

292

חגן ב' לט"ו

מיקום א"ש
 קולנוע
 א-ב

13/12/2018, 15:00, ת"מ, א"ש, קולנוע

נפתח: 1499 B.75

נסגר: 1999 2.



שט נתיב משנה למסגרת ח. בר-און - ארה"ב - קונגרס -
 חובר על סטאטורים - אותיות א - י"ב

חצ-7077/2

מחזור פתיח

מחזור פתיח: 00000000

תאריך הדפסה: 25/12/2018

מחזור פתיח: 3-312-3-5-7

292



ארכיון המדינה

משרד ראש הממשלה

טופס מראה מקום להוצאת תעודות יחידות*

חטיבה מס': 130.2
 מיכל מס': 7077/31
 תאריך התעודה: _____
 שם מחבר התעודה: _____
 סוג התעודה (סמן ✓ במקום המתאים):

תיק מס': 2
 שם הנמען: _____

24/11/76

29/11/76

30/11/76

7/1/77

29/4/77

22/12/78

מכתב

מברק

תזכיר או מיוכר

דיון וחשבון או זכרון דברים משיחה או דיון

פרוטוקול של שיחה, דיון או ישיבה

*הטופס ימולא בשני עותקים. העותק הירוק יוכנס לתיק במקום התעודה שהוצאה; העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.

VISIT OF CODEL ABOUREZK TO EGYPT, November 13-15, 1976

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 13

- 1215 - Codel arrives via Egypt Air 733. Met by Deputy Chief of Mission and Mrs. H. Freeman Matthews, and Control Officer Mr. Samuel H. Wyman.
- 1230 - (Approx) - Codel departs for hotel. Baggage will follow in Embassy truck.
- DCM's Vehicle - Senator and Mrs. Abourezk, Mr. Matthews, Driver
- Car A1 - Mrs. Matthews, Ms. Abourezk, Mrs. Ramey, Driver
- Car A2 - Mr. Burke, Mr. Wyman, Ms. Miller, Security Guard, Driver
- Car A3 - Ms. Weidner, Mr. Baer, Mr. Billion, Driver
- Car A4 - Ms. Grieder, Mr. Duhamel, Mr. Johnson, Driver
- 1345 - Arrive hotel and proceed to rooms. Please note room assignments. Control room for all Codels is #1124, on same floor as your rooms. An internal Embassy telephone extension (#423) has been connected to this room. Control Officer Mr. Wyman can be contacted on Extension 359 (home) or extension 304 (office) through this phone.
- 1430 - Lunch at Hilton
- 1530 - Afternoon free
- 1915 - Depart Hilton for Tahrir Club, to attend reception given by People's Assembly Speaker Sayyid Mar'i.
- Car A1 - Senator and Mrs. Abourezk, Ms. Abourezk and Mrs. Ramey, Driver and Security Guard
- Car A2 - Mr. Burke, Ms. Miller, Mr. Wyman, Driver
- Car A3 - Ms. Weidner, Mr. Baer, Mr. Billion, Driver
- Car A4 - Ms. Grieder, Mr. Duhamel, Mr. Johnson, Driver
- 1930 - Arrive Tahrir Club
- 2130 - Depart Tahrir Club for Hilton. Dinner may be obtained at the Hilton either in the nightclub on the 12th floor, or in the main dining room on the second floor, or in the coffee shop on the main floor. In addition, each of the two other major hotels (Sheraton and Meridien) have excellent restaurants and both are a short drive from the Hilton.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 14

1100 - Depart Hilton for President Sadat's Barrages.

DCM'S VEHICLE - Senator and Mrs. Abourezk
Mr. Matthews
Driver

Car A1 - Mrs. Matthews
Ms. Abourezk
Mrs. Ramey
Security Guard
Driver

Car A2 - Mr. Burke
Mr. Wyman
Ms. Miller
Driver

Car A3 - Ms. Weidner
Mr. Baer
Mr. Billion
Mrs. Wyman
Driver

Car A4 - Ms. Grieder
Mr. Duhamel
Mr. Johnson
Driver

1200 - Arrive President's Barrages for meeting with President Sadat. -

1300 - Depart Barrages for Hilton; same car assignments.

1400 - Arrive Hilton for lunch (tentative).

1900 - Reception hosted by United States Ambassador to Egypt and Mrs. Hermann Fr. Eilts, in the Aroussa Hall on the second floor of the Hilton.

2130 - Dinner (see dinner comments on Saturday's schedule).

(CODEL ABOUREZK)

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 15

1045 - All baggage must be collected in hotel lobby by this time, for transportation to airport by Embassy truck. Senator Abourezk, Mr. Burke, Ms. Grieder and Ms. Weidner depart for Embassy for meeting with Ambassador Eilts

Car A1 - Senator Abourezk, Mr. Burke, Ms. Grieder, Ms. Weidner, Mr. Wyman, Security Guard and Driver.

Car A2 - If not required by other members of party.

1100 - Meeting with Ambassador Eilts

1200 - Depart hotel for airport

DCM'S VEHICLE - Senator and Mrs. Abourezk, Mr. Matthews, Driver

CAR A1 - Mrs. Matthews, Ms. Abourezk, Mrs. Ramey, Driver

CAR A2 - Mr. Burke, Mr. Wyman, Ms. Miller, Security Guard, Driver

CAR A3 - Ms. Weidner, Mr. Baer, Mr. Billion, Driver

CAR A4 - Ms. Grider, Mr. Duhamel, Mr. Johnson, Driver

1300 - Arrive Airport VIP Lounge

1415 - WHEELS UP, SAUDI AIRLINES #144 FOR RIYADH.

MEDICAL HINTS

THE HILTON HOTEL HOUSE DOCTOR IS COMPETENT BY REPUTATION, AND CAN DISPENSE MEDICINES FOR MINOR STOMACH AILMENTS AND COLDS.

IF MORE INVOLVED TREATMENT IS DESIRED, DR. TOUSSON SALEM CAN BE CONTACTED AT 34433. DR. SALEM WILL NOW COME TO THE HOTEL, HOWEVER; HE ONLY RECEIVES PATIENTS IN HIS CLINIC.

TO ASSIST IN PREVENTING MEDICAL PROBLEMS, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT YOU NOT REPEAT NOT EAT FRESH SALADS OR FRUITS SERVED ANYWHERE, AND BY ALL MEANS AVOID THE GASPACHO SOUP SERVED AT THE HOTEL.

CODEL: ABOUREZK

Nov.13 - 15, 1976

ROOM ASSIGNMENTS

<u>N A M E</u>	<u>HILTON HOTEL</u>	<u>ROOM NO.</u>
Sen. & Mrs. Abourezk		1107
Ms. Abourezk		1106
Mr. Baer		1102
Mr. Billion		1102
Mr. Burke		1104
Mr. Duhamel		1103
Ms. Grieder		1105
Mr. Johnson		1103
Ms. Miller		1101
Ms. Ramey		1106
Ms. Weidner		1105

Luncheon at the Ambassador's Residence
1:30 pm, Saturday, November 6, 1976

Ambassador and Mrs. Francois M. Dickman - hosts

The Honorable James Abourezk and Mrs. Abourezk

Ms. Mikki Abourezk

Mr. Allen Burke

Ms. Bethany Weidner

Ms. Wendy Griedner

Mrs. Helen Ramey

Mr. Al Bear

Mr. David Billion

His Excellency Saif Ghubbash, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Mana al-Otaiba, Minister of Petroleum

His Excellency Ambassador and Mrs. Najmuddin Hammoudah, Advisor, MPA

Dr. Ibrahim Ibrahim, Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. and Mrs. George Naifeh, Public Affairs Officer, USIS

Mr. and Mrs. Samuel R. Peale, Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy

Mr. Maurice Bean, Foreign Service Inspector

Mr. Kenneth Rogers, Foreign Service Inspector

Mr. Daniel Foster, Foreign Service Inspector

PROGRAM SCHEDULE

SENATOR JAMES ABOUREZK VISIT TO THE U.A.E.

. The Senator and his delegation will be guests of the U.A.E. Government and will be staying at the Abu Dhabi Hilton Hotel - Tel. 61900

. Embassy Control Officer, Public Affairs Officer George A. Naifeh - Office Tels. 62543 and 62157; Home Tel. 44843

. Delegation:

Senator James Abourezk

Mrs. James Abourezk (Wife of the Senator)

Miss Mikki Abourezk (Daughter of the Senator)

Mr. Allen Burke, Press Secretary

Ms. Bethany Weidner, Legislative Assistant

Ms. Wendy Griedner, Legislative Assistant

Mrs. Helen Ramey (Sister of the Senator)

Mr. Al Bear (Friend from South Dakota)

Mr. David Billion (Friend from South Dakota)

Thursday, November 4

Arrive 2325 via BA 346 from London.

Delegation will be met by officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the American Ambassador.

Friday, November 5

11:00 a.m. Assemble in the Hilton Hotel Lobby on the ground floor to be taken to the Heliport for flight to the Emirate of Sharjah.

11:15 a.m. Depart to Sharjah from Hilton Hotel Heliport.

12 noon Arrive in Sharjah.
Will be met on arrival for visit to the Sharjah Petroleum Company followed by short tour through Sharjah town.

1:30 p.m. Arrive at the Palace of H.H. Shaikh Sultan, Ruler of Sharjah for lunch, followed by discussion with the Ruler.

- 5:00 p.m. Depart Sharjah by Helicopter to Abu Dhabi Hilton Hotel, Heliport.
- 5:30 p.m. Arrive at Hilton Heliport.
- 5:30 p.m.- Free to have dinner at the Hilton Hotel at your
7:30 p.m. convenience.
- 8:00 p.m. Mrs. Abouresk and female members of delegation will call on Shaikha Fatima, President Zayed's wife. Mrs. Samuel Peale, wife of the D.C.M. at the American Embassy will accompany Mrs. Abouresk on the visit.
- 8:30 p.m. The Senator and any official members of the delegation wishing to accompany the Senator will call on Shaikh Zayed, President of the U.A.E.

Saturday, November 6

- 9:30 a.m. Entire delegation tour of Abu Dhabi
1. Visit the Petroleum Exhibition
 2. The Port
 3. Abu Dhabi City
- ~~Uncomplete~~ (Plans are being made for the women of the delegation to visit the Girls' Secondary School. Party will be notified as soon as visit confirmed.)
- 10:30 a.m. The Senator and official party will meet with H.E. Saif Ghubash, Minister of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 11:30 a.m. Meet with H.E. Dr. Mani Saeed Otaiha, Minister of Petroleum.
- 1:30 p.m. Lunch hosted by Ambassador and Mrs. Francois Dickman.
- 6:30 p.m. The Senator's lecture on "U.S. Decision Making Process", in the Foreign Ministry's Lecture Series at the Khubaira Palace. The Senator will be introduced by Dr. Ibrahim Ibrahim of the Foreign Ministry.
- 8:30 p.m. Dinner in honor of Senator Abouresk and delegation. Hosted by H.E. Saif Ghubash, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, at the Hilton Hotel.

Sunday, November 7

9:15 a.m. Depart Hilton Hotel for Airport.

10:20 a.m. Depart Abu Dhabi via GF 331 for Dubai.

10:45 a.m. Arrive Dubai. Details of Dubai program will be submitted later.

2:55 p.m. Depart Dubai via GF 253 for Baghdad.

SCHEDULE FOR SENATOR JAMES ABOUREZK AND PARTY
The Middle East November 3-18, 1976

Wednesday, November 3

8:30 p.m. Leave Washington/Dulles PA 106

Thursday, November 4

8:30 a.m. Arrive London/Heathrow

10:15 a.m. Leave London/Heathrow BA 346

11:25 p.m. Arrive Abu Dhabi

Abu Dhabi Control Officer will be George Naifeh

Hotel reservations are at The Abu Dhabi Hilton

Friday, November 5

The Ruler of Sharjah has requested one full day with the group

10:30 a.m. Depart Abu Dhabi Airport via
helicopter

11:00 a.m. Arrive Rulers palace

Details of schedule will be provided upon arrival

5:00 p.m. Depart Sharjah Palace

5:30 p.m. Arrive Hilton

8:00 p.m. Tentative appointment w/ President
U.A.E. Shaikh Zayed

Saturday November 6

Appointments with Ministers of Petroleum and Foreign Affairs
(not yet confirmed)

SCHEDULE FOR SENATOR JAMES ABOUREZK AND PARTY - PAGE 2

Sat. Nov. 6 cont.

9:30-10:30 a.m.	Tour of Abu Dhabi City
11:00 a.m.	Appointment w/Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Saif Ghubash
1:30 p.m.	Lunch w/ American Ambassador and Mrs. Francois M. Dickman
6:30 p.m.	Lecture at Khubairi Palace by Jim on "U.S. Decision-Making Process."
8:30 p.m.	Dinner at The Abu Dhabi Hilton hosted by Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Sunday November 7

10:20 a.m.	Lv. Abu Dhabi GF 331
10:45 a.m.	Arrive Dubai
2:55 p.m.	Lv. Dubai GF 253
5:15 p.m.	Arrive Baghdad, Iraq

Control officer will be Bronson Percival

Jim and 6 others will stay at Rashid Palace, the National Command Guest House - others will stay at a 1st class hotel

Mr. Mohammed Al-Hassan will handle all arrangements for group

Monday November 8

8:30 a.m.

"Zionism as Racism Conference"
Abourezk opens Baghdad conference with speech

Tuesday November 9

Baghdad

9:20 p.m.

Leave Baghdad Egyptair 727

10:45 p.m.

Arrive Damascus, Syria

Control officer will be James Houser

** Jim : Tell Syrians that Duhamel, Johnson, Miller party will arrive in Damascus Friday November 12 at 9:30 a.m. on Syrian Arab Airways #362.

Stewart Auerbach, Washington Post Correspondent
Hotel Commodore, Beirut Tel. 350-400
If Stewart is unreachable you can call the Post's
Foreign Desk in D.C. at 202- 223-7400 and ask
for Peter Harris or anyone else on duty for assist-
ance in reaching Stewart.

Reminder while in Syria speak to Assad about
Peter Forella (in jail for drug charge)

Hotel reservations are at the Damascus International Hotel

Wednesday November 10

10:30 a.m.

Visit to the Martyr's School

6:00 p.m.

Meeting w/ Speaker of Peoples
Council, Mr. Muhammed Ali
Al-Halabi

8:30 p.m.

Dinner at Orient Club Hosted
by Mrs. Salma Najib, Chair-
person of Peoples Council
Foreign Relations Committee

*** Lunch w/ Greek Orthodox Patriarch Elias IV at Ambassadors
residence request to be rescheduled for loth.

Thursday November 11

Damascus

10:00 a.m.

Meeting w/ Prime Minister for
Economic Affairs Jamil Shayya

11:30 a.m.

Meeting w/Foreign Minister Khadda

SCHEDULE FOR JAMES ABOUREZK AND PARTY -PAGE 4

Thursday November 11 cont.

1:00 p.m. Meeting w/ Prime Minister
Khulayfawi

Friday November 12

10:00 a.m. Visit to Ommayyad Mosque

11:00 a.m. Visit to Handicraft Museum

12 Noon Visit to National Museum

Saturday November 13

9:30 a.m. Leave Damascus MS 723

11:30 a.m. Arrive Cairo, Egypt

Control officer will be Samuel Wyman

Appointments w/ Sadat and Foreign Minister Fahmy requested -
time of appointments confirmed on arrival

Hotel reservations being requested through President -
probably at Cairo Hilton

Sunday, November 14

Cairo

Monday, November 15

2:30 p.m. Leave Cairo SV 144

6:05 p.m. Arrive Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

Control officer Joe Eblan

Hotel reservations at Intercontinental

November 15 cont.

Audience w/ King Khaled, Crown Prince Fahd and Minister of Petroleum Aki Yamani requested
Meetings may have to take place in Jidda due to pilgrimage holidays - all officials will be in Jidda

Tuesday, November 16

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

Wednesday, November 17

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

Jim: sometime during visit they are planning an interview w/Minister of Info. in English

Thursday, November 18

1:30 a.m.	Leave Riyadh SV 771
6:45 a.m.	Arrive London
12:05 p.m.	Leave London PA 107
3:20 p.m.	Arrive Washington/ Dulles

נ' בכסלו תשל"ז
28 בנובמבר 1976

27
7/11 (א-2) מיני

27

סוד
8

א ל: סר צבי דמיה, הסגרירות כווינגסטון

מאת מנחל סג"א

הנדון: ביקור במסור אכורזק במז"ח
מכתב ד, שלג סה - 24/11

(27)
~~27~~

בהמשך למכתב המרכז בקשר לנ"ל אבקשן, אחרי המועצה עם הסגריר, להדלמה 2 נקודות מהוך המכתב:

א. כי במקורו במז"ח האטימ אכורזק את הנוצרים במרגדיה והתעלם מהעובדה שאט"ף והמוסלמים הביאו למספר בו נהרגו 60,000 איש בלבנון.

ב. כי בדמשק (נקודה 3) ואולי גם במירזת אחרות, ניסה אכורזק לביים כספים לגרכ"ה העמולתיים של הקרבים כארה"ב. כן כמובן יש להבליט את הסמינר על-הציונות כנגדו.

ניסה לי שטחונאי שיראה כי ביריבו מרטי חוכניה אכורזק יאמין שגם הידיעה דלקיל טחיטנות. כמובן שיש להזהר מאוד במקור או מגלוי ידע כלשהו על המלווים מרט לדברים המודמסים בתוכנית.

בכרחה,
N.I.
משה רכיב

העתיק
סר א. עברון, המסנה למנכ"ל
המרכז

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

בלתי מסווג

מברק יוצא

אל וושינגטון ניו יורק

מאת המשרד

חודש 209

בשלה 121430 נוב 76

בנסור אבו רוק שהביע לדמשק ב 9 במוש בפפרד (II) עם רוהם חלי-ארוי, ס/רהם לעניכס
כלכליים ומיל שיא, הדאם ויור מועצה העם. זך עם כל אחי כזם במצב באיזור ובפרט
בהשקפות סודית ואיחב ביחס לפתרון הענינו הפלסטיני. הצחיר שלא יתכן פתרון צודק
למשבר המזרח אלא אם תיסוג ישראל מתודמות שכבשה ב 67. (סאנא 11).

מרכז

שהח רהם מנכל ממנכל מאום אב ממשא זרחים חקר רם

תא רש

אלו ותשינגטון, ניו יורק

מאת: המשד

ח/280

גשלה 121580 נובי

המנטור והמוקדש האמריקני, ג'ימס אבוזק קרא למדינות ערב להגשימ
 אודות ערכית בקידום פני המזימות הישראליות.
 המנטור אמר בדבריו ב-8 נובי, בוועידה הרעיתית על הציתות והתכנסת
 עזה בבגדאד - כי עובדות המאבק הערבי - ישראל משפיעות מ'מע' לזמ
 על זעת הקהל האמריקני וחל שינוי בעת קהל זו ומגנים שואל על
 התעלמותה מהזכריות המלטיניות.
 מאודעות וחמים מלבנת כיטו על המאמציים המושקעים כדי לשפר עובדות
 המאבק הערבי-ישראל במ' דעת הקהל והאמריקניות.
 היא קרא למדינות ערב להגביר מסעות והסברה כדי לשרות שינוי בעת
 הקהל והאמריקניות, המלחמה הערבית אינו בטיני ובגולנ מלבד זלא מקרב
 הוגי דעת הקהל והאמריקניות - הקונגרס האמריקני ומנשלת ארה"בי

מצפה

שוח רוחם מנכל ופנכל סמנכל מאומ אב מצפה מזח'ים חקר מעת והסברה רמ

- - - ד-ד -

אב/של

א
11/11/76
מס' 11/11/76

ממלכת ישראל ווטינגסטון העתק ניו יורק

שכ"ד

המס'ד

במהר דברי הסנטור אברזק ב-8/11 כפי שהופצו ע"י סימז"ת ב-9/11. כועידה כשהחטים נציגי 46 מדינות ערכיות מוסלמיות וקומוניסטיות עם ברה"מ בראשן וכן נציגי ארגונים שמאלניים קיצוניים ועוינים סתמערב.

משיעים לנסות ולהביא לתגובה ~~האמיתית~~ לדבריו, הן על מה שאמר וכן בהקשר לאכסניה המוזרה בה בחר סנטור אטריקני להטמיע את דברי הכלע שלו. ~~דדשה ההקשר עלה את על מה שאנחנו מבלגה המגז.~~ סימו נא לב כמיוחד לעצותיו לערבים כיצד עליהם לעמוד ~~תח~~ מדימות יסדאל וכיצד עליהם לנהל את מלחמתם בה.

מס"א

12.11.76

מ. בבלי

ס'ג'ו
ד'א/א'ו'ס (א'ג'ו'נ'ז)
ב

ממשיאל וושינגטן, ניו יורק

המשרד

הסנטור הדמוקרטי האמריקני, ג'יימס אבורק קרא למדנות ערב להגשים אחדות ערבית בקידום פני המדינות הישראליות.

הסנטור אמר בדברו ב-8 נובמבר, בועידה הרעיונית על הציונות המתכנסת עתה בכבודא - כי עובדות המאבק הערביי ישראלי משפיעות מזמן לזמן על דעה הקהל האמריקנית וחל שינוי בדעה קהל זו ומבגיים את ישראל על החלטהה ~~מסמסמס~~ מחזכויות הפלסטיניות.

טאורעות הדמים בלבנון כיסו על המאמצים המוסקעים כדי לחשוף את עובדות המאבק הערביי ישראלי כגני דעה הקהל האמריקנית.

הוא קרא למדינות ערב להבכיר את מסעות ההסברה כדי לעשות שגוי בדעה הקהל האמריקנית.

המלחמה הערבית אינה כסיני ובגולן כלבד אלא בקרב חוגי דעה הקהל האמריקנית - הקונגרס האמריקנית וממשלת ארה"ב"

ממ"א

12.11.76

סז כבלי

211c

כל המוסר תוכנו מסמך זה כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בספרון המדינה
יחסי-חוץ ומודות רשמיים),
תשי"ז-1957.

ס ו ד י

ל
ה'תש"ז
(2/16)

אל : המשרד
מאת: וושינגטון

מס' : 477
נשלח: 292845 יולי 77

מצפא

נפגשתי היום בקפיטול עם דייוויד אובי שנמנה על משלחת המילטון.
נשמע די פסימי לגבי סיכויי ההסדר באזור. אמר כי אמנם ראש ממשלת ישראל
אמר שהכל נתון לתום, אבל הרקע של רחם השקפותיו זה - RECORD
שלו עומדים בסתירה לכך.

אובי ציין כי התרשם מאד מאסד, אחד המנהיגים המתוחכמים ביותר שפגש.
אסד נוקט עתה גישה הרבה יותר חיובית כלפי הסדר במזת מאשר בפגישתם
לפני שנתיים (אובי סירר אז במזת).

אסד אמר להם בין השאר, כי ההחלטה על הכרה בישראל היא החלטה ריבונית
סורית ואינו להחתיב זאת להם, באשר לחסי מסחר אנשי העסקים הסורים
יחילשו אם ירצו בכך או לא (אובי מעיר על כך כי אנשי מסחר וכלכלה
סורים עמם שוחחו אמרו להם כי מאד מעוניינים לסחור עם ישראל).

אובי ציין כי שוחחו עם אסד ארוכות בנושא הפלשתינאי. אסד חשב לפני
שענה. הוא לא אמר אף פעם אחת שיש להקים מדינה פלשתינאית עצמאית, מכאן
מסיק אובי שאסד מצדד בקשר פלשתינאי-ירדני.

לגבי פגישתו עם ערפאת ציין שהיה מאד EVASIVE וכי עיקר
מאוייו הוא לזיז את נשיא מסינת פלסטין בשטח כשהוא שי ועמד לדעותו. אפילו
ירחו בלבד.

אובי אמר כי הוא סביר ששטיב רוזנפלד צודק במאמרו שפורסם היום
וושינגטון פוסט על הערבים ואשפ, וכי יש להציע לערבים לפתור הבעיות
בעצמם. הדבר צריך להראות כבא מרצונם ומתוכם ולא חדישה מבחוצ או ליד
שולח המום. אובי אמר כי יש לדבר עם אשפ, בדרגים נמוכים.
השבתי לו בהתאם לעמדתו הידועה. הוספת כי סנטור סטון התרשם מעמדתו
הנוקשה מאד של אסד וחזר כמעט מיואש מבנו. אובי אמר כי אין הוא סבור ככ.
הערה: עוד נכוננו לנו בעיות רבות עם אובי.

רפ"ח.



כ"ב שבט תשל"ז
8 עברו 77

81

Handwritten notes in Hebrew:
הנדון: המורשה דיורד אובי - תכנית
שלום למזה"ת
אל: מנהל מצפ"א
מאת: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון
מס' תעודת זהות: 1000000000000000000
מס' תעודת זהות: 1000000000000000000
מס' תעודת זהות: 1000000000000000000

הנדון: המורשה דיורד אובי - תכנית
שלום למזה"ת

מיודענו דיורד אובי שלח לי עותק ממסמך שהיבר, בו
הוא מציע יוזמת שלום אמריקנית למזה"ת. את המסמך קרא במליאה
ביה"נ ב-2 דנא וכך מסר עותק מטנו למזכיר המדינה לקראה צאתו
למזה"ת.

פחד, מדבר המסמך על מחוייבותה של ארה"ב לקיומה
ובטחונה של ישראל - מחוייבות הנובעת מטעמים רבים, מוסריים
ואחרים - עד כדי נכונות לשיגור צבא אמריקני להצלת ישראל, אם
תישקף סכנה לקיומה.

מאידך, הוא קורא לנסיגה ישראל מכל השטחים - פרט
לתיקונים קלים מוסכמים וחדדיים - הקמה לשוח פלשתינאית עצמאית,
יצירת שטחים מפורזים בכל הגבולות. כמו"כ חוזר המסמך על הסעיף
מהלטה 242 הקורא לבטול מצב לוחמה, הכרה בהיבונות ועצמאות של
כל מדינה באזור, גבולות בטוחים ומוכרים וכו', ואף מרחיבו
בקוראו גם לכינון יחסים דיפלומטיים ומפחריים מלאים בין ישראל
לערבים.

אובי מציע שקודם יסכימו הצדדים על העקרונות הנ"ל
ואחרי כן יגשו למו"מ על פרטי העקרונות ופרטי הביצוע.
כמו"מ הוא קורא לשתף את אש"פ או את יורשו.

מצ"ב המסמך במלואו.

Handwritten signature:
ב. ב. רפיה

העתק: המרכז, משה"ת



TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-442654) (P)
FROM: AMEMB, TEL AVIV (100-442654) (P)

RE: "MURDER OF JACOB
MORDECAI BROWDER"

Handwritten notes in blue ink:
"MORDECAI BROWDER"
"MURDER OF JACOB MORDECAI BROWDER"
"MURDER OF JACOB MORDECAI BROWDER"
"MURDER OF JACOB MORDECAI BROWDER"

DATE: 10/10/54
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

Reference is made to the report of the
New York Office dated 10/10/54, captioned
as above, and to the report of the
Tel Aviv Office dated 10/10/54, captioned
as above.

The above information was obtained from
the New York Office by the New York
Office on 10/10/54, and is being
repeated for your information.

The New York Office is currently
conducting an investigation of the
above information, and is expected to
report the results of its investigation
to the New York Office in the near
future.

The New York Office is currently
conducting an investigation of the
above information, and is expected to
report the results of its investigation
to the New York Office in the near
future.

Very truly yours,
[Signature]

Handwritten signature and initials

**MIDDLE EAST PEACE: AN AMERICAN
INITIATIVE**

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. OBY) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. OBY. Mr. Speaker, 1 month after our Bicentennial year, the United States is at peace. Nowhere are our servicemen firing weapons in anger at an enemy.

We remain alert to threats, and we have the will—and the means—to protect ourselves, our allies, and our interests.

But the price of peace, and of liberty, is more than simply eternal vigilance. It is more than costly military preparedness. In a world where communication is instantaneous, where people can move about the globe at twice the speed of

sound, and where total destruction is only minutes away, in a world of intense interrelationships and increasing interdependence, the price of security and freedom for a country such as ours is also, inevitably, the willingness to assume the burdens and risks of leadership.

I am not suggesting that we revert to the role of world policeman. We tried that for 25 years, at times with remarkable success. But the tragedy of Vietnam demonstrated all too vividly that such a role is no longer possible or desirable.

And although we should promote our ideals of social justice and should, in good measure, choose our friends based on shared values, we should not be lured into attempting the role of mankind's conscience. Despite this country's greatness, we have enough trouble solving some of our own most basic problems without trying to claim that our judgment and our system are valid for nations with vastly different histories, cultures, and political circumstances.

But leadership, as opposed to domination, is a role both appropriate and necessary for the United States. We possess a strength unique in world history and unparalleled by any other nation today. We simply cannot decline to accept a commensurately active role in working constructively with others to solve the most urgent problems facing all of us before those problems reach the crisis state. If we decline that role, it is likely that several of those problems will either intensify until we have no choice but to intrude in a provocative and dangerous way, or will be exploited by other powers in ways inimical to our welfare and that of our allies.

MIDDLE EAST—LEGACY OF HOSTILITY

The area of the world crying most desperately for creative American leadership today is the Middle East. It is there that the danger of war, including nuclear confrontation, is the greatest. Paradoxically, it is also there that imaginative and courageous policies could lead to a degree of peace and tranquility unknown for generations.

The history of the Arab-Israeli dispute is well-known and does not need to be repeated here. But it would be useful to review some of the more pertinent facts and to set the background against which current U.S. policy must be formulated.

On one side, of course, is Israel, to which we are tied by deep and long-standing bonds of moral, social, historical, political, and economic interest. On the other are the Arabs. Formerly of little concern to the United States, they now are the object of increasing American attention because of the radical change in the oil price and supply situation, the dramatic increase in American business interests in the area, the increasing pressures in and on Israel, and the strategic implications for our relations with the Soviet Union.

For years the Arabs dedicated themselves to the obliteration of Israel. They exerted direct military, political, and economic pressure on Israel. They constantly inflamed Palestinian irredentist ambitions. Four wars and countless incidents have left the two sides glower-

ing at each other across a gulf of hatred and death, economic strangulation and terrorism, displaced peoples, seized property, and occupied territory.

There is little to be gained by trying to assess responsibility for past events. One would need to attempt the impossible and pointless task of assigning relative weights to such factors as Arab intransigence, the fact that Israel was imposed on the area, the horror of Nazi tyranny—and Western failure to perceive it in time—and centuries of anti-Semitism in Europe and colonialism in the Arab world.

Today's pertinent fact is that Israel does exist. As Secretary Kissinger recently expressed it, "We shall never forget that Israel's security has a special claim on the conscience of mankind."¹ Today's pertinent fact is also that there are new realities in the Arab world. A combination of leadership changes and a decade of military history have led all of her immediate Arab neighbors to declare that they are willing to live in peace with Israel, that they desire to devote themselves to solving their own pressing domestic economic and social problems. Their words have been backed up by numerous actions including Egypt's rebuilding of cities along the Suez Canal and Syria's intervention in Lebanon when the civil strife threatened to deteriorate to the point that Israel would feel compelled to enter. Given the potential explosiveness of the Lebanese situation, it was gratifying that Israel acted in a responsible and imaginative manner.

Despite the continued adherence of the PLO to an uncompromising public line, many Palestinians—including PLO members—have openly indicated that they, too, are reconciled to Israeli sovereignty and are prepared to drop their challenge to that state's legitimacy in exchange for a homeland of their own outside the pre-1967 Israeli borders. Even PLO leader Yasser Arafat has taken this position in private.

Recent developments in Lebanon may alter the PLO's mandate from the Rabat summit of 1974, but that is something which remains to be seen. Considering PLO resiliency in the wake of the 1970 "Black September" confrontation with Jordan, and looking at the recent PLO election successes in the West Bank, that organization may well survive as the only centralized focus of the Palestinian cause. Indeed, at this stage any other result would seem likely to remove the only possible negotiator for the foreseeable future, thus leaving the more extreme Palestinian elements free to step up their activities. In any case, the Arabs will have to give us a new signal in this regard if they withdraw support from the PLO. In the absence of any such signal, we must proceed on the assumption that, although we may not like it, the PLO is a viable negotiating entity, because at this time there is no concrete alternative in sight.

An important goal of American policy in the Middle East, as will be discussed in some detail below, should be to create a framework which will strengthen the

moderate tendencies in all camps and allow them to prevail over the radical elements.

As many others have observed, this is not a time to delude ourselves or to avoid candor and honesty in our relations with any of the parties, including Israel. In Senator JAVITS' words:

It is time to offer new alternatives, new perspectives and new possibilities.²

My purpose here is to make such an offer and to propose a concrete policy which can, I believe, meet the legitimate concerns of both sides and move them to the type of just and lasting peace which has eluded us all since 1948.

THE ISSUES—DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES

Before proceeding to the specifics of my proposal, I would like to lay out what I perceive to be the views and needs of each side.

For Israel, the crucial necessity is explicit Arab acceptance of the Jewish State and assured arrangements to protect its security. Prime Minister Rabin has said that Israel will make major territorial concessions and that a just settlement of the Palestinian question will be possible—but only within the context of an overall peace settlement. Rabin does not, however, promise withdrawal from all territories nor does he foresee an independent Palestinian State. Rather he seems to envision a continuing Israeli presence in strategically important areas. And any Palestinian entity is pictured by the Israeli Government as part of Jordan, not as a sovereign state. In line with these policies, although the Government of Israel recently forbade the establishment of a new Israeli settlement in the heart of the West Bank, it continues to permit and encourage numerous Jewish settlements in the Golan Heights, the Jordan Valley, the West Bank area surrounding Jerusalem, the Gaza strip, and the Sinai Peninsula along the Gulf of Aqaba leading to the port city of Eilat.

On the Arab side, although Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, through their endorsement of U.N. Security Council resolutions, have all accepted Israel's right to exist, they are unwilling to declare an end to the state of belligerency or grant formal recognition of Israel until the Israelis give up all of the occupied territory and settle the Palestinian question. There is some discrepancy between their positions on post-settlement recognition of Israel's Government. President Sadat stated at a press conference on April 25, 1976, that Israel "is an established reality indeed" and that his acceptance of Security Council Resolution 242 included "a recognition of Israel." President Assad of Syria, on the other hand, told interviewers last December that diplomatic recognition is a matter of sovereignty for each government to decide on its own and is not necessarily part of the peace settlement.³

It is difficult to speak with confidence about a Palestinian position, but given the decisions of the Rabat summit and the subsequent positions taken by all major Arab leaders, thus far there seems little choice but to accept the PLO as the de facto, official Palestinian spokesman. The PLO has not publicly backed away

¹Footnotes at end of article.

from its dream of creating a secular state in greater Palestine comprised of the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel. But Arafat's private statements to many Westerners, including Senator ABEL STEVENSON, suggest genuine flexibility in accepting a Palestinian State outside the bounds of pre-1967 Israel. Assad indicated this too, telling a Western correspondent as early as 2 years ago that, although he would support any decision taken by the PLO, he "would imagine that what the PLO decides will not exceed the spirit of U.N. resolutions. And these do not call for the dismantling of Israel."

Just as Rabin may feel boxed in by domestic political considerations from taking a tougher line with his right wing, or a more flexible one on the overall question of negotiations, Arafat may well believe that he cannot soften his public position without risking ouster by more militant leaders until he has a firm commitment which he can offer to the Palestinians in justification of such a change.

ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING A NEW INITIATIVE

In a sense, what we face is a chicken-and-egg problem. Israel will not pull back from the occupied territories until the Arabs grant—and guarantee—recognition and security, and the Arabs will not grant recognition until Israel pulls back.

But the problem, of course, runs far deeper. In important part, it involves on the Israeli side a deep-seated fear that, in giving up tangible real estate assets which they perceive to be of great strategic value, they would be receiving in return only promises and paper protocols. In addition, given the Palestinian public insistence to date on its more grandiose ambitions of absorbing the Jewish state, only a small number of brave Israeli voices outside the Rabin administration call for acceptance of an independent Palestinian state. Even those people generally insist that, before Israel negotiates with any Palestinian group, that group must publicly state its acceptance of Israel's right to exist under the terms of the U.N. resolutions.

Whatever one's view of former Secretary of State Kissinger's marathon efforts in 1975 and the second Sinai accord, it is now clear that the remaining issues are not susceptible to solution through step-by-step diplomacy. In part this is due to the geographic limitations which exist in the West Bank and the Golan Heights where partial pullbacks are difficult. But primarily it is because in political terms neither side is prepared to give up what it sees as its principal bargaining chips for anything short of a full settlement.

Israel's concern over the impact on her security of relinquishing the occupied territories is understandable. If the 1973 war had been launched from the pre-1967 borders, the heavy losses would have been far more severe, and the ultimate result of the war might have been quite different. And foreign Minister Allon was quite right when he suggested to the graduating class at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem recently that techno-

logical advancement has not reduced the importance of secure borders.

But quite frankly I do not believe that the occupied lands provide nearly as much security as is generally assumed. During the period between the end of the 6-day war in 1967 and the truce in the 1969-70 war of attrition, for example, there were about as many casualties as in the 1967 war itself. And the buffer nature of the occupied territories has been seriously undermined by the establishment of so many new Israeli settlements right up against the temporary borders. Meanwhile, the recent riots in the West Bank suggest that continued occupation only serves to bring the violent aspects of the Arab-Israeli dispute within Israeli borders rather than in any way providing a solution. And while a function of many factors, Israel's problems in international organizations in the last year or more are at least partially attributable to the continuing occupation and the establishment of new settlements, which even our Government publicly opposes.

Even more important, however, is the fact that without return of those territories to the Arabs, there is simply no chance of the peace for which the Israeli people have fought for so long. The problem is not to find a way to force Israel back to the 1967 borders and the 1967 insecurities. The problem is to find a way of bringing about an overall peace settlement which will meet the needs of all parties concerned—Israel for its peace and security, the Arab States for return of their territory and national pride, and the Palestinians for a homeland of their own.

If this is achieved, no matter what the shape of its borders, Israel will be far more secure than it has ever been before. As Israeli peace activist Amos Kenan stated in 1974:

In the absence of such a peace, our attempt to hold on to all the areas as a means of defense has already, in the last year [i.e. in the Yom Kippur war], proved only to stimulate war and not to prevent it.

And in the words of David Ben Gurion—

Peace is more important than real estate. We don't need the territory.

AN AMERICAN PROPOSAL

Such a settlement is possible. But because none of the parties directly concerned has the political flexibility to propose it, the impetus must come from outside. Because of our political, economic and military involvement with both sides, the United States is in a unique position to provide that impetus.

Before going any further, let me state clearly that while we should assure that Moscow is not permitted to subvert our efforts or gain strategic advantage in the area, at the same time it is important that we make sincere efforts to secure Soviet cooperation in this venture. Shuttle diplomacy effectively excluded the Russians from Middle East politics for some time, and the temptation for them to play the role of spoiler would be great if we tried to keep them out of the final settlement as well. Moreover, a constituent part of such a settlement would

be an effort to control the arms race in the area, and Soviet cooperation would be extremely important to success. We must build in mechanisms for creating and maintaining peace which could not be upset by Soviet failure to cooperate. But our own interests, and those of the Middle Eastern countries, demand that we strive for participation by Moscow, and that we give it a stake in maintaining the peace agreement.

And it is urgent that we renew efforts to create that peace agreement now.

The stalemate which has existed for more than a year now cannot be allowed to continue. We simply must get the peacemaking machinery moving again because while the peacemakers may be frozen, the warmakers are not. In the pressure cooker atmosphere which characterizes the Middle East, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that standing still is not a reasonable alternative. History has amply demonstrated that in the Middle East, one either moves towards peace—or towards war.

A future Arab-Israeli war would not only mean far greater devastation and loss of life than any of the four previous wars; it would not only bring with it the danger of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union; it would also inevitably lead to another oil embargo, bringing havoc to the world's economy and to our own. The Arabs, the Palestinians, and the Israelis are the ones who will have to make the difficult and painful decisions if a just and permanent settlement to that tragic conflict is to be achieved. The responsibility for success—or failure—is theirs. The consequences of their success or failure will affect us all.

Today Israel enjoys widespread support in the United States. Senator STEVENSON said in a speech last year before the Anti-Defamation League:

America's commitment to Israel is unequivocal. The day America abandons Israel will be its last day as a great power.

I think most Americans share that view. But if we are to assure the continuation of this broad consensus, we must steer a course away from war and move effectively toward peace.

I do not propose an imposed settlement, forcing the various parties to accept conditions which are incompatible with their political, military or psychological needs. But I do urge that we seize the initiative to create a framework in which the basic needs of all parties can be met.

One of the most serious problems with many discussions of Middle East peace has been the fact that while the elements of an overall settlement are presented, the process suggested is either piecemeal, or is not addressed at all. I believe that the critical element which can move peace proposals from the rhetoric of speeches to the dialog of negotiations is the concept of simultaneous acceptance by all parties of a set of principles regarding a final settlement, with that settlement itself to be achieved through a series of verified, progressive stages. The principles would include most importantly:

First. The termination of all claims or

states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force, and the eventual establishment of full diplomatic and commercial relations between all of these states;

Second. Eventual withdrawal of all Israel Armed Forces and administrative organs from all territories occupied since June 4, 1967, except as mutually agreed, with the specific exception of Jerusalem which would be the subject of special provisions;

Third. The establishment of a Palestinian national entity in areas outside the June 4, 1967, Israel borders, with the nature and degree of its relationship with other Arab entities to be determined by the Palestinian people themselves; and

Fourth. The creation of demilitarized zones along all borders between Israel and its neighbors, supervised for such time as both sides consider necessary by international peace-keeping forces which could not be removed except by agreement of both sides.

These principles would be incorporated into the invitations extended by the United States—and hopefully the Soviet Union—all concerned parties to attend a reconvened Geneva Conference, or a new Paris, Rhodes or Hague Conference if the symbolism of Geneva is a problem. Acceptance of the invitations would, by definition, indicate acceptance of the principles—and nothing more. The parties invited to attend would include Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and the PLO or its successor(s) to the Rabat mandate.

Assuming that Israel accepts the invitation under these terms, I would also advocate, in the context of a peace settlement, a public bilateral assurance, by treaty if necessary, that if Israel is subjected to unprovoked attack, and if the Government of Israel so requests, the United States will take whatever steps are necessary to protect Israel, including deployment of forces.

Each of these points deserves further amplification and justification.

Point 1: The first principle is merely an expansion of one of the crucial parts of the 1967 Security Council Resolution 242, simply adding the logical step of establishing full-scale relations. In declaring an end to the state of war and recognition of each state's right to exist peacefully within secure and recognized boundaries, it represents the bottom line for Israel. Without acceptance of this provision by all parties, Israel cannot negotiate a full-scale peace.

Only the Palestinians, of course, have refused thus far to accept the basic principle. But it is a fundamental aspect of the proposal I am suggesting that the Palestinians will be achieving their real objective—Israel acceptance of a Palestinian state in the now occupied territories—and thus will have a basis for reciprocating with a recognition of Israel's right to exist.

I suggest extending Resolution 242 to encompass eventual establishment of

diplomatic and commercial relations, not only because they represent the logical symbol of a true peace settlement, but because they will provide the kind of interrelationships in the area which will help maintain the peace. As I observed earlier, Syrian President Assad has asserted that recognition is a matter of sovereignty. I agree, but that is as true for the country receiving recognition as for the one proffering it. As such, I believe it is an important element in giving mutual reassurance regarding long-term intentions.

Agreement to end terrorism would be part of the specific provisions stemming from this principle. But no one should be so naive as to believe that all violent incidents will end or that indeed an intensification of terrorism will not take place as a genuine peace is at hand. The hysterical and isolated acts of a small number of diehards, however, are quite a different matter from the pattern of organized and supported terrorism which has been condoned and encouraged in the past by all of Israel's neighbors.

Point 2: The Israel withdrawal from all occupied territories is another aspect of Resolution 242 and is one of the two bottom-line requirements for the Arabs without which no agreement is possible. As I stated before, the occupation is now a major political stumbling block to peace, and its removal as a part of this package will both permit forward movement on the negotiating front and at the same time enhance rather than diminish Israel security.

Certain small areas, such as land over which roads run between neighboring towns, might by mutual agreement become exceptions to the general rule. In fact this would likely take place in both directions. But any argument that this or that piece of land must be retained for strategic reasons or because it provides an intelligence base otherwise infeasible cannot be permitted to hold sway. Irredentist sentiment would find fertile soil in such exceptions and would threaten eventually to undo that which all of the other efforts are designed to achieve.

Jerusalem is the single exception. That city holds a special place in the hearts of Jews, Moslems and Christians as well as embodying sensitive political interests. The Israelis cannot be asked to abandon Jerusalem, nor can the Arabs reasonably be asked to relinquish their claims. Various solutions have been proposed, most of which envisage control by each religion over its holy places and substantial political autonomy for each national group in those sections where it dominates. I will not pretend to hold a magic solution in my pocket, but I do believe that all parties can be expected to understand the need for special treatment of Jerusalem and, accordingly, to accept the need for special, negotiated arrangements.

As part of the Israeli agreement to withdraw from all other occupied territories, it will be necessary for the Israelis also to accept the fact that any Jewish settlements which exist in those territories will come under Arab control at the time of reversion. I realize the sensitivity of this issue in Israeli domes-

tic politics, but I also am aware from personal conversations with Arab leaders during my visit to the area in August 1975 that Israel's toleration—and encouragement—of Jewish settlements in occupied Arab lands is the single most tangible piece of evidence to which the Arabs point in their attempts to prove that Israel is determined not to give up those territories and is therefore unwilling to reach a meaningful peace agreement.

Not only are these settlements in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as former Ambassador Scranton recently pointed out,² but they encourage the hard-line elements within Israel, and abroad, who hold the misguided belief that a "greater Israel" is somehow more compatible with a genuine peace than is a "greater Palestine."

The eventual reversion to the Arabs of jurisdiction over these settlements is legally and practically necessary. In the meantime, the continuation of the current policy unnecessarily puts Israel on the defensive in the arena of the world public opinion. Therefore, both as a signal of good intent, and as a matter of prudent policy, the Government of Israel would be well advised to call a halt now to the establishment of new settlements.

Point 3: The establishment of a Palestinian entity addresses the other vital element on the Arab requirements list. As expressed by a recent Brookings Institution study on the Middle East:

The Palestinians for the most part believe that they have a right to self-determination. For a peace settlement to be viable, indeed for it even to be negotiated and concluded, this right will have to be recognized in principle and, as a part of the settlement, given satisfaction in practice.³

There is no question that some sort of affiliation of a Palestinian entity with Jordan would be preferable from the Israeli point of view and probably, objectively speaking, from the Arab perspective as well. But the time is past when we or the Israelis can afford to indulge ourselves in the belief that we can legitimately dictate that aspect of the settlement.

As suggested to me by President Sadat a year ago, once the Palestinians have a homeland, an international supervised plebiscite could be held to determine their relationship with Jordan, if any. But as the Brookings study suggests, the simple fact of the matter is that unless Israel accepts the possibility of an independent Palestinian state, negotiations with the PLO or any other Arab authority will be out of the question. No Arab leader inside or outside the Palestinian movement will accept responsibility for imposing anything less than choice of a free state on the Palestinian people—perhaps because they believe it would be unjust; certainly because they know they could not enforce it and would only jeopardize their own positions.

Point 4: The demilitarized zone—DMZ—concept is already embodied in Security Council Resolution 242 and is a necessary psychological if not military element. A permanent peacekeeping force is an obvious requirement given the pre-

²Footnotes at end of article.

vailing mutual distrust. Two extensions of the normal DMZ setup would also likely be in order and would be appropriate subjects for negotiation.

The first of these would be agreement to third-party aerial surveillance of the border areas. This type of arrangement has worked well in the Sinai for a number of years, with each side receiving relevant information assuring that the other side is not massing for an attack.

The second extension of the DMZ concept would probably have to be some agreement that, although the Palestinians could maintain their own armed forces and could arrange alliances as they saw fit, no troops or weapons under the control of a foreign power could be stationed within the Palestinian State.

Another aspect of this subject would be an effort by all countries in the area, on a mutual basis, to restrict, and hopefully end, the arms race. Part of this effort should be agreement among all major suppliers, East and West, not to continue to fuel a military buildup on either side. Neither side of the arms control effort—supplier or recipient—could realistically be expected to refrain altogether from arms transactions. But the volume of weapons should be carefully monitored and the introduction of entirely new systems, upsetting the balance, should be avoided by mutual agreement. We must squarely face the fact that for the United States this will require a major change in our present practice of transferring ever larger quantities of increasingly sophisticated weapons to Israel, and increasingly selling them to the Arab world, with no apparent policy to effectively control the flow to either.

Although specific U.N. action—aside from establishing the peacekeeping force—would be outside the scope of these negotiations, it would be fully appropriate if the United Nations pledged to come to the aid of any signatory state subjected to threat or use of force by any other signatory state. How far the Security Council could or would go in this regard, however, is a matter of some doubt. It may be able to do no more than, as in the case of Korea, facilitate the actions of individual members.

Therefore, in recognition of this country's close ties to Israel and the political difficulty involved in any decision by the government in Tel Aviv to participate in the type of arrangement I am describing, a bilateral U.S. commitment to Israel is probably essential if real peace is to be obtained and war avoided. Whether by treaty, executive agreement supported by a joint congressional resolution, or some other method, a formal American commitment to help defend Israel in the event of an unprovoked attack is, I am convinced, required to instill in Israel the confidence in that country's secure future necessary for it to embrace this settlement.

Moreover, I believe such a guarantee accords with our national will and our national interest. As Secretary Kissinger so eloquently put it in his April 4, 1976, address to the American Jewish Congress:

"The survival and security of Israel are unequivocal and permanent moral commitments of the United States. Israel is a loyal friend and a fellow democracy whose very existence represents the commitment of all free peoples."

Quite frankly, it is my assumption that, even in the absence of a formal commitment, if Israel were on the brink of disaster, there is a strong likelihood we would become directly involved anyway. A pledge such as I am proposing would merely eliminate any doubts in the minds of both the Israelis and potential adversaries and troublemakers, thus minimizing both the chance of miscalculation and the likelihood of American participation in a future war.

Returning to the overall package, let me emphasize once again that the crucial feature of this peace proposal is that agreement in principle be reached now on the key elements of a final settlement, with implementation to be carried out in verified stages. I believe this concept holds great promise for acceptance. King Hussein suggested just such an outline to me when I visited Jordan in August 1975. Former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban endorsed the same idea in a September 1975 interview.¹ And the distinguished members of the Brookings study group, representing a broad spectrum of views on Arab-Israeli relations, supported the concept in their study published at the end of last year.²

The vital point at this stage is to get simultaneous agreement to the four principles I have outlined, thus allowing the various parties to justify their participation and permitting the implementation to proceed within a clear framework of understanding on where the process is heading.

The later phases of staged implementation will also provide continuing reinforcement and reassurance to each side that it is getting as much as it is giving and that we will not reach the end of the road with a backlog of misunderstandings and disagreements which would eventually undermine the peace. I have no specific suggestions as to how it would be constituted or operated, but an arbitration mechanism will be an obvious requirement.

I have no illusions about the difficulty of getting the U.S. Government to make such a sweeping proposal so early in a new administration. But there is never a "good" time for bold strokes. I believe that any delay can only increase the frustrations and bitterness and massive, uncontrolled military buildups on both sides, and, in the charged atmosphere now prevailing, only heighten the possibility of war. The situation in Egypt alone, where economic problems and political pressures bring that country closer and closer to the breaking point, demands that renewed diplomatic activity not be postponed. The time available to Sadat to show that cooperation with the United States can bring tangible results grows shorter with each passing day.

It is not too soon to act. There are new realities on both sides which we must take advantage of before they are over-

taken by events. Their partial successes in the 1973 war have brought the Arabs to the realization that while they cannot eliminate Israel, they can negotiate with honor. And the same war brought the Israelis to the understanding that the moral basis of Zionism and the delicate requirements of democracy cannot long endure continued forced rule over a million Palestinians or the crushing burdens of defense in a state of perpetual belligerency.

Those who guide the course of American foreign policy in the administration and Congress, the supporters of Israel who have poured their hearts and resources into sustaining that beleaguered state, and all of us concerned with peace and justice in that troubled area must rise to the challenge of American leadership.

There are right times and wrong times, right issues and wrong issues over which to assume an active role. Vietnam was wrong. And Angola was wrong. But if there ever was or ever will be a right time and place to commit ourselves to bold initiatives in the cause of peace, it is now and it is in the Middle East.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Speech at Chizuk Amuno Synagogue, Baltimore, Md., May 9, 1976.

² Speech before the American Jewish Committee, Washington, D.C., May 12, 1976.

³ Time, December 8, 1975.

⁴ Washington Post, February 28, 1976.

⁵ Newsweek, June 10, 1974.

⁶ Merrill A. McPeak, "Israel: Borders and Security," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1976.

⁷ *Israel and the Palestinians: A Different Israeli View*, New York, Bantam, 1975.

⁸ John McCook Roota, "Peace is More Important Than Real Estate," *Saturday Review*, April 3, 1971.

⁹ May 6, 1976.

¹⁰ Speech before U.N. Security Council, March 24, 1976.

¹¹ *Toward Peace in the Middle East, Report of a Study Group*, Washington, D.C., the Brookings Institution, 1975.

¹² Washington, D.C.

¹³ *New Outlook*, September, 1975.

¹⁴ See 11 above.

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוקן וסודות רשמיים), תשי"ז - 1957.

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הרוב העצום (342 נגד 32) בו נדחתה הצעת אובי לקצץ מאתיים מיליון דולר מחסיוע הצבאי לישראל הרשיט מאך את חברי בית הנבחרים. ידידינו בבית עמדו על כך שתיערך הצבעה שמיח (ולש מצ בעה זו מלמדת בין השאר על:

- א. גודל התמיכה בישראל כאשר מדובר בסיוע ישיר לישראל.
- ב. למרות הרעש שהצליח אובי להקים סביבו ננטיונחיו החוזרים לקצץ בסיוע לישראל (בהח ועתד ההקצבות במליאת הועדה ובמליאת ביהנ) החבררי לכל שאובי מייצג מיעוט קטן ביותר.
- אין ספר שמטמעות ההצבעה לא נעלמה מעיני אובי עצמו וחבריו וכן מכל הגורמים העוקבים אחר המתרחש בגבעה בהקשר הישראלי, כולל הנמשל והערבים.

רפיח

שוח רהמ מנכל שתבט ממנכל סמנכל מצפא חטברה מזחית מעת חקר רם אמן
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PREPARED FOR

PROGRAM Today

STATION WNBC-TV (New York, Ch. 4) and NBC TV Network

DATE Tuesday, September 2, 1975

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SENIOR CONGRESSMAN HAS DOUBTS ON U.S. ROLE IN MIDEAST PACT

(The program was in its last half hour.)

BARBARA WALTERS: During the last two weeks a delegation of American Congressman has been making its own on-the-scenes studies in the Middle East. The delegation represented the Foreign Operations subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. And the senior member of that delegation, Representative David Obey of Wisconsin, is in our Washington News Center now with Today Washington correspondent Douglas Kiker. Good morning, Doug. It's nice to see you again.

(VIDEO: Kiker and Cong. Obey in Washington.)

KIKER: Good morning, everybody. Congressman Obey, you have just returned from a trip to the Mideast. You are a member of the House Foreign Operations Appropriations subcommittee. I wonder how much faith and confidence do you have in this new agreement that's been signed between Israel and Egypt?

OBHEY: Well, I'm frankly very pessimistic about the long run. America is being asked to do essentially two things that are important. I think, number one, agreed to the on-land presence of American personnel in the form of those technicians in the Sinai; and secondly, we're being asked to provide for Israel an aid package of two billion plus, not just this year but each year for the next four years.

doesn't mention Egypt

What I worry about in that regard is this: When I talked with President Sadat in Egypt, he emphasized that it was critically important that almost immediately another interim agreement be signed in the Golan area.

King Hussein, when we talked to him in Jordan, said he felt there was virtually no chance that that would happen. I was hoping I'd find it was wrong; but when I went to Israel and when we talked with Mr. Rabin in Israel and I asked him that specific

question, he said that he was more than doubtful--

KIKER: More than doubtful?

OBEY: More than doubtful that there would be any immediate substantive agreement in the Golan.

KIKER: And without that, Sadat's in trouble.

OBEY: Well, that's what Sadat said. And then I asked Rabin to elaborate and he said, "You know, in the Sinai we have enough room for taking risks." But he said, "The principle of interim agreements is not applicable everywhere equally."

And then he went on to say that what Israel wanted after this agreement was a period of one or two years with no deadlines, no reassessments--and I've forgotten the third word which he mentioned--

KIKER: The whole idea was that Israel was buying time.

OBEY: I think that's--I think that's the way he sees it. It would seem to me that the Israelis are hoping to buy time thro this agreement which will enable them to consolidate their position in the Golan and also in the West Bank, hoping that they can, having cut Egypt out of it, then deal with the Palestinian question, for instance, on their own terms.

KIKER: And deal with Syria on its own terms also.

OBEY: Yes.

KIKER: President Ford called this agreement historic. I gather that you think otherwise.

OBEY: Well, I think it could be important if it does in fact establish this momentum. But I'm very worried that it won't. And I'm worried really that--I think we have a commitment to Israel and I think we have to provide enough assistance to insure its survival. But I do not believe that we have a commitment to a foreign policy which is essentially unrealistic, and I believe -- at least I'm afraid -- that the aid in the magnitude being suggested by the Israelis will lead to the kind of self-confidence and perhaps intransigence on the part of Israel which will make a long-term agreement more difficult.

KIKER: Well, of course both the aid and the stationing of American civilian technicians in the buffer zone must be approved by Congress. Let's take them one at a time.

I know they're going to come as a package. Is Congress willing to put Americans for the first time in the Mideast,

wrong!

granted that it's not military personnel involved but nevertheless it's American citizens? Will Congress give the President that authority?

OBEY: I just don't know. I myself, for instance, am leaning against it, but I want to keep a relatively open mind as much as I can, given the impressions I've gathered.

KIKER: Well, obviously, you know, the old question about "another Vietnam, slow buildup," and all the rest, is that what people will be afraid of?

OBEY: I think that's what people will be afraid of. I think there's also something else. The fact is that by virtue of the nature of the debate which Congress will have on those technicians, I think they will become very symbolic. That means I think that they become symbolic targets for any terrorists who want to blow things up in the Middle East. And even though it's a very difficult place for terrorists to get to, Mr. Rabin said that he couldn't totally guarantee that they would be safe. And it just seems to me that if the United States had to go in there for any purpose whatsoever, either to rescue those technicians or to respond to any attack on them, that we would run the very grave risk that any usefulness of the United States in the Middle East would be ended for along time.

And I think that's as serious as the Vietnam potentiality.

KIKER: Let me ask you now about the aid. We're not only pledging to give aid to Israel but also to Egypt, vast amounts of aid. First of all, are we giving Israel too much in your opinion, and secondly, do you think Congress will approve giving aid to Egypt in view of the oil cartel's pressures on us with our oil prices, and should we?

OBEY: Well, my guess is that I think you have to bet that the odds are that Congress would probably go along. But as I say, I'm very skeptical about it, and what I'm worried about is not the fact that we're giving aid to Israel but I'm worried about the fact that Israel is expecting so much that if we give the amount that they're asking, they would be in such a firm position themselves that I don't think they'll feel any strong need to negotiate, specially on the Palestinian question. And in the long run, I don't think that's in Israel's best interests. I think what that will do is help to radicalize the rest of the Arab world and to make the Palestinians even more troublesome than they have been up to now.

KIKER: Well, when you add up the whole package, military and economic, to both sides, it amounts to what, five billion dollars?

OBEY: I don't think it amounts to that much. I think that--

I'm frankly not certain what the dollar amounts are in the final agreements. But I know that you're talking at least around three. And when you look at the entire foreign aid bill that that would mean, that means that we'd be voting on a foreign aid bill in excess of five billion dollars this year for the entire world.

I have great doubt whether or not Congress is going to do that, especially when the President has just vetoed an education bill (two words not broadcast) spending level.

KIKER: So it would appear that now having sold this pact to the Israelis and to the Egyptians, Mr. Kissinger and the Ford Administration must now sell it to the American Congress.

OBEY: Well, I think that they have to sell it to the American Congress and the American people, and I think there are strong reasons why we should be asking some tough questions before we agree to the whole package.

KIKER: Thank you very much, Representative David Obey, who is a member of the House Foreign Operations Appropriations subcommittee, just back from a trip to the Mideast.

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כ"ט בטבת, תשל"ו

2 במרץ, 1976

מ ז כ ר פ ו י מ י

הנדון: דברי אובי בדיון ועדת ההקצבות

בדיון מליאת ועדת ההקצבות של ביה"נ על חוק הסיוע לשנת"א 1976, ב - 1.3.76, הציע המורשה אובי לקצץ בסיוע לישראל. בהצעת התיקון שלו נקב בקיצוץ של 500 מיליון דולר, אך בחילופי הדברים שלאחר מכן אמר כי עיקר כוונתו לסימליות שבקיצוץ, ולא דווקא לסכום מסויים.

אובי פתח בהדגשה כי ידוע לו שדבריו יחפשו כעמדה אנשי - ישראלית, אך הוא משוכנע שעמדתו לא רק נכונה ונבונה, אלא גם לטובתה של ישראל. בין השאר אמר:

* ישראל חזקה מצבאות ערב, כפי ששמע בעצמו מהרמטכ"ל גור, והשאלה בהתמודדות צבאית תהיה לא עצם הנצחון, אלא המָשָׁן והמחיר.

* מטרתו של אובי אינה הסכון אלא נקיטת מדיניות נכונה, ואילו השתכנע שיש בכך חיוב היה מוכן להקצות לישראל אפילו חמישה בליון דולר לשנה.

* בדבריו ב - MEET THE PRESS טעה רוה"מ רבין בכל שלוש הנקודות שבהן התמקד והוא - אובי - יכול להוכיח זאת.

* אם יאושר הסיוע במלוא היקפו, יהווה הדבר איתוח לנוקשי - הקו בישראל כי אכן הקונגרס פועל כרצונם.

* קיצוץ בסיוע לישראל יהווה איתוח חיובי לסוריה שנעשתה מדינת מפתח בעולם הערבי, לגבי יחס ארה"ב אליה. לעומת זאת, אם לא יקוצץ הסיוע לישראל, ירוצו הסורים לבריה"מ ויקבלו ממנה סיוע נוסף.



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* האומדנים הישראליים לגבי יחסי הכוחות אינם מוסמכים כאלה ששמע אובי מנציגי קהיליית הביון האמריקאית והוא מפציר בועדה להחכנס לשמיעה הידרוך ממומחים אלה טרם הצבעתה. (בדיוני 11 - וועדה החקצבות לסיוע חוץ בנובמבר 1975 דחה היו"ר פסמן את בקשת אובי לקיים הידרוך מסוג זה, בהסתמכו על דברי קיסנינג'ר שעדותו הוא מיצגה את הערכה מומחי המימשל. בסגנון זה ענה פסמן לאובי גם בדיון הפעם).

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The first part of the report is devoted to a description of the
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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



כ"ה אדר ב' תשל"ו
30 במרץ 1976

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שגרירות ישראל
ושינסטון
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המחלקה לאורחים רשמיים
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דאר זכונס

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מאת: צבי לפיח, וושינסטון

תנדון: אובי כפרר על המחפזותנו במועבי"ס

פז"ב דברים שאמר אובי, המופיעים ברשומה הקונגרס ב-29 במרץ.

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL

WASHINGTON, D.C.

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ISRAEL'S ACTION ON U.N. DEBATE
ENCOURAGING

HON. DAVID R. OBEY

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 29, 1976

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I do not want to make too much of it, since the Israelis themselves have made a point of saying that it is in no way indicative of a change in policy, but I was nevertheless pleased with the decision by the Government of Israel to participate in the current United Nations debate over recent developments in Jerusalem and the west bank.

While both parties have participated in United Nations General Assembly debates in the past and in the deliberations of some specialized agencies, this is the first time Israel has sat at the same Security Council table with the PLO. What this means, therefore, is that Israel is recognizing reality at the

United Nations and that is a hopeful sign. I believe that over time, as Israel and the Palestinians both participate in international meetings, Israel will be put less on the defensive and other parties in the forum will be forced to take a more rational view. Regardless of disclaimers to the contrary, I hope that it will be noted in the future that this decision was the first step in a process which will eventually see the Palestinians and the Israelis facing each other across a negotiating table together with other interested parties as they work out a just and lasting peace in the Middle East with secure and recognized borders which, in the end, is the only real protection for any of the parties in the Middle East.

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8 אוי"ק 1975

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הנדון: הסדרת ר. אובי-ד-ויסקונסין
מכתב 1237 מיום 30.9.75
מכתב 955 מיום 31.8.75

1. קראתי את דוחו של הנ"ל על סיורו במזה"מ באוגוסט ט.ז. (דוח שצטט למכתב הנ"ל).
כן ראיתי את מאמרו בניו-יורק טיימס מיום 3.10.75 שהנו למעשה תמצית של הדו"ח הנ"ל.

2. הוא אמנם מביא בדוחו כמה חרסמויות חיוביות לגבי סיורו בארץ, אך ברור שהסקנותיו
והמלצותיו אינן חיוביות מפילו מה ועם מדיקתו.

3. התוכל אולי להשכילני לגבי מקורות גישתו השלילית (מכתב מס. 1235 מיום 30.9.75). האם
נוצר קשר עם תומכיו בוויסקונסין.

4. ברשותך אמנה דוגמאות מספר מתוך דוחו לגבי האספקטים השליליים בהמלצותיו:

* ההמלצה לקצוץ סכומי הסיוע לישראל מלווה בנפות הסכום שכקשה ישראל; בהדגשה הביעתי על
ישראל לסיוע רב שנהוי (המסחם בסכומי עתק); בהתעלמות מכוונת המגטל לסייע למצרים ישירות
ובאמצעות גורמים אחרים; בהתעלמות מסיוע אמריקני לארצות ערב אחרות; מן הסיוע הסובייטי
ועוד.

* אל מול האור (מנופת קמא) של הסיוע המבוקש לישראל מודגשים צורכי הננים הדוחקים של
ארצ"ב.

* כן מופיעה הטענה שסיוע כזה נקטיה עמיה ישראל; יעורר בה אטליות בדבר טריות זמן נכר
הקומד לרשותה; יגביר עוצמתה הצבאית ללא מרומורציה לצרכיה יחסום הענוחה החיובית להסורות
המתחוללות בעולם הערבי בכיוון להסררי שלום.

* בהקשר זה (של "סיוע ענק") הוא מזכיר את תאגה הקצב של העלאת ישובים בגולן ובגרט"ע
וטוען שתוצאתה סכך המייע למעשה ארצ"ב לישראל לספור ביריה את "שלל המלחמה".

5. בעזרת הטענות הנ"ל ואחרים חובע חבר ועדה התקצבות הזה לקיים יתר אסוק מבוקר בסיוע לישראל
ולקצץ נכרות הסכום המבוקש.

6. מה הם לרעתך הסכויים של הנ"ל להשפיע על חבריו בעזרת טענותיו אלה?

ב ב ר כ ה,

דוד בן-דב

לשכת המנכ"ל

העתק:
מראיחן בנבור, וושינגטון
מר דוד הורגסן, וושינגטון
המרכז

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PARING AID TO ISRAEL

THE CASE USUALLY MADE FOR THE SYRIAN AGREEMENT IS THAT IT IS ONE
 STEP IN A STEP BY STEP PROCESS THAT WILL LEAD TO PEACE. AS A
 RESULT OF CONVERSATIONS IN AUGUST WITH PRESIDENT ANWAR EL SADAT
 KING HUSSEIN BREMER YISHAU RABIN AND OTHER ARAB AND ISRAELI
 LEADERS. I FEAR THAT CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF THE SYRIAN
 PACKAGE IN ITS PRESENT FORM COULD RUN THE RISK OF PEACE
 FURTHER THAN EVER FROM OUR GRASP.

RECENT PUBLIC DEBATE OVER UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN THE
 SETTLEMENT HAS CENTERED ON THE QUESTION OF SETTLING AMERICAN
 TECHNICIANS IN THE SINAI.

WHILE THAT ACTION MAY NOT BE OBJECTIONABLE IN ITSELF TO THE UNITED
 STATES IS FOR THE FIRST TIME TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED ON THE
 GROUND IN THE MIDDLE EAST IT HAS AN OBLIGATION TO ITSELF TO INSURE
 THAT THE CONCERNED PARTIES AVOID A SITUATION OF HOSTILITIES
 AND ACTIVELY SEEK A PERMANENT PEACE SETTLEMENT.

IT IS MOST DOUBTFUL THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL BE IN A POSITION
 TO DO SO UNLESS CONGRESS INSISTS ON A MORE RESTRICTED USE OF
 AMERICAN AID THAN IS CONTAINED IN THE PACKAGE BEING REQUESTED
 BY THE ADMINISTRATOR.

THE ADMINISTRATOR REPORTEDLY INTENDS TO SEEK ABOUT \$1.5 BILLION
 DOLLARS IN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID FOR ISRAEL IN THE FISCAL
 1976 BUDGET. AID IN THAT MAGNITUDE-- ESPECIALLY WHEN IT IS
 VIEWED AS THE ONLY PAYMENT ON A THREE YEAR PAYMENT PACKAGE-- IS
 MORE LIKELY THAN NOT TO ENCOURAGE THE CONTINUING BELIEF AMONG
 THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY HAVE MORE TIME THAN IS IN FACT AVAILABLE
 TO ACHIEVE RESOLUTION OF BASIC QUESTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
 AND ON THE WEST BANK.

CONGRESS WOULD THEREFORE BE SERVING BOTH ISRAELI AND LONG TERM INTERESTS
 AND THE INTERESTS OF PEACE BY REDUCING SUBSTANTIALLY THE AMOUNT
 OF AID BEING REQUESTED. IN THIS CASE IT IS TO MAINTAIN HER EXISTING MILITARY
 CAPABILITY.

THE ARAB AND ISRAELI LEADERS WITH WHOM I SPoke DEEMED EQUALLY
 COMMITTED TO PEACE. BUT THE ISRAELIS DO NOT SHARE THE ARAB'S
 BELIEF THAT WITHOUT A SYRIAN FACT MOVEMENT ON OTHER FRONTS THE
 ISRAELI STRATEGY SEEMS TO BE TO DEAL WITH SYRIA THROUGH THE SYRIAN AGREEMENT
 AND SEPARATE EGYPT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE FROM THE REST OF THE ARAB

- 2 -

THIS WOULD PUT ISRAEL IN A SECURE MILITARY POSITION BECAUSE WITHOUT EGYPT THE REST OF THE ARAB WORLD PRESENTS NO SERIOUS MILITARY THREAT.

THIS WOULD IN TURN GIVE ISRAEL TIME WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF AMERICAN AID TO CONSOLIDATE HER POSITION IN THE WEST BANK AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN HER MILITARY POSTURE. ALTOGETHER THE ISRAELIS SEEM TO BELIEVE THAT THESE "NEW REALITIES" WOULD GRADUALLY BRING ABOUT GREATER ARAB WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE THE GOLAN AND PALESTINIAN QUESTION ON TERMS THAT ARE MORE TO ISRAEL'S LIKING.

BUT RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION LEADERS AT THE "MODERATE" AND "EXTREME" ENDS OF THE SPECTRUM ILLUSTRATE HOW MILITANTS IN THE ARAB WORLD WOULD SEEK TO UNDERMINE ANY SETTLEMENT THAT DOES NOT IN THEIR VIEW ADDRESS PALESTINIAN GOALS.

THE LONGER IT TAKES TO CONCLUDE FOLLOW THROUGH AGREEMENTS THE GREATER THE APPEAL THAT THE MORE EXTREME OF THESE POSITIONS WILL HAVE FOR A GROWING MAJORITY OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. AND UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE RHETORIC AND ACTIONS OF PALESTINIAN LEADERS SUCH AS YASIR ARAFAT IN 1975 COULD LOOK LIKE A MODEL OF MODERATION IN COMPARISON WITH THE RHETORIC AND ACTIONS OF PALESTINIAN LEADERS IN 1977 OR 1978.

NEITHER ISRAEL NOR THE UNITED STATES CAN REASONABLY EXPECT THAT TODAY'S UNIQUE CONSTELLATION OF MODERATE ARAB LEADERS- KING HUSSEIN MR SADAT AND EVEN PRESIDENT HAFEZ AL ASSAD IN THE CONTEXT OF MIDDLE EASTERN HISTORY- WILL REMAIN IN ASCENDANCY FOR VERY LONG UNLESS THE PATTERNS OF MODERATION CAN SHOW SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN RECOVERING TERRITORY AND FULFILLING IN SOME MEANINGFUL WAY PALESTINIAN ASPIRATIONS FOR A HOMELAND.

AND ISRAEL'S POLICY IS NOT LIKELY TO REFLECT SUFFICIENT RECOGNITION OF THE URGENCY OF THAT PROGRESS IF THE ISRAELIS ARE GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT CONGRESS IS WILLING TO VOTE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID IN THE MAGNITUDE BEING REQUESTED BY THE ADMINISTRATION NOT JUST THIS YEAR BUT EVERY YEAR FOR THE NEXT THREE OR MORE YEARS.

THE UNITED STATES HAS A MORAL COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL. OUT OF THAT COMMITMENT COMES AN OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE ENOUGH ASSISTANCE TO ASSURE HER SURVIVAL. WE DO NOT HOWEVER HAVE A COMMITMENT TO UNDERWRITE AND ENCOURAGE AN ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY- BORN THOUGH IT IS OF UNDERSTANDABLE FRUSTRATION PRESSURE AND FEAR- THAT IS ESSENTIALLY IMMEDIATE AND UNREALISTIC THAT IS NOT RESPONSIVE TO NEW CONDITIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD AND THAT IN THE LONG RUN CAN ONLY PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF ISRAEL'S WORST ENEMIES WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR ALL CONCERNED.

UNLESS THE MOMENTUM FOR PEACE IS SUSTAINED- AND ACCELERATED-

- 3 -

AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE MODERATE FORCES IN THE ARAB WORLD MAY
WELL BE CAST ASIDE CONFRONTING ISRAEL WITH A FAR STRONGER AND MORE
HOSTILE ENEMY IN THE YEARS TO COME. IF THAT HAPPENED THIS NEW
AGREEMENT WOULD GO DOWN IN HISTORY AS JUST ONE MORE LOST OPPORTUNITY
ONE MORE INTERVAL BETWEEN WARS.

ADKAN
ITONUT

שהח דהם סבכל שרהבט סבכל סבכל מצפא ספח הסבריה מצודי תילסור מאוט א ב סזחים חקר רס אמן ברון

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- 3 -

AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE MODERATE FORCES IN THE ARAB WORLD MAY
WELL BE CAST ASIDE CONFRONTING ISRAEL WITH A FAR STRONGER AND MORE
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AGREEMENT WOULD BE LOST IN HISTORY AS JUST ONE MORE LOST OPPORTUNITY
ONE MORE INTERVAL BETWEEN WAR.

ADKAN

12001

THIS IS A COPY OF THE ORIGINAL WHICH IS IN THE FILE OF THE ARAB BOYCOTT

1955

12/22

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון


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כ"ה תשרי תשל"ו
30 ספטמבר 1975

אל: מצפ"א ✓
מאת: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

הגדון: דו"ח המורשה אובי על סיורו בישראל

להלן הדו"ח שפירסם המורשה דיויד אובי על סיורו האחרון
בישראל ובארצות ערב כראש משלחת הת-הועדה לסינוע חוץ בועדת
הקצבות של ביה"נ.

בברכה,

צ. רפיח

הערה:
לשכה רה"מ
לשכה שחב"ט
המרכז, משה"ח
מנכ"ל משרד האוצר

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1978

1978
JANUARY 30

TO: THE DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

RE: [Illegible]

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OBSERVATIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST
AFTER THE SINAI AGREEMENT

A
Report
By

Hon. David R. Obey

To The
Appropriations Committee

Throughout recorded history, no area of the world has experienced more turmoil than the Middle East, and no people have suffered more abuse, deprivation, discrimination and acts of genocide than have the Jews. Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the Middle East has been torn by religious, political and military strife. From the day of its creation, Israel has been subjected to unrelenting efforts to snuff out its national existence.

Now, after four wars, the loss of thousands of Israeli and Arab lives, the displacement of two million people, the waste of billions of dollars and the battering of the economic and social stability of virtually every state in the area, the possibility of peace is again being earnestly and prayerfully discussed.

Last month, in an effort to gain a better understanding of the issues which plague this troubled part of the world and a more accurate perspective on the pending Egyptian-Israeli accord in the Sinai, Congressman Edward Koch of New York, Congressman Joseph Early of Massachusetts and I visited Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel. Our trip lasted from August 20th to

August 30, 1975, during which time Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was negotiating the second Sinai agreement.

As members of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, which will be asked to appropriate funds for American commitments related to that agreement, our purpose was four-fold:

- to assess the attitude of each country in the confrontation area toward the pending agreement;

- to assess for ourselves the likelihood that the agreement and related commitments would lead to long term peace in the Middle East;

- to evaluate the expectations each of the countries in the area have about the future role of the United States in that part of the world -- politically, economically and militarily; and

- to make our own judgments about the proper American role.

We left the United States the same day Secretary Kissinger did, and at that point American actions were described in some quarters as buying peace rather than negotiating it. I returned from the Middle East with the disquieting impression that unless attitudes in the area change -- especially in Israel and Syria -- we may in fact be buying short run peace, but in the long run may only be providing time which can be used by some of the participants to consolidate their own positions, thereby making further concessions seem less necessary and future compromise less likely.

At this point I should state that I am speaking only for myself; others in the delegation may have differing views. But after studying the historical, social and political issues involved, there are only certain means by which a person in my position can assess a situation like this. Among the most important are:

- talking with the decision makers and advisers in each affected country;
- judging the meaning of their words; and
- looking at the material evidence.

Based upon these methods of evaluation, my impressions are depressingly different from those I had honestly hoped to form as a result of this trip.

The argument usually put forth in support of a step-by-step approach to the resolution of the Middle East question is that a second interim agreement between Egypt and Israel in the Sinai will help lay the groundwork for further agreements -- between Israel and Syria in the Golan, between Israel and the Arabs on the Palestinian and West Bank problems -- and finally lead to a set of lasting understandings and agreements which will, after nearly 30 years, restore a sense of justice and order to the Middle East which can be the basis for a true peace.

I sincerely hope that that will in fact prove to be the case. But I am very doubtful it will. The following chronological report on our experiences in Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel, especially our conversations with government officials in those countries, explains the reasons for my concern and my basic pessimism.

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EGYPT

We arrived in Egypt late Friday evening, August 22nd, after a brief stopover in Portugal. On Saturday, we:

--traveled to Suez and inspected the newly reopened Suez Canal;

--reviewed Egyptian urban housing reconstruction efforts in the cities of Suez and Port Taufiq, both of which were far more heavily damaged in the '73 war than I had imagined;

--visited impressive rural housing construction projects in farming villages that had also been damaged in the war. (These projects seemed well-conceived and effectively carried out, particularly in contrast with the failure of similar efforts in other parts of the world).

--we drove to Ismailia for a two-hour discussion with a number of Egyptian economic development officials, and with the Chairman of the Suez Canal Authority, Mashour Ahmed Mashour, who expressed deep gratitude that the United States had been the first nation to respond to Egypt's request for assistance in helping to clear the canal after the '73 war. (The importance he attached to the fact that the U. S. had been the first to offer a helping hand was, I think, a clear illustration that in international as well as domestic affairs, an ability to respond quickly is crucial. Had we acted a few days later -- after the French and British had offered their help, for instance -- the impact of our action would have been greatly diminished).

--returned to Cairo for a frank, far-ranging and extremely revealing discussion with a spokesman for the Egyptian Parliament, Mr. Mansour Hassan. He emphasized that Egypt is like an elder brother to the other Arab nations, "who feels the responsibility to do what responsibility requires." He suggested that the younger brothers in the family will acquiesce as long as Egypt is able to show that President Sadat's path of peaceful liberation of Arab territory is working, but stressed the critical importance of follow-on agreements on other fronts besides Sinai. Mr. Hassan stated that if interim progress in the Golan does not follow within three to six months, "the rest of the Arab world will become restless, will say Egypt sold out, and the trend will go the other way." This theme was later reiterated by President Sadat.

--attended a working dinner with various American embassy and Egyptian government officials, including Mr. Hassan, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Economic Cooperation Gual Nazer, and Dr. Fouad Sarraf, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance.

Almost without exception, the Egyptian officials with whom we spoke that day professed a willingness to accept the reality of Israel's existence if Israel agrees to a withdrawal to pre-1967 borders and to a resolution of the Palestinian question, including the creation of a Palestinian state located in the West Bank and Gaza (with an eventual United Nations-sponsored plebiscite to determine whether that state would be affiliated

with Jordan or would be separate and independent). This specific and unified position on Palestine stands in sharp contrast to the vague and varying references later made in Syria to "Palestinian rights." The Egyptians repeatedly expressed an urgent desire to move Egypt away from a war footing toward a greater emphasis on attacking the country's staggering economic and social problems.

The next day, Sunday, we drove from Cairo to Alexandria, where we met with President Anwar Sadat and Vice President Muhammed Husni Mubarak for over an hour. Sadat made it quite clear that he believes American involvement in the Middle East negotiations goes beyond the role of mediator, that he sees our participation as a signal that the U. S. will follow a more "even-handed" approach to future Middle East problems, and that he expects the U. S. to be responsive to his country's economic and military needs.

Specifically, President Sadat said he needs financial assistance from the United States and other developed countries in order to solve his short term liquidity problems and stated that he desires investments by American companies. He also expressed the hope that the United States will allow him to purchase a number of "defensive military articles" which are not now available to him because of his recent rebuff to the Soviet Union.

Sadat maintained that both Syria and Israel have been re-armed since the '73 war while Egypt has not. He said he needs to purchase enough arms to keep Egypt from being "strangled" and to prevent his country from being so weak that Israel "will again

become arrogant with me." When asked what magnitude of arms he was expecting, Sadat said he had not discussed specific arms levels with American officials, but asserted that his request "would be humble, very reasonable, not billions like Israel."

When asked whether he would agree to a demilitarization in the Sinai as part of a final agreement with Israel, Sadat said he would accept a "mutual demilitarization of the borders." In this regard, he said he would take realistic note of the differing geographic requirements, i.e., that Israel has less territory and thus less flexibility than Egypt in the Sinai.

I believe Sadat impressed the entire delegation with his almost desperate desire to overcome the gargantuan economic and social problems that beset his country, and his consequent desire to achieve a state of peace which will enable him to direct a greater share of Egypt's scarce resources toward the task of economic reconstruction. But above all, President Sadat stressed that he believes it is absolutely necessary that some follow-on agreement be reached in the Golan Heights. When asked whether he agreed with Mr. Hassan's assertion that some progress in the Golan must be made within three to six months, he snapped, "No, no, too long, too long" and stated in the strongest terms that negotiations with the Syrians were essential "as soon as possible." Sadat voiced concern that Israel "is in the same state that we were in before the '73 war -- one of confusion;"

he said that Israel "is still unable to accept the post-1973' realities, and is still arrogant, power hungry and unable to make peace." He warned that Syria "must not be allowed to despair," and suggested that pressure on Egypt from other parts of the Arab world could become intense, and perhaps irresistible, if the Syrians, Palestinians and others came to believe that Egypt had cut a deal for herself without concern for (and achievement of) further progress on other fronts.

After a most forthcoming and cordial meeting with President Sadat we met with Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy, in what proved to be a far less productive and far more argumentative session. The Foreign Minister was obviously preoccupied and showed the strains of the negotiations; he seemed frustrated at the difficulty of dealing with an American government which possesses not only an active executive branch but an independent legislative branch as well. Perhaps our most substantive exchange came at the conclusion of our conversation when the Foreign Minister passionately expressed the belief that unless an overall settlement is soon reached, which includes the establishment of a home for the Palestinians, no Israeli or Arab leader would be safe from attack by Palestinian terrorists, and that in the long run the Arabs and Israelis "would be destined to destroy one another."

SYRIA

On Monday we departed for Damascus, and that day and the next night we:

--were briefed by the American ambassador and various embassy staff members on both the political and economic situation in Syria;

--attended a dinner with embassy personnel and Syrian government officials, including Mohammed Issam Hilou, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of State for Planning Affairs, Ambassador Nadim Duway, a Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zouheir Jannon, Director of Public Information, and Dr. Mohammed Sadek Ayyubi, Economic Advisor to President Assad;

--discussed various political and human rights questions, particularly the status of the Syrian Jewish population, with Dr. Al-Imadi, Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade. We tried to impress upon him that if for no other reason than pure practicality, it might be in Syria's best interest to allow the country's 4,500 Jews to emigrate. He replied that Syria had moved from being a Moslem state to a secular state and asserted that any effort to treat one group differently because of its religion would both violate the constitutional laws of Syria and would open the door to serious problems with other groups. He stated that travel restrictions are imposed on all Syrian citizens, and that all citizens -- Jews and non-Jews alike -- have the same constitutional rights. (Considering the present circumstances in that country, however, it is difficult to believe that Syrian Jews are allowed to fully exercise those rights. We came away with the distinct impression that it would be helpful

if other members of Congress who are concerned about the Syrian Jewish question were to visit Syria and to include the matter of Syrian Jews on their agendas).

--reviewed the progress of the principal American aid project in Syria, the modernization of the Damascus water system. (One could not help but conclude that in considering productive applications of economic assistance, that this type of project represents one of the most useful and politically visible and advantageous uses for U. S. foreign aid).

--made an unsuccessful attempt to meet with representatives of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. (Whether by design or faulty communication, this meeting never materialized, although prior to our departure from Washington PLO contacts had led us to believe that it could be arranged).

Unfortunately, President Assad was occupied with a state visit during our stay in Syria and we were therefore unable to meet with him. Given that fact, any impressions drawn from our Syrian experience are undoubtedly much less useful and more tentative than those drawn elsewhere, but nevertheless, several impressions stood out.

In contrast to the near unanimity of response in Egypt, the Syrians we spoke to expressed varying reactions to the question of recognizing the State of Israel if Israel eventually withdrew to the pre-1967 borders and agreed to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, either in association with Jordan or as an independent state. A number of officials who seemed to hold less responsible positions were either unresponsive or subtly hostile to the question. Several

refused to respond on the grounds that "we know better than to think that Israel would be non-expansionist and realistic enough to ever consider such a settlement." Still other Syrians were much more vague than the Egyptians had been in their definition of "Palestinian rights" and displayed a much more militant frame of mind than the Egyptians. But most senior officials such as Hilou and Al-Imadi expressed the conviction that Syria is weary of war and that while it might be difficult, Syria would find it in its best interest to reach agreement with Israel in order to allow accelerated development of the rapidly modernizing Syrian society. However, their willingness to consider such a "peace" was conditioned upon an Israeli show of "good faith" through some (undefined) movement in the Golan -- a condition which even they consider unlikely to be met.

In contrast to the Egyptians who seem to accept the reality of Israel, one senses that even those Syrians who do seem to finally accept in principle the idea of "peace" with Israel do so because they are confident that while it would be impossible to defeat Israel militarily (at least in the short run), the economic and cultural competition between an increasingly united and oil-rich Arab world and what they consider an essentially alien European cultural entity such as Israel will in the end result in Arab supremacy. Syrian suspicion of "Zionist expansionism" seems to be fed by their belief that continued Israeli establishment of settlements in occupied territories in both the West Bank and the Golan Heights offers concrete evidence that Israel is determined to hold onto those areas indefinitely.

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I might note that the delegation asked both the Syrians and the Israelis about the theory held by some that Syria's failure to rebuild the city Quneitra near the Golan Heights, which was destroyed in the '73 war, was an indication either that Syria was seeking to maintain a living symbol of "Israeli aggression" or was planning for another war in the area. The Syrians dismissed that theory as "nonsense" and said they had no intention of rebuilding a city in the shadow of Israeli guns. While the predominant attitude in Israel seemed to be one of suspicion, we did talk to responsible Israeli officials who agreed that for the present it would make no sense for Syria to rebuild Quneitra.

JORDAN

Sobered by our Syrian experience and disappointed that our efforts to meet with PLO representatives had been unsuccessful we flew to Amman Tuesday afternoon. Our stay in Jordan included:

--a conference with Crown Prince Hassan, who is in charge of Jordanian economic policy, concerning economic development plans for the East Bank and the role Jordan expects the United States to play in that development. (In contrast to widespread assertions that Jordan wants the return of the West Bank in order to bolster its East Bank economy, the Prince stated that in purely economic terms, the West Bank has in fact been a drain upon, not an asset to, the Jordanian economy).

--a two-hour meeting with Prime Minister Rifai and King Hussein;

--a dinner with various American embassy and Jordanian officials.

Our meeting with the King and the Prime Minister included discussions of the Jordanian view of Syrian attitudes, the importance Jordan places upon its ability to purchase an air defense system from the United States and the Palestinian problem. The meeting was pervaded by a profound sense of pessimism. The King and the Prime Minister made the following points:

--They consider Syria's President Assad "a genuine moderate." King Hussein suggested that Syrian attitudes toward the Sinai accord were colored in part by the suspicion that Egypt had "used" Syria in 1973 as a diversion to facilitate Egypt's crossing of the Suez Canal to recover Egyptian territory.

--They stated that contrary to press reports, Jordan and Syria have not formed an official joint military command. (Although no formal military command has been created, Hussein and Assad apparently did agree to increased cooperation during Hussein's recent visit to Syria).

--They said that in the past few years Jordan has been able to play a moderating role among the Arab states because it has had the distinction of receiving American support -- a rarity in the Arab world. They added that Jordan needs to purchase the controversial Hawk missile batteries it has requested, not only to protect its own air space, but to show the Jordanian people and the rest of the Arab world that Hussein's moderate style can be useful to the entire area and can yield more positive results than would polarized negativism.

--Rifai suggested that Hussein "simply cannot maintain his credibility in the Arab world" unless he shows an ability to defend his own air space. Hussein warned that if Congress should turn down his request, he would have no choice but to purchase a similar but inferior defense system from the Soviet Union. This would be tragic, he said; "it would result in something which we have tried to avoid for 14 years -- the polarization of the Middle East between the two super powers -- but I would have no other choice." Hussein suggested, in fact, that the Israelis hope to push him into purchasing arms from the Russians so that they will be able to turn to the United States and say, "See, we are your only true, reliable ally in the Middle East and you must continue your aid to us." (Hussein's charge was later vigorously denied by Israeli Prime Minister Rabin).

Above all, Hussein conveyed a profound sense of pessimism at the likelihood that Israel and Syria will be able to reach an interim compromise that will be capable of preventing another war in the Middle East. He pointed to the Syrians' tendency to "oversimplify problems," his belief that the Israelis "lack the wisdom" to take advantage of the new tilt toward moderation in Syria and the present disarray among the Palestinians (leaving no authority with whom to negotiate).

Both Rifai and Hussein suggested that "it isn't necessary" for Israel to retreat to the '67 lines now. But "if

momentum is to be established," they said Israel must be willing to say: "We will relinquish territorial holdings beyond the '67 borders at some future time as a final step in an overall agreement consisting of a series of mutual concessions and commitments, each followed by a time period in which to test each other's good faith. Then, as a final step after being satisfied that all the other conditions of such an overall agreement had been lived up to, we will relinquish our post-1967 territorial holdings."

Rifai and Hussein suggested that the United States is the only power which is in a position to influence both sides, but they expressed the conviction that after the Sinai agreement "the U. S. possesses neither the ability nor the will to pressure the Israelis into any kind of significant move -- even on the Golan." They further expressed the fear that with an election year hiatus in the United States, the momentum for peace would disappear and the Palestinians would regroup in a more militant mood. The King suggested that the United States is "paying Israel too high a price for this interim agreement with Egypt and may thereby be jeopardizing the prospects for future interim agreements" (i.e., that by committing ourselves so heavily now, we will have no further leverage with Israel). "As you can see," the King commented, "we are depressed -- we are not optimistic."

ISRAEL

We arrived in Israel on Wednesday and our three days there were as disturbing to me as they were moving. They included --a working lunch hosted by the director of the Ministry

of Finance, Mr. Arnon Gafni. We were thoroughly briefed on the immense economic problems besetting Israel -- the over 20% inflation rate, the burgeoning foreign exchange deficit of \$3.6 billion, the stringent measures taken by the Israeli government to attack that deficit, the burdens placed on the economy by a military budget which comprises 40% of the national budget and 30% of the gross national product. The inability of the Israeli economy to withstand these immense pressures without outside assistance was made most clear. In the face of these seemingly overwhelming problems, one must admire the vigor and commitment the Israelis have shown in building a dynamic, modern society.

--a one-and-one-half hour discussion with Prime Minister Rabin, who impressed us all with his toughness, his absolute frankness and openness;

--a dinner meeting with Yitzhak Navon, Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee and a number of other Knesset members and private citizens of various political persuasions.

--a moving visit to Yad Vashem, the Israeli monument to the Jewish victims of twentieth century barbarism. Nearly 120 million Americans have been born since the tragedy memorialized at Yad Vashem. To many of them, the events of World War II, the incredible attempt to decimate an entire people, are only faintly understood. A visit to Yad Vashem tells the story simply and powerfully with pictures, numbers and narrative. One cannot visit the

place and not appreciate the source of the skepticism, the caution and the fears of the Israeli people, all of which have been magnified by 27 years of sustained struggle to preserve the State of Israel.

--a visit to a West Bank Palestinian refugee camp at Ramallah, near Jerusalem;

--a discussion with Muhamad Shilbayeh, a well-known Palestinian writer from Jerusalem. Mr. Shilbayeh seemed genuinely impressed with the democratic process in Israel and displayed an ironic combination of respect and anger toward the "Israeli state of mind." But most of all, he expressed a poignant sadness. At one point in our conversation he said, "For 25 years I am nothing in the world; I am like a leaf cut from a tree. Today, we Palestinians are the Jews of the last half of the 20th century."

--a visit to a kibbutz near the Golan Heights;

--an inspection of Israeli-held territory and military positions within the Golan.

--a briefing and dinner with Minister of Defense Shimon Peres, Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Mordechai Gur and other Israeli defense officials; and finally,

--a tour of old Jerusalem, a city which sums up human tragedy, pain, aspirations and history more intensely than perhaps any other city in the world. One of the most touching moments of the tour came when our guide took us to a synagogue built by his grandfather which had been destroyed in the 1948 war.

The most important statement made by Prime Minister Rabin in summing up his assessment of the Middle East situation was that "even until today I still don't believe that the Arabs are ready to accept the essence of the real peace. Arabs define peace as simply an end to war, but Israelis define peace as an end to war plus (the establishment of) normal relations." The Prime Minister cited the following cautionary signs:

--the vague and varying definition among different Arab groups of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinians;"

--the ominous difference between Yasser Arafat's "practical plan" for a Palestinian state composed of the West Bank and Gaza and his "vision" of a greater Palestine to include the State of Israel;

--Rabin's own belief that the '67 lines must be adjusted in some ways if they are to be true "boundaries for peace;"

--the impossibility of Israel negotiating with an entity (i.e., the PLO) "that does not even recognize our right to exist;"

--the necessity for understanding that peace cannot be wished into existence in a few short months, but will take "a long process of years."

In urging Congressional acceptance of the newly negotiated Sinai plan, the Prime Minister emphasized his belief that:

--any analogy between U. S. involvement in Vietnam and U. S. technicians monitoring warning devices in the Sinai is "absurd" because in this instance, both parties have agreed to the U. S. presence. The technicians' purpose,

he said, "is to give stability to the agreement, to beef it up." While he said he could "give no guarantees" about their safety, he expressed the belief that Egyptian, Israeli and U. N. forces would see to it that "no harm came to them," and that "they can leave" in the event of another war.

--many Israelis feel that the Sinai agreement is more in the interest of the United States than of Israel because it will help the U. S. President and guarantee America its oil supply.

We raised President Sadat's concern that some movement on the Golan follow the Sinai agreement almost immediately, and asked Prime Minister Rabin how likely he thought it was that a follow-on agreement could be negotiated in the near future. He replied that he was "more than doubtful;" and added that "in Sinai we have room to take risks, but the principle of step-by-step interim agreements is not everywhere equally applicable."

He said he feels that significant agreements with the Syrians are likely only in the context of an overall agreement in Geneva and observed that that would be some time away. He stated that after the Sinai agreement Israel would want "a period of several years in which we might negotiate, not under deadlines, not under reassessments and not under pressure." He asserted that time was needed to change attitudes, to allow Egypt to gain in prosperity and to "give Syria an opportunity to see the effects of the easing of tensions between Egypt and Israel." This, he said, will be a "long process. Unless the Syrians recognize that there is a reduction of tension between Egypt and Israel, I don't believe they will approach the issue in a reasonable way."

In another meeting, Defense Minister Peres made it quite clear that Israel desires and expects an American military aid package "in the magnitude we are requesting this year, not just for this year but every year for the next four years." His military staff questioned Jordan's need for 14 Hawk missile batteries and said that "the difference is that Hussein doesn't really expect to be attacked by us; we do expect to be attacked by him."

WHAT DO WE HAVE NOW?

Arms Purchases

King Hussein of Jordan clearly expects the United States to allow him to purchase an "air defense system" -- 14 Hawk missile batteries -- in order to give him the capability to defend his own air space and to maintain his credibility among his own people and the rest of the Arab world. He says that if his request is refused, he will have no other choice but to purchase a similar but inferior system from the Soviet Union.

President Sadat of Egypt clearly expects the United States to allow him to purchase "defensive" military equipment now that he has cut his ties with the Soviet Union and in fact considers the Russians the principal instigators of Arab criticism of him for signing a separate agreement with Israel in the Sinai.

Economic and Military Aid

Egypt desires U. S. financial assistance to help it win the race against economic collapse and the bill will be at least five hundred million dollars a year. Jordan expects con-

tinued assistance, to the point of direct budgetary support in order to keep its economy afloat and to assist in plans to develop a "food basket" on the East Bank. Syria is "interested" in continued U. S. economic aid in order to accelerate its economic development, but even more importantly, as a sign that the United States is truly interested in establishing a lasting, helpful relationship with Syria. While the Israelis presented us with a \$3.7 billion military and economic aid request (including costs related to the Sinai agreement), it is clear that they realistically expect an aid package more on the order of about \$2.5 billion annually for a number of years to come.

Peace Expectations of the Various Parties

President Sadat stated flatly that if the new Egyptian-Israeli agreement were to have any degree of success, it would have to be followed almost immediately by an interim agreement in the Golan between Israel and Syria, and that if such a follow-on agreement were not achieved, Sadat would be accused of abandoning the rest of the Arab world and the momentum for peace would be lost.

The Syrians are difficult to read, but show little if any faith that Israel will negotiate a meaningful settlement in the Golan. They express great suspicion that Egypt is willing to cut a deal for itself at the expense of Syria and the Palestinians.

Jordan's King Hussein expresses near resignation at the inability of the Syrians and the Israelis to agree to anything

significant on the Golan and says he believes that the United States possesses "neither the ability nor the will to pressure the Israelis into a significant move on the Golan" which could maintain the momentum for peace. Both the Syrians and the Jordanians point to the continued establishment of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the Golan as evidence in their eyes that the Israelis have no real intention of giving up either area, even in the context of an eventual overall agreement.

In Israel, Prime Minister Rabin said that he was "more than doubtful" about the likelihood of a follow-on agreement in the Golan and stressed that after the Sinai agreement, Israel would want a period of some years "during which we might negotiate, not under deadlines, not under reassessments and not under pressure.

How then do I assess the attitudes of the respective parties and the implications those attitudes hold for the future?

I believe King Hussein genuinely wants peace and would negotiate for peace as reasonably as possible if given the opportunity by the Israelis and Arabs. Unfortunately, past actions by both have, for the time being, denied Jordan the opportunity to be of much assistance in reaching any accord -- short term or long term.

I believe the Egyptians also genuinely desire peace so that they can devote a greater share of their resources to their own desperate economic problems and I believe that that desire runs deeper within the Egyptian body politic than just President Sadat. But the resentment of generations, the pressures against Sadat's moderate position and his signing of a separate agreement (pressure being voiced throughout the Arab world and being fed, according to Sadat and many other observers, by the Soviet Union),

could in time erode that thrust of moderation unless, in the words of Mansour Hassan, spokesman for the Egyptian Parliament, Sadat "can show that his path of peaceful liberation of Arab land is working," and that it constitutes a reasonably hopeful path, not just for Egypt, but for Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians as well.

I also believe that Israel is genuinely desirous of peace in order to shed the heavy defense burden it has borne for its entire existence, and so that the Israeli people can for the first time live without fear of destruction. But the Israelis do not share President Sadat's and King Hussein's assumption that without post-Sinai pact movements on other fronts, time is basically working against the prospects for peace. Rather the Israelis emphasize the need for time during which Syria can absorb the impact of a reduction of tension between Israel and Egypt.

The Israeli strategy seems to be: deal with Egypt through the Sinai agreement and separate her out as much as possible from the rest of the Arab world. This will put Israel in a secure military position because without Egypt, the rest of the Arab world presents no serious military threat. This will in turn give Israel time -- with the assistance of American aid -- to consolidate its position in the West Bank and the Golan and to further strengthen its military posture. Altogether, the Israelis seem to believe that these "new realities" will gradually bring about greater Arab willingness to negotiate the Golan and Palestinian questions on terms which are more to Israel's liking.

But recent public statements by PLO leaders at the "moderate" and "extreme" ends of the spectrum (Arafat and Habash), illustrate how militants in the Arab world will seek to undermine any settlement which does not, in their view, address Palestinian goals. The longer it takes to conclude follow-on agreements, the greater the appeal that the more extreme of these positions will have for a growing majority of Palestinian people. And under these circumstances, the rhetoric and actions of Palestinian leaders such as Arafat in 1975 could look like a model of moderation in comparison with the rhetoric and actions of Palestinian leaders in 1977 or 1978.

It is apparent that most Arab leaders feel a temporary sense of relief at no longer being directly responsible, since the Rabat conference, for negotiating the question of "Palestinian rights." Often, when that question came up, the Arab response would be, "That is no longer up to us. You will have to ask the PLO."

That temporary avoidance of responsibility will have to be reversed because it is unlikely that Israel will be able to tolerate the creation of a Palestinian entity without some understanding (on control of terrorist raids, for example) agreed to by Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan. But that reversal in Arab attitude is not likely to occur until Israel, by finally accepting in principle the eventual establishment of a Palestinian entity, forces the Arab leaders to once again confront their ultimate responsibility on the question.

Essentially, Congress is being asked for the moment to fulfill two crucial commitments made by Secretary Kissinger in the new Sinai pact -- the stationing of about 200 American technicians in the Sinai to monitor warning devices, and the provision of aid to Israel at a level of more than \$2 billion for at least the next three years, and probably longer.

what
about
Egypt

I do not agree with those who suggest that the presence of American technicians is analogous to the presence of American advisors in Vietnam 20 years ago. As Prime Minister Rabin has stated, in this instance both sides approve of their presence. There are, however, at least two other legitimate questions that can be raised.

One is simply that by their very nature, these technicians will become symbolic of the agreement and of the United States' role therein. As such, they will also become potential targets for terrorists violently opposed to the agreement. If a terrorist attack on the technicians led to large-scale rescue or reprisal operations (ala Mayaguez), America's usefulness in efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East would surely be limited for some time to come.

The other practical consideration is simply a question of whether we are not setting the stage for some sort of Soviet presence in the Middle East as part of a future settlement in the area (i.e., in the Golan Heights). Perhaps Soviet participation of that nature is inevitable and may even be considered desirable by some, but the implications of such a development should be weighed now, not later.

Essentially, Congress is confronting a balancing of risks:

the risk that an American presence in the Middle East in any form might lead to our entanglement in any future war, versus the risk that an American refusal to perform what Secretary Kissinger has called "this peace keeping role" will in fact increase the likelihood of another war. On balance, I suspect the latter risk is the greater and I will, therefore, probably support the stationing of American technicians in a monitoring and peace keeping role, provided that the certainty of their withdrawal at the first outbreak of hostilities is made clear.

The other key request Congress must consider is a commitment of economic and military aid to Israel in excess of \$2 billion each year for at least the next three years. That is a huge amount of money and it is a long range commitment. If provided, it will undoubtedly limit the availability of American financial resources for needed domestic programs. It will also make it more difficult to obtain support for the additional international commitments for developmental assistance which Secretary Kissinger outlined in his imaginative speech at the United Nations on September 1st and which was embodied in part in the U. N. Special Assembly resolution adopted September 16. Even weighed against those priorities, I think it would be worth the price, if, by paying it we could be reasonably sure that we were truly promoting momentum for peace. But if anything, I fear that Congressional approval of that request in its present form could push the prospect for peace further than ever from our grasp.

As The Washington Post noted on September 3rd:

" . . .if the U. S. felt a heavy obligation to break the stalemate of the past few months, it has incurred an even heavier obligation under the terms of that agreement to promote the sort of comprehensive Mideast settlement that would put an end to stalemate in this area, once and for all."

That same editorial raised a crucial question when it asked:

" . . .How much leverage is left to the United States now that so much in American military and economic assistance has already been firmly pledged?"

I recall King Hussein's warning that the United States "is paying Israel too high a price for the interim agreement with Egypt, thereby jeopardizing prospects for future interim agreements," and I recall his prediction that "the United States possesses neither the ability nor the will to pressure the Israelis into any kind of significant move, even on the Golan."

I understand why Israel is so cautious and so suspicious, given past actions by several of her Arab neighbors. I believe the United States has a moral commitment to Israel, and that we have an obligation to provide enough assistance to assure its survival. I do not believe, however, that we have a commitment to underwrite and encourage an Israeli foreign policy -- borne, though it is, of understandable frustration, pressure and fear -- which is essentially immoderate and unrealistic, which is not responsive to new conditions in the Arab world, and which in the long run, can only play into the hands of Israel's worst enemies, with disastrous consequences for all concerned.

I honestly believe that aid in the magnitude being requested by the Administration for Israel (especially when it is viewed as only the downpayment in a three-year or more package) is more likely than not to encourage the continuing belief within Israel that it has more time than in fact is available to achieve resolution of basic questions in the Golan and on the West Bank. (I say this with full recognition that Israel has been the winner on the battlefield. But this is one case where if the victor seeks to keep the spoils, it will be disastrous for all concerned).

I do not think that it is reasonable for Israel or the United States to expect that today's unique constellation of moderate Arab leaders -- Hussein, Sadat, and even Assad, in the context of Syrian history -- will remain in ascendancy for very long unless the path of moderation can show substantial progress in terms of both recovering territory and fulfillment, in some meaningful way, of Palestinian aspirations for a homeland.

I do not believe that Israel's policy will reflect sufficient recognition of the urgency of that progress if it is given the impression that the Congress is willing to vote military and economic aid, in the words of Defense Minister Peres, "in the magnitude we are requesting this year, not just for this year but every year for the next four years."

I do believe that we would be doing Israel and the cause of peace a long term favor by reducing substantially the amount of aid being requested for Israel by the Administration, limiting it to an amount necessary to keep Israel's economy

viable and to maintain its existing military capability. Any additional military assistance should be limited only to an amount necessary to offset any increases in the offensive capabilities of the Arabs. Such a decision would in no way endanger Israel's survival in the event of another war. Not even the Israelis suggest that Israel is in danger of military defeat at this time; Israeli Chief of Staff Gur told our delegation that there is no question that Israel could still win another war. "It is simply a question of over what period of time and at what cost," he said.

It would be nice if we could afford to give Israel a number of years during which it might negotiate "not under deadlines, not under reassessments and not under pressure," as Mr. Rabin urged. But I do not think we can realistically expect that that much time is still left to us. As the September 3rd Washington Post editorial said,

"Nobody can be certain, of course, what would be the consequences if there was no further progress with respect to the Israeli-Syrian front on the Golan Heights, for example, or with respect to the West Bank. What is clear is that these issues remain unresolved, that the grievances of the Palestinians are still unanswered, that the Egyptians have reclaimed no more than a fraction of their Sinai territory and that continuing stalemate on these matters will swiftly create a circumstance little different from the one that Mr. Kissinger described in defense of Monday's interim agreement: a circumstance threatening "both military and economic consequences for the world that we had to do something about."

At times, the greatest service any friend can perform is to make one face unpleasant realities. I think this is the role the United States must play with both sides if we are to be a

true force for peace in the Middle East. Israel, a country of three million people, is already extended to its economic limits. The Arab world of more than 100 million people is growing steadily in wealth and political and economic sophistication. I believe that unless the momentum for peace is sustained -- and accelerated -- at this critical juncture, moderate forces in the Arab world will be cast aside, and a far stronger and far more hostile enemy will confront Israel in the years to come. If that happened, this new agreement would go down in history as just one more lost opportunity, one more interval between wars. We cannot allow that to happen.

If the United States is to agree to supply billions of dollars of aid to the Middle East and to deploy American technicians in the Sinai -- thereby for the first time becoming directly involved on the ground in the area -- it has an obligation to itself to insist that the involved Middle Eastern parties avoid future outbreaks of hostility, and actively seek a permanent peace settlement. I doubt that the United States will be in a position to do that unless Congress insists on a more disciplined use of American military and economic aid than is contained in the package being requested by the Administration. I believe a thoughtful reading of the various memoranda of the agreement between the U. S. and Israel which were published in the press recently will substantiate those doubts. As former Undersecretary of State George Ball recently said:

"What the Congress is being asked to consider against a two-week deadline is as freighted with future implications as the Tonkin Gulf resolution, and Congress should not be deterred by threats of disaster if it refuses to approve everything the Secretary of State has promised."

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מברק נכנס - מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים), תשי"ז - 1957.

שמור

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ד' אלול
ה'תש"ז (1956)

מ. רביב.

מטור איגלסון הזמינני היום לצהרים בקפיטול כדי לשמוע על האפשרויות האחרונות במתן השתתפה גם עוזרתו לענייני חוצ.

איגלסון הרבה לשאול והשבתי באריכות בנושא הפלשתינאי, הפליסטים, אשף וגבבה.

בין השאר אמר כי הנשיא שגת בעצם קיום ההודעה המשותפת עם הסובייטים.

ובשינוש חלא זחיר שלו במילות קוד כמו הומלנד, זכויות לגיטימיות וכו'.

עם זאת הוסיף שסטוס קוו הוא דבר נטווכן ויש להמנע ממנו.

היה שאנו חרוי רוצים ומוכנים ללכת לגבבה בכל עת ולשט כך הסכמנו עם ארתב על בייר העבודה.

היה היא אצל הערבים.

רפיה

שח רחב (רחט) מנכל שחכט ממנכל ממנכל מצפא מזתים חכר 100

SECRET - CONFIDENTIAL

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SECRET - CONFIDENTIAL

October 18, 1976

SENATOR THOMAS F. EAGLETON (Democrat - Missouri)Biographical Information:

Born September 4, 1929, in St. Louis, Mo.; enlisted in U. S. Navy and served 1948-49; B. A. Amherst College, cum laude, 1950, LL. B., Harvard Law School, cum laude; 1953; married Barbara Ann Smith of St. Louis, Mo. on January 21, 1956; two children; elected circuit attorney of St. Louis, Mo., 1956; elected attorney general of Missouri, 1960; elected Lieutenant Governor of Missouri, 1964; elected to the United States Senate, November 5, 1968; reelected to the United States Senate, November 5, 1974; for the term ending January 3, 1981; Catholic.

Political Information:

Eagleton gained national prominence in 1972 when he was nominated for the Vice-Presidency by George McGovern. Ten days after being nominated, it was disclosed that Eagleton has received electro-shock therapy for depression. Eagleton was eventually dropped from the Democratic ticket. None of this adversely affected his position in Missouri, and, in fact, he won his Senate seat again in 1974 by a very large margin.

Committees:

Appropriations
Labor and Public Welfare
District of Columbia (Chairman)
Special Committee on Aging

Voting Record:

Eagleton voted favorably on all the Fiscal Year 1976 and 1977 foreign aid bills. He opposed the Fiscal Year 1975 foreign aid bill. He voted for the \$2.2 billion emergency authorization for Israel in December 1973.

Eagleton signed the letter of 1976. He voted for the Sinai resolution. He has voted for every Jackson amendment giving the President authority to provide Israel with arms credits.

Eagleton was among about a dozen Senators in July of 1976 to attend a luncheon for PLO "ambassador" Shafiq Al-Hout. In reply to a letter concerning his attendance, Eagleton wrote that his attendance was "very brief." He said: "In fact, I was there just long enough to ask one question -- how is a Middle East peace possible when the Arabs aren't unified. The representative did not answer my question, so I left." Eagleton's AA in Kansas City said that the Senator believed "the whole thing was a waste of time" and "had no meaning in regard to his position on the PLO."

Eagleton cosponsored a resolution deploring the 8/11/76 terrorist attack at Istanbul Airport.

Voting Record (Cont.)

Eagleton was outspoken in calling on Congress to review the proposed sale of arms to Saudi Arabia.

Eagleton was critical of the U. S. agreement to PLO participation in the U. N. Security Council debate on the Middle East in December of 1975. He said it only encouraged intransigence on Middle East peace negotiations.

In August of 1975, upon his return from a three-day trip to Israel, Eagleton said he would approve sending 200 U. S. civilians to the Sinai, but not without reservations. He said that the Israel-Egyptian accord should mark the end of step-by-step negotiations and that a final settlement at Geneva should follow.

Later in the month, he spoke of the Sinai agreement as the "best chance we have to influence peace in the area." He disapproved of the sale of Pershing missiles to Israel while recognizing that the SCUD "is the only Arab weapon" capable of penetrating Israeli air space "to hit the population center." He proposed the F-4 or F-5's as more suitable to offset the SCUD capabilities. In a letter to a constituent (who attacked Eagleton as being pro-Arab) on these matters, Eagleton wrote that he thinks the Israelis trust the Egyptians sincerity in wanting to maintain a truce. He also questioned whether the Pershing would be a valid deterrent against the SCUD and FROG. He also noted that it is unrealistic at present to expect the accuracy promised by defense contractors, that the technology isn't adequate yet. He said he is positive Egypt does not believe Israel will never be the first to introduce nuclear weapons, and therefore the Pershing sale would only further erode confidence. Finally, he said he will not become pro-Arab "until the Arabs become pro-Israel."

Eagleton felt the sale of Hawk missiles to Jordan was excessive and opposed it.

In 1974 he introduced the amendment to bar military aid to Turkey for violating the Foreign Assistance Act or the Foreign Military Sales Act by using U. S. weapons for non-defensive purposes. When several Senators said this amendment could apply to Israel for its activities in Lebanon, Senator Eagleton disagreed: "The law...only applies when a sovereign nation that is a recipient of our largess uses that largess to subjugate and invade a third nation." The Israelis acted "only after an aggressive act against them."

Eagleton responded to a constituent telegram in July of 1974 on nuclear reactors to Egypt by saying he was opposed to any aid for Egypt and thinks Egypt "could well look to some of her near neighbors (eg. Saudi Arabia, Libya, etc.) for some financial help. I do not believe the U. S. should be involved in the proliferation of nuclear power, even for peaceful purposes...I will vote against any aid, including nuclear technology, to Egypt."

Eagleton has often spoken out on behalf of Soviet Jewry.

SENATOR THOMAS F. EAGLETON (Democrat - Missouri) (Continued)Comments:

Eagleton's service on the Appropriations Committee makes him very important regarding U. S. aid to Israel. His Legislative Assistant, Brian Atwood, is very supportive and a good friend of Israel. Major defense contractors in Missouri are: McDonnell Douglas; General Dynamics; Emerson Electric Co.; and Sterling Lacquer Manufacturing Corp.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת חקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

דף מספר _____ מתוך _____ דפים

עותק מספר _____ מתוך _____ עותקים

סודי ביותר

אל: המשדד

מאת: וושינגטון

מיידי

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נשלח: 021330 דצמ 76

עבדונ, מ.רביב

נפגשתי היום ביוזמתי, בקפיטול, עם סנטור איגלטון כדי לשמוע רשמיו מביקור המשלחת באזורנו. איגלטון חילק דבריו לשלושה פרקים (כך יחולק גם הדוח שתכתוב הועדה): מכירת הכורים הגרעיניים, סיכויי השלום במזת ומכירות הנשק לאיראן. להלן עיקר דבריו -

א. כורים גרעיניים: יתמוך במכירת הכורים הגרעיניים לישראל (למצרים ואיראן) כפופ לבטחונות החמורים והמצעים ביותר שאדם יכול להעלות בדעתו.



כיצד יטפלו הם בכך בדוח.

ב. סיכויי השלום במזת: הדעה הכללית של המשלחת היא ששנת 1977 חייבת להיות שנת התקדמות לקראת שלום וכינוס ועידת גנבה. המשלחת החדשה ברורה שהג רביג והג סאדאת וחוסייג רוצים בשלום ואם כי לא נפגשו עם אסד הם בדעה שגם אסד רוצה בכך.

באשר לוועידת גנבה אמר תחילה כי גם אשפ חייב להיות מיוצג בדרכ כל שהיא. לא כמשלחת רשמית, שווה ונפרדת, אלא באיצטלה אחרת כל שהיא - ירדן, כלל ערבי או בכל סידור אחד שיוסכם עליו. שאלתיו אם מתכוונ במפורש לאשפ או לפלשתינאים ? ואמר כי כוונתו אכן לפלשתינאים - מהגדמע, מעזה וגם מדרום לבנון אך לא לאשפ. אשפ סבל אמנם מכוח קשות אבל הפלשתינאים קיימים וצריכ שייוצגו בגנבה.

איגלטון צייג כי המשלחת יצאה מישראל מודאגת עד מאד מהמצב הכלכלי בישראל אותו כינה קטסטרופלי, ומהבעיות ביחסי העובדים והמעסיקים.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת חקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

דף מספר מתוך דפים

עותק מספר מתוך עותקים

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

סודי ביותר

= 2 =

מודאגים מאד מכך שהתקציב הישראלי גדול יותר מה GNP שלנו. אינן זו שאלה של ההשפעה שיש לכך על התקציב האמריקני והיינו על סיוע החוץ, אלא שאלה של ייאייכ תוכלו להמשיך ככ יי? גם המצב הכלכלי במצרים חמור יותר, קהיר נמצאת במצב של תוהו ובוהו ממש. בכל שעה משעות היום יש פקקי תנועה ברחובות העיר הנראית כמחפרת והולכת.

המשלחת החדשה מאד מפגישותיה עם רהט והשרים האחרים, היא החדשה עד מאד גם מטאדאת, ציינן במיוחד הרושם העז שעשה טאדאת על הנשימ, על איראן מבריק בנפרד.

רפ"ח, ==

סחח רהט מנכל שהבט(בנפרד) טננכל י. רביב רוזן אלון ארגיב רביב/מצפא רים אמנ (בנפרד)

טרי/ו.א.א.

צג/מה

הנהגות ודרכים

הנהגות ודרכים

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הנהגות ודרכים

הנהגות ודרכים

הנהגות ודרכים

דברי חיים

3

הנהגות ודרכים

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

ג' חשון תשל"ז
27 אוקטובר 76

612

ד"ר רפיח (מיגל) / ע
ר

אל: מצפ"א

מאח: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנטור איגלטון על החרם הערבי
והסיוע לישראל

מצ"ב נוסח נאום שעמד סנטור איגלטון לשאת במרכז
הקהילתי של יהודי קנזס-סיטי ב-27 דנא. ואשר פורסם כהודעה
לעתונות.

בהודעתו חקף איגלטון את עמדת מימשל פורד בענייני חקיקה נגד
החרם הערבי, היקף הסיוע לישראל והלחץ המדיני עליה.

כזכור, חבר איגלטון במטלחה ריביקוף, שתבקר כארץ בחחילת
נובמבר.

ב ב ר כ ה,
צ. רפיח

1970-1971
1970-1971



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

800

1970-1971
1970-1971

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1970-1971

1970-1971

EAGLETON

Missouri

SPEECH
JEWISH COMMUNITY CENTER
8201 HOLMES
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI
2:00 P.M., WEDNESDAY
OCTOBER 27, 1976

It used to be said that politics stops at the water's edge. Not this year. Not with Gerald Ford in the White House.

Foreign policy has become a political football in this election year. Throwing caution -- and diplomacy -- to the wind, the President of the United States has decided -- much to the dismay of the State Department and the Pentagon -- to cut his own swath.

Not that it is wrong for a President to be involved in making foreign policy; it's just that the new directions Mr. Ford has carved out in the course of his campaign contradict the long-standing positions of his own Administration.

Perhaps it was inevitable that President Ford would go it alone after the Republican Convention. As has been widely reported, the Republican National Platform repudiates the Ford/Kissinger foreign policy. That platform calls for morality in foreign policy, a quality Governor Carter has recognized as having been lacking over the past several years.

The Republican platform recognizes and commends Russian author Alexander Solzhenitsyn, a man President Ford and Secretary Kissinger refused to either recognize or commend.

Their platform states that we must not make undue concessions nor grant unilateral favors in pursuing detente.

It cites the Helsinki agreement, negotiated by Secretary Kissinger, as having taken from those who do not have freedom the hope of one day gaining it.

It says that secret agreements -- "agreements hidden from our people" -- should have no part in American foreign policy.

That is the Republican Platform. Any resemblance to Governor Carter's speeches is purely coincidental.

But that platform has one other passage which is worthy of note in the midst of a heated election campaign. The prologue of the Republican platform avows that "Our principles cannot be subject to passing whim; they must be true, strong, consistent and enduring."

President Ford take note!

The positions Mr. Ford has adopted in recent days directly contradict the record of his own Administration. One might even be tempted to call them passing whims.

Take Mr. Ford's promise to release the names of those big companies which have participated in the Arab boycott -- companies which have discriminated against other American companies which may have had Jewish board members or which have committed the sin of trading with Israel.

Congressional committees fought for months to get the Administration to release these names, subpoenaing the names and even citing President Ford's Commerce Secretary for contempt for his failure to provide the subpoenaed information. No dice -- the President wanted to protect his big business friends from the embarrassment of public exposure.

You can imagine our surprise, then, when he announced on national television during the second debate that his Commerce Department would announce these names the next day. It was a dramatic announcement, one which won the President important debating points.

But what happened the next day? The man who lays claim to experience and leadership was repudiated by his own Commerce Department. Department spokesmen reacted with stunned dismay. One was quoted as saying something like "The President didn't mean to say that. He meant companies which participate in the future."

Some time after the Commerce Department told President Ford what he meant to say, the names of U.S. companies currently complying with the boycott began to appear. It is only a partial list, but even the tip of the iceberg would not have been exposed had not the President felt forced by the exigencies of a televised debate to ~~change~~ his Administration's long-standing policy.

Perhaps it isn't surprising to see President Ford scrambling to appeal to the Jewish vote. His Administration's record on supporting Israel is not good.

Secretary Kissinger pressed Israel to the wall over the Sinai Agreement. At one point he even called Israel "intransigent" because it was understandably reluctant to forfeit an important part of its security.

Perhaps, in retrospect, Dr. Kissinger's heavy-handedness was redeemed. Certainly the Sinai agreement was a good one and I, for one, supported it.

But in the year that followed the signing of that agreement, the Ford Administration seemed reluctant to carry out the provisions which called for aid to Israel. The Administration first gave indications of wanting to eliminate money for Israel in the transition quarter, then settled for half the amount Dr. Kissinger had promised. And an official policy of footdragging was imposed over Israel's request for weapons.

Then, suddenly, in the midst of the campaign, the President announced that Israel would get its weapons. Immediately complaints were heard from the Pentagon and the State Department that the White House in its haste to score political points had never bothered to check with those agencies.

Some have expressed alarm over the nature of these weapons. They are sophisticated and they are devastating.

But we must ask ourselves whether Israel would require new, more sophisticated weapons if the United States had not pursued a policy of selling equally sophisticated weapons to the Arab states. Does Mr. Ford think that the American people have short memories?

I remember the struggle we had in the Senate over his efforts to sell the sophisticated Hawk ground-to-air missile to Jordan. The Administration argued that the Hawk would be used only for defense. But they wanted to sell so many missile batteries that even the Pentagon agreed that that many mobile Hawks could be used to cover an offensive attack on Israel -- by either Jordan or its ally Syria.

I remember the struggle to get the Administration to reduce the number of Sidewinder air-to-air missiles it wanted to sell to Saudi Arabia. This sale proposal would have provided for more Sidewinders than the Saudi Air Force could have used. And Saudi Arabia, as has happened before, would have become the Sidewinder arsenal for the confrontation states on Israel's borders.

And I remember the fight the Administration waged to defeat our efforts to stop the sale of the Maverick, an offensive air-to-surface missile, to Saudi Arabia.

The facts about the balance of power in the Middle East cannot be changed by election-year politics. The Arab states now enjoy an overall 3 to 1 advantage in weapons and manpower over Israel. The Ford Administration has approved sales to Saudi Arabia totalling \$7.5 billion in 1976 alone. That is three times what Israel has received from this Administration in 1976.

Instead of stabilizing the military balance in the Middle East, the Ford Administration has been feeding both ends of an arms race. Such a policy can only make a future Middle East war all the more devastating.

Mr. Ford's policy shifts are legitimate tools for use by an incumbent president -- though it is equally legitimate to point out the political nature of his belated shifts. However, blatant misrepresentations are never legitimate.

In the foreign policy debate President Ford stated that his Administration had urged the House and Senate to pass strong anti-boycott language in the Export Administration Act. He then charged that Congress "failed" to adopt such language.

Congressman Ben Rosenthal and Senator Adlai Stevenson were, to say the least, surprised to hear this charge. They know -- and President Ford knows -- that the Administration blocked the Export Act because of the likelihood that it would contain strong anti-boycott language. Senator Tower, acting at the behest of the Administration, filibustered the move in the Senate to push that bill toward passage.

Ben Rosenthal's description of the President's comments says it all. He called them "a shameful distortion of the truth."

The President also sought to take credit for the Ribicoff amendment to the tax bill -- an amendment which would take away tax benefits to companies engaging in the boycott. Senator Ribicoff responded to President Ford by stating that he was "amazed at the misrepresentation of the Administration's position... The truth is that the President's entire Administration fought to kill the anti-boycott section in the tax bill."

The inconsistency manifest in President Ford's positions on Israel does not stand alone. He has allowed the political winds to shift his Administration's policies in other areas as well.

For example, President Ford claimed credit for stemming the communist tide in Portugal after the United States consistently and strongly denied any involvement one way or the other in that country. As a result, the Portuguese government has protested to our Ambassador about Ford's statements.

He ordered that the word "detente" not be used by his Administration, perhaps thinking that semantics could cover the ineffectiveness of his negotiations with the Russians.

He confused Dr. Kissinger's diplomatic double-talk about a free Eastern Europe with reality and then -- and this is a recent development -- he sought to make up for his egregious error by approving on October 21, \$20 million in credit under the Commodity Credit Corporation to finance the sale of 111 million pounds of lard to Poland!

These contradictions and inexplicable actions are not the mark of a man experienced and knowledgeable in the field of foreign affairs. They are the mark of a man whose quest for votes does not know the bounds of consistency.

An editorial cartoon I saw last week further illustrates my point. In the first frame General George Brown -- a man who has earned an unenviable reputation as an unguided missile -- says to Secretary of State Kissinger, "Militarily speaking, Israel is a burden. . ."

The next frame has Secretary Kissinger protesting: "No, no, Israel is not a burden!"

Finally, out comes President Ford, a confused look on his face, saying, "Quick, which is it? I've got a debate coming up."

Even in an election year we must expect our President to understand the great responsibility he carries. Especially in an election year we must expect him either to defend his policies or admit he was wrong.

Mr. Ford has done neither.

###

ט"ן קולטור

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

1

ד' שבט חשל"ו
6 ינואר 1976

אל: מזתי"ם
סצפ"א ✓

מאח: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנטור איגלטון
מברקס 19.

לסיפא של מברקס:

כפי שראיתם ודאי בדווחי הקודמים, מעורבותו של סנטור איגלטון בנושא הקפריסאי ידועה לנו ובהסתמך על כך הפעלנוהו כבר מספר פעמים בעבר בנושא הקפריסאי. איגלטון נענה ברצון לפניוחינו.

נוכל לפנות אליו גם בעחיד אך יהא עלינו להיות בררנים ולוודא שנפנה אליו רק בנושאים שהם בדרגה חשיבות ראשונה.

ב. ר. כ. ה.

צ. רפיח

העמק: השגריר, ניקוסיה

REPRESENTATIVE FRANK ANNUNZIO (D-Illinois)

1-3/1/16

Term began: 1965
Home town: Chicago
Committees: Banking, Currency and Housing; House Administration

Excellent voting and resolutions record. Cosponsored O'Neill-Yates resolution calling for U.S. reassessment of relationship with U.N. if Israel should be expelled or suspended. Also cosponsored Bingham resolution disapproving HAWK missile sale to Jordan. In newsletters, often reasserts support for military aid to Israel and her territorial integrity. Voted for Sinai Resolution to station U.S. technicians in Sinai. Cosigned letter to President Carter criticizing Oct. 1 1977 U.S.-Soviet joint communique on Middle East. Letter was cosigned by 136 Representatives.

TV Week, Boston Globe, July 16, 1978

A candid portrait of Tip O'Neill

By Robert A. McLean
Globe Staff

"All politics is local."

Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, wired for sound, is a walking, talking graduate course in practical-political science of the "Barry's Corner" grassroots variety; living proof for aspiring young office holders that the American political dream can work, with work; and a multi-dimensional profile of the man who wields awesome clout as the second most powerful person in the nation.

"Mr. Speaker: A Portrait of Tip O'Neill," a most-remarkable cinema verite excursion behind Washington's closed doors, airs Tuesday at 8 p.m. on WGBH-TV (Channel 2) which produced this first-ever TV glimpse of the power and the glory of our national leadership.

Never a shrinking violet since his first successful run in 1936 as a 22-year-old for state representative from North Cambridge, O'Neill in recent years has preferred to work behind the throne in Washington as a powerful party wheelhorse. The Channel 2 production by Nancy Porter is the first he has allowed, after turning down similar requests from the commercial networks and the BBC.

Most revealing in its candid view, the camera and body microphone he wears capture facets of the O'Neill character that are rarely seen by any except those with whom he is consorting at the time. He is caught informally conferring with aides, lobbyists, the press, Democratic colleagues, fellow congressmen, going about the business of the office of Speaker of the US House of Representatives.

There are the tense days of July 1977, when O'Neill was under pressure in the Koreagate investigation, stalled over the naming of a prosecutor. The Channel 2 camera crew covered a press conference at which O'Neill was assailed by reporters for foot-dragging in the probe.



Tip O'Neill, the picture of a politician.

Porter, who spent "four or five months" just getting O'Neill and his staff accustomed to her crew's presence, was sure the tense Koreagate situation would be an off-limits period for the production, and was pleasantly surprised when they were allowed to film the conference.

Along with the fascinating "inner circle" moments when O'Neill is directing the machinery of national law-making and politicking, there are the lighter sides: hobnobbing casually with the Carters at a White House grounds picnic where Tip delights in showing off his new granddaughter; relaxing while wining and dining — and singing his favorite songs — with his family and friends at their Cape Cod vacation retreat; hacking at a sand-trapped golf ball in a driving rain with daughter Susan.

Perhaps the most persuasive proof of O'Neill's political acumen is revealed when he returns to his home district, to cut a few cordial

capers with the old boyhood gang from Barry's Corner in Cambridge, and hold court in his district office in Watertown, receiving a parade of voters bringing their problems to their representative. This is where it all begins, for, as he says, "All politics is local."

He deals, in turn, with an immigrant couple seeking work for the husband, an award ceremony for a disabled veteran — the third generation of a family O'Neill has known in his 8th Massachusetts Congressional district — a man protesting Turkish coffee imports, a group of Bay State union leaders upset over President Carter's weak support of regional workers.

Big, bluff, commanding, a thatch of white hair capping a map-of-Ireland face — complete with ever-present cigar — O'Neill is the picture of the quintessential politician. His meaty hands have grown large over 42 years of campaigning, a million casual "How are ya?" handshakes,

hands that firmly grasped the gavel of power in January 1977.

The many moods of Mr. Speaker are there: breezily greeting people while striding through the halls of Congress; huddling with Jimmy Carter and the Democratic leadership on administration policy and legislative package strategy; hugging the women and pumping the hands of the men at an indoor Somerville clambake; doing a funny double-take when Carter sidles up to a knot of O'Neill listeners at a reception; muttering in joy and pain when his golf drive goes awry and the rain extinguishes his cigar.

No "authorized biography" puffery, the piece — by virtue of technology, with O'Neill wearing the wireless microphone in most sequences — catches the asides, the nuances, the natural goofs that humanize what might otherwise be a shallow dive into the swim of federal politics, natural feeding ground for this accomplished practitioner.

O'Neill reportedly was a trifle disturbed by one or two moments when he was caught with his briefing down — a hurried corridor conference with an aide on the precise name and the pronunciation of Menachen Begin "it rhymes with Fagan from 'Oliver' — as O'Neill was to introduce him at a House reception; the quick check of the first names of a group of visiting Boston broadcasting people to be sure he would be able to greet each personally.

The wired-for-sound technique also catches some amusing moments — a meeting with colleague Peter Rodino in a busy House corridor and Rodino's attempt to exchange a confidence, not knowing about the microphone. "I'm wired," O'Neill murmurs into Rodino's ear, with a knowing nod, and Rodino responds with a conspiratorial "Yeh." "I'll call ya later," the speaker promises.

דו"ר (לש אקט)

28.1.79

אלו צבי רשיה, וושינגטון

מחלקת מ"א

הנדון: בקור עזרו של יו"ר בית הנבחרים האמריקני

ארי וויס עזרו של יו"ר בית הנבחרים האמריקני תומאס אוניל, שהחל בישראל במסגרת בקור טרסי בין ה-22.12.78-7.1.79.

במהלך הבקור הסדרנו עבורו מספר מניסוח עם מאיר ריזן, שלי רובינסטיין, אפרים אילון, גר ריזן, דן הלפרין ובקור בעדה התעופה עציון.

ארי וויס הנו, כמובן, אהוד הם ומבין למקומה של ישראל. גילה התמצאות והכנה בכל הנושאים הקשורים לשו"מ למצבה של ישראל בזירת המז"מ. עם זאת, ראוי לציין כי ארי השאיר רושם כאילו חסר לו מידע על להוציא יסוד במיוחד בתחומי הכמתון והכלכלה. אין הוא מעורבן בנושא ה-relocation של בסיסי צה"ל במדינה ולא בהיקף מידע החוץ אודות מבקשה ישראל כארה"ב.

הסיוע בבסיס עציון היה חשוב מאד עבורו והוא התרשם עמוקות מנדליו ומכנהו. בהדיון שקבל מאת מספר הבסיס, הומתחו לו דברים חשובים אודות לא ידע בנוגד הטיבות קיומם של שטחי אסובים נרחבים לחיל האוויר, צומק אסטרטגי וזמן אחרת. הוסבר לו במירוט על המגבלות והקשיים שיועמדו על צה"ל (נחיל האוויר בארם) כתוצאה מהעברה הבסיסים טסיני לנגב.

על עמדתו בנושא כמתון ישראל ניתן היה ללמוד מהפירוט ש"ויחורה של ישראל על עדה התעופה ובמיוחד עציון, ככר העלבים המוקדמים של המ"מ היה - Trivial

בשיחותיו עם גר ריזן קבל ארי הדיוקים מעורטים על המצב, התהליכים והמסומה באזורינו והוא הרשים כמבנה וחמיטתו את עמדתו ישראל. לזכריו של ארי וויס על היהודים באזור הקונסוליה בוטטון למנוח לעמים המנוח יומל אל יו"ר בית הנבחרים אוניל, להמשיך ולהדביט מידע חשיבה ארצות הברית בישראל נשרתה גם את הדינמיקה האמריקנית במז"מ. לדעתו של ארי הן מדינת ישראל והן היהודים באזור בוטטון are not making their case clear enough

לסכום, לרעתנו היה זה בקור חשוב ומערכתן לגבי אדם הקרוב ובעל השפעה על יו"ר בית"נ.

גודה לך באת הוכל לרווח לנו על הגובותיו והתרשמותו של ארי מבקורו בישראל.

ב כ ר כ ה,

עוזר בן-חור

היקום: מחלקת מ"א
לשכה המנכ"ל



א"ת
ג' תמוז
תש"ל

12 בדצמבר 1978

א ל: מנהל מצפ"א
מאח: צ. רפיח, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנטור וונדל אנדרסון

נפגשתי היום עם סנטור אנדרסון (דמוקרט ממינסוטה) במשרדו בקפיטול לשיחת פרידה. אנדרסון הובט, כידוע, בבחירות האחרונות במינסוטה.

הודתי לו על הידידות והעזרה הרבה שהגיש לישראל במשך השנים, עוד בהיותו מושל מינסוטה וכן בתקופת כהונתו כסנטור בווינגטון. אמרתי כי אנו זוכרים היטב את ההחלטה המיוחדת נגד טרור שהגיש לוועידה הכללית של המפלגה הדמוקרטית בניו-יורק ביולי 1976, בעקבות "מבצע יונתן", החלטה שנחקבלה אז פה-אחד. (אנדרסון עשה אז תרגילים פרוצדורליים רבים כדי שההחלטה תוגש כמחווה יוצאת מן הכלל).

אמרתי שנשמח להוסיף ולעמוד עמו בקשר גם בעתיד.

אנדרסון אמר שבכוונתו לחזור למינסוטה ולפנות לעסקים פרטיים. "עד עתה הייתי עובד צבור והגיע הזמן לעשות לביתי. עם זאת לא ויתרתי על הקריירה הצבורית שלי. אם אוכל - אנסה לחזור לסינט. מכל מקום אהיה פעיל ואשמיע קולי. ידידותי לישראל תהא כחמיד, ותוכלו תמיד לפנות אלי".

אנדרסון אמר כי טרם ביקר בישראל והיה פאד מעוניין לעשות

זאת.

אמרתי כי נשמח אם יבקרנו ונארחו כראוי לו.

בברכה

צבי רפיח

העתק:
המנכ"ל
הקונכ"ל, שיקאגו

20 1900 101

Faint text, possibly a date or location.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER

THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE
HAS THE HONOUR TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT OF
A COPY OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE
LAND OFFICE FOR THE YEAR 1900.

THE REPORT IS A MOST INTERESTING AND
VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE KNOWLEDGE
OF THE LAND RESOURCES OF THE COLONY.
IT SHOWS THE EXTENT OF THE LAND
UNDER CULTIVATION AND THE PROGRESS
MADE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
LAND RESOURCES OF THE COLONY.
THE REPORT IS A MOST INTERESTING
AND VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE
KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAND RESOURCES
OF THE COLONY.

Yours faithfully,
The Commissioner of the General Land Office.

THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE
HAS THE HONOUR TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT OF
A COPY OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE
LAND OFFICE FOR THE YEAR 1900.

Yours faithfully,
The Commissioner of the General Land Office.

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HAS THE HONOUR TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT OF
A COPY OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE
LAND OFFICE FOR THE YEAR 1900.

מברק נכנס-מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת העשר

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אנציה/

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לחיסון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

מסי: 367
נשלח: 261830 יולי 78
התקבל: 270036 יולי 78

אל: המשרד
מאת: רוטינגטון

ש מ ר

מ י ד י

אל קשתומי. דע מזאר-מצפאי.

משרד אנדרטון-משחקים האולימפיים.

במשכ לשלנו.

לחבר משיחה עם עוזר:-

משרד אנדרטון בהצעת ההחלטה ליצור לחץ על בריתם כדי שזו תודיע עליהם על נכונותה לאפשר למשלחת ישראל להשתתף במשחקי האולימפיאדה ב-1980.

בריתם פברואר ש.ז. שיגר אנדרטון מכתב לברז'נייב כו ביקש מהסובייטים פרישתם הודעה רשמית על נכונות בריתם לקבל משלחת ישראל למשחקים.

כעבור נחקקה תשובה-פנה אנדרטון בחודש אפריל לשג. בריתם דוברינין וביקש לתשובת הסובייטים לפנייתו. או אז נמסר לו כי מכתבו לא התקבל אצלו.

המשג נמסר ביד העתק מהמכתב לשג. בריתם סא.

כעבור עשה ממשרדו של אנדרטון לשגרירות וביקשו תשובה-נמסר, פעם נוספת, כי המכתב לא התקבל.

לדבריו העוזר מוכן אנדרטון לעשות כמיטב יכולתו כדי לעזור לנו.

החבר לו ביותר לדעת עמדת ממשלת ישראל לגבי פעולתו. נודה אם תודיעונו.

ליומן העוזר, Co-Sponsor יצטרף כ- להצעת ההחלטה
מ. אנדרטון תובא ההצעה להחלטת מליאת הסינט.

ג. י. ד.

משרד החוץ, תל אביב, ג' 1978

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מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

535130



תאריך: 25.2.76

הג'ו"ל
137 + 18101 י. כהן ליאור, י. כהן ליאור בן י"ק
מספר: 10101 מ. יצחק ליאור, ס/מנהל הסברה

אל : מר ר. בן רב, ס"מ מנהל מצב"א

מאה : יצחק ליאור, ס/מנהל הסברה

הנדון: פכתב חשובה לנשיא הסנט של קולורדו

מתפלאים שהעברתם אלינו בקשה רצונית כזו עם פתק בעילום שם ובאיחור של חודש מיום שמכתב פ. אנדרסון נחקל בארץ.

נהיה מוכנים לגשת לחכנת חשובה לכל שאלותיו בתנאי (1) שהעריכת הסופית והאחריות למשלוח המכתב בדרך הנאוהה תחול עליהם.
(2) שיכתב מייד מכתב ביניים לאיש הטודיעו כי קנינו בטיפול (עם העתק אלינו).

נא אשרו לנו הנ"ל כדי שנוכל להחזיר בטיפול.

ב ב כ ה
יצחק ליאור

העתק: מנהל הסברה
מזכיר רשמיים
מר א. אמיר, מאו"ר

OFFICE OF THE



STATE OF

DEPARTMENT OF

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and the seal of the said office, at the City of

THIS 10th DAY OF

A.D. 1919, at the City of

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and the seal of the said office, at the City of

THIS 10th DAY OF

1919

At

in presence of

Witness my hand and the seal of the said office, at the City of

אורח
2

(להתחברות מוסמית במסגרת המוסדות)

מזכר

תאריך	12.2.76
חוק מס' 1	מס' 1
מחנה:	מס' 1
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מחנה מס' 1 ממוקם בשטח של 100 דונם

כ-300 מ"ר של שטח בנוי של קולנוע

המבנה בנוי על ידי המוסדות והוא מיועד לשימוש


כמסגרת לימודית וקולנועית. המבנה בנוי על ידי

המוסדות והוא מיועד לשימוש כמסגרת לימודית

וקולנועית. המבנה בנוי על ידי המוסדות והוא

מיועד לשימוש כמסגרת לימודית וקולנועית.

FRED E. ANDERSON
President of Senate
State Senator
1931 East First Street
Loveland, Colorado
80537



THE STATE OF COLORADO
SENATE
DENVER, COLORADO 80203

COMMITTEES

Vice Chairman of:
Appropriations
Member of:
Agriculture, Livestock
and Water
Business Affairs and Labor
Audit Committee

January 21, 1976

Mr. Arie Amir
Foreign Guests Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Jerusalem

Dear Arie:

Please accept my apologies for not having written to you before now. I want to sincerely thank you for the tremendous experience we had in December in visiting Israel.


I still feel that I need more time to digest everything that we saw and heard. I was really impressed by what your country has been able to accomplish in a short period of time.

My support is very much with your position. However, when I returned to the United States, an attorney in my town had just spent seven weeks visiting a number of countries, most of which were in the third world group. He did spend several days in Israel, most of the time on the west bank of the Jordan. From the comments that he made to me, I am certain that the only side of the story that he received while there was from the Arab side.

That is why I am going to ask you to comment on a number of questions that he gave me concerning Israel. I have answered some of them from my point of view of what I saw but I think it is in the best interests of Israel to have a full explanation on all the points that he raises especially those that I know from what I saw are not true. These are the questions:

- "1. Isn't it true that there are six new cities being built on the west bank of the Jordan near old Jerusalem, which is on land that under the United Nations' declaration the Israelis are in violation for building on the land.

Handwritten scribbles and marks in the top left corner, possibly including a small diagram or signature.



- "2. Isn't it true that these six new cities, (which hold about 10,000 inhabitants each), are going to be restricted to Jewish people only.
- "3. On my way from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea (which is on the west bank of the Jordan) I saw quite a large development which I was told was both a factory and a further Jewish settlement being built. It is my understanding the Israelis are doing this systematically on the west bank, this indicates to me they have no intention of relinquishing much, if any, of the west bank of the Jordan.
- a. Is the above information correct and, if so, what is their rationale for doing that?
- "4. Isn't it true that a great deal of the educated Arab population of Israel, which is predominately Christian, has opted to leave Israel because they can see no future for themselves.
- "5. My reading on the history of the creation of Israel shows it was created by Israeli soldiers, or terrorists as the Arabs would view them, who mounted an armed warfare and sent the Arabs fleeing to the east and then with the help of the United States passing a resolution in the UN Israel was recognized as a country. I did read where a foreign minister of England when England had the trusteeship stated that he felt there should be an Israeli state and it is my understanding that that is one of the points the Israelis use for moral justification for the forcible taking of the land.
- "6. Isn't it true that the Israeli Government has never paid any compensation for the land that was taken in the '48 War or any of the subsequent wars?
- "7. Some of the people that I talked to when I was in the west bank of the Jordan said that the Israeli Government had offered to pay compensation for property around Jerusalem but it was at prices that they knew were way below the real values.
- "8. Isn't it true that if you are a Jew then you automatically can immigrate to Israel, but that that is not true of other nationalities.

"As you can probably judge from the tone of my letter I am no longer a strong supporter of the State of Israel. I at one time had a gut reaction that Israel was all in the right. One reason is my Christian heritage where it was the land of the Hebrews and it is prophesied that the Jews will retake their land, thus it was inevitable and prophesy being fulfilled."

Mr. Arie Amir


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January 21, 1976

Arie, I am really sorry to do this to you but I do think that in the best interests of Israel, it would be helpful for me to have your position fairly stated since this person is giving a number of programs in our area on the trip that he took. I have answered a number of comments but I would appreciate your response.

I want to thank you again for everything that you did for us on the trip.

Sincerely,



Fred E. Anderson
President of Senate

FEA/pb

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

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January 5, 1978

Mr. Bill Aberman
President
Jewish Community Relations Council
Suite 400
15 South Ninth Street Building
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

Dear Bill:

Thank you for sharing with me the Minneapolis City Council resolution regarding the Joint U.S. - Soviet Communique on the Middle East.


The United States has been committed to the preservation of a sovereign state of Israel with secure and recognized borders since 1948. Therefore, I find the October 1st joint U.S. - Soviet statement on the Middle East disturbing. The Soviet Union has never and does not now share our interests in the Middle East or our commitment to Israel. We must never waiver from that commitment merely to promote a temporary improvement in our relations with Russia. I am particularly concerned that the joint statement made no mention of UN Resolutions 242 and 338. These resolutions have been the cornerstone of American policy in the past and, in my judgment, they must remain so.

The recent historic meetings between Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat provide a glimmer of hope that the tensions and bloodshed of the past 30 years will finally come to an end. Accepting Prime Minister Begin's invitation, President Sadat demonstrated that Israel may finally receive long overdue recognition as a free, democratic state.

I am enclosing for your information a copy of a letter and accompanying Concurrent Resolution sent to President Carter by me and some of my Senate colleagues. I am also enclosing part of a radio transcript in which I was asked to comment on possible Mid-east peace as a result of the Begin-Sadat meetings.

As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I am prepared to continue to vote to send Israel the aid it needs to protect itself from aggression. But as one who is well aware of the destruction and suffering which accompanies armed conflict, I would much prefer to see peace between Israel and its neighbors.

Sincerely,



Wendell R. Anderson
U.S. Senator



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אל: מצפ"א

מאת: צבי רמיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנטור וונדל אנדרסון

סושל מיניסוטה, וונדל אנדרסון, נחטנה מחליפו של סנטור
מונדייל בהכנת מונדייל לתפקידו כסגן הנשיא.

אנדרסון, הינו ידיד ישראל אשר, בזכור לכם, העביר את
החלטת נגד חטרור בוועידת המפלגה הדמוקרטית בניו-יורק ביולי
אשקד.

מצ"כ דו"ח על שיחה שקיימו עמו ב-2.12.76 נציגי א.ד.ל.
במיניאפוליס.

ב כ כ ה,
Handwritten signature
צ. רמיה

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO: [Illegible]
FROM: [Illegible]
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

DATE: [Illegible]
TIME: [Illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

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Meeting was held with the Governor on Thursday, December 2, 1976. The Governor met with the following people for one hour: Hal Field, Jr., Arnold (Bill) Aberman, Robert Latz, Marvin Pertzik, Marion Newman, Marcia Yugend and Mort Ryweck.

We briefed the Governor on the background of our agency, what is our constituency and by what authority we come to meet with him. Hal spoke to the Governor of the role the community has played in meeting with the congressional delegation in the past -- Marvin spoke to the make-up of the Jewish community.

The Governor assured us that he would follow in the same path as Senators Humphrey and Mondale in his response to those issues which concern the Jewish community. He shared with us his concern that Senator Humphrey did not appear to be in a good position to win his bid for the majority leader of the Senate. Bob and Bill assumed some responsibility in contacting people to get an accurate picture of the situation. We all expressed our chagrin that the Senator might not win the Senate election to this post.

The Governor expressed his concern over the high cost of supplying foreign governments when there is not even a decent public transportation system in Washington, D.C. He also spoke to his concern over this country becoming the arms salesman of the world. The point was made to him that if this country had a decent energy policy and program the oil producing countries could not hold us up for blackmail on arms sales-- we would be able to say no to them. We pointed out that in the Senate he might be able to play a role in developing this energy policy.

The Governor spoke to the need for this country to have a strong defense policy, the need for this country to support the State of Israel--at the same time he has pulling at him all these other "needs" that he finds domestically. He does not believe in a volunteer army--thinks everyone should serve. It was mentioned to him that the "civilian army" of Israel is an interesting concept-- had he ever been to Israel he was asked. He would like to go and he did share with his aide, Stanley Breen, who later shared the information with Marcia Yugend, that he would like to go to Israel but not until he is elected to the Senate.

If Senator Humphrey is not elected to the post of Senate Majority leader Governor Anderson cannot serve on the same committee on which Senator Humphrey serves. He (Gov. Anderson) would like to serve on the Ways and Means Committee, the Administration committee, the Agriculture committee. He wants to serve on those committees which disburse the money-- that's the way he started out in the Minnesota legislature and found that to be the most useful for him.

The plight of Soviet Jewry was discussed re: the Helsinki accord and the follow-up meeting which will take place this summer in Belgrade. The Governor was given a copy of Myths and Facts and AIPAC was described to him. He was also given a folder put together by the NCSJ regarding Helsinki. He was told of the Senate Committee investigating the violations

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of the Helsinki agreement regarding telephone calls, mail, etc. We told him that he would be receiving information from time to time from us regarding both matters concerning Israel and Soviet Jewry. We would be sending him data to share with the Senate Committee regarding violations of Helsinki that our local committee has been amassing. He was also told of the Congressional Vigil re: Soviet Jewry and it would be good to send him some background information on this Vigil once he gets to Washington if Senators take part in the Vigil. He talked about the fact that he is not knowledgeable on the details of certain bits of legislation such as the Jackson Amendment, etc. We said that we would be sending him information regarding legislation. We also talked with him about the anti-boycott legislation which will surely be re-introduced into Congress when that body reconvenes after the inauguration.

HY/cdc

cc: Michael Weinberg
Viola Hymes
Hort Ryweck
Herb Kohn

12/7/76

FRED E. ANDERSON
President of Senate
State Senator
1931 East First Street
Loveland, Colorado
80537



File

COMMITTEES
Vice Chairman of:
Appropriations
Member of:
Agriculture, Livestock
and Water
Business Affairs and Labor
Audit Committee

THE STATE OF COLORADO
SENATE
DENVER, COLORADO 80203

January 28, 1976

The Honorable Yigal Allon
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Minister:

My visit to Israel in December was an extremely informative experience for me and this was due in large part to your taking the time from your busy schedule to visit with us. Thank you for meeting with us personally in an extremely trying time considering the negotiations you had going on with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico.


I was most appreciative of your frank discussion with us and the way you answered our questions. I was quite frankly glad that they did not attend the January 12th session. I feel sorry about the water situation in the Golan Heights as far as the economic development of Israel, besides the military aspects of the territory in that area.

I enjoyed meeting you and hope that our paths shall cross again some day.

Sincerely,

Fred E. Anderson
President of Senate

FEA/pb



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מברק נכנס-מסווג

מחלקת הקשר

לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסיחוק וסודות רשמיים).
חשייו - 1957.

סודי

הג'נ'רל
אויס

א : המשרד

מחא: ושינגטון

מס' 303

נסלח: 1800; מאי 78

החקבל: 190053

מנכל.

המסומים.

ייטס שחח עם ירירן הקרוב והותיק סיה אוניל לאחי ההצבעה במיכט. ייטס אמר שלי פהשיחה
היתה קשה. ייטס מהח ביקורה על השיכחו המוצהרת של אוניל בעמדת הממשל.
אוניל אמר שהממשל צריך היה למכור מסומים למצרים ומעוריה וכי הדבר יקרב אותן למזם לשלום.

רפיח

יה רחצ ס/רחצ שחכס מנכל המנכל המצמא חקר רס אנע

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O'NEILL-TIMES

BY JIM ADAMS

WASHINGTON (AP)--THOMAS P. O'NEILL, SPEAKER OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ON MONDAY DENIED A NEW YORK TIMES REPORT THAT AN INVESTIGATION INTO HIS FINANCES DISCLOSED QUESTIONABLE TRANSACTIONS

"THERE IS NO TRUTH TO IT," O'NEILL SAID. "THERE IS NO TRUTH TO IT WHATEVER."

THE NEWSPAPER SAID SUNDAY IT FOUND NO ILLEGALITY IN O'NEILL'S FINANCIAL DEALINGS BUT THAT THE INQUIRY RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT O'NEILL'S ROLE IN SOME TRANSACTIONS.

THE TIMES SAID IT LEARNED THAT O'NEILL HAD 56,100 DOLLARS IN UNSECURED LOANS WITH THE INDUSTRIAL BANK AND TRUST CO. OF EVERETT, MASSACHUSETTS, IN 1970 AND THAT A MIDDLEMAN TOLD A GRAND JURY HE OBTAINED AN ADDITIONAL 30,000 DOLLARS IN UNSECURED LOANS FOR THE CONGRESSMAN.

IT SAID IT COULD NOT LEARN WHEN THE LOANS WERE PAID OFF BUT THAT THEY WERE NOT REPORTED AND THAT A HOUSE RULE THAT BECAME EFFECTIVE JAN. 1, 1971, REQUIRED CONGRESSMEN TO REPORT UNSECURED LOANS.

O'NEILL SAID HE DID GET A 30,000 DOLLAR UNSECURED LOAN FROM A FRIEND, BUT THAT HE PAID IT OFF BEFORE THE DISCLOSURE RULE TOOK EFFECT.

MORE

(Sign) 07/1/78
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WASHINGTON -- O'NEILL-TIMES 2 (W337)

"I DON'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THE GRAND JURY," O'NEILL SAID. "THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING THERE AND I WAS CLEARED."

THE GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION APPARENTLY WAS THE ONE THAT LED TO CONVICTIONS OF FOUR OF SOME 20 PEOPLE WHO INVESTED IN A BROADWAY CAPITAL FUND.

THE SPEAKER SAID HE AND THE OTHERS EACH PUT UP 5,000 DOLLARS TO FORM THE MUTUAL FUND BUT SAID HE DID NOT KNOW THE OTHERS PERSONALLY.

THE TIMES SAID O'NEILL FAILED TO REPORT THE INVESTMENT IN HIS 197

6

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE STATEMENT.

THE TIMES ALSO REPORTED THAT O'NEILL AND THREE OTHER MEN HELD A 67,500 DOLLAR MORTGAGE ON A NURSING HOME, BUT THAT RECORDS DETAILING HIS INVOLVEMENT WERE EITHER BACK-DATED OR WITHHELD FROM COURTHOUSE REGISTRATION, WHICH SERVED TO OBSCURE O'NEILL'S INVOLVEMENT.

THE NEWSPAPER ALSO SAID THAT O'NEILL'S VOLUNTARY FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BEFORE BECOMING SPEAKER PUT HIS NET WORTH AT ABOUT 125,000 DOLLARS, BUT THAT HE APPARENTLY UNDERVALUED SOME OF THE STOCK HE HELD.

THE SPEAKER CONTENDED THE NEW YORK TIMES INVESTIGATION WAS "A REHASH" OF A SERIES OF ALLEGATIONS A POLITICAL OPPONENT SENT TO 100 NEWSPAPERS.

END

Handwritten notes in the top right corner, possibly a date or reference number.

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מנהל נציגות

~~ש.פ.~~

With the compliments of

ב.י.ע.

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
בוסטון

CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
450 PARK SQUARE BUILDING
BOSTON, MASS. 02116
TELEPHONE (617) 266-3800

THOMAS P. O'NEILL, JR.
Massachusetts

DEMOCRAT
MAJORITY LEADER

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

April 19, 1976

Mr. Ephraim Radner
116 Douglas Road
Belmont, Massachusetts 02170

Dear Mr. Radner:

This will acknowledge your recent correspondence urging my continued support for Israel.

I appreciate your concern for this matter. Please be assured that I support the full transitional appropriation of \$550 million for Israel.

I trust this information is helpful.

With every good wish,

Sincerely

Thomas P. O'Neill

Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.

blg/j

*Stinson:
For your info
all*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1976

Dear Mr. Schlossberg:

The President has asked me to thank you for your letter on the proposed sale of six C-130 cargo aircraft to Egypt. He appreciates your interest in bringing your views to his attention.

As the President has made clear, any such sale would only be taken in fullest consultation with the Congress. On the basis of those consultations and in accordance with the procedures of the Foreign Military Sales Act, we submitted to the Congress our formal letter of intent to sell six unarmed C-130's to Egypt. Full hearings were held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee, with the Secretary of State and other senior government officials testifying. No objections were posed by these Committees and the sale is proceeding in the normal manner.

Egypt's moderate policies and close relations with the United States have been crucial to the advancement of the peacemaking process, and our willingness to sell such aircraft must be evaluated in this light. At the same time, this sale implies no commitment to future sales. We have no intention of becoming Egypt's major arms supplier.

The President remains unequivocally committed to Israel's security and survival and, to this end, has requested substantial sums of assistance for Israel for FY '76 and FY '77 of approximately \$4 billion. This commitment is receiving the highest priority in decisions which the President makes regarding our policy towards the Middle East.

With the President's best wishes,

Sincerely,

RL Elliott

Roland L. Elliott
Director of Correspondence

Mr. Albert Schlossberg
President
The Jewish Community Council
of Metropolitan Boston
72 Franklin Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02110

Shimehon: For your info.
RL

JAMES O. EASTLAND, MISS., CHAIRMAN

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
SUBCOMMITTEE ON REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 371, SEC. 17, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 20, 1976

Mr. Albert Schlossberg
President
Jewish Community Council
of Metropolitan Boston
72 Franklin Street
Boston, Massachusetts

Dear Albert:


Many thanks for your letter concerning the Security Supporting Assistance Bill.

I want you to know that I will most definitely support this legislation, and the funding for Israel. This Bill came up to the Senate floor for consideration today, but was postponed till next week.

I assure you that I continue to believe that we must provide Israel with the means to defend her security. In honor of Israel's 28th anniversary of independence, I delivered a speech in the Senate on the status of U.S. -Israeli relations, and am enclosing a copy of it for your information.

Again, many thanks for your letter, and my best.

Sincerely,


Edward M. Kennedy

Encl.



United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 94th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 122

WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, MAY 5, 1976

No. 65

Senate

ISRAEL INDEPENDENCE DAY AND THE JEWISH HERITAGE OF AMERICA

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, today marks the 28th anniversary of the founding of the State of Israel. It is a special day which all Americans can join Israel in celebrating. On this day we pay tribute to a people and a nation whose struggle for peace and freedom is one very much our own. And in this Bicentennial Year it is also especially appropriate that we honor the role our Jewish ancestors played in the development of our great Nation.

No nation merits our continuing support more than Israel. During her first 28 years, the State of Israel has endured more trials, fought more battles, and overcome more obstacles to its survival than most nations experience in 200 years of history.

Yet, in many respects, Israel's struggle for liberty goes back centuries. For the dream of a Jewish homeland is as ancient as the heritage of Israel itself. And that vision has been kept alive throughout the ages by the faith of all Jews, and in their continuing belief in the words of Israel's prophets.

That spirit triumphed 28 years ago. And the land of Israel—a land of immigrants and a land of hope—became a free and independent nation where Jews in exile could return to the land of their fathers—to be in Jerusalem once again. For Israel is a haven—perhaps the only one there is—for a people who have given the world so much and have been its victims all too often.

And since that hour when Israel's first Prime Minister—David Ben-Gurion—proclaimed a new freedom in an ancient land, the United States has stood side by side in Israel's quest for peace. A peace that would end the suffering, a peace that would end the hatred, and a peace that would last forever.

I am proud of our special relationship with Israel and her people. I am proud of her accomplishments. For these 28 years have been a time of fulfillment and a time of realization, and a time of building.

It is not always easy for Americans to understand the unique burden of the people of Israel.

We do not live in a sea of threat and hostility. We do not pass each day in the face of war. And we do not lose our sons and fathers in the constant defense of our homeland. But the people of Israel do.

Yet Israel is like the United States in many ways—we share much in common. And these similarities are the cornerstone of our bonds of friendship, and the foundation of our support for this beleaguered nation.

Both nations won bitter fights for independence. Both acknowledge the supremacy of moral law. Both believe in individual as well as national liberty—and both will fight to maintain that liberty. For the values of American democracy and social justice course through the history and life of Israel. And whether here, or in Israel, we must stand for their preservation and protection.

The United States is the oldest republic, and so it is fitting in this Bicentennial Year that we, the oldest republic and the youngest people, pay tribute to Israel, the youngest republic and the oldest people, and reaffirm our commitment to her today.

Let all nations know that our commitment to Israel is continuing and real. Our pledge is firm, the bond will not be broken. The United States will do all it can to provide Israel with the means to defend her security until she enjoys a peace which she has sought for 28 years.

No people deserve this more than those we honor today.

Two hundred years ago, just as 28 years ago, the Jews of Europe came to a new land in search of freedom, and a haven from oppression and tyranny. Even before our Nation's independence, Jews could be found in the new world.

The first organized settlement of European Jews in the United States dates back to the 17th century when several families organized the first Jewish congregation in Newport, R.I. And according to historians, it is claimed that the earliest recorded date of a European Jew arriving in America is in 1648, when in my home State of Massachusetts, Isaac Abraham—a respected man of commerce—sold one of his vessels in Boston.

The ordinary men who fought for America's independence, and at times just endured, were the men who fought

for America's freedom, and among them were Jewish Americans.

One was Isaac Solomon, a member of the Marblehead, Mass., colonial regiment that fought against the British at Bunker Hill. He is the only revolutionary soldier who signed a payroll by writing his name in Hebrew letters.

To this day their monuments endure. In Boston, when the Bunker Hill Monument was under construction in 1840, the civic leaders of Boston could build no more from lack of funds and community support. Then one of New England's most famous citizens—Judah Touro—came forward and rallied the citizens of Massachusetts to complete the task.

Others soon followed. From Russia and Holland, from England and Ireland, from every European nation, the Jewish people joined the steady tide of new immigrants to a new land. They came to Boston, to New York, and the cities and towns of America. They pioneered their way across the Nation. And as they reached the shores of America, they soon began to leave their legacy in all facets of American life.

Wherever we look, in business and the labor movement, in literature and the law, in medicine and public service, in defense of the equality of all Americans, at every level of our Government, we find citizens of American Jewish heritage. Indeed the Jewish experience in America serves as an inspiration to all Americans and people everywhere who treasure man's greatest right—his right to be free.

In many respects, it is far too difficult to list the accomplishments of America's Jews. From a heritage, a culture, and a religious tradition comes a spirit which is fully integrated into the values of America and her way of life. And that spirit of righteousness and equality is the pillar of our Nation's democratic heritage.

In this Bicentennial Year, in my home State of Massachusetts as across the Nation, let us honor the people of Israel on their independence day. Let us pay tribute to America's Jewish heritage. Let our two nations join together to bring security and peace to the Middle East. For Jewish Americans have found a home in a grateful nation. Their spirit and determination to pursue a life dedicated to the preservation of America's heritage serves well to remind us that we are a nation of immigrants.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 24, 1976

Mr. Norman S. Rabb
180 Beacon Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02116

Dear Mr. Rabb:

Secretary Kissinger has asked me to respond to your comments about arms sales to Egypt. We are pleased to have the benefit of your thinking on this issue.

The United States, particularly since the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, has been actively engaged in efforts to move the confrontation states in the Middle East toward an overall settlement of their differences. The recent agreement between Israel and Egypt and corollary efforts that have been undertaken offer more promise for an ultimately peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute than has been the case at any time over the past quarter century.

Egypt has a decisive role in Middle East affairs. Thus, the approach Egypt takes toward the resolution of the conflict that has kept the area unsettled for many years is critical to the US interest in achieving a just and permanent peace. Egyptian determination to move toward peace has been essential in achieving the progress made thus far.

President Sadat has shown his desire to end Egyptian dependence on the Soviet Union and it is clearly in our interest to assist him in defending his policies of moderation against outside pressures. Congress concurred with the President's proposal to sell six C-130's to Egypt. This is a cash sale and does not involve US assistance funds.


We recognize the importance of Egypt's economic needs and believe that Egypt clearly wishes to concentrate its attention on reconstruction and economic growth. Congress has been requested to provide substantial funds for economic assistance to Egypt in fiscal years 1976 and 1977. The objective

of US assistance is to support Egypt's new priorities in a way which will permit Egypt to meet the aspirations of the people through peaceful means. This is the only assistance we are giving or proposing at present.

We strongly believe it is in our national interest to be responsive to Egypt's needs at this crucial time. This step is vital in maintaining the confidence of Egypt in the peace process and the US role in it.

Since Israel's inception 28 years ago it has been American policy to support Israel. The United States today is no less committed to the security and survival of Israel. This is a fundamental US interest and one of the cornerstones of our Middle East policy.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John E. Reinhardt". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "J" and a long horizontal stroke at the end.

John E. Reinhardt
Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs

מברק נכנס-מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר חוכן מסמך זה, בולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי חוץ וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

ס ו ד י

מט. 156

נשלח 061800 גזב 75

אל : המשרד

מאת: רושינגטון

מ י י ד י

מצפא, דע הרצוג ני.

הודעת אוניל.

לשלי הגלוי 142.

ניטם שטייע לנו רבות בכל הקשור לתחלטה ביה"ג ולהודעת אוניל סיכם אמש ישירות עם
מיינחתאן כי המשלחת האמריקנית באום תפיץ את הודעת אוניל ותחלטה ביה"ג לכל המשלחות
באום. הודעתי על כך הבוקר סלפוניח לנאום.

רפיה

שהח רחמ מנכל ממנכל מ. קדיון ארוב מצפא מאונקאב תסכרה

מכ/מב

Zionism Resolution

מקלט

מס. 142

אל : המשרד

נשלח 061800 נוב 75

מאת: רושינגטון

מצפא, דע: תרצוג ניו יורק, ענבל בוסטון (הועבר)

להלן ההודעה שחמט תיום במליאת בית הנבחרים TOMAS O'NEILL מנמיג הרוב הדמוקרטי בבית.

6/11/75

MR SPEAKER, ON OCTOBER 17, 1975 THE THIRD COMMITTEE OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTED A RESOLUTION WHICH STATED THAT ZIONISM WAS EQUIVALENT TO RACISM. THE UNFORTUNATE EFFECT OF THE RESOLUTION WAS WELL STATED BY THE US REPRESENTATIVE TO THE THIRD COMMITTEE, LEONARD GARMENT, WHEN HE SAID: "UNDER THE GUISE OF A PROGRAM TO ELIMINATE RACISM THE US IS AT THE POINT OF OFFICIALLY ENDORSING ANTI SEMITISM." WHEN I HEARD OF THE THIRD COMMITTEE'S RESOLUTION, MR SPEAKER, I WAS MOVED TO FILE A HOUSE RESOLUTION TO DENOUNCE THE THIRD COMMITTEE'S ACTION. THE HOUSE LEADERSHIP ON BOTH SIDES OF THE AISLE GAVE ITS SUPPORT TO THE RESOLUTION. I AM PROUD TO SAY THAT THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HAS OVERWHELMINGLY JOINED IN CONDEMNING THE THIRD COMMITTEE'S RESOLUTION. FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRTY SIX MEMBERS, DELEGATES AND THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER HAVE CONSPONSORED THAT RESOLUTION FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRTY SIX OUT OF 437.

436

UNDER THE PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE, SPEAKER ALBERT COULD NOT JOIN AS A COSPONSOR, BUT HE HAS AUTHORIZED ME TO SAY THAT HE FAVORS THE PURPOSES OF THE RESOLUTION. AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE ALMOST UNANIMOUS SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE RESOLUTION. HE BELIEVES IT WILL BE HELPFUL IN THE DEBATE BEFORE THE US GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO DEFEAT THE ILL CONCEIVED RESOLUTION OF THE THIRD COMMITTEE. I WOULD HOPE SO, MR. SPEAKER.

AS A LONG TIME FRIEND OF THE UN I REGRET VERY MUCH THAT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THAT ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN DIMINISHING, AND YET, THAT LOSS OF SUPPORT IS UNDERSTANDABLE WHEN THE THIRD COMMITTEE TAKES ACTION AS IT DID ON OCTOBER 17 IN FLOUTING THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UN AND ENGAGED IN WHAT CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS PETTY POLITICS.

THE REACTION IN THIS COUNTRY HAS BEEN IMMEDIATE AND OVERWHELMING. THE UNPRECEDENTED UNANIMITY IN THE HOUSE IN APPROVING THE RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE THIRD COMMITTEE'S ACTIONS IS REPRESENTATIVE OF SOLID AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. I WOULD VENTURE TO STATE THAT IF THAT VICIOUS RESOLUTION IS APPROVED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THERE IS NO KNOWING WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES TO THE UN'S ARE LIKELY TO BE, BUT, THERE WOULD BE CONSEQUENCES OF THAT I AM QUITE SURE. THERE IS NO KNOWING WHAT THE REACTION OF THE US WOULD BE, BUT THERE WOULD BE A REACTION. THE UN CANNOT LONG SURVIVE DESTRUCTIVE ACTIONS SUCH AS THAT TAKEN BY THE THIRD COMMITTEE. THIS IS THE TIME FOR THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO GIVE HEART TO ITS FRIENDS AND INSPIRATION TO THE WORLD. IT CAN DO SO BY SENDING THE THIRD COMMITTEE'S RESOLUTION DOWN TO RESOUNDING DEFEAT. I WOULD HOPE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SEIZED THIS MOMENT FOR GREATNESS.

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

BY :

SUBJECT:

RE: [Illegible subject line]

ON OCTOBER 17, 1950, THE THIRD COMMITTEE OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTED A RESOLUTION WHICH STATED THAT STONIS WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME. THE UNQUALIFIED EFFECT OF THE RESOLUTION WAS WELL STATED BY THE US REPRESENTATIVE TO THE THIRD COMMITTEE, LEONARD GARNETT WHEN HE SAID: "UNDER THE GUISE OF A PROGRAM TO ELIMINATE RACISM THE UN IS AT THE POINT OF OFFICIALLY ENDORSEMENT AND SANCTIONING WHEN I HEARD OF THE THIRD COMMITTEE'S RESOLUTION MR. SPEAKER I WOULD LIKE TO FILE A HOUSE RESOLUTION TO DENOUNCE THE THIRD COMMITTEE'S ACTION IN HOUSE LEADERSHIP ON BOTH SIDES OF THE AISLE GAVE ITS SUPPORT TO THE RESOLUTION. I AM PROUD TO SAY THAT THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HAS OVERWHELMINGLY JOINED IN CONDEMNING THE THIRD COMMITTEE'S RESOLUTION. FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRTY SIX MEMBERS, DELEGATES AND THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER HAVE CONSIDERED THAT RESOLUTION FOLLOWS THE PRECEDENT OF THE HOUSE. SPEAKER ALBERT COULD NOT JOIN AS A COSPONSOR BUT HE HAS AUTHORIZED ME TO SAY THAT HE FAVORS THE PURPOSES OF THE RESOLUTION."

EMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE ALMOST UNANIMOUS SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE RESOLUTION. HE BELIEVES IT WILL BE HELPFUL IN THE DEBATE BEFORE THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO DEBATE THE ILLEGITIMATE RESOLUTION OF THE THIRD COMMITTEE. I WOULD HOPE SO, MR. SPEAKER.

AS A LONG TIME FRIEND OF THE UN I REGRET VERY MUCH THAT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THAT ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN DIMINISHING AND YET THAT LOSS OF SUPPORT IS UNDERSTANDABLE WHEN THE THIRD COMMITTEE TAKES ACTION AS IT DID ON OCTOBER 17 IN FLOUTING THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UN AND ENGAGED IN WHAT CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS PETTY POLITICS.

THE REACTION IN THIS COUNTRY HAS BEEN IMMEDIATE AND OVERWHELMING. THE UNPRECEDENTED UNANIMITY IN THE HOUSE IN APPROVING THE RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE THIRD COMMITTEE'S ACTION IS REPRESENTATIVE OF SOLID AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. I WOULD WISH TO STATE THAT IF THAT VIOLENT RESOLUTION IS APPROVED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THERE IS NO KNOWING WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES TO THE UN WILL BE. BUT THERE WOULD BE CONSEQUENCES OF THAT SORT. THERE IS NO KNOWING WHAT THE REACTION OF THE UN WOULD BE BUT THERE WOULD BE A REACTION. THE UN CANNOT LONG SURVIVE SUCH ACTIONS AS THAT TAKEN BY THE THIRD COMMITTEE. THIS IS THE TIME FOR THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO GIVE HEART TO ITS MEMBERS AND INSPIRATION TO THE WORLD BY SENDS THE THIRD COMMITTEE'S RESOLUTION DOWN TO ROUNDING DEFEAT. I WOULD HOPE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SEIZED THIS MOMENT FOR GREATNESS.

- 2 -
RESOLUTION-----

WHEREAS THE US AS A FOUNDER OF THE UN ORGANIZATION HAS A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN PROMOTING THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES FOR WHICH THAT ORGANIZATION WAS CREATED AND

WHEREAS IN ARTICLE 1 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UN THE PURPOSES OF THE UN ARE STATED TO BE-

"TO DEVELOP FRIENDLY RELATION AMONG NATIONS BASED ON RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL RIGHTS AND SELF DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES AND TO TAKE OTHER APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN UNIVERSAL PEACE.

TO ACHIEVE INTERNATIONAL CO OPERATION IN SOLVING INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS OF AN ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, CULTURAL OR HUMANITARIAN CHARACTER AND IN PROMOTING AND ENCOURAGING RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOR FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS FOR ALL WITHOUT DISTINCTION AS TO RACE, SEX, LANGUAGE OR RELIGION."

WHEREAS SUCH PURPOSES ARE THREATENED WITH BEING NULLIFIED AND SUBVERTED BY THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE THIRD COMMITTEE OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON OCTOBER 17, 1975 WHICH RESOLUTION WRONGFULLY ASSOCIATES AND EQUATES ZIONISM WITH RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, AS WAS POINTED OUT SO WELL BY THE US REPRESENTATIVE TO THE THIRD COMMITTEE, WHEN HE SAID "UNDER THE GUISE OF A PROGRAM TO ELIMINATE RACISM, THE UN IS AT THE POINT OF OFFICIALLY ENDORSING ANTI SEMITISM ONE OF THE OLDEST AND MOST VIRULENT FORMS OF RACISM KNOWN TO HUMAN HISTORY".

NOR THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, THAT THE US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE THIRD COMMITTEE OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON OCTOBER 17, 1975 IN THAT SAID RESOLUTION WRONGFULLY ASSOCIATES AND EQUATES ZIONISM WITH RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, AND URGES THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO DISAPPROVE SAID RESOLUTION, IF AND WHEN IT IS PRESENTED FOR A VOTE BEFORE THAT BODY.

AD KAN

RAFIACH-

שהח רחם מנכל ממנכל ממנכל מאום אב מממא מעת הסברה מזחמים חקר תעוד אילסר

מב/מכ

RESOLUTION

WHEREAS THE US AS A FOUNDER OF THE UN ORGANIZATION
 HAS A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN PROMOTING THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES
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 WHEREAS IN ARTICLE 1 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UN THE PURPOSES OF THE
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 AND TO TAKE OTHER APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN UNIVERSAL
 PEACE,
 TO ACHIEVE INTERNATIONAL CO OPERATION IN SOLVING INTERNATIONAL
 PROBLEMS OF AN ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, CULTURAL OR HUMANITARIAN CHARACTER
 AND IN PROMOTING AND ENCOURAGING RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND
 FOR FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS FOR ALL WITHOUT DISTINCTION AS TO RACE,
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 DISCRIMINATION AS WAS POINTED OUT SO WELL BY THE US REPRESENTATIVE
 TO THE THIRD COMMITTEE WHEN HE SAID UNDER THE GUISE OF A PROGRAM
 TO ELIMINATE RACISM THE UN IS AT THE POINT OF OFFICIALLY
 ENDORSING ANTI ZIONISM AS ONE OF THE OLDEST AND MOST VIRULENT FORMS
 OF RACISM KNOWN TO HUMAN HISTORY.
 AND WHEREAS BE IT
 RESOLVED THAT THE US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STRONGLY CONDEMS
 THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE THIRD COMMITTEE OF THE UN GENERAL
 ASSEMBLY ON OCTOBER 17, 1975 IN THAT SAID RESOLUTION WRONGFULLY ASSOCI-
 TES AND EQUATES ZIONISM WITH RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION,
 AND URGES THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO DISAPPROVE SAID RESOLUTION,
 IF AND WHEN IT IS PRESENTED FOR A VOTE BEFORE THAT BODY.

AD KAM
BARLACH-

look for any data from the same on this date
100-10710

דו"ח מפגישה האלוף גזית והסורסה אדבן

היה
מחמיר
וי כן
מאן מלשון

הפגישה התקיימה בלשכת ראש אמ"ן ב-16 בסבטואר 1978 בנוכחות:

- ראש אמ"ן
- הסורסה אדבן
- מר ג'ורג' סימור
- מר אוטטין סמיה
- שלמה גורביץ (רסס)

השיחה נסבה בעיקרה על עיסוק המטוסים עם סעודיה ומצרים וראש אמ"ן אמר כי לעיסוק עם מצרים מחנגד בעיקר בגלל עיתויה הגרוע אולם לאסמקת F-15 לסעודיה יש משמעות צבאית רצינית. ברור הוא כי המטוסים יופנו כנגד ישראל שהרי אין כל ידיעות לא לנו ולא לסוכנויות הביון האמריקניות כי ישנה טכנה תקיפה מצד עירק ולשם הגנה מפני הפיכה אין צורך בנשק מתוחכם כזה. מכירת נשק כזה לסעודיה יהפכה למחסן הנשק של המז"ח שבעת מלחמה נצטרך להתמודד אהו.

לשאלת מר אדבן על משמעותן הצבאית של התנחלויות השיב ראש אמ"ן כי השיבות ההתנחלויות אינה צבאית אלא אסטרטגיה פוליטית כי בינינו ובין מרכזי האוכלוסיה של מצרים מפריד מדבר סיני כ-200 מילין וחשוב לשמור על המרדה זו והפרדה מצרים כ-400 אלף תושבי רצועת עזה וההפרדה הטובה ביותר היא בעזרת הישובים כי העדרם יביא למעורבות בין צבא מצרים וצבא קמחרש ברצועה על כל הסכונים הפתחוניים הכרוכים בכך.

האלוף גזית עמד גם על אלמנט ההפתעה בפעולות סאדאת וביקש להדגיש כי בעזרת הישובים לא תעמוד מצרים בפני פרובוקציות על גבולה מצד תושבי רצועת עזה אשר מאלצת להתערב בנועשה.

דו"ח מפגישה רוח"ם - המורשה אפר

לדעת
היה
על
המורשה
לדבר

הפגישה החקיימה ב-46 בפברואר 1978 בלשכת רוח"ם בנוכחות:

רוח"ם, תא"ל פורן, טר יהודה אכנר, מר יחיאל קדישאי, מר משה רביב, שלמה גורביץ (רשם).
המורשה אבדו, מר ג'ורג' סימור, מר אוסטין סמית, קולונל ביסל (הנספח הצבאי בשג' ארה"ב בח"א).

במרץ

לאחר דברי הכרכה אמר רוח"ם כי יהיה בוויסינגטון ב-14 ו-15 והביע תקווה כי יקב היחסים האישיים שנוצרו בינו ובין הנשיא קרטנר יוכלו להתגבר על כל אי ההכנות שהתעוררו לאחרונה.

המורשה אפר העלה את נושא הסיוע הישראלי לאתיופיה תוך ציון העובדה שזה יעלה בקונגרס על רקע אישור עיסוק הנשק המשולש המוגשת ע"י הנשיא וזאת בהקשר לבחינת השימושים שאותם עושה ישראל בנשק הנשלח מארה"ב לישראל.

רוח"ם ציין כי שוחח בנושא אתיופיה גם עם הנשיא סאדאט ואמר כי יש למנוע עליית הקומוניסטים באתיופיה ואנו ניסינו למנוע זאת וחבל שלפני שמונת החדשים האחרונים לא עשה המערב דבר כדי לקרבת כיוון שאז כמות הנשק הסובייטי הייתה מעטה ומספר המומחים היה קטן ואילו כעת מספרם גדול הרבה יותר.

על דברי ת"ח דיין אמר רוח"ם כי הוא דבר על העבר ואכן בחקופת הקיסר סלאמי הייתה הידידות שורה בין אתיופיה וישראל. אולם גם עתה חשיבותה של אתיופיה לישראל רבה ביותר שזו סומלי נחמכה ע"י הערבים וישנה סכנה כי יוכלו לסגור המעבר אל ישראל וממנה באזור באב אל מנדב, כשם שנעשה הדבר במלחמת יוה"כ, ומעשה כזה הינו פגיעה על האינטרס היווני שלנו והביא עלינו סכנה גדולה.

רוח"ם אמר כי עתה אין אנו מספקים נשק לאתיופיה אולם אנו רוצים עתה כבעבר להחזירה לחיק המערב, אולם עתה הדבר מסובך בגלל הנשק שהיועצים הסובייטיים. סומלי מבקשת סיוע רב יותר מהמערב, אך אין לשכוח כי עד לפני זמן קצר הייתה סומלי נחמכה בנשק רב ממזרים וממדינות בעלות אוריינטציה סובייטית ועתה נלחמים באזור לראשונה בנשק סובייטי כול נשק סובייטי.

הסיבה העיקרית לאספקת נשק לאתיופיה בעבר הייתה לשכור על קשר וגשר בין סרינה זו ו"המערב" וארה"ב הייתה מדווחת בנושא על ידנו. כמוכן שהיו לנו סיבות ואינטרסים נוספים לעשות כן. (אם חשיבותה האסטרטגית של אתיופיה הסביר ת"ח"ם תוך הסתייעות בכפפת) רוח"ם אמר כי בהמשך לנושא אתיופיה רוצה לדבר גם בנושא דרום אפריקה ולהסבירו לאורח.

רה"מ טחח בשאלה: מה עלינו לעשות שכשעה שאנו מוקפים באויבים מכל עברינו באה מדינה ומציעה לנו ידידות האם נוכל להרשות לעצמנו לדחותה?

רה"מ הדגיש כי אנו מתנגדים לגזענות שהרי אנו קבננו הגזענות ועל החלטה המצדירה ציונות כגזענות הינה מעוותת כל כך, אנו מכוונים להתנדוהנו זו בפני שלטונות דרום אפריקה אולם האם עקב כך נוכל לדחות שיהוף פעולה עמם בתחומים כלכליים וכו' . תשובה חיובית על כך הינה צביעות שהרי המגנים בעצמם מקימים עם דרא"פ יחסי מסחר וביניהם ברה"מ, צרפת ובריטניה שאף היו ספקיות נשק מרכזיות של דרא"פ. אולם רק אנו סגונים על כך. אמילו "אפריקה השחורה" מקיימת קשרים עם דרא"פ. כדוגמה לשיתוף הפעולה ורווח שאנו יכולים להפיק מהקשר עם דרא"פ הביא רה"מ אה נושא הבונדס שרק בעקבות ביקור שר האוצר בדרא"פ לאחרונה הותרה מכירתם בדרא"פ. האם יכולים אנו להרשות לעצמנו להפסיד את מכירת הבונדס ביוחד בקרב הקהילה היהודית החסה החיה שם. על שאלת המורשה אצ"ו האם מדובר גם במכירת נשק השיב רה"מ כי בעבר היו מכירות נשק בהיקף זעום אך הן חדלו.

לבני החלטה נשיא ארה"ב על מכירת מטוסים למצרים ומעודיה אמר רה"מ כי אספקת F-15 למעודיה לאחר שבנו את בסיס הענק בטובוק הופכת אותה למדינת עימות לכל דבר שהרי ביכולת המטוסים הללו להגיע לעיר אילת תוך 10 דקות.

המורשה אצ"ו ציין כי המחייבים אספקת נשק למעודיה פועלים כי מעודיה מעולם לא הצטרפה בעבר למדינות העימות במלחמותיהם נגד ישראל וכן שהמעורבות הרוסיה בעירק מעוררת סכנה שזו תאבד למערב אם לא יספקו לה המטוסים.

אמנון צפוני אמר

רה"מ אמר בחגיגה לכך כי ידוע לנו כי ישנה הכנסה מעודיה למדינות העימות להעמיד לרשותם את המטוסים ועל כן המחשבה על עתיד ילדינו מחייבת שוחנו להתנגד למכירה. לגבי מטוסים אמר רה"מ כי מצרים החתלנו במו"מ אך תוך כדי שמירה על קיומו ישנה מידת מה של סכנת עימות ואספקת המטוסים האמריקנים מהזקה אופציה זו על פני אחיזת השלום. יחד על כן יש לנו בעקבות הסכם סיני השני התחיבות אמריקנית ממורשה לספק לנו מטוסים אלה ולכן מדוע כורכת ארה"ב קיום התחיבות ממורשה זו בעיסקות אחרות. והוסיף כי טעל במה הכנסת ביקש (ב-15.2) מנשיא ארה"מ לקול מכירת המטוסים ההתקפיים למצרים ומעודיה המוגעים בנו ובמו"מ לשלום תוך הדגשה על אי הצדק בכריכת העסקות זו בזו ודברים ברוח דומה יאמר לנשיא בפגישתם הקרובה. המורשה אדבו הביע תקווה לפגוש את רה"מ בווישינגטון.

19.2.78
שלמה גורביץ'
מח"צפון אפריקה

The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work done during the year. It is followed by a detailed account of the various projects and schemes undertaken, and a summary of the results achieved. The report concludes with a list of recommendations for the future.

The work done during the year has been very satisfactory and has resulted in a number of important achievements. These include the completion of the first phase of the irrigation scheme, the construction of a number of new roads, and the establishment of a number of new schools.

It is hoped that these achievements will be a stimulus to the people of the country and will encourage them to work more hard and more effectively in the future.

The following table shows the progress of the various projects and schemes undertaken during the year.

Project	Progress
Irrigation Scheme	First phase completed
Road Construction	Number of new roads constructed
School Establishment	Number of new schools established

The following table shows the results of the various projects and schemes undertaken during the year.

Project	Results
Irrigation Scheme	Area of land irrigated
Road Construction	Distance of roads constructed
School Establishment	Number of children attending

Handwritten signature or note

1954
 1955
 1956

יב" אדר ב' תשל"ח
19 בפברואר 1978

251

Handwritten notes and signatures, including "19/2" and "19/2" written vertically, and "19/2" written horizontally. There are also some illegible scribbles and initials.

א ל: מר צ. רסיה, וושינגטון

מאח: שלמה גורביץ, מצפ"א

הנדון: דו"ח ליווי המורשה ^{19/2} ~~אשר~~

ליוויתי את המורשה אפרו מר ג'ורג' סימור ומר אוסטין סטיה במשך על ביקורם בארץ, 15 - 18 בפברואר.

הביקור עמד בצל פירסום עיסקה החבילה בדבר אספקת המסוסים לסעודיה, מצרים וישראל והנושא הועלה בהרחבה בכל הפגישות שהתקיימו.

האורח העלה כמעט בכל הפגישות את נושא אספקת הנשק מישראל לאתיופיה.

אולם פרט לנושאים המדיניים הנ"ל הפריד את האורח ועוזרו נושא הצילום. הוא דאג להצטלם בכל הפגישות וכן בכל האחרים היכולים לשמש אותו כעמיד במערכת הבחירות, כגון הכותל המערבי וכנסיות הקבר או על בנעה עם קצין צה"ל ומטה פרוסה.

מיד עם הגיעו תודרך האורח ע"י שגריר ארה"ב ולמחרת היום עלה לירושלים ונפגש עם המנכ"ל מר עברון. בשיחה נדונו בהרחבה נושאי אספקת המסוסים לסעודיה ומצרים,

עמיד הסו"מ לשלום, יחסינו עם אתיופיה, ביקור מארח בארה"ב וההתנחלויות

(דיווח ממורש בנפרד). מפגישה זו נצא האורח למגישה מצולמת עם רה"מ בלשכתו

ולא הפסיק לבטא הערכתו על כי הוסדרה לו פגישה זו שעבורו היתה היא ביקורו

(דיווח השיחה זו בנפרד) בשיחה פגישות אלה היה נוכח הנסמך הצבאי האמריקני בשג'

ארה"ב. לאחר הפגישה עם רה"מ עזב קולונל כיסל והצטרף אלינו אדמונד הול מהקונסוליה

הכללית האמריקנית בירושלים, אשר טרם להוסיף להסברי את כל האספקטים הערבים. בשלב

זה בקש האורח לחרוב מהתכנית ולבקר ולו רק לדקות מספר ככותל המערבי וכנסיות

הקבר לשם צילום, ולאחר שעשינו כן יצאנו לביקור בהאחזות מבוא חורון

(מושב שיהוטי ליד לטרון) שם שוחח עם שניים מהמתושבים. לאחר ככן עלה האורח לחירבת

צופין (קלקיליה) שם זכה להסבר מפי דובר המיטשל ביו"ש והביקור הותיר בו רושם רב, זאת

סמעי מפי מר סימור ובשיחות שהיו לאחר מכן אמר המורשה כי אכן גבולות כגון אלו

שראינו הם בלתי אפשריים. איש הקונסוליה עזב אותנו לאחר הביקור בחירבת צופין.

בהמשך אותו יום נמשכו האורחים עם ראש אמ"ן אלוף גזית ושהב"ט (דיווחים כנפרד). בפגישה עם שש"בם היה נוכח שוב הקולונל כיסל. למחרת ביקרו האורחים ברצועה עזה ובימיה והפעם היינו מלווים ע"י מר מד פייפר מסג" ארה"ב שמוכחותו היא בנושא ההתנחלויות וברצועת עזה והוא הפגין התמחות זו בשאלותיו לאנשים אותם פגשנו.

בעזה זכו האורחים להסבר מקיף מפי רס"ן אמיר חשין, קצין קשרי הציבור של הממשל, וביקרו במחנה הפלסטיים שאמי וכשכונה החדשה שנבנתה לפליטים הרוצים לשפר הנאי מגוריהם - שיך רדואן. לאחר מכן ביקרו האורחים בקהנייה שהינו האחרות בידואיה לסמוני פיתחה רפיה ושחו תה יחד עם נכבדי הבדואים, ביניהם השיך של דהנייה ושיך השיכים של צפון סיני.

על התפתחות ימיה והכניות הישוב באזור שמעו האורחים מפי דוד הרטום, מזכיר המקום. האורחים גילו לאורך כל הביקור יחס אוהם לישראל ופר אבדו הגדיר עצמו ככל שיחוחיו כידיד ישראל.

מר סיפור גילה הבקיות הרבה ביותר כמתרחש באזורנו וגילה ענין בכל פרטי ההתפתחות המדיניות וכדאי היה להעביר אליו חסר ישראלי כנדון.

בנושא המרכזי שעלה בשיחות - עיסקה המסויס שמע האורה דברים רבים, אך נסע גם בשיחות פרטיות מלהביע איזושהי דעה כנדון. דברים היוכיים מפורטים אמר בנושא הגבולות.

רנ"יים להערכה מאמציה של מחלקת האורחים ובמיוחד סגן מנהל המולקה מר טרושאור שלמרות ההתראה הקצרה ביותר הצליחו לארגן התכניה שסילאה כמעט את כל בקשות האורה.

בברכה,

שלמה גורביץ

העתק:

מנהל מצפ"א ✓

מנהל מאו"ר

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סגור צדדי אנדוויק

למיטה פינג אנדוויק

למיטה פוק אנדוויק

CONTACT: Richard Cohen, P.R. Director
Doral Country Club -- Cordoba Room
Phones: (305) 592-0571, 592-0502

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For Immediate Release

SENATOR SARBANES WARNS AGAINST JET SALE
TO SAUDI ARABIA, OPPOSES 'INTERFERENCE'
BY THE U.S. IN ISRAELI DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

MIAMI -- Senator Paul Sarbanes, Democrat of Maryland, has warned that the sale of F-15 jets to Saudi Arabia would "destabilize" the balance of military power in the Middle East.

In an address to 500 delegates attending the national biennial convention of the American Jewish Congress here, Senator Sarbanes said the Carter Administration's proposal to sell "the most sophisticated fighter-bomber in our arsenal" to Saudi Arabia would "significantly enlarge the threat of an Arab strike against Israel."

In addition to the possibility that Saudi Arabia itself might use American arms against Israel, Senator Sarbanes said, the oil-rich Arab kingdom might transfer the F-15's to another Arab state for use against Israel should a new round of hostilities break out in the Middle East.

Critical of Sadat

On the current impasse in Middle East peace talks, Senator Sarbanes said the world had hailed President Sadat's historic flight to Jerusalem last November "because it was the beginning of a process toward peace -- not the end of it.

"It is a matter of deep regret to me," he said, "that President Sadat has not followed up the breakthrough that opened the possibility of progress toward a settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict.

"The Egyptian leader, having accepted Prime Minister Begin's invitation to address the Knesset, cannot now sit back and assume that he need do nothing more.

"His trip may well have broken the psychological barrier separating the Arab world from Israel. But there is a political barrier as well -- and President Sadat cannot avoid his responsibility in reducing and eliminating this barrier as well."

'No Interference in Israeli Domestic Affairs'

The Maryland Democrat, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, alluded to reports that the U.S. would prefer a different Prime Minister in Israel in

(More)

1950-1951
1952-1953
1954-1955

For Summary Review

RESTATEMENT OF THE
TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
BY THE U.S. IN THE MATTER OF

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Statement of Facts

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Conclusion and Recommendations

... [Faint, mostly illegible text at the bottom of the document]

cautioning against any American involvement in the Israeli political scene.

"The United States must do or say nothing to interfere in the domestic affairs of Israel," Senator Sarbanes told the American Jewish Congress delegates, adding:

"The decisions about Israel's political leadership can be made only through the free and legitimate governmental processes of Israel, not by any outside power. Israel is a democracy, with a free press and free speech. Indeed, the freedoms and democracy of Israel are among the major reasons why the American people feel so positively toward the Jewish state.

"We have no right to influence or change that government, its composition or its leadership."

On efforts by American friends of Israel to influence U.S. policy in the Middle East, Senator Sarbanes declared:

"The most fundamental thing to realize is that those American Jews and non-Jews who are concerned for Israel's security constitute not an Israeli lobby but an American lobby.

"As a member of this group, I owe no apologies for and have no regrets about asserting those powerful ties of friendship, mutual commitment to democratic values and mutual concern for peace that underlie American-Israeli relations."

X X X

...not only must we have a... in the... political...
 "The... must do... in the...
 of Israel,"...
 "The... political...
 the... process of...
 Israel is a... with a...
 democracy of... the...
 positively... the...
 "We have no... that...
 the..."

On... of... U.S. policy...
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 "The... thing to...
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 as a... I...
 ...
 values and... for...
 ..."

X X X

Record-20018
 Legislative Office

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

5736

0101

שמו

קונטרס
א"י"ה

Handwritten signature and initials

מל: המשרד, נר: 348, מ: 110
דח: מ, סג: ש, תא: 261278, וח: 1530
נד: סנטור אינוויה

שמו/מ"י די. =

מצפא

וע לשכת דהמ', מנכ"ל משה' רף, רפ"ח-כאן.
למברק דיניץ 332 סה-17 בנובמבר.

לא קבלנו שר"ן אישורכם למכתב השגריר לסנטור אינוויה. כובור
לכם בקשנו להכחיש בשם דהמ' את ההצהרה שיוחסה לו כאילו לא
חתמום ישראל על הסכם שלום אם לא 'ובטח לה הסיוע שהיא מבקשת
מארבע'.
להלן הנוסח המוצע:-

DEAR SENATOR INDOYE,

DURING YOUR RECENT CONVERSATION WITH ISRAEL'S MINISTER OF
FINANCE, MR. SIMCHA EHRlich, YOU MENTIONED A STATEMENT WHICH
WAS REPORTED TO ALLEGEDLY HAVE BEEN MADE BY PRIME MINISTER
BEGIN, NAMELY, THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT SIGN A PEACE TREATY
WITH EGYPT UNLESS THE U.S. PROVIDED TO ISRAEL THE AID IT
HAD REQUESTED.

I HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED TO REITERATE TO YOU THAT PRIME
MINISTER BEGIN NEVER MADE SUCH A STATEMENT. WHAT THE PRIME
MINISTER DID SAY WAS THAT HE SPOKE OF THE ENORMOUS BURDEN
THAT ISRAEL WILL HAVE TO BEAR IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
HER COMMITMENT UNDER THE PROPOSED PEACE TREATY WITH EGYPT.

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

נא אישורכם בחוור.

יוסי גל.

נפ: שח, דהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, סמט, דס, אמן.
מצפא, הסברה

Handwritten text on the right margin: דברי יחסיים מן המשרד להגנת המדינה

מברק נכנס-מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

אל: המשרד

שמו

כאח: דווש'נגטון

מס. 170

נשלח 081800 77

התקבל 090145

נ/חמיה

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מצפא, מאור דע מנכל האוצר רפ- סא

חתקשר עמי חיות סנטור אינר'ייה לאמר כי מאחד והסנט יקיים
 ישיבות סדירות בדצמבר (במשכ כעשרה ימים) לזיוג בחוק האגרגיה הוא
 נאלצ לחזות את ביקור תת הועדה שלו במזת וב'שראל לחזילת ינואר.
 במידה ו'חברד לו שגמ בחזילת ינואר לא יוכל וב'יקור לצאת אל הפועל
 הוא ישקול ביקור שלו ב'שראל בלבר בדצמבר.
 אמרתי לו כי מוטב שהביקור ייערכ לפני חזילת הדיוג בקתוגרט בחוק
 ס'וע החוצצ 1979 כדי שנוכל לציימ בארצ במידע ובהסכרימ החדושים.
 אינר'ייה אמר כי זו בדיוק כוונתו ולכ. הוא שוקל נסיעה בגפו
 אמ עמיתיו לא יוכלו להצטרף אליו.

רפ"ח

Handwritten note: שהיה אמר חמיה אמר חמיה אמר חמיה אמר חמיה אמר חמיה

SECRET DOCUMENT
NO. 100-100000
CLASSIFIED BY: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible]

SECRET DOCUMENT

SECRET

SECRET DOCUMENT
NO. 100-100000
CLASSIFIED BY: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible]

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SECRET DOCUMENT
NO. 100-100000
CLASSIFIED BY: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible]

SECRET DOCUMENT
NO. 100-100000
CLASSIFIED BY: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible]

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30.9.77

ג

376

אין אינדיס (אין אינדיס)

אל: מצפ"א

מאו"ר

מאת: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: משלחת ועדה ההקצבות

בסיחה שקיימו נגיד בנק ישראל ומנכ"ל האוצר עם הסנטורים אינווייה, מתאיאס, דה קונסיני, וצ'יילס (חברי תת-ועדה ההקצבות לענייני סיוע חוץ) ב-29 דנא, מסר אינווייה כי הוא עומד לבקר במזה"ח בין ה-19-1 לדצמבר, בראש משלחת של ועדה ההקצבות. המשלחת הגיע לישראל ב-15 לדצמבר וחשחה 4 ימים. לאינווייה תלווה אשתו.

הרכב המשלחת טרם נקבע. היא תבקר גם במצרים, ירדן, סוריה, סעודיה ואיראן.

נדברתי עם אינווייה כי נשכ יחדיו להכין התכניה ועוד אודיעכם במועד.

למותר לציין החשיבות המיוחדת של ביקור זה. עלינו, כמובן, לעשות כל מאמץ כדי לוודא שהסיוע יהא מוצלח, כפי שהיה סיוורו הקודם של אינווייה בישראל ב-1975.

צ. רפיה

העמק: השגריר, כאן

איתן רף, כאן

מנכ"ל האוצר



378

30.9.77

מ"מ: יצחק
מ"מ:

מ"מ: יצחק, מ"מ:

הודעה על פגישת עבודה

הודעה על פגישת עבודה בין מ"מ יצחק וסגן מ"מ יצחק (מ"מ יצחק) ב-29.9.77 (יום חמישי) בבניין המשרד. הפגישה נערכה ב-19.9.77, שבת, בבניין המשרד.

הפגישה נערכה ב-21.9.77 בבניין המשרד.

הפגישה נערכה ב-29.9.77, שבת, בבניין המשרד.

הפגישה נערכה ב-29.9.77, שבת, בבניין המשרד.

הפגישה נערכה ב-29.9.77, שבת, בבניין המשרד.

מ"מ יצחק
מ"מ יצחק

מ"מ יצחק, מ"מ
מ"מ יצחק, מ"מ
מ"מ יצחק, מ"מ



יב' מפנז תשל"ז
29 יוני 77

סודי

302

Handwritten notes in blue ink:
מל
אליהו
הוא נדון
הוא נדון
הוא נדון

אל: מנהל מצפ"א
מאה: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנטור אינווייה

לאחר שנודע לי, אחמול, כי סנטור קרנסטון - בהשראה והסרצה
הביה הלבן - מגייס חתימות על מכתב המיכה בנשיא וכי סנטור אינווייה
חמם על המכתב, התקשרתי טלפונית עם אינווייה. להלן עיקרי שיחתנו
שהתקיימה אחמול:

אמרתי כי רציתי לשחף אותו - כידיד ותיק - בדאגתנו העמוקה לנוכח
ההצהרות הרבות המושמעות מפי דוברים שונים של הממשל המקסיקות עמדה
הערבים, מעוררות אצלם ציפיות מוגזמות ופוגעות בעיקרון המו"מ הישיר
ובסיכויי הצלחתו. הדגשתי במיוחד מסיבה העתונאים עם דובר מחמ"ד אחמול.
ובנוסף לכך, אמרתי, אני שומע ש"מסחובב" מכתב וכי גם דבר זה מוסיף
על המבוכה.

אינווייה אמר: אכן יש מכתב. אמרו לי שהנשיא רוצה שהסנטורים
יביעו בו המיכה. הפעילו עלי לחץ לחתום וחתמתי. הרי ריביקוף חמם
על המכתב, ואמרו לי אם ריביקוף חמם - זה ודאי בסדר.

אמרתי לאינווייה שלצערי אין עמדה ריביקוף משקפת את עמדתנו.

אינווייה הופתע לשמוע זאת. אמרתי - לצערי זה המצב.

אינווייה אומר - אני רוצה שחדע שרואים בריביקוף דוגמא.

אינווייה הוסיף - ומה נזק בכך שכמה סנטורים חותמים על מכתב כללי.
הגיד לאנשיך בישראל שאנחנו הרי תומכים בישראל ונחמוך בה.



- 2 -

סודי

אמרתי - הבעייה היא שאתם סנסורים חשובים ולך יש משקל רב במיוחד,
בקרב היהודים ובקרב ידידי ישראל. אם המכתב יישלח - תהן לכך העתונות
פרשנות משלה שאיננה בהכרח תואמת את כוונותיך.

כאן אמר לי אינווייה - טוב, הן לי לחשוב על כך.

הודיתי לו על השומה לבו וסיימנו בידידות, כרגיל.

עד כאן שיחתי עם אינווייה.

על הנזק הרב שגורם ועוד יגרום לנו ריביקוף בקרב הסנסורים, ינאויא

אם אלמון גמ מציג 15.

ב ב ר כ ה
צ. רפיח

העמק: לשכה שה"ח
מ"מ המנכ"ל.



- 2 -

0111

הממשלה הישראלית תודה רבה על הפקודת המס' 1000/57
המורה על הפיקוד המס' 1000/57. הממשלה הישראלית תודה רבה
על הפקודת המס' 1000/57.

הממשלה הישראלית תודה רבה על הפקודת המס' 1000/57.

הממשלה הישראלית תודה רבה על הפקודת המס' 1000/57.

הממשלה הישראלית תודה רבה על הפקודת המס' 1000/57.

הממשלה הישראלית תודה רבה על הפקודת המס' 1000/57.

הממשלה הישראלית תודה רבה על הפקודת המס' 1000/57.

ד. א. ר. ס. מ.

ד. א. ר. ס. מ.

הממשלה הישראלית תודה רבה על הפקודת המס' 1000/57.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

יד' סיון תשל"ז
31 מאי 77

262

למס' /

*ג' /
אויזאוס (אין ז'י.)*

אל: מצפ"א ✓

מאת: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: פטור אינדייה

בשעתו אמר לי אינדייה בכוננהו לבקר בישראל - ביקור
עבודה רשמי - בעת פגרת הקונגרס באוגוסט.

אני שב ומזכיר זאת עתה לצורך סכנון ביקורי הקיץ שאתם
עורכים.

צ. רפיה
[Handwritten signature]

העתק: מאו"ר.

RECEIVED

1977

10



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL

WASHINGTON, D.C.

1977

10

RECEIVED

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RECEIVED

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RECEIVED



כח' כסלו תשל"ז
20 דצמ' 76

621

ת
ה'אלתר
(תנ"א)
א"ת"ה

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

מאה: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנטור אינוייה

נפגשתי היום, ביוזמתי, לשיחה של שעה המימה עם סנטור אינוייה במסדרו בקפיטול. אמרתי כי לא באתי להעלות בקשה מיוחדת בעניני סיוע וכד' אלא לספר לו על התרשמיותי מביקורי בארץ עם משלחת ריביקוף ולעדכנו במתרחש.

אינוייה אמר כי משיחות שקיים עם כמה מהסנטורים שהיו במשלחת ריביקוף התרשם כי הסנטורים חזרו מהמזה"ח עם הרושם הבא:

- א. סאדאח בכנוח רוצה שלום.
- ב. סאדאח מוכרח לרצוח בשלום כי ההגיון מחייב זאת (מצבו הכלכלי הקשה וכו').
- ג. הישראלים רוצים גם הם שלום אבל בתנאים אלו ואחרים.

כמו"כ אמר כי הקונגרס החדש יתן לישראל הסיוע הדרוש לה, בשנה הבאה ולאחריה. אבל הסנטורים שואלים עד מתי? ועלינו לקחה זאת בחשבון.

ניצלתי ההזדמנות כדי לסקור באריכות רצוננו בשלום, התבטאויות רה"מ ושה"ח בענין זה בפני משלחת הקונגרס ולאחר מכן, הערכתנו לנושא אש"פ, אחרי לבנון ולקראת ועידת ג'נבה, והשבתי לשאלות רבות אחרות שלן בעניני אזורנו.

היה ידידותי ונחמד כהמיד.

ב ב ר כ ה
3
צ. רפיה

העמק: המנכ"ל
המשנה למנכ"ל
הסגיר, כאן
הציר, כאן



ב' כסלו השל"ז
24 נוב' 76

שמו

637

Handwritten notes:
ל
זאב (אולי)
פיל

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: צבי רפיח, רוסינגטון

הנדון: שיחתי עם סנטור אינווייה
בהמשך למברקי מ-23 דנא

להלן פרטים נוספים משיחתי עם אינווייה אהמול:

א. ביקשני להודיעכם כי הוא עומד לקבל תפקיד חשוב בהנהגת הסינט:
הוא ייבחר למזכיר הטיעה הדמוקרטית, התפקיד השלישי בהשיבותו
אחרי מנהיג הרוב וסגנו.

ב. להערכתו - מנהיג הרוב יהא סנטור רוברט בירד או הולינגס.
ואילו המפרי לא יזכה בתפקיד זה.

ג. המועמד לתפקיד סגן מנהיג הרוב ("המצליף") הוא קרנסטון
מקליפורניה. ואולם אינווייה מעריך שהסנטורים מהדרום ודאי
יגישו מועמד משלהם.

הערה: הכחירות לתפקידי הנהגה בסינט יתקיימו ב-4 בינואר.

ד. אינווייה ימשיך, כמובן, לכהן כיו"ר ועדת הסינט לענייני
מודיעין. כמו"כ ישמור על תפקידו כיו"ר חת-ועדת התקצבות
לסיוע חוץ. בגלל בכירותו בוועדת התקצבות יכול היה אמנם
לקבל תפקיד יו"ר של חת-ועדת אחרת בוועדה זו כמו:
בינוי צבאי, תקלואח, אוצר או מחס"ד ומשפט אך העדיף להשאר
בחת הוועדה לסיוע החוץ. חת הוועדה היחידה בה הוא מעוניין
יותר היא חת הוועדה לענייני הפנטגון. כשהתפנה זו - בעוד
כמה שנים - יחליף בה את סיוע החוץ.



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שמור

- 2 -

אמרתי שאישיה אני שמח כי הוא ממשיך לכהן כיו"ר חת הועדה
לסיוע חוץ.

כבר כה,
צ. רפיח

העמק: לשכת שה"ח
המנכ"ל
המסנה למנכ"ל
המרכז משה"ח
השגריר כאן.

THE
1952



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.

1952
- 8 -

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משרד החוץ

מחלקת חקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

דף מספר _____ מתוך _____ דפים

עותק מספר 15 מתוך 23 עותקים

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסיחוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

סודי ביותר

Handwritten signature or initials.

מס. 500

נשלח: 301700 ארג

אל: המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון

אלו עברו, לשלי 501.

להלן דברים נוספים שאמר לי איננו יזה:

- א. להערכתו, המירוצ לנשיאות יהיה צמוד מאד אך קארטר ינצח ביהס של 48 - 52. יש חשיבות עליונה לויכוחים הטלביזיוניים העתידיים בין שני המועמדים לנשיאות. זו הזדמנות יחידה למליונים רבים של אמריקנים לבחון המועמדים מקרוב והיטב. אינן הוא סבור שאחד ינצח את השני והמירוצ, כאמור, יהא צמוד. הקונגרס הבא יהא שמרני יותר בהדיכור גם הממשל הבא יהיה יותר שמרני - הנ בגלל המירוצ הצמוד שבינ שני המועמדים והנ משום הצורך להסדיר את הכלכלה האמריקנית. הממשל הבא יאטרכ להכניס סדר במנגנון הממשלתי ויעשה זאת.
- ב. עבודתו כיוזיר הועדה לפיקוח על קהילית המודיעין (עשרה גופי מודיעין) תגזול הרבה מאד מזמנו, אך הוא ימשיכ להתמסר כבעבר לתת-ועדת הקצבות לסיוע חוצ. אמ יאלצ לוותר על חברות באחת הוועדות - ודאי לא תהא זו וועדת הקצבות.
- ג. הציג מועמדותו לתפקיד מזכיר הסיעה הדמוקרטית בסינט, התפקיד השלישי בחשיבותו בסיעה (כיום ממאו סנטור מוס מיוטה). אינן לו מתנגדים ומקווה להיבחר.
- ד. אינן בטחון מלא שרוביט בירד יהא יוזיר הסיעה הבא. הוא מבקש כבר תמיכה גם בסיבוב שני של הצבעות. הבא אדיו - מבחינת הסיכויים - הוא הולינגס, ורק לאדיו המפרי.

רפ"ח

שח רחמ מנכל שחבט ממנכל ארגוב י. רכיב רפיכ/מצמא רס ר/אמן צג/ש

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



א. רפ"ח

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

אדר ב' תשל"ו
כ" 22 במרץ 1976

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
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מאת: צבי רפ"ח, וושינגטון

בשיחה שקיימתי אהמול עם סנטור אינווייה, ביקשני למסור באורח
אישי לשר-החוץ, כלחלק :

"השי שקיבל אינווייה משה"ח בעה ביקורו בגינוסר אשתקד - מנורות
שמן עתיקות עשויות חימר - היה נפלא.
אינווייה משאיל את המנורות לבתי-סטר ולחוגים שונים כמוצג ישראלי
עתיק והם נהנים טכך מאד.

אינווייה מוסר דרישה שלום חמה לשר-החוץ ונושא עמו זכרונות
נעימים מביקורו בקיבוץ גינוסר ומפגישתו עם שר החוץ.

עד כאן דברי אינווייה.

בברכה,

צ. רפ"ח

✓ העתק: מנהל מצפ"א

משרד החוץ
ירושלים



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

תאריך: 27.12.73
מס' תעודת: 1000

הגביר המכובד
משרד החוץ, ירושלים

הצדדים להסכם, אשר נחתם ב- 27.12.73, מתחייבים להבטיח את
האבטחה וההגנה המיטבית.

הצדדים להסכם, אשר נחתם ב- 27.12.73, מתחייבים להבטיח את
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הצדדים להסכם, אשר נחתם ב- 27.12.73, מתחייבים להבטיח את
האבטחה וההגנה המיטבית.

בשם משרד החוץ

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

הגביר המכובד

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.

1974

APR 11 1974
11:00 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

RE: [Illegible]

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May 10, 1976

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

THE 28th ANNIVERSARY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

HON. FRANK ANNUNZIO

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 10, 1976

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, on May 15 we commemorate the anniversary of an event of stirring significance and inspiration in mankind's continuing struggle for freedom and dignity—the day upon which 28 years ago the Jewish people proclaimed the independent sovereign Republic of Israel.

The founding of Israel is a vital, living monument to the persistence and heroism of a people who have suffered many centuries of persecution and know only too well the bitterness and despair of an existence without even the most basic freedoms.

The strategic location of the traditional homeland of the Jews, as a crossroad of commerce and cultural exchange among three continents, has made the Jewish nation a prime target of foreign invaders. Under ancient kings and as part of ancient empires, the Jews suffered massacre, deportation, and slavery.

The Roman Empire imposed its will on the Jewish people for several centuries during which time—70 A.D.—Jerusalem was again besieged and, after a heroic defense, its people were reduced to starvation. This event coincided with the final Diaspora and the subsequent elimination of Palestine as the focal point of Jewish culture and civilization for almost 2,000 years.

Throughout the Middle Ages, in most of the countries of the world, the Jews were severely restricted in their civil and religious liberties, as well as being subjected to periodic physical harassment or outright persecution by fire and sword. This sad history culminated in the 20th

century with the unspeakable horror at Auschwitz and Buchenwald.

Seen in this context of tears and tragedy, the establishment of the State of Israel is, therefore, a momentous turning point in the history of the Jewish people. The nation was carved out of bedrock, desert, and malarial swamp surrounded by hostile neighbors. Yet the courage and tough determination forged during their centuries of exile enabled the Jews to face these problems with vigor and unwavering enthusiasm.

Today, as a nation of some 3 million people, Israel can rightfully boast of its astounding record of economic, political, and social accomplishments. In spite of the continuing problems of heavy armament expense and the integration into their society of many new immigrants, Israel has not abandoned its innovative spirit or sympathetic interest in the people of other lands with similar problems.

Encouraging other small nations, not only by example but also with substantive action, Israel conducts programs of technical assistance, on-the-job training courses, and the loan of experts and instructors to scores of nations in the less developed areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In a mere 28 years of existence, the State of Israel has contributed mightily with energy and imagination to our hopes and dreams for the eventual establishment of a creative, democratic, and progressive world community of nations.

To the citizens of Israel and their friends in this and every other nation, I join my colleagues in the Congress in a tribute on this special day. May the State of Israel continue to be a source of encouragement and inspiration for all peoples of the world.

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה) תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ
מחלקת השגר
תל אביב

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שעה: 17:55

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נשתקבל 042322

מצפה-מאור

מקור המורשה BILL ALEXANDER דמוקרט מארקנטו.

להלן משיחה עם עוזרו:

א. אלכסנדר, סגן מצליח טיעון חריב והגבר נוסף התמצאות של בית, מתעורר לקרי בארץ ב-15-18 ד"ר, פרטי שיטות עוד גודל עכבר.

ב. מאז נבחר לבית ב-1960 לא התבאר בפומבי בנושאים הקשורים בו. דרך דאבעותיו לגבי ווק זיוע חז-סעודה לא שישב תקון ואנ"ק.

ג. אקטוב, המכ בהחלטת מדינת פאטרטים ישראל, התנגד להצבת סכנאים בסיני.

ד. מועניי בנושאי בטחון האקלאות מעוניין לשוחח עם ואשי משתכט דאבל, שר האקלאות, המדי כנסת ולקבל הדדוק מריניע על שיהות ישראל-מצריים

יזכי ישראל לפתיד בקרומי האקלאות והמסוד.

ה. ינ לבקר בשארם אל שייכ וצליחה תנו מימית, חזו לו בקור דאשונ בארץ.

ו. ארזכ הדג להזמנה חזר במלונ הומסה הוצאות שהותו בארץ.

ז. נאד האם תכינר עקרי תכניות בקהיר לתאריכים 15-18 ד"ר.

חזר יעונר פרטיה בהקדם.

חט"ר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה) תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ
מחלקת השגר

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ARKANSAS

(Popularity, 1970 census, 1,923,295)

SENATORS

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Democrat, of Little Rock, Ark.; born at Sheridan, Grant County, Ark., February 23, 1896; first lieutenant of A.S.S.C. during the First World War; lawyer; prosecuting attorney of the seventh judicial district of Arkansas, 1927-30; married Norma Myers Cheatham, November 10, 1937; member of 74th Congress (1935-36) and 75th Congress (1937-38) from the Sixth Congressional District of Arkansas; elected United States Senator November 3, 1942, for the term beginning January 3, 1943; reelected in 1948, 1954, 1960, 1966, and in 1972 for the term ending January 3, 1979.

DALE BUMPERS, Democrat, of Charleston, Ark.; born in Charleston, August 12, 1925; attended the public schools of Arkansas, University of Arkansas, Northwestern University, LL. B. degree, 1951; admitted to Arkansas Bar, 1952; served in U.S. Marine Corps, 1943-46, staff sergeant; president, Charleston Chamber of Commerce; past president, Charleston School Board, Franklin County Board of Education; past chairman, United Fund, Boy Scout Fund, and Cancer Fund; Governor of Arkansas, 1970-74; married former Betty Flaanagan, 1949; three children: Brent, Bill, and Brooke; elected to the U.S. Senate, November 5, 1974, for the term ending January 3, 1981.

REPRESENTATIVES

FIRST DISTRICT.—Counties: Clay, Craighead, Crittenden, Cross, Fulton, Greece, Independence, Izard, Jackson, Lawrence, Lee, Mississippi, Monroe, Phillips, Polk, Randolph, St. Francis, Sharp, Boone, Van Buren, and Woodruff (21 counties). Population (1970), 424,893.

WILLIAM VOLLEGE (BILL) ALEXANDER, Jr., Democrat, of Osceola, Mississippi County, Ark.; born in Memphis, Shelby County, Tenn., January 16, 1934; attended University of Arkansas, graduated from Southwestern at Memphis in 1957 with B.A. degree in political science; received LL.B. degree from Vanderbilt University in 1960; served as president of the student body in law school in 1959-60; served in the U.S. Army in 1951-53 in the Adjutant General Corps; married Gwendolyn Haven on February 6, 1957; one daughter, Alyce Haven, born April 25, 1968; legal research assistant to Federal Judge Marion Boyd, Memphis, Tenn., 1960-61; associate, firm of Mantedonico, Boone, Gililand, Heskett & Loeb, 1961-63; partner, firm of Swift & Alexander, Osceola, Ark., 1963-68; former communicant and Sunday School teacher, Calvary Episcopal Church, Osceola, Ark.; former commissioner, Arkansas Waterways Commission; former secretary, Osceola Port Authority; former member, Osceola Civic Center commission; former director, Northeast Arkansas Economic Development District; former director, Mississippi County O.E.O.; former attorney for Mississippi County Urban Renewal Agency; director, East Arkansas Area Council of Boy Scouts; former member, Mississippi County Quorum Court and its Budget Commission; former director, Mississippi County Y.M.C.A.; member, American Academy of Political and Social Science; former member of Alumni Board of Directors, Southwestern at Memphis; former director, Osceola Municipal Port Authority; former director, Osceola Municipal Planning Commission; member, Osceola Bar Association, Mississippi County Bar Association, Arkansas Bar Association, Tennessee Bar Association, American Bar Association, Northeast Arkansas Bar Association; admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court; member and past president, Osceola Rotary Club; past president, Arkansas State Society of Washington, D.C.; member, American Legion, Kappa Sigma Fraternity, Phi Delta Phi Legal Fraternity; named to Who's Who in the South and Southwest, 1967; Outstanding Civic Leaders of America, 1967; Who's Who in America; elected to 91st Congress November 5, 1968; reelected to each succeeding Congress; chairman, Subcommittee on Family Farms and Rural Development, 1973-74; member, Committee on Agriculture, 1969-74; member, Committee on Government Operations, 1971-74; member, Committee on Appropriations, 1975 to present; assistant majority whip, 1973-76; deputy majority whip, 1977 to present; member, Democratic Steering and Policy Committee, Democratic National Congressional Committee.

SECOND DISTRICT

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
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במסגרת גביר (המיושב אלוהים ביהודה)
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2. גביר F-15 מסודר.
with
the Compliments of the
Embassy of Israel
at Washington

ברכה
א. מ. י.

7/2/77



For your information
Josh Elberg

AUG 11 1977



United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 95th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Vol. 123

WASHINGTON, FRIDAY, AUGUST 5, 1977

No. 135—Part III

WHAT'S BEHIND THE SUNDAY TIMES OF LONDON'S "EXPOSE" ON ISRAEL?

HON. JOSHUA ELBERG

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, August 5, 1977

Mr. ELBERG. Mr. Speaker, ever since the Sunday Times of London published what it alleged was an investigative piece on Israeli treatment of Palestinian prisoners, a controversy has raged in the news media over what's really behind this story.

I offer for the record an article from the New Republic of July 23, 1977.

The New Republic's probe shows that there were serious deficiencies in the Sunday Times article—not the least of which is the fact that at no point did reporters from the London newspaper ever talk to Israeli judicial or military officials to seek a response to the serious charges of torture.

The magazine rightfully states that these charges cannot be dismissed lightly. But it acknowledges the difficulty that the Israelis have had in proving that something did not happen.

Mr. Speaker, the New Republic concludes that—

Any suggestion that Israel engages in this kind of systematic torture of Arabs simply is not true.

I commend the following to the attention of my colleagues:

TORTURE TALKER
(By Seth Kaplan)

Governments torture, or at least some governments do. It is by now one of those evil banalities of modern life. But are all charges of torture—in Chile and the Soviet Union, in Syria and South Africa, in some African militaries or in an industrial superstate—equally true and equally newsworthy? Or perhaps more to the point, what constitutes proof of a coherent and deliberate program of torture as an instrument of revenge and intimidation?

On June 19, the Sunday Times of London published a long and detailed report by its investigative "Insight Team" alleging that the Israeli government systematically tortures Palestinian prisoners in the West Bank and Gaza. Two weeks later, the Israeli embassy in London issued a reply denying the charges and challenging the journalistic methods of the reporters. On July 10, those reporters wrote again, this time in their own defense. In Israel itself, the Jerusalem Post, though doubting the credibility of the Sunday Times' indictment, called for some sustained oversight against the temptation of a beleaguered people to ignore the use of torture against their enemies; in the Israeli parliament, there is a move for a parliamentary inquiry. But, as the Insight Team conceded in its initial story, it's hard to know whom to believe. "In the nature of torture, only the two parties are present: torturer and victim."

The Insight Team charged that the Israelis have used torture to gain information about terrorist groups, to obtain confessions which then are used to obtain convictions of the terrorists by Israeli courts, and to deter the Arab population from resisting Israeli rule. The story was based on interviews with 49 Arabs who had been detained, some members of their families and two Jewish Communist lawyers who had defended them.

In the Israeli rebuttal, much was made of the fact that the reporters talked only on involved Arab sources and their defense attorneys. At no point in its investigations did the Insight Team confront Israeli judicial or military officials with their evidence and charges. Having made their choice not to do so, the British journalists set about to compile a strong circumstantial case. It is certainly not one that can be shrugged off cavalierly. The core of their findings is the mutually corroborating accounts of five Palestinians. All of them said they were taken to an interrogation center known as "The Palace of the End" where they were subjected to almost identical forms of abuse. They said they were blindfolded and once a day sent to "the fridge," a cold box with spikes on the floor, constructed so that the prisoner can neither sit down nor stand up. Others testified to different abuses.

The Israeli reply included a general denial of the Sunday Times' charges, and some specific counter-evidence on a few of the cases. Of course it's hard to prove that something did not happen. How could the Israelis adduce concrete proof that one or another Arab was not tortured? However the Israelis did not even attempt to disprove—or even specifically deny—the most vivid charge in the Sunday Times article, that concerning the "fridge." The Israeli reply says, "The fact . . . that prisoners were at such and such a prison together and both describe it, is indeed evidence, but it is evidence as to facts that are not in question." This is disingenuous; these identical descriptions go to the heart of the Insight Team's accusations.

The thrust of Israel's rebuttal is a defense of the integrity of its judicial system. Most effectively, the Israelis show that the Sunday Times disguised to the point of deception the terrorist activities of its complainants. These people have taken many lives, including those of Arabs. In the latest round, the Insight Team conceded some significant omissions.

So what is the verdict in England? The Sunday Times reported that it had received 324 letters from readers, of which 262 criticized "a farage of innuendo" and 50 praised a "courageous exposure." Thirty-two discussed associated matters. Two law lords came down hard against the Sunday Times' article. Lord Justice Salmon said, "The Israeli reply destroyed the credibility of the allegations." The former Lord Chancellor, Lord Hailsham, termed the Israeli judiciary "manifestly independent. I am quite certain that they would never have allowed things to pass by that would have aroused criticism or complaint in the most meticulous English court."

In this country, Nicholas von Hoffman discussed the Insight Team report with glee in his syndicated column of July 1. Von Hoffman adopted the same metaphors for the Israelis that became so popular in the Soviet press after the Six Day War, comparing them to Nazis: "If Heinrich Himmler were around to read The [Sunday] Times' report his story heart might beat with pride. . . . [T]he grotesque irony of using gas as an instrument of torture ought to have been too much . . . for . . . Israeli officials. . . ." But the facts as they have emerged from the Insight Team-Israeli exchange hardly justify von Hoffman's analogy. At worst, the Israelis seem to have tortured only active terrorists. Nothing in the articles indicates the use of torture as a way of controlling the Palestinian population as a whole.

The American press does not seem to know what to do with stories about human rights violations by foreign governments. They are almost always difficult to verify. The Boston Globe reprinted excerpts from the Sunday Times reports and a few other papers played the controversy big. Others ignored it or buried it in the back pages.

There are reasonable policies that newspapers might follow. Ronald Hozen, foreign editor of The Washington Post, said last week that his paper would report allegations made by the Red Cross, the Human Rights Commission, and those discovered by the Post's own reporters. The Post carried a five-paragraph item the day after the Insight Team's report appeared, and nothing since then. Earlier in the year it ran a series by its own correspondent on conditions in Israeli prisons. These articles reported allegations of torture, but did not give them any credibility. The Post may have missed an interesting controversy by doing so little with the Sunday Times story, but at least its coverage seems consistent.

The New York Times, on the other hand, followed a ragged course. The day after the Sunday Times article appeared, our Times buried a small box on the Insight Team's report in the nether regions of the paper. When the Israeli reply was issued, the Times ran a long bylined article on page three. The story itself, however, was a model of even-handedness: six paragraphs on the accusations, six paragraphs of rebuttal. Then, later in that week, the Times ran a Reuters dispatch from Israel by Bernard Edinger. Israeli authorities allowed Edinger to interview Palestinian guerrilla prisoners in Gaza, specifically to counter the Insight Team's allegations. Edinger found the prisoners' descriptions of their treatment—being stripped and beaten—not sufficiently grim to qualify in his book as "torture." Why the Times chose to print Edinger's story at all, which had been censored by Israeli military authorities, is something of a mystery, particularly in view of the short shrift allowed the original Sunday Times dispatch.

Systematic use of torture as a method of political control is obviously repugnant. But one thing is clear from this controversy: any suggestion that Israel engages in this kind of systematic torture of Arabs simply is not true. The question of how a government should treat people who regularly detonate bombs in public places is not susceptible to simple absolutism, such as the outright condemnation of torture. One may have to use extreme measures—call them "torture"—to deal with a terrorist movement whose steady tactic is the taking of human life.



Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 95th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

House of Representatives AUG 11 1977

MONDAY, AUGUST 1, 1977

SALE OF F-15 FIGHTERS ADDS TO THE "ARMS PILE"

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, August 1, 1977

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Speaker, recent news reports have indicated the concern of many Members of the House and Senate about the proposed sale of F-15 fighter planes to Saudi Arabia.

I share this concern, because I believe the sale of such sophisticated arms to Saudi Arabia could upset the delicate balance of power in the Middle East, and the equally delicate discussions which hopefully will lead to peace talks.

I commend to the attention of my colleagues an editorial on this subject from the Philadelphia Inquirer of July 28, 1977. The editorial points to the efforts of Senators Humphrey and Case on the issue, and the danger inherent in the plan to sell the F-15 fighter planes to Saudi Arabia:

Is New Arms Sale Policy So At Variance With Old?

In a joint letter to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Sen. Clifford Case (R. N.J.) and Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D. Minn.), have raised pertinent questions about the proposed sale of 60 F-15 supersonic fighter planes to Saudi Arabia, at a price in the neighborhood of \$1 billion.

Among other things, the two influential members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would like to know when the offer to sell the planes was made, by whom, under what commitment if any, and why, and how if at all the Congress has been consulted on the deal. Is the Administration carrying out a commitment made by its predecessor? Or is it making a new commitment?

Like the decision to sell the Shah of Iran seven highly complex airborne radar systems, at a price of \$1.28 billion, the proposed deal raises other questions. Do the Saudis need the plane, and for what purpose? Or is it that the U.S. Air Force needs, or thinks it needs, to sell them the plane in order to reduced unit costs on the F-15s it is buying for itself?

All of which raises the central question, which is simply this:

How does the Carter Administration's new policy of curbing sales of U.S. weapons

abroad differ in practice from the old policy of its predecessors—a policy Mr. Carter derided as "neutral contractor"?

In principle, of course, the differences are vast. Under the former policy, U.S. arms manufacturers were encouraged to compete for sales abroad, and the armed services competed with each other to encourage such sales.

Under the new policy, which Mr. Carter announced last May, the U.S. "will remain faithful to treaty obligations, and will honor historical responsibilities to assure the security of the state of Israel." Where other nations are concerned, however, arms transfers are to be viewed "as an exceptional foreign policy instrument," with "the burden of perma-

son" to be "on those who favor a particular arms sale rather than those who oppose it."

What, then, is "exceptional" about the proposed sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia? Ideally, an exceptional irony. In his statement last May, Mr. Carter also said that the U.S. would sell major arms to other nations "where I determine these countries friendly to the United States"—which both Saudi Arabia and Iran are—"must depend on advanced weaponry to offset qualitative and other disadvantages to maintain a regional balance."

The irony is that the advanced weaponry to be sent to Iran, Saudi Arabia's rival for influence in the Persian Gulf, upsets the regional balance, which then can be received Saudi Arabia. And so the arms pile up in that volatile area. Who knows whom they might be used against or how the U.S. might become involved, as an ally or even as target?

It is true, as the administration warned Congress in an official report a few days ago, that curbing the international arms traffic is not easy: "The prospect that other countries will voluntarily and spontaneously follow our model of restraint is unlikely." What is still not clear, however, is whether that model of restraint is being followed by the administration itself.

שגרירות ישראל
וויטינגטון

ת"פ
קולניס (אח"כ)

16. 8. 1977

אל: אל 334

מאת: צבי רפיח

מצ"ב לעיונכם בקרי האונטה

J. EILBEG שהוכיח בנטולת

הקולניס ק-5.8.77.

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TORTURE TEMPEST
(By Seth Kaplan)

Governments torture, or at least some governments do. It is by now one of those evil banalities of modern life. But are all charges of torture—in Chile and the Soviet Union, in Syria and South Africa, in some African minilates or in an industrial superstate—equally true and equally newsworthy? Or perhaps more to the point, what constitutes proof of a coherent and deliberate program of torture as an instrument of revenge and intimidation?

On June 19, the Sunday Times of London published a long and detailed report by its investigative "Insight Team" alleging that the Israeli government systematically tortures Palestinian prisoners in the West Bank and Gaza. Two weeks later, the Israeli embassy in London issued a reply denying the charges and challenging the journalistic methods of the reporters. On July 10, these reporters wrote again, this time in their own defense. In Israel itself, the Jerusalem Post, though doubting the credibility of the Sunday Times' indictment, called for some sustained oversight against the temptation of a beleaguered people to ignore the use of torture against their enemies; in the Israeli parliament, there is a move for a parliamentary inquiry. But, as the Insight Team conceded in its initial story, it's hard to know whom to believe. "In the nature of torture, only the two parties are present: torturer and victim."

The Insight Team charged that the Israelis have used torture to gain information about terrorist groups, to obtain confessions which then are used to obtain convictions of the terrorists by Israeli courts, and to deter the Arab population from resisting Israeli rule. The story was based on interviews with 49 Arabs who had been detained, some members of their families and two Jewish Communist lawyers who had defended them.

In the Israeli rebuttal, much was made of the fact that the reporters relied only on involved Arab sources and their defense attorneys. At no point in the investigations did the Insight Team confront Israeli judicial or military officials with their evidence and charges. Having made their choice not to do so, the British journalists set about to compile a strong circumstantial case. It is certainly not one that can be shrugged off cavalierly. The core of their findings is the mutually corroborating accounts of five Palestinians. All of them said they were taken to an interrogation center known as "The Palace of the End" where they were subjected to almost identical forms of abuse. They said they were blindfolded, and once a day sent to "the frigidaire," a cold box with spikes on the floor, constructed so that the prisoner can neither sit down nor stand up. Others testified to different abuses.

The Israeli reply included a general denial of the Sunday Times' charges, and some specific counter-evidence on a few of the cases. Of course it's hard to prove that something did not happen. How could the Israelis adduce concrete proof that one or another Arab was not tortured? However the Israelis did not even attempt to disprove—or even specifically deny—the most vivid charge in the Sunday Times article, that concerning the "frigidaire." The Israeli reply says, "The fact . . . that prisoners were at such and such a prison together and both describe it, is indeed evidence, but it is evidence as to

facts that are not in question." This is disingenuous; these identical descriptions go to the heart of the Insight Team's accusations.

The thrust of Israel's rebuttal is a defense of the integrity of its judicial system. Most effectively, the Israelis show that the Sunday Times disguised to the point of deception the terrorist activities of its complainants. These people have taken many lives, including those of Arabs. In the latest round, the Insight Team conceded some significant omissions.

So what is the verdict in England? The Sunday Times reported that it had received 384 letters from readers, of which 262 criticized "a farrago of innuendo" and 90 praised a "courageous exposure." Thirty-two discussed associated matters. Two law lords came down hard against the Sunday Times' article. Lord Justice Salmon said, "The Israeli reply destroyed the credibility of the allegations." The former Lord Chancellor, Lord Hailsham, termed the Israeli judiciary "manifestly independent. I am quite certain that they would never have allowed things to pass by that would have aroused criticism or complaint in the most meticulous English court."

In this country, Nicholas von Hoffman discussed the Insight Team report with glee in his syndicated column of July 1. Von Hoffman adopted the same metaphors for the Israelis that became so popular in the Soviet press after the Six Day War, comparing them to Nazis: "If Heinrich Himmler were around to read The [Sunday] Times' report his story heart might beat with pride . . . [T]he grotesque irony of using gas as an instrument of torture ought to have been too much . . . for . . . Israeli officials . . ." But the facts as they have emerged from the Insight Team-Israeli exchange hardly justify von Hoffman's analogy. At worst, the Israelis seem to have tortured only active terrorists. Nothing in the articles indicates the use of torture as a way of controlling the Palestinian population as a whole.

The American press does not seem to know what to do with stories about human rights violations by foreign governments. They are almost always difficult to verify. The Boston Globe reprinted excerpts from the Sunday Times report and a few other papers played the controversy big. Others ignored it or buried it in the back pages.

There are reasonable policies that newspapers might follow. Ronald Koven, foreign editor of The Washington Post, said last week that his paper would report allegations made by the Red Cross, the Human Rights Commission, and those discovered by the Post's own reporters. The Post carried a five-paragraph item the day after the Insight Team's report appeared, and nothing since then. Earlier in the year it ran a series by its own correspondent on conditions in Israeli prisons. These articles reported allegations of torture, but did not give them any credibility. The Post may have missed an interesting controversy by doing so little with the Sunday Times story, but at least its coverage seems consistent.

The New York Times, on the other hand, followed a ragged course. The day after the Sunday Times article appeared, our Times buried a small box on the Insight Team's report in the nether regions of the paper. When the Israeli reply was issued, the Times ran a long bylined article on page three. The

WHAT'S BEHIND THE SUNDAY TIMES
OF LONDON'S "EXPOSE" ON
ISRAEL?

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, August 5, 1977

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Speaker, ever since the Sunday Times of London published what it alleged was an investigative piece on Israeli treatment of Palestinian prisoners, a controversy has raged in the news media over what's really behind this story.

I offer for the record an article from the New Republic of July 23, 1977.

The New Republic's probe shows that there were serious deficiencies in the Sunday Times article—not the least of which is the fact that at no point did reporters from the London newspaper ever talk to Israeli judicial or military officials to seek a response to the serious charges of torture.

The magazine rightfully states that these charges cannot be dismissed lightly. But it acknowledges the difficulty that the Israelis have had in proving that something did not happen.

Mr. Speaker, the New Republic concludes that—

Any suggestion that Israel engages in this kind of systematic torture of Arabs simply is not true.

I commend the following to the attention of my colleagues:

story itself, however, was a model of even-handedness: six paragraphs on the accusations, six paragraphs of rebuttal. Then, later in that week, the Times ran a Reuters dispatch from Israel by Bernard Edinger. Israeli authorities allowed Edinger to interview Palestinian guerrilla prisoners in Gaza, specifically to counter the Insight Team's allegations. Edinger found the prisoners' descriptions of their treatment—being stripped and beaten—not sufficiently grim to qualify in his book as "torture." Why the Times chose to print Edinger's story at all, which had been censored by Israeli military authorities, is something of a mystery, particularly in view of the short shrift allowed the original Sunday Times dispatch.

Systematic use of torture as a method of political control is obviously repugnant. But one thing is clear from this controversy: any suggestion that Israel engages in this kind of systematic torture of Arabs simply is not true. The question of how a government should treat people who regularly detonate bombs in public places is not susceptible to simple absolutism, such as the outright condemnation of torture. One may have to use extreme measures—call them "torture"—to deal with a terrorist movement whose steady tactic is the taking of human life.

PHILADELPHIAN REACTS TO MIDDLE EAST MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 14, 1977

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Speaker, last week's meeting between President Carter and leaders of the Jewish community included the participation of two distinguished Philadelphians, Mr. Theodore R. Mann, chairman of the National Jewish Community Relations Council, and Mr. I. Jerome Stern, president of the Federation of Jewish Agencies of Greater Philadelphia.

Mr. Mann, a leading attorney in Philadelphia, is past president of the Jewish Community Relations Council in the city; and has held several top posts with the American Jewish Congress. Mr. Stern, also a well-known attorney, has had a similarly distinguished career of public service.

Following last week's meeting in the White House, Mr. Stern authored the following reaction for the op-ed page of the July 13, 1977, Philadelphia Inquirer. I commend it to the attention of my colleagues:

... BUT HE IS CLEAR ON SUPPORT OF ISRAEL
(By I. Jerome Stern)

One of the prime concerns of the Carter Administration has been a continuing effort—by public pronouncement and by private discussion and negotiation—to bring about an end to the bitter strife in the Middle East, and to bring the parties to this 30-year struggle to the bargaining table.

Last week I took part in a conference at the White House with President Carter, Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance, and their advisers, in a frank discussion of these knotty Mideast problems.

This meeting was arranged at the President's request with the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations and other leaders of Jewish communities throughout the United States.

Our talks that day were typical of the "grass roots meetings" the President has found it useful to schedule to keep in touch with the American people. For this, he is to be commended.

President Carter's peace proposals for the Middle East, which he first articulated at Clinton, Mass., stem not only from his own deep religious convictions which are rooted in the Old Testament, but from his understanding that the existence of Israel, a friendly democratic state in that part of the world, is vital to U.S. interests.

The existence of a Jewish homeland was, until the establishment of the State of Israel by mandate of the United Nations, a hope, a dream, an aspiration of Jews for more than 2,000 years. Now that survivors of hate and oppression have returned to the Biblical land of their fathers, they have but one overriding desire—to live in peace with their neighbors. It should be noted that throughout these 20 centuries Jews have always lived in and enriched the land now known again as Israel and the Holy City of Jerusalem.

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CONGRES

I am convinced that our President understands the religious and political reasons for the survival of the State of Israel—both Israel and the U.S. share the goal of peace in the Middle East. President Carter's meeting with Prime Minister Begin, that opens next Tuesday, should be an opportunity for both countries to explore the avenues to peace.

The President, in his remarks at Clinton on March 16, 1977, defined the peace he envisaged for the Middle East. The points he made included more than Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist—though even this has so far been ignored by every one of Israel's Arab neighbors.

The borders would be opened to travel, to tourism, to cultural exchange, to trade. There would be navigation of the waters by Israeli ships, and finally there would be full diplomatic recognition of Israel as a sovereign state. This definition of peace is one which the State of Israel has already endorsed. When will her adversaries address these vital elements in any real peace?

In his remarks to Jewish leadership in the White House meeting I attended, the President reaffirmed that he was committed to permanent peace and security for Israel. His private as well as public utterances on this topic are consistent and reassuring.

If the Arab nations in confrontation with the State of Israel will agree to have face-to-face negotiations on all issues without preconditions, a commitment Israel has made time and time again, and that Israel's new Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, has also endorsed, then peace could come to this part of the world.

I commend the President for being the catalyst in prodding the parties to sit down together to talk. His role is a difficult one; however, he realizes that unless a real peace is achieved, continuing confrontations will shed more blood in another futile attempt to destroy the survivors of the Holocaust and Jewish refugees from Arab and other lands.

The ancestors of this same Jewish people brought the concept of peace and justice to the world. In the words of the prophet Isaiah:

"... They shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore."

We all hope and pray that the time is near at hand when the vision of Isaiah becomes a reality.

271/k

14.7.77

Jack Anderson

The Carter-Brezhnev Face-Off

As Jimmy Carter ascends the pinnacle of power, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev is watching intensely every step he takes. The President-elect, in turn, is taking Brezhnev's measure with equal care.

The two leaders are studying detailed intelligence reports on one another. Carter has even had access to excerpts from Brezhnev's private conversations.

The Kremlin leader has supplemented his intelligence reports by soliciting information about Carter from American visitors. He literally cross-examined Treasury Secretary William Simon, for example, about the incoming president.

Brezhnev seemed troubled about Carter's campaign statements that he would be tough with Russia. Simon rugged off the election campaign as America's "silly season" and assured the premier that Carter was unlikely to change the detente with Moscow.

Brezhnev responded by asking Simon to deliver a personal message to Carter. Contrary to reports that the Kremlin would aggressively test the mettle of new administration, Brezhnev sent word that he had no intention of test or embarrassing Carter.

The President-elect has received confusing reports, meanwhile, about the

Soviet Union's capacity to make trouble. The Central Intelligence Agency has reported that the Soviets are spending six per cent of their gross national product on armaments. The Defense Intelligence Agency has insisted the percentage is more than double the CIA figure. Indeed, some analysts believe Soviet defense expenditures exceed 20 per cent.

In the summer of 1972, according to a top-secret report, Brezhnev discussed the huge Soviet military outlay with Kremlin colleagues. He was quoted in the intelligence report as confiding: "I fear for the Soviet people to know that one out of every three rubles goes for defense."

Certainly, the growing military power of the Soviet Union will be a major problem for Jimmy Carter after he moves into the White House. He will discover from his transition papers that the U.S. intelligence community is divided over the Soviet menace.

One faction looks upon the Soviets as antagonistic and dangerous. But another faction believes the Soviets are willing to work for a peaceful, live-and-let-live world. Our own sources say the reality lies between the two extremes. Meanwhile, neither faction has been able to dominate U.S. policy.

Carter's intelligence analysts will advise him that the Soviet Union, though born in revolution, is losing its revolutionary zeal. The government is still militant, and its leaders hope to dominate the world. But as one high intelligence official told us: "They don't have a master calendar with a date out there in the future that's circled in red."

The Soviets, Carter will be told, are motivated by one major fear: invasion. For centuries, the Soviet land mass has been pillaged by one invader after another, ranging from the Tartars and Mongols to the Turks and the Nazis.

The last invasion left the deepest scars. In many ways, World War II is still being fought by the Soviets. Kremlin leaders, capitalizing on the dread of invasion, have used this fear to justify heavy military expenditures.

They are moving, nevertheless, into a critical, new era of Soviet-American relations. This could lead to new confrontations or a cautious peace. "The situation," one intelligence official told us, "is dangerous as hell."

Apparently, the Kremlin strategists still feel threatened by both East and West. After Mao Tse-tung died, they sought reconciliation with their former Chinese comrades, but the advances were rebuffed. The best estimate is

that the Soviets will continue to work behind the scenes for a rapprochement with the Chinese. But in the meantime, the 40 Soviet divisions aren't likely to be withdrawn from the tense Chinese-Russian border.

Although a quarter of the Soviet army is now camped on the border, the size of the force may not be as significant as it seems. Intelligence reports claim that Russia's best troops are in Europe, not Asia.

Carter must give immediate attention to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, which have been dragging on for seven years. Our intelligence sources say that the Soviets are puzzled and disappointed by the U.S. approach to the SALT negotiations. They expected the American negotiators to be shrewd Yankee traders, not the mediocre spokesmen who were sent to the talks. Apparently, this has persuaded the Soviets that Washington isn't really serious about SALT.

This nagging distrust is the basic problem with the Soviet-American diplomacy. "There is ultra-suspicion on both sides," said an official. "The lack of mutual confidence is the ultimate problem." Our sources add that Carter will have to win Soviet confidence before any future negotiations will be

effective. This probably will take a face-to-face meeting with Brezhnev.

The President-elect will be advised, meanwhile, to be careful not to prod the Russians into another extensive and expensive arms race. "They watch us, and we watch them. We were told. They react to our reaction to them." If Carter should make a wrong move, therefore, it could tilt the delicate relationship and disrupt the detente.

At least part of the Soviet military growth, according to a confidential analysis, can be attributed to simple inertia. The Kremlin is subject to the same pressures as the Pentagon to produce more and more, better and better weapons. Each Soviet weapons system is pushed by the military brass who believe in it, the industrial commissars who manufacture the component parts and the bureaucracy that handles the paperwork. "There is no bureaucracy like the Soviet bureaucracy," said one expert.

With their growing military muscle, the Soviets are practicing power diplomacy around the world. They are gaining influence in Africa and moving into the power vacuum in Southeast Asia. How to cope with this will be Jimmy Carter's biggest challenge.

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12/12/72

Washington Post

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

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ש. פלדמן

העוק: המחלקה המשפטית, מטה"ח

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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JOSHUA ETLBERG, PA., CHAIRMAN
 TAIL S. FARRANCE, MD.
 ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN, NY
 CHRISTOPHER J. DOOS, CONN.
 HAMILTON FISH, JR., NY
 WILLIAM B. COHEN, MAINE

Committee on the Judiciary
 U.S. House of Representatives
 Washington, D.C. 20515

CARVER J. CLINE, COUNSEL
 ARTHUR P. KNIGHT, JR., COUNSEL
 ALEXANDER B. EYON, ASSOCIATE COUNSEL
 FRANCIS F. CHRISTY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST

January 13, 1977

JAN 17 1977

Honorable Elmer B. Staats
 Comptroller General of the United States
 General Accounting Office
 Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Staats:

The Immigration and Naturalization Service, with the cooperation of the Department of State, is presently compiling evidence on alleged Nazi war criminals who entered the United States fraudulently. Three cases are in the process of being heard by judicial authorities and it is expected that proceedings in a number of other cases will be instituted in the near future.

For the past two years I have been following closely the action being taken by the Service in these cases. Certain allegations have emerged which lead me and some of my colleagues to believe that the existence and backgrounds of these individuals were known to the Service for a long time without any action having been taken.

These people entered the United States and acquired benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act in contravention of United States law. No adequate explanation has been forthcoming from the Service as to why they did not proceed against these individuals until Congress brought the matter to their attention.

I would like to enlist the cooperation of the General Accounting Office in conducting a thorough investigation of this situation, especially to determine if Immigration personnel deliberately obstructed active prosecution of these cases or engaged in a conspiracy to withhold or quash any information in its possession.

I intend to explore all avenues to get the true facts behind these cases and the apparent negligent attitude adopted by the Immigration Service.

I consider this matter to be of extreme urgency and would be grateful if you would consider this investigation on that basis.


With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Joshua Etlberg
 JOSHUA ETLBERG
 Chairman

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

27. 7. 1976



אל: מצפ"א

סאח: צבי רפיח

מצ"ב לעיונכם חליפת המכתבים בין המורשה איילברג
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NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN THE
UNITED STATES

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 22, 1976

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Speaker, since March 30, 1976, I, in my capacity as chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, have been attempting to secure from Attorney General Edward H. Levi satisfactory explanation why the Immigration and Naturalization Service has not progressed further in its investigation of Nazi war criminals residing in the United States. At this time, there are 53 people living here who have been accused of being Nazis and of committing war crimes during World War II.

There appears to be hard evidence in some cases while others may be nothing more than unsubstantiated charges. However, it was determined several months ago that there is enough evidence to warrant action against some of these people and that additional evidence and witnesses, who are willing to testify, are available in Israel.

Furthermore, for some unknown reason the Justice Department appears to be unconcerned about bringing a swift and just conclusion and is not pursuing this matter at more than the slowest possible speed, if at all. It has not closed any cases where there is a lack of evidence and it has not acted in cases where action is clearly necessary and warranted.

Today, I place in the Record copies of my correspondence with Attorney General Edward H. Levi:

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., June 25, 1976.

HON. EDWARD H. LEVI,
Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I call attention to your letter of May 26, 1976 regarding alleged Nazi war criminals residing in

the U.S. and hasten to add that the statements contained therein are certainly not responsive to my inquiry of March 30, 1976.

Although it appears that the Department of Justice views the matter of alleged Nazi war criminals as a non-priority issue, the public is genuinely interested and I feel it is incumbent upon you to bring this matter to a conclusion as soon as possible.

As I have stated previously, the Government of Israel has been responsive in supplying evidence and potential witnesses, but in both the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of Justice, there seems to be a reluctance to proceed with denaturalization or deportation as the case may be. I know that after meeting with Major Gershon Lengsfelder, Chief of Investigation, Nazi War Criminal Office of Israel, he too is frustrated because the Immigration and Naturalization Service is not making proper use of available evidence in the alleged Nazi war criminal cases.

I urge you again to assign adequate and capable personnel to investigate all allegations, to interview every possible witness and to expedite the preparation of cases.

Mr. Attorney General, it is incongruous to me that the investigation of alleged Nazi war criminals continues to drag on and on, but additional personnel can be immediately transferred to the Florida area to expedite the naturalization of Cubans residing there.

I trust you will respond promptly and supply me with an up-to-date status report on each alleged Nazi in the United States.

Sincerely,

JOSHUA EILBERG,
Chairman.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, D.C., May 26, 1976.

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration,
Citizenship, and International Law,
Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am responding to your letter concerning the progress of the Immigration and Naturalization Service investigations regarding alleged Nazi war criminals residing in the United States and, specifically, the results to date of the visit of Sam Bernsen, General Counsel of INS, to Israel.

I am advised that since Mr. Bernsen returned from Israel, INS has received 21 affidavits relating to the identification of 14 alleged Nazi war criminals in the United States. In addition, INS has initiated requests to Israel regarding 18 new suspects. Thus, Israel is now assisting INS in 73 cases.

I am also informed that information furnished by Israel has substantially contributed to the development of prima facie cases of war crimes concerning 7 individuals. Three of these cases involve U.S. citizens who are subject to revocation of naturalization and have been referred to the appropriate INS District Office for action. Another substantially similar case is now being reviewed for referral. In addition, an Order to Show Cause in a deportation hearing is now being issued with regard to a permanent resident alien. As I understand has been discussed with you, 2 cases have been developed in which there is evidence of war crimes, but not a statutory basis for deportation at this time.

In view of the foregoing, INS believes the assistance of the government to Israel has been valuable and is being utilized effectively. We look forward to their continued contribution in these important matters.

Sincerely,

EDWARD H. LEVI,
Attorney General.

MARCH 30, 1976.

HON. EDWARD H. LEVI,
Attorney General,
Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: Considerable time has passed since the General Counsel of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Sam Bernsen, met with Israeli officials to discuss matters of evidence relative to alleged Nazi war criminals residing in the United States.

I know of no progress made since that meeting and I am fearful that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is not expeditiously and diligently proceeding to obtain and evaluate every possible shred of evidence that could be used in the denaturalization, deportation or extradition of the alleged Nazi war criminals.

I trust, Mr. Attorney General, that you will do everything in your power to cause the Immigration Service to proceed with this inquiry. I would appreciate being advised of what success, if any, has been accomplished.

With kindest regards,
Sincerely,

JOSHUA EILBERG,
Chairman.

סגרירות ישראל
וושונגטון

א.א.א.

22.6.1976

אל"מ מצפ"א

מאה: צבי רפיה

מצ"ב לעיונכם דברי המורשה איילברג על
ארת"ב נ-10, בתי שפורסמו ברשומות
הקונגרס מ-11 ונא.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

צ. רפיה

הערה:

מאו"ם א"

ג' נבה

ג. שעל

RECEIVED
MAY 10 1880

AMOUNT PAID

TO THE

ORDER OF

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

OF THE

AMERICAN

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FOR

THE

OF

UNITED STATES SHOULD KEEP
PROMISE TO WITHDRAW FROM
THE ILO

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, June 11, 1976

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Speaker, the United States has threatened to withdraw from the International Labor Organization because of that group's policy of getting into issues which have nothing to do with its purpose. This stand, clearly stated by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, is to be applauded. Since our warnings have not been heeded, we should prove that we mean what we say and begin the steps of withdrawal from the ILO. At this time I enter into the Record an editorial from the Philadelphia Inquirer concerning this situation. The newspaper is to be commended for its position:

UNITED STATES SHOULD KEEP PROMISE TO
WITHDRAW FROM THE ILO

Last November Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, noting the tendency of the International Labor Organization to "become increasingly and excessively involved in political issues," served formal notice that the U.S. intends to withdraw from the 126-member United Nations agency unless it "returns to its basic principles."

Now that the agency has departed even further from its basic principles, the U.S. should make it clear that it means exactly what it said.

The immediate issue is the decision of the ILO's governing body to admit the Palestine Liberation Organization, a terrorist group, not a government, to an ILO-sponsored conference on world employment.

Earlier, the governing body had decided, by a single vote, to ban the Palestinians from representation at the conference. Then, brushing off the American contention that it was flouting its own rules, the governing body reversed itself, under pressure of Arab governments, other "third world" countries and the Communist bloc.

The reason was clear enough. The Arabs themselves had made it clear that they intended to boycott the conference if they lost on the issue. The ILO plainly took their threats more seriously than it took the American warning.

After the reversal, a PLO spokesman hailed the seating of his organization as "a defeat for Israel and the advocate of Israel, which is the United States." Precisely so. That was the intention.

If the Arab countries and their "third world" and Communist supporters want to twist the eagle's feathers, however, there is no reason why the U.S. should sit still for it. Nor is there any reason why the U.S., which puts up one-fourth of the ILO's annual \$50 million budget, should continue paying for the privilege of having the ILO used as an anti-American sounding-board.

For this is not simply a matter of one vote lost. Like other specialized U.N. agencies, the ILO is supposed to be neutral and nonpartisan, dedicated to the improvement of workers' conditions and the advancement of human rights. Yet as Mr. Kissinger pointed out last November, the ILO has shown in recent years a "selective concern for human rights," ignoring violations in such countries as Saudi Arabia, where slavery is still practiced, and the USSR.

There is, of course, something to be said for hanging in there and fighting for one's principles, but there does come a time when the best way to uphold one's principles is to withdraw from the organization which consistently flouts them. We think that time has come as regards the ILO and that a U.S. withdrawal might have a salutary effect on the nations now perverting international agencies into instruments of political warfare.

[Faint, illegible handwriting on lined paper]

סגרירות ישראל

רושינגטון

30. 6. 1976

אל: מצפ"א

מאה: צבי רפיח

מצ"ב לעיונכם הודעה שפרסם המורשה איילברג,
על מחדלי משרד המשפטים של ארה"ב בהבאת
נאציים לדיון.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

צ. רפיח

העתק:

נצ"מ זיו-אל, ניויורק

מח' משפט משה"ח

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

GARNER J. CLINE, COUNSEL
ARTHUR B. DODDS, JR., COUNSEL
ALEXANDER B. COOK, ASSOCIATE COUNSEL
FRANCES F. CHRISTY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST

JOSHUA EILBERG, PA., CHAIRMAN
PAUL S. BARRANDIS, MD.
ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN, N.Y.
CHRISTOPHER J. BODU, CONG.
MARTIN A. RUSSO, ILL.
HAMILTON FISS, JR., N.Y.
WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE

Friday, June 25, 1976

FOR RELEASE AFTER 5 P.M., SATURDAY, JUNE 26

WASHINGTON, D.C.--Rep. Joshua Eilberg (D., Pa.) has accused the Justice Department of dragging its feet on the problem of alleged Nazi war criminals living in the United States and of failing to take action which could result in their prosecution.

Eilberg, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, made the charges in a letter to Attorney General Edward H. Levi.

In the letter Eilberg stated, "Although it appears that the Department of Justice views the matter of alleged Nazi war criminals as a non-priority issue, the public is genuinely interested and I feel it is incumbent upon you to bring this matter to a conclusion as soon as possible."

"I urge you again to assign adequate and capable personnel to investigate all allegations, to interview every possible witness and to expedite the preparation of cases," Eilberg continued.

Eilberg added, "Mr. Attorney General, it is incongruous to me that the investigation of alleged Nazi war criminals continues to drag on and on, but additional personnel can be immediately transferred to the Florida area to expedite the naturalization of Cubans residing there," Eilberg added.

Earlier this year, at Eilberg's request, the Attorney General sent officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to Israel to find out if there are any witnesses to the war crimes allegedly committed by persons living in the U.S. The response was a list of witnesses in 27 of the 53 cases now under investigation and other leads in ten cases.

First and last add/NAZIS

Additionally, Eilberg was informed by a senior State Department official that three cases could definitely be prosecuted without further evidence and that there is a similar possibility in eight others. The State Department has been attempting to get the cooperation of officials in the Soviet Union in locating witnesses in that country.

Eilberg said he was told by an Israeli official that it was his opinion that there would be no action in the United States if the present officials of the immigration service, a part of the Justice Department, in charge of this matter are not replaced.

"Unfortunately, I must agree with this evaluation," Eilberg said. "These people seem to be cautious to the point of inaction."

"It is my belief that if they wanted to take action they could, but for some reason they prefer not to try to bring these people to justice," added Eilberg.

The persons accused of war crimes cannot be tried in the United States. They have to be denaturalized or deported to the country where the crimes were committed or to Germany for trial.

(For further information contact David Umensky at 202 225-4661 or 202 543-5666.)

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דו"ל
(אילברג)

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נשלח 211630 מאי 76

אלו המשרד
מאתו נוסף בגסיון

מצפא.

אייילברג - שה"ח - להלן הודעה ממסר המורשה איילברג לפרטים ב-20 דנא:

REP. JOSHUA ELIBERG (D. PA.) SAID THURSDAY THAT ACCORDING TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER YIGAL ALLON ALL OF THE AUTHORIZED SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK ARE STRATEGICALLY LOCATED AND ARE NECESSARY FOR THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL. EILBERG MET PRIVATELY WITH ALLON DURING A TRIP TO ISRAEL LAST WEEK.

EILBERG SAID "THESE SETTLEMENTS ARE PLACED IN CAREFULLY SELECTED LOCATIONS ACCORDING TO A PLAN FOR THE DEFENSE OF ISRAEL". "IN THE EVENT OF A SURPRISE ATTACK THE ISRAELIS EXPECT THEM TO BE THE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE AND TO PROVIDE TIME FOR REGULAR ARMY UNITS TO BE BROUGHT UP TO BLUNT THE ATTACK" EILBERG CONTINUED. EILBERG STATED "RECOGNIZING THAT LAND CONCESSIONS WILL BE MADE THE SETTLEMENTS WILL HELP PROVIDE SECURE AND DEFENSIBLE BORDERS TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL".

CONCERNING THE EXPIRATION OF THE MANDATE FOR UNITED NATIONS' FORCES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA ON MAY 30 ALLON TOLD EILBERG HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE RENEWED WITHOUT NEW CONDITIONS.

EILBERG SAID "IN THE EVENT THE MANDATE IS NOT RENEWED THE ISRAELIS BELIEVE THAT SYRIA IS SO PREOCCUPIED WITH ITS INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON THAT THEY DO NOT EXPECT ANY ALTERATIONS ALONG THE BORDER".

RAFIACH===

מאת דחם סנבל שהבס סנבל סנבל מעת הסברה מאזם אב ד. אריאל מצפא מזמים חקר דם אסן

תעוד אילסר אורלי

רע/יל

Handwritten signature or stamp, possibly "J. Edgar Hoover"

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REP. JOSHUA ELBERG (D. PA.) SAID THURSDAY THAT ACCORDING TO
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER YIGAL ALON ALL OF THE APPROVED
SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK ARE STRATEGICALLY LOCATED AND ARE
NECESSARY FOR THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL.

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WEEK.

ELBERG SAID "THESE SETTLEMENTS ARE PLACED IN CALIBRATED
LOCATIONS ACCORDING TO A PLAN FOR THE DEFENSE OF ISRAEL
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ELBERG STATED "RECOGNIZING THAT LAND CONFLICTS WILL BE MADE
THE BEST INTERESTS WILL HELP PROVIDE SECURE AND DEFENSIBLE BORDERS
FOR THE STATE OF ISRAEL."

CONCERNING THE EXPIRATION OF THE MANDATE FOR UNITED NATIONS
TRUST TERRITORIES AND SYRIA ON MAY 30 ALON TOLD ELBERG
THAT HE WOULD BE RENEWED WITHOUT YOUR CONSENT ONLY
ELBERG SAID "IN THE EVENT THE MANDATE IS NOT RENEWED THE ISRAELI
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LEBANON THAT THEY DO NOT EXPECT ANY ALTERATIONS ALONG THE BORDERS

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קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
 CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30308

מ
 ד/מ
 (ס' 16, 11)

805 PEACHTREE ST. N. E.
 SUITE 606

שמו

אטלנטה, 16 באוגוסט 1976
 ל" באב תשל"ו
 (371)

אלו: מר חנן בר-און, השגרירות, וושינגטון
 מאת: הקונסול הכללי, אטלנטה

בשבוע שעבר החקיימה פגישה בבירמינגהם אלבמה בין נציגים יהודים מערים שונות של מדינת אלבמה עם הסנטור אלן ועוזרו. יוזם הפגישה היה ג'ורג' מילניק מאלבמה. השתתפו כעשרים איש. בין המשתתפים היה גם נציג של ה-A.D.L. ונציג של ה-A.J.C.

ידוע שאלן מעכב את האישור הסומי של העזרה לישראל. החברו בוויכוח שהוא בפרינציפ בעד עזרה לישראל אך מתנגד בכל הוקף להכליל בהצעה מדינות כמו זמביה, זעיר ומוזמביק. טוען שמדינות אלו הודיעו על השתתפותן במאבק נגד רודזיה. מעמדו של אלן חזק ואין סיכוי שאפשר ללחוץ עליו בשעת בחירות.

סנטור ספרקמן

ישנן שמועות חזקות שהנ"ל עלול לפרוש מתפקידו בגלל גילו ומוזכרים ארבעה מועמדים אשר יתחרו במקומו באלבמה.

1. המושל וולאס.
2. סגן המושל, ג'רי ביטלי.
3. החובע הכללי, בקס רוד.
4. סגן השופטים, אפלין.

בברכה,

 נחום אסטר
 קונסול כללי

החקו:
 מר צ. רמיה, וושינגטון
 מצפ"א ✓

Permanized



NEW YORK OFFICE
CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
ATTENTION: [illegible]

DATE

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TO: [illegible]
FROM: [illegible]

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112 1/2 1/2

November 3, 1976

Confidential

REPRESENTATIVE JOHN M. ASHBROOK (Republican - Ohio)

Biographical Information:

Hometown, Johnstown, Ohio; born in Johnstown September 21, 1928; graduate with honors at Harvard University, A.B., in 1952, and Ohio State Law School, J.D., in 1955; received Honorary LL.D. at Ashland College 1963; practicing attorney and publisher of the Johnstown Independent, a weekly newspaper; member 101st and 102d Ohio General Assemblies.; former Young Republican national chairman, 1957-59; married, father of three daughters; served in U.S. Navy; Baptist.

Political Information:

Ashbrook is one of the most conservative members of the House. In fact, Ashbrook waged a highly unsuccessful campaign for President in 1972 because of two Nixon Administration policies: the adoption on wage and price controls and the movement toward closer U.S.-Chinese (People's Republic) relations.

Ashbrook advocates a shift from the "welfare state" of the New Deal and the Fair Deal back to reliance on the mechanics of the free enterprise system; and that abroad, the U.S. needs to pursue an aggressive foreign policy and roll back the Iron Curtain, and to rid the government of those whose treasonous advice had resulted in the loss of China.

Ashbrook's arch-conservatism and his 1972 Presidential bid estranged himself from the House Republican leadership and has jeopardized his popularity in his Congressional district.

Ashbrook also served as a ranking Republican on the House Internal Security (formerly the American Activities) Committee before it was abolished by House liberals. (During the 1960s Ashbrook often blasted liberals for opposing the Vietnam war but supporting military aid to Israel.

Committees:

- Judiciary
- Education and Labor

Term Began:

January, 1961

Legislative Record:

Ashbrook has had a very poor record in Congress. Although voting for the \$2.2 billion emergency aid package for Israel in 1973, he has voted against all foreign aid bills. Moreover, Ashbrook was one of 31 Congressmen who voted for the Amendment by Rep. David Obey (D-Wis.) in March, 1976 to cut military credits to Israel by \$200 million.



John M. Ashbrook
Johnstown (17th Dist.)
Republican—8th term

REPRESENTATIVE JOHN M. ASHBROOK (R-Ohio)Legislative Record (Continued)

Ashbrook has rarely cosponsored major congressional pro-Israel resolutions and declarations except those against the U.N.

Ashbrook did cosponsor the Jackson-Vanik Freedom-of-Emigration Amendment but did so not only because of Soviet Jewry but also because he opposed trade concessions for the Soviet Union.

Ashbrook's sympathy for Soviet Jews stems from his anti-Soviet, anti-detente view point. He will often speak out against Soviet oppression and anti-semitism.

Ashbrook also is a virulent critic of the U.N. and has advocated U.S. withdrawal. He criticized the U.N.'s support for the PLO and has made remarks on a number of occasions on the PLO's terrorist activity.

On the Middle East, Ashbrook speaks of Soviet involvement in "fanning the flames of war." He has opposed U.S. aid to Egypt which he believes will enable her to repay debts to the Soviet Union.

He has urged Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan and well as other "moderate" Arab states to disassociate themselves from the radical Arab states.

"The Arabs must assure the Israelis that they have given up their efforts to throw the Israelis into the sea while the Israelis must be willing to give assurances to the Arabs that they (Israelis) are willing to enter into serious negotiations regarding the conquered lands," he declared on November 7, 1973.

Comments:

Any private talks with Ashbrook should emphasize Soviet activity in the Middle East and Israel as a stable and reliable bulwark against Soviet expansionism. Ashbrook would certainly like to visit the captured Soviet equipment camp.

מברק נכנס - מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר חוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים), תשי"ז - 1957.

ס ג ו ר

אל: המשרד

מאת: רוסינגטון

מס 154
נסלה: 21930 20 אפריל 76

Handwritten signatures and initials in blue ink, including a large 'S' and 'R'.

הצמא.

א. ייסס בירר אט אלברט נטיעתו למזחה כולל ההיבט הישראלי.
אלברט השיב לו כי מרכז ביקורו הוא באיראן וכי יבקר גם בכנוריה ובעוד שתי מדינות (לא פרט, כנרא במסרף הפרטי). הוא לא יבקר במצרים טוריה ירדן או עיראק.
בישראל כבר ביקר בעבר.
עד כאן.
ב. כידוע בידי אלברט הזמנה של יור חכנסת לביקור גומלין. אם יהליט לבוא ארצה נשתדל שאכן יבוא בואש משלחת לביקור גומלין.

רפיח

הנכד ממנכל ארגוב הצמא

רע/ר



CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

102 MONTGOMERY STREET
SUITE 1000
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104
801-2788

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל

סן פרנסיסקו

ש מ ר

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כ"ה תשרי תשל"ו
30 ספטמבר 1975
422.1

Les Aucoin (D)

אל: מר צבי רפיה, וושינגטון.
מאח: הקונסול הכללי, סן פרנסיסקו.

הנדון: קונגרסמן אוקוין מאורגון.

להלן הערות של הנ"ל בשיחות שניהל עם מנהיגי הפדרציה בפורטלנד, הן כקבוצה והן כיחידים. השיחות התנהלו במחצית ספטמבר:

1. מסכים כללית להסכם החדש.
2. מגלה התנגדות רבה להסכם גם בקונגרס וגם בין בוחריו. המכתבים המתקבלים הם ביחס 3:1 נגד ההסכם.
3. הוא מייחס חלק מזה להיסטוריה של תקופת וויאטנם.
4. גורם אחר לדעתו: התמימות של האמריקאי המאמין בהסכמים ללא סיכונים.
5. הוא לא מסכים לנקודות 3 ו-4 ומעדיף סיכונים על מצב חיקון.
6. לכן יצביע בעד.
7. על נושא ההגירה מרוסיה: הוא מאמין שחיקון ג'קסון היה counter productive. הוא מאמין בדיפלומטיה שקטה בנושא זה.
8. הדגיש שאין להבין את עמדתו כרכוח כלפי רוסיה, מכיון שהוא סבור שיש להתנהג עם הרוסים ביד חזקה ביחוד לאור העובדה שהדסנס הינו חד-סטרי ושמצא מלחמת העולם השניה זכו הרוסים, דבר שאושר להם בהלסינקי.
9. הוא סבור שהלסינקי היה המקום הנכון להעלות את בעיית ההגירה מרוסיה. אנשי שיחו החרשמו שהוא בקיא ביותר הן בפרטי ההסכם החדש והן לבעיית היהודים ברוסיה.

אגב, על מנה לעמוד יפה על עמדותיו ודרך מחשבתו אני ממליץ ביותר לקרוא את המאמר ב"ניו יורק טיימס מגאזין" מיום 31.8.75 - "The lost innocence of Congressman AuCoin".
אם אין לך, אוכל לשלוח לך צילום.

העתק: מר מ. ארד, ציר וושינגטון.
מצפ"א.
מר א. עברון, משנה למנכ"ל.

בבדכה,
[Signature]
ד"ר שלמה תדמור.



כ"ח אב תשל"ו
24 אוגוסט 76

361

הנדרון
24/8/76

אל: מנהל מצפ"א
מאת: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנטור אלן מאלבמה

מילואים למברקי מה-23 דנא.

פגישה עם הסנטור נקבעה ביוזמת המנהיגים היהודיים מאלבמה ונועדה לשיחת רקע כללית. הנושא הישראלי הועלה כדבר טוב מאליו ובאורה טבעי נדון ענין הסיוע.

אלן ביקש מהיהודים כי יתערבו בקונגרס, לפחות אצל חברי הקונגרס היהודיים, כדי שיפעלו לביטול הסיוע לזאיר, מוזמביק וזמביה.

טובן שאין היהודים מתכוונים לעשות זאת.

באותה פגישה הבהיר אלן כי, בניגוד לאשר נאמר עליו, לא היה בכוונתו לקצץ, בעבר, 500 מליון דולר מהסיוע לישראל. נהפוך הוא - היה בכוונתו לקצץ בסיוע למצרים.

אלן חזר ואמר כי לא יעשה מאומה לפגוע בסיוע לישראל.

ידידינו אומרים כי לדיון בחוק במליאה הסינט נקבע פרק זמן קבוע מראש אשר יאפשר למליאה לסיים הדיון בספטמבר.

הדיווח הנ"ל מבוסס על דווח (נפרד) של ארבעה ממשתתפי הפגישה.

בברכה,
צ. רפיה

העתק: המשנה למנכ"ל, משה"ח
קוננכ"ל, אטלנטה.

משרד החוץ והאגודה

ירושלים

תש"ז

משרד החוץ והאגודה
ירושלים, תש"ז



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL

WASHINGTON D.C.

17th St NW

To Boston 24

Handwritten signature and date: 1/27/47

משרד החוץ והאגודה

משרד החוץ והאגודה

משרד החוץ והאגודה מודיע כי משרד החוץ והאגודה
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משרד החוץ והאגודה מודיע כי משרד החוץ והאגודה



- 2 -

לדעתו עבר הכלח על הגישה הגורסת שיש להתייב מול ברה"מ בכל מקום שהיא מפעילה יוזמה אפילו תהיה חתרנות קיימים אזורים שבהם לארה"ב אנטרסי בטחון ברורים והם (א) אירופה המערבית (ב) יפן (ג) המזרח (בהדגש מופחת).

ארה"ב אינה "שוטר העולם" ואל לה להתערב ולפעול באזורים אחרים שאינם חיוניים לבטחון ארה"ב. לדעתו אין כל מקום לפעולה אמריקנית אם ישלטו הסובייטים (בדרך פלישה או כל דרך אחרת) על יוגוסלביה או רומניה. אפשר לנסות לעודד את עצמאותן של מדינות אלו אך תו לא. מזרח אירופה נתונה להשפעה סובייטית וזהו זה!

* במיוחד יוצא קצפו על מדיניות הממשל כלפי אנגולה הוא לא מוכן לקבל את הטעון שלעמדת ארה"ב כלפי המאבק שחל בה (על התפוכוחיה השונות) עלולות להיות השלכות שליליות לגבי מדינות אחרות ביבשת אפריקה או בעולם השלישי בכלל. הוא לא רואה את יבשת אפריקה כחיונית לבטחון ארה"ב (?). הוא אפילו גורס שיתכן מצב שארה"ב תתמוך בפעילות סובייטית אם היא תכוון לעודד תנועת שחרור אפריקנית (רודזיה).

כדאי לציין שבנושא זה הוא נגרר לוכוחים לא מעטים בעת סיורו בארץ.

* אין אספין מוסרד מהיתחזקות הקונגרס לעומת הזרוע המבצעה אף כי אין הוא רווח נחה יתרה מהתרופפות הכוח הנשיאותי ומסממני ההשתוללות הבלתי אחראית של כמה מאמצעי התקשורת (נושאי בקורתו של המהנה הניאו-פטימי). המאבק בין האכסוקוטיבה לבין הרשות המחוקקת הנו פועל יוצא טבעי של השיטה הקונסטיטוציונלית, קיימות עליות וירידות. אין לשנות מצב עניינים זה. יש לחיות עמו. אין הוא כה גרוע. התערבות הקונגרס אינה מהווה סכנה. מה שדרוש הנה מדיניות ברורה מוגדרת ורחקת טווח שאפשר להסבירה ולהבהירה בפני הקונגרס והעם.

(5) האורה אמנם שמע בקשב את הסברי מארחיו ומלווייו הישראלים אך נסנע (כנראה מתוך מחשבה תחילה) מלהרכות בהבעה דעותיו הוא על המצב במזרח (פרט לבטויי בקורת על מזכיר המדינה). עם זאת אין ספק שהוא מייחס חשיבות רבה לתמורות במצרים; לקראת סוף בקורו נפגש עם שני אישים אשר הביעו דעות אופוזיציוניות. בעוד אשר דברי עזר וייצמן חפפו במדה רבה את קו מפלגתו (הפגישה נערכה בסמוך לחדוש פעילותו בליכוד) חרגו דברי אריק שרון בכמה נקודות מן הדעות שהביע הנן כידוע ^{RIS} sui generis (למשל בנושא הגדה המערבית, ירדן והמו"מ עם הפלסטינים).

הפגישות עם שני הג"ל בבתייהם היו נעימות. בעוד שהמגישה עם שרון נכללה בתוכנית המקורית (רעייתו הנה מארחת למופת) נערכה הפגישה עם וייצמן לפי יוזמה רוזנבלט.

(6) למרות בקורתו הידועה של אספין על בזבזים והגזמות בתקציב ההגנה ובסדרי מערכים של צבא ארה"ב, גלה ענין בתקציב הביניים. הביקור בבסיס ההסבה של צה"ל ב-25.4.76 היה מוצלח מבחינה זו. המפקד (סא"ל אוגמט) עשה מלאכה נאה והאורה, שהוא בקי בתחום זה, גלה ענין רב בחהליכי העבודה בבסיס זה.


גם הבקור בתעשייה האווירית (יוזמה, יעילות, התפתחות ביצור, קדמה) היה מועיל.



- 3 -

7) רעייתו הצעירה נלוותה אליו במרבית הסיורים. אף היא ליברלית כמוהו, מעונינת בקדום האשה, הביעה, כנראה גם בשמו הוא, תמיהה על בקור ראש ממשלה דרום אפריקה בארץ ועל משמעותיו. שניהם בקרו אשתד בדרום אפריקה כאורחי ממשלתה והסיור בארץ זו הוחזר בקרבם משקע מריר.

8) הרשמותי מן התקופה הקצרה ששהיתי עם הנ"ל בתום החוכמים הנה שהסיור היה מועיל.

ב ב ר כ ה,

דוד בן דב

העמק: המסנה למנכ"ל
לשכה המנכ"ל
מר צבי רפיה, וושינגטון



- 3 -

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С. С. С. С.

1947

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אשרי
מנהל

7.4

7.4.76

אלו לשכת המנכ"ל

מאת: מנהל מאו"ר

הנדון: בקור המרשה סר - מוסמך לציטוט מארה"ב

הנ"ל, דמוקרט פויסקובטין, חבר ועדה השרותים המזוינים של הקונגרס יגיע לנקקטא(רשמית כאורח האוביגרסיטה העברית) ב-16 עד 27 באפריל 1976.

אספין, מהמחה בנושא אספקת בטק, ואחד ממנקרי הענטגון הכולטים. בקובטלציה מסוימת של שלטון הדמוקרטיים צפוי להיות מועמד אשרי למשרה זו החבונה.

... מצ"ב סינמה הכבית אשר צפויים להול בה פנויים.

עורך התכנית - סר ציון אברובי.

ב נ ר כ ה

בדפון ירון

הענקו: סר א. צברון, משנה למנכ"ל

סר מ. ארנוב, ס/מנכ"ל

סר י. גור-אריה, ס/מנכ"ל

מנהל טכנ"א, מנהל הסברה

מנהל טע"ח, קב"ט

מנהל החבורה

סורסה, חבר ועדה הפרותים הסזויינים של הקונגרס (בלויים רעיתו)

יום שישי - 16.4.76

אחת"ב -	סביעים	-
	נסיעה לחיפה	-
<u>לינה - דן כרמל, חיפה</u>		

יום שבת - 17.4.76

בקור כנערה (כנסית חבשורה)	-	10.00
בקור בסקופות הקדושים מסביב לכנערה (סנהה, כפר גזוס, הר האופר)	-	11.00
ארוחת צהרים בטבריה	-	13.50
סיור בקריה מסונה ובכפר יובל	-	15.00
נסיעה לאילת הסחר	-	17.00
ארוחת ערב עם אלוף (סללע) דן לנר, בנאות סודכי	-	
<u>לינה - אילת הסחר</u>		

יום ראשון - 18.4.76 (אורה צה"ל)

בקור כרמל הגולן - כולל אחד הקבוצים ברמת	-	
בקור בכסיס חיל האוויר	-	
נסיעה לחיפה	-	
<u>לינה - דן כרמל, חיפה</u>		

יום שני - 19.4.76 (אורה צה"ל)

בקור בכסיס חיל הים	-	
נסיעה לתל-אביב	-	
סביטה עם שה"ח בתל-אביב	-	15.30
סביטה עם שהב"ט בלשכתו	-	18.00
<u>לינה - דן, תל-אביב</u>		

יום שלישי - 20.4.76

סביטה עם ראס אס"ן	-	09.00
נסיעה בכסיס להסנה סנקים בתל הסוטר	-	11.00
סביטה סלוות בארוחת צהרים עם האלוף א. חמיר ועוזרייו	-	13.50
נסיעה לירושלים	-	
ארוחת ערב עם הסנהה לסנכ"ל טר א. צברון	-	28
<u>לינה - סלון הסלר דוד, ירושלים</u>		

יום רביעי - 21.4.76

סיור כללי להכרת העיר	-	09.30
בקור בטוזיאון ישראל	-	11.00
ארוחת צהרים עם סנהל סנפ"א טר ס. רביב	-	13.00
בקור בבית לחם	-	16.00
חה עם הסנכ"ל בני אילת	-	17.30
ארוחת ערב עם ס. ארנוב	-	
<u>לינה - סלון הסלר דוד, ירושלים</u>		

1917 - 1918

Jan 1 - 1917
Dec 31 - 1918

1919 - 1920

1921 - 1922

Jan 1 - 1921
Dec 31 - 1922

1923 - 1924

1925 - 1926

Jan 1 - 1925
Dec 31 - 1926

1927 - 1928

1929 - 1930

Jan 1 - 1929
Dec 31 - 1930

1931 - 1932

1933 - 1934

Jan 1 - 1933
Dec 31 - 1934

1935 - 1936

1937 - 1938

Jan 1 - 1937
Dec 31 - 1938

1939 - 1940

יום חמישי - 22.4.76

נסיגה לבקור בעזה	-
בקור במחנה פליטים ותאחדות נח"ל, כולל ארוחת צהרים	-
חזרה לירושלים	-
ערב חפסי	-
<u>לינה - טלון המלך דוד, ירושלים</u>	

יום שישי - 23.4.76

בקור ביד וטס	09.00
בקור בחפירות הכמל ובעיר העתיקה בלויית טדי קולק	10.30
ארוחת צהרים עם סר ארנון גפני, סנכ"ל האוצר	13.30
בקור במרכז עליטה	17.00
ארוחת ערב עם ד"ר אסנון כהן	2
<u>לינה - טלון המלך דוד, ירושלים</u>	

יום שבת - 24.4.76

בקור במצדה	-
רחצה בים המלח	-
ארוחת ערב עם אריק שרון (ברחובות)	-
<u>לינה - טלון דן, תל-אביב</u>	

יום ראשון - 25.4.76

בקור בתעשייה האווירית	09.00
בקור במפעל כור כולל ארוחת צהרים עם שאיר עמית	12.00
פגישה עם טמי פלד, בנימו	15.00
מה עם ח"כ ס. ארנס	17.00
ארוחת ערב עם ח"כ יריב	20.30
<u>לינה - טלון דן, תל-אביב</u>	

יום שני - 26.4.76

לפנה"צ חפסי	-
פגישה עם רה"ט בירושלים	-
הרצאה בסכון דיוויס, באוניברסיטת העברית	-
פגישה בנימו של מנחל טצט"א סר ס. רביב (עם מוזמנים נוספים)	-
<u>לינה - טלון המלך דוד, ירושלים</u>	

יום שלישי - 27.4.76

ירבא את הארץ או סוהה ליום או יפשיים נוספים בקבוץ (פ"פ רצוננו)

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למטה קיבלו ביום 1

קיבלו 113

באלטס

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LONDON -- EDITORIALS 4
DAILY TELEGRAPH, CONSERVATIVE, ON THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA:
"U.S. TREASURY SECRETARY MICHAEL BLUMENTHAL WENT TOO FAR IN HIS
PUBLIC REBUKE OF CHINA DURING HIS VISIT TO PEKING FOR HER MILITARY
ACTION AGAINST VIETNAM. HE DREW VERY LITTLE DISTINCTION, IF ANY AT ALL

BETWEEN THE CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA BY VIETNAM,
RUSSIA'S SURROGATE, AND CHINA'S RETALIATORY 'FRONTIER PENETRATION.'
HE LECTURED CHINA ABOUT SETTLING DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS.
"BEFORE CHINA REACTED AGAINST VIETNAM THERE WAS AS MUCH HOPE OF
VIETNAM QUITTING CAMBODIA AS OF RUSSIA AND CUBA QUITTING ANGOLA,
ETHIOPIA AND OTHER PLACES THEY HAVE GRABBED. THERE MAY NOT BE MUCH
(HOPE) EVEN IF -- CONTRARY TO EXPECTATIONS -- CHINA STAYS IN VIETNAM,

AND TRIES TO ENFORCE A DEAL. AT LEAST NOTICE HAS BEEN SERVED ON
VIETNAM TO STOP HER IMPERIALIST EXPANSION, AND ON RUSSIA NOT TO
TREAT CHINA AS SHE AND CUBA TREAT THE WEST...
"THE STRONGER CHINA BECOMES THE MORE WILL RUSSIA BE INHIBITED IN

HER DESIGNS IN ASIA. HER POLICY ELSEWHERE WILL ALSO BE
AFFECTED...MR. CARTER CANNOT AFFORD NOT TO PLAY THE CHINA CARD --
THOUGH HE MUST DO SO WITH IRON NERVES, CAUTION AND SKILL."
END

06036 27 FEB 79

REPRESENTATIVE HERMAN BADILLO (Democrat - New York)

Biographical Information



Herman Badillo
of Bronx (21st Dist.)
Democrat—3d term

Home town, the Bronx, N. Y.; born in Caguas, Puerto Rico, August 21, 1929, emigrated to New York City at age of 11; first person of Puerto Rican birth to sit with a vote in the Congress of the United States; graduated magna cum laude from City College of New York and cum laude from Brooklyn Law School in 1954 where he received the first scholarship prize, was class valedictorian and a member of the Law Review; has practiced law in New York City; became certified public accountant 1956; Commissioner of New York City Department of Housing Relocation, November 1962 to August 1965; elected borough president of the Bronx, November 1965 to December 1969; adjunct professor at Fordham University's Graduate School of Urban Education, 1970 to present; board member Mount Sinai Hospital, as well as other civic organizations in New York City; married, three children; Protestant.

Political Information

Badillo's district encompasses the South Bronx, probably one of the worst slum areas in the United States. It contains 44% Puerto Rican-Americans and 43% blacks. In 1974, 11% of those eligible to vote did so.

Herman Badillo's driving interest is not Congress, but becoming Mayor of New York. He will probably run for the third time in 1977 when Mayor Beame will be 71.

Term Began

January, 1971

Committees

Judiciary - (began serving in 1975 on this committee)
Small Business

Legislative Record

Badillo has voted consistently for foreign aid bills and has signed and cosponsored all major resolutions and declarations favorable to Israel. He has spoken out on many occasions on behalf of Soviet, Romanian and Syrian Jews. He was a cosponsor of all anti-boycott measures.

In 1973 he spoke on behalf of the \$2.2 billion emergency authorization for Israel. He has been a supporter and advocate of close relationship between the U. S. labor movement and the Histadrut.



CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

108 MONTGOMERY STREET
SUITE 1000
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104
981-2785

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
סן פרנציסקו

ש ו ר

1109

כ"ה חשרי תשל"ו
30 ספטמבר 1975
422.1

אל: מר צבי רפיח, וושינגטון.
מאח: הקונסול הכללי, סן פרנציסקו.

הנדון: קונגרסמן דון בונקר מאורגון.

להלן נקודות מדו-שיח עם אנשי הפדרציה:

1. התרשמות מביקורו בישראל: יש לנו הנהגה פרגמטית המוכנה לוויחורים למען שלום.
2. לדעתו רוב הקונגרס לא נוחן אימון במזכיר המדינה.
3. זאח בגלל ה-duplicity שלו בקשר לוויאטנם, הלחץ בקשר למכירת נשק לתורכיה ולירדן.
4. הוא ייחס את המתיחות בין הקונגרס לבין מחלקת המדינה לתכונות דלעיל של המזכיר.
5. הרגשתו היא שמזכיר המדינה מנהל מו"מים ללא הסמכות הדרושה.
6. על קבוצת אנשי הקונגרס הצעירים: הרבה רעש ומעט השפעה.
7. יעץ למקד את מאמצי השכנוע בועדת הבית ליחסים בינלאומיים.
8. מבין שאין לישראל הרבה אפשרויות המרון בגולן, בגדה ובירושלים.
9. דעתו האישית שישראל לא הייתה מאויימת על ידי מדיניות ה"היערכות מחדש".
10. סתם ולא פירש: ישראל ניסתה להיאבק עם מזכיר המדינה והמציאות החדשה במזרח התיכון מבלי להשתמש ב-trump card.
11. הגירה מרוסיה: הביע סברה של מזימה ברה"מ - מזכיר המדינה.
12. הוא מאמין שהחמיכה בתיקון ג'קסון הולכת ונחלשת.
13. רואה את סנסור המפרי כאיש המפתח בעניין זה.

בברכה,

ד"ר שלמה תדמור.

העחק:
מר מ. ארד, ציר, וושינגטון.
מצפ"א.
מר א. עברון, משנה למנכ"ל.

מאוס
ק"מ 18
ק"מ 8
ק"מ 11

December 22, 1977

REPRESENTATIVE J. HERBERT BURKE (Republican-Florida)

Term Began: 1967

Committees: House Administration; International Relations--Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Subcommittee on International Operations

Consistently votes against foreign aid bill until this year but consistently supports all pro-Israel resolutions and amendments. Supported resolution expressing disapproval of sale of HAWK missiles to Jordan. Cosigned Oct. 6, 1977 letter to Carter expressing concern over joint US/USSR communique on Mideast. Opposed C-130 sale to Egypt.

Burke represents the heavily-Jewish district of Hollywood, Florida.

4

מזכ"ל

אלוף



קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30308

PHONE 875-7851

809 PEACHTREE ST., N. E.
SUITE 606

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8.6.76


אל: דר צבי רפיו, וושינגטון

J.H. Burke הנכין

נ"ל וכן ביה"כ שלח הנכנס הד"ר לזמן
בפעילותה עכ"ל ואם העצבאלה טרן.

בג"ח
משה יאלץ

העסק: מזכ"ל



Dear Editor:

Israel was 28 years old this month. For more than a quarter of a century, the Jewish people have been translating their religious and cultural heritage into the practical achievements of nation-building. They have overcome the obstacles of the constant opposition of their Arab neighbors and of a harsh climate, to develop the highest standard of living in the Middle East. The Israelis have fully realized the prophecy that the desert shall blossom as the rose.

What is even more remarkable is that Israel is one of the very few democracies in the Middle East. This is a rare achievement indeed. There are 160 independent nations in the world today, but only 57 of them can be called functioning democracies. Israel carries its commitment to democracy to its occupied territories as well. Only a few weeks ago, elections were held in the West Bank territory. These elections were probably the freest ever held in the Arab world, and allowed Jordanian women to vote for the first time.

It is Israel's greatest sorrow that its twenty-eight years of existence have failed to ensure its security. In 1947, when the Holy Land was partitioned by a United Nations resolution, the Arab Palestinian leader Jamal Husseini said, "the partition line proposed shall be nothing but a line of fire and blood." From that day forward, Arab policy towards Israel has been one of unrelenting war, terrorism, and diplomatic isolation.

The Arabs have been able to rely on their oil revenues and an endless supply of military assistance from the Soviet Union to pursue their ends. They have created economic havoc among the industrialized nations, and have blackmailed 40 developing nations into breaking formal diplomatic relations with Israel since 1967. It is not any coincidence that this military and economic warfare has increasingly become associated with the emergency of a virulent anti-semitism among the Arab states, the Soviet Union, and sympathetic radical elements throughout the world.

A continuous supply of armaments has continued to flow into the Middle East, even since the 1973 war. The Soviet Union, ever desirous to embarrass the United States and expand its power, has been the Arabs' principle supplier, but western nations - including ourselves - have not been slow to find opportunities for sales. Since 1973, Arab arms acquisitions, either completed or in progress, have amounted to nearly \$16 billion.

It is incomprehensible to me why the United States would enter into a relationship as an arms supplier to Egypt. Nonetheless, this is what we see happening. We are ar-

equipment, and F-5 fighters.

The United States and Israel have both for years been seeking a way to ensure peace. We must stand behind Israel, our ally. We must ask ourselves what our real interests are in the Middle East, which cannot possibly be to put ourselves in both camps of so inflammatory a dispute. These initial sales of arms to Egypt are only the beginning of an ominous trend which should be halted now, before it develops an irreversible momentum. Our best interests are served when we can ensure that a small nation like Israel can celebrate its twenty-eighth birthday with the confidence that it can look forward to many more such anniversaries in the centuries to come.

U.S. CONGRESSMAN
J. Herbert Burke

Letters
to the Editor

1521

משרד החוץ
תל אביב
358



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.

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United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 25, 1976

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary
Department of State
2201 C Street
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It has come to my attention that the Soviet Union has as of June 15th tripled the import duty on incoming packages. As I understand it, this will place severe additional burdens on those who depend on outside assistance, particularly the Jewish population. I would appreciate it if you would investigate this matter on an urgent basis, and recommend to the new Commission being set up to monitor compliance with the Helsinki Accords that it take vigorous action with respect to this apparent violation of those Accords.

Sincerely,

Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senator

JRB/rc

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 25, 1976

Ms. Shirley C. Horowitz
Jewish Federation of Delaware
701 Shipley Street
Wilmington, Delaware 19801

Dear Shirley:


Thank you for your letter regarding the imposition of the duties by the Soviet Union on incoming packages and the attached information.

As you may know, Congress has recently passed legislation to establish a Commission to monitor the Helsinki Accords, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This Commission is just getting underway and has not yet completed its organization set up, but the problem to which you refer is the type of complaint that it has been set up to investigate. I anticipate that the Commission will be in business soon, and I will, in the meantime, convey your concern to it. For your information I enclosed a copy of the law which established this new Commission.

I have also written to Secretary Kissinger urging him to breathe real life into this Commission and its work concerning violations of the Helsinki Accords. I enclose also a copy of my letter to him.

Again, thank you for sharing your thoughts with me on this subject. I will send on any pertinent information that I receive.

Sincerely,


Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senator

JRB/rc
enclosures (2)

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

שמור 3

כ"ג בחשוון תשל"ז
28 באוקטובר 1975

1298

אל: מזכ"א

מאת: ז. רפיח, ושינגטון

Senator Joseph R. Biden (D-Del)
For Relations הנדון: סנטור ביידן

כצ"ב דווח על פגישה עם הנ"ל בה מפרט הסנטור את דעותיו
והערכותיו. ביידן הצביע כידוע נגד הטכנאים ויש, לכן, עניין
רב בהערכותיו.

Cong

ב ב ר ה ,
ז. רפיח

העתיק: המסנה למזכ"ל
לשכה המזכ"ל
מרכז

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.

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1961

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Jewish Federation of Delaware

701 SHIPLEY STREET, WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801

Telephone: 656-8555

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Habibnal Association
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Executive Director
SIDNEY C. HODKOWITZ, Director
Women's Division

October 20, 1975

June Rogal
AIPAC
Colorado Building
1341 G Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20005

Dear June,

As I indicated, we met with Senator Joe Biden on October 15. The meeting lasted one and one-half hours. Joe would have given us much more time, but we felt he had told us enough. He, himself, started out on the Sinai disengagement, particularly the technicians, and let me enumerate some of the points he made.

1. He based his vote on a constitutional issue. He felt it was important that the Senate see all the documents. What he saw indicated there ought to be a treaty rather than an executive decision.

2. He believes there should have been an open debate because it is healthy for the country. Without an open debate, he believes we might slide into another Vietnam, even though he recognizes a vast difference between Vietnam and the Mid-East.

3. From a negative point of view, he felt the issue should be forced. He knew he was the 'point person'. His decision made senators stand up. They know now what they are getting into. They cannot go back to the administration and say they did not know; at least from the documents given to them. (He believes there are other documents)

4. A great deal of time was spent in his office, not on the substance of the issue, but on other issues such as the constitutional one. He indicated that he personally spent a lot of time questioning Mr. Kissinger.

5. He felt in the long run much of this will not help Israel. He went on to other areas. He indicated that at this time, he is prepared to support aid to Israel. He feels that the aid will amount to something like 1.82 billion dollars.

6. Under no circumstances will he vote for the Pershing missiles for any country. He expects the Pershing missiles will be a separate item in the foreign aid budget because the administration knows there will be problems on the aid bill if the Pershing are included.

7. The total budget will probably be 15.4 billion dollars over a 5 year period. He will support such a budget, but that it is important that the American people understand what they are getting into and why they should support the budget.

8. He is not sure that the step by step approach is a correct one nor helpful to Israel. He does not believe that it will lead to a settlement in the Mid-East until the Palestian issue, Golan Heights and Jerusalem are dealt with.

9. Once there is an agreed understanding between our government and any other government, the senate should know about these matters. He does not believe that the senate should be involved in the negotiations, but once a plan is finalized, the senate should understand the interpretation that is given to every sentence.

10. He does not believe that the senator who voted against the technicians are anti-Israel, but they are against not being told what the documents mean.

11. He predicts a growing public relations problem with the American public vis-a-vis Israel over the matter of aid, particularly when the American people are not being told the entire story.

12. Since many of the issues were 'chisled in granite', it may redound to the benefit of the senate and to Israel. He is not yet prepared to support aid to Egypt. He believes that in some degree, the United States has isolated Jordan and Egypt and the 'moderate voices' do not have credibility anymore in the Arab world.

13. He believes we are escalating, at a very rapid pace, the arms race. The next war, if indeed there is one, is going to be extremely costly in men.

Page 3.
June Rogal
October 20, 1975


14. He believes that it is in the American self interest to support Israel. I believe that he views his support of Israel as in the best interest for the United States. He believes and he reiterated this time and time again, he was friendly to Israel.

15. He believes that the vote on the technicians is clearly indicative of how the vote will go toward foreign aid. He does believe that the aid will not go down, but rather increase. He is prepared to vote for increased aid.

16. He will vote to raise the ceiling if necessary.

These then are the comments that were made. It was a meeting in which he did 80 percent of the talking, but the bottom line of everyone, with the possible exception of myself, is that he clearly indicated he will support foreign aid as the administration submits it.

Sincerely yours,



Nathan Barnett
Executive Director

NB/kh
cc: Phil Horn



(17/2/78) *[Handwritten signature]*

Jerusalem, February 17, 1978

Senator Birch Bayh
The Senate
Washington D.C.

Dear Senator Bayh,

I thank you for your kind letter of January 23, 1978. I am, indeed, sorry that we were unable to meet as planned. It is my hope that a further opportunity will soon arise enabling us to become personally acquainted.

The Prime Minister is very much engaged in the diplomatic processes which will lead, hopefully, to the speedy renewal of our negotiations with Egypt. Indeed, I can testify that this remains his highest priority to which he is devoting his personal energies night and day.

As Secretary to the Cabinet I am witness to the daily efforts of the Government as a whole for peace. Indeed, it is a Cabinet comprising, among others, no less than eight former senior commanders who, at various times, led Israel's forces in the struggle for our country's independence and our national survival. Today, all are united in the exclusive dedication to the cause of genuine peace and genuine security of Israel. We are confident that these just goals will, in the end, triumph.

May I add, in this connection, that the cause of peace demands first of all, stability in the region, based on the preservation of the balance of power. Therefore, by changing the balance in favour of the Arab side, one cannot promote the process of peace. One never knows against whom will these new and sophisticated arms and weapons systems be used. So long as we are engaged in the active peace diplomacy, such a change in the balance of power, minimizing our deterrent capability, can only make the process even more complicated, and our national security endangered. That is why I allow myself to express the hope that the new proposal for arms supply to Egypt and Saudi Arabia will be reconsidered.

Yours sincerely,

A. Naor
Aryeh Naor

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

January 23, 1978

Mr. Arye Naor
Secretary of the Cabinet
Section of Information
Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I only regret the circumstances which I know you understand prevented me from having the chance to talk with you when you came to my office last Wednesday.

Your message from the Prime Minister was greatly appreciated and I hope you will convey to him my warmest personal regards. While difficulties remain on the road to peace in the Middle East, I know the Prime Minister will remain constant in his purpose to see that a just and lasting settlement is finally achieved.

I look forward to seeing you during your next visit to Washington.

Best personal regards,

Sincerely,

Birch Bayh
Birch Bayh
United States Senator



*In sorry we
missed the chance to
visit.*

Birch

מברק נכנס-מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בסחון המדינה יחסי חוק וסודות רשמיים), תשי"ז - 1957.

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אלו המשרד

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פנידי

מנכל

נפגשתי היום לצאריים עם סנטור בירץ באי שחזר בשבוע שעבר מביקור בישראל ובטרקו. עדינתי הסנטור בהתפתחות האחרונות וההעכבתי במיוחד על שאלת היטובים וכן הצעתנו לגבי יתודה ושומרון הסנטור הודה על החסברים וציין התרשמותו מביקורו בארץ ומשיחתו עם רותם.

דיניץ.

סחה רותם סרוהם מנכל נצחא

אב/א

A



CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
111 EAST WACKER DRIVE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60601
PHONE (312) 644-4140

כ"א באייר תשל"ז
9 במאי 1977
104

קונסוליה כללית
של ישראל

סג' ד"ר אלוט (סג' אלוט) Bayh

א ל : צכי רפיה, יועץ, רושינגטון

מאת : י. ענחבי, שיקגו

שלום כו

Birch Bayh הנדון: הסנטור

הנ"ל היה אורח ועידת הדסה שהתקיימה בפורט וריין,
אינדיאנה לפני כשבוע. מצ"ב נאזמו בוועידה כפי
שהופיע בעתונות המקומית.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

יגאל ענחבי

העמק: מצפ"א

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The News-Sentinel

FORT WAYNE, INDIANA 46802 MONDAY, MAY 2, 1977

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Bayh Isn't Impressed



By MARK HELMKE

U.S. Sen. Birch Bayh Sunday called reports he may not seek re-election in 1980 "ridiculous" and "not responsible journalism."

In Fort Wayne for the Illinois-Indiana Hadassah Regional Conference, Indiana's Democrat senior Senator discounted an April 15 news report from The News-Sentinel's Indiana News Service in Washington, D.C.

The Indiana News Service reported sources near the Senator's office said Bayh has told his staff not to turn down any job offers based on the assumption he will be a candidate for a fourth term in three years.

The sources strongly suggested Bayh might not be anxious to go through what could very likely be the toughest contest of his career, possibly against popular Republican Gov. Bowen.

Although Bayh said Sunday he hasn't definitely decided to run again in 1980 — "I'm still trying to get over 1972, 1974 and 1976," when he tested the Presidential waters (in 1972 and 1976) and won his third term (in 1974) — Bayh emphasized that any reports that he planned not to run were false.

Bayh acknowledged "too many" Senators "run just to run," but he felt he was still accomplishing things in Congress.

In another matter, Bayh said he has "exhausted" the possible number of candidates for the U.S. Attorney's post in the Northern District of Indiana.

He said he just completed interviews with two new candidates from Lake County, and hopes to recommend to President Carter an attorney in the "next couple weeks," a promise he has been making over the last several months.

Fort Wayne attorney Kenneth Waterman is reported to be in the running for the post, as is Acting U.S. Atty. Richard Kelsner of South Bend. There have been reports Bayh is taking so long to make a decision because Lake County, a Democratic stronghold, has demanded the political appointment of a U.S. Attorney, but Bayh is leery of getting involved in Lake County's political jealousies.

Bayh told the about 100 leaders of Hadassah — a Jewish woman's club — the Middle East conflict will have to be solved before 1985 when the Soviet Union is predicted to run out of its own oil reserves.

The national conflicts in the Middle East will be much more difficult to resolve if the Soviet Union starts looking there to import oil, Bayh said.

Bayh was hopeful President Carter's new foreign policy efforts will effect a peace in the Middle East. He said he found it "comforting" Carter has abandoned the Nixon and Ford "foreign policy by leaks," and encouraged an "open dialogue and ongoing debate" to resolve foreign conflicts.

The U.S. will have to "strongly let both sides know we're committed to the continued state of Israel," Bayh said. "A couple kilometers in the Sinai or the Golan Heights will not make much difference if Israel knows U.S. planes will be there to help if there is another war," Bayh said.

The U.S. should also continue providing military and domestic assistance to Israel, Bayh continued. "But it should not be a blank check either," he added. "We don't want to escalate the war. We want to step back and make sure there is a balance."

Bayh says oil won't change policy, denies retirement

By KIRK STONE

America won't be blackmailed into changing its Middle East policy because of oil pressure from the Arabs, Sen. Birch Bayh said yesterday responding to a question about the possible international implications of the energy crunch.

The state's senior senator addressed the annual meeting of the Illinois-Indiana Hadassah Regional Conference. Approximately 130 Hadassah leaders are attending the affair at the Marriott Inn.

In an interview after his remarks, Bayh labeled as "ridiculous" recent published reports he has serious reservations about seeking reelection in 1980.

The key to withstanding oil pressure from the Arabs, he suggested, is to build up the 180-day reserves President Carter

has recommended so any embargo will be ineffective.

If the United States has this reserve, some of the oil producers will need the revenue from American purchases before the nation runs out of oil. Bayh added, however, that he is concerned about the ability of America's friends in Japan and Europe to hold up under Arab oil pressure.

Bayh, who has long been a nemesis of the nation's big oil companies, also said part of the answer is for Americans to change their habits to emphasize mass transportation instead of the personal automobile.

It has been difficult to convince people it's worth waiting 10 minutes at a bus stop, according to Bayh, who said that at

times he shakes 500 hands at a plant gate and sees 475 cars in the parking lot.

Bayh outlined what he believes are the essential ingredients of any peace settlement in the Middle East, starting with the unquestionable commitment by the United States to the continuation of the state of Israel.

The Arabs must know full well, that if they tackle Israel, they will also have to take on the United States, Bayh told the receptive audience.

He urged that the United States continue to provide the necessary military and economic aid to Israel to maintain a balance in that pivotal part of the world, but said not even the nation's friends should get a blank check.

To supply too much arms to Israel, he claimed, would only escalate the military build up on both sides and increase prospects for a devastating war.

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat has requested F5 fighters and anti-tank weapons from the United States.

After the meeting Bayh was asked if the United States should provide the arms rather than let the Soviets or some other nation do it.

The senator said that approach is folly because if the United States supplies 10 fighters to Egypt, it must also send 10 to Israel.

Bayh also told the group he has been pleasantly surprised at the way Carter has championed the cause of human rights, a policy that has meaning for countless Russian Jews.

After the meeting, Bayh revealed he is still talking to candidates for U.S. Attorney for the northern district of Indiana to replace John Wilks. He said he hopes to announce his choice in one or two weeks.

Bayh also reported he intervened in behalf of the city of Fort Wayne in an effort to obtain \$2.3 million for community development and planning from the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Rather clearly, someone in the Armstrong administration "goofed," according to the senator, who said he had a long chat with Mayor Robert E. Armstrong about the city's failure to submit a proper application.


Bayh said he feels fairly confident part, if not all, of that federal grant money can be obtained for the city through HUD's discretionary program.

Bayh made it plain he was not pleased by the story he is considering retiring when his term ends.

Bayh complained that he was not contacted for comment before the story appeared and then noted he is still trying to get over his last election in 1974, rather than prepare for another one.

The Indiana News Service article indicated Bayh was out of the country and unavailable for comment. In view of the fact the next senatorial election is three years off, Bayh observed the story could have waited until he returned.

Fort Wayne Journal Gazette 5/4/77



REPRESENTATIVE GOSWICE E. BYRON (D-Maryland)

1137
—

Term began: 1971
Home town: Hagerstown, Cumberland
Committees: Interior and Insular Affairs; Armed Services

Negative record on foreign aid legislation. Voted against \$2.2 billion emergency military authorization after the Yom Kippur War for Israel. Voted against Sinai Resolution to station American technicians in Sinai.

האזנה = אקוויבן בילגה

האזנה = אקוויבן בילגה

האזנה = אקוויבן בילגה

CONGRESS' 'RESPONSIBLE ROLE' IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2,200)

BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

(377) 0789

(AS SENATE MAJORITY LEADER, ROBERT BYRD OF WEST VIRGINIA SERVES AS CHIEF STRATEGIST AND FLOOR SPOKESMAN FOR THE DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY IN THE SENATE. BYRD WAS FIRST ELECTED TO CONGRESS IN 1952 AND SERVED FOR THREE TERMS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BEFORE WINNING A SENATE SEAT IN 1958. ELECTED MAJORITY LEADER BY HIS PARTY COLLEAGUES IN JANUARY 1977, BYRD IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, AND COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION. THIS ARTICLE IS ADAPTED FROM HIS ADDRESS TO THE SENATE AT THE CLOSE OF THE 95TH CONGRESS THIS MONTH.)

BECAUSE OF THE COMPLEXITY, THE SWIFTLY MOVING EVENTS, THE

U.S.G.C.
/

PAGE 2 -- BYRD

QUESTION FREQUENTLY HAS BEEN ASKED WHETHER CONGRESS CAN PLAY AN EFFECTIVE ROLE IN THE FOREIGN POLICY AREA.

I BELIEVE THE ANSWER TO BE UNQUESTIONABLY AFFIRMATIVE. AND I BELIEVE THAT EVENTS OF RECENT MONTHS ARE STRONG EVIDENCE OF A RESPONSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

BEFORE COMMENTING FURTHER ON THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE, LET ME TURN TO SOME OF THE SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

TO SPEAK OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IS, IN LARGE MEASURE, TO SPEAK OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

THAT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ARE GIVEN SUCH IMPORTANCE IS UNDERSTANDABLE. OUR TWO NATIONS ARE THE WORLD'S GREATEST MILITARY POWERS, POSSESSING EXTENSIVE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. IN VIEW OF THE CATASTROPHIC POTENTIAL OF THIS NUCLEAR WEAPONRY, WE ATTACH GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO MUTUAL AGREEMENT ON RESTRAINT AND LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR ARMS.

I CONSIDER A GOOD STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY TO BE OF PRIMORDIAL IMPORTANCE. AT THE SAME TIME, IT MUST BE A GOOD TREATY -- A TREATY THAT IS VERIFIABLE AND FULLY

PAGE 3 -- BYRD

PROTECTIVE OF OUR SECURITY INTERESTS AND THOSE OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES.

I AM HOPEFUL THAT A GOOD SALT TREATY CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED. IF AND WHEN THAT OCCURS, THE TREATY WILL RECEIVE THE MOST THOROUGHGOING SCRUTINY WHEN IT IS SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE.

DESPITE OUR HOPES FOR LIMITING THE NUMBERS AND THE DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WE CAN AFFORD TO HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION.

THE SOVIETS ARE OUR ADVERSARIES.

THEY HAVE HUNDREDS OF STRATEGIC WARHEADS AIMED AT THE UNITED STATES. THEY HAVE UNDERTAKEN A MASSIVE MILITARY BUILDUP IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE. THE SOVIET-CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA REMAINS A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS ENGAGED IN INHUMANE AND REPRESSIVE TREATMENT OF SOME OF ITS OWN CITIZENS.

IN PAST MONTHS, RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS HAVE

* SEEN GENERALLY CHARACTERIZED AS IN A DETERIORATING STATE,
BUT MORE RECENTLY THERE HAVE BEEN SOME SLIGHT SIGNS OF
UPTURN.

PAGE 4 -- BYRD

WITH PRESIDENT CARTER, I WOULD OBVIOUSLY PREFER
COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION, RATHER THAN
CONFRONTATION. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD BE REALISTIC. WE CAN
HOPE FOR COOPERATION AND SEEK TO AVOID CONFRONTATION, BUT,
UNDENIABLY AND INEVITABLY, WE ARE ENGAGED IN COMPETITION.

THUS OUR FOREIGN POLICY MUST BE CONDITIONED BY THIS
ONGOING COMPETITIVE RELATIONSHIP. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THESE
REALITIES, MUCH AS WE MIGHT PREFER TO SEE THINGS DIFFERENTLY,
AND MUCH AS WE HOPE RELATIONS WILL IMPROVE. THE SOVIET
MILITARY STRENGTH CANNOT BE DISMISSED. THIS IS A MAJOR
FACTOR AFFECTING OUR NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ALLIANCE, WHICH IS
ONE OF THE CORNERSTONES OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY.

BUT IN RECOGNIZING THESE REALITIES, WE SHOULD NOT MAKE
THE SOVIET UNION THE SOLE FOCAL POINT OF OUR ENTIRE
FOREIGN POLICY. THERE ARE TOO MANY OTHER IMPORTANT ITEMS ON
OUR INTERNATIONAL AGENDA. WE NEED TO ACT ON OUR
OWN INITIATIVES, STEERING A COURSE THAT REFLECTS OUR OWN
BEST INTERESTS AND OUR DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH OTHER
NATIONS IN BUILDING A MORE STABLE, MORE SECURE, AND MORE
PROSPEROUS WORLD.

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WHILE WE MUST ALWAYS ASSURE THAT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED, IT IS TIME TO BREAK AWAY FROM THE ACTION-REACTION CYCLE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IF THE SOVIETS SHOW SERIOUS SIGNS OF SEEKING MORE POSITIVE RELATIONS, THEN WE WILL BE PREPARED TO RESPOND, AND IN A POSITIVE VEIN.

WE ENTER NEGOTIATIONS ON A POSSIBLE SALT TREATY NOT AS A FAVOR TO THE SOVIET UNION, BUT IN OUR OWN INTEREST. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO LIMIT THE SPIRALING AND COSTLY STRATEGIC ARMS RACE. IF A SOUND, FAIR, AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED, THEN IT WILL BE IN OUR INTEREST.

I BELIEVE THE SAME PRINCIPLE SHOULD APPLY TO THE MUCH-DISCUSSSED QUESTION OF SOVIET TRADE. WE SHOULD ACT OUT OF OUR OWN INTERESTS. THE BASIS FOR OUR POLICY SHOULD BE QUITE CLEAR: TO THE EXTENT THAT IT SERVES OUR INTERESTS, WE SHOULD ALLOW TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

THERE MUST BE STRICT REGULATIONS ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. I WOULD OBVIOUSLY PREFER

PAGE 4 -- BYRD

RETURN

BUT MORE RECENTLY THERE HAVE BEEN SOME SLIGHT SIGNS OF BEEN GENERALLY CHARACTERIZED AS IN A DETERIORATING STATE

TO THE SOVIET UNION, I FAVOR A FIRM EMBARGO ON ANY EQUIPMENT THAT MIGHT HAVE MILITARY APPLICATION, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS RECENTLY MOVED TO IMPOSE THOROUGH REVEIN

PAGE 6 -- BYRD

ON ANY TRANSFER OF PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT, AND PROPERLY SO.

BUT WE WOULD HARDLY BE ACTING IN OUR OWN SELF-INTEREST IF WE WERE TO CUT OFF AGRICULTURAL SALES TO THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH SALES REPRESENT A VALUABLE EXPORT MARKET OF AT LEAST 6,000 MILLION DOLLARS ANNUALLY.

ECONOMIC LEVERAGE CAN BE AN INSTRUMENT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO OVERESTIMATE ITS VALUE. IN THE CASE OF THE SOVIET UNION, WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE LIMITS OF LEVERAGE. THE SOVIETS WOULD OBVIOUSLY LIKE TO HAVE ACCESS TO SOME OF OUR MORE SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY, BUT THEY ARE NOT TO ANY MAJOR EXTENT DEPENDENT ON US. MOST ITEMS THE SOVIETS SEEK TO IMPORT ARE AVAILABLE FROM OTHER SOURCES; OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES AND JAPAN HAVE GENERALLY BEEN QUITE EAGER TO SELL TO THE SOVIETS.

WE SHOULD SET FORTH OUR TRADE POLICY AND ADHERE TO IT. OBVIOUSLY, WE WANT TO RETAIN SOME FLEXIBILITY, AND OUR POLICY SHOULD BE A MATTER FOR CONTINUING RE-EVALUATION, BUT NOT ON A DAILY OR WEEKLY BASIS. WE CAN HOPE THAT THE LIMITED

PAGE 7 -- BYRD

TRADE WHICH WE DO CARRY ON SOVIET BEHAVIOR OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. BUT JUST AS WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE LIMITS OF LEVERAGE, SO SHOULD WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE BENEFITS OF SUCH TRADE MAY BE LIMITED AND GRADUAL AT BEST.


WHAT I AM SUGGESTING IS THAT WE CONTINUE TO MOVE AWAY, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, FROM THE REACTIVE ROLE AND MOVE TOWARD A MORE ACTIVE, POSITIVE ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS HAVE ALREADY MOVED IN THIS DIRECTION, ALTHOUGH MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE.

MOST NOTABLY, PRESIDENT CARTER, BY NEGOTIATING THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, SEIZED THE INITIATIVE, TURNING WHAT APPEARED TO BE THE A DEAD-END STREET INTO WHAT COULD WELL BE THE ROAD TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS WAS A REMARKABLE BREAKTHROUGH.

I BELIEVE THAT AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN GAINING THE HIGH OF COOPERATION FROM EGYPT IN THE PEACE EFFORT WAS THE APPROVAL EARLIER THIS YEAR OF THE SALE OF F-5E AIRCRAFT TO EGYPT. THE SALE TOOK OUR RELATIONS WITH EGYPT ACROSS NEW THRESHHOLD;

CONFIDENTIAL



IT REFLECTS THE INCREASING TIES BETWEEN OUR

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TWO COUNTRIES. PRESIDENT SADAT HAS SAID THAT THE SENATE'S SUPPORT OF THE SALE -- VOTING DOWN A RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL -- WAS CRITICAL.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE SENATE HAS REAFFIRMED ITS STRONG AND LONGSTANDING SUPPORT FOR THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL. ISRAEL REMAINS THE LARGEST RECIPIENT OF U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.

WE ALSO MOVED TO HELP CREATE MORE STABLE CONDITIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY SELLING F-15 AIRCRAFT TO SAUDI ARABIA, RECOGNIZING THE MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SAUDI ARABIA. WE LOOK TO THE SAUDIS TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF POSITIVE AND FORWARD-LOOKING ACTION BY THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE SENATE WAS ON THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES. THE SENATE GAVE EXTENSIVE CONSIDERATION TO THE TREATIES -- 37 DAYS OF DEBATE, PRECEDED BY LENGTHY COMMITTEE HEARINGS. DURING ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE TREATIES, THE SENATE AMENDED AND ADDED TO THE TREATIES -- STRENGTHENING THEM AND MEETING LEGITIMATE CONCERNS RAISED

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BY MEMBERS OF THE SENATE. THE SENATE'S ACTION IN APPROVAL OF THE TREATIES WAS, I BELIEVE, CONSISTENT WITH OUR NATIONAL PRINCIPLES, AND IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AS WELL AS OUR HEMISPHERIC NEIGHBORS. THE TREATIES HAVE GREAT SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE FOR OUR FUTURE RELATIONS WITH THE RAPIDLY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA -- COUNTRIES WHOSE DESTINIES ARE CLOSELY INTERTWINED WITH OUR OWN.

I WANT TO MENTION ONE FURTHER POLICY ISSUE WHICH THE SENATE DEBATED THIS YEAR, AND WHICH, LIKE THE MIDDLE EAST ARMS SALES AND THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES, AROUSED STRONG FEELINGS. I AM REFERRING TO THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO ON UNITED STATES ARMS TO TURKEY.

HERE AGAIN, THE SENATE ACTED IN A RESPONSIBLE MANNER; ITS APPROVAL OF THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO WAS CONDITIONED ON PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION THAT SUCH ACTION WOULD SUPPORT A SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS ISSUE. THE AMENDMENT WHICH THE SENATE APPROVED WAS DESIGNED TO HELP SPUR A SETTLEMENT ON

PAGE 8 -- BYRD

IT REFLECTS THE INCREASING TIES BETWEEN OUR

CYPRUS AND TO SHOW AN EVEN-HANDED APPROACH IN THE AREA.

ON ALL OF THESE MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES, THE SENATE

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HAS PROVIDED THE ADMINISTRATION WITH THE CRITICAL SUPPORT
IT HAS NEEDED. THE SENATE HAS ALSO LEFT ITS OWN IMPRINT ON
EACH OF THESE MEASURES, REFLECTING THE CONTINUING HIGH
LEVEL OF SENATE INVOLVEMENT IN FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES.

A SALIENT ASPECT OF THE TURKISH EMBARGO QUESTION WAS ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO NATO. LIFTING THE EMBARGO INVOLVED NOT
ONLY REVITALIZING UNITED STATES-TURKISH RELATIONS, BUT
STRENGTHENING THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, OF WHICH TURKEY
IS AN ESSENTIAL MEMBER.

NATO HAS BEEN A PRIMARY EMPHASIS OF THE CARTER
ADMINISTRATION, AND THIS IS STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY THE
CONGRESS. AT THE NATO SUMMIT MEETING HERE IN MAY,
THE MEMBER COUNTRIES AGREED TO A LONG-TERM
DEFENSE PROGRAM (LTDP), WITH GREATER ALLIANCE COOPERATION AND
PLANNING. THE PROGRAM REPRESENTS A SUBSTANTIAL COMMITMENT
TO THE STRENGTHENING OF NATO'S DETERRENT AND
DEFENSE POSTURE.

ALTHOUGH THE SENATE AND THE ADMINISTRATION CAN POINT
WITH CONSIDERABLE PRIDE TO OUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, A FULL AND CHALLENGING INTERNATIONAL

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AGENDA REMAINS.

IN ADDITION TO STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS, WHICH I HAVE MENTIONED, THERE IS ALSO A NEED FOR PROGRESS IN LIMITING CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS. THIS, OF COURSE, REQUIRES THE COOPERATION OF OTHER SUPPLIER NATIONS.

WHILE THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT STEP, MANY CRITICAL PROBLEMS REMAIN UNRESOLVED. OF PARTICULAR CONCERN IS THE CONTINUING CIVIL WAR WHICH HAS BROUGHT SUCH DEVASTATION TO LEBANON AND WHICH HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR POSSIBLE BROADER CONFLICT IN THE REGION.

STILL ANOTHER AREA WHICH CALLS FOR SKILLFUL DIPLOMATIC EFFORT IS SOUTHERN AFRICA; OUR AIM MUST BE TO ENCOURAGE PEACEFUL CHANGE AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, BUT A VOLATILE ATMOSPHERE MAKES PROGRESS DIFFICULT.

THERE ARE, OF COURSE, A NUMBER OF OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES, BUT ONE THAT I BELIEVE TO BE OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE IS OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS OF GRADUALLY GROWING TIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA. WE ARE MOVING TOWARD GREATER COOPERATION IN A NUMBER OF AREAS -- EDUCATIONAL,

PAGE 12 -- BYRD

SCIENTIFIC, AND COMMERCIAL. RECENTLY THE SENATE APPROVED LEGISLATION THAT WOULD EXTEND LIMITED MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS TO CHINA, MAKING IT ELIGIBLE FOR SHORT-TERM CREDITS. I BELIEVE SUCH DEVELOPMENTS ARE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS, AND ARE IMPORTANT FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF A STABLE BALANCE OF POWER AND THE PRESERVATION OF WORLD PEACE.

IN CLOSING, I WANT TO FOCUS ON ECONOMIC POLICY BECAUSE THIS IS A MATTER WHICH SHOULD BE RECEIVING GREAT EMPHASIS. IN MANY RESPECTS IT IS THE KEY TO OUR INTERNATIONAL POSTURE. IT IS HERE THAT WE MUST REALLY BEAR DOWN. WE MUST GET OUR ECONOMIC HOUSE IN ORDER IF WE ARE TO CARRY OUR WEIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STABILITY AND IMBALANCE ARE A MATTER FOR THE MOST SERIOUS CONCERN. UNEVEN GROWTH RATES AMONG THE WESTERN NATIONS AND JAPAN AND THE STAGGERING DEBT BURDEN OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES HAVE SEVERELY STRAINED THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM AND HAVE FUELED INFLATION.

WE CANNOT BE COMPLACENT ABOUT THE DECLINE OF THE DOLLAR AND OUR HUGE TRADE DEFICIT. THERE MUST BE A CONTINUING AND

PAGE 13 -- BYRD

CONCERTED EFFORT TO FIGHT INFLATION, REDUCE OUR EXCESSIVE OIL IMPORTS, RESIST PROTECTIONIST PRESSURES, AND EXPAND EXPORTS.

SOME NOTABLE ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY THE CONGRESS AND BY THE ADMINISTRATION TO STEM INFLATION AND STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMY. OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE, I BELIEVE, IS THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITMENT TO RESTRAIN SPENDING, AS EVIDENCED IN THE SECOND CONCURRENT BUDGET RESOLUTION, WHICH REDUCED THE DEFICIT TO BELOW 40,000 MILLION DOLLARS.

ANOTHER KEY ELEMENT OF THE EFFORT TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF OUR ECONOMY IS THE ENERGY LEGISLATION APPROVED BY THE CONGRESS THIS YEAR. THIS MOVEMENT TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE ENERGY PROGRAM HAS IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES. FOREIGN LEADERS HAVE VIEWED US A PROFLIGATE IN OUR USE OF ENERGY, NOT ONLY REDUCING THE SUPPLY OF OIL AVAILABLE TO THEIR COUNTRIES, BUT, ALSO, CONTRIBUTING TO OUR BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS PROBLEMS AND THUS WEAKENING THE DOLLAR BY OUR

DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTED OIL. THE RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON ENERGY SHOULD SEND A STRONG AND POSITIVE MESSAGE TO OTHER NATIONS.

8


CLEARLY, ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ARE LIKELY TO CREATE INTERNATIONAL INSTABILITY. WE HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THE INCREASING INTERACTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE ECONOMIES OF OTHER NATIONS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT 20 MILLION AMERICAN JOBS DEPEND ON OUR EXPORTS. MORE THAN HALF THE WHEAT, SOYBEANS AND RICE GROWN IN THE UNITED STATES IS SOLD OVERSEAS. ONE OUT OF EVERY THREE DOLLARS IN U.S. CORPORATE PROFITS DERIVES FROM INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES.

THE ECONOMIC WELFARE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE INCREASINGLY DEPENDS ON A WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN WHICH WE NEED TO OBTAIN RESOURCES FROM ABROAD AND TO FIND MARKETS FOR OUR PRODUCTS. THE DEVELOPING OR THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES ARE CRITICAL IN THIS REGARD. TWO-THIRDS OF OUR IMPORTS ARE RAW MATERIALS THAT WE DO NOT OR CANNOT READILY PRODUCE. THE U.S. NOW DEPENDS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FOR 45 PERCENT OF OUR OIL, 85 PERCENT OF OUR BAUXITE, 93 PERCENT OF TIN, 59 PERCENT OF ZINC ORE, AND 36 PERCENT OF IRON ORE.

PRESIDENT CARTER RECENTLY ANNOUNCED A NEW TRADE POLICY -- FEATURING AN INCREASED EMPHASIS ON PROMOTING THE EXPORT OF U.S. PRODUCTS -- WHICH SHOULD HELP STRENGTHEN OUR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POSITION.

A CENTRAL PURPOSE OF OUR ECONOMIC POLICY MUST BE TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE DOLLAR. THERE MUST BE INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN AND WILL CONTROL GOVERNMENT SPENDING, CONTROL THE BUDGET DEFICIT, AND CONTROL OUR OIL IMPORTS. CONFIDENCE IN THE DOLLAR IS VITAL TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STABILITY. THE U.S. SETS THE ECONOMIC PACE FOR THE REST OF THE WORLD.

CONGRESS HAS TAKEN SIGNIFICANT STEPS TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE REST OF THE WORLD THAT WE HAVE THE NECESSARY DISCIPLINE AND THAT WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT CUTTING SPENDING, BRINGING DOWN THE DEFICIT, AND ESTABLISHING A SOLID ENERGY POLICY. CONTINUED PROGRESS IN THIS DIRECTION MUST BE A MAJOR GOAL IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. ITEM





קצ
מדי
ג'ק ו'לניו (בא)

י"א בשבט, תשל"ט
8 בפברואר, 1979

אל : מצפ"א

מאת: צ. רפיח, וושינגטון

הנדון: שיחה עם עוזרו של רוברט בירד

קיימתי אתמול שיחה ממושכת עם עוזרו של סנטור רוברט בירד לעניני חוץ, PURVIS, אשר נלווה אל בירד בביקורו בארץ.

יזמתי את השיחה, בארוחת-צהרים, כדי להבטיח קיום קשר הדוק וסדיר בינינו לעתיד. זאת במיוחד לנוכח התחזית, אשר אושרה לי ע"י PURVIS בשיחתו, שבירד, בניגוד לעבר, מתכוון לגלות פעילות רבה בעתיד בעניני חוץ.

פרבים אמר לי שהסנטור והא מודעים היטב לביקורת הרבה בה נתקבלה בישראל הודעת הסנטור בענין הישובים והסיוע. שגרירות ארה"ב בישראל דאגה להעביר להם סיכום העתונות וההגובות בישראל. פרבים רוצה להבטיחנו, בשם הסנטור, ומבקש שאודיע זאת לאנשינו בארץ כלהלן:

א. הסנטור היה גם בעבר ויהיה חמיד בעתיד ידידותי, אוהד וחומך בישראל, ואל יהא לנו כל ספק בכך.

ב. באשר להודעתו על הישובים הוא בדעה שחלה אי-הבנה לגבי עמדתו. הסנטור לא אמר שאם נקים ישובים יקוצץ הסיוע. הוא כן אמר שלגבי הסיוע המיוחד אם נקים ישובים חדשים זה יעורר בעיות בקונגרס. כאן אמר שבירד

THE STATE OF
MISSISSIPPI

IN SENATE,
January 14, 1958.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE
FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1957.

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
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE
FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1957.

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FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1957.

רואה בישובים גורם מעכב רציני בההליך המו"מ והשלום. בירד שמע על
כך תלונות רבות בכל ארץ ערבית בה ביקר והוא סתייחס לכך ברצינות רבה.

הגבתי באריכות בנושא הישובים. דיברתי על זיקתנו ליו"ש ועזה,
על כך שלא ייתכן שיהודים יזדקקו לאשרת כניסה ליו"ש או שלא יוכלו לגור
בה וכו'.

לסיכום נדברנו לקיים קשר הדוק בעתיד.


צ. רפיח

העתק: לשכת הסנכ"ל
השגריר, כאן

THE STATE OF TEXAS, COUNTY OF DALLAS, ss. I, _____, Clerk of said County, do hereby certify that _____ is the true and correct copy of _____ as the same appears in the _____ of said County.

Witness my hand and the seal of said County at Dallas, Texas, this _____ day of _____, 19____.

Clerk of said County

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס

בלתי מסווג

נס 224

נסלח: 141800 צמג 78

חמקבל: 150136 דצמ 78

אלו מסודר

את: רוטינגטון

אלו מנהל מצמא

להלן הנוסח של הצהרת טכאסון בירד בפתיחת מסיבת העיתונאים ב 12 דצמ.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including "מניין" and "3/11/78".

SUBJECT: SENATOR BYRD'S REMARKS ON MIDDLE EAST.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF OPENING STATEMENT ON MIDDLE EAST MADE BY SENATE MAJORITY LEADER BYRD AT PRESS CONFERENCE DECEMBER 12 FOLLOWING SENATOR'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT TO REPORT ON HIS MIDDLE EAST TRIP.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

IN EACH MIDDLE EAST COUNTRY I STRONGLY EMPHASIZED THE COMMITMENT OF PRESIDENT CARTER, CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. MY FEELING AFTER TALKING WITH HEADS OF STATE AND OTHER LEADERS IN EACH OF THE COUNTRIES IS THAT THE PULSE BEAT OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IS STRONG.

WHILE THERE REMAIN DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AS TO HOW THE COMMON GOAL OF PEACE WE ALL SEEK CAN BE ACHIEVED, I URGED THESE LEADERS TO BE FLEXIBLE AND NOT INSIST ON PRECONDITIONS. IT IS MY OPINION THAT PRESIDENT SADAT NEEDS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ISSUE THAT CAN BE USED TO HELP PERSUADE OTHER MODERATE ARAB STATES TO ENTER INTO THE PEACE-PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS ENVISIONED IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. A MEANINGFUL GESTURE IS NEEDED WHICH WILL MAKE CLEAR THE INTENTION TO MOVE AHEAD ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ISSUES AND TO ASSURE THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. IT IS MY HOPE THAT ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE CAN BE WORKED OUT IN A SIDE LETTER OR OTHER INSTRUMENT LINKING THE TREATY TO FUTURE STEPS TOWARD PEACE ON THIS ISSUE. THERE ALSO NEEDS TO BE A CONCRETE DEMONSTRATION OF GOOD INTENTIONS BY THE ISRAELIS ON THE SETTLEMENTS QUESTIONS. IN MY TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN I ASSURED HIM OF THE US FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF ISRAELM THIS IS A HISTORIC AND CONTINUING COMMITMENT.

HOWEVER, IN MY OPINION THE 96TH CONGRESS -- WHILE EMPHASIZING

1952

1952

1952

The
 following
 items
 were
 received
 from
 the
 office
 of
 the
 Secretary
 of
 the
 State
 on
 1/15/52

1. [illegible]
 2. [illegible]
 3. [illegible]

Total
 3 items

-2-

FISCAL RESTRAINT AT HOME -- WILL BE RELUCTANT TO INCREASE ISRAELI AID WHILE ISRAEL CONTINUES TO SPEND ON THE PROLIFERATION OF NEW SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK. THE US POSITION HAS ALWAYS BEEN THAT SUCH SETTLEMENTS ARE ILLEGAL.

AT THIS TIME IN THE PEACE PROCESS, AND THIS IS WHAT I TOLD LEADERS ON BOTH SIDES, THERE NEEDS TO BE A COOLING OF THE RHETORIC. SOME COMMENTS FOLLOWING THE CAMP DAVID TALKS HAVE SERVED TO HARDEN POSITIONS AND HAVE TENDED TO POISON THE ATMOSPHERE FOR NEGOTIATIONS. END TEXT.

גר 1/1

שהח רהם שרהם שחבט מנכל ממנכל סמנכל מצפא משז הסגרה מאום א ב מצחיס חקר יום אמנ תעוד קטסו'יה
מב/כס

אנחנו
באורג
אנחנו

בלש

דחוף

מאת: האצ

גר: 29.11.78/836/2072

מס': סיסמ

מס': 1446 29.11.78

הנדון: הסכם השלום // בירד על שיחותיו עם סאדאת

סאדאת קיבל (29 בנוב) את סנטור בירד ביי אלקנאטר אלח'יריהיי למשכ
יוזם משנה. המשתתפות מארכ, אילטס וכנ ווליאם קראופורד עוזר סגן שהיוו
היו.

בירד אמר, כי החליטו להקנות. המטרה יחד עם סאדאת על השמדת קטר לקידון
המויי. סידוע אני מבקש מאזור כשליחו. המעוז בפני סאדאת את החשימה
פי הוא זוכה בהתגלות הודות ליוזמת השלום שלו.

המימשל המדי והקונגרס עושים מיטב מאמציהם להשלמת חוזה השלום
מקיים בהודיה מוצלחת. סאדאת וקיסר רוצים בהדוש המויים.
כנ אמר כי סאדאת הדגיש זאת בפניו פעמים רבות.
בירד הביע והתאמנותו כי סאדאת לא יחסוך מאמצ למען השכנה שלום
כולל ואדק במזויי.

עוד אמר: אעביר לקטר את השקפות סאדאת.
בירד סגר לסאדאת אהדת סנטור במשך למויים לשלום.
דוא בקר במעו זה בסו

הודו:-

הוא אשר במשעו זה בסוריא
הוא בקר במשעו זה בסוריא, בישראל, בירד, בטעודיה ובתורכיה.

סוף נעמי אדוק

מ.א.ד.+++

Senator Robert C. Byrd, September 18, 1978

"I commend President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin for their courage and flexibility and I hope that the spirit of Camp David will continue in the days ahead and extend to all the countries in the Middle East.

"President Carter's role was central to the substantial achievements of the summit. He deserves our admiration and the commendation of all who desire peace in the Middle East.

"This important and historic step is a good indication that compromise, regardless of differences, can be forged in the Middle East, through patience and negotiations.

"I hope the momentum of this great step forward will continue so that ultimate peace may become a reality."

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

בלתי מסווג

מבוקס גבנס

נשלח 0319000 אוגוסט 78

תקבל 030118 אוגוסט 78

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מאז; דושנינגטון
(ג'ניו) (אוס)
22

א ל מעמא ד ע קונבלניוירוקס (העבר)

לכבוד

חבר ביהמ"ד גונמן בלבנתם (דמוקרטים מניו יורק) שיגורתינום ל נשיא את המכתב שלהלן עליו
חשבו יוד עמו 45 חבדי בל תנ"י. תוכנת ב מסר על ידו לפירסום.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT

WE ARE WRITING TO EXPRESS OUR SERIOUS APPREHENSIONS ABOUT THE EVENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE IN LEBANON DURING THESE LAST FEW MONTHS. WE FEAR THAT UNLESS THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY JOIN IN CONCERTED ACTION TO REVERSE THE SITUATION, AN HISTORIC, CULTURED AND DEMOCRATIC NATION COULD WELL LOSE ITS IDENTITY AS A SOVEREIGN AND FREE STATE.

REPORTS FROM LEBANON INDICATE THAT THE ANCIENT CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY IS IN DANGER OF DESTRUCTION. THE SYRIAN ARMY, WHOSE MISSION IN LEBANON WAS SUPPOSEDLY ONE OF "PEACEKEEPING", IS INSTEAD ACTING AS AN OCCUPYING FORCE. SYRIAN LEADERS THREATEN THE EXTIRPATION OF THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS AND FULFILL THAT THREAT NOT ON THE BATTLEFIELD BUT THROUGH THE RANDOM HEAVY SHELLING OF CHRISTIAN POPULATION CENTERS. ACCORDING TO THE BBC THE SYRIANS HAVE, IN RECENT WEEKS, THROWN AS MANY AS 600 ARTILLERY, MORTAR, AND ROCKET ROUNDS PER HOUR INTO CHRISTIAN EAST BEIRUT. HUNDREDS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS HAVE DIED AND THOUSANDS HAVE LOST THEIR HOMES AND OTHER POSSESSIONS. IS THIS "PEACEKEEPING" OR IS IT RATHER AN ATTEMPT BY SYRIA TO FULFILL ITS HALF CENTURY DREAM OF A "GREATER SYRIA" THROUGH THE ELIMINATION OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE THAT WAS CREATED TO SERVE AS A HAVEN FOR THE CHRISTIANS (AS WELL AS FOR THE ISRAELI AND JEWISH LEBANESE WITH WHOM THE CHRISTIANS HAVE LIVED IN HARMONY UNTIL THE RECENT CIVIL WAR)?

WE FEEL STRONGLY THAT THE MASSACRE AND FORCED MIGRATION OF LEBANESE CHRISTIANS OUGHT TO BE VIGOROUSLY CONDEMNED BY THE UNITED STATES. WE ARE DISMAYED BY THE ADMINISTRATION'S PASSIVITY ON THIS MATTER. STATEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN ISSUED HAVE BEEN EITHER EXCESSIVELY EMBELLISHED OR MARKED BY AN EXTRAORDINARY, AND MISPLACED, EVENHANDEDNESS.

THIS NATION HAS, UNDER YOUR ADMINISTRATION, BEEN OUTSPOKEN IN ITS CHAMPIONSHIP OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALL PEOPLES. YET IN THE MATTER OF THE FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS OF THE CHRISTIAN LEBANESE-- A COMMUNITY WHICH HAS LONG BEEN CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH THE WEST-- THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE MORE THAN SILENCE.

MR. PRESIDENT, WE URGE YOU TO SPEAK OUT FORCEFULLY AGAINST THE SYRIAN ONSLAUGHT.

THE UNITED STATES MUST WORK THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS OR INDEPENDENTLY TO SEE THAT THE INDISCRIMINATE SYRIAN SHELLING OF BEIRUT STOPS. WE MUST PRESS FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CHRISTIAN AREAS OF BEIRUT AND FOR THE GRADUAL REDUCTION OF THE SYRIAN PRESENCE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE SYRIAN "PEACEKEEPERS" COULD BE REPLACED BY THE GENUINE PEACEKEEPERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND IN DUE COURSE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, INDEPENDENT OF OUTSIDE INFLUENCE, COULD REASSERT ITSELF THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. A SMALL AND VULNERABLE COMMUNITY IS UNDER SIEGE. WE URGE THAT THE UNITED STATES NOT TURN AWAY.

SINCERELY,

ADKAN

RAFIACH.

שהח ד"המ ט' רוצו שהבט מנכל ממנכל מ צמא מעת הסברה מזתים חקר דגא אמך תעוד הסטורית

מס' 388:

נשלח: 171900 פבר' 78

הזקבל: 180302 פבר' 78

אל: המשרד

מאת: רוש'נגטון

Handwritten notes:
ג' ב' 78
ד' א' 78
(מ' א' 78)

מצפא, דע צתובר ניו יורק (ה' א' 78)

בכחה של טרי טמ'ית שפורסמה היום בניו יורק טיימס על מכירת המטוסים
למצרים וסעודיה נכסל הקטע הבא על גונת בניגום:

REPRESENTATIVE JONATHAN B. BINGHAM ECHOED THIS THEME AFTER CONFERRING WITH MR CARTER AT THE WHITE HOUSE, AN OUTSPOKEN SUPPORTER OF ISRAEL AND CRITIC OF PREVIOUS ARMS DEALS WITH THE ARABS. MR BINGHAM IS A KEY MEMBER OF THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, WHICH HAS JURISDICTION OVER SUCH SALES. NONETHELESS, MR BINGHAM SAID HE DOUBTED THAT THE HOUSE WOULD VETO THE PROPOSED SALES, "SINCE EVERYONE REALIZED THE SAUDIS ARE IMPORTANT AND SADAT IS CURRENTLY IN GOOD GRACES". HE PREDICTED IN A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW THAT THE SALES WOULD PRODUCE "A GREAT FLAP AND NOISE" IN CONGRESS, BUT WOULD NOT BE BLOCKED. MR BINGHAM SAID HE WAS CONVINCED BY A VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA LAST MONTH THAT THE SAUDI LEADERSHIP REGARDED THE ARMS SALES AS A TEST OF AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP. "I MET CROWN PRINCE FAHD, WHILE I WAS THERE, HE TENDS TO LOOK YOU IN THE EYE AND SAY IN EFFECT "IF WE ARE FRIENDS AND I SAY I NEED SOMETHING THEN WHY DO YOU QUIBBLE ABOUT IT?" THAT SEEMS SIMPLISTIC TO US, BUT THAT'S THE WAY SOCIETY WORKS THERE".

בניגום טוען שזכאסו יצאה רושם מטעה לגבי עמדתו ושיגר היום למערכת

ת'ו יורק טיימס את המכתב הבא

TO THE EDITOR:

TERENCE SMITH'S ARTICLE IN THIS MORNING'S TIMES GIVES A GROSSLY MISLEADING IMPRESSION OF MY POSITION ON THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION WITH RESPECT TO ARMS SALES TO THE MIDDLE EAST. HE FAILED TO STATE THAT I AM OPPOSED TO THE ARMS SALES TO EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA. HE ALSO NEGLECTED TO STATE THAT I HAD URGED THE PRESIDENT ON JANUARY 31 TO DEFER ANY DECISION ON ARMS SALES BECAUSE OF THE ADVERSE EFFECT SUCH A DECISION MIGHT HAVE ON THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. HE IMPLIED THAT I HAD DISCUSSED THE ARMS SALES IN MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER ON FEBRUARY 15 WHICH I DID NOT. HIS ARTICLE TOOK MY SUMMARIES OF ARGUMENTS THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BE USING AND MADE IT SOUND AS IF I AGREED WITH THEM, WHICH I DO NOT. THE NEW YORK TIMES ON THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, CORRECTLY

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

DATE: 1/17/78

NO. 100
100-100000-100000

(1/17/78) DATE: 1/17/78

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- 2 -

STATED MY POSITION AS FOLLOWS:
REPRESENTATIVE JONATHAN BINGHAM, DEMOCRAT LIBERAL OF BRONX,
SAID THE FATE OF THE DEAL IN CONGRESS MIGHT DEPEND ON THE
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BELIEVED THAT "MOVING OVER THE LINE FROM NON LETHAL TO LETHAL
WEAPONS FOR EGYPT WOULD BE A VERY DANGEROUS PRECEDENT."

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שהיא מה ש/רהג טהבס לנכס לומנכס סמנכס לנכס
למל הסגרה נתנת יתך רח אמן גמזכ הסלרייה

11/10/73

11/10/73

- 2 -

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1/2 of and 1/6/73 can now
be done for me in any order

ב'נג'ד מ'ג'ו'ג'ו'ג'

December 1977

REPRESENTATIVE JONATHAN B. BINGHAM (Democrat-New York)

Term Began: 1965

Committees: Interior and Insular Affairs; International Relations--Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, (Chairman), and Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs

One of the most actively pro-Israel Representatives in Congress. Consistently supports foreign aid. Consistently initiates or supports pro-Israel resolutions. Introduced resolution expressing disapproval of HAWK missile sale to Jordan. Annually introduces bill authorizing resettlement assistance for Eastern European and Soviet refugees in Israel. This has resulted in \$160 million in resettlement aid. Received award this month from United Israel Appeal for efforts on behalf of Congressional programs for resettlement of these refugees in Israel. Introduced 1975 amendment in Committee to raise supporting assistance to Israel by \$200 million.

Major initiator of anti-boycott legislation passed by Congress to prohibit compliance by U.S. firms of secondary and tertiary boycott. Initially introduced anti-boycott legislation in 1975. Bingham's Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade took initial action on the Export Administration Act which contained the anti-boycott provisions.

Strongly opposes PLO participation in negotiations. Introduced 1975 bill to impose controls on export of nuclear fuels and technology. Serves as member of Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe to monitor compliance with the Helsinki Accords.

Initiator of Oct. 6, 1977 letter to Carter expressing concern over joint US/USSR communique on Mideast. Outspoken critic of Carter administration's "flirtation" with PLO. Calls it "indefensible." Says "American support for a PLO role at Geneva not only undermines our goal of meaningful negotiations but also erects a roadblock in the way of such negotiations." Since 1972, Bingham has introduced amendments in Committee earmarking

economic and military aid to Israel. Middle East issues are one of Bingham's main legislative interests.

Bingham's wife, the former June Lehman, is the niece of the former New York Governor. She is Jewish. She wrote the authoritative biography of Reinhold Niebuhr (American philosopher) and serves on a number of Presidential Committees. Most recently, President Carter asked Mrs. Bingham to serve on the search committee to recommend a new Chairman for the National Endowment for the Humanities. She's well-liked and respected by President Carter. Recently Bingham and his wife visited Cuba and met for approximately 12 hours with Castro. June Bingham presented Castro with Bruno Bettelheim's book on kibbutz life.

Bingham should be thanked for all his activity and support. Bingham hosts periodic meetings for the core group of pro-Israel House International Relations Committee members to discuss legislative strategy on Israel-related issues.

NOTE: Bingham is personally close to Secretary of State Vance. In the 1950's, Bingham served as Executive Assistant to Governor Averill Harriman and knew Vance before and during this period.