

325

ת"ת ברטמן

ת"ת קוטז
טלרית
ס-ס

3' וולס, וולס-וילס, וולס, וולס, וולס

נפתח: 1991 276
נסגר: 1991 276



שט זניק - משנה למנכ"ל ח. בר-און - ארה"ב - קונגרס -
חומר על סנאטורים - אותיות ס - י"פ

מזוזה פריט: 7077/10-חצ

מזוזה פריט: 000bdvf

תאריך הדפסה: 15/12/2014

מזוזה פריט: 3-312-3-5-7

325/111



ארכיון המדינה

משרד ראש הממשלה

טופס מראה מקום להוצאת תעודות יחידות*

חטיבה מס': 130.2
 מיכל מס': 7077/7
 תאריך התעודה: _____
 שם מחבר התעודה: _____
 סוג התעודה (סמן ✓ במקום המתאים):

תיק מס': 10
 שם הנמען: _____

פקיט 1976
 30/11/76

- מכתב
- מברק
- תזכיר או מיוזכר
- דין וחשבון או זכרון דברים משיחה או דיון
- פרוטוקול של שיחה, דיון או ישיבה

*הטופס ימולא בשני עותקים. העותק הירוק יוכנס לתיק במקום התעודה שהוצאה;
 העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.

15" 0

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0 1/16

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Handwritten signature or initials.

א ל: מר צ.רפיה, השגרירות, וושינגטון

מאח: מ"מ מנהל מצפ"א

הנדון: ביקור סנסור פל

המכנית כפי שבוצעה:

26.8: 11:00 החקבל בלוד ע"מ הח"מ וע"י הנספח הצבאי האמריקני.

12:00 - 15:00 תדרוך וא"צ עם שגרה"ב

15:30 דוד פריש

16:00 שהב"ט

19:00 א"ע עם מ. ארנס יו"ר והו"ב.

27.8: 07:00 - קליקיליה (מבט על ח"א) סלפיה (ראש המועצה) מרכז רפואי אזורי,

בית לחם - מחנה פליטים (שיחה עם המוכתר) וסיור סביב גוש עציון (שבח"א)

17:00 משיחה עם נכבדי הגדה ביוזמת ואצל הקונסוליה האמריקנית בירושלים.

28.8: 09:00 יד ושם

10:00 ביקור קצר בהאחזות (מעלה האדומים)

11:00 יציאה דרך גשר אלנבי.

ליוויחי את הסנסור במשך כל הביקור (פרט, כמובן לשיחה בקונסוליה האמריקנית, ממנה נעדר, לפי הוראות גם המלווה מטעם שגרה"ב, קולונל ויליאמס!).

מטרת הסנסור היחה לדבריו להבין את בעיות הגדה המערבית וכך גם נערך הביקור. השיחות עם פריש ועם ארנס היו מבחינה זו מועילות וטובות. נשאל הרבה על אספקטים אנושיים חוקיים ובטחוניים של החזקתנו בגדה וקיבל תשובות מלאות. בשיחה עם שר הבטחון, החרשם במיוחד מבטחוננו של השר בצדקת דעותיו, עמן הסכים, בדבריו לאחר מכן, הרבה פחות. הסיור בגדה נערך כלוית פושל בית לחם והיה מצויין. בכל מקום דובר באופן הפשי עם הנכבדים המקומיים, ושאל הרבה שאלות (כולל מביכוח - "חחה איזה שלטון אתם רוצים לחיות").

The first part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the State to the Governor, dated the 10th of the month. It contains a report on the state of the treasury and the public debt. The Secretary states that the treasury is in a state of comparative health, and that the public debt is being managed with care and economy. He also mentions the progress of the public works and the state of the agriculture and commerce.

The second part of the document is a report from the Board of Directors of the Bank of the State, dated the 15th of the month. It contains a statement of the assets and liabilities of the bank, and a report on the management of the bank during the year. The Board states that the bank has been successful in its operations, and that its assets are in a state of security and its liabilities are being met with care and promptness.

The third part of the document is a report from the Board of Directors of the Bank of the State, dated the 20th of the month. It contains a statement of the assets and liabilities of the bank, and a report on the management of the bank during the year. The Board states that the bank has been successful in its operations, and that its assets are in a state of security and its liabilities are being met with care and promptness.

The fourth part of the document is a report from the Board of Directors of the Bank of the State, dated the 25th of the month. It contains a statement of the assets and liabilities of the bank, and a report on the management of the bank during the year. The Board states that the bank has been successful in its operations, and that its assets are in a state of security and its liabilities are being met with care and promptness.

לאיש דעות מוגדרות לחלוטין בנושא הפלשתינאי - זכותם לחזור (לפחות לגדה)
זכותם למדינה משלהם. בנושא האשפ"י - יש לדבר עם אש"ף: - ארה"ב דברה עם הויטקונג,
צרפת עם ה-F.L.N ואם ישראל מסיבוחיה היא לא יכולה לדבר עם - על
ארה"ב לעשות זאת. (לשאלת ארנס האם על ארה"ב לדבר עם טרוריסטים פורטריקנים
ענה - "בהחלט כן"). דומני שהחרשם מהאווירה החפשית בגדה, מסגנון הדיבור
הגלוי של הערביסומהעדר הצבא. כמו כן החרשם מאד מעליית רמת החיים במחנה
הפליטים בו ביקר (ושבמקרה היה המחנה בו ביקר לפני 12 שנה), מרמת התעסוקה
ככו". אולם כאמור, כל הקידמה הכלכלית לא באה, בעיניו, לפתור את הבעייה המדינית.
לכל היוותר הצלחנו להוציא את העוקץ מהתעסולה הערבית בדבר התעללוהנו ויחסנו
לערבים בשטחים. בנושא זה השתכנע לחלוטין.

בביקור ב"יד ושם" החרשם מאד - אביו היה יו"ר (?) ה-
U.N. war crimes Commission שהקים ע"ח האמריקאים ב-1943.

איננו "דיפלומט" ואומר - ושאל את כל העולה על ליבו. (ב"יד ושם" שאל, די
בהוצפה, לפה השאלונים הממולאים עבור כל אחד מקורבנות השואה עשויים סנייד
לא טוב במיוחד. המלווה ענה לו שהכסף של ישראל מוקדש בעיקר למניעת שואה שניה -
ושיש גם מיקרופילמים). בסיכום - לא איש קל אך דומני שהפקנו המקסימום מהביקור
הקצר.

בברכה,

מ. בבלי

The first part of the report deals with the general situation in the country. It is followed by a detailed account of the work done during the year. The report concludes with a summary of the results and a list of references.

The second part of the report deals with the work done during the year. It is followed by a detailed account of the work done during the year.

The third part of the report deals with the work done during the year. It is followed by a detailed account of the work done during the year.

1950
1951



25.10.77

400

אל: מצפ"א ✓

מאה: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: בקשת המורשה FRASER למידע

בפגישה שקיים ב-21 לח"ז פרופ. יהודה בלוס עם המורשה
פרייזר - ביקש האחרון לקבל מידע מפורט לגבי:

א. הפקעה קרקעות פרטיות בגדה לצרכי ההנחלות.

ב. שמוש במקורות מיט של כפרים ערבים ע"י המתנחלים ביהודה ובשומרון.

פרייזר הינו כידוע חבר בכיר בוועדה החוץ של ביה"נ - יו"ר
תח הועדה לארגונים בי"ל, וישב ראש בהירינגס שהתקיימו לאחרונה בביה"נ
בנושא ההתנחלויות בשטחים.

לאור חשיבותו הרבה של המורשה פרייזר - הוא מוזכר גם
כמועמד אפשרי לרשת את המפרי כסנטור - נודה לכם באם העבירו אלינו
בהקדם המידע המבוקש על ידו.

בחודה מראש וזכרונה,

צ. רפיה

העחק: הסברה
מזה"ם

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

בלתי מסווג

מברק נכנס

מס: 379
נשלח: 26:00 79 פבר
ניקבל: 27:15

Handwritten signature/initials in blue ink.

אל המשדר
מאח ורשינגטון

אל: מצפה, מזח"מ.
איראן.

(רפובליקני מדרום-דקוטה)

PRESSLER

סגור לארי

סולן הודעה שמסר (שנא במקום אכורזק) כמליאת הסינט כ-28 דנא.

MR. PRESSLER, MR. PRESIDENT, AMONG THE CASUALTIES IN THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION IS IRAN'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE. I HAVE BEEN DEEPLY DISTURBED BY REPORTS THAT A NUMBER OF IRAN'S RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC COMMUNITIES MAY FACE DISCRIMINATION, EXPLUSION, AND EVEN DESTRUCTION AS A RESULT OF IRAN'S BEING TRANSFORMED INTO AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. OUR OWN NATION, WHICH SINCE ITS INCEPTION HAS STOOD FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO SPEAK OUT NOW, TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT THAT THEOCRATIC OPPRESSION OF SO-CALLED INFIDELS IS A RELIC OF ANOTHER AGE, AND CANNOT BE EXCUSED IN THE NAME OF RELIGION OR NATIONALISM.

CHIEF AMONG THOSE COMMUNITIES APPARENTLY SINGLED OUT FOR MISTREATMENT ARE IRAN'S 200,000 TO 300,000 BAHAI'S. ADHERENTS OF A PEACEFUL SHI'ITE MOSLEM OFF-SHOOT MORE THAN 125 YEARS OLD, THE BAHAI COMMUNITY HAS WON WIDE RESPECT FOR ITS COMMUNITY ENDEAVORS AND ITS ROLE IN IRAN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. ACCORDING TO SOURCES CLOSE TO THE KHOMEINI LEADERSHIP, THE BAHAI COMMUNITY MAY NOW EXPECT TO BE TREATED AS SCHISMATICS UNDER MOSLEM LAW. IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, THE VERY SURVIVAL OF THE COMMUNITY, AND ITS PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY, WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON THE WHIM OF THE NEW RULERS.

ALSO ENDANGERED BY THE ISLAMIC TAKEOVER ARE IRAN'S 110,000 ZOROASTRIANS. THEY ARE PRACTITIONERS OF IRAN'S OLDEST RELIGION, A SIXTH CENTURY B.C. MONOTHEISM WHICH PUTS A PREMIUM ON THE GOOD WORKS OF MEN. THE ZOROASTRIANS, LIKE THE BAHAI'S, HAVE MADE CULTURAL CONTRIBUTIONS FAR BEYOND THEIR NUMBER, AND LIKE THE BAHAI'S, THE ZOROASTRIANS ARE REGARDED AS INFIDELS BY THE NEW RELIGIOUS GOVERNMENT.

MR. PRESIDENT, I HAVE ALSO BEEN LESS THATN REASSURED BY THE GREETINGS EXTENDED BY THE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO IRAN'S 75,000 JEWS. IT IS TRUE THAT ISLAM REGARDS JEWS AND CHRISTIANS AS PEOPLE OF THE BOOK, DESERVING OF PROTECTION. BUT IT IS ALSO UNFORTUNATELY TRUE THAT ISLAMIC GOVERNMENTS BELIEVE THAT JEWS SHOULD BE RELEGATED TO THE POSITION OF DHIMMIS, SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS WITH

SPECIAL TAXES AND A HOST OF SPECIAL RESTRICTIONS. THE ANTI-JEWISH AND ANTI-ISRAEL ASPECT SOME OF IRANIAN RIOTERS, AS WELL AS THE WARM GREETING EXTENDED TO THE PLO'S YASSIR ARAFAT BY THE AYATOLLAH, ARE VERY DISQUIETING.

I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT ISRAEL STANDS READY AT THIS VERY MOMENT TO TAKE IN IRANIAN JEWS WHO WISH TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. I WOULD POINT OUT THAT ISRAEL'S CONTINUING POLICY OF WELCOME TO REFUGEES FROM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD IS ONE MORE EXAMPLE OF THE IDEALS WHICH ISRAEL SHARES WITH THE UNITED STATES.

MR. PRESIDENT, I AM ALSO CONCERNED THAT AS THE NEW IRANIAN GOVERNMENT STRUGGLES TO ASSERT ITS AUTHORITY, A NUMBER OF IRAN'S ETHNIC COMMUNITIES MAY BE OPPRESSED IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL UNITY. THE KURDS IN THE NORTH, AN ANCIENT PEOPLE WHO HAVE SOUGHT INDEPENDENCE FOR NEARLY 3,000 YEARS, ARE A LIKELY TARGET. SO ARE THE BALUCH TRIBESMEN IN THE SOUTH-EAST, THE QASHAQAIS IN THE SOUTHWEST, AND THE TURKOMANS IN THE FAR NORTH.

IT IS UNDENIABLE THAT AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD IRAN HAS BEEN BADLY MISHANDLED FOR THE LAST YEAR. THE UNITED STATES HAS SUFFERED SETBACKS IN ITS REGIONAL POSITION AND POTENTIAL COMPROMISES OF ITS MILITARY SECURITY. INDEED, THE EVENTUAL COSTS OF THE POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE FAILURES IN IRAN HAVE YET TO BE REVEALED. I HAVE NOTED WITH DISMAY REPORTS THAT THE UNITED STATES CHOSE NOT TO REMOVE ADVANCED MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM IRAN SO AS NOT TO IMPAIR FUTURE RELATIONS WITH THE KHOMEINI GOVERNMENT. I WOULD HOPE THAT IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT STAND IDLY BY. SILENCE IN THE FACE OF WHAT MAY BE A MASSIVE REPRESSION OF ALL NON-MOSLEMS IN IRAN WOULD DO NOTHING TO ENHANCE OUR INFLUENCE IN THE COUNTRY, OR BOLSTER AMERICA'S POSITION IN THE REGION.

I BELIEVE THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE AWARE THAT, AS IN TIMES PAST, THE CONGRESS WILL TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN EXAMINING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND WILL NOT BE COERCED INTO SILENCE IN THE NAME OF DIPLOMATIC NICETIES AND ON THE BASIS OF CLASSIFIED SECRETS.

AD KAN.
RAFIACH==

שתי ימי סוף אנו מקבלים אתכם בלבביות רבה ואלו



תאריך:

1978
 (תקופת)
 תל-אביב

אל: משה רבי

מאת: טי כהן

מקסימה ער 30
 1978

1) מתיבה וישראל גנים פניה הקנה

ער ארנה זמסקי "הגלגל" התחילן" של

היבסני הכותל זמנה, ובמאהל יתליף

ער כק, היציבה של באקוויז היא

כי היסט יאשרי חנה עה

2) לארג כינונו של הסני שלום לניה -

ויבוצי יהיה קשה למצב פאסוס

(זקוקים) צייסוקי - ער עם אכבו -

ער. היסטור מאר כי אכן

ישה סכני ~~משה~~ שזקוקי - הסני

שלום "האר" חרקים אסוקי - ער

אכבו - ער.



ח-קול 210

CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

105 MONTGOMERY STREET
SUITE 1000
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104
991-2786

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל

סן פרנציסקו

293

27 מרץ 1978
101.2

אל: צבי הפיח, השגרירות, וושינגטון.
מאח: הקונכ"ל, סן פרנציסקו.

הנדון: מדעות שני הסנטורים של אורגון -
פקוד והאטפילד - על מדיניותה
המזתית של ארה"ב ועיסקות הנסק.

ראה נא ברצ"ב המאמר שהופיע ב"אורגוניון" פורטלנד.
בודאי תשים לב להבדלים בעמדות שבין שני הסנטורים, אם כי
(בקטע שלפני האחרון) מצוטט האטפילד האומר שגם הוא יצביע
נגד עיסקת החבילה.

בברכה,

מרדכי ארציאלי

העתק:
ח. בראון, הציר, וושינגטון.
מ. ארד, סמנכ"ל.
מנהל מצפ"א. ✓

1950-1951



Congress said no longer giving automatic support to Israel

WASHINGTON — Oregon's two Republican senators rarely agree on anything to do with Middle East politics, but they agree on this: The mood on Capitol Hill has shifted dramatically away from automatic support for Israel.

In separate interviews, Sens. Mark Hatfield and Bob Packwood said the celebrated peace overtures of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat have gradually opened Congress to the Arab side in the dispute.

The shift of opinion apparently gives President Carter a freer hand to press the Israelis for more concessions to achieve peace, as Carter is expected to do when Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin visits Washington later this month.

Packwood, by his own description a "zealot" for Israel, estimated that where Israel could once count 75 solid votes in the Senate, the number of sure supporters has fallen to 55.

"There has simply been a withering of support for Israel," he said. "It is unfortunate. It is wrong. Israel's cause is just as right now as it has ever been."

Hatfield, one of the handful of senators who has spoken up for Arab interests in Congress, sees the shift as a healthy development.

"Sadat's initiatives have given a certain credibility to the Arab viewpoint that was totally overlooked before," the senior Senator said. "I think the United States in its role as peacemaker has got to have some degree of even-handed-

ness to have credibility on both sides."

Both men said last week's terrorist raid on Israel, in which 37 Israelis were killed and dozens more wounded, would temporarily revive support for the Israeli position, but they agreed Israel would probably never regain its previous strength in Congress.

Though the senators said the Middle East rarely comes up as a topic in meetings with Oregon constituents, they say there has been a new respect for the Arab cause there, too.

Packwood tells of a Rotary Club meeting he attended in Medford recently where a constituent asked, "Isn't it true that President Sadat is trying to bring peace and the Israelis are trying to stop it?"

In the interviews, the senators differed sharply in both temper and perspective on current issues in the Middle East.

Packwood generally condemned Carter's handling of the Middle East, and called for the United States to restrict its role in supplying arms for Israel and carrying messages between the conflicting countries.

"It may take another 10 years, 20 years, 30 years, but left to their own devices, those nations will reach a settlement," Packwood said.

Hatfield had a milder appraisal of the job Carter is doing in the Middle East, and endorsed a more activist United States' role than the simple shuttle diplomacy of the Nixon era.

"I would hate to think we were just a high-class messenger service," Hat-

field said. "There is no question the United States still has tremendous influence on the state of Israel, and a fair degree of influence on the moderate Arab states."

According to Packwood, the Middle East is Carter's "weakest spot" so far in his first term as president.

"If he has a consistent position at all, it is an effort to bring pressure on Israel to give up more land than Israel should give up without irrevocable guarantees of peace and tranquility," Packwood said.

Packwood said Israelis should be free to establish settlements on the occupied West Bank of the Jordan River and added, "I have never been convinced they ought to have to give back all of the West Bank."

Packwood called Carter's recent weapons package, which links arms for Saudi Israel with fighter planes for Saudi Arabia and Egypt, a mistake, and said he would vote against the Arab portion of that sale if he is given the chance.

"Our function, aside from offering our good auspices as a go-between should be to keep Israel sufficiently supplied so that she can bargain from a

position of parity with the Arabs," Packwood said.

Hatfield said that he feels Carter's Middle East policy "lacks clarity," but added, "I felt the president was making major steps by encouraging the Israelis not to go ahead with new settlements on the West Bank, which are clearly an obstacle to peace."

Hatfield added, "I can understand the Israeli concern about who is going to occupy the West Bank, especially after last week's terrorist episode. I would be reluctant to say the West Bank is going to have to be yielded."

"That should come, if at all, as part of a package deal to resolve the question of a Palestinian homeland."

Hatfield said he would vote against the Israeli-Arab arms package because of "my habit of voting against all arms packages," but he commended Carter for recognizing that the Arabs have military problems other than Israel — especially in East Africa.

Hatfield said that with the shifting mood in Congress, he thinks there is the chance the arms deal will be approved — something which would have been inconceivable about a year ago.

MAR 17 1978

Oregonian Mar 16

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסיחוץ וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

נא
ק"א (אוס) (קפ"ו)

מברק יוצא - מסווג

ס. 33

מסלח 091400 אפר 78

ס ו ד י
ר ת ד י


רוט
רמטר

המברק מסווג יחד עם הנוסח או הארץ. רישום המודיע בריש. במסר לעיסקה המסוימת עם סגוריה השמיע
אשר העליון הבאה:
המברק נאם צמוד, כל עוד הנשיא לא יעני את כל כובד מהלכו למען איסור העסקה יש
למטה להכשילה בקרב הריש. מאידך אם קאמור ימועד לקו גרם שהוא מליחם לעיסקה מיוחד
המברק יום ימו להידר על העלה פנמה היא יעבור בקרב רש.
מנהל מוצא

המברק נכלל שחט ממכלל שטור דיבור מצא מזה מ חדר רש און

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו

משרד החוץ



ת"א
יו"א (שקנוק)

כ"ז באדר ב' תשל"ח
5 באפריל 1978

שטור

אל : מר צביר רפיה, וושינגטון

מאת : מצפ"א

הנדון: סנסור פקוד

ליוויחי האורה ורעיהו בין התאריכים 31.3 - 2.4. סננו במטוס צבאי קטן מירושלים לאורך הגדמ"ע עד שכס מסם לבקעת הירצן, חברון, רצועת עזה, פיהחה רפיה, אילת, טנטה קטרינה לשארם אל שייך. הסלול נקבע עפ"י בקשה הסנסור. לא כולאה בקשה הסנסור לסוג צמונה מסכס עקב בעיות בטיחות.

בשארם אל שייך, נהקבלנו ע"י המושל הצבאי עמו סיינו במקום והאורה חודרך ע"י מפקד המרחב בדרגת תא"ל שהדיגיש את הסכנה באספקת מטוסי F-15 לסעודיה ועל בעיות ההגנה של המרחב. כצאתו מהדריך אמר כי חבל שכל אותם שאינם משוכנעים כמותו להצביע נגד עיסקה החבילה אינם שומעים הסבר זה ולעצם סיכויי עיסקה החבילה אמר דברים הדומים להערכה עליה הבריך מנהל מצפ"א ב-3.4.

לאחר חודריך זה ועד לנחיתתנו בנת. ב.ב. ב-2.4 היה אופי שהייחנו חיירותי בלבד, אציין כי את הדרך בשארם לאילת עשינו במכונית חוף ביקורים בנביעות, מצפה שחם ואחרים נוסעים בדרך.

בפגם 2/4 נפגש האורה עם שהב"ט (דיווח בנסרד), במסך כל הביקור הביע האורה אהרה לישראל וביקורת קשה על הדרך בה נוקט המיטשל הן כלפי ישראל והן בנושאי פנים. לגבי הבחירות הבאות אמר כי המועמד הדמוקרטי הנגדי יהיה מושל קליפורניה בראון (שמאישיותו הסתייג ביותר) והגביר סיכוייו כקלושים. אולם בבחירות לנשיאות עצמן הגדיר את הנשיא כ"ניתן להבסת" אולם אמר שלרפובליקנים כרגע כשמונה מועמדים מהם סנסורים ומהם מושלים (לדעתו ריגן ופורד לא יחמודדו) אך אין לנקוב במועמד מרכזי בשעה מקדמת זו.

יש ליחד מספר טילים לרעיהו הסנסור ואישיותה. הגב" פקוד מעורה היטב בחיים הפוליטיים ובקיאא בצורה יוצאת מהכלל במהרהש באזורנו ואחדחה לישראל היתה גלויה, בראה כי השמעתה על הסנסור רבה ביותר. במסך כל שהותנו היה הזוג נינוח וחביב, לחלק מהסיוור נחלוותה רעיהו שקשרה קשרי ידידות עם הגב" פקוד.

העקב: מנהל מצפ"א
מנהל סאו"ר
הקובכ"ל, סן-פרנציסקו

ב ב ר כ ה

שלמה גורביץ

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First paragraph of faint body text.

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Sixth paragraph of faint body text.

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מדינת ישראל

ת"ת
קולג' (מ/נ/ק)

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

תאריך: כ"ו באדר ב' תשל"ח
4 באפריל 1978

מספר:

דיווח מפגישת שהב"ט - סנטור פקוד

הפגישה התקיימה בלשכת שהב"ט בתאריך 2.4.78.

השתתפו: סנטור פקוד ורעייתו
שהב"ט
מר משה רביב
מר דוד קוליץ
רס"ן אריה שור
שלמה גורביץ (רשם)

הסנטור ביקש לאמת דברי האלוף איתן כי נחפסו בידי המחבלים באד"ל רובים מדגם M-16 שמקורם בסעודיה וציין כי הנספח הצבאי האמריקני שלל אפשרות זו בטענה שלסעודיה נמסרו רק ארבעה רובים מדגם זה. לאחר בדיקה שנעשתה ע"י רסן שור השיב שהב"ט כי אין אימות מלא לדברי האלוף איתן, כיון שרובים מסוג זה מצויים כלכנון בכפריות גדולות ויתכן שם מקור הרובים.

שהב"ט ספר על ביקורו בקהיר ולשאלת הסנטור לגבי הסגי הביקור אמר שהב"ט כי עצם קיום המפגש והמסען השיחה הוא הישג מכיון שהיה חשש ש"ו-שיח ייפסק כליל. שהרי עד עתה היה עם בישראל במצב טרגי בלתי טבעי שלטרוח שחי מזה שנים רבות באזור היה מנותק לחלוטין מהטובבים אהו והאמין, יתכן בטעון, כי אין כל סיכוי לשנות מצב זה ולהפסיק המלחמות ולהשיג השלום.

לפתע בא סאדאת מבקר בישראל ומדבר על שלום חוץ דרישת נסיגה לגבולות 67. זה זעזע וריגש את העם רולו אולם בעקבות התרוסמות הרוח באה התפכחות והתחילה דאגה.

הנשיא סאדאת כלל לא מביין מדוע י; ישראל ממשיכה להתוכח עמו שהרי העניק לנו שלום ולכן אין לנו צורך כלל בצבא. תשובת שהב"ט לנשיא סאדאת היחה כי קימות מדינות ערב נוספות באזור וכנגדן יש לקיים עדיין צבא וכן יש לדאוג לעתיד מה יהיה לאחר הסתלקות סאדאת. וכדוגמה הביא את יחסי ארה"ב-בריה"מ שלמרות יחסי השלום ביניהם מקימים צבאות אדירים, בסיסים ברחבי העולם וכו'.

הסנטור שאל לגבי הוראות שניתנו לחיילי האו"ם באד"ל. וזאת בהתייחס להכרזים שונים ששמע מקצין צרפתי (אמר שלא יפתחו באש אלא להגנתם) ומקצין נורבגי (אמר שימנעו בכל מחיר חדירת אלמנטים עוינים לאד"ל). וכך שאל לגבי אפשרות חציית הליטני ליד גשר חרדלי. שהב"ט השיב כי ההוראות שניתנו לחיילי האו"ם אינן ידועות לו והוא חושש כי ליחידות השונות נחנו הוראות שונות, לגבי אפשרות חציית הליטני אמר מר ויצמן כי הליטני לכל אורכו ניתן לחציה בקלות יחסית והשאלה היא מה יעשו בטרוריסטים שיתפסו לאחר החציה באזור הליטני או דרומה משם ומה יקרה אם הפת"ח יפעל באד"ל. שהרי האו"ם נמצא שם בין הפטיש לסדן בין הצהרת סרקיס שאין ביכולתו לשלוט על אד"ל ובין הצהרת ישראל שלא תסבול החקפות טרור משם ועוד 40 אלף טורים נמצאים מצפונה. יתר על כן מה יקרה אם הפתח יתקוף מברית ע"י ספינה שתצא משם. זה מצביע רק על כך ששורש הבעיה היא באש"ף ובצורך בחיסולו.

2./.

מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ

ירושלים

האריך:

מספר:

- 2 -

לשאלת הסנטור על הדרך לעשות זאת השיב שהב"ט כי יש לעשות כן בכמה דרכים ע"י כך שאמות העולם לא יקימו כל מגע אתם, ע"י כך שהאו"ם יפקח על כל לבנון או ע"י פעולה שלנו.

שהב"ט סיפר כי בהיותו ראש אג"מ ב-68-69 ובעית המחבלים מירדן היתה בשיאה הוחלט כי בנוסף לאמצעי המניעה נגד החדירה והפגיעה במחבלים (כ-1000 נהרגו) יש לאלץ הירדנים לפעול כנגד המחבלים וע"י פעולות כנגד ירדן אילצנו הירדנים לפעול כפי שאכן עשו בספטמבר 1970.

להערת הסנטור כי ללבנונים אין כח לעשות כן הגיב שהב"ט כי לאור מספר החיילים הסורים ששם יש באפשרות סוריה לעשות זאת.

שהב"ט הוסיף כי "הפתרון הקל" המוצע לנו - מדינה פלסטינית בגדמ"ע אינו קביל שהרי משמעותו החזרת הטרור לגדמ"ע.

שהב"ט השיב לאורח על שאלותיו לגבי אפשרויות ההגנה השונות על הגדמ"ע, חוץ השענות על גורמים סופוגרפיים אולם הוסיף כי הבעיה הישראלית בגדמ"ע היא האוכלוסיה הערבית שיכולה להיות עוינת וע"כ יש צורך במציאת דרך לחייט משותפים.

לשם כך יש צורך בנוכחות צבאית ישראלית: 1. כנגד האוכלוסיה המקומית. 2. כנגד חדירת מחבלים ממזרח לירדן. 3. למנוע פלישה צבא סדיר מהמזרח.

שהב"ט הדגיש שישנה הסכמה ישראלית-אמריקנית ואפילו מצריה כנגד מדינה פלסטינית ולנוכחות צבאית ישראלית מסוימת בגדמ"ע.

שהב"ט הצביע על צעדו הגדול של רה"מ הן בקבלו את הנשיא סאדאת והן בהציגו תכנית נדיבה הן בסיני והן בגדמ"ע (אוטונומיה וחוסר ריבונות ישראלית) וזאת למרות שבא מפלגה שדגלה כל השנים בכך שהגדמ"ע היא חלק מאדמת המולדת. הסנטור ציין כי חוסר ריבונות לא יכול להתקיים זמן רב. על כך הגיב שהב"ט כי היתכן אוטונומיה שחבוקר ע"י שתי מדינות: ישראל וירדן בגדמ"ע וישראל ומצרים בעזה.

הסנטור העיר כי מעשי ישראלי בעזה עשויים להפכה למעין דנציג על כך אמר שהב"ט שהרי מדברים אנו על שלום מלא וגבולות פתוחים וע"כ אין כל אסון בישובים האזרחיים באזור פיתחת רפיח.

לשאלת הסנטור על עתיד שארם-אל-שייח השיב שהב"ט כי הצענו הוצאת הצבא, מסירת הרבונות למצרים, השארת האזרחים והעברת השטח לחסות האו"ם.

לגבי עיסקת המסוטים אמר הסנטור שגם אם תבחה עתה הרי בסופו של דבר האושר מכירת מסוטים לסעודיה ומצרים ושהב"ט אמר כי באזור כסלנו בעצם הדחיה יש רווח שהרי דחיית העיסקה יתכן שיש בה גם משום דחיית מלחמה.

שלמה גורביץ



CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

108 MONTGOMERY STREET
SUITE 1000
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104
981-2788

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל

סן פרנציסקו

536

כ"ח תשרי תשל"ח
10 אוקטובר 1977
101.2

מכתב קצין (כאמ"ח)
היו"ד

אל: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון.
מאת: הקונכ"ל, סן פרנציסקו.

הנדון: בוב פקווד.

ראה נא ברצ"ב מכתבו של הסנסור מאורגון בוב פקווד ליו"ר ה- CRC
בפורטלנד.

בברכה,

מ. י. ג. י. ג.
מרדכי ארציאלי

העתק:

- ח. בר און, הציר, וושינגטון.
- ב. נבון, ציר הסברה, וושינגטון.
- לשכת המנכ"ל.
- מנהל מצפ"א. ✓

WILLIAM E. TALMADGE, GA.
WALTER D. BROWN, OHIO
WALTER F. BROWN, JR., VA.
WALTER D. BROWN, JR., WIS.
WILLIAM D. BRANTLEY, ALA.
WILLIAM D. BRANTLEY, ALA.

WILLIAM D. BRANTLEY, ALA.
WILLIAM D. BRANTLEY, ALA.
WILLIAM D. BRANTLEY, ALA.
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WILLIAM D. BRANTLEY, ALA.
WILLIAM D. BRANTLEY, ALA.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 29, 1977

MICHAEL STERN, STAFF DIRECTOR
GORDON S. GILMAN, CHIEF MINORITY COUNSEL

Victor Menashe, MD
Chairman, Community Relations Committee
Jewish Federation of Portland, Oregon
6651 S. W. Capitol Highway
Portland, Oregon 97219

Dear Dr. Menashe:

Thanks very much for your letter concerning Palestinian representation at a future Geneva Conference. I'm sorry I didn't get a chance to respond sooner but as you've no doubt read in the paper things have been pretty hectic around here the last week.

I believe you are correct in your perception that the Administration is subtly shifting its position with regard to the Palestine Liberation Organization and is placing pressure on Israel to negotiate with its representatives. Its actions earlier this week are indicative.

As you know, the Administration provided a formula which would permit a unified Arab delegation, including Palestinians, to take part in the opening of a new Geneva Conference. Not surprisingly, it then failed to support publicly Israel's refusal to meet with a pan-Arab delegation comprised in part by P.L.O. representatives.

Personally, I continue my strong belief that under no circumstances should the U.S. apply pressure on Israel to negotiate with the P.L.O. or its representatives. Only when the legitimate Arab states agree to bargain face to face with the Israeli government will a true and lasting peace be possible.

I certainly appreciate, Dr. Menashe, your contacting me on this important issue and look forward to hearing from you again soon.

Cordially,



BOB PACKWOOD

BP:sjb



1.11.77

א"ל
א"מ
א"פ

410

אל: סגן מנהל מצפ"א
מאת: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

למיקי שלום רב,

מצ"ב הדו"ח שפרסם סנטור פל על ביקורו בישראל באוגוסט ש.ז.

כפי שתראה הדו"ח הוא חיובי מבחינתנו. יש לכך חשיבות מיוחדת

לנוכח העובדה שפל לא היה בדרכ"ל מהתומכים הנלהבים שלנו - אם כי
בסופו של דבר היה מצביע בדרך הישר - והיו לו ספקות בנושא הפלשתינאי
והשטחים.

בעמוד VI תראה שהוא מציין גם אוחק בין האישים עמם נפגש

בישראל.

בברכה,
צ. רפיח

SECRET



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

011

11.11.77

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
FROM: AMEMB, TEL AVIV

URGENT 11/11/77

RE: ISRAELI AIR FORCE (IAF) - 11/11/77

1. IAF aircraft were observed on 11/11/77 in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip. The aircraft were observed in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip at approximately 10:00 AM. The aircraft were observed in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip at approximately 10:00 AM. The aircraft were observed in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip at approximately 10:00 AM.

2. The aircraft were observed in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip at approximately 10:00 AM. The aircraft were observed in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip at approximately 10:00 AM. The aircraft were observed in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip at approximately 10:00 AM.

SECRET

SECRET

95th Congress }
1st Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT

THE WEST BANK

A KEY ELEMENT
IN THE
SEARCH FOR PEACE IN
THE MIDDLE EAST

A REPORT
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
BY
SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL



OCTOBER 1977

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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WASHINGTON : 1977

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(II)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., October 4, 1977.

HON. JOHN SPARKMAN,
*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the August recess, I visited Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan in an effort to obtain a better understanding of the geography and demography of the critical West Bank area as they relate to Israel's security needs and a peace settlement. Whether Israel retains control over all or part of the West Bank or withdraws substantially to the pre-1967 lines, important security concerns of Israel will have to be met in some way. I wanted to gain a deeper appreciation of just what those needs are so that I would be in a better position to evaluate any proposals for a peace settlement.

In this connection, I am pleased to submit the enclosed report of my findings and recommendations. I hope that my report will be of value to you and other members of the committee in understanding the West Bank aspect of the effort to seek peace in the Middle East.

On this trip, I was accompanied by Mr. Geryld Christianson of my staff who helped immensely in the preparation of this report.

Ever sincerely,

CLAIBORNE PELL.

(III)

PREFACE

I have long had a great personal feeling of admiration for and commitment to the State of Israel even before that brave nation was reborn as an independent entity in 1948. My fascination with the idea of the creation of a Jewish State initially grew out of my father's experience in 1943-45 as the U.S. Representative on the United Nations War Crimes Commission. As a result of his initiative—which, because of opposition in the State Department, later cost him his job—genocide was declared a war crime.

The whole tragic episode of the Nazi holocaust convinced me that a Jewish homeland was needed, a place where a Jew could enter and live by right, not by sufferance. This view was reinforced by my own experience of having had a taste of Nazi tyranny when I was arrested by the Gestapo in Danzig before World War II and also, after the war, when I was in charge of the American Consulate General in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, I offered refuge to Slovak Jews fleeing from a local pogrom. Shortly after World War II, when I worked on the staff of the United Nations Secretariat, there was talk that a Jewish homeland might be established in Latin America or East Africa; but it soon became clear that only the land of ancient Israel would be acceptable. Thus Israel was reborn in 1948, in great part as a result of the support of the United States.

More recently, as Cochairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I have been deeply involved in the effort to promote the observance of the human rights provisions contained in the Helsinki Accord of 1975. The right of Soviet and Eastern European Jews to emigrate to Israel and other countries is a key element in the observance of that accord. I believe strongly that if Israel is to be the principal haven for oppressed Jews, the United States must do all that it can to eliminate the barriers to those who yearn to make a new life in Israel.

In the 29 years of Israel's existence as a modern state, she has never lived in peace. Only since 1973 have all of her Arab neighbors (excluding, of course, the PLO) apparently reconciled themselves to the fact that Israel is there to stay by accepting Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967; but therein lies some measure of hope that real peace might not be the impossible dream it once seemed to be.

Recalling my visit to Israel before the Six-Day War in 1967, I remember vividly the tension under which the people of Israel lived within the vulnerable figure-eight armistice lines established in 1948, where at one point the Arab West Bank, controlled by Jordan, extended to a point less than 10 miles from the sea. That all changed after the 1967 war when Israel occupied the entire West Bank as well as the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and Sinai.

Since the conclusion of the partial Sinai disengagement agreement of 1975, the focus of peace efforts has been on finding a comprehensive solution to the problem of peace rather than continuing the step-by-step approach. This is an ambitious undertaking. One of the central

issues in a comprehensive settlement is the question of to what extent Israel is prepared to give up territories occupied in the 1967 war in exchange for the peace Israel is seeking from the Arabs. In this connection, the most difficult territorial issue is the future of the West Bank, because of its size, large Arab population, and strategic and political importance.

Because of the importance of the West Bank, an area I had not seen before, I decided to visit this "administered territory", as it is known in Israel, during the Senate's August recess. My specific objectives were (a) to obtain first-hand information on Israel's security needs in the critical West Bank area, and (b) to obtain Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian Arab views on where the West Bank and its inhabitants—both Israeli and Arab—might fit into a peace settlement.

I began my visit in Tel Aviv, where I met with the American Ambassador, Samuel Lewis, and his staff; Defense Minister Ezer Weizman; Prof. Moshe Arens, the Chairman of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee; Mr. Michael Bavli, head of the Foreign Ministry's North American section; and with Colonel David Farhi, the Deputy Coordinator of Administered Territories.

I then toured the West Bank by automobile, stopping in Arab villages and at an Arab refugee camp administered by the United Nations Relief and Works Administration (UNRWA), visiting with an Israeli family in one of the new industrial settlements near Jerusalem, and seeing for myself the strategic military terrain of the West Bank. I also visited Jerusalem, where I toured the Jewish quarter of East Jerusalem, stopped at the Wailing Wall, and viewed the careful archaeological excavations taking place around the ancient temple.

The most moving experience during my trip was a stop at Jerusalem's magnificent Yad Vashem Museum, a memorial to the victims of the Nazi holocaust. Here, enshrined for all generations, is the full, tragic story of the hideous extermination of six million human beings. Among the many photographs and copies of historical documents of the period which were on display was a letter of 1944 which revealed the gross insensitivity of even our own Government to the fate of the Jews in Europe. In that letter, a high American official explained why it would not be "feasible" for the Allied forces to bomb the furnaces of the extermination camps. It recalled to mind that most of the victims of the Nazi holocaust could have been saved if the United States and the rest of the world had been willing to bend their immigration laws and make arrangements to move them to safety.

I concluded my Middle East trip with a meeting with Palestinian Arab leaders from the West Bank and a stop in Amman, Jordan. There, I met with the American Ambassador, Thomas Pickering, and his staff; Crown Prince Hassan, King Hussein's brother; Minister of Information Adnan Abuh Odeh, former Prime Minister Zaid al-Rifai, and other senior Jordanian officials in order to obtain first-hand their views on the situation in the West Bank and on the prospects for peace.

My trip left me with a much clearer idea of the problems that must be solved if peace is to be achieved; I only wish that I had a correspondingly clearer idea of how an enduring peace can be achieved. I am, however, offering some observations in this report on the direction American policy should take in the coming months to facilitate the peace process. I hope they will be useful to my colleagues in the Congress, to the administration, and to concerned citizens.

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THE WEST BANK, A KEY ELEMENT IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

I. BACKGROUND ON THE WEST BANK

As noted in the preface to this report, I decided to concentrate on the West Bank area, because it is the most important, and so far most intractable, of the territorial questions to be addressed in any peace negotiations. The West Bank has also been a source of controversy and friction with the Carter administration, as a result of the Begin government's approval of several existing or planned Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

Since June 1967, Israel has been the occupying military authority on the West Bank of the Jordan River. The West Bank, comprising 2,270 square miles (about twice the size of Rhode Island) and an Arab population of 640,000, had been under Jordanian administration from 1948 to 1967. The final disposition of the area was to be the subject of a general peace settlement between Israel and the Arab States, an agreement that has been impossible to reach for almost 30 years now. The boundary between the West Bank and Israel, known as the "Green Line," is the 1949 armistice line and simply marked the demarcation line between Israel and Arab League forces at the time that the U.N.-ordered ceasefire went into effect.

After June 1967, Israel sought to negotiate the return of the occupied territories in exchange for peace and recognition by the Arab States. In August 1967, however, a summit conference of Arab leaders in Khartoum laid down four principles which effectively closed the door on direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs. These principles were: No peace with Israel, no negotiations with Israel, no recognition of Israel and a declaration of the rights of the "Palestinian people in their own country." Then, in July 1968 the National Congress of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) met in Cairo and adopted a "national charter" which, among other things, states in article 19 that "the partition of Palestine in 1967 and the establishment of the State of Israel are illegal * * *."

From 1967 until 1974 Israel was prepared, in the event of a "genuine" peace settlement, for most of the West Bank to revert to Jordan, whose sovereignty over the area would be confirmed in a general Middle East peace conference. In October 1974, however, the Rabat Summit Conference of Arab leaders passed a resolution recognizing the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestine people"—and therefore, by implication, the heir to the leadership of the Palestinians on the West Bank. Israel made it clear immediately that it had no intention of permitting the creation of a hostile, independent Palestinian state under the control of the PLO.

With the passage of years, Israel's hold on the West Bank has become stronger. The Israeli military authorities oversee the government of the West Bank (called Judea and Samaria by the Israeli authorities.) However, the 23 municipalities and 31 rural councils still operate under Jordanian and British Mandate Law. The military government's authority in the West Bank area is quite extensive and covers anything that could cause a security problem.

The first Israeli settlements in the West Bank were established in the fall of 1967 and were dual-purpose Nahals, agricultural communities which also performed defense functions along the Jordan River. Since these first, temporary settlements, more than 35 additional settlements have been established on the West Bank with a total population of approximately 4,500. Originally most of the settlements were established in a so-called "security belt" along the Jordan River and around Jerusalem, although some were set up by Jewish religious groups near Hebron without Israeli Government approval. This system of security settlements fits generally into what came to be known as the Allon plan, named after former Foreign Minister Yigol Allon who advanced the idea in 1976. The details of this plan will be described in part II of this report.

In the spring of 1976 Israel permitted local elections to take place in the West Bank municipalities. The mayors thus elected have so far not coalesced into an independent political force and, for the most part, they continue to recognize, although with differing degrees of enthusiasm, the PLO as the representative of the West Bank population.

Economically, the West Bank is a predominantly agricultural area. It exports most of its produce to Jordan under the so-called "open bridges" program (although only one of the three bridges is actually open). The West Bank's fruits, vegetables and olive oil are then reexported from Jordan to various other Arab States. The West Bank farmers also export to Israel, but to a much lesser extent. About 60,000 West Bank and Gaza Strip residents work in fairly well paid jobs in Israel and commute daily back and forth. Increasing numbers of workers from the West Bank are finding employment in the Arab oil-producing States, however, and only return to their homes in the occupied territories during the summer months. The general trend is away from work in Israel and the West Bank itself and toward employment in higher-paying jobs in the oil-producing countries.

II. ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK

Neither the Labor governments that held power after the 1967 war nor the Begin government has been clear regarding the eventual status of the West Bank under a peace settlement. Every Israeli Government has maintained that this question and the details of any Israeli withdrawal under the terms of Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 should only be addressed at a peace conference. It has been generally assumed, however, that a Labor government would be more forthcoming on this question than would the Likud-led government of Prime Minister Begin. Whether, in fact, there would be any difference may never be known.

Yigol Allon, Foreign Minister of Labor Prime Minister Rabin's government, did, however, put forth a "personal" peace plan which appeared in the October 1976 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. In describing that plan, which he emphasized had no official standing in his government, Allon argued against annexing "an additional and significant Arab population." Instead, he proposed "some minor tactical border alterations along the western sector of the 'the green line'" and "absolute Israeli control over the strategic zone to the east of the dense Arab population." Allon did not clarify who would have sovereignty over the Arab-populated area. A map showing how such a strategic zone might be delineated is at the end of this report.

At best a trial balloon under the Rabin government, the Allon plan has no support in the Begin government. On May 19, 2 days after his election as Israel's likely next Prime Minister, Menachem Begin travelled to the West Bank and declared the whole area "liberated," not occupied, territory that belonged to Israel by historical right. Since becoming Prime Minister, Begin has legalized three established but unauthorized Jewish settlements and has given the go-ahead on construction of an additional three settlements on the West Bank that had been authorized by the Rabin government. He has also extended Israeli social services and regulations to cover the Arab population of the West Bank, giving rise to charges of "creeping annexation" and causing tensions with the Carter administration.

During my discussions with Israeli leaders, I was struck by their deep sense of unease over the prospect of giving up the strategic West Bank in return for only promises of peace by the Arabs—promises which might not be kept from the outset or later repudiated if the present Arab leaders are replaced by more radical ones. Something "concrete," I was told, must accompany the promises to make the latter attractive. Asked to give an example of such a "concrete" action, an Israeli official told me that the new Egyptian construction in the Suez Canal area could be considered as investments in peace thereby giving greater credence to Egyptian statements. Others told me that before discussing any Israeli withdrawals it would be better to agree on confidence-building measures such as arms control agreements or cooperative projects in the civilian sector.

In surveying the military aspects of the West Bank, Defense Minister Weizman emphasized to me the threat of Israel's being cut in two if Arab Armed Forces were again to gain access to the West Bank, which, as I mentioned earlier, juts within 10 miles of Tel Aviv and the Mediterranean Sea. Later, when I crossed into the West Bank at that point, I went to the former Jordanian fortification that once dominated the area and saw for myself how vulnerable Tel Aviv and the surrounding area were to the hostile forces that once occupied that position.

The following day, I saw the strategic ridge of the West Bank that looks down on the Jordan valley. This ridge is highly important as a site for early warning stations to detect and warn of an attack from the east and as a defense point to deter or direct fire down on an attacking force. Whether in the future the West Bank is retained by Israel or given up, it is clear that this ridge must not be allowed to be held by forces hostile to Israel. What I saw convinced me of Israel's need for the "secure and recognized boundaries" referred to in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.

Although the Begin government is reluctant to give up the West Bank, it is not clear that it is determined to hold on to every square meter of the area come what may. It is clear, however, that whether or not Israel's political borders extend to the Jordan River, any Israeli Government would likely consider the Jordan to be Israel's eastern frontier for military purposes. In this connection, I have noted that Vice President Mondale in a speech he gave in San Francisco on June 17 said that "there could be separate lines of defense or other measures that could enhance Israel's security. The arrangements in the Sinai and in the Golan Heights provide models of how Israel's security might be enhanced until confidence in a lasting peace can be fully developed" My own experience as an advisor to the U.N. Law of the Sea negotiations leads me to believe that consideration ought to be given to the establishment of some kind of Israeli "security zone" in the West Bank without Israel's actually obtaining sovereignty over the area. In the case of the law of the sea there is wide agreement on the creation of a special purpose "economic zone" in which coastal states have economic rights, but which remains high seas in all other aspects.

III. THE ARAB VIEW

In late 1976, President Sadat of Egypt suggested that a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip should be "linked" to Jordan. King Hussein of Jordan has not abandoned entirely the idea that the West Bank residents might opt to return to Jordanian control, with no independent, PLO-dominated government. Syria has tended to support the PLO position that a West Bank/Gaza Strip state should be formed under PLO aegis and could then, if it so desired, establish links of some sort with Jordan.

The PLO itself has consistently stated that the West Bank and Gaza should be independent of Jordan and enjoy full sovereign rights and could then establish ties with Jordan at some time in the future if the population wished to do so.

The West Bank population is not well organized politically, but several West Bank mayors hewed closely to the PLO position in a recent statement addressed to the United States and the Soviet Union as cochairmen of the Geneva Conference.

While in Jerusalem, I spoke with several leaders of the Palestinian Arab community in the West Bank. None of them was a member of the PLO, but it was clear that they sympathize with that organization. It quickly became evident that their distrust of Israel is as great as Israel's distrust of the Arabs. They expressed fears that Israel would absorb the area and eventually push out the Arabs. My meeting with these Palestinians came shortly after the announcement of the PLO's refusal to accept Security Council Resolution 242 and Israel's right to exist. In response to my criticism of that decision, my Palestinian interlocutors claimed that the PLO action, particularly the refusal to accept the existence of Israel, was justified because Israel refused to recognize the right of a Palestinian Arab state to exist. They maintained that Palestinian Arabs have a separate sense of identity from other Arabs and a deep attachment to the lands they have inhabited west of the Jordan.

These leaders had little faith that the Palestinians could expect much from direct Arab negotiations with Israel and looked to the United

States for help. I took this opportunity to clear up what appeared to be a misreading of what America is prepared to do to promote a peace settlement. I expressed my own belief that the United States cannot be expected to be truly evenhanded because of our role in the very creation of Israel and our strong commitment to the survival and security of Israel. I emphasized that in my own case, as set forth in the preface of this report, I have a great personal commitment to Israel that causes me to be particularly sensitive to Israel's security needs.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In all of my discussions in Israel, the West Bank and Jordan, I tried to get reactions to the various approaches to peace that have been advanced recently. Included among them were the Allon plan, which I have already summarized, and an approach suggested in 1975 by the Brookings Institution in Washington, which is reported to be the basis of the Carter administration's policy. Under this latter approach, Israel would withdraw in stages to the pre-1967 lines with only such modifications as are mutually accepted. These boundaries would be safeguarded by demilitarized zones supervised by U.N. forces. Palestinian self-determination (either as an independent state or an autonomous area of Jordan) would be provided for on the condition that the Palestinians accept the sovereignty and integrity of Israel within agreed borders.

I also sought reactions to a variation that occurred to me whereby the 1967 lines between Israel and the West Bank would be redrawn in such a way as to eliminate the vulnerable figure-eight configuration of Israel by adding territory to its narrow midsection and transferring a compensating and equivalent amount of pre-1967 Israeli territory to the West Bank.

What I found out in the process of raising all of these approaches to peace is that all parties are reluctant to move from the discussion of generalities such as "secure borders" and "Palestinian rights" to specifics.

As I see it, the choices from an Israeli point of view are either (1) an Israel smaller than the territory it presently controls although larger than the pre-1967 Israel, but at real peace and containing a manageable Arab minority or (2) a larger Israel constantly threatened by war and containing a sizable, and perhaps increasingly troublesome, Arab minority. This second option carries with it the risk that, as with the Christian Crusaders, who were able to wrest control of the Holy Land for a couple of hundred years, Israel may eventually be overwhelmed by the much larger and more populous Arab nations surrounding her. From the Arab point of view, the choices, as I see them, are either (1) to accept that any Palestinian "homeland" is going to fall within the present West Bank-Gaza area and that it must be effectively demilitarized, including safeguards against remilitarization; or (2) to pursue the unrealistic dream of a "secular" Jewish-Arab state (in effect an Arab dominated state) in what is now Israel and the West Bank and thereby risk an Israeli reaction leading to the total absorption of the West Bank by Israel.

My judgment is that a majority of Israelis and Palestinians would opt for the respective first choices above. The problem, then, is to define precisely how these choices can be implemented. That will not

be easy. In the case of Israel, it will be necessary to demonstrate how, if purely security concerns are responsible for Israel's reluctance to give up the West Bank, Israel's concerns could effectively be met through means other than the retention of all of that territory. In my view, some kind of solid international guarantees, with the United States playing a major role in their implementation, would be required.

From the American point of view, I see four choices—

To disengage from the peace effort.

To agree to PLO representation at a peace conference in spite of that organization's intransigence regarding Israel's right to exist.

To support a change in the language of Security Council Resolution 242, or a new resolution, in an effort to win Palestinian acceptance of Israel's right to exist in exchange for recognition of the right of a Palestinian Arab state to exist.

To set aside the PLO issue and make an effort to reconvene the Geneva Peace Conference with as many Arab States as are prepared to engage in a dialog with Israel. This approach would not exclude the possibility of participation by non-PLO Palestinians as part of a Jordanian or pan-Arab delegation, which Foreign Minister Dayan has suggested Israel could accept under certain conditions.

I oppose the first option, as a U.S. disengagement is likely to push the Arab States into a more radical position, thus setting back the cause of peace. The second choice is totally unrealistic and objectionable, as Israel is understandably opposed to sitting down at a Conference with an organization pledged to destroy the State of Israel. The third option, involving the possibility of the creation of a Palestinian state, is similarly likely to be unfruitful because of understandable Israeli objections and the fact that neither Israel nor the Arabs are likely to make the kinds of commitments the other wants in advance of a Peace Conference. These are major issues that can only be addressed in direct negotiations. I therefore believe that the fourth course of action is the only viable one. It is also far preferable to the one announced jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union on October 1, which seems to accept PLO participation at a Geneva Conference without the PLO's having to end its opposition to the right of Israel to exist. This I believe very wrong, as a Conference one of whose participants is dedicated to the destruction of the other could never prove fruitful. Before such a Conference could succeed, I believe the PLO would first have to abandon its present charter provision that Israel must cease to exist.

Although the gulf between Israel and the Arabs is wide, I see no realistic alternative to convening a Peace Conference. As Winston Churchill once said, "it is better to jaw, jaw than war, war." Convening a Conference does not, of course, mean that success will follow; nor should there be any self-defeating notion that a Conference must produce quick results or be considered a failure. We should expect that the achievement of real peace will probably take years. The important thing is to set in motion a process that produces enough early results to demonstrate that peace is, indeed, eventually possible.

In this connection, the United States should urge the other participants in a Conference to be more specific from the outset than they have in the past about their ideas for a settlement and to engage in a genuine dialogue on them. In my view, it is time for specifics and not more generalities.

APPENDIX A

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242

The following is the full text of Resolution No. 242, as adopted by the United Nations Security Council on November 22, 1967:

"The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with article 2 of the charter.

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; and

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; and

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a special representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible."


APPENDIX B


UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338


The following is the full text of Resolution No. 338, as adopted by the United Nations Security Council on October 22, 1973:

"The Security Council

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; and
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.







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REPUBLICAN SENATOR CHARLES H. PERCY, WHOSE POLITICAL FUTURE
APPEARED TO BE IN DANGER ONLY DAYS AGO, TOOK A SOLID LEAD IN EARLY
RETURNS AND APPEARED TO BE HEADED FOR A THIRD TERM.
AND ILLINOIS GOVERNOR JAMES R. THOMPSON, 42, WHO HAS BEEN WIDELY
MENTIONED AS A POSSIBLE REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDER IN 1980,
APPEARED ON HIS WAY TO THE MANDATE HE SOUGHT FROM ILLI OIS VOTERS.
POLITICAL NEWCOMER ALEX SEITH HAD WAGED A HARD-FOUGHT CAMPAIGN
AGAINST PERCY. PERCY, 59, FOUND HIMSELF IN TROUBLE DURING THE
CAMPAIGN AS SOME REPUBLICAN VOTERS VOICED DISSATISFACTION WITH HIS
VOTES IN FAVOR OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES.
THOMPSON WAS AHEAD WITH ABOUT 70 PERCENT OF THE VOTE AND
TELEVISION NETWORK PROJECTIONS GAVE HIM A SIZEABLE LEAD OVER
DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE MICHAEL BAKALIS, A 40-YEAR-OLD FORMER
UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR.
IN THE FINAL DAYS OF THE CAMPAIGN, PERCY RELIED ON THE HELP OF
NUMEROUS ENDORSEMENTS, INCLUDING THOSE OF HEAVYWEIGHT BOXING
CHAMPION MUHAMMAD ALI, FORMER GOVERNOR RONALD REAGAN OF CALIFORNIA,
FORMER PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD AND HOLLYWOOD MOVIE ACTOR JOHN
WAYNE.

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

16/7/78 - אפרוחו וויאוי

כא" בסיוון תשל"ח
26 ביוני 1978

ר. ד. ק. . וואללאס (מ.א.)

אל : מצפ"א
מאת : צ. רפיה, כאן

הנדון : נחיתת אל-על בשיקגו - מכתב סנטור פרסי
לואנס

... מצ"ב מכתב סנטור פרסי למזכיר המדינה מה-14 ליוני.
עוזרו של פרסי מסר לי כי פעילותו של פרסי למען זכות נחיתה של אל-על בשיקגו, כולל פניהו לואנס, קיבלה פרסום בעהונות שיקגו (ביוזמה פרסי, כמובן).

ב ב ר כ ה,
צבי רפיה

העתק: הציר, כאן
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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RICHARD A. WEGMAN
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

June 14, 1978

The Honorable Cyrus Vance
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

BY HAND

Dear Secretary Vance:

On June 26, 1978, the United States and Israel commence an important round of commercial air transportation negotiations which may lead to substantial direct benefits to the consumers and the respective economies of each country. If successfully concluded, these negotiations may result in lower fares, charter flights to Israel from anywhere in the United States, and direct wide-bodied service by El Al to Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami, and Boston.

Because of this country's special relationship to Israel, and because of the importance of these negotiations, I urge you to become personally involved. Your involvement would demonstrate to both the Israeli and the American people that our government is just as concerned about planes of peace as we are with planes of war -- planes of peace not armed with rockets, but instead bearing goodwill and friendship.

The time has now come to open an aerial bridge to Israel -- not just from New York City -- but from every principal city in the United States, including Chicago in my own State of Illinois. Such a bridge will strengthen the philosophical, religious, and commercial ties between the two nations. At this time, more than ever, Israel must be shown that we will go that extra mile to build these bridges and not dismantle them.

Since 1968, I have been personally attempting to convince the State Department to grant additional landing rights in Chicago for El Al. However, because of protectionist policies of both governments, El Al has been limited to serving the United States through the New York gateway.

However, the Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Civil Aeronautics Board have united in the last year to redirect our domestic and international aviation policies on a path that places healthy competition, lower fares, and consumer preferences ahead of narrow protectionist policies.

On April 19, 1978, by a vote of 83-9, the Senate passed the Air Transportation Regulatory Reform Act of 1978, which I co-sponsored and supported.

The Honorable Cyrus Vance
Page Two
June 14, 1978

This proposed law gradually lessens government control of our nation's airlines. It permits airlines to lower fares and add new routes, without government interference. Although it does not cover international aviation, many of its supporters believe it should serve as a model for negotiating bilateral international agreements.

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We are not the only nation to alter its policy during the past year. I understand that the Israeli government has already informally communicated an important projected change in policy that includes:

- An "open skies" policy. Both scheduled and charter operators would be able to land in any point in Israel or the United States. This removes one of the major obstacles to negotiations by permitting charters from the 47 states currently excluded by Israel.
- Low fares. Airlines would be able to set fares at the level they desire. This deregulation of air fares should lead to various innovative standby, advance purchase, and regular air fares that will make travel to Israel more affordable to those wishing to travel on TWA or El Al.

In return, Israel is asking for landing rights in Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami and Boston, and additional cities which El Al may designate later. I understand that El Al wants to provide Boeing 747 one-stop service to Chicago via Montreal or Boston; 747 one-stop service to Miami via Madrid; and 747 one-stop service to Los Angeles via Amsterdam or London.

The Honorable Cyrus Vance
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June 14, 1978

Approval of new multiple landing rights for El Al is understandably important to many Illinois and Midwest citizens who have religious and cultural ties to Israel. Currently, air service to Israel is needlessly difficult from Chicago and other cities. It usually means flying to New York City in order to transfer to an El Al wide-bodied nonstop flight to Israel. For elderly passengers, this New York stop can be especially gruelling because it may mean a time-consuming bus ride and luggage transfer between La Guardia and Kennedy Airports. The only U.S. flag carrier servicing Israel -- TWA -- stops in Athens en route. It uses narrow-bodied Boeing 707 equipment, which is clearly less-favored by passengers in comparison with the wide-bodied jets, according to a recent survey taken by the Airline Passengers Association. A 1977 survey showed that 70.2 per cent of passengers surveyed preferred the 747 while only 2.7 per cent preferred the 707.

It is clear that many of my own constituents prefer El Al because of their pride in traveling aboard an airline that embodies the achievements and hopes of Israel -- an airline that is imbued with an heroic and dependable tradition. I understand, for instance, on eastbound flights over the North Atlantic, not uncommonly at least ten orthodox Jewish men (the minimum required for a religious service) gravitate to the aft section of the 747 and don their prayer shawls and phylacteries to greet the rising sun seven miles over the earth, with traditional morning prayers. At times Torahs or Biblical scrolls -- a sacred symbol to the Jewish people -- are cradled through the aisles.

And, sometimes, as the plane descends across the Israeli coastline, the cabin breaks out in song as Hebrew folk songs ring out over the public address system.

Additionally, El Al has an impeccable safety and security record, which must be an important consideration to any traveler heading to the Middle East. Safeguards range from rigorous pre-flight clearance checks to the use of armed escorts.

I am sure that many of my constituents, who live in Chicago and in suburbs near O'Hare International Airport, would use this new service by El Al, if approved. Some have relatives and friends in Israel. Most simply want to tour and understand the country and its daring people. Already 35,000 to 40,000 Illinois residents travel to Israel every year. The Chicago and Waukegan City Councils and the Illinois legislature will have passed resolutions favoring the new service.

Approval would clearly strengthen the Israeli economy which is heavily dependent on Western tourism. Israel today is considered one of the outstanding tourist attractions in the world to both those making a pilgrimage

The Honorable Cyrus Vance
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The Israeli proposal for additional landing points should also help provide more jobs for American workers. I understand that if the U.S. Government approves these added landing sites, El Al will proceed to purchase three Boeing 747's together with spare parts, worth approximately \$165 million. Israel already is negotiating with McDonnell-Douglas and Lockheed for the purchase of new intermediate-range jet equipment for its service to Europe, Iran, and South Africa.

The Star of David painted on the tail of El Al's jumbo jets will be a welcome sight in the skies over Metropolitan Chicago and other major U.S. cities, if these negotiations are successfully concluded. An aerial bridge of peace will have been established, cementing the democratic and Judeo-Christian ties that link our two countries.

Because of my personal interest in the successful outcome of these negotiations, I would like to have a representative of my staff observe the negotiating sessions. I understand that various trade, labor, and public interest groups already have been awarded such observer status. I would also appreciate a timely response to the concerns I have outlined, prior to the start of these renewed negotiations.

- Sincerely,

Charles H. Percy
United States Senate

CHP:hm



ר. י. ק. אלמ. כ.

הודו
אייק. וואנטרס
פ. י. ס.

30 ביוני 1978

א ל: מצפ"א
כלכלית

מאת: צ. רפיח, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנטור פרסי - זכויות נחיתה לאל-על

סנטור פרסי מגלה, כידוע, פעילות נמרצת למען הבטחת
זכויות נחיתה לאל-על.

הוא "רץ", כידוע, לבחירות השנה. הוא רוצה ודאי
לאזן את תמיכתו במטוסי ה-F-15 לסעודיה ע"י תמיכתו בנחיתה
מטוסי אל-על.

ב-27 ביוני הכליל בקונגרסיונל רקורד דברייט למען
זכויות הנחיתה לאל-על, מכתבו לואנס וכן ראיון עם מרדכי
בן-ארי שפורסם בווישינגטון סטאר ב-23 ביוני.

הנ"ל מצ"ב.

בברכה

צבי רפיח

העמקים:

הציר, כאן
איתן רף, כאן

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Twenty years ago, President Harry Truman requested Senate ratification. President Richard M. Nixon now requests that it no longer be delayed. A bipartisan group of Senators in this subcommittee now recommends ratification by the Senate. A significant and beneficent step in mankind's long tortured and bloody history is about to be taken.

ISRAELI EL AL AIR NEGOTIATIONS HELD IN SECRET

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, yesterday, a highly important round of discussions began at the State Department between the Israeli and United States Governments to renegotiate the 1950 air agreement between the two allies.

The Israeli Government should be commended for boldly proposing a new "open skies" policy. This innovative and forward-thinking policy would open up commercial air transportation to any airline wishing to fly to any city in either of the two countries. If carried out to its fullest extent, "open skies" would mean that direct air service between the two countries would become more easily accessible to hundreds of thousands of our citizens who now must fly through New York's overcrowded and overburdened J. F. K. International Airport.

As part of that proposed policy, the Israeli Government would permit low-fare charters to Israel from all 50 States and the territories. Currently, such charters are only permitted from California, Oregon, and Washington State.

In return, the Israelis wish to provide direct service on its national carrier—El Al Airlines—to Los Angeles International Airport, Chicago-O'Hare International Airport, Logan International Airport in Boston, and Miami International Airport.

The Israeli initiatives appear to be eminently reasonable and should be warmly received by the U.S. Government. Instead, I have been informed that, in exchange for these initiatives, the U.S. Government appears to be willing to award El Al only one or two additional landing sites in the United States. El Al currently only serves New York. This offer was made by U.S. negotiators despite the well-known fact that the Israeli airline could well suffer heavy financial losses in the new competitive environment proposed by the Israeli Government. The United States is the leading source of profit for El Al. Without a reasonable proportion of the traffic between the two nations, El Al—Israel's vital link to the outside world—may be placed in financial jeopardy.

Mr. President, one disturbing element of these negotiations is the view taken by the U.S. negotiators toward the proposed new service to the additional U.S. cities. Rather than viewing the proposals as bringing direct economic and social benefits to these American cities, the U.S. position appears to view the additional cities merely as bargaining chips. I was surprised to learn that our own negotiators view this extension of service as primarily of direct benefit to the foreign nation, without due consideration of the obvious benefits such added service would

afford to American air travelers and U.S. cities.

There was no formal mechanism for civic parties to make presentations to the U.S. negotiators before the sessions began. In this case, for instance, it appears that there was no formal solicitation of the views of the city of Chicago Department of Aviation, the Massachusetts Port Authority, the Miami Aviation Department, and the Los Angeles Department of Airports.

This same kind of freezing out of public and civic interests led to LOT, the Polish Airlines, being denied Chicago landing rights in 1973, although Chicago has the third largest Polish population in the world after Warsaw and Cracow. Similarly, Sabena Belgium Airlines was denied landing rights at Chicago several years ago and eventually withdrew its application. As a result, an opportunity to provide convenient nonstop service from Chicago to Brussels—the headquarters of the European Economic Community—was lost. It is difficult for me to understand who benefits from the denial of Chicago landing rights to the Polish and Belgian Airlines. It is certainly not the citizens of this country. It is similarly difficult for me to understand why the Israelis would be denied any of the four cities, given their new interest in low fares and more competition.

Mr. President, this curious policy is already being publicly reflected in the posture taken by U.S. officials in the Israel negotiations. This is hardly the proper way of treating a trusted friend and ally whom we economically assist in a number of ways. Why not hard earned trade instead of that much more economic aid?

Because of my concerns that some, if not all, of the four cities would be denied direct service to Israel, I urged Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, in a letter of June 14, 1978, personally to intercede to insure the success of these negotiations.

I subsequently asked that an observer from an appropriate Senate committee be permitted simply to attend and monitor these negotiations, without participating in any direct way. Already participating are representatives from the Air Transport Association, the National Air Carriers Association, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, and Ralph Nader's Aviation Consumers Action Project. However, none of these groups has expressed a desire to urge our negotiators to work for the expansion of El Al flights to those four metropolitan areas currently without full service to Israel.

When I asked to have a Senate representative listen in on the proceedings, my request was rejected, allegedly because the negotiations would turn into a "circus." It appears that our Government wishes to conduct these negotiations behind closed doors. While labor, industry and token consumer representation are free to listen and actually take part, Congress is denied access even to observe what is going on during these vital negotiations. I note that there are no verbatim transcripts or detailed notes taken.

I just cannot understand this policy, and have so told the White House and Department of State. Why not "let the sunshine in?" There are no national security considerations in these negotiations. There are no sensitive matters being discussed that would be harmful to our interests if discussed out in the open.

What are at stake are important domestic matters, about which the Congress and the public have a right to know.

That right is being ignored. It is difficult to understand the concerns and fears of the State Department that a little openness might somehow jeopardize these talks. When we opened up Senate markups and conference committee markups to the public, there were those who thought that Congressional action would be paralyzed because of the open meetings. Instead, the public has become better aware of the important decisions made on their behalf by their elected representatives without any impairment to the operations of the Senate. Opportunities have been offered many times in these sessions for the executive branch to have an input at a crucial time in a spirit of true partnership.

I am convinced we also need to let the sunshine in on these negotiations which have such a direct bearing on the air service which consumers and cities will receive. The practice of excluding observers from Congress from negotiations of this type which have such a broad-based domestic impact, and are not fraught with national security factors, should now be seriously questioned. The U.S. Senate should not have the door slammed in its face, while private and commercial interests are permitted into the negotiating sessions. This is not the kind of partnership President Carter is trying to create.

I am attaching a copy of my letter to Secretary Vance, and a recent press account of a speech given by Mordechai Ben Ari, executive chairman of El Al, outlining the new Israeli position. I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, D.C., June 14, 1978.

HON. CYRUS VANCE,
Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SECRETARY VANCE: On June 25, 1978, the United States and Israel commence an important round of commercial air transportation negotiations which may lead to substantial direct benefits to the consumers and the respective economies of each country. If successfully concluded, these negotiations may result in lower fares, charter flights to Israel from anywhere in the United States, and direct wide-bodied service by El Al to Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami, and Boston.

Because of this country's special relationship to Israel, and because of the importance of these negotiations, I urge you to become personally involved. Your involvement would demonstrate to both the Israel and the American people that our government is just as concerned about planes of peace as we are with planes of war—planes of peace not armed with rockets, but instead bearing goodwill and friendship.

The time has now come to open an aerial

bridge to Israel—not just from New York City—but from every principal city in the United States, including Chicago in my own State of Illinois. Such a bridge will strengthen the philosophical, religious, and commercial ties between the two nations. At this time, more than ever, Israel must be shown that we will go that extra mile to build these bridges and not dismantle them.

Since 1968, I have been personally attempting to convince the State Department to grant additional landing rights in Chicago for El Al. However, because of protectionist policies of both governments, El Al has been limited to serving the United States through the New York gateway.

However, the Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Civil Aeronautics Board have united in the last year to redirect our domestic and international aviation policies on a path that places healthy competition, lower fares, and consumer preferences ahead of narrow protectionist policies.

On April 16, 1978, by a vote of 83-9, the Senate passed the Air Transportation Regulatory Reform Act of 1978, which I co-sponsored and supported.

This proposed law gradually lessens government control of our nation's airlines. It permits airlines to lower fares and add new routes, without government interference. Although it does not cover international aviation, many of its supporters believe it should serve as a model for negotiating bilateral international agreements.

President Carter has stated that, in negotiating international air transport agreements, instead of trading restriction for restriction, we should trade opportunity for opportunity. This policy has been brilliantly and boldly implemented by CAB Chairman Alfred Kahn. It was Chairman Kahn who cast aside the protests of U.S. flag carriers to allow Freddie Laker's low-fare Skytrain to begin operations from this country to London. Mr. Kahn placed the interests of consumers who want lower fares to Europe ahead of mere protectionism. The latter may have been necessary during the early years of international commercial aviation, but clearly is no longer necessary. Frankly, we are very fortunate in Chicago that foreign-flag carriers apparently think more highly of the potential Midwest market for travel to Europe than our own flag carriers. Only one such U.S. carrier operates out of Chicago to Europe, with year-around nonstop service to London and summer only nonstop service to Paris. Eight foreign flag carriers pick up the slack, because U.S. flag carriers chose, unfortunately, to direct most of their European-bound traffic through New York's crowded Kennedy Airport.

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Sincerely,

CHARLES H. PERCY,
U.S. Senate.

[From the Washington Star, June 23, 1978]

ABANDON ALL AIRLINE REGULATION, EL AL
CHIEF URGES

(By Thomas Love)

The head of Israel's El Al Airline yesterday proposed abandonment of all economic regulation of the airline industry and reworking of the present first class-economy class accommodation structure of commercial aviation.

Mordechai Ben Ari, executive chairman of El Al, also called for international aviation security authority to protect the world's airlines from terrorist attacks through intelligence gathering and preemptive military-like strikes.

A new method of dealing with the threat of terrorism is necessary to guarantee "the survival and existence of the civil aviation network," he told the National Aviation Club yesterday. "We are mistaken if we think the present silence is the end of the terrorist problem."

"Terrorist International' is regrouping itself and one of its prime targets is international civil aviation," he said. "What is being done now is insufficient" to protect the airlines.

Later, Ben Ari explained he had made his proposals to the International Air Transport Association.

"The only effective method of combating terrorism in the air is a policy of active defense by governments and airlines," he said in a telegram to IATA.

An anti-terrorist defense, he said, must be built on the three levels of active intelligence gathering, preemptive measures against all forms of armed attack and—if the first two should fail—active defense action.

He called for "an IATA Interpol" for intelligence gathering and preventive action.

The agency would be responsible for the "supervision of the security measures" taken by all governments and airlines as well as the establishment of security ratings for all airports and airlines.

This would not be an usurpation of state powers, he said, predicting that governments would appreciate the help since "it would be a framework for significant cooperation and work to their benefit."

On the economic front, Ben Ari said "the only alternative to complete regulations of the airlines is the complete deregulation," a concept which he said should be adopted as soon as possible.

He called for "open skies with unlimited freedom of competition, without government interference. Indeed, complete freedom of the air would mean that every airline can fly from and between any place in the world it chooses, without restriction and with the right to charge any fare it deems fit.

"In other words," he continued, "the principle of 'freedom of the air' would be identical to the principle of 'freedom of the seas.'"

The only government intervention, he said, should be to assure that airlines actually provide the service they say they will at the advertised price. Existing controls over safety and operational matters would not change under this concept, he added.

Such a policy, he predicted, "would constitute a revolutionary step toward assuring

the long-range growth and development of a healthy and dynamic international air transport system based on the principles of free competition as the best safeguard of the interests of the consumer."

Although he admitted the concept might seem a bit "radical, perhaps too drastic, departure," he said "I think it is high time we realized that our industry has reached maturity and that we can well afford to live in an environment of free competition and enterprise."

In answer to a question, he predicted that the government of Israel would agree to let all airlines operate in that country under the "open skies" concept.

Ben Ari said he was not proposing to disband IATA. "We have to preserve IATA as a trade association," he said, "because without it we can't operate a worldwide system." IATA, he explained, is necessary to coordinate such things as ticket sales, connecting flights and the like.

"In view of the fact that the future of international civil aviation seems to lie in mass transportation of the pleasure-motivated traveler at low fares, the solution to the economic problems of the airlines—especially on international routes—seems to point to a basic change in the service concept on scheduled carriers," Ben Ari said.

He proposed abolishing the present first class and economy class categories and replacing them with three new classes.

There would be a "deluxe class" with service and accommodations superior to the existing first class. First class would be replaced with a "business class" with less space than the existing accommodations but better service. A new "holiday class" would offer bare-bones, no-frills accommodations with little space between seats and no free food—travel comparable to that now offered by Laker's "Sky Train."

Ben Ari said El Al would offer this holiday class service starting some time late next year.

THE NEED FOR A BALANCED BUDGET

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Earlier this month the voters in California overwhelmingly approved Proposition 13.

The taxpayer is now demanding restraint of taxes and spending on the Federal level.

I believe the logical first step would be to adopt a resolution proposing a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced Federal budget.

I have sponsored such a resolution, Senate Joint Resolution 51, which is pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee. There are 33 similar resolutions before the House Judiciary Committee.

The National Taxpayers Union informs me that already 22 of the required 34 State legislatures have passed a resolution calling for a constitutional convention to consider an amendment requiring a balanced Federal budget.

In the next few weeks, California is expected to become the 23d State to pass such a resolution. The California State Senate recently approved the resolution 25 to 2.

These calls for conventions are passing rapidly and by wide margins. For example, in Kansas, the House voted 90 to 19 to approve the resolution, while the Senate almost unanimously approved it 38 to 2.

Nebraska approved its resolution 29 to

7; Georgia 156 to 11 in the House and 52 to 2 in the Senate. Elsewhere, the margins are just as impressive.

It is time for Congress to act on the balanced budget amendment.

The fact that 22 State legislatures have passed these resolutions seeking a balanced Federal budget indicates widespread sentiment for consideration of such an amendment.

Indeed, in the most recent Gallup poll, 78 percent of the respondents favored a constitutional amendment requiring Congress to balance the Federal budget.

As a body that supposedly is representative of the people, we should immediately hold hearings on the subject. I would hope that this could be done at an early date.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record Senate Joint Resolution 51, which I introduced in the Senate on May 10, 1977.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the Record as follows:

S.J. Res. 51

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is hereby proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid for all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within three years after its submission to the States for ratification:

"ARTICLE

"SECTION 1. In exercising its powers under article I of the Constitution, and in particular its powers to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises and to enact laws making appropriations, the Congress shall assure that the total outlays of the Government during any fiscal year do not exceed the total receipts of the Government during such fiscal year and that the Federal indebtedness is eliminated.

"Sec. 2. During the first fiscal year beginning after the ratification of this article, the total receipts of the Government, not including receipts derived from the issuance of bonds, notes, or other obligations of the United States, shall not be less than 95 per centum of the total outlays, not including any outlays for the redemption of bonds, notes, or other obligations of the United States. During the second fiscal year, the total receipts shall not be less than 98 per centum of the total outlays.

"Sec. 3. During the third fiscal year beginning after the ratification of this article and for each succeeding year thereafter, total outlays shall not exceed total receipts.

"Sec. 4. In the case of a national emergency, Congress may determine by a concurrent resolution agreed to by a rollcall vote of three-fourths of all the Members of each House of Congress that total outlays may exceed total receipts.

"Sec. 5. During the fifth fiscal year beginning after the ratification of this article and for the next twenty-four succeeding fiscal years thereafter, the total receipts of the Government shall exceed outlays by an amount equal to 4 per centum of the Federal indebtedness at the beginning of the fifth fiscal year. The President shall, not later than the thirtieth day after the close of the fifth fiscal year, ascertain the total Federal indebtedness and transmit said total to Congress by special message.

"Sec. 6. Thereafter, whenever the Congress

determines under section 4 that an emergency exists and authorizes outlays to exceed receipts, any indebtedness ensuing therefrom shall be extinguished within five fiscal years of being incurred.

"Sec. 7. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."

BUDGET ACT WAIVER

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar Order No. 857.

There being no objection, the resolution (S. Res. 456) waiving sec. 402(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 with respect to the consideration of S. 3067, the Civil Rights Commission Act of 1978, a bill to authorize appropriations for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, and for other purposes, was considered and agreed to, as follows:

S. Res. 456

Resolved, That, pursuant to section 402 (c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the provisions of section 402(a) of such Act are waived with respect to the consideration of S. 3067, a bill to extend the Commission for five years, to authorize necessary appropriations for the Commission, to effect certain changes to comply with other changes in the law, and for other purposes. Such waiver is necessary in order to insure that the Commission on Civil Rights will be able to carry out its statutory duties during the fiscal year 1979. The moneys to be appropriated are sufficiently small that the consideration of S. 3067 will not significantly affect the congressional budget. That while the Committee on the Judiciary has engaged in a substantial effort to consider the bill beginning in December 1977, there is sufficient reason to believe that the committee will not report the bill during the present Congress. Thus, both the committee and the Senate will be prevented from complying with the Congressional Budget Act with respect to the May 15 deadline and from giving timely attention to the authorization of appropriations for the United States Commission on Civil Rights.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the resolution was agreed to.

Mr. STEVENS. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION ACT OF 1978

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar Order No. 831.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the bill by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Calendar 831, S. 3067, to extend the Commission on Civil Rights for five years, to authorize appropriations for the Commission, to effect certain technical changes to comply with other changes in the law, and for other purposes.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, are there any committee amendments?

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נשלח: 161800 יוני 78
התקבל: 170157 יוני 78

מל: המסרד
ממ: רושינגטון

Handwritten: (ס' 1/6/78) זאמא

אל מצפאי, שיקאגו, (ה' 1/1)

מפנה חשוב לבטח לדברי סנטור פרסי שנתפרסמו בקונגרסיונל רקורד
ב-13 דנא.

PRESIDENT SADAT MUST PROFFER PEACE PLAN.

MR. PERCY, MR. PRESIDENT, LAST NOVEMBER WHEN PRESIDENT SADAT MADE HIS HISTORIC VISIT TO JERUSALEM, THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD FELT THAT AT LONG LAST, A BREAKTHROUGH HAD BEEN ACHIEVED WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IT WAS CERTAINLY A BREAKTHROUGH, PRESIDENT SADAT HAD PERSONALLY RECOGNIZED THE EXISTENCE OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO SECURITY AND SURVIVAL.

ONLY A FEW YEARS EARLIER NO ARAB LEADER WOULD EVEN USE THE NAME OF ISRAEL, NOW THE LEADER OF THE MOST POPULOUS ARAB STATE WAS IN ISRAEL SPEAKING WITH ISRAEL'S LEADERS, ADDRESSING THE KNESSET, EMBRACING HIS FORMER ANTAGONIST GOLDA MEIR AND INSISTING ON PEACE.

BUT NOW, 6 MONTHS LATER, THIS BREAKTHROUGH, LIKE OLD SOLDIERS, SEEMS TO BE FADING AWAY. NOW, 6 MONTHS LATER, THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE SUSPENDED, PRESIDENT SADAT IS TALKING OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A FUTURE WAR AND INDICATES THAT HIS PATIENCE WITH ISRAEL IS WEARING THIN. HE SAYS HE CAN SUSTAIN HIS PEACE INITIATIVE FOR PERHAPS NO MORE THAN ANOTHER 2 MONTHS UNLESS ISRAEL WILL MAKE MORE FORTHCOMING PROPOSALS.

I BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT SADAT MEANS TO HAVE PEACE, BUT SINCE HE HAS NOT PUT A PEACE FORMULA ON THE TABLE TO BE NEGOTIATED, WE MUST ASSUME THAT HE IS SEEKING PEACE ON THE ORIGINAL ARAB TERMS. TOTAL ISRAEL WITHDRAWS BACK TO THE PRE-1967 BORDERS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN HOMELAND. IN VIEW OF ISRAEL'S SIGNIFICANT WITHDRAWAL IN THE SINAI IN 1975, AND ISRAEL'S EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TOTAL SINAI, IT WOULD SEDEM THAT PRESIDENT SADAT HIMSELF COULD NOW PROFFER A PEACE FORMULA IN WHICH HE WOULD FULLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ISRAEL'S

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LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS.

FOR THE FACT IS THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAS MADE A PEACE OFFER WITH CONCESSIONS WHICH PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A SERIOUS NEGOTIATION, BUT PRESIDENT SADAT- SINCE HIS BOLD AND COMMENDABLE INITIATIVE LAST NOVEMBER- HAS NOT.

IN THE MEANTIME THE UNITED STATES HAS SOUGHT TO ENCOURAGE BOTH ISRAEL AND EGYPT TO RESUME THEIR NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THE UNITED STATES HAS STRESSED THE NEED FOR ISRAEL TO MODIFY HER POSITIONS. WE HAVE SEEN NO EVIDENCE THAT EQUIVALENT EFFORTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH EGYPT.


IT IS NOW TIME TO IMPRESS OUR FRIENDS IN EGYPT WITH THE NECESSITY TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE AND SET FORTH A PEACE PLAN OF THEIR OWN TO BE NEGOTIATED ALONG WITH THE PEACE FORMULA OFFERED BY PRIME MINISTER BEGIN.

THE UNITED STATES HAVING NOW AGREED TO SELL AIRCRAFT TO EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA OVER THE STRONG OBJECTIONS OF ISRAEL, SHOULD BE IN A POSITION WITH THOSE TWO NATIONS TO URGE MODIFICATIONS OF POLICY WHICH WOULD FACILITATE THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS AND ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE. IF THE EGYPTIANS RESOLUTELY REFUSE TO OFFER NEW CONDITIONS FOR PEACE TO BE NEGOTIATED ALONG WITH THOSE OFFERED BY ISRAEL, THEY WILL FIND THEIR CREDIBILITY SOMEWHAT REDUCED BEFORE WORLD OPINION.

I HAVE FREQUENTLY SPOKEN MY MIND ABOUT THE MIDEAST SITUATION. I HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF PRIME MINISTER BEGIN FOR HIS SETTLEMENTS POLICY AND FOR HIS REINTERPRETATION OF UN RESOLUTION 242. I SUPPORTED THE ARMS SALES TO EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA, BUT AT THIS MOMENT THE BALL IS IN THE ARAB COURT, AND I WOULD HOPE THAT SOME CREATIVE AND IMAGINATIVE PLAN WOULD BE FORTHCOMING AS A MEANINGFUL FOLLOWUP TO PRESIDENT SADAT'S TRIP TO JERUSALEM LAST YEAR.

ADKAN
RAFIACH.

טבת דהיא ס' תרמ"א ביהמ"ד א"ת מ"ת מ"ת
המס' נ"א ה"ר י"א א"ת א"ת ה"מ א"ת



תעודת רשמי (רשמי)

official text

APRIL 29, 1977.

(BYLINER) NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: A THREAT TO GLOBAL PEACE

BY CHARLES H. PERCY
UNITED STATES SENATOR

(CHARLES PERCY, A MEMBER OF THE U.S. SENATE SINCE 1966, HAS BEEN ONE OF THE LEADERS IN CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO CURB THE WORLD-WIDE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE IS A REPUBLICAN MEMBER OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND, AS ONE OF THE AUTHORS OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION LEGISLATION NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS, HAS BECOME A MAJOR SPOKESMAN IN THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER THE MOST EFFECTIVE METHOD OF SEEKING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO LIMIT THE POSSIBILITY THAT WEAPONS MANUFACTURE WILL BECOME A BYPRODUCT OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ENERGY PRODUCTION.)

ONE OF THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS FACING THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD TODAY IS NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

FOR YEARS WE ASSUMED THAT ONLY THE TECHNOLOGICALLY SOPHISTICATED INDUSTRIAL NATIONS WOULD BE CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. BUT IN 1964 THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA JOINED THE "CLUB" OF NUCLEAR NATIONS, PROVING THAT A DETERMINED NATION WOULD DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHOUT A SOLID INDUSTRIAL BASE. IN 1974, INDIA DETONATED WHAT THEY CALLED A "PEACEFUL" NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. THIS WAS AN ESPECIALLY ALARMING WATERSHED. IT PROVED THAT A DEVELOPING NATION COULD PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM AN OSTENSIBLY PEACEFUL NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM.

WORLDWIDE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION HAS ACCELERATED SINCE TWO OF OUR ALLIES, FRANCE AND WEST GERMANY, HAVE AGREED TO PROVIDE SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO BRAZIL AND PAKISTAN. BOTH COUNTRIES ASSERT THAT THESE UNPRECEDENTED EXPORTS WILL BE SUBJECT TO STRICT SAFEGUARDS. BUT WITH THESE NEW FACILITIES, BRAZIL AND PAKISTAN WOULD BE ONLY A FEW SHORT STEPS AWAY FROM PRODUCING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES WITHOUT VIOLATING ANY COMMITMENTS.

(MORE)

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UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE

Tel Aviv 71, Hayarkon Street, Tel. 54338 ext. 204 / 218

Jerusalem 19, Keren Hayesod Street, Tel. 222376

WE HAVE ALSO HEARD ESTIMATES THAT ISRAEL HAS OR COULD QUICKLY CONSTRUCT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND TAIWAN DEVELOPED ITS OWN FACILITY TO TRANSFORM THE "ASHES" OF USED NUCLEAR REACTOR FUEL INTO PLUTONIUM -- THE BASIC COMPONENT OF A NUCLEAR BOMB. ALTHOUGH TAIWAN HAS AGREED TO FOREGO SUCH PROCESSING IN THE FUTURE, THE FACT THAT THE TAIWANESE SUCCESSFULLY OBTAINED SUCH A CAPABILITY DEMONSTRATES A SERIOUS WEAKNESS IN EXISTING INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS. FINALLY, OMINOUS QUESTIONS HAVE ALSO BEEN RAISED ABOUT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTENTIONS OF SOUTH KOREA, ARGENTINA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND LIBYA.

ONE OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS IN COMBATting PROLIFERATION IS THE INCREASING AWARENESS OF THIS THREAT IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD. THIS UNDERSTANDING GOES BEYOND OBVIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE INDIAN BLAST AND THE PROPOSED SALE OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY TO BRAZIL AND PAKISTAN. THERE IS A GROWING RECOGNITION THAT EXISTING INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS -- ALTHOUGH VITAL -- FALL FAR SHORT OF THE UNPRECEDENTED MEASURES NEEDED TO CURB THIS EXTRAORDINARY THREAT.

UNFORTUNATELY, HOWEVER, THAT CONCERN HAS NOT YET LED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME. HAVING INVITED THIRD WORLD NATIONS TO ACQUIRE BOMB CAPABILITY BY OUR INACTION FOLLOWING THE INDIAN BLAST, WE HAVE DONE LITTLE TO RECOVER FROM THIS GRIEVOUS MISTAKE AND FORGE AHEAD WITH NEW INITIATIVES.

I DO NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST THAT MEETINGS SUCH AS THOSE IN LONDON AMONG REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONS THAT SUPPLY NUCLEAR FUELS, AND OTHER BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, HAVE NOT ACHIEVED IMPORTANT RESULTS. COOPERATIVE EFFORTS SUCH AS THESE HAVE CONSTITUTED A VITAL FIRST STEP, WITH PARTICULAR VALUE IN LAYING THE POLITICAL GROUNDWORK FOR NEGOTIATION OF THE FAR MORE COMPREHENSIVE CONTROLS WHICH ARE NEEDED.

HOWEVER, WE HAVE CONTINUED TO PURSUE A GRADUAL, CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH SUCH AN APPROACH IS CERTAINLY SOUND IN THE NORMAL CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY, WE MUST COME TO TERMS WITH THE FACT THAT THE TIME FOR SUCH AN INCREMENTAL APPROACH IS LONG GONE IN THE BATTLE AGAINST PROLIFERATION. WE ARE LITERALLY RIGHT ON THE BRINK OF A NEW ERA IN WHICH NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY WILL BE COMMONPLACE. NONE OF OUR ALTERNATIVES ARE PLEASANT, AND ALL BEAR SOME COMMERCIAL OR POLITICAL RISK. YET, I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN AND MUST ASSUME AN AGGRESSIVE LEADERSHIP POSITION, AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT OUR EFFORTS WILL BE REWARDED BY COOPERATION FROM OTHER NATIONS WHOSE SECURITY IS EQUALLY IMPERILED.

I HAVE JOINED TOGETHER WITH SENATORS JOHN GLENN, JR. (D-OHIO), ABE RIBICOFF (D-CONN.), JACOB JAVITS (R-N.Y.) AND ALAN CRANSTON (D-CALIF.) IN INTRODUCING LEGISLATION WHICH SETS FORTH A TOUGH, COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM. IT ESTABLISHES UNPRECEDENTED CRITERIA TO GOVERN THE TRANSFER AND USE OF U.S. NUCLEAR EXPORT ITEMS AND CALLS FOR GREATLY ACCELERATED NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN HARNESSING THIS TECHNOLOGY. IN ADDITION, THE BILL CALLS FOR MEASURES TO ENSURE A RELIABLE SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL TO NATIONS WHICH ARE WILLING TO ADHERE TO EFFECTIVE CONTROLS, PROVIDING AN INCENTIVE FOR THOSE NATIONS WHOSE INTEREST IN NUCLEAR POWER IS PURELY PEACEFUL TO REFRAIN FROM ACQUIRING DANGEROUS NATIONAL FACILITIES. FINALLY, THE BILL CONTAINS A NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONAL PROVISIONS TO STRENGTHEN THE FORMULATION AND MANAGEMENT OF U.S. NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICIES.

ON APRIL 27, AND EARLIER IN THE MONTH, PRESIDENT CARTER ANNOUNCED POLICIES WHICH SEEK TO ACHIEVE MANY OF THE SAME OBJECTIVES I HAVE DESCRIBED ABOVE. HE HAS SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES OF HIS OWN.

I WELCOME DEBATE ON THIS CRUCIAL ISSUE, AND WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS MYSELF TO ONE OF THE CENTRAL POINTS OF THE DISCUSSION. I DO

NOT FEEL THAT THE BILL WHICH I AM SPONSORING CALLS FOR ANY UNILATERAL MORATORIUM ON U.S. NUCLEAR EXPORTS.

THE BILL HAS BEEN CAREFULLY DRAFTED TO MINIMIZE CONFLICT WITH OUR EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND TO PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO STRENGTHEN THOSE AGREEMENTS PRIOR TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRICT NEW CONTROLS. MOREOVER, IN RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT CIRCUMSTANCES AND POLITICAL IMPERATIVES VARY FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY, THE BILL PROVIDES FOR THE FLEXIBILITY NEEDED TO REACH PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS.

I DO NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST THAT THE BILL IS PERFECT. MANY ISSUES RAISED BY THIS LEGISLATION REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE BILL CONTEMPLATES AN INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR THE PROVISION OF NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES WHEREBY NO COUNTRY -- EVEN THE WEAPONS STATES -- COULD OPERATE SENSITIVE FACILITIES ON A NATIONAL BASIS. ALL SUCH SERVICES WOULD BE PROVIDED UNDER INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES, AND SUCH INTERNATIONALLY CONTROLLED FACILITIES COULD BE LOCATED ONLY IN THE WEAPONS STATES OR ON INTERNATIONAL TERRITORY. THE RATIONALE FOR THIS APPROACH IS TO AVOID GIVING ANY ADVANTAGE TO ONE NATION OVER ANOTHER BY IMPOSING A UNIVERSAL BAN ON NATIONAL FACILITIES WHILE MEETING LEGITIMATE ENERGY NEEDS AND PERMITTING ATTRACTIVE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES. WHILE THIS PROPOSAL SEEMS TO BE VERY PROMISING, IT WILL BE CAREFULLY EXAMINED ALONG WITH OTHER OPTIONS TO ENSURE THAT THESE ARE THE BEST PROVISIONS TO MEET THE OBJECTIVES OF NON-PROLIFERATION.

SIMILARLY, I FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT LEGISLATION ALONE CANNOT SOLVE THE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM. UNLESS WE BEGIN INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND TO RESOLVE THE MYRIAD PROBLEMS WHICH HINDER ANY SWEEPING POLICY, WE CANNOT BE SUCCESSFUL. BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT U.S. EFFORTS IN THIS FIELD CAN BE AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD ACHIEVING A RATIONAL INTERNATIONAL REGIME TO CURB THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY.

* * *

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

24 מרץ 1978

למחלקת

בגלל ויל ערין - לנטיסיה (ולסיון)

אל : מצפ"א

מרכז

מאת : צ. רפיה, וושינגטון

פנס'

הנדון: הגובות סנטורים על המזה"ח

בצאתם מפגישה עם הנשיא בביה הלבן ב-23/3, שוחחו
כמה סנטורים עם עתונאים שהמתינו להם.

להלן רישום מהוך הקלטה שנערכה.

בברכה

צבי רפיה

העחק:

הקונכ"ל, שיקגו

SENATOR PERCY

Q: Inaudible)

A: I was not very optimistic a few days ago as you know and I have no reason to have changed that, I am usually an optimistic person, but I think with the present positions as outlined to us it is extremely difficult to move into the negotiating ~~area~~ as we had hoped. ~~the previous~~ meeting with president sadat and Prime Minister Begin would allow us to do.

Q: What is going to have to give?

A: I don't know. We don't know exactly where we are going from here. I think the question that should be put to Prime Minister Begin today (at National Press Club) when you said to us "everything is negotiable" are his six positions and six points that he has made therefore, they will not give on those points. Are those subject to negotiations or not? If they are not, I see no possibility of going ahead with the meaningful negotiations.

Q: Do you think Prime Minister Begin is the wrong man at the wrong point of history?

A: I was impressed with the fact that he had sufficient strength and now after the southern lebanese occurrences he had added strength and we need a prime minister in Israel that has sufficient strength to negotiate. Everyone in the Arab world wanted that. They realized that a weak prime minister could not negotiate a settlement for a satisfactory peace and take the necessary risks, cause everyone has to take risks. He has that strength. There seems to be an inability to recognize even on the question of settlements which in my judgement do not endanger the security of Israel, he seems to be unwilling to do anything about that, taking into account the strong feelings in Israel, in the american jewish community in the congress, by the president of the US. I think you will have to ask him at the national press club today whether ~~his~~ his position on that is subject to

PERCY (continued)

Q: Has the time come for the US to propose its own formula for a middle east peace solution?

A: I think that the president has outlined some things that, not that he is trying to impose a peace, but to propose things that he feels are reasonable and can be subject in the negotiating process. And we have tried to do that here, as we try to do domestically with our own internal problems with labor management relationships. But there seems to be a stopping point where the president seemingly cannot go ahead in the present level of negotiations.

Q: Is this something that he has put on paper or absolutely drawn?

A: I think it is up to the president to state what the American position ~~is~~ and I think we should not discuss that, The question is whether ^(or not) the proposals made, and the president has made it clear that Israel has made a proposal originally, subject to negotiations, but now it appears as though there is an entirely different policy by Israel that there had been in the past. And ~~instead~~ instead of moving forward, there seems to be a major step in the opposite direction and that is going to make the process much more difficult.

Q: There is a history of american presidents and israeli prime ministers having difficulty with one another, and its then been turned over to the congress ~~for~~ for resolution in the past. Does that mean that it is any easier or there is no progress on the issue by moving it to the congress?

A: I dont think, the constitution does not provide for policy initiative to be with the congress. We should advise and consent, we can accept or refuse to accept but we should ~~(advise and consent)~~.....

Some of us took a very active role to try to bring Jordan into, and I talked personally with King Hussein with the full knowledge of the administration. I

(rest of question is not essential, only as it pertains to Percy's remarks on Jordan)

Percy: I am very discouraged now about the prospect of bringing King Hussein in this as a moderating force. I see ~~that~~ today no basis for doing this, when a few weeks ago I was hopeful this meeting would bring Jordan into this process. I think would be very helpful and essential for peace in the area.

Q: On the arms sale.

A: I think there is a deep questioning of the arms sale because the conflict in testimony by Saudi Arabia as to whether it is entirely defensive or whether these weapons would be used offensively. There is a difference of statement to administration and to members of congress by the royal family of Saudi Arabia and I urge secretary Vance and the president to clarify that with Saudi Arabia. If this is an entirely defensive package, then the congress would be supportive if there is a chance that it would be offensively used, I think it would have a much more difficult situation. Saudi Arabia has a responsibility to now define those conflicts that have come from its own authoritative sources.

Q: What are the conflicts?

A: ~~Whether~~ As to whether they would be used or not. Some members of the foreign relations committee have been advised by members of the royal family that if the chips were down, and if there was a war, these weapons would be used. Now that's an entirely different proposition from the proposition used by Saudi Arabia.

Q: Used against whom?

A: Possibly against Israel. It is this lack of clarification on those crucial points that could affect ~~the~~ the whole package.

Q: Israel used American weapons to invade Lebanon and there has been no effort by Congress to cut that off even though that violates the Arms Export Control Act. Why hasn't congress spoken out on that issue?

PERCY (continuation)

A: I think there is concern. The administration has called for a withdrawal of those forces and replacement by the UN. I think that Congress is supportive of that. I think that Saudi Arabia must take into account that the Turkish-Greek policy question is involved when there is a position taken that they will not use the arms.

OCT 11 1977

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RICHARD A. WEGMAN
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

October 3, 1977

Mr. Raymond Epstein
Chairman
Public Affairs Committee
Jewish United Fund of
Metropolitan Chicago
1 South Franklin Street
Chicago, Illinois

Dear Ray:

In view of the concerns you have expressed to me about the Administration's position on the Middle East, and the subsequent issuance of the joint Soviet-American statement, I want you to have my own reaction to this latest document:

It is my feeling that the ambiguous nature of the Soviet-American statement is bound to cause widespread concern. For example, the statement is unclear on whether complete or partial withdrawals of Israeli forces are contemplated, yet this is a matter of the most serious consequence for Israel. Similarly, the statement gives the provocative impression of U.S. support for a Palestinian state, although it only specifies assurance of the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinians. The nature of Palestinian participation at Geneva is left open.

The statement would have been more satisfactory to me if it had called on the Palestinians to recognize clearly and specifically Israel's right to exist and to live in peace within secure borders. This has always been a major concern of mine.

I did have a positive reaction to the linking of the goal of normal peaceful relations with termination of the state of war. I have always believed that Israel would be unwise to accept any peace agreement which did not guarantee normal peaceful relations, including full diplomatic recognition and the opening of trade

Mr. Raymond Epstein
October 3, 1977
Page 2

and cultural relations.

Although I concur with the concept of international peace-keeping forces, I object strongly to the hint that Soviet and American troops might be introduced into the region as part of the peacekeeping forces. It would seem much wiser, in the interest of peace, not to bring the armed forces of the super-powers into the region.

Sincerely,



Charles H. Percy
United States Senator

CHP:scp

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

MELVIN PRICE

23RD ILLINOIS DISTRICT

October 18, 1977

CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

SUBCOMMITTEES
INTELLIGENCE AND
MILITARY APPLICATIONS
OF NUCLEAR ENERGY,
CHAIRMAN

RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT

COMMISSION ON
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

Mr. Aaron Karchmer, President
Mr. Hyman Ruffman, Executive Director
Jewish Federation of Southern Illinois
6464 West Main Street, Suite 7A
Belleville, Illinois 62223


Dear Messrs. Karchmer and Ruffman:

Thank you for your recent letter dated October 11, 1977, in which you enclosed a copy of your wire to President Carter regarding our Middle East policy. I understand your concern over these recent developments and I can assure you that I will closely scrutinize all negotiations and statements originating from the White House on this sensitive issue.

You may be assured of my continued and active support for the State of Israel.

Kindest regards.

Sincerely,



Melvin Price
Member of Congress

MP/sa

MK
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI
4TH DISTRICT, ILLINOIS

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FOR YOUR INFORMATION
FROM JAMES P. RICE

007 33 10

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

October 21, 1977

COMMITTEES:
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE:
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TREASURER—U.S. GROUP
MEMBER—IPU COUNCIL

Mr. Raymond Epstein, Chairman
Public Affairs Committee
Jewish United Fund of Metropolitan Chicago
1 South Franklin
Chicago, Illinois 60606

Dear Mr. Epstein:


I am pleased to acknowledge receipt of your mailgram and I appreciate your concern over developments in Washington in which the Administration has taken a definite pro-Arab tilt in efforts to establish a so-called peace conference in Geneva.

Frankly, I am amazed at the pressure that the President and Secretary Vance have placed on Mr. Begin's government. I do not believe that a conference in which the Soviets will serve as co-chairmen will be a proper vehicle. I am convinced that the Soviets will do everything they can to torpedo the conference in order to take advantage of the political complications that exist in the Middle East.

There are special concerns in the necessary defense positions that the Government of Israel must maintain, and I certainly hope that the Administration will not reach the point of pressuring Israel into a decision that will be against the long-term national interests of the people of Israel.

In view of your interest, I will keep in touch with you on developments.

Sincerely yours,



Edward J. Derwinski, M.C.

EJD: sc

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 27, 1977


Mr. Herschel Auerbach
Post Office Box 881
Palatine, Illinois 60067

Dear Herschel:

Many thanks for your note. I can understand, I believe, the reasons for your concern, though I don't share them. I am concerned that the lobbying which seems to suggest "Begin right or wrong" will end up driving a wedge between our country and Israel, perhaps even between American Jews and non-Jews. It would be best if we got behind our own Chief Executive. I enclose a copy of a letter in which my concern is explained.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



Enclosures

I share your concern --- and a heartfelt hope for a true peace in the Middle East.

I have personally discussed the subject, including the position of the Palestinians and the PLO, with President Carter. I am convinced that U.S. policy in the Middle East has not changed. The President has been more explicit than his predecessors in outlining the U.S. position. And his statements have been contrasted with the actions and statements of Mr. Begin. If there has been a shift of policy, I suspect it has been in Jerusalem, not in Washington, with the Begin government's policy of encouraging settlements in the West Bank and suggesting that this territory has now been "liberated." Most recently it has even acknowledged its military incursions into Lebanon. Shift or no shift, the Begin government is perceived throughout the world as bent upon expansion.

The Carter Administration has no intention of "recognizing" the PLO. It has only recognized the obvious, as did its predecessors; it has stated that there can be no resolution of the Palestinian problem without the Palestinians. And like its predecessors, it has acknowledged implicitly that there is no visible organization to represent the Palestinians except the one organization they themselves have set up for that purpose. It is saying what every U.S. Government has said, however, quietly, that when the PLO accepts the right of Israel to exist then it should be part of the negotiations.

The passage of time without movement toward peace continues to play into the hands of the most immoderate elements in the Middle East. It is happening now and on all sides. Mr. Begin is "liberating" the West Bank. Mr. Arafat is sounding more intransigent. The Saudis are cutting back oil production. And U.S. policy is steadfast. It remains committed to the survival of Israel and, as it has since the end of step-by-step diplomacy, to multilateral negotiations involving all parties prepared to accept the right of all the others to exist. The basis for negotiation remains an exchange of occupied territory for formal recognition and guaranteed boundaries.

It would be tragic if the new government of Israel moved Israel away from the U.S. and a well-established basis for settlement. In the end Americans, Jews and non-Jews alike, will stand by their country. I am hopeful that the new government of Israel will recognize, as did its predecessors, that the interests of both countries can, and should, be compatible.

I enclose an article on this subject which I think is a balanced discussion of the problem.

With best wishes,

Americans and Israel

By Anthony Lewis

Sympathetic public opinion in America has always been vital to Israel, and never more so than in her diplomatic near-isolation these days. The sympathy is natural: It is right that Americans should care about a country of shared ideals and so compelling a history. But the support should reflect not only human feelings but a realistic sense of Israel's long-term interests.

The question of American public attitudes is made acute by the growing possibility that the Geneva Conference on the Middle East will be reconvened before the end of the year. That prospect emerges from Israel's agreement, albeit with prickly conditions, to a Palestinian presence at the conference. There is a momentum for Geneva.

Considering all the brickbats thrown at President Carter and Secretary of State Vance for their Middle East policy—the charges of muddling and amateurism—they could take considerable satisfaction in a Geneva meeting. But of course that would only be the beginning: of negotiation and of American responsibility. For everyone recognizes that only U.S. leadership has any chance of closing the still enormous distance between Israel and the Arabs on substantive issues.

That is where public opinion, its understanding and its steadiness, will matter. It is no secret that American supporters of Israel have been extremely sensitive to any suggestion of U.S. pressure on Israel—sometimes more sensitive than the Israelis. President Carter has not yet applied any significant pressure. But when he has spoken aloud on something as evident as the necessity for a Palestinian homeland, he has been denounced as "provocative."

It is Menachem Begin, not Jimmy Carter, who has been provocative. Since becoming Prime Minister he has taken the unyielding position, at least publicly, that the West Bank territory occupied by Israel in 1967 is hers by right going back to the Bible. Until an ambiguous halt this week, he has allowed further Jewish settlements in the area. His Minister of Agriculture, Ariel Sharon, has produced a grandiose plan to settle 2 million Jews in the occupied territories.

Those positions are fantasies: dangerous fantasies. Ancient history is deeply meaningful as a source of Israel's vision, but it is entirely inadmissible as a definition in international law or diplomacy. What would happen to the peace of the world if every nation insisted on biblical boundaries or its own scriptural equivalent?

The Begin Government has suggested that the problem of the West Bank can be solved by improving the Arabs' social and economic conditions and giving them a degree of local

autonomy. That is another fantasy. Paternalism, however beneficial, will not work there any more than it did for the French in Algeria. Even the most moderate Palestinians want to run their own society.

Americans who visit Israel often speak of the vulnerability of the country's pre-1967 waist: the narrow area between the Mediterranean and the West Bank. That is a fact, but it was also a condition of the compromise that allowed the creation of Israel in 1948 with world support. The world as it is today cannot accept unilateral boundary changes for reasons of perceived security.

In any case, territory is not security for Israel in the light of modern weapons systems. Minor adjustments to the 1967 borders are imaginable. But can it really increase Israel's security to hold on to the West Bank and thus assure continuing hostility from the Arabs and disapproval from the rest of the world?

In our concern for Israel's survival, we tend to forget an important part of the dream that accompanied her creation and development. That was the dream of peace with her neighbors. Israelis and American supporters both envisioned a time when people with so much in common could live together, and Israel would no longer need to be an armed camp.

After the 1967 war, that vision of peace was the declared reason for holding on to the occupied territory. Apart from such particular areas as Jerusalem, the land would be held temporarily. It was said, as a lever to bring the Arabs to genuine peace. But now security is sought in territory, not peace.

The Arabs are talking of peace now in terms that would have been regarded as astounding in 1967. Secretary Vance came back from his last Middle East tour with undertakings by the neighboring Arab states to conclude peace treaties with Israel. The Foreign Minister of Egypt, Ismail Fahmy, said the other day that "the Arab countries are ready for the first time to accept Israel as a Middle Eastern country to live in peace."

Words can deceive, and it is wise to be wary after the bloody history of Arab opposition to Israel's existence. But it is foolish to pretend that there has been no change in Arab attitudes. There has been a significant change.

Americans must remain committed to Israel, but not in the blinkered vision of survival in hostility. The aim is a stable relationship with her neighbors, and that requires the mutual abandonment of extravagant claims. We help Israel by supporting American leaders when they point out the price of fantasy.

N.Y. Times
9-20

Term began: 1945

Committees: Armed Services, Chairman; Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Biographical Data: Born on January 1, 1905; Catholic. Married; one child. Bald, bespectacled. He resides in East St. Louis. His district: 15 percent black, industrial (metals) with no significant Jewish population. He served in the Army during World War II. Career: Newspaper correspondent for the East St. Louis Journal, St. Louis Globe Democrat, St. Louis News-Review. Price has won reelection easily since 1962 by margins in excess of 2 to 1. On the Armed Services Committee, Price has been a member of the bipartisan coalition that has supported the war in Indochina and the current high levels of military spending. In 1973, however, in what was a significant break with his past positions, Price opposed the bombing of Cambodia after signing of the Vietnam cease-fire.

Back in 1945, he signed the Congressional round-robin letter to President Truman under the auspices of the American-Christian Palestine Committee which urged that immediate steps be taken to open Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and to establish Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.

In May 1952, Price took the Floor to oppose cuts in economic assistance to Israel.

In May 1956, on the House Floor, Price congratulated Israel on her 8th anniversary. He expressed concern over the Department of State's delay in granting Israel defensive arms.

In February 1956, he joined in cosponsoring the 86-member Democratic Congressional declaration proposing United States and allies support:

1. United Nations' guarantee of Israel frontiers;
2. Israeli purchases of U.S. defensive arms;
3. Continued U.S. economic and technical aid to the Middle East;
4. U.S. aid for Arab refugee resettlement;
5. Opposition to partition of Israeli territory.

In January 1957, he signed a letter sent by 74 Democratic Congressmen to Secretary Dulles asking for assurance against a return to conditions under which Nasser barred Israeli shipping from the Suez Canal.

Malvin Price (Continued)

Since 1969, Price has joined in support of all major declarations and resolutions calling for direct negotiations in the Middle East and arms for Israel. He supported the 1975 resolution to station U.S. technicians in Sinai. He was a cosponsor of the Mills-Vanik legislation and voted in support of the amendment on the House Floor.

He voted in favor of the \$2.2 billion Emergency Security Assistance Act.

As Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee in the 93rd Congress, Price introduced legislation giving Congress the right to veto the export of nuclear technology.

Cosigned Bingham/Yates/Anderson letter to President Carter criticizing 10/1/77 U.S.-Soviet joint communique on Middle East. Letter was cosigned by 136 Representatives.

שגרירות ישראל

ווישינגטון

19 . 7 . 1977

Handwritten signature and initials in blue ink, possibly "L. H. H."

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: צבי רפיה

מצ"ב לעיונכם נוסח מכתב ששיגר המורשה
פיש לנשיא ארה"ב המבקר העובדה שהויכוח עם
מנהיגי ישראל נערך מעל דפי העיתונות. המכתב
הוכלל ברשומות הקונגרס ב-13 דנא ע"י המורשה
גילמן מניו-יורק.

ב ב ר כ ה,

צ . רפיה

העמק:

REPORT

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THE FUTURE OF THE MIDDLE
EAST

HON. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, July 13, 1977

Mr. GILMAN, Mr. Speaker, the precarious state of affairs in the Middle East is of primary concern to many of us who serve in this body. So, too, there are many of us concerned about recent expressions by the administration concerning our Middle East policy.

I would like, at this time, to share the thoughts of my neighbor and colleague,

July 13, 1977

CONGRESS

this distinguished gentleman from New York, HAMILTON FISH, JR., by inserting a letter he has written to President Carter, asking for restraint and understanding in our dealings with the new Israeli Government.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., June 30, 1977.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The running debate between representatives of your Administration and officials of the new Israeli government over the course of future Middle East negotiations, has added a disturbing dimension to the already difficult task of obtaining peace for that area of the world.

Naturally, the United States and Israel share a common desire for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. However, it is obvious that there are great differences between the positions expressed by you and that of the new Israeli Prime Minister. I must point out that I cannot see any benefit to the parties concerned in airing these policy differences in the open. Using the world press as a mechanism to promote each other's position has only added confusion to this already complex matter.

It is common knowledge that the new Israeli government has just come to power. I believe that it is our responsibility as a trusted ally of Israel to afford the new leadership the same opportunities as the prior Israeli government had to work towards a settlement with the Arabs. U.S. policy today should be one of restraint and understanding, not pressuring and limiting Israeli options by calling for preconditions to negotiations. With best wishes.

Sincerely,

HAMILTON FISH, JR.,
Member of Congress.

REPRESENTATIVE HAMILTON FISH, JR. (Republican-New York)

Biographical Information:



Hamilton Fish, Jr.
of Millbrook (25th Dist.)
Republican—4th term

Home town Millbrook, N. Y.; born in Washington, D. C. June 3, 1926; Graduate of Kent School, Kent, Conn.; A. B., Harvard College, 1949; LL. B., New York University School of Law, 1957; attended John F. Kennedy School of Public Administration, Cambridge, Mass.; admitted to New York bar; enlisted in USNR, 1944-46; served in Ireland as vice consul, 1951-53, U. S. Foreign Service; counsel, New York State Assembly Judiciary Committee, 1961; Dutchess County Civil Defense Director, 1967-68; appointed as Congressional Advisor to the United States Delegation to the First Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference of Human Environment, 1970; Congressional Delegate to the 41st Executive Session of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), Geneva, May 1972; Married Julia Mackenzie of Montreal (deceased, March 26, 1969); four children; Episcopalian.

Political Information:

The 25th Congressional district occupies the heart of the Hudson River Valley. In colonial days and even after independence, this valley nurtured one of the few feudal social systems in the United States.

In the past few years, the predominantly Republican character of the affluent district has been strengthened by the arrival of conservative minded middle-class people from the New York City area and its suburbs. During the 30's and 40's Franklin Roosevelt was never able to carry this district in which he lived. Even more irritating to FDR, the Hudson Valley persisted in reelecting as its Congressman, Hamilton Fish, Sr., an isolationist, and German sympathizer, who hated Roosevelt bitterly. The Fish family was as socially prominent as the Roosevelts and have been representing the area in Congress on and off since 1842. An earlier Hamilton Fish had been Secretary of State under President Grant.

Like his father, Fish, Jr. is a Republican, but of a rather different sort. He has shown no particular inclination to repeal FDR's New Deal but does share with his father, a certain skepticism about American intervention abroad, and has voted against military involvement in Indochina.

But the Fishes, father and son, ended up disagreeing on the issue that focused the most attention on the Congressmen, the impeachment of Richard Nixon. As a member of the Judiciary Committee, Fish announced in his patrician tones, looking over his half-glasses, that he would have to vote against Nixon. His father was a diehard Nixon defender.

Term Began: January 1969.

Committees:

Judiciary
Small Business

Legislative Record:

Fish has had an extremely supportive record in Congress both on Israel matters and on Soviet Jewry.

Fish had been critical of the Nixon policy of withholding jets to Israel in 1970 calling for an end to our "even-handed policy". He has described Israel as the only friend of the U. S. in the Middle East. Fish has cosponsored all pro-Israel resolutions and declarations and has voted in support of all foreign aid bills. On occasion, he has taken a leadership role.

In October, 1973, Fish introduced a resolution calling upon the President to redouble his efforts to persuade the Austrian government to reopen the Schoenau center.

On June 21, 1975 he introduced legislation which would deny visas to citizens of countries which discriminate against U. S. citizens seeking visas to those countries.

In July, 1975 Fish visited the Soviet Union and has cosponsored numerous letters, resolutions, and petitions on individual dissidents and refusniks and on increased tax on parcels sent to Russia. Fish has spoken often on the House Floor on the plight of Soviet Jews,

Fish also attended the Second World Conference on Soviet Jewry in Brussels in February, 1976.

In a press release of October 23, 1976, Fish outlined his support for anti-boycott legislation. "The time has come to take a strong stand against economic blackmail by the Arab countries, not only to protect the civil rights of our citizens but also to maintain the freedoms for which we fought 200 years ago."

Comments:

Fish requests frequent briefings on the Middle East in Washington and he can be expected to use the information he obtains on the visit to speak on Israel's behalf when legislation arises.



חש"ל"ו
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ס ו ד י

אל : מר מ. רביב, מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: דוד תורגמן, השגרירות, וושינגטון

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הנדון: שיחת ח"כ לויין עם סנטור פל
מכתבך 34 מה-29.8.76

במענה על שאלותיך לגבי נסיבות קביעת הפגישה בין ח"כ לויין לבין סנטור פל, ברצוני להבהיר:

ח"כ לויין שהה בוושינגטון לרגל ועידת ארגון המורים. ח"כ לויין ביקש מהשגרירות להסדיר לו פגישות בבחי הקונגרס עם אישים העוסקים בתחומי התעניינותו: חינוך ומדיניות חוץ.

בהתאם להנחיות הסדיר מר א. אורן, עוזרו של מר צ. רפיח, פגישות עם אותם חברי קונגרס, שניתן היה להשיגם באותם ימים בוושינגטון (עונת הפגרה). נקבעו הפגישות עם האישים הבאים: המורשה בראדמס (פגישה זו בוטלה בגלל התחייבות אחרת של ח"כ ש. לויין); המורשה פרקינס, יו"ר תת הועדה של ביה"נ לענייני חינוך. (בפגישה הנ"ל פרקינס עצמו לא השתתף בהתנצלו שנאלץ לפגוש את רעייתו והשאירנו עם צוות עוזריו); סנטור פל.

הציר בקשני להחלות לפגישות אלו מאחר ובאותם ימים שהה מר צ. רפיח בארץ ומר א. בנצור היה בחופשה.

ב ב ר כ ה,

דוד תורגמן



כ' באב תשל"ו
16 באוגוסט 1976

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סודי

אל : מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: השגרירות, ושינגטון

הנדון: פגישת ח"כ שלום לויין עם סנטור PELL חבר ועדת החוץ
של הסנט ובהשתתפות הח"מ

1. לויין הביע תודה והערכה לעזרתה המדינית והכלכלית של ארה"ב ולעמדתו הידידותית של הקונגרס. לויין ביקש לשמוע הערכה פל על המצב במזה"ת.

2. פל אמר שאינו רואה שנוי במצב בגלל עמדת שני הצדדים. פל אינו חושש עתה ממלחמת עולם כתוצאה מהסכסוך במזה"ת. לדבריו, אם מדינות ערב התקפנה את ישראל ותפלושנה לשטחה, תבוא ארה"ב לעזרתה והוא יהיה מהראשונים שיתבעו זאת. במקרה כזה אינו חושש מתגובה סובייטית היות וארה"ב תפעל בתקיפות ובהחלטיות דבר שירתיע הסובייטים מעימות. מצד שני, אם ישראל תתקוף ותצעד על דמשק וקהיר, יש להניח כי בריה"מ תבוא לעזרת הערבים ובמקרה כזה ארה"ב לא תתערב. מכאן שאינו חושש יותר מפני עימות צבאי בינגושי כתוצאה מהמצב במזה"ת. לויין אמר כי אין לנו כל כוונה לתקוף את מדינות ערב.

3. לויין דיבר על חוסר הנכונות של הערבים להשלים עם זכות קיומה של ישראל ולעשות שלום עימה וכן על חוסר האפשרות לחזור לגבולות 67 ובמיוחד בגדה. פל אמר כי זה מאשר, איפוא, קביעתו כי בסיסית קשה יהיה להתקדם להסדר בגלל עמדות שני הצדדים. כאן ציין פל כי הרקורד שלו בהצבעות למען ישראל הינו פרו ישראלי ביותר ודוקא על כן ברצונו לומר כי המשך



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


ההתנחלויות בגדה מערב השגת הסדר. בנקודה זו שלף פל מתוך יומן הכיס שלו מפה קטנה, שלדבריו גזר אותה מתוך עתון ובה מצויינות ההתנחלויות בגדה. זיהיתי מיד את המפה שצורפה לכתבתו המפורסמת של טרנס סמית בניו יורק טיימס לפני כשלושה חודשים, והערתי לסנטור פל על הטעות האופטית של מפה זו עליה ציין סמית ההתנחלויות כתופסות מחצית הגדה. לויך הסביר גם פרשת קדום והחלטת הממשלה. פל הגיב כי מכל מקום אין לישראל זכות לבנות את התנחלויות כי "שטח זה אינו שלכם". לויך הסביר המצב הבטחוני של גבולות 67.

4. פל הביע תרעומת, ועל כך חזר מספר פעמים במהלך השיחה, על הלחצים הכבדים המופעלים עליו ועל חבריו ידידי ישראל בכל פעם שבנושא מסויים אינם מזדהים לחלוטין עם עמדת ישראל וציין כדוגמה ללחצים אלו את תקון ג'קסון ומכתב 76 הסנטורים (עליו חתם). פל הסיף שעלינו לגלות פחות רגישות ולא לצאת מיד בהאשמות כאשר ידידינו הומכים בנו רק ב-95 אחוזים. הערתי כי לשגרירות לא היה כל חלק בנושא תקון ג'קסון וכי למרות כל הלחצים שהופעלו עליה נמנעה מנקיטת עמדה.

5. לויך אמר כי לדעתו אין לארה"ב עניין בהחלשת ישראל ע"י קיצוץ בגבולותיה וכי ישראל הינה המשענת והידידה הטובה ביותר של ארה"ב באזור ולכן גם ארה"ב זקוקה לישראל. פל העיר כי זה נכון שישראל היא הידידה הנאמנה של ארה"ב אך באותה מידה נכון שישראל קיימת תודות לעזרתה של ארה"ב. לויך אמר כי ארה"ב אינה יכולה לסמוך על ידידות הערבים. פל הגיב שאינו מוכן לשמוע מפי אף אחד במי על ארה"ב לבחור כידידותיה ועל מי יכולה לסמוך.

6. בסיום השיחה שאל לויך מה יוכל למסור לחבריו בוועדת החוץ של הכנסת מפיו. פל ענה כי מביע הערצתו לישראל על





- 3 -

ס ו ד י

עמידתה והישגיה השונים לרבות בהפרחת השממה וכי ימשיך
לתמוך בישראל. לויך שאל אם יוכל, איפוא, לומר כי פל
מתיצב עמנו במאת האחוזים. פל השיב: זאת לא אמרתי, לא
אמרתי מאה אחוזים אולם אמרתי כי אני תומך בישראל.

ב ב ר כ ה,

3 יולי
דוד תורגמן

הערה: מר א. עברון, משנה למנכ"ל
לשכת המנכ"ל
לשכת שה"ח
המרכז
מר צ. רפיח, כאן

REPRESENTATIVE WALTER FLOWERS (Democrat - Alabama)

Biographical Information:

Home - Tuscaloosa; born in Greenville, Ala., April 12, 1933; attended University of Alabama, 1951-57, LL.B., 1957; Rotary Foundation Fellow at University of London, England, 1957-58 (graduate student in international law); commissioned as a Reserve officer, Military Intelligence, Army, 1955; served on active duty as lieutenant, 1958-59; married, three children; member, Christ Episcopal Church.

Political Information:

Flowers is running without Republican opposition this year as he did in 1974. His district contains the largest percentage of blacks (38%) in Alabama.

Flowers was one of the Democrats during the Nixon impeachment hearings thought most likely to vote against impeachment. However, he played a significant role in the actual phrasing of the impeachment counts which passed and gave an impassioned speech indicating that he would vote for impeachment.

Term Began:

January 1969

Committees:

- Judiciary
- Science & Technology
- Select Committee on Aging

Legislative Record:

Flowers has voted consistently against foreign aid. He voted for the Sinai resolution and has cosponsored resolutions favorable to Israel. He voted for the Jackson-Vanik Freedom-of-Emigration Amendment, but also voted for the Conable motion to delete Title IV (which contained the Vanik measure) from the trade bill.

Flowers voted for the \$2.2 billion emergency authorization in 1973.

He voted against the Case-Fenwick bill establishing a commission to monitor compliance with human rights provisions of the Helsinki agreement. In 1970 Flowers indicated that he did not favor economic assistance to Israel, even though "it had not been requested." He has cosponsored resolutions condemning U.N. action against Israel and has said that a reassessment of the U.S. role in the U.N. should be the "bare minimum" action.



Walter Flowers
of Tuscaloosa (7th Dist.)
Democrat—4th term

קולג'רס

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

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כ"ג אדר א' תשל"ו
24 פברואר 1976

אל ממש"א

מאת: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: הצבעת פרוקסמיאר על חוק סיוע החוץ

בהצבעת הסינט על חוק סיוע החוץ לשנת 1976, שנערכה ב-17 דנא, הצביע הסנטור פרוקסמיאר מויסקונסין נגד אישור החוק (החוק אושר, כידוע, ברוב של 60 נגד 30).

בנמקו את הצבעתו אמר פרוקסמייר (הדברים פורסמו ברשומות הקונגרס מ-17 דנא):

"I will vote against the bill even though it contains provisions for military support to Israel and certain NATO countries which I believe are essential. Our continued support for Israel is the critical ingredient to stability in the Middle East and the assurance of economic and military survivability of that nation. We cannot and should not relinquish that role."

ב ב ר כ ה
3
צ. רפיה

העתק: ה קונכ"ל, שיקגו
המרכז, משה"ח

משרד החוץ
ירושלים



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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THE STATE OF ISRAEL

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REPRESENTATIVE BILL FRENZEL (REPUBLICAN-MINNESOTA)

Term began: 1971

Home Town: Golden Valley

Committees: Ways and Means

Biographical Information: Born 1928 in St. Paul. Dartmouth College, B.A. and M.B.A.; Served in the Navy during the Korean War. Was President of the Minnesota Terminal Warehouse Co. and served in the Minnesota House of Representatives, 1962-1970

Special Comments: District includes the expanding white collar Western suburbs of Minneapolis, including the predominantly Jewish suburb of St. Louis Park. This is the Wealthiest district in the entire state. Frenzel is a moderate-to-liberal Republican.

Frenzel is concerned that the \$300 million ceiling on EximBank credits for the USSR has hampered U.S.-Soviet trade, the benefits of which other nations are reaping. He feels the Soviets must be given incentive for increasing Jewish emigration, but he blames the credit limitation and not the Jackson Amendment for the Soviet rejection of the Trade Agreement.

Legislative Record: Has consistently supported aid to Israel, as well as all aid legislation.. Voted for the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. Frenzel also voted for the Sinai Resolution to station 200 American technicians in the Sinai and co-sponsored the Bingham Resolution disapproving the sale of Hawk missiles to Jordan.

December 22, 1977

REPRESENTATIVE SHIRLEY N. PETTIS (Republican-California)

Term Began: April 1975

Committees: Education and Labor; International Relations--Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East

Replaced her husband who died in February 1975. Consistently voted against foreign aid until fiscal year 1978. Voted for resolution to station American technicians in Sinai. Cosponsored O'Neill resolution calling for U.S. reassessment with UN if Israel should be expelled or suspended. Pettis recently attended Committee hearings on Israeli settlements.

December 1977

REPRESENTATIVE DONALD J. PEASE (Democrat-Ohio)

Term Began: 1977

Committees: International Relations--Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East

Supports foreign aid. Initially said would be too busy to get deeply immersed in Mideast issues. Introduced resolution reaffirming U.S. commitment to obtain full compliance with human rights provision of Helsinki Accords. During Subcommittee hearings questioned "if there is no settlement, and the U.S. cuts back aid, is it retaliation or recognition that the U.S. can't indefinitely provide aid to that area of the world? Is it feasible for the U.S. to continue supplying security supporting assistance at such high levels over the next several years? If aid no longer contributes to peace talks, is such large aid justified?" During Committee hearing asked why anti-boycott provisions should be included in law in an era when Carter is trying to reduce burdens on businessmen. He did, however, support the Export Administration Act including anti-boycott legislation. Introduced legislation this year calling for U.S. economic boycott of Uganda. This trip is Pease's first to the Middle East and will contribute heavily to his future outlook.

December 1977

REPRESENTATIVE DANTE B. FASCELL (Democrat-Florida)

Term Began: 1955

Committees: Government Operations; International Relations--Subcommittee on International Operations, (Chairman) and Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs

Excellent record and solid support for all relevant legislation. Has taken leadership role on many legislative issues of concern. Has supported Committee amendments to increase amount of aid for Israel. Strong support on behalf of Soviet Jewry. Chairman of Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to monitor compliance with the Helsinki Accords. Cosigned letter to President U.S. Olympics Committee calling attention to USSR/Third World plan to exclude Israel from 1980 Moscow Olympics by forcing Israel out of required number of federations needed to participate. Cosigned Oct. 6, 1977 letter to Carter expressing concern over joint US/USSR communique on Mideast. Introduced amendment in 1976 to extend repayment period for Israel on military loans. Chairman of Subcommittee on International Operations which authorizes Soviet refugee assistance. Expert on Latin America and has many close contacts in the area. Former chairman of Subcommittee on Latin America.

Represents heavily Jewish district in Miami. Among core group of pro-Israel Representatives on International Relations Committee who initiate action.

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

ה' בכסלו תשל"ט

5 בדצמבר 78

Handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be "א. רפיה".

אל : מצפ"א

מאת : צ. רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: שיחת קונגרסמן פינדלי עם ערפאת

מצ"ב ההודעה לעהונות שפרסם פול פינדלי על פגישתו עם ערפאת.

נ ב ר ט ה
צ. רפיה

העתק: המרכז

דוד תורגמן, כאן

אל"מ לנגוצקי, כאן

הקונכל, שיקגו



REPRESENTING
THE LINCOLN DISTRICT

ARAFAT PLEDGE OPENS DOOR

FOR U.S. TALKS WITH PLO

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Findley said Arafat promised the new Palestinian state "would live at peace with all of its neighbors" and would give "defacto recognition" to the State of Israel. Findley added, "This pledge advances substantially the prospect for a comprehensive and durable peace."

Findley, the senior Republican on the House Middle East Subcommittee, said he received the assurances during a four-hour discussion with Arafat. He first met the PLO leader last January and since has kept in communication by mail.

In his statement today, Findley said,

"Mr. Arafat's pledge meets the essential conditions of a 1975 memorandum in which the U.S. government promised Israel it would not 'recognize or negotiate with the Palestinian Liberation Organization so long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.'

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"The reaction of the U.S. government to Mr. Arafat's pledge is critically important. It will be a clear test of our good faith interest in talking to the PLO. If we still refuse to talk, then I must question whether our government is really interested in exchanging ideas with the PLO--despite the public statement of President Carter early this year that "there must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects."

"The breadth and perseverance of the PLO movement, in my view, is not fully appreciated in the United States. The PLO is the unchallenged spokesman of the Palestinian cause. It can be either an enormously constructive or disruptive influence on the Camp David process and in my view it makes great sense for the Carter administration to begin talks immediately. The U.S. administration cannot destroy, or even seriously weaken the PLO by refusing to deal with it.

"Everyone should recognize, of course, that much hard negotiating with the PLO lies ahead, but the only way to start is by talking.

"Critics may quibble that Mr. Arafat's pledge keeps open the right to use non-violent, that is, diplomatic and democratic means, to enlarge the new Palestinian state at the expense of Israel. But anyone with the slightest understanding of Middle East realities must understand why, at this stage, this reservation--totally non-violent in its form--is the very least recognition Mr. Arafat must give to the dreams the PLO has nurtured for 30 years. Yet, like everything else, even this reservation can be negotiable.

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"If, on the other hand, the U.S. Administration regards this as a significant statement and uses it as the basis for discussions with the PLO, then it could open the way to a comprehensive peace which would be very much to the benefit of all parties in the Mideast, especially Israel.

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"I told him that this statement does not answer the fear so often voiced by Israel that the PLO would continue violence against Israel even if a Palestinian state is established.

"We then developed through discussion the pledge of non-violence. Here is what Mr. Arafat agreed to, after I wrote down the words, read them to him, and he discussed them repeating the phrases several times. He said he would stand behind the statement.

"Mr. Arafat's statement, the one which I feel had the greatest significance:

"'The PLO will accept an independent Palestinian state consisting of the West Bank and Gaza, with connecting corridor, and in that circumstance will renounce any and all violent means to enlarge the territory of that state. I would reserve the right, of course, to use non-violent means, that is to say diplomatic and democratic means to bring about the eventual unification of all of Palestine.'

"He promised, 'We will give de facto recognition to the State of Israel.'

"I asked, 'Would you then live at peace with all your neighbors?' His answer, 'we would live at peace with all our neighbors.'

"Then he added,

"'But it is we who would need protection, not Israel. Israel has 12 to 15 atomic bombs. I know.'

"To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time that the head of the PLO has promised de facto recognition and peaceful relations with the State of Israel.

"Israel can no longer say that the PLO is pledged to destroy Israel with force. Every previous statement kept open the possibility that the PLO might continue violence even after a Palestinian state is established.

"Following are extracts from other statements made by Mr. Arafat. Where interpretation is needed, I have added my comments in parentheses. Otherwise, the words are those of Mr. Arafat."

* * *

Egypt taking part in Camp David is a great loss to the Palestinians, but we are strong enough to carry on.

Camp David is a disaster to us. It gives (for the first time U.S. and Egyptian) legitimacy, legal standing to Israeli occupation of our land (in the West Bank and Gaza). You have put a U.S. legal umbrella over Israeli control of the West Bank. Why legalize this new slavery for Palestinians? That's what self-rule is--a new slavery under a legal umbrella. In Rhodesia, the U.S. is demanding majority-rule--the recognition and participation of blacks. Why such a different attitude toward Palestinians. You demand majority rule in Rhodesia. Why not in the West Bank?

* * *

I accepted a moderate line, a moderate policy. What did I get? Immediately three of my most trusted friends were killed. Then Southern Lebanon. Then we got hit by Camp David. If I had not been strong and trusted, I would have been killed by reaction to Camp David.

* * *

You will pay a very high cost for Camp David. I am not talking about the cost in money. Iran is a sign. A sign of the future. One-third of the banners I've seen pictured from the protests are about Palestinians. My picture. Fatah. Some banners in Arabic. The theme of the Palestinians "Revolution until victory" is seen. The religious leaders there are my friends. I am not the man leading the revolution in Iran, but definitely the PLO cause plays a role.

Two years ago I forecast trouble for the Shah. He has given me some blame. (What will happen, I asked. Can the Shah regain support and govern?) It is too late.

* * *

The Palestinian cause is the conscience of the Arab mentality everywhere. The PLO brings dignity to Palestinians--4 million of them. Never forget that the PLO is their lost homeland. It embodies their aspirations for the future. The toughest Palestinians are those who live under occupation. I suggest you get a CIA briefing and learn the size, the reaction of great numbers to me and the PLO, especially the reception I had from Egyptians on the pilgrimages.

* * *

I know the (U.S.) Administration is against the PLO, against a Palestinian state. Did we ever do anything against America? Why open war against us as you have in Camp David?

* * *

(What can be done at this stage to improve the situation, I asked?). The U.S. must recognize the PLO. The U.S. must take that step, and not for our interest alone.

* * *

After Camp David it was said, "The PLO is over." What happened? Baghdad. Solidarity.

* * *

Findley said, "Shortly before midnight he dictated a message to President Carter. It was candid and thoughtful. He worked carefully over the words. I do not feel I should release the text or comment at this time.

"At the beginning of our discussion, Mr. Arafat said he had sent condolences to the family of Congressman Leo Ryan, killed in Guyana. Mr. Ryan was with me when I had my first interview with Mr. Arafat last January."

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

April 6, 1978

*(in response to my
letter about the PLO
his attack made Findley
appear foolish to be
backing Arafat in peace
talks)*

18312
018517 75
Mr. Len Lieberman
3169 Elmhurst Drive
Springfield, Illinois 62704

Dear Mr. Lieberman:

Thank you for your letter regarding my position on the Middle East.

I am also very concerned by recent events in the Middle East. I feel that we have arrived at a very critical juncture where there will be progress toward peace or a stalemate which could produce more tragic events in what could become an unrelenting escalation toward war.

I have strongly condemned the acts of terrorism by Al-Fatah which took the lives of innocent Israelis near Tel-Aviv. I made a public statement to this effect which I am enclosing for your information. It refers to my January meeting with Yasir Arafat, to what he said at that time regarding the P.L.O. and the use of terrorism, and summarizes my reactions to the conflict between what he said and the recent murderous acts in Israel. As I note in my statement, whether Arafat deliberately misled the Members of Congress with whom he met in January or whether he is not in sufficient control of the P.L.O. to prevent terrorist acts reduces his credibility as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people at peace negotiations.

It is important that we continue to encourage moderates in the Middle East to work toward peace. The participation of moderates such as Sadat and Hussein as well as others in talks will be critical to the success of the search for tranquility and understanding.

Sincerely,

Paul Findley

Paul Findley
Representative in Congress

Enclosure

Edith Myers, President of the Springfield Jewish Federation(SJF), Joseph Feuer, Past-President of the SJF and member of the Jewish Community Relations Council, Leonard Lieberman, President of the Central Illinois Jewish Federation and Past-President of the SJF, Albert Myers, Past-President of the SJF and as a member of the Jewish community at large met with Congressman Paul Findley in Mr. Findley's office on December 7, 1978. The purpose of the meeting was to express our concern with Congressman Findley's ongoing relations with Yasser Arafat as leader of the PLO, and Mr. Findley's recent press statements regarding Mr. Arafat's disavowal of terrorism and willingness to live in peace with the Israelis.

The group presented 4 areas of concern to Mr. Findley for his reaction:

1. You are supporting Yasser Arafat and the PLO, while the United States Government does not. Why do you support Arafat, a repeated terrorist, who has earlier sworn to end PLO terrorism, but praised PLO terrorists when these actions continued?
2. Your actions with the PLO are inconsistent with United States foreign policy regarding the Camp David accords. These actions, and repeated emphasis on the Palestinian problems, endanger the possibility of peace between Egypt and Israel. Your support of the PLO is also inconsistent with American foreign policy, to the extent that the PLO support the revolutionists attempting to overthrow the Iranian government.
3. Why hasn't Arafat confirmed your interpretation of the November meeting between the two of you?
4. How is support of Arafat and the PLO inconsistent with the wishes of your constituency? Do you think that the Jewish community, or the Christian community concerned with terrorism and hostilities against Christians in Lebanon, support your interest in Arafat and the PLO?

Mr. Findley took notes on these areas of concern, but before addressing them addressed himself to the issue of his conduct in foreign affairs generally. He acknowledged that his foreign affairs involvements usually do not impact his midwestern district, and that his positions in relations with China and U.S. Civil Rights have never been popular with his constituents. On matters of direct interest to Central Illinois, Mr. Findley attempts to serve his district well, and he hopes that area residents will allow him to participate in other issues as his conscience indicates.

In response to Albert Myers query about adhering to the wishes of his constituency on matters of the Middle East, Mr. Findley responded that he firmly believes that the Palestinian issue is critical to our common goal of peace between Israel and her neighbors. Unless and until the Palestinian homeland matter is resolved, peace cannot occur in the Middle East.

Len Lieberman and Albert Myers then insisted that the resolution of a Palestinian homeland through the creation of an independent Palestinian state (provided for in the same United Nations resolution creating the State of Israel in 1948) cannot be addressed while Yasser Arafat and the PLO represent the Palestinian people.

Each member of the group pointed out to Mr. Findley that Yasser Arafat had renounced terrorism in the past and then had come back to it and that the PLO charter still includes the destruction of the State of Israel. Mr. Findley acknowledged that after the January, 1978 meeting with Arafat and 9 members of Congress where the PLO renounced terrorism forever, he was disappointed when terrorism by Al Fatah resumed and Arafat praised their actions. In response to Joseph Feuer's inquiry as to why Mr. Findley stands by Arafat and is encouraged when Arafat once again calls for an end to terrorism, Mr. Findley replied that the very fact that Arafat will speak out for peace for just that moment is a significant action by itself. Even if other PLO leaders can later get him

to withdraw his remarks, the statement itself is evidence of flexibility. Mr. Findley admits that some of Mr. Arafat's actions and positions are wrong just as he considers Israel's Prime Minister Begin wrong in his position on West Bank settlements. Albert Myers noted that while Begin may be right or wrong, he is always truthful.

Len Lieberman said that he interprets Arafat's statements as a lie, rather than as a glimpse of possible flexibility and a desire for peace. Mr. Findley asked what Arafat could do, to be considered trustworthy. Len Lieberman responded that one full year of absolute abstinence from terrorism would make him be willing to listen to discussions of Arafat and PLO involvement in peace negotiations. But Mr. Findley was informed that Arafat and the PLO are now considered symbols of terrorism and can never be fully cleansed of their image. The issue now is to develop new spokespersons for the Palestinians, leaders associated with peace rather than terrorism. Len Lieberman also asserted that Mr. Findley, acting as a liaison for Arafat, is very much part of Arafat's credibility and hindering the development of alternative Palestinian leadership.

Mr. Findley denied that he gives credibility to Arafat and the PLO, and denied that he even support them. He only intends to offer the Palestinians a means to be heard. The group disagreed, saying that Mr. Findley, through his meetings with Arafat, is a contributing factor to the stability of Arafat's position and the legitimacy of the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinians. Mr. Lieberman repeated that by dealing with Arafat and the PLO, no other group has the opportunity to arise and expect to be recognized by the world.

Albert Myers addressed Mr. Findley on why we asked for this meeting at this time. At issue is the possibility of peace between Israel and Egypt. The more complicated the issues become, the less the chances for any type of peace. Since Egypt and Israel may be near a settlement, raising the cause of the Palestinians serves no constructive purpose. Peace has to be given a chance, and if the Palestinian question can be put aside for the moment, later on it can be addressed directly and between nations of the Middle East who are on better diplomatic terms.

Albert Myers stated that Mr. Findley has long served this district well on issues of importance to Central Illinois. Mr. Findley has thus earned our support over these years, from all sections of the community. Just as we support his statesmanship on matters of international affairs which do not concern his constituency, we ask him to support the positions of the area Jewish and Christian communities when international affairs are important to us. Disassociation of our Representative to Congress from the world's leading international terrorists is not an unreasonable request, from our perspective. In fact, replacement of Arafat and the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinian people will probably lead to a more rapid resolution of the Palestinian problem. Joseph Feuer agreed, saying that with the track record of Arafat and the PLO, there is little likelihood of Israel and the world trusting these Palestinian representatives with the negotiation of peace.

The meeting concluded with the group's request that Mr. Findley cease his involvement in the presentation of the Arafat and PLO perspective of peace in the Middle East at least until Israel and Egypt sign a peace treaty, and that Mr. Findley give serious consideration to allowing the Palestinian leadership to emerge by not offering himself to Arafat and the PLO as the principal conduit for communications regarding Palestinian self-determination.

NEWS from

Congressman **PAUL FINDLEY**

20th District, Illinois • 2133 Rayburn Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20515 • 202-225-5271



REPRESENTING
THE LINCOLN DISTRICT

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Opinion / San Francisco Examiner

Sadat bears the heavier blame

IS THE Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty to become the greatest lost chance of a generation? This is the gripping question on this particular day by which, according to earlier hopes springing from Camp David, the document was to have been signed and sealed.

But things have run afoul, and there is no treaty. And while we hear much confident talk that one will be signed, eventually, by President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of Israel, a dark current of worry runs beneath the whole performance now, and no one really knows.

The crying necessity of the moment seems quite clear to us: Sadat needs to back down on some of his recent, excessive demands.

This is where the problem lies. The United States in the past few days has been trying hard to get Israel to back down and accept Sadat's inflated requirements for the treaty, whereas it should have been striving to veer Sadat away from those obstructions he has raised.

Yes, in all fairness, we should have been applying the main pressure on Cairo, not Jerusalem, because it's Sadat, not Begin, who has been trying to weasel out of the understandings reached at the Camp David summit and force Israel to give more than had been agreed upon by both sides.

The United States took Egypt's side in this, because of President Carter's exceeding haste to get a treaty signed by today, but all the leverage applied by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on his visit to Jerusalem last week failed to budge the Israeli government. Begin's cabinet firmly rejected the new proposals as "inconsistent with the Camp David framework," and in fact a substantial change of that framework, and sadly enough, this seems to be the truth.

Sadat has tried to add gaping loopholes in the proposed treaty for Egypt's benefit, while loading additional, dangerous requirements on Israel. He is, for example, trying to back out of an understanding that the treaty between Egypt and Israel would take priority over agreements — some of them mutual-defense pacts — that Israel has with Arab nations hostile to Israel. Last week an Egyptian spokesman said his country is remaining loyal to its defense obligations to

other Arab states and "giving them priority over any other agreements."

If this intent persists in Cairo, then probably there will be no treaty with Israel. The latter hardly could take seriously a document that still allowed Egypt to go to war against Israel as part of a perceived duty to assist other Arab countries. It would be a rather worthless treaty.

Also, Sadat appears set upon adding a "linkage" between the two-nation peace treaty and a solution to the complicated question of the disputed West Bank of Jordan, a region vital to Israel's security and not taken from Egypt. Sadat, with U.S. help, has tried to tie Israel to a firm, narrow timetable for Palestinian self-rule there, though any safe solution depends on the cooperation of parties (most notably King Hussein of Jordan) who are not even agreeable to these current negotiations. Hussein says now, in fact, that the Russians should be brought into the negotiating picture, a sentiment that casts gloom on any hope of his constructive participation.

All this, and some more besides, is extra baggage that Sadat has added, some of it contrary to prior agreement. The Israelis last month approved the draft peace treaty, in line with the Camp David agreements, which had been pressed on them by the United States. They are willing to give Egypt back the vast Sinai peninsula and continue work toward a West Bank solution within definite procedures. Sadat is trying to push them beyond what they think their national security interests conceivably could bear, and they will not be pushed, either by him or by President Carter.

Perhaps there is still some bluff in Sadat's bargaining — possibly he'll moderate and sign the treaty the Israelis have agreed upon, within the Camp David framework, before things slide too far downhill. President Carter must not give up, in trying to bring him and Begin together in a final triumph of peacemaking.

But the president needs to impress upon Sadat that he cannot maintain military loyalty to the other Arab states while having a peace treaty with Israel. Sadat is under great negative pressure from the other Arab nations, which despise Israel, but he must decide, very soon, how much he really values peace — as against the approval of his brethren.

San Francisco Chronicle

THE VOICE OF THE WEST

Founded 1865 by Charles and M.H. de Young

George T. Cameron, Publisher 1925-55

Charles de Young Thieriot, Publisher 1955-77

Richard T. Thieriot
Editor and Publisher

Gordon Pates
Executive Editor

William German
Managing Editor

Templeton Peck
Editorial Page Editor

Editorials

The Unsigned Peace Treaty

TOMORROW WAS SUPPOSED to be the day for signing the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Pens will not be put to paper after all; peace still eludes the peacemakers, chief of whom, in the American view, is President Carter, who says he is "frustrated."

Well he may be, since the treaty terms that the Israeli cabinet and government flatly rejected yesterday are Egyptian terms that Mr. Carter had accepted and, through Secretary Vance, recommended Israel accept.

It would be wrong to say that we now are nowhere. The Israeli cabinet statement in Jerusalem yesterday said Israel is prepared to sign the draft treaty that was left on the table on November 11 after post-Camp David negotiations. That ought to be assurance that not all hopes are dashed.

THE PRESENT STICKING POINT has come since the November 11 draft was brought forth. President Sadat lately asked for changes to be made in it. The Israelis say these are "unacceptable to Israel and are rejected by it," and they go on to deplore the "attitude and interpretation" of the U.S. regarding them.

The Israeli position seems to be: We were ready to sign the November draft, but here are new demands from the Egyptians which cancel the meaning of the treaty, expose Israel to grave risks, and establish dubious interpretations of the commitments of the parties, from which Egypt is given a chance to back away.

Specifically, the Israelis say that:

- They cannot agree to a delay in the Israeli-Egyptian exchange of ambassadors until after autonomy has been set up in the Gaza Strip.

- They cannot accept a proposed letter of interpretation regarding Egypt's existing treaty obligations with Arab states. Such an interpretation, they say, would "empty" the treaty of its meaning.

- They can't agree to a December 1979 target for establishing self-government on the West Bank — though Mr. Carter says he "personally" doesn't see how this could be difficult for the Israelis.

AFTER DEPLORING the attitude of the U.S. government in supporting these proposals, the Israeli statement declares that possibly autonomy arrangements "can be clarified and reformulated."

So, back to the table. Blessed are the peacemakers, but evidently their Christmas is not to be a merry one.

Jackson Predicts Egyptian-Israeli Security Pact

12/15/78

By Mike Layton
P-I Olympia Bureau

Western world."

Jackson also warned that Americans must curb their thirst for oil and their "inflation psychosis" or President Carter's plans for restraints will become mandatory wage and price controls to "put tooth into what is voluntary now."

"The American people have not had such a preview of disaster in a long, long time," Jackson said of the inflation cycle and its threat of recession or worse.

Jackson sounded like the "cold warrior" of old as he warned the businessmen and a number of state government Democrats of the Soviet Union's designs on the Mideast.

"I am not one of those alarmists who say the Russians have a grand design to take over the world," Jackson said.

"They seek targets of opportunity" and are following "a historical pattern aimed at the oil fields of the Middle East, the source of the industrial heartbeat of the industrial nations of Europe, North America and Japan."

"The Russians are in Afghanistan, pointing a dagger at Pakistan and Iran," Jackson said. "They're in Iraq and they're in Yemen, pointing at Saudi Arabia."

They are also in Ethiopia and Libya, he said, "making a complete circle."

Russian intervention is not "the typical imperial assault landing marines and soldiers," Jackson said. "They're working within, to create a climate to deny oil to the Western world if that is necessary to pursue their goals."

The U.S. must continue to support the Shah of Iran even though "we don't always have a clean choice" of our friends, Jackson said.

"It is now up to us to work closely with our allies — I'm not talking about military intervention — to make it clear to the Russians that we will not allow the Mideast to fall," he said.

"There is no alternative to the

shah," Jackson said. "The ideal leader (of Iran) is just not around."

Jackson made his prediction of a Mideast peace settlement based on his recent talks with both Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

"I can say to you that we're going to have a peace treaty," Jackson said. "Maybe not before Christmas. But in two or three months."

With an infusion of U.S. technology and Saudi money into Egypt, Jackson said, that country and Israel could force a mutual defense agreement making them the most powerful entity in the Middle East.

"The nation's No. 1 issue that we

all face is the issue of inflation," Jackson said, blaming it mostly on the rising prices of oil since 1973.

Economists are predicting recession, even depression, unless the nation finds an end to "double digit inflation," he said.

"We have developed an inflation psychosis in America," Jackson said. Everyone tries to anticipate inflation and it continues to soar upward, he said.

"It's a state of mind the country needs to break," he said. If it continues, Jackson said, voluntary guidelines "will have to be made mandatory."

COPY
FOR YOUR INFORMATION
COMMUNITY RELATIONS COMMITTEE
Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle
Suite 525 Securities Building
Seattle, Washington 98101

Jackson sees Egypt-Israel pact

Times Olympia bureau

OLYMPIA — Israel and Egypt will sign a peace treaty within two or three months, then will join forces to maintain security in the Middle East, Senator Henry M. Jackson said here yesterday.

Jackson also told a luncheon meeting of state and local government officials, that the United States must support the Shah of Iran or risk a Russian intervention and a possible shutoff of Middle East oil to Western nations.

"We need to let our adversaries as well as our friends know we will help maintain the stability of Iran and the Middle East," said the senator, a longtime hard-liner on communism.

Jackson said he recently was told by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat that a treaty with Israel

would be signed in "two or three months."

He said that he sees the formation of an Egyptian-Israeli pact for jointly dealing with any covert operations by Russia.

"That's the kind of plan for stability we need," he said.

Jackson also reiterated his earlier advocacy of a "Marshall plan" with technical assistance to help Middle Eastern nations raise their standard of living.

As to the future of the Shah of Iran, the senator said that if the Shah should fall, it would Iran, resulting in harm to the Western World.

"Extremists have said they would cut off oil to the West and to Israel," he said.

He said Russia is pushing to strengthen its position in the Middle East and to surround the oil

fields on which industrialized nations depend.

Jackson also warned that mandatory wage and price controls may be required if President Carter's voluntary plan fails.

Prime interest rates could go up to 13 per cent, touching off a recession or even a depression, he said.



Need a wheelchair or other medical equipment? Call the Easter Seal Society's Assistance and Information for the Disabled (AID) program for help, 284-5700.

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Seattle, Washington 98101



ת"ס
ת"ס
קונצרט (תינוק) - ארה"ב

6 ביוני 1978

א ל: מצפ"א

מרכז

מזתי"ם

מאת: צ. רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: ארה"ב - דרום תימן

פול פינדליי, רפובליקני מאילינוי, חבר ועדת החוץ בבית-
הנבחרים, שוקד בשנים האחרונות על חידוש הקשרים בין ארה"ב לדרום
תימן ואף נותן פרסום לפעולותיו בנדון. מצ"ב הודעה שמסר במליאת
בית-הנבחרים ב-2 דנא, בה הוא סוקר פעולותיו בנדון ומבשר על צאת
משלחת של 4 אנשי מחמ"ד לעדן, בחדש זה, כדי לדון, בין השאר, על
חידוש היחסים הדיפלומטים על דרום תימן.

כזכור, ביקר פינדליי בעדן בינואר ש.ז. והצטרף באיחור, בשל
כך, למשלחת זבלוקי שביקרה אותה עת בארץ.

בברכה

צבי רפיה

העתק:

ד. תורגמן, כאן
אל"מ לנגוצקי, כאן

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

OFFICIAL U.S. NEGOTIATING TEAM
TO VISIT ADEN

HON. PAUL FINDLEY

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, June 2, 1978

• Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, for 4 long years I have been encouraging in every way possible the resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen—a small but strategically important country located on the Arabian peninsula at the mouth of the Red Sea.

In that endeavor I have journeyed to Aden twice and held countless conferences with U.S. and Aden officials—citing the growing importance of Aden, in light of military and political developments on the Horn of Africa.

From my first experience with President Salem Rubyal Ali in 1974 and during two subsequent interviews with him, I have been convinced of the desire of the Aden Government to establish a cordial relationship with the United States. In fact, during my most recent talk with President Ali in January of this year in Aden, he dictated a warm personal message which I delivered personally to President Carter.

From this review, you can imagine my satisfaction and joy at having the privilege of announcing that Aden will welcome a U.S. negotiating team later this month. The team will consist of four senior officials of the U.S. State Department, who will be authorized to discuss U.S.-Aden affairs, including the resumption of diplomatic relations. I have confirmed the facts with the Aden mission at the United Nations, New York.

The first sign of friendship occurred in May, 1974 when President Ali granted my request by releasing into my care a constituent Ed Franklin of Pike County, Ill., who had then served 16 months of a 5-year sentence on a spy charge. Franklin was a victim of circumstance, convicted because, as a tourist, he unintentionally photographed a security area in Aden.

A few months later President Ali responded to another of my requests releasing two other U.S. citizens from

prison. Last September President Ali visited New York to participate in United Nations deliberations and told me, in an interview, that his government would welcome improved relations with Washington.

It has always been my view that diplomatic relations are mutually beneficial, offering advantages to both governments. They are a convenience, indeed a necessity to effective work for peace and understanding.

The opening of a U.S. diplomatic mission in Aden, which I hope will soon be a reality, would make possible a new avenue for U.S. influence for peace and stability in a region where Soviet influence is substantial.

The U.S. mission was closed on demand of the Aden Government in 1969 in the wake of a Middle East crisis. •

1
ex
7/11/78 (ט"ו תשרי)

לשכת ראש הממשלה

ירושלים, כ"ה באדר ב' תשל"ח
3 באפריל 1978

820 (1-2)
820 (3-1) 1

אל: מנהל לשכת שר החוץ

מצ"ב העתק מכתב שקיבל ראש-הממשלה ממר פאול
פינדלי.

אנא שמשדד החוץ יבקש ממר צבי רפיח בוודשינגטון,
לשוחח עם האיש ולהודות לו בשם ראש-הממשלה.

בברכה,

יא

יהודה אבנר
יועץ לראש-הממשלה.

ROOM 2133, RAYBURN BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-5271

PAUL FINDLEY
20TH DISTRICT, ILLINOIS

COMMITTEES:
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AGRICULTURE

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

March 7, 1978

The Honorable Menachem Begin
The Prime Minister
Jerusalem, Israel



Dear Mr. Begin:

I am honored to have your very responsive and encouraging letter of January 25, 1978, in which you welcomed my proposal for agricultural cooperation between Israel and Egypt.

As a member of both the Committees on Agriculture and International Relations, I have been advised that you will be in Washington next week.

My purpose in writing is to suggest respectfully an initiative that could help to break the present impasse in Israeli-Egyptian negotiations, transform that stalemate, and renew the spirit of Jerusalem that existed during your gracious hospitality to President Sadat of Egypt. At the same time it could create a positive atmosphere for your schedule in Washington.

I am aware of your concerns regarding the escalation of the arms race in your region through the military jets package proposed by President Carter. I am also aware of the concern of our Government regarding the deterioration of the peace-making process.

In your letter to me you stated that you hoped that the concept I propose would "soon become a relevant item on the agenda of the Israeli-Egyptian dialogue."

Knowing that the establishment of peace and cooperation with your neighbors is your highest aspiration, I respectfully suggest that you take the occasion of your visit to Washington to propose a program of Israeli technical assistance to Egyptian agriculture that could begin almost immediately and need not and should not await the settlement of difficult issues in the military and political fields.

This humanitarian program could be undertaken in close cooperation with United States and Egyptian technicians, who

March 7, 1978

Page 2

are already working together under the Title XII Famine Prevention Program of the U. S. Foreign Assistance Act.


Israel, more than any other nation, has developed modern know-how to make desert areas productive. Egypt faces a compelling problem of agricultural underdevelopment and widespread nutritional deficiencies.

Mr. Prime Minister, I had the honor to meet with you in Jerusalem and with President Sadat in Cairo. It seems to me that you could inspire the world by returning the olive branch of peace that Mr. Sadat brought to Jerusalem with your proposal to plant, in a sense, the olive tree in Egypt.

Such a step would help to restore the concept of brotherhood and good will, in advance of a formal peace treaty, and provide momentum that would translate today's possibilities into tomorrow's food on the tables of Egypt's hungry masses. Nothing would do as much to consolidate the peace process that began in Jerusalem and support the leadership in both Egypt and Israel as they strive to lead the Mideast into a new era of peace for your region and for all humanity.

I stand ready, of course, to meet with you during your Washington visit. I am prepared to sponsor any new legislation that might be indicated to support the fruition of Israeli-Egyptian agricultural cooperation and am confident that my colleagues will lend their support.

Sincerely,


Paul Findley
Representative in Congress



1



כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מנהל נכנס-מסווג

מס. 127
נשלח: 081400 מרץ 78
נתקבל: 082249

סמור

מילדי

ל
ד"ר/אבנר
(אויזלני)

אל: המשרד

מאת: רוש

מנכ"ל

קונגרסן מול FINDLEY, חבר ועדת החוץ בבית'נ, היה לאחרונה בורץ במשלחת
זאבלוקי, אינו מידידנו (בין השאר נפגש בזמשק עם ערמאת), מסר לי היום העתק מכתב
ששיגר אתמול לראש משל' לראש המשלה באמצעות טחמ'ד.
להלן נוסח המכתב:

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
MARCH 7, 1978

THE HONORABLE MENACHEM BEGIN
THE PRIME MINISTER
JERUSALEM
ISRAEL

DEAR MR. BEGIN:

I AM HONORED TO HAVE YOUR VERY RESPONSIVE AND ENCOURAGING
LETTER OF JANUARY 25, 1978, IN WHICH YOU WELCOMED MY PROPOSAL
FOR AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT.

AS A MEMBER OF BOTH THE COMMITTEES ON AGRICULTURE AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, I HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT YOU WILL BE
IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK.

MY PURPOSE IN WRITING IS TO SUGGEST RESPECTFULLY AN
INITIATIVE THAT COULD HELP TO BREAK THE PRESENT IMPASSE IN

כל המוסר תובן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מבקר נכנס-משווג

-2-

ISRAELVI-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS, TRANSFORM THAT STALEMATE, AND RENEW THE SPIRIT OF JERUSALEM THAT EXISTED DURING YOUR GRACIOUS HOSPITALITY TO PRESIDENT SADAT OF EGYPT/AT THE SAME TIME IT COULD CREATE A POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE FOR YOUR SCHEDULE IN WASHINGTON.

I AM AWARE OF YOUR CONCERNS REGARDING THE ESCALATION OF THE ARMS RACE IN YOUR REGION THROUGH THE MILITARY JETS PACKAGE PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT CARTER. I AM ALSO AWARE OF THE CONCERN OF OUR GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE DETERIORATION OF THE PEACE-MAKING PROCESS.

IN YOUR LETTER TO ME YOU STATED THAT YOU HOPED THAT THE CONCEPT I PROPOSE WOULD "SOON BECOME A RELEVANT ITEM ON THE AGENDA OF THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN DIALOGUE".

KNOWING THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE AND COOPERATION WITH YOUR NEIGHBORS IS YOUR HIGHEST ASPIRATION, I RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST THAT YOU TAKE THE OCCASION OF YOUR VISIT TO WASHINGTON TO PROPOSE A PROGRAM OF ISRAELI TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO EGYPTIAN AGRICULTURE THAT COULD BEGIN ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AND NEED NOT AND SHOULD NOT AWAIT THE SETTLEMENT OF DIFFICULT ISSUES IN THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL FIELDS.

THIS HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM COULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH UNITED STATES AND EGYPTIAN TECHNICIANS, WHO ARE ALREADY WORKING TOGETHER UNDER THE TITLE XII FAMINE PREVENTION PROGRAM OF THE U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT.

ISRAEL, MORE THAN ANY OTHER NATION, HAS DEVELOPED MODERN KNOW-HOW TO MAKE DESERT AREAS PRODUCTIVE. EGYPT FACES A COMPELLING PROBLEM OF AGRICULTURAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND WIDE-SPREAD NUTRITIONAL DEFICIENCIES.

MR PRIME MINISTER, I HAVE THE HONOR TO MEET WITH YOU IN JERUSALEM AND WITH PRESIDENT SADAT IN CAIRO. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT YOU COULD INSPIRE THE WORLD BY RETURNING THE OLIVE BRANCH OF PEACE THAT MR. SADAT BROUGHT TO JERUSALEM WITH YOUR PROPOSAL TO PLANT, IN A SENSE, THE OLIVE TREE IN EGYPT.

SUCH A STEP WOULD HELP TO RESTORE THE CONCEPT OF BROTHERHOOD

0000/3

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - נוטווג

מס. 412

בשלה 271530 ינו 78

ס ו ד י

קואליט (ניו/גוי)
הא

אל: נוט

מאת: משרד

בהמשך לשלנו הגלוי מיום 27/1.

1. המורשה פינדלי הפך עצמו פטרון לאש"ף. הוא יוזם הפגישה עם ערפאת (5/1) בדמשק מאז אינו חול לדבר למען תיקון הדמיה אש"ף.
2. המדיקונא דבריו בפני התקשורת ומידע מירבי על דבריו בפני ועדת-החוץ של הקונגרס ודיווחו לנשיא.
בבקש הערכתכם:
- א. מה משקל ה"לובי" החדש בקונגרס והאם 2 המזרשים האחרים שהשתתפו בפגישה עם ערפאת גם הם תומכי אש"ף.
- ב. האם יתכן שפינדלי התבקש ל"ל" שליחות מטעם הממשל כשפגש את ערפאת.
- ג. האם ידוע על דקע וקשרים קודמים של פינדלי עם אש"ף, סורים או ערבים בכלל. העלול להערכתכם ואיש למלא תפקיד דומה לזה של אבו רזק.
- ד. היש תגובות או החיחסויות לפעלתנותו בממשל, בקונגרס, ובעתונות.

המרכז

שחח דהם מ/יהם מנכל שהבט ממנכל המנכל מצפא מדתים חקר דם אמך

וא/ותו

אילן
אילן (10/11)

מס 411
נשלח 271530 ינו 78

אל: רושינגטון
מאת: המשרד

א. המורשה פינדלי ושנפגש עם ערפאת (5/1) בדמשק דיבר ברובת עמו
(13/1) על כך שינסה להסדיר פגישות לערפאת עם קארטר וראשי הקונגרס
(מדיווח רדיו קהיר).

ב. בשוכו לאזהיב נמסר ממשרדו כי הביא לקארטר (18/1) שדד קעיפ
ערפאת (רדיוסר) סירב למסור פרטים.

ג. סוכנות אף (26/1) מוסרת כי המורשה פינדלי פירסם חלק
מתוכן שיחתו ומחשד הפייסני של ערפאת:

ד. ערפאת מכקש מקארטר שלא לחמשיכ ולדחוק את אשפ לפינה בשום שהוא
רצאה מאד לשמור על איזון מזון.

ה. אשפ מוכנ לסבל מצב של אי-לוחמה אבל לא יותר.

ו. ערפאת אמר לפינדלי שאם חוקם מדינה בעזה ובגדמיע יחדיל אשפ
הביעוהו הסריטוריאליות נגד ישראל.

ז. כנ אמר שבחוכ 25-50 שנים ישראל תהיה חייבת להיות קשורה עם
המדינה הפלשתינית.

ח. פינדלי טוענ שערפאת ויתר כליל על פעולות שרוד. ציטט מדברי
קרמי שהסביר שלאשפ אין מאטרה ובחי כלא שיאפשרו לו לפעול נגד
טרוריסטים פלשתינאים.

המרכז

שדה רחם סירחם שרבוט מנכל ממנכל סמנכל מצפא מזח'ים א חקר דמ אמנ
סססס
מ/א/ת

PL0

BY JIM ADAMS

7:03 AM
D/M/T
Findley

WASHINGTON (AP) -- YASSER ARAFAT, LEADER OF THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, HAS URGED PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER IN A MESSAGE NOT TO "FURTHER PUSH ME INTO A CORNER," A U.S. CONGRESSMAN SAID THURSDAY.

ARAFAT DICTATED THE MESSAGE FOR DELIVERY TO CARTER DURING A THREE-HOUR MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVE PAUL FINDLEY, AN ILLINOIS REPUBLICAN, AND THREE OTHER CONGRESSMEN IN DAMASCUS JAN. 5, FINDLEY SAID.

ARAFAT SAYS IN THE MESSAGE HE IS BITTER ABOUT CARTER'S COMMENT THAT THE PLO HAS REMOVED ITSELF FROM THE PEACE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND CONTENDS THE PLO INSTEAD HAS TAKEN THE MODERATE POSITION OF PARTICIPATING IN PEACE EFFORTS.

"I MOST SINCERELY HOPE THAT YOU WILL NOT FURTHER PUSH ME INTO CORNER BECAUSE I WOULD LIKE TO MAINTAIN MY MODERATE BALANCE," THE MESSAGE SAYS.

FINDLEY SAID ARAFAT WAS CONCILIATORY IN SOME RESPECTS DURING THE INTERVIEW BUT REFUSED TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO FULL PEACEABLE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

"ARAFAT WOULD ACCEPT A STATE OF NON-BELLIGERENCY BUT WOULD GO FURTHER," FINDLEY SAID.

HE QUOTED ARAFAT AS SAYING AT ONE POINT THAT IF A PALESTINIAN STATE IS CREATED OUT OF THE WEST BANK OF JORDAN AND THE GAZA STRIP "IT WOULD RENOUNCE ALL FURTHER TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGAINST ISRAEL."

BUT AT ANOTHER POINT, FINDLEY SAID, "ARAFAT SAID THAT IN ANOTHER 25 TO 50 YEARS HE THOUGHT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO BE LINKED TO A PALESTINIAN STATE."

ARAFAT ALSO DISAVOWED TERRORISM, FINDLEY SAID.

HE QUOTED ARAFAT'S POLITICAL ADVISOR, FAPOUK KADDUMI, AS CONTENDING THE PLO CANNOT CONTROL PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS BECAUSE IT DOES NOT HAVE THE POLICE ENFORCEMENT POWER AND JAILS IT WOULD HAVE AS A STATE.

(END)

03476 06 JAN 78

December 1977

REPRESENTATIVE PAUL FINDLEY (Republican-Illinois)

Term Began: 1961

Committees: Agriculture; International Relations--Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade

One of most outspoken critics of Israel in Congress. Ranking Republican on Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. Supports foreign aid but does not co-sponsor any pro-Israel resolutions. Did not co-sponsor resolutions calling for Phantom jets to Israel. Voted against Jackson-Vanik freedom of emigration amendment. Strongly opposed anti-boycott legislation included in Export Administration Act noting job loss, U.S. interference in Arab boycott of Israel. Called Export Administration Act a "major step backward" for peace. Voted for \$2.2 billion emergency authorization for Israel in 1973 but introduced an amendment to bill calling for total Israeli territorial withdrawal. Voted for stationing American technicians in Sinai. Praised Morton Kaplan/Cherif Bassiouni proposal to establish Palestinian state in Gaza and West Bank. Strongly supported Administration on HAWK missile sale to Jordan. Offered 1975 amendment in Committee calling on U.S. to consult with "any reasonable party" (including the PLO) on "legitimate rights" of the Palestinians. Voted for Obey amendment in 1976 to cut \$200 million military aid to Israel. He consistently votes to cut aid for Israel in Committee. Strongly opposes West Bank settlements.

In July 1977 offered Mideast peace proposal calling for Israeli withdrawal to approximate 1967 borders; UN Zones between Israel and her Arab neighbors; "self-determination within the West Bank...and Gaza, subject to Palestinian recognition of and respect for the sovereignty and integrity of Israel within the agreed boundaries"; compensation for Arab and Jewish refugees; right to repatriation subject to maintaining "national identity" of States involved; US military base in Israel. (Proposal attached.)

Findley is a Europhile, who strongly identifies himself with European thinking. He has introduced legislation calling for a North Atlantic Governmental Alliance comprising the U.S and European countries.

prohibited the use of any funds appropriated under this bill for a reduction in 6-day mail delivery service. This amendment, which I strongly supported, would have served notice on the Board of Governors of the U.S. Postal Service that the Congress will not allow 6-day mail service to be eliminated.

Since we have set up an independent postal authority and relinquished congressional control over the day-to-day operations of the Postal Service, it becomes vitally important that we exercise care in appropriating vast sums of money to subsidize those operations. The people of this Nation do not expect us to act as postmasters and postmistresses, but they certainly will hold us responsible for exercising control over the pursestrings of the multibillion dollar Postal Service. The American people do not want Saturday mail delivery stopped, and we should have insisted on inclusion of this amendment. It would have sent a clear message to the Postal Service Management.

BILL TO REDUCE 4-PERCENT FOUNDATION TAX

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. WRIGHT). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. CONABLE) is recognized for 20 minutes.

Mr. CONABLE. Mr. Speaker, I am introducing today, along with my colleague on the Ways and Means Committee, Congressman JAMES CORMAN, a bill to reduce the present 4-percent tax on foundation investment income to 2 percent. Twenty-four other members of the Ways and Means Committee are joining us in sponsoring this bill.

The broad support of these bills among the membership of the Ways and Means Committee tells us something about the merits of the issue to which the bills are addressed. Let me review the substance of that issue briefly.

The 4-percent tax on foundations was added to the Internal Revenue Code in 1969. Six years of experience with this tax reveals that it produces revenue which is well over twice the amount which the Internal Revenue Service spends in its functions concerning all classes of tax-exempt organizations—including not only foundations, but also social clubs, trade associations, labor unions, fraternal groups, and many others. That experience shows also that the real burden of the tax falls very directly upon the charitable service projects and programs to which foundations make grants.

In the United States, private philanthropy shares with Government the responsibility for many human needs which in other nations are solely or almost exclusively the concern of Government. Our approach represents our traditional view that a strong society is one with vigorous private institutions, foundations among them. The Government now plays a substantial role in supporting medical research, assisting the performing arts, alleviating problems of rural health and nutrition, and providing legal services for poor and disadvantaged groups. Not only were foundations

active in all of these areas before Government, but the experience gained through relatively modest foundation projects has frequently enabled Government to chart its course more wisely and more efficiently. Foundations have provided a marketplace for new ideas and programs, a fund of risk and venture capital for enlarging knowledge, and a source of support alternate to Government, for citizen groups, including the poor, minorities, women, and others.

Government and foundations, therefore, share goals and objectives. They are partners—not adversaries. If these underlying assumptions about the desirability of private initiative, the decentralization of power, and the utility of a broad base of decisionmaking are correct—and I fervently believe they are—we, as representatives of the people, must take care not unnecessarily to tax, and thereby diminish, the foundation resources that help support the private service structure. It is counter-productive to do so.

Our experience with the foundation tax shows that, at the 4 percent rate, this levy does precisely what it ought not to do. It unnecessarily reduces the flow of foundation funds to our hospitals, schools, universities, museums, youth groups, minorities, community programs, and the range of human benevolent activity supported by foundation giving.

Lowering the tax by one-half would increase quite directly the amount that foundations pay to their charitable beneficiaries. That result would follow necessarily because, under a provision which we added to the Internal Revenue Code in 1969, every year foundations must pay out for their charitable purposes the greater of their net income or 5 percent of their investment value. In applying this minimum payout requirement, foundations credit as a payout for charitable purposes the amount they pay under the 4-percent tax. A reduction of the tax would, therefore, increase specifically the amount that foundations are compelled to distribute to their charitable beneficiaries.

On the basis of recent collections of the Treasury from this tax, we could expect a 2-percent rate to restore about \$30 million a year to charitable service activities. Based on Internal Revenue Service estimates of expenditures in 1975—the most recent year for which the IRS made such data public—the remaining \$30 million of revenue that a 2-percent tax would produce for the Government would exceed by approximately \$20 million dollars the IRS costs of supervising foundations.

Whether one views the 4-percent tax as a way of returning to the Government the expense of supervising foundations or as a necessary imposition to assure that foundations pay some share of the general costs of Government, our experience now tells us that a 2-percent rate is more than adequate. Consequently, adjustment of the rate of the tax is now very much in order.

Mr. CORMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to join today with my colleague, BARBER CONABLE and other members of the Ways and Means Committee in in-

roducing legislation to reduce the present 4-percent tax on foundation income.

In 1969, Congress became concerned over abuses that had developed among some foundations, and stringent reforms were adopted. One of the provisions of the 1969 act required the Internal Revenue Service to conduct intensive audits of foundations. An excise tax at the rate of 4 percent was requested by the Service as necessary to cover audit costs. Since then, the Service has audited almost every foundation in the country at least once. It has found a high level of compliance with the reforms enacted in 1969, and has determined the tax could be reduced to 2 percent and still cover the costs of auditing.

The 1969 act also requires that every grantmaking foundation pay out each year, for charitable purposes, the greater of its net income or 5 percent of its asset value. It imposes broad restrictions on self-dealing and business holdings, special new requirements for grants by foundations to individuals, a set of safeguards for grants by foundations to organizations other than public charities, and strict limitations on foundation efforts to influence legislation or to participate in voter registration.

These restrictions are enforced by very substantial penalty taxes imposed on foundations, individuals, and foundation managers who approve prohibited transactions.

Grant-making and operating foundations make vital contributions to our society. Foundation support was responsible for the development of our public library system in the United States, and helped devise medical answers to malaria, hookworm, yellow fever, typhus, rabies, tuberculosis, and a number of other diseases. Foundations have played a major role in the development of public television in this country, and provide important continuing sustenance for our colleges and universities.

In light of the clear record of accomplishment by foundations and in light of the success of our 1969 reforms, we should act now to reduce the 4 percent tax on foundation income to 2 percent. The additional 2 percent could be returned to foundations to flow through to scholarship recipients, medical research programs, and other projects that meet the needs of the community as well as the individual. I hope that this legislation will receive early and favorable consideration.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE RESOLUTION

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, we Americans share with our friends in the Middle East the anxiety of those who wait, unsure of what the future brings to that restive region.

With others we greeted 1977 expectantly, thinking that this year would usher in what no year since 1948 has: the beginnings of a true peace in the Middle East. The ensuing months, however, have lessened our optimism with-

out increasing our understanding of why we should relinquish our hope of peace. With gloomier thoughts have come predictions that failure to convene a Geneva Conference by the fall will provoke war. Countering these observations, some dispute that war is either imminent or inevitable.

Such speculation does not serve us well. We cannot predict war. We do not know whether war in the Middle East will come tomorrow or in October or in June or whether it will come at all. What alone is certain is that the conditions that have produced four wars in 29 years continue to destabilize the region and create a high risk of renewed conflict. Our efforts, undeterred by spells of optimism or pessimism, must be directed, toward removing the conditions for war and minimizing the probability of conflict.

Continuity of the concern, initiative, commitment, and perseverance that have long characterized U.S. policy toward the Middle East is extremely important at this time. This concern and initiative inspired us to support the creation of the State of Israel. Commitment and perseverance have enabled us unrelentingly to stand by Israel when few others did.

Further manifestations of our Middle East policy are the economic, diplomatic, and military assistance we have provided to that region during the past three decades. In recent years, we have infused large amounts of aid into this area. We have offered our diplomatic services in calming overt conflict and devising ways to restrain further hostilities. We have made available in support of the 1975 Sinai accord between Egypt and Israel not only U.S. technology but also U.S. citizens to monitor that technology.

In return for our efforts, we have earned many dividends. Our aid has helped promote the well-being and security of Israel while it has also facilitated improved relations with Arab States. We have, in Israel, a strong, viable, and democratic friend. Our new friendships with Arab nations have enhanced our ability to act as mediator and have reduced an often pernicious and disturbing Soviet influence in the Middle East. In an area where trust has been totally lacking, the Sinai support mission has functioned as a workable example of how Israel and Egypt can coexist.

Arab leaders have at last expressed a willingness to come to terms with Israel and have indicated their readiness to accept the fact of Israel in the Middle East. Progress toward peace has occurred.

But much remains to be done. No one can go so far as to characterize the situation in the Middle East as good. Budgets sag under military expenditures that drive up inflation. This inflation oppresses the disadvantaged and threatens regimes that are moderate and progressive. Living constantly with uncertainty and fear disturbs Arab and Israeli populace alike, driving some away, alienating others. Nations, armed to the teeth, scrutinize each other's movements, ever watchful for one sign which may signal new bloodshed.

A diminishment of U.S. efforts in furthering peace is unthinkable. We debate

the perimeters of our role but we may not deny it. It will approach in the future what it has always been in the past. We will continue to demonstrate our concern and will re-pledge our commitments. We will aid and support; we will suggest, cajole, plead, and badger. We will not impose, however, for that is not only beyond our means but unlikely to produce a settlement that is either realizable or durable. But we have too much at stake to sit this one out.

The United States has much to contribute to the building of a momentum toward peace in the Middle East. We can help to create the conditions which will give promise to a Geneva-type conference. We can give assistance and support to the parties participating in negotiations. We will serve as mediator and conciliator of differences. We will undoubtedly also be involved in offering, as we did in 1975, a means to guarantee a successful outcome. We must help to assure not only that a conference takes place but, equally important, that the conference is based on a sense of purpose and understanding which will enable it to succeed. We can, therefore, encourage the participants to move toward acceptance of broad and basic principles that are vital to a peace settlement by setting forth the general outlines of what we deem to be essential ingredients of peace. We can seek to stimulate a growing consensus on the nature of peace in the Middle East that will impel them toward a final settlement.

With that in mind, I am introducing today a resolution which embodies basic principles which I believe are fundamental and essential to peace in the Middle East. They are consistent with U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 which has been accepted as the framework for negotiations by Israel and the Arab States directly involved.

The first principle of the resolution reiterates language of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 and calls for the renunciation of the use of force to settle disputes. The right of Israel to exist unchallenged as a sovereign and independent state within secure and recognized boundaries is basic to the settlement and crucial to peace.

Principle two must be at the heart of any agreement. Peace will remain precarious and without solid foundation unless each party agrees to establish diplomatic relations and move toward full economic and political relations with all other parties. Cultural and educational exchanges and tourism are examples of unfettered movement and contacts that are needed to enlarge the mutual understanding of differing societies and make peace meaningful. This principle must be the supreme objective of any peace agreement.

Israeli withdrawal from territory occupied in 1967 is intrinsic to U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, will be central to any settlement, and is therefore called for by principle three of the resolution. Territorial aggrandizement by armed conflict is unacceptable; it risks setting a precedent that may one day be turned against Israel, prejudicing that Nation's own security and survival. How-

ever, some limited modifications of Israeli borders from those existing in 1967 may be necessary to render those boundaries more defensible.

Principle four calls for establishment of zones that will assist the implementation of the agreement. These zones must be free of national military forces, patrolled by U.N. troops, and should be of proportionate width on either side of the boundaries established between Israel and her neighbors. Flexibility and common sense will be necessary in assuring the fair and effective application of this principle. The size and geography of Israel will preclude exact proportionality in certain areas.

In the fifth principle, the resolution calls for self-determination for inhabitants of the west bank and Gaza. The settlement may provide a link between the west bank and Jordan. The critical element is self-determination, letting the inhabitants decide their own future. Unless the interests and rights of the Palestinians are met by a final settlement, a just and durable peace will not be achieved. However, just as there must be a Palestinian homeland, the Palestinians must recognize Israel and the right of Israel to maintain its identity and character as a Jewish state.

Equitable compensation for those who have suffered economic losses as a result of their displacement forms principle six.

The seventh principle acknowledges that some refugees may wish to return to the locale from which hostilities displaced them. This should be permissible to the extent that it does not undermine the national security or destroy the national identity of the states involved.

As expressed in principle eight, freedom of navigation of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Suez Canal should be the right of all parties to the agreement.

Principle nine recognizes that Jerusalem is a holy city for the Jewish, Christian, and Moslem faiths. All individuals should be free to enter Jerusalem to observe their religious beliefs. This principle, fortunately, has existed in practice since 1967.

A final peace settlement on these principles presages a formalization of the ever-increasing American role in the Middle East. In the event of a final agreement based on these principles, this resolution, in section two, expresses a sense of Congress that the United States should guarantee the settlement:

This commitment should not be aimed against any party to the agreement but, instead, would support the principles agreed upon in the peace settlement to the benefit of all parties. Although Congress expressed great concern during its evaluation of the 1975 Sinai agreement that the United States not guarantee a situation that continued to be unstable and in flux, it is my belief that it would approve a U.S. guarantee of a final and overall settlement.

In a sense, Congress would be taking one further step and formalizing what already exists as a vague and ill-defined American commitment to the security of Israel. Beyond that, of course, Congress

would be dealing fairly with the interests of Arab states. In 1973 we placed our forces on alert when Arab armies threatened to overrun Israel. We went to considerable lengths which included the weakening of our own military preparedness to speed emergency supplies to Israeli troops. We have continued since then to send high levels of military aid to that nation.

In the context of a final peace settlement in the Middle East, and only then, I would argue that it is in our interest, and in the interest of Israel and of all nations to seek peace and stability in the Middle East for the United States to establish a military base in Israel as part of the American guarantee. Israel, of course, would have to want and accept the existence of a U.S. base on its territory in order for this to occur. But I believe that we would all have much to gain by this clarification of the security relationship between the United States and Israel and by a U.S. security commitment to guarantee a peace—a just peace for all parties—based on the principles I have described. A U.S. security guarantee of the final settlement would be, therefore, a logical part of a peace package.

I am introducing the following resolution on Middle East peace in the hope that the United States will approach the fall of 1977 with neither optimism nor pessimism but with a sense of realism that will generate renewed and practical efforts toward peace.

Text of the resolution follows:

H. CON RES. 284

Whereas peace in the Middle East is essential to world peace and to the peace and well-being of the people of the United States: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the United States should seek agreement by all parties to a peace settlement in the Middle East based upon the following principles:

- (1) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every State in the area and the right of each to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.
- (2) Development of full diplomatic and economic relations among all parties to the agreement.
- (3) Withdrawal by Israel to boundaries approximating those of June 5, 1967.
- (4) Establishment and control by the United Nations Security Council of a zone of proportionate width on each side of the borders between Israel and its contiguous neighbors, the security and inviolability of which is to be maintained by United Nations forces subject only to the authority of the United Nations Security Council and removable only by its affirmative vote, such zone to be free of nationally controlled military forces.
- (5) The right of Palestinians to self-determination within the West Bank of the Jordan River and Gaza, subject to Palestinian recognition of and respect for the sovereignty and integrity of Israel within the agreed boundaries.
- (6) Just compensation for Arab and Jewish refugees from the region who have suffered losses as a result of their displacement.
- (7) The right, limited only by overriding considerations of national identity and secu-

rity of the States involved, of displaced persons of the region to return to their homes.

(8) Guaranteed freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal and all international waterways of the area to all parties to the agreement.

(9) Guaranteed unhindered access to the city of Jerusalem to persons of all religious faiths.

Sec. 2. It is the further sense of the Congress that the United States should guarantee a final settlement based on the principles stated above.

A \$48 BILLION PRESIDENTIAL ERROR

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. EDWARDS) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, those who persistently oppose the deregulation of natural gas cite as justification the need to provide financial protection to consumers. However, as my two esteemed colleagues, Representative DAVID STOCKMAN of Michigan and Representative CLARENCE BROWN of Ohio, have just demonstrated in their analysis, "The Cost of Natural Gas Deregulation: A Reestimate," deregulation will actually benefit consumers. Indeed, they have reached the logical conclusion that our Nation can no longer afford not to deregulate. I commend their study to all my colleagues. I would also like to place in the RECORD an editorial from the Wall Street Journal, "A \$48 Billion Presidential Error," which fully supports the Stockman-Brown analysis:

A \$48 BILLION PRESIDENTIAL ERROR

When the House Commerce Committee two weeks ago voted 22-to-21 against deregulation of new natural gas, President Carter and his energy people celebrated a victory. The White House had come down to using the argument that deregulation would give producers a "windfall" of more than \$71 billion in revenues. This is over and above what they would get from the \$1.75 per thousand cubic feet (mcf) price ceiling in the Carter plan. Perish the thought, even though producers would probably invest almost as much in exploration and production as they receive in revenues.

Mr. Carter's energy people have been shamelessly playing with numbers like this all year to support their case for continued regulation, scaring people with the idea that deregulation will cost consumers a lot more money. What they carefully avoid mentioning is that continued regulation will cost even more.

In a careful, conservative study that bends over backward to be fair to the White House, two Republican Congressmen this week estimated that the Carter plan will cost \$48 billion more than deregulation between now and 1990. Here is how Rep. David Stockman of Michigan and Rep. Clarence Brown of Ohio came to this conclusion:

They first reject the incredible White House assumption, implicit in its numbers game, that at a price above \$1.75 per mcf zero gas will be produced. The study instead reckons that over the 13-year period, an additional 25 trillion cubic feet (tcf) will be produced as a result of deregulation. Current production is about 20 tcf a year, and the estimate of 25 tcf from deregulation is highly conservative. More production, of course, would mean more savings from deregulation.

If American consumers are denied 25 tcf of natural gas, they will have to get the energy instead from oil or liquefied natural

gas or synthetic gas from naphtha or coal. All are more expensive than gas is likely to be under deregulation. The cost of these fuels adds \$168 billion to the energy bill. And by moving 25 tcf less gas through the pipeline system, the distribution charges rise per unit to the consumer. This comes to another \$44 billion cumulatively. The administration simply ignored these hidden costs in making its case.

The 13-year energy costs under deregulation are then calculated by Stockman-Brown at \$414.2 billion. The parallel figure under the Carter plan is \$461.8 billion with the gap between the two widening every year thereafter.

If there is any error in these numbers, the Carter plan gets the best of it, considering the length to which Reps. Stockman and Brown went to be fair. For example, they hold OPEC pricing constant through the 13 years. But obviously, if the United States must substitute for 25 tcf of domestic natural gas, it most likely will have to import the energy equivalent. This increase in demand would permit OPEC to increase its oil price by at least \$1 per barrel for all oil. This adds an average of roughly \$33 billion to the U.S. import bill during the 13 years, and adds \$100 billion to the import bill of Europe, Japan and the Third World. The Stockman-Brown \$48 billion estimate charitably ignores these costs.

Even if the increased demand has no impact on OPEC pricing, it would still mean the United States would have to increase imports of Arab oil by nearly 500,000 bbls. per day when compared to a deregulated scenario. The Stockman-Brown study figures the Carter plan will mean an extra \$26 billion in the U.S. import bill over these years even without a price increase.

The Carter people will no doubt want to quibble with these numbers, if they can't find a way of ignoring them altogether. But there is absolutely no logical way deregulation can cost consumers more than the Carter plan. The only way the President's people can defend their position is by sticking to their assumption that there is no gas to be found above \$1.75. It is hard to see how any serious person can accept such an assumption. Even the most pessimistic of the three estimates in the ERDA MOPPS study, for example, found twice as much gas at a price of \$3.25 than at \$1.75.

Mr. Carter is supposed to be good with numbers and logic, and ought to sit down with his own slide rule, taking the administration's gas deregulation position as seriously as the B-1 or the neutron bomb. It's inconceivable that a good engineer would make a \$48 billion mistake.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. SIKES) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. SIKES addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANNUNZIO) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, during this 19th observance of Captive Nations Week, it is fitting that we extend our encouragement to the millions of people in the captive nations who yearn for the freedom we take for granted.

In his inaugural address, President Carter committed himself and our Na-

פול פנדלי

REPRESENTATIVE PAUL FINDLEY (Republican-Illinois)

Term began: 1961 7/1/6

Home town: Pittsfield

Committees: International Relations (3rd ranking); Agriculture

Biographical Information: Born 1921; B.A. from Illinois College; Congregationalist; served in the Navy during World War II; President of Pike Press, Inc., 1947-60.

Special Comments: Findley is one of the few ideological "enemies" Israel has on the committee. He has been the most outspoken for Israel in the House. He takes a particular interest in NATO affairs, and has proposed the creation of an Atlantic Union.

Legislative Record: Findley supports all foreign aid bills, and also voted for the \$2.2 billion for Israel in 1973. However, Findley has consistently denounced Israeli air strikes into Lebanon and is now supporting a proposal that would ban aid to countries that have not yet signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Findley views the PLO as a reasonable negotiating party, and this year proposed an amendment (defeated in committee) calling on the United States to "consult with any reasonable party" on the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinians. Earlier this year Findley introduced a concurrent resolution setting forth seven principles for peaceful settlement in the Middle East, including withdrawal of Israeli forces to the pre-1967 borders and recognition of Palestinian sovereignty on the West Bank and Gaza with reciprocal recognition of Israel.

Findley approved of the sale of Hawk missiles to Jordan, and feared that otherwise Hussein would buy arms from the Soviets, doing "irreparable harm to Israel" and strengthening Jordan's alliance with Syria. During debate on the Sinai Resolution, Findley introduced an amendment to limit the presence of U.S. technicians in Sinai to 2 years, suggesting that a termination date on the American presence might force the parties into negotiations on other M.E. issues.

October 18, 1976

SENATOR JAMES B. PEARSON (Republican - Kansas)

Biographical Information:

Born in Nashville, Tenn., May, 7, 1920; moved with his family to Virginia; attended Virginia schools; graduated from the University of Virginia Law School in 1950; attended Duke University 1940-42; interrupted schooling to serve as a Navy pilot based at Olathe, Kans., Naval Air Station 1943-46; married the former Martha Mitchell of Johnson County, Kans., in 1946; four children; admitted to the bar in 1950 and began practice at Mission, Kans., in 1950; city attorney for Westwood, Fairway, and Lenexa 1952-61; assistant county attorney 1952-54; probate judge of Johnson County 1954-56; member of the State senate 1956-60; was not a candidate for reelection; returned to law practice; was the State campaign manager for Governor Anderson's successful race in 1960 and served as State Republican chairman for a short term thereafter; appointed to the United States Senate January 31, 1962, and elected November 6, 1962, for the term ending January 3, 1967; reelected November 8, 1966, for the term ending January 3, 1973; reelected November 7, 1972, for the term ending January 3, 1979; Presbyterian.

Political Information:

Pearson was elected last time by one of the widest margins in the Senate. Kansas has a Republican Governor, two Republican Senators, and four Representatives are Republican out of five.

Committees:

Foreign Relations
Commerce
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Voting Record:

Pearson has generally voted for the foreign aid bill. He did vote against the FY76 authorization bill which was vetoed by the President because of various policy provisions to which he objected. He voted in favor of the FY76-77 authorization bill and the FY77 appropriations bill; was absent on the FY76 appropriations bill; and voted for the FY75 and FY74 foreign aid bills. He was not present for the vote on the \$2.2 billion emergency authorization in December 1973, but he did support it in committee and indicated he would have voted favorably on the Senate Floor had he been present.

Pearson voted for the Sinai resolution. At the time he said the U.S. could not afford the alternative of war which would occur if the Congress failed to approve sending the U.S. technicians. He urged movement away from bilateral negotiations toward multilateral negotiations. He did prefer sending a multi-national group to the Sinai instead of only Americans.

Pearson was among 14 Senators who visited the Soviet Union and met with Soviet leaders and Jewish activists. Pearson was among 76 Senators in October of 1972 sponsoring the Jackson Freedom of Emigration Amendment, but five months later he was not among 78 Senate cosponsors of the same amendment.

SENATOR JAMES B. PEARSON (Republican - Kansas)Voting Record (Continued)

Senator Pearson signed the letter (12/19/74) of 71 Senators to President Ford supporting Israel and rejecting the PLO. He also joined on the letter to President Ford (5/21/75) with 76 Senators on the Administration's reassessment of Mideast policy.

In 1967 Pearson was outspoken in favoring U.S. help in providing nuclear desalinization plants to Israel.

Pearson voted by proxy in favor of the recent resolution of disapproval on the Maverick missile sale to Saudi Arabia in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Comments:

Pearson is one of the least active Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee and does not attend many of the committee meetings. He does not often vote by proxy in committee, so his recent proxy vote on the Maverick missiles was important. He should be thanked for his vote.

Pearson has a friendly Jewish staff assistant on the committee, Ralph Nurenberger, but Pearson, one of the most independent-minded members of the Senate, rarely listens to staff advice.

Two major defense contractors in Kansas are Beech Aircraft and Cessna Aircraft.

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סמור

כה"כ שבט תשל"ט
22 בפברואר 1979

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א לז מר צ. רפיה, ווינגטון

טאז: מנהל המחלקה לענייני אנרגיה וחרם

הנדון: פעילות לובית במדינת USA
מברק פחונות של ניו-יורק מס' 330 מ-15.2.79

במברק הנ"ל הועבר במלואו טאמר של ספייר על "לוב ואיידהו" שהומיעו ב"ניו-יורק טיימס" מ-15.2.79.

טאמר זה מביא הנהגות - והטעות - שהתעוררו בי עת בקרתי ביולי שעבר בסן-פרנציסקו ומסעתי מפי קונכ"ל על הפעילות הלובית באידהו, כאשר היה ברור למדי שהמטרה האמיתית של התרגיל הלובי הוא סנטור צ'ירץ', במגמה לאלצו לשנות גישתו לסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי, או להסתכן בכך שלא יבחר מחדש (מסחבר שבטנה הבאה הוא חייב להתמודד טוב). אמנם בסוף המהלך הלובי דוקרת העיניים ומעשיהם נעדרים הזהירות והתשכוח בו מתנהלות פעולות עם מטרות דומות ע"י ארצות ערביות אחרות (במיוחד סעודיה) ע"י אנשי מקצוע מאומנים, אך למרות זאת לא מן הנמנע שהמרוגים הלוביים אימפקט מרשים.

הייתי מבקש את חוות דעתך, אם יש ביזמות הלוביים, ובמיוחד במהלכי הפוליטיקאים האמריקאים באיידהו כגון SYMMS והסנטור הרפובליקני McCLURE כדי לסכן סיכויי סנטור צ'ירץ' עצמו? האם יש באיידהו קהילה יהודית בעלת ספקל?

אנחה לקבל כל מידע והערכות שהמצא לנכון להעביר.

ב ב ר כ ה,

Handwritten signature

אפרים אילון

העקו: מר ס. בר-און, הציר, ווינגטון
מר ס. ארציאלי, קונכ"ל, סן פרנציסקו
מצפ"א ✓
ספ"ד

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



צד קונטרס (סיימס)
א"צ

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

6 בפברואר 1979

א ל: מצפ"א

מרכז


מאת: צ. רפיח, וושינגטון

הנדון: המשלחת הלוויה בקונגרס

קונגרסמן סטיב סיימס, רפובליקני מאידהו, הידוע בקשריו ההדוקים עם הלווים, מארגן במשרדו, ב-7 לפברואר, מפגש של כמה חברי קונגרס עם חבר המשלחת הלוויה המבקרת עתה בארה"ב.

פצ"ב מכתב הזמנה ששיגר סיימס לעמיתיו.

בברכה


צבי רפיח

העתיק:

הקונכ"ל, טן-פרנציסקו

ד. תורגמן, כאן

POSTAL OFFICE
LEGATION BUILDING
2104 D.C. 20515
12-225-6111

COMMITTEE ON
INSULAR AFFAIRS
AND AGRICULTURE

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

January 30, 1979

Room 114, D. C. Post Office
Post Office Box 114
Boise, Idaho 83701
208-334-1778
305 Federal Building
COPUR D'ALPHI, IDAHO 83014
208-664-5450
Lewis-Clark Hotel
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501
208-743-1492
Room 16, MARK IV MOTOR INN
Post Office Box 8528
Moscow, IDAHO 83843
208-882-5560

On February 7th at 4:00 p.m., Mr. Ahmed El-Shahati, Head of the Foreign Liaison Office of the Libyan Congress will be in my office for a meeting. I would like you to join us from 4:30 to 5:30 p.m. to have a frank discussion with Mr. Shahati and ask him the hard questions which have been raised about the Libyan government.


This will be a private meeting for just a few Members and Mr. Shahati. The press will not be present or be notified about the meeting, and your presence here will receive no public exposure. As I said above, it will be an opportunity for you to really question Mr. Shahati about his government's policies.

I think it is important to mention that 40% of Libya's oil exports come to the U.S., and between 10 and 11% of U.S. oil imports come from Libya. Presently, Libya is the second largest oil supplier to this country. In 1977, Libyan exports to the U.S. totaled \$3.87 billion, while the Libyans only imported \$320 million worth of U.S. goods. That amounts to an 11 to 1 imbalance of payments.

The farmers in Idaho would like to open agricultural exports to Libya. The Libyans would also like to enter into some trade agreements with us, as there are many goods they would like to purchase from us. They tell the Idahoans that they do not want to be pushed into cooperating with the Eastern Bloc, but they have not been able to gain access to our markets. They also do not believe they have gotten fair treatment from the American news media as to their attitude toward the U.S.A.

I think you will find the meeting with Mr. Shahati on February 7th very informative. Please R.S.V.P. as soon as possible so that we can make the proper arrangements. Contact Loretta Fuller of my staff at 5-6611.

Sincerely,


Steve Symms

Member of Congress

מברק נכנס-מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

סי"ח
שגור
אשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים), תשי"ז - 1957.

מס. 111

נשלח: 071600 פ"ר 79

התקבל: 080112 זב"ר 79

אלו המשרד

מאת: רוסינגטון

מצפא.

קונגרסטן Syams. רטובליקני מאידהו, הידוע בקטיוו ההדוקים עם הלובים הומין

אליו חברי קונגרסט לפגישה שחערך היום עם אחמד אל - SHAHATI

המוצג כיראט משרד הקיסטור של הקונגרסט הלובי לענייני חוציי"ש וזכר המשלחת הלובית

המטיירת בארהב והקשורה עם גילי קרט.

סיימט רצה שהפגישה תהא סודית וסגורה לעתונות אך הדבר נודע לגק אנדרטון ספרטס ואת הבוקר

במידור שלביזיה ונודע לעתונאים אחרים נאן.

רפיה

מאת רהמ סרהמ מנכל יחבט סמנכל מצפא מזחים חקר רם אמן

מברק נכנס-מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

17/11/57 (10:00) -
שמור

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים), תשי"ז - 1957.

מס. 111

בשלה: 071600 פ.ד. 79

התקבל: 080112 זבר 79

אלו המסרד

מאת: וושינגטון

}

מצפא.

קונגרסמן S/M/S, רטובליקני מאיזהו, הידוע בקשריו הדוקים עם הלוביס הזמין אליו חברי קונגרס לפגישה שתערך היום עם אחמד אל - SHAH ALI המוצג כיראש משרד הקיסור של הקונגרס הלובי לענייני חוצייש חבר המשלחת הלובית המטיירת בארצב והקשורה עם בילי קרטנר. סיימט רצה שהפגישה תתא סודית וסגורה לעתונות אך הדבר נודע לגק אנדרסון שפרטט ואת הבוקר בשידור טלביזיה ובודע לעתונאים אחרים נאן.

רפיח

משרד החוץ סרתם מנכל שהבט שמנכל מצפא מזתים חקר רם אמן

A

עבוד

עבוד

עבוד



OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

[Handwritten notes and signatures in the top left corner, including names like 'Mr. Tolson' and 'Mr. DeLoach']

DATE: 11/11/68
TIME: 10:00 AM

RE: [Illegible subject line]

On 11/11/68, [illegible] advised that [illegible] had been [illegible] by [illegible] and [illegible] on 11/10/68. [illegible] stated that [illegible] was [illegible] and [illegible] was [illegible].

[illegible] advised that [illegible] was [illegible] and [illegible] was [illegible]. [illegible] stated that [illegible] was [illegible] and [illegible] was [illegible].

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[illegible] advised that [illegible] was [illegible] and [illegible] was [illegible]. [illegible] stated that [illegible] was [illegible] and [illegible] was [illegible].

[illegible] advised that [illegible] was [illegible] and [illegible] was [illegible]. [illegible] stated that [illegible] was [illegible] and [illegible] was [illegible].

[Handwritten initials and date]

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס

בלתי מסווג

מס. 282

בתקבל: 240219 י 78

גשלה: 231600 י 78

אלו המסודר

מאת: רוטינגטון

מצמא

SENATOR CHARLES PERCY SAID TODAY (22.1.78) THAT THE LEADERS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL SHOULD RESIST THE TEMPTATION TO ESCALATE THEIR CRITICISM OF EACH OTHER OVER THE SUSPENSION OF THE PEACE TALKS. PERCY SAID "HEIGHTENED RHETORIC WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO THE URGENT NEED OF BOTH PARTIES FOR A SENSIBLE NEGOTIATION LEADING TO A PEACE AGREEMENT. TO CONCENTRATE ON THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS WILL ONLY AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION AND MAKE IT HARDER TO RESUME THE TALKS. HOPEFULLY BOTH SIDES HAVE INTERRUPTED THE TALKS TO INDICATE THEY ARE DETERMINED TO DO THEIR UTMOST TO OBTAIN THEIR MAXIMUM DEMANDS. I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT NEITHER SIDE WILL MAKE FURTHER ADJUSTMENTS OF POSITION IN ORDER TO OBTAIN PEACE. I CAUSTICALLY URGE US PUBLIC OFFICIALS TO AVOID PLACING BALME AND TO EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR RESUMPTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE MUST STRESS THAT IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THIS GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO DIE."

(13)

שה רחם שרהם שהבס מנכל ממנכל ממנכל מצמא - מעת הסברה נתיב הקר רם אמן מעוזי הספלייה

מב/

12/1/78
 (13/1/78)
 12/1/78

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

יד' שבט תשל"ז
2 פברואר 77

67

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: שי פלדמן, וושינגטון

הנדון: דברי הסנטור פרסי על המצב במצרים.

ב-24 ליאנואר התבטא הסנטור פרסי לאמר שהמהומות הפנימיות במצרים נוצלו ע"י גורמים קיצוניים העושים ניסיון לנסיונו של סאדאת להשיג שלום ויציבות במזה"ת. הסנטור קרא לכל האנשים האחראים במדינות המזה"ת להוסיף סיוע למנהיגים כסאדאת העושים קונסטוקטיבית להסגת שלום ויציבות באזור.

רצ"ב נוסח המלא של דבריו.

בברכה,


שי פלדמן

העתק: המרכז, משה"ח

tions to end the heavy subsidization of food prices for lower income people. President Sadat was obliged to take this action. Some have observed in hindsight that he should have raised prices more gradually, but he chose to move boldly.

Certainly this action would have come much sooner had it not been for the beneficial and essential economic assistance that Egypt has been receiving from the United States, Iran, Arab countries, Japan and the OECD. Egypt has many friends in the world. It will continue to be a high priority with them to provide economic assistance to Egypt, both for the welfare of the Egyptian people and in support of President Sadat's efforts to achieve stability in the region.

This will probably not be the last time that extremist elements of left and right seek to make political hay at the expense of reasonable leaders of the area. I would hope that responsible people in all the countries of the Middle East would give support to those leaders such as President Sadat, whose highest priorities are to improve the lot of their people through economic development and by constructive moves to achieve regional peace and stability.

SENATOR JACKSON CONGRATULATES PRESIDENT CARTER ON WITHDRAWAL OF GASOLINE DECONTROL PROPOSAL

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, earlier this afternoon President Jimmy Carter's decision to withdraw the Ford administration's gasoline decontrol plan was announced at the White House. I want to congratulate President Carter on a forthright and statesmanlike action. The withdrawal of these 11th-hour Ford proposals shows that President Carter understands the essential importance of credibility in Government. It shows that he is prepared to act on this understanding.

There is simply no way to make reasonable the effort by Mr. Ford—acting on the last day of his authority as President—to remove mandatory price and allocation controls from sales of motor gasoline. Acquiescence by Congress or the new administration in a plan of such uncertain and complex impact, submitted in this fashion, would really be unthinkable. I am gratified that President Carter moved quickly to retract an inappropriate and unfortunate proposal.

The legacy of the FEA's management of domestic petroleum supplies and prices deserves early consideration by the Carter administration and the 95th Congress. The regulations now in existence were written by the Nixon and Ford administrations in response to a congressional mandate to control domestic prices and preserve competition in the petroleum industry. It is no secret that these administrations were staffed by reluctant regulators. The energy policy advice which has emanated from the FEA for the past 3 years has been a drumbeat for decontrol. A direct result of this attitude has been a regime of controls which is in many respects inconsistent with the intent of Congress.

The solution to the problems with FEA regulations, however, is not total decontrol. Removal of all protection against unwarranted price increases is no solution. Removal of all effective guarantees to supply to independent businessmen at competitive prices is no solution.

I believe we can devise equitable ways to deal with the real problems associated by past FEA regulation without the extreme measure of total decontrol. I believe we will obtain the cooperation and assistance of the FEA under President Carter in this effort. President Carter's action of today is a positive and welcome beginning for this cooperation.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter to Vice President Mondale from Gorman C. Smith, Acting Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration, rescinding the gasoline decontrol amendments proposed in energy actions numbered 8 and 9 be printed in the Record, at this point.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION,
Washington, D.C., Jan. 24, 1977.

HON. WALTER F. MONDALE,
President of the Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have today directed FEA's Acting General Counsel to rescind the amendments which were issued January 19, 1977 exempting motor gasoline from the Mandatory Petroleum Allocation and Price Regulations. This action is intended to withdraw from congressional consideration Energy Actions Nos. 8 and 9 which were transmitted to the Congress on January 19, 1977 under the provisions of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, as amended by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.

Accordingly, I wish to inform you by this letter of our withdrawal of Energy Actions Nos. 8 and 9.

The reason for this action is to provide an opportunity for the new Administration to determine whether the exemption of motor gasoline would be consistent with the energy policy proposals, which are currently being developed for submission to the Congress. This action is not intended to constitute any position regarding the merits of Energy Actions Nos. 8 and 9, but is instead taken only to afford the opportunity for full consideration of the implications of the exemption of motor gasoline from price and allocation controls in the context of the comprehensive national energy policy now being developed.

Sincerely,

GORMAN C. SMITH,
Acting Administrator.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAROLD BROWN

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I was delighted with the action of the Senate in giving unanimous support to the nomination of Dr. Harold Brown to be Secretary of Defense. The qualifications which Dr. Brown brings with him to this high office are impressive: 24 years of involvement in national security policy, nuclear weapons expert, Director of Defense Research and Engineering for the Department of Defense at age 33, Secretary of the Air Force, delegate to the 1969 SALT negotiations where he was the "unofficial" representative of the sci-

entific community, and president of the California Institute of Technology.

During his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Dr. Brown states that he views the high post for which he is being considered as an "intimidating responsibility." Based on his previous record as an outstanding physicist and his sensitivities to arms control policies that reflect our national security considerations, I believe Harold Brown possesses both the necessary technical expertise and sufficient political awareness which will enable him to shoulder this responsibility.

No one in this Chamber would challenge Dr. Brown's statement that the preservation of our national security is the foremost responsibility of a national administration. But this task has become increasingly difficult as the issues associated with it have become more complex. Greater demands are being made on our resources to the point where "guns and butter" are not possible in unlimited combinations. A new awareness, which is not so new to some of us, has been articulated by a new administration which says that the strategic balance cannot be measured in terms of military arsenal alone. National leadership, economic strength, reliability of allies, public trust in Government and an open Government which trusts the public are also necessary indicators of national strength. I believe that Secretary of Defense Harold Brown understands this. His knowledge of the limitations and capabilities of weapons of mass destruction in no way renders him incapable of understanding the human dimension of national security.

We must leave no room for doubt that we are committed to a defense posture that will continue to deter even the thought by a potential adversary that a successful attack on our country is possible. To this extent disarmament can never be an adequate substitute for defense. Still, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks must continue to occupy the foremost place in the consideration of a force structure appropriate to our security needs. SALT II negotiations must be pursued vigorously and a final agreement must be fully considered by the American people.

Our present defense establishment must also make constant reference to the real world, to the capabilities of the Soviet Union, and to the doctrine which guides the U.S.S.R. in its defense policies. While this latter point regarding intentions may force us to live in ambiguity, as Dr. Brown insightfully noted, it is important that we recognize that important differences exist in our view of the world and in the global outlook of the Soviet Union. This is important if we are to avoid making the mistake of "mirror-imaging" our chief competitor in the world arena. It also emphasizes the need to better understand our own role in the world and fashion our capabilities to support that role. We have had enough instances of "weapons in search of missions."

More specifically, I hope Secretary Brown makes the determination that we

competition in the air travel industry. This thoughtful and timely article should be required reading for anyone interested in reform of Federal regulation.

Chairman Robson effectively refutes the notion that relatively modest price rise in airline tickets over the past decade indicates the present regulatory system works well. He points out that enormous savings resulting from advances in technology in the 1960's were not passed on to consumers through lower prices. Rather, they were squandered as airlines overscheduled flights, flew planes with plenty of empty seats, and competed to give away free drinks, movies, and the like.

Today's regulatory system encourages inefficiency. By limiting the number of airlines which can provide service between different cities, such regulation discourages airlines from lowering ticket prices. Less regulation will not lead to destructive competition as some maintain, but instead will encourage cost-efficient, innovative practices. Chairman Robson feels that this is especially important now that the "financial bloom (come) off the airline industry's

It is time we in Congress reexamined the 1938 airlines regulatory legislation. Federal regulatory agencies need a fresh look. The Regulatory Reform Act of 1977 is a refinement of last year's bill (S. 2812) which mandated a comprehensive overhaul of the regulatory system. It will be introduced in the 95th Congress this week. In the interest of consumers, working people, business continuing and a strong, vigorous, competitive U.S. commercial airline service, recognized as the best in the world but, with further improvements possible, I urge my colleagues to give careful consideration to this measure upon introduction.

I also hope all my colleagues will read Chairman Robson's valuable essay. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for "Competition Needed Now in Air Travel," appearing in the Chicago Daily News editions of January 15-16, 1977, to be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COMPETITION NEEDED NOW IN AIR TRAVEL

(By John E. Robson)

WASHINGTON.—Defenders of current aviation regulation warn of a "naive and dangerous" idea reforming the 1938 federal regulatory laws to make air transportation more competitive.

The reforms contemplate fewer restrictions against entering the airline business and more freedom to lower or raise fares and expand or contract service. They are embodied in legislation supported by President Ford, congressional aviation leaders of both parties and the Civil Aeronautics Board.

Because airlines fares have historically risen less than the consumer price index, opponents of reform argue that fares cannot be considered "too high." In the highly competitive electronics business, a technological revolution made hand-held calculators available to the consumer at a fraction of their introductory price. In 1959, jet aircraft brought a technological revolution to the airlines. Yet from 1958 to 1966—while airlines enjoyed spectacular operating-cost savings and the consumer-price index inched up at an annual average barely over

1 per cent—regulated airline fares were basically static. Even the historically favorable comparison to the general price index despite airline complaints that the CAB unconscionably suppresses fare levels.

If airlines fly fewer empty seats, fares can be lowered or stabilized. Yet, even during the dramatic airline passenger growth of 1960-1970, "load factors" declined. ("Load factor" is the percentage of seats flown occupied by passengers.) The reason was that the airlines went on an overscheduling binge, mounting many more flights than were needed to handle the traffic.

Indeed, a pernicious airline tendency under current regulation is to compete by trying to outfly or out-gimmick the other guys instead of beating their basic price.

There is a dizzying variety of "discount" air fares, customarily restricted to particular markets or time periods and by other conditions. But no federally regulated scheduled airline ever sought to reduce regular coach fares throughout its route system.

Under the existing regulatory structure, a limited number of airlines are authorized to fly each route and price-cutters can't jump in. So incumbent airlines have little incentive for basic price competition. Instead, they compete with some flights or other enticements. Too many flights and "freebies" raise costs and, ultimately, fares. One airline official called the current New York-to-Florida airline war being waged with complimentary lox, bagels, drinks and movies a "giveaway scramble" that will "be passed on to the customer."

But there are notable exceptions outside the federally regulated scheduled air system where carriers provide excellent, low-fare service and can make money at it.

In a genuinely competitive system, limited instances of short-run over-capacity might occur. But, in the long run, the efficient carriers will set the competitive benchmarks and no airline could long afford wasteful forms of competition. To argue, as some regulation opponents do, that airlines would pursue long-term self-destructive competitive practices seems a most damning assessment of the industry.

Defenders of the status quo claim that America's air system would wither without federal regulation. What built and sustains our air system is not regulation but the tremendous demand for air travel in a geographically immense, affluent, travel-minded nation. The CAB doesn't make people buy airline tickets. And reducing CAB regulations would not curb either the public's appetite for air travel or the airlines' motive to furnish it.

In recent years, the financial bloom has been off the airline industry's rose. And, during the last quarter-century the airlines earned the currently authorized return on investment only three times. With their sub-par historical earnings record and a need for greatly improved future earnings if they hope to attract adequate capital, one wonders why the airlines cling so doggedly to the old regulatory regime.

The regulatory laws were passed in 1938 when air transportation was an infant industry. It is now mature. And many see the airlines' future economic environment as much less salubrious than the past: more modest traffic growth, rapidly rising costs and limited productivity gains. These changes require changes in the regulatory system.

Advocates of a more competition-oriented regulatory system have not promised magic. We maintain that, in the long term, it should foster a more efficient air-transportation system that can be reflected in fare levels, can stimulate growth, can enable airlines to attain more consistent profitability, and meet the demands of the flying public.

Admittedly, the transition from the present protective regulatory system to a more

competitive one poses uncertainties for the airlines. Nonetheless, the potential benefits seem strongly to warrant the change. It is relevant that, following the Northeast railroads' financial collapse, federal rail regulation was relaxed to stimulate a more competitive climate.

CAPITOL POLICE PRAISED

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, the past Thursday's activities here in the Nation's Capitol were heartwarming and stirring with tens of thousands of Americans from every State gathered for the inauguration, for the parade and for the other activities associated with what I consider to be one of the most important days in our country's political life.

I had the pleasure of attending our open house Thursday afternoon in the Dirksen Senate Office Building sponsored by the Alabama State Society. Hundreds of Alabamians who reside in this area were present as were additional hundreds of Alabamians who made the long trip from home just for the inauguration.

Mr. President, I wish to pass on to the Senate some observations from my fellow Alabamians relating to the reception which they received here in the Capitol complex—the Capitol and the Congressional Office Buildings. Without exception these comments were in praise of the calm, gentlemanly and gentlemanly help provided them by members of the Capitol Police Department. Amid all of the day's activities—with tens of thousands of people pressing to get close to the inaugural ceremony on the Capitol steps; with thousands of visitors asking directions or seeking lost members of their parties or trying to find parking spaces and then later trying to remember where they had parked—amid this turmoil the Capitol police remained calm, pleasant, and helpful. Visitors from my home State, and I am sure visitors from each of the other States, have gone home with a good feeling about the helpful treatment accorded them by the Capitol police. In behalf of Alabamians who came to participate and to view the past week's events, I want to express my appreciation to our Capitol police and to commend them for a job well done.

EGYPTIAN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, from foreign intelligence sources, and other sources available to me, I have confirmed that the riots in Egypt, begun by students, were quickly exploited and expanded by well-prepared urban leftists, then rightists, attempting to embarrass the administration of President Sadat. It is obvious that these are extremist elements who are hostile to President Sadat's efforts to seek peace and stability in the Middle East.

The origin of the agitation, of course, was in the decision to raise the prices of certain food items and other products. Gasoline, for example, was raised 31 percent, and bottled cooking gas 46 percent. Under pressure from international monetary institutions and certain na-

10/10
REPRESENTATIVE L. H. FOUNTAIN (Democrat-North Carolina)

Term began: 1953 7/1/6

Committees Important to Israel: International Relations (fourth ranking); Government Operations

Biographical Data: Born 1913 in Leggett; attended University of North Carolina, where he earned a B. A. and J. D.; Presbyterian. Served in the Army during World War II; later served in the North Carolina Senate (1947-1952).

Home Town: Tarboro, North Carolina

Special Comments: Fountain comes from a predominantly rural and small-town district, which depends entirely on textiles and tobacco. During 20 years in Congress, Fountain has compiled a staunchly conservative record.

Consistently opposes foreign aid bills, although he voted for the \$2.2 billion for Israel in 1973. This year he has not committed himself on the question of aid for Israel, but he has voted in committee for cuts and it is expected that he will once again oppose the bill. Earlier this year Fountain co-signed an unhelpful letter to Secretary of State Kissinger authored by Representative Helen Meyner (D-N. J.) applauding Kissinger's efforts to achieve Middle East peace via the Sinai agreement and urging "persistent and imaginative" efforts be initiated to further Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Did not co-sponsor the Bingham Resolution disapproving the sale of Hawk missiles to Jordan.

October 18, 1976

SENATOR WENDELL H. FORD (Democrat - Kentucky)Biographical Information:

Born in Daviess County, Ky., September 8, 1924; attended public schools of Daviess County, University of Kentucky, 1947 graduate of the Maryland School of Insurance; served in the U.S. Army, 1944-46, Kentucky National Guard, 1949-62; was a partner in the firm of E. M. Ford and Company Insurance; held the position of chief assistant to the Governor of Kentucky; State senator, 1965-67; Lieutenant Governor, 1967-71; Governor, 1971-74; president of the Kentucky and National Jaycees; Junior Chamber of Commerce; chairman, National Democratic Governors' Caucus, 1973-74; chairman, Southern Governors' Conference, National Governors' Conference; Democratic Party Advisory Council; National Energy Advisory Council; Committee on Natural Resources and Environmental Management; member, Democratic National Committee, 1962-present; married the former Jean Neel, 1943; two children; elected to the United States Senate, November 5, 1974, for the term ending January 3, 1981.

Political Information:

After winning the Governorship in 1967 he helped elect Walter Huddleston to the Senate, and then, after serving his mandatorily-limited one term, he ran for the Senate and won in 1974. Ford was a strong backer of Sen. Edmund Muskie for President in 1972, and was one of the most vocal Governor's advocating Robert Strauss for Democratic National Chairman.

Committees:

Aeronautical and Space Sciences
Commerce

Voting Record:

He has voted for all foreign aid bills since his term began. He signed the letter of 76 on the Administration's reassessment of U.S. policy in the Middle East.

He voted for the Sinai resolution. Although he expressed concern about the cost, he said alternatives to the Sinai plan were worse than its ratification, and that he would vote for it "reluctantly".

He voted for the Jackson amendment to the Defense Procurement Act (6/6/75) authorizing the President to transfer aircraft and related equipment to Israel.

Comments:

Sen. Ford has a legislative assistant who is hostile toward Israel.

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה) תשי"ז - 1957.

מס' 142

סודי

נשלח 111900 י"ד 77

אל: המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון

ל
ז' ארז
(סג' ז' ארז)

אל: עברון, רביב.

נפגשתי היום ביוזמתי לשיחה בקפיטול עם סנטור וונזל פורד, דמוקרט מקנטאקי שהיה כזכור חבר במשלחת ריביקופ. היה ידידותי מאד. בסיום השיחה חזר ואמר כי נוסל לפנות אליו בעת הצורך וישמח לסייע. סיפר כי בהיות משלחת ריביקופ בקהיר הוצע גם לו להפגש עם נציג אשפ. בניגוד לשלושה מעמיתיו שנפגשו הוא סירב. ייחסי איננו מכירים בהמ"י. ביקש וקיבל ממני הסבר מפורט מדוע אין להקים מדינה פלשתינאית בגדה המערבית ומדוע יש לפתור השאלה בהקשר הייחודי. הגיב שהסבר נראים. הסכים עמי לחלוטין כי זהא זו שטות ואסור להעלות עתה את יוקרת אשפ ולטפחו. על ידי מעמד של משלחת עצמאית בגנבה או צעדים דומים. הודשם משיחתו עם סאדאת שאכן פניו לשלום. השבתי כי כפי ששמע בשיחותיו בישראל אנו מוכנים למזמ - 1977. הודשמתי שביקורו בישראל חיזק את ידידותו לנו והעמיק הכנתו לעניינינו. רפ"ה

שחח רותם מנכל ממנכל שחבט י. רביב שק רוזן ארגוב אבידר מצפא מזתיס חקר רס אמן

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כא' בכסלו תשל"ז
13 בדצמבר 1976

ד"ר אהרון (סניטור) (13) פ.י.ר.

א ל: הגב' גולדה מאיר

מאח: מנהל המחלקה לצמון אמריקה

חשבתי שתמצאי עניין בקטע המצוטט כדלקמן מדיווחו של סנטור ונדל פורד
מקנטקי שביקר בארץ עם קבוצה ריביקוף. הדו"ח הוא מה- 17.11.76.

"The following morning we had breakfast with retired
Prime Minister Mrs. Golda Meir. She is in her mid-70's
and, reportedly, her health is failing, but if you
could have seen and listened to her, you would never
have thought so.

She was quite talkative and after brief remarks
opened the floor for questions. She answered all
questions very frankly and straight-forwardly.
She seemed to be in a position of answering the questions
much better than any other individual with whom we
have visited".

בברכה,

א.י.

משה רביב

21
(376) (376) 021/1

OFFICE OF SENATOR WENDELL H. FORD

NOTE TO EDITORS: Senator Ford has been appointed to a special Senate commission that is surveying nuclear proliferation in the Mid-East and Europe. The group left Washington on November 5, and will return November 23. The 12-member delegation is scheduled to visit Austria, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Iran and England. This is the second of a series of reports to Kentuckians by Senator Ford on the events of the trip. The report was filed by Senator Ford from the city of the dateline, covering the period of November 8-11, and distributed upon its receipt by his Washington office.

JERUSALEM -- We arrived in Israel from Vienna at 1:30 p.m., Tel Aviv time on Sunday afternoon. At the Ben-Gurion International Airport, we were welcomed by Israeli officials and a response was made by the co-chairmen of our delegation, Senator Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut and Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee.

After we checked into the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, we received a briefing from the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Malcom Toon. After the briefing we left to call on Israel's Prime Minister Rabin.

Rabin was very frank and open with us with very little, if any, of our discussion off the record. He indicated that it was a different world when you lived with the hope for peace in the face of the threat of war. He said that the Israelis have but one goal -- and that is to, through negotiations, bring about peace.

Rabin said that as far as Israel was concerned none of the points to be negotiated had to be decided in advance. He said that Israel asked only two things from its adversaries first, that they describe the meaning of peace, and secondly, that they allow open boundaries for exports.

To the Israelis "open peace" is having no barriers at the border; that citizens from Israel, for instance, could travel to and from Egypt without fear of harassment, and that Egyptians have the same unrestricted travel privileges.

I am convinced that Israel would give up all of its occupied land if only Egypt and other Arab countries would agree to this one point.

Because the war in Lebanon has redirected the attention of the Palestinians, the Israeli borders have been free of terrorism for some time now. Syria and other Arab countries have taken an active interest in the outcome of that conflict. Syrian troops in Lebanon have effectively weakened the Palestine Liberation Organization's strength, and as I read it, they intend to remain in Lebanon to maintain peace in that country.

Something that I found very unique here is the educational system. The state pays for the first through the ninth grades, but after that the students or their families must pay for the schooling. When men are finished with high school, they go straight into military service for 3 to 3 1/2 years. After women graduate from high school, they go into service and train for a minimum of two years.

On Monday morning, we left the hotel at 10 a.m. and paid a visit to the Martyrs and Heroes Memorial. Senator Ribicoff, on behalf of the delegation, placed a wreath at the memorial which is dedicated to the memory of the six million Jews who lost their lives in World War II. It was a very impressive and stirring visit. After a tour of the Hall of Remembrance, we proceeded to Hebrew University to discuss the political situation there as it relates to international affairs. During the course of this discussion, it was brought out that this small country has been involved in five wars in the past 27 years. The point was made that whereas larger countries might survive losing a war, this country could not.

I feel it is significant to note that any decision on future wars rests in the hands of a very few -- the President of Egypt, the King of Jordan, the King of Saudi Arabia, the King of Iran. In these countries there is no free press, no free assembly, and only a handful of individuals who will make the decision on war in the future. As a result Israel, with its free press, open assembly and majority vote, is placed in a most unusual situation, being surrounded by countries which have different forms of government.

In the opinion of the political scientists we met at the University, the United States is playing right into the hands of the oil-producing nations. The professors could not understand why the United States, with all of its vast resources and available technical knowledge, is not moving faster in the direction of energy self-sufficiency. They were curious as to why we had not made more use of coal, through converting it into a clean fuel. They see this as a very important item, because Israel is 99 percent dependent on oil from other countries. Israel hopes to gradually improve its situation so that by 1985 the country will no longer be so dependent on fuel oil, and can rely more and more on coal-fired generating plants and nuclear power. Since all of the energy in this country is generated from oil, the problem is quite pronounced.

The professors indicated to us that America, as a world power, should encourage developed countries to assist those less-developed countries in economic improvement. For example, they said, consider Saudia Arabia which, as a result of its increased gross national product, is in a very strong position of assisting other nations in various areas which could help the economy.

We continued our discussion on a more informal basis over lunch, talking with those who had knowledge of the problems in the political arena as it affects Israel and the Middle East.

That afternoon we took a break to tour the old city of Jerusalem and returned for a meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yigal Allon. Allon was very emotional, very persuasive and generally had answers to the questions that were put to him. We went back and forth among the Senators, discussing various areas of concern for more than two hours. I was most impressed with Allon and believe that his role in the administration is most important to Rabin.

The following morning we had breakfast with retired Prime Minister Mrs. Golda Meir. She is in her mid-70's and, reportedly, her health is failing, but if you could have seen and listened to her, you would never have thought so.

She was quite talkative and after brief remarks opened the floor for questions. She answered all questions very frankly and straight-forwardly. She seemed to be in a position of answering the questions much better than any other individual with whom we have visited.

At the breakfast, we presented her with a gift -- a large ash tray from Tiffany's I also gave her some Kentucky tobacco credit!

Next we went to the office of the Minister of Commerce and Industry, Chaim Bar-Lev, for a briefing on Israel's economy and energy needs. As the one who is responsible for the economy and energy, he certainly has his hands full. We questioned the director-general of the Israel Electric Corporation and the head of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission about the country's present and future energy needs. We discussed water supply problems, desalination, licensing processes for nuclear energy and other questions related to nuclear power development. We had a very fair and wide-ranging give-and-take discussion.

After lunch, we went to Bethlehem to visit the Church of the Nativity. Bethlehem is a unique place, and the church was quite impressive.

From Bethlehem we went to the Knesset, which is Israel's parliament, where we visited with the Speaker of the Parliament, Yisrael Yeshayahu, and met with several members of the Knesset.

Instead of asking them questions, we suggested that they question us. Once again, the subject of what the United States was doing to become self-sufficient in energy surfaced.

I was called on to talk about what we were doing to expand the utilization of coal -- a subject which they seemed most interested in since Israel is in the process of constructing coal generating plants. In all probability, Israel will obtain its coal from South Africa which becomes a little thorn in the side of the diplomatic problem here in the Mideast, since Israel is giving some small arms and small artillery pieces to South Africa -- an arrangement that could create some problems for the diplomatic position of the United States, vis-a-vis the third world.

That evening we were guests at a dinner hosted by Prime Minister and Mrs. Rabin. I was seated next to the wife of Israel's Ambassador to the United States, Mrs. Vivian Kinsburg Dinitz, who is a native of Northern Kentucky. She was born in Cincinnati, but raised in Northern Kentucky. She was a student at the University of Cincinnati, where she first met Ambassador Dinitz. Her parents are Mr. and Mrs. Solomon Kinsburg. It seems that everywhere we go we find someone with ties to Kentucky. It is indeed a very small world!

The next morning -- our next-to-last in Israel -- we flew to the Golan Heights area. There we were briefed by the chief of the general staff of the Israel Defense Forces, Lt. Gen. Rav-Aluf, a very impressive, knowledgeable and tough military man. When you see the Golan Heights, an area of only 4,444 square miles and see how it protects the borders of Israel, you can better understand why the country is so emphatic about keeping it.

It appears that the buffer zone is working very well and that there have been very few, if any, incidents. We talked to the military troops from the U. S. who are assigned to the United Nations' force station at the Golan Heights. Afterwards, we visited a kibbutz at Gonen and had lunch with the people who lived there.

Upon our return to Jerusalem, we had a press conference where Senator Ribicoff recommended that President-Elect Carter appoint Secretary of State Kissinger as envoy to the Mideast, to continue his efforts to bring about peace here.

Our final briefing of the day was from Israel's Minister of Defense, Shimon Peres. It is our understanding that Peres will be Rabin's main opposition in next year's election for

Prime Minister. The convention will be held in late February or March, and the elections are scheduled for October. So for the first time, apparently, there will be a long political campaign in Israel for election to the office of prime minister.

From all indications we have been able to gather, Rabin is expected to hold on to a very slim margin and will be selected to represent his party, and, in all probability, remain prime minister.

We are to leave here early the next morning for Jordan where we are to visit with King Hussein.

בלתי מסווג

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מע, הסברה.

1. להלן תעתיק מדוייק של הקטע שהוסיף הנשיא לשעבר ג'רלד פורד (על הסכסוך המוכן מראש), בהופיעו בטקס ידידי האוניברסיטה העברית בניו יורק (על מום ישיר ופתרון כפוי)

THE END OF THE FORD SPEECH- JUNE 9 1977- AT A DINNER FOR THE AMERICAN FRIENDS OF THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY

... THAT BOND HAS NEVER BEEN BREACHED. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT IN THE FINAL STRENGTH AS WE IN 1975 WERE CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH ISRAEL AND EGYPT IN THEIR ACHIEVEMENT OF THE SINAI TWO AGREEMENT, AN AGREEMENT WHICH HAS PRODUCED MEANINGFUL RESULTS. THE UNITED STATES DID NOT IMPOSE THESE TERMS AND NEVER SHOULD ALONE OR WITH ANY OTHER SUPER POWER. WE CAN AND WE MUST WORK WITH ALL PARTIES IN THAT CRUCIAL AREA FOR PEACE, SECURITY, JUSTICE AND PROSPERITY. IN THE EBB AND FLOW OF CURRENT EVENTS WE MUST NOT DIM OUR HOPES OR UNDERCUT OUR DETERMINATION. ALL OF US MUST RESTRAIN OUR PUBLIC RHETORIC AND KEEP OUR(SOUNDS LIKE) POWDER DRY, TRUSTING TO BE THE ULTIMATE TO THE WISDOM OF A PARTIES TO FIND A SOLUTION THAT WILL MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF ALL MANKIND. THE AWARD YOU GIVE ME TONIGHT NAMED IN HONOR OF ONE OF ISRAEL'S AND AMERICA'S FINEST SONS IS SO SPECIAL. SO SPECIAL TO ME. I WILL ALWAYS TREASURE AND WILL DO MY BEST TO LIVE UP TO ITS HIGH STANDARDS AND HONOR THE MAN WHO GAVE SO MUCH AND WHO MEANS SO MUCH TO ISRAEL AND ALL OF THE YOUTH."

2. לכתבים הישראלים בניו יורק העברנו זאת מיידית. מוצע שהקטע המילולי יועבר על ידכם לסכנויות או לאחד הכתבים הבכירים בבירה, כפי שסוכם עם הסגיר דיניץ.

רפפורט

שהה רהם מנכל שהבט ממנכל סמנכל הסברה. מעת מצפא חקר תעוד אילטר יב איל
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(50) 07017
U.S. SHOULD BEGIN TALKS WITH PLO, CONGRESSMAN SAYS (650)

WASHINGTON -- THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION SHOULD MOVE QUICKLY TO ESTABLISH DIRECT TALKS WITH THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) -- "THE UNCHALLENGED SPOKESMAN OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE" -- U.S. CONGRESSMAN PAUL FINLEY OF ILLINOIS SAID IN WASHINGTON DECEMBER 1.

CONGRESSMAN FINLEY, WHO MET WITH PLO LEADER YASIR ARAFAT FOR FOUR HOURS IN DAMASCUS NOVEMBER 25, SAID THAT ARAFAT PLEDGED TO HIM TO RENOUNCE ALL VIOLENCE AGAINST ISRAEL AND GIVE ISRAEL DE FACTO RECOGNITION IF A PALESTINIAN STATE WERE ESTABLISHED.

"ARAFAT'S PLEDGE MEETS THE ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS OF A 1975 MEMORANDUM" THE CONGRESSMAN SAID. IN THAT MEMORANDUM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PROMISED ISRAEL IT WOULD NOT "RECOGNIZE OR NEGOTIATE WITH THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION SO LONG AS THE PLO DOES NOT RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND DOES NOT ACCEPT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND 338."

CONGRESSMAN FINLEY SAID THAT HE FELT ARAFAT'S PLEDGE MET THOSE CONDITIONS AND THE REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED BY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE HAROLD SAUNDERS,
WHO TESTIFIED BEFORE CONGRESS IN SEPTEMBER THAT THE
UNITED STATES "COULD ESTABLISH DIRECT CONTACT OR DIALOGUE
WITH THE PLO IF IT ACCEPTED ALL THE PRINCIPLES AND
PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION 242, INCLUDING ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO
EXIST."

ARAFAT'S PLEDGE, CONGRESSMAN FINDLEY SAID, MEETS THOSE
PRINCIPLES AND JUSTIFIES "IMMEDIATE TALKS WITH THE PLO."

THE CONGRESSMAN ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT "EVERYONE SHOULD
RECOGNIZE THAT MUCH HARD NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO LIES
AHEAD. BUT THE ONLY WAY TO START IS BY TALKING."

FINDLEY SAID THAT "THE DREAM I HAD IN GOING TO DAMACUS
WAS TO FIND OUT IF (THERE WERE) SOME MINIMUM CONDITIONS FOR
PEACE THAT (MR. ARAFAT) WOULD SET DOWN HIMSELF." MR. ARAFAT
THEN WROTE AND APPROVED FOR RELEASE THE FOLLOWING
STATEMENT:

"THE PLO WILL ACCEPT AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE
CONSISTING OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, WITH CONNECTING
CORRIDOR, AND IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE WILL RENOUNCE ANY AND
ALL VIOLENT MEANS TO ENLARGE THE TERRITORY OF THAT STATE.

PAGE 3 -- PLO


I WOULD RESERVE THE RIGHT, OF COURSE, TO USE NON-VIOLENT MEANS, THAT IS TO SAY DIPLOMATIC AND DEMOCRATIC MEANS TO BRING ABOUT THE EVENTUAL UNIFICATION OF ALL OF PALESTINE."

ARAFAT THEN PROMISED, ACCORDING TO FINDLEY, "DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL" AND TO "LIVE AT PEACE WITH ALGHOUR NEIGHBORS." FINDLEY COMPARED DE FACTO RECOGNITION TO THAT RELATIONSHIP NOW EXISTING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

THE CONGRESSMAN WENT TO EUROPE FOR A MZZOING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGAINZATION AND FROM THERE WENT TO DAMASOUS. HE MET WITH ARAFAT ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE, HE SAID, AND RECEIVED NO ADVICE FROM THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT OR THE WHITE HOUSE.

THE CONGRESSMAN SAID HE HAD FORWARDED MR. ARAFAT'S PLEDGE TO THE WHITE HOUSE, BUT HAD, AS YET, NO RESPONSE FROM THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. CONGRESSMAN FINDLEY RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES LATE NOVEMBER 30.

FINDLEY SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE ARAFAT PLEDGE WAS



PAGE 4 -- PLO

EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. "ARAFAT REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES TO ME: 'I HAVE VERY FEW CARDS TO PLAY AND I MUST NOT PLAY THEM ALL AT ONCE.'" THE CONGRESSMAN ADDED, "ARAFAT PLAYED A VERY BIG CARD IN MAKING THIS PLEDGE TO ME," ADDING: "HE TOOK A DELIBERATE AND SUBSTANTIAL RISK IN APPROVING THE STATEMENT RELEASED... THE RISK, OF COURSE, IS THAT HE MAY GET NOTHING IN EXCHANGE FOR IT... IF WE REFUSE TO TALK (WITH THE PLO) THEN I MUST QUESTION WHETHER OUR GOVERNMENT IS REALLY INTERESTED IN EXCHANGING IDEAS WITH THE PLO".

FINDLEY CHARACTERIZED THE CURRENT U.S. POSITION TOWARD THE PLO AS A "DEFEATIST HEAD-IN-THE-SAND POLICY."

THE CONGRESSMAN SAID HE ITERATED TO ARAFAT THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST, CITING THE "ENORMOUS (FAVORABLE) IMPACT IN AMERICA" OF SADAT'S VISIT TOH347-23..

"SADAT IS NOW A HERO TO THE U.S. PUBLIC," THE CONGRESSMAN SAID HE TOLD ARAFAT.

HE TOLD ARAFAT THAT, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PLO MOVEMENT

PAGE 5 -- PLO

WAS NOT UNDERSTOOD IN THE UNITED STATES. THE PLO IS VIEWED AS A "SMALL BAND OF VERY VIOLENT PEOPLE BENT ON DESTRUCTION AND TERRORISM," THE CONGRESSMAN SAID HE TOLD ARAFAT. HE SUGGESTED THAT ARAFAT COULD CHANGE THAT IMAGE.

ITEM

FREE WORLD DEFENSE DEPENDS ON ALLIED COOPERATION IN ARMS
PRODUCTION (600)

BY HUGH O. MUIR

USICA SECURITY AFFAIRS CORRESPONDENT

WASHINGTON -- THE EAST-WEST MILITARY BALANCE IS IN A
"PERIOD OF TRANSITION," SAYS A TOP U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIAL,
AND THE ADVANTAGE WILL SKING TO THE EAST IF THE WESTERN
ALLIES -- PARTICULARLY THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION -- DO NOT COOPERATE IN SHARING ARMS PRODUCTION.
-- UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
WILLIAM PERRY -- THE NUMBER THREE MEN IN THE PENTAGON --
SAID DECEMBER 5 THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS SEEN AS IN THE
"MIDST OF A VERY SIGNIFICANT ARMS BUILDUP" BUT THAT
THE ANSWER DOES NOT LIE SIMPLY WITH THE UNITED STATES
SPENDING MORE FOR DEFENSE.

HERE IS AT PRESENT, MR. PERRY TOLD A MEETING OF THE
AMERICAN DEFENSE PREPARZBMESS ASSOCIATION, COMPRISING

PAGE 2 -- PERRY

PRINCIPAL U.S. ARMS MANUFACTURERS, "TREMENDOUS WASTE
AND DUPLICATION" IN THE PRODUCOPON OF WEAPONS BY THE
UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES.

THE ANSWER IS IN "A TRIAD OF COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS,"
THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID, BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND

THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION, DRAWING ON A COMBINED DEFENSE BUDGET
EQUAL TO THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS WARSAW PACT
ALLIES, THE U.S.-NATO COOPERATION WOULD REDUCE WASTE
AND MAINTAIN EAST-WEST "ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE" IN THE
FORSEEABLE FUTURE.

THE "TRIAO" COMPRISES THESE APPROACHES TO THE DEVELOPMENT
AND PRODUCTION OF ALL ALLIED ARMAMENTS, MR. PERRY SAID:

-- FIRST, THE OPENING UP OF NATO DEFENSE MARKETS TO THE
ENTIRE NATO DEFENSE INDUSTRY SO THAT, FOR EXAMPLE,
BRITISH INDUSTRY COULD BID ON U.S. DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND
VICE VERSA. "WE HAVE SUCH AGREEMENTS SIGNED WITH ALL
NATO INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES," HE SAID, BUT THE EFFORT IS AT
A "RELATIVELY MODEST LEVEL AND I HAVE RELATIVELY MODEST
EXPECTATIONS OF IT."

PAGE 3 -- PERRY

-- SECOND, AND "OF MORE IMMEDIATE EFFECT," HE SAID, IS
DUAL PRODUCTION OF A GIVEN WEAPONS SYSTEM, WHERE THE
BEST THAT COMES OUT OF A GIVEN COUNTRY'S DEFENSE INDUSTRY
WOULD ALSO BE BUILT BY ANOTHER COUNTRY'S INDUSTRY. THIS

CAN PROVIDE "A MORE DRAMATIC IMPACT" ON THE ELIMINATION OF DUPLICATION, MR. PERRY SAID, WARMING HIS DEFENSE INDUSTRY AUDIENCE THAT "I CAN TELL YOU FLATLY THAT THE ALTERNATIVE" -- OF THE U. S. BUILDING EVERYTHING FOR THE ALLIANCE -- "IS NOT A REALITY."

-- THIRD, THE "FAMILY OF WEAPONS" PROGRAM, WHICH HAS THE LONG-RANGE GOAL OF PRESERVING EVERY NATION'S RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. HERE, ONE NATION WOULD BE GIVEN THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO R AND D A GIVEN WEAPON, WHILE THE RIGHTS TO DEVELOP THE FOLLOW-ON WEAPON IN THAT SAME FAMILY WOULD BE GIVEN TO ANOTHER COUNTRY. "I SEE POSITIVE DIRECTION IN THAT AREA," MR. PERRY SAID, POINTING TO MEETINGS IN EUROPE IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS EUROPEAN COUNTERPARTS THAT ALSO PRODUCED AGREEMENT TO DEVELOP ALL THREE COOPERATIVE EFFORTS.

PAGE 4 -- PERRY

SUCH COOPERATION IS VITAL, THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID, BECAUSE PREVIOUS WESTERN DOMINANCE IN THE MILITARY FIELD IS DISAPPEARING.

FOR EXAMPLE, HE SAID, "FIVE YEARS AGO THE U.S. INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCE CARRIED THREE TIMES THE WARHEADS OF THE SOVIET ICBM FORCE. TODAY THEY ARE ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT. FIVE YEARS FROM NOW THE SOVIETS COULD HAVE THREE TIMES (THAT) OF THE U.S. FORCE."

BUDGET IS A KEY TO THE TRANSITION, HE SAID, POINTING OUT THAT IN 1964 THE U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET WAS 40 PERCENT MORE THAN THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION, THAT IN 1971 THE BUDGETS WERE AT ABOUT THE SAME LEVEL, AND THAT TODAY SOVIET ARMS EXPENDITURE IS ABOUT 40 PERCENT MORE THAN THE U.S. LEVEL -- "75 PERCENT MORE," HE ADDED, "IF YOU INCLUDE ALL OF THE SOVIET G AND D EXPENSES."

THUS, MR. PERRY SAID, "A PROGRAM OF COOPERATION IN ARMS PRODUCTION WITH OUR ALLIES IS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE -- NOT FOR POLITICAL REASONS OR TO MAKE OTHER COUNTRIES FEEL GOOD, BUT FOR OUR ALLIES NATIONAL SECURITY."

ITEM

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

~~שגרירות~~
בז'נבה

26.5.1976

אל: - - - - - מצבא

מאת: צבי רפיח

מז"ב לעיונכם - - - - - אצול סטיבנסון
- - - - - אלמג בקו - 356 - - - - - א-19-14
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ב ב ר כ ה ,

צ. רפיח

העחק:

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Senator Adlai E. Stevenson
May 19, 1976

FOR MANY YEARS AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS CONSISTED OF LITTLE MORE THAN A SERIES OF EFFORTS TO BUY TIME. THE PASSAGE OF TIME WITHOUT MOVEMENT TOWARD PEACE -- HAS MOVED THE SITUATION TOWARD WAR.

THE LINES HARDEN, THE TENSIONS MOUNT, THE MOST IMMODERATE ELEMENTS ON ALL SIDES GAIN AUTHORITY.

NOW THE SURVIVAL OF A MODERATE SADAT GOVERNMENT IN EGYPT MAY DEPEND ON ITS IMMODERATION, AS WELL AS SUFFICIENT WEAPONRY FROM THE WEST TO KEEP THE OFFICER CORPS FROM TURNING RESTLESS -- AND SUFFICIENT CAPITAL FOR THE DISTRESSED EGYPTIAN ECONOMY TO KEEP THE PEOPLE FROM TURNING RESTLESS.

MUCH OF THE AUTHORITY LOST BY THE SADAT GOVERNMENT IN THE ARAB WORLD WAS RECOVERED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT ASSAD IN SYRIA.

THE PALESTINIANS ARE THE CENTRAL PROBLEM. AND THE PLO, WHILE SUFFERING FROM SERIOUS INTERNAL DISUNITY AND SOME DISTRUST IN ARAB CAPITALS, NOW STANDS WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT RIVAL AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS.

NOW THE ARAB SIDE HAS LIMITLESS FINANCIAL RESOURCES. THE ISRAELI ECONOMY IS DEPRESSED BY THE BURDENS OF WAR -- AND THE ISRAELI PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED.

THE PASSAGE OF TIME HAS ADVANTAGED NO ONE REALLY,
EXCEPT PERHAPS THE SOVIET UNION. ARAB STATES ARE
DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION. EVEN JORDAN IS TURNING
TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR WEAPONS.

WHATEVER ELSE MAY BE SAID ABOUT AMERICAN POLICY IN
THE MIDDLE EAST, THE IMPASSE HAS RESUMED. STEP BY STEP
DIPLOMACY HAS RUN ITS COURSE. THE U.S.-ISRAELI "END
OF WAR" FORMULA

NEVER WAS REALISTIC. AMERICAN EFFORTS APPEAR TO BE CONFINED
TO KEEPING ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS FROM WARRING OVER LEBANON.

THE DEADLY IMPASSE HAS RESUMED. THE MOVEMENT IS TOWARD
WAR. AND THE LEVELS OF VIOLENCE FOR THE NEXT BATTLE IN
THE LONG WAR ARE RAISED, AS HAPPENS IN EVERY SUCH INTERLUDE.
THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD HAS NOW BEEN REACHED IN THE MIDDLE
EAST.

NOW FOR THE GOOD NEWS.

AS WE ALL FIND ON OUR TRIPS TO THE MIDDLE EAST,
COMMUNICATION PROCEEDS ON TWO SEPARATE PLANES, ONE
PUBLIC AND ONE PRIVATE. ARAB PUBLIC UTTERANCES, IN PARTICULAR,
ARE DISTORTED BY THE EXAGGERATION AND HYPERBOLE WHICH
MARK ARAB CULTURE. IT STRENGTHENS THE HARD LINERS IN
ISRAEL WHO SAY "THEY WANT TO DESTROY US."

AND THE HARDLINERS, SOMETIMES WITH RELIGIOUS OVERTONES, INFLUENCE ISRAELI POLICY AND CREATE EVENTS, MOST CONSPICUOUSLY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, WHICH CAUSE ARABS TO SAY "YOU SEE THEY SEEK LEBENSRAUM, NOT PEACE."

THIS CIRCULAR PROCESS HAS CREATED GULFS OF FEAR AND HATE WHICH CAN ONLY BE BRIDGED BY OUTSIDE POWERS.

THE TASK, AS I SEE IT, IS TO PUT COMMUNICATIONS ON THE MORE MODERATE, REALISTIC PLANE AND SEEK AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF SIMULTANEITY. THE TRADE OFFS ARE BASICALLY, OCCUPIED TERRITORY FOR RECOGNITION AND SECURITY GUARANTEES.

ALL SIDES RECOGNIZE THAT ANOTHER WAR IS A WAR NO ONE CAN WIN -- EXCEPT POSSIBLY THE SOVIET UNION. AND THE ARABS RELISH DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION NO MORE THAN ISRAELIS WELCOME DEPENDENCE ON THE U.S. THEY ARE ALL NATIONALISTS. THEY ALL SEEK INDEPENDENCE. AND NOW THE ARABS HAVE A CHANCE TO BUILD STABILITY AND NATIONHOOD NOT ON WAR, BUT WITH THEIR NEW FOUND OIL WEALTH. THEY ALL SEEK DEVELOPMENT -- AND DEVELOPMENT IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH A CONTINUED STATE OF BELLIGERENCY. ALL THE WARRING PARTIES HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN PEACE.

WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS, ARAB LEADERS ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE RIGHT OF AN ISRAELI STATE TO EXIST -- AND FOR GOOD REASON. IT IS A REALITY. AND THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT

IS, AND MUST REMAIN, UNEQUIVOCAL. BUT NOW AMERICA IS NOT BEING TESTED; ISRAEL IS. A LONG TERM OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORY IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH AMERICAN INTERESTS, NOR WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 -- NOR THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION. IT IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH ISRAEL'S SECURITY -- WHICH WILL ONLY BE ASSURED BY DEMILITARIZED ZONES AND UNEQUIVOCAL GUARANTEES. BOUNDARIES ARE ALL INDEFENSIBLE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE -- AND BOUNDARIES WHICH TRAP THE AGGRIEVED ADVERSARY WITHIN ARE IMPRUDENT IN THE EXTREME AS RECENT EVENTS IN THE WEST BANK MAKE EVIDENT TO MANY ISRAELIS AND AMERICAN JEWS.

CONTINUED STALEMATE CAN ONLY LEAD TO ANOTHER OUTBREAK OF THE WAR. ITS CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE SERIOUS -- NOT ALONE FOR THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS -- NOT ALONE FOR THE VICTIMS OF ANOTHER OIL EMBARGO IN THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD -- BUT FOR THE NUCLEAR SUPERPOWERS CONFRONTING EACH OTHER.

THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT PARALYZED BY AN ELECTION. IT IS MOVING TO ESTABLISH A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH JORDAN, EVEN TO REPAIR ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH EGYPT. SYRIA IS MOVING TO EXPAND ITS AUTHORITY IN LEBANON AND TO FORM A COMMON FRONT WITH JORDAN.

THE U.S. DARE NOT WAIT. NEXT YEAR WILL BE AN ISRAELI ELECTION YEAR. IT IS PAST TIME WE FACED THE OBVIOUS -- AND PUT ASIDE THE WISHFUL THINKING AND THE MYTHS WHICH HAVE OBSCURED REALITY IN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL. JUDGING FROM MY OWN EXPERIENCE, AMERICANS ARE READY FOR THE TRUTH, MORE SO THAN THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

THE MOST CHARITABLE THING THAT CAN BE SAID ABOUT STEP BY STEP DIPLOMACY IS THAT IT HAS RUN ITS COURSE. NOW IS THE MOMENT, PERHAPS THE LAST, TO SEEK AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT WITHOUT WAR.

THE PRINCIPLES FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AND WITH SOME SPECIFICITY BY THE U.S. AND, IF POSSIBLE, THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIET UNION MUST BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND THAT IF IT SEEKS TO ENJOY THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF DETENTE IT MUST ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF DETENTE. THOSE PRINCIPLES, INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS BY ISRAEL, ARAB RECOGNITION, GUARANTEES AND DEMILITARIZED ZONES SHOULD BE MADE THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION IN A PROCESS INVOLVING ALL THE PARTIES PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF ALL THE OTHERS. THESE PRINCIPLES COULD BE ACCEPTED BY ALL THE PARTIES SIMULTANEOUSLY THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF OUTSIDE POWERS. OTHER QUESTIONS, INCLUDING THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM AND PALESTINIAN RIGHTS COULD BE RESOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS ONCE THE MOMENTUM WAS REVERSED. THE PALESTINIAN

QUESTION IS AFTER ALL AS THORNY AN ISSUE FOR THE ARABS AS FOR THE ISRAELIS. ITS RESOLUTION IS NO ONE'S PRE-CONDITION FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS.

IT DID NOT TAKE ANOTHER TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO BRING ME TO THESE CONCLUSIONS. THIS TRIP GAVE ME A SENSE OF GREATER URGENCY AND A BELIEF THAT IT IS STILL NOT TOO LATE. THAT IS A VIEW WHICH IS NOT SHARED BY ALL AUTHORITIES. IT IS, HOWEVER, NOT TOO LATE TO TRY.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

י"ז ניסן תשל"ו
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
אל: מצפ"א

מאח: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנטור סטיבנסון

מצ"ב מכתבו של סטיבנסון מ-28.5 המדבר בעד עצמו.

כפי שתראו, סטיבנסון נותר בשלו. ודאי עוד תהיינה לנו
"צרות" נוספות עמו.

בברכה,

צ.רפיח

העחק: המנכ"ל

המשנה למנכ"ל

המרכז, משה"ח

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

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May 28, 1976

Mr. James P. Rice
Executive Vice President
Jewish Federation
One South Franklin Street
Chicago, Illinois 60606

FOR YOUR INFORMATION
FROM JAMES P. RICE

Dear Mr. Rice:

Thanks for your letter. Yes, of course, I found its enclosures interesting, but not surprising or new. One learns early to put such material in perspective. It is available on all sides about all sides. It is prudent to read such material, but to look beyond it for the interests and motives which underlie truth. History by-passed Hussein, as a representative of the Palestinians. It may soon by-pass Arafat. We pay little attention to history -- until it is too late. And what next? History, to be read if one is willing, suggests that Arafat's successor will not be a model of "moderation." One irony is Israel's willingness to join with his enemies to hasten his demise and a greater Arab unity backed by the Soviet Union. It is taking shape. Even Hussein is now seeking arms in Moscow and making common cause with Syria. And what of Lebanon? The great hope is that Jewish leaders in the United States, like many in Israel already, will face reality. Many are prepared to do so, with no illusions about Mr. Arafat or any other Middle East leaders. Their own included. These states are after all, all at war. I have yet to find in the history of the Middle East a war waged with "moderation."

So, yes, it is written and heard on all sides, and it is time for some statesmanship to override the hate and ignorance -- and where will it come from, if not the United States?

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



Senator Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois

May 6, 1976

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Realities in the Middle East

MAY 13 1976

Remarks by Senator Stevenson at the Annual Dinner of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Chicago, May 6, 1976:

I am not an outspoken admirer of Secretary Kissinger's style or policies. His step-by-step diplomacy in the Middle East delayed progress toward an overall settlement. It required tangible concessions by Israel which were not reciprocated by Egypt. I was one of a small minority in the Senate to vote against the Sinai Resolution. But when the Secretary of State says, as he did a month ago before a kindred gathering, that "the survival and security of Israel are unequivocal and permanent moral commitments of the United States," my response is a firm Amen.

Whatever else may be said about it, the step-by-step diplomacy of Secretary Kissinger has run its course. It is ended. The deadly impasse has resumed. In Jerusalem recently not one Israeli official among many could answer my question, "What next; where do we go from here?" Nor can American officials answer the same question -- Where do we go from here? The U.S. has no policy in the Middle East.

The starting place for any sound policy is a recognition of realities.

It is as a friend of Israel that I speak to you about realities in the Middle East. They are realities which we allow at Israel's peril and America's to be obscured by dangerous myths and wishful thinking. Unless there is movement toward peace, there is movement toward war.

The Sinai Accord represented no major departure for the U.S. in the Middle East. It was another expensive and impulsive effort to buy time. It bought another pause between battles in a long, continuing war. With each purchase of time, the lines hardened, the radicals gained influence. The Arabs in the main became more dependent on the Soviet Union -- and the levels of violence for the next battle were raised. The nuclear threshold has now been reached in the Middle East.

American actions in the Middle East have not been founded on reality since the earliest days of Israel's secular existence. They have been dictated by expediencies in America and myths in Israel. All we did was buy time. And time was against everyone, except the most immoderate elements. The U.S. never had a policy in the Middle East; it hid from reality.

Now Israel is isolated in world councils; it has no other source of support, only the U.S. That is a reality.

Now the Arabs have virtually unlimited financial resources at their disposal. The burdens of war depress the economy and divide the people of Israel. That is another reality worth facing.

Now the moderate Sadat Government has little authority in the Arab world, except what it recovers by being immoderate. The Sinai Accord excited high expectations in Egypt which have been disappointed. So the Sadat Government's authority within Egypt may be diminishing. Without substantial aid, including military

(MORE)

sales, Sadat could fall and Egypt be returned to the Russian orbit. With aid, Egypt, its strategic passes and oil in the Sinai recovered, could turn on Israel -- again. Authority in the Arab world lost by Egypt was gained by Syria and the PLO. Their influence is large in Lebanon, which may be partitioned or join the ranks of Arab militants.

The support of oil-rich Arab states has given the PLO an unaccustomed measure of affluence. The Rabat summit in 1974 deprived King Hussein of his role as spokesman for the Palestinians and gave it to the PLO. Now Palestinians speak for Palestinians. And the PLO wins favor among those willing to forget, perhaps too quickly, the horrors of Munich and Tel Aviv.

The oil embargo of 1973 forced the Arab world upon the Western consciousness as never before. So has the Arab boycott. The Yom Kippur war destroyed the myth of Israeli invincibility and Arab inferiority.

Americans are not about to sell Israel for a barrel of oil. But now it is easier to concede a legitimacy to Arab interests. An impulse, about as basic as the instinct for survival, seeks to accommodate forces upon which life depends.

The Arab image is improving. That is another reality.

I am not here tonight to say what I would like to say -- and what you would like to hear. There has been too much of that.

Now American support for Israel depends on Israel. It is no longer automatic. America will not abandon Israel; but it will ask if Israel has abandoned itself.

The Israeli image is not improving.

Two months ago Israeli officials spoke to me with pride of the trusting relationship between Jew and Arab in Israel and the tranquil Arab acceptance of the military occupation of the West Bank. The municipal elections, scrupulously free of coercion, were an act of political courage and wisdom. A confident and trusting relationship with Arabs who are citizens of Israel and Arabs under Israeli administration was of inestimable worth.

Why has peace been put at risk by the continued establishment of Israeli settlements in the West Bank in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention which states that "the occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies"?

Why provide agitators with a tailor-made issue with which to incite riots in the streets of Nazareth by confiscating Arab-owned land?

Why permit the secret purchase of land from West Bank Arabs, in contravention of the Jordanian law which applies to them?

Why an ostentatious holiday march through the West Bank by thousands representing a militant Israeli minority? The predictable response was more rioting -- and at a time when the Lebanese crisis had already heightened the possibility of another Middle Eastern war.

I ask these questions because some friend must. Israel has not been well served by those who hide from reality, nor by those who, perceiving the truth, have whispered their warnings. Now the hour is late.

(MORE)

I am grieved by an Israel isolated; an Israel protected on more than one occasion by only the slender margin of an American veto from censure by the United Nations Security Council; an Israel, which a scant few years ago counted almost every Black African country a friend, welcoming to Jerusalem the leading apostle of apartheid.

Some of these actions are the free exercises of genuine democracy. Israel must respect minority opinion and minority rights, or Israel will have abandoned itself. Its ideals and its competence must measure up to standards we set for no other, or its claim to a special place in the conscience of the world and a special relationship with the U.S. will be compromised.

I am not casting blame or excusing others. The tendency to blame others -- other officials, other countries, always someone else -- is deeply disturbing. Analogies between Israel and South Vietnam have been made before -- and they are not helpful to Israel. It all signifies a new disorder in the ranks and an inability to accept responsibility.

There is little in what I say that is not obvious to those prepared to face realities. Much of it is history already. My suggestion is to face the obvious. But who is prepared?

Having sketched such a cheerless picture of realities in the Middle East, I hasten to add that there are also rays of hope and promise. Some are prepared.

Many within the governing Israeli Labor Party recognize that the continued military administration of a million restless Arabs is not in Israel's strategic interest. Many in Israel believe it is time for the Israeli Government to recognize that the Palestinian people have a right to national self expression in the West Bank and in Gaza, either with a state of their own or with a semi-autonomous state within Jordan. The dangers of irredentism are real; but the dangers of continued stalemate, they realize, are greater. Of what avail, after all, are nuclear weapons and "defensible" boundaries when the enemy is within? Demilitarized territories and internationally guaranteed boundaries offer Israel greater security.

Brave voices in Israel are raised in favor of accommodating legitimate Palestinian interests. They do not suggest -- nor do I -- any move which would endanger Israel's future. They recognize that Arab hostility to Zionism has been an open sore for fifty years. It has been the root cause of five wars. It is a sore which cannot be healed by an agreement or by the passage of another generation. Any settlement must provide for security guarantees of undoubted validity.

I do not suggest unilateral concessions by the Israelis -- nor do those in Israel who seek accommodation. Most Arabs do not require it -- except in the heated rhetoric of Middle East war.

The common interests of Arabs and Israelis alike are often unperceived. Communication proceeds on separate public and private planes. It frequently has little to do with reality or the communication of truth. Public utterances by Arab leaders are distorted by the exaggeration and hyperbole which are a characteristic of Arab language and culture. The 1968 Palestinian National Charter calls for "the elimination of Zionism in Palestine," which can only mean the destruction of the State of Israel. In private one hears at the highest levels of Arab leadership that Arab governments accept, with a condition, the continued existence of the State of Israel. Arab leaders reaffirm their commitment to Security Council Resolution 242; compliance with that resolution is their condition for recognition of Israel.

(MORE)

That resolution itself accepts the right of an Israeli state to exist. And no one, except the most extreme groups, like the Iraqis, rules out simultaneity -- simultaneous recognition on the one side and withdrawal from occupied territories on the other.

For all the publicly expressed stubbornness and belligerence, most Israeli and Arab leaders want peace.

The Arab states, like Israel, set a high priority on internal development. They would like to use their new-found oil wealth to raise their people from centuries of malnutrition, inadequate housing and lack of education. Most Arabs -- like Israelis -- are weary of the burdens of an armed camp. All seek national independence and freedom from external influences. Arab nationalists seek independence of the Soviet Union as much, at least, as do Israeli loyalists independence of the U.S.

A way must be found to overcome the provocations on all sides, and it could be. If a direct Arab-Israeli negotiation is not feasible -- and some authorities say Arab culture requires settlement of disputes through middlemen -- then outside powers with important stakes in the Middle Eastern peace must facilitate negotiation, at Geneva or in another forum. They cannot impose a settlement, but they could establish the principles to guide a settlement and initiate the process by which it is reached. Only outside powers can appeal to the common interests in peace and overcome the widening gulf of self-inflicted fear and suspicion which divides the warring parties.

In all of this the Soviet Union has a potential to foster peace -- or to block it. Russia's purpose in the Middle East is not entirely clear. It may see a Middle East settlement as serving its interests. Recent statements from Moscow indicate as much. But the obsequious pursuit of detente by Secretary Kissinger and the Presidents who have served under him has produced the reverse of detente -- tension. Russian imperialism is moving, as we have seen in Angola. It is pushing to the limits, and we are establishing no limits. If Russia views continued instability in the Middle East as best serving its interests, then it must be made to understand it cannot enjoy American imports, credits and access to American markets and other benefits of detente without accepting the responsibilities of detente. Russian participation in a common effort to bring about a settlement would be welcome proof that detente has some meaning to the Soviet leadership.

There are those who believe that it is too late for peace in the Middle East. Some respected authorities say the conflict must move to war and to the brink of a nuclear exchange. Then, so the theory goes, the superpowers will be forced to intervene; to impose a settlement and save themselves.

I disagree.

I do not believe it is too late; certainly it is not too late to try.

Continued stalemate in the Middle East sooner or later will lead to another outbreak of war. It will be a war in which there will be no winners. Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union would win a nuclear confrontation. A war means, at the least, another oil embargo and a depression in the Western world. It means intense suffering and loss of life on all sides. And it might mean another war which decided nothing. The stalemate must be ended.

(MORE)

Let there be no misunderstanding. America's commitment to Israel is unequivocal. The day America abandons Israel will be its last day as a great power. But America's will is not now tested; Israel's is tested.

Peace requires Israel to act greatly. It requires the understanding and the humility of which the prophets spoke. It requires preparedness and firmness. It requires your continued support and mine. Peace requires leadership in America and Israel which acts from a recognition of moral obligations, true self-interest -- and from a perception of reality.

The elements of a lasting settlement are there -- waiting to be put together by men brave enough to make peace, instead of war.

So let us be brave -- and then we will look back to this as the time when the process of peace was started; when the walls began to topple; when men learned again to esteem brotherhood and truth -- and the honor of a generation was saved.

Let us pray, in the words of the young Solomon, "Lord, give Thy servant an understanding heart."

Shalom.

x x x

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



~~שגרירות~~
ש'ל
שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

כ"ז כסלו תשל"ו
27 באפריל 1976

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אל: מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנטור סטיבנסון
על מכירת ההרקולסים למצרים

במכתב, שתצלומו מצ"ב, מפרט סטיבנסון את דעתו לגבי מצרים
ומכירה נשק אמריקני לה.

סטיבנסון חוזר על ידידותו לישראל, התנגדותו לשיטת הצעד-
אחר-צעד של קיסטינג'ר וקובע כי אין מנוס מלספק למצרים את ששת
המטוסים.

ב ב ר כ ה ,
צ. רפיה

העתק: המשנה למנכ"ל
המרכז, משה"ח
הקונב"ל, שיקגו

SECRET



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1976
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United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 6, 1976

Mr. Harry S. Kurshenbaum
General Service Employees Union
1640 North Wells Street
Chicago, Illinois 60614

Dear Mr. Kurshenbaum:

I can understand why a sale of military equipment to Egypt, even when it only involves a small number of unarmed, propeller-driven C-130 aircraft, is unsettling to friends of Israel. As a friend of Israel, I, too, have been concerned, as I am by the general prospect of an arms build-up in the Middle East.

Unfortunately, the Administration has set the stage in the Middle East in such a way that support -- even including token military support -- to the Egyptians is almost unavoidable. It is the fruit of the step-by-step approach to a Middle Eastern settlement, which I have consistently opposed. In concluding the last provisional Sinai Accord, the Egyptian Government accepted U.S. leadership and burned its bridges with the Soviet Union. As a poor country, Egypt must rely upon the West not only for economic assistance for its development, but for military supplies as well. There have been no Soviet arms deliveries since last May.

President Sadat has proved himself one of the most moderate of Arab leaders. But he is threatened by internal political opposition and must be able to demonstrate that his new course is of economic benefit to his people and that it will not endanger Egyptian national security. Should he fall from power, it is almost certain that he would be replaced by more radical leadership. The return of Egypt to the Soviet orbit would then be likely, and that would not be in Israel's interest.

Step-by-step diplomacy has left us with a dilemma -- provide aid to the Sadat government or let it fall and be succeeded by a Soviet-aided government. The dilemma is made more difficult for me because I am not convinced that U.S. aid can save Sadat. Economic aid and token military support may, however, keep him in the picture long enough to achieve a settlement. And the six C-130's which have been ordered are scarcely sufficient to tilt the military balance towards Egypt. I am afraid step-by-step diplomacy has left us no choice.

Sincerely,

Adlai Stevenson

מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

תאריך: כ"ו באדר ב' תשל"ו

28 במרץ 1976

מספר:

אוכלוסיה
ג' ת"ת סלג' ✓

שומר

אל : מנהל מצפ"א


מאת : מנהל אירופה א'

הנדון : פגישת סטיבנסון-ערפאט

השגריר ההולנדי סיפר לי כולקמן על סמך שיחה בין הנציג ההולנדי באו"ם לבין גויר? גויר נפגש עם ערפאט אחרי פגישתו עם סטיבנסון והפירסום מסביב לנושא.

ערפאט, שלדברי גויר היה מחוץ בגישתו, החפאר שאודות לפעולתו ניצל הרובע היהודי בבירות מהרס. ערפאט דיבר על מדינה בפלסטין ולא הפיכה פלסטין למדינה של אש"ף. ערפאט אמר עוד כי סטיבנסון לא הבין את דבריו.

בברכה,


נ. יעיש

העחק: ה' ז. ש"ק, סמנכ"ל

ה' מ. קדרון, יועץ

לשכה שה"ח

לשכה המנכ"ל

מרכז

התביעה
הגושה על ידי
התביעה

כל המוסד תוכן מסמך זה, בולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוקן וסודות דשמיים),
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוק

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

ש מ ר

מס' 198
נשלח: 081800 מרץ 76

אל: תמשרד
מאת: בניו יורק

ד ח ו פ

אל הלפרין האוצר ים
העתק רף וושינגטון רפיה ווש (העבר)
סטיבנסון.

1. ממך ששמעתי מה- א ד ל כאן מטכבר שסטיבנסון התרשם גרוע בשיחותיו עם מנהיגי ישראל.
 2. לאור דיווחי וושינגטון אני תמים דעים עם חדעה שלא מדובר כאן בשינוי טקטיקה אלא כנסיגה מתוכננת.
 3. בקשתי מה- א ד ל לנסות לעשות נשהו עם למבוע ממנו לסגת מהצעתו.
 4. בשיחות תהווה מכה ללחימה בחרט.
 5. אשוות על כך גם עם אנשי אמדיקן גויש קונגרס ואמדיקן גויש קומיטי.
- יגאל שפירא

אוצר חש שהח ~~נמכל~~ ממנכל אלון כלכלית מצפא
רע/רד

כל המוסר חוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים), תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוק

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

ס ו ד י

אל: המשרד

מאת: רושינגטון

מס' 151

נשלח: 061400 מרץ 76

מ י י ד י

Handwritten signature/initials

אל:מצפא- מתמכ, אגמון אוצר. שר שפירא נ"ו יורק רפ' (אנ).

לדערכתי המבוססת גם על שיחה עם מקור מהימן המקורב מאד לסטיבנסון, היו לצעדי של סטיבנסון מניעים פוליטיים ולא דווקא טקטיים תחיקתיים. כפי שנמסר לי היה סטיבנסון נתון ללחצייהם של הבנקים וחוגי התעשייה האילינוי המתנגדים לחוק וכנ"ל אינ לי ספק שהופשע גם משיחותיו בארצות ע"ב, ובעיקר סובב בסעודיה.

מקורביו אומרים שהוא עצמו הביע לאחרונה אי שביעות רצון מנוסח/חוק שלו. על ידי חזית התצבעה על החוק למספר חודשים הוא מאפשר למעשה להתנגדי החוק להפעיל השפעתם כדי לשנות ולמתן החוק. התוצאה תהא, ששיני החוק אכן יוקחו, או שהחוק כלל לא יגיע לתצבעה) בגלל שנת הבחירות ומושב הקונגרס קצר) מבלי שאפשר יהיה להאשים את סטיבנסון עצמו בתפנית חדה ובנסיגה מעמדתו כתוצאה מלחץ סעודי או אחר. (את חוק מינהל היצוא עצמו אפשר יהיה להאריך לתקופת זמן נוספת ללא כל תיקון

גישתו זו של סטיבנסון משתלבת היטב, לדעתי, בהתרשמותו הכללית מסעוני הערבים לה נתן ביטוי הנ בשיחותיו בישראל והנ בהתמסאותיותו בפור שונים כאנ.

רפ"ח

שח רותם מנכל שהבט ממנכל אלון י. רביב ריוזן ארגוב מצפא חקר כלכלית רמס. אוצר אכ/ אד

מס' תיק: 001230
תאריך: 001230

מס' תיק: 001230
תאריך: 001230

מס' תיק: 001230

המחוקק מנסה להסדיר את המצב הקיים, אך לא ברור מהו המטרה האמיתית.

ההצעה נועדה להסדיר את המצב הקיים, אך לא ברור מהו המטרה האמיתית. ההצעה נועדה להסדיר את המצב הקיים, אך לא ברור מהו המטרה האמיתית.

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הצעה

ההצעה נועדה להסדיר את המצב הקיים, אך לא ברור מהו המטרה האמיתית. ההצעה נועדה להסדיר את המצב הקיים, אך לא ברור מהו המטרה האמיתית.

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוק וסודות דשמיים), תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

101
ל
המשרד

אל: המשרד

מאת: וטינגטון

מסי 76

בהול

נשלח: 082000 מרצ 76

אל: הלפרינג אוצר. דעאגמונ אוצר. מצפא שר ניו יורק שפירא ניו יורק. (א/א/בר)
לשכ 46 שפירא 70
הצעת סטיבנסון.

1. מציעים להצתיג להשלמת הכירור כאנ קודם שתיזום תיקונ לדיעה על נסיגת סטיבנסון בהצעותיו. מקורותינו כאנ מצטיימ את ביואל(עוזרו של סטיבנסון) שלדבריו הועלזה האפשרות הרחיה על ידי אנשי האוצר באיצ ולא על ידי הסנטור. כנ אינ ידידינו מאושרים מהדעיונ עצמו. שום שהם אינמ צופים וטו נשיאותי בשלב זה. גמ ביואל עצמו העריכ שלא צפוי וטו. העסית החצעה בסינש תיצור תנופה ותקל על העבר הצעת קוצי בביהיג. הממשל קיבל בהתלהבות את הידיעה על הרחיה ודובריו מספרים לכל המעונייג שעד ספטמבר לא צפויה כל פעולה הקיקתית בנושא הרדם. סנטור ויליאמס מאוכזב קשות מצערו של שותפו להצעה.

2. בהתחשב בעיתוי צערו של סטיבנסון והצדיותו בנושאי מזהת אחרים בעקבות סיורו בארצות שיב אינ להוציא מכלל אפשרות הקשר כולל יורד של שינוי עמדה מצידו ולא צעד טקטי שנועד לשפר סיכוי קבלת הצעת החוק. מייד עם סיומ הכירורם השונים נודיב עמדה סופית. דם-רפיה-

אוצר חש שהה מנכל מ/מנכל אלון כלכלית מצפא
מב/אר

ל
המשרד
מאת: וטינגטון
מסי 76
נשלח: 082000 מרצ 76
לשכ 46 שפירא 70
הצעת סטיבנסון.

1957

1957

1957

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Handwritten text block, possibly a signature or a specific note.

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משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

סודי

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

מס. 52

נשלח: 031700 מרץ 76

אל: המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון

*ל
סט. ג'נרל*

מ. רביב.

נמסר לי שסטנור סטיבנסון אמר בפורום בשיקגו שהוא לא יזם כל תדרוך לעיתונות על התרשמותו ממתינותו של עראפאת, סטיבנסון סיפר שהוא דיווח על מסעו והתרשמותיו למחמד. תידרוך העיתונות על התרשמותו של סטיבנסון ממתינותו של עראפאת נעשה איפוא לדברי סטיבנסון על ידי מחמד.

בנצור

הח רחמ מנכל שהבש ממנכל יץ רביב מצפא חקר רט אמנ

נביתמ

מברק נכנס-מסווג

משורד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

[Handwritten signature]

שמור

[Handwritten note: מ/60/100]

אל: המשרד

מאת: ורשינגטון

מס. 35

גשלה 021430 מרץ 76

מעט הסברה.

הצעות ערפאת לסטיבנסון.

פירוט ההצעות ביי ורשינגטון יי מיום אי (המאמר הוסיף אליכם בנפרד) זכה להי נרחב למדי ובו בזמן כפי שבדרכ כלל קורה במקרים כאלה הובלעה ההכחשה של אשפ בעמודים הפנימיים ואפ לא הופיעה בכמה מהדורות העתונ. היה ברור לנו שהגורמים הדוגלים בהידברות בין ישראל לאשפ במערכת העתונ ירצו לנצל ידיעה זו כדי לקדם את רעיונותיהם. ואמנם מאתמול בסקר כאשר נודע לנו על כוונה לכתוב מאמר מערכת בנושא ניסינו קודם כל למנוע כתיבתו וכאשר התברר שהדבר לא יעלה בידינו התרכזנו בנסיון להקשות את חודו בתצבעה על הכתשות אשפ על ידיעות בדבר התארגנות ארגוני הטרור לפעולה משותפת נגד ישראל ומאידך על יוזמותיה המדיניות הרציניות של ישראל.

כעת אנו מנסים למנוע כתיבת מאמר מערכת ומאמר פרשנות בעתונים אחרים כדי שהנושא ימות מיתה טבעית ואם אשפ ימשיך להתכתש לרעיון כפי שעשה אתמול יהיה הדבר לעודדנו.

פזנ"ב

שהח רחמ מנכל שתבט ממנכל ממנכל מעט הסברה מצפא מזחלים הקר רח אטן רע/אמ

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - מסווג

3

מ/ק/ס
731/ח

731/ח
בשלה 011500 מרץ 76

ש מ ר

אל: רוטינגטון ניו יורק
מאת: המשרד

ב ה ו ל

להלן הגובה לא לייחוס ל"הצעות" שמטר ערמאת לטטינגטון, כפי שמסרנו לעוזבאים
ששאלו כאן:

ממקורות יודעי דבר אמרו כי בדברים שמטר פטינגטון השיתחו עם ערמאת, בראת שהיו אלה
מקטבות שונות שהן INCONSISTENT שהיו כנראה מייצגות לעשות על פטינגטון רועם
של מחיבות. פטינגטון גם לא ניטה להציג את דברי ערמאת כ"הצעה".
אין חיש בגסיונות מבהיגי אשם לתשמיע לכל דלכפין דברים הנשמעים מחיבות.
דוהי שיטתם. כמו בכל המקרים בעבר, לא איתרח הכחשת ערמאת לבוא גם במקרה זה.
מעת-מצפת

שהח רחם מגכל שחוט ממכלל טמכלל מצפא מעת הסברה מזהים חקר רים אמן
צג/בה

מס. 541

נשלח 291100 פבר 76

אל; המשרד

נאח; וושינגטון

מצפא, המרכז, רבון.

MIDEAST PROPOSAL OFFERED.
ARAFAT URGES OCCUPIED-AREA BUFFER ZONES.
BY DON OBERDORFER.

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION LEADER YASER ARAFAT HAS PROPOSED THAT ISRAEL CREATE NEW UNITED NATIONS BUFFER ZONES IN TOW OCCUPIED ARAB AREAS AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARD A MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE AND RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. THE ARAFAT PLAN WHICH APPEARS TO BE CONSIDERABLY MORE MODERATE THAN THE FORMAL POSITION OF ARAB STATES WAS BROACHED TO SEN. ADLAI E STEVENSON (D. ILL.) IN A BEIRUT MEETING DURING STEVENSON'S JUST COMPLETED MIDDLE EAST TOUR. AFTER THE DISCUSSION STEVENSON TOOK THE PLAN TO ISRAEL AND THE US.

ACCORDING TO STEVENSON THERE WAS LITTLE INTEREST FROM ISRAEL WHICH "REJECTS OUT OF HAND ANY NEGOTIATION WITH THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) EVEN IF IT WERE ON THE BEST TERMS" US OFFICIALS STUDYING ARAFAT'S IDEA WOULD NOT COMMENT ON ITS MERITS OR CHANCES. PREVIOUSLY THE PLO HAS NOT BEEN WILLING TO RECOGNIZED ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. ITS TRADITIONAL GOAL HAS BEEN A SECULAR STATE OF CHRISTIANS JEWS AND MOSLEMS IN ALL OF PALESTINE INCLUDING THE PRESENT AREA OF ISRAEL. IN RECENT MONTHS IT HAS HINTED THAT IT WOULD SETTLE FOR A SEPARATE PALESTINIAN STATE ALONGSIDE ISRAEL. STEVENSON EVIDENTLY DID NOT ASK ARAFAT ABOUT THE ULTIMATE FUTURE OF THE TERRITORY TO BE PLACED UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES IN THE PLAN HE SUGGESTS.

STEVENSON IN AN INTERVIEW WOULD ONLY HINT AT THE DETAILS OF THE ISRAELI "UNILATERAL SIGNAL" THAT ARAFAT SUGGESTED. OTHER SOURCES SAID THE PLAN WAS FOR ISRAEL TO PERMIT JOINT ISRAELI-UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATION OF BUFFER ZONES CONTIGUOUS TO ISRAEL IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND TURN OVER THE REMAINDER OF THOSE TWO OCCUPIED AREAS TO THE UN.

IF ISRAEL MAKES THIS FIRST MOVE ARAFAT INDICATED THE PLO WOULD THEN RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST WHICH COULD BREAK THE ISRAELI PLO DEADLOCK AND LEAD TO A GENERAL PEACE CONFERENCE AT WHICH THE SEEMINGLY INTRACTABLE ISSUES OF THE MIDDLE EAST COULD BE SETTLED. STEVENSON DECLINED TO CHARACTERIZE ARAFAT'S SUGGESTION AS A "HARD PROPOSAL" BUT CALLED IT "AN OFFER." THE PLO LEADER "WANTED TO GET THIS AROUND" THE SENATOR SAID.

HE ADDED THAT HE WAS TOLD BY ARAFAT AND HIS AIDES THAT THE PLAN IS A NEW ONE. STEVENSON SAID IT HAD BEEN BROACHED PREVIOUSLY BY PLO LEADERS TO EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT. SYRIAN PRESIDENT HAFEZ ASSAD WHO IS NOW CRUCIAL TO DIPLOMATIC MOVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS REPORTED BY STEVENSON TO BE "HARD

- 2 -

AS NAILS" ON COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED AREAS AS A PRECONDITION TO NEGOTIATIONS. BUT STEVENSON SAW THE SYRIAN LEADER BEFORE MEETING WITH ARAFAT. THE SENATOR QUOTED ARAFAT AS SAYING SYRIA WOULD GO ALONG WITH HIS PLAN.

OFFICIALLY MOST OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES FAVOR AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AS THE SOLUTION TO THE KNOTTY PALESTINIAN PROBLEM STEVENSON SAID HOWEVER THAT PRIVATELY LEADERS OF SOME ARAB COUNTRIES HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT A SEPARATE PLO DOMINATED PALESTINIAN STATE.

IN CONVERSTATIONS DURING HIS TRIP "OFFICIALS IN ALL ARAB STATES EXCEPT IRAQ ACKNOWLEDGED PRIVATELY THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST STEVENSON SAID. HOWEVER THERE ARE PRECONDITIONS SUCH AS WITHDRAWAL TO PRE-1967 BOUNDARIES HE SAID STEVENSON VISITED EGYPT SAUDI ARABIA SYRIA LEBANON IRAQ IRAN AND ISRAEL DURING HIS 16-DAY TRIP SEEING HIGH OFFICIALS IN EVERY PLACE.

SINCE HIS LAST JOURNEY TO THE MIDDLE EAST PRIOR TO THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR "THE SITUATION HAS DETERIORATED AND BECOME MORE COMPLICATED," THE SENATOR SAID. HE SAID WAR IN THE AREA IS "A POSSIBILITY" AS EARLY AS LATE MAY WHEN THE MANDATE EXPIRES FOR UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. STEVENSON RATED THE CHANCES FOR EITHER A WAR OR A GENERAL DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT AT LESS THAN 50-50 DURING 1976 HOWEVER.

IN EGYPT STEVENSON FOUND THE SADAT GOVERNMENT SO WEAKENED THAT "THE US IS BEING PRESSURED TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND MILITARY SALES IN ORDER TO SAVE SADAT." HE SAID SADAT HAS HEART TROUBLE AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENTS STABILITY IS "VERY MUCH IN QUESTION".

ONE POTENTIAL SOURCE OF TROUBLE IS THE EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES WHICH WERE HURT BY THE BREAKDOWN IN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. SOVIET MIG ENGINES HAVE BURNED OUT LIMITING EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE OFFICERS TO SIX HOURS OF FLYING PER MONTHS STEVENSON REPORTED HE SAID PEKING HAS AGREED TO GIVE EGYPT 20 ENGINES.

PAZNER----

שחח רתמ פנכל שתבט ממנכל סמנכל מעת הסברה מצפא מזחיתם חקר רם אמנ תעוד אילטר רנון

רע/אר

לבג - חקיקה
גורן

כח באדר א', תשל"ו
29 בפבר' 1976

סודי

א ל: מר צבי רפיה, השגרירות וושינגטון
מאת: מנהל מצפ"א / צמ"ע

הנדון: סנטור אדלאי א. סטיבנסון
מכתב 98 מיום 10.2.76

1. הקדמה

השתתפתי בשיחה הממושכת שנערכה בבית פרופסור מוקה אביר ב-24.2.76. אין לי כל ספק שהדיון (שבו השתתפו גם הפרופסורים אלכסנדר קינן ושמריהו טלמון) הותיר מטקע שלילי ובכמה נקודות אף מדכא. נסיתי להשוות, למחרת היום, את תחושותי עם התרשמות מוקה אביר ומצאתים זהות.

2. הערות על גישת האורח

הרושם לגבי האיש הנו בין היתר:

- * הגיע למזה"ת עם מטען דעות קדומות בלתי נוחות.
- * התמצאותו בענייני המזה"ת אינה מעמיקה דווקא.
- * שיחותיו במדינות ערב חידדו כמה מדעותיו הקדומות ואף ספקו מטען שלילי נוסף.
- * הרושם הוא שהוא קבל פשוטן כמשמען וללא סלקציה בתוחית את רוב הדעות שהושמעו באזניו בבירות ערב (תוך החפיפה הידועה) פרט לאלו ששמע בבגדאד.

3. ארצות ערב רוצות בשלום

סטיבנסון הביע את שלבושו שמשטרי מדינות ערב שבהן בקר (פרט לעיראק) מעוניינים באמת שבחמים בשלום עם ישראל (כמובן על בסיס הנאים מסויימים). נראה שאין משוכנעים בצדקה טענת ישראל שממשלות ערביות אלו טרם השלימו עם קיומה של ישראל. בנקודה מסויימת ערך מעין השוואה בין מימדי העוינות ההדדית שבין ישראל לבין ערב. מכאן לא רחוקה הדרך לטענות הקשיחות הישראלית.

4. מצרים

התרשם קשות ממצבה הכלכלי הקשה של מצרים והשתכנע בצורך להושיט לה סיוע כלכלי נרחב; זאת, אף כי הוא מודע לעובדה שמימדיו הנוכחיים של הסיוע הכלכלי האמריקני אינם אלא טפה בים.

עם זאת נראה שהשתכנע שכדי לתמוך בסאדאת ולמנוע מפלתו, יש להושיט לו גם סיוע צבאי מבוקר. התרשם מאוד מן הטעון שבגלל מדיניותה של בריה"מ, חלה התדרדרות גוברת ביכולתה הצבאית של מצרים (מטוסייה מסוגלים לטוט רק שש שעות בחודש) אינו משוכנע שריאד מוכנה לסייע למצרים בצורה נאותה. למעשה התרשם שאין שליטי סעודיה משוכנעים בכח עמדתו של סאדאת ושלכן אינם מעוניינים להשפיע עליו סיוע נזיב. כן אין סטיבנסון משוכנע בנכונותן של הערכות מחמ"ד בנושא זה. הוא סבור, איפוא, שאין לו וושינגטון מנוס אלא לספק למצרים פריטי ציוד צבאי מסויימים ושצעד כזה הנו חיוני לאינטרסיה של ארה"ב. הסכמנו לו הסכנות והסכונים תוך פרוט מאגרי הנשק בארצות ערב אחרות (סעודיה). כן הזמנו השעף הטעונים בדבר קרע סופי עם בריה"מ. לא ברור אם קלט הסברים אלה אך, התרשם מן הטעון בדבר יכולתם של מטוסי ההובלה C-130 (הרקולט) למלא תפקיד חשוב בהטסת ציוד צבאי למצרים.

סודי

5. סעודיה

למרות ההסברים ששמע לגבי סעודיה וצרכיה ברכש צבאי, טען שיש לסייע לה לעמוד בפני איומים סובייטיים ותככי פנים. למעשה היתה אמבילנטיות בגישתו כי בנגוד לטעון הנ"ל הביע התנגדות למימדיהן הגדולים של מכירות הנשק האמריקני לארצות חוץ בעוד שבנקודה אחרת הסתייג מכמה מגלויי הדטנס והותורים לבריה"מ (חוטר עקביות בולט) -

6. פלסטין

בהמשך השיחה הביע את הכרתו שהבעיה הפלסטינית הנה המכשול העיקרי בדרך להסדר ושפתרונה יאפשר לממשלות ערב, הרוצות בשלום, להגיע לידי ההסכמים הרצויים. דומני שלא היה ספק שהותרם "מגזינותו" של ערפאת. ושהוא הקנה לדבריו אמינות וכנות. צטט בהתפעלות את נכונותו להגיע לכלל דו-קיום בשלום עם ישראל בחנאי שיוכל לקבל כמה "קילומטרים מרובעים" (עלובים) בגדה המערבית כדי שיוכל להצדיק בפני פלגיו השונים של אש"פ את העזתו ואומץ ליבו. סטיבנסון גלה הבנה לבקשה "צנועה" זו מבחינתו של ערפאת.

7. התקדמות עם ירדן

התרשמותו בישראל משיחותיו היא שנוצר קפאון מסוכן בבעיות ירדן ופלסטין כאחת, משום: * חוסיין לא יוכל להתזיר לעצמו את הזכות לייצג הפלסטינים (ישראל החמיצה את ההזדמנות אשר נקרתה לה לפני רבאט).

* ישראל אינה מסוגלת לשום וויתורים בעלי ערך כלשהו בגדמ"ע.

* חוסיין יתא פחות ופחות משרן בתביעותיו נוכח הדוק יחסיו עם סוריה. עונה יעלה מחיר.

* שום צעד משמעותי לא יעשה, לא בחקשר לבעיה הפלסטינית ולא בחקשר להסדר ישראלי-ירדני, ללא גושפנקא מלאה מטעם דמשק.

זהו קפאון מטוכן הנקשה על ארה"ב למלא את תפקידיה בגשור הפער שבין הצדדים. זהו מצב כמעט מייאש.

8. תווך מוליטרטרלי

לאור קפאון זה (שביצירתו יש לישראל חלק נכבד) לא תהא כנראה ברירה אלא להפעיל "מדיניות מולטיטרטרלית". הרמז לפתרון כפוי ברור.

9. הסכם הביניים

הוא לא הסתיר את העובדה שהוא הצביע (9.10.75) נגד ההחלטה לחציב 200 טכנאים אמריקניים באזור החיץ בטיני בעקבות הסכם הביניים מיום 4.9.75 אך הפעם העלה טעון כנראה חדש להתנגדותו: הוא ידע שהסכם זה בכלללותו עלול לרתק את ארה"ב להתחייבויות מצחיקות לכת לסייע לביטחון המזון ואולי אף להושיעו מקטסטרופה כלכלית (נמנע מלהזכיר את ישראל בחקשר זה). ההסכם היה "מעורפל".

10. סיום מצב המלחמה

לאחר ששמע באותו יום הסברים לגבי החלטה הנמשלה מ-22.3.76, הביע דעתו שאין כל סיכוי שפורמלצן כאלו יסייעו לקדום הסדרים שהרי מדינות ערב עומדות על מלוי התנאים הבסיסיים וכו' וכו'.

11. סכום

התמונה בכלותה ברורה. אף כי אין אולי סכוי רב, כדאי דומני להוסיף ולשוחח עמו על כמה בעיות יסוד הן לגבי עמדתם הבסיסית של משטרי ערב כלפי ישראל עצמאית ורבונית והן לגבי הבעיה הפלסטינית. במכתבן הנ"ל ציינת ש"סטיבנסון תומך בסיסית בישראל", חתם כל מכתב 76 הסנטורים מיום 22.5.75 ושהוא תומך בסיוע חוץ לישראל.

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סודי

הערה:

עוזרו ויליאם בואל עושה רושם שקול ורציני המעוניין ללמוד
דומני שכדאי לטפח גם אותו.

ב ב ר כ ה,

דוד בן-דב

העתק:

הציר, וושינגטון
לשכת המנכ"ל
המרכז

Page

1950
The following information was received from the
files of the Department of State.

SECRET

TOP SECRET

1950
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files of the Department of State.



ס' אדר א' תשל"ו
10 בפברואר 1976

98

אל: ממש"א

מאו"ר

מאת: שבי רפיח, וושינגטון

הנדון: סמפור סטיבנסון
למברקי מ-10 דנא.

בסיסית חונך סטיבנסון בישראל. חתם אשתקד על מכתב 76
הסנטורים והטך ביוזמות אחרות. מאידך, אין הוא נמנה על היוזמים
והנלהבים. הצביע בסינט נגד אישור הצבת הטכנאים בסיני. מאמין
שעל ישראל והערבים כאחד לגלות גמישות כתנאי להסדר במזה"ת.

בדצמבר 1974 קיבל עיטור "איש השנה" של הבונדס. באוהה
הדמנות נשא נאום מדיני על ישראל והמזה"ת, אותו אני מעביר לכם
ג"ב.

המך בסיוע חונך לישראל, אבל טחה ביקורת על סיוע שבאי אטריקני
לחו"ל (פרט לישראל). היה מראשי המתנגדים לשלחמה בויטנאם (ומכאן
התנגדותו לטכנאים). ידוע כאחד המתנגדים והמבקרים הבולטים של
קיסינג'ר. ההנגר למסעות הדילוגים שלו במזה"ת ותומך בכינוס ועידה
ג'נבה.

בשיחות עמו ראוי להקדיש תשומת לב מיוחדת לנושא הפלשתינאי.
עמדתו עד כה היתה שכל עוד אין אש"פ מביר בישראל ומפסיק הטרור -
אל לארה"ב ולישראל לדון עמו. אבל אם ימלא אש"פ אתר הנאים אלו,
אזי יצדד הסנטור בהכאתם למו"ס. את ערפאת הוא רואה כמתון יחסית.

סטיבנסון אינו מאמין גדול באירומה ובנאט"ו ובמחויבות
ארה"ב כלפי אירופה. כמו"כ היה ידוע כחסיד האו"ם אך מודאג מאד
כהתדרדרות האחרונה (כולל הופעה ערפאת באו"ם). אביו, כידוע, היה
בין הטאר, שגריר באו"ם.



- 2 -

סטיבנסון ידוע בסינטיס כאדם רגיש מאד, המבליט את עצמאיותו.
אומרים עליו שהוא סובל מהסביך היותו "הבן של אביו".

עוזרו, WILLIAM BUELL, כבן המישיג, שירת שנים רבות
במחמ"ד באירופה ואפריקה. רק לפני חצי שנה החל לעבוד עם הסנטור
בעוזרו לעניני הוץ. מקיים קשרים הדוקים עם מחמ"ד וודאי ניזון
מהערכותיהם והדרוכיהם. זהו ביקורו הראשון באזורנו. כדאי, אפוא,
להשקיע גם בו מאמץ.

יש לזכור כי הסנטור ועוזרו יגיעו לישראל לאחר סיור בארבע
ארצות ערביות ופגישה עם סאדאת ומנהיגים ערבים אחרים. מטמעות
הדבר מבהינה המטען שיגיע עמו - ברורה.

בברכה,
ד"ר רפיה

לוטה: א. לוח הנסיעה של הנ"ל במזה"ת
ב. הנאות שנשא בשיקגו ב-15.12.74 באירוע 'הבונדס'.
ג. תולדות ר"ג

IR - Iranian National Airlines
MS - Egyptian Airlines
RB - Syrian Arab Airlines
SV - Saudi Arabia Airlines
** - Wait List

February 6, 1976
j.

AES MIDDLE EAST ITINERARY:

Tues.	2.10	Lv. Dulles	TWA #890/F	6:45p
		Arr. Rome, Italy		11:20a
Weds.	2.11	Lv. Rome, Italy	TWA #840/F	12:30p
		Arr. Cairo, Egypt		5:55p
		Accommodations: Have requested 2 doubles; hotels not yet confirmed.		
Fri.	2.13	Lv. Cairo, Egypt	MS #761	6:00a
		Arr. Jiddah, Saudi Arabia		8:55a
		Accommodations: Residence of Ambassador and Mrs. Porter		
Fri.	2.13	Lv. Jiddah, Saudi Arabia	SV #908	6:30p
		Arr. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia		8:45p
		Accommodations: Embassy Guest House		
Sat.	2.14	Lv. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	SV #703	6:45p
		Arr. Jiddah, Saudi Arabia		8:05p
Sun.	2.15	**Lv. Jiddah, Saudi Arabia	RB #384	8:30a
		Arr. Damascus, Syria		9:45a
		Accommodations: Residence of Ambassador and Mrs. Richard Murphy		

Alternate reservations:

Sat.	2.14	Lv. Riyadh	SV #932	3:30p
		Arr. Damascus		5:00p

Tues.	2.17	Lv. Damascus, Syria	MS #726	4:40p
		Arr. Baghdad, Iraq		6:55p
		Accommodations: Residence of FSO and Mrs. Marshall Wiley		

Weds. 2.18 Lv. Baghdad, Iraq IR #512 9:10p
Arr. Teheran, Iran 11:00p

Accommodations: Intercontinental Hotel

Mon. 2.23 Lv. Teheran, Iran ElAl #564 12:00 noon
Arr. Tel Aviv, Israel 1:45p

Accommodations:

Mon. 2.23 Tel Aviv Hilton

Tues. 2.24 Jerusaly, Jerusalem

Weds. 2.25 Lv. Tel Aviv, Israel TWA #803/F 7:20a
Arr. JFK 1:55p

Weds. 2.25 Lv. JFK TWA #63 4:00p
Arr. Dulles 5:25p





Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 93^d CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 120

WASHINGTON, FRIDAY, JANUARY 10, 1975

No. 181

Senate

E 7466-E 7467

HON. ADLAI E. STEVENSON III

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Friday, December 20, 1974

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, on Sunday, December 15, 1974, I was honored as the Israel Bond "Man of the Year" in Chicago. I ask unanimous consent that the text of my speech be included in the Record.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be included in the Record, as follows:

REMARKS BY SENATOR STEVENSON

I am honored by the generous recognition you have accorded me and glad for an opportunity to express some thoughts about the future of Israel.

This is the final night of the Festival of Hanukkah—a season of hope. I want my remarks to be in keeping with the spirit of the season. I want also to be thoroughly candid with you about what we read in the headlines from the Middle East—and what we read between the lines.

So, tonight I sound three notes: a note of sober, even somber, realism; a note of earnest caution; and a note of genuine hope—even confidence—that Israel, which has endured many storms, will survive another, and soon prosper in peace.

This gathering is a testament to the inspiration Israel holds, not just for those of the Jewish faith, but for millions of others in the world.

Israel is a testament to the power of the human will to triumph over adversity and cruelty.

Israel symbolizes the righting of terrible wrongs—and so, it touches our memories and the conscience of us all.

The flowering of modern Israel is a testament to man's persevering genius—his economic, technological, scientific and democratic genius. Israel has made the desert bloom and the human spirit flourish.

So, in Israel more is at stake than the future of one small nation; more is at stake than the pride of its friends and supporters. In Israel the honor of a generation is at stake. History will not deal kindly with a world that fails to help this small, free and courageous nation to prosper and to live in peace.

It would be foolish tonight to ignore the storm clouds that hover over Israel.

At a time when the United States should be speaking with one voice in support of Israel, the highest ranking officer of the United States armed forces, General Brown, has sounded a discordant note. In one interview, he questioned the loyalty of American Jews to the United States. In another, he saw fit to question the judgments at Nuremberg.

For these lapses, the President thinks General Brown should merely be reprimanded. I think he should have been reprimanded—and then removed.

Even more seriously, we see tonight an eclipse of principled leadership in the world—most tragically in the United Nations.

The U.N. in recent days has passed resolutions that defy both realism and justice.

Humanitarian relief programs have been perverted into cynical tools of political reprisal.

And we have seen the saddest spectacle of all: the General Assembly, which once was a council of peace, sounding an ovation for a terrorist.

In 1961 my father, speaking from his seat in the United Nations, warned against the day when the actions of the United Nations might be meaningless—because no one would take them seriously: a day when raw power might overwhelm international morality. If that day came, he warned, the true victims would almost certainly be the small and developing nations newly coming to independence.

Now his words seem sadly prophetic. For these dismal events in the United Nations do not so much threaten Israel as they threaten the United Nations itself. Already the United States Senate has voted to withhold funds from UNESCO until it ceases its politically motivated behavior.

It would be tragic if the United Nations, still the fragile vessel of our hopes for international cooperation and world peace, should sink still lower in the esteem of civilized humanity.

So, let those nations who, having sought an international forum and then abused it, show some restraint—or finally destroy the frail vehicle upon which rides much of mankind's hope.

Still other, more immediate, dangers are on our minds tonight.

The people of Israel find that some battlefield victories bring, not elation, in their wake, but trouble: bitterness and recrimination, now inflation; burdensome taxes and economic recession.

The friends of Israel watch with growing anxiety as Russia rearms her Arab clients—and as the Arabs, the P.L.O. and Iran included, unite within a fortress built of oil.

Israel's fate hangs upon the thread of supplies and support from the United States. And now the resupply of Israel is complicated by logistical uncertainties in the Azores and elsewhere.

The patient efforts of Secretary Kissinger to approach a settlement step by step have been threatened, if not doomed, by the recent Arab summit in Rabat.

All these somber facts point to the danger in the Middle East that war will erupt anew.

Some say that Israel cannot countenance the growing unity and continuing rearmament of the Arab states or the new status of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Some say that with the Syrian disengagement agreement less than six months from expiring; with the Arabs gaining unity and strength, the Arabs may be reaching a point where they will not show restraint—and so Israel is reaching a point where it cannot show restraint.

Some are counseling war in the name of peace. In short, some who call themselves friends of Israel are counseling a preemptive strike; arguing that Israel must attack upon some provocation to buy time and—perhaps with support from the United States—invade Arab oil fields and break the back of the oil cartel.

So here I strike my note of earnest warning: There may be appeal in such bold and simple ideas—in such forceful notions about ordering human affairs. But there is also great danger.

The great danger is that things will give way and the center will not hold. The wise will lack strength and the passionate intensity of the extremists will carry.

Already the statesmanship of Prime Minister Rabin is under assault from more militant citizens in Israel.

Arab moderates are beleaguered and living under the threat of assassination.

Yasir Arafat, ringed by zealots even more extreme than he, feels compelled by an Israeli reprisal in Beirut to appeal to murder in Tel Aviv. The danger is great that the voices of moderation may be silenced by zealots—and the patient work of peace obliterated by war. This past week the spiral of terrorism took another tragic turn in Tel Aviv and Beirut.

This is a time to sustain and support the leadership of Prime Minister Rabin. He is guided not by dreams of conquest or revenge, but by a clearer perception of reality.

(OVER)

A preemptive strike by Israel, he knows, would be followed by an oil embargo against all the major oil consuming nations. Such a strike, however much disguised, would forfeit U.S. support for Israel, and cause world depression.

The Prime Minister is wisely speaking of flexibility; of talks rather than war; of the political process rather than preemptive strike. He needs and deserves our support against those immoderates who, like Samson, would bring down the temple upon our heads.

And now, real hope.

For I see light beyond the clouds on the horizon.

There is, in the air of both Israel and the Arab states, also in Moscow and Washington, a new breath of realism, born of the horror war can bring, a new willingness to conciliate opposing views.

Israel has bravely and forthrightly accepted a new austerity so that it can carry both the burdens of its people's needs and the national defense.

Despite the new status conferred upon the Palestine Liberation Organization at the Arab summit in Rabat, Arab moderates still have the upper hand. There is some hope that the P.L.O. may now be subjected to new restraints and moderating influences. Now the P.L.O. has status to lose, as well as to gain, by irresponsible demands and violent tactics. The Soviets appear to be exercising a chastening influence—and we should bear in mind that Arab moderates are by no means enthusiastic about the prospect of a Palestinian state ruled by Yasif Arafat.

Secretary Kissinger's efforts may have been set back—but that does not mean that war is imminent, or that continued conflict is the unending destiny of the Middle East.

No, I believe the future holds more hope than that.

I do not believe that the United States should accept the P.L.O. as spokesman or agent for the Palestinians.

I do not believe that the U.S. should pressure Israel to do so.

For until the P.L.O. renounces terrorism and acknowledges Israel's right to exist, Israel has nothing to negotiate with the P.L.O.

But history—even recent history—has taught us that today's impossibilities can become tomorrow's possibilities.

Our hope tonight—a hope which deserves our prayers and our tireless efforts—is that a more promising future can be built in the Middle East out of a process of negotiation that includes all parties who are willing to renounce violence and accept the right of Israel to exist. Such a process is possible and could lead to a settlement of all the tangled issues that plague the Middle East; a settle-

ment that would be guaranteed by the great powers—and finally, a settlement that would justify restraint and concession by Israel and its neighbors.

I am hopeful because I am confident of the continuing support of the United States for the State of Israel, the people of Israel—and the idea that is Israel.

The U.S. will remain Israel's steadfast friend and supporter. Israel will justify and guarantee U.S. support by its reason and its commitment to a peaceful settlement of its disputes.

We are not about to sell Israel for a barrel of oil.

Any relaxation of the U.S. commitment to Israel's security and integrity would encourage the Soviets and the Arab states to believe that their ends could be achieved by force. I do not expect that relaxation to come because I do not expect Israel to invite it.

Adversity is not new for Israel and for people of the Jewish faith. They have overcome much in the past and must overcome much again. But I believe more deserts will bloom in the Middle East. And this time, in peace.

The times are dangerous. But they are also hopeful. You can hear, amid the uproar of men and nations, the flutter of wings, the gentle stirrings of life and hope. In the heat of fear and conflict new ideas and a new spirit may come into this world, as gently as doves.

Let us look at Israel's achievements—and take heart for her future. Let us look—and work—toward the day when peace comes, and then we will gather to look back to this time as the time when the process of peace was started; when the walls began to fall; when men learned once again to esteem reason and brotherhood.

For that to happen will require high statesmanship. It will take the understanding and the humility of which the prophets spoke. It will take preparedness and firmness. It will take your continued support and mine—and the support of all the American people. It will take leadership in America which acts from a clear recognition of our moral obligation and true self-interest in the Middle East—leadership that is not deflected by weariness or the whims of private interests or the fitful currents of opinion. But given that support, the elements of a settlement are there to be put together by wise and persevering and moderate men.

So let us work to make it happen.

And as we do so, let us pray, in the words of the young Solomon, "Lord, give Thy servant an understanding heart."

Shalom.

SENATOR ADLAI E. STEVENSON (III) (D-ILL.)

Term began: 1971

Committees: None important to Israel

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כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

שמו

אל: המשרד

מאת: ורשינגטון

מס. 505

נשלח: 261800 פבר 76

מל"ר

אגמון אוצר. תלפריין אוצר. מתנד.

שר אנל קסוטו רפיח כע.

סטיבנסון ויליאמס.

התיקון שהיה צריך לבוא לחצבעה היום במליאת הסנט לא הובא להצבעה לאחר שעוכב ברגע האחרון

על ידי סטיבנסון עצמו.

הניסוח הרשמי הוא כי על כמה מהאמסקטים של החוק יערכו HEARINGS נוספים בעת הדיון

EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT

-2

ידידינו כען מודאגים מעובדות הדחיה וחוששים שתיא קטורה בנטיעתו של סטיבנסון למזרח התיכון

(בנוסף לביקורו בישראל בפגש עם ערפאת וביקר במצרים, עיראק ומעוריה).

רף

אוצר חש שהח מגכל ממנכל אלון כלכלית מממא

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ג'ני, סט' ב'נין

ירושלים, כ"ב באדר א', תשל"ו
23 בפברואר 1976

אל : שר החוץ

מאת: מנהל מצפ"א

לקראת פגישתך עם סנטור סטיבנסון חשבתי שתמצא ענין במספר
התבטאויות שלו היום.

אחרי תדרוך שה' שעתיים וחצי ע"י השגריר טון יצא סטיבנסון ואמר
לי כי הוא לא מבין את החלטת הממשלה מאמש ולדעתו היא רק "קוסמטיקה".

אמרתי כי תהיה לו הזדמנות לשמוע מחר מרה"מ ונאך הסבר מלא על
ההחלטה. אציין שהיא מצביעה על נכונות הממשלה להמשיך בתהליך המדיני
בתזוכה של ארה"ב לקראת הסכמים נרחבים. המיוחד בה, בין היתר, שהיא
מתחסת לכל שלושת המדינות השכנות ולא למדינה אחת בלבד.
סטיבנסון ענה כי ארה"ב מנהלה כל הזמן בירורים עם מדינות ערב ולא
מתקדמת כלל. הוא לא רואה כיצד סוריה תסכים למו"מ ללא אש"ף. הוא
נפגש עם ערפאת ומצא אוהו יותר מתון מאשר אישים בבגדד וכדמשק. ישראל
חייבת להכיר במציאות ולא להתעלם ממנה כפי שארה"ב התעלמה מסין במשך
30 שנה. הברירות כפי שהוא רואה אותן הן או לשלב את אש"ף או לתת לחוסין
"הרבה מאד".

עוזרו אמר כי הוא לא חושב שיצמח איזה נזק אם יערך בירור בדבר
אפשרות השגת הסכמים ל"אי לוחמה". תהליך כזה עם כל שלושת מדינות ערב
ארה"ב טרם ניסתה. הוא לא אופטימי אך כדאי לנסות.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY

1950

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טטיבנסון אמר שככל שהוא מזועזק יותר בבעיות האיזור בסידור הנוכחי כך הוא יותר פסימי. ייתכן ולא יהיה מנוס ממלחמה נוספת שלאחריה ארה"ב וברה"מ יכפו הסדר. דאגתו נובעת גם מהערכתו את המצב הפנימי בארה"ב. סנטור פרסי נואם באילינוי על נסיגה לגבולות 1967 ומדינה פלסטינית וזוכה למחיאות כפיים סוערות. לדעתו הסדר הביניים החליש מאוד את סאדאת. הצבא המצרי "חסר מנוחה" כי אין לו נשק. אין מנועים למטוסים ומצרים בקושי הצליחה להשיג 20 מנועים מסין הרוצה לפגוע בהשפעה הסובייטית. הרבה אמריקנים מדברים אלינו דברים שאנו רוצים לשמוע. הוא יהיה גלוי לב כי הוא ידיד אמיתי.

בברכה,

משה רביב

העתקים: המשנה למנכ"ל

מר צ. רפיח, וושינגטון

ז'אז'ס

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

ט' אדר א' תשל"ו
10 בפברואר 1976



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

98

Handwritten notes and signatures in blue ink, including a large signature and some illegible text.

אל: קמפ"א

מאו"ר

מאת: צבי רפזיח, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנסור סטיבנסון
למברקי מ-10 דנא.

בסיסית הומך סטיבנסון בישראל. חתם אשתקד על מכתב 76 הסנטורים ותמך ביוזמה אחרות. מאידך, אין הוא נמנה על היוזמים והנלהבים. הצביע בסינאט נגד אישור הצבת הטכנאים בסיני. מאמין שעל ישראל והערבים כאחד לגלות גמישות כחנאי להסדר במזה"ת.

בדצמבר 1974 קיבל עיטור "איש השנה" של הבונדס. באותה הזדמנות נשא נאום מדיני על ישראל והמזה"ת, אותו אני מעביר לכם **234**.

תמך בסיוע חוץ לישראל, אבל מתי ביקורת על סיוע צבאי אמריקני לחו"ל (פרט לישראל). היה מראשי המתנגדים למלחמה בויטנאם (ומכאן התנגדותו לטכנאים). ידוע כאחד המתנגדים והמבקרים הבולטים של קיסנינג'ר. ההנגד למסעות הדילוגים שלו במזה"ת-ותומך בכינוס ועידת ג'נבה.

בשיחות עמו ראוי להקדיש השומת לב מיוחדת לנושא הפלשתינאי. עמדתו עד כה היתה שכל עוד אין אש"פ מכיר בישראל ומפסיק הטרור - אל לארה"ב ולישראל לדון עמו. אבל אם ימלא אש"פ אחר תנאים אלו, אזי יצדד הסנסור בהבאתם למו"מ. את ערפאת הוא רואה כמתון יחסית.

סטיבנסון הינו מאמין גדול באירופה ובנאט"ו ובמחוייבות ארה"ב כלפי אירופה. כמו"כ היה ידוע כחסיד האו"ם אך מודאג מאד מההדרדרות האחרונה (כולל הופעת ערפאת באו"ם). אביו, כידוע, היה בין הטאר, שגריר באו"ם.



- 2 -

סטיבנסון ידוע בסינטיס כאדם רגיש מאד, המבליט אה עצמאותו.
אומרים עליו שהוא סובל מתסביך היותו "הבן של אביו".

עוזרו, WILLIAM BUELL, כבן חמישים, שירה שנים רבות
במחמ"ד באירופה ואפריקה. רק לפני חצי שנה החל לעבוד עם הסנטור
כעוזרו לעניני חוץ. מקיים קשרים הדוקים עם מחמ"ד וודאי ניזון
מהעמדותיהם והדרוכיהם. זהו ביקורו הראשון באזורנו. כדאי, אפוא,
להתקיע גט בו מאמץ.

יש לזכור כי הסנטור ועוזרו יגיעו לישראל לאחר סיור בארבע
ארצות ערביות ופגישות עם סאדאט ומנהיגים ערבים אחרים. משמעות
הדבר מבהינה המטען שיגיע עמו - ברורה.

ב ב ר כ ה
ד. ר. מ.
צ. רפיה

לוטה: א. לוח הנסיעות של הנ"ל במזה"ת
ב. הנאום שנשא בשיקגו ב-15.12.74 באירוע הבונדס.
ג. תולדות חיים

SENATOR ADLAI E. STEVENSON (III) (D-ILL.)

Term began: 1971

Committees: None important to Israel

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1/10/76
10/12/74



United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 93^d CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 120

WASHINGTON, FRIDAY, JANUARY 10, 1975

No. 181

Senate

E 7466—E 7467

HON. ADLAI E. STEVENSON III

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Friday, December 20, 1974

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, on Sunday, December 15, 1974, I was honored as the Israel Bond "Man of the Year" in Chicago. I ask unanimous consent that the text of my speech be included in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be included in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS BY SENATOR STEVENSON

I am honored by the generous recognition you have accorded me and glad for an opportunity to express some thoughts about the future of Israel.

This is the final night of the Festival of Hanukkah—a season of hope. I want my remarks to be in keeping with the spirit of the season. I want also to be thoroughly candid with you about what we read in the headlines from the Middle East—and what we read between the lines.

So, tonight I sound three notes: a note of sober, even somber, realism; a note of earnest caution; and a note of genuine hope—even confidence—that Israel, which has endured many storms, will survive another, and soon prosper in peace.

This gathering is a testament to the inspiration Israel holds, not just for those of the Jewish faith, but for millions of others in the world.

Israel is a testament to the power of the human will to triumph over adversity and cruelty.

Israel symbolizes the righting of terrible wrongs—and so, it touches our memories and the conscience of us all.

The flowering of modern Israel is a testament to man's persevering genius—his economic, technological, scientific and democratic genius. Israel has made the desert bloom and the human spirit flourish.

So, in Israel more is at stake than the future of one small nation; more is at stake than the pride of its friends and supporters. In Israel the honor of a generation is at stake. History will not deal kindly with a world that fails to help this small, free and courageous nation to prosper and to live in peace.

It would be foolish tonight to ignore the storm clouds that hover over Israel.

At a time when the United States should be speaking with one voice in support of Israel, the highest ranking officer of the United States armed forces, General Brown, has sounded a discordant note. In one interview, he questioned the loyalty of American Jews to the United States. In another, he saw fit to question the judgments at Nuremberg.

For these lapses, the President thinks General Brown should merely be reprimanded. I think he should have been reprimanded—and then removed.

Even more seriously, we see tonight an eclipse of principled leadership in the world—most tragically in the United Nations.

The U.N. in recent days has passed resolutions that defy both realism and justice.

Humanitarian relief programs have been perverted into cynical tools of political reprisal.

And we have seen the saddest spectacle of all: the General Assembly, which once was a council of peace, sounding an ovation for a terrorist.

In 1961 my father, speaking from his seat in the United Nations, warned against the day when the actions of the United Nations might be meaningless—because no one would take them seriously; a day when raw power might overwhelm international morality. If that day came, he warned, the true victims would almost certainly be the small and developing nations newly coming to independence.

Now his words seem sadly prophetic. For these dismal events in the United Nations do not so much threaten Israel as they threaten the United Nations itself. Already the United States Senate has voted to withhold funds from UNESCO until it ceases its politically motivated behavior.

It would be tragic if the United Nations, still the fragile vessel of our hopes for international cooperation and world peace, should sink still lower in the esteem of civilized humanity.

So, let those nations who, having sought an international forum and then abused it, show some restraint—or finally destroy the frail vehicle upon which rides much of mankind's hope.

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The patient efforts of Secretary Kissinger to approach a settlement step by step have been threatened, if not doomed, by the recent Arab summit in Rabat.

All these somber facts point to the danger in the Middle East that war will erupt anew.

Some say that Israel cannot countenance the growing unity and continuing rearmament of the Arab states or the new status of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Some say that with the Syrian disengagement agreement less than six months from expiring, with the Arabs gaining unity and strength, the Arabs may be reaching a point where they will not show restraint—and so Israel is reaching a point where it cannot show restraint.

Some are counseling war in the name of peace. In short, some who call themselves friends of Israel are counseling a preemptive strike; arguing that Israel must attack upon some provocation to buy time and—perhaps with support from the United States—invade Arab oil fields and break the back of the oil cartel.

So here I strike my note of earnest warning: There may be appeal in such bold and simple ideas—in such forceful notions about ordering human affairs. But there is also great danger.

The great danger is that things will give way and the center will not hold. The wise will lack strength and the passionate intensity of the extremists will carry.

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(OVER)

A preemptive strike by Israel, he knows, would be followed by an oil embargo against all the major oil consuming nations. Such a strike, however much disguised, would forfeit U.S. support for Israel, and cause world depression.

The Prime Minister is wisely speaking of flexibility; of talks rather than war; of the political process rather than preemptive strike. He needs and deserves our support against those immoderates who, like Samson, would bring down the temple upon our heads. And now, real hope.

For I see light beyond the clouds on the horizon.

There is, in the air of both Israel and the Arab states, also in Moscow and Washington, a new breath of realism, born of the horror war can bring, a new willingness to conciliate opposing views.

Israel has bravely and forthrightly accepted a new austerity so that it can carry both the burdens of its people's needs and the national defense.

Despite the new status conferred upon the Palestine Liberation Organization at the Arab summit in Rabat, Arab moderates still have the upper hand. There is some hope that the P.L.O. may now be subjected to new restraints and moderating influences. Now the P.L.O. has status to lose, as well as to gain, by irresponsible demands and violent tactics. The Soviets appear to be exercising a chastening influence—and we should bear in mind that Arab moderates are by no means enthusiastic about the prospect of a Palestinian state ruled by Yassif Arafat.

Secretary Kissinger's efforts may have been set back—but that does not mean that war is imminent, or that continued conflict is the unending destiny of the Middle East.

No, I believe the future holds more hope than that.

I do not believe that the United States should accept the P.L.O. as spokesman or agent for the Palestinians.

I do not believe that the U.S. should pressure Israel to do so.

For until the P.L.O. renounces terrorism and acknowledges Israel's right to exist, Israel has nothing to negotiate with the P.L.O.

But history—even recent history—has taught us that today's impossibilities can become tomorrow's possibilities.

Our hope tonight—a hope which deserves our prayers and our tireless efforts—is that a more promising future can be built in the Middle East out of a process of negotiation that includes all parties who are willing to renounce violence and accept the right of Israel to exist. Such a process is possible and could lead to a settlement of all the tangled issues that plague the Middle East; a settle-

ment that would be guaranteed by the great powers—and finally, a settlement that would justify restraint and concession by Israel and its neighbors.

I am hopeful because I am confident of the continuing support of the United States for the State of Israel, the people of Israel—and the idea that is Israel.

The U.S. will remain Israel's steadfast friend and supporter. Israel will justify and guarantee U.S. support by its reason and its commitment to a peaceful settlement of its disputes.

We are not about to sell Israel for a barrel of oil.

Any relaxation of the U.S. commitment to Israel's security and integrity would encourage the Soviets and the Arab states to believe that their ends could be achieved by force. I do not expect that relaxation to come because I do not expect Israel to invite it.

Adversity is not new for Israel and for people of the Jewish faith. They have overcome much in the past and must overcome much again. But I believe more deserts will bloom in the Middle East. And this time, in peace.

The times are dangerous. But they are also hopeful. You can hear, amid the uproar of men and nations, the flutter of wings, the gentle stirrings of life and hope. In the heat of fear and conflict new ideas and a new spirit may come into this world, as gently as doves.

Let us look at Israel's achievements—and take heart for her future. Let us look—and work—toward the day when peace comes, and then we will gather to look back to this time as the time when the process of peace was started; when the walls began to fall; when men learned once again to esteem reason and brotherhood.

For that to happen will require high statesmanship. It will take the understanding and the humility of which the prophets spoke. It will take preparedness and firmness. It will take your continued support and mine—and the support of all the American people. It will take leadership in America which acts from a clear recognition of our moral obligation and true self-interest in the Middle East—leadership that is not deflected by weariness or the whims of private interests or the fitful currents of opinion. But given that support, the elements of a settlement are there to be put together by wise and persevering and moderate men.

So let us work to make it happen.

And as we do so, let us pray, in the words of the young Solomon, "Lord, give Thy servant an understanding heart."

Shalom.

IR - Iranian National Airlines
MS - Egyptian Airlines
RB - Syrian Arab Airlines
SV - Saudi Arabia Airlines
** - Wait List

February 6, 1976
j.

AES MIDDLE EAST ITINERARY:

Tues.	2.10	Lv. Dulles	TWA #890/F	6:45p
		Arr. Rome, Italy		11:20a
Weds.	2.11	Lv. Rome, Italy	TWA #840/F	12:30p
		Arr. Cairo, Egypt		5:55p
		Accommodations: Have requested 2 doubles; hotels not yet confirmed.		
Fri.	2.13	Lv. Cairo, Egypt	MS #761	6:00a
		Arr. Jiddah, Saudi Arabia		8:55a
		Accommodations: Residence of Ambassador and Mrs. Porter		
Fri.	2.13	Lv. Jiddah, Saudi Arabia	SV #908	6:30p
		Arr. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia		8:45p
		Accommodations: Embassy Guest House		
Sat.	2.14	Lv. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	SV #703	6:45p
		Arr. Jiddah, Saudi Arabia		8:05p
Sun.	2.15	**Lv. Jiddah, Saudi Arabia	RB #384	8:30a
		Arr. Damascus, Syria		9:45a
		Accommodations: Residence of Ambassador and Mrs. Richard Murphy		

Alternate reservations:

Sat.	2.14	Lv. Riyadh	SV #932	3:30p
		Arr. Damascus		5:00p

Tues.	2.17	Lv. Damascus, Syria	MS #726	4:40p
		Arr. Baghdad, Iraq		6:55p
		Accommodations: Residence of FSO and Mrs. Marshall Wiley		

Weds. 2.18 Lv. Baghdad, Iraq IR #512 9:10p
Arr. Teheran, Iran 11:00p

Accommodations: Intercontinental Hotel

Mon. 2.23 Lv. Teheran, Iran ELAL #564 12:00 noon
Arr. Tel Aviv, Israel 1:45p

Accommodations:

Mon. 2.23 Tel Aviv Hilton

Tues. 2.24 Jerusaly, Jerusalem

Weds. 2.25 Lv. Tel Aviv, Israel TWA #803/F 7:20a
Arr. JFK 1:55p

Weds. 2.25 Lv. JFK TWA #63 4:00p
Arr. Dulles 5:25p





D

מברק נכנס-מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסד תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

י"ן
סייגים
2

סודי

מ.ס. 204
נשלח 131700 דצמ 78
התקבל 14037

אל: המשרד
מאת: וושינגטון

מנכ"ל, מצפא"י.

סנטור סרבנס, דמוקרט ממרילנד, חבר ועדת החוץ, ביקר היום בשגרירותו לחתימה בספר הזכרון לגולדה מאיר ז"ל.

בהזדמנות זו קיימו הציר והחמי שיחה ארוכה בענייני דיומא. לבקשת סרבנס סקר בפניו הציר את המצב ענה במומי, במיוחד משמעות יציב 6 ולוח הזמנים, נהגיש הסכנות הטמונות בחתימת לוח זמנים מראש לגבי עצם ההסכם עם מצרים, הציר הוסיף, כי ככל שאנו מעוניינים מאד בחתימת ההסכם, מוקדם ככל האפשר, אין להוציא מכלל אפשרות שניאלץ לומר לא, אם נידרש לחתום על דבר שיפגע בטחוננו ועתידנו.

בתגובה אמר סרבנס שהוא מכין היטב את עמדתו ואמר כי הוא מניח שאם אנו יתפתח מצב שניאלץ לומר לאו-וודאי נדאג להכין מראש את דעת הקהל כאן. סרבנס הוסיף כי ככל שמתקרבים לבחירתו לנשיאות כנ יקשה יותר על הנשיא ללחוץ עלינו וכי לישראל יש ידידים בשתי המפלגות, ככל שהנשיא יהא דו-מפלגתי. אין הוא מתחל לנו עימות עם הנשיא, אבל אם לא יהא מנוס מכך מוטב שנהא מוכנים להתמודד על דעו והקל כאן.

סרבנס ציין כי על אף שהנשיא והקונגרס מדברים על קיצוצים בתקציבים הרי הוא משוכנע שאם ייחזק הסכם שלום-הקונגרס יאשר יסוע מיוחד. כאן ציינתי שזו גם החתומות שלנו משיחות עם סנטורים אחרים.

לגבי הכרזות רוברט בירד מאומול-אמר שלא שמע על כך, שלא שוחח עם בירד אחרי שובו, אך ברור שבירד הוא תומך נאצי של הנשיא בנושא מדיניות החוץ.

ייחומחיות של בירד בתחומי מדיניות החוץ היא למלא את רצונ הנשיא והזלפתו בתחום זה יי-אמר סרבנס.

כאן ציינתי כי דווקא משום כך רואים רבים בדבריו לחץ נוסף-והפעם באמצעות סנהיג בכיר בקונגרס-של הנשיא על ישראל.

במשך כל השיחה דיבר סרבנס כידיד המתחלק עמנו במעיותינו ומנסה לעוצ עצות ידיד כיצד לנהוג.

רפ"ח.

שהי רוג סלויה אנה שהי אנה טון זיבן אלפא יקר רם אלן

6 בדצמבר 1977
פא/287

Handwritten notes and signature:
ד"ר
5/12
הח'ה
2

אל : מר צבי רמיה, הסגרירות וושינגטון.
העמק: מר א. רון, טמנכ"ל.
מר י. בן אהרון, הקונסוליה הכללית.
מא"ם ב".
מצפ"א.
סאח : פ. אליאב, נאו"ם.

צוותא עם חבר הקונגרס האמריקאי Samuel S Stratton ב-4/12.

א. בתאריך הנ"ל שהייתי באולבני, ביום עיון של הקהילה היהודית שם, אליו הוזמנו גם מראשי הצבור הלא יהודי. הופעתי בעצרת המרכזית יחד עם סטראטון שם ענינו גם לשאלות וכיו"ב התראיינו יחד אח"כ בשלוש רשתות טלוויזיה וכן שוחחנו יחד בין האירועים.

ב. סטראטון, כידוע לך הוא מהחברים הדמוקרטים הבכירים בוועדת השרותים המזויינים של בית הצירים האמריקאי, ועמד בראש המשלחת הראשונה של בית הצירים שבקרה בישראל ובמצרים לאחר מלחמת אוקטובר. סיפר לי במקצת חוויותיו אז, כולל דברי סאדאת שאין לחלוט על נורמליזציה ביחסים בין שתי המדינות בדור הנוכחי.

ג. בהופעותיו נקט קונו פרו-ישראלי ברור ונמרץ. שיבח את מהלכי סאדאת והיענותו ישראל והביע תקוותו למו"ם ממשי ואף להסדר ישראלי-מצרי, באם לא ניתן להשיג מסדר כולל עם כל מדינות ערב. אמר שאין רע "שהערבים הקיצוניים" לא יבואו לקהיר, שכן מסללא היו מסכלים סיכויי הסדר. גינה התודעה הסובייטית אמריקאית כמכשול להסדר, ואמר שטעות להכניס הסובייטים לאיזור שכן כל רצונם לכבוש לעצמם מעמד. אמר שקייסינג'ר אכן ידע כיצד לשפל בהם, היינו ניהל המו"ם לבדו בעוד שהוא נותן להם מדי פעם מחוות ריקות. התבטא נגד מדינה פלסטינאית שתחזור תחת קיום ישראל בעצם מהותה, כן התבטא נגד יוזמת המזכ"ל לכנס וועידה מכינה נוספת בציינו שהאו"ם בכל פעולותיו בנושא מז"ח נוקט עמדה חד צדדית ואנטי-ישראלית.

ד. בשיחותיו עמי, אך גם בהופעותיו הפומביות, כולל בטלוויזיה, מתח ביקורת על ממשל קרטר בכך שאינו משתף את הקונגרס, "כפי שעשה קייסינג'ר", במחשבותיו ודעותיו בנושאי האיזור. גם נתן להבין שדעתו אינה נוהה מההיסוסים של וואשינגטון לאמץ את המחלק הישראלי-מצרי, וכן, כאמור לעיל, מתח ביקורת על הסכמת הממשל להודעה המשותפת עם הסובייטים. לעומ"ז שיבח מספר פעמים את גישתו של קייסינג'ר, כשלמעשה הוא מחרמק על פועלו.

ה. הנקודות היחידות בהם היה קצת וויכוח בינינו הייתה הצעתו שאולי ניתן לרכוש את חוסיין לבוא לקהיר ע"י מתן נשק אמריקאי, בציינו בנעימה של צער שהעיסקה הגדולה של רכש ירדני נחקלה בקשיים בווישינגטון. כן ציין החיוביות של השגת

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111

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1. ...

2. ...

3. ...

4. ...

5. ...

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הסכמה סעודית לטהלך המצרי, כדי להבטיח המשך הסיוע הכלכלי מצידם למצרים.
ה. כלליה עשה האיש רושם נחמד וידידותי.

ב ב ר כ ה,

פ. אליאב.

STENNIS FIGHTS FOREIGN POLICY CONSOLIDATION--

SENATE ARMED SERVICES CHAIRMAN JOHN STENNIS SAYS HE IS
OPPOSED TO A PROPOSED CONSOLIDATION OF HIS ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE WITH THE SERELATIONS.

THE CONSOLIDATION IS ONE OF THE HIGHLIGHTS OF A REORGANI-
ZATION OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE SYSTEM BEING
STUDIED BY A SPECIAL PANEL CREATED EARLIER THIS YEAR.

Handwritten notes:
L
d J 60 - 01/17

STENNIS TOLD THE PANEL SEPTEMBER 15 THAT SUCH A CONSOLIDA
TION "COULD RESULT ONLY IN REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF COMMITTEE
TIME AND ATTENTION THAT THE SENATE DEVOTES TO NATIONAL
DEFENSE.

H "IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT A DISTINCTION BETWEEN NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY ALWAYS BE MAINTAINED," SAID
STENNIS. "CONSOLIDATING THESE TWO VITAL SUBJECTS IN ONE
COMMITTEE COULD HAVE A SERIOUSLY ADVERSE EFFECT ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE EFFORTS AS WELL AS ON FOREIGN POLICY."



CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

105 MONTGOMERY STREET
SUITE 1000
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104
961-2788

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
סן פרנסיסקו

213

י' אדר תשל"ז
28 פברואר 1977
400.4;101.2

ק/א.י.

[Handwritten signature]

אל: מר צבי רפיח, וושינגטון.
מאת: הקונסול הכללי, סן פרנסיסקו.

הנדון: קונגרסמן סימס.

אני מצרף בזה ארבעה גזירים עם ציטוטים מדברי הנ"ל בשובו
מביקור בלוב כחבר של משלחת רצון טוב באיידהו.

שים לב להתבטאויותיו על החרם ופרשת אבו דאוד.

בברכה,

[Handwritten signature]

ד"ר שלמה תדמור

העחק:
מר ב. נבון, ציר, וושינגטון.
מצפ"א.

Idahoans Are Optimistic

Possible Libyan Trade Seen

21-2-77 Monday
Idaho Statesman

By KIP RUTTY
Copyright 1977, The Idaho Statesman

TRIPOLI, Libya — An Idaho goodwill delegation is optimistic about future trade possibilities with Libya after touring one of that country's massive agricultural developments near Benghazi.

U.S. Rep. Steve Symms told a news conference he opposes the so-called "Arab boycott" bill pending in Congress. "I think it's unfortunate any time trade barriers are set up between people."

A Libyan newsmen asked Symms his impression of "all the false news that the Libyan Arab Republic is a dictatorship, Fascist and harbors terrorists."

Symms said he hadn't seen

enough of the country to form an opinion. However he commended the Libyan government for its effort in education and agricultural programs.

He also said he didn't know why the U.S. protested when France freed alleged Palestine terrorist Abu Daoud Jan. 11. Daoud is suspected of plotting the terror attack at the 1972 Olympics in Munich in which 17 persons were killed.

Idaho delegation member Vernon Ravenscroft, Tuttle, said he thought the goodwill trip was a qualified success.

"On the person-to-person level it was successful," he said. "In terms of future trade developments, it remains to be seen. But I think the

visit and others like it could clear up some misunderstandings people in the U.S. have about Libya."

On Saturday the Idaho delegation toured the "Green Hills" project, a 275,000 acre agricultural development project near Benghazi, Libya's second-largest city.

The project, developed at a cost of over \$300 million, is one of five large-scale agricultural operations aimed at making Libya self-sufficient in the production of most foodstuffs by 1980.

"It is primarily dryland farming," project chairman Bashir Jodeh said. The area receives less than 12 inches of rain annually.

He said the government has put 2,150 farmers into business by giving them 200 acres each, a house,

livestock, tractor and other farm machinery.

The government also provides all technical assistance to the farmers, such as free repair of equipment.

"We figure it costs about \$100,000 to start a farmer in business, Jodeh said." The farmer has to pay back only \$30 of this. Last year farmers made between \$16,000 and \$20,000 before expenses." For the first three years, farmers also receive \$250 a month from the government.

Libya has made agriculture top priority in its five-year plan, allocating 21 per cent of its budget to it. By comparison, only 9 per cent is budgeted for further development of its oil industry.

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1.
in
sk

Libya

(Continued from Page 1A)

dealt almost entirely with foreign affairs, consisted of some nuances that didn't go unnoticed by University of Idaho economist James Araji, a native of Iraq.

"I thought it was important that the Libyans spoke to the delegation in English once the talks got under way," he said. "I think it was a sign of respect and the importance they place on the visit of the Idaho delegation."

Each of the meetings with the Libyan officials began in Arabic, with English translations, but as the talks progressed, the Arab leaders spoke English more frequently.

The Idahoans were also given the literal red carpet treatment with a carpet being unrolled on at least two occasions during the welcoming.

Symms said he was impressed by the Libyans' willingness to openly discuss some of the sensitive points in U.S.-Libyan relations.

After Tuesday's diet of foreign affairs discussions, a series of meetings with agricultural officials is scheduled for today.

The trip is intended as a goodwill mission to explore trade possibilities between Idaho and Libya, specifically in the areas of agriculture. Idaho and Libya are similar in some of the crops grown and their reliance on irrigation water for cropland development.

The Libyans have announced a goal of becoming self-sufficient in food production by 1980 after letting their agricultural development fall into disrepair before the 1969 revolution that ousted the monarchy.

The development is being fueled by the petrodollars that Libya earns as the world's biggest source of sulfur-free oil.

Besides Symms and Araji, the Idaho delegation includes Vernon Ravenscroft, chairman of the Idaho Republican Party; University of Idaho agricultural economist Dr. Richard Schermanhorn and University of Idaho student president Lynn Tomiyaga.

Idahoans Welcomed to Libya

By KIP RUTTY
The Idaho Statesman

Copyright 1977, The Idaho Statesman

TRIPOLI, Libya - A group of Idahoans were told Tuesday its visit marks the start of the Arab Libyan Republic's effort to establish a dialogue with the American people.

The Idaho delegation, headed by Congressman Steve Symms, is the first group to officially be invited to Libya.

"We hope the United States, which went through a revolution of its own, will understand when another country goes through a similar experience," Ahmed Shabaty, minister of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, told the group during a welcoming ceremony at the national airport in Tripoli.

Shabaty's position is equivalent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the United States.

Symms told Shabaty that he hoped the United States and Libya would develop trade and cultural ties and extended an invitation for a delegation of Libyans to visit Idaho.

Libya, a country twice the size of Texas, has a population of 2.5 million people and is in the midst of massive industrial and agricultural plans. It expects to spend the equivalent of 25 billion U.S. dollars on the plans in the next five years.

The leadership of the north African nation bordering the Mediterranean has been viewed as confusing and contradictory by some in the West and government officials went to great lengths Tuesday to explain their views to the Idahoans.

Besides meeting with Shabaty, the Idahoans also met Dr. Ali Treki, minister of state for foreign affairs, who is the counterpart of U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.

Treki said Libya doesn't have

much hope that Mideast peace talks will lead to a solution of that problem and criticized U.S. support of Israel. But Treki, and other Libyan government officials, took pains to emphasize their argument was with the U.S. government and not its people.

"Ties between Washington and Tel Aviv (Israel) are stronger than the ties between Washington and Hawaii, or Washington and Alaska," Treki maintained.

He said the key Libyan foreign policy is to remain free from any significant alignments with any of the major powers. He called on the superpowers to review their policies toward smaller nations, declaring that the days of "spheres of influence" are over.

"We try to deal with each country on a nation-to-nation basis," he said.

"Just because we do not align

ourselves with the United States doesn't mean we are aligned with the Soviet Union."

Treki said he felt several of Libya's actions and positions were misunderstood or misreported in the West. He said Libya is not aiding the Irish Republican Army with weapons and is against terrorist hijackings.

"In our talks with the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) directory, we tell them that we're against acts of terrorism. Hijacking should not involve innocent victims," he said.

Treki maintained that hijacked airplanes, such as the ones from Japan and Malaysia, were only allowed to land in Libya for either humanitarian reasons or because the country from where the airplane was hijacked requested it.

The meetings Tuesday, which

(See "Libya," Page 2A)



Touring Libya

Kip Rutty, Statesman agriculture writer, is traveling with the Idaho delegation during its tour of Libya. Rutty will be filing daily reports of the group's activities and collecting observations on life in the Middle East.

The Idaho STATESMAN

Article ✓

Idaho Delegation Promotes Products For Libyan Trade

By KIP RUTTY
The Idaho Statesman

TRIPOLI, Libya — Members of an Idaho delegation touring Libya promoted several Idaho products in meetings Thursday with Libyan trade agency representatives.

Idaho wheat was the main topic of discussion at a meeting at Libya's General National Corporation for Supply, the country's main importing agency. It has annually imported just over a half a million tons of grain, primarily soft white and hard-red wheat, since 1973.

Rep. Steve Symms and University of Idaho marketing Prof. Dr. Richard Schermerhorn said they would put representatives of Idaho wheat growers in touch with the Libyan agencies.

Libyan officials said they would be pleased to receive such contacts and outlined what they are looking for from foodstuff suppliers. They said they used to put out bids for commodities but now prefer to go directly to producer associations, to eliminate middlemen and get a better price.

But the producer organization must have the capability for long-range supply and be able to handle the details of exporting the Libyan trade, officials said.

Among the other top 10 food commodities imported by Libya are sugar and tomato paste.

Ahmed Martadi, undersecretary for the Ministry of Industry, noted that Libya has imported large amounts of cement and wood for its

construction and furniture industries. Libya has been importing 2.5 million tons of cement annually. But he said that shipping costs would make it difficult for Idaho to compete with European suppliers of these products.

Other products discussed in the exploratory talks included dairy and beef herd replacement stock, dairy products, forage crops and seed stocks.

Representatives of the Libyan National Chamber of Commerce said they were "very anxious to establish economic ties with the U.S." As a first step, Thursday during a reception and banquet, they invited a delegation of Idaho businessmen to visit Tripoli for further discussions.

They said the only hitch to such ties might be the uneasy relations between the two countries. Rep. Symms said he thought many Idaho firms would like to do business with Libya.

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Delivery of C130s Requested

Libya's Khadafy to Woo U.S.



Muammar Khadafy

By KIP RUTTY

TRIPOLI, LIBYA — Libyan leader Muammar Khadafy said Wednesday he is "ready to turn the page" and begin a new effort to improve relations with the United States.

Calling the Carter administration "a new beginning," the Libyan strongman said attempts to mix economics and politics had complicated the situation between the two nations in the past.

This was a reference to Libya's thus-far abortive attempt to purchase eight C130 transport planes in the United States. Libya has paid for the planes, but the sale has not been approved by the U.S. government.

Khadafy told The Statesman that Libya is willing to accept the planes on a "civilian basis." He said Libya would not use the aircraft for military purposes, but only to transport sheep and other agricultural commodities, as well as for Red Cross work.

"We already have several of these planes in our country," he said, adding that there was no logical reason for the U.S. not to approve the delivery. "If the Libyan Arab Republic wanted to supply armor to other countries, it doesn't need these planes to do so.

These airplanes are a commodity which we paid for and should receive," he said.

On another sensitive point in U.S. Libyan relations — the Palestinian question — Khadafy re-

stated his position that the solution should be left to the Palestinians, both Jewish and Arab, and that Jews who emigrated should return to their nations of origin.

"All of this will require a dialogue," he said. "We agree to a dialogue along these principles."

Khadafy said Libya is "ready to accept back the Jews who emigrated to Palestine from the Libyan Arab Republic."

He said until the Palestine area is disarmed, any solution will be only a temporary one. "The world doesn't want to disarm it (Palestine), which only provides a temporary solution. It is really a powder keg."

The 44-year-old Libyan president, who assumed power nearly eight years ago in a military overthrow of the monarchy, maintained his nation is sadly misunderstood in the West.

Foremost, among misunderstand-

ings, he said, is his government's position on hijacked airplanes that have landed in Libya. They have been allowed to land only because innocent passengers were threatened, he said.

"The impression being given abroad is exactly opposite of our position," he said. "Our religion (Moslem) does not permit us to commit an act of terrorism."

He emphasized that Libya gives "no assistance" to hijackers and said such reports were "propaganda" that succeeded because there was strong sentiment at the time in the West against Libya.

Earlier, Khadafy formally had welcomed a delegation from Idaho, saying he has "wanted to meet American people for a long time." He said it was a "good opportunity for a visit."

Khadafy said the visit by the Idahoans is a first step in improving relations between the people of Libya and the United States. The Idaho delegation, led by Congressman Steve Symms, is touring Libyan agricultural and industrial developments in what is being billed as a goodwill mission.

The Libyan government appears to be placing greater importance on the visit than just a goodwill mission. The meeting with Khadafy, which had been uncertain prior to the group's arrival in Tripoli, came unexpectedly on the second day of the one-week visit.

The Idaho delegation also has received extensive coverage in the Libyan press.

Rutty Traveling With Idaho Group

Kip Rutty, Statesman agriculture writer, is traveling with delegation of Idahoans touring Libya. In addition to reporting on the activities of the group during the week-long tour of the oil-rich nation, Rutty also will be collecting observations on life in the Middle East.

מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

תאריך: ו' בכסלו תשל"ז

מספר: 28 בנובמבר 1976

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10/11/76

אל: מאו"ר

מצפ"א

מאת: עמנואל גלבר

Juri Santini

הנדון: לרוי לחבר הקונגרס

לרויחתי את מר סנטיני ורעייתו בחלק מבקורו הראשון בישראל שהתקיים בין 12-23 בנובמבר. בקורו בערך במימון יהודי מדינת גדה אנתה הוא מיצג בבית המורשים.

בלווה אליהם הזוג *Hernstadt* מאותה מדינה שהיו יוזמי הבקור ומימונו. זוג זה בקר כבר מספר פעמים בארץ. הגב' הרנסטאדט פעילה בארגון היאס. לא התרשמתי שהם עתירי בכסים.

למעשה היה זה בעקרו בקור תיורי עם מספר פגישות וסיורים באתרים שהיה עבין הסברתי לפקוד אותם (החפירות בעיר העתיקה, מצדה, הגולן והגדר הטובה).

מסכות שונות כוסלו הפגישות עם שר החוץ ועם היועץ המדיני לשר הבטחון.

לעומת זאת התקיימה שיחה טובה עם שר הבטחון במסגרת מפגש חברתי בכיתו של מר דני פינקס ברחובות שהוא ממכירי הזוג הרנסטאדט.

בביצוע התכנית היו התערבויות של הזוג הרנסטאדט שלא היו תמיד נוחים אם כי כללית כרצעה התכנית.

יש לציין שהיזום היהודי בבקור מסוג זה איננו מסייע כפרט כאשר הוא כבר חושב עצמו למבין בעניני ישראל.

השאלה הנשאלת היא באם בבקור כזה לא נתן להסתפק בקביעת יום או יומיים לפגישות בעלות ערך הסברתי מטעם משרד ולהשאיר יתרת הימים לספולו של היוזם.

גישתו של סנטיני היא אוהדת והתרשמתי שהבקור תרם למידע בוסף והבנה יותר יסודית של עניינו. סנטיני הבו מורשה חדש יחסית (בנחר כעת בפעם השניה) ועדי' כה לא פעל בועדות להן זיקה לבעיות ישראל.

הוא דמוקרטי ולדברי הרנסטאדט טובים סכוינו לזכות להבחר לסנט מטעם גדה כאשר המוסב יועמד לבחירה.

ב. ב. ר. ה.,
[Signature]
עמנואל גלבר

ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΙΑΚΟ

ΠΡΩΤΟ ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟ

ΑΡΧΕΣ

ΑΡΧΗ

ΑΡΧΗ

ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΣ

Ο παρών κανονισμός...

Υπογραφή

02/10

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