activities to Anastasio Somoza [longtime dictator of neighboring Nicaragua and a lifelong enemy of Figueres]. They tapped the bedroom telephone of Juan Bosch when he was president in the Dominican Republic and they tapped my telephone! It's a paradoxical thing. I had very good relations with their cultural people, while other sections of the agency were fulfilling a promise to Somoza to help overthrow my government in 1955. It was a commitment made to Somoza as his price for aiding in the CIA's overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1953.

Somoza was a West Point man, very well thought of by all branches of the American government, not only the CIA. An American President once said of Somoza, "He's a bastard, but he's our bastard."

On the Bay of Pigs: I learned of the Bay of Pigs while I was preparing for an invasion of the Dominican Republic to overthrow the Trujillo dictatorship. Suddenly my pilots and radio operators began to disappear, and by talking with their families in Miami, we learned they had gone to Guatemala to organize an invasion of Cuba. I practically moved to Washington to convince them they were going about things backward. I met with several people at the CIA and with Vice President Nixon.

Shortly after Fidel took Havana, he went to the United States. He made a fool of himself at Harvard—because they asked him embarrassing questions—and from there he flew to Washington. In Washington, Vice President Nixon interviewed him in his office in the Senate. Nixon told me of the terrible impression Fidel made on him. He characterized Fidel as a lunatic. He [Nixon] was scared as hell; I could see it in his eyes. He told me, he claimed, that he had told the CIA to begin

AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

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Morris J. Amitay
Executive Director

February 17, 1977

Honorable Walter F. Mondale
Vice President of the United States
White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Vice President:

As usual, it was nice seeing you yesterday, and I hope to see you again as events and your schedule warrants.

Now that President Carter has reversed the Ford Administration's decision to supply Israel with CBU-72 cluster bombs and is reappraising the commitment to supply Israel with FLIR night vision equipment, I think it would be appropriate for him to take another look at the Ford Administration's decision to supply Saudi Arabia with 650 television-guided Maverick air-to-ground missiles. As you will recall, that sale was in addition to the 1,000 Mavericks earlier sold to the Saudis.

On September 30, Carter stated in Boston: "There is no reason to think these (Mavericks) missiles will increase security and stability in the Middle East. There is no reason to think they can be used only for defense. There are only reasons to fear that we will increase the chance of conflict. No Administration which was sensitive to the climate in the Middle East would let the sale go forward."

To be candid, while I was somewhat reassured after listening to you, I am still concerned over the signals that are being made. I am enclosing a memorandum summarizing the points I raised.

With warm wishes,

Sincerely,

Morie

Morris J. Amitay

Enclosure

MJA:cc

bcc; DAVID AARON

February 17, 1977

ISSUES OF CONCERN

1. Sale of Israel Kfirs to Ecuador

The Administration bar of the sale of these aircraft which have American-made engines not only means the loss of \$200 million to Israel, but is a crippling blow to Israel's fledgling aircraft industry and to its overall economy. It means Israel will continue to need a high level of U.S. aid in the future instead of becoming more self-sufficient. Ecuador will now buy French, or even Soviet, aircraft which is clearly not in U.S. interests.

2. Mixed Signals on Anti-Boycott Legislation

Despite campaign promises of support for effective anti-boycott legislation, the Administration is apparently seeking much weaker legislation than the identical Proxmire-Williams (Senate) and Bingham-Rosenthal (House) bills. This effort is being pushed by the State Department in order to mollify the Saudi Arabians and overlooks the fact that this issue is an American one, and should not be based on our Middle East diplomacy.

3. Denial of Concussion Bombs for Israel

The reversal of President Ford's decision to sell these weapons to Israel deprives Israel of a cost-effective way to neutralize deadly Arab SAM sites and air bases, and deter future attacks. This weapon, along with the FLIR, a night detection system whose sale to Israel is still being studied, had been promised to Israel by the previous Administration. By contrast, sales of sophisticated U.S. weaponry to Arab countries are going ahead -- e.g., television-guided air-to-surface missiles (Mavericks) for Saudi Arabia.

4. Public Statements Harmful to Israel

The State Department's public rebuke of Israel's oil drilling in the Gulf of Suez, timed to coincide with Secretary of State Vance's visit to Israel, is disturbing as well as a number of previous "leaks." They are meant to highlight discord between the U.S. and Israel, and seem to be deliberately timed to do so.

5. Biased Personnel

Without sufficient guidance from the White House, entrenched middle-level bureaucrats at State, Defense and the NSC are pushing an anti-Israel line on future U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East. They are making Arab and PLO "moderation" the key instead of focusing on the lack of Arab acceptances of Israel and normalization of relations. In doing so, they are currying favor with unreliable dictatorial regimes at the expense of Israel, a loyal and democratic friend of the United States. The President is, in effect, having an unbalanced picture presented to him.

Aspac.

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6-7 JAN

Moshe

SALE OF CBU-72 TO ISRAEL

History

October 8, 1976 - President Gerald Ford approved the sale of CBU-72 units to Israel, worth less than \$7 million.

December 16, 1976 - Israel promised in a letter to the U.S. Department of Defense that it would use the CBU only against military fortified targets and only if Israel were attacked.

February 6, 1977 - The Washington Post released the findings of a leaked State Department memorandum to Secretary of State Vance recommending presidential reversal of the CBU sale.

February 8, 1977 - President Carter told a news conference that he was requesting a State Department and Defense Department review "to analyze the political and military consequences of the sale."

February 16, 1977 - Associated Press reported that the Carter Administration had decided to cancel the sale "for political and diplomatic reasons unrelated to any Defense Department reviews or studies of the weapon's usefulness."

The Weapon

The CBU-72 is a fuel-air explosive (FAE) bomb, deliverable by jet aircraft. Aviation Week describes FAE as a weapon which provides "an extremely powerful blast over a target by a delayed explosion of an aerosol fuel sprayed over the area in cloud form before detonation." When detonated, the fuel-air mixture explodes with a powerful concussive effect, with overpressures estimated at 300psi. Earlier versions of the bomb were used in Vietnam for defoliation and minefield clearance. The FAE is in the inventory of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. It is believed that the Soviet Union is developing FAE bombs, as well.

Israel's Need for the CBU-72

There are several important tactical uses for the CBU-72: minefield clearing; destroying parked aircraft, even if located in revetments; and destroying hardened missile and missile radar sites.

In a May 1976 study, two researchers from the Australian National University reported that the fortification of Egyptian and Syrian airfields after the 1967 war "has reduced severely the effectiveness of Israeli air strikes against protected aircraft on the ground ... Egypt has over 450 reinforced concrete shelters, many partially underground and camouflaged.... The Egyptian Air Force Commander told an international audience in 1975 that out of all the bombs that fell on his airports during the October War, only one fortified shelter was partially damaged." The pressures produced by the CBU-72, however, would be capable of collapsing the Egyptian revetments.

Israel has no substitute for this weapon which would serve to deter future Arab surprise attacks.

Drohe

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Vice President Walter Mondale, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Morris J. Amitay, and Hyman Bookbinder

DATE: February 16, 1977 - 3:00 p.m.

PLACE: The Vice President's Office, The White House

BACKGROUND

A meeting had been set up by Bookbinder the night before with Mondale because of a general unease over some of the new Administration actions since the Inauguration. These included the turndown of the Kfir fighter bomber sale to Ecuador, the apparent denial to Israel of concussion bombs, (since confirmed) signals from the Administration to go slow on anti-boycott legislation, the public rebuke of Israel about oil drilling in the Gulf of Suez, and a number of statements by Secretary of State Vance regarding the purpose of his trip to the Middle East. After greeting us in a very cordial manner, Mondale asked whether we would mind if Dr. Brzezinski would join us. (We understood from Mondale's secretary that he had been seeing Brzezinski right before he came down.) We briefly explained we were there to express concerns and he said "well in that case it's a very good idea that Brzezinski does join us so that he can hear it straight from you."

CONVERSATION

Bookbinder gave a brief introduction that we were there on a personal basis and not officially. I did add, however, that after discussing the situation with Alex Schindler, Chairman of the Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, that I would also be expressing his sentiments. I then gave an outline of what specific events were causing concern among friends of Israel in the United States, including people on the Hill. (As the most recent example I cited the public rebuke of Israel over oil drilling in the Gulf of Suez and its timing to coincide with Vance's trip to the Middle East. Brzezinski said that the timing was not helpful, was indeed unfortunate, and Mondale agreed. Brzezinski added that he didn't know if the Israelis had complained about this to the State Department. I told him that to the best of my knowledge they had the day before. (I was surprised that he was unaware of it.) I mentioned the turndown of Israel's request to sell Kfirs to Ecuador. I cited not only the arguments contained in the memorandum which I had brought (attached), but also the Tad Schultz article in the New Republic. Both Brzezinski and Mondale indicated they had read the article. Mondale explained that President Carter felt very strongly against further proliferation of American arms to Latin America, or being a party to any more arms being shipped. When I pointed out that this would mean that the Ecuadorians would wind up purchasing either Soviet or French equipment Mondale said that the United States was endeavoring to see that other potential suppliers would not arm Ecuador. Brzezinski acknowledged that Ecuadorians were angry - "very hot." Brzezinski added that my doubts as to whether there had been sufficient input based on the Latin American situation were unfounded - that, in fact, these interests had been fully consulted, and that this was not a decision reflecting anti-Israel bias.

I next brought up the sale of concussion bombs to Israel noting that I understood that a negative decision had already been reached, and that only the announcement had been delayed. Mondale would not say whether a decision one way or the other had been reached. I explained that there was a distinct Israel military need for this particular weapon. Bookbinder added that its denial would send the wrong signals to the Arabs and the Soviets.

I then brought up the new Administration's stance regarding anti-boycott legislation, indicating I had heard they were seeking an indefinite postponement. I said I understood that in preparation of Vance's testimony (Feb. 28 and March 1) there was insufficient input from Treasury and Commerce, with most of it coming from NEA at State. Brzezinski objected saying that in fact he was coordinating the Administration's position that would be enunciated by Vance and that there was input from all the other agencies. (This I later discovered was essentially correct.) With regard to the boycott, Mondale said that they were very much aware of what both he and Carter had said during the campaign and that they would support and implement anti-boycott legislation. When I asked him specifically whether they would support the Proxmire-Williams and Bingham-Rosenthal bills, he said that they would lay out their position during the Vance testimony. (This reinforces my own feeling that the Administration is looking for some sort of substitute language more acceptable to business.)

Overall, I said, there was a feeling that the focus of our diplomacy in the Middle East was shifting towards finding moderation by the PLO and talking about territory when the primary issue was Israel's acceptance by its Arab neighbors and movement toward a genuine reconciliation. I recalled that I had discussed this with Mondale earlier, and he said that he agreed wholly with me that Arab movement toward real peace was the key. I summed up by saying that all of these events happening since Carter took over was causing unease and concern and that Jews were entitled to a degree of paranoia and protective feelings for Israel given our tragic history, and events in Europe 35 years ago. Mondale sought to assure us that the Administration's foreign policy in the Middle East would be based on making Israel feel secure based on her own conception, before being asked to make any concessions. Brzezinski added that he agreed fully with this overall approach. Brzezinski said that he had been misunderstood and misquoted by an Arab Ambassador. What he had actually told him was that the United States had a special relationship with Israel and it can never truly be "evenhanded"; that this was historic, ethnic, political [I forget the fourth adjective he used - it was not "moral"] and that this was something that the Arabs would have to understand and accept.

Bookbinder repeated that we were there as friends and said that we were thankful for the increase in foreign aid. Mondale said that the increase was connected to the turndown on the Kfirs, and that he felt it had been demeaning for Israel to have to go to the Hill every year to have its foreign aid total raised. Brzezinski added that we should also have noticed the new Administration's stand on human rights. Mondale noted that on his trip to Europe he had tried to get more balanced statements on the Middle East for EEC countries. Brzezinski stated that this had been a difficult task. We expressed our appreciation for that also. Bookbinder and I both mentioned that American Jews had largely supported Carter and that we felt a Democratic Administration would be more instinctively inclined towards support of Israel because as I put it the Democratic Party had more "neshama" -- soul! (I explained what this meant for Brzezinski and Mondale who seemed to get a kick out of this characterization). Bookbinder added that he felt that this Administration would be much better for Israel and that we were not coming in to complain but just to let them know what the perceptions were in the American Jewish community.

Mondale reacted positively to my suggestion that on an appropriate occasion soon Carter, while mentioning America's allies in Western Europe and Japan also include Israel. Brzezinski, however, interjected that Israel was not an ally since it is not bound by any treaty to the United States. He said that if Carter was talking about our allies and friends, he could make such mention.

I left the attached memoranda on the table in front of Mondale and Brzezinski. Mondale picked them up and handed them to Brzezinski saying "you're a faster reader than I am." (I subsequently sent a set to Mondale with the attached letter the next day.) I told Brzezinski I was looking forward to our lunch on Wednesday and that I hoped he would react to the substance of the memoranda, since AIPAC always prided itself on the credibility of its facts and that without access to all the facts we tried to be very careful in what we said. He said that he would look them over. As an after thought he asked our opinions on the outcome of the Israeli Labor Party selection. We were noncommittal saying it looked close. Brzezinski said that until it was decided that the full convention would vote he thought Rabin would prevail, but now he thought Peres would win.

At the conclusion of the meeting Mondale thanked us several times for having come in to warn them of this growing feeling of concern among American Jews and of our opinion of what effect the Administration's actions were having on public opinion in Israel. The meeting lasted about 45 minutes.

MJA OBSERVATIONS

1. Mondale's asking Brzezinski to join us was indicative of the Carter Administration people's efforts to work as a team. While his indicating to us that it would be good for Brzezinski to hear what we have to say, was a positive factor, I don't see how Mondale can keep up with all the complexities and nuances of Middle East policy to the extent Brzezinski can. (Backed up by Bill Quandt whom I find to be compulsively "even-handed" and no friend of Israel's.)

2. Although Mondale was his usual warm and sympathetic self and throughout the meeting mentioned that he had been present at key meetings in which important decisions had been made, I got the impression that Brzezinski came into the meeting a bit apprehensive and with somewhat of a chip on his shoulder. He is a cold fish.

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Make
February 15, 1977

ISRAELI KFIRS FOR ECUADOR: SERVING AMERICAN INTERESTS

An Irrational Decision

The State Department decision last week to block the sale of Israeli Kfir C-2 fighter/bombers to Ecuador is contrary to the national interests of the United States both in South America and in the Middle East. The avowed goal of preventing an arms race in South America will not be promoted, for it is now clear that the government of Ecuador will turn to either the French or the Soviets for equivalent aircraft. Moreover, America's relations with both Israel and Ecuador have been damaged. If the ban is allowed to stand, both Israeli and American companies who participated in the Kfir program will lose millions of dollars in unrealized sales.

Background

1. Most major Latin American countries are already equipped with French Mirage or American F5 aircraft, both on the same technological level of the Kfir. These include Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile.

Ecuador's neighbor, Peru, recently acquired 36 highly sophisticated Su-22 fighter/bombers from the Soviet Union. Ecuador is particularly anxious and concerned about this purchase by the Peruvians and the Russian technicians who will be sent with the aircraft.

Two years ago, Ecuador purchased 18 British-built Jaguar fighter/bombers, a plane with technology on par with the Kfir.

2. Israel had good reasons to believe it would have no problem in obtaining clearance from the United States for the sale of the Kfir with the American-made GE J-79 engine--a power-plant which has been in use all over the world for 15 years.

The United States had notified Israel that it had no objection to Israel exporting the Kfir C-2 with the GE engine; however, the U.S. government desired that it have final approval on each sale, on a case-by-case basis.

Israel alerted the U.S. government of its intentions to sell to Ecuador and notification was passed to the State Department by Israel's Ambassador in Washington in October, 1976, informing the Department that Israel was close to a sale of the Kfir.

Israel's Minister of Defense Shimon Peres met with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger last December when he also raised the possibility of the sale. There was no indication given that there was any problem.

As negotiations with Ecuador grew closer to a successful conclusion, Israel's Ambassador Dinitz again spoke with Secretary Kissinger requesting that the U.S. positive decision for the sale be formalized.

2. Improvements
Based on the positive assurances given to Israel's Ambassador by Secretary Kissinger, Israel entered into the agreement in good faith and made full commitments to the government of Ecuador.

A few days before the change of Administration, Dr. Kissinger informed Israel's Ambassador that he did not wish to make this final formal decision on the approval of the Kfir sale to Ecuador because of the late date of his tenure in office. Kissinger assured Dinitz, however, that he was totally positive towards the sale and would leave a written recommendation to his successors in favor of the sale.

Effects of the Decision

Since Israel and thus Ecuador had been led to believe by the United States that a Kfir sale would not be opposed, the State Department's current action--avowedly to prohibit the introduction of advanced and sophisticated equipment to Latin America--can only be interpreted as being capricious. The Chief of the Ecuador Air Force has already informed the U.S. Ambassador that his government considers the vetoing of the sale an "unfriendly gesture towards Ecuador." The United States has also been informed that Ecuador will not purchase any equipment from the U.S.

As a result of the State Department's decision, the Ecuadorian government informed the Israeli Ambassador that they no longer will accept any offers or representatives from Israel or Israeli firms, because "they are no longer considered reliable suppliers, since they must depend on the United States for approvals."

The Soviet Union and France are certain to be the only beneficiaries if the Kfir sale remains blocked. Ecuador has already announced its intention to request offers from those countries. As has been established by previous French practice, any Mirage sale is likely to be of a larger number of aircraft than originally planned. If the Soviet Union concludes a sale to Ecuador, then it is likely that Soviet advisors and technicians will accompany Soviet aircraft. The Soviet Union is certain to turn any sale to Ecuador into a political "victory." And the Soviet advisors will establish an important political foothold for the USSR in a region which the U.S. has endeavored to keep free of a Soviet presence.

Conclusions

The State Department's rationale for blocking the sale--limiting the arms race in Latin America--simply does not hold water. The U.S. itself tried to sell F-5E fighter/bombers to Ecuador. F-5E sales have already been concluded with the governments of Brazil and Chile--countries with regimes far more autocratic than that of Ecuador. The Kfir sale would simply serve to even a balance which was first unsettled by the aforementioned American and Soviet sales. Ecuador finds itself in a situation which it perceives as being dangerous, and which Ecuador believes can only be ameliorated by a purchase of modern aircraft. The State Department decision will not change this.

It should also be noted that a Kfir sale would carry with it implicit American influence over the actions of Ecuador. Reliance on Israeli/American training and spare parts would enhance America's leverage on the Quito government. Now, that potential influence has been lost and Ecuador is now likely to disengage from the U.S., simply to demonstrate its sovereignty in the wake of what Ecuador believes was a demeaning American action.

Israel, an ally of the United States, has been hurt by the U.S. action and the credibility of its own leadership tarnished. Israel's industrial reputation is likely to suffer from the charge of "unreliability" and its economy, desperate for export markets, is certain to be hurt. The Ecuador sale would have been worth about \$200 million, including spare parts. Because Israel needs export sales to amortize its defense investment, the blocking of the Kfir sale will not only slow Israel's economic recovery, but it will also hamper Israel's drive to become self-reliant for its own defense needs and less dependent on American aid.

Finally, the United States has damaged itself, pointlessly. The loss of \$1 billion in expected Kfir sales will mean a loss over the next 2-5 years of \$400 million, which American subcontractors would have gotten from their participation in an expanding, successful Kfir program.

Recommendation

The State Department's action ill serves the political, economic and security interests of this country and of Israel and Ecuador. There is ample reason to believe it was animated by an unfortunate anti-Israel bias which exists in certain quarters of the State Department. It should be reviewed immediately by the President, as Ecuador is likely to consummate an aircraft purchase with France or the USSR shortly, thus fixing permanently what can yet be undone by a more rational decision.

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February 2, 1977

HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE - SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS

HEARING ON THE REPROGRAMMING OF FY77 FUNDS FOR THE COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM

MEMBERS PRESENT: LONG (MD.), OBEY, WILSON (CAL.), YATES, BURKE (CAL.), ROYBAL, STOKES, YOUNG (FLA.), SMITH (NEBR.), CEDERBERG

MEMBERS ABSENT: KOCH, CONTE

WITNESS : JOHN E. MURPHY, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

ACCOMPANIED BY: ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ROBERT H. NOOTER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR NEAR EAST, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Subcommittee discussed and approved by unanimous vote the request from the State Department to transfer \$190^{million} from long term capital projects approved in FY77 to the commodity import program for emergency aid to Egypt.

Murphy explained in testimony the State Department's request, emphasizing that the State Department was not asking for approval of more funding, but only for the transfer of funds in an emergency situation. Said the crisis was not caused by a food shortage, but rather by the rise in food costs due to Sadat's removal of certain subsidies. Egypt has such a great deficit partly because of its policy of selling products to its civilians at low prices.

Atherton stressed that we should grant Egypt the emergency aid in order to express political support for Sadat. Outlined Egypt's political and economic policy under Sadat:

1. Sadat has liberalized Egypt politically by allowing political parties and debate.
2. Sadat has liberalized Egypt economically by allowing foreign investment.
3. Sadat has reoriented Egypt politically and economically away from dependency on the Soviet Union towards the West, especially towards the United States.

We should respond to Sadat's request given that it's the first time that hope exists for breaking out of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Asserts that there is a consensus that conditions are now favorable to peace negotiation. Egypt is the key. Sadat's efforts to restructure Egypt's economy is a goal we should encourage. Notes sharp criticism of Sadat by the USSR and by other socialist countries - that Sadat is trying to open up the Egyptian economy to Western capitalism. Egypt needs the injection of additional resources to its economy and looks to Arab countries and to the U.S. Approval of aid would be a sign of support for Sadat. Disapproval of aid would be a blow to Sadat's image in Egypt and among the other Arab countries.

Long questioned why aid couldn't be taken from Egypt's military expenditures. Egypt is a great threat in the Middle East. Expressed concern that Egypt spends 4 times the percentage of its GNP on military expenditures that the U.S. spends.

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Murphy answered that Egypt had reduced the percentage of its GNP that it spends on military over the last few years and that there is not peace in the Middle East, but simply an armistice. It is unrealistic to expect any government in that situation to reduce its military by very much. The bulk of Egypt's military expenditures is for the maintenance of the existing establishment.

Long said they should cut future arms plans such as that of attaining 2 nuclear reactors.

Young and Stokes questioned how U.S. aid to Egypt compares with aid Egypt receives from other countries, particularly Arab countries.

Nooter responded that U.S. aid is less than one third of the aid Egypt receives from others. One half the aid that Egypt receives is from OPEC. Saudi Arabia is Egypt's largest supporter.

Young questioned Nooter on Egypt's balance of payment position.

Nooter responded that Egypt has a great trade deficit. Egypt spends \$4.3 billion on imports and only receives \$1.75 billion on exports. Tourism and income from the Suez Canal help to offset this deficit.

Young questioned how serious the situation in Egypt is. Is the government on the verge of a breakdown?

Atherton responded that he wouldn't want to exaggerate the immediate threat. What is important is the potential threat if the recent trend is not stopped.

Aschert || Young quoted Brzezinski's statement that Egypt's stability is important to Middle East stability. He will support the funding if it will stabilize Egypt and thus contribute to Middle East stability, especially since no new funding is involved.

Obey said that he basically supports the aid because if Sadat is in a shaky position it is useful to assist him. Expressed concern that this kind of aid isn't visible in political terms (as compared to the Aswan Dam in Syria). He is not convinced that the projects they've been pursuing are visible enough. Stressed visibility over economic justification. How hard are you working for visible projects so that Sadat can show that it pays to be friendly with the United States?

Nooter responded that he's aware of the problem of visibility and mentioned that the U.S. is providing Egypt with new buses which will be visible to the "man on the street." Said visibility will be discussed in the FY78 program.

Um- your friend! Wilson said that there is nothing more important to Israel than maintaining a moderate in Egypt. This aid to Egypt would be constructive for Israel.

Yates questioned Atherton's statement that the Middle East was near to peace.

Atherton responded that this proposal is important to Sadat's strength which is important to the peace process. He did not say that peace is around the corner, but rather that conditions are more favorable than usual for peace

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negotiations. It is all-important to maintain these conditions. There is determination of all the involved governments to make the effort towards peace negotiations.

Yates asked for evidence.

Atherton cited as evidence that Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Israel, and Saudi Arabia had expressed that this is a year to make significant progress; that the Arab nations had acted to end the strife in Lebanon which had been a distraction away from the Arab - Israeli conflict and had been a divisive factor; and that the modern Arab governments are cooperating to find openings for peace negotiat

Long requested that a list of actions and statements of Sadat and other Arabs which would indicate a progress towards peace be made up and distributed to the members of the subcommittee. He wants concrete evidence.

Wilson said that Israel should be included in this list and Long concurred.

Yates suggested that this list be delayed until Vance returned from his visit to the Middle East.

Burke asked if the projects which are being eliminated in this transfer of funds will have to be reinstated.

Nooter answered that the projects will be postponed until the reevaluation of priorities in FY78.

Long asked if Murphy could assure that no additional funding would be requested in FY77.

Murphy responded that there are no intentions of requesting more funds as of now, but he could not assure that a situation would not arise for more additional funding.

Long asked if we could trust Sadat, considering his part in the Yom Kippur War.

Atherton said that it is in Egypt's national interest to make peace; that Sadat sees no other way to deal with Egypt's economic problems.

Yates questioned that if economic instability is Sadat's reason for making peace, why should we make Egypt more economically stable?

Atherton explained that Egypt needs peace to get at its fundamental economic problems.

Long said that once Egypt receives nuclear power reactors it is 90% on its way towards nuclear weapons. How long will there be peace if Egypt gets them? Is there any plan at all to reconsider providing Egypt with nuclear reactors?

Atherton Don't know of any plan to reconsider, but don't know of any plan not to reconsider, either.

Young and Long questioned if some of our aid to Europe might be being transferred to Egypt and Long mentioned France's recent transaction.

Nooter concurred that the possibility exists.

Yates requested that the amount of assistance that Egypt receives from other countries


HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE - SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONSHEARING ON THE REPROGRAMMING OF FY77 FUNDS FOR THE COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM

be put in the record.

Nooter stressed the importance of supporting Egypt's economic program because an economic setback could lead to a military takeover.

Wilson mentioned that we should keep in mind areas in the U.S. where there is high unemployment when deciding which commodities to provide to Middle Eastern countries. The tone of this aid should be not of propping Sadat, but of encouraging a friend.

- Submitted by Ruthanne Greenberg



news release

JANUARY 26, 1977.

THIRD DAY OF THE MONDALE MISSION: 'WARMTH AND CANDOR'
IN BONN

BY HUGH O. MUIR
IPS STAFF CORRESPONDENT

BONN, JAN. 25 -- IN WHAT VICE PRESIDENT WALTER MONDALE DESCRIBED AS "VERY WARM AND USEFUL" TALKS WITH CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT, AMERICAN AND GERMAN LEADERS HAVE "DISCUSSED THE NEED TO STIMULATE OUR ECONOMIES (AND) TO SHARE COOPERATIVELY...THE BURDENS OF THE STIMULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY."

IN THREE AND A HALF HOURS OF TALKS JANUARY 25 IN BONN, MR. MONDALE AND MR. SCHMIDT COVERED A "VAST RANGE OF CONCERNS" TO THEIR TWO COUNTRIES. IN MEETING WITH THE PRESS AFTERWARDS, THE VICE PRESIDENT AFFIRMED THAT:

-- "WE AGREED ON THE NEED TO GAIN NEW MOMENTUM ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS."

-- "WE DISCUSSED NON-PROLIFERATION AND HAD AN EXCELLENT EXCHANGE. WE AGREED TO CONSULT FURTHER IN A COOPERATIVE FRAME OF MIND AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A CO-OPERATIVE SOLUTION WERE MUCH ENHANCED BY THIS DISCUSSION."

-- "WE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE NEED FOR PROGRESS, AND THE NEED FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TO HAVE TIME FOR (SECRETARY OF STATE VANCE'S) MISSION TO VISIT THE LEADERSHIP OF THE VARIOUS MIDDLE EAST NATIONS, TO DEVELOP A FULLER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN THERE."

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UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE

Tel Aviv 71, Hayarkon Street, Tel. 54338 ext. 204 / 218

Jerusalem 19, Keren Hayesod Street, Tel. 222376



-- "WE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE VERY FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN."

-- "AND WE DISCUSSED OUR SHARED HOPE THAT SOMETHING COULD BE DONE IN A MULTILATERAL WAY TO RESTRAIN THE SALE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS WHICH ARE NOW BEING SOLD IN SUCH ABUNDANCE AROUND THE WORLD."

OFFICIALS TRAVELING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID LATER THAT ABOUT 80 PERCENT OF THE TIME SPENT TOGETHER BY MR. MONDALE AND THE CHANCELLOR WAS DEVOTED TO THE TWO QUESTIONS OF (1) THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND (2) NON-PROLIFERATION MATTERS, REVOLVING AROUND THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE PROSPECTIVE SALE OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS BY GERMANY TO BRAZIL.

ASKED BY JOURNALISTS IF THE QUESTION OF THE BRAZILIAN SALE HAD BEEN RAISED IN THEIR TALKS, MR. MONDALE SAID "WE BEGAN A VERY IN-DEPTH DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THAT MATTER. WE'VE AGREED TO CARRY ON THESE DISCUSSIONS TO DETERMINE WHAT KIND OF FINAL RESOLUTIONS CAN BE HAD ON THIS MATTER, AND ALSO ON THE BROADER ISSUES OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION."

"THERE WILL BE OTHER TALKS THAT WILL FOLLOW THOSE THAT WE HAD TODAY," HE CONCLUDED, "AND IT IS BECAUSE OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE NATURE OF SOME OF THE MATTERS INVOLVED I CANNOT GO BEYOND THAT POINT AT THIS TIME."

MONDALE PARTY OFFICIALS SAID LATER THAT HIGH LEVEL TALKS WITH THE GERMANS ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION QUESTION WILL BEGIN SOON, POSSIBLY AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK. DISCUSSIONS ALSO ARE ANTICIPATED WITH THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT. THE OFFICIALS ADDED THAT THE UNITED STATES FOUND THE TALKS WITH MR. SCHMIDT AND HIS AIDES QUITE ENCOURAGING, THAT THE MEETING WAS QUITE POSITIVE AND THAT THERE WAS A COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE.

SPECIFICALLY THE QUESTION OF THE IMPENDING GERMAN SALE OF MATERIALS TO BRAZIL FOR A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, OFFICIALS POINTED OUT THAT THE EXISTING NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY DOES NOT COVER SUCH A TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES. ONE OF THE OPTIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO DISCUSS, THE OFFICIALS POINTED OUT, IS A NEW NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, IN WHICH NEW RULES WOULD APPLY TO ALL SIGNATORIES -- NOT, AS IN THE PRESENT ISSUE, JUST TO GERMANY.

ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, THE OFFICIALS SAID THAT THE GERMAN LEADERS WERE AWARE OF A DESIRE BY THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN FOR COOPERATION IN STIMULATING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY. IN TERMS OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC PROGRAM, THE MONDALE OFFICIALS INDICATED THAT IT APPEARED TO COMPARE FAVORABLE WITH THE MAGNITUDE OF THE U.S. EFFORT. THE NEW GERMAN ECONOMIC PROGRAM -- INTRODUCED A WEEK AGO TO THE GERMAN PARLIAMENT BY CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT -- HAS NOT YET BEEN MADE FINAL, THE U.S. OFFICIALS SAID, AND THE HOPE IS THAT WHEN IT IS IT WILL BE ADEQUATE TO INTERNATIONAL NEEDS.

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A FACTOR, THE OFFICIALS SAID, IS THAT THE UNITED STATES FEELS IT IS IMPORTANT THAT INTERNAL NATIONAL DISCIPLINES ON ECONOMIC MATTERS SHOULD BE ALLEVIATED TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH COUNTRIES CAN PROVIDE BUOYANCY TO THE REST OF THE WORLD'S ECONOMIES THAT NEED HELP.

ONE ENCOURAGING FOCUS BY THE GERMANS, THE OFFICIALS SAID, IS THAT THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD ECONOMIC STIMULATION IS EXPECTED TO BE THROUGH DOMESTIC ECONOMIC STIMULATION -- AND NOT PRIMARILY THROUGH EXPORTS -- WHICH GENERALLY BENEFIT PRINCIPALLY THE EXPORTING COUNTRY.

ON THE MATTER OF THE UPCOMING SUMMIT MEETING, OFFICIALS WITH THE MONDALE PARTY POINTED OUT THAT THERE IS A GROWING APPRECIATION THAT THE SUMMIT WILL NOT JUST CONCERN ITSELF WITH ECONOMIC MATTERS. NON-PROLIFERATION, THE OFFICIALS AGREED, IS ONE OF THE ISSUES THAT COULD BE ADDED.

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דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

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מחלקת הקשר

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המנכ"ל.

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הא. מנהל נ. ל. ס. - מנהל

ד"ר חיים
ה. חיים

With the compliments of

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
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WALTER F. MONDALE
MINNESOTA

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 30, 1976

Raanan Sivan, Consul General
Consulate General of Israel
450 Park Square Building
Boston, Massachusetts 02116

Dear Ronnie:

I am deeply gratified by your thoughtful note at this very special moment of my career.


I well remember the vista along the Suez and fervently hope that whenever I have the opportunity to revisit that site, the circumstances will have dramatically changed -- devoid of thoughts of conflict and replaced by the hope of a peace which is just, durable and will insure the well-being of Israel.

President-elect Carter's and my desire for peace -- particularly in the Middle East -- is a foundation of our Administration. With your support and goodwill, the task of obtaining that most worthwhile goal will be made that much easier.

Again, my sincere thanks for your warm message of congratulations.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'W. Mondale', written in a cursive style.

Walter F. Mondale

מברק נכנס - מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים),
תשי"ז - 1957.

ש מ ר

63/11

אל: המשרד

מאת: בון

מצפא איר א.

דע בראון וושינגטון (העבר במס 188)

ביקור מונדייל.

ממקור בכיר במשהח. לא הוצע או תוכן לפי שנת החדר יום.

תהנתת היא שהמסע בעיקרו אינפורמטיבי וייצוגי כשהדגש על עניני

בטחון (סאלט, מבפ"ר, ובש"א וכו') אך ניתן לשער שידובר לפחות שולית גם על מזת.

נושא צפוי התסכם הגרעיני הרפגי - ברזילי. רפג מתכוונת לקיימו אולם תהיה מוכנה להגיד

לבצעו במלוא התחשבות ברגישויות מאמרתב.

מרוז

שהח רתמ מנכל מ/מנכל שק י. רביב מצפא איאר א ב חקר רמ

צג/אד

ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ

ΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟ ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑΣ

ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΙΑΚΟ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ

Α/Α	ΟΝΟΜΑ	ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΙΑΚΟ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ
1	ΑΝΤΩΝΗΣ	ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΙΑΚΟ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ
2	ΑΝΤΩΝΗΣ	ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΙΑΚΟ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ
3	ΑΝΤΩΝΗΣ	ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΙΑΚΟ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ
4	ΑΝΤΩΝΗΣ	ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΙΑΚΟ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ
5	ΑΝΤΩΝΗΣ	ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΙΑΚΟ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ

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MEETING WITH WALTER MONDALE

10:00 A.M. -- DECEMBER 2, 1976

PRESENT: Morris Amitay, AIPAC
Kenneth Wollack, AIPAC
David Aaron, Assistant to Sen. Mondale and Carter's
Transition Liaison to the NSC and CIA

TOPICS:

1. Foreign Aid Bill

Mondale said that he would talk to the transition group about a possible \$1.5 billion military program to Israel for Fiscal Year 1978. He added that much will depend on who will be the new Secretary of State, and developing a working relationship with whomever that may be.

Mondale asked about Israel's economic situation and was shocked to hear that Israel's inflation rate this year would reach 30 to 40%.

Mondale was receptive to the concept of military joint production and sub-contracting between Israel and the United States in order to reduce Israel's dependence on U.S. assistance in the future.

2. PLO Office in Washington

Mondale made the point that these situations are hard to avoid in an open society, but he was outraged over the possibility of an office being opened. He was interested in determining what grounds could be established for preventing a Washington office and asked David Aaron to look into the matter.

3. Rabin Visit to Washington

Mondale said he would approach Carter on this issue for a visit possibly in March. He asked that this be kept strictly confidential.

4. George Brown & DOD

The anti-Israel bias at defense was discussed; particularly, Brown, Clements, Noyes and Jenka. Mondale referred to Brown as "that son-of-a-bitch" and inquired on the duration of his appointment next January.

Aaron seemed to have a high regard for Jenka and was unaware of his pro-Arab leanings.

5. Middle East Diplomacy

MJA gave a briefing on the current Egyptian "peace" offensive. He emphasized the need for the United States not to be trapped into an early Geneva Conference. A conference in March would not enable the U.S. and Israel to develop a common strategy and, therefore, success was highly unlikely. MJA stressed the dangers of even-handedness, and of raising Arab expectations.

Mondale responded by saying he sees no reason why Egypt should consider itself on equal footing with Israel, vis-a-vis U.S. relations. He said Carter is keeping a hands off policy with regard to both domestic and foreign policy issues until January 20. He said that Carter has given no indication to the Arabs that his stalwart support of Israel will diminish next year.

6. U.N. Criticism of Israel

In response to press reports that the Administration had cleared with Carter the U.N. Security Council consensus statement criticizing Israel -- Mondale described it as "utter bullshit", as did Aaron.

Mondale said the press has had nothing to write about, therefore, recent articles have been totally erroneous. As an example, he referred to a recent Evans and Novak column about CIA Director Bush's meeting with Mondale and Carter and again described it as "total bullshit".

7. Middle East Diplomacy

Mondale was quick to understand the undesirability of pushing for an early and hastily prepared Geneva Conference, especially he said when Soviet intentions are unknown. Mondale assumed that the Soviets would push the radical Arab line and added that PLO participation could represent an immediate stumbling block.

8. Arms Sales to the Arab States

This was discussed in the context of the Arab-Israel conflict and then de-stabilization of Arab regimes internally by providing high technology items to segments of the armed forces which could overthrow present rulers.

9. AIPAC Policy Conference Dinner

Mondale asked that he receive a written invitation to address the conference on Monday evening, April 25, 1977.

Mondale recollected that he entered Congress on Israel's 18th anniversary, adding with amazement how things have progressed in the last 12 years.

COMMENT: Mondale implied that many foreign policy issues would have to be held in abeyance until the Secretary of State was named and Carter took office. He said, however, that he would work closely with the Secretary and the President on these issues.

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

כג' בכסלו תשל"ז
15 בדצמ' 1976

סודי - ביותר
לנמען בלבד

א ל : סגן רוה"מ ושר החוץ
העתק : ראש הממשלה
מאת : השגריר, וושינגטון

מכתב, מכתב, מכתב, מכתב, מכתב, מכתב, מכתב, מכתב, מכתב, מכתב

שיחה עם מונדייל ב-14.12.76

ב-13.12.76 החקשרו ממשרדו של מונדייל ומסרו שמונדייל ישמח להפגש עם
השגריר למחרת 14.12 ב-1030 בבוקר.

השיחה נערכה במשרדו בסנט. החלק הראשון ערך שעה ונוכחו עוזרו לעניני
בטחון לאומי דוד אהרון וצבי רפיה. החלק השני נערך ב-4 עיניים ונמשך
כ-15 דקות.

א. פתחתי בהבעת הערכה על שהזמינני לשיחה ביודעי עומס העבודה והלחצים
הרבים לפגישות העומדים בפניו. מונדייל השיב שחמיד יקבלני ברצון
וכי הוא שמח להזדמנות להחליף בינינו דעות והערכות. אמר בהומור
שבעצם לחץ הזמן הוא לא כל כך גדול אך מנצלים רושם זה כדי להפגש
עם מי שהם רוצים להפגש.

ב. אמרתי שחזרתי מביקור בארץ וראשית ברצוני למסור לו ד"ש חמה ואיחולים
מראש הממשלה, שר החוץ, שר הבטחון ובקשה מיוחדת לד"ש מגב' מאיר.
כולם קיבלו בקורת רוח מרובה את בחירתו מפני שאנו מכירים אותו
כידיד אישי וכמנהיג החי את תחושת העם ומבין את מהות מפעלנו.
מונדייל הודה במילים חמות ואמר שאכן ישראל קרובה ביותר ללבנו והוא
היה ויהיה ידיד נאמן וחבר קרוב.



סודי ביותר
- 2 -

ג. אמרתי שמן הצד החברתי ברצוני לעבור לניתוח המצב המדיני וההתפתחויות באזורנו וכן לסקור בפניו ההשלכות לגבי העתיד. אמרתי ששנת 1976 עמדה באזורנו בסימן המשבר בלבנון. עקבנו ואנו עוקבים מקרוב אחרי ההתפתחויות הן בגלל היחס של הנעשה בלבנון לשאלות בטחוננו והן בגלל ההשלכות של המשבר על התמורות בעולם הערבי וסיכויי ההתקדמות לקראת שלום.

ד. אשר ללבנון עצמה הגענו למעשה למצב של השתלטות צבאית סורית אך בינתיים לא מצטייר פתרון מדיני לאורך זמן. בהקשר זה מדאיגות אותנו שתי אפשרויות: לא נוכל להסכים לירידת צבא סורי לאזור הדרומי. (כאן שאל מונדייל אם כוונתי מדרום לליטאני והשבתי שכוונתנו לכל אזור דרומה מהקו בו הם נמצאים היום וזה חופף פחות או יותר לקו הליטאני). ושנית, לא נוכל להשלים עם חזרת המצב לקדמותו שיאפשר פעולות טרור של מחבלים נגד ישראל מדרום לבנון. מתוך שתי האפשרויות הללו נראית בעינינו החמורה ביותר חדירת צבא סורי או בינערכי לדרום לבנון. בעוד שפעולות מחבלים אם תקרנה ניתן יהיה לטפל בהן במשור המקומי הרי חנועת כוחות סוריים תשנה שינוי אסטרטגי את מפת הכוחות באזור ותעמידנו במצב בלתי נסבל. זאת ועוד, גם נוכחות סורית לא תוכל להבטיח מניעת פעולות חבלנים אך במקרה כזה עלולה להביא כל פעולה נגד המחבלים לידי התנגשות ישירה בינינו ובין הסורים דבר שכולנו רוצים להמנע ממנו. הפתרון הוא להשאיר את אזור הדרום כמעין אזור חייץ כאשר כוחות המיליציה הנוצרית הפועלים בו יוכלו להיות מתוגברים ע"י צבא לבנוני של סרקיס כאשר יהיו בידו כוחות כאלו. מונדייל שאל האם בינתיים קיימת חדירת חבלנים לדרום. השבתי שיש חדירה מסויימת אך לא בקנה מידה מסוכן וכי עדיף מבחינתנו לטפל במצב הביניים מאשר להסכים לסידור אחר שמעורב בו צבא סורי או בינערכי.

אמרתי שאנו עומדים בקשר אמיץ עם הממשל לגבי ההתפתחויות בלבנון ובאופן כללי אנו רואים העניינים בצורה דומה ופועלים תוך תיאום והבנה. מונדייל אמר שזו גם התרשמותו על בסיס החדווכים שקיבל.



סודי ביותר
- 3 -

ה. אמרתי שהמשבר בלבנון יצר חמורות מעבר למצב בשטח. תארתי את החלשתי של אש"ף הן פיסית והן כגורם בעל השפעה באיזור ; צמצום השפעתה של בריה"מ הן לגבי סוריה ולגבי השפעתה במז"ח בכלל ; והתגבשות הקואליציה המצרית - סורית - סעודית.

הדגשתי שכל אחת מן החמורות הנ"ל יכולות להיות גורם שיפעל לחיוב או לשלילה בהתאם לצורה שבה יסופל :

1. אש"ף סבל אבדות בשטח ואבדן יוקרה באזור. יחד עם זאת, ואולי בגלל זה מרגישות מדינות ערב הצורך לשלם לארגון מס-שפתיים כפי שהדבר מחבטא באו"ם ובזירה הבינלאומית. אש"ף היה וממשיך להיות הגורם המתסיס והמחבל בכל אפשרות להסדר. החלשותו יכולה להיות נכס בחנאי כמובן שלא ייעשה דבר כדי להפיח בו רוח חיים. מונדייל אמר שהוא בהחלט מסכים לכך ושאל מה הדוגמאות לנסיונות להפיח בו רוח חיים. אמרתי שיש שתי דוגמאות בולטות. אחת נסיונו של אש"ף להקים משרד הסברה בושינגטון. אין לנו כל ספק שהיה זה נסיון, בעזרת כמה תומכים אמריקנים, להעמיד את הממשל החדש בפני עובדה מוגמרת. הצלחנו להביא לגרוש שני הנציגים אך הבעיה עומדת ויש להיות ערים ולמנוע מהם ומאוהדיהם לחדש המאמץ וליצור עובדה פוליטית שתעמיד אותנו ואח הממשל החדש בפני בעיה בלתי נסבלת. מונדייל אמר שהוא בהחלט מסכים לכך וברך על ערנותנו שהביאה לגרוש האנשים.

אמרתי שדוגמא שניה בקשר לאש"ף היא הנסיונות מצדו להציג עצמו או חלקים ממנו כמתונים. נתחתי את הצהרות ערפאת וההדגשים ששם הוא ומנהיגים אחרים על הסכמתם להקמת מדינה פלשתינאית בכל חלק מארץ ישראל שישוחרר כסלב ביניים להגשמת משימתם השלמה, דהיינו הפיכת מדינת ישראל כולה למדינה פלשתינאית חילונית בהנהגתם. הצבעתי על הציטוט האחרון מ-4.12 מדברי חאלד אל חסן חבר הועדה המרכזית שלהם שהדגיש שזו התחלה להגשמת המטרה הסופית של ייסוד מדינה פלשתינאית חילונית בכל א"י.



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אמרתי שמפליא עד כמה אנשים טובים, כולל כמה מחבריו בסנט,
אינם ערים למשמעויות הדברים ורואים בהם מיתון. מונדייל אמר
שהדברים ברורים לו לחלוטין. הוא שם לב שאש"ף עצמו רואה
בהסכמה להקמת מדינה בגדה ובעזה כשלב ביניים ואין לו כל
אשליות שמסרתם הסופית חיסול מדינת ישראל. אמרתי למונדייל
שברצוני בהקשר זה להבהיר לו מדוע לא נוכל בשום פנים להסכים
למדינה שלישית ביננו ובין ירדן. הסברתי לו שהפתרון היחיד
לבעייה הפלשתינאית יכול לבוא רק במסגרת מו"מ עם ירדן. אמרתי
שחשוב להבהיר מה ההבדל בין פתרון פלשתינאי במסגרת ירדן לעומת
פתרון המבוסס על מדינה עצמאית בגדה. מניתי 4 גורמים המהווים
ההבדל היסודי בין השניים: ראשית, בכל מקרה חייב השטח בגדה
המערבית להיות מפורז אחרת נשקפת לנו סכנה רבה. אפשר לפרז
חבל ארץ מסויים כאשר הוא קשור למדינה אחרת (ירדן) אך אי אפשר
לפרז מדינה שלמה. שנית, פתרון במסגרת ירדן משמעותו שהבירה
נשארת להיות רבת עמון ואילו הקמת מדינה עצמאית בגדה מייד
תעורר את שאלת הבירה הערבית בירושלים. שלישית, כאשר הפתרון
קשור לחוסיין חזקה עליו שידאג שלא יהפך לשטח בשליטת ערפאת
והמחבלים דבר שיסכן גם עצם קיומו. הנסיון גם מלמד שערבים
מסוגלים להסל חבלנים בצורה אפקטיבית כאשר הם מאיימים על עצם
קיומם. כך היה בירדן ב-1970 וכך היה בלבנון ב-1976. מכאן
ששטח בפיקוח חוסיין אמין הרבה יותר מאשר מדינה עצמאית שתהפך
לקן מחבלים ורוצחים בשליטת ערפאת וארגונו. רביעית, מדינה
עצמאית תהפך מייד למוקד רדיקלי ומאגר להפשעה סובייסית ונשק
סובייסית. תוך זמן קצר נמצא עצמנו במצב בו יתד בעל אוריינטציה
סובייסית תקועה במרכז המז"ת. כל הנימוקים הללו אינם רק
פוגעים נמרצות באינטרסים של ישראל אלא גם באלו של ירדן וארה"ב,
ובסופו של דבר מסכנים את כל המערך הפרו-מערבי במז"ת כולל
ירדן וסעודיה. מונדייל אמר שההנמקות משכנעות ביותר, כי הוא
שותף לדעתנו, ויידע להעביר זאת לקארטר.



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2. הנקודה השנייה היוצרת סיכויים וסיכונים היא ירידת השפעתה של בריה"מ. גם פה צריך להשמר מלהפיח רוח חיים או להעניק תנופה חדשה לבריה"מ. כל היסג שהושג במז"ת הושג ע"י ניטרולה של בריה"מ מן ההליך המדיני. כל נסיון להכניסה מחדש יחבל בעצם סיכויי המו"מ, יגביר את עקשנות הערבים ויעמיד את ארה"ב במצב של התחרות על סינגור הערבים. לא הם ולא אנחנו צריכים להיות מעוניינים בזה. מונדייל אמר שזה מקובל עליו לחלוטין ושאל כיצד זה מתיישב עם ועידת ג'נבה. אמרתי שברשותו אגע בנושא זה במהלך דברי.

3. הנקודה השלישית שיש לעקוב אחריה בזהירות היא המערך החדש לנוצר בין סוריה מצרים וסעודיה. מצד אחד יכול הדבר לאפשר התקדמות במו"מ מצד שני נשקפת הסכנה שתרכובת זו של כח אנשים נשק וכסף תעורר את החיאבון הערבי. אמרתי שלא רק בריה"מ תבחון את הממשל החדש בארה"ב גם העולם הערבי יעביר את הממשל החדש בחינה, ולמעשה כבר התחיל בכך. אם ירגישו הערבים שארה"ב מוכנה לשמש מנוף ללחץ על ישראל הרי שיגבירו את חביעותיהם עד שאפילו אמריקה לא תוכל לספקם ובודאי שישראל לא תוכל להיות שותפה למהלך כזה. לעומת זאת אם תתייצב המדיניות האמריקנית באיתנות כנגד נסיונות הסחיטה והלחץ ותבהיר לערבים נכונותה להגיש שרותים טובים כדי להביא הצדדים להדברות על הסכם שלום שיהיה מבוסס על בטחון לישראל הרי שגם הם יורידו חביעותיהם ולא יבססו כל גישתם על הנסיון לתקוע תריז בין ארה"ב לישראל ולהשתמש בארה"ב כמנוף ללחץ על ישראל. מונדייל אמר שהדבר נכון ביותר וכי זו תהיה מדיניותם. שאל מה הסימנים שבידינו שהערבים אכן כבר הולכים בכיוון זה. אמרתי שראשית הם אומרים זאת בשידוריהם ובהודעותיהם, ושנית כל "מתקפת השלום" במרכאות של סאדאת מבוססת בעצם על הקשחת הקו תוך בחינת הממשל החדש ולא על נסיון אמיתי להציג בסיס להדברות. לקחתי את הצהרותיו וראיונותיו של סאדאת



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ונתחתי אותם. הבהרתי למונדייל שסאדאת מגדיר את השלום כהסכם על סיום מצב המלחמה ודורש חמורה זה את נסיגת ישראל מכל השטחים והקמת מדינה פלשתינאית בגדה ובעזה. ספרתי לו שבעת המו"מ על הסכם הביניים אמר סאדאת לקיסניגר שהמורה הסכם על סיום מצב המלחמה היה מוכן להסכים לקו שיעבור כ-20 מילים מהגבול הבינ"ל. הוא אמנם לא היה יכול ללכת להסכם רחב כזה ללא התקדמות גם בזירות אחרות אך ברור היה שידע להבחין בין המחיר שהוא דורש עבור שלום מלא. וסופי ובין הסכם על סיום מצב המלחמה. היום מעלה סאדאת את המחיר עבור הסכם על סיום מצב המלחמה. מה שהוא מוכן לתת זה פחות משלום ומה שדורש זה המחיר הסופי שאפילו עבור שלום סופי אין ישראל יכולה להסכים לו כי זה יסכן בסחונה. מונדייל אמר שהדברים נהירים לו לחלוטין וגם הוא לא הבין מדוע כמה מחבריו בסנס ראו בזה סימן למתינות. עוזרו אישר דברי ואמר שאכן יש בזה משום הקשחה ולא מיחון עמדות מצד סאדאת.

ז. מונדייל אמר ששוחח עמו סנטור ריביקוף על התרשמותו מביקורו במצרים. ריביקוף אמר לו שהוצע לו להפגש עם ערפאת אך ריביקוף סרב ואמר למונדייל שניתן לו להבין שנשיאי מצרים וסוריה לא היו מבינים על כך בעין יפה. לאור זאת שאל מונדייל איך אני רואה את היחס בין מנהיגי ערב ואש"ף. תארתי את היחסים המסובכים של ניצול הבעיה הפלשתינאית מחד וחוסר רצונם לשעבד האינטרסים שלהם לתביעות הפלשתינאיות. אמרתי שכל שהענין של מדינות ערב יגדל בחיפוש הדרך לפתרון הסכסוך וככל שנתקדם אתם יותר יהפך מבחינתם הנושא הפלשתינאי למטרד ויהיה פחות סיכוי שיחייצבו מאחורי התביעות הקיצוניות של אש"ף. הבהרתי כיצד המנהיגות הקיצונית הפלשתינאית הייתה תמיד האויב הגדול ביותר של הפלשתינאים עצמם.

ח. אמרתי שלאור כל הניתוח הנ"ל ברצוני להבהיר לו את עמדתנו.
1. אנו מוכנים ללכת למאמץ ממשי להדברות ב-1977. יתכן מאד שלא ניתן יהיה להגיע להסכמים ובודאי לא לביצוע אך אנו מוכנים



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לנסיון רציני להגיע להדברות ולהצבת היסודות להתקדמות לקראת שלום. מונדייל הפסיקני ואמר שזה חשוב ביותר גם כ- *Public Posture* כי אסור שישראל תראה בעיני הצבור כמונעת אפשרות להתקדם לשלום. אמרתי שאני מדבר איתו מעבר לדימוי הצבורי, זה רצוננו הכנה ואנו מוכנים ורוצים לעשות מאמץ רציני להתקדם.

2.

חיוני שלא יהיה גיבוש עמדה כלשהיא לפני שתהיה הדברות עם ישראל בדרג הגבוה ביותר. מכאן שלדעתנו יש מקום לפגישה בין קארטר ורבין בסביבות מרץ לשם ליבון אסטרטגיה משותפת. מונדייל אמר שכנראה שהעברתי מחשבה זו כבר לקארטר כי קארטר דיבר איתו על כך והוא נוטה לזה. אמרתי שאכן מסרתי על כך הן באמצעות אייזשטאד והן באמצעות סטון. מונדייל אמר שזה בסדר גמור ועובדה שאכן הדברים הגיעו לקארטר. אמרתי למונדייל שאנו חייבים להגיע למצב כאשר שנינו יושבים מצד אחד של השולחן והבעיה לפנינו ולא כאשר אנו יושבים משני עברי השולחן והבעיה בינינו. מונדייל הסכים לחלוטין. הבהרתי למונדייל מדוע עדיפה בעיני דרך זו של שיחה כאן על פני שיגור שליח לאזור היוצר דרמה וציפיות ואינו מאפשר הדברות ושיחה ישודית עם קארטר עצמו. מונדייל אמר שמקבל זאת בהחלט והוא מניח שכך אמנם ינהג קארטר. מונדייל אמר ש-מובן יהיה צורך להזמין אחר כך גם את ראשי המדינות האחרות הנוגעות לאזור כי לא יהיה מוצא. אמרתי שזה הגיוני.

מונדייל אמר שאין לו ספק שזו הדרך הנכונה וכי כל מגמתנו צריכה להיות להגיע לאסטרטגיה משותפת ולסכם על מהלכים משותפים. אמרתי שיש יותר מדי ערכים משותפים לשתי מדינותנו ויחסים עמוקים ביותר מכדי שלא נגיע למצע משותף ולדרך פעולה משותפת. מונדייל אישר זאת ואמר שזו כוונת קארטר ובודאי שהוא עצמו יטה שכם לענין זה.



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3. אמרתי שיש נושא נוסף שאנו מבקשים עזרתו. הצגתי בפניו את בקשת הסיוע שלנו לשנת 1978 והשארתי בידי עוזרו העתק הנייר שהגשנו בזמנו לממשל. מונדייל אמר שידוע לו שהממשל הנוכחי מנסה לחתוך בכל התקציב כדי לסעון שהוריש לממשל החדש חכנית שתוכל להביא לתקציב מאוזן. ברור שדרך זו היא לא דרך מפני שהדבר לא ניתן מבלי לקצץ בשירותים חיוניים כולל חוק סיוע חוץ. הוא חושש שנושא סיוע החוץ הוא אחד הקורבנות של הצעת התקציב שרוצה להוריש המשטר היוצא. אמרתי שאנו עושים כל שביכולתנו לפעול אצל המשטר היוצא אך בקשתי שהם מצדם יעזרו ככל שיוכלו בתקופת המעבר. מונדייל הבטיח לעשות זאת. עוזרו אמר ששמע שאגף התקציבים מתכנן קיצוצים ניכרים וכי ימליץ לגבינו על סכום כולל של 1.5 מיליארד סיוע חוץ כלכלי ובטחוני (במקום ה-2.3 שבקשנו) אך אין זה רשמי ואין זה סופי.

אמרתי שגם אלינו הגיעו שמועות על קיצוצים והצבעתי על החומרה הרבה מבחינתנו ועל המצב הבלתי אפשרי שהדבר יעמיד אותנו.

ט. מונדייל שאל על ועידת ג'נבה והסברתי נכונותנו והמגבלות הקיימות. שאל מדוע אנו דוחפים כל כך לכינוסה של ג'נבה. אמרתי שאנו חייבים להתייצב כנכונים להשתתף לפי כתב הסמכות המקורי אך אין לנו אשליות לגבי אפשרות להגיע למו"מ ממשי. אמר שזו גם דעתו. שאל על הפורמולות השונות בעניין שיחוף פלשתינאים. אמרתי לו שאנו מוכנים, כפי שהיה בעבר, שבמשלחת ירדן יהיו פלשתינאים. לא נסכים לייצוג אש"ף בכל משלחת שהיא או בכל צורה שהיא.

הדגשתי שג'נבה יכולה לשמש מעמד פתיחה או מעמד סיכום אך אינה יכולה להיות תחליף למו"מ בין הצדדים בסיוע אמריקני.



סודי ביותר

- 9 -

י. חלק זה של השיחה נסתיים בדברי מונדייל שאמר שתמיד האמין ומאמין שישראל היא המדינה המשתוקקת לשלום יותר מכל מדינה אחרת וכי זו מטאת נפשה ההיסטורית והלאומית וכי הוא בטוח שנמצא שפה משותפת עם הממשל החדש.

בשיחה ב-4 עיניים

יא. מונדייל שאל לדעתנו על ואנס. אמרתי לו שתמיד ראינו בו אדם הגון וישר ואנו צופים לעבודה משותפת אתו. שאל אם אין לנו חששות או היסוסים. אמרתי שעד כמה שידוע לי לא היו. אני אישית נפגשתי עמו פעמיים בעת האחרונה, כמו כן נפגשו אתו בעבר הן רוה"מ והן שה"ח והתרשמנו מגישתו ההגונה והמקצועית. מונדייל אמר שואנס יבצע כהלכה וביושר ובהגינות המדיניות שתקבע.

יב. חזרתי והודיתי לו שהקדיש כל כך הרבה זמן לשיחה בינינו. אמר שדלתו תמיד תהיה פתוחה בפני ואף פעם לא יהיה עסוק ^{ידי} הוא מצא השיחה ליעילה ביותר וסקירת המצב מאלפת.

יג. אמרתי לו שנקודה זו מביאה אותי לנקודה שרציתי לשתף אותו. מאז ומתמיד היו לישראל שני מוקדי הבנה ועזרה ואלו היו הבית הלבן והקונגרס. זה עזר לנו במשך כל השנים להתגבר על גורמים עויינים בתוך הבירוקרטיה של מחמ"ד, הפנטגון וה-CIA. מספיק לעיין במסמכים ששחררו על שנות 1948 כדי להוכיח כיצד היה צריך הנשיא להתגבר על התנגדות כוחות אלו. היות והדברים הנחתכים כאן נוגעים לגורלנו הרי שבקשתי שתהיה לנו גישה ישירה בעיניים חיוניות. מונדייל אמר שהדבר ברור לו והוא ידאג לכך.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

סודי ביותר

- 10 -

יד. לבסוף ביקש מונדייל שהדברים העדינים שהוחלפו בינינו ידווחו רק באמצעות בלדר כדי שלא תהיה כל דליפה העלולה להעמידו במצב קשה ולחבל באפשרויותיו לעזור לנו. חזר והדגיש שיהיה תמיד פתוח ונכון להפגש ולעזור לנו.

בברכה,

מברק נכנס-מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכן — עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-
חוץ וסודות רשמיים). עשי"ז —
1957.

ש.מ.ר
2108
ש.מ.ר

מס 255

נשלח: 141600 דצמ 76

אל: המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון

מצפא מאור.

משרדו של מונדייל ביקשו בשם מונדייל כי נקדיש תשומת לב מיוחדת ל-NICKOLAS COLEMAN
עורך המיניאפוליס סטאר ומנהיג חרוב בביה"נ של מינסוטה תשוהה עתה בארץ במסגרת
משלחת בתי המחוקקים.

קולמן חיננו ידיד אישי קרוב של מונדייל ורצוי שייאמר לו כי מונדייל התעניין בו במיוחד.
אנא דווחו כדי שבודיע לאנשי מונדייל.

רפיה

עמ' מנכל מ/מנכל ארגוב מצפא מורחים

אב/מ

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

דף מספר מתוך דפים

עותק מספר 15 מתוך עותקים

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

ל
ה
נ
13

סודי ביותר מס' 139

נשלח: 071545 דצמ 76

אל: המשרד

מאת: רושינגטון

סודי ביותר-לנמען בלבד

מנכ"ל, עבדון

בפגשתי היום לצדדים עם דייוויד ארון, יועצו של מונדייל לענייני חוץ ובטחון וראש צוות המעבר של קרטל בנושאי ה N S C וה- C I A . אני מקיים עמו קשר הדוק מאז ההג לעבוד לפני למעלה משנתיים כעוזרו של סנטור מונדייל בנושאי חוץ ובטחון.

אני משתתף בפגישות השונות שמקיים מונדייל וכן בהתייעצויות קרטל בנושאי חוץ. בין השאר השתתף הבוקר בפגישת מונדייל-אנדריאוטי ועמד להשתתף היום גם בפגישת ואנס דאנדריאוטי. להלן עיקר דבריו-

א. אין כיום לאיש בממשל תכנית או לוח זמנים לגבי המזת. נוצרו תיקוות לקראת תזוזה לשלום, במיוחד במזת-בעיקר עי הדיבורים הערביים (לסנטורים וכו') וכן עי התגובות של רחם רבינ (נאום ועידת ולסינקי)- וגם בקרב כמה חוגים ומוסחים בארה"ב. הציפיות הנ גדולות יותר מאשר אפשרויות הביצוע. צריך לטפל בכך בזהירות רבה כדי שלא לגרום לאכזבה אשר תסב בסופו של דבר נזק רב יותר וחטפז סיכויי החסד. לכן אין למדד יתר על המידה הנשיא הנבחר יצטרך לקבוע את עדיפותיו הנ בין נושאי פני-שיפור המצב הכלכלי והאבטלה הגוברת- לנושאי חוץ והנ בין נושאי החוץ לבין עצמם. בין נושאי החוץ שיעסיקו את הממשל מנה את ברהם וסאלט, תעלת פנמה, הקשרים עם אירופה ובנות הברית והמזת.

העדיפות לא תהא במושגים של קודם יטפלו בנושא אחד ואח"כ בנושא שני, אלא יטפלו בכל הנושאים באותה עת. לפי העדיפות יחלטו כמה אחוזים מהזמן יוקצבו לכל נושא ונושא. מסגרת זאת טרם נקבעה. ב. ארון בטוח כי לאחר שהנשיא יכנס לתפקידו ובטרם יחליט מה לעשות במזת הוא ירצה להתייעץ עם ישראל.

ג. במהלך השיחה ביקש הברה לגבי בקשת הסיוע שלנו לשנת 1978.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

דף מספר מתוך דפים

עותק מספר מתוך עותקים

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

סודי = 2 יו תר

הבורתי כי בקשנו 1,5 מיליארד סיוע צבאי ועוד כ-800 מליון סיוע תומכ וכי שמענו שהממשל-בהמלצת ה O M B עומד לבקש מליארד אחד בלבד סיוע צבאי וכי גם בקשת הסיוע התומכ והא נמוכה בכמה מאות מליונים. מסרתי לו גם נתוני הסיוע ל-77/76.

אaron אמר כי יתקשר עם איזנשטדט וימסור לו הדברים, לטיפולו. כמו כן אמר כי נצטרך להציג ולנמק את בקשתנו וצרכינו היטב בפני הממשל החדש. המצב הכלכלי בארה"ב טעון שפור הדבר עומד בראש דאגות הנשיא והממשל בקשתנו עלולה להיות מושפעת גם מכוונ ההתפתחות הכלכלית בארה"ב-אמ יחול שפור או הדרדרות.

ד. אaron אמר כי אינו יודע עדיין כיצד יטופל עניין התקציב. אנשי ה O M B יישומרים מרחקיי מצוות המעבר לגבי התקציב שיגיש פורד. בפני קרט קימות האפשרויות הבאות להגיש תיקונים לתקציב, או תקציב משלים להתחלטה טרם נפלה.

אaron אמר כי היחסים בין קרט ומונדייל הם מצויינים וכי הייכומיהם ביניהם עובדת יפה מאוד.

אaron מחדשם שאכן קרט נותן תכנ של ממש לתפקיד סגן נשיא, הוא משתף את מונדייל בבחירת המועמדים לתפקידים השונים ובנושאים אחרים.

ה. נדברנו להוסיף ולקיים מגע הדוק כבעבר. השיחה אינה לייחוס.

רפ"ח.

שה היה שרבי לנא וללנא ירבי וביכ/לנא רמ ו/אמן

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על חוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

ס ו ד י

נר: 79

נשלח: 041200: נוב 76

אל: המשרד

מאת: רושינגטון

ב ה ו ל

ושהייח, עברונ העתק לשכת רה"מ.
שוחחתי הבוקר עם סגן הנשיא המיועד מונדייל לפני שיצא
לג'ורג'יה למסיבת עיתונאים משותפת עם קארטר. בדיכתי בשם רה"מ ושהייח
על הצלחתם ואחלתי להם תקופה פוריה בסיוונתם למען ארה"ב והעולם החופשי
כולו.

מונדייל הודה מאד על הברכות. אמר שברצונו לחזור ולהגיד לי שכל
שאלה לי למחרת המינוי שלהם בועידה הדמוקרטית וכל ששוחחנו מאז
שריד וקיי"מ. חזר על ידידותו העמוקה ומחוייבותו הבלתי מעוררת שלו
וטל קארטר לישראל. אמר שימסור על שיחתנו לקארטר כאשר יראה אותו היום.
ביקש שלאחר שובי מן הארצ ניפגש כדי להחליף דעות בעניינים הנוגעים
לתקופת המעבר וכן לטווח ארוך. ביקש שנשמור קשר אישי ורצוף.
ביקש במיוחד שאמסור בארצ דייש חמה לרה"מ ולשהייח. אמר שבסוף
השבוע ייצאו קארטר והוא לחופשה של כשבוע ימים ואחר כך יחזרו
לטפל בנושאי תקופת המעבר.

דיניצ ==

שוחח רחא מנל מנל (אחרי) אילוב ל. רה"ב מנל



U.S. ELECTIONS '76

1.5/12/76 - 1.5/12/76
1.5/12/76 - 1.5/12/76

News Report

SEPTEMBER 20, 1976

(PROFILE) WALTER F. MONDALE: DEMOCRATIC VICE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE

By James Aldrich
IPS Congressional Correspondent

IN NAMING SENATOR WALTER F. MONDALE OF MINNESOTA AS HIS VICE PRESIDENTIAL RUNNING MATE, PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE JIMMY CARTER DESCRIBED HIM AS A MAN WITH "A GREAT FEELING OF UNDERSTANDING AND COMPASSION FOR PEOPLE WHO NEED THE SERVICES OF GOVERNMENT MOST."

MR. MONDALE SAID THAT "TO BE SELECTED AS A VICE PRESIDENTIAL RUNNING MATE AT ANY TIME IS A HIGH HONOR AND A GREAT CHALLENGE. BUT TO BE PICKED BY THIS GREAT AND HONORABLE MAN ... I AM PROUD TO BE PART OF HIS TEAM."

MR. MONDALE, 48, HIMSELF HAD EXPLORED A RUN FOR THE PRESIDENCY TWO YEARS AGO BUT DROPPED OUT LAST NOVEMBER WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT "BASICALLY I FOUND I DID NOT HAVE THE OVERWHELMING DESIRE TO BE PRESIDENT WHICH IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE KIND OF CAMPAIGN THAT IS REQUIRED ... I ADMIRE THOSE WITH THE DETERMINATION TO DO WHAT IS REQUIRED TO SEEK THE PRESIDENCY, BUT I HAVE FOUND THAT I WAS NOT AMONG THEM."

MR. CARTER, ASKED IF THIS HAD AFFECTED HIS DECISION TO SELECT MR. MONDALE, SAID IT HAS BEEN "ONE OF THE MAJOR DOUBTS I HAD ABOUT HIM ... BUT MY MIND HAS BEEN COMPLETELY RELIEVED ABOUT THAT ... HE SAID HE WITHDREW BECAUSE HE KNEW HE COULD NOT WIN, THAT THE SUPPORT HE HAD HOPED TO ACHIEVE DID NOT MATERIALIZE." "HOWEVER," MR. CARTER CONTINUED, "ONCE I DECIDED TO JUST CHOOSE THE PERSON I THOUGHT WOULD BE THE BEST TO LEAD THIS COUNTRY AND BE THE MOST COMPATIBLE TO ME, THE MOVEMENT TOWARD SENATOR MONDALE WAS ALMOST INEXORABLE."

(MORE)

EL 2

UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE

TEL AVIV - 71 HAYARKON STREET, TEL: 54338, EXT.204

JERUSALEM - 19 KEREN HAYESOD ST., TEL: 222376 /225755



MR. MONDALE SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN INTERESTED IN THE VICE PRESIDENCY AS "A CEREMONIAL POST" BUT HAD ACCEPTED AFTER MR. CARTER TOLD HIM THAT "HE INTENDS TO USE HIS VICE PRESIDENT IN A VERY BROAD RANGE OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES, BOTH IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY."

ASKED WHAT MR. MONDALE'S FIRST RESPONSIBILITIES WOULD BE, MR. CARTER REPLIED "THE FIRST DUTY WILL BE TO HELP WIN THE ELECTION IN THE FALL."

ASKED WHO INFLUENCED HIM THE MOST IN THE MANY DISCUSSIONS HE HAD HAD IN MAKING HIS VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION, HE REPLIED, "SENATOR MONDALE."

WALTER FREDERICK MONDALE ROSE TO POLITICAL PROMINENCE BY ABILITY, HARDWORK, AND DILIGENCE -- AND SEEMINGLY BY BEING IN THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE RIGHT TIME.

HE WAS BORN IN THE SMALL, SOUTHERN MINNESOTA TOWN OF CEYLON JANUARY 5, 1928, ONE OF SEVEN CHILDREN OF A METHODIST MINISTER, THE REVEREND THEODORE SIGVAARD MONDALE, OF NORWEGIAN ANCESTRY. AS A BOY HE ACQUIRED THE NICKNAME "FRITZ," WAS EDUCATED IN MINNESOTA'S PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM, AND FROM 1946 TO 1949 HE ATTENDED MACALESTER COLLEGE, A LIBERAL ARTS INSTITUTION IN ST. PAUL. IN HIS SENIOR YEAR HE TRANSFERRED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA WHICH IN 1951 AWARDED HIM A B.A. DEGREE "CUM LAUDE." AS A STUDENT, HE HAD WORKED HIS WAY THROUGH SCHOOL IN A FOOD PACKAGING PLANT.

BY 1948, HOWEVER, HE WAS ALREADY IN POLITICS. IN THAT YEAR HE SERVED AS CAMPAIGN MANAGER IN THE STATE'S SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT IN THE SUCCESSFUL BID OF HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, THEN MAYOR OF MINNEAPOLIS, FOR THE U.S. SENATE. HIS EFFORTS RESULTED IN MR. HUMPHREY, A DEMOCRAT, CARRYING THAT DISTRICT, ~~THERETOFORE~~ HEAVILY REPUBLICAN, BY A SUBSTANTIAL MAJORITY.

IN 1951, SHORTLY AFTER GRADUATION, MR. MONDALE ENTERED THE U.S. ARMY, SERVED IN KOREA, AND WAS DISCHARGED AS A CORPORAL IN 1953. HE THEN ENROLLED IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LAW SCHOOL.

IN 1955 MR. MONDALE MARRIED JOAN ADAMS OF ST. PAUL, A MINISTER'S DAUGHTER WHO AT THE TIME WAS A HISTORY STUDENT AT MACALESTER COLLEGE. THEY HAVE TWO SONS, THEODORE AND WILLIAM, AND ONE DAUGHTER, ELEANOR JANE.

FROM 1956, WHEN HE WAS ADMITTED TO THE MINNESOTA BAR, TO 1960, MR. MONDALE PRACTICED LAW IN THE MINNEAPOLIS FIRM OF LARSON, LOEVINGER, LINDQUIST, FREEMAN AND FRASER. ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THIS FIRM, ORVILLE L. FREEMAN -- LATER TO BE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE IN THE KENNEDY-JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS -- HAD HIS EYE ON THE STATE GOVERNORSHIP. IN 1958 MR. MONDALE MANAGED MR. FREEMAN'S SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN FOR THAT POST.

(MORE)

EL 2

AFTER SERVING TWO YEARS AS A SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE STATE'S ATTORNEY GENERAL, HE WAS APPOINTED BY GOVERNOR FREEMAN IN 1960 TO SERVE THE UNEXPIRED TERM OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WHO HAD RESIGNED. IN NOVEMBER OF 1962 MR. MONDALE WAS REELECTED TO THAT POST WITH 236,192 VOTES, OR 59.6 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL VOTE CAST -- ONE OF THE LARGEST MARGINS OF VICTORY EVER OBTAINED BY A CANDIDATE FOR STATE OFFICE IN MINNESOTA.

IN 1964 HE WAS A MINNESOTA DELEGATE TO THE DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING CONVENTION AT WHICH THEN-PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON PICKED SENATOR HUMPHREY AS HIS VICE PRESIDENTIAL RUNNING MATE. ON NOVEMBER 17 OF THAT YEAR, FOLLOWING THE JOHNSON-HUMPHREY LANDSLIDE ELECTION, MINNESOTA GOVERNOR KARL F. ROLVAAG APPOINTED MR. MONDALE TO THE TWO REMAINING YEARS OF MR. HUMPHREY'S SIX-YEAR TERM. SINCE THEN HE HAS WON TWO FULL SENATE TERMS ON HIS OWN, TAKING 53.9 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL STATE VOTE IN 1966 AND 56.7 PERCENT IN 1972.

HE CURRENTLY SERVES ON THE POWERFUL NEW SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE; THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, CHARGED WITH WRITING TAX AND TRADE LEGISLATION; AND THE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE. ALSO SENATOR MONDALE WAS ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, HEADED BY IDAHO SENATOR FRANK CHURCH.

MR. MONDALE IS REGARDED BY HIS FELLOW SENATORS AS A MODERATE TO LIBERAL IN HIS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. HIS VOTING PATTERNS AND GROUP RATINGS ARE ALMOST IDENTICAL TO THOSE OF SENATOR HUMPHREY.

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, AN INDEPENDENT AND SCHOLARLY WEEKLY MAGAZINE, RECENTLY REPORTED: "IN 1975 MONDALE VOTED FOR PRESIDENT FORD'S POLICIES 43 PERCENT OF THE TIME; 46 PERCENT OF HUMPHREY'S VOTES WERE WITH THE PRESIDENT. BOTH MINNESOTA SENATORS VOTED WITH THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION OF REPUBLICANS AND SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS ONLY 7 PERCENT OF THE TIME." THE LIBERAL AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION (ADA) RATED BOTH SENATORS AT 94 ON A SCALE FROM ZERO TO 100.

THE SENATOR DESCRIBES HIMSELF AS A "CENTRIST POPULIST," FAVORS TAX REFORM AIMED AT REDUCING THE TAX BURDEN ON THE MAJORITY OF AMERICANS AND HAS ALSO CALLED FOR CUTS IN THE U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET AS A WAY OF HELPING THE "AVERAGE FAMILY."

HE HAS SAID, "I AM FOR DETENTE, BUT FOR DEFENSE TOO. MY TARGETS ARE WASTE AND UNILATERAL ESCALATION OF THE ARMS RACE. TO SAVE A BILLION DOLLARS ON ARMS IS TO SAVE IT FOR THINGS I WANT TO DO." AREAS WHERE HE WANTS SUCH SAVINGS APPLIED INCLUDE EDUCATION AND CHILD-CARE PROGRAMS.

(MORE)

EL 2

IN 1975 HE VOTED FOR FUNDS TO CONTINUE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ON THE CONTROVERSIAL B-1 BOMBER AS A "NON-THREATENING AMERICAN DETERRENCE" TO ADVANCED SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONRY. THIS YEAR, HOWEVER, HE TOLD THE SENATE IN MAY HE HAS "SERIOUS QUESTIONS" ABOUT PROCEEDING WITH PRODUCTION MODELS OF THE AIRCRAFT AND WAS ONE OF THOSE WHO PROPOSED LEAVING THE DECISION UP TO THE NEXT PRESIDENT. (ALTHOUGH THE SENATE WENT ALONG WITH THAT PROPOSAL IN PASSING THE FY-1977 WEAPONS PROCUREMENT BILL, THE HOUSE REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE DELAY AND THE SENATE GAVE IN, THEREBY ALLOWING A START ON THREE PRODUCTION MODELS THIS YEAR.)

ALONG WITH DEFENSE CUTS, MONDALE HAS PROPOSED REDUCTIONS IN FOREIGN AID. HE HAS ALSO SUGGESTED THAT FUNDS FOR PROGRAMS SUCH AS SKYLAB AND THE SPACE SHUTTLE COULD BE BETTER SPENT ON DOMESTIC PROGRAMS.

IN HIS RECENTLY PUBLISHED BOOK, "THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF POWER," MR. MONDALE ADVOCATES A BALANCING OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND AN INCREASE IN EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE CONGRESS AND THE PEOPLE.

HE ALSO SUGGESTED CHANGING THE PRE-ELECTION SYSTEM OF PICKING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, CALLING THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF 30 STATE PARTY PRIMARIES "CHAOTIC." BASICALLY, HE IS AN ADVOCATE OF REGIONAL PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES IN ALL 50 STATES, GROUPING THEM GEOGRAPHICALLY. THE SELECTION OF A PARTY'S PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE, HE SAYS "IS A NATIONAL PROCESS THAT DESERVES A NATIONAL DESIGN."

* * *

EL 2

DEMOCRATIC VICE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE WALTER F. MOND

LE

PICTURED THE NIXON AND FORD ADMINISTRATIONS AS +CYNICAL....
SHORT-SIGHTED+ PROPONENTS OF UNCONTROLLED INTERNATIONAL

*(initials)
MONDALE*

PAGE 5 -- MIDEAST

ARMS SALES AND WARNED THAT WIDESPREAD WEAPONS PEDDLING IS
HIGHLY DANGEROUS TO SECURITY.

Aug. 1476

NOTING THAT THE UNITED STATES IS CURRENTLY THE WORLD'S
LARGEST WEAPONS MERCHANT, WITH SALES RUNNING ABOUT 10
BILLION DOLLARS ANNUALLY, MONDALE
OF CALIFORNIA THAT THE ARMS TRADE IS ALREADY AGGRAVAT-
ING POTENTIAL CONFLICTS IN THE WORLD AND COULD DRAW THE
COUNTRY INTO WAR.

WHILE SUCH SALES ARE OFTEN JUSTIFIED ON ECONOMIC AND
DIPLOMATIC GROUND, MONDALE SAID, THE POLICY IS ACTUALLY
SELF-DEFEATING.

+DESPITE SUPPLYING ARMS TO BOTH SIDES, WE COULD NOT PRE-
VENT THE INDO-PAKISTAN WAR NOR THE CONFLICT IN CYPRUS,+
MONDALE SAID. RATHER THAN SERVING AS A INSTRUMENT OF GOOD
WILL,+ HE CONTINUED, THE ARMS TRADE HAS OFTEN FOSTERED
BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION IN THE GOVERNMENT OF CUSTOMER COUN-
TRIES.

MONDALE SAID THE DEMOCRATS ARE COMMITTED TO
MAINTAINING A STRONG U.S. DEFENSE POSTURE CAPABLE OF DOING
+WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO ASSURE AMERICAN

PAGE 6 -- MIDEAST

SECURITY AND SAFETY.+

BUT HE SAID, THE WORLD DESPERATELY NEEDS A STRATEGIC ARMS
LIMITATION TREATY AND THE FIRST STEP SHOULD BE GREATER AMER-
ICAN SELF RESTRAINT IN THE PROLIFERATION OF BOTH NUCLEAR
TECHNOLOGY AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS.

+I BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE A PRESUMPTION
AGAINST ARMS

SALES WHICH SHOULD BE OVERCOME ONLY IF THE SALE ADVANCES
AMERICAN SECURITY, FOREIGN POLICY OR WORLD PEACE,+ MONDALE
SAID.

+I WOULD MUCH PREFER TO SEE...FOOD AND PEACEFUL GOODS, NOT
GUNS, AT THE HEART OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.+
MONDALE SAID ARMS CONTROL WOULD BE A MAJOR FOCUS FOR ANY
CARTER-MONDALE ADMINISTRATION FOR TWO REASONS: +IT MAKES
SENSE NOR AMERICAN SECURITY AND FOR PEACE IN THE

+AMERICA YEARNs FOR A FOREIGN POLICY THAT REFLECTS OUR
IDEALS--FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY AND PEACE. IT IS NOT ONLY WHAT
THESE SALES DO TO OTHER COUNTRIES, IT IS WHAT THEY DO TO US.+

EDMUND S. MUSKIE, MAINE, CHAIRMAN
WARREN S. MAGNISON, WASH.
FRANK E. MOSS, UTAH
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, S.C.
ALAN CRANSTON, CALIF.
LAWTON CHILES, FLA.
JAMES ABRAHAM, S. DAK.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DEL.
SAM NUNN, GA.
HENRY BELLMON, OKLA.
ROBERT DOLE, KANS.
J. GLENN BEALL, JR., MD.
JAMES L. BUCKLEY, N.Y.
JAMES A. MCCLURE, IDAHO
PETE V. DOMENICI, N. MEX.

DOUGLAS J. BENNETT, JR., STAFF DIRECTOR
JOHN T. MC EVVOY, CHIEF COUNSEL
ROBERT S. BOYD, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 2, 1976

Mr. Dan Bawly
Bawly Millner & Co.
P. O. B. 888
Tel-Aviv, Israel 61000

Dear Mr. Bawly:

Thanks for sharing your thoughts with me on the Israeli rescue mission into Uganda, and on terrorism in general.


As I stated in my acceptance speech for the nomination as Vice President, I feel we must reject the notion that we will sit by passively while terrorists maim and kill innocent men, women and children. Israel's rescue was warranted because many nations agree on the injustice of bartering with terrorists for the lives of individuals to redress political grievances or to make political impact; most nations are also aware that success in such vicious endeavors will inevitably lead to additional attempts.

We have before us the serious task of achieving a true freedom of the skies and a protection of human lives. In this regard, several measures dealing with terrorism are now in the Senate. I will be sure to remember your concerns as I review this urgent matter.

Sky terrorism will not be ended while there are nations who comply with such inhumane tactics and who provide asylum to perpetrators of terrorism. I sincerely hope that Israel's courageous action will make would-be skyjackers and their supporters think more seriously about the implications of such actions in the future.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,


Walter F. Mondale

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

סודי ביותר

מס' 28

נשלח: 051330 אוג 76

אל : המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון

מייד

שהיית.

נפגשתי היום לארוחת בוקר עם סנטור מונדייל לפי בקשתו. השיחה ארכה כשעה ומחצה והשתתף בה גם DAVID ARON יועצו של הסנטור לעניינים בינלאומיים.

א. לאחר חילופי ברכות אמר מונדייל כי רצה להפגש אתי כדי לשמוע הערכותינו על ההתפתחויות במזימת והשלכותיהם על ישראל. ראשית רצה לשמוע המצב בלבנון, הסיכונים והסיכויים ונגיעתו לישראל ולמעצמות. סקרתי בפניו בהרחבה ההתפתחויות בלבנון וגישה של ישראל. הבהרתי והשלכות בטוח קצר ולטווח הארוך. הדגשתי גישתנו היסודית המודרכת משיקולי בטחוננו. ציינתי החשיבות שבהחלשת אש"ף כגורם המערער היציבות והמתחל בסיכויי השלום. מניתי את האופציות השונות העשויות להתפתח כתוצאה ממשיב לבנון והשלכתם לגבי הסכסוך.

ב. מונדייל הדגיש מחדש שקארטר הבהיר בצורה חד משמעית שבטחונה ושגשוגה של ישראל יהיו אבני הפינה בכל מדיניותו המזימית וכנ שלא יפעל לכפיית פתרון אלא לעידוד הצדדים למוים ביניהם. סקרתי את שורשי הסכסוך. הבהרתי נכונותה של ישראל למוים על שלום, וספרתי על הענותנו לבקשת האפשרות להסכמי סיום מצב המלחמה. הדגשתי שהלחצ צריך להיות מופנה כלפי ארצות ערב ושנכונותם להשלים עם ישראל צריכה להיות מתורגמת הלכה למעשה. דברתי על הבעיה הפלשתינאית ופתרונה במסגרת מוים עם ירדן והתנגדותנו המוחלטת לחקמת מדינה נפרדת בגדה ובעזה. מצאתי אצל מונדייל הבנה והסכמה לגישתנו היסודית בכל השאלות הללו.

ג. מונדייל שאל על גישתנו לענין חימוש מדינות ער בו העסיקה המדינה עם סעודיה. הבהרתי גישתנו לנושא והסכנות השמועות בהגבית מירוצ החימוש.



MC : 15000

DOI: 10.1002/anie

05207

שְׁמִי הַגָּדוֹל הַקָּדוֹשׁ הַנּוֹרָא הַנִּיבְרָא הַנִּיבְרָא הַנִּיבְרָא

משרד החוץ

מחלקת חקשר

ברק נכנס — מסווג

דף מספר..... מתוך..... דפים

עותק מספר..... מתוך..... עותקים

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך — עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז — 1957.

סודי בנותר

מונדייל היה תקיף מאד בתמיכתו בגישתנו בנושא זה.
ד. מונדייל שאל על מדיניות ההתיישבות בשטחים וסקרתי בפניו בהרחבה מדיניותנו בשטח זה. מונדייל שאל על התיישבות בלתי מאושרת וסקרתי לו על החלטת הממשלה בנושא זה.
ה. כשאר הבעתי בפניו, במהלך הסקירה, דאגתנו מכמה קולות הנשמעים בדבר הצורך בשילובה של בריהיים בתהליך הפתרון באיזור וכנ הסמכנה שאנו רואים בדיבורים על ערבויות כתחליף לגבולות בטחון, אמר מונדייל שכוונתי בוודאי לגיורגי בול ותומכיו והוא רוצה להפנות תשומת לבי לעובדה שגיורגי בול לא הוזמן להתייעצות באטלנטה ולא ימלא תפקיד מרכזי במדיניות החוץ של קארטר.
ו. מונדייל אמר שהשיחה היתה חשובה לו במיוחד וכי ירצה להמשיך ולקיים אתי מגע קרוב ופגישות תדירות לגבי ההתפתחויות במזית. חזר והדגיש הידידות והמחויבות הבלתי מסוייגת לישראל מצדו ומצד קארטר.
דיני צמח

שחח והס מנכל שחבט ממנכל י. רביב ארגוב רוזן אבידר רביב/מצפא רס ראמן
צג/נש

כ"ה בתמוז תשל"ו

23 ביולי 1976

ל
18/7

אל: מר ד. תורגמן, השגרירות, וושנגטון
מאת: דורית שביט, המרכז

הנדון: ביקורת בעתונות ירדן על ג'ימי קרטר וסנסור מונדייל

להלן תמצית של 2 מאמרי מערכת שהופיעו בעתוני ירדן, בהם יש ביקורת על ג'ימי קרטר ועל וולטר מונדייל:

א. "אלשעב", 17.7: העתון חוקף את הצהרת קרטר כי הוא בוחר בוולטר מונדייל לתפקיד סגן הנשיא וכי אחת הסיבות החשובות לבחירתו טמונה בידירות ובאימון ההדדי שבין מונדייל לבין ישראל. לדברי העתון מוכיחה הצהרה זו כי ארה"ב היא מכשיר בידי ישראל ומשועבדה למען המטרות הבלתי חוקיות והבלתי אנושיות של ישראל. נראה, אומר העתון, כי המטרה המסתתרת מאחורי הצהרה זו היא לרכוש את קולות הבוחרים היהודים בארה"ב, אולם הכרזה זו מהווה פגיעה בעקרונות שעליהן הוקמה ארה"ב ובכבוד האזרח האמריקאי.

ב. "גורדן טיימס", 17.7: העתון מגנה את הסנסור מונדייל על ששיבח את פעולת צה"ל באנתבה. דברי מונדייל כי "נתמיד בחמיכתנו במאמצים הנעשים ע"י אנשים הגונים כדי להדוף את הפירטיות האוירית" מוכיחים, לדעת העתון, כי הסנסור אינו שולט בשפה האנגלית. הסנסור הפגין בורות באשר להבדל בין "תגינות" לבין חוסר המוסר הציוני המסתתר מאחורי פעולות נועזות. אם הסנסור מונדייל רוצה להילחם בפירטיות האוירית עליו לחשוב פעמיים על עברו בסנט ועל חמיכתו במתן סיוע עצום לישראל על מנת להבטיח את המשך הסטטוס קוו במזה"ת. אם הסנסור ירהרר היטב יגיע למסקנה שפעולותיו שלו ושל חברי הקונגרס האחרים הם שעודדו את הפירטיות האוירית. העתון מוסיף כי התנהגות זו של מונדייל מנוגדת להצהרת קרטר אשר אמר "אנו רוצים להחזיר את האמת". הודעת מונדייל רק מאשרת שהאמת היחידה שנהיה עדים לה במזה"ת היא שהציונות רכשה לצידה עוד אדם הגון וחכם בחיים הציבוריים בארה"ב.

ב ב ר כ ה,

ד. שביט

העחק: מנהל המרכז

סגן מנהל המרכז

מצפ"א

הקונסוליה הכללית, ניו-יורק

1975-1976

1975-1976

1975-1976

1975-1976

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1975-1976

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז-1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

סודי

מידי

מברק נכנס - מסווג

אל: המשרד

מאת: רוסינגטון

נשלח: 301230 יולי 56

ל
מ/ח
ל/ח

מנכל.

התקשר אליהם הסגן מונדייל. אמר שסיים כמה ימי התייעצות בגורגיה עם קארטר
ובין השאר דנו במדיניות חוץ ובמזת. בדיון לחזור ולהבטיח לי שמצא
קארטר ידיד נאמן בכל הנוגע לענייננו. כמו כן ביקש להפגות תשומת לב
להודעתו של קארטר במסיבת עיתונאים אתמול בה הדגיש

HIS CONSISTENT AND UNSHAKABLE SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL AND THAT THIS MUST
BE THE CORNERSTONE OF AMERICAN POLICY IN THE M.E.

מונדייל הוסיף שבשיחותיהם הדגיש קארטר כל פעם שבכל מאמצי תשלום במזת
יונחה עי העקרון הזה ויפעל רק תוך תאומ עם האינטרסים של ישראל בטחונה
ושלמותה.

הודיתי למונדייל על מה שמסר לי וכנ על דבריו הפומביים של קארטר ודבריו
בהתייעצויות הפנימיות. מונדייל אמר שימשיך לשמור על קשר אתי וכי אם יש
לי מה להעביר אליו או למושל שלא אוסר לפגות אליו ישירות. הודיתי לו.

ד"ר צ"צ

שהח והם מנכל שהבט ממנכל י רביב ארגוב ויזן אבידור שק מצפא מזתים חקר רם אמר

צג/המ

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

כ"ב תמוז תשל"ו
20 יולי 1976

335

Mandall

[Signature]

אל: מצפ"א ✓

מאת: אמיר אורן, וושינגטון

הנדון: מונדייל על ישראל

מצ"ב נוסח נאום שנשא סנטור מונדייל ב-TEMPLE ISRAEL
שבמיניאפוליס, לקראת יום העצמאות ה-28 של מדינת ישראל.

הנאום נישא ב-6 במאי ש.ז.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

אמיר אורן
אמיר אורן

העחק: הקונכ"ל, שיקאגו

RECEIVED
1970



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

332

1970 APR 22

1970 APR 22

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1970 APR 22

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1970 APR 22

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1970 APR 22

1970 APR 22

1970 APR 22

FINAL

TEMPLE ISRAEL

It is an honor to speak here, in celebration of the founding of Israel. The State of Israel occupies a special place in the affections of the American people which is almost unlike any other country. There is no treaty of alliance between the United States and Israel, and yet the bonds are stronger than with many of our formal allies.

It's appropriate therefore to consider the reasons for this extraordinary friendship which has existed for 28 years.

I think the basic reason for our strong ties to Israel can be seen in the letter Dr. Chaim Weizman sent to President Truman on May 13, 1948. In part, it said this:

"Tomorrow midnight, May 15, the British mandate will be terminated and the provisional government of the Jewish State will assume the full responsibility for preserving law and order within the boundaries of the Jewish State, for defending that area against external aggression, and for discharging the obligations of the Jewish State to the other nations of the world in accordance with international law."

Dr. Weizman then went on to urge the United States recognize Israel and he then concluded by saying:

"The world will regard it as especially appropriate that the greatest living democracy should be the first to welcome the newest into the family of nations."

To our everlasting credit, within 48 hours, the United States had announced its recognition of Israel.

Since Israel's founding, scores of new states have come into the world. Most of these states have called themselves democracies; but few

have lived up to the test of individual liberty and social justice required for a true democracy. Despite the turbulence and tragedy of the last 28 years, Israel has lived up to that standard and has fulfilled the promise expressed in Dr. Weizman's letter.

In explaining the depth of our relationship, some like to emphasize the strategic importance of Israel; the need for a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the Middle East. I have no quarrel with those reasons. Indeed, I think they're sound.

But I don't think we should be hesitant about saying what I believe lies at the heart of our commitment to Israel's security: it is a commitment to the concept of democracy, and to its survival in the face of adversity. I'm proud to say that America feels bound to Israel by ties of culture; by philosophic tradition; by history. I share the American people's profound sympathy for the democratic system which exists in Israel, for the enormous effort which the people of Israel have made to achieve social justice, and for the incredible sacrifices and valor the Israeli people have shown in defending their nation and, indeed, their very survival. In short, our commitment to Israel resides not just in our heads, but in our hearts.

ADVERSITY

That Israeli Democracy should be as strong and as vibrant as it is today is truly remarkable. Woodrow Wilson feared to take the United States into the First World War because he felt that full-scale war would be the end of our democratic traditions. If he feared for the strength of American democracy in the face of war, let's look at the pressures on Israel:

3 Temple Israel

--It has fought four wars since its birth in 1948. It has never known true peace. The last war alone cost the equivalent of a year's gross national product -- \$8 billion. In US terms that is equivalent to costing us more than a trillion dollars.

Right now, Israel shoulders the largest per capita defense burden in the world: 30% of its GNP goes for defense compared to 12% in the Soviet Union and 6% in the United States. Proportionately, if the US had the Israeli Defense burden, we would be spending \$400 billion on defense, about 4 times what we do now.

--To these external pressures on Israeli democracy, one must add the incredible social challenges:

Absorbing millions of new settlers from enormously varied cultures, the construction of an economy of great productivity wrought from the desert. Despite the enormous defense burden Israel still manages to devote 60% of its budget to civilian needs. As a result, Israeli's have an average tax rate of 60%-- the highest in the world. But they are determined to avoid the choice so often posed in this country, of protecting national security or educating school children.

And yet, despite these pressures, Israel continues to move forward to provide justice on the social level, liberty on the individual level, and democracy on the political level.

WHEN I FELL IN LOVE WITH ISRAEL

I have traveled and met with leaders in Europe, Asia and the Soviet Union. And I also visited Israel. Almost everywhere, political leaders were exclusively concerned with global politics, strategic balances, and so forth.

Only in Israel did top leaders such as Golda Meir take the initiative to talk of human issues such as the importance of educating the young. Only in Israel did I find a deep concern for the children, for giving them all an equal chance at life, for helping those with handicaps, for encouraging those with talent. In Israel they understand that our children are 100% of our future.

What I admire most about Israel is that its people and its leaders are not satisfied with their amazing record. They know there are still problems and they crave the opportunity to solve them.

That's what makes the present situation so tragic, so painful for them and for us who wish them well. If, despite the endless war and tension, there has been this much progress in economic development and education and health and social equality, how much more Israel could have achieved if it did not have such a heavy defense burden and had not suffered such horrendous waste in war.

What a tragedy -- that that gallant, pioneering, creative tiny land of Israel has not during these past 28 years been permitted to make the full contributions to its own and world progress that it was prepared and anxious to make.

But what of the future of our relationship? How many more birthdays -- a few or thousands? I'm told there is increasing concern in Israel over the durability of the American commitment. This concerns me because I want to emphasize my personal commitment to Israel and my conviction that the Congress and the Senate stand solidly in support of Israel's security.

The diplomacy required in the near future to move towards a more stable peace in the Middle East requires that the stability and durability of the American commitment to Israel's security be made crystal clear -- to Israel and, most important, to its Arab neighbors.

I believe that the United States, as well as Israel, should seek to develop better relations with the Arab states surrounding Israel. But I do not believe that we can afford to become neutral; or lukewarm or that we can afford to develop those relationships at the expense of our relationship with Israel. Nothing could be more counterproductive to peace than to provide a false impression that somehow America was no longer so concerned about Israel's future.

And I do believe that this is a fundamentally false impression. But in world affairs impressions are very critical. If the Arab leaders, if the Soviet Union, if the Third World, if our own Western Allies believe that the United States is fudging its commitment to Israel -- they will act accordingly.

6 Temple Israel

In recent years, too many things have happened to encourage speculation about American commitment to Israel: the Public scolding of Israel for alleged intransigence after the initial failure to arrange a Sinai disengagement; the unseemly haggling over funds to Israel for the transition quarter; the start of a military supply line to Egypt and the evident limitless sales of arms to Arab nations still hostile to the existence of a secure Israel; and the on-and-off again positions of support for Israel in the United Nations; and in the last few days uncontradicted stories that the United States may soon press Israel to accept the PLO as a legitimate spokesman for the Palestinians; and, just today, the Presidential veto of military credits and assistance to Israel.

All of these issues are complicated. But together -- absent unambiguous declarations and actions regarding our basic commitment to Israel's security -- these have started to give the impression that the American-Israeli connection is not what it used to be. Israel must have a committed America and it must be clear to all.

Perhaps the most unfair charge levelled against Israel in recent years is that of "intransigence." Tough, yes. Cautious, yes. Suspicious, yes. Why not -- in light of the past 28 years? But intransigent? The record eloquently refutes the charge.

The Israelis made significant territorial withdrawals in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War and then, last year, abandoned oil fields and strategic passes and even more territory in order to demonstrate its good faith. I flew over those passes. This is not a record of intransigence.

7 Temple Israel

Today, Israel pronounces its readiness to make further major territorial concessions, on all fronts, for Arab agreement to "end the state of war" -- not for a final peace agreement, not for full diplomatic recognition, but for a symbol of Arab willingness to abandon hostilities while that full peace is pursued. Intransigent? I don't think so.

If America's good offices in the Middle East negotiations are to be effective, these kinds of charges must stop. The feeding of speculation about our intentions must end. The value of our good offices in pursuit of peace depends above all upon the strength of our relationship with Israel. It must be made clear that we are unswerving in our support for Israel's right to exist at peace within secure borders.

The Administration must realize that being wishy washy or neutral is the same as being against Israel. America is Israel's only true friend which is in a position to help. No other country is willing or can provide the backing required for a fair solution to the problems of the Middle East and for Israel's quest for a just society.

Can anyone disagree with this picture of the future in the Middle East held by Golda Meir:

"I want my grandchildren to live in an Israel that is part-and-parcel of this entire area. But I don't want them to live in an Israel that will always be complimented as the only democratic state here, the only developed state. I want Israel to be part of a highly developed culturally advanced Middle East with much co-operation between its peoples. Each people maintaining its individual characteristics and yet a region that lives together. Above all, I hope that Israel will become the ideal, just society of which we dreamed."

It is that kind of vision and that kind of spirit that will make America's commitment to Israel endure.

8 Temple Israel

In public life, one is so often confronted with challenges which are morally ambiguous or hazardous. The cause of Israel is not of that kind. We can be proud of our support of Israel. For it is the cause of justice, decency and freedom.

Happy Birthday!

* * *

(3/14/76)

A Hard-Nosed Dreamer

Walter Frederick Mondale

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM

He is an unusual politician: a liberal dreamer who is always in search of compromise; a hard-nosed investigator who shuns publicity; an open, friendly man

Man
in the
News

who finds it impossible to hold a plastic smile and difficult to slap a back; an effective Senator with a broad range of legislative achievements who detests buttonholing and cajoling colleagues.

He is eager to be Vice President, he said in an interview Wednesday when he was waiting nervously in a hideaway hotel room to learn whether Jimmy Carter would tap him as his running mate, but he is not at all sure that he would like to be President.

A 'Compatible' Team

In many ways, Walter Frederick Mondale's background is the antithesis of Mr. Carter's. He was reared in a family where intellectual and cultural pursuits were placed ahead of material gain. He was an enlisted man in the Army. He is a lawyer. He entered politics as the protégé of powerful establishment figures. He has never run in a difficult election campaign.

Yet, at their joint news conference yesterday, Mr. Carter and Mr. Mondale both used the word "compatible" to describe their relationship, and there is considerable evidence that such will be the case.

Both men pride themselves on being well prepared. Mr. Carter studied intensely throughout his campaign for the Democratic Presidential nomination to gain a grasp of complex subjects. Mr. Mondale has the reputation

in Washington of being, perhaps, the best-informed member of the Senate on the entire gamut of legislative issues. Like Mr. Carter, he does his homework himself rather than relying on aides to do it for him.

Furthermore, Mr. Carter has based his campaign to a large extent on his pledge to have a compassionate administration. If there is one characteristic that has dominated Mr. Mondale's political career, it is his genuine compassion for underdogs. As Attorney General of Minnesota in the early 1960's, he fought for the right of poor defendants to be represented by public counsel. As a Senator, he has made his mark on such issues as open housing, Indian education, migrant workers and child nutrition.

"Perhaps more than anything else, I've worked on poverty," Mr. Mondale says, describing his dozen years in the Senate. "I've just spent so much time trying to understand the problems of people who don't have the power to insist on being heard."

That second sentence could have come straight from a Carter stump speech.

The sensitivity with which

Continued on Page A12, Col. 3

N.Y. TIMES
July 16, 76
kps



בלתי מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס

מס. 301

אלי: המשרד

מאמ: ורשינגטון.

מצפא.

מונדייל.

היום בבוקר התקיימה בביד יורק מסיבת עיתונאים בה הציג קרטז את סנטור מונדייל
כמועמדו למשרת סגן נשיא.

בין שאר דבריו מודע בחר דווקא במונדייל דיבר על כיסוריו כסנטור ובית שטים או
שלוש הדוגמאות שהביא להמחיש לקהל שומעיו כיסורים אלה הזכיר במיוחד את מעורבותו של
מונדייל בהחלטות הנוגעות להקדמ הסיוע לישראל.

פזבר

שהח רוחם מנכל ממנכל ארובב מעת הסברה מצפא

רע/מה

לש
דחוייה
(13/1)

המחנה:

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כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

מס. 341
נשלח 161900 יולי 76

טודי
מייד

אל: המשרד
מאת: וושינגטון

מ/נ
מ/נ

אל: שהח

הבוקר-המסתיים את סגשור מונדייל כדי להודות לו על דבריו אמר בנאומו
בועידה על ישראל והמלחמה בטרור. מונדייל התקשר תוכ 16 דקות.
לאחר שברכתיו על מינויו ועל דבריו אמר שהוא מלא תודה והערכה
על השלפונ. מכל השלפונים שקיבל יקר לו במיוחד שלפונ זה כידיד אישי
וכמעדי גדול של ישראל.
מונדייל אמר שהוא יכול להגיד לי סוד:

YOU HAVE FRIENDS ON THE TICKET

אמרתי לו שאנו יודעים זאת ואישית הוספתי שאנו בטוחים יותר מאד
שגם הוא הצטרף ל- Ticket מונדייל אמר שהוא מבינ מה שאני
אומר ואם רוצה להגיד לי שהבוקר בישיבה הראשונה שהיתה להם עלה ענין
ישראל בתור אחד הנשאים הראשונים קרטר אמר:

I AM DEVOTED TO THAT COUNTRY AND NOTHING IN THE WORLD WILL
CHANGE MY DEDICATION TO IT AND TO ITS PEOPLE

מונדייל אמר שהוא רוצה לדאוג בקרוב וביקש למסור דש חמה גם מגין
לוויאנא. חזר ואמר שיש לנו ידידי אמת בשני המועמדים וחזר וחזרה
על הברכות.

דיניץ

שהח דהמ מנכל עכרון מצפא

רע/טו

מס. 331

גשלה 161000 יולי 76

אל: המשרד

ממ: וושינגטון

משה רביב.

בנאום קבלת מועמדות המפלגה הדמוקרטית לסגן נשיא, שיבה מוגדל בועידה את פעולת
צהל, פרט לחתימות זו וזבר מעט מאוד על עניני חוץ ולא הזכיר שום מדינה אחרת
בתקשר לענין כלשהו.
לחלן הקטע:

WE REJECT, TOO, THE IDEA THAT THIS NATION MUST SIT BY PASSIVELY
WHILE TERRORISTS MAIN AND MURDER INNOCENT MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN.
IN THE EARLY YEARS OF THE 19TH CENTURY THIS NATION DEFEATED THE
BARBARY PIRATES AND GUARANTEED FREEDOM OF THE SEAS. IN THE FINAL
QUARTER OF THE 20TH CENTURY WE MUST DEFEAT THE NEW BREED OF PIRATES
AND GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF THE SKIES.

ISRAEL, ALWAYS A BULWARK OF LIBERTY, HAS SET HISTORIC EXAMPLE FOR
FREEDOM LOVING PEPOLES AROUND THE WORLD BY ITS BOLD AND DARING
MISSION IN UGANDA.

WE COMMEND THEIR COURAGE AND DARING AND PLEDGE OUR SUPPORT IN THE
CONTINUED EFFORTS OF DECENT MEN AND WOMEN TO DEFEAT THE MODERN
PIRATES OF THE SKY.

AD KAN

PAZNER==

ממכלל מעת הסכרה מצפא מזתים חקר דם אמר זאבי

שחם רזע שחבס ממכלל ממכלל

רע/טו

THESE

THESE

THESE

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BRZEZINSKI

E

Q GPE26B

EAS504 EPC310

206 :SALT - BRZEZINSKI:

WASHINGTON
, DEC 20, REUTER -- WHITE HOUSE SECURITY AFFAIRS

ADVISED ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI SAID TODAY THE UNITED STATES WOULD NEVER WEAKEN
E K
ITS NATIONAL SECURITY IN STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
(SALT) TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

OR BRZEZINSKI VOICED THE HOPE THAT TALKS BETWEEN THE U.S.
AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTERS OPENING IN GENEVA TOMORROW WOULD
SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS
A NEW SALT ACCORD.

+BUT I ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL NEVER CONSTRAIN OUR ABILITY
TO MEET OUR NATIONAL SECURITY NEEDS,+ HE TOLD THE FOREIGN
POLICY ASSOCIATION IN PREPARED REMARKS.

+A SATISFACTORY SALT AGREEMENT WILL ALLOW US TO MAINTAIN
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC ARSENAL AS A DETERRENT
AGAINST NUCLEAR WAR, BASED ON AN UNMATCHED RETALIATORY CAPABILITY
IN THE EVENT THAT SUCH A WAR SHOULD EVER BREAK OUT.+

MR BRZEZINSKI, FREQUENTLY DESCRIBED IN THE SOVIET PRESS AS
ANTI-SOVIET, SAID THE UNITED STATES GENUINELY WANTED TO WIDEN
THE SCOPE OF U.S.-SOVIET ACCOMMODATION.
W MORE RH/RB/FI

Handwritten in red:
END/190155Z

211 :SALT - BRZEZINSKI 2 WASHINOTTN:
THE WHITE HOUSE ADVISER ADDED THAT HIS REMARKS APPLIED NO
ONLY TO SOVIET-AMERICAN BILATERAL RELATIONS BUT ALSO TO +THE
NEED TO EXERCISE
ESTRAINT IN REGARD TO GLOBAL AND REGIONAL
RBULANCE.+

E APPARENTLY WAS REFERRING TO U.S. CONCERN, OPENLY
EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT CARTER AND OTHER OFFICIALS, OVER SOVIET
ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE.

MR BRZEZINSKI SAID PRESIDENT CARTER WAS ABOUT TO MAKE
CRUCIAL DECISIONS ON U.S. SECURITY, INCLUDING THE NEED TO
IMPROVE AMERICA'S MISSILE ARSENAL AND CORRECT WHAT HE CALLED
ITS IMPENDING VULNERABILITY TO A SURPRISE ATTACK.

HE ALSO MENTIONED THE NEED FOR IMP
VEMENTS IN COMMAND AND
CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS TO STRENGTHEN PRESIDENT CARTER'S ABILITY
TO MANAGE CRISES AND CONFLICTS.

+OUR FIRST PURPOSE
MAINS, AS ALWAYS, TO DISSUADE A
OPPONENT FROM INITIATING AN ATTACK,+ HE SAID.

MR BRZEZINSKI DESCRIBED PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION TO ESTABLISH
NORMAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA ON JANUARY 1 AS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT
DEVELOPMENT IN RECENT HISTORY.

+A STRONG AND SECURE CHINA CAN CONTRIBUTE TO INTERNATIONAL
STABILITY,+ HE SAID.

REUTER RH/RB/FI



11

CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

111 EAST WACKER DRIVE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60601
PHONE (312) 644-4140

קונסוליה כללית
של ישראל

232

יה בתש"ס
19 באוקטובר 1978

אל: חנן בר-און הציר וושינגטון
מצפ"א

מאת: הקונסוליה הכללית, שיקאגו

הנדון: ביקורו של בז'יז'ינסקי בשיקאגו

בז'יז'ינסקי הוזמן להיות הנואם הראשי בארוחת הערב השנתית של
מכון וייצמן.

לפי הצעתי בז'יז'ינסקי התקבל בשדה התעופה ע"י ריימונד אפשטיין
ומימון וישנר בשם כל הארגונים היהודיים של שיקאגו. בדרך משדה התעופה
העירה עיקר השיחה נסובה על נושא אחד - ירושלים. אפשטיין ווישנר בחרו
את הנושא הזה כנושא מרכזי לדבר עליו ולהדגיש את נחישתו של כל הציבור
היהודי בארה"ב לעמוד לצד הממשלה במאבקה על שלימות ירושלים. תשובותיו
של בז'יז'ינסקי היו אוהדות אך לא יותר כטובן.

לפני ארוחת הערב דומנו כ-30 ממנהיגי הקהילה כאן לשיחה עם פרופ'
בז'יז'ינסקי. השיחה התנהלה בדרך של שאלות ותשובות.

בין התשובות של בז'יז'ינסקי:
אין לממשלת ארה"ב מדיניות ברורה לגבי הפתרון בלבנון מקווים להגיע
להבנה מסוימת עם הממשלה הסובייטית אך הוא אינו בטוח שהדבר יביא את
הפתרונות. ממשלת ארה"ב התמך ביוזמת ממשלת צרפת אם היא התגבש. ברור
שלממשלת ארה"ב אין כל כוונה ומחשבה להתערב בכח בנעשה בלבנון.

לגבי הגדה הערכת השגרירות שלהם וכן הערכתו של אתרתון היא שיש
ציבור שמוכן יהיה להתפטר עם ממשלות מצרים וישראל להקמת המנהל
האדמיניסטרטיבי, יש גם מתנגדים קולניים וקשה לקבוע היום ידו של
איזה צד תהיה על העליונה.

להערכתו של בז'יז'ינסקי לאוסטין לא תהיה ברירה אלא להצטרף
לשיחות במסגרת הסכמי קמפ-דיויד. לדעתו גם תשובת הסעודים אם כי לא
היתה מספקת הרי גם לא היתה מאכזבת.



1975-1976
1975-1976

CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
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1975-1976



CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

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- 2 -

קונסוליה כללית
של ישראל

בכל דבריו שילב ושיזר בז'יז'ינסקי דיברי שבח לצוות הישראלי של קמפ דייויד וכו'.

אם היה בכוונתי לתח לבז'יז'ינסקי תחושה שקהילת שיקאגו מאוחדת ומלוכדת מאחורי עמדותיה של ממשלת ישראל הרי שהמטרה הזו הושגה בלי ספק. את בז'יז'ינסקי ליווה ג'רי שכטר ממשרדו של דובר הביח הלבן.

ארוחת הערב עצמה היתה ארוץ מוצלח ביותר בהשתתפות כ-1600 איש שכ-30% מהם היו לא יהודים, אנשי מדע, תעשייה ובנקאות הגדולים בעיר.

נאומי של בז'יז'ינסקי כלל כמה אפיוזות אישיות של מפגשים עם ישראלים וערבים בקמפ דייויד דברים שלא היו בטקסט מודפס. הנאום היה הרצאה מבריקה על בעיות מדיניות חוץ של ארה"ב בעולם המשתנה של סוף המאה העשרים. לא היתה בנאום ההיחטות ישירה לענייני ישראל והמזה"ת.

כפי שאמרתי הארוחה היתה מוצלחת. נדמה לי שבז'יז'ינסקי היה מאושר, ההקבל בכבוד רב. כידוע לך הוא קצת חשש לפני שקבל את תזמנת מכון וייצמן ואם כראי לעסוק בקרוב לבבות הרי זו היתה פעולה מוצלחת בכוון זה.

בברכת מועדים לשמחה

נחום שמיר



מדינת ישראל
תש"ח

CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
111 EAST WACKER DRIVE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60601
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

המשרד הכלכלי של מדינת ישראל, תש"ח, מס' 1000/57
המשרד הכלכלי של מדינת ישראל, תש"ח, מס' 1000/57

המשרד הכלכלי של מדינת ישראל, תש"ח, מס' 1000/57
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המשרד הכלכלי של מדינת ישראל, תש"ח, מס' 1000/57

המשרד הכלכלי של מדינת ישראל, תש"ח, מס' 1000/57
המשרד הכלכלי של מדינת ישראל, תש"ח, מס' 1000/57

משרד הכלכלה

Official Stamp and Signature

ג'רוזלם פוסט

משרד החוץ

25. IX. 1978

מל:

Brzezinski plays down settlement freeze issue

Jerusalem Post Correspondent
WASHINGTON. — Making light of the controversy surrounding the length of a moratorium on new Jewish settlements in the West Bank agreed on in the Camp David accords, U.S. national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski said yesterday that there was not much difference

between Israel and America on this point.

Speaking on ABC television, Brzezinski asserted that although no period had been fixed for negotiations on setting up an autonomous authority on the West Bank, at a certain stage the Israelis said it could take three months.

Brzezinski, one of the principal members of the U.S. delegation at Camp David, said he believed the settlement freeze issue would be resolved quickly. According to what he remembered, since he didn't have the notes before him, the relevant reference to the freeze was: "Following the signature of the framework and during the negotiations, there will be no further settlement activity, and after the negotiations for the setting up of the

self-governing authority have been completed, the issue will go up for negotiation."

Brzezinski played down the rejection of the Camp David accords by Arab hard-liners and said he hoped moderate Arab states would soon join Egypt in the peace process.

Asked about King Hussein of Jordan's talks with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in Amman at the end of last week, the national security adviser said on ABC's "Issues and Answers" programme: "We want to be as helpful and as forthcoming to King Hussein as we possibly can. We understand his problem. We understand his difficulties. We can even appreciate some of his inhibitions. None the less, we feel strongly that we now have a viable framework for peace and only Hussein will benefit

and only the Arabs will benefit and indeed ultimately the Israelis as well, if all of the moderate parties take part in that process."

Asked about Syria's stand, Brzezinski replied: "Clearly, Syria is a concerned party and at some point Syria will, we hope, come in and also negotiate a peace treaty with Israel."

"Until that is done, we will not have the final settlement for which we all yearn and which is so much needed by that region."

Does the U.S. want the Soviet Union to come in to the process? "If the Soviet Union wishes to involve itself in promoting accommodation between the parties concerned...certainly no one would object," he said.

(Related story by Wolf Blitzer back page.)

FOR A STRONG ECONOMY
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
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הוא ערב כלכלה.
קוסינגר ציין כי התכנסו עשרות
מאפשר לכוונות ישראלים מסוימים
להשיג את המטרות המוגדרות ביניהם
והוא ציין גם שערב התקיימו שנים אם
כי לא התקיימה כלכלה מוגבלת.



Professor Bz~~ur~~inski on 18 October 1977

As far as my remarks are concerned, I stand by them. I think the US, given the fact that it does enjoy trust among the Arabs and among the Israelis, that it is the only outside party that enjoys that relationship with Israel and with the Arab States, has not only an opportunity but an obligation to try to bring to a settlement a conflict which is destructive to the interests of many parties. I think we analyze the consequences of that conflict not only for the Mideast region but for the US specifically, or specifically for Israel, or specifically only for the international economy. One readily reaches the conclusion this is a very destructive conflict which, if persisting, will poison international relationship and create truly dangerous circumstances. I think the statement I made is a reasonable statement which all Americans will agree and I think this is precisely why the parties to the conflict want us to be as engaged as we are in the promotion of arrangements which will facilitate direct negotiations between them.

I think that the President and the Vice-President have repeatedly stated that it is not in our interest to threaten the viability of Israel as a form of persuasion. It seems to us, and I think this is a judgement which is both psychologically and morally quite wrong, to threaten someone's sense of security when at the same time, you are trying to persuade that someone to engage in a process, the outcome of which is to be a negotiated settlement designed to enhance their security. I think threat, direct or indirect, to the economy or political or security viability of Israel, would have the most devastating political and psychological consequences. I think one has to be aware of not only the psychological situation but to its total history and I think any morally sensitive person cannot forget what has happened in the last 30 or 40 years in the world, and I think this in itself ought to condition our conduct.

The fact of the matter is that all military or economical arrangements between Israel and the US are negotiated between the two parties and that is a fact of life and that has always been the case and that will continue to be the case. These negotiations have been conducted in good faith and will be conducted in good faith.

Both questions simply overstate the degree of convergence. I think there has been definitely some narrowing of US-Soviet differences in regard to the Mideast and the joint US-Soviet statement reflects that narrowing and by the same token, indeed some moderation in Soviet policies on formulations regarding some very sensitive issues. I don't think that implies by any degree a joint US-Soviet approach with regard to the nature of the ultimate settlement.

We have not spoken to the Soviets about the nature of the ultimate settlement and our position is that once the necessary preparations have been made for the Geneva Conference, both procedurally and substantively, we want the parties themselves to negotiate the settlement.

And, therefore, it would not be in keeping with that approach to try to formulate a joint US-Soviet concept of a settlement.

and question - simply overstate the damage of counterforce.

That there has been a change in the nature of the damage is not in doubt. The damage is now more extensive and more varied. It is no longer limited to the physical destruction of the target itself, but extends to the damage to the target's economy, to the damage to the target's infrastructure, to the damage to the target's population, and to the damage to the target's environment. I don't think that implies any change in the nature of the damage.

It is the nature of the damage.

We have not changed the nature of the damage. We have only changed the nature of the damage. The damage is now more extensive and more varied. It is no longer limited to the physical destruction of the target itself, but extends to the damage to the target's economy, to the damage to the target's infrastructure, to the damage to the target's population, and to the damage to the target's environment. I don't think that implies any change in the nature of the damage.

And, of course, it would not be in conflict with the statement that the damage is now more extensive and more varied. It is no longer limited to the physical destruction of the target itself, but extends to the damage to the target's economy, to the damage to the target's infrastructure, to the damage to the target's population, and to the damage to the target's environment. I don't think that implies any change in the nature of the damage.

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מצפא

אשתדורס הופיע יועץ הנשיא לענייני בטחון לאומי, בודזינסקי בהופעה פומבית לפני עתונאים

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קנדיה לפני שבועיים בו דכיר על זכותה של ארוב להשתמש ב- LEVERAGE שלה

אל ישראל אמר:

Prof Bzinsky (?)
Oct 18. 1977.

AS FAR AS MY REMARKS ARE CONCERNED I STAND BY THEM. I THINK THE US, GIVEN THE FACT THAT IT DOES ENJOY TRUST AMONG THE ARABS AND AMONG THE ISRAELIS, THAT IT IS THE ONLY OUTSIDE PARTY THAT ENJOYS THAT RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL AND WITH ARAB STATES, HAS NOT ONLY AN OPPORTUNITY BUT AN OBLIGATION TO TRY TO BRING TO A SETTLEMENT A CONFLICT WHICH IS DISTRUCTIVE TO THE INTERESTS OF MANY PARTIES. I THINK WE ANALYZE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THAT CONFLICT NOT ONLY FOR THE MIDEAST REGION BUT FOR THE US SPECIFICALLY, OR SPECIFICALLY FOR ISRAEL, OR SPECIFICALLY ONLY FOR THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY. ONE READILY REACHES THE CONCLUSION THIS IS A VERY DISTRUCTIVE CONFLICT WHICH IF PERSISTING WILL POISON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIP AND CREATE TRULY DANGEROUS CIRCUMSTANCES. I THINK THE STATEMENT I MADE IS A REASONABLE STATEMENT WHICH ALL AMERICAN WILL AGREE AND I THINK THIS IS PRECISELY WHY THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT WANT US TO BE AS ENGAGED AS WE ARE IN THE PROMOTION OF ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL FACILITATE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THEM. I THINK THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE PRESIDENT HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED THAT IT IS NOT OUR INTEREST TO THREATEN THE VIABILITY OF ISRAEL AS A FORM OF RESUASION. IT SEEMS TO US AND I THINK THIS IS A JUDGEMENT WHICH IS BOTH PSYCOLOGICALLY AND MORALLY QUITE WRONG TO THREATEN SOMEONE'S SENSE OF SECURITY WHEN AT THE SAME TIME YOU ARE TRYING TO PERSUADE THAT SOMEONE TO ENGAGE IN A PROCESS THE OUTCOME OF WHICH IS TO BE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT MDESIGNED TO ENHANCE THEIR SECURITY. I THINK THREAT, DIRECT OR INDIRECT TO THE ECONOMY OR POLITICAL OR SECURITY VIABILITY OF ISRAEL WOULD HAVE THE MOST DEVASTATING POLITICAL AND PSYCOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES. I THINK ONE HAS TO BE AWAREERE OF NOT ONLY THE PSYCOLOGICAL SITUATION BUT TO ITS TOTAL HISTORY AND I THINK ANY MORALLY SENSITIVE PERSON CANNOT FORGET WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN THE LAST 30 OR 40 YEARS IN THE WORLD AND I THINK THIS IN ITSELF OUGHT TO CONDITION OUR CONDUCT.

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KAN NSHAAL AKATAV AIM BECHOL ZOT YESHVA EFSHARUT BEYEDEY ARAAB
LEAFIL LECHATZIM, AL KACH, ANA BZAZINSKI =

THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT ALL MILITARY OR ECONOMICAL
ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE US ARE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE
TWO PARTIES AND THAT IS A FACT OF LIFE AND THAT HAS ALWAYS BEEN
THE CASE AND THAT WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE. THESE NEGOTIATIONS
HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED IN GOOD FAITH AND WILL BE CONDUCTED IN GOOD
FAITH.

BITSHUVA LISHEELA AL AHODAA AAMERICANIT -SOVIETIM, AMAR:

BOTH QUESTIONS SIMPLY OVESTATE THE DEGREE OF CONVERGENCE. I THINK
THERE HAS BEEN DEFINITELY SOME NARROWING OF US-SOVIET DIFFERENCE
IN REGARD TO THE MIDEAST AND THE JOINT US-SOVIET STATEMENT REFLECTS
THAT NARROWING AND BY THE SAME TOKEN INDEED SOME MODERATION IN
SOVIET POLICIES OR FORMULATIONS REGARDING SOME VERY SENSITIVE
ISSUES. I DON'T THINK THAT IMPLIES BY ANY DEGREE, A JOINT US- SOVIET
APPROACH WITH REGARD TO THE NATURE OF THE ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT.
WE HAVE NOT SPOKEN TO THE SOVIETS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE
ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT AND OUR POSITION IS THAT ONCE THE NECESSARY
PREPARATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR GENEVA CONFERENCE BOTH PROCEDURALLY
AND SUBSTITUTIVELY WE WANT THE PARTIES THEMSELVES TO NEGOTIATE
THE SETTLEMENT.
AND THEREFORE IT WOULD NOT BE IN KEEPING WITH THAT APPROACH TO TRY
TO FORMULATE A JOINT US-SOVIET CONCEPT OF A SETTLEMENT.

AD KAN

PAZNER

זו דהם מכלל שחבט ומכלל סמבולמפא הסכנה מעת חפזות מזחית באום אב וקור דם אמר
תעיד אלסר ועדת חוב

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A REPORTER AT LARGE

BRZEZINSKI

WHEN a President makes foreign policy, only a handful of people are directly involved: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Under Jimmy Carter, this group also includes the Vice-President, certain trusted domestic advisers, and, occasionally, another Cabinet officer, such as the Secretary of the Treasury. At the center of the system for making foreign and defense policy is the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski is the person who spends the most time with the President on the broad range of questions this group must deal with, and is the one who most often presents the policy alternatives to the President and interprets the President's directives to the others.

The job of formulating foreign policy these days is complicated by the

historical setting. The Vietnam war shattered old assumptions about American influence and power and the uses to which that power could be put, and left no generally accepted guide for our future behavior. Within our government, even among this small group of men, there are differences over what, exactly, the lessons of Vietnam are. At the same time, the issue of how to conduct our relations with the Soviet Union remains very much in question and under debate among these men. Also at the same time, there are other forces to contend with, in the form of new, assertive movements and nations, and of new kinds of world influence—in particular, the power of those who hold commodities that are in demand. The old "bipolar" struggle and the new "multipolar" world combine in complex and sometimes confounding ways. The people now struggling with these problems are dealing with a world

that is no less dangerous and far more complicated than any that their predecessors had to deal with.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI's personality and style embrace a number of contradictions. He can be a man of charm, graciousness, cheerfulness, and vivacity, and he has a deep streak of fun in him. He has, for all his sophistication, a certain childlike quality that can be appealing. He can also be cold, arrogant, insensitive, peremptory with others; he has a combative nature, and, according to the testimony of a number of people who have observed him, he is often inclined toward debate rather than discussion, and enjoys putting people down and making jokes—sometimes unkind ones—at others' expense. People have observed him to be patient, controlled, and decent, and also impatient, mercurial, and a bit mean. He is described as a person who can show

equanimity and can be temperamental, as one who can be both stubborn and flexible. His taut, compact body and angular features give him a look of energy and alertness. Brzezinski has high cheekbones, a sharp nose, narrow blue eyes, arched eyebrows, and sandy hair that sweeps in a large wave in front and is short on the sides, and shoots straight up in back, making it reminiscent of the fifties. He was born in Poland of an aristocratic family, and in 1938, when he was ten, they moved to Canada, to which his father was posted as a diplomat. They stayed in Canada after Poland was taken over by the Communists at the end of the Second World War. His wife, Emilie, or Muška, is a grandniece of Eduard Beneš, who was the President of the last free government of Czechoslovakia. Muška Brzezinski is an attractive woman and, like her husband, a strong and spirited personality. The Brzezinskis are practicing Catholics, and have three children. Though Brzezinski is protective and private about his family life, and despite all



"Well, here comes the old masculine mystique."

the pressures of his job, he manages to be present at parties of the powerful in Washington.


Brzezinski is often described by his associates as an "aristocrat," by which they mean not just his breeding but his manner in dealing with his colleagues. At the office, one of his associates said to me recently, he is "the *fonctionnaire*," the official; he doesn't form deep relationships through his work. It seems that, in fact, he has always been a bit on his own: he went from McGill University, in Canada, to Harvard, where he did graduate work and taught for a while; when he did not receive tenure, he went on to Columbia, where he set up his own institute, the Research Institute on Communist Affairs. He operated within the academic community but always as a sort of separate state, maintaining contacts with people who could help his career along. Similarly, according to several of his associates and many people throughout the government, he is essentially a loner in this Administration. He is described as without allies in the bureaucracy and also as without much sense of how to develop allies. Even those who defend him say that he simply isn't very good at dealing with people. They say that he often gives offense without realizing it; that, for all his emphasis on "collegiality"—a word he often uses to refer to his relations with his staff and with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown—he demonstrates little sense of the need to cultivate relationships that would help him in his present job. Collegiality, of course, is, as some people from the academic world point out, a fiction: the pretense of camaraderie among highly rivalrous people. One of Brzezinski's friends has suggested to me that his childlikeness has its charm but is a questionable quality for the job he is in. He said that Brzezinski has a freshness—in the good sense—about him and a taste for simple things, such as taking a walk; that he likes fresh ideas; that he is a person of enthusiasms. It is the enthusiasms that can cause difficulty. This person went on to say, explaining why Brzezinski is not very popular in this Administration, "Zbig rubs people wrong because he's a smart-assed intellectual. So are others around this town, but he's more so." To many, he seems to have the cocksureness of someone who was always

the brightest kid in the class. (Interestingly, the characteristic of having been the brightest kid in the class is one that the President shares.) He is generally described as bright and quick, but by several as a bit too bright, too quick. Of the many people I have discussed the subject of Brzezinski with, hardly any have used the word "thoughtful."

Brzezinski's childlike quality, his friend said, produces an awkwardness in his dealings with people. I pointed out that Brzezinski often seemed to try hard at friendliness, and this person laughed and said yes, but that was the problem—he seemed so often to be making an effort. Brzezinski retains an accent, which gives a certain staccato quality to his speech. When one enters his office, he will say, "Hi! How's life?" or even, "Howdy!" He doesn't just take pains to point out how collegial things are with Vance and Brown; he talks of his relationships with—landing on the words like a cymbal clash—"Cy!" and "Harold!" Once when I was interviewing him—shortly after I had seen a brief display of his temper—he paced about the office playfully tossing a pillow in the air. I had the impression that he was the sort of fellow who enjoyed tossing a pillow in the air and also that he wanted me to know that he was

the sort of fellow who enjoyed tossing a pillow in the air. He gets a kick out of the machinery in his home and in his office which indicates how close he is to the most sensitive secrets, the most fateful decisions. Early one evening, I was talking with him as the President was arriving back in Washington from a brief vacation in Georgia. Brzezinski has in his office a machine, rather like a small television set, that tells him where the President is at any moment.

When the President moves from one place to another, the machine lets out a small beep. As we talked, the beeps indicated that the President had landed at Andrews Air Force Base, the President had boarded his helicopter, and so on, until the President's helicopter landed on the White House lawn. Each time the machine beeped, even though it was fairly clear what the beeps indicated, Brzezinski raced over to see what the machine was saying. Perhaps this was because Brzezinski was rather keyed up: as soon as the President landed, there was to be a meeting of Carter, Brown, Vance, Brzezinski,



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

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and Vice-President Walter Mondale on, I later learned, the neutron weapon.

No one questions that Brzezinski has a talent as a synthesizer or that he is creative. Brzezinski is a conceptualizer, who has made his way by means of the use of words. His career has been marked by an outpouring of books, articles, columns. He is a skilled entrepreneur of ideas, and, as one of his former colleagues at Columbia says, "sometimes it comes off and sometimes it doesn't." He is often described as articulate, and he can sound brilliant, dazzling. It is sometimes not clear to people afterward how much he has actually said. Articulativeness takes various forms. Some people are articulate in that they can express a thought clearly and succinctly. Brzezinski tends to be wordy. Moreover, many see his style as one that employs inflated words and thus inflates the thought. He likes big words, and he likes to coin new terms and striking phrases. One of his books is titled "Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era." A "technetronic society," according to Brzezinski, is "a society that is shaped culturally, psychologically, socially and economically by the impact of technology and electronics." In a speech in 1977 before the Trilateral Commission, of which he was director before he joined the government, he said:


In some regards, the crisis of the spirit in recent years has been specifically American; in a larger sense, it has been part of the broader malaise of the West; in some respects, it is related to the political awakening of mankind, which has had the effect of transforming heretofore seemingly universal Western values into an apparently parochial perspective. As a crisis of historical confidence, and of international relevance to a world that seemingly rejects Western values, its essence has been well expressed by Hermann Hesse writing in "Steppenwolf"...

One of his aides says that Brzezinski's mind is so quick that it sometimes gets out ahead of him. Sometimes the words do, too. During an appearance on "Face the Nation" early this year, Brzezinski suggested that the border clash between Vietnam and Cambodia was the first case of a "proxy war" between China and the Soviet Union. Asked if there were any intelligence reports that Chinese or Soviet advisers were involved, he replied that there were not. In fact, the intelligence reports indicated that China, being weaker than the Soviet Union and allied with the weaker of the two warring

nations (Cambodia), did not want a war between those nations to take place. When I asked him recently about the statement, he offered this explanation: "I probably should not have used the word 'war.' I should have said 'proxy conflict.' The war between the two countries has deep-seated historical roots. But the conflict between the two major countries is a proxy conflict." I asked him if he thought that the two major countries were promoting the war, and he replied, "The two major countries are not necessarily promoting it, but both are interested in the outcome, because it can determine how Indo-China is organized. If Hanoi emerges, that enhances the Soviet role."

Brzezinski was one of the first of the contenders for a foreign-policy position in a Democratic Administration who paid attention to Carter. They met through the Trilateral Commission, an organization started by David Rockefeller in 1973. The idea behind the commission, which was developed when John Connally, then Secretary of the Treasury, was applying economic shock treatment to our allies, was that economic and foreign policy should be made in cooperation with our European and Japanese allies. A number of lawyers, businessmen, academics, and others who move in and out of the foreign-policy field were invited to become members. Several politicians were also invited to join, and the story goes that those forming the commission thought it should include a Southern governor and that the choice came down to Carter, then governor of Georgia, or Reubin Askew, governor of Florida. Brzezinski was one of those who were instrumental in selecting Carter for the commission (an idea that has several claimants). Through the commission, Carter got exposure to foreign-policy questions, and came to know Brzezinski. They spent a good bit of time together at a meeting that the commission held in Japan in May of 1975, where Carter made a foreign-policy speech of which he was said to be quite proud. Brzezinski reviewed and discussed the speech with him before it was given, and following the speech Brzezinski praised Carter from the rostrum as a candidate who was not afraid to speak out on the issues. Brzezinski, not unlike other ambitious people in the foreign-policy field—or, for that matter, the domestic field—was known to be on the lookout for a Presidential candidate whose success could bring him a high government position. The main difference between Brzezinski and most of the

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THE TASTE MAKER

others was in the degree of effort he put into the enterprise; he had gained something of a reputation for sending his writings around, with notes attached, and making himself available to various potential candidates. He had served from 1966 to 1968 on the policy-planning staff of the State Department and had been one of the most public of the defenders of the Vietnam war, participating—using his debating skills—in the "teach-ins" that took place during those years. Gradually, he modified his views. (On a "Face the Nation" appearance late last year, he described the Vietnam war this way: "What started off as an act of counterintervention against a foreign intervention became a national-liberation struggle, and we got bogged down in it.") He directed Hubert Humphrey's foreign-policy task forces during Humphrey's 1968 Presidential campaign, and in subsequent years made himself available to Humphrey, Henry Jackson, Walter Mondale, Edward Kennedy, and Birch Bayh. Politicians, busy people, are attracted to the good briefing officer—the person who can sum up a problem in a way that seems intelligent, clear, and useful. People who are hesitant, who suggest too many dilemmas and shadings, do not do so well. Brzezinski often impresses people as a good briefing officer. To Carter, as other Carter aides see it, Brzezinski came on as a man with a world view, a global thinker. Kissinger and Brzezinski are said to have been rivals for years—during a luncheon at the State Department for outside academics and others in 1973, at the time Kissinger was national-security adviser and Secretary of State, Kissinger turned to Brzezinski and said, "Zbig, you want this job"—and the irony is that Kissinger, for all the unpopularity of his policies, helped pave the way for Brzezinski. Some think even the accent was a factor.

One word that is frequently used in descriptions of Brzezinski by people in the government is "impulsive." Members of his own staff say that they have learned not to act at once on some of his instructions but to wait awhile and then try to get him to change his mind. He is an activist, and he works for an activist President, whom he briefs at the beginning of each day. Some staff members say that Brzezinski, who tends to combativeness in any event, often seems particularly feisty after these morning meetings, and comes back with ideas or instructions that are best allowed to cool. An official

of the State Department who is in a position to know about these things says that the Department also feels it necessary to deflect some ideas that come from the President by way of Brzezinski. "It's part of Brzezinski's make-up to react quickly," says one official. Brzezinski is often described as a less settled personality, as a person with less ballast, than his principal counterparts, Brown and Vance, as more eager to assert himself and demonstrate

his—and this country's—"toughness." For all the rhetoric in Carter's speeches, and Brzezinski's own writing and speeches, about there now being a new kind of world, Brzezinski's essential reaction to events, according to many witnesses, is to see them in

terms of the rivalry of the Soviet Union and the United States. They add that Brzezinski, for his part, is frequently eager to take actions that challenge—the Soviet Union. One official has told me, "His first, flash-point reaction usually has an anti-Soviet tone, but after discussion, when there is time to get other opinions, it turns out that that may be his first reaction but not necessarily his final reaction. That's a good quality. But it puts a high premium on there being time for subsequent reactions." When I asked the official what context this comes up in, he replied, "It would be too much to say it comes up everywhere—but only a little."


Staff members say that Brzezinski is not inflexible, and tell of times when they were able to persuade him to change his mind. "His mind can be changed when you can pin him down," one aide says. They say that he invites discussion and disagreement, does not mind dissent from his opinions, and is also willing to turn around and go in and try to change the President's mind—and has succeeded in doing so. "Of all of the people in this Administration," says one foreign-policy official, "Zbig is the one most able to do something strikingly good and the most likely to do something strikingly bad." He explains that Brzezinski is capable of an original insight, of making a connection between things that no one else could see, and that he is also capable of the greatest mistake in judgment. A number of people stress the point that, in addition to the numerous times Brzezinski, Vance, and Brown meet, they spend a great deal of time on the phone with each other. Also, Brown and Vance do have their own access to the President. But they must decide



how often they want to use it. Moreover, Vance spends a great deal of time out of the country. There is no question that, of them all, Brzezinski spends by far the most time with the President. George Ball once said, "Nothing propinques like propinquity." It is Brzezinski's role to present the views of the others to the President, but he and his associates make it clear that he does not hesitate to press his own views as well. This gets to the question of how the national-security system is supposed to and does work.

THE way the national-security system of any Administration works is inevitably a reflection of the President as well as of the major officials involved. Every President has to have some kind of apparatus for coordinating the making of foreign policy, because so many parts of the government have a claim on that policy. The State and Defense Departments are the most obvious ones, but other departments, even the Agriculture Department, take actions that affect our relations with other nations. The State Department and the Defense Department are bound to view several important questions from different perspectives, and over the years there have been towering arguments between them. Someone has to help the President sort all this out, and has to coordinate the execution of his policy decisions. That was the original idea of having a National Security Council. The whole thing gets a bit more complicated when, as has happened in recent years, the N.S.C. weighs in with a voice of its own. When people speak of the National Security Council and of the N.S.C., they are actually talking about two somewhat different things: the formal group of top-level officials which helps the President make and carry out foreign and military policy, and the substantial staff that works under the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Increasingly, the term "N.S.C." is applied to the latter.

The National Security Council was created in 1947 as a reform of the way national-security policy was made, and it was charged by statute with advising the President "with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security." The statutory members of the National Security Council are the President, the Vice-President, and the Secretaries of State and Defense. Listed as official advisers are the director of the C.I.A. and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Oth-



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ers who might be called in are the Secretary of the Treasury, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Attorney General, and the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. President Eisenhower, who believed in tidy organization, relied heavily on the National Security Council, but the dominant foreign-policy figure of his Administration was Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. During the Nixon Administration, by contrast, Henry Kissinger dominated foreign policy while he was serving as national-security adviser (in 1973, he became both Secretary of State and national-security adviser, and then, in 1975, just Secretary of State, with his former deputy in the national-security job). The National Security Council structure began to reach its modern form under John F. Kennedy, who ordered a revision after the Bay of Pigs.

The national-security adviser can play a number of roles: the presenter to the President of the options developed in consultations with the relevant agencies; personal adviser to the President; coordinator of the management of foreign and military policy. Some men who have held the job have seen it more in terms of presenting the options, some more in terms of presenting their own advice. Brzezinski represents himself as doing both, and this dual capacity causes some mistrust and some confusion elsewhere in the government. It is also said by a number of people that Brzezinski lacks understanding of the coordinating function, of how to make the machinery of government work. The national-security adviser and his staff may also have to spur action, head off action, guide diplomatic negotiations. "I'm a synthesizer, analyzer, coordinator," Brzezinski said to me recently. "I might also be alerter, energizer, implementer, mediator, even lightning rod. All of these roles I play at different times, depending on the issues."

Just as President Carter has preferred not to have a chief of staff on domestic affairs, he has preferred to have no dominant figure on questions of foreign policy. And just as he would be criticized for having one person through whom everything concerning domestic policy had to be filtered, he would be criticized for having such an arrangement for foreign policy. But it is one thing, especially when it comes to foreign policy, to have a number of ideas flowing in to

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a President and another to have a cacophony of voices flowing out, speaking to the world about what our policy is.

Vance, Mondale, and Brzezinski—along with, in recent months, Hamilton Jordan, the President's chief domestic adviser—meet with the President for breakfast each Friday morning; and Brown, Vance, and Brzezinski meet for lunch almost every week. "The National Security Council is a handful of people whom the President gathers when he chooses," says one foreign-policy official. The official National Security Council itself is divided into two committees: the Policy Review Committee, to deal with special issues, in which one department has the principal role, such as arms for the Middle East (which Brown chaired), Southern Africa, or the Far East (which Vance chaired); and the Special Coordination Committee, which deals with questions, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) or the Horn of Africa, that cut across agency jurisdictions and which Brzezinski always chairs. Officials these days make much of the fact that the chairing of some of these meetings is shared, in contrast to Kissinger's time, when he chaired almost all committee meetings. Since so many people made a point of telling me recently that the chairing of the committees was shared, I asked what difference it made. One of the more straightforward officials said that since the draft paper is drawn up by the agency whose representative chairs the meeting, that agency has some advantage. These things are taken very seriously. One member of the N.S.C. staff said to me recently that the questions usually asked by outsiders—"Who's ahead?" or "Who is more powerful?"—aren't the right questions. "The real question," he said, "is 'Who's got the running on this issue?' That's what we look at."

The N.S.C. staff is composed of thirty professionals, whose responsibilities are divided among the regions of the world—reflecting the regional divisions in the State Department—and among intelligence and defense matters. As a symbol of new emphases, Brzezinski also created staff positions to handle what have come to be called "North-South" questions—economic issues between the developing and the developed nations—and "global" issues, which include arms transfers, human rights, and nuclear proliferation. N.S.C. jobs are valued by people on the rise in the fields of foreign policy and national security, and the present staff members are, by and large, highly in-



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telligent and capable people. Relations between the members of the N.S.C. staff and their counterparts at the State Department vary. The people at the N.S.C. and the State Department who handle the Middle East, for example, are said to work together smoothly, whereas there has been considerable friction between the man who handles Latin America policy for the N.S.C. and the people at the State Department who deal with the region, the State Department's Latin America bureau being relatively traditional and resistant to change.

Great mounds of paper move from the agencies to the N.S.C. staff, which communicates by phone or memo, or at meetings, with counterparts throughout the government. A State Department official estimates that less than five per cent of the information that goes from the Department to the N.S.C. actually goes from Vance to Brzezinski. The N.S.C. staff sees the intelligence reports that are received by the State Department. Even the N.S.C. staff has difficulty keeping up. One staff member told me recently, "I spend all my time on one area, and I realize that I skim off only a tiny percentage of what I should know. There are at least two or three hundred items a day in my 'in' box. I have to sort out what it's essential for Zbig and the President to know. When I think of how hard it is for me to stay on top of things, I have to believe that it's impossible for the President, Vance, and Brzezinski." An aide to Brzezinski estimates that some three hundred and fifty pages reach Brzezinski's desk each day, and that about a fourth of what reaches Brzezinski will reach the President. Memos to the President from the agencies that are concerned with national-security affairs go through Brzezinski, who will put his own covering memo on them—which the other agencies do not see. This, too, is the kind of thing that is taken seriously in the government. One State Department official says, "As a practical matter, if I worked in the White House, I wouldn't want to have to clear that covering memo with the department. It would take too much time. But that memo is tremendous power, as is anything the N.S.C. staff wants to put on top of what comes from State and Defense." In addition, every evening Vance sends a report directly to the President which Brzezinski later sees. However, if it suggests any action, Brzezinski has a chance to comment

on it before it reaches the President. And, in addition, staff members send Brzezinski nightly reports on what they did that day, intelligence matters they think he should be aware of, and even which journalists they spoke with and what sorts of questions the journalists were asking.

Brzezinski is said to be quick with paperwork, but some staff members say he is so quick that they sometimes wonder how much he has absorbed. Others complain that from time to time the paperwork can get quite backed up. But people who worked for Kissinger say that often they didn't know what happened to the papers they sent in. Kissinger was secretive with his staff; Brzezinski vowed to be open with his, and he has been fairly so. He has kept his promise to hold weekly staff meetings—some of which are routine, some of which are spirited debates about, say, what to do in the Horn of Africa, or about the dollar. He has tried to remain accessible to the staff, but, as the pressures and the papers mount up, this has become more difficult. And some issues, particularly the most sensitive ones, are closely held among the principal participants. An argument could be made that these are just the ones that should receive the most airing within the government, but the theory is that this runs the risk of disclosure. After some leaks last year, particularly on matters relating to SALT—leaks that might well have come from any number of places—the N.S.C. staff was questioned severely by its senior members, and its access to information about what was going on within the N.S.C. was cut down. Once a week, the staff members prepare reports on items that might be of interest to the President; Brzezinski selects from them, adds his own views, and sends a memo to the President. Within the White House, much is made of the fact that memorandums by the staff of Stuart Eizenstat, the President's Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy, go to the President, via Eizenstat, with their own signatures on them, while memorandums by Brzezinski's staff go in with Brzezinski's signature. It is also widely noted that Eizenstat's staff has more direct dealings with the President than Brzezinski's does. In places occupied by people of ambition, these things count for a lot.

What with all the paper flow and all the meetings, one wonders how these people get much time to think, and, according to their own testimony, they



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don't. One N.S.C. staff member says, "In these jobs, we work off of our intellectual capital. We don't have the time to think new thoughts." The pressures on Brzezinski are even greater. He has to be responsive to the President, to his own counterparts, to the press, to the public, and to a highly articulate staff. Each day begins early—sometimes at seven—with preparations for his morning briefing of the President. For that, he goes over the intelligence reports that have come in overnight and been forwarded to him by the people in the Situation Room, in the White House basement. He makes notes to himself on a small white pad, in small, neat handwriting, of points he wants to bring up with the President. Then, on any given day he may have to make decisions on a range of subjects which includes the Middle East, the neutron weapon, the Horn of Africa, Rhodesia, SALT, economic questions. He will deal with the press (he gives a fair number of interviews these days), with the President's domestic advisers. He may have to help with the preparations for a Presidential trip abroad, a Presidential speech, or the visit of a foreign leader. He may also deal with questions concerning our intelligence capabilities (a matter in which he has a great interest), with a dispute over the size of the Navy. Meanwhile, a State Department official in Mogadishu, Somalia, may be asking for reaction to discussions with Siad Barre, the leader of Somalia; our ambassador to Saudi Arabia or an ambassador from a foreign country may come in to see him. He sees the President, on the average, four times a day—and once, Brzezinski told me, as many as eleven. He lunches with journalists, with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin; he tries to keep up old contacts in the academic world. He also makes it clear that he spends a lot of time talking with Vance and Brown. One staff member says, "He moves so quickly he's damn hard to get to concentrate on issues sometimes. The point is, he's very, very quick, and all his life he's been quick. He thinks he knows the end of your sentence when he's heard the first three words. He does have a thing about having pretty much an open-door policy. That means that people are hanging around the door ready to dive-bomb him with a question, and usually they catch him on the way to something else. You have to recognize when you're not going to be able to get him to focus."

I asked Brzezinski once how he can handle all that he must do. "There is



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
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Vance prevailed and no statement was issued (but, through briefings of members of Congress and the press, the President and his aides took pains to emphasize the depth of the differences). By March, during a bitter controversy over policy in the Horn of Africa, the sniping in the press at the State Department by members of the N.S.C. staff—indicating that the State Department wasn't being sufficiently "tough"—so exasperated Vance that he phoned Brzezinski and told him to tell his staff to cut it out. One N.S.C. staff member said to me during the debate over the Horn, "There is more realpolitik in our shop." But Brzezinski is regarded as far more sensitive than Vance to criticism that comes his way via the press.

As for Harold Brown, he is described as conducting himself within the National Security Council as a very self-assured man, convinced of his brilliance and unpersuaded of his need to convince others of it. It is said by those who have witnessed meetings of the principals that Brown is a very forceful presence—sometimes the most forceful. Brzezinski is described as the one most eager to say bright, clever things; Vance as fairly quiet, Buddha-like, stating his position directly and with little adornment; and Brown as a man who states his position and when he is disagreed with is inclined to reply sardonically—and to good effect—to the opponent's argument. There have been occasions when Brown, too, has checked an impulse of Brzezinski's—an example being the issue of the Horn of Africa. One man who is close to the President says that at these meetings the President's immersion in paperwork—about which, this man said, some of the criticism is valid—comes in handy. "When we have a meeting," this man told me, "Carter's ready. So the question becomes not who's toughest or cleverest but who's got the best argument."

One of Brzezinski's liabilities, according to a number of people, including some of his defenders, is a lack of political feel. One State Department official says, "People who sit in that job and don't have a sense of the political process are at a great disadvantage." One of Brzezinski's staff members says, "He's a political blank." As numerous people describe his lack of political sense, it involves dealing with people—his own staff, others in the White House, officials in other parts of the government, foreign diplomats, members of Congress—understanding how to get policy executed, and judging the implica-

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tions of policies. It was in an effort to insure more consideration of domestic political implications that Hamilton Jordan got into the process of decision-making on foreign policy—at first on an informal basis, then on a more systematic basis. So now he attends the Friday-morning breakfasts of Brzezinski, Vance, Mondale, and the President, and Brzezinski attends meetings of the White House senior staff, which are now held three times a week. However Brzezinski may have felt about Jordan's intrusion on his jurisdiction, he has, according to several people, made an effort (which would, of course, be the only wise thing to do) to behave at the breakfasts as one of the team. Still, there are tensions with the domestic staff. Some, again, are inevitable; the chemistry between the quick-talking, conceptualizing, sophisticated, aristocratic Brzezinski and the earthy Georgians around the President is not likely to be good. And on the domestic side of the White House, others besides the Georgians share something of the suspicion that many feel about those who dwell in the world of foreign policy—a suspicion that such people regard themselves as something apart, experts, people who deal in matters that others cannot possibly understand. Not only within the White House but in much of Washington, a good deal has been made of the fact that Hamilton Jordan is known to refer to Brzezinski—in a description apparently based on looks as well as style—as Woody Woodpecker. (Jordan enjoys making irreverent comments, but no other such appellation

for a member of the Administration has come to light.) Some of those on the White House staff complain, as do some people at the State Department, that matters they thought were settled between them and Brzezinski have a way of resurfacing. Within the White House, this complaint has applied to such matters as the number of foreign visitors the President would receive this year—the domestic aides were trying to keep the number down—and the return of the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary, which caused an uproar in the Hungarian-American community in this country, and which the domestic aides thought they had prevented. It was after the President, in March of 1977, in a town meeting in Clinton, Massachusetts, said that the Palestinians should have a "homeland" that some domestic aides thought they had better

keep an eye on foreign policy. And it was after the release of the joint statement by the United States and the Soviet Union calling for a reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, and saying that one of the conference's purposes would be to insure "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people," that they decided to move in. The authorship of the joint statement, which caused an uproar in the Jewish community, has few claimants. The President's domestic political aides were quick to say that they had never seen it before it was issued. A couple of Brzezinski's aides told me that Brzezinski, who was in Europe just before it was issued, had not seen it. Brzezinski does say that he saw it, but points out that, while he supports it, Vance initiated it. Vance does not disclaim it. (Actually, the discussions of the joint statement were deliberately confined to a few people, for fear of leaks. It is not clear that the reaction would have been any milder if more outside people had been prepared for it.) The domestic aides held Brzezinski responsible for the original concept of the President's trip abroad last year—a trip that was to have covered eight nations in eleven days—and they say that Jordan and Powell did not learn of it until shortly before it was announced. One of the President's advisers said to me at that time, "There are only two people who think that trip is a good idea—Brzezinski and the President." After a while, the original trip was divided in two, but the first one was still almost beyond human endurance.

Despite the fact that among the principals most policy disagreements are openly and candidly discussed, the fact is that Brzezinski has not built a reservoir of trust or good will among members of the Administration. Perhaps it is inevitable that when the head of the N.S.C. is a strong personality with his own strong views, there will be suspicions about how accurately others' views are represented. One hears of instances in which Brzezinski is thought to have pressed his advantage of access. But since no one sees all the memorandums that Brzezinski sends to the President or is in on all their meetings, no one can know for sure. Brzezinski did not help himself in others' eyes when he began to cultivate increased press attention to his views. He indicated at the outset that he understood this danger. He had been a bit of a celebrity before he joined the Carter



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Administration, but he was careful during the first few months not to appear to be seeking publicity. In October of 1977, Brzezinski said in an interview that appeared in the *National Journal*, "I was sensitive to the fact that if I started running around being the object of numerous interviews and television programs [the impression that he sought to undercut the Secretaries of State or Defense] would be abetted and people would simply thrive on it." He continued, "Moreover, I do think that [in avoiding this] I can be more effective in influencing what is of central importance, namely the direction of things." Then in the course of the next few months Brzezinski gave numerous interviews, and between October 30th and January 8th appeared on "Issues and Answers" once and "Face the Nation" twice. He is the first national-security adviser to have his own press assistant. In a recent talk with me, Brzezinski said, "The fact that there is genuine trust between the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and this place is very important. This would be an easy place to intrigue from. But that trust is something I worked very hard at in the course of the last year." He added, smiling, "Occasionally at some cost to my ego." But whatever trust there was has been dissipating. Of late, Brzezinski has increasingly developed a public persona, set himself forward as a shaper of policy, publicly placed himself apart in his views from other policymakers. He has let himself go, acted more openly on his own deepest instincts—and, by his own testimony, had more fun. One symptom of mistrust is that the domestic aides sometimes take care, when the White House issues some official explanation of a foreign-policy matter, that Brzezinski's name gets attached to the explanation so he will be held responsible for it. Brzezinski is blamed for an inability to deal well with members of Congress which can in fairness also be attributed to several people at the White House, including the President, but still there appears to be something to the charge as it applies specifically to the national-security adviser. Here the contrast with Kissinger cannot be escaped. For better or worse, Kissinger had a talent for cultivating and charming members of Congress—even ingratiating himself at the height of the Vietnam war with some of those who opposed the war. Recently, I asked a senator who is very important to the Administration on foreign policy and is a sophisticated man what sorts of dealings he had had with

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Brzezinski. He replied, "Virtually none," adding, "He doesn't seem to know how to deal with senators."

Earlier this year, Brzezinski held two meetings on Middle East policy with people representing Jewish organizations. One, by all accounts, went smoothly enough; the other was marked by an eruption of temper on Brzezinski's part. At the second one, according to a couple of witnesses, Brzezinski, feeling provoked by some of the questions, let loose his scrappy side. The result, according to witnesses, was to fuel fears in the Jewish community, a process that was helped along by Brzezinski's evident satisfaction that the confrontation had taken place. He expressed this satisfaction to his staff, and also told a *Times* reporter that he almost welcomed the opportunity to respond on the record to the resentment and the charges that had been directed at him by some Jewish leaders. Though there is little disagreement between the State Department and Brzezinski over Middle East policy, Brzezinski is the target of more attacks—apparently because of the difference in style between him and Vance, because Brzezinski is seen as the initiator of policies that displease some Jewish leaders, and because they don't want to attack Carter directly, and consider Brzezinski the next best thing. Yet even people within the Administration who share the view that pressure had to be brought on Israel to change its policy felt that a confrontation such as took place at the second meeting was unnecessary. "When he gets angry questions, he feels justified in responding in angry tones," one says of Brzezinski. "It's a luxury to be able to lash back." Another says, "He simply doesn't understand how to massage people."

The members of Brzezinski's staff who say that he's flexible also say that views he developed in his academic career guide much of his current thinking and advice. Brzezinski himself has said, "On the whole, my views are strategically consistent, tactically very fluid." In an interview recently, I asked Brzezinski what his strategic views were. "The ones I've been outlining in my books since 1960," he replied. "I see the U.S.-Soviet competition as deep-seated. On the other hand, the world has entered a phase of political awakening and some disorder. So that the real danger is not Soviet domination but anarchy. The United States has to play an active world role, because if it doesn't, I think, there is a high danger the world will fragment in a way that is chaotic." Brzezinski is a collector and sprinkler of ideas, and sometimes



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they don't fit together. Someone who has worked with him says, "He doesn't think through issues he doesn't understand as well as he might. He reacts in areas he doesn't understand. Sometimes the reactions are good, sometimes they're not. It goes back to the academic environment, where people put a premium on coming up with sometimes controversial ideas and then seeing how others react and then formulating a theory. The trouble is, when you're sitting as the head of the N.S.C. staff and you offer an idea, people may think you've thought it through and they should act." The "trilateral" idea—the Trilateral Commission's idea that the United States should formulate policy in conjunction with our European allies and Japan—appears to have hit the floor soon after the Administration took office. Other Pacific nations—the Philippines, Australia, and so on—let it be known that Japan could not speak for them on international questions. As for Europe, relations with Germany gradually deteriorated, over a number of questions—including economic ones—to such a degree that some in the Administration believe they are at the lowest point in decades. "The trilateral idea is dead," says one foreign-policy official. "It was just rhetoric." (People within the Administration say that there is a lack of coordination between economic and foreign policy.) Some policy ideas—inevitably, perhaps—run into other policy ideas. The push for human rights has collided at times with the Administration's interest in maintaining or securing good relations with certain nations. So has the desire to stop the spread of nuclear power and the sale of conventional arms.

There is no question that Brzezinski has helped to steer our foreign policy in some new directions. He clearly feels that the United States must seek to ally itself with the nations that he refers to as "the new influentials." He outlined this approach in a talk to the White House senior staff and the Cabinet—with the President in attendance—in the early days of the Administration, and has pursued various policies, including the President's travels, to put it into effect. In the briefing, Brzezinski explained major shifts that have taken place in the world since the Second World War—in population, economic power, and technology. He said, picking up on a theme of the Carter Presidential campaign, that the United States had traditionally supported the status quo in nations undergoing social conflict, and that now we should make a greater effort to identify the



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
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social forces of the future and align ourselves with them. "The new influentials" include Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Brazil, Venezuela, Iran, India, and Indonesia. Five of them (Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Iran, and Indonesia) are major oil exporters, and three (India, Brazil, and Indonesia) are among the most populous nations in the world. All of them but Indonesia were visited by the President. (And the Vice-President is scheduled to go there.) The previous Administration was often criticized for paying some of these countries little attention (not including Iran and Saudi Arabia). Moreover, Brzezinski has shown a greater sensitivity than his predecessor did to North-South questions, though efforts to deal with some of those questions have been hampered by economic realities in the United States. Those who believe that we must address the concerns of the developing nations say that Brzezinski's instincts on these questions are enlightened and progressive. The strategies on cultivating "the new influentials" and aligning ourselves with the correct social forces posit, of course, that officials can predict with accuracy which will be the influential countries and the correct social forces. They also posit a high degree of activism on our part.

What has happened in our foreign policy is that this new, "multipolar" awareness has been combined with the old "bipolar" struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact, Brzezinski has believed for some time that this would happen, and that it would lead to a clash of the two superpowers. During one of my conversations with him, he urged me to read an article that he had written for *Encounter* in 1968. In the article, entitled "Peace and Power," he argued that the end of the Vietnam war and the recent rise in Soviet military capability would lead to a situation in which there would be "two overlapping global military powers pursuing conflicting global policies in a dynamic setting of Third World instability." This new, "overlapping fluid (or mobile) imperial power," as Brzezinski termed it, was bound to lead to a collision somewhere. "Indeed," he wrote, "apprehension over this possibility could increase the inclination of each of the major powers to move in first, in the hope that by 'staking out' a claim it will discourage the other from moving. But the implicit premium on preemption would

mean a spiral of intervention." He said that the likely prospect was for some anarchy and social fragmentation in the Third World, and added, "Sporadic violence, in the context of a premium on preemption, may have a suction effect on U.S. and Soviet intervention forces, resulting by the '70's in some unprecedented confrontations." He referred to the "Fashoda" incident, in 1898, in which English and French colonial expeditionary forces contended over control of the Upper Nile region. The French got there first, but backed

down, without a fight, under pressure from the British. Brzezinski wrote, "At the minimum, at least one 'Fashoda' is to be expected." He continued, "The question is, of course, whether in the context of the new nuclear equation an American-Soviet 'Fashoda' will work

out as peacefully as the Anglo-French one did in the late 19th century."

In our conversation, Brzezinski said that his thesis that the two powers would come into conflict in a third place was being borne out. "This is going to put a premium on preemption, because who gets there first has command of the situation," he said. (In the Fashoda incident it was the nation that got there first that backed down.) "This Fashoda business no one has picked up," he went on. "Fashoda is very germane to our current concerns."

I asked him if this meant that he contemplated situations in which we might have to get there first.

He replied, "Yes, if it's vital enough. Yes, we ought to contemplate getting there first—or we will have to get there second and become first." He smiled.

I asked if there was an intersection between the new, multipolar reality and the bipolar reality.

"Yes," Brzezinski replied. "There are many different axes of conflict in the world: the traditional conflict between Soviet and American powers; the new conflicts with emerging countries; racial conflicts; North-South conflicts. They intersect, and the more they intersect, the more dangerous they become. What makes the South African conflict so dangerous is that it is racial, North-South, nationalistic, and ideological—all four rolled into one."

I asked him what he believed the Soviets' ultimate goal to be.

He said, "I don't think they have sat down and made a blueprint, a master plan for world conquest. I don't think they even have a plan for world



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revolution. As in the case of a lot of human behavior, they are driven by psychology, bureaucratic impulse, history, ideology, and nationalism. But this does not mean they will not act to exploit revolutions. In the end, it gets down to a simple proposition: they would like to become number one, like we did. It's better to become number one from the number-two position than to be toppled from number one. That's why there is such a serious problem. It's much more destabilizing for our self-esteem, for our role in the world; there's no way of knowing where you will stop once you start going downhill. Besides, there is the moral, religious context. If the West stands for anything in terms of values, it's for spiritual values and the spiritual identity of the individual. It would be a pity if that became less central in human affairs."

Brzezinski's emphasis on the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union sets him apart from many of the people he works with, both on his own staff and in other parts of the government. One who works in the national-security apparatus says, "Zbig has thought about the Soviets during much of his academic life. He thinks of them as more central and key than Vance does. Brzezinski's own instinct is to stand up, be tough, outproduce them economically and militarily. His view is that we are coming out of a bad time and they have to be shown some things. There is an almost systematic toughness in Zbig's writing and thinking. Vance believes that the Soviets are vital, but he is more likely to take other questions into consideration." A State Department official says that the difference in outlook between Brzezinski and State is one not so much over policy as over emphasis. Vance is described as not wanting to cause unnecessary abrasions in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Officials offer a number of examples of Brzezinski's preoccupation. One is that he has brought up the idea from time to time that perhaps the United States should cause trouble for Agostinho Neto, the leader of Angola, who has Cuban backing—perhaps by giving some support to Jonas Savimbi, who had South African backing during the struggle over who would control Angola when it gained independence from Portugal. In 1975, Neto was backed by the Soviets and the Cubans, while the United States at first supported Holden Roberto and then, after he dropped out, joined South Africa in

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supporting Savinbi. At the end of 1975, the Ford Administration tried to increase our aid to Neto's opponents, which was mainly channelled through the C.I.A., and Congress not only balked but also tightened the restrictions on C.I.A. activity so that they would apply specifically to Angola. During the 1976 campaign, Jimmy Carter was critical of the Ford Administration's action. Also in 1976, Neto's forces prevailed. In recent months, Brzezinski has raised the question of whether the congressional restrictions are still applicable; the C.I.A. has told him that they are. I remarked to an Administration official who told me about this that I thought the matter of Angola had been settled before this Administration took office. He replied, "So did I. That's why I'm confused."

Brzezinski's concern about the Soviet Union came up in the context of the elections in France and Italy—what to do if the Communists gained power, what to do to prevent them from doing so. In the case of Italy, our ambassador was called back, and the State Department issued a statement toughening our earlier positions. The theory was that our statement of non-involvement but concern had been taken by some in Italy to mean that we were not concerned. Some Administration officials said privately that they did not want to be the ones to "lose" Italy. There are some within our government who feel not that it is unimportant who comes to power in these countries but that our issuing such statements does not affect the electorate at which they are aimed, except, perhaps, in precisely the opposite direction from what was intended.

Brzezinski's concern about the Soviet Union also comes up in the context of questions about our policies toward Eastern European nations—about how much emphasis should be given to encouraging some of those nations, such as Poland, Hungary, and Rumania, to distance themselves from the Soviet Union. Thus the President's visit to Poland, the first stop on his trip late last year. In Warsaw, at a press conference, he praised the "great religious freedom and otherwise" of the Polish people, and Brzezinski and Mrs. Carter made a publicized call on Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, the Primate of Poland's Roman Catholic Church. It comes up in the context of whether to play to China in order to twit the Soviet Union. It comes up in regard to questions of intelligence-gathering methods. Brzezinski has been pressing

for a revision of our intelligence-gathering methods, to move them from dependence on technological "hardware"—a dependence that developed during the nineteen-fifties, when the Soviet Union and other parts of the world were more difficult to penetrate than now—and back to more traditional espionage methods. He has also expressed concern about the restrictions that have been placed on C.I.A. activities as a result of the disclosures and investigations of recent years. He is troubled by the number of reviews to which

some activities have to be subjected before they can be undertaken. He apparently believes that the United States should be able to use a wide range of techniques to


influence the course of events in other countries. The Senate and the House, in creating intelligence-oversight committees, and President Carter, in issuing an executive order in January, took the position that whatever actions are proposed should be worked through a system that includes informing appropriate members of Congress and also the acceptance of responsibility by the highest executive leaders. The executive order requires that the President must "sign off" on any activity of any importance. Brzezinski is known to believe that the President should have broad flexibility, including "deniability"—that is, that it should be possible to carry out operations in a way that would enable the President to deny he knew about them. The question of accountability for such operations was one of the basic issues raised in the recent examination of our intelligence activities. The argument for it was that since any major intelligence activity could cause us great damage, it ought to be decided upon by our highest officials, who ought to take responsibility for it.

THE differences over how we should conduct relations with the Soviet Union, over how we should conduct policy in the post-Vietnam era, came to a head on the issue of our policy concerning the Horn of Africa. The specific question was what was to be done about the presence of Cuban and Soviet advisers in Ethiopia, which was involved in a border war with Somalia. While no one liked the idea that those foreign troops were in the region, there was strong disagreement over what was to be or could be done about it. Some dramatic actions were considered, and some strong internal debates took place. In recent years, the relationships among the United States and the Soviet Union



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and Ethiopia and Somalia have begun to resemble a grand right and left in a square dance. The United States had been a strong backer of the Ethiopian regime headed by Haile Selassie, who was overthrown by the military in 1974, and even in the first years thereafter we tried, by selling the new government F-5 airplanes and other military equipment, to prevent it from turning to the Soviet Union for help. But then, as the Ethiopian regime became increasingly radical, we reduced our military assistance, and Ethiopia did turn to the Soviet Union for help—which in 1976 the Soviets agreed to give. Until then, the Soviets had been closely involved with Somalia, Ethiopia's historic enemy, and had built up its military capability. The United States, toward the end of the Ford Administration, decided to end military-grant aid to Ethiopia (though it would continue military sales), but did not announce this step. The Carter Administration did announce it, early in 1977, indicating that it was part of the new human-rights policy. By summer, relations between the United States and Ethiopia were very nearly broken off. Meanwhile, the Somalis, seeing that the Soviets were arming the Ethiopians, turned to the United States for help. Carter and Brzezinski were attracted to the idea of befriending the Somalis, as a way of countering the Soviets. In April of 1977, Carter allowed *Time*, which was reporting "With Jimmy from Dawn to Midnight," to hear him instruct Mondale to "tell Cy and Zbig that I want them to move in every possible way to get Somalia to be our friend." But the idea of arming the Somalis collided with the President's stated goal of reducing our role as an arms supplier and also with a policy enunciated in a speech by Vance in July. In that speech, Vance said that our policies in Africa "should not be reactive to what other powers do, nor to crises as they arise"—that "daily headlines should not set our agenda for progress." He went on, "A negative, reactive American policy that seeks only to oppose Soviet or Cuban involvement in Africa would be both dangerous and futile. Our best course is to help resolve the problems which create opportunities for external intervention." In the end, the government made an agreement in principle to provide "defensive" arms to the Somalis. As these deliberations were going on, however, Somalia was encouraging guerrilla activity in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, which is inhabited by ethnic Somalis, and on



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July 23rd, eight days after the United States decided, and informed the Somalis, that it would discuss supplying them with weapons, Somalia attacked Ethiopia (and we held off providing arms). Now the issue was one of "territorial integrity"—a very sensitive one in Africa, where all sorts of boundaries were drawn in the colonial era in such a way as to divide tribes. The Ethiopians called for help. The Soviet Union agreed to supply weapons, and in November it began to airlift Cuban troops, provided them with large amounts of military supplies, and increased the number of its advisers in Ethiopia.

Brzezinski felt strongly that the United States should react. There were two issues: what could be done about the military situation, and how the Soviets and the Cubans could be got out of Ethiopia. Moreover, there was concern that the Cubans and their allies, once they reconquered the Ogaden, might move into Somalia. While much was made in the press of reasons that the Horn is strategically important—that it lies abreast the oil routes from the Persian Gulf, that it is close to the mouth of the Red Sea, that it is near the Middle East oil states—some officials say that in the course of the internal debate hardly anyone in the government, including Pentagon representatives, argued that the Horn was very important strategically. For Brzezinski, it was a matter of the Cuban and Soviet presence in the area. Also, the President is described by some within the government as being much more bothered by the Cubans than some of the other officials are; it's said that to him as well as to Brzezinski they seem to represent some sort of challenge that sets off a visceral reaction. And Brzezinski is described as reacting viscerally to various stimuli. Within the N.S.C., there was talk of how, after all, Ethiopia was where the Second World War began. There were expressions of concern that the establishment of a Soviet footing in the Horn could cause serious problems for President Carter in the 1980 election. N.S.C. staff people say that concern was also expressed because a number of countries in the Middle East—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Sudan—were said to be worried about whether we took with sufficient seriousness Soviet meddling in Africa. (We tried to get some African nations to object to the Soviet and Cuban presence, but since the intervention was in behalf of "territorial integrity,"

there was no response.) Brzezinski is described as having felt that we should make some gesture to show that we understood the Middle East nations' concerns. And one of Brzezinski's associates said to me as the debate over the Horn was proceeding that while no one believed in a domino theory for Africa, it was a fact that if the Soviets settled down in Ethiopia, and Siad Barre, the leader of Somalia, turned around and made a deal with them, then Kenya (wealthy, pro-Western, and capitalist), bordering both Ethiopia and Somalia on the south, and Djibouti, an enclave between Ethiopia and Somalia, would be in trouble. "It's just a fact," he said. The difficult question, he said, given the circumstance that the American people are by and large very uninterested in foreign policy, is how our government can deal vigorously

enough with an incipient problem to prevent it from becoming a very big problem. He continued, "We're learning that the absence of involvement is dangerous and can lead you to more serious involvement. Nobody argues that we have to fight over every square inch in the world, but we're beginning to learn that there are clouds no larger than a man's hand which cannot be ignored."

Some people in the government, even within the N.S.C. staff, argued that to call attention to the Horn would be precisely the way to make it more of a domestic political issue. And they also asked what the point was in calling attention to it, since there was so little we could do about it. Moreover, some officials pointed out, Ethiopia had invited the Cubans and the Soviets in, and the Somalis were the aggressors. Nevertheless, it was Brzezinski's inclination to call attention to it—and to act. And although some in the government argued that in the long run the Soviet Union would be no more welcome in the area of the Horn than it had been in other countries outside its immediate sphere—for example, Egypt and the Sudan and even Somalia—people who make policy often find it difficult to think in terms of the long run. One foreign-policy official says, "My experience tells me that Communist countries, left to themselves, will mess things up in these ventures. It's easy for me to say that in ten years it's not going to matter, but ten years is not the life span of Presidents." On February 24th of this year, when Brzezinski was giving a briefing on the President's forthcoming foreign




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trip, he took the opportunity to announce that there were ten or eleven thousand Cubans in Ethiopia, that substantial Soviet equipment was involved, and that a Soviet general was directing some of Ethiopia's armed forces. On the same day, State Department officials were citing lower figures, and they were surprised that the Soviet general was mentioned. (The previous November, a map had appeared in the *Times* indicating the number of Cuban military personnel, advisers, technicians, and military aides in various countries in Africa. It had accompanied a story saying, "The Carter White House is seriously disturbed by the steadily expanding Cuban military presence in Angola, Ethiopia, and other African countries." A packet of material on which the chart was based had been prepared for the N.S.C., unbeknownst to State Department officials. Department officials believe that it was prepared by the C.I.A.) The State Department was not pleased by the White House pronouncements. Its policy had been to issue, in response to inquiries by the press, conservative estimates, partly for policy reasons—to avoid making the situation into a great U.S.-Soviet crisis, and in the hope of winning support of a settlement by the Organization of African Unity—and partly to protect intelligence sources. "We're over here talking about the Horn in one way, and Zbig is over there giving his briefing," says a State Department official. "A lot of people were trying to tell him that what we could do about the Horn was very limited, and therefore if we made a big commotion it would only make things worse. It would also make it look like more of a Russian success story. That was the consensus here. But he went ahead and did it anyway."

Brzezinski was not convinced that what we could do was so limited. A number of discussions of what we might do took place beginning in February, when the Administration began to focus on the possibility that Ethiopia might cross the Somalia border. One of the ideas he backed was that the United States should send in a naval task force. On this Brzezinski was opposed not only by Vance but also by Harold Brown. What, Brown asked, was the task force going to do after it got there? Brown's question was never successfully answered, and that idea was headed off. Brzezinski also suggested that if the Sudanese and the Egyptians, or, conceivably, the Saudis and the Iranians, were to send troops to Somalia, they might need equip-

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ment, and we should consider ways to help out. This suggestion ran into legal restrictions on the supplying of arms, and, in addition, it raised political questions about the effect of supplying, say, Egypt with infantry arms. He was also interested in giving assurances to the Somalis and others that if Somalia should be invaded by Ethiopia, and if in that case Arab countries should send in troops to help Somalia and the troops should be interfered with by the Cubans or the Soviets, we would somehow come to the aid of those troops by military means. Questions were raised about what, exactly, we would or could do to help, and the preponderance of opinion was against our getting militarily involved. Even the Pentagon, it is said, drawing on recent experience, was not disposed to see us get into a situation in which we would not be able to follow through. Earlier, the Administration had considered the possibility that American military supplies given or sold to other countries might be transferred by those countries to Somalia. There was a legal problem with this: the law says that we cannot permit the transfer of weapons that we would not be prepared to supply directly. During these deliberations, Brzezinski raised once again the possibility of "playing the China card."


A State Department official says, "I think Zbig feels there is an inexorable push that comes from the Soviets. Most of us agree. But he feels you have to take a strong position, so that you can dramatize your position and build strong support. Others will say, O.K., but what are you going to do about it? We haven't got the tools we used to have: the use of covert activity, or even military and economic assistance, is incredibly circumscribed by legislation now. Besides, large covert activities don't stay covert any longer. Other people are more sensitive to these things than he is." One high official who was in on these deliberations says, "Sometimes raising the question of whether we will be 'tough' or 'weak' is a reaction people have when they don't understand the complexity of an issue—it's an emotional response." Another official says of the deliberations, "To try to publicly assert national anger in the absence of a remedy may lead to precisely the opposite of what is intended—to an appearance of impotence. The more we escalated the issue of the Horn, the more the question was asked what we were going to do about it. Since there was no way of getting withdrawal of the Russian and Cuban troops, pressing the issue made that

more obvious. Brown was very helpful here. He asked, How do you answer that problem? He's lived through a period where we asserted our power and didn't have an answer, and he saw what happened to our nation. He wants a strong nation and a strong defense, but he understands what's a bluff and what isn't."

As our own government's battle over the Horn was going on, Brzezinski called attention to it around Washington, telling people that it was the first major foreign-policy battle within the Administration, and that he was winning. He saw it, he told people, as an embodiment of a theory he had developed about how Vietnam had created generational differences over foreign policy: In one group there is a generation of people in their fifties and early sixties who were influential ten years ago and were involved in decisions about Vietnam (this would apply to Vance and Brown) and are deeply affected by that experience, and another generation of people in their thirties who were emotionally opposed to the war at that time (this would apply to some of the younger officials at the State Department) and who remain marked by that experience. In the other group, his theory goes, are those in their forties who are too young to have been decision-makers about Vietnam, and those in their twenties who are too young to have had any involvement at all. Therefore, people in their thirties and people in their fifties and sixties are those most affected by Vietnam, and others are less inclined to think about it when considering, say, Ethiopia or Yugoslavia. (Brzezinski just turned fifty.)

I asked him recently if he thought that, in general, America was too strictly bound by post-Vietnam attitudes.

"Yes," he replied. "There is a tendency in America to be traumatized by international difficulties. The generation of the nineteen-forties was always thinking about the failure of



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the League of Nations. I'm talking about leadership groups now. The leadership of the sixties was always thinking about Munich. Now there is a generation worried by Vietnam, with consequences of self-imposed paralysis, which is likely to be costlier in the long run."

The other great issue that came up in the course of the Administration's internal debate over the Horn—and it will come up in other contexts—was what to do about "linkage." "Linkage," or making a connection between one aspect of the United States-Soviet relationship and another aspect of it, was selectively employed by Kissinger over the years, depending on the circumstances and on whether it was seen to be in our interest. When the Carter Administration took over, it explicitly rejected the concept of "linkage." Vance said that negotiations with the Soviet Union would not be linked to all Soviet actions—that each issue "should be discussed on its own footing." The Administration position on the Horn had been to say that the Soviet involvement there could affect the political atmosphere in the United States. This was, State Department officials concede, a statement of the obvious—that, especially given all the attention that was being called to the situation, the activities of the Soviets in the Horn might make it more difficult to gather the necessary political support to win Senate approval of a new SALT agreement. Then, on March 1st, Brzezinski, speaking to a group of reporters, said that events in the Horn could affect not only the atmosphere in which a SALT treaty would be considered but also the negotiation process itself. This was seen as an implied threat that if the Soviets did not behave we might not negotiate such an agreement. The State Department was caught off guard, and the State Department press spokesman, Hodding Carter, at his regular noon briefing of the press, tried to pull the matter back within the boundaries of "atmosphere." Vance felt strongly that Brzezinski's language suggested that there was some definite linkage between the Horn and moving ahead on the SALT negotiations, a position with which he vigorously disagreed. The next day, he used the opportunity of a congressional hearing to say "There is no linkage between the SALT negotiations and the situation in Ethiopia." Finally, President Carter, at his press conference the same day, said that the Soviets' action "would make it more difficult to ratify a SALT agreement" and that "the two are

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
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linked because of actions by the Soviets. We don't initiate the linkage." These verbal acrobatics by no means settled the matter, for they were only a symptom of the deep differences that caused them in the first place.

Just after it all happened, I asked Brzezinski why the Horn was a major policy issue.

"The major point I would like to make at this stage is that the Horn is important because it gets to the heart of the question of what is the meaning of détente," he replied. "Behind the smoke of the Ogaden battle in the White House and State is the question of how do we structure the United States-Soviet situation so that it is less dangerous and doesn't present a threat to United States interests. In some ways, I suppose there are two different concepts of détente. There is the concept that the President has articulated, which is that détente ought to be comprehensive, reciprocal, and based on mutual restraint, and there is the concept that détente is a good thing and somehow leading to something more comprehensive; thus something to be nurtured in itself. I belong clearly to the first school. In the nuclear age, we can't have stability unless détente is general and reciprocal. What we have to establish is that the rules of the game have to be the same for both sides. I think that the Horn is a basic test of that. I think if we don't establish some reciprocity and some mutual restraint and don't make it binding, especially in its military flavor, then we're going to get a reaction against détente that is going to make some things that are desirable impossible to achieve—such as SALT. I think there is a real danger that if we pursue détente in a manner that gives the Soviets the impression that they can do what they're doing in Ethiopia, then it's destructive to the relationship. Ethiopia is an expansion of what they did in Angola, except that this time they are present themselves; in Angola they only used Cubans. Each time, it becomes more costly, more dangerous. That's why in my judgment we should respond forcefully, make clear their action is not cost-free."

He continued, "Others feel that if we respond too strongly we will not be effective anyway, and a lot of the good things going on would become unravelled. Connected with all this is a sort of mini-debate on SALT. The President says we're not creating linkage but the Soviets are imposing one. I say there is

no linkage, because SALT is in our mutual interest, but that the negotiations and ratification can get complicated by what's happening. Cy says there is no linkage. We all agree on that starting point. The question is what existential judgment we make. We're not saying, 'Get the hell out of Ethiopia or no SALT'—that's linkage. I'm not saying that. But there is some sort of connection, that's the point. So the debate about the Horn is really about the more fundamental question of what is the nature of détente. It's a much more sophisticated and much more complicated and much more muted debate. It's about one's view of the world: should there be rules, or is the relationship an end in itself?"

A few days later, I asked Vance about this debate.

"There are different views about the Soviet Union," he replied. "My view is that the relationship with the Soviet Union is of central importance in our foreign policy. It can't be so consuming that it results in our neglecting other critical matters that must be dealt with, yet at the same time it must be recognized as one of a handful of critical foreign-policy issues. It's my view that it is in our interest and in the interest of the Soviet Union to manage the relationship in a way that seeks to reduce tension and to find broader areas of common understanding. I recognize that the relationship is very complex, that there is a mixture of matters where we do have differing views—sometimes ideological, sometimes practical. Having said all that, we have to come back to what we are trying to do. My view is that we should try to increase the common ground or manage the differences in a way that doesn't lead to the danger of conflict. It all has to be put in the perspective of what is more important and what is less important. That's why I come to SALT as the

most important item in our relationship. It's life or death, and it's very much in our interest to find agreement and put ourselves on the way to the next SALT agreement. And it's also my view that this sets the tone for the rest of the relationship."

Brown's view about linkage, as it is described by one of his associates, is that the first thing our policymakers should ask themselves is, Whom does it help or hurt more? Brown is said to believe that a general policy of linkage is meaningless, or even bad; that we should "link" where there is a high de-



gree of relevance between what we subject to and what it is being linked with; and that we should look for areas where linkage would hurt the Soviets more than it would hurt us, or where the impact would be at least equal. Given the importance to us of achieving a SALT treaty, therefore, Brown does not believe that linking the Horn and SALT is the right thing to do.

One of the problems, it is widely agreed, is that Kissinger sold détente as more than it was. When the United States and the Soviet Union signed a joint statement of principles in 1972, the Soviet Union

did not forswear competing with the United States or supporting governments and revolutionary movements. According to an argument that is made by some people in State, what the Soviets

did in the Horn violated not détente but a view of détente that Kissinger sold. Brzezinski believes that in urging a strong reaction to such Soviet ventures he is in fact acting to preserve détente. "We have moved into a phase where old systems are crumbling and there is a new turbulence, and that turbulence must not be exploited," he said to me recently. "If it is, it is bound to re-create the Cold War. We want respect for diversity in the world; we want respect for local forces—for the countries concerned about their place in the world. I argue with people that I am far more for détente by arguing this, that to acquiesce in this kind of interference is to set the stage for a public reaction in the United States and a reaction by the United States that will be strong and destabilizing. So in the long run the other course will be far more destabilizing. When I say that I argue that, it's not just with State, it's also the Hill and within my own staff."

The "soft"- "tough" construction of the debate over how to deal with the Soviet Union has been a dominant force in our political life since the end of the Second World War. There are those who say that not only is it unfortunate—carrying implications of an unpleasant earlier era—but also it interferes with thought and, moreover, those who make it have it backward. One government man who has thought about these things for a long time says, "The maintenance of some sort of useful relationship with the Soviet Union is in the security interests of the United States. Therefore, it is not 'soft' but actually the hardheaded thing to do to work at ways to maintain that relation-

ship. The alternative is to engage in useless conflict with them on unimportant issues. What you have to decide is where the Soviets are apt to impinge on your vital interests and not let them impinge on them, and not pick a quarrel when they're not impinging on your vital interests. To pick a quarrel with them every time you can is soft-headed. Also, to do that gives them the wrong impression—because they're not going to know when you really mean it." It is argued that we should limit the number of times our prestige

is put at risk, and the number of unnecessary gambles we take. This man went on, "A 'proxy war' is precisely what we ought to avoid. We shouldn't set everything up as an opportunity to wage a gladiatorial contest by proxy. Just because the Soviets get


themselves involved with the Ethiopians, why should we have to find a government to act as our proxy—in an area of small importance?"

He continued, "What's wrong with looking at the world that way is that that's not the way the world is. What's happening now in Africa would be happening if there were no Soviet Union. As in Vietnam, where we intervened to bring 'stability' to that part of the world, we think of the continuing hostilities in Africa as a great-power struggle, which it need not be. The Soviets are mucking around in Africa because they want to have more influence. It's not that I think that Soviet influence is benign or their motivation is benevolent. But we shouldn't react in every instance, because not all of them make that much difference, and we could make a bad situation worse."

There is very little disagreement within the government that what the Soviets and the Cubans are doing in Africa is deplorable; the differences are over how deplorable, and what is to be done about it, and how it affects other policy questions concerning Africa. In the case of Rhodesia, the State Department and the White House agreed that the United States should try to find a negotiated political solution that would deny the Cubans and the Soviets another opportunity to exploit. And bit by bit the United States government has got itself into the position of assuming responsibility for this admittedly difficult achievement.

In one of our recent conversations, Brzezinski cited Rhodesia as an area of great danger.

"The risk is that the Soviets and the




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Cubans will try to put us in an even more awkward position than in Ethiopia," he said. "In Ethiopia, they were defending territorial integrity. In Rhodesia, they would be opposing white racism and apartheid. That gives added urgency to implementing the Anglo-American plan." That plan would supplant the "Salisbury agreement," reached by Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith and some Rhodesian black leaders, which provides for a transition period and for elections administered essentially by Smith and his security forces. The Anglo-American plan calls for Smith to relinquish power to a British administrator, and for elections supervised by the United Nations.

In the view of some in the government, there is a danger of producing a premature polarization of forces in Southern Africa. What Africans see as a liberation movement, this argument goes, we might view as an East-West struggle and thus help to make it one. There is also the danger that in our eagerness to ally ourselves with the "forces of change," and to keep the Soviets and the Cubans out, we can end up in an indiscriminate bidding contest for the favor of whoever seems to be on the march. And, as a matter of fact, the square dance over the Horn continues. The decision our government made was that we could be of no help to the Somalis while they were in the Ogaden, and that diplomatic representations should be made to the Soviet Union about the risks (whatever they were) if the Ethiopians crossed over into Somalia. On March 8th, the Somalis announced that they were withdrawing from the Ogaden, mainly because they were being badly beaten. Since then, officials have tried to keep a line open to the Ethiopians—have even told them we would permit the shipment of "non-lethal" military equipment that they had already purchased—in order to prevent them from allying themselves too closely with the Soviet Union, and at the same time have tried to work out arrangements with the Somalis whereby we would supply them with arms if they would forswear their irredentist policy (which as yet they have not agreed to do). One of the reasons for wanting to arm the Somalis is to keep them from turning to the Soviets once more. This leaves the questions of why a Soviet-Somali marriage would be any more successful than it was the first time; how the Soviets could sustain a relationship with both Ethiopia and Somalia; and what grounds we have for assuming that the Somalis, given more arms,

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
would behave, whatever they said. And then the Kenyans are fearful of an increasingly armed Somalia, because Somalia has historically claimed some Kenya territory, and the two countries are old enemies. And on it goes.

I talked with one of the President's domestic advisers as the first Horn crisis settled down and the rearranging of positions began. He said, "When the Russians start moving in there, the President feels we cannot fail to let them know that they can't do that without some risk to themselves. At the same time, we're keeping in touch with the Ethiopian government and seeing how they look at it. We can't be forced into letting the Cubans and Russians put us in a situation where we are backing people with untenable views. Then we can take a run at opposing outside interference from a higher ground. With bumps and starts, that's where the thing is sort of headed. It's also a damn good realpolitik way to look at it."

I asked this man if the President felt we needed to face the Soviets down somewhere.

"He doesn't feel that that's a foregone conclusion," he replied. "He recognizes it as a possibility, but he'll be damn sure that if we face someone down it will be on firmer ground than we were on in the Horn."

The strains within our government over the specific instance of the Horn did not end with the Somali retreat. As the President flew from Brazil to Nigeria in late March, Brzezinski, aboard Air Force One, gave a background briefing for the press—allowing himself to be identified only as "an Administration official"—in which he gave a new, highest-yet estimate of the number of Cuban troops in Ethiopia (sixteen to seventeen thousand), and on the same day the State Department released a more conservative estimate (at least fifteen thousand). And before the President left on his trip, there was a terrific battle between the State Department and the N.S.C. staff over the tone of the speech that the President was to make in Lagos, Nigeria. The President was leaving on a Tuesday, and on the preceding Saturday drafts were going back and forth between the two groups. Vance was trying to moderate the President's remarks warning against outside interference in the affairs of the continent. He had some success. At one point, I'm told, the N.S.C. draft had the President saying that we say to the "ideological scavengers" of the world, "Hands off Africa." The final draft of the speech



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was not agreed upon until the morning of the President's departure.

SINCE speeches are a device for establishing policy, the drafting of them frequently becomes the arena for struggles over a particular policy. It is a law of governing that he who makes the speech makes the policy; at least, he tries to. When the President makes a speech, policymakers compete to affect what he says. Inevitably, some maneuverings marked the preparation of the speech that the President gave on defense policy on March 17th at Wake Forest University. The speech was Brzezinski's idea, and it was drafted by an N.S.C. staff member. Brzezinski let it be known in the press that he was putting "bite" in it, that he had "toughened up" the speech, as part of his effort to, as he put it, "help stiffen the back of the Administration." The speech said, among other things, "Our strategic forces must be—and must be known to be—a match for the capabilities of the Soviets." It said, "We do not desire to intervene militarily in the internal domestic affairs of other countries, nor to aggravate regional conflicts. And we shall oppose intervention by others." It did talk about our desire for a mutual arms-limitation agreement, but it also said that "we must take other steps to protect the strategic balance." To many minds, including some within the government, it had the tone of early Kennedy ("We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty"). Around the White House, some people later told me they realized that it was the sort of speech that might spur the military to seek increases in the defense budget. There was some worry within the Administration that the speech in fact provided arguments for the opponents of SALT. One of the President's associates said, "The Russians are building advanced missilery, building forces in Europe, playing games in Africa. Their efforts are not to be disregarded. They should not proceed on the theory that we won't respond. It was important to Presidential leadership for Americans to see that their President is aware of these things. But we have to be careful not to exaggerate it, and then have to live with the apprehensions that build up. That speech did not do so, I think, but some people might want to run with it for that purpose."

When I asked Brzezinski about the speech, he volunteered that it was reviewed twice, by both Vance and

Brown. Vance did see an early version of the speech and had a brief opportunity to go over the final draft. (The State Department did suggest a number of changes. It wanted the language about Soviet intervention in local conflicts toned down, and it was, but not to the degree that State sought. And Vance suggested that language about parity in weapons be changed to "essential equivalence." In the speech, this became "functional equivalence." Brzezinski says that "functional equivalence" is a new phrase, and a new concept. He says, "I thought 'essential equivalence' didn't convey the point. The term 'functional equivalence' means that our weapons need not be identical or similar.") Brzezinski says he suggested early this year that the President give a defense speech, because he had given speeches outlining his other foreign-policy views and "what was missing was a speech about his role as Commander-in-Chief," adding, "It wasn't so tied to our recent problems with the Soviets, but in some way the timing was felicitous."

Others explained to me that the speech was also designed to counter an impression that might have been caused by various actions the President had taken: the cancellation of the B-1 bomber (there is some consternation in the N.S.C. that people failed to notice that at the same time he cancelled it he approved the deployment of the Cruise missile); the postponement of development of a mobile missile (MX); the pursuit of a strategic-arms-limitation agreement and also negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban and for the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean; the discussions of anti-satellite arms control. One N.S.C. person said to me recently, "The people at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency understood the number of initiatives to



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mean that this would be the heyday of arms control. The speech was to correct that impression." Brzezinski apparently persuaded the President that because of the kinds of questions the President had dealt with he was in danger of being seen at home and abroad as too easygoing about questions of national security.

I asked Brzezinski not long ago how great he felt the danger was that we might appear to be weak.

He replied, "My own view is that we probably do not appear weak to those who have to think about it seriously. But we might appear ambivalent. We haven't sent unambiguous signals that we're weak, but we may have sent signals that there is a disjunction between our will and our power. However, if we were to continue to send Pollyanna-ish signals, then they might conclude that we're weak."

I asked him what he meant by "Pollyanna-ish signals."

"We've sent a number of signals—the B-1, negotiating on the Indian Ocean, not embarking on a defense buildup. If that continued, it could be misunderstood. The speech helps."

In the spring of 1977, in fact, Hamilton Jordan identified a list of actions taken by the Administration, including some of those mentioned by Brzezinski and also the negotiation of the Panama Canal treaties and the proposal to withdraw troops from Korea, that could make the President appear too "dovish" and cause him domestic political problems. The defense speech is said to have been well received by Jordan and some other domestic political advisers.

I asked Brzezinski about the statement "We shall oppose intervention by others" in the Wake Forest speech.

He replied, "That's a reaffirmation of something that has been taken for granted and perhaps has been assumed as no longer relevant."


"That at some point we may have to take strong action to oppose intervention?" I asked.

"Yes," he replied. "We could take strong action ourselves, including intervene, unless we can do it indirectly, by giving the countries concerned the means to deal with this intrusion."

I asked him about a statement in the speech that the United States was "improving and will maintain quickly deployable forces—air, land, and sea—to defend our interests throughout the world."

"That is a contribution we have made from here," Brzezinski replied. "More than a year ago, we were stressing the need for greater inde-

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
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pendence from the need for foreign bases, and the need for rapid deployment, so that we should not be dependent on a Maginot Line—the need to have forces that could be rapidly deployed to the Mideast, Africa, Asia. The President accepted this concept formally—that we should develop this capacity—and Harold Brown has been developing it for a year. The troops withdrawn from Korea will be restructured and retrained to be used with other divisions." In Brzezinski's mind, this is connected with his theory about overlapping imperial power and "Fashoda's" and his concern about our being preempted.

I asked Brzezinski then about something I'd read that he had said in an interview. He had said that the proposition that a nuclear war would mean the end of humanity was "baloney."

He replied, "It's inaccurate thinking to say that the use of nuclear weapons would be the end of the human race. That's an egocentric thought. Of course, it's horrendous to contemplate, but, in strictly statistical terms, if the United States used up all of its arsenal in the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union used all of its against the United States it would not be the end of humanity. That's egocentric. There are other people on the earth. I don't know if it's a good thing or a bad thing to say that this notion is wrong, but I know it is wrong factually."

A NUMBER of people within the Administration worry about the way foreign policy is made, and they are also concerned that an impression is being given to the nation and the world that the policy is not guided by steady hands. Some fluctuation is inevitable as policymakers respond to actions taken by other nations, but even within the Administration many people believe that the conduct of our foreign policy has been marked by a lack of equilibrium. Some of this is laid to early enthusiasms: plunging into policies that had not been thought through. Among the examples given of this are human rights, limitations on arms sales (of which it is now said that the early goals were "unrealistic"), and the first SALT proposals. In the case of SALT, the President, before his negotiators went to Moscow in March of 1977, announced at a press conference that we would offer a dramatic proposal for "substantial reductions" in the arsenals of both sides; he added that, as a "fall-back," we would propose an agreement along the lines of that arrived at in Vladivostok in 1974, which set outer

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
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limits on both sides—limits that required neither side to make cuts. But the attention was on the more dramatic of the two proposals—the one for “substantial reductions”—which in fact, when it got to the details of which weapons were to be cut, asked that the Soviets make substantially more drastic cuts than the United States. Then, after holding fast to that proposal for a few weeks, the Administration changed course and went for something along the lines of the “fallback” position. Several people—inside the Administration and out—believe that the Administration set itself up for appearing to “back down” from a bold position, and that when it is time to seek Senate approval of a new SALT agreement the Administration is going to pay for having invested so much public capital and prestige in the proposal for substantial reductions. Carter believes in deep cuts in the weapons held by both sides; Brzezinski was apparently attracted by the political aspects of the proposal—both as a challenge to the Soviet Union and as a proposal that would win the approval of arms-control conservatives, which it did. The problem is that they did not think through the implications of announcing the proposal and then having it turned down and then retreating to the “fallback” position.

In the internal debating over both the nature and the timing of the SALT negotiations, Brzezinski was characterized by a number of people as being less inclined than Vance to try to reach an agreement by this spring or summer. The State Department view was that the negotiations should proceed to their conclusion, because of the precarious state of health of Leonid Brezhnev, the leader of the Soviet Union; because the Soviets were developing a new generation of weapons systems that a SALT agreement might keep them from deploying; and because there were any number of other reasons that postponement could result in the loss of an opportunity. Brzezinski was reported by several people to be unwilling to give the same emphasis to SALT, and Brown was said to be somewhere between Vance and Brzezinski. Brzezinski has been described by people who observed the process closely as seeing SALT not just as an end in itself but as a device for bringing pressure on the Soviets to do things we wanted them to. Brown's view was that if we could get a good SALT agreement it would be beneficial for us, because it could keep the arms race from proceeding and could free up funds that would otherwise have to be



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spent on strategic weapons. One of the considerations of the White House, of course, was that, given the length of time it was taking to complete Senate action on the Panama Canal treaties, and given other constraints on the agenda of Congress this year, an election year, this was no year to ask the Senate to approve a SALT treaty. But at a White House meeting on March 2nd the President gave officials firm instructions to proceed to try to reach an agreement. (As it happens, Brzezinski made his "linkage" statement on the previous day.) The timing of the Senate debate on approval would be decided later, and Vance would go to Moscow to push the agreement toward conclusion. Then the internal argument became one over the instructions he would

take with him. All this time, there was consternation within the government over the reluctance at the White House to come to grips with difficult decisions—decisions with both political and strategic implications—about our final positions. Shortly before Vance's trip to Moscow, the *Times* reported, "In recent days, some White House officials have been privately complaining to some journalists about the ability of Mr. Vance and some of his aides to deal with the Russians." The story went on to say that the "officials'" main concern is that Vance and his aides "are overly concerned about achieving a strategic-arms accord and are not prepared to press the Russians hard enough about their military involvement in the Horn of Africa and about other new Soviet moves."

Uncertainty seemed to guide the decision-making about whether to proceed with the production of the neutron warhead, and the President seemed to come out in the worst of all possible positions. This was his own doing. First, he agreed to go ahead with its production, and then, against the advice of the Defense and State Departments and the N.S.C., he decided this spring to halt its production, and then, when that decision came under attack within the Administration and in Congress and from some of our NATO allies (whose support for the warhead the Administration had been seeking), he announced that its production would be delayed and that the weapon would be a "bargaining chip" in the negotiations with the Soviet Union. Besides giving a public picture of uncertainty, the episode worked the President into a corner: if the Soviets

chose not to trade, he would have to proceed with the production of a weapon that the world now knew he had earlier decided against, or he would have to appear to "back down."

A man in one of the departments, speaking about the fairly widespread worry in the government that foreign-policy decisions are made in an ad-hoc, sporadic way, said to me recently, "There is a tendency over at the White House to fly into things and take spot initiatives without thinking things through." He continued, "You should understand how you got into the situation." Some in the Administration express concern that decisions are made without much thought being given to the connections between a certain move and larger foreign-policy goals.

Even those who concede that it is difficult to formulate consistent policy in a complicated world, where a number of powers can change the terms, say that there has been excessive confusion. One man who is in a high position in the government, and who has had prior government experience, says, "It's hard for people in the bureaucracy to carry out policy if they don't know what it is." High officials of both the Defense Department and the State Department say that they are often surprised by pronouncements that come either from Brzezinski or from the President. In order to govern, the President and his top associates need a certain degree of understanding and support of their policies by the bureaucracy. But the problem goes beyond even that. A number of those I have spoken with in the government talk of the need not just for the bureaucracy but also for the American people and other peoples of the world to have a clearer view of our goals. One man who understands a great deal about government says, "You don't get a policy through a speech, or even through the first few actions following that speech, but from consistent-minded people taking a series of consistent actions." The failure to establish clear policies is attributed not just to the style of Brzezinski but also to that of the President. One official said to me, after expressing his worry about the apparent "thrashing around" in foreign policy, "Carter and Brzezinski have a similarity in outlook and temperament. Instead of being able to hold conflicting thoughts in their heads about a given subject and come out with a blend, they hold all those conflicting thoughts,



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but what comes out is not a blend but a leaning this way and leaning that way. That explains the shifts in policy." One man who is quite close to the foreign-policy decision-making said to me, "I still can't read the President on foreign policy."

Several people, inside the Administration and out, express concern that the Administration speaks with too many voices on foreign policy, that often it seems that there are two Secretaries of State. They are quite troubled when, on the eve of the Secretary of State's trip to Moscow to negotiate an arms-control agreement, "White House officials" publicly suggest that he is not up to dealing with the Russians. They are given pause by the picture of a national-security adviser who goes about letting it be known that he is putting "bite" in and "toughening" the Administration's policy. Of course, advertising oneself as the one who is "tough" on the Communists can be a way of establishing political security. (Brzezinski also tries to deflect criticism of the way he is handling his job by suggesting that it comes from "ideological" motives.) There are other "hard-line" voices within the Administration. And, in any event, the old "hard-line"/"soft-line" dichotomy is misleading. The real issue, as it has been described to me over and over again, is between two kinds of "toughness": combative toughness as against measured toughness, and the latter is not to be confused with uncritical acceptance of Soviet moves. It is not a question of Brzezinski's views; it is a question of his temperament and of his judgment. One longtime observer of foreign policy says, "We need officials who are firm and wary in dealing with the Soviet Union; the last thing we need is an official who is impulsive and excitable in dealing with them." Brzezinski is not the first national-security adviser to step into a public policymaking role. There will always be divisions among a President's advisers, and some will become public, but when it comes to questions of foreign policy the implications can be quite serious. Others, who do not wish us well, are taking our measure. Several observers have reservations about the way the role of the national-security adviser has developed. The role has been shaped as much by the way Presidents have conceived it as it has by the men who have filled it. Many of those who are concerned about the nature of the job say that whoever holds it should be an "honest broker"—someone who communicates the views of the departments



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
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
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
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to the President and presents alternatives to him—and also that he should not be a separate public spokesman on foreign policy. A President does need someone to help mediate among the conflicting interests of the State and Defense Departments, each of which has its own clients (countries, military services); to see to it that the President's interests are represented in policy considerations; and to offer the President independent judgment. These people argue that the person who holds that job should not be an intellectual neuter, a clerk, but neither should he have strong views—irrespective of what they are—which he presses upon the President and which predispose him to give a certain response to most situations. A President, it is argued, does not have the time to sort out all the factors that may be feeding what his key adviser is telling him. This is one of those areas in which it is impossible to draw a line but it is possible to know when one has been crossed.

Even some of the President's advisers feel that the Administration is trying to do too much in foreign policy, that it is being drawn into the very chaos that Brzezinski describes and says it is our role to prevent. They are disturbed by what they see as impatience, an inability to let some things just happen. People who are inclined to react suddenly and strongly can lead their governments into situations that those governments need not get into. History tells us that nations can cause themselves to be drawn into confrontations that they did not seek or that were not necessary. Some people in the Administration wonder, on the basis of the record so far, how well equipped this Administration will be to handle a fast-breaking foreign-policy crisis. They are aware that we haven't had to face a real crisis yet. —ELIZABETH DREW

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