

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

כל המסר תוכן מספר זה כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לחיקון
דיני העונשין (במחוז המדינה
יחסי החוץ וכדומה ייחסיים).
תשי"ז-1957.

אל: המשרד
מחז: רוטינגטון

שמור

מסי 337
נשלח 191500 מאי 77

ל
א/מ/כ

(Leman)

חבר ועדת LEMAN

מצא, דע אליים שביט כאנ.
א. המורשה היהודי (מפלורידה) ביל
הק ציב של בית הנבחרים, מטפל בנושאי מחונ לאומי. מצטרפ למשלחת ועדת
השרותים המזויינים של בית הנבחרים המסירת באירופה. יהיה בסריסל
ב-27-28 וכן ב-30 למאי, אוסלו ב-28-29, ופריס לביקור בתערוכה האוירית
31/5 עד 3/6.

א. יש לשגרירינו באחת הכירות ענין מיוחד להפגש עמו, להסג ישמח
לשות זאת.

ב. לפריס- משלחת ועדת השרותים המזויינים מעוניינת לבקר בביתג הישראלי
בתערוכה ופנתה בצנורות הפנטגון להסדיר זאת.
נציג התעשייה האוירית הישראלית כאנ, מרכינ קלימוב, מטפל בככ ויגיע
לפריס בסופ שבוע זה. ברשותו פרטים על המשלחת.

רמ"ח

מנכל ממנכל
שסון זריגוב ענוג מצא איר א
מב/קא

ח' בסבת השל"ז
29 בדצמבר 1976

30

א. ל: מר ז. רפיה, וושינגטון

מאה: ס/מנהל מבס"א

הנדון: ביקור המורשת ליהודים
מכתב 619 מה- 16/12

לא נראה לנו שביקר גם בארץ במסגרת סיורו
זה. האם היחה לכך סיבה כלשהיא?

בברכה,

ס. בבלי

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

כד' כסלו תשל"ז
16 דצמ' 76

619

Handwritten signature in blue ink, possibly reading "משה דיין" (Moshe Dayan).

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: צבי דפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: ביקור חבר הקונגרס וויליאם ליהמן במזה"ח

רצ"ב הודעה שפרסם חבר הקונגרס היהודי וויליאם ליהמן בעקבות
ביקורו במזה"ח.

לתשומת לבכם:

1. הרושם הרב שעשה עליו סאדאת.
2. התרשמותו מדברי סאדאת שתמיכתו באשף אוטומאטית וטכאנית וכי להחזרת השטחים שכבשה ישראל ממצרים ב-1967 קדימות עליונה אצל סאדאת.
3. הצהרת התנגדותו לאספקת נשק לארצות ערב.
4. התיחסותו לביקור אצל הקהילה היהודית בקהיר ובקבול.

ב ב ר כ ה,
Handwritten signature
צ. דפיה

THE STATE DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

[Handwritten signature]

TO: [illegible]
FROM: [illegible]

DATE: [illegible]
SUBJECT: [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. [illegible text]

2. [illegible text]

- 3. [illegible text]
- 4. [illegible text]
- 5. [illegible text]
- 6. [illegible text]

[illegible signature]

WILLIAM LEHMAN
13TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

COMMITTEES:
EDUCATION AND LABOR
POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE

DEC 2 1976

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
424 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-4211

DISTRICT OFFICE:
2020 N.E. 1630 STREET
NORTH MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA 33162
(305) 945-7818

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

November 24, 1976

Dear Friends,

On November 21, I returned from a trip to Europe and the Middle East and I wanted to report to you on my impressions while they were still fresh in my mind.

The main reason for the trip was the opportunity to meet Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. I had the chance to sit in a room with him and ask him questions. I was able to hear not only his words, but to feel for myself his mood, the tone of his response, the level of intensity of his reactions, and thereby to learn what kind of an Egyptian leader the U.S. is dealing with.

Egypt faces staggering economic and health problems and Sadat impressed me as being intelligent enough to realize this. He also, I believe, has a genuine concern about his people and is trying to do something about upgrading Egypt's standard of living and relieving the horrendous overcrowding of its cities.

When the subject of the PLO came up, I felt Sadat's response to be mechanical and automatic. Supporting the PLO is a kind of "motherhood" issue in the Arab world. Sadat knows the Palestinians are part of the Middle East problem, but they're not essentially an Egyptian problem. Sadat's #1 priority is to regain possession of all the land in the Sinai captured by Israel in the 1967 war.

Sadat complains that when he kicked out the Russians, they cut off his source of new military equipment and spare parts. This is causing Sadat some unrest among his military leaders. However, I cannot, in good conscience, favor U.S. arms sales to any Arab state because any action that threatens the security of Israel is a definite detriment to peace.

As a member of the Education and Labor Committee, I made it a point to visit special schools in Germany where severely retarded adults are working in a sheltered workshop environment and are making a substantial contribution not only to the economy but to their own well-being. I have seen nothing in the United States equal to these schools in which retarded adults are truly productive workers. In one school, less than 4% could read and yet they were producing high quality workbenches, components for Volkswagens, toys, and other saleable products.

If we could send our state Health and Rehabilitative Services people over to see this school, it could be of more help to the mentally handicapped in Florida than any other measure I could think of.

Our group visited Rome to learn why the Communist party had become so strong in Italy. The problem appears to be that the ruling Christian Democrat party has grown old and is unable to respond effectively to the needs of the Italian people.

Most of the major cities in Italy are administered by the Communist party, which apparently is more able to run an efficient city administration. I hope the Christian Democrats can revitalize their party because the Italian people have no real desire to go communist and a communist Italy would be a serious threat, not only to NATO, but to the American position in the Middle East. We must keep our close ties to Italy and help in any way we can to maintain Italy as an American ally and a part of the free world.

I wanted to visit an underdeveloped, emerging Third World nation. Afghanistan is a particularly good example of such a country where America and Russia are both striving for influence. We now spend ten million dollars annually on foreign aid in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is not a popular subject, but often it's a matter of simple humanity. In the schools I visited, I saw bright, cheerful kids going to class in conditions that would make even the worst rural school in Alabama, where I grew up 50 years ago, seem like a luxurious facility in comparison. Anyone who visits such a school would have to say we should do what we can to help these young people.

However, there are problems with the aid program. In Afghanistan, too much of our aid is still going into Kabul, the capital and the largest city. More of the rural people then move into this already congested city. This, in turn, threatens the substructure of life in the countryside. What we need to do is get the aid into the villages and towns outside the main metropolitan areas and get our foreign aid people out of the big cities.

There is so much more to tell. I saw how the French have tackled the problem of refugees from Algeria and Morocco. This is a situation similar to the absorption of the Cuban refugees in south Florida.

The Committee with which I was traveling focused on the problem of international drug traffic. If we are ever to control drug traffic, we must first eliminate the original source, the cultivating of poppies. We can't do that until an alternative source of income is provided for those farmers who are now totally dependent on poppies for their very existence.

We had an audience with the Pope in the Vatican. He's a very intelligent, sensitive man and very concerned with the plight of the world's unfortunate and the poor.

I had interesting visits with the remnants of the Jewish community in Cairo, which numbers about 400, and in Kabul, where some of the remaining 25 Jewish families can trace their history in Afghanistan back a thousand years.

I spent time with rank and file U.S. troops in Western Europe and found the morale of our new volunteer army to be good and much improved from what I understand the situation was only a few years ago.

It's impossible to sit in Washington and really know what's going on in the rest of the world. We're spending billions of American tax dollars overseas on foreign commitments, loans, aid, and on our overseas troops and military bases. I think it is important to see first hand how well this money is being used. We also need to better know the world leaders with whom we will be dealing in the future.

I believe the people I've met and the things I've seen on this trip will make me a better representative for the people of the 13th District of Florida.

This has been another report about my work as your Congressman. Please don't hesitate to contact me if I can assist you in any way.

With every good wish for the holiday season, I am

Sincerely,

Bill
WILLIAM LEHMAN
Member of Congress

Handwritten text in the top left corner, possibly a signature or initials.

5

62217 1/10/75 ✓ Prepared December 23, 1975

REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO (Republican-California)

Term began: 1974 7/1/74

Committees Important to Israel: International Relations (12th ranking); Interior and Insular Affairs

Biographical Data: Born 1926 in Ventura; received B. A. from University of California at Santa Barbara and law degree at Santa Clara Law School; served in the Navy during World War II; Mayor of Ojai, 1958-1961; served in California Senate, 1961-1974.

Home Town: Ventura, California

Special Comments: Lagomarsino is considered a conservative. His future support for aid to Israel could depend on his impressions in Israel.

Has consistently opposed foreign aid, although he did support an amendment in committee last year to convert \$100 million of the \$300 million in military credits for Israel to grants. He also co-signed a letter to President Ford declaring his vote against last year's foreign aid bill was not a vote against aid to Israel, but against other elements in the bill. Lagomarsino has supported efforts to achieve overall cuts in this year's foreign aid bill including aid to Israel and it is expected that he will once again oppose the legislation.

Lagomarsino co-signed an unhelpful letter to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger authored by Representative Helen Meyner (D-N. J.) applauding Kissinger's efforts to achieve Middle East peace via the Sinai agreement and urging "persistent and imaginative" efforts be initiated to further Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Voted for the Sinai resolution to station 200 American technicians in Sinai.

B



① ז"ל
② י"ח ק"ל

CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

111 NORTH BERRY STREET
SUITE 414
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104
415.2798

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
סניף סן פרנסיסקו

ש ב ו ר

169

י"ח שבט תשל"ו
20 ינואר 1976
400.9;101.2

א"ל: מר אבי רמיה, וושינגטון.
מאת: הקונסול הכללי, סן פרנסיסקו.

הנדון: קונגרסמן ג'נט מאיזור סקרמנטו.

1. יש בעיות חמורות עם הנ"ל, ביחוד בקשר לסרובו להתחייב להצביע עבור המענקים וההלוואות.
2. אטנם הוא היה בין החותמים על טודעה בעתון שהוקיעה את הה"מ האו"ם בנובמבר אב" -
3. לקבוצה יהודים שביקרה אצלו בעקבות מכתב ערוץ שלו ב"ניו יורק טיימס" אמר: "לו הייתי הנשיא הייתי מסיר באש"פ כנגדו העם ההלסטיני".
4. נימק את (3) בכך שהמפתח למניעת מספר אנרגיה חדש הוא בידי הערבים.
5. ג'נט סבור שיש חפיפה גמורה בין המזרח התיכון, וייסנאס ואנגולה.
6. קב"ל על לחץ על סנסורים וקונגרסמנים כנגד ארגונים יהודיים.
7. בסוף השיחה נתן להבין שאולי יצביע בעד, אבל רק לאחר שיעייץ היטב ב"חבילת ה-2,3 בלינק ויעמוד על כך שיוצאו מסנה הפריסים הטבאיים המיותרים שניצבים בממשלה הישראלית דורשים אבל לא זקוקים להם באמת".
8. אחרי מלחמת יום הכיפורים התנהג בצורה דומה, היינו התעקש שלא יצביע בעד ולאחר לחצים "נעתר".
9. מסקנה הקבוצה שהיחה אצלו: אי אפשר לסמוך עליו בעת מספר.

בברכה,

[Handwritten signature]
ד"ר ש"ה חדמור.

העמק:
מר א. עברון, מסנה לכנס"ל.
מר מ. ארד, ז"ר, וושינגטון.
מצפ"א. ✓

Rep Robert L. Jeggett (D-Calif)
(Valley & Richmond)

Member Armed Services Committee
Elected 1962

2015

4

בלתי מסווג

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

7/11/81 (אילס)

מבוק נכנס

7/

מס. 4
נשלח 071015 מרץ 78
התקבל 071853

אל: המשרד
מאת: אילנס

מזמא. דפיה- ורש (תנבר)
חבר בית הנבחרים לויטס הכיכ הונגדות למכירת נשק למצרים ולטעוריה כראיון לתת
הריו 6.1.81

רומם
שנת רומם סרומם מנכל שחבט מנכל סנכנכ מיעת הסכרת מצמא מזמיום חקר רם אמך
רע/אי

STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF DALLAS

Know all men by these presents that

NO. 4
COUNTY OF DALLAS, TEXAS
SHERIFF

JOHN A. SMITH, Sheriff of the County of Dallas, Texas, do hereby certify that the within and foregoing is a true and correct copy of the original as the same appears in the records of the County of Dallas, Texas, this 1st day of January, 1900.

JOHN A. SMITH, Sheriff
County of Dallas, Texas

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

סודי ביותר

317

כח' חמוז חשל"ז
14 יולי 77

א.פ.י.
לישי אסוקו
הל
ד"ר אלוט (מבו ד"ר אלוט אלוט)

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

מאח: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

המצ"ב נועד להיות מברק ונשלח בד.פ. לבקשת השגריר.

ב בר כה,
3
צ. רפיח

הוציא: המנהל
אשר ליה

OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL



DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1918

OFFICE OF THE

STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS
1918

RECEIVED
STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Handwritten notes and signatures in the center of the page, including a signature that appears to be 'John C. ...' and some illegible scribbles.

RECEIVED BY THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

1918

מכרז יוצא

סוג בטחוני: סודי ביותר

דחיפות : מייד

זמן חיבור: 131515 יולי 77

אל : מנכ"ל, רביב

מאת: שגושינגטון

נפגשתי היום, לבקשתי, עם אליוט לויטס, ציר ביה"נ
מאטלנטה. לויטס מכיר היטב את הנשיא מהקופת היות הנשיא מושל
ולויטס חבר בית המחוקקים המקומי קאנג'ה.
בין השאר סיפר לויטס כלהלן:

א. הנשיא הזמין אליו את לויטס לשיחה אישית שנקיימה לפני
שבועיים והוקדשה גם למזה"ת.

ב. הנשיא רוצה מאד כי עוד השנה תהא תזוזה לקראת שלום. הנשיא
לא אמר כלל כי הוא רוצה בכינון השלום בשנה זו.

ג. הנשיא מאמין שהוא הוא האיש שיוכל להביא הצדדים לידי הדברות.
הוא רואה בכינון השלום במזה"ת לא רק אינטרס מדיני-פרגמטי
אמריקני אלא גם שליחות, מעין שליחות דתית.

ד. הנשיא רוצה בתזוזה בשנה זו לא רק משום שהוא סבור שהתנאים עתה
בשלים לכך ומשום חששו מהאפשרות שמא לאחר - מכן לא יהיו
המנהיגים הנוכחים בארצות ערב על כנס, אלא גם משום שיש לו
בעיות אחרות בהחום מדיניות החוץ שהוא דוחקן לקרן זוית, אך
יהא עליו לטפל בהן בשנה הבאה.

ה. הנשיא משוכנע כי מנהיגים ערב עמם נפגש יעמדו בדיבורם
ויקיימו ההסכמים להם יתחייבו. עם זאת צריך שההסכמים

יהיו SELF ENFORCING

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

2

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

- 1. CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 2. CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 3. CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 4. CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 5. CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 6. CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 7. CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 8. CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 9. CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION
- 10. CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

לפי (צ"מ) א"ל

ו. אנשיא ובבית הלבן עושים עתה הכל כדי להיות "כאשר" אל בגין ולהשרות אוירה טובה לקראת הפגישה אותה מגדיר לויטס כ"קריטית".

ז. לויטס אומר כי הצהרה ראש-הממשלה על נכונותו ללכת לג'נבה ב-10 לאוקטובר היחה מאד מועילה ובעיתה, והיא הסירה, למעשה, את הספק אם ישראל רוצה או אינה רוצה ללכת לג'נבה. לויטס סבור שהלחץ הציבורי בנקודה זו מופנה עתה אל הערבים.

ח. בהסתמכו על היכרותו הטובה את הנשיא מסב לויטס חשומה לבנו לכך שגם אם לפעמים נשמע הנשיא כאילו א הוא אומר דברים כדרך אגב וגם אם לא חמיד דבריו נשמעים מדודים ומהוקצעים אל נסעה לחשוב שאין לדברים אלו משמעות. הנשיא מתכוון לכל מילה ומילה שהוא אומר גם זו הנשמעת כאילו נאמרה בלהט השיחה או ~~כאשר~~ כלאחר-יד כביכול.

ט. עוד מציין לויטס כי הנשיא מעריך מאד גילוי-לב ו"דיבור לענין" (DOWN TO EARTH) והוא, לויטס, סבור כי חשוב שהשיחות עם הנשיא תתנהלנה ברוח זו. עם זאת מציין לויטס ההערכה הרבה שרוח הנשיא לגישה "אנטלקטואלית ברופסורית" לבעייה מסוימת (ברז'נסקי) אך מסתייג מגישה מתוחכמת יתר על המידה (קיסנינג'ר).

עד כאן מפי לויטס.

רפיח

מברק ירצא

ד. המעורבות של "המורה" בתוך המסגרת של המערכת הכלכלית והחברתית, תהיה כפי שיקבעו המוסדות המוסמכים.

סוג בטרונני:

ד. המעורבות של המערכת הכלכלית והחברתית, תהיה כפי שיקבעו המוסדות המוסמכים. **דחיפה:** המעורבות של המערכת הכלכלית והחברתית, תהיה כפי שיקבעו המוסדות המוסמכים. **זמן חגירות:** המעורבות של המערכת הכלכלית והחברתית, תהיה כפי שיקבעו המוסדות המוסמכים.

אל :

ד. המעורבות של המערכת הכלכלית והחברתית, תהיה כפי שיקבעו המוסדות המוסמכים. **כאמ:** המעורבות של המערכת הכלכלית והחברתית, תהיה כפי שיקבעו המוסדות המוסמכים. המעורבות של המערכת הכלכלית והחברתית, תהיה כפי שיקבעו המוסדות המוסמכים.

ד. המעורבות של המערכת הכלכלית והחברתית, תהיה כפי שיקבעו המוסדות המוסמכים. המעורבות של המערכת הכלכלית והחברתית, תהיה כפי שיקבעו המוסדות המוסמכים. המעורבות של המערכת הכלכלית והחברתית, תהיה כפי שיקבעו המוסדות המוסמכים.

המעורבות של המערכת הכלכלית והחברתית, תהיה כפי שיקבעו המוסדות המוסמכים.

המעורבות של המערכת הכלכלית והחברתית, תהיה כפי שיקבעו המוסדות המוסמכים.

המעורבות של המערכת הכלכלית והחברתית, תהיה כפי שיקבעו המוסדות המוסמכים.

המעורבות של המערכת הכלכלית והחברתית, תהיה כפי שיקבעו המוסדות המוסמכים.

המעורבות של המערכת הכלכלית והחברתית, תהיה כפי שיקבעו המוסדות המוסמכים.

המעורבות של המערכת הכלכלית והחברתית, תהיה כפי שיקבעו המוסדות המוסמכים.



Handwritten notes in blue ink: "מ"א" and "דו"ת (מקום)"

כב' טבת תשל"ז
12 ינו' 77

13

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: אבי רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: אליוט לויטס

נפגשתי השבוע, ביוזמתי, לצהריים עם אליוט לויטס, ציר ביה"נ היהודי מאטלנטה, מקורבו וידידו של קארטר עוד מהקומץ היה קארטר מוטל גורג'יה ולויטס חבר ביה"נ המקומי.

לויטס סיפר כי הוא נמצא בקשר סדיר עם יועציו הקרובים של קארטר וכי הוא בטוח עתה, כבעבר, שגישתו של קארטר כלפי ישראל הינה ידידותית.

לויטס מסב השומה לבנו לכך שיוהר סכל אדם אחר בקבינט ובכיה הלבן, ברט לאנס, ראש ה-O.M.B, הינו המקורב ביותר לנשיא. לדברי לויטס, לאנס מקורב לקארטר אף יותר מהמילטון ג'רדן ומגורדי פאואל. הוא יודע שלאנס וקארטר נפגשים ומשוחחים הכופות, לא רק בענייני כלכלה וכספים. הוא משוכנע שלאנס יהיה יועצו האישי הבלתי-רשמי של קארטר גם בבית הלבן.

האדם היחידי שלויטס מציין כמקורב לקארטר במידה שווה כמו לאנס הוא צ'רלי קירבו.

לויטס עצמו מכיר את לאנס מהקומץ לימודיהם המשותפים באמרי קולג' באטלנטה. לויטס אומר כי הוא נפגש עם לאנס לעתים הכופות, כאן בווינגטון.

לויטס עצמו הינו, כמובן, ידידותי לנו ומסייע במידת הצורך.

ב. כ. ה.
א. רפיה

העתק: משנה למנכ"ל
השגריר, כאן
איחן רף, כאן



12

1980 - 1981
12

1980 - 1981
12

AMERICAN OVERSIGHT

AMERICAN OVERSIGHT, WASHINGTON, D.C. HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF...

AMERICAN OVERSIGHT HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF...

AMERICAN OVERSIGHT HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF... (highlighted text)

AMERICAN OVERSIGHT HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF...

AMERICAN OVERSIGHT HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF...

AMERICAN OVERSIGHT HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF...

AMERICAN OVERSIGHT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

AMERICAN OVERSIGHT
WASHINGTON, D.C.



קונסוליה כללית נג' ישראל
 CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30308

806 PEACHTREE ST., N. E.
 SUITE 656

טלפון 875-7851
 אטלנטה, 1 בדצמבר 1976
 ט' בכסלו תשל"ז

215.10.7.3(541)

אל: מר צבי רפיה, וושינגטון
 מאת: הקונסול הכללי, אטלנטה

הנדון: חבר הקונגרס לויטס

נפגשתי עמו לראשונה לאחר הבחירות. שוחחנו כשעה על הבחירות, על נצחונו של קרטר ועל ביקורו הראשון בישראל לפני כעשרים שנה ומפגשו עם פרופ' סטל רוט.

לויטס חושב שהאדמ.נסטרציה החדשה הפגין חיבה לישראל ויהיו בתוכה אנשים שמבינים את מצבנו. אם זאת הדגיש שקרטר הוא איש יסודי ביותר שאוהב לבדוק לפני כל החלטה ושנוטה לשמוע דעות שונות אך צריך לזכור שהוא המחליט הסופי. הוא מודאג במקצת מהמצב הכלכלי בארה"ב ולא בטוח כמה זמן עוד יהיה אפשר להקציב לישראל את הסכומים שהיא זקוקה להם.

התרשמותו מהמצב השורר במזרח התיכון היא כדלקמן:
 מאמין שחלה התקדמות מסוימת במחשבה לקראת הסדר של מספר מדינות ערביות כגון מצרים, ערב הסעודית וסוריה, מדינות אלו להערכתו רואות בפלסטינאים גורם שעלול להזיק גם להם. לפי זה הוא נוטה לקבל את הדעה השוררת שהסיכויים לקראת הסדר הם יותר טובים כיום מאשר היו בעבר.
 הסברתי לו את עמדתנו ואת תקותנו לקראת הסדר עם שכנינו.
 הוא מקוה לבקר בחהילת השנה הבאה בישראל.

(-) נחום אשתר

בברכה,

נחום אשתר
 קונסול כללי



CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
NEW YORK

NEW YORK, N.Y.
MAY 15, 1944

TO THE DIRECTOR
OF THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

RE: [Illegible Name]
[Illegible Address]

REPORT OF THE CONSUL

[Illegible text]

[Illegible text]

[Illegible text]

[Illegible]

[Illegible]

[Illegible handwritten notes]



צילום זמנית מ-30
DEC 1 1976
מגן איל"ם

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30308

PHONE 875-7851

805 PEACHTREE ST., N. E.
SUITE 656

3

אטלנטה, 1 בדצמ' 1976
ס' בכסלו תשל"ז

215.10.7.3(541)

אל: מר צבי רפיה, וושינגטון
מאת: הקונסול הכללי, אטלנטה

הנדון: חבר הקונגרס לויטס

נפגשתי עמו לראשונה לאחר הבחירות. שוחחנו כשעה על הבחירות, על נצחוננו של קרטנר ועל ביקורו הראשון בישראל לפני כעשרים שנה ומפגשו עם פרופ' סטל רוט.

לויטס חושב שהאדמיניסטרציה החדשה תפגין חיבה לישראל ויהיו בתוכה אנשים שמבינים את מצבנו. אם זאת הדגיש שקרטנר הוא איש יסודי ביותר שאוהב לבדוק לפני כל החלטה ושנוטה לשמוע דעות שונות אך צריך לזכור שהוא המחליט הסופי. הוא מודאג במקצת מהמצב הכלכלי בארה"ב ולא בטוח כמה זמן עוד יהיה אפשר להקציב לישראל את הסכומים שהיא זקוקה להם.

התרשמותו מהמצב השורר במזרח התיכון היא כדלקמן:
מאמין שחלה התקדמות מסוימת במחשבה לקראת הסדר של מספר מדינות ערביות כגון מצרים, ערב הסעודית וטורקיה, מדינות אלו להערכתו רואות בפלסטיןאים גורם שעלול להזיק גם להם. לפי זה הוא נוטה לקבל את הדעה השוררת שהסיכויים לקראת הסדר הם יותר טובים כיום מאשר היו בעבר.
הסברתי לו את עמדתנו ואת תקוותנו לקראת הסדר עם שכנינו.
הוא מקוה לבקר בתחילת השנה הבאה בישראל.

ד"ר

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

22. 6. 1976

אל: מצפ"א

מאה: צבי רפיח

מצ"ב לעיונכם. זכרי הטובות אליהם לויטם
על ההחלטות האנ"ם ללבנון. כפי שמורפמן
בכשנמנה הקו נגכם ב-9 דנא

ב ב ר כ ה ,

צ. רפיח

העוק:

הקונכ"ל, אטלנטה

(CONGRESSIONAL RECORD)

JUNE 9, 1976

UNITED NATIONS IS APPLYING
DOUBLE STANDARD VIS-A-VIS
AGGRESSION IN LEBANON

(Mr. LEVITAS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEVITAS. Mr. Speaker, there are many of us who are increasingly questioning the wisdom of the actions taken by the United Nations.

We question the U.N.'s effectiveness. We question the evenhandedness and fairness of the U.N. We question the relationship of the United States to that body.

However, it is surprising to me, Mr. Speaker, to see the United Nations stand silently by while armed aggression is taking place in Lebanon. The United Nations Security Council, which is so swift to convene and to act in instances when other nations in the world are involved, is again applying a double standard in the case of Lebanon. It does nothing. It says nothing. It watches while foreign arms, foreign forces, and foreign powers commit aggression against a member nation and threaten the peace of that region and, indeed, the peace of the world.

Mr. Speaker, if there has ever been a need for the security and the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations to be brought to bear, it is in the case of what is occurring in Lebanon today as we see this ancient, peaceful community being destroyed. Why? Why does the U.N. do nothing? I think this proves the useless hypocrisy of the organization, which was conceived a dream for world peace and now has become a useless and ineffective body which piously proclaims slander and lies as truth. They shall reap the whirlwind.

Mr. Speaker, I call upon the United Nations and the Security Council to take those steps necessary to secure peace and security in the troubled land of Lebanon. In other words, put up or shut up!

(50)

22/11

5

October 18, 1976

SENATOR PAUL LAXALT (Republican - Nevada)

Biographical Information:

Born in Reno, August 2, 1922; attended Carson City High School, Santa Clara University, University of Denver Law School; served in U.S. Army, World War II; district attorney, Ormsby County, 1951-54; entered into private practice of law, engaged mainly in trial work, 1954-66; Nevada Lieutenant Governor, 1966-70; retired as Governor to reenter private life, 1970; served as senior partner of legal firm, Laxalt, Berry & Allison, with offices in Carson City, Nev., 1970-74; involved with family and associates in construction and opening of Ormsby House, a hotel-casino in Carson City, together with other land developments; six children; elected to the U.S. Senate, November 5, 1974.

Political Information:

Laxalt is the first Basque-American to serve in the Senate, and the first Nevada Republican Senator since 1952. In 1964 Laxalt ran against Sen. Cannon and lost by 48 votes. In 1974 Laxalt won his seat by only 624 votes.

Committees:

Aeronautical and Space Sciences
Labor and Public Welfare

Voting Record:

Laxalt's voting record on the foreign aid bills has been mixed. He voted for the FY76-77 authorization bill. He either voted against all other foreign aid legislation or was not present. He did vote for the Sinai resolution. He signed the letter of 76. He voted for the Jackson amendment to the Defense Procurement Act to renew section 501 giving the President authorization to transfer aircraft and related equipment to Israel by loan or sale.

Laxalt wrote an article in April of 1976 for The Jewish Reporter of Las Vegas in which he said: "Our roots in the Israeli struggle to survive go back to the United Nations action -- which the U.S. spearheaded -- creating this nation. We shouldered the responsibility to mold a Jewish state in the Middle East twenty-eight years ago and must never renege."

Comments:

The Atomic Energy Commission (now within the Energy Research and Development Agency) is one of the largest employers in Nevada.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



ה'תשנ"ז
(מס' 77)

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

י"ז סבת חשל"ז
7 ינואר 77

5

אל: מצפ"א


מאת: שי פלדמן, וושינגטון

הנדון: יחסי ארה"ב-ישראל וארה"ב-אירן

רצ"ב מאטר שנכתב ע"י סנסור פול לקסלט. במאטר מביא הכותב את מסקנות ביקורו במזה"ה כהבר משלחה ריביקוף.

תשומת לבכם שהסנסור רואה את מדיניות החימוש של ישראל ואירן כנובעות מפקפוק גובר בנכונותה של ארה"ב לקיים סוערבות לטובתן מעבר למה שהיא עושה כבר עתה.

ב ב ר כ ה,


ש. פלדמן

העתק: השגרירות, טהרן.

SECRET



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: [Illegible]

DATE: [Illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY MATTER

Reference is made to the report of [Illegible] dated [Illegible] at [Illegible].

The above information was obtained from [Illegible] and is being furnished to you for your information.

J. Edgar Hoover

[Signature]

Very truly yours,

Truckee, Calif.
Sierra Sun-Bonanza
(Cir. 2xW. 5,774)
(Cir. Free 3,080)

DEC 15 1976

Allen's P.C.B. 10, 1980

1100 - 23 1/2

Laxalt reports

U.S. policy creates arms race in the Middle East

By SEN. PAUL LAXALT

The utility of America's Armed Forces was long judged by our allies according to the effectiveness to which we could come to the aid of friends in times of need. This ability on the part of our country to offer assistance was viewed here at home as a necessity for national security reasons and a matter of good faith.

Well, times have changed our perspective and we've grown more cautious of what

are being called "foreign entanglements." Not surprisingly, I found on my recent fact-finding tour of the Middle East that their standards of judgement on this subject are also altering somewhat.

For instance, nations we have considered close allies for years like Israel and Iran now seriously question our willingness to commit U.S. involvement on their behalf over what we are now doing although they may not

necessarily doubt our military capabilities. This development is the direct result of a very complicated situation in the Middle East and has led to an arms buildup in this part of the world that could be deadly.

Iran shares a common border with the Soviet Union which — while not now an immediate concern to this country's leader, the Shah — cannot be ignored. At the same time, Iran has had continuing problems with

Iraq. In the light of these circumstances, the Shah of Iran believes there exist very legitimate reasons for his country to be fully prepared militarily. He told a group of us visiting senators that he can no longer assume, as he once did, that the United States will come to his aid if seriously needed so Iran must arm itself to the extent he deems necessary.

The nation of Israel, of course, is in a state of constant tension with the

Arab peoples. Peace, at best, is always tenuous here. And in conferences with Prime Minister Rabin and the foreign minister we were informed that because of the complicated political situation in the Middle East, Israel fully expects to "go it alone" if necessary in the future without any overt American involvement. As in Iran's case, this means Israel is arming to the teeth.

So what we have is an arms buildup that I, frankly,

find rather frightening. Yet, the U.S. is between a rock and a hard place. We have a responsibility — especially in the case of Israel — to help secure this nation. And we can't neglect Iran, a friend of longstanding. Security of both nations at this time leads to providing certain arms that each country requests. In all honesty, if we didn't supply what is needed, the French and British would and we were told this in several conversations by

both the Israelis and Iranians.

The obvious spin off is that the Arab adversaries of Israel have joined the arms race as has Iraq. This whole scene reminds me of a small snowball when when started downhill built to gigantic and dangerous proportions.

There aren't any easy answers. What we're dealing with is cultures that have thousands of years of attitudes and prejudices built in and no amount of diplomacy

can change this for the near future, if can only offer compromises.

In the Middle East today the situation is so very complicated and colored with grays that it is difficult at times to pick the correct course of action.

The Iranians and Israelis paint no illusions for themselves and recognize quite candidly our nation's dilemma. Unfortunately, this has produced an arms race in the Middle East.

מברק נכנס - מסווג

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, בלתי
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים).
תש"ז - 1957.

הא
ד"ר ארנסט (אין-61)

ס ו ד י

מס: 191

נשלח: 091800 דצמי 76

אל: המשרד
מאת: רושינגטון
מ.רביב

נפגשתי היום עם סנטור LAGAL במשרדו בקפיטול לשמוע רשמיו
מהביקור. להלן עיקרי דבריו-

היה זה ביקורו הראשון בישראל ובמזת. החרשם שכולם במזת רוצים שלום ואכן
צריך לעשות למען התקדמות לשלום. כל המנהיגים עמם נפגש-בישראל ירדן
מצרים ואיראן הם מאד טובים כל צד יצטרך לוותר כדי להגיע לשלום
ובכלל זה ישראל. מוכרחים לפתור גם את הבעיה הפלשתינאית. תחילה אמר
אשפ, מששאלתיו הבהיר-פלשתינאים ולא דוקא אשפ. מסכים עמנו שאשפ רוצה
להשמיד ישראל וכל עוד זו מטרתו אל לנו לנהל עמו מומ. הוא-לקסלט-
דואג לפתרון הבעיה הפלשתינאית בכללה ואין ארגון זה או אחד מענינו
במיוחד.

סיפר שנפגש בקהיר עם נציג אשפ (עקל) יחד עם הסנטורים גריפין וגלנ.
מדברי עקל החרשם שאשפ היום יותר גמיש מבעבר. לא נכנסו עמו לפרטים.
ואולם כאמור-העיקר לדבריו, הם הפלשתינאים ולא אשפ

לגבי ישראל אמר- ייבדור לעינ כל שעשיתם עבודה נפלאה בתפוח הארץ. אבל
מצבכם הכלכלי קשה ביותר והחלות שלכם בנו מלאה. יש לאהוב התחייבות מוסרית
לגביכם. אבל הטענות ששמעתי בישראל כאילו ישראל גומלת לאהוב בכך
שהיא מהווה נכס אסטרטגי לארהב-אינמ מקובלים עלי ועל כמה מעמיתי
(לא פירש מי). לקסלט מציע לנו לא להשתמש בטעונ האסטרטגי שכן הדבר
יוצר רושם כאילו אנו מעמידים היחסים בינינו על בסיס שווה של קח ותן.
לדבריו, האמת היא, שאהב תומכת בישראל מטעמי מוסריים בעיקר.

לגבי מצרים אמר- החרשתי שסאדאת כנה ורוצה בשלום. המצב הכלכלי של המצרים
הוא איום. קהיר מלוכלכת ומתפורדת. הוא חייב לפתור מצבו הכלכלי ולשם-
כך זקוק לשלום.

הערה:- משיחתנו והערותיו השונות החרשתי שאיננו מתעניין יחד על המידה
בעניני חוצ. חזר ואמר לי שאיננו איש צבא ואיננו אסטרטג. כל מה שמעניין
אותו הוא שתהא תזוזה לשלום.
על דבריו לגבי איראן בנפרד.

רפ"ח.

שח רותם מנכל שהבט ממנכל רוזן י. רביב שק ארגוב מצפא מזחיס חקר רם אמנ (כארי) חז/קא

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

כ"ט חמוז תשל"ז
15 יולי 77

322

היכר
ל
ה.י.ר.

אל: מספ"א

מאת: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

רצ"ב שתי התבטאויות שהופיעו ברשומות הקונגרס ב-14 דנא.

בראשונה טוען המורשה LEDERER מפנסילבניה כי טדיניוח
הממשל למזה"ת מבולבלת, וכי בלבול זה מעודד סמסלות ערב להמנע
מנסיון להגיע לשלום פתוך התקווה שארה"ב תלחץ על ישראל.

בהתבטאות השניה הכליל המורשה איילברג ברשומות את דיווחו
של ג'רום שטרן, ממנהיגי יהדות פילדלפיה, מפגישה מנהיגי היהדות
עם הנשיא קרטר בה השתתף.

ב ב ד כה,
3 י.ר.
צ. רפיח

העחק: בני נבון, כאן.

יקונט, באזאביה

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



EMBASSY OF GREAT BRITAIN
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Handwritten notes and stamps, including a date stamp that appears to be "APR 15 1954".

TO:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

FROM:

THE AMERICAN LEGATION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Reference is made to the letter of the British Legation dated 11-1-54.

The American Legation has been advised that the British Legation is planning to hold a meeting on the subject of the proposed amendments to the Constitution of the United States. It is requested that you advise the American Legation of the date and time of this meeting.

The American Legation is interested in the views of the British Legation on the proposed amendments to the Constitution of the United States. It is requested that you advise the American Legation of the views of the British Legation on this subject.

J. C. R. [Signature]
2. [Signature]

Very truly yours,

[Handwritten signature]

U.S. MIDEAST POLICY DISTURB-
INGLY CONFUSED

HON. RAYMOND F. LEDERER

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 14, 1977

Mr. LEDERER. Mr. Speaker, on June 16, I spoke to the House about the overreaction of the administration to the Israeli elections and the rise to authority of Menachem Begin. Since then President Carter's statements on his Mideast policy and statements of the State Department have only further confused the American position. The President's meeting recently with national Jewish leaders has put some confidence back into the American stand. However, our country's position is still disturbingly confused.

Listening to and reading official announcements, I am still unable to discern a concrete policy on the necessities of a Mideast peace, especially with regard to borders and a Palestinian homeland. I think such confusion can only encourage the Arab countries to withhold peace attempts in the hopes of bringing Israel to its knees with the help of the United States. This is, I am sure, not what the President intends. With this in mind, I anxiously await the results of the President's meetings with Mr. Begin next week.

I here insert two articles which appeared in my hometown newspaper, the Philadelphia Inquirer. I believe these explain the adverse effect of the administration's policy on peace efforts:

U.S. MIDEAST STATEMENT IS
ITSELF "DISTURBING"

If the Carter Administration "wrongly" believes, as it said in an official statement issued by the State Department, "that progress toward a negotiated peace in the Middle East is essential this year if future disaster is to be avoided," it would have done better not to issue the statement.

This is not to say that the statement, which calls on Israel to withdraw from occupied ter-

territories on all fronts and by implication takes Prime Minister Menachem Begin to task, necessarily will do terrible harm. It is only to say that it is more likely to obstruct than to advance "progress toward a negotiated peace," because it has already made the Israelis more nervous than they have been about the direction of U.S. policy and may give the Arabs false hopes as to what they can expect from the U.S.

Why was the statement issued at all? Officials explain that it was a response to "disturbing" comments by the new Israeli prime minister. Yet what Mr. Begin said was hardly new. He has made no secret of his reluctance to surrender territory on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. He was, at worst, ambiguous about what he means by negotiating "without preconditions."

Still, ambiguity is hardly an unknown quantity in the higher reaches of other governments, including Washington. If U.S. officials wanted to send Mr. Begin a message before his visit to Washington three weeks from now, they could have picked up the telephone, sent him a cable or used a diplomatic pouch.

What makes the State Department statement all the more disturbing, if not astounding, is that it comes on the heels of an administration effort to assuage Israeli concern about U.S. Mideast policy. Vice President Mondale's San Francisco speech, in which he said, or appeared to say, that the U.S. did not intend to pressure Jerusalem or impose its views on the parties, was part of that effort. So was the administration's announcement of new sales of \$115 million in arms to Israel.

U.S. officials also said they were responding to Sen. Jacob K. Javits, who himself was responding to Mr. Mondale. In a speech delivered on the Senate floor Monday, the New York Republican criticized the "imbalance in what the Israelis and the Arabs are being called on to do." Yet what Sen. Javits said, Mr. Mondale had acknowledged in noting the "profound asymmetry in what the two sides in the Middle East are seeking." Israel, the Vice President pointed out, is being called on to give up territory, which is tangible and "difficult to regain short of war." The Arabs are being asked to make peace, which "can be ephemeral," easily retracted.

Those who drafted the State Department message should have considered how the Arabs would read it. It is simply not enough to go through the ritual of asserting—ambiguously—that "the Arab states will have to agree to implement a kind of peace which produces confidence in its durability." The Arabs must understand that they cannot force the U.S. to do their bargaining for them to obtain what the Israelis under no circumstances will concede—Insecure, indefensible borders and an independent, irredentist state, dominated by terrorists, in their midst. The Arabs must understand that they, too, must make tangible concessions. There must be no ambiguity about that and especially no illusions.

ON THE MIDEAST—CARTER IS LESS THAN EVEN-
HANDED

(By Elia Góes)

The Mideast could well become Jimmy Carter's Waterloo.

That's the impression I'm getting as his administration begins to formulate a policy on settling the Arab-Israeli standoff.

It's not that Jimmy Carter doesn't want peace in the Mideast, of course. Like every modern President before him, he's made that a top priority goal. But the problem is that, with each passing week and each additional administration statement, Carter has shown a surprising inability to size up the situation—and the attitudes of the adversaries in question—as they really exist.

In short, it is one thing to say that "progress toward a negotiated peace in the Middle East is essential this year if future disaster is to be avoided." It is quite another thing to pull it off. And I'm not at all sure that Carter is savvy enough to do it.

You only have to look at his changing position to wonder.

As a candidate, Jimmy Carter issued statement after statement that, from an Israeli point of view, at least, were very reassuring. On June 6, 1976, for instance, he said point blank that a precondition for a Middle East peace was a change in the Arab attitude for Israel.

He called not only for an Arab recognition of Israeli state but also for diplomatic relations, a peace treaty, open frontiers and an end to both an embargo and propaganda against the tiny country. He asked for final borders between Israel and its neighbors, but emphatically stated that they should be "determined in direct negotiations between the parties and they should not be imposed from outside."

On the question of a Palestinian state—one of the thorniest points of contention between the two sides—Candidate Carter said, "There ought to be territories ceded for the use of the Palestinians. I think they should be part of Jordan and be administered by Jordan. I think half the people in Jordan are Palestinians themselves."

That point of view was very close to the one espoused by the government of Yitzhak Rabin and served to dispel much of the distrust many American Jews had felt toward Carter until then.

But things have changed considerably since Carter's move to Washington. The President has delivered what can only be seen by the Israelis—and their sympathizers—as one body blow after another. The administration cancelled an arms sale to Israel, refused to allow the sale of Israeli-built Kfir jets to Ecuador and turned down, for security reasons, it said, a proposal for a co-produced U.S.-Israel military communications system. By the time the administration announced a \$115 million arms sale to Israel, tensions between the two countries were already high.

Yet this, all of this, including Carter's ill-advised description of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad as "a strong supporter in the search for peace," was mere prelude to the recently declared Middle East policy statement which called on Israel to withdraw from all of its occupied territory.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to see exactly what Carter hoped to gain by this statement. Meant as an official response to what is seen as newly elected Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin's hard-line stance on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it served only to exacerbate U.S.-Israeli relations and to give hope to the Arabs that they will be asked to concede nothing at the bargaining table.

For while it is true that the statement called, in theory, for "both sides to the dispute to make difficult compromises," it, in fact, took only the Israelis to task. And while it called for a "homeland for the Palestinians whose exact nature should be negotiated between the parties," it never mentioned Jordan—a semantic slight which could not be lost on either side.

So what Carter has done is to serve notice to the Israelis, who, after all, have won every war with the Arabs since 1948, that he can no longer be viewed as a solid ally. And he's managed to give the Arabs some hope that American rhetoric will accomplish what all of their aggression has not—total capitulation by the other side.

It's not a position designed to make either side willing to compromise and it's not likely to make peace any more of a reality in 1977 than it has been for the past 29 years. About

the only thing that it does is to put Carter into the diplomatic equivalent of being right smack dab between a rock and a hard place.

And that's a very precarious place for a President to be.



LEAHY

5

מברק נכנס - מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

Handwritten signature and notes in blue ink, including the word "טודי" (Today).

כל המוסר תוכנו מספק זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסיון וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

אל: המשרד
מאת: ורש

מס. 48
נשלח 031600 אויג 78
המזבל 052304

מבכל

נפגשתי היום לשיתוף אויבת עם סנטור LEAHY ומוקרט מורמונט, חבר ועדת התקצבות אשר הצביע בעד עסקת המסוסיס. סקרתי את ההגמפתחיות האחרונות והצבעתי על וקשר שבין אישור עסקת המסוסיס לבין עמדתו הנוקשה של מצרים ומקוריות השאטני בידינו מסמך השגרירות המסכת עמדת הממשלה לאור ועידת לירס.

ליחי אשר כי הוא ורכים מעמיתיו התרשמו מאד לטובה מרברי שתח דיין לאור ועידת לירס וההגישה החדשה של מנישראל בנושא העומת כפי שכיה לכיסודי בזברי יתח. כמו כן אמר שהוא ורכים מעמיתיו קרים להקשתה שולה במחית סאראת כלפי העומת והתרשמו על כך.

באשוי לעמדת סעודיה-לאור ורכים שאנרתי ים בדעתו לפנות גם לטועמי ול- C. I. A. ולשמוע הערכתם בגדון.

במחלק השיתה חזר ליחי וחריגיש מספר פעמים כי יודדותו לישראל ותמיכתו בנו היא איתנה ורכה. אין היא תלוית בקול היהודי (יש בורמונט קהילה קטנה ביותר) אלא היא נובעת גם מהיותו כן למשפחה קהולית שידעה אמלייה בעבר.

רפיה
שהח רתח סרתח מנכל ממנכל מצמא דיניץ/באמצעות לשמנכל חקר רח
ח/אוס

8132

5



RICHARD G. LUGAR
INDIANA

5107 Division Office Building
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

INDIANA OFFICE:
Room 407
43 East Ohio Street
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA 46204

138-0-237
138

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

COMMITTEES:
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY
BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

June 20, 1978

Mr. Burton M. Joseph
National Chairman
Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith
315 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10016


Dear Mr. Joseph:

Thank you for your recent communication regarding President Carter's proposed arms sales to Middle Eastern nations. I am truly sorry that my decision in this instance was a disappointment to you.

I listened to both the public and the closed session arguments with great care because the controversies surrounding the proposed sales have troubled most Senators and many other citizens of our country for several weeks. After listening to the debate, I was convinced that it was in the best interests of our nation to give the President the permission which he had sought. Further, I believe that the solution which has been reached will prove to be in the best interests of Israel and other countries in the Middle East.

I am strongly committed to the establishment of a lasting Middle East peace and will continue to work toward that end. I appreciate your taking the time to express your personal viewpoint and for giving me the benefit of your counsel on an issue of extraordinary importance to peace in the Middle East and peace in the world during the years immediately before us.

Sincerely,


Richard G. Lugar

RGL:mdm

S. I. HAYAKAWA
CALIFORNIA

CHIEF OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

COMMISSION
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION,
AND FORESTRY
HUMAN RESOURCES
BUDGET

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 19, 1978

Mr. Burton M. Joseph
315 Lexington Ave.
New York, New York 10016

Dear Mr. Joseph:

Thank you for writing concerning the arms sales package to the Middle East.

The resolution of disapproval on the arms sales package to the Middle East--S. Con. Res. 86--was rejected in the Senate by a vote of 44 yeas to 54 nays. I voted against the resolution because we should not allow a strategic raw material exporting country, such as Saudi Arabia, to become vulnerable to Soviet adventurism. We have seen a glaring example of Soviet adventurism in the Horn of Africa and although the conflict has abated somewhat, we cannot assure that the Soviets have decided to behave. I want to ensure the safety and prosperity of Israel. Such a goal is very close to my heart. But the achievement of this goal requires that our other allies, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, must also feel secure against external attack.

Again, thank you for writing.

Sincerely yours,

Sam Hayakawa

S. I. Hayakawa

SIH/tcj

JOHN SPARKMAN, ALA., CHAIRMAN

FRANK GRUCH, OHIO
CLAUDE PELL, N.J.
GEORGE MC GOWAN, S. CAR.
DICK CLARK, IOWA
JOSEPH H. ROSEN, JR., DEL.
JOHN SLENN, OHIO
EDWARD (DUKE) STEWART, FLA.
PAUL D. SARNOFF, MD.
MURIEL HUMPHREY, MISS.

CLIFFORD P. CASE, N.J.
JACOB K. JAVITS, N.Y.
JAMES H. PEARSON, MISS.
CHARLES H. PERCY, ILL.
ROBERT P. GIFFIN, MISS.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.

HOWELL JONES, CHIEF OF STAFF
JOHN E. SCHMIDT, CHIEF CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 20, 1978

Burton M. Joseph
National Chairman
Anti-Defamation League of
B'nai B'rith
315 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10016

Dear Burton:

Thank you for your recent letter and for sending me a copy of your statement on the Senate's decision to support the Carter Administration proposal to sell arms to Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

You can be assured that in my discussions with President Carter, I have in the past and I intend to continue to stress how critically important it is--for all nations--that the participants in the Middle East conflict resume the peace talks as soon as possible.

Thank you--as always--for giving me the benefit of your views.

Sincerely,

Muriel Humphrey

with other

5

Wolfe
N. J. W.

OPHIR TOURS LTD

Travel & Tourist Service

HEAD OFFICE: 54 BEN YEHUDA ST. TEL AVIV. P.O.B 3378 PHONES 247237-9

Telex: 33624

Cables: OPHIRTRAV

Itinerary specially prepared for:

THE BOEHM JOURNEY TO ISRAEL

8 Days - 7 Nights

Sunday, November 26 - December 4, 1978

Monday, November 27

Ben Gurion- Airport-- Jerusalem

Morning Arrival in Israel at Ben Gurion Airport. Group will be met and assisted by Ophir Tours Representatives, and transferred to Jerusalem for accommodation.

6.30 p.m. Briefing

7.00 p.m. Reception

8.45 p.m. Musical welcome to Israel at "Khan" Folklore Cave.

Tuesday, November 28

Morning After breakfast, proceed to Mt. of Olives to enjoy the beautiful panoramic view of the entire city of Jerusalem. Then continue to the Old City, and proceed on a walking tour, passing the Via Dolorosa, Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the Western Wall, the Temple Area, the Dome of the Rock, the Stations of the Cross, Ancient Synagogues and the colourful Bazaars. Proceed to Mt. Scopus for viewing of Epstein masterpiece "Our Tree of Life", thence to Ein Karem for viewing of the Chagall Windows and lunch as guests of Hadassah.

Afternoon Free for own activities.

7.30 p.m. Reception at the Jerusalem Hilton.

8.30 p.m. The Anniversary Ball with dinner - Formal Gala in celebration of Israel's Thirtieth Year of Statehood in the Grand Ballroom of Jerusalem Hilton. Guests of Honour: Their Excellencies, the Ambassador of the United States and Mrs. Samuel Lewis; Hebrew University President, Mr. Avraham Harmon, Mrs. Helen Boehm and her distinguished entourage on their good-will visit to Israel. The Anniversary Ball will be the occasion of the official presentation of the Boehm Israel collection to Israeli Heads of State. Black tie.

Wednesday, November 29

Morning After breakfast, proceed for a full day tour to Massada. Drive to Jericho, to visit the oldest known city in the world. View historic excavations, including the ancient walls and Hisham's Palace. Proceed to Massada, via the Caves of Qumran, where the Dead Sea Scrolls were found. Ascend by cable-car to Fortress of Massada- the last stronghold of the Jewish Zealots in their war against the Romans. Visit the excavations, Herod's Palace, the Synagogues, the Bath House etc. Lunch at Arad. Return to Jerusalem.

.../2



Handwritten notes in a box:
 אורח
 ג'ס'ד
 ירמין


Handwritten notes:
 ירמין
 ירמין

Date:

Ref GR/5783/78

Page:







OPHIR TOURS LTD

Travel & Tourist Service

HEAD OFFICE: 54 BEN YEHUDA ST. TEL AVIV. P.O.B 3378 PHONES 247237-9

Telex: 31624

Cables: OPHIRTRAV

Itinerary specially prepared for:

THE BOEHM. JOURNEY TO ISRAEL

8 Days - 7 Nights

Sunday, November 26 - December 4, 1978

Date: .

Ref GR/5783/78

Page: 2

Wednesday, November 29 (Cont'd)

8.00 p.m. An evening at the Israel Museum, Reception and colation..
Guided view of the famed Museum... Presentation of segments of
Boehm collection for permanent display.

Thursday, November 30
Jerusalem - Galilee

Morning After breakfast, drive to Nazareth to visit the Holy sites,
including the Church of the Annunciation, Mary's Well, St. Joseph
Church, the Sea of Galilee. Continue via Kana to Tiberias, for
a Tour of the City, the Hot Springs and the Health Resort.

Lunch Proceed to Tiberias for lunch at Hof Hashaket.
After lunch, proceed by bus to Tabgha, site of the Miracle of
the loaves and Fishes. Then to Capernaum, to visit the ancient
Synagogue from the second century. Continue on via Mt. Beatitudes
to see the mosaic floor of the fourth century Byzantine Church,
and on to Kibbutz Guest Houses for dinner and overnight.
After dinner special entertainment in honour of the Boehm
Journey to Israel.

Friday, December 1st
Galilee - Tel Aviv


Morning After breakfast drive to Safad, visit its famous Artists Quarters..
proceed to Acre, the ancient city of the Crusaders where we
stop for lunch at the Argaman Restaurant. Continue to Haifa,
Caesarea to visit the Roman Amphitheatre. Proceed to Mrs.
Reuber Rubin's House as guests at the famous studio of Reuben
Rubin, Israel's premier Artists..thence along the coastal road
to Tel Aviv and the famed Tel Aviv Hilton.

Evening A traditional Sabbath Eve Meal. Hosts: Mrs. Aviva Najar, Mrs.
Daniel Moynihan, President and Honorary President of IADAF,
with participation of cross-section of Israel's art world.

Saturday - 2 December
Tel Aviv

Morning Free for optional tours to Santa Katherina Monastery, Mt. Sinai,
Eilat on the Red Sea and the desert area.

7 p.m. Official reception at the Tel Aviv Museum where a representative
collection of Boehm creations will be presented to the Museum.
Hosts: Mayor Shlomo Lahat and Members of the Board of the
Tel Aviv Museum.







OPHIR TOURS LTD

Travel & Tourist Service

HEAD OFFICE: 84 BEN YEHUDA ST. TEL AVIV, P.O.B 3378 PHONES 247237-9

Telex: 33824

Cables: OPHIRTRAV

Itinerary specially prepared for:

THE BOEHM JOURNEY TO ISRAEL

8 Days - 7 Nights

Sunday, November 26 - December 4, 1978

Date:

Ref GR/5783/78

Page: 3

Saturday - 2 December (Cont'd)

9.00 p.m. Drive to the Old City of Jaffa, and the artists Quarters. Visit Israel's premier artists, then proceed to Omar Khayam for a special Folklore Show.

Sunday - 3 December

9.30 a.m.

Visit to Tel Aviv University for two special events. The dedication of the International Research Centre for Study of Drug abuse by Mrs. Elizabeth Moynihan, and the presentation of a segment of the Boehm Israel Collection for the University Arts Institute.



Lunch at the University.


Afternoon Free for shopping.

8 p.m. Gala Farewell dinner - Dance hosted by Mrs. Helen Boehm in honour of the Ladies and Gentlemen who are extending their gracious hospitality to the Members of the Boehm Journey to Israel in the Thirtieth year of the Israel's Statehood...

Monday, 4 December

Morning Departure to Ben Gurion Airport for return flight to New York. Arrival time scheduled to make possible same-day flights to point of origin in United States.





1055N
0507

United States Senate

WASHINGTON D.C. 20510

June 16, 1978

Mr. Burton Joseph
315 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10016

Dear Burton:

I appreciate your communication expressing concern over the Administration's proposed sale of jet fighter aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. As you know, on May 15 the resolution of disapproval was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 54-44. I voted with the minority to disapprove the sale, primarily because of the timing of the sale with regard to continued progress towards peace in the Middle East.

I believe that the Soviet Union and its Cuban allies are carefully and deliberately surrounding the oil-rich Persian Gulf. I also believe that both Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which are in the forefront of the forces of moderation in the Arab world, have a legitimate need to modernize and upgrade their military forces. Both countries face growing threats to their security posed by such Soviet client states as Iraq, Libya, Syria, South Yemen, and Ethiopia.

The F-15s being sold to Saudi Arabia cannot be delivered prior to 1982. For this reason, I believe that this arms sale will have very little impact upon the Middle East military balance for the next three to four years. It does, however, have a large psychological impact, and I was afraid that regardless of the outcome of the vote in the Senate, the "losing" side will be less likely to make the concessions necessary to promote a peace settlement in the Middle East. For this reason, I joined with Senator Jackson and Senator Moynihan in a letter to President Carter urging him to delay submitting the proposed sale to the Congress pending further movement toward a peace settlement. I am enclosing a copy of this letter for your information.


I also worked for a compromise which could have avoided any of our friends in the Middle East feeling that they had lost the Senate vote, but all such efforts failed.

I believe that in the long run a stable peace in the Middle East can only be brought about through improved relations between Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Although I would have preferred to see the sale postponed pending further peace efforts, I am hopeful that my fears will not be realized and that all three countries will realize that their security can best be protected by moderation and compromise which will lead to peace in the Middle East.

I am also hopeful that these sales will not interfere with the long-standing relationship between our country and Israel. I believe that the Senate and the Administration are determined to continue to maintain this U.S.-Israel friendship.

I appreciate your sharing your views with me on this very important issue, and hope that you will continue to advise me on matters of concern to you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Sam". The signature is stylized with a large, looping initial letter.

Sam Sam

Enclosure

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C.

April 25, 1978

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Without getting into the substance of your proposal to sell sophisticated aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt, we write to address the issue of the timing of the Administration's request to the Congress to authorize a new arms "package."

There is no doubt that the proposal will face an intensive and divisive debate in the Senate where the outcome is uncertain. Indeed, there are strong indications that a majority of the Senate will vote to disapprove at least one of the proposed sales. We share what we believe to be the overwhelming sentiment of the Senate that the package not now be presented for debate and decision.

Our national effort would be far better directed toward encouraging a peace between Israel and Egypt, to reinforcing the promising elements of the Sadat-Begin dialogue and to bringing those negotiations to a favorable conclusion. Were the proposed arms sales presented to the Congress following a peace between Israel and Egypt, there is no doubt that it would receive favorable consideration in the Congress.


Approval by the Congress with a consensus rather than the probable rejection of part of the package after a bitter controversy is clearly in the national interest. A delay would facilitate an intensified negotiation effort.

Once a peace agreement has been reached, the Congressional attitude toward the provision of sophisticated weapons to the parties would be very different from what it is today. In the aftermath of a peace agreement, the atmosphere in which the arms proposals would be considered would be far more conducive to the outcome you desire.

For all these reasons we believe that a delay of a few months is essential. It would provide additional time and additional incentives for the realization of a peace accord. It would spare the country and

our friends in the Middle East a debate certain to be marked by bitterness and contention. We hope that you will give serious consideration to this proposal; and we stand ready, individually, to assist in the efforts to bring about a peace in the Middle East.

Sincerely,


Henry M. Jackson, U.S.S.


Daniel Patrick Moynihan, U.S.S.


Sam Nunn, U.S.S.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

31 ביולי 1978

א ל : מזתי"ם
מאת : נ. תמיר, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנטור מוינהן - המצב בלבנון

ב- 26 דנא - במליאת הסינט - הפנה סנטור מוינהן חשומה לב
הקונגרס להתדרדרות המצב בלבנון.

בלוטה - פרטום דברי מוינהן ברשימות הקונגרס.

בברכה,

נ. תמיר

העק : מצפ"א

OFFICE OF THE
DIRECTOR



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1975 10 12

TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: [Illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

1. [Illegible text]

2. [Illegible text]

10/12/75

[Illegible]

[Illegible]

THE DESTRUCTION OF LEBANON

• Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. President, over the past 2 years I have attempted to call public attention to the implications to the accelerating pace of destruction in Lebanon. A conflict in Lebanon has raised up enormous physical and human casualties; yet these are no less important than the veritable destruction of the Lebanon democracy.

It strikes me that the Western World at large has been startlingly oblivious of the onslaught against the Lebanese democracy.

Put plainly, what the totalitarian powers have achieved with their arms, with their surrogates, in Lebanon is paradigm of what they have in store for other nearby democracies and for democracy in general. Israel is most immediately affected but surely other democracies might well take note. And yet there continues a tendency to describe events in Lebanon in a manner which seems to exclude Lebanon from the arena of democracy's concern. In October 1977, I spoke in New York City and said:

Permit me just a moment to recall the events of June, 1976, when the American Ambassador to Lebanon Francis Meloy and Robert Waring, our Embassy's economic counselor, were murdered in cold blood and broad daylight in circumstances that clearly implicated—the PLO. PLO spokesmen in Beirut, joined by the PLO's representative at the United Nations, announced that an investigation would be conducted into the killings. They would round up the usual suspects.

The charade continued: The PLO announced that three suspects were in custody, the PLO spokesmen in Beirut this time expressing the view that the three had been working for some outside power, perhaps even the Central Intelligence Agency! And in July of 1976, it was announced to our evident satisfaction and relief that American diplomats in Beirut would henceforth receive PLO protection. I repeat: this was the American government's response—its apparent response—to the destruction of the Lebanese democracy by the arms and the clients of the Soviet Union—of which the PLO is surely among the more prominent.

The American Catholic community chose not to identify itself with its more than one million fellow communicants in Lebanon, while the media, by labeling them "right wing Christians," in effect excommunicated them from the liberal society. Surely a triumph of Newspeak, for their struggle concerned the preservation of a liberal policy, not the creation of an authoritarian one.

In this morning's Wall Street Journal there is a valuable editorial which reviews the background of the violence in Lebanon. I ask that the text of that editorial be printed in the Record.

The editorial follows:

(From the Wall Street Journal, July 26, 1978)

THE VIOLENCE OF LEBANON

(NOTE.—For the violence of Lebanon shall cover thee, and the spoil of beasts, which made them afraid, because of men's blood, and for the violence of the land, of the city, and of all that dwell therein.—Habakkuk 2:17.)

The open wound that is Lebanon is noticed only when the bleeding is especially profuse. The Syrian bombardment of Beirut is merely the latest horror. Judging from everything from official statements to journalistic accounts, few American opinion leaders are equipped to understand the Lebanese situation, let alone resolve it.

When the precarious balance of internal Lebanese political power collapsed in 1975, the weak forces of public order went down with it. All that remains are armed gangs—the natives barely controlled by their own chiefs, and the foreigners stirring the pot for their own purposes. Americans, apparently incapable of comprehending the kind of politics driven by religious and dynastic loyalty, frantically try to grasp the situation by sorting out "leftists" and "rightists."

Yet consider the "Progressive Socialist Party," actually Druse (an Islamic heresy) who follow the Jumblatt family. They have been allied to the Moslems and Palestinians. Another Druse group, hereditary enemies of the Jumblatts, have been neutral; the Druse clans in Israel support the Jews against the Palestinians, Christian or Moslem.

Or take the Franjeblists, adherents of an ex-president, the murder of whose son and heir set off the latest round of fighting. In 1976 the Syrians intervened to prevent them from overrunning predominantly Moslem Tripoli in the north, and they were identified as the most extreme right-wing Christians; now allies of Syria, a thoroughly fascist dictatorship, the Franjeblists have become "liberals" to the Western press.

The international aspect is almost equally devoid of ideological content. The Syrians, who were introduced to Lebanon with U.S. blessings, are ruled by a clique of Alaouite Moslems, a small and well-despised minority. Syrian objectives in Lebanon are transparently obvious, once we shake the American convention of viewing international boundaries as representing real frontiers between nations. Until 1944 Lebanon was part of Syria, and the Syrians would like it back, as they would other Syrian territory sliced off by the European imperialists—most of what is now Israel and Jordan.

In 1976, Syria supported the Palestinians against Jordan, but in 1976 the Palestinians were the strongest faction in Lebanon so Syria helped the Christians break them. Now the Christians are dominant, so the Syrians have turned artillery on them in order to enforce their de facto protectorate over Lebanon. This is how an imperial power concentrates to the natives that it intends to be obeyed.

From the south, Israel is also applying an ancient strategy—divide et imperum. Never adverse to helping the Arabs fall out among themselves, the Israelis eagerly embraced the opportunity to support the Maronite Christians against the Palestinians and to wipe out the PLO bases in south Lebanon, and is now sustaining a Christian "militia" along the border.

The Lebanese situation has some special features. Incredible as it sounds, some of the Israeli-linked force are paid by the Lebanese government, as are a good part of the Christian, Moslem and Druse fighters. Although the Lebanese army broke up three years ago, paymasters wend their way through the rubble to remunerate troops on all sides. With what, you ask? Well, taxes are being collected. The fiscal apparatus of the Lebanese state is still intact. In fact, during the last two years, the Lebanese pound has appreciated 10% relative to the dollar.

The State Department has declared its determination "to take whatever steps we consider necessary to help establish peace and necessary to help establish peace and security in Lebanon." Well, does the situation described above sound like anything Mervyn Vance and Young can understand, much less control? The official U.S. response is depressingly predictable—just stop the fighting, without noticing why the fighting broke out in the first place; form a pluralistic government, forgetting that the civil war is the result of a failure of pluralistic government, and foreigners keep hands off, ignoring the fact that the most unsettling foreign element, the Palestinian refugees, have no place to go.

Lebanon was created in 1944 to be a Christian-dominated state; it broke down because of the higher birth-rate of the Moslems and the introduction of half a million well-armed Palestinians. A democratic Lebanon would be Moslem-ruled and would not be strong enough to control the Palestinians.

Many Maronite leaders are advocating a partition, leaving them in control of a rump Lebanon, but this would require an encroachment, and probably bloody, relocation of peoples. Worse, the Maronites are in the center of the country. The south adjoining Israel is inhabited by pro-Palestinian Shiite Moslems. Only Syria could restrain the PLO there, and the Israelis are not about to permit a Syrian presence on their northern frontier.

We're afraid that it's naive to talk of peace in Lebanon, and basing our policy on abstract principles of justice is singularly inappropriate. Who is right in Lebanon depends on which side you are on. The U.S. will best serve its own interests by following the primitive rule of supporting its friends. In the convoluted politics of the Levant, our friends have been the Saudis, the Hashemites of Jordan, the Maronites and the Israelis.



14 בדצמבר, 1976
106.3.1 - 871

ד"ר/אוינין

א ל: מנהל מצפ"א
מאת: יועץ הסברה

הנדון: שר הבטחון והסנטור הנבחר מוינהאן על בפה אחת בבולטימור

ב 8/12 הופיעו שר הבטחון ומוינהאן על במה אחת בארוחת ערב גדולה שערך ה ZOA בבולטימור, נוכחו בארוחת אלפיים איש, היתה זו ארוחת הערב הגדולה ביותר שאורגנה מעולם בקהילה היהודית בבולטימור. נוכח גם הסנטור הנבחר ממדינת מרילנד מר סרבינס, היה זה אירוע מרשים ביותר.

בין השאר אמר מוינהאן שהוא רואה לעצמו יעוד בסינס לתמוך בישראל ובמדיניותה כולל ההכרח בגבולות ברי הגנה ואי נסיגה לגבולות 1967 שהוכיחו עצמם כגבולות שבירים שאינם ניתנים להגנה.

מוינהאן ציין שהוא משוכנע שהסנטור הנבחר סרבינס יתמוך בו במאבקו וסרבינס נענע בראשו לאוח הסכמה.

ב ב ר כ ה


אורי ברנר

העמקים:

מר ש. דיניץ, השגריר
מר ש. ארגוב, סמנכ"ל
מר ח. בראון, ציר
מר ב. נבון, ציר הסברה
מר צ. רפיה, יועץ
מר א. בנצור, יועץ

1914

1914

1914

1914

1914

1914

1914

1914

1914

1914

*א.י.י.
מ.ל. ומסוד
דושינגטון
(גוינין)*

מזמא דע לשכת השתח נ"י .

להלן הודעה לעתונות שפירסם היום סנטור מדינאי .

THE JOINT SOVIET AMERICAN STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUED OCTOBER 1 MARKS A NEW STAGE OF WHAT CAN NOW BE CLEARLY SEEN AS A CAMPAIGN OF ESCALATING DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE AGAINST ISRAEL. THE COMMUNIQUE CAN ONLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE EROSION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO A SECURE EXISTENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO A CORRESPONDING ENHANCEMENT OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AT LARGE. THESE ARE PROSPECTS I MUST VIEW WITH GREAT CONCERN.

THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNIQUE THE PATTERN OF PAST PRESSURES AGAINST ISRAEL REPEATS ITSELF. ISRAEL IS ASKED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS WHICH ARE REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL AND TANGIBLE ISRAEL'S ENEMIES ARE ASKED TO OFFER PROMISES ASSURANCES AND OTHER EVANESCENT DECLARATIONS.

CAN THERE BE ANY DOUBT UPON READING THIS JOINT SOVIET AMERICAN STATEMENT THAT THE GREAT POWERS SEEK TO HAVE ISRAEL ACCEPT AS ITS NEIGHBOR AN ENTITY LED BY MEN WHO STILL PROCLAIM THEIR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S DESTRUCTION AND DISSOLUTION?

THE BASIC PREMISE OF THIS JOINT ENTERPRISE IS FLAWED IN THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL WAY. THE OPENING PHRASES OF THE DOCUMENT ANNOUNCE THAT "BOTH GOVERNMENTS ARE CONVINCED" OF THE NEED FOR "A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT". LATER THE COMMUNIQUE SPEAKS OF THE TWO POWERS AS "GUIDED BY THE GOAL OF ACHIEVING A JUST POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST". THIS ASSERTION OF A COMMON SOVIET AMERICAN INTEREST IS WHOLLY DISINGENUOUS. PAST HISTORY AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS SHARE NOT INTEREST IN A TRUE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEIR INTEREST IS IN CONTINUED TURMOIL AND TENSION. EVEN NOW SOVIET WEAPONS AND SOVIET CLIENTS CONTINUE THE DESTRUCTION OF LEBANON. THEIR ABIDING INTEREST IS IN THE ADVANCE OF THEIR IMPERIALISTIC AND IDEOLOGICAL POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. INDEED THE SOVIETS ARE AND HAVE BEEN A PRIME SOURCE OF INSTABILITY IN THE REGION. THERE ARE FAR BETTER WAYS FOR THEM TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR INTEREST IN PEACE THAN THE ISSUANCE OF COMMUNIQUE.

IT IS DISTURBING IN THE EXTREME THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS CLOTHED SOVIET PURPOSES IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH THE CLOAK OF RESPECTABILITY IMPLICIT IN THE ASSERTION OF SHARED INTERESTS. REALITY IS QUITE TO THE CONTRARY. THE MOTTO OF THE SOVIETS IN THIS MATTER AS IN SO MANY OTHERS IS SIMPLE. "THE WORSE THE BETTER". SIMPLY PUT THE SETTLEMENT OF AN ISSUE CALLED THE "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE" IS FOR THE SOVIETS AN OPPORTUNITY TO INTRODUCE INTO THE MIDDLE EAST STATE WHICH IS MARXIST PROSOVIET ANTI AMERICAN AND ANTI DEMOCRATIC.

IT IS PARTICULARLY OMINOUS THAT THE JOINT STATEMENT MAKES NO MENTION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE US POLICY IS MOVING TOWARD A SETTLEMENT IMPOSED ON ISRAEL.

בלתי מסווג

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס

- 2 -

TO BE GURANTEED BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WHICH IS
TO SAY A GURANTEE OF DISASTER.
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SEEMS UNABLE TO PERCEIVE OUR TRUE
AND ABIDING INTERESTS IN THIS MATTER YESTBN THE GOOD SENSE OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE IS SUCH THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO SEE THAT THE
TRADITIONAL PXLICY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
IS MAINTAINED.

AD KAN
RAFIACH==

שתח רוחם טנכל ממנכל שהבט טמנכל מצפא מזנזים הסכרה מעת מאום אב חקר רם אמנ חעוד
אילטר ו.חוב.
אב/אר

1942

1942

1942

2

TO BE GUARANTEED BY THE OFFICE STATES AND THE SO LET US ON WHICH IS
TO SAY A GUARANTEE OF WATER
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SEEMS TO BE IN A POSITION TO
WE ARE NOT SURE OF THE RESULTS IN THIS MATTER. THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE IS ON THAT THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO
THE NATIONAL BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE BOARD OF
IN THE UNITED STATES

1942

THE NATIONAL BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE BOARD OF
IN THE UNITED STATES





מזכיר

מזכיר - משרד המבחן

מזכיר - משרד המבחן

מ/א

בברכה

שגרירות ישראל

בושינגטון

מזכיר

SEP 28 1977
AKB

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

New York

Excerpts from Remarks by Senator Daniel P. Moynihan

Combined Jewish Appeal and Israel
Emergency Fund Solidarity Dinner

Queen Elizabeth Hotel

Montreal, Quebec

September 7, 1977

(Moynihan) 09/07/77
LA

The first principle we must understand is that it is not for outside powers to determine the borders of the various states in the Middle East. It has always seemed supremely sensible that the political geography of the Middle East reflect a consensus among the countries which must live with those borders. Yet this much can be said about the frontiers of Israel: Israel forced to return to the borders of June 1967 is as Czechoslovakia forced to yield the Sudetenland. How can anyone expect a sovereign Israeli state to be a willing party to its own eventual dismemberment?

The recent mission of Secretary Vance to the Middle East reminds us that this particular "diplomatic process" can be far from a genuine negotiation. Instead, the government of the United States is asked to listen sympathetically to the statements of Arab governments, and to "understand" their positions, and then to attempt to secure Israeli acquiescence in them. When Israel does what it must, an impression is somehow created that Israeli attitudes toward one or another question have become the barrier to peace. Unless we take the greatest care, the government of the United States is represented as associating itself with such conclusions. And my

own disquiet is increased when I see the willingness of our Administration to sell all manner of advanced military technology to the oil states while finding all manner of excuses to hamstring many such transfers to Israel; and increased yet again when we hear public criticism of Israeli action coupled with repeated references to something called "moderate" Arab leadership, and "moderate" views within the PLO. Is a PLO "moderate" one who wishes to dissolve the State of Israel in years rather than in months?

This is one result of the absence of face-to-face, direct, negotiation among the states who must resolve the Middle East issue. This is precisely why we must, in the United States, pursue a policy which stresses the importance of such negotiations, and leaves the substance of the matter to the negotiators themselves.

The position to which we should adhere is no mystery. In fact it has rarely been stated more clearly than by President Carter, in his presentation to the Platform Committee of the Democratic Party in June of 1976. He said:

. . . "I believe deeply that the foundation of our Middle East (policy) must be insuring the safety and security of Israel. This country should never attempt to impose a settlement in Israel, nor should we force Israel to make territorial concessions which are detrimental to her security. We should attempt to promote direct negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbors. Israel must be allowed to live within defensible borders. As President, I would never force Israel to give up control of the Golan Heights to the Syrians nor would I recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organization or any other group purporting to represent the Palestines when those organizations refuse to recognize Israel's right to exist in peace. The negotiations that will lead to permanent peace can only proceed on the basis of a clear and absolute American commitment to insure Israel's security and survival as a Jewish State."

When Mr. Carter debated former President Ford on foreign affairs before a nationwide television audience in October 1976, the Democratic candidate was even more specific and equally forthright.

. . . "(U)nder the last Democratic administration, 60 percent of all weapons that went into the Middle East were for Israel. Nowadays--75 percent went for Israel before--now, 60 percent go to the Arab countries, and this does not include Iran. If you include Iran, our present shipment of weapons to the Middle East, only 20 percent goes to Israel.

There is a deviation from idealism; it's a deviation from our commitment to our major ally in the Middle East, which is Israel; it's a yielding to economic pressure on the part of the Arabs on the oil issue. . . .

. . . (I)n 1975 we almost brought Israel to their knees, after the Yom Kippur war, by the so-called reassessment of our relationship to Israel. We in effect tried to make Israel the scapegoat for the problems in the Middle East and this weakened our relationship with Israel a great deal and put a cloud on the total commitment that our people feel towards the Israelis. There ought to be a clear, unequivocal commitment, without change, to Israel. . . ."

Why were the future President's declarations taken so much to heart? I believe that there was something in the process of applying the slow diplomatic pressure to Israel--the Vietnamization of Israel, as my friend James R. Schlesinger put it at the time--the pressure on a friendly country to make concessions to its enemies on pain of appearing to be responsible for the absence of peace--which most Americans found deeply offensive. It was a reflection, perhaps of the ethics we learned as small children: "pick on someone your own size." The policy which President Carter enunciated during his campaign remains, I am sure, his view. I am hopeful that he will turn away advice which values oil more than it values freedom in Middle East equation.

There is another aspect of America's relations with Israel, one that transcends mere diplomacy, for it

involves the abiding relationship between Israel and the other democracies. Every democracy in the world--and the Canadian one is no exception--has a major interest in the survival of a democratic Israel. True, it may fall to the United States to resist the Soviet-sponsored effort to overwhelm Israel by military might. But the opportunity to resist the efforts of the totalitarian world to delegitimize the State of Israel, to pronounce it a pariah state that must be expelled from world society is an opportunity that all free nations share. Each of us, for example, has one voice in the United Nations. I am proud to say that when I was the United States representative there and Saul Rae was the Canadian representative there were surely two voices that would speak out for decency and truth. Of course there were many more than just two. But the number of states that would really stand up and be counted on this subject was not the number it should have been.

Earlier I spoke of Czechoslovakia and the Sudetenland and the world crisis of 1937. I do not wish to alarm, and certainly I do not wish to accuse. But one senses a spirit of Munich abroad in the democracies in 1977

also, forty years later. Can it be we will not learn that history? Can it be we are doomed to repeat it? Surely not. Surely not again.

All democracies must remember where their common interests lie. They lie in their common strength and security, and in their political and ideological solidarity in the face of assault. And they lie in mutual respect, which at the very least dictates that no democracy shall ever ask another to do anything which would threaten its very existence.



קונסוליה כללית של ישראל

כו' באלול תשל"ז
9 במסכתסבר 1977
375.1.1

320
ד"ר בן-ציון (הולמן)
2

מ: סצפ"א

מאת: הקונס"ל, מונטריאול

הנדון: נאום של הסנסור הניאל סוינהן
בארוחה למען המגבית המאוחדת

הנ"ל נאם ב-7.9.77 בארוחה רבת משתתפים למען המגבית המאוחדת, בה
השתתפו השגריר מרדכי שלו, אשר ברך את האורח וסקר את רשמיו מבקורו
בישראל.

הסנסור סוינהן תקף בנאומו את האו"ם בנושא זכויות האדם. דבריו
שיקפו את מאמרו שפורסם ב"קומנטרי" של אוגוסט 77 (המצית המאמר בתשקיף
מס' 33).

הוא חסריו שבכולות ישראל לא צריכים להקבע ע"י גורמי חוץ, ישראל
לא צריכה להיות שותפה לפרוקה היא. ארה"ב מאזינה החילה לערבים ואחר כך
מתקבל הרושם כאילו ישראל המעצור להכנה. תקף את כנוי מנהיגות ערב ואש"פ
כמתונים. דוגל במשא ומתן ישיר בין מדינות וסוען שאין חלוקי דעות בין
המפלגות בארה"ב.
על מדיניות האב למזרח התכוון:

ישראל בשוחה.

לא לכפות עליה ויתורים טריטוריאליים ולהבטיח גבולות בעלי הגנה.
לא להכיר באש"פ, אולם צופה ללחץ דיפלומטי, מקוה שקרטר לא יעריך
הנפס יותר מחרות במז"ח.

סיים שמספר המדינות באו"ם המשמיעות קולן נגד סילוף האמת זעום
מדי.

בברכה שנה טובה,

צבי כספי

העתק: השגריר אוסבה



Handwritten notes in blue ink, including a circled '1' and some illegible scribbles.

1000 BROADWAY
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10018

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

מס' 385

נשלח: 281730 ספט 77

התקבל: 290200 ספט 77

אל: המשרד

מאת: רחשינגטון

ל
ד"ר/מנכ"ס (מ/מ)

מ י ד י

מצפא מז'ים, דע טוויא (הועבר מס 165).

סוף הודעה לעתונות שפרסם היום סנטור מויני'הא:

MOYNIHAN WARNS AGAINST USE OF "OIL WEAPON" TO PRESSURE ISRAEL.
STATEMENT BY SENATOR DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN (D., N.Y.)
ON THE FLOOR OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, SEPTEMBER 28, 1976

MR. PRESIDENT, I ADDRESS MY COLLEAGUES ON A MATTER AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND, MORE FUNDAMENTALLY, THE INTEGRITY OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. IT IS POTENTIALLY A GRAVE MATTER AND I SHOULD LIKE TO PROVIDE SOME BACKGROUND. IN 1974 AND 1975, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TOOK MAJOR INITIATIVES IN SECURING WHAT HAVE SINCE BECOME KNOWN AS THE MIDDLE EAST DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS. THOSE AGREEMENTS, WHICH REMAIN THE BASIS FOR WHAT CAN BEST BE DESCRIBED AS THE ARMED TRUCE WHICH CURRENTLY OBTAINS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, DERIVE THEIR EFFECT IN NO SMALL MEASURE FROM THE GOOD NAME OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SPECIFIC UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTION TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THOSE AGREEMENTS. THE SECOND OF THESE AGREEMENTS, THE SO-CALLED SEPTEMBER 1975 DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, PROVIDED FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF UNITED STATES MONITORING PERSONNEL IN THE SINAI, AND FOR CERTAIN OTHER UNITED STATES UNDERTAKINGS DESIGNED TO SECURE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PARTIES, ESPECIALLY OF ISRAEL. MY COLLEAGUES WILL RECALL THAT A MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE AND NOT INEXPENSIVE CONCESSION MADE BY THE ISRAELIS AS PART OF THE AGREEMENT INVOLVED THE ABANDONMENT OF THE OILFIELDS AT ABU RUDEIS. THE PRODUCTION FROM THOSE OIL FIELDS ALLOWED NOT ONLY A SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS IN HARD CURRENCY OTHERWISE EXPENDED FOR IMPORTED OIL, BUT PROVIDED A MEASURE OF ENERGY SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN THE FACE OF RAPIDLY GROWING INTERNATIONAL HOSTILITY TOWARD ISRAEL. THE UNITED STATES MADE IT PLAIN THAT UNITED STATES ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WOULD PROVIDE THE ADDITIONAL HARD CURRENCY NECESSARY TO COMPENSATE ISRAEL FOR THE LOSS OF THE OIL. MORE IMPORTANT, IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD ACT TO INSURE ISRAEL A RELIABLE SUPPLY OF IMPORTED PETROLEUM. THE SOURCE OF THAT PETROLEUM WOULD BE IRAN, AS IT HAD BEEN IN THE PAST. IT WOULD BE A GRAVE MATTER IF THE UNITED STATES WERE NOW TO ATTEMPT TO MANIPULATE ISRAEL'S ENERGY DEPENDENCE AS A WAY OF EXTRACTING FURTHER ISRAELI DIPLOMATIC CONCESSIONS. MORE THAN GRAVE, IT WOULD BE DISHONORABLE. ISRAEL'S VIRTUALLY TOTAL DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTED PETROLEUM GROWS DIRECTLY OUT OF UNITED STATES INITIATIVES, AND GAS INCURRED, PRESUMABLY, BECAUSE OF SOME FUNDAMENTAL BELIEF

1951 JAN 23
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

388 100

77 THE SOURCE
77 THE SOURCE

TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-100000)

RE: [Illegible]

[Illegible text block]

[Illegible text block]

-2-

IN THE INTEGRITY OF UNITED STATES UNDERTAKINGS AND COMMITMENTS. ACCORDINGLY, I AM DEEPLY DISTRESSED BY INFORMATION THAT HAS COME TO ME FROM SOURCES THAT I CONSIDER RELIABLE. INDEED, I WOULD NOT RAISE THIS MATTER ON THE BASIS OF ONE REPORT ALONE, THE MULTIPLICITY OF SUCH REPORTS MAKES THIS MATTER SIMPLY TOO URGENT TO IGNORE. IN ESSENCE, I AM INFORMED THAT AMERICAN DIPLOMATS HAVE BROACHED TO ISRAEL'S PRINCIPAL SUPPLIER OF PETROLEUM THAT IT UNDERTAKE TO CUT OFF OIL SHIPMENTS TO ISRAEL UNLESS ISRAEL AGREES TO CERTAIN UNITED STATES PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE CONDUCT OF MIDEAST NEGOTIATIONS. THESE ARE REPORTS WHICH I DO CHOOSE NOT TO BELIEVE, FOR THEIR TRUTH WOULD IMPLY THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS ACTING IN THE WORST OF FAITH TOWARD OUR TRADITIONAL FRIEND AND ALLY — PERHAPS OUR ONLY FRIEND AND ALLY — IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE STATE OF ISRAEL. I MUST THEREFORE CALL ON THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO STATE FORTHWITH AND WHOLLY WITHOUT AMBIGUITY, WHETHER THE UNITED STATES HAS SUGGESTED OR URGED SUCH A COURSE ON THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. AND IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE CANNOT LAY THE MATTER TO REST IN SUCH FASHION AS TO REMOVE ANY DOUBT, THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR PEACEMAKING EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WILL BE SEVERE INDEED.

AD KAN

RAFIACH -

שוח רחם שרהבט ממככל ממככל מצמא מדתימ ארגיה חקר משפט הסברה מעת
מאות א ב דמ אגנ ועוד איסור ועדת חרב
א/רמ

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

16.9.77

ד"ר אריאל
הירש
[Handwritten signature]

שמור

[Handwritten signature]

361

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנטור מויניהאן

בחדשים האחרונים הגיעו אלי הדיס ודברי תרעומת ממקורות שונים על כך שמוניהאן נמנע מלהחבטא ולפעול בנושאים ישראלים. מייק ארנון סיפר לי שגורמים יהודים בניו-יורק מחלוננים שמוניהאן דוחה הזמנות להופיע באירועים שלהם.

בעקבות זאת נפגשתי לארוחה צהריים עם שני עוזריו הקרובים לעניינינו: האחד עוסק בנושאי חוץ (לשעבר עוזרו של ג'קסון) והשני (יהודי) איש הקשר שלו לנושאים יהודיים. חוץ כדי שיחה הסבחי חשומה לבס להדיס המחבלים כנ"ל. השניים הבינו הרמז היטב.

לאחר-מכן נחקיימה פגישה השגריר ומויניהאן (עליה הברקנו בנפרד). מויניהאן כבר היה מוכן לפגישה. הוא חזר ואמר כי הוא רוצה לדבר בעניינינו, אחרי ביקור דייק.

בברכה,
צ. רפיה
[Handwritten signature]

יצחק
בצ"ר, בא"ן
יק"ל, ניו-יורק

משרד החוץ
ירושלים



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.

תש"ז

מס' 100

10.9.57

מ: 10000
מ: 10000

הודעה על פיקוד

הודעה על פיקוד המבצע...
הודעה על פיקוד המבצע...
הודעה על פיקוד המבצע...

הודעה על פיקוד המבצע...
הודעה על פיקוד המבצע...
הודעה על פיקוד המבצע...

הודעה על פיקוד המבצע...
הודעה על פיקוד המבצע...
הודעה על פיקוד המבצע...

מ. מ. מ.
מ. מ. מ.

מברק נכום - מסוג

**משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר**

כל המוסר תלכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי חוץ וסוכנות רשמיות). תשי"ז - 1957.

77-161200 ספט 77

החקבל 161943

*הח
ק/א/אוס (אוי/קין)*

ש מ ר

אלזהמשרד
מאת: זורסינגטון

מצפא.

נפגשתי אתמוללפי בקשתי עם סגמור מוינהאן, במשרדו בקטיסול, בהשתתפות רטיח. סקרתי עמדתנו בנושא המו'ם ובמיוחד בענין הפלסטינאים ואשפ. מוינהאן אמר שהו'ס מנין עמדתנו ותומך בה. הוא ימתיץ עוד לגמד ביקורו ס' דיין או אז ירצה להפגש עמי שנית לשמוע סיכום הביקור. לאחר מכן יש בכורגתו לצאת בגאום סוכזי על מדיניות חוץ בו יתיחס לנושאים שלנו.

הפרה: בחודשים האחרונים נמנע מוינהאן מלהתכסא בנושאים סדתיים. פגישתנו ברעדה גם לשמש תזכורת ולפי הגובתו, יש להביח שהתזכורת הרעילה.

דיביץ

סחה רהם מנכל ממנכל אבריאל דיבון מצפא

ח/א

SECRET

October 26, 1976
Confidential

01/17 20014
REPRESENTATIVE CARLOS J. MOORHEAD (Republican - California)

Biographical Information

Home; Glendale, Calif., born in Long Beach, Calif., May 6, 1922; graduated University of California at Los Angeles, B.A., 1943, University of Southern California School of Law, J.D., 1949; enlisted in U.S. Army Reserve in June 1942, served 3 1/2 years during World War II, presently Judge Advocate with rank of lieutenant - colonel; practicing attorney; California State Assemblyman, 1967-72; married, five children.

Political Information

Moorhead's district takes in Pasadena and Glendale, very well-to-do suburbs of Los Angeles. Pasadena, however, does have an increasing black population which has caused some trouble over school busing, much of it stemming from the fact that 40% of the students are black, 12% are chicano, while the electorate remains overwhelmingly white.

Pasadena is the home of Caltech with a notably liberal faculty and student body contrasted with the conservative area residents.

Moorhead was a staunch defender of Nixon during the impeachment hearings.

Term Began

January, 1973

Committees

Judiciary
Interstate and Foreign Commerce

Legislative Record

Moorhead has consistently voted against foreign aid bills. He was one of 52 Representatives who voted against the December 1973 \$2.2 billion emergency authorization for Israel.

In January of 1975 he introduced a bill to limit the American contribution to the United Nations.

He voted for the Sinai resolution and for the Case-Fenwick bill establishing a commission to monitor the human rights provisions of the Helsinki agreement.

Comments

Moorhead's district is heavily Republican and conservative but is drifting toward the left, as the composition of the electorate changes.



Carlos J. Moorhead
of Glendale (22d Dist.)
Republican—2d term

ON 11/14

REPRESENTATIVE JAMES R. MANN (Democrat-South Carolina)



Biographical Information:

Greenville, S. C.; born in Greenville, Greenville County, S. C. April 27, 1920; graduated from The Citadel (B. A. degree) in 1941; entered U. S. Army as second lieutenant in July 1941, separated in March 1946, as lieutenant colonel at age 25, colonel, USAR (Ret.); graduated from the Law School of the University of South Carolina in 1947; married, four children; Baptist.

Political Information:

Mann is the dean of the South Carolina House delegation. He is being opposed by the same Republican whom he soundly beat in 1974.

Mann's district is made up of the largest textile producing area of the United States. It is also one of the most industrialized and most blue collar parts of the nation. There is an on-going, very bitter fight in this district over unionization. Industry, with the support of Mann, violently opposes the unionization efforts among the workers. Wages are low, working conditions are not very good; and the people who run things in the district like it that way. Mann is very much a member of the district's establishment.

He voted for the impeachment of Nixon. He has tired of other jobs and could very well not run in the near future, hoping for a federal judgeship.

Term Began: January, 1969,

Committees:

Judiciary
District of Columbia

Legislative Record:

Mann votes against all foreign aid bills. He voted for the Sinai resolution.

Mann cosigned a letter with 16 other Representatives to Rep. Al Ullman, Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, urging passage of the Bentsen Amendment to the Tax Reform Act which denies tariff and trade preferences to nations harboring international terrorists.

Mann voted against the Case-Fenwick bill establishing a commission to monitor the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Agreement.

James R. Mann
of Greenville (4th Dist.)
Democrat—4th term

SECRET
OFFICE



EMBASSY OF BRAZIL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Handwritten initials: P/W

Handwritten initials: W/L

Handwritten initials: W/L

TO: DIRECTOR, STATE DEPARTMENT
FROM: AMEMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

URGENT 10/10/64

RE: [Illegible]

1. [Illegible]

2. [Illegible]

Handwritten initials: W/L

Handwritten initials: W/L

CONTACT: Bob Rose

Exclusive to Maine Weeklies
For Use Week of March 20, 1978

THIS WEEK IN WASHINGTON

by Sen. Edmund S. Muskie

THE MIDDLE EAST

As this is written, the eyes of the world are focussed again on the Middle East. Israel has decided to strike back militarily against Palestinian terrorists after the loss of more than 30 innocent lives in a terrorist raid.

If there ever was a time for restraint, this is the time. Those of us who look on as concerned observers may find our views overtaken by the events of the next week. I hope instead that everyone involved can still find a way to keep cool.

President Sadat² of Egypt gave us a ray of hope last week, when he condemned the terrorist attack. I hope the leaders of every nation will read his words: "I shall always condemn this irresponsible action," Sadat said. "I wonder what is really the result of such acts... Whenever anything happens here there is talk of war. Well, I don't like this logic at all. I hope we can overcome the sadness of this tragic action and establish peace once and forever in the area."

I can understand Israel's actions against the Palestinian terrorists. At the same time, if the result is to undermine the prospects for peace, the result would be just what the terrorists hoped to accomplish.

I think we should try to concentrate on what we can learn from the terrorist attack. First of all, it dramatized Israel's vulnerability. In the area where the attack was launched, Israel is about nine miles wide. Almost all of the settled portions of Israel were vulnerable to artillery fire until Israel took Arab territory in the 1967 war. And the Israelis are willing to return 97.5% of that occupied land immediately, as part of a peace settlement. More land would be returned over time, under the Israeli peace proposal.

Israel's interest is not in land, but in security. And the terrorist attack demonstrated why.

I hope President Sadat reviews the incidents of the past week in that light. Perhaps it will give him a better understanding

of why Israel feels as it does about portions of occupied Arab land.

There is one aspect of the Middle East situation in which we as Americans are deeply involved. As you know, a package of arms sales to the Israelis and Arabs has been proposed. Without question, we should delay action on it.

In the first place, I think it was a mistake to tie the sales into one package. We should be able to assess the value to our national security of sales to Israel and to the Arabs based on the facts as to their separate requirements, and not on arguments relating to the political situation or political tactics.

Secondly, in light of the terrorist raid, people will not be in the mood to listen to any arguments about arms sales, whatever those arguments are.

We have to make our decision on the arms sales in a reasonable atmosphere. It is impossible to guarantee a reasonable debate at this time. The question should be put off.

#

 *Nati-*
I thought you might like to see this - see what a persuasive fellow you are!
 CHARLES J. MICOLEAU
 ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
 SENATOR EDWARD S. MURKIE
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20510
 (202) 224-5344
CSM

Play
John

15

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (כסחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים), תשי"ז-1957.

משרד החוץ
מחלקת השגר
ש מ ר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

אל תמטק
נאת ווש

מנכל מצפא.

78 011300
התקבל 012000

א/א/א (ס/ט/ו) א/א/א

הייכ רום טעד ארוחת צהריים עם סנטור מצבאום בקפיטול ב-30 לינואר. האתחופ החיים.

הייכ רום פתח בהעלותו הצעות לשתוף פעולה ישראלים מצרים בתחום האנרגיה: הקמת כור גרעיני המיימי שישרת את שתי המדינות וכן הטיית צינוריים הטפליניים לעבר חיימי אסימי באפן שתורם לנל שלו יבנה לחופ הימי במקורות גבול משותפת לישראל ומצרים. בתשובה לשאלת מצבאום תבחר הייכ רום את היתרונות המונמי בכך למצרים וכן את החרומה והחובה שתחא בכך לביטוס יחסי השלום בימי ישראל ומצרים ולפיתוח שתי המדינות.

לאחר מכן אמר מצבאום כי ברצונו להעביר באמצעות הייכ רום שדר לכל התוגעים בדבר בישראל מצבאום אמר כי תנועת הכולדוורים והטרקטורים ביישובים בסימי כפי שהחקפו מעל מסכי הטלוויזיה בארצות גרמו נזק תעמולתי רב ביותר לישראל. אינ מצבאום מתחם לקיום של הישובים תוכחיים ואינ הוא מתכוון תליכה להציע לישראל מה צריכים להיות אמצעי הבטחון שלה. אבל מזוע, אמר, יש צורך בעיצומו של ומוימי. יש מצרים להכריז על ישובים חדשים ולהביא לפעולת טרקטורים אינטנסיבית בשטחי מצבאום סבור שזו הייתה שגיאה ומורה מצדו לעורך הדימי בנושא זה ולדבריו התגותו בגדון התקבלה כאן בצורה מאד לא נעימה. הוא כידיד נאמן שלנו שישראל כל כך קרובה לנו, מרשה לעצמו לומר לנו זאת. ה הזכיר כי כבר אמר זאת בשעתו לשגריר.

הייכ רום הגיב באמרו שאינ המדובר ביישובים חדשים, אלא ביי עיבוים והרחבת הישובים הקיימים וכיצד אפשר למנוע מיישובים קיימים להתפח ולחבט. הייכ רום ציינ כי למרבה הצער אמצעי התקשורת נפחו העימי והציגוהו בצורה לא נכונה. יש לראות הישובים כחלק ממערכ הבטחון של ישראל הכולל גם את שדות התעופה בסימי.

כל המוסר חובן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בסתן המדינה
יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים),
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

= 2 =

מברק נכנס-מסווג

עוד אמר הח"י כ רזמ כי יש בעיות אחדות- מלבד הישובים- שיש יוחד מרכזיות
לגבי עמ ההתקדמות לשלום. נושא ההתחליות נופח מעבר לכל
פרופרציה ובכך הוא משרת את התעמולה הערבית.

מצבאום אמר כי יקח הסכרי הח"י כ רזמ לתשומת לבו.

רפ"ד

שורה רחבה סברה אנה סברה אנה אנה
לא אנה

THESE ARE THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE SAMPLES
COLLECTED AT THE SITE ON THE DATE INDICATED ABOVE.
THE ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
METHODS DESCRIBED IN THE ATTACHED REPORT.

THE ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED BY THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL:

NAME



DR. J. H. SMITH, JR. (ANALYST)
MR. R. L. JONES (ANALYST)
MR. W. D. BROWN (ANALYST)



מבוק נכנס-משווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

אל: המשרד

סאת: וואשינגטון

ס ו ד י

מ י ד י

כל המוסר חוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי חוץ וסודות רשמיים), תשי"ז - 1957.

מס. 161 נשלח: 181330 י"ר 78

התקבל: 182136 י"ר 78

אל: מנכ"ל

אחול התקשר אלי סנטור מצנבאום. אמר שכ"ד ברצונו לחביע דאגתו על סיכונ וחליכ זמ"מ' הנובע מעזחתנו בע"נ הישובים בסי"נ. הסברתי לו בפרוטרוט את כל השתלשלות העני"מ. מצנבאום אמר שאינ לי מה לחשוש לגבי עזחתו הוא אכ בקרב חבריו מתקבל הרושם שישראל מתעקשת על ש"רת חלק מסי"נ ביחה ואפ עושה להדחת של"טהה בו עי"י עיבוי הישובים ודוחבת השטח. סמו כ הדיבורים על הקמת 3 ישובים נוספים ביו"ש מחזקים הרושם השלילי. כל הסברינו שזו למעשה התיישרות בתוך מתנות צבאיים מנקלטים כי הציבור אינו מבינ החבדל אלא רואה בזה נוקשות ישראלית ותכלה במאמצי השלום.

ל
ד"ר
(מאגרי)

הסברתי גישתנו היסודית לשאלת הישובים וכי השיבותם האטרטגית. ספירתי לו בהרחבה על שיחותינו עם הצמטל בעני"נ הישובים ביו"ש וכי על הצגת חכ"ת סי"נ על ידי רה"מ ותגובת הנשיא טענתי שלא יתב שאוחה חכ"ת שהוגדה עי"י הנשיא כקונסטרוקטיבית וכדבר שחייב להיות קביל על המצרים, וזה שלושה שבועות אח"כ מכשול לשלום ותכלה במאמצים.

מצנבאום הסכים אתי אכ הוסיף שמה שיוצר השינוי החדשטי בדעת הקהל הי"ר התמונות של הדחפורים בכל רשתות הטלביזיה מחופ אל חופ ההתאחדות החוטרות ונשנות שנציפ את האזור בישובים וכוי. סי"ט באומרו שהוא לא ינטוש תמיכתו ולא יבקר את ישראל פומבית אכ חובתו כ"ד"ד לחלק אתו בהחשמויות שהוא קולט.

ד"נ יצ =

שהח רחמ ס/רחמ שתכט מנכל מנכל דיכונ ששון מצמא רט/אמן
מכ/חד

שגרירות ישראל
ווישינגטון

ט"א
סג'לים (ז'רנבלם)

6 . 6 . 1977

א. א. א.

אל: מספ"א ✓

סאח: צבי רפיח

מצ"ב לעיונכם דברי הסנטור מצנבאום

לחיוב העזרה שמושיטה ישראל לנוצרים

שנדרוס לבנון.

ב ב ר כ ה,

צ . רפיח

התקן:

המרכז, משה"ח

OFFICE OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF
THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE

1901

TO _____

BY _____

THIS DEED IS _____

LEBANESE CHRISTIANS SAY ISRAEL ONLY PROTECTION AGAINST ANNIHILATION

Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, in a recent issue of the Cleveland Jewish News, I read a story that pleased me much because it addressed itself to the protection that the Israelis are giving to the Lebanese Christian people. The story quoted Francis Rizik, political adviser to Christian forces in southern Lebanon, who publicly had read a letter from Maj. Saad Haddad, commander of the Christian militia in the area, which said in part:

"Our former enemy, Israel, is today the only and last support we have. The bitter irony is that Israel, constantly vilified, has opened her heart to us."

"I look forward to that day when there will be a peaceful solution to the problems of the Middle East, and any effort toward eliminating the bloodshed that has occurred in that part of the world."

April 29, 1974

must find favor with all peoples regardless of their political perspectives.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the newspaper report be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

LEBANESE CHRISTIANS SAY ISRAEL ONLY PROTECTION AGAINST ANNIHILATION

TEL AVIV—A Lebanese Christian said here this week that the only force that deterred Palestinian terrorists from annihilating Christians in Lebanon was Israel's Army.

The speaker, Francis Rizik, political adviser to Christian forces in southern Lebanon, read a letter from Maj. Saad Haddad, commander of the Christian militia in the area, which said, in part: "Our former enemy, Israel, is today the only and last support we have. The bitter irony is that Israel, constantly vilified, has opened her heart to us."

Rizik appeared at a press conference Tuesday arranged by the Public Committee for Aid to Lebanon. It was the first time that a citizen of a neighboring Arab country held a press conference in Tel Aviv.

He was accompanied by prominent persons who head the committee, among them Moshe Sanbar, former governor of the Bank of Israel; Magr. Augustin Harfoush, leader of the Maronite Christian community in Israel; and representatives of the Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa municipalities, who announced a project to aid the stricken citizens of southern Lebanon.

Rizik said he spoke in the name of Maj. Haddad, who was unable to come "because of the military situation." He read Haddad's letter calling on world opinion to aid the south Lebanese population. The letter said:

"Missile and phosphorous bombs are killing and wounding women, children, the elderly and the sick. The Christian world, the so-called free world, deserted us at the most difficult moment. Even our government in Beirut does not assist us and the Red Cross cars don't reach us. . . . Our former enemy, Israel, is today the only and the last support we have. The bitter irony is that Israel, constantly vilified, has opened her heart to us. Where should we send our wounded, our expectant mothers, our old and sick? Would the terrorists treat them? Their 155-mm. shells, Katyusha and Grad rockets are responsible for all the suffering and horror around us."

After the letter was read, Sanbar called on the public to contribute funds to the victims of the fighting in Lebanon. Deputy Mayor Yitzhak Arzi of Tel Aviv announced that 3,000 Boy Scouts would distribute circulars to Tel Aviv homes this Saturday announcing that blankets and old clothes will be collected for Lebanese villagers next Tuesday. Similar collections will be made in Jerusalem and Haifa.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס

בלתי מסווג

183 טס
נשלח 122000 ינו 77

אנ: המשרד
מאת: וועינגטון

הר
אלג'יס (מתינת 10.1)

אל: טצמא

אבו דאוד, בהמשך לשלנו 177.

רצייב תוכן הדברים שעומד הסנטור מצנבאום לשאת העיב בכל ימות ומנט.

MR. PRESIDENT, MR. NETZENBAUM, TWENTY FOUR HOURS AGO, THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES HUSTLED AN ACCUSED TERRORIST ONTO A PLANE BEFORE THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM COULD BE PROPERLY ASSESSED, AND SENT HIM OFF TO ALGERIA BEYOND THE REACH OF LAW AND JUSTICE. A LOT MORE THAN ONE MAN LEFT FRANCE ON THAT PLANE. FRENCH TRADITIONS OF HONOR AND JUSTICE ALSO HAD DEPARTED FROM THOSE WHO MADE THE DECISION TO FREE ABU DAUD WITH SUCH INDECENT HASTE. THE WORLD HAS WITNESSED OVER AND OVER AGAIN WHAT A SAVAGE PRICE IS ALWAYS PAID FOR WINKING AT TERRORISM. THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN PARIS. TERRORISTS WHO ARE FREED WITHOUT TRIAL, WHO ARE REWARDED WITH FIRST CLASS PASSAGE AND FIRST CLASS TREATMENT WILL REMAIN TERRORISTS. THOSE WHO SUPPORT THEM WILL REMAIN INTERNATIONAL DISRUPTORS OF THE PEACE, SECURING THE TERRORISTS' CONVICTION THAT THEY ARE ABOVE THE LAW, THAT SOVEREIGN AND ONCE PROUD NATIONS WILL BEND THE KNEE TO THEM. MR. PRESIDENT, I ADDRESS MYSELF TO THIS OUTRAGE NOT ONLY IN THE NAME OF VIOLATED JUSTICE AND CYNICAL DISREGARD OF RATIONAL LEGAL PROCEDURES, BUT FROM A PERSPECTIVE OF DEEP PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AS WELL. TWO OF MY CLOSEST FRIENDS FROM CLEVELAND, DR. BENJAMIN AND DOROTHY BERGER, ARE THE FATHER AND MOTHER OF DAVID BERGER, ONE OF THE MEN BRUTALLY MURDERED AT THE MUNICH OLYMPICS. I KNEW DAVID AS A CHILD AND WATCHED HIM GROW UP TO BE A SPLENDID YOUNG MAN, JOINING WHAT HE BELIEVED WAS A CREATIVE CHALLENGE... WORKING IN ISRAEL. ALL THIS LOVE AND DEDICATION ENDED WHEN HE WAS SHACKLED AND SHOT IN COLD BLOOD FOR THE CRIME OF REPRESENTING THE "WRONG" NATION AT AN INTERNATIONAL FESTIVAL OF SPORTS AND GOOD WILL. BUT NO SUCH CRUEL AND INSTANT PUNISHMENT IS METED OUT TO THE MAN ACCUSED OF PLANNING THESE PREMEDITATED MURDERS. FOR HIM THERE IS NO PUNISHMENT AT ALL, NOR ANY SERIOUS EXAMINATION OF THE CHARGES. A GREAT NATION CHOOSES TO DONDOME INTERNATIONAL BANDITRY AND IN THE PROCESS MAKES DECENCY AND ORDER AND LIFE ITSELF, MORE DANGEROUS FOR ALL OF US. I WAS CHAIRMAN OF THE CEREMONIES IN CLEVELAND WHEN A MEMORIAL WAS DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF DAVID BERGER. THE ELOQUENT SPEAKER AT THOSE CEREMONIES WAS THE DISTINGUISHED SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA, SENATOR HUBERT HUMPHREY. ALL OF US THERE THAT DAY PLEDGED THAT WE WOULD NOT FORGET DAVID BERGER, NOR WOULD WE FORGET THE MEANING

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

315

ח" תמוז תשל"ו

6 יולי 1976

אלוף (היו"ר) אהרון אורן
מ - קולנוע (אמריקא)

אל : מצפ"א

מאת: אמיר אורן, וושינגטון

הנדון: קשרי אש"פ עם אישים ואירגונים בארה"ב

מכתבי מ-26 במאי 1976

בהמשך לדבריו בנושא זה, שצורפו למכתבי האסור, פירסם המורשה לארי
מקדונלד רשימה נוספת של אישים ואירגונים המהוארים על-ידו כפעילים
פרו-אש"פים בארה"ב.

דברי מקדונלד פורסמו ברשומות הקונגרס ב-2 דנא.

ב כ ר כ ה

א. אורן

העחק: מ. נבות, כאן

הסברה, כאן

הקונכ"ל אטלנטה

המרכז משה"ח

100

100
100
100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

CAMPAIGN TO LEGITIMIZE THE
PLO TERRORISTS

HON. LARRY McDONALD

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 1, 1976

Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Speaker, a multilevel campaign is being implemented in this country to direct U.S. foreign policy to a position of support for the Soviet-backed, transnationally active terrorist group, the Palestine Liberation Organization—PLO.

At the lowest level, the PLO itself, with assistance from the Cubans, is building a coalition of revolutionary street activists to create a disruptive presence in our larger cities and generate initial publicity in the left press. These activists are in many cases already members of terrorist support groups and may provide the PLO with recruits to assist in the logistics of a PLO terrorist action here or to perform some "solidarity bombings" as PLO proxies.

At the top, the campaign commenced with a call from the Institute for Policy Studies—IPS—for secret meetings between influential Americans, including national legislators, PLO representatives, IPS members, pro-PLO Israelis, and others.

The Institute for Policy Studies plan for meetings with the PLO was initiated by IPS's two codirectors, Richard Barnett and Marcus Rasquin, and IPS staffer Saul Landau, a Castroite revolutionary who serves Havana as a propagandist and organizer.

The IPS plan called for the secret meetings to be set up by Samuel Rubin, one of the institute's principal financial angels and long a source of funding for Old Left and New Left projects. Samuel Rubin and his son-in-law, attorney Peter Weiss, are the two main financial stars in the IPS galaxy and a brief review of their activities is necessary to add perspective.

Samuel Rubin, the retired former chairman of the board of Faberge, has used his perfume fortune to fund many old and new left projects through his Samuel Rubin Foundation, 9 East 64th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021. In the late 1940's, Samuel Rubin served as chairman of the New Council of American Business, a Communist Party, U.S.A.—CPUSA—front which escaped public investigation. Samuel Rubin's son, Reed Rubin, serves as the foundation's treasurer. Reliable old left sources report he is named for John Reed, the American Communist publicist for the Bolsheviks who is buried in the Kremlin.

Secretary of the Rubin Foundation is Cora Rubin Weiss, Samuel's daughter. Cora Weiss has been active for over a decade in organizing support for Soviet-backed Marxist-Leninist national liberation movements such as the Vietcong and Khmer Rouge terrorists.

Cora Weiss has been a quiet source for cash funding for a number of key antiwar groups and projects in support of the Indochinese Marxist-Leninist terrorists. She has served as a leader of

Women Strike for Peace, a group thoroughly generated by the CPUSA and which acts in concert with the Soviet Union's World Peace Council apparatus; of the CPUSA-dominated new Mobilization Committee and its successor, the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice; of Clergy and Laity Concerned; of the Coalition for a New Foreign Policy, which in accordance with the calls of the World Peace Council is trying to stop U.S. development and production of new weapons to defend America from Soviet advanced weapons technology; and with Friendship, a project of reparations to the Vietnamese Communists of which Mrs. Weiss was a main organizer.

Currently, Cora Weiss has been serving the terrorist support groups of the July 4 Coalition—J4C—as an organizer and executive board member and assisting in gaining demonstration permits for the Philadelphia counter-Bicentennial march.

Cora Rubin Weiss' husband, patent attorney Peter Weiss, serves as vice president of his father-in-law's foundation. Peter Weiss was born in Austria on December 8, 1925, and was admitted to the bar in 1953. Weiss is a member of the National Lawyers Guild, the principal legal support group for revolutionary terrorists in the United States; and is a leading volunteer staff attorney with the Center for Constitutional Rights—CCR—an NLG offshoot.

CCR attorneys William Kunstler, Ramsey Clark, Bill Schaap, Margie Ratner, and Peter Weiss applied to join the defense team for the Baader-Meinhof terrorists now on trial in Stuttgart, West Germany. A young radical attorney on the Baader-Meinhof defense team participated in the kidnapping of the OPEC oil ministers from Vienna to Algeria last December, led by Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez, alias "Carlos the Jackel." The Baader-Meinhof gang provided the logistical backup for the Palestine Liberation Organization's Black September slaughter of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics.

Peter Weiss served for 10 years, till 1973, as president of the American Committee on Africa, the principal U.S. support group for Soviet-backed African terrorists; and remains the ACOA counsel. Weiss is also representing the Southern Africa Committee, a related coalition of revolutionary supporters of African terrorists which recently discovered from a Freedom of Information Act suit that it was the subject of an FBI investigation. Weiss has been chairman of the Institute for Policy Studies board of trustees since 1970.

The IPS campaign is designed to create personal relationships between the Americans and the PLO representatives and to develop alternatives to foreign policy and spur on behind the scenes negotiations for a Middle East settlement giving the Palestine Liberation Organization major concessions, particularly control of any West Bank areas after an Israeli withdrawal.

The Institute for Policy Studies, through its leading activist organizer, Arthur Waskow, author of the Mayday

disruptions of Washington, D.C., in 1971, and Paul Jacobs of the Transnational Institute, also participated in an advertisement which appeared in the New York Times on April 4, 1976.

The advertisement was sponsored by a coalition, Middle East Peace Now—NEPN—operating from the 11th floor at 777 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017, and from P.O. Box 271, Nyack, N.Y. 10960, a post office box used by the Fellowship of Reconciliation—FOR.

Among the small group of sponsoring organizations was the Committee for a Just Peace in the Middle East—CJPME. This group is run by Alex Kolkin, chairman of the Communist Party, U.S.A.—CPUSA—National Jewish Commission. The present function of that commission is to pressure the few Jewish members left in the CPUSA to defend Soviet anti-Semitism and oppose the State of Israel in support of Soviet foreign policy objectives.

Visits by my friends to the offices of the Committee for a Just Peace in the Middle East for literature and information revealed stacks of Communist Party literature, primarily reprints of speeches by the aging Stalinist warhorse, Hyman Lumer, who heads the CPUSA Educational Commission. Lumer has been an outstanding "Stakhanovite" in defending Soviet anti-Semitism and slave labor camps. Lumer was an individual signer of the MEPN ad along with such identified CPUSA members as Anne Braden, Esther Cooper Jackson, Paul Jacobs, now a fellow of OPS's Transnational Institute; Sylvia Kushner, George Murphy of the Afro-American newspapers, Pauline Rosen, Jack Spiegel, Jessica Smith Abt, and Louise Berman, identified 30 years ago by the FBI as a Soviet intelligence contact.

The advertisement, which attempts to promote the PLO's gang of armed thugs as the equivalent of a freely elected sovereign state, was signed by the following mixture of Judas goats and sheep:

INDIVIDUAL SPONSORS

Rev. Charles Angell, S.A., Ecumenical Trends; J. Martin Bailey, A.D.; Rev. Lee Baldwin, United Methodist Church (UMC); Dr. Lee Barker, United Presbyterian Church; Anne and John Bennett; Hanna Bergan; Daniel Berrigan, S.J.; Peggy Billings; July Bjorkman; Harriet Bleeker, WILPF; Eugene Bloomfield; Charles Bloomstein, Center for War and Peace Studies; Marjorie Boehl; Elise Boulding; Kay Boyle; Anne Braden; Dr. Selma Brandow; Robert Campbell; Edward Canler; Esther Carroll; Naam Chomsky; Marilyn Clement, IFCO; Irene Cohen; Melvin Cohen; Edna Coleman, WRL; Rev. George Collins; Jeffrey Cooklin; Michael Cook, S.J.; Philip Corrao; Edward Cripps, S.J.; Peter Cronshaw; Robin Cusany; John Cummings; Ann Davidson; Bill Davidson; Onsie Davis; Miles Day; Mordecai Dayan; Rev. Paul Deats, FOR; Ruby Dee; Shirley and George DeHority; David Dellinger; Barbara Deming; Francis and Adma d'Heurle; Bishop Ralph Dodge, UMC; Dorothy Doherty; Irvin Dorez, Israeli-Arab Reconciliation Project; William Douthard, WRL; Most Rev. Carroll Dozier, D.D., Bishop of Memphis; Mrs. J. Eamon; Marion Edwan; Eileen Egan; Colin Eisler, Jewish Peace Fellowship (JPF); Robert Ellisberg, Catholic Worker; Edward Ericson, Society for Ethical Culture; Prof. Joseph Pahey, Pax Christi; Mary Farquharson; Rev. Richard Fernandez; W. H. & Carol FORT;

Lawrence Fisher; Libby Frank, WILPF; Martha Friedlaender, Fellowship of Ethical Pacifists; Ruth Gage-Colby; Rabbi Everett Gendler; Allan Geyer; Kenneth Giles; Rev. Columba Gilliss, Episcopal Peace Fellowship; Allen Ginsberg; Naomi Goodman, JFF; Elizabeth Gorman; Raphael Gould, American Committee on Africa; Hazel Grossman; Martin Gouterman; Most Rev. Thomas Gumbleton, Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit; Max Gundy; CIP; Robert Gwyn, Chapel Hill Friends Meeting; Alice Hamburg; Ruth Harris; Mark Haven; Ruth Heiss; Brig. Gen. H. B. Hester (Ret.); Leonard Hirschman; Sister Adrian Hofstetter, O. P., Center of Ecumenism & Reconciliation; Sidney Hollander, Jr., BREIRA; Prof. Dorothy Jane Van Hoogstraate; Theresa Hoover UMC; Barton Hunter, FOR; David R. Hunter, Council on Religion and International Affairs; Robert Huston, UMC; Homer Jack, World Conference on Religion and Peace; Esther Cooper Jackson, Freedomways; Paul Jacobs; Phyllis & Julius Jacobson, New Politics; Lillian Jameson; Alica Jonas.

Rosa Julstrom, Edward Kaplan; Abraham & Ida Kaufman; William Keeney; E. Scott Kennedy, Mideast Mobile Education Project; Roy Kessler, WRL; Sid Kivanoski; John Kleever, M.D., Americans for Middle East Neutrality; Fay Knopp; Rabbi Douglas Krantz; Ruth & Israel Kushner, CJP; Rabbi Lawrence Kushner; Sylvia Kushner, Chicago Peace Council; Dr. & Mrs. Donald Lehman; Rev. Bernard Lee, Southern Christian Leadership Conference; Sid Lens; Betty Sue Lentz; Harold Leventhal; Henrietta Levine; Dr. E. James Leiberman; Yvonne Logan; Ross Lomanitz; Dr. Hyman Lumer; Bradford Lyttle; Scott Mackey; David McReynolds, WRL; Joy Marks; Paul Mayer; Irving Messik; Lorna S. Milgram; Rev. David J. Miller; Eleanor & Joe Miller, SANE; Lois Miller, UMC; Neal Mills; Reynolds Moody, Lt. Col. U.S.M.C. (Ret.); Arthur Moore, New World Outlook; Mr. & Mrs. Ward Morehouse; Joseph Mulligan, S. J.; George Murphy, Afro-American Newspapers; Frances Neely, Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL); Marian Henriquez Neudel, Chutzpah; Roberta Neuman; Craig Nesby; Mildred Scott Olmsted, WILPF; Peter Orlovsky; Eleanor Gorbam Otterness; Grace Paley; Marjorie & Victor Paschke; Jack Patterson, APSC; Jim Peck; Sid Peck; Elizabeth Pendleton; Marquita Piatlov; Irma Prior, WILPF; Fred Pischne; Edward Ramberg; Robert Randall, Jr.; Lois Lee Rathbun; Rosalie Reichman, APSC; Edna Roberts; Rabbi Michael Robinson; Pauline Rosen; Gertrude Rosenblum; William S. Samuel III; Prof. Ronald & Marguerite Santoni; Anne Schafer; Rev. Christoph & Kathryn Schmauch, World Fellowship; Marilyn Scholze; Howard Schomer, United Church of Christ; Henry Schwarzhild, ACLU; Rabbi Gerald Serotta, CCNY Hillel; Judy Sikora; Ruth & Philip Siltman; Hugh Smythe; Allan Solomonow; Jack Spiegel; Dorothy Steffens, WILPF; Lucy Steinitz, Response; Helene Stolker, JFF; I. F. Stone; Prof. Curwen Stoddart; Marilyn & Stephen Suffet; Rachel & Kenneth Tilsen, Native American Solidarity Committee; Harry Tobman, CJP; Louis Untermyer; Edith Villastrigo, Womens Strike for Peace; Maurice Visscher; William Walker; A. Dudley Ward; Arthur Waskow; E. McKinnan White; Rev. Edward Wicklein; Herman Will, UMC; May E. Wilson; Louise Wilson; Raymond Wilson, FCNL; Matilda Saxton Winn, UMC; Rabbi Arnold Jacob Wolf, Yale Hillel; Beverly Woodward; Gordon Zahn; Vinton Ziegler; Jessica Smith Abt, New World Review; Baltimore Meeting of Friends; Robert Barnal, Amnesty International; Louise Berman; Rev. Wilson Boots; Brent S. Hall; Ethel Sanjines; Wendy Schwartz, WRL; Jean Wagner; Janice & Gerard Vanderhaar; Thomas C. Cornell.

Coordinator: partial listing.

*Organizations given for identification only.



א"ק
א"ק
א"ק - קונזול (מקלוסקי)

CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

105 MONTGOMERY STREET
SUITE 1000
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104
415-398-2788

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
סן פרנסיסקו

52

סודי

25.1.79

אל: צבי רפיח, השגרירות ואשינגטון
מאת: הקונס"ל, סן פרנסיסקו

הנדון: קונגרסמן פייט מקלוסקי

לבי היר

בכנס האזורי של איפ"ק בסן פרנסיסקו בדצמבר (בו הבאתי ברכות
בטעם ישראל) מצא פייט מקלוסקי הזדמנות להסביר-סיומתו-לביבור על עמדתו
(השלישית מאד מבחינתו) בנושא פאצות המיזרר. הסביר והתגונן, אך
בסופו של דבר הגן על עמדתו ולא נסוג ממנה.

כידוע לך, למרות שדובר ^{אחראטום} יגיע לביקור בארץ לא ביקר
בסופו של דבר. ידוע מאזור הבחירה שלו סיפר לי שבהרבה ביקורו
בטו"ח נשאר בדעותיו כשהיו בעבר.

קונגרסמן פייט מקלוסקי אמר לי שהוא מצטער מאד שלא הצליח לבקר בארץ הפעם
והוא מקווה ובטוח שהדבר יעלה בידו בהזדמנות ראשונה.
כידוע לך חוזר ומדבר על כך כבר כמה שנים, אך לא מגשים הבטחתו.

ידידנו בדעה שפייט מקלוסקי ימשיך להוות בעייה עבורנו.

בברכה

מ. ארזי

העתק: השגריר ואשינגטון
הציר, ואשינגטון
מנהל מצפא ✓



13 אפריל 1978

אל : טפ"א
סרכז

מאת: צ. רפיה, וושינגטון

הנ
קולטת
(ה/נ ארמק וט ארמק)
(אקוסקי)

הנדון: קונגרסמן פול מקלוסקי על השימוש
בפצצה מסר
למברקי טה-11 דנא

מצ"ב האיגרה ששיגר מקלוסקי לעסיהיו בביה"נ
וחדפיטי המאמרים שזרפו אליה.

בברכה

צ. רפיה

העתק:

מר י. צ'חנובר, נ"י

PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, JR.
12TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
AND
COMMITTEE ON
MERCHANT MARINE
AND FISHERIES

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

205 CANNON BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-3411

DISTRICT OFFICE
305 GAUNT AVENUE
PALM ALTO, CALIFORNIA 94306
(415) 328-7383
(408) 275-7452

April 10, 1978

APR 11 1978

Dear Colleague:

I, like most of us, have supported military and economic assistance to Israel on every vote which Congress has considered in recent years. Last week, however, I learned from unimpeachable sources that Israeli forces used U.S.-supplied cluster bombs (CBU's) against Lebanese civilian areas near Tyre on March 19th. It was reported in the Washington Star on January 18 that the Israelis had supplied CBU's to the Ethiopians who in turn had used them against insurgents in Eritrea.

CBU's leave an aircraft as a single unit, then divide into numbers of single grenades, which, in turn, explode at random to create a blizzard of steel fragments over an area as large as 25 acres. A Life article describing the effect of one CBU dropped by mistake by one U.S. aircraft on a Vietnamese ranger unit in 1971 is enclosed for your review, and also the articles describing the use of CBU's by Ethiopian aircraft, and the nature of Israeli advice and assistance to the Ethiopians.

CBU's were supplied to Israel by the United States between 1970 and 1975, subject to an agreement that they would be used only for defensive purposes, and that they would not be furnished to other nations without U.S. consent. Use of this type of anti-personnel weapon against refugee camps or in civilian areas which shelter enemy guerrilla forces is not only inhumane, but particularly disregards the painful lesson we learned in Vietnam that wiping out civilian villages in order to get at a few insurgents is counterproductive from a military standpoint.

I suggest that when this year's Foreign Assistance Act comes before us, we amend the bill to require that in the event of any future use of CBU's by the Israelis in other than military action against military forces in contact with Israeli troops, the President be directed to forthwith terminate all arms deliveries to Israel pending further congressional action.

If you are in agreement with this principle, please call Michele at 55411.

Sincerely,

Paul N. McCloskey, Jr.
Paul N. McCloskey, Jr.

THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE WITH RECYCLED FIBERS

...no gives me the lead. "Come and help me bring

two doctors have been forced to leave some of the worst casualties unattended in order to save those with a better chance. Two of the men Burrows and I brought in are dying where we left

family and back to the war. After two hours the first quiet laugh is heard. Clunking shovels heap fresh soil on the blood-stained ground, the dead are packaged in ponchos, tied with bandages, packs and weapons of the missing men are heaped for removal. An American voice suggests that the helicopter pilots should be called in to back-haul the bodies tonight without being told they are running risks for the dead. Fortunately, Major Todd will have none of that nonsense. The bodies stay. Before they are taken away in the morning, a Vietnamese trooper looks for, finds and removes a pair of boots which are apparently his size.

But now there are still more wounded to move. "How many to go?" a paratrooper asks. "Three, I think." And then to me, "Is that one dead?"

I stoop over a man whose face is shrouded from the dust by a towel. My hand is on his chest and I feel a slight movement. "No, he's alive."

"Okay, make it four."

A Frantic Night on the Edge of Laos

by JOHN SAAR

Late afternoon, 6 February 1971. I first hear the distant whistle of a plane as Larry Burrows and I stand chatting at the roadside headquarters of Task Force 11 just three kilometers from the Laos border. Tomorrow, or maybe the day after, this amalgam of elite South Vietnamese army units will pull its armored truck carriers back on to dusty Route 9 and head into Laos. We plan to ride with them.

The U.S. advisers are relaxed and pleasant and Task Force 11's commander, Lt. Colonel Bui The Dung, returns our greeting with a warm smile. Everyone knows that across the border in Laos there will be hard battles, but today the mood is light-hearted, almost festive. Chattering and joking, the paratroops are settling in, gouging out slit trenches, stringing tents. Rice savored with onions and vegetables bubbles over dozens of fires, scalding tea in blue-and-white china bowls passes deftly from one hand to the next.

Like a horn on New York's Fifth Avenue, the rising whine of a jet fighter is simply a background

noise in Vietnam. I hear it, think "jet on a strike run" and ignore it. Why not? Every so often someone will say, "Hey, look at that jet roll out," and you watch—detached, safe, vaguely sympathetic to the recipients of the ton of high explosive or tanks of napalm. To the allied armies and the jets who travel with them, our air power is as innocuous and reliable as home electricity. Only this time the jet was rolling in on us.

In the fading light the diving plane is hardly visible. But two men, a Vietnamese officer and his American adviser, see it, and the three bombs tumbling toward them. They go headlong into a trench. Alabama-born Staff Sergeant Bob Logan later spoke of it as "high diving without a pool." Burrows is talking about film shipments. Two eyes snatch my attention—close, but safe. Then explosions are on us, in us, among us. The world one terrible *Herzsch* of sound and blast—and one brain lurches with the impact. For a frozen moment I read incredulity and horror on the faces around me, then we are all down and scrambling for cover.

A shallow cooling trench. Two big fires, two simmering pots inches away. Christ, I'm going to roast to death. But my head is saying, don't move, mortars, mortars, another salvo any moment. I carry that helmet everywhere, where is it? I look around. One man is moving—fast, decisive—toward the impact area; Larry Burrows. In a thought vacuum I follow. The sunset is still pale gold on the mountaintops. Now there is a stronger, wicked yellow; flames are licking from the turret of a burning truck. We run on and Burrows goes prone to frame the scene. We are the first ones here, and the brain can't accept the visual evidence as real. People bleeding, tattered, broken people storn everywhere by the steel cyclone. Nightmarishly outlined in the half light, dust-gray apparitions already showing ominously dark, spreading blotches rise to an elbow and extend a pleading arm. From all sides comes the elemental moan of men beseeching help.

Pandemonium. Two officers are already on the radio, calling for Medevac helicopters, but most are momentarily shocked into inactivity. And pandemonium in my head. Again it is Burrows who gives me the lead. "Come and help me bring

that chap in," he says. No stretchers. Awkwardly, we pick him up by legs and arms. God, this is not only macabre, it's difficult and tiring as well. We stumble across the broken ground. My hands are slick with the man's blood and I feel its seeping wetness in my clothes. He is hard hit to the chest and stomach, now I know he must be hit in the head as well. From the depths of him comes a groan of unspeakable pain. It wrings from Burrows an answering groan of commiseration.

We bring in two more badly wounded and lay them at the edge of a bomb crater where a dressing station is hubbubbing into action. Excited voices gabbling into radios, figures blundering into one another. A wide-eyed medic arrives running barefoot with a "panic bag" in hand. A roar of exploding ammunition from a burning armored personnel carrier adds to the confusion.

Now the wounded are coming in thick and fast, very few walking. The talk is not of NVA rockets or mortars but of something called CBU

dropped accidentally by a friendly plane. These cluster bomb units leave the plane as a single bomb, then explode apart into numbers of oval grenades, which in turn explode individually to create a blizzard of steel. If one plane on one run can inflict such savage hurt, I think, what unimaginable suffering has been inflicted by thousands of planes on thousands of runs?

For perhaps 10 minutes Task Force 11 has been overwhelmed by shock. Now paralysis passes and the pressure of emergency reveals personality. Most assenive is Major Todd, Georgian, senior adviser to the paratroops, who bellows orders in a mixture of pidgin English and bastard French which reduces everything to stark essentials. When the first helicopter is coming in, we hear him yell, "Only the man. No stretchers. 'Cause so beaucoup many."

Major Bill Aiken, senior adviser to the cavalry squadron, is on his second tour, but he has seen nothing like this. He sits, head sunk, shoulders

hunched, and when one of his team tells him that "So-and-so is badly shaken up," Aiken replies, "He ain't the only one." But later, when there is work to do, he is on hand.

In his command center, neat in a long green coat, Colonel Dung coordinates the recovery of the wounded and alerts his outer defenses. He is outwardly calm, but his emotions are suppressed not absent, and in the morning he allows himself a single telling comment: "It is sad to lose men in this way."

One of two wounded officers is paratroop-Major Nguyen Son Ha. A chirpy man of equisite manners and delightfully deplorable English, he declines to be Medevaced until 12 hours later. By that time his broken arm is grossly swollen and his face is blanched with pain.

After 30 minutes the wounded are still coming in. Among the last is a man with a broken leg who staggers in unaided. How many are there? Thirty, forty, Christ, at least fifty. Two medics

were killed outright and even at full strength there is no way the aid teams could cope with these numbers. As I watch, it becomes plain that the two doctors have been forced to leave some of the worst casualties untended in order to save those with a better chance. Two of the men Burrows and I brought in are dying where we left

them. Some of the bandaging has been too hasty. One man squelches in a pool of his own blood as he rocks to and fro with pain. Three medics come over and replace the blood-soaked field dressings. The man is still contorted with pain and turns his head into the side of a corpse alongside.

The moon glides from behind clouds and lights the small slope. It is littered with wounded, blood stains showing starkly against the gleaming white bandages. The medics and the other unwounded figures who scurry about are impossible to distinguish as American or Vietnamese. One man, whose left leg is nothing but bone and shredded flesh, raises his head to see while the medics are

scissoring away the cloth. He sees and falls back soundlessly. The thought of what he sees chills me inside. Another man lying on the ground in the crucifix position moves inch by inch to the man next to him. He gropes for the man's hand and claps it tight. The wounded are talking to one another. I can't imagine, nor do I want to know, what they say.

The Vietnamese follow the Chinese philosophy: pain must be borne with minimum display, and to a Westerner the stoicism is awesome. Men in terrible fear and pain are murmuring for the aid of their Creator and whimpering gratefully. I yearn for someone to scream so that I too may cry. No one does. But there is no snobitative cast for men who are 20 years old and want to live. They fight for breath until you long for them to die. Chest heaving with the effort, one man emits a rasping, almost metallic rattle as he sucks air through a blood-filled throat.

At last he dies, chest expanded, as though that last effort stopped his heart. The man whose blood stained my trousers is also dead. One of the two doctors working with frenetic speed is 29-year-old Dr. Phan Van Chuong, who joined the army only six weeks ago. He is appalled by the number and severity of the casualties. In the morning, close to tears, he will say, "It was impossible, impossible."

The first American Medevac helicopter circles cautiously down through the cloud cover and, clacks in to land, then pulls away.

"What's the problem?"
"He can't see to land." Route 9 is ankle-deep in dust, and the blades throw up a cloud which drowns the bright landing light.

"Throw water to damp the dust."
The helicopter lands and there is another obscene drama half-seen through the dust. There are too many casualties, no place for stretchers. Little groups of half-real, half-glimped figures

run out with the worst wounded in their arms. The blinking red lights on the chopper glow eerily on their helmets and seem to pulse HURRY, HURRY, HURRY. Forced to treat their comrades like so many corpses, the paratroops shove wounded on top of one another until the cabin is a surreal slaughterhouse. Then the chopper sets off on its dangerous return flight.

The airlift goes on for three hours. The accidental bombing by an American aircraft, probably Navy, cost seven dead and 34 wounded. Several of the wounded were expected to die. But slowly Task Force 11 recovers its confidence, turns its face away from the grave of personal calamity and back to the war. After two hours the first quiet laugh is heard. Clunking shovels heap fresh soil on the blood-stained ground, the dead are packaged in ponchos, tied with bandages, packs and weapons of the missing men are heaped for removal. An American voice suggests that the helicopter pilots should be called in to back-haul the bodies tonight without being told they are running risks for the dead. Fortunately, Major Todd will have none of that nonsense. The bodies stay. Before they are taken away in the morning, a Vietnamese trooper looks for, finds and removes a pair of boots which are apparently his size.

But now there are still more wounded to move. "How many to go?" a paratrooper asks.
"Three, I think." And then to me, "Is that one dead?"

I stoop over a man whose face is shrouded from the dust by a towel. My hand is on his chest and I feel a slight movement. "No, he's alive."
"Okay, make it four."

Bombing in Eritrea Described

Reporter Recounts Attack by Ethiopians; Residents Flee as Raids Increase

By Raymond Wilkinson
United Press International

TESSENEI, Eritrea — Ethiopian warplanes are bombing Eritrean towns with napalm and cluster bombs in an apparent systematic campaign to terrorize the civilian population and disrupt the guerrillas' fight for independence.

The campaign began at the start of the new year, according to the Eritrean Liberation Front, is increasing in intensity.

The Ethiopians officially have denied the bombing charges. Their campaign, however, appears to be succeeding against the civilians.

Tessenei was bustling trade center of some 25,000 people before ELF guerrillas closed in early last year and stormed the Ethiopian garrison.

It is now a virtual ghost town of some 5,000.

I was in Tessenei when Ethiopian warplanes, painted in desert camouflage, bombed the town and neighboring village of Ali Gidir twice within four hours.

Snooping out of the midday sun as Tessenei slumbered during its daily siesta, two Soviet-built MIG 21s, recently shipped to Ethiopia as part of a massive arms buildup, skimmed over the town dropping two bombs.

Russian-built anti-aircraft weapons opened fire on the aircraft as civilians scrambled into their homes and newly dug trenches.

Four hours later the Ethiopian planes were back, wheeling for several minutes in the clear sky and dropping napalm and deadly cluster bombs.

One napalm bomb devastated several thatch huts. A cluster bomb fell nearby, battering the area with shrapnel. One person was wounded.

The cluster bomb's canister was recovered later. In stenciled English were the words "bomb-cluster." Several other bombs fell on a nearby farm.

A week ago warplanes staged a similar lightning hit-and-run raid on Tessenei. Six persons were killed and several score wounded as two bombs, reportedly Israeli-manufactured, smashed accurately into the town center, hitting a hotel and nearby buildings.

Other towns have been hit in recent days, according to the ELF, causing casualties and panic among civilians.

The Eritreans, who now control more than 90 per cent of Ethiopia's northernmost province, charge this is a new and deliberate policy of terror by Ethiopia's military rulers aimed primarily against civilians rather than guerrillas.

The rebels also characterize the bombings as a last desperate attempt by an enemy already acknowledging its impending total defeat.

"This bombing is a sign of desperation by the Ethiopians," said Abdel Wahab Mahmud, the ELF leader in charge of Tessenei. "Once they have started bombing civilian towns they have no intention of ever returning again."

"The bombing signifies to us the Ethiopians are leaving for good and have given up the idea of trying to retake the towns they are bombing."

The Ethiopians have been battling against secessionist guerrillas in Eritrea off and on for more than 12 years. They are also fighting Somali forces in the disputed Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

Guerrilla administrators in Tessenei have been making vigorous efforts to attract refugees who fled into nearby Sudan back to their homes and revive the town.

But since the bombing began, more frightened civilians have slipped away. The ELF has begun to urge the population to dig foxholes. But until darkness falls people remain indoors or close to home. Almost all daylight activity, civilian and military, has been halted.

Traffic is banned between sunrise and sunset. Classes for 400 children between 4 and 10 are held in the evening. In a tiny factory men and women churn out up to 200 camouflage uniforms for guerrillas each evening.

Before dawn the guerrillas transfer "all rolling stock—heavy trucks, jeeps and Landrovers—from a central but exposed town garage to a nearby camouflaged workshop for repairs.

Much daylight work has even stopped on the nearby Ali Gidir plantation, a sprawling 1,700-acre farm where the ELF is growing enough sorghum to feed its entire army.

But the captured combine harvesters are trundled out in the evening to continue the current harvest, a vital necessity both for food for the guerrilla army and to obtain revenue to continue the war.



By Rand Cook—The Washington Post

Israel Helping to Arm Ethiopia Despite U.S., Egyptian Objections

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

Working alongside the Soviet Union and Cuba, Israel is making a significant contribution to the Ethiopian war effort despite U.S. efforts to talk it out of participating in the complex situation in the Horn of Africa.

Administration sources say not only the Carter administration but also President Anwar Sadat of Egypt have tried unsuccessfully to dissuade Israel from providing ammunition, spare parts, and technical assistance, enabling Ethiopia to use military equipment originally supplied to it by the United States.

But while the administration has criticized the Soviet Union for fueling the war between Ethiopia and Somalia, it has not sought to bring much pressure on Israel for its role, the sources say.

Ethiopia is using Israeli help and a massive flow of Soviet arms to fight an invasion from Somalia of Ethiopia's southeastern Ogaden region. It is also using the foreign aid against a liberation movement in the north-eastern Eritrea region.

THE UNITED STATES has publicly urged negotiation of the Ogaden war, but it lacks any real leverage with either Ethiopians or Somalis. What leverage this country might have with Israel, whose own armed forces depend on U.S. equipment, has not been used.

This apparent reluctance to exert pressure against Ethiopia's interest is consistent with the administration's failure to cancel export licenses for thousands of military items now in U.S. warehouses that were bought by Ethiopia last year. The administration seems to observ-

ers to be trying to avoid pushing its already tense relations with Ethiopia to a complete break.

The equivocal U.S. policy emphasizes the complexity of the situation, which turns upside down many of the normal relationships of international power.

Contrary to the usual Soviet role in foreign military ventures, the Kremlin is helping the victim of international aggression. The aggression is by a Somali army that was trained by Soviet soldiers and armed by Moscow with one of the largest arsenals in Africa.

A few years ago the Soviets indirectly aided the Eritrean separatists, who were Moslems supported by Arab countries that Moscow supports in the Middle East. Now the Soviets are backing the Coptic Christian gov-

See ETHIOPIA, A-13

ETHIOPIA

Continued From A-3
ernment of Ethiopia against the Eritreans.

One Arab friend of the Soviets, Iraq, backs the Eritreans. But it has let the Soviets use Baghdad airport for their airlift of arms to build up the Ethiopian army against the Eritreans.

Perhaps most complex of all is the position of Israel.

Israel and the Soviet Union are opponents in the Middle East. For two decades the Soviets have armed Israel's enemies. The Kremlin has tried to thwart recent Arab-Israeli peace efforts and it reportedly has recently been flying extra weapons to Syria, the most important Arab country that opposes those efforts.

Yet in Ethiopia, Israeli experts are working separately from, but parallel to, the Soviets for the same purpose.

The small group of ostensibly civilian experts has filled critical gaps created by the expulsion of the American military mission last year by Ethiopia's leftist military junta. Sources say the Israelis have provided the technical assistance without which such categories of American-made military equipment as radar, radio networks and F-5 jet fighter-bombers would have become unusable.

IN ADDITION TO Israeli-made spare parts for this equipment, Israel has provided cluster bombs, napalm

and other ammunition, these sources say. One source says Israel has created a special production line to adapt air-to-ground rockets to fit Ethiopia's F-5s, and effective use of the rockets has been an important element in stopping Somali armor.

When U.S. officials have asked Israel why it continues to help Ethiopia as Soviet and Cuban influence grows there, they have received generally vague answers about historic ties — that some date back to the biblical Queen of Sheba.

Surrounded by hostile Arabs when it became a nation in 1948, Israel saw independent Ethiopia as one of the few potential friends in an Africa then still almost entirely under colonial rule. During the 1950s and '60s, Israeli specialists developed the Ethiopian meat industry, trained paratroopers, established model farms and generally encouraged friendly relations.

But Ethiopia broke diplomatic relations at the time of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Israeli technicians returned in 1975 and have worked there since without an embassy to provide formal contacts between the two governments.

Israel and Egypt share an interest in not having the Soviet Union entrenched in Ethiopia. Ethiopia stretches along the Red Sea and their sea lanes run through it.

In his meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin in recent months, Sadat has urged Israel to abandon activities that he felt bolstered Soviet interests in the area and helped consolidate a regime in Addis Ababa that is coming under Soviet influence.



17 באפריל 1978

א ל: מצפ"א
מאח: צ. רפיה, וושינגטון

ד"ר רפיה (מקלונסקי)

הנדון: מקלונסקי

מזכירתי רשמה עיקרי הדברים שנאמרו ע"י חבר הקונגרס
פול מקלונסקי, בהופעתו בהכניית הטלביזיה "פנורמה" בווינגטון
ב-17 דנא. מצ"ב.

בברכה

צבי רפיה

העמק:

מרכז, משה"ח

PANORAMA, APRIL 17, 1978

Hosts: Olita Crawford and Hal Bruno (Newsweek) ^{quest host-}

Interview with Congressman Paul McCloskey, Jr.

Defined CBUs, mentioned U.S. accidental use in Laos. Reiterated contents of Dear Colleague letter without specifically mentioning it.

McCloskey: Most of us who support Israel are appalled by this.

Crawford: Most?

McCloskey: Most of us are appalled privately, but don't want to offend Jewish (Israel) lobby or the many Jewish constituents in their districts... I feel that some of Begin's policies have hurt support.

Bruno: Why are CBUs worse than napalm or others?

McCloskey: ...The burden is on the U.S. which developed it. We have a special obligation to limit their use. I don't think we should have given it to either side in the Arab-Israel conflict.

Crawford: But fact remains that we did...what is your objection.

McCloskey: I don't like it because the decision to use CBUs was clearly a high level decision. I see it as an attempt to test U.S. will.

Bruno: Did you get any response to your objections.

McCloskey: took two weeks to get a response from Carter administration. Someone at embassy said: "We take those reports with a grain of salt." But I don't think that an offhand comment during an informal phone conversation can be used against them.

Crawford: What about charge that Israel sold or gave CBUs to Ethiopia?

McCloskey: There has been no confirmation. But that is a proper question to ask.

Bruno: Why is this bomb worse?

McCloskey: ...when you respond to guerrillas based in villages, you create hatred in survivors (i.e. civilians). Questions why Israel would deliberately violate agreement.



CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

105 MONTGOMERY STREET
SUITE 1000
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104
415-2788

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
סן פרנציסקו

1159

כ"ב חשוון תש"ל
15 נובמבר 1976
101.2

Handwritten: יג
ג' י"ג חשוון תש"ל

א"י: מר ג. רפיה, וושינגטון.
טאח: הקונסול הכללי, סן פרנציסקו.

הנדון: קונגרסמן מקלוסקי.

אני מצרף בזה גזיר המנתח את הנ"ל בצורה קולעת.

נדמה לי שבחום תקופת שירותך ושירותי כאן גובל לכתוב ספר
פסיכולוגי על ה"קיים מקלוסקי".

בברכה,

ד"ר ש"מה חדמור

העתק:
מר ב. נבון, ציר, וושינגטון.
ממ"א ✓

McCloskey, Israel And Congress

Congressman "Pete" McCloskey came into the office last week. He had seen a complaint in this column about some remarks he had made at Stanford about the effect of Jewish money on Congress.

So he came in to talk about it. The first thing he did was to apologize for his remarks at Stanford. Without any shilly-shallying, he said that he had been wrong to make such a comment and he didn't expect that to happen again.

The further discussion about Congress vis-a-vis Israel and the Middle East was instructive because McCloskey is a notably honest and analytical man. The conventional judgement about McCloskey, with respect to Israel, is that his voting has always been supportive of Israel, but his public remarks have often been disturbing - mainly because they seem to harp on the influence of the Jews in affecting Congressional action on the Middle East.



Roeb

The Congressman reaffirmed his belief that the Jews exert strong influence on Congress - stronger than most groups or interests - because of their effective organization. He was referring to such activities as the Action Alert in this area. He said that letter-writing,

wiresending, phone-calling from constituents are more effective instruments for moving Congressmen than most people realize.

McCloskey emphasized his belief that such activity on the part of citizens is perfectly proper, and legitimate. However, while he saw nothing wrong or sinister in any of the activity of the Jewish community on behalf of Israel, he was concerned about its influence on his colleagues, because he wanted his colleagues to act in an objective and unemotional way on such issues.

It was suggested to him that the constant references to "Jewish influence" implied disturbingly that it is not because of American national interest that the U.S. supports Israel.

McCloskey's candid reaction to that concern was helpful. It reminds us that there is a kind of typology of Congressmen and public officials who support Israel. First, there are those Congressmen who have a primary emotional attachment to Israel. That includes Jews - and a relatively small and diminishing group of non-Jews who are emotionally entangled perhaps because of their experiences during the World War II era. The second group believes that Israel is of geopolitical and military importance to America. They tend to believe that the central concern in foreign policy is the U.S.-Soviet Union confrontation; that the credibility of the U.S. is the only deterrent to Soviet imperialism; and that the abandonment of Israel would be a mortal blow to American credibility.

The third group is composed of those who tend to support Israel more for "moral" reasons than for reasons of American national interest. Thus, Israel is a small, beleaguered democracy and should be supported by the U.S. against encroachment for that reason. This group tends to think that Soviet imperialism is over-exaggerated in the Middle East and elsewhere - and that the center of U.S. Foreign policy should shift away from that concern.

Congressman McCloskey would tend to fall roughly into this category. His commitment to Israel, he says, is a strong "moral" commitment. He has trouble with the concept of "American national interest" as it relates to Israel, because of his particular view of the world scene; although he is characteristically open to further dialogue on this question.

The point is that Congressman McCloskey is pro-Israel on his own ("moral") grounds; and we would just hope that, as articulate as he is, he would actively interpret those grounds to the public. He is a mold of public opinion as well as a legislator.

Beyond that: The "third group," as roughly characterized above, is the growing edge of Congress. They are indeed pro-Israel, but the question is whether generalized "morality" in foreign affairs is as compelling in the long run as hard American national interest. This is not a condemnation of those who are pro-Israel on grounds other than national interest. But it is a reality which we must address in shaping our programs.

San Francisco Jewish Bulletin 12.11.76



CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

108 MONTGOMERY STREET
SUITE 1000
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104
881-2788

3

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
סן פרנציסקו

ש ו ר

1197

י"ז חשוון תשל"ו
22 אוקטובר 1975
422.1

אל: מר צבי רפיח, וושינגטון.
מאח: הקונסול הכללי, סן פרנציסקו.

הנדון: קונגרסמן מק-לוסקי.

1. דעתי עליו ידועה לך.
2. בודאי שמעה שלהפתעת כולם הוא היה "ילד טוב נורא" בכנס AIPAC.
3. אולם בראיון עם כתב הבולטיין היהודי (והדבר נמצא על סייפ) הוא אמר שאמנם היה זה משגה שארה"ב יצרה את ישראל, אבל מכיון שכך, יש לארה"ב החתיבות הומניטריות לחמוך בנו והוא יעשה כך במשך 10 השנים הבאות. את הסיעון שיש לחמוך בנו כי אנו דמוקרטיה הוא מבטל כלא רלוונטי.
4. ובכן סוף סוף יצא המרצע מן השק.

בכרחה,

ד"ר שלמה חדמור.

העחק:

- מר ש. דיניץ, השגריר, וושינגטון.
- מר א. עברון, משנה למנכ"ל, משה"ח.
- מר מ. ארד, ציר, וושינגטון.
- מר ד. בן-דב, מנהל מצפ"א בפועל. ✓



CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

100 MONTGOMERY STREET
SUITE 1000
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104
881-2788

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל

סן פרנסיסקו

ש מ ר

1241

כ"ו חשוון תשל"ו
31 אוקטובר 1975
422.1

אל: מר צבי רפיח, וושינגטון.
מאח: הקונסולי הכללי, סן פרנסיסקו.

הנדון: קונגרסמן מק-לוסקי.

בהמשך למכתבי האחרון אני מצרף בזה את עיקרי משנתו של הנ"ל.
הדברים רוככו ע"י הכתב. במקור הם היו הרבה יותר קשים.

בברכה,

ד"ר שלמה חדמור.

העחק:

- מר ש. דיניץ, השגריר, וושינגטון.
- מר א. עברון, משנה למנכ"ל, משה"ח.
- מר מ. ארד, ציר, וושינגטון.
- מר ד. בן דב, מנהל מצפ"א בפועל. ✓

CONGRESSMAN McCLOSKEY**U.S. Has 'Obligation To Israel'**By **Phil Bronstein**

(Jewish Bulletin Assistant Editor)

Congressman Pete McCloskey (R-San Mateo) believes the United States has an obligation to support Israel, but feels that historically, the creation of Israel may not prove to be a positive, step, even for Jews.

McCloskey told the Bulletin in an interview here that he supports Israel because "We (the U.S.) created it and when you create something you have a certain obligation. I felt, not without opposition from my colleagues in Congress, that when we brought Cambodia into a war, we had an obligation at least not to let them go down the drain without making an attempt to save the two million people who relied on us." The argu-



McCloskey

ment that Israel is a military foothold in the Mideast for the U.S., is one McCloskey does not accept. "I also don't buy the argument that we should support Israel because it is a democracy," said the Peninsula congressman. "We've supported democracies time and again only to find that under certain strains, they will develop into dictatorship overnight."

In the light of world politics, McCloskey expressed reservations about the role of Israel. "I'm not so sure the creation of Israel will prove to be a boon even to the preservation of Jews there. Whenever you go against a developing historical trend and divide a country as we divided Korea, Germany and Vietnam -- and now the Israeli-Palestinian thing -- you create the seeds for war. There has been no greater cause historically for war than denying a people the right of their homeland. This is why both the Israeli and Palestinian motivations are

so high. Solving the Palestinian problem is the number one issue for peace."

McCloskey was asked whether there would not be a similar problem if the Jews had been denied a homeland. "It's hard to say. I'm not familiar enough with the history of the area . . . but it's quite possible."

The whole issue in the Mideast, McCloskey said, was misdirected. He feels that "the real threat to Israel is the lack of attention to the major trends that are developing in regard to the use of nuclear power for destructive means. It isn't these issues of sales and grants of Pershing or Hawk missiles. The idea of peaceful atomic power being turned into weapons could destroy Israel no matter how much they are or will be getting in aid.

Turning his attention to the ideological conflict in the Mideast, McCloskey voiced objections to literature from Jewish organizations such as AIPAC (American-Israel Public Affairs Committee). "I see the same sort of hatred in the brochures (AIPAC) that I read in the publication from the Arab countries. Whenever you hear other guy's arguments, a propaganda and your words are truth, you're throwing in words of hatred that inflame passions instead of cool them. I don't see another Congressman's views as "propaganda" because I disagree with them . . ."

McCloskey said he would continue to vote in favor of military aid requests from Israel only in far as it initiates a climate for continued negotiations. As far as any Arab requests, McCloskey said he would judge them in the same light.

10/11/20
10/11/20
10/11/20
10/11/20

10

December 1977

REPRESENTATIVE HELEN S. MEYNER (Democrat-New Jersey)

Term Began: 1975

Committees: District of Columbia; International Relations--Subcommittee on International Operations and Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs

Supports foreign aid. Voted for stationing American technicians in Sinai. Has been unhelpful on several issues. Did not co-sponsor resolution expressing disapproval of HAWK missile sale to Jordan but later voted against the sale. Initiated 1975 letter to Kissinger applauding his efforts in achieving Sinai agreement but urged "persistent and imaginative efforts" be made to facilitate dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians. Has publicly expressed respect for Arab leaders, who "no longer talk about destroying Israel." Labelled Jackson-Vanik freedom-of-emigration amendment "counter-productive." Opposed sale of Pershing missiles to Israel. Says Palestinian problem is core of Mideast conflict. Voted for full U.S. funding for UNESCO. Urged U.S. not to withdraw from International Labor Organization saying withdrawal will "only isolate Israel." Meyner recently praised Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. She said the meeting "vindicates the assertion of the Israelis that face-to-face negotiations are essential for a real peace settlement in the Middle East."

Meyner visited the Middle East in 1975 and was impressed by Arab leaders and Israeli "doves." She has hosted a number of luncheons for Amos Kenan in Congress. Meyner has a hostile legislative assistant.

Her husband is a former Governor of New Jersey. She is the cousin of Senator Adlai E. Stevenson.



CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

108 MONTGOMERY STREET
SUITE 1000
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104
881-2788

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
סן פרנציסקו

664

Handwritten signature and date: 7.10.77

כ"ז כסלו תשל"ה
7 דצמבר 1977
400.4;101.2

אל: צבי רפיה, השגרירות, וושינגטון.
מאת: הקונס"ל, סן פרנציסקו.

הנדון: סנסור מק-קלור כאיידהו.

Handwritten note: > 3 א' 77

קיבלתי הכתבה הרצ"ב אודות השקפותיו של הנ"ל לגבי
מדיניותה המזרח תיכונית של ארה"ב כפי שהועתקה בעתון בבווייזי,
צאיידהו. אני מניח שראיה את הדברים במקורם, אך אני מצרף
בזאת למקרה שלא נתקלה בהם.

בברכה,

Handwritten signature
מרדכי ארציאלי

העחק:

- ה. בראון, הציר, וושינגטון.
- ס. ארד, ס/מנכ"ל.
- ב. נבון, ציר ההסברה, וושינגטון.
- מנחל סצפ"א. ✓

More Even-Handed Policy

McClure Assesses Middle East

Stationer 11-14-77
By STEPHEN C. SMITH

WASHINGTON (AP) — In private, the U.S. Senate is coming around to a more even-handed view of the Middle East that Sen. James A. McClure, R-Idaho, says he has had for a long time.

"When I first went to the Middle East in 1973, there was no doubt that the Senate had uncritically accepted the U.S. policy of unilateral commitment to Israel with no animosity towards the Arab nations but no concern about them either," McClure said. "There was a great deal of lack of information and lack of concern rather than any positive attitude towards the Arab nations."

The lack of concern lasted until the October war in 1973. "It was a lack of attitude towards the Arab nations and the energy crisis was not being well understood. There were very few in the Senate in 1973 that were looking forward or anticipating the problem and they had not focused on the implications of the energy crisis or the oil export-import program," he said.

The war and the energy crisis, however, has shifted the views of many senators, McClure said.

"Since 1973, there has been a shift towards a more even-handed policy, recognizing first and foremost from the beginning our commitment to the continued existence of Israel and a resistance to what had been the Palestine Liberation Organization's articulation of predominate Arab opinion earlier for the destruction of Israel," McClure said.

The Senate still votes heavy margins when issues involving Israel come up on the floor, McClure said. "But that's more a recognition of domestic political reality than it is of any perception of U.S. interests."

"I remember the first speech I made in January of 1974, after my trip in December of 1973," he said. "A number of senators stopped by my desk and said 'Jim, you're right' because I was calling for an even-handed policy, a recognition of legitimate rights of Arabs as well as the legitimate rights of the Israelis, and more and more are agreeing with that position," he said.

But, McClure said, supporters of a balanced policy have been unable to

translate that to votes on the floor of the Senate. "We don't have very many of those votes and those votes tend to polarize. I think the public's perception of the Senate position is probably based upon the almost subliminal attitude toward a more even-handed policy in the Middle East," he said.

"But I think the public is beginning to accept the need for desirability for a policy that says for Israel's sake, as well as the sake of the U.S. interests, we've got to find a solution to the political impasse," McClure said.

However, McClure doesn't see the Senate's position on the Middle East changing as quickly as he feels public opinion will change. "The American public is less committed to any course of action because they aren't subject to the same political forces. Therefore, the American public opinion has never been as totally one-sided as the Senate opinion. I think the public opinion is moving towards a more positive, even-handed position," McClure said.

McClure doesn't see himself becoming a spokesman for the "Arab side" in the same way Sen. James Abourezk, D-S.D. speaks out. Abourezk is of Lebanese heritage.

But, Idaho's junior senator would like to be a spokesman for a more balanced U.S. policy. "I think my perception of my own role would be to say 'Hey, let's question what the existing policy has been and develop an even-handed policy that first of all recognizes the legitimate U.S. interests and concern, both economically, politically and militarily, with justice to both parties involved.'" He added the policy should "recognize our commitment to Israel, but recognize the Arabs have rights, too," he said.

"Now that's a pulling away from the past expression of opinion," he said. "And I would say yes, I would regard myself as one of the earlier spokesmen for that viewpoint."

McClure still has hopes for a balanced policy in the future. "The majority opinion in the Senate has changed, and is still changing, and has been changing for the past five years," he said.

מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

ש.מ.ר.

תאריך: כא' בכסליו תשל"ו
25 בנובמבר 1975
מספר:

אל: מר בני רפיח - ושינגטון

מצפ"מ ✓

סאת: עטנאל גלבר

הנדון: סנטור מק לור (*Mc Clure*)

1. לויית את הסנטור ואת עוזרו האותוויי (*Northway*) בנקורם כישראל בימים 23 ו-24 בנובמבר. מצד שגרירות ארה"ב הוצמד אליהם ג'סס דין (*James Dean*). לסנטור היו שתי פגישות: עם האלוף א. סמיר על אזור ההפרדה בסיני ומערך האתראה, בה השתתף גם הנספח הצבאי קולנל ויליאמס, ועם ד"ר דינשטיין על בעיות האנרגיה והשלכות פנוי שדות הנפט.
2. הסכרי האלוף סמיר כנראה לא הסירו את חששות האורח לגבי בטחונם של הטכנאים האמריקאים במקרה של פעולות איבה ואפשרות הוצאתם, אך תרמו כלי ספק להבנת נושא ההתראה והצרך בקווי הגנה בסיני. השיחה גלשה גם לנושא הסורי ובין המחשבות שהעלה האורח הייתה זו של החזרת השלטון האזרחי ברמת הגולן לידי הסורים כאשר העמדות הצבאיות (התלים) נשארים בידי צה"ל. ניסיתי לאחר מכן להסביר כמה מפקפק הוא להניח שזה פתרון בעיני הסורים, בכוונתו לבדק תגובת הסורים כשעת ביקורו בדמשק.
3. השיחה עם ד"ר דינשטיין היתה עניינית וטובה והאורח קבל הצגה יסודית של בעיות האנרגיה והכבירותנו בחחום זה. היו חלופי דעות בבעיות האנרגיה של שתי הארצות והאורח קבל הסבר על המחויבות האמריקאית כלפי ישראל בנדון.
4. הסנטור בקר בקונסוליה הכללית האמריקאית בירושלים ונפגש עם הקונסול. לא הוזמנתי כמובן להשתתף בפגישה זו. התרשמתי שהוא לא הופגש עם ערבים.
5. השיחות בין האמריקאים בהם נוכחתי ובעקר עם סגנו של השגריר שקבל פניו בנמל התעופה נסוכו על ענייני פנים בארה"ב, בעיקר מועמדותו של ר'גן. התרשמתי שהסנטור טרם קבע עמדה לגבי פורר או ר'גן ומחכה לראות ידו של מי תהיה על העליונה.

2/..

REPORT OF THE

1950

REPORT NO. 1

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

REPORT OF THE

1. The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country in 1950. It is a very interesting and informative study of the country's progress during the year.

2. The second part of the report deals with the economic situation of the country in 1950. It is a very interesting and informative study of the country's economic progress during the year.

3. The third part of the report deals with the social situation of the country in 1950. It is a very interesting and informative study of the country's social progress during the year.

4. The fourth part of the report deals with the political situation of the country in 1950. It is a very interesting and informative study of the country's political progress during the year.

5. The fifth part of the report deals with the cultural situation of the country in 1950. It is a very interesting and informative study of the country's cultural progress during the year.

מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ

ירושלים

תאריך:

מספר:

- 2 -

6. הבקורות העקרויות שעלו מדבריו של הסנסור בשיחות שהיו לנו בנסיעות ובין פגישות היו:
- א. ארה"ב חייבת לשמר ולהדק הקשרים עם ארצות ערב. אין לה עדיין פתרון לבעיות האנרגיה שלה.
 - ב. על ישראל לותר יותר ולאפשר המשך המוטנסטרם.
 - ג. שרש הבעיה הם הפלסטינים.
 - ד. עראפת הוא כרגע המנהיג המוכר היחידי.
 - ה. עראפת סתן את עמדותיו.
 - ו. עראפת מוגבל בהתכטאוויו בגלל קיום זרמים יותר קיצוניים וכוונותיו יותר מתונות מדבריו.
 - ז. הטפול במסמך סנדרס מצד מחמ"ד לא היה מוצלח. צריך לעסק בדיפלומטיה שקטה. בית המורשים והעתובים מונעים מגעים וברורים חסויים.
 - ח. הוא לא בגע בשאלת ירושלים (בדרך לגשר אלנבי נכנסנו למעלה האדומים והוא התרשם מההתקדמות הרבה בעבודות מאז בקורו בשטח בינואר ש.ז.)
 - ט. ההתקפה על רמת מגשימים גראתה בעיניו כצעד של הקיצוניים להכשלת הסדר בצפון והעתוי מותאם לבקור ולדהיים.
7. הגבתי על טענותיו השונות לגבי מתינות עראפת וכו'. הדגשתי דבקות עראפת כאמנה הפלסטינית שפרטיה לא היו ידועים לו. טענתי שבישתו לנושא רק מעודדת קיצוניות יתר מצד אש"ף, תמנע עליה זרמים בקרב תושבי הצדה ועזה שיהיו נכונים להסדר ורק תמנע התקדמות בתהליך בו ארה"ב מעונינת. בוכחתי שידיעותיו על הציונות, על בוכחות היהודית בישראל במשך הדורות ועל תולדות הארץ לפני קום המדינה קלושות למדי.
8. לצערי לא יכלתי להתרשם שבקור זה כבר גרם לתמורה בדעותיו אם כי אולי תזוזה בכמה מהשקפותיו. הבקור בסוריה ובעיראק, בהן טרם בקר, יעמיד אותו על מהות גישת מדינות אלה והשפעתן השלילית על נסיונות פתרון הסכסוך.
9. הבקור היה קצר מאוד. הסנסור חזר כמה פעמים על רצונו לערוך בקור יותר יסודי בלויית רעיתו.

בברכה,

עמנואל גלבר

העתק: מר א. עברון, משנה למנכ"ל

אמצעי ביטחון

משרד הביטחון

תש"ב

משרד

משרד

- 3 -

המשרד מודיע כי הוכרזו חוקים חדשים להגנת המדינה

א. כל מי שיש לו מידע על חששות או סכנה למדינה יודע על ידי

ב. כל מי שיש לו מידע על חששות או סכנה למדינה יודע על ידי

ג. כל מי שיש לו מידע על חששות או סכנה למדינה יודע על ידי

ד. כל מי שיש לו מידע על חששות או סכנה למדינה יודע על ידי

ה. כל מי שיש לו מידע על חששות או סכנה למדינה יודע על ידי

ו. כל מי שיש לו מידע על חששות או סכנה למדינה יודע על ידי

ז. כל מי שיש לו מידע על חששות או סכנה למדינה יודע על ידי

ח. כל מי שיש לו מידע על חששות או סכנה למדינה יודע על ידי

ט. כל מי שיש לו מידע על חששות או סכנה למדינה יודע על ידי

י. כל מי שיש לו מידע על חששות או סכנה למדינה יודע על ידי

יא. כל מי שיש לו מידע על חששות או סכנה למדינה יודע על ידי

יב. כל מי שיש לו מידע על חששות או סכנה למדינה יודע על ידי

יג. כל מי שיש לו מידע על חששות או סכנה למדינה יודע על ידי

משרד

משרד הביטחון

משרד הביטחון



CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

100 MONTGOMERY AVENUE
SUITE 1000
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104
881-2704

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל

סן פרנציסקו

1331

פנימי

כ" כסלו תשל"ו
24 נובמבר 1975
422.1

אל: מר צ. רפיח, וושינגטון.
מאח: הקונסול הכללי, סן פרנציסקו.

Senator James Mc Clellan
R-Ida

הנדון: סנטור מק-לור.

(ראה מכתבי השמור מהיום מס' 1329).

מצ"ב קטע מה"איירנהו סטייטסמן" מיום 16.11.75 הממחיש
אח מה שנאמר לי על ידי כל הגורמים בעת ביקורי בבוויזי.

בברכה,

ד"ר שלמה חרמור.

העחק:

מר א. עברון, משנה למנכ"ל.
מר מ. ארד, ציר, וושינגטון.
מצפ"א, משה"ח.

שלמה

אני תופס את
החלק הקטנים

9

NOV 16 1975

Allen's P.C.B. 10-128

McClure Urges U.S. Balance 349 In Dealing With Israel, Arabs

Peace will not come to the Middle East until the question of Palestinian refugees is solved, Sen. James McClure told a group of veterans at Boise State University Saturday.

There is a "danger of an imbalance" in the Middle East currently because the United States has overcommitted itself to Israel, McClure said. He said the United States is more of an ally than a friend of Israel.

McClure has made several trips to the Middle East and is a critic of the U.S. position there. He will leave Saturday to visit Israel, Iraq and Jordan.

"I am not pro-Arab, nor anti-Israel," McClure told the veterans. "I am pro the United States. I want to be impartial friends with both."

McClure said it must be recognized that Israel has had to defend itself from Arab attacks since its creation by the United Nations after World War II. "But I think we have overcommitted ourselves," McClure said. The U.S. must ask Israel not to expand its borders, he added.

Peace is now possible in the Middle East because of the new Arab attitude which is ready to recognize the existence of Israel, McClure said. To have confidence in that new attitude is a "calculated risk, but it's time to make



Sen. James McClure

Israel take the risk," McClure said.

A new treaty places 200 American technicians between the Arabs and Israelis, McClure said. He noted the Senate has voted to use U.S. armed forces to rescue the technicians in case of war.

"We cannot fool the U.S. people," McClure said. At the present time, if war starts, the United States would have to supply Israel with arms. If that occurs, an Arab oil boycott would be imposed. "Then it would be the United States against the rest of the world," he said.

One veteran asked McClure why the United States' defense budget was so high. Until the U.S. can negotiate a balanced arms agreement with confidence, it will not be violated. "We will have to continue to spend at this level for security," McClure said.

He noted that the Soviet Union has violated several past arms agreements. "How can you have confidence when they look you right in the eye and tell you a lie," he said.

The Soviet Union spends 70 per cent of its defense budget on military equipment while the U.S. spends 40 per cent of its budget on hardware, he said. The Soviet Union spends the other 30 per cent on manpower, while the U.S. spends 80 per cent of its budget on manpower, he said.

While the United States and the Soviet Union have equal strength in strategic arms, the U.S. lags in conventional weapons, McClure said.

The past two years the Soviet Union has spent more than the U.S. in defense, McClure said. The reason the U.S. continues to spend billions in defense is because "the world is not a secure place," he said.

03'N

REPRESENTATIVE LLOYD MEEDS (D-Washington)

Term began: 1965

Home Town: Everett

Committees: Education and Labor; Interior and Insular Affairs; Rules

Meeds' record on Israel has been generally good. He has cosponsored most resolutions but although he was a cosponsor of the Jackson-Vanik freedom of emigration amendment, he voted against the amendment on the House Floor. He has supported all foreign aid legislation and cosponsored the O'Neill resolution on the U.N. calling for U.S. reassessment of its relationship with U.N. if Israel should be expelled or suspended.

REPRESENTATIVES JAMES R. MANN (D-S.C.)

162

Term began: 1969
Home town: Greenville, Spartanburg
Committees: District of Columbia; Judiciary

Has a negative voting record on foreign aid legislation although did vote for the \$2.2 billion emergency military authorization after the Yom Kippur War for Israel. Supported the stationing of American technicians in the Sinai and the Jackson-Vanik freedom of emigration amendment. Voted against the Export Administration Act including legislation to combat the Arab boycott, but later voted for the bill.

10/10/25 ✓
13/10/25 ✓
14/10/25 ✓

2



24 מרץ 1978

למחוקק
בגרי ויש עתיד - לנציגים (ולסיומן)

אל : מצפ"א
מרכז

פאת: צ. רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: תגובות סנטורים על המזה"ח

מקצוואין

באחת מפגישתם עם הנשיא בכיה הלבן ב-23/3, שוחחו
כמה סנטורים עם עוזבאים שהמתינו להם.
להלן רישום מחוך הקלטה שנערכה.

בברכה

צבי רפיה

העתק:

הקונב"ל, שיקגו

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY



WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 1954

Handwritten: Clearing
1954-1955 - 1954-1955
1954-1955 - 1954-1955

Handwritten: 1954-1955

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

1954-1955

1954-1955

REMARKS OF SENATORS MCGOVERN, HART, JAVITS, AND PERCY AFTER EMERGING FROM
A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER March 23 1978

MCGOVERN: I just want to say for myself that on this issue he (the President) has my full sympathy and support. I think the president is doing everything humanly possible to keep the peace negotiations alive and that is the most important issue right now in the middle east. It is more important than the arms sale or the issues associated with it. What is important is to keep all the parties in the middle east in a flexible, reasonable position and that is what president Carter is trying desperately to do.

Q: But there is inflexibility, isn't there?

A: Well, there is some inflexibility...on the part of all the parties. There is not the degree of flexibility that is going to take to bring about a settlement, if there is ever a time when the president of the US needs sympathy and understanding on an issue that is right now in the middle east. He is not being unfair to either side. There is no question on my mind that he is dedicated to the long-range security of the state of israel. He emphasized that over and over again, but he believes that part of israel's security depends on the influence we have on the Egyptians and Saudis and other arab states.

SENATOR HART (GARY HART)

Q: What is your mood on the arms sale?

A: I agree completely with Senator McGovern's assessment of the discussion this morning. I don't think we can make a judgement on the arms sale proposal outside the context of where the peace negotiations stand now. We are now in a posture of the fourth quarter of the game. Both sides or all the sides are digging in. I think particularly the Begin government and as was suggested by one or more members in the discussion this morning, we may be closer to a settlement as a result of the crystallization of some of these positions. I think the congress, particularly the senate is going to take a very hard look at these arms sale.

myself I am not an advocate of arms sales generally, ma although I think that if we are going to provide arms in the middle east the airplane proposal, the package approach does make sense.

MCGOVERN

Q: How ~~optimistic~~ pessimistic are you (inaudible)

A: The situation does not alook as good to me as I had hoped it would. I think ~~that there has been a hardening of the lines rather a surprising~~ ~~hardening of the lines in view of the optimism that we had six months or a year ago.~~ ~~Although~~ The situation does not look as good today as it did then.

On the optimistic sides, when issues come into sharp focus that means you are nearing a better understanding of what is at stake and i suppose it could be argued that would open the hope of the settlement. But there is no question that the moment of truth is close at hand.

Q: Are you suggesting that it is Prime Minister Begin who is intransigent?

A: Well, I don't want to say that. I think it is very difficult for all of the parties in the middle east ,I would only say this, that unless there is more flexibility on the part of Israel, on the part of all of the parties in the middle East, I think don't see any hope for a settlement. The thing I would like to emphasize is that I think the US government position is sound today..I think President Carter's position is sound. I t is very unfair to label him as being unreasonable towards Israel, ~~and~~ ~~think~~ he is not unreasonable towards Israel. He is taking a position that he believes is not only in the best interest of Israel but also in the best interest of peace in the middle east.

JAVITS

Q: Inaudible

A: I think the prospects are ~~momentarily~~ discouraging. Israel feels that its security is in ~~danger~~ and difficulty, President Sadat feels that he has been as forthcoming as he can be. Our president feels that he has played the mediating

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

ו' חשון תשל"ז
29 אוקטובר 76

מ.א.ג. (מ.א.ג.)
מ.א.ג. (מ.א.ג.)

619

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: צ. רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: מקוברן מנמק הצבעתו בעד עסקת
המאבריקים עם סעודיה.

מצ"ב תשובה שטיגר מקוברן למנהיג יהודי
שחמך בו ב-1972, בה הוא מפרט מדוע המך במכירת המאבריקים
לסעודיה.

ב ב ר כ ה,
צ. רפיה

משרד החוץ
ירושלים



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.

הג

ר' משה משה
בשם משרד החוץ

לש: משה

משה מ. משה, משרד החוץ

הגדרת המונחים המופיעים בהמשך
המונחים הם:

המונחים המופיעים בהמשך
המונחים המופיעים בהמשך הם:

מ. מ. מ.
מ. מ. מ.

GEORGE McGOVERN
SOUTH DAKOTA

Your Information

10-10-76

10/23

15th 1278 pkllzpt mlln

10/10

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 14, 1976

Dear Joe:

Many thanks for your thoughtful letter of October eighth, concerning the sale of Maverick missiles to Saudi Arabia. I appreciate your expressing your feelings in such a forthright way, and I want to be equally honest with you.

This is one of those issues on which there is no obvious right answer, Joe, but on balance, I decided that I had to support the sale. After looking at all the information and examining the classified documents, I became convinced that the Administration had made at least a passable case that Saudi Arabia has a military justification outside of the Middle East context. In addition, the Saudis have not violated previous agreements against weapons transfers, and in this case it would be virtually impossible in any event because the missile requires particular racks and modifications which are not available in the forces of the confrontation states.

This alone would not necessarily settle the issue. You know of my commitment to the State of Israel, and my concern about any step which would pose even a remote risk to Israel's security. Obviously, it would be impossible for the Administration to give a firm and permanent guarantee against such risks in connection with this sale. However, it seemed to me that the resolution of disapproval carried greater risks.

I do not think it is in the interests of either Israel or the United States for us to adopt an inflexible hard line against Saudi Arabia.

Israel presently has strong support in the Congress, and that support is sustained by a similar view among the public as a whole. But I am frankly worried about how that situation could change if the Saudis employed their full capacity — including their economic capacity — to influence public opinion in this country. Thus far, as you know, the Saudis have been in relative terms a restraining influence, both among the OPEC countries and in the context of the Middle East conflict. If that posture were reversed, I think there would be a serious danger of erosion in public support for Israel. To avoid that, I think that while we must be firm in our dealings with the Saudis, we must also be prudent enough to avoid steps which they could see as demonstrations of American hostility toward them.

The Maverick sale came down to that sort of issue. It had already been renegotiated downward, and it was on that basis, for example, that Senator Javits voted to approve the sale. In addition, the notification on the Maverick sale was in a long list of proposed transactions involving some nineteen countries. It would have been a different matter if we had been able to get anywhere with a resolution dealing as well with some of the other doubtful transactions on the list. But instead, Saudi Arabia was singled out as the only sale to be disapproved in committee. And it thus became an expression, not of concern over arms sale policy generally, nor even over the absence of an appropriate security justification dealing with the Persian Gulf, but simply a step against the Arabs.


You and I viewed this issue with basically the same motives, and I regret that we nevertheless came to different conclusions. I simply think that the United States has to preserve its ability to support Israel with more than arms and economic aid — that we have to guard against any loss of public support for those steps, and that we must also maintain our capacity to influence

the Arab States in the direction of an ultimate settlement that will guarantee the security of Israel. From those perspectives, I think it was a mistake to generate a confrontation over this sale.

Let me say that I continue to appreciate your active support in 1972. My commitment to the survival of Israel remains strong. In the event you did not see it, I enclose a report based on my visit to the Middle East last year, which you may find of interest.

With kind personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,



George McGovern

Rabbi Joseph B. Glaser
Central Conference of American Rabbis
790 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10021

29 בספטמבר 1976

אס
קואליציה
(אליאנס)

אל : מר ד. שמורק - השגריר נאו"ם

מאה: מנהל אמרכ"ז

הנדון: השקפת פידל קסטרו על פתרון בטכסון מז"ת

מחוך הדווח של הסנסור גורג' מק-קוגרן, על בקורו בקובה, בחדש מאי 1976, ואשר הופיע ברשומות הקונגרס, אנו קוראים דלהלן:

מק-קוגרן: "בדברנו על מז"ת תארחי בקוים כלליים הסדר אפשרי, אשר הצעהי בעקבות בקורו באזור, בראשית השנה, היינו הכרה מלאה בישראל ובחמורה היא הסוג לגבולותיה ב-1967, הוך הקונים מעשיים, וכמו כן הכרה בזכות ההגדרה העצמיה של הפלשתינאים. קסטרו סבר שנוסחא כזאת עשויה להביא שלום ושהישראליים, אשר הם "עם נבון", עתידים להיות סוכנים לקבלה. הוא הוסיף (קסטרו) "הערבים סולדים מפתרונות של צעד אחרי צעד, ממה שמכונה נוסחת קיסטינגר כיון שמגמחה להפריד ביניהם".

בסוחני שדעות אלו ההיינה לך לענין.

ב בר כוק
י. ג. מל
יעקב ברמור

העתק: ✓ מר ס. רביב, מנהל מצפ"א
✗ מר צ. רפיה, וושינגטון

AT 10:00 AM, JUNE 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

RE: [Illegible Title]

On June 10, 1964, [Illegible] advised that [Illegible] had been [Illegible] by [Illegible] on June 9, 1964. [Illegible] stated that [Illegible] was [Illegible] and [Illegible] was [Illegible].

[Illegible] advised that [Illegible] was [Illegible] and [Illegible] was [Illegible]. [Illegible] stated that [Illegible] was [Illegible] and [Illegible] was [Illegible]. [Illegible] advised that [Illegible] was [Illegible] and [Illegible] was [Illegible]. [Illegible] stated that [Illegible] was [Illegible] and [Illegible] was [Illegible]. [Illegible] advised that [Illegible] was [Illegible] and [Illegible] was [Illegible]. [Illegible] stated that [Illegible] was [Illegible] and [Illegible] was [Illegible].

Very truly yours,

[Illegible Signature]

[Illegible Name]
[Illegible Title]

21
01/25/76
(W/AM/PM)

Manley 2/25/76 n. 27.31 n. 25

JOHN SPARKMAN, ALA., CHAIRMAN	CLIFFORD P. CASE, N.J.
MIKE MANSFIELD, MONT.	JACOB K. JAVITS, N.Y.
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO	HUGH SCOTT, PA.
STUART SYMINGTON, MO.	JAMES S. PEARSON, KANS.
CLAIBORNE PELL, R.I.	CHARLES H. PERCY, ILL.
GALE W. MC GEE, WYB.	ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, MICH.
GEORGE MC GOVERN, S. DAK.	HOWARD M. BAKER, JR., TENN.
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN.	
DICK CLARK, IOWA	
JOSEPH W. BROWN, JR., DEL.	

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

PAT M. HOLY, CHIEF OF STAFF
ARTHUR M. KUHLE, CHIEF CLERK

September 27, 1976

SEP 29 1976

Dear Manley:

I appreciate your letting us know about your concern over the proposed sale of Maverick missiles to Saudi Arabia, and I wanted you to have a description of my reasons for deciding to oppose the resolution of disapproval.

This is one of those issues upon which there is no obvious right answer, Manley, but on balance I decided that I had to support the sale. After looking at all the information and examining the classified documents I became convinced that the Administration had made at least a passable case that Saudi Arabia has a military justification outside of the Middle East context. In addition, the Saudis have not violated previous agreements against weapons transfers, and in this case it would be virtually impossible in any event because the missile requires particular racks and modifications which are not available in the forces of the confrontation states.

This alone would not necessarily settle the issue. You know of my commitment to the State of Israel, and my concern about any step which would pose even a remote risk to Israel's security. Obviously it would be impossible for the Administration to give a firm and permanent guarantee against such risks in connection with this sale. However, it seemed to me that the resolution of disapproval carried greater risks.


I do not think it is in the interests of either Israel or the United States for us to adopt an inflexible hard line against Saudi Arabia. Israel presently has strong support in the Congress, and that support is sustained by a similar view among the public as a whole. But I am frankly worried about how that situation could change if the Saudis employed their full capacity -- including their economic capacity -- to influence public opinion in this country. Thus far, as you know, the Saudis have been in relative terms, a restraining influence, both among the OPEC countries and in the context of the Middle East conflict. If that posture were reversed I think there would be a serious danger of erosion in public support for Israel. To avoid that, I think that while we must be firm in our dealings with the Saudis, we must also be prudent enough to avoid steps which they could see as demonstrations of American hostility toward them.

The Maverick sale came down to that sort of an issue. It had already been renegotiated downward, and it was on that basis, for example, that Senator Javits voted to approve the sale. In addition, the notification on the Maverick sale was in a long list of proposed transactions, involving some nineteen countries. It would have been a different matter if we had been able to get anywhere with a resolution dealing as well with some of the other doubtful transactions on the list. But instead Saudi Arabia was singled out as the only sale to be disapproved in Committee. And it thus became an expression not of concern over arms sale policy generally, nor even over the absence of an appropriate security justification dealing with the Persian Gulf, but simply a step against the Arabs.

You and I viewed this issue with basically the same motives, and I regret that we nevertheless came to different conclusions. I simply think that the United States has to preserve its ability to support Israel with more than arms and economic aid -- that we have to guard against any loss of public support for those steps, and that we must also maintain our capacity to influence the Arab states in the direction of an ultimate settlement that will guarantee the security of Israel. From those perspectives, I think it was a mistake to generate a confrontation over this sale.

With best personal regards, I am

Sincerely,



George McGovern

Mr. Manley Feinstein
1314 North Third
Aberdeen, South Dakota 57401

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים),
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוק

מחלקת השטר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

מס. 429

נשלח 261230 אוג 76

Handwritten notes:
סודי
החוק
המשרד
מאת: וושינגטון
עברון.
נפגשתי אחמול יחד עם רפיח עם סנטוס מקגברן.
ראוי לציון שמקגוברן העיר לאחר חשיחה שתערכותגנו ודברינו לגבי לבנון והמצב
של הפלסטינאים תואם את הערכות הסי אי איי כפי ששמע אתם לפני זמן לא רב
בעת חזירון.
נקבע שנמשיך לעמוד בקשר לשם עדכון.
מקברן ספר בין השאר שמתעתד שוב לבקר באזור לאחר הבחירות.
בר און
שחח רחמ מנכל שהבט ממנכל י. רכיב ארובוב רוזן אבידר מצפא חקר רם אמן
מב/אס

אל; המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון

עברון.

נפגשתי אחמול יחד עם רפיח עם סנטוס מקגברן.

ראוי לציון שמקגוברן העיר לאחר חשיחה שתערכותגנו ודברינו לגבי לבנון והמצב

של הפלסטינאים תואם את הערכות הסי אי איי כפי ששמע אתם לפני זמן לא רב

בעת חזירון.

נקבע שנמשיך לעמוד בקשר לשם עדכון.

מקברן ספר בין השאר שמתעתד שוב לבקר באזור לאחר הבחירות.

בר און

שחח רחמ מנכל שהבט ממנכל י. רכיב ארובוב רוזן אבידר מצפא חקר רם אמן

מב/אס

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

בלתי מסווג

מברק נבנס

בשלה: 271200 יולי 76

מאת: וושינגטון

מירי

מצפה

להלן כתבתו של דון אוברדורפר בווישינגטון מוסט של היום ה-27.7:

Handwritten notes and signatures in the right margin.

MCGOVERN: US SHOULD EYE SENDING TROOPS TO LEBANON.
 SEN GEORGE MCGOVERN (D.S.D.) SAID YESTERDAY THAT THE US SHOULD CONSIDER SENDING TROOPS TO LEBANON AS PART OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IF ALL ELSE FALLS TO STOP THE CIVIL WAR THERE. MCGOVERN MADE THE PROPOSAL IN AN INTERVIEW AFTER EXTENSIVE HEARINGS ON MIDEAST POLICY WERE COMPLETED BY THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS OF WHICH HE IS CHAIRMAN.
 MCGOVERN SAID HE HOPES THAT THE LEBANESE BLOODSHED CAN BE STOPPED BY THOSE INVOLVED OR BY THE ARAB LEAGUES HITHERTO UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS. IF THESE FAIL TO STOP THE KILLING THE US SHOULD SEEK THE CREATION OF A UN FORCE MCGOVERN SAID.
 IF UN ACTION IS IMPOSSIBLE THE US SHOULD CONSIDER "INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION TO RESTORE ORDER" ALONGSIDE FRANCE BRITAIN AND IF POSSIBLE THE SOVIET UNION MCGOVERN ADDED.
 "I'M AS HOSTILE TO NEEDLESS INTERVENTION AS ANYONE" SAID MCGOVERN A LONGTIME OPPONENT OF THE VIETNAM WAR. "BUT IF I THOUGHT THIS COULD STOP THE BLOODSHED I WOULD SUPPORT US PARTICIPATION AND US HELP TO BANKROLL SUCH AN EFFORT."
 CALLING THE LEBANESE FIGHTING "AN UTTER TRAGEDY" MCGOVERN SAID THAT US ACTION TO STOP IT HAD BEEN TOO LATE AND TOO LITTLE. "WE LET IT GET OUT OF HAND" HE SAID.
 SEN CHARLES H PERCY (ILL) SENIOR REPUBLICAN ON THE MIDDLE EAST SUBCOMMITTEE DID NOT ENDORSE MCGOVERN'S SUGGESTION ON LEBANON. PERCY SAID SOVIET FORCES MIGHT BE INTRODUCED IF US FORCES TOOK PART AND THAT SUCH INTERVENTION WOULD BE UNWISE.
 AT THE CONCLUSION OF SIX DAYS OF HEARINGS INVOLVING 26 WITNESSES MCGOVERN AND PERCY AGREED IN SEPARATE INTERVIEWS THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD UNDERTAKE MAJOR AND URGENT EFFORTS TO SEEK A GENERAL ARAB ISRAELI SETTLEMENT EARLY IN THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL TERM NO MATTER WHO IS IN THE WHITE HOUSE.
 THE TWO SENATORS SAID THERE WAS A CONSENSUS OF MOST WITNESSES ON THE BROAD OUTLINE OF A GENERAL SETTLEMENT: ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ARAB TERRITORY OCCUPIED IN THE 1967 WAR CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN ENTITY IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WITH OUTSIDE SECURITY GUARANTEES AND AN ARAB DECISION THAT ISRAEL IS HERE TO STAY.
 SUCH A SETTLEMENT WOULD BE ALONG THE LINES OF A PROPOSAL LAST YEAR BY A GROUP OF PROMINENT AMERICANS THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION BROUGHT TOGETHER. MCGOVERN CALLED THE BROOKINGS PLAN "SOUND" AND SAID

שגרירות ישראל
ווישינגטון

27. 7.1976

*למלך
מזכ"ל
המס' -
סימני*

א/ג/ס
(מקבלת)

אל: מצפ"א

מאה: צבי רפיח

מצ"ב לעיונכם דברי מקבול על השברה ביח
לשגטוריה, כפי שפורסמו ברשומות הקונגרס
ב-21 דנא.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

צ. רפיח

העחק:
הסברה, כאן

THE WASHINGTON POST: YELLOW
JOURNALISM

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, today's Washington Post carries the crudest example of yellow-journalism that I have witnessed in many years. It is a page 2 story by Eugene L. Meyer implying that my public position on the State of Israel is influenced by the fact that a piece of property I own has been rented to the Syrian Ambassador. The article can only be the product of a mean-spirited, vindictive editorial judgment that sacrifices decency and fairness to sensationalism.

The article also carries a quote by Hyman Bookbinder, executive director of the American Jewish Committee, saying that my voting record and statements on Israel are "generally good."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator suspend for a moment, please?

Senators will please clear the well. Senators wishing to converse please retire to the cloakroom. Senators will take their seats.

Will Senators clear the well, please? The Senator from South Dakota has a right to be heard. Please clear the well and the aisles.

The Senate will be in order.

The Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. McGOVERN. Continuing the quote from Mr. Bookbinder, it says that:

McGovern, more often than others, has indicated some less than total support for the current Israeli position. It adds up to a feeling he is soft on the issue. There's a lot of easy Arab money around.

Bookbinder said:



After while it does develop a potentially general softness and attitude about your clients, I'm more concerned about a general quid pro quo than an explicit crude one.

When I telephoned Mr. Bookbinder early this morning after reading the Post story, he said that his remarks were taken out of context. Judging from the general tenor of the Post story and my confidence in Mr. Bookbinder's integrity, I believe that his remarks were twisted out of context.

Mr. Bookbinder has today sent the following statement to the Washington Post and has also authorized me to release it to the Senate:

I am distressed over Mr. Meyer's reckless stringing together of unrelated comments to give the impression that I believe Senator McGovern's position on the Middle East may have been the result of the rental of his home. In the brief telephone interview with the reporter, I steadfastly refused to be drawn into such an intimation.

Whatever difference I may have with Senator McGovern on any given issue, I have always considered him totally honorable and fair. I still do. It is unthinkable to me that George McGovern would permit any financial consideration to determine his position on any issue affecting the welfare of this country or the peace of the world.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, I yield to the Senator.

Mr. RIBICOFF. I read the article this morning in the Washington Post, and I reject it completely.

I have known the Senator from South Dakota for many years. The Senator from South Dakota cannot be bought by anyone on any issue. The Senator from South Dakota is a man of integrity and high principles. He speaks his mind, and he speaks his mind on the basic issues facing this country. To say that the Senator from South Dakota would be selling out his deep views and feelings because he rented a house to the Syrian Ambassador is an absolute outrage and a canard.

The Senator from South Dakota has always approached the problems of all people looking forward to a peaceful world. There is no question about his integrity. His record on the State of Israel and the Middle East is there for anyone to read, and in many votes in the Chamber and many statements that he has made throughout this country and throughout the world.

The Senator from South Dakota owes no apology to anyone. The Senator from South Dakota is admired by every person in the Senate, and the Senator has millions of friends, people of all races, colors, and creeds, and that includes the people of the Jewish faith.

I consider the Senator from South Dakota one of my closest friends. He always has had my highest admiration and always will have my highest admiration and respect.

Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the Senator from Connecticut for those words. I am deeply grateful to him.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, I yield to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I rise to join with the Senator from Connecticut in his observations on the public record and indeed the private concerns of the Senator from South Dakota, not only on the issue of the problems in the Middle East but on all public matters.

We in this body from time to time have votes of disagreement. Those votes are based upon serious concern and a hard look at the problems as we see them. People do not always agree. But that does not mean that we are at liberty to contest the other fellow's motives.

The Senator from South Dakota is known in his State, in my State, and in this Senate as a person of absolute personal integrity. And it goes without saying that this has been one of the reasons for his political strength, for the high admiration in which he is held by literally hundreds of thousands of our fellow citizens.

The Senator from South Dakota has interested himself as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations in all matters of our foreign policy and particularly the critical issue of the Middle East. He has traveled in the Middle East. He has had the courage to speak with people of different persuasions in the Middle East. That does not in any way mean that he is the captive of any one group or that he has an allegiance or alliance with any group that would in any way violate his own sense of what is right for the national interest of the United States.

I say to the Senator, I would not worry about such a story if I were you. It does not impress anyone. I can assure you that those of us who know you only can say this, that we are proud to call you our friend.

Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the Senator from Minnesota very much, and I am deeply grateful to him.

I quite agree that the story itself has little or no merit, but this happens to be the fourth time that the Washington Post has carried stories about this piece of property. I was puzzled by the first three, which were largely repetitious stories. They have now carried three photographs of the house. I would have had less publicity if I had bought a massage parlor out in Fairfax.

I think that what needs to be put on the record are the total facts about this whole issue. I did not think it was worth replying to either when the first three stories appeared. That has happened over the last 16 months. But for some inexplicable reason this newspaper is fascinated with this transaction and is trying to blow it up into a major national and now an international issue. So while I appreciate the Senator's kind and generous advice not to be concerned about it, I have answered in detail.

What are the further facts?

Prior to my 1972 Presidential campaign, I took all of my current savings and placed them in a blind trust administered by Mr. Myer Feldman, a Washington attorney, and Mr. Henry Kinselman.

At the end of that 5-year trust, December 31, 1974, there was approximately \$60,000 in the fund. It was this money

that I used to make the down payment on a \$250,000 house on Kalorama Road. The house carries a \$150,000 mortgage and a \$50,000 second loan.

I had originally thought that the property could be used as a center for the storage and historical study of the papers from my 1972 campaign. This idea was opposed by citizens of the Kalorama Association and so I simply turned the property over to my lawyer and asked him to look into the possibility of renting it. The history project and all of my public papers are now to be housed at Princeton University at the request of Princeton.

My lawyer decided that the property was best suitable for use as an embassy rental. Indeed, he learned that the previous owner of the house had already been approached by the Syrian Ambassador who was looking for a house to rent for his family. The house was rented at the going rate for such a property—a rate which has not yet covered my payments and upkeep on the property. There is no gain to me beyond what I would receive from any other tenant who was renting the property.

For reasons that have never been clear to me, the Washington Post has been fascinated by my purchase of this house. The Post has now carried four news stories in the last 16 months about my ownership of this house. In three of these stories, they have carried prominent photographs of the house.

The previous stories simply puzzled me. Today's story is a vicious smear that demands an answer.

It is a smear, first of all, because it implies that the rental of my house to an Arab envoy has led me to less than a 100-percent commitment to all aspects of Israel foreign policy. I resent this shabby implication with every fiber of my being. I have tried to the very best of my ability to be fair and impartial about Middle East issues—especially since I became chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Near East. I am willing to submit my entire record on the Middle East to the closest scrutiny by my colleagues in the Senate or by anyone else.

I do not say that I have agreed down to the last detail with every single position the Israel Government has taken. But there is nothing "soft" or biased or unfair in my record as chairman of the Subcommittee on the Near East.

I think it would be catastrophic if Israel's independence, freedom, or survival were destroyed. I am determined to do all in my power to prevent that. But a U.S. Senator must evaluate these and other issues according to his own best judgment—not on the basis of what some lobbying group feels is the most slavish, single-minded position.

To argue that it is improper for a Senator to rent a piece of property to an Arab envoy is to suggest that the Arab boycott against firms doing business with Israel be applied in reserve against Arabs. I deplore the Arab boycott. I would equally deplore a boycott against firms doing business with the Arabs. We have to begin dealing with each other as hu-

man beings—not as stereotyped enemies or supporters.

In an effort to prove that I have been subverted by the Syrian Ambassador, the Post article mentioned that I supported the sale of a limited number of Hawk missiles to Jordan. That just happens to be the position of the U.S. Government. Are Secretary Kissinger and President Ford also renting houses to the Arabs? Is it not possible that all of us came to a conclusion without the help of the Syrian Ambassador that it is better for Jordan to be dependent on the United States for its defense than to be dependent upon Moscow?

The Post also says that while I signed a letter with 75 other Senators in May 1974, urging continued support of Israel that I qualified it with a statement making clear that this was not an endorsement of Israel's permanent occupation of Arab lands seized in the 1967 war. That is also the position of the U.S. Government. Some of my Senate colleagues, who are longtime champions of Israel, refused even to sign the May 1974 letter on the grounds that it was an excessively biased pro-Israel position that would jeopardize a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict.

Because of what I regard as a nasty slur on my character and my judgment by the Washington Post, I hereby ask Senator CANNON, the chairman of the Ethics Committee, to submit this entire matter to his committee for evaluation. If there is the slightest belief by the committee that I have done anything unethical or improper in renting my house to an Arab Ambassador, I want to be so advised. On the other hand, if the committee concludes that my handling of this matter is proper, I want that to be known to the public. I will be guided by the committee's judgment.

I am going to request that that committee look into the allegations made in the Washington Post story, that they consult with me, with my lawyer, or with anyone else with whom they want to talk. If there is the slightest hint of anything unethical or improper or unwise, about this investment on my part, I want the Senate Ethics Committee to put that on the public record. If, on the other hand, after looking at it, they find what I believe to be the case, that it is a perfectly proper, open transaction and one that any Senator can stand on, I want that to be a part of the public record.

I ask unanimous consent that the Washington Post story and Mr. Bookbinder's statement of today be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SYRIAN ENVOY RENTS McGOVERN HOME
(By Eugene L. Meyer)

Since March 1975, Sen. George S. McGovern (D-S.D.), chairman of the Senate foreign relations subcommittee on Near Eastern affairs, has received rental income from Syria on a property he owns in Washington.

The property, a large brick house at 2447 Kalorama Rd. NW, was purchased for \$250,000 in January, 1965, and is rented as a residence

for Syrian ambassador Sabah Kabbani and his family.

According to Hardy Tirana, McGovern's attorney, the rental property has so far failed to produce a net profit for the 1972 Democratic presidential nominee. The balance sheet of first-year expenses over income resulted in a \$3,448.78 loss—in effect a tax deduction from McGovern's gross income.

McGovern declined direct comment Monday and denied, through press aide Robert McKeithen, that the arrangement created any conflict of interest for him. "He views the Syrian ambassador as strictly a tenant," McKeithen said.

Since his outspoken public support of Israel during the 1972 campaign, McGovern has come under increasing criticism from pro-Israel groups here for what they consider stands generally more sympathetic to the Arab cause and critical of Israeli policies.

In May, 1975, McGovern joined 75 other senators in signing a letter urging continued U.S. support for Israel and then issued a qualifying statement criticizing Israeli occupation of Arab lands since 1967.

Last August, according to congressional sources, McGovern fought unsuccessfully in closed sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to have the U.S. sell Hawk missiles to Jordan.

Hyman Bookbinder, executive director of the American Jewish Committee, said McGovern's voting record on aid to Israel and his statement on Israeli independence are "generally good."

"But McGovern, more often than others, has indicated some less than total support for the current Israeli position," he said. "It adds-up to a feeling he is soft on the issue."

"There's a lot of easy Arab money around," Bookbinder said. "After a while, it does develop a potentially general softness and attitude about your clients. I'm more concerned about a general quid pro quo than an explicit crude one."

McGovern bought the large house with a \$50,000 down payment, a \$150,000 mortgage and a \$50,000 personal bank loan as an investment. His original intentions he said at the time, was to house in it 1972 presidential campaign memorabilia. The collection is being stored instead at Princeton University.

The neighborhood civic association raised zoning objections, lawyer Tirana said yesterday, and "we knew we'd be looking for a tenant." The Syrian ambassador has already contacted the former owners about renting the property but they wanted to sell it rather than lease it, Tirana said.

Ambassador Kabbani called McGovern aide Owen Donley, who called Tirana, who said he has handled the property for the senator since.

The house was best suited for embassy use, Tirana said, thus narrowing the rental market. "The alternative would have been selling the house," Tirana said. "The senator didn't want to sell the house. He still doesn't."

From March 1975 to March 1976, the Syrians paid \$24,750 in rent, while McGovern paid \$8,384 in maintenance and insurance, \$3,702 in taxes, and \$17,129 in mortgage and loan payments, for a net deficit of \$3,465, according to Tirana. Under a new lease in effect since March, the monthly rent has risen from \$2,500 to \$3,000, and Tirana estimates McGovern will "probably come close to breaking even for the year."

STATEMENT BY MR. HYMAN BOOKBINDER

I am distressed over Mr. Meyer's reckless stringing-together of unrelated comments to give the impression that I believe Senator McGovern's position on the Middle East may have been the result of the rental of his house. In the brief telephone interview with

the reporter, I steadfastly refused to be drawn into such an intimation.

Whichever difference I may have with Senator McGovern on any given issue, I have always considered him totally honorable and fair. I still do. It is unthinkable to me that George McGovern would permit any financial consideration to determine his position on any issue affecting the welfare of this country or the peace of the world.

KIDNAPING OF SCHOOLCHILDREN IN CHOWCHILLA, CALIF.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, I send to the desk a resolution and ask unanimous consent for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 489) relating to the kidnaping of schoolchildren in Chowchilla, Calif.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the resolution?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, I am sure that all my colleagues in the Senate followed with the same concern I did the chilling events of the kidnaping of 27 persons in a schoolbus in Chowchilla, Calif. I know we all shared the same sense of relief and gratitude when the children and their driver were found safe and well.

The resolution I have submitted expresses the Senate's esteem and high regard for the bravery and level-headedness shown by those kidnaped during their horrible ordeal.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the resolution.

The resolution, with its preamble, was agreed to, as follows:

S. Res. 489

Whereas on July 13, twenty-six children and one adult from the community of Chowchilla, California, were kidnaped from their school bus;

Whereas the kidnaping was a matter of the most intense concern throughout the State of California and the United States;

Whereas the courage and resolve of the members of the group enabled them to escape from the underground cell into which they were herded;

Whereas their safe return to their homes and families was greeted with joy and thanksgiving by their fellow residents of Chowchilla, the citizens of the State of California, and the people of the United States; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That

The Senate of the United States join the people of the United States in expressing immense relief and joy at the safe return to Chowchilla of all the kidnap victims; and, Be it further resolved, that:

The Senate convey to those kidnaped: Frank Edward Ray, Jennifer Louise Brown, Jeffrey Brown, Cynthia Lynette Van Hoff, Jody Matheny, Darie Daniels, Angela Robinson, Michelle Robinson, Jody Washington, Julia Carrejo, Irene Carrejo, Linda Carrejo, Stella Carrejo, Lisa Barletta, Larry Parks, Anora Parks, Sheryl Lynn Himsley, John Easterbrook, Barbara Parker, Lisa Ardery, Monica Ardery, Judy Reynolds, Rebecca Reynolds,

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

כ"ו טבת תשל"ו
30 דצמבר 1975

1395

① ~~הג~~
② ~~כ"ו~~
③ ~~ש"ס~~
מאחז

אל: מצפ"א ✓

מאחז: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: סגסור מקגוברן עונה למבקרי
על הגובחו בענין פעולתנו בלבנון

מצ"ב מכתבו של מקגוברן מה-12 דנא המדבר בעד עצמו.

ב ב ר כ ה ,
ב/אחי יאן
צ. רפיה

העהק: המשנה למנכ"ל
המרכז, משה"ח
הקוננכ"ל ניו-יורק

RECEIVED



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.

NOV 1967

Handwritten notes:
①
②
③
④
⑤
⑥
⑦
⑧
⑨
⑩

ATTENTION
SECRETARY

RECEIVED
NOV 1967

STATE DEPARTMENT

Handwritten notes:
1
2
3

RECEIVED
NOV 1967

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 12, 1975

Dear Friend:


Thank you for your letter regarding my comments on the Israeli bombing attacks on villages in Lebanon.

Please know that I continue to be a firm defender of Israel's right to independence and full recognition. In fact, I have publicly stated many times that the U.S. has a clear obligation to guarantee the security and survival of Israel. We must stand by Israel to achieve a real peace in the Middle East. By the same token I have consistently deplored terrorist attacks. In the report I released upon my return from the Middle East I emphasized that before any kind of settlement could be accomplished the PLO would have to publicly repudiate all acts of terrorism, and explicitly recognize Israel's right to exist.

But I could not withhold comment on what I considered to be ill-timed and ill-conceived raids against these settlements in Lebanon. There has been progress toward a more responsible point of view on the part of some Palestinian leaders. The raids have damaged that trend. At the same time I am told that they have spurred a growing solidarity between Southern Lebanese moslems and more extremist Palestinian elements, a development which is unquestionably against the interest of Israel. As Maj. Gen. Aharon Yariv, a former Israeli military intelligence chief stated, these raids were "self defeating." In addition, Haaretz, the leading Israeli newspaper, criticized the air strikes.

So on both humanitarian and practical grounds, I think the raids were a serious mistake.

Sincerely,


George McGovern

Inge Barron
2111 West Rogers Avenue
Baltimore, MD 21209

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

כ" בניסן תשל"ז
8 באפריל 1977

189

הנדון: המורשה מקדונלד
מאח: שי פלדמן-ווישינגטון
אל: טצפ"א

הנדון: המורשה מקדונלד

ב-5 דנא, טעל דמי רשומות הקונגרס, התבטא המורשה
מקדונלד לאמור שארגון בהירה הינו קבוצה המופכת בטרוויסטים
טל אס"פ. רצ"ב דבריו הכוללים מאמרו של ד"ר שאטאן שהופיע
בירחון קוסנטרי.

ב ב ר כ ה,
He
סי פלדמן

העמק: הקונסוליה באסלונטה
אורי בר-נר, כאן

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

WHY BREIRA? PART I

HON. LARRY McDONALD

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 5, 1977

Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Speaker, I wish to call to your attention an article on one of the support groups operating in the U.S. on behalf of the terrorist Palestine Liberation Organization. The article has been published in *Commentary*, a magazine with whose conclusions I have often found disagreement, but which has a high reputation for accuracy and fairness.

"Why Breira," by Joseph Shattan, confirms many of the points I previously made in documenting Breira as a support group for the PLO terrorist, developed and coordinated from the Institute for Policy Studies.

Mr. Shattan has made the very significant point that Breira's leaders liken the organization to the "antiwar" activists who worked so hard for the Communist victories in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. For Breira, the Vietcong are the PLO. Part I appears today, part II will appear tomorrow.

The article follows:

WHY BREIRA?

(By Joseph Shattan)

(Note.—Joseph Shattan, who has recently received his doctorate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, has written in *Cowart* and elsewhere on Middle Eastern affairs and modern European history.)

Ever since the end of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, pressure has mounted around the world for a final settlement of the Middle East conflict; scenarios and counter-scenarios have been proposed, the merits of step-by-step diplomacy have been weighed against the merits of an overall settlement achieved at once and among each of the parties, and in this country an agonizing debate has gone on over the proper role of the United States with regard to the contending sides, and especially with regard to Israel. In the midst of all this, as might be expected, much talk has taken place inside the American Jewish community about relations between that community and the Israeli government and people—what they have been, what they might be, what they ought to be.

Of late, much of this talk has focused on a new and controversial Jewish group called Breira, which advertises itself as offering "a choice" for shared responsibility between Israel and the Diaspora. On the one hand, the emergence of Breira (the word in Hebrew means "alternative") has been hailed by the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* as a major political development, angering a new willingness on the part of American Jews to criticize the state of Israel. On the other hand, some American Jewish organizations have reacted to Breira with suspicion and hostility, and one group, Americans for a Safe Israel, has published a well-documented pamphlet, written by Rael Jean Isaac, which challenges Breira's legitimacy and charges that "the majority who join [it] are unaware of the purposes of the minority who shape the path of the organi-

zation."* Mrs. Isaac's arguments merit serious consideration, but first it is necessary to know something of Breira's history.

Breira was founded in the immediate aftermath of the Yom Kippur War. It offered to serve as the vehicle, within the Jewish community, for an open and critical discussion of all matters of concern to American Jews, especially their relation to Israel. Its initial statement of purpose, issued in December 1973, declared: "Nothing is more important for the continued vitality of Jewish life than extensive discussion within the Jewish community about the State [of Israel], its problems, its policies, its relationship to us and our hopes for it." At the time of its founding Breira was made up of young-veterans of the 60's Jewish counter-culture (grouped mainly around *Response* magazine) and a number of Reform and Conservative rabbis concerned with asserting the spiritual and cultural parity of Jewish life in the Diaspora with that in Israel.

Breira first came to the wider attention of American Jewry on November 4, 1974, when it issued a flyer opposing the mass "Rally Against Terror" held to protest Yasser Arafat's appearance before the United Nations. This demonstration, in Breira's view, was counter-productive, and "only reinforced Jewish anxiety and Israeli isolation." Since the Arab League had designated the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, "coming to terms with the future role of the PLO in negotiations with Israel" had become a "necessity," and Breira called on the Israeli government to declare its willingness to negotiate with "the full range of Palestinian leadership." Interestingly, most of the members of Breira's Advisory Committee refused to endorse this statement.¹

Until the middle of 1975, Breira voiced its criticism of Israeli policy within the confines of the Jewish community, where it had to build a base of support in order to become a viable organization. While the results of Breira's "membership drive" were not spectacular, neither were they insignificant. To its initial core of members Breira was able to add a considerable number of rabbis who had been active in the civil-rights and antiwar movements of the 1960's, among them Eugene Borowitz, Balfour Brickner, Joachim Prinz, Arnold Jacob Wolf (who is now Breira's chairman), and quite a few campus Hillal rabbis. Although all were "Zionists," some of these rabbis were not altogether out of sympathy with Al Fatah, even as they had not been totally unsympathetic to the Vietcong.²

* "Breira: Counsel for Judaism," by Rael Jean Isaac, *Americans For a Safe Israel*, 20 pp., \$1.00.

¹ In an article for *Sh'ma* magazine, Rabbi Balfour Brickner described the "intense personal conflict" he had felt during the Jordanian civil war in 1970, when a "radical Jewish friend" phoned from Washington and asked him to take the lead in collecting Jewish names to protest possible United States intervention. "The issue might have been simple for the ordinary American Jew," Rabbi Brickner wrote, "but not for those who, despite their love of Israel, had long and loudly protested their country's intervention into the Vietnamese civil war. Was the Jordanian situation any different? After prolonged soul-searching, Rabbi Brickner decided that it was different. "When I called my friend back he seemed to understand but, in talking, he threw me into a turmoil a second time, asking how I would feel if Hus-

sein overwhelmed the guerrillas. Ouch." Rabbi Brickner did not explain why the prospect of the PLO's defeat threw him into such a turmoil.

Although Breira's statement of purpose had placed a considerable range of issues on the organization's agenda, and had cited the need for "extensive discussion and debate within the Jewish community" about these issues, it soon became evident, first, that the one subject that held Breira's interest was in the fate of the Palestinians in the Middle East and, second, that little prior discussion was taking place even on what Breira's own position was to be on that subject. In July 1975, Robert Loeb, Breira's executive director, testified before Senator McGovern's Subcommittee on Near Eastern Affairs and called upon Israel to negotiate directly with the PLO "on all future relationships between their two states [sic]." Statement after statement was issued by Loeb, in Breira's name, criticizing Israeli policy, especially on the West Bank. Mark Brumensky, a columnist for *Inter-Change*, Breira's monthly review, wrote in *Newsday* (August 22, 1975) that the United States ought to "impose its leverage" on Israel and even "coerce" it, if necessary, into negotiating with PLO and establishing a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza. Arthur Waskow, of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington and a member of Breira's executive committee, held seminars under Breira's auspices for members of Congress "to open," as he put it, "new perspectives they hadn't considered" with regard to a resolution of the Palestinian question.

In the spring of 1975 Breira circulated a statement expressing solidarity with the "peace forces" in Israel actively opposed to Gush Emunim, an Israeli political-religious group which calls for the annexation of occupied West Bank territories. The statement was endorsed by many Jewish intellectuals not associated with Breira, and it was the understanding of some of them, at least, that the statement would in no way be linked to Breira. When the statement, entitled "It is Time to Say No to Gush Emunim," appeared in the *Jerusalem Post*, it did indeed make no mention of Breira. Loeb, however, simultaneously issued a press release in which Breira openly took responsibility for the statement, and on the strength of this the *New York Times* published an editorial lambasting Breira and noting that it was "picking up wide support among influential Jewish intellectuals . . . overcoming as well the misapprehension of many Jewish Americans that criticism of Israeli policies would be seen as a rejection of Israel."

With an editorial endorsement from the *Times*, Breira suddenly became an organization of national prominence. To the roster of names on its various committees were added those of Village Voice radicals like Paul Cowan and Vivian Cornick and, more significantly, those of distinguished American Jewish intellectuals like Irving Howe, Arthur A. Cohen, and Nathan Glazer. When a series of private meetings was held last November between PLO representatives and a number of American Jews among them Breira's Arthur Waskow, it was Waskow who published a piece on the *New York Times* Op-Ed page about it. So well established had Breira become that at the end of February of this year it was able to hold its first national conference, featuring as speakers a number of well-known political analysts and religious figures.

If Breira has attracted the attention and

support of many rabbis, liberal intellectuals, and Jewish students and professors, it has also become the object of a good deal of concern within the organized Jewish community. Much of this concern, articulated in detail in Israel Jean Isaac's study of Breira,³ is grounded in the prehistory of the group and of those running it. Robert Loeb, for example, the executive director, came to Breira from a group called CONAME (Committee on New Alternatives in the Middle East), where he had been in charge of field activities; and John Ruskay, who along with Loeb has worked on a full-time basis for Breira from the beginning (he is now its secretary), had served on CONAME's steering committee. At least one other prominent member of Breira had been affiliated with something called MERIP (Middle East Research and Information Project), and both CONAME and MERIP appear to have had close links with the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, a radical think-tank and organizing center founded in 1963 by Marcus Raskin and Richard Barnett. All of these organizations, Mrs. Isaac goes on to show, have had a history of hostility to Israel.

Lavishly funded by grants from various foundations, the Institute for Policy Studies supports a number of staff members all of whom are engaged in specific "projects." For some time, Arthur Waskow, a senior fellow at the Institute and now (as noted) a member of Breira's executive committee, once headed a project on "The Crisis of American Jewry" (which resulted in the publication of a book, *The Bush Is Burning!*, containing organizational guidelines and descriptions of the various radical Jewish groups with which Waskow was then involved) and he currently runs an IPS project investigating the "triangular relationship among the U.S. government, the Israeli government, and the organized Jewish community inside the United States." Waskow's own view regarding this "interaction" are hardly positive. In an article for *Response* magazine in 1971, he argued that the "Zionism" of established Jewish organizations "is no devotion to the dream of Zion, but a sniveling admiration for Dvayan, for jet-planes, for the Johnson or Nixon or Agnew who will deliver them." In that same article, he urged the American Jewish community to shift "its moral, political, and financial support" to dissident Israeli groups such as Slach (the Israeli New Left). Breira's "project of concern" bears a striking similarity to Waskow's current project at IPS.

According to Mrs. Isaac, the Institute for Policy Studies has a number of anti-Israel activists on its paid staff. Joe Stork, a member of the "collective" that produces *MERIP Reports*, is one such staff member. *MERIP*, which was founded in 1971, identifies openly with the PLO, and distributes its literature, its posters, and even its flags. When terrorists gunned down Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics, *MERIP* issued a flyer reading, "Munich and similar actions cannot create or substitute for a mass revolutionary movement, but we should comprehend the achievement of the Munich action. . . . It has provided a boost in morale among Palestinians in the camps. . . . It is regrettable when people are killed, Israeli or Palestinian or Lebanese or Syrian, but at the

³ Mrs. Isaac's own sympathies, to judge from other of her published writings, would appear to tend toward the position of the Land of Israel movement, but her pamphlet on Breira is free of any overt bias and is scrupulous in its respect for evidence and in its use of documentation. Mrs. Isaac is also the author of a useful and well-argued book, *Israel Divided: Ideological Politics in the Jewish State*; see my review in the September 1976 COMMENTARY.

very least we should know where to put the blame." (On Israel.)

In 1974, *MERIP Reports* printed "Zionism and American Jews," a speech given by MERIP's Sharon Rose to the 1974 convention of Arab-American University Graduates, a group described by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith as "the key PLO 'connection' in the United States." Sharon Rose addressed herself to the question, "How did Zionism move from a tiny force to being accepted by most Americans as the equivalent of Judaism and what are the perceptible cracks in the political hegemony of the Zionist movement and what forces are likely to widen them?" An earlier essay by Miss Rose, included in Waskow's book, *The Bush Is Burning!*, called for a "bi-national, democratic secular state, encompassing the entire area of the original Mandate"—which of course is exactly the PLO euphemism for the dissolution of the state of Israel—to carry out the necessary "revolution" in the Middle East.

In 1971, at the Institute for Policy Studies, Mrs. Isaac reports, MERIP conducted a discussion on "How American Radicals See the Resistance Dilemma"; its proceedings were subsequently published in 1972 in the PLO's *Journal of Palestine Studies*. At the conclusion of the discussion, Barry Rubin, a member of the MERIP "collective," called for a specifically Jewish anti-Zionist organization. "I think it would be good to have Jews campaigning actively for Palestinian needs," he said. "It immediately breaks up the myth combining Judaism and Zionism. In that case it's something that probably Jews can be much more effective in doing." After August 1974, Rubin's name no longer appeared in *MERIP Reports*, but in September 1975, when the first issue of the Breira newsletter *InterChange* came out, Barry Rubin was listed as associate editor for international affairs. *InterChange* identified him as a doctoral candidate at Georgetown University but neglected to cite either his association with MERIP or with the violently anti-Israeli *MacInte Guardians*.

Coname, the other organization in the background of Breira, was established in 1970. Its sponsors included such recent supporters and activists of the New Left as Marcus Raskin, Richard Barnett, Barbara Black, and Arthur Waskow, all from the Institute for Policy Studies, as well as L. P. Stone, William Kunstler, Staughton Lynd, and Howard Zinn. Peter Weiss, chairman of the Institute's Board of Trustees (and vice president of the Samuel Rubin Foundation, one of the Institute's—and now Breira's—main financial supporters), was a member of CONAME's steering committee along with other New Left notables like Paul Jacobs, Neam Chomsky, and Irene Gendler (among others). Unlike MERIP, CONAME did not call for the destruction of Israel—though it sponsored speaking tours for such Israelis as Arne Bober and Israel Shahak, who did. Rather, CONAME argued that a Palestinian state must be established alongside Israel and that the PLO must be recognized by the United States and brought to Geneva.

On October 25, 1973 nineteen Arab-American or pro-Arab groups, among them CONAME, sent a telegram to members of the House and Senate urging "absolutely no arms and advisers to Israel." In December 1973, in response to various requests from those wishing to become more active in the struggle against Zionism, the Middle East Coordinating Committee, a well-known pro-Arab group, issued a "partial list of groups and organizations in the New York area who are actively working on behalf of justice in the Middle East." CONAME was on the list. *Time* magazine (June 23, 1975) listed CONAME among the "some 20 organizations" that were "carrying the Arabs' message."

Breira, Mrs. Isaac proceeds to show, is in-

ally descended from CONAME. Loeb and Ruskay came directly out of CONAME into Breira; indeed, they seem to have helped set up Breira while they were still working for CONAME. (When, in April 1976, CONAME merged with the Fellowship of Reconciliation, Alan Solomonow, CONAME's executive director, cited Breira as an organization continuing CONAME's work.) Presumably, they felt, like Barry Rubin, that a specifically Jewish organization actively campaigning on behalf of "Palestinian needs" would be more effective than a non-Jewish one. CONAME and Breira shared an identical position on the PLO and the need for a Palestinian state, but Breira was carefully designed to make its appeal to the Jewish community rather than to the "peace community."

Loeb and Ruskay did not build Breira by themselves; Arthur Waskow, in a 1976 *Response* symposium, revealed that he had "helped to build" Breira—and Mrs. Isaac demonstrates that "the old Waskow circle" consisting of veterans of many of his organizations, "provided a wealth of recruits" to Breira. Waskow was also discreetly involved with MERIP, sharing a Washington post-office box with that organization. In all his complex involvements with MERIP, CONAME, and Breira, Waskow has of course continued to be funded by the Institute for Policy Studies which, in addition to its indirect sponsorship of MERIP and CONAME, has undertaken to introduce PLO representatives into the mainstream of American life.

If individuals such as Loeb, Ruskay, and Waskow were marginal elements in Breira, it could be argued that their views and past activities are not a matter of serious concern. Unfortunately, Mrs. Isaac maintains, they are among its central figures, and it is they, rather than any of the rabbis and intellectuals listed on the organization's masthead, who make its policy. A certain deception is thus being practiced, Mrs. Isaac concludes. Loeb, Ruskay, Waskow, and Rubin claim to be "Zionists" and sail under the colors of an organization that professes love for Israel, yet all of them have been identified with markedly anti-Israel organizations in the past, and none has repudiated that connection. In October 1973, while Israel's survival literally hung in the balance, their "concern" for Israel was such that they opposed emergency military aid. Since then, Mrs. Isaac asserts, they have built Breira into a front group, enlisting the good names and reputations of well-meaning rabbis and liberal Jewish intellectuals, but all the while working to advance the interests of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

FDA BAN ON SACCHARIN

SPEECH OF

Hon. G. V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY

OF MISSISSIPPI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 4, 1977

Mr. MONTGOMERY, Mr. Speaker, I commend my two colleagues, Representative JIM MARTIN and Representative GEORGE O'BRIEN, for taking this time today in order that the Members might have an opportunity to air their views on the ridiculous proposed ban on saccharin. I would also urge my colleagues to join with them in cosponsoring their legislation that would halt the ban of saccharin.

I have long had doubts about some of our Federal agencies which have been bowers unto themselves and have gone far beyond the legislative intent of Con-

ב' כשכח השל"ו
4 בינואר 1976

ת נ י ס י

7

א ל: מר שמשון ענבל, הקונ"קל, כוסטון

סאחו מנהל סג"א בפועל

הנדון: סנסור בקינטייד ומשל ניו-כנסטון

מכתבי 1155 מיום 30.11.75

מכתב ט" 354 מיום 18.12.75

1. הרטה לי לציין שלא ברור לי מפני מה הופתעה מסכובי הנ"ל או על סמך מה הגעה לכלל מסקנה שהופתעה לי למע בקורת הסנסור על המושל.

2. ברקתי מחדש מכתבי הנ"ל ולא מצאתי שם התייחסות להפתעה, לטליאה, להשתוממות ומיובא בהן למע דברי הסנסור. משום הבאתי לידיעתך את העובדה שבאורה פומבי וכנוכחות מארחים ישראלים ואורחים מהקונגרס השחטס הסנסור בלשון קיצונית כיווה כאשר דבר על המושל. זאת בהשוואה לנוסחו המנוסח הכאופקה והמתונה בכל יתר השיחות וחלופי הדברים.

3. אין כל היסס שהמושל ואנשיו מוחתים מצידם בקורה על הסנסור. קשה לצפות אחרת.

4. אשר לתשובה מעמדם היחסי של השניים, לפחות בקרב הממסד בווינגטון (ובודאי מבחינתנו ובמיוחד בנושאי רכש), דומני שאין להרחיב הדבור.

בברכה וכל טוב,

דוד בן - דב

העוק:

משה ארז, העיר, וושינגטון
מר צבי רפיה, וושינגטון

1944

1944

1944

1944

1944

1944

1944

1944

1944

1944



CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
450 PARK SQUARE BUILDING
BOSTON, MASS. 02116
TELEPHONE (617) 266-3800

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
בוסטון

פנימי

י"א חבה השל"ו
15 דצמבר 75
נ-357

אל: סר ד. בן-דב, מנהל מצפ"א בפועל

סאח: הקונסול הכללי

ריב היקו -

הסנאטור סקינטייר והמושל תומסון

שלך 1155 מ- 30 נובמבר 75

מכתבך הפהיעני.

המושל, כפי שכתבתי פעמים רבות, יסני קיצוני, ואילו סקינטייר -
דמוקראט. מדוע הועמק שהאחד מבקר את השני, ולו גם באריפות?
אוכל להבטיחך שבסו אזניי שמעתי את המושל ואנשיו מוחחים
ביקורת חריפה על הסנאטור סקינטייר...
היקו.

בברכה,

René
שמשון ענבל

העמק: מר ט. ארד, הציר, וושינגטון
סר צ. רפיה, וושינגטון
כירסום
א.מ.

כטס 550

גשלת: 241645 וצט 75

אל: המשרד

מסמ: רושינגטון

מנפא

סנטור

מקומי פירטס כ-19 דנא ברשומות הקונגרס דוח על ביקור משלחתו
לאחרונה במדת . לחלץ הקטע על מצרים . הדוח תמלא שולח בדיק הבא .

OUR NEXT STOP WAS CAIRO. OUR EMBASSY PEOPLE IN CAIRO CONSIDER THAT THE SOVIET UNION SUFFERED A SERIOUS SETBACK WHEN THEIR MISCALCULATIONS OF EGYPT'S ATTITUDE LET TO THEIR REVERSAL IN EGYPT AND CREATED THE ATMOSPHERE WHICH IS LEADING TO A RESUMPTION OF NORMALIZED AND HISTORICALLY GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. RESTORATION OF ECONOMIC AID TO EGYPT CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF LIMITED DEFENSIVE MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND THE INCLUSION OF OUR NATO ALLIES IN THESE MEASURES ARE LOGICAL STEPS WHICH SHOULD STRENGTHEN THESE TIES AND IMPROVE THE CHANCES FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

PRESIDENT SADAT APPEARED VERY WELL AND IN GOOD SPIRITS. IN A FRIENDLY AND VERY CANDID EXCHANGE HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- EGYPT IS LACKING IN ARMAMENTS WHILE ISRAEL HAS REPLACED EQUIPMENT LOST DURING THE YOM KIPPUR WAR. SYRIA ALSO HAS RECEIVED SUBSTANTIAL SHIPMENTS FROM THE SOVIETS WHILE NO SOVIET DELIVERIES HAVE BEEN MADE TO EGYPT SINCE THE CEASE FIRE. THIS LEAVES EGYPT IN AN AWKWARD POSITION.
- HE ENCOURAGES US HELP TO SYRIA TO PREVENT EXCLUSIVE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THAT COUNTRY.
- SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION IS CRITICAL TO THE ATTAINMENT OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
- THE PALESTINIAN SOLUTION WOULD BE BASED ON A PALESTINIAN STATE CONSISTING OF THE GAZA STRIP THE WEST BANK OF THE JORDAN RIVER AND A CONNECTING CORRIDOR. HE IS WORKING TOWARD THIS GOAL.
- HE CONSIDERS THAT THE PALESTINIAN SOLUTION COULD ALSO BE BASED UPON "OTHER COMPENSATION" BESIDES TERRITORIAL RESTORATION BUT HE DID NOT DEFINE THESE TERMS.
- HE BELIEVES THERE IS A BASIS FOR SYRIA AND ISRAEL TO AGREE UPON A GOLAN HEIGHTS COMPROMISE WITH US GUARANTEES.
- HE EXPECTS TO BE ASKING THE UNITED STATES IN THE FUTURE FOR CERTAIN DEFENSIVE ARMS.
- FOR SOME TIME INTO THE FUTURE EGYPT AND ISRAEL WILL NOT HAVE CONFIDENCE IN EACH OTHER BUT BOTH HAVE CONFIDENCE IN SECRETARY KISSINGER.
- HE BELIEVES THAT IF ISRAEL WITHDREW TO ITS PRE 1967 BORDERS

הג' תש"ו

פ. ד. ר.

כ"ו בסלול תשל"ו
30 בנובמבר 1975

אלו פר שטון עמל, הקונכ"ל, כוסטון

מחוז מנהל סג"א כפועל

הנדון: סנסור חוסס ב" מקינסטיר (ד-ניו-המטטיר)
זכטל ניו-המטטיר
מכתבי ט- 5 אוש"ט סט. 1043

1. מכתבי הנ"ל דנוחתי לך על שיתוחי עם הזטל אלדיום
חוסטון ב-6.10.75 - 5 .

2. חטתי לנכון לנסור לך שבמלך בקורה של מילתה הקונגרס
האחרונה בארץ (26.11.75 - 26) עלה במקרה סמו על כוסל
ניו-המטטיר כשיחה עם הסנסור הנ"ל ועם כמה כורעים אחרים.

3. סנסור מקינסטיר חתטט במילים חריטנה ולמעשה כוסט כיותר
כעט טכט בקורה קטלניה על הזטל הנ"ל. הוא מנה את כל
מקרקתיו ומביאותיו. הוא הנדירו כזה טכט מדינה אחרת
(ג"רבי"ת) וכאדס אתר אינו מוסוף ככוד לניו-המטטיר.

4. לידיעתך.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

ב. בן-דב

העקו: פר טטה ארד, הציר ווטינגטון
פר צבי רטיח, השגרירות ווטינגטון

1944

100-100000-100000

100-100000-100000

100-100000-100000

100-100000-100000

100-100000-100000

100-100000-100000

100-100000-100000

100-100000-100000

100-100000-100000

100-100000-100000

100-100000-100000

מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

תאריך: 18/1/76

מספר:

Handwritten initials

32

אל: סר צבי רפיה, השגרירות וושינגטון

סאת: מנהל מצפ"א בפועל

הנדון: *Claude W. McFadden*, יועץ בכיר בועדת השרותים המזוינים

של הסנס

מברק סס' 625 מיום 29/12/75

1. נפגשתי עם הנ"ל ב- 14/1/76. נלווה אליו קומנדר *THORPE* מחיל הים (נציגו ליד ועדת השרותים המזוינים). תורפ לווה כזכור את סמור ויליים ל. סקוט (ר- וירגיניה) אשר בקר בארץ ב- 5/8/75 - 3 (מכהבי סס' 7/8/75).

2. שוחחנו בעיקר על החלק הצבאי של הצעת חוק סיוע החוץ ס- 30/10/75 המסתכם באורח גלובלי בסך 2,824.5 בליון דולר ובחבילה המזרח תיכונית הספציפית בסך 1.675 בליון דולר. כך החלטנו דעות על ההתפתחויות האפשריות בעתיד.

3. אנסה לסכם כמה מן ההערות שהשמיע במהלך השיחה:-

* כבר בש"א 1976 עשוי הממשל לנקוט צעדים בגלל מגבלות בתקרה התקציבית (374.5 בליון) ובגרעון המאוסר (בסך 74.1 בליון) אשר אושרו ע"י הקונגרס ב- 12/12/75. מכל שכן - בש"א 1977 (כידוע שואף הנשיא להעמיד תקרה תקציבית זו על סך 395 במקום 423 בליון כאשר הוגש ב- 21/1/76 הצעה תקציב לש"א זו).

* אין הוא בטוח אם השנתיים שיחולו יפגעו דוקא בסכום הכולל של הסעיף הישראלי. יתכן שלא יהיו בו קצוצים או שיחולו קצוצים שוליים אך, עם זאת יתכן השנתיים יתבטאו:-

א. בשנתי חנאי הרבית (שהם כבר נבוחים ונוקשים מן העבר) היינו, 8-9 אחוזים שהוא טעור הריבית שמסלם האוצר האמריקני עם הלוואותיו. המדובר כסובך בחלק חושדאי.

ב. בשנתי היחס שבין חלק האשראי וחלק המענק של הסיוע הצבאי.

* אל נכון התעצנה נכיוה אלו בש"א הבאות.

* יש לזכור שהממשל מנסה לצמצם ובעתיד הלא רחוק לחסל לחלוטין את המענקים הצבאיים במסגרת תוכניות *MARSHAL PLAN* הכוללות מעורבות של יועצים צבאיים ושאינן מקובלות על הקונגרס. כבר עתה קיימים וכוחים עזים בנושא זה עם מדינות סונות גם מחוץ למז"ה, למשל, עם קוריאה הדרומית כאשר תוכנית זו התבצע וחושלים, יזדקר המענק הצבאי הישראלי יותר ויותר כשריד שנותר לפליטה ולא דוקא נעימה. (כדאי אבב לציין שבחבילה המז"הית מופיע רק סכום של 100 מ' דולר במסגרת זו *MAR* בשביל ירדן.

מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ

ירושלים

- 2 -

תאריך:

מספר:

* נציגי הפנסגון עמלים קשות כדי להסביר חזור והסבר כל סעיף בבקשותיהם ובחוכניותיהם במסגרת הקציב ההגנה (שקוצץ לשח"א הנוכחית מ- 98 ל- 90.5 בליון דולר). נראה שגם בעלות ברית המבקשות סיוע צבאי חצמרכנה מעתה להגיש הסברים מסורטים ומשכנעים ביותר לגבי כל "פסיק" בבקשותיהן לסיוע צבאי. יתכן שכדאי יהיה לאמן ולהדריך נציגים ישראלים בכל הלבירינט המסובך הזה כדי שיוכלו לשכנע חברי קונגרס בצדקת בקשתם.

* ספר שקיימת רגישות גוברת (המוכרת לנו ישה) לא רק לגבי אספקת מערכות נשק מתוחכמות לארצות חוץ (למשל המזה"ת) אלא גם אפילו יותר לגבי אספקת טכנולוגיה לייצור מערכות כאלו. זה לא רק ענין של תחרות אלא ענין של סכון בסחונני ממדרגה ראשונה.


* הדגיש את המושג *BURDEN SHARING*. גוברת והולכת התביעה שמקבלות הסיוע תוכננה בצורה חותכת שהן מחלקות באורח נאווה במעמסה המוטלת על ארה"ב. מכאן כל החקירות והדרישות בדבר האמצעים שנוקטת ישראל כדי לצמצם את הפער במאזן התשלומים ולפחית את תלותה בסיוע אמריקני. בישה דומה מופעלת גם לגבי בעלות ברית אחרות.

* יוזמותיו של ג'קסון בועדת השרותים המזויינים לא סייעו במיוחד. לא צמחה שום תועלת למשל מן ההחלטה שהצליח להעביר במליאה (לא בועדה) ב- 6/6/75 בדבר הארכת החולת החקון למעוף 501 לחוק הקציב ההגנה 1970. הקון זה מאפשר לנשיא למכור לישראל ציוד צבאי (בעיקר מטוסים וחלקי חלוף) באמצעות אסראים מתוך הקציב ההגנה כדי לשמור על מאזן הכוחות במזה"ת. סנטורים רבים מצטערים על שחמכו בחקון שהוארך בפעם השלישית ואשר אפשר כזכור לנשיא ניכסון לאשר אסראים בגובה של 500 מליון דולר ב- 1970 במסגרת זו.

* ועדת השרותים המזויינים של הסנס התעניין עתה יותר ויותר בבעיות אלו לאור הכוונה לדון בבעיות הסיוע הצבאי ולהעביר את חוות דעה לועדה ההקצבות של הסנס. מכאן שגור יועציה לארץ. כזכור נמסר שלועדת השרותים המזויינים לכיים עיונה בסיוע הצבאי לשח"א 1977 עד מרס 1976 אגב היועץ הבכיר ביותר של הועדה וראש הסגל שלה - *T. Edmund Brannell*. בקר כאן בסוף השבוע שעבר ונסגש עם אנשי משה"בס (על כך שמעתי משנארה"ב). מקפאדן הוא השני אחריו ברשימת הסגל של הועדה.

* דבר על עדויות קולבי ונציגי הפנסגון והסעים שמספקותיהם (סגרמו לנו נזק) מבוססות על מחקר מעמיק וממושך. זוהי אחת הסבות הנציגי הועדה הגיעו לארץ כדי לעמוד על המצב מבלי ראשון.

ב בר כ ה,



דוד בן-דב

העתק: המטנה למנכ"ל
לשכת השר
לשכת המנכ"ל

מר חנן בר און, הגיר וושינגטון

מר איתן רפ, וושינגטון

טל 531111 (02)

הקריה, דוממה ירושלים 91999

18/1/76

התאחדות עובדי המבחן

ס ו ד י

אל : הקונסול הכללי, טן-פרנסיסקו

מאת: מנחם מצפ"א בפועל

הנדון: בקור יו"ר ביה המחוקקים (אסמבלי)
של קליפורניה בישראל (דצמבר 1975)
מכתבי מס' מיום

1. כהמשך למכתבי הנ"ל וכמונבטה הנני מצ"ב סכום הסגירה של דברי שה"ח כאשר נפגש עם ליאו מקארטו כ- 24/12/75.
2. הסכום חובר ע"י סר אנרתם מילוא מלשכת חצר אשר נכח יחד עמי כעת השיהת והוא נוסר את הדברים לפי סדר השו"ת.

ב בר כ ה,

דוד בן-דב

העקו: סר טפה איד, הציר וושינגטון

סר אורי בר-נר, יועץ המברה, וושינגטון

מלך

נקודות מדברי שה"ח בשיחתו עם ליאו מקארתי 24.12.75

1 אין תחליף לסו"מ על בסיס 242 ו-338. סמיה כלשהי פרושה
 2 תכתיב ~~י-סורי~~ המנוגד לאינטרס האסרוקאי.
 הזמנה אש"פ לדירון סועבי"ם היא נושא סובסטאנטיביבי ויש לבלום
 אותו. אנו לא נשתף פעולה עם סועבי"ם.

3 סוריה התנגדה לג'נבה מן ההתחלה. גם בסו"מ ההפרדה התנו
 השתתפותם בנוכחות גנרל סצרי, כדי להודיע האופי הצבאי והקשר עם
 סצרים. טגסת סוריה ססועבי"ם תחליף את ג'נבה ^{האופי} לרוח זמנים לפי
 הפרוט הערבי של 242. ישראל בעד חידוש ג'נבה.
 4 אנו נמצאים בתקופה המחייבת מהלכים סקטיים.

5 עמדת ארה"ב בכתב רבע"פ ביחס לאש"פ תחייב אותה להסיל וסו בסועבי"ם.
 6 אינו מוציא טכלל אפשרות הסכם קבוע עם סצרים וירדן ללא סוריה.

7 בעד "טומנסוס" כינינו לבין ירדן ופתרון צודק של הבעיה
 הפלסטינית ע"י טו"מ עם ירדן והפלסטינים תושבי השטחים. ירדן
 פלסטינית ברובה הגדול. זוהי יחידה כלכלית אחת (ססכפ, ייצוא),
 כל הפלסטינים בגדה בעלי דרכונים ירדניים, וקיימים X האלמנטים של
 שפה, דת והסטוריה.

8 הערכת עתיד הגדס"פ:
 איחוד עם ישראל - רוב תושבי הגדס"פ נגד.
 פלסון אש"פ - " " " " " "
 סדינה עצמאית - ירדן וישראל נגד.
 איחוד עם ירדן על בסיס פדולי - הרוב בגדס"פ רואה בכך כרע
 במיעוטו.

9 על ארה"ב לתזהיר את ירדן כי הליכה עם סוריה לקראת הנהגה
 צבאית מאוחדת מהווה סיכון בסחרבי לירדן: גנרלים ירדניים עלולים
 לפעול עם סוריה נגד הממשל, אסד עלול להתפך יותר פופולרי מחוסין.

10 ארה"ב יכולה לסייע ע"י פעולה להביא להסכם ביחס לגבולות (61 ירדן)
 סאיגם במחלוקת, בצפון ובדרום, ופאיגם קטורים להקשר הפלסטיני.
 אפשרי אפילו כהסדרים זמניים. הירדנים עדיין חוששים סכך אך
 בסבלנות אולי עוד נגיע לכך.

The following information was obtained from a review of the files of the [redacted] and is being furnished to you for your information.

[redacted] was born on [redacted] at [redacted] and is currently residing at [redacted].

[redacted] has been employed by [redacted] since [redacted] and is currently in the position of [redacted].

[redacted] has been identified as a [redacted] and is currently being monitored by [redacted].

[redacted] is currently being monitored by [redacted] and is being considered as a [redacted].

[redacted] is currently being monitored by [redacted] and is being considered as a [redacted].

[redacted] is currently being monitored by [redacted] and is being considered as a [redacted].

[redacted] is currently being monitored by [redacted] and is being considered as a [redacted].

(11) פלוס יושג כתוצאה של סאזן צבאי ראסן פוליטי. לכשיושגו הסורים תוכל לבוא התפתחות הדרגתית של השלמה מצד סוינות ערב. הפלמטיבים בשטחים היו האלמנט הקיצוני ביותר מאז 1948 ¹⁹⁶⁷ כיום - לסרות נוכחותו הצבאי בשטחים - הט הפכו לגורם המתון ביותר, תוך חיים בצוותא, חופש יציאה וכדו'. לטרו להכיר אותנו.

(12) רצוננו להגן על עצמנו בעזרת עצמנו. נוכל לעשות זאת כל עוד נסמך ^{לארה"ב} הסאזן הצבאי. הדבר חשוב לנו, לאירופה ולתושבי האזור. אם יעורבו הסעצנות תהיה זו בעיה כלל עולמית.

(13) ארה"ב כמעצמת-על ודאי לא תרצה להחלישנו. העומס הכלכלי רב. סיוע החוץ חיוני נוכח הנסל הכספי של צורכי הבטחון, אינני מצפה ~~ל~~ ^ל צבא אמריקני, לא כיועצים. ארה"ב תרצה ודאי שנוכל להגן על עצמנו. ישראל היא נכס, לא מעמסה. הסיוע האמריקני לישראל מנוצל בצורה יעילה וברודאי בהשוואה לסיוע לארצות אחרות.

(14) במסגרת שלום ניתן לותר בסריסוריה. גבולות הבטחון בחושים לא לרכישת שטחים גרידא אלא מסיקול הגבתי. חשיבותן גדלה דווקא על רקע התפתחות הטכנולוגית בכלי הנשק השכל שעה נוספת לגיוס מילואים חיונית לבטחוננו. ^ל היחידים בעולם שאינם יכולים להרשות לעצמם להפסיד קרב.

(15) על ארה"ב לפעול לעידוד המתונים בעולם הערבי (ירדן ומצרים) להגיע להסכם. אין רע בסוריה מבודדת שכן חסיד ניסתה ליהנות משני העולמות אך פרקסית בסופו של דבר (זאחרונה לחתום על הסכם שניה"ב, הפרדה וכו').

אלק רמת מלול

12/2
12/2
12/2
12/2

תאריך



~~התאריך
הוא
הוא
הוא~~

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30308

PHONE 875-7851

805 PEACHTREE ST., N. E.
SUITE 656

אטלנטה, 9 בנוב. 77

(881)

אל: מר צבי רפיה, רוטינגטון

מאת: הקונסוליה הכללית, אטלנטה

הנדון: מסמך מורגן - אפון קרולינה

רצ"ב דבריו של המנטור כנאום ב- 22/10/77
ש"הוכנסו" לטרלוט אוברבר מ- 4/11/77.
הדברים היוכיים ביותר.

בברכה

מאיר רומס

העקו: מר ח. בר-און, קונסול

מר א. כרם, רוטינגטון

מצפא ✓

הסברה

U.S. Should Stand By Israel

U.S. Sen. Robert Morgan, D-N.C., spoke here Oct. 22 at a dinner marking the centennial anniversary of B'nai B'rith, the Jewish service organization. Here is some of what he said.

We have a tradition in our country of permitting special interest groups to bring their influence to bear on national policy. This is unavoidable; we cannot shut off any group's right to organize for political action. And it is not necessarily bad — our system of government is designed to resolve differences of opinion, and differences of interest or advantage.

But there is no freedom without the danger of abuse. Abuse comes when we in Washington forget that we are sent there to resolve differences, not to take anybody's side exclusively.

There are always pressures to vote in favor of this group, or that group, because they are politically powerful. For an elected representative to go along with the program of any interest group, regardless of the effect on public policy, is wrong. Not many do it.

I assure you I have no intention of doing so. I was sent to Washington to represent all the people, and to vote for what I consider fair and equitable. I will be glad to take the criticism which goes along with that.



Morgan

I say this because I want to make one thing very clear. My support of Israel is based on a conviction that it is the right thing to do, and not because that I want to play ethnic politics.

There is much danger in setting Greek-Americans against Turks, blacks against whites, Jewish Americans against those of Arab descent. It is a game we will play to the detriment of good public policy.

But I think our continued support of Israel is good policy. It is good policy because the world needs two things.

- First, we need to make sure that governments committed to human freedom and democratic rule have every chance of survival in a world that is in desperate need of them.

- Second, we need an America that lives up to its commitments to its allies.

We have often heard it said how much Israel needs the United States. But let us turn that around: Think for a moment about how much we need Israel. Let us remember how much the world itself needs Israel.

Think back on the newspaper headlines you have read in the past few years. How many times have you read of the founding of a democratic state? How many times have you been informed that a new government has been established on the principles of individual freedom, and the dignity of democracy? Not very often.

Instead, we hear about endless

threats to that dignity, and excuses for terrorism, despotism and the convenience of the state over the rights of human beings. We should never forget that the State of Israel rose out of the ashes of persecution, that it remains a democratic nation, and that its survival does the whole world good.

I don't want the United States to be the last free country on earth. We need all the help we can get.

For this reason, I believe in a policy of commitment to nations that share our way of life in good measure. Where there is more freedom than less and more democracy than tyranny, there we must give support and friendship. We owe it to our origins, and our own principles of life, to do nothing less.

In recent years, Israel has won the admiration of much of the world for its ability to defend itself. The raid on Entebbe Airfield was a direct blow against terrorism. It caught the imagination of a world which has seemed to stand, baffled and terrified, at the point of a terrorist gun.

But I believe Israel's true strength, its true contribution to the world will lie in the ways of peace. Israel has shown its genius for all the arts of life — business, culture, government and all the other things which give meaning to the word "civilization." It is civilization very much as we in America know it, and value it. We cannot permit that light to be snuffed out, without suffering harm to our own way of life. Because of that, we should be a friend to Israel, as long as that light shines.



אין קשר

105 - 0

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסיחוץ וסודות רשמיים), תשי"ז - 1957.

מס' 342

מס' 342
בטלח 191730 ינו 76

אל: המשרד
מח: וושינגטון

עברונ.
בפגשתי היום עם סנטור רוכס מורגנ במשרדו בקפיטול.
זה אמר כי היה שבע רצונ מאד מביקורו לאחרונה (עם משלחת מקאינטייר) בישראל, במיוחד התרשם מהאיור בגולג ובמקלטים שבקבוצ למרגלותיו וברור לו שאסור לנו לרדת מהגולג. (יילפני הביקור בישראל לא הייתי כל כך בטוח בכי"י). האוב, אמר שכל סנטור וקונגרסמן יבקר בגולג, מעוניין לשוב ולבקר בישראל עם משפחתו.
ב. הדר ואמר שהוא (שם) לישראל ותומכ בנו תמיכה מלאה, יחבל היא אתה והמוקרשיות תבודדות מאיזור זה של העולם וארחב הייבת טאג יעליה (הערה: הצבעותיו וההחלטותיו בסינט מאשרות זאת).
ג. בייחמתו ועלה עניין אנגולה והאריכ בשענה נגד מזכיר המדינה על שהוא נקדיש עיקר תשומת לבו לועזת החוצ של הסינט שרוב חבריהם הינם בילניס (להוציא את ספרקמנ יישהוא אנגמ מסדר אבל אינו יכול להיזי דברי) ומזניה לחלוטין סנטורים שאינם חריימ בוועזת החוצ אך רואים נכוחה את הסכנה הסובייטית באנגולה ותומכים בממשל. דווקא אותם אינ הממשל והמזכיר טורחיים לתורכ. (בקטגוריה זו ציינ בין השאר את הסנטורים טטון דומיניצי מקלורכ וכמוכג אותו עימו). הדגיש והכיל בין הפנטגון הטורח לתורכו לעיסי מזומנות בנושא הייצור והרכש לבין המזכיר המתעלמ ממנו כלייל הוא רואה בכך שגיאאת קשה של המזכיר המזיקה בסופו של דבר לאינטרסים של ארבה.

בדקשר הגל ציינ במיוחד את יעבצ. ייאזכ יוכל יעבצ לתבוע סיוע טראל כאשר הוא מתנגד כסיוע באנגולה. הרי בשני המקרים קיימת הסכנה הסובייטית. כדאי שתאמרו זאת ליעבצי.
ה. סימר על פגישתו עם המשלחת במצרים. אמ סאדאת לא יטפל בכלכלת ארצו-מצרים עתידה להתמוטט. בפגישה עם מועצה האומה תבעו מהם המצרים להפסיק התמיכה בישראל. סנטור מקאינטייר אמר להם באורח המרור ביותר שאחזב תומכי לחמוכ בישראל וכי אל ישלר יעצמ המצרים. על סאדאת אמר - הוא יוכנ להתקדם בנושא החסדר כל עוד לא יסכנ את מעמדו.

מברק נכנס - מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר
סודי

בל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה) מס. 550 ייחויץ וסודות רשמיים).
נשלח 1975/297 מסמך 75

אל: המשדר
מאת: וויסינגסון

מיידי

0
28

מנכ"ל
מנכ"ל

המסמך
מסמך
מסמך

גיוון מקפול, סגן ראש הטייעה הדמוקרטית בביהג, אמר לי אחפול, במסיבה תזחזית, כי הנמשא ומרכזי בביהג תאנוע יוא דיונ בחידוש הטיוע לתורכיה מאכוע תבא, הוא מקווה, יובאו לאישור מליאת ביהג תזכנאימ בטיני. אינ הוא רואה קוטי באישור זה במליאה. מאידכ, הוא צופה קטיימ לגבי אטתקת הפרטינג לישראל. להעריסנו הנושא יונעורד במטגרח הדיונ על סיוע חיוצ לישראל. אינ לארחב די טיילימ לצרכיה היא. נמיילה מתמלאי תיצוממז וקיימ תיחקל בזחנגדות. חידוש קו הייצור במיוחד עבור ישראל יעלה סכס רב. ייצור הדגמ תחשו עודנו החוק. הוא מעריכ שחוק סיוע חיוצ בכללו יאוסר, או כי איננו באוח לגבי תזכומ.

רמ"ח, ==

שהח דהמ מוכל שהכס ממנכל סמנכל מצפא מזתים חקר רמ אמן
מכ/ממ

כל המוסד חובן מספך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוספך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-משווג

105-0

שקיה

סודי

מס' 412

בשלה: 221800 יג 76

אל: המשרד

מאת: רושינגטון

13

סידי

אל: עברונ

נפגשתי היום עם ייצמציפיי הדמוקרטי בביה"ג ג'ונ מקפול במשרדו
בקפיטול. אמר כי אין כל ספק שקיומה ובטחונה של ישראל הינם
אינטרס אמריקני ברור וכי אלמלא ישראל היו סובייטיים משתלטים
על כל המזרח. לדבריו גם הסעודים מכירים מ בכך ובתועלת שהם מפיקים
מישראל. שאל וקיבל הסברים על המתרחש בלבנון וקלקם של סוריה וארגוני
הטרור.

הזאונג מרות על החברים החזשים של בית הנבחרים אשר רואים בפרשת
וייטנאם את סופ תקופת המעורבות של ארהב בעניני העולם ואשר דבר
מחוצ לארהב עצמה אינו מעין אותם. אין הם זוכרים את לקח מלחמת
העולם השנייה וכיצד הבדלנות האמריקנית שקדמה לה תרמה למלחמה.
הזאונג על עמדת הקונגרס בענין אנגולה. אמר כי אין ספק כי
תקונ טאני לחוק ההקצבות של הבטחון יאושר גם בביה"ג (ההצבעה
שנדחתה עקב ביקור המזכיר המוסקבה תתקיים בשבוע הבא) הרי
לא עזרת ארהב לא יוכלו הפלגים האנטי סובייטיים לחזיק מעמד.
אמר כי ארהב איננה במצב טוב עשה והביע תקווה כי נשיא
חדש שיקבל מנדט מהעם לארבע שנים יוכל ללכד את העם ולהנהיגו.
הזהיר מפני בחירתו של ריגן. ייהוא שהקנ מצליחיי אומר ועושה
מה שאומרים לו יועציו. אמ ייבחר, חלילה, חשוב יהיה לדעתו מיהם
המושכים בחוטים מאחוריו-הם יהיו הקובעים.

הדגיש המשקל הרבה ביותר שיש ליהדות ארהב. אלמלא הם והחשש
מייתגובות הזעמי שלום היו חברי קונגרס רבים מצביעים נגד
הסיוע. אבל הוסיף היהודים לותצים עבור מטרה נכונה.
השתתף היום בתדריך סגור שנתנ קולכי לזת ועדת ההקצבות לעניני
בטחון. קולבי התלונג שעם התערבות כה מרובה של הקונגרס ופרסום
סה רב באמצעות הקונגרס אי אפשר ל- CIA . לבצע עבודה יעילה.
התדריך לדבריו לא נגע במזרח ובישראל.
הזמנתי את מקפול לבקר בישראל. הודה אך אמר כי לא יוכל לצאת
בעתיד הנראה לעיני.

רפ"ח

שהח דהם סנכל שהכס ססנה למנכל אירגונ אכידר רוזן י. רביב סספא סזחיס חקר רם
אמו
רפ/אמ

1977

1977

1977

1977

1977

1977

1977

1977

1977

1977



סי' שבה חשל"ז
7 פברו' 77

78

ידיעת אמת היא
[Signature]

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

MAGUIRE הנדון: המורשה אנדרו

ביקרתי בשבוע החולף, ביוזמתי, אצל אנדרו מגוואייר במשרדו בקפיטול. מגוואייר עמד, כידוע, בראש משלחת חברי ביה"נ שמחתה בפני סגרייר צרפת כאן על שחרור אבו-דאוד וכן היה מראשי פעולות המהאה האחרות בביה"נ בנושא זה.

מגוואייר, בן 38, דמוקרט מניו-ג'רסי, החל עתה בשנת כהונתו השלישית בביה"נ. ידידותי מאד לישראל. בעל תאד P.H.D מהרוורד ביחסים בי"ל. ב-9-1966 היה עוזרו של ארתור גולדברג, השגריר באו"ם, לענייני המזה"ת. מחמצא היטב בענייניו, ביקש להיות חבר ועדת החוץ של ביה"נ אך מכיוון שהיה בין הפעילים להדחת רוברט טייקס מראשות תה-ועדה בוועדת ההקצבות (ענייני אפיקה), והימרה בכך את פי הנהגת ביה"נ - נמנע מטנו הדבר.

דיבר בלהט רב על הצורך להילחם בטרור וללמד את כל משתפי - הפעולה לקח, כולל הצרפתים.

הודיתי לו והבעתי הערכתנו לעמדתו זו.

אמר שביקר בישראל ב-1974. חזרתי והזמנתי לבקר.

ב ב כ ה
[Signature]
צ. רפיח

העתק: השגריר, פריס.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.



EMBASSY OF GREAT BRITAIN
WASHINGTON, D.C.

[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten initials]

FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Dear Sir, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th inst. in relation to the matter mentioned therein. I am sorry that I cannot give you a more definite answer at this time.

The Department is currently reviewing the matter and will advise you as soon as a final decision has been reached. In the meantime, please continue to keep us advised of any developments. Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Yours faithfully,
[Signature]

Very truly yours,
[Signature]

Very truly yours,
[Signature]

[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten initials]

of 15/11/11

13/11

מברק נכנס-משוג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ד - 1957.

Handwritten notes and signatures in the top right corner, including the name 'מלח' and other illegible scribbles.

סמך

אליהמטרד

מאת: רוסינגטון

מס 99

נשלח 081510 ינו 79

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: מנהל מצטא. דלהלן נוסח מכתב שסנטור מתיאס שלה בימים אלה לנשיא קטר, וכתב איננו חוזר איננו לפרטום או יחוס-

AT THE CLOSE OF A YEAR MARKED BY GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS AND FRAUGHT WITH MANY FRUSTRATIONS, I WANT TO SALUTE YOU FOR WHAT YOU DARED TO

ATTEMPT AND DISCUSS WITH YOU WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

AS ONE WHO HAS FOLLOWED EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST FOR YEARS, I AM PERHAPS MORE FAMILIAR THAN SOME WITH THE DIFFICULTY OF THE DECISIONS REQUIRED OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT IF PEACE IS EVER TO COME TO THAT AREA. TO PUT ASIDE THE CONFLICTS OF MORE THAN THIRTY YEARS REQUIRED RARE COURAGE. I AM CONVINCED THAT BOTH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND PRESIDENT SADAT HAVE THIS COURAGE.

IN ADDITION, ISRAEL IN PARTICULAR, MUST HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE FIRMNESS OF HER HISTORIC TIES WITH THE US IN ORDER TO UNDERTAKE THE TOUGH DECISIONS WHICH LIE AHEAD. SUCH A STATE OF CONFIDENCE IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO ISRAEL IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH STILL SEPARATE THE MID-EAST FROM PEACE.

I AM CONVINCED THAT ONLY AN ISRAEL CONFIDENT IN OUR RELIABILITY WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE THE NECESSARILY DIFFICULT STEPS DOWN THE ROAD. THE CAUSE OF PEACE IN THE MIDEAST CAN ONLY BENEFIT FROM A RENEWAL OF THE DEEP AND IREVOCABLE TIES THAT HAVE BOUND US TOGETHER SINCE THE CREATION OF THE MODERN STATE OF ISRAEL.

RESPECTFULLY,

CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR.

א.א.א.

בראון

שהח רהם סרחה שהבט הנכל ששון רוזן מצאא רט ראמן

רמ-רע

מברק נכנס - מסווג

אל: המשרד
מחז: דושינגטון

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקיסור

Handwritten notes in blue ink, including a large signature and the words "מדינת ישראל" (State of Israel).

מנכ"ל, דיניצ, מצפה

לדגל מכתב נשיגר היום סנטור מתיאס למזכיר המדינה.

כל המוסר חוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
חוק העונשין (בטחון המדינה
לשנת 1954) ויודע 78 (שמיים).
התקבץ: 78

מס' נשכח התקבץ

MR SECRETARY :

AS YOU KNOW, I COSPONSORED A RESOLUTION LAST WEEK WHICH PASSED THE SENATE 87-0 EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE CONGRESS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE US SHOULD CONTINUE TO PROMOTE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT AND TO ENCOURAGE OTHER ARAB STATES TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO PEACE TREATIES WITH ISRAEL.

I BELIEVE IT VITAL THAT ON YOUR FORTHCOMING TRIP TO THE MIDEAST TO MAKE CLEAR THE GREAT IMPORTANCE ATTACHED BY THE US CONGRESS TO DIRECT, GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE MIDEAST CONFLICT.

RECENT STATEMENTS BY EGYPTIAN AND SAUDI ARABIAN OFFICIALS APPEAR TO PLACE IN JEOPARDY A CONTINUATION OF THE FACE TO FACE NEGOTIATING PROCESS BEGUN SO HOPEFULLY BY PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGHAU LAST NOVEMBER. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS THAT COULD BE DONE ON YOUR TRIP IS TO EXPRESS UPON THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABI THE SENSE OF URGENCY FELT IN THE CONGRESS ON THIS MATTER.

YOU HAVE OUR BEST WISHES IN YOUR EFFORTS TO GET THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATION TABLE. ALL CONCERNED MUST REALIZE THAT COMPROMISE IS NECESSARY IF PEACE IN THE MIDEAST IS TO BE ACHIEVED. THIS CAN ONLY BE REALIZED THROUGH FACE TO FACE NEGOTIATIONS.

SINCERELY,

CHARLES MCC. MATIAS, JR.

Handwritten signature in blue ink.

Handwritten text in Hebrew at the bottom of the page.

כל המוסר חוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או סקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי חוץ וסודות רשמיים),
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

סודי

מברק נכנס-מסווג

ה'תש"ז
10/10/57

מס 426
השלח 291300 יולי 57
הקבל 292151 יולי 57

אל: המסוד
מאת: ודש

סנבל

שוחחתי אתמול ארוכות עם סנאטור מתיאס, הסכרתי את עמדתה של ישראל, התכבירה המבורית
וכי' הצרעתי כמו בשיתח עם סטון על הסכנה שהמצרים ינסו לשלף לסקטיקה שנקטו בינואר
וכן הלאה. בין השאר שוחחתי ארוכות עם מתיאס בענין הלבנו כי הוא תביע כברות לא דק
להביא באזני הממשל דאגתי החמורה לאור המצב שהתפתח אלא גם לנסות ולתנוע ספך סנסורית
נוספים למעול גם מצדם ככרון זה.

בר און

אזה רהם סרהם שתכט סנבל סנבל סנבל מצנא מזתים חקר רט אמן

אל



5 באפריל 1978

א ל: מצפ"א

מח: צ. רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: הצעה החלטה בביה"ג על פעולה
צה"ל בלבנון

MAZZOLI, חבר ביה"ג דמוקרט מקנטאקי, שאיננו
מידדינו, הגיש בשבוע החולף הצעה החלטה בביה"ג המגנה
חרימות אה פעולת צה"ל בלבנון. ההחלטה מגנה גם אה פעולת
הטרור בכביש החוף.


יש לציין כי בעוד שעל החלטה הגנוי לאש"פ
בעקבות הרצה בכביש החוף החמו למעלה מ-410 (מתוך 435)
חברי ביה"ג הרי על ההחלטה הזו חתמו פרט לבעל ההצעה
עצמה רק שלושה, ביניהם - פארן מיצ'ל, יו"ר ה -
BLACK CAUCUS .

בברכה

צבי רפיה

העתיקים:

המרכז, משה"ח
לשכה המנכ"ל
השגריר, כאן



WHEREAS THE RAID MOUNTED BY PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
TERRORISTS WHICH RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF SOME 34 INNOCENT,
NON-COMBATANT ISRAELI CITIZENS WAS A DESPICABLE, HEINOUS
ACT; AND

WHEREAS THE ISRAELI ARMED FORCES MOUNTED A RETALIATORY ATTACK
BY LAND, SEA AND AIR AGAINST P.L.O. GUERRILLA STRONGHOLDS
IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WHICH RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF AT LEAST
400 PERSONS, AND ESTIMATED 130 OF WHOM WERE INNOCENT, NON-
COMBATANT LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS; AND

WHEREAS OVER 400 MEMBERS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SIGNED A RESOLUTION EXPRESSING PROFOUND OUTRAGE AND MORAL
DISGUST OVER THE DEATHS OF INNOCENT ISRAELI CIVILIANS; AND

WHEREAS THE KILLING OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS IS WRONG, WHETHER AT
THE HANDS OF CRAVEN TERRORISTS OR AT THE HANDS OF MILITARY
FORCES; AND

WHEREAS THE UNITED NATIONS HAS OFFERED A REASONABLE METHOD FOR
RESUMING, MAINTAINING AND KEEPING PEACE IN SOUTHERN
LEBANON; NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT

RESOLVED BY THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

THAT THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES EXPRESSES ITS DISMAY,
DISGUST, OUTRAGE -- BUT, ABOVE ALL, ITS INEFFABLE SADNESS --
OVER THE CARNAGE IN ISRAEL AND SOUTHERN LEBANON; EXPRESSES ITS
BELIEF THAT SUCH VIOLENT ACTIONS UNDERMINE THE QUEST FOR A JUST
AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST; CALLS UPON ALL INVOLVED
NATIONS TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE UNITED NATIONS' PEACE-KEEPING
ACTIONS; AND, CALLS UPON ALL INVOLVED NATIONS TO TURN THEIR ENERGIES
TO THE SEARCH FOR A LASTING PEACE FOR THE TORTURED LANDS OF THE
MIDDLE EAST.

MA

Montgomery
Parsons Mitchell
Robin Beard

1mm

March 1978

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

כה" תמוז תשל"ז
11 יולי 77

למחלקת ה"ה.ה.ה.
למחלקת ה"ה.ה.ה.

311

אל: מצפ"א
מאת: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: הסנטורים הרפובליקנים מהאיאס
ודנפורת על סדיניות הנשיא במזה"ת

מצ"ב נוסח דברי הסנטורים הנ"ל שנאמרו במליאה הסינט
ב-1 ליולי.

דנפורת מותח ביקורה על גישה הממשל, ואילו מהאיאס
קורא להפסקת"מלחמת המילים".

ב כ ר כ ה,
צ. רפיה

העחק: המרכז, משה"ח.

משרד החוץ
ירושלים



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.

11E

ת"ד 11
רחוב תל אביב
11 תל אביב

מס': 222
שם: מר משה, מנהל

Handwritten signature

המחיר: המסמך המצורף הוא
המסמך של המשרד המרכזי

המסמך הוא מסמך מ"מ המכיל את כל
המידע.

המסמך הוא מסמך מ"מ המכיל את כל
המידע המצורף.

מ. מ. מ.
מ. מ. מ.

מסמך: מסמך, מסמך.

MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Mr. MATHIAS. I was happy to note that in yesterday's press conference the President imposed a salutary restraint on his Cabinet and staff with regard to the Middle East. I assume he and the Vice President intend to play by the same rules. We should respond by joining them in a reasonable period of golden silence.

This is an issue of growing concern to me. We have seen in recent weeks, and most particularly in recent days, a confrontation developing between the administration and some supporters of Israel on the subject of peace in the Middle East.

The administration has been criticized for the public nature of its developing Middle East policy and for many of the specific features of that policy. Two weeks ago Vice President MONDALE, in an effort to clarify the administration's attitudes, gave a major address on the Middle East. This speech has led to intensified discussion. In recent days the debate has picked up significantly, fueled by the statements made in Washington and in Israel.

This increasingly acrimonious exchange is unwise. I do not believe that it contributes to the one goal all of us in this Chamber so desperately want—a stable and enduring Middle East peace. This is a good time for quiet, constructive discussion, not heated exchanges which serve only to hinder understanding and agreement. I call for a cease fire on Capitol Hill on the subject of the Middle East.

I propose to the administration, to my colleagues, and to our friends in Israel that we call a halt to this war of words. I see no useful purpose in having the atmosphere so poisoned by positions taken publicly that Mr. Begin's visit will be jeopardized before he arrives. Let Mr. Begin come and meet with President Carter in a constructive atmosphere. Leave them some issues to discuss. Maybe these two men sitting together unhindered by the public spotlight can find a way to move this difficult problem toward the resolution we all want so much.

Our national policy of assuring the continued existence of Israel is unaltered. Our national hope that a just peace can be achieved within the framework of U.N. Resolution 242 is undimmed. We must leave no possibility for misconception on these questions.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

ל' בניסן תשל"ז
18 באפריל 1977

201

Handwritten notes:
קצת
מקצת
(מקצת מקצת)

אל : מנכ"א
מאת : צ. רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנסור מתאיאס - על בעיית האנרגיה

בחורף האחרון שהיה מהקשים ביותר שידעה ארה"ב, כתבו תלמידי ביתה
ד' בבית"ס יטודי במרילנד לסנסור מתאיאס ושאלו לדעתו על בעיית האנרגיה.

סנסור מתאיאס השיב בנפרד לכל ילד וילד ובכלל זה לבני ריסון
הלומד בכיתה זו.

כדאי לקרוא את התשובה.

ב ברכה,
צ. רפיה

העמק: סח ט. יערי, מנהל מח' אנרגיה

משרד החוץ
תל אביב



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.

משרד החוץ
תל אביב

משרד החוץ
תל אביב

משרד החוץ
תל אביב

משרד החוץ

משרד החוץ
תל אביב

DAVID R. CARLSON, MD., CHAIRMAN

JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, MD.,
EDWARD W. BURNETT, MD.,
ROBERT W. BYRD, MD.,
ROBERT T. STONE, MD.,
JAMES E. EASTLAND, MD.,
JAMES H. EASTLAND, MD.,
JOSEPH P. BYRNE, MD.,
EDWARD W. BURNETT, MD.,
DAVID R. CARLSON, MD.

STEVE THORNDIKE, MD.,
EDWARD W. BURNETT, MD.,
WILLIAM L. SCOTT, MD.,
FRANK J. PATTERSON, MD.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 30, 1977

Rimon Rafiah
Somerset Elementary School
Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015

Dear Rimon:

Although all of you signed the same letter, I wanted to reply to each of you individually.

You asked me how I feel about the energy problem. I think it is the most serious problem facing our country and will be so throughout the rest of this century.

In January, for the first time, the United States imported more than 50% of the oil we use. It is bad enough to be able to supply only one-half of our own oil needs. Even worse it is clear that our oil supplies will someday run out. Until we can develop energy from the sun or the wind or some other such supply, you and I and all Americans will have to do our best to conserve energy. This will be a real challenge for you. Riding your bike or walking, for example, is far better than having your parents drive you. I know you will do your best to save energy.

You also asked me what I thought of busing your class to another school when Somerset was closed due to a natural gas shortage. It must have been interesting to see another school at first hand. But the extra trouble for you and your teacher is merely a taste of what we all may have to do in the future to save energy. Of course it takes energy in the form of gasoline to bus you to the other school. So perhaps that solution is not the best in the long-run.

Maybe it will be one of you, as a scientist, lawyer, or government official who will show us all how to handle the energy problem. I believe it will be the children of today who will have the answers for tomorrow.

Sincerely,

Charles McC Mathias, Jr.
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.
United States Senator

Clk:ke

אג"א



מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

ס ו ד י
95

תאריך: כט' כניסן תשל"ז
17 באפריל 1977
מספר:

א ל: מר צבי רפיח, השגרירות, וושינגטון
מאח: מנהל טצפ"א

הנדון: ביקור סנטור צ'רלס מתיאס ובנו

רצ"ב הוכניחו של הסנטור כפי שנחצעה למרות הקשיים שנבעו מההתמחוויות הפנימיות. מתיאס והוסון מאוד העריכו עובדה זו וציינו ענינם הרב בקיום הביקור דווקא בעת הזאת. כן התרשמו מהטהירות בה הצליחה מפלגת העבודה לאחות הקרעים ולבחור במר פרס כראש הרשימה.

הצעת מתיאס לחנות כח גרעינית משוחפת לישראל ומצרים כסיני עלתה בשלושה מעמדים. א. מתיאס העלה אותה בשיחה עם שה"ח. תגובה מר אלון היחה כי הוא מסופק אם המצרים יסכימו לרעיון וכי לדעתו ישנם רעיונות מעשיים מאוד לשיחוף פעולה בינינו ובין ירדן שהוא תומך בה.

ב. בשיחה עם שהב"ט הסביר מתיאס שהרעיון שלו הוא בכחינת חלום המחפש את האינטרס המשותף בין ישראל ומצרים. שהב"ט הגיב כי בזמנו הציע אדמירל שטראוס משהו דומה. מתיאס אמר כי סנטור ביקר היה מעורב בהוכינה אייזנהאואר - שטראוס והביע ענינו בפני מתיאס להיות מעורב אם הרעיון ילבש עור וגידים.

ג. בשיחה עם ראש אמ"ן אל"ם שלמה גזית, ר"אמ"ן הגיב כי לדעתו ניהן לבצע פרוייקט יותר קל ויותר מהיר של העברת עורפי הנילוס הנשפכים לים, לסיני.

אוסף כי כל האישים שעמדו להפגש עם מתיאס חודרכו על דעתה של הועדה לאנרגיה אטומית שאל למתיאס לצאת בהרגשה שאנחנו מתלהבים מההוכינה שלו. אך כפי שתראה הקוו שננקט היה של הטלה ספק יותר מאשר דחיה - ובצדק, כי אין כל סיכוי שהערבים יקבלו ההוכינה.

לאור נסיעתו לועידת נאט"ו בחורכיה רצה מתיאס לשמוע יותר על ראיחנו את חורכיה ויחסנו עמה ועל כן סודרה הפגישה עם יעל ורד.

2/...

מדינת ישראל

- 2 -

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

תאריך:

מספר:

לא אחזור על הערכות המצב שמתיאם שמע מאנשינו. אציין רק נקודה אחת מדבריו: לדעתו המלה הכי מסוכנת ביחסי ישראל ארה"ב היא Intransigence, בין אם היא תתיחס לישראל ובין אם תתיחס ליחסה של ארה"ב לישראל. כן שבינואר יבאה ארה"ב יותר מ-50% מצרכי הדלק שלה, אם כי לא הכל ממדינות ערב והנשיא חייב לקחת בחשבון עובדות אלה. בשיחה עם ר' אמ"ן שמע מתיאם בין היחר עדכון על המצב בלבנון. הוא מצדו העלה את חששותיו משימוש בנשק גרעיני ע"י מחבלים בציינו כי 50 חברות גדולות בעולם מסוגלות כיום לייצר טעצה גרעינית. בניגוד לביקוריו הקודמים לא העלה מתיאם את הנושא המלשתינאי והוא לא חפס מקום חשוב בשיחות.

כנו לא הביע כל דיעה וקשה לדעת כיצד החרשם.

הוטון ימשיך כמתוכנן בשיחות וסיורים עד ה-21.4.

בכרחה,

משה רביב

העחק:

מר א. עברון

השגריר בווישינגטון

המרכז

משה רביב

ירושלים, כד' בניסן תשל"ז
15 באפריל 1977

1267

א

ש כ ו ר

אל : מר צ. רפיה, השגרירות וושינגטון

מאת: מנהלת מזחי"ם

הנדון: פגישה עם סנטור מחיאס

בפגישה עם סנטור מחיאס ב-13 דנא שוחחנו בעיקר על תורכיה.
הדגשתי שלוש בעיות מרכזיות:

א. הגרעון הכבד במאזן התשלומים שנגרם בעיקרו בשל עליית מחירי
הנפט.

ב. בעיות פנים

ג. בטחון פנים

רוב הזמן שוחחנו על א' לפי הקווים המופיעים במברק שאני שולחה
אליך רצ"ב ובסקירה באותו נושא ששלחנו בראשית שבוע זה לדוד תורגמן,
וכן המסמעת המדינית של הדרדרות המצב הכלכלי - כספי: התקרבות
לבריה"מ ולמדינות ערב. המסקנה שלא נאמרה אך השתמעה בברור הייתה
כי חשוב להגביר הסיוע לתורכיה.

ב ב ר כ ה,

י

יעל ורד

העמק: מנהל מצפ"א ✓

received, of 2000, 1999
of 1998, 1997
1996

1995



1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1
shen 21610 shen

SENATOR MATHIAS PROPOSES COOPERATIVE SINAI ENERGY PROJECT
 (450)

WASHINGTON, APRIL 4 -- ON THE EVE OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, SENATOR CHARLES MCC MATHIAS, JR., PROPOSED EXPLORATION OF A COOPERATIVE ENERGY PROJECT ON THE SINAI PENINSULA.

THE MARYLAND REPUBLICAN'S APRIL 1 PROPOSAL SAID IN PART:

"WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT, I ENVISAGE A PROJECT IN SINAI OF TREMENDOUS SCOPE AND POTENTIAL WHICH WOULD EMPLOY THE TALENTS OF BOTH THE EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS, BOTH IMMENSELY CREATIVE PEOPLES, AND THE WORLD'S MOST SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY -- THAT OF THE ATOM--TO BENEFIT THE ENTIRE AREA. I HAVE IN MIND A NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT CAPABLE NOT ONLY OF MEETING THE CURRENT POWER NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE IMMEDIATE GAZA AREA, BUT ALSO OF PROVIDING ELECTRICITY FOR NEW INDUSTRY, FOR A SIZEABLE DESALINATION FACILITY, AND FOR EXPORT THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST TO THE REBUILT CITIES ALONG THE SUEZ CANAL, TO LOWER ISRAEL AND TO THE TOWNS OF THE WEST BANK IN JORDAN...

PAGE 2 -- MATHIAS

"IT IS CLEARLY TIME FOR US TO THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT A PROJECT OF THIS NATURE WHICH WOULD BE OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND COULD BE A KEYSTONE IN A STABLE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE. A SINAI NUCLEAR PROJECT PROMISES PROFOUND BENEFITS FOR ALL ITS PARTICIPANTS BECAUSE IT SYMBOLIZES THE COMMONALITY OF INTEREST THAT EXISTS, BUT MUST BE RECOGNIZED IN ORDER TO EFFECT A CHANGE OF ATTITUDES. THE AMERICAN TECHNICIANS, WHO TODAY SCAN THE SINAI PASSES WITH WEARY WATCHFULNESS, COULD BE REPLACED BY AN INDUSTRIAL TEAM MAKING AN INVESTMENT IN THE DESERT WITH DIVIDENDS FOR THE ENTIRE WORLD.

"FOR EGYPT, THIS PROJECT COULD BE A LINCHPIN IN A COMPREHENSIVE AND CREATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM...

"FOR ISRAEL, A SINAI PROJECT COULD PROVIDE A CRITICAL ELEMENT IN A STABLE PEACE...A VENTURE OF THIS MAGNITUDE, INITIATED AND SPONSORED BY THE UNITED STATES IN COMBINATION WITH OTHER ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND PERHAPS, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, WOULD BE A VISIBLE AND CONCRETE INVESTMENT BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE DURABILITY OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT...

PAGE 3 -- NATHIAS

"ANOTHER LIVELY POSSIBILITY IS THE USE OF SOLAR CELLS FOR IRRIGATION PUMPING AND SMALL POWER SYSTEMS OR THE USE OF WIND POWER FOR ELECTRIC GENERATION. WE ALSO HAVE THE TECHNOLOGY AT HAND TO PUT IN OPERATION FIVE YEARS FROM NOW A LARGE SCALE WATER DESALINATION PLANT BASED ON SOLAR ENERGY...

"OBVIOUSLY, THIS KIND OF A PROJECT CANNOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR CONCRETE POLITICAL AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN A FINAL SETTLEMENT: IT WOULD BE INTEGRAL, BUT COMPLEMENTARY AND REINFORCING...

"PRESIDENT CARTER HAS SPOKEN OUT BOLDLY ON HIS VISION OF A MIDDLE EAST PEACE. HE HAS EXPRESSED HIS CONVICTION THAT THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT SHOULD AGREE AT AN EARLY POINT ON THE SHAPE OF A FINAL AGREEMENT, AND THEN PROCEED TO NEGOTIATE ON THE TIMING AND METHOD OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

"I PROPOSE THAT WE NOW CAREFULLY EXPLORE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SINAI ENERGY PROJECT WHICH COULD BE PART OF THAT FINAL AGREEMENT-- A PROJECT WHICH WOULD LEAD ITS STRENGTH TO THE STABILITY AND LONGEVITY OF AN ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE..."

--ITEM



171

5.4.77

לר
מחמא

אל : מצפ"א

מאח: צ. רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנטור מתאיאס מציע חתנה כוח גרעינית בסיני

מצ"ב נוסח הודעה שפטר סנטור מתאיאס (הרפובליקני ממרילנד, חבר וועדה החקצבוח) במליאת הסנאט ב-1 דגא.

בדבריו מציע מתאיאס הקמת חתנה כוח גרעינית בסיני שתשרה את מצרים וישראל כאחת, וכן את הגדה המערבית.

מתאיאס מציע לפתוח בבירורים ובפעולות הכנה עוד לפני השגת הסכם שלום מופי.

כמו-כן הוא מציע לשקול ספעלים מטהמים גם כחומי אנרגיה אחרים כמו אנרגיה השמש.

מתאיאס דאג להעביר נוסח נאוסו זה במיוחד לשגריר ולי. אני מניח שהוא העביר זאת גם למצרים.

מן הראוי כי בביקורו בישראל בעוד ימים ספורים יתייחסו בני-שיחו להצעתו זו ויגיבו עליה. הוא ודאי מצפה לכך.

מתאיאס, כידוע, הינו סנטור ידידותו והומך באורח עקבי בישראל. שימו-נא לב כי בדבריו מביע מתאיאס תמיכה הסנט בסדך הרב שמסקיע הנשיא במאמצים לשלום במזה"ת.

ב כ ר כ ה
צ. רפיה

העמק: המרכז, משה"ח

הועדה לאנרגיה גרעינית, ח"א

היועץ המדעי, מאן

UNITED STATES



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL

WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT :

RE: [Illegible text]

[Illegible signature]



NEWS from Senator Charles McC.

MATHIAS

95-1-52

RELEASE: Hold for 3:00 p.m.
April 1, 1977

CONTACT: Charles S. Cogan
(202) 224-4654

MATHIAS URGES STUDY OF CONSTRUCTIVE ECONOMIC PROJECT

TOWARDS EXPANDED PEACE EFFORTS IN SINAI

Following is the proposal of Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R-Md.) for exploration of a cooperative energy project on the Sinai Peninsula.

On Sunday President Anwar Sadat of Egypt arrives in Washington on his second visit to the United States. Three weeks ago, we again welcomed Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin of Israel, and later this month King Hussein of Jordan will be here for his first discussions with President Carter on the Middle East. At the same time, consultations continue between the United States and Saudi Arabia, Syria and other nations of the Middle East whose vital interests are tied to the success or failure of our efforts to assist the parties concerned in reaching a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Senate can only approve of the energy with which a peace settlement is now being pursued. It is essential not only to our welfare but to world peace, that Israel and her Arab neighbors enter into negotiations that can lead to final settlement of this conflict which is now in its thirtieth year.

Successful negotiations hold the hope that a social and physical rebuilding and a resurgence of human creativity in the Middle East will occur and that the region's vast wealth and human resources will be wedded in prosperous and mutually-beneficial endeavor. If negotiations fail, however, we can look forward to even greater conflict and destruction, to further squandering of precious resources and, quite possibly, to a cataclysm of global proportions. We must do what we can to insure that this cannot, and does not, happen.

As President Carter's efforts to attain a Middle East settlement proceed, we should ask ourselves what more can be done at this critical time to enhance the prospects of peace: what useful contribution can we make to the process of peace seeking?

I think that one element of the solution that needs reinforcing is the long range economic interests of the entire Middle East which impose certain common obligations and offer certain common opportunities to the nations of the area.

The job that the fireman does in extinguishing the flame and preventing the spread of fire is vital and necessary but it is a separate role from that of the architect, the engineer, the carpenter and the mason. While we admire the skill and courage of the one, we do not have to neglect the positive virtues of the others.

Examination of the area's needs and its resources, in the light of our own technical capabilities, suggests one answer which I believe merits serious consideration.

I have visited Sinai several times. I have flown over its historic, arid, empty surface and can testify that the area today is one of the world's most desolate places. It is also a bitterly contested piece of real estate in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Between the time that Moses came down from the mountain and the signing of the 1975 agreement between Egypt and Israel, the Sinai was not of great political significance. Today, it is a meeting ground where Egyptians and Israelis jointly resolve the practical problems attendant on the still uneasy truce.

more

It is also a zone of disengagement where American citizens and American technology serve to reinforce the strategic buffer between the two countries. These two elements of the 1975 accord continue to function smoothly and suggest to me a possible mode for future cooperation in the area to buttress a durable peace.

Within the context of a final settlement, I envisage a project in Sinai of tremendous scope and potential which would employ the talents of both the Egyptians and the Israelis, both immensely creative peoples, and the world's most sophisticated technology -- that of the atom -- to benefit the entire area. I have in mind a nuclear generating plant capable not only of meeting the current power needs of the people of the immediate Gaza area, but also of providing electricity for new industry, for a sizable desalinization facility, and for export throughout the Middle East to the rebuilt cities along the Suez Canal, to lower Israel and to the towns on the West Bank of the Jordan River.

The site I have proposed is not the only feasible location for such a project. But it does offer some unique advantages. Prior to 1967 it was the sovereign territory of Egypt. Today it is occupied and controlled by Israeli troops. President Carter's suggestion for a final settlement would see it restored to Egypt. But whatever the political complexities of Sinai, it is a harsh, barren and unproductive land. Yet like other deserts, much of it may be made to flower.

Sovereign rights need not be affected by the presence of a multi-national institution. In fact, it should enhance the prestige of any nation to be the host to a facility that would produce both water and energy for an entire region.

It is clearly time for us to think seriously about a project of this nature which would be of vital interest to the countries of the Middle East and could be a keystone in a stable Arab-Israeli peace. A Sinai nuclear project promises profound benefits for all its participants because it symbolizes the commonality of interest that exists, but must be recognized in order to effect a change of attitudes. The American technicians, who today scan the Sinai passes with weary watchfulness, could be replaced by an industrial team making an investment in the desert with dividends for the entire world.

For Egypt, this project could be a linchpin in a comprehensive and creative economic development program designed to restore Egypt to prosperity and prominence. It would signify our recognition of that country's development needs, and our willingness to underwrite with our technological expertise Egypt's continued reconstruction. It would demonstrate the United States' intention to bind our skills and resources to Egypt's future and signal our support for Egypt as a strong, moderate and productive leader in the Middle East.

For Israel, a Sinai project could provide a critical element in a stable peace -- the true peace which Israel must have if substantial territory is to be ceded as part of a final settlement. A venture of this magnitude, initiated and sponsored by the United States in combination with other economic, political and, perhaps, security arrangements, would be a visible and concrete investment by the United States in the durability of a final settlement, possibly rivaling in importance any other form of U.S. participation in a final agreement.

For Egypt and Israel, the time has come when each must decide whether to live in isolation from the other, or in cooperation. It is to the advantage of each to bring the other into its fold, to create a framework in which all the states of the area can reach accommodation with, and live upon the terms of the other. A Sinai nuclear project would be part of that framework.

For the United States, an economic link in a chain of commitments between Israel and her Arab neighbors, within and supportive of a final settlement, can only be advantageous. And for the nations of the West, participation in the technical development of a Sinai nuclear project would demonstrate their support for a peace whose benefits all would share. A working partnership in this project would advance the development of a multi-national community of nuclear interest, the need for which is felt in many areas of the world.

more

The ability of a Sinai nuclear project to pay for itself in time is an essential element in consideration of the project. It would be neither wise nor justifiable to ask other nuclear nations to join with the United States in providing the technological know-how for such a project unless its economic feasibility were reasonably assured. Nor, should we propose that the countries of the region with great financial resources cooperate in a Sinai project fund without first demonstrating its economic practicality.

But, once this is done, it is quite clear that a strong and significant commitment to a Sinai nuclear project would serve the interests of all the nations in the Middle East, and particularly those for whom the absence of a stable Middle East peace would only encourage the forces of radicalism. For them, as for the United States, support of such a project would be a form of enlightened self-interest. While none of them may feel that it is possible to break the path in this direction, more than one may wish to travel it.

Mr. President, in my mind this proposal for a cooperative venture between the Arabs and Israelis need not be confined to the area of nuclear power. I have used nuclear power as an example but, in fact, climatic and geographic features of the Sinai might well dictate the exploitation of quite different forms of energy.

Today the lead time for a nuclear power plant is between eight and nine years, while certain solar and wind energy projects require a lead time of only five years. For instance, within five years there could be operating in the Sinai a ten megawatt-electric solar power plant that, combined with a backup system, could generate enough electricity for a city of 10,000. This type of system is easily susceptible to expansion and by 1985-1995 could be enlarged to supply power to much of the area.

Another lively possibility is the use of solar cells for irrigation pumping and small power systems or the use of wind power for electric generation. We also have the technology at hand to put in operation five years from now a large scale water desalinization plant based on solar energy.

Selecting one or a combination of these solar or wind options for such a project would have the added advantage of giving impetus to the development of the new technologies so sorely needed in the energy field.

Our own pilot model in the solar thermal field at Barstow, California, has been drastically cut back recently by President Carter. Funds for this project have been reduced from \$61.25 million in President Ford's budget to \$6.25 million, with the \$55 million reprogrammed into exploration and development of near-term space heating for buildings. Obviously, both types of energy development are desirable and a project, such as I am proposing, could give new impetus to the development of long range, high risk technology.

One of the greatest advantages of a solar project is that the Israelis and Egyptians already are actively exploring the potential of solar energy and each has a number of technicians trained in the field. Saudi Arabia's interest in solar energy is visible in our own backyard. If you take a short jaunt to Reston, Va., you can now see a solar school in operation financed by the Saudi Arabian government. Other countries now actively pursuing solar energy research include Australia, Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Japan. An internationally supported and funded project in the Sinai — an optimum location for a solar project — would not only demonstrate global concern for a stable and durable peace in the Middle East but could lead to breakthroughs in the field of energy production which the entire world so desperately seeks.

Obviously, this kind of a project cannot be a substitute for concrete political and security arrangements within a final settlement: it would be integral, but complementary and reinforcing. Some may object on the ground that it is not practical to suggest that a cooperative energy project be undertaken before there is a final agreement and implementation of it has begun. But, peace is woven of dreams as well as won by work. If we wait until the settlement we seek is at hand, we simply lower the symbol of our faith that the Arabs and Israelis can work together in constructive harmony, or that the states of the region will be willing to

contribute from their own resources to such a project, or that the technologically advanced nations of the world will join to support and develop such a project.

So careful thought, and careful preparation, can begin now. We can start to explore the feasibility and evaluate the potentiality of various energy systems.

President Carter has spoken out boldly on his vision of a Middle East peace. He has expressed his conviction that the parties to the conflict should agree at an early point on the shape of a final agreement, and then proceed to negotiate on the timing and method of its implementation.

I propose that we now carefully explore the development of a Sinai energy project which could be part of that final agreement -- a project which would lend its strength to the stability and longevity of an Arab-Israeli peace. The rewards of such an idea -- for the nations of the immediate area, for the participants themselves, for the United States and for all the peace-loving nations of the world -- could be rich indeed.

MEMORANDUM

X

213 OPEN

(CONFIDENTIAL)

To: Zvi Rafiah
From: Morris J. Amitay, Kenneth Wollack
Date: January 7, 1975
Re: Information requested on visiting senators

SENATOR CHARLES ("MAC") Mc.C. MATHIAS JR. (REPUBLICAN - MARYLAND)

Term Began: January 1969

Committees: Committee on Appropriations and its subcommittee on Foreign Operations. No other committees important for Israel, however, he does take part in many international conferences in Europe and has sponsored legislation in the foreign affairs field.

Personal

Characteristics:

Mathias descended from one of Maryland's oldest and aristocratic families and is one of the most liberal Republican members of the Senate. Mathias has never been in high favor at the White House and for a while, some observers felt that he was to be singled out for political extinction by the Republican party. Mathias's special interest is the political process: he has introduced a bill for public financing of presidential campaigns; another to require the executive branch to provide Congress with more information and data. In 1968, he campaigned as a dove on Vietnam.

Mathias is receptive to and likes to associate with intellectuals, scholars and academicians. It is important that he has contact with such people in Israel.

His former Administrative Assistant Sam Goldberg is now a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations in the State Department. Goldberg, the son of a Rabbi, incidentally, has never been helpful.

Religion: - Episcopalian

* * * * *

(MATHIAS continued)

Mathias has supported all major resolutions and legislation for Israel although he has never been in the forefront. In many cases, he was late in cosponsoring measures and only after strong constituent pressure. However, sensitized to this, on the December 9th letter to President Ford, he was one of the first to add his name. His support for Israel does not unfortunately stem from a realpolitik foreign policy philosophy, but rather from constituent pressures.

In December 1969, Mathias called for an overall reappraisal of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. "The U.S. remains willing to prevent aggression in the Middle East and to preserve the integrity of nations there, not because potential aggressors in the region are 'Communist controlled' but because we have solemn ties of treaty and sentiment in the region."

He said our commitment to Israel is not derived from the fact that Egypt receives military assistance from the Soviet Union but because Israel exemplifies the principles on which the United States was founded -- "for which our sons shed so much blood in World War II." Similarly, he said our support for Lebanon is based on positive effects of ideology rather than "on a false assumption that the other Arab states are part of an international Communist movement."

Beyond these relationships, Mathias maintains that U.S. desire for stability and peace in the region derives from its importance as a producer of oil and, because of Soviet petroleum investments and purchases in the area, it too has a similar interest in maintaining peace and stability. He called for a repeal of the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine which he said embodies an essential false notion of the trends and threats in the area.

He testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on this subject in February 1970. He noted, however, that his position in no way reflects a change in U.S. support for Israel.

In January 1971 during a debate on the Selective Service Act, Mathias attacked the "deleterious effects of the Vietnam war on U.S. military capability and international credibility." "Nixon is painfully alert" he said "of the alternating balance of power in the Mediterranean and the consequences that this could have for Israel, for Middle East stability, and for world peace. If the relative deterioration of our total military structure continues, however, it will not be possible for us to hold the line in these places ... in short, it is time to get our eye on the ball and the ball is not in Vietnam."

In December 1973, Mathias inserted a series of newspaper articles and editorials emphasizing the fact that the energy crisis is not the result of the political situation in the Middle East.

כל המוסר הוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוקן וסודות רשמיים), חשי"ז - 1957.

משור החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

מגרק נכנס - מסווג

Handwritten signature/initials

מס' 328 סודי

נשלח 191700 ינוי 77

אלו המשור
מאת: רוטינגטון

אלו מנכל, עברונ, נמגשתי היום, לבקשתי, בקפיטול עם סנטור מתאיאס. השתתפו ארתור הוטון, איש ה-N.S.C. לשעבר, העושה עשה תקופת השתלמות בסינט במשרדו של מתאיאס וכן רפית. בשיחה שארכה כשעה והיתה מאד ידידותית הברתי למתאיאס עמדנו בענין מויים והליכה לגינה והדגשתי נכונותנו לעשות כן ב-1977.

שובה לשאלת מתאיאס ציינתי ארכי הסיוע שלנו בסכ 2,5 מיליארד דולר ואכזבתנו שהתקציב שהוגש אחמול לקונגרס כולל סיוע לישראל בסכ 1,5 בליון דולר בלבד. מתאיאס אמר שיש להבינ את הפוליטיקה האמריקנית. כל נשיא יוצא רוצה להגיש תקציב מצומצם ומאוזן. ככל האפשר ולהשאיר ליורשו את ההתמודדות עם המציאות.

מתאיאס העלה ביוזמתו את החקיקה נגד החרם הערבי. אמ כי נמנע מלומר זאת מפורשות (כידוע יש קהילה יהודית גדולה במרילנד) השתל להמזיר לנו כי יש לנהוג בנושא זה בזהירות. בינ השאר הזכיר את החורף הקשה ביותר העובר עתה על אמריקה וציין את ההשפעות החמורות שתזינה למחסור בזלק בארהייב, (כאילו אמר ייאם ליזום חקיקה - למה דוקא בזורפיי). בתגובתי הברתי שענין החרם הינו בעיקרו של דבר נושא החייב להאריך אזרחים אמריקנים וכי כל כניעה לחרם מוליכה כניעות נוספות, ואמרתי כי כקייפ על הזירה האמריקנית אני יכול להעיד שהתגובות נגד החרם ונסיונות להשתמש בארהייב כמכשיר זוכים לסלידה מסל שדרות הציבור. מתאיאס אמר שזו גם החדשמותו.

בפתח השיחה סיפר מתאיאס על פגישתו עם ייראש ממשלת ירדן זייד א-ריפאעיי. (ראה גם סברק רפיח 93) מתאיאס אמר שהחדשם שריפאעי היה הפעם הרבה יותר שקול ומיושב בדעתו בכל הקשור לסכסוכ ולמויים. מתאיאס דיבר על הצורך בתזוזה לקראת שלום ומצדי, כמובן, אמרתי שאנו מוכנים וכוי. מתאיאס ציין השינוי הגדול באוירה בארצות ערב ביחס לישראל ולדוגמא ציין שבעבר היו הערבים נזהרים מלהזכיר שם ישראל ואילו עתה הם מדברים עליה בגלוי.

כל המוסד הוכן מסמך זה. כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק להיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסיחות וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

= 2 =

כאן העיר רפיח ששם ישראל אינו מופיע במפות הערביות, בהקשר זה הזכרתי
שגם ב SAIS של אונ' מס'טת ג'והנ הופקינס עדיין סלמדים
לפי מפות שאינ בהן שם ישראל ומתאיאם המקיימ קשרי ידידות עם נשיא
ג'והנ הופקינס ביקשני שאמציא לו הפרטים כדי שיטפל בעני'נ.
מתאיאם היה ידידותי.

דינ'צ

שחח רחם מנכל שתבט ממנכל אביזר ארגוב רוזן י. רביב מצטא מזתים חקר רם אמון
מב/טו

התעוררתי בלילה הזה וראיתי את האור
הזהוב של השמש זורח מעל ההרים
והים מתנודד מתחתיו. זה היה
הרגע הראשון שבו הרגתי את החיים
באמת. זה היה הרגע הראשון שבו
הבנתי את חשיבותו של כל דבר.

— 8 —

הוא היה הרגע הראשון שבו הרגתי את החיים
באמת. זה היה הרגע הראשון שבו הבנתי
את חשיבותו של כל דבר.

Handwritten notes: Staff, 2, and other illegible markings.

מצפא

מתיאס. סנטור מתיאס נאס היום בסרדויק מרילנר על הנושא "לקראת שלום במזרח".
כנוסח הנאום שנמסר היום על משדדו מתמקד מתיאס בקביעה מרכזיים הנראים לו חיוניים
לכל הסדר ישראל - ערבי (הנוסח המלא בדיס).

THE INGREDIENTS ESSENTIAL TO ANY ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IS SEEMS TO ME THESE:

1. THE ARAB NATIONS AND THE PALESTINIANS MUST RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S BOUNDRIES AND RESPECT HER SOVEREIGNTY INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND REFRAIN FROM ALL HOSTILE ACTIONS DIRECT OR INDIRECT AGAINST HER.
2. ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW TO THE JUNE 5, 1967, LINES WITH ONLY THOSE MODIFICATIONS THAT MAY BE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE.
3. ISRAEL MUST ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF EITHER AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE OR OF A PALESTINIAN ENTITY VOLUNTARILY FEDERATED WITH JORDAN. CONCURRENTLY THE PALESTINIANS MUST ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL.
4. PART AND PARCEL OF ANY SETTLEMENT MUST BE GUARANTEES FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY. AS SUGGESTED IN A RECENT BROOKINGS INSTITUTION STUDY ON THE MIDDLE EAST THESE MIGHT TAKE THE FORM OF MULTILATERAL GUARANTEES ENDORSED BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR AND PROVIDING FOR DEMILITARIZED ZONES SUPERVISED BY UN FORCES OR OBSERVERS WHO COULD NOT BE WITHDRAWN BY UNILATERAL ACTION (AS WAS PREVIOUSLY THE CASE).
5. SHOULD ISRAEL CONSIDER SUCH GUARANTEES INADEQUATE THE UNITED STATES THEN MUST BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SUPPLEMENTING THEM WITH UNILATERAL GUARANTEES AGAINST MAJOR VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENTS WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO WORLD PEACE AND TO THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL. ANY SUCH GUARANTEES OBVIOUSLY COULD NOT BE UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT CAREFUL EXAMINATION AND FULL PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT.

RAFIACH

שח רחמ סנכל שחבט סנכל סנכל מנה הסברה מצפא מדחיס חקר דם אמר תיעוד אילטר

רנון

רע/תמ

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

TO:

FROM: [Illegible]

SUBJECT: [Illegible]

1. [Illegible]

2. [Illegible]

3. [Illegible]

4. [Illegible]

5. [Illegible]

6. [Illegible]

7. [Illegible]

8. [Illegible]

9. [Illegible]

10. [Illegible]

11. [Illegible]

12. [Illegible]

13. [Illegible]

14. [Illegible]

15. [Illegible]

16. [Illegible]

17. [Illegible]

18. [Illegible]

19. [Illegible]

20. [Illegible]

21. [Illegible]

22. [Illegible]

23. [Illegible]

24. [Illegible]

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

TO:

FROM: [Illegible]

SUBJECT: [Illegible]

1. [Illegible]

2. [Illegible]

3. [Illegible]

4. [Illegible]

5. [Illegible]

6. [Illegible]

7. [Illegible]

8. [Illegible]

9. [Illegible]

10. [Illegible]

11. [Illegible]

12. [Illegible]

13. [Illegible]

14. [Illegible]

15. [Illegible]

16. [Illegible]

17. [Illegible]

18. [Illegible]

19. [Illegible]

20. [Illegible]

21. [Illegible]

22. [Illegible]

23. [Illegible]

24. [Illegible]

ATTACHMENT

SECRET

מ"א 303

טורי ביוגר

25.4.76

288

אל : סר צבי רפיח, השגרירות, וושינגטון

סאת : ס. ארגוב, טמבכ"ל

הנדון: ביקור סנטור סתיאס

ליורית את סנטור סתיאס ב-21-22 אפריל. ב-21 בערב בילה בביתו ספר פעור ארוכות עם פטנאל סיון, מנחם פילסון וחייט ברקאי. לסחרהו נועד, לטי סדר כרוגולובי, עם סר האוצר, ראש הספלה, סר הכסחון, ראש אמ"ן, סר החוץ, ובערב בילה בביתו של דן מולקובסקי יחד עם קבוצה חשתיבים ואנשי כלכלה.

לא אכנס לפירוט רב וארווח באופן כללי. להלן פיקרי הדברים.

א. רביע הביניים. חזר ואישר תפיסתו בהקצבה והבטיח לעשות כמיטב יכולתו. סאידך המעים שהסב סנוצר סנוך וסביך כאחת לכל הצדדים וחבל שהדברים הגיעו לידי כך. בסיחהויו הרטמיות לא היו לו טענות כלפינו כעת שנסבע מלספוח ביקורה על הסמסל. סאידך בסיחה אחי האשים את ה- באחריות לטר שקרה וקבל על הצורה הדוקנית שבה טועלים היום אנשי ה- . סאידך גיכא חזר והספיר בכל אנשי שיחז להכיר בכך שקייסה היום סביארת חרטה שפיקרה סחו אילוצים כלכליים ופיננסיים חסורים בארה"ב, וסאידך הצורך להתחשב באינטרסים אמריקנים חרטים בעולם הערבי ונטיחוח החלות הגוברת בנפס הערבי. חזר וסער בכל הודסנות שלפני 3 שבועות יובאה ארה"ב סחו"ל 45% סחצרוכה הנפס שלה כסרוב רובה של כפוח זו באה מסקורות צרביים. לא הכחיד שלהצוכתו גם לפיקולים אלה טעקל לא סבוטל לגבי סוגיה זו.

ב. סיורו בארצות ערב. נפגס עם סאדאת, אסד, ערסאת ותרוסיין.

חזר ססבריט מלא דאגה ואפילו חרדה לפתיוו ונורלר על סאדאת אסר בו הוא רואה גודס סרכוזי וחילוכי כאחת. סאר את סאדאת כסי שנתון לטמי סערכות לחצים. סצו אחו סצג כלכלי-חברתי חולך וסחסיור וסצד סני הצורך לטפק צרכיה הצבאיים של סצרים עם ביותקה ססקורות האספקה הסרבייטיים שלה. הביע חששות לגבי עמיד סססרו על סאדאת למקרה ולא יסצאו סחרונות בסני החחופים האלה.

הופתע לסובה ספגיטמו עם אסד אסר הריסו כסדינאי ססוכס וריאליסטי אסר "דבר לפחות" בסוטגים "סחובים". ססר סאסד אף הביע באזניו בכרבות ליון בהכרה בישראל בססגרת אל הסדר כולל.

מגיטחו עם ערסאת אסר למי כל הסיסנים סודרה בתאום עם השגרירות האמריקנית בוסטק ועם ברכחה הימה לדבריו "סעבינת ביוגר".

1942

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I am writing you to advise that I have been
employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
since 1941. I am currently assigned to the
New York Office and am working under the
supervision of Mr. [Name].

I am currently working on the [Project Name] and
am making good progress.

I am currently working on the [Project Name] and
am making good progress. I am currently
working on the [Project Name] and am making
good progress. I am currently working on the
[Project Name] and am making good progress.
I am currently working on the [Project Name] and
am making good progress. I am currently
working on the [Project Name] and am making
good progress. I am currently working on the
[Project Name] and am making good progress.

I am currently working on the [Project Name] and
am making good progress.

I am currently working on the [Project Name] and
am making good progress. I am currently
working on the [Project Name] and am making
good progress. I am currently working on the
[Project Name] and am making good progress.

I am currently working on the [Project Name] and
am making good progress. I am currently
working on the [Project Name] and am making
good progress. I am currently working on the
[Project Name] and am making good progress.

I am currently working on the [Project Name] and
am making good progress. I am currently
working on the [Project Name] and am making
good progress. I am currently working on the
[Project Name] and am making good progress.

הופתע מסון דבריו "המפוגים" של ערשאת. את תמצית דברי ערשאת הגדיר כן: כנוצח להכנס למ"ם עם ישראל על אפשרות הכרת אש"ם בה לאחר שלאש"ם יהיה נסיים טריטוריאלי. ספר ערשאת גילה הבנה ליחסיה המיוחדים של ארה"ב עם ישראל אלא רק בקט מסובבו לארה"ב יזכור שיש עוד עם במזה"ת הזכאי ומצפה ל"צדק".


את חשיון מצא כדרכו מהון אך מוסרד מחוטר כל התקדמות.

הפרטסויות:

מהיכרות אישית של האים ספר כ-12 שנים חוספני מפלי להפיד על כך שגט בארזים אחזה שלהבת. כפי שהוא עצמו חזר והדגיש בכל הודטנות ידירותו והסיכחו בנו טריריט וקיימים אולם לצד הגבי וס case טעלו, זה - ^{case} איבנו מבוטל כלל ופיקר לארה"ב אינטרסיס מונתקיים באזור ואלה סחייכים התחטבות ב- ^{case} הערבי כולל ה- ^{case} הפלטסינאי. לא יתכן להשאיר הסצב כמות שהוא לחייבת להיות חזונה. חזונה זה לא יכולה לחכות עד חוס במירות בארה"ב ולאחר טכן הבחירות בארץ. הסצב באזור לא יחיר זאת והמססל לא ירטה זאת. הזכיר שהחריש מפני כך סבר בביקורו הקודם למצטער לאמר מביקורו זה חזר וחיוק דתמו עגט סרט מפינו זאת הריבו סצורים להכיר ככך ומן הראוי סנקדיט לעטות זאת כדי למגרע ארתס איכוכיט וחריגרת העוקדוים לאחרונה כדי מצט בפעט את יחסי ישראל-ארה"ב.

סתיאט איבנו רואה סקוט והפטרות לצעדוים גוטפייט ומטגרת סריביות צעו אחר צעד. זו ססס ובאה לקייבת. לפי הערכתו סתבקט עכטיו ראה גיטה וסיפול כולל בפעיה. סטריו ומצטר בהקטר לכך ססתיאט לא רואה ולא חזנה הסור שלא יכלול גורמליזציה של ססס ביחטי ישראל ערב כטט סאיבנו רואה כספטיט אלא גטיבה יפואליות ססיניות ומטרון של ססס לפעיה הפלטסינאיט אשר איבנה פראית לו היום כנכולח צדק.

כטיחה אישית אחי וכן בהערה שהפטיט במיתחו עם שה"ח המייחט סתיאט לנושא ספילוחבו בגבסה והחריש סטכי בעיות בחתום זה. על כן בנטרד.

ב ב ר כ ה,

שלמה ארנוב

התקו: לשכת הטר
לשכת הסנכ"ל
השגריר, ווטיונגטרון
הציר, ווטיונגטרון
סר א. עברון, הסטנה למנכ"ל
סר ס. רביב, סנהל סצט"א

Handwritten notes:
מ.נ.ר.
מ.נ.ר. / מ.נ.ר.

א. ל: סנהל לשכת הסוכ"ל

סאח: ס / סנהל סכס"א

הנדון: סנסר Mathias (2)

בהספך למזכרי הנדון שהבוקר

ב- 13:00 טלפן לי שלמה ארבוז ומסר כדלהלן:

א. הסנסור לא החרש מהחלטות. כשנשאל ע"י כתב "קול ישראל" הנדון ענה שהפעם לא דיבר בשוחדים ומקווה לעשות זאת בבקורו הבא.

ב. ג"דן הרש (שבאר"ב) ועוזרו של הסנסור הודיעו שלגוטו של עניין כל הכתוב במכתב נכון - הוברר להם היטב ע"י א. עברון, ס. רביב ו-ס. כבלי שבקורם כאלה ייעשו רק בחסותנו.

ג. הסנסור הוסיף שלא דיבר כלל עם כתב הוויטינגטון גוטס ושטיטווא אחר כנראה דבר אחר - הוא דבר עם כתב הלום אנג'לס סייסס (מחלקת עבודה כאן מוסיעה שלמעטים מקבל הוויטינגטון גוטס את דיווחיו ככתב הלום אנג'לס סייסס, ביל דרומונד, ולא ככתבם הקבוע יובל אל יבור).

כנראה,

ס. כבלי

Handwritten notes at bottom:
מ.נ.ר. / מ.נ.ר.
מ.נ.ר. / מ.נ.ר.

July 28
1951

to the
1951

of the
1951

ג'רוזלם פוסט

משרד חינוך

14. V. 1976

~~משרד חינוך~~
אל:
~~משרד חינוך~~
משרד חינוך
משרד חינוך
משרד חינוך

Mathias blames misunderstanding

Jerusalem Post Correspondent

WASHINGTON. — Senator Charles Mathias has said that his "misunderstanding" with the Israeli Government over its refusal to permit him to visit Palestinian refugee camps in the Gaza Strip has been resolved following talks with Ambassador Simcha Dinitz.

He said he had arranged with Dinitz, before his trip to Israel, permission to visit the camps without official escorts. He was barred from doing this, however, by Israeli officials who apparently had not been informed of his understanding with Dinitz.

Mathias also expressed "shock

and disappointment" at the uproar of protest caused by his meeting in Beirut with PLO leader Yasser Arafat. "I have amply demonstrated my commitment to Israel," he stated, arguing that Arafat has become a "fact to be dealt with" and the meeting with him was necessary to better understand the problem.

Mathias, a member of the important Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee which appropriates funds for foreign aid, said further that Israel was now in "greater peril" than at any previous time and he pledged his continuing support for large scale foreign assistance to Israel.

115

[Handwritten signature]

Mathias pnd ① ✓
~~non 230~~ ②

May 17, 1971

Dear Mayor:

To say that the Roman singular you so
generously gave me the most valuable acquisition
of my trip would be to ignore the warm history of
your hospitality and the joy of renewing our acquaintance.

Sincerely yours,

[Handwritten signature]

Charles W. Marshall, Jr.
United States Senator

The Honorable Roddy Folger
Mayor
City of Acropolis
Athens, Greece

מ'קווה

(מ'מנסין) מ'נר

ס"כ כסלו תשל"ו
12 בנובמבר 1975

ס ס ר

1120

אל: מר עמוס גנור, הקונכ"ל בפועל, ניו-יורק
מאחז מנהל מצפ"ג בפועל

הנדון: המורשה הלן סטיבנסון-מיינר (3- ניו-ג'רסי)
מכתבך מיום 4.11.75

1. קראתי בענין רב את מכתבו של סמורד לוויד הולנדר מיום 16.10.75 על שיחתו עם הגב' הנ"ל ב-10.10.75. לי נראה שהוא מלא את המקירו נאמנה.
2. הנני מחרטט שתגובותיה ותשובותיה מאשרים בעליל את השותיננו וחשדותינו (מכתבו 883 מיום 13.7.75)
3. אומנם נוצא אולי בקרבה, בעקבות שיחה זו או שיחות דומות אחרות, חשש שטא לא תצליח לזכות מחדש במקומה בכחירות הבאוש; עם זאת, מסומקני אם השפענו הארסיה של בעלה האטשר לה לשנות טעמה.

בברכה,

דוד בן דב

העתק: מר צבי רמיה, וושינגטון

1. Introduction

2. Objectives

3. Methodology

4. Results and Discussion

5. Conclusion

6. References

7. Appendix

8. Summary

9. Index

10. Final Remarks

ס ו ד י

4 בנובמבר, 1975

אל : מר צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

מאת : עמוס גנור, ניו-יורק

הנדון: המורשה הלו מיינר, ניו-ג'רסי

יחכן והדוות על שיחה שקיים עם יור' הפדרציה היהודית באיזור כחירתה של הנ"ל, כבר נמצא בידך, על כל פנים אני מעבירו במצורף.

העחק דו'ח זה מועבר אל חברנו מר דוד בן דב מנהל מצפ"א בפועל, אשר לווה את הנ"ל בעח ביקורה בארץ לפני חדשים אחדים, ואשר הציע כי שיחה כנ"ל חקויים עמה.

בברכה,


עמוס גנור

העחק:

מר דוד בן-דב, מנהל מצפ"א בפועל

10/10/00

10/10/00

10/10/00

10/10/00

10/10/00

10/10/00

10/10/00

10/10/00

TRAPASSO, DOLAN & HOLLANDER

COUNSELLORS AT LAW

October 16, 1975

40 PARK PLACE
NEWTON, N.J. 07860

383-3233

ALBERT P. TRAPASSO
FRANK A. DOLAN
SANFORD LLOYD HOLLANDER
PAUL L. ABRAMO

Mr. Ken Wollack
American Israel Public Affairs Committee
1341 G Street, N.W.
Suite 908
Washington, DC 20005

Dear Ken:

As I indicated to you on the telephone, I met with Helen Meyner on Friday, October 10th, for about 50 minutes. We covered a broad range of items which I will attempt to abstract to you as best I can.

She initiated our conversation recalling my correspondence to her following her return from Russia and the Middle East relating to Russian Jewry. I told her that her position that Russian Jewish emigration was an internal Russian affair was indefensible, both politically and morally. She stated that her position was misunderstood but then made the argument that the Jackson-Vanik amendment has inhibited Russian emigration. I told her that it was only because of the Jackson-Vanik amendment and the desire of the Russians to secure favorite nation status that 100,000 Russian Jews came out, and only after people like her began to equivocate did Russia find weakness in our position and change its mind.

We then discussed some basic philosophical differences she and I have about individual goodness (relating to getting individual Russians out) and meaningful social change (getting free emigration for Soviet Jews). I am not sure she understood.

Our discussion then swung around to Israel and we discussed a broad range of topics, ranging from her change of position from support of 14 mobile missile units for Jordan to her support for 200 advisors in the Sinai, to her present circulation of a letter to Secretary Kissinger asking him to be imaginative in regard to negotiations with the Palestinians. Following your lead, I asked her to define the Palestinians and advised her that I am sure Israel would negotiate with Jordan, and has been negotiating with west bank Palestinian leadership. She was quick to retreat from any implication in her letter to Kissinger that she meant negotiations with the P.L.O., and I think that she will stay with this position until someone else exercises leadership in this area.

Our discussion then moved to the pragmatics of the hour, one, her re-election next fall, and two, her support for the 2.3 billion dollar aid package to Israel. I do not believe that she will

support anything resembling the 2.3 billion dollar aid package. She forthrightly indicated opposition to the Pershing missiles and said that she would have to look to the package very completely before she could make any decision on this. In political language, this is a "negative" as far as I am concerned. She did ask me to be sure that I understood that she agreed with my position wholeheartedly in regard to the survival of Israel as a nation and was concerned that we support democracies wherever we find them in the world.

I then told her that her image in the Jewish community within her District was not good. I told her that most Jews that I knew felt that, in regard to Israel, she fell somewhere between Senator Aderes and former Senator Fulbright. She attempted to chuckle but the lump in her throat prevented it. I then pointed out to her that there were 8,000 Jews in her Congressional District, and that I was president of the United Jewish Federation, and that unless her image changed, most likely the 80% who voted for her last time would not do so again. I assured her that I, and most of the people I knew and represented, were anxious to have a Democrat in our Congressional District but I was greatly concerned with the leadership she was exercising in this area and that I was further puzzled with why we agreed on almost every other issue coming before the Congress except when it had to do with Jews. After some amenities, the interview ended at that point.

I regret to say that I do not believe that Helen Meyner has any great feeling for the needs of Israel or the Jews of Russia. She is greatly concerned with the concept of "peace" and would most likely sell her soul for it because she believes it is the right thing to do. If Israel and/or Russian Jewry would have to be sacrificed along the way, or even risked for "peace" she would be prepared to take that risk.

I believe that I can still communicate with her although I think she probably feels that I am a fanatic in regard to Jewish matters.

If I may be of further service to you, please don't hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours,



Sanford Lloyd Hollander

SLH:gp

3.10.75

1038

ש ט ר

אל : מר צבי רפיח, השגרירות וסינגפון
מאת: מנחל סטא בפועל

הנדון: חברה הקונגרס הלן סטיבנסון מיינר
(ד-ניו ג'רסי)

מכתב 1113 מיום 16.7.75
מברק 562 מיום 29.9.75
מכתב 883 מיום 13.7.75

1. המידע במרשך הנ"ל מאשר את התרשמות כולנו לגבי נסיוניה
ומאוויה של הנ"ל.

דומני ש. סנטור אבודק והמורשה מופט זכו בבה ברית נאמנת
"המחודלקת" אם לא מוסחת ע"י בעלה.

2. האם ניתן לעשות משהו במדינתה?

3. בעתון היהודי בסן-פרנסיסקו פורסם ביולי מאמר מאת ארל
ראם על התרשמותו הקשה מסברי הנ"ל בעה שיחתה עם קטום קינג
במלון המלך דוד.

ב ב ר כ ה,

דוד בן-דב

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

מחלקת הקשר

כוכו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך — עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז — 1957.

ש מ ר

אל: המשרד

מאת: רוטינגטון

ט"ו 562

מס' 291500 ספט' 75

מצפא.

תלן מיינר, חברת ועדת החוץ בביחנ. שביקרה לאתרונה בישראל וקייננה מידידינו, הפגישת לפני מספר ימים את עמוס לען עם המורשת צרלי וילסון מאותה ועדה. מטרת הפגישת להניע את וילסון לחתום על מכתב של חברי קונגרס אל המזכיר המדינה למען יניע את ישראל לנתל מזם עם הפלשתינאים. כפי שנמסר לי המכינו עד כה לחתום על מכתב זה רק סנטור אבורזק, המורשת MOFFET (ממוצא ערבי) ומיינר עצמה.

רפיה

תחת רהט מנכל ממנכל ארגוב י. רביב מצפא חקר

צב

מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

883

תאריך: ה' אב השל"ה
13 יולי 1975

סודי

מספר:

א ל: מר צבי רפית, השגרירות, וושינגטון
מאת: ס/מנהל מצפ"א

הנדון: HELEN STEVENSON MEYNER Rep. -
מברקן מס' 294 מ- 17.6.75

1. נמסרה עם הנ"ל עם בעלה מושל ניו-ג'רסי לשעבר ועם עוזרה לובן ב- 9.7.75, בין היתר בעת ארוחת צהרים בכנסת כאורחי סגן יו"ר, ח"כ בן-פורת.
2. אין לי כל ספק שמדובר באנשים משוחדים אשר ספגו בצורה יעילה את מעוניי התעמולה הארסית של הערבים (הבעל אולי יותר מאשתו). גם העוזר הצעיר מצטרף למקהלה. לפי מברקן השני ניתן להבין שהם יצאו לסיורם במזה"ח (יותר משבועיים בארצות ערב ויוסיים בלבד בישראל) כאשר ברשותם מסען דעות קדוסות. לא ברור לי בדיוק מאין שאבו אותן. יתכן שהדבר כרוך בכעיות פנים כמדינת ניו-ג'רסי; אולי בהקשר לכשלון מיינר בבחירות המקומיות.
3. הלן מיינר עצמה אמנם נסחה להבהיר את דאגתה לשיאורה של ישראל ולרווחתה. אך מתוך הערוהיה השתמע כאלו שוכנעה שאין ישראל עושה למען השלום וכאלו היא עשה לקראת קרבות וקורבנות נוספים.
4. היה ברור בעליל שהבנתה בענינים בי"ל בכלל ובעניני המזה"ח בפרט הנה מצומצמת למדי. היא עצמה הודתה שהנה חדשה במקצוע ושעליה ללמוד רבות. אך בעניני סכסוך ישראל-ערב נראה שכבר קבעה לעצמה השגות ועמדות.
5. התרשמותי הינה שהיא מושפעת במידה נכרת ע"י בעלה (היא הודתה שהוא נהל את מערכת הבחירות שלה ושהיא הצליחה להביס את המתחרה הרפובליקני רק בגלל ספיעה פרשה ווסרגיים) בעלה הופיע למעשה בקיצוני יותר במעונו האנטי-ישראליים ונדמה היה שמכצבצת בדבריו נימה קלה של אוהה אנטישמיות "חברתית" המוכרת כה יפה.
6. אולי לצורך המחשה, כמה פנינים מניהם:-
* יהודי סוריה אינם רוצים לעזוב (הם בקרו בגסו).
* למה צריך להאבק למען יהודי בריה"מ יש שם עוד מעופים. ובכלל: הרי יהודים אלה שויכים ללאום הסובייטי ולא לישראל.
* ישראל מגלה עקשות שעשויה לגרור מלחמת עולם שלישית. לאמריקני הממוצע נמאס כל העסק. כמה עוד זמן אפשר להשפיע על ישראל כסף) והדבר מתייחס גם למגבית ולמלוה העצמאות.
* זוהי נקודה חשובה שהרי כל ההסתחותה של ישראל לרבות קליטת העלייה מוסמנה אך ורק ע"י כספים מארה"ב.
* אמנם ישראל קבלה סיוע צבאי וכלכלי יותר מכל מדינות ערב גם יחד אך עתה לא חוכל להדוף החקפה ערבית שהרי הערבים הפכו חזקים ועשירים.
* בכל זאת אין ישראל מגלה גמישות ואלו סאדאת מגלה מתינות מופלגת ורצון לשלום.
* עד כה רק הטעון הישראלי שלט באמצעי החקשורת בארה"ב עתה יחול שנוי.
* אין להבין את שטות פעולות הנקם של ישראל (עין חחת עין) המחכטאות ברצח ללא אבחנה של נשים וילדים בכפרים ערביים מעבר לגבול "ראו מה עשיתם לקוניסרה!" המודיעין שלכם סתם מסעה אהכס" ראו מה עשיתם לספינה האמריקנית "ליברטי" ועוד ועוד.
7. כפי שידווח לכם במסרד שנו האורחים את ההוכניה פעמים רבות עד שנראה שהסיוור כאן היה רק כדי לצאת ידיו חובה.

מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

תאריך:

מספר:

- 2 -

8. קבלתי דווח מטי יודי ארל ראב (יו"ר המועצה היהודית בסן-פרנסיסקו) שטע במקרה את השיחה בין האוג לבין יודים עמוס קינן. הוא אומר שהחלפו השפעות מזעזעות. האורחים שאלו את קינן אם השלמונה מרשים לו לצאת לחו"ל בחופשיות.
9. עם זאת חובה לציין שהם ראו לנכון להדגיש שהם מעוניינים ללמוד ולהשכיל ושלכן הם מעלים שאלות כנ"ל. ואולם.....
10. לאור חכרותה של מורשה זו בועדה החוץ, יתכן שיש מקום ליזום פעולה נאותה במחוז הבחירה לשיקולכם.

בכרחה,
ב/אוי-
דוד בן-דב

העקב: מר מרכזי שלו הציר וושינגטון

שגרירות ישראל

וויטינגטון

א. ג. ק. ל. ג. כ. (א. מ. ה.)

8 . 7 . 1977

אל: א. א. מצמ"א

✓

מאה: צ. ב. רפ"ח

מצ"ב לעיונכם דברי המורשה אבנר
מקווה, שנאמרו ב-30 ליוני במליאה ביה"נ,
על מדיניות הממשל במזה"ח.

ב ב ר כ ה,

צ. רפ"ח

העתק:

STATE OF NEW YORK
IN SENATE
January 10, 1911.

REPORT

OF THE
COMMISSIONERS OF THE LAND OFFICE

IN RESPONSE TO A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE SENATE
MAY 10, 1909, AND A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE SENATE
MAY 10, 1910.

ALBANY:

1911.

1911

PRINTED BY THE
UNIVERSITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
AT ALBANY.

not demonstrate sensitivity to the historical struggle of Israel. Yes, we are all anxious for peace in the Middle East. But whether such peace will be lasting will depend on its fairness, on whether all sides will be able to negotiate without one side being unduly coerced. The State Department announcement has raised grave questions about the administration's possible intention to "lean" on the new Israel Government. I hope and trust that there are no such intentions, and that this will be made clear by the administration and remove any doubts that have been created. We ought not send false signals to either Israel or the Arab world about our intentions.

STATE DEPARTMENT CASTS CONFUSION ON MIDDLE EAST

HON. ABNER J. MIKVA

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 30, 1977

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Speaker, I wish to express my concern and dismay regarding the statement on Middle East policy made earlier this week by the State Department.

The road toward a lasting peace in the Middle East has enough obstacles without adding any new, sharp curves. Yet, that was the effect of the State Department pronouncement that Israel should withdraw from captured territories on all fronts as part of a Middle East peace agreement.

On the one hand, we are told in some press accounts that the policy statement by the State Department did not, in substance, go beyond earlier administration statements of Vice President MONDALÉ's recent speech summarizing the main points of the U.S. position. On the other hand, however, the statement was front page news because of its emphasis, because it was delivered with explicit White House approval and because it has been widely interpreted as a signal to the new Israel Government of U.S. intentions.

At the least, the State Department policy announcement has created new doubts and confusion over an area of the world that already has a surplus of both. At the worst and a cause for grave concern, is the possibility that this statement means that a new burden is being placed on Israel to shoulder the risks of a peace settlement. If that is the way some will interpret administration policy, a result will be the weakening of the Israel position even before the next round of negotiations begin.

Such a possibility serves no useful purpose in the pursuit of a just and lasting peace. It certainly does not reflect the feelings and beliefs of the vast majority of the American people or their representatives in Congress. It certainly does

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



ת"פ
ר"א (א"מ) (מ"ק) (א"מ)

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

7 ביוני 1978

אל : טר י. למדן, נאו"ם
מאת: נ. חמיר, וושינגטון

הנדון: התבטאות המורשה מיקווה - קשר אש"פ -
או"ם

ב-31 דנא התבטא חבר ביה"נ מיקווה - במסגרת דיון
במליאה הקונגרס בנושא סיוע חוץ - בזכות קיצוץ הסיוע לאו"ם
עקב פעילות "היחידה המיוחדת".

בוודאי תמצא ענין במרסום המדבר בעד עצמו.

בברכה

נ. חמיר

העתק:
מצפ"א ✓
מאו"ם א.

RECEIVED
1970



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON

1970

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: AMBASSADOR, ISRAELI EMBASSY

RE: [Illegible]

[Illegible text]

[Illegible text]

[Illegible text]

[Illegible text]

[Illegible text]

1492 112 31

20117

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Chairman, I particularly want to speak in behalf of section 115 of H.R. 12598, the fiscal year 1979 Foreign Relations Authorization Act. This section expresses the sense of the Congress that the United States should continue to work to terminate certain units within the United Nations General Assembly designed to propagandize against the State of Israel and in favor of the PLO.

The provision is similar to a bill that I introduced earlier this year with approximately 30 cosponsors which would have cut U.S. contributions to the U.N. in an amount proportional to the funds spent to support the Palestinian propaganda units. I would have preferred that the tougher language of my bill be included

in H.R. 12598, but I am pleased that the House will have an opportunity to express its displeasure with these U.N. activities.

The alleged purpose of the unit is to observe the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, but the activities of the group would include dissemination of messages of hatred against the State of Israel and its inhabitants. This unit is, in effect, an extension of the U.N. Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, which is composed of 23 states—19 having no diplomatic relations with Israel. Clearly, the new unit will only further erode the respect for the impartiality of the United Nations.

The continued existence of the unit can only complicate and possibly jeopardize the sensitive peace negotiations in the Middle East, and reduce the role the United Nations might legitimately play in helping to assure a just and lasting peace.

I urge my colleagues to join with me in supporting section 115 of the bill, and demonstrating our commitment to real peace in the Middle East as well as to an impartial and fair United Nations. The interests of the people of the Middle East and the interests of the United Nations as an institution will not be served if the U.N. is used as a propaganda mouthpiece for the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Mr. Chairman

כל הסוסר תוקן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך — עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני הענישין (בטחון חמדינה יחסי
חוץ וסודות רשמיים), פשי"ז —
1957.

משרד החוץ
—
מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

שמו

אל: המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון

מס. 173
נשלח 091630 נוב 76

Handwritten signature and notes in blue ink.

מנפא.

מקוזה .

עם תום מניין הקולות מסתבר כי יתרונו של המורשה מקוזה על מתחריו בשגר.
אף שיתכן תחליך בשפטי נוסף, הקשור בלנין קולות / המאכלעית מחוץ לאזור,
משוכנע עזה מקוזה כי נצחונו מובטח .
אורן

שוח מבכל משככל מנפא
מב/מח

1947

1947: 1947
1947: 1947

1947: 1947
1947: 1947

1947

1947

1947: 1947
1947: 1947
1947: 1947

1947

1947: 1947
1947: 1947

156

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

כ"ה שבט תשל"ו
27 ינואר 1976



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון
56

3

אל: מצפ"א ✓

מאת: אמיר אורן, וושינגטון

המזן: דברי המורשה ניקס על אש"פ

מצ"ב דברים שאמר המורשה רוברט ניקס (דמוקרט ממנסילבניה)
ואשר מורסמו ברטומות הקונגרס ב-21 דנא.

ניקס מבנה את אש"פ, אותו הוא מכנה "אירגון של כנופיות
טרוריסטים". כן הוכנסה על-ידו לפרוטוקול החלטתה של מועצת
עירייה טילדלפיה, בגנות החלטה האו"ם נגד הציונות.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

אמיר אורן

העמק: הקונב"ל, טילדלפיה
נאו"ם, ניו-יורק
הסברה, משה"ח

11

משרד החוץ



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL

WASHINGTON D.C.

20

1974

3

משרד החוץ
מחלקת המזרח התיכון

מס' 1000/74

הממשלה הישראלית
מחלקת המזרח התיכון

הממשלה הישראלית
מחלקת המזרח התיכון

1974

1974

1974

משרד החוץ

מחלקת המזרח התיכון

מחלקת המזרח התיכון

PHILADELPHIA CITY COUNCIL, DENOUNCES U.N. RESOLUTION ON ZIONISM

HON. ROBERT N. C. NIX

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, January 21, 1976

Mr. NIX, Mr. Speaker, the city council of Philadelphia has sent me a copy of a resolution they have adopted denouncing the United Nations General Assembly resolution which classifies Zionism as a form of racism. The council accurately states that the action of the General Assembly distorts history, encourages anti-Semitism, and violates fundamental principles of the U.N. Charter. I commend the council for its forthright stand on this matter.

Since the General Assembly's rash actions in last year's session, we have seen new developments that undermine both the United Nations and the chances of peace in the Middle East. This time the forum is the Security Council.

In the current Middle East debate in the Security Council, the Palestine Liberation Organization has joined the deliberations as an invited and honored guest. The PLO, which is not a state, participates in that capacity, although its sworn goal is the destruction of a member state of the United Nations.

Undoubtedly many people hoped that if the PLO was given respectability and a free voice in Middle East deliberations, that it would "moderate" its stance and seek genuine negotiations with Israel. The representatives of the PLO in the Security Council went out of their way to disabuse us of that notion. They have stated plainly that their object remains the elimination of the State of Israel, that they reject all earlier Security Council resolutions that include recognition of the national independence of Israel, and that they will continue to promote terrorism on a worldwide scale.

Mr. Speaker, the plain fact of the mat-

January 21, 1976 CONGRE

ter is that the PLO, despite its new diplomatic trappings, remains an organization of terrorist bands. The only negotiations they contemplate holding with Israel concern the terms of Israel's national suicide. The nations of the world that are genuinely interested in permanent peace in the Middle East must understand that the PLO is an enemy of peace as well as an enemy of Israel.

I offer for the Record the resolution of the Philadelphia City Council:

COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
RESOLUTION

Condemning the United Nations General Assembly for its distortion of history and ill-considered attempt to equate Zionism with racism.

Whereas, The United Nations General Assembly on November 10, 1975, adopted a resolution which describes Zionism as a form of racism thereby identifying it as a target of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Discrimination; and

Whereas, The General Assembly of the United Nations decided to launch on December 10, 1973, a Decade of Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination and a program of action which the United States supported and in which it desires to participate; and

Whereas, The extension of the program of the Decade to include a campaign against Zionism brings the United States to a point of encouraging anti-Semitism, one of the oldest and most virulent forms of racism known to human history; and

Whereas, In article I of the Charter of the United Nations the stated purpose of the United Nations include "To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms of all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion;" and

Whereas, The State of Israel has provided a homeland for thousands and thousands of people fleeing racism and genocide, and has provided millions of dollars of assistance to African, Asia and Latin American countries in the form of agricultural, technical and medical aid; therefore

Resolved by the Council of the City of Philadelphia, That we hereby condemn the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 10, 1975, which wrongly associates and equates Zionism with racism and racial discrimination, thereby contradicting a fundamental purpose of the United Nations Charter.

Further Resolved, That we hereby call for an energetic effort by all those concerned to obtain reconsideration of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations which wrongly equates Zionism with racism.

Resolved, That certified copies of this resolution be forwarded to the Secretary General of the United Nations, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, and the Congressional Delegation and the Senators from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as evidence of the sincere sentiments of this legislative body.

EVILYN G. WHITE—A PIONEER
WOMAN IN CALIFORNIA HISTORY

יב' בטבת תשל"ז
2 בינואר 1977

א ל: מר יעקב לוי, ניו יורק

סאת: רוחמה ספיר, סנס"א

Rep. Alan Nevas הנדון: ביקור

הנ"ל הגיע כמתוכנן ואנו התקשרנו אתו.

ביקר במשרד זימן שעה ארוכה עם משה רביב ולאחר
מכן שלחנו אותו במכונית המשרד לכנסת. בכנסת התקבל
יפה. נערך לו ולרעייתו סיור בבנין וח"כ י. כן-סאיר
ארחם לארוחת צהרים בכנסת.

לידיעתך.

במריבה זנד"ש,

רוחמה ספיר

(105)

11



כב' אייר תשל"ז
11 מאי 77

229

גנן נאמן (קולקט)

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: שי פלדמן, וושינגטון

הנדון: תיקון נלסון לחוק ייצוא הנשק
בהמשך לשלנו 226 ס-5 מאי 77.

רצ"ב דברי ההסבר שמסר הסנטור נלסון לתיקונים
שהגיש לחוק ייצוא הנשק. הדברים הופיעו ברשומה הקונגרס
ב-26 לאפריל.

ב ב ר כ ה
1/2
שי. פלדמן

העתק: המרכז, מטה"ח
י. צ'חנובר, כאן
נספח צה"ל, כאן

RECEIVED
1975



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1975

1975

MEMORANDUM
FOR THE RECORD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

[Illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
DATE: 1975

pretrial detainees, juveniles, the mentally ill, the mentally retarded, the physically handicapped, and the aged reside.

By Mr. NELSON:

S. 1394. A bill to amend the Arms Export Control Act to require the President to provide certain information to the Congress with respect to any proposed major arms sales to a country which is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to provide the Congress with 30 days of continuous session in which to disapprove proposed arms sales; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

S. 1395. A bill to amend the Arms Export Control Act to provide the Congress with an opportunity to disapprove proposed transfers from the recipient country to another country of defense articles or related training or other defense services supplied by the United States; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

ARMS SALES

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, the two bills which I am submitting today are designed to fill several loopholes in the present reporting requirements of the Arms Export Control Act. Together, they: First, give Congress a longer period of time to review thoroughly arms sales proposals made by the executive branch; second, provide Congress automatically with more information upon which it can base better analyses of arms sales proposals; and third give Congress veto authority over third country transfers of arms produced by the United States.

I have previously introduced legislation to bring about all three of these objectives in earlier Congresses. Identical legislation has also been introduced in this—the 95th Congress—by Congressman SOLARE and 39 cosponsors.

It is now only too well documented that the United States is the world's leader in selling arms abroad. From 1966 to 1975, this country sold \$34.9 billion worth of armaments to other countries, or more than the rest of the world's major suppliers combined. In the last fiscal year alone, the United States agreed to sell abroad military equipment and weapons worth over \$14 billion.

TRENDS

The trends are disturbing. We have witnessed over the last several years an alarming growth in the volume of military equipment and arms sold abroad by the United States. As recently as 1970, our entire foreign military sales program accounted for less than \$1 billion worth of equipment and weapons, this in stark contrast to last year's total, which represents nearly 14 percent of the dollar value of all U.S. foreign military sales in the last quarter century.

There has also been a dramatic change in the identity of those receiving our arms largesse. A program originally designed to assist major NATO Allies has become the chief means by which many nations of the so-called Third World acquire weapons. The developing countries bought over half—53 percent—their weapons from the United States during 1966-75. Our share of this market totaled \$27.5 billion. This included 96 percent of their imports of air-to-surface and air-

to-air missiles. More than half of our foreign military cash sales in recent years have been made to nations of the newly oil-rich Persian Gulf and Mideast. By fueling local arms races, the United States advances the potential for the creation or exacerbation of regional tensions and conflicts, which in turn increase the likelihood of major-power confrontation.

In addition, the United States is selling increasingly destructive and sophisticated military equipment. In contrast to the days when the United States drew only on surplus stocks for foreign military sales, we now sell some of our most advanced missiles, warplanes, and electronic gear. This policy has deleterious effects on our own armed services readiness as well as our overall national security. With the move away from U.S. military aid and toward payment by the recipient country for its arms, the recipients are more often demanding—and receiving—our most sophisticated armaments off the same assembly line that supplies our own forces, and sometimes before we are fully supplied. Foreign orders for highly advanced weaponry are made even before we proceed to their full-scale production. Maintenance of our technological superiority is threatened by such concurrent sales of advanced weaponry. This is especially so when sales are made to unstable regimes, whose successors may not be friendly to the United States, or when such equipment falls into hostile hands in a regional conflict.

Mr. President, in 1973 I first introduced legislation giving Congress a voice in controlling the burgeoning U.S. arms trade. Passed by Congress in 1974 and enacted in 1975, this measure gave Congress the opportunity to consider—and if necessary, reject—any proposed foreign military sale of \$25 million or more by concurrent resolutions of each House. Strengthened in 1976 with passage of the Arms Export Control Act (Public Law 94-329), congressional review now extends to the proposed sale of any major defense equipment or arms over \$7 million. Congressional oversight has been further improved by the addition of more stringent reporting requirements. There remain obstacles, however, to the establishment of a truly comprehensive congressional oversight capability with regard to U.S. foreign military sales policy. It is with the intention of removing some of these barriers that I introduce this legislation.

PROVIDING CONGRESS ADEQUATE TIME TO CONSIDER ARMS SALES PROPOSALS

Existing law is based on an amendment which I offered and which was included as part of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974—Public Law 93-859—under which the President is required to submit to Congress any proposed foreign military sale in excess of \$25 million. According to the provision finally adopted by the conference committee and by both Houses in 1974, the Congress had a period of 20 calendar days in which to veto the proposed sale by the passage by both the Senate and the House of a concurrent resolution of disapproval.

Last Congress, I introduced an amend-

ment which was essentially the same as the one I am introducing today. Final congressional action on that legislation resulted in extending the period of congressional review to 30 calendar days. It seems to me, however, that Congress still requires greater time to review major arms sales. And for that reason, I am resubmitting the amendment which gives the Congress 30 days during which Congress is in continuous session in which to veto a proposed arms sale. This would give Congress more than a mere 30 calendar days. It would mean that the days on which either House is in adjournment for more than 3 days would not be included in the 30-day computation.

The change embodied in this amendment is clearly headed. The present time period of 30 calendar days for the passage of a concurrent resolution by both Houses is clearly inadequate. It is extremely difficult for Congress to act this quickly on almost any matter of importance.

It is simply not realistic to expect that a resolution of disapproval of a proposed arms sale, a matter which would require comprehensive review and hearings in both Houses, could possibly be passed in such a short time frame. In addition, since even after an arms sale is agreed to, delivery time can extend over several months or years, there is no reason to believe that this slightly extended period of time for congressional consultation would be onerous either for the prospective arms buyer or for the State or Defense Departments. In fact, \$32 billion worth of arms have been approved by the Congress but have not yet been delivered to their destined country. Moreover, this proposed change in the language of the law would also prevent a situation in which an administration could report several proposed sales during the August recess, for example, and thus effectively prevent a congressional veto.

Mr. President, let me only say in final argument for this legislation that this bill is identical to part of legislation previously passed by the Senate when it originally voted on my arms sales proposal in 1973. The need that I foresaw at that time for a sufficiently long period for review has been demonstrated in the practical application of the Nelson amendment since its original passage. The 1975 sale of Hawk missiles to Jordan constituted a major test of the Nelson amendment procedure. In that instance, Congress forced debate on the important foreign policy ramifications of the sale, exposed serious disagreement within the administration on the wisdom of the sale as proposed, and in the end extracted significant concessions in the form of assurances from the President that the weapons would not be transferred in such a way as to allow their use in an offensive capacity against Israel. Those were not insignificant accomplishments. In the words of Judith Miller of the Progressive magazine, Congress effectively "Served notice that it is able and willing to exercise supervisory authority in some cases over administration arms sale policy."

But one will recall that the case of the Jordan Hawk missile sale also pointed

out very serious shortcomings in the present congressional veto procedure. At the very least, it became apparent that 20 calendar days was altogether too short a time for both Houses of Congress to consider adequately a significant and controversial arms sale proposal.

If Congress is to act responsibly, hearings must be held and adequate time allowed for genuine debate of the merits of a specific sale.

Moreover, notification of the sale, coming as it did shortly before the August recess, further dramatized the inadequacy of the present time frame. Nothing presently stops any administration from submitting a sale when Congress is not in session, thus precluding any congressional action.

Last year, Congress increased the time period from 20 to 30 calendar days, but 30 calendar days is still inadequate considering that the clock on that 30 days does not stop ticking over the weekends. The 30-calendar-day procedure makes no distinction between workdays and recesses.

Events in the closing days of the last session dramatically demonstrated the shortcomings even of the 30-calendar-day period. On Wednesday evening, September 1, 1976, on the eve of Congress' traditional Labor Day recess, the President informed Congress of a decision to sell arms to 11 separate countries for a total dollar figure of \$6.024 billion in 37 separate transactions. Starting from the moment Congress received the executive announcement, the clock began ticking toward the 30-day deadline. Failure to act meant that the sales could go through exactly as proposed by the President. The clock had ticked over the recess. When Congress returned from the Labor Day recess, it had only 24 days in which to act.

Therefore, Mr. President, I have concluded from the history of the Nelson amendment in practice, that we need a 30-day period to review a sale in Congress that would exclude from the counting any period of adjournment of more than 3 days or the adjournment of the Congress sine die.

GREATER JUSTIFICATION OF PROPOSED SALES

Another lesson learned in the closing days of the last Congress was that Congress should have at its disposal greater executive justification for the arms sales they propose to Congress for approval. As the law stands now, Congress is only informed what country is involved, the total estimated value of the transaction, a description of the articles and services offered, which U.S. military service is involved, and the sales commission being paid in connection with the sale. This information is insufficient and in the past at least has appeared to be sketchy and lacking in thought of the full range of the implications of such sales.

Such bits and pieces are clearly not adequate to reach any sort of responsible judgement as to the ramifications and advisability of any given sale. What is even worse, frequently such little data as is transmitted is classified in the actual notification to Congress.

Pursuant to section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, more detailed

and analytical information is available to Congress upon its request. This includes data outlining the impact of the proposed sales on U.S. foreign policy, on regional balances and arms sales, on arms control policies and negotiations, on the military preparedness of U.S. Armed Forces and on war reserve stocks. But Congress is allowed only 30 calendar days to act on a proposed arms transfer. Notification, hearings, consideration and any legislative initiatives must all be completed within this time, which has proved inadequate. The 30-day clock, moreover, begins ticking the moment notification is transmitted to Congress. Clearly, Congress has not the time—once notification is given—to wait for the Executive to formulate responses on request to submitted questions on complicated issues. Although the information outlined in section 36(b)(1) (A-M) should be in the Executive's hands before any decision to make an arms transfer is made, experience has shown that it is not.

The legislation I am introducing today requires that this comprehensive analytical information, now available only on request, be transmitted as a matter of course at the same time that notification is given. This provision would not apply to NATO or its member countries.

THIRD COUNTRY TRANSFERS

The third objective of the legislation extends the Nelson amendment mechanism, including its veto procedure, to review of third country transfers of U.S.-supplied military equipment.

Present law allows the President to permit transfers of American made equipment to third countries, provided only that he notify Congress of his intentions. The legislation which I am introducing today brings Congress into this year's decisionmaking process by permitting the Congress to scrutinize such a Presidential grant of permission for a weapons transfer. However, the amendment makes provision for a Presidential waiver of the congressional review requirement, if in his judgment an emergency exists which requires a transfer in the national security interests of the United States.

Both Houses of Congress approved this oversight capability in last year's original International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, S. 2682. President Ford, however, vetoed the entire bill and the third country provision was sacrificed to make S. 2682's successor more palatable to Ford's taste.

In my view, if Congress has the right and responsibility to review and possibly reject a sale in the first instance, it should also have the right and responsibility to disapprove the transfer of those weapons to other countries. The volume of sales has increased geometrically and thus the potential for those weapons to get passed along to other countries is also vastly expanded. This legislation would, for example, enable Congress to consider potentially controversial transfers where the President has given his permission but Congress has not, such as the transfer of a number of F-5 aircraft from Iran to Jordan.

Mr. President, I am encouraged by President Carter's stance on restraining the heavy flow of arms abroad. His administration reflects a philosophy in refreshing contrast to that of recent administrations. As Vice President MONDALI asserted at the end of his European trip, the sale of arms has "reached disgraceful proportions, and is robbing nations of resources they need." The Vice President has also voiced his opinion that "international control of arms transfers" should be placed "at the front rank of the world's agenda." The President also assured us that:

The Secretary of State will be more hesitant in the future to recommend to the Defense Department the culmination of arms sales agreements. I have asked that all approval of arms sales, for a change, be submitted to me directly before the recommendations to Congress.

I would hope that the President will move forward in actions as well as words. As pleased as I am by such Executive pronouncements, however, they ought not serve to obstruct further congressional progress in reasserting its participation in the conduct of foreign affairs.

This is not a partisan issue. It is a question of the constitutional need for adequate input by the legislative branch into the process by which this country relates to others. This requirement speaks to the proper congressional role, and is independent of Executive intent.

The Congress should take pride, moreover, in the fact that it was the legislative branch which first recognized and focused on the significance of U.S. arms transfers, and brought the issue into the public forum. Foreign military sales constitute major foreign policy decisions involving the United States in military activities and potential de facto commitments without sufficient deliberation or participation by those outside the confines of the executive branch. These matters require serious consideration by the Congress in an institutionalized fashion, and should not be the exclusive domain of the executive branch.

If Congress is serious about exercising its full constitutional duty in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy, it must clearly fashion substantive tools with which to forge a responsible arms control policy.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the texts of the legislation I am introducing today be printed in the Record at this time.

There being no objection, the bills were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

S. 1394

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act is amended—

(1) by amending so much of the second sentence as precedes subparagraph (A) to read as follows: "In addition, if the letter of offer is to be issued to a country which is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or is to be issued to an international organization other than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the President shall transmit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Re-

lutions of the Senate a statement setting forth—"; and

(2) by inserting the following new sentence immediately after subparagraph (M) and before the third sentence: "If the letter of offer is to be issued to a country which is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or is to be issued to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the President shall, upon the request of either the Committee on International Relations or the Committee on Foreign Relations, transmit promptly to both such committees a statement setting forth, to the extent specified in such request, the information described in subparagraphs (A) through (M)."

Sec. 2. Section 3d(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act is amended by striking out "thirty calendar days after receiving such certification" in the last sentence and inserting in lieu thereof "the first period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress (as determined in accordance with section 801(b)(1) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976) which begins after the date on which such certification is received by the Congress".

S. 1295

As it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 3(d) of the Arms Export Control Act is amended—

(1) by striking out ", 30 days prior to giving such consent," in the text preceding paragraph (1);

(2) by redesignating such section as section 3(d) (1) and redesignating paragraphs (1) through (5) thereof as subparagraphs (A) through (E), respectively; and

(3) by adding the following new paragraph at the end thereof:

"(2) Unless the President states in the certification submitted pursuant to this subsection that an emergency exists which requires that consent to the proposed transfer become effective immediately in the national security interests of the United States, such consent shall not become effective until the end of the first period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress (as determined in accordance with section 801(b)(1) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976) which begins after the date of such submission and such consent shall become effective then only if the Congress does not adopt, within such 30-day period, a concurrent resolution disapproving the proposed transfer."

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



אוף זאזע
באמיק - סניאן נאסח

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

194

נ" ניסן תשל"ו

6 באפריל 1976

אל: טזפ"א ✓

טאה: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנטור גלסון בעד מכירה ה-130 C למצרים

מצ"ב הודעה שפירסם סנטור גלסון בנדון.

ב ב ר כ ה
3
א. רפיה

העמק: הקונכ"ל, סיקבו

RECEIVED
JAN 10 1971

Handwritten notes:
1/10/71
1/10/71



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1/10/71

RECEIVED

1/10/71

1/10/71

Handwritten initials:
S. G.

RECEIVED

1/10/71

SENATOR GAYLORD NELSON

(202)224-5323

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

76-53

WASHINGTON, D.C., APRIL 2 - Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.), the author of the Nelson Amendment under which Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was mandated to testify today before the Foreign Assistance Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, issued the following statement regarding the Administration's proposed sale for \$65 million of six C-130 transport planes to Egypt.

"The sale of aircraft to Egypt should be regarded more as a political act than a military step. It is part of a Middle East dynamic in which the United States is taking a responsible course as a political broker in encouraging the parties in the Middle East conflict to develop peaceful relations."

Nelson's position differs from that of both critics and defenders of the Administration proposal.

"Both sides are exaggerating the significance of this sale." Nelson explained, "The sale does not change our basic commitment to maintaining Israel's security and promoting peace in the Middle East."

"Those who argue that this step represents the dramatic opening of an irrevocable new military relationship between the United States and Egypt are exaggerating the meaning of the sale. On the other hand, those who argue that if Congress disapproved the proposed sale, it would be a 'slap in the face of Sadat' are also engaging in rhetorical hyperbole, which displays a questionable disregard for Congress' constitutional role in debating America's foreign policy."

Nelson added that, "those who argue that Egypt is actually engaging in a massive disception by coming to the United States for a deepening of their political relationship when they are allegedly still pledged to the Soviet Union, should also be called into question."

Nelson argued that under the Nelson Amendment providing for Congressional veto of foreign military sales, "each future sale to Egypt - or any other nation for that matter - which amounts to \$25 million or more must be reported to Congress which then has

Add One - Arms Sales

twenty days to reject the proposed sale. Therefore, those who say that by approving the C-130 sale under the Nelson Amendment, we are committing the United States government in the future, simply are ignorant of the safeguards which Congress has equipped itself with in recent years."

Nelson also commended the President for not heeding the advice of some not to come to Congress under the Nelson Amendment to discuss the significance of this sale to Egypt but rather to allow the sale to go through commercial channels which would have prevented a Congressional consideration and a veto opportunity.

"We should neither exaggerate the meaning of this sale, nor expect to reap any spectacular benefits. After all Egypt has had a military relationship with Soviet Union which goes back two decades and it will not go away overnight in spite of the attention the press has paid to Sadat's recent abrogation of Egypt's treaty with the Soviet Union. Sadat's military apparatus has grown dependent on Soviet-made goods and that dependency will not be changed by the sale of six C-130s.

"On the other hand, we should not pass up whatever marginal benefits may accrue from engaging in increasing exchanges between this country and Egypt.

"In the delicate game of diplomacy, marginal changes made at significant moments in history may be highly valuable. The United States should be trying to achieve movement toward peace in the Middle East. Progress toward that goal can only be measured in small increments which must be founded on realistic expectations and honest efforts by all."

#

C25jmps

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

ו' חסון חשל"ז
22 יוני 77

Handwritten notes:
למח
סקול

Handwritten notes:
296
קוליס
(וליסין)

אל: מצפ"א
מאח: שי פלדמן, וושינגטון

הנדון: יצוא נשק - חיקון נלסון
שלנו 226 מיום 5 מאי 1977
229 מיום 11 מאי 1977

מליאה הסנט אישרה ב-15 דנא אח חיקון נלסון במסגרת
דיוניה בחוק הסיוע שת"א 78.

רצ"ב נוסח התיקון שנחקבל וכן דבריו של סנטור נלסון
בזכות התיקון. פן רצ"ב הודעה לבוחריו שפרסם נלסון באותו נושא.

נוסח התיקון ודברי נלסון - מרשומות הקונגרס ב-15 דנא.

ב ב כ ה,

Handwritten signature:
שי פלדמן

העמק: המרכז, משה"ח
י. צ'חנובר, ניו-יורק
נספח צה"ל, כאן



298

*Q 130
May*

17 11 55
17 11 55

מ"מ: א"מ

מ"מ: א"מ, מ"מ: א"מ

מ"מ: א"מ - מ"מ: א"מ

מ"מ: א"מ 2 11 55

מ"מ: א"מ 11 55

מ"מ: א"מ 11 55 - מ"מ: א"מ 11 55
מ"מ: א"מ 11 55

מ"מ: א"מ 11 55 - מ"מ: א"מ 11 55
מ"מ: א"מ 11 55

מ"מ: א"מ 11 55 - מ"מ: א"מ 11 55

מ"מ: א"מ

מ"מ: א"מ

מ"מ: א"מ

מ"מ: א"מ

מ"מ: א"מ

quest. This amendment simply provides that it shall be furnished automatically by the administration to the Committee on Foreign Relations at the time the administration sends down the proposed letter of offer to sell arms.

Mr. President, in 1973 I first introduced legislation giving Congress a voice in controlling the burgeoning U.S. arms trade. Passed by Congress in 1974 and enacted in 1975, this measure gave Congress the opportunity to consider—and if necessary, reject—any proposed foreign military sale of \$25 million or more by concurrent resolutions of each House. Strengthened in 1976 with passage of the Arms Export Control Act—Public Law 94-329—congressional review now extends to the proposed sale of any major defense equipment or arms over \$7 million. Congressional oversight has been further improved by the addition of more stringent reporting requirements. There remain obstacles, however, to the establishment of a truly comprehensive congressional oversight capability with regard to U.S. foreign military sales policy. It is with the intention of removing one of these barriers that I offer this amendment.

One lesson learned in the closing days of the last Congress—when President Ford dumped on Congress a \$6 billion plus package of proposed arms sales on the eve of the Labor Day recess—was that Congress should have at its disposal greater Executive justification for the arms sales the executive branch proposes to Congress for approval. Current law does not require enough information about a proposed sale upon which to base an intelligent, reasoned judgment. As it stands now, the law requires only that the Congress be told what country is involved, the total estimated value of the transaction, a description of the articles and services offered, which U.S. military service is involved, and the sales commission being paid in connection with the sale. This information is insufficient and in the past at least has appeared to be sketchy and lacking in consideration of the full range of the implications of a given sale.

Such bits and pieces are clearly not adequate to reach any sort of responsible judgment as to the ramifications and advisability of an arms transfer. What is even worse, frequently such little data as is transmitted is classified in the actual notification to Congress.

Pursuant to section 36(b)(1) (A) through (M) of the Arms Export Control Act, more detailed and analytical information is available to Congress upon its request. This includes data outlining the impact of the proposed sales on U.S. foreign policy, on regional balances and arms races, on arms control policies and negotiations, on the military preparedness of U.S. Armed Forces, and on war reserve stocks. But Congress is allowed only 30 calendar days to act on a proposed arms transfer. Notification, hearings, consideration, and any legislative initiatives must all be completed within this time, which has proved inadequate. The 30-day clock, moreover, begins ticking the moment notification is transmitted to Congress. Clearly, Congress has

not the time—once notification is given—to wait for the Executive to formulate responses on request to submitted questions on complicated issues. There is no mechanism in the Arms Export Control Act to produce necessary supplementary information automatically or even quickly. Although the information outlined in Section 36(b)(1) (A) through (M) should be in the Executive's hands before any decision to make an arms transfer is made, experience has shown at least that this is not always the case. The legislation I am introducing today supplies that missing mechanism. It requires simply that this comprehensive analytical information, now available only on request, be transmitted as a matter of course at the same time as notification is given. This provision would not apply to NATO or its member countries.

This amendment, then, would not only benefit the Congress in its deliberations on arms sales. It would in addition effectively insure thoughtful consideration on the part of the executive branch—before the fact—of the wide-ranging ramifications of foreign military sales.

In his May 19 policy paper on arms export control, and in many other statements during his 6 months in office, President Carter has made clear and convincing his strong commitment to reversing the spiraling arms trade. In an early interview, the President suggested a welcome new direction in U.S. policy:

The Secretary of State will be more hesitant in the future to recommend to the Defense Department the culmination of arms sales agreements. I have asked that all approval of arms sales, for a change, be submitted to me directly before the recommendations to Congress.

Last month's position paper embodied several specific principles to guide U.S. foreign military sales policy, with the overall effect of rather sharply limiting the permissible grounds for approving a sale. Signaling a clear break with past practice, Mr. Carter asserted that in his administration the burden of persuasion will fall on those advocating a sale; rather than indiscriminate encouragement of arms sales for short-term political gains or maintenance of defense industry production lines as in the past, the presumption will be against sales. The President said that—

The United States will henceforth view arms transfers as an exceptional foreign policy implement, to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our national security interests.

Mr. President, I am encouraged by President Carter's forthright stance stemming the heavy flow of U.S. arms abroad. His administration reflects a clear departure from those past in weapons export policy.

This is not a partisan issue, however. It is a question of the constitutional need for substantive, informed input by the legislative branch into the process by which this country relates to others. This requirement speaks to the proper congressional role, and is independent of Executive intent.

The Congress should take pride, more-

BY AMENDMENT NO. 448

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON) proposes an unprinted amendment numbered 448.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:
At the bottom of page 22, add the following NEW SECTION:

GREATER EXECUTIVE BRANCH JUSTIFICATION FOR TRANSMISSION OF PROPOSED LETTERS OF OFFER

Sec. 31. Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act is amended—

(1) by amending so much of the second sentence as precedes subparagraph (A) to read as follows: "In addition, if the letter of offer is to be issued to a country which is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or is to be issued to an international organization other than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the President shall transmit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a statement setting forth—"; and

(2) by inserting the following new sentence:

"If the letter of offer is to be issued to a country which is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or is to be issued to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the President shall, upon the request of either the Committee on International Relations or the Committee on Foreign Relations, transmit promptly to both such committees a statement setting forth, to the extent specified in such request, the information described in subparagraphs (A) through (M)".

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, this amendment speaks only to the insufficiency of information the executive branch provides Congress for its consideration of foreign military sales proposals.

This amendment simply requires that the executive branch shall submit to Congress, as a matter of course, with each proposed letter of offer to sell arms, the information contained in section 36(b)(1) (A) through (M) of the Arms Export Control Act. Under the current law, all this information is available upon re-

S 9894

CON

over, in the fact that it was the legislative branch which first recognized and focused on the significance of U.S. arms transfers, and brought the issue into the public forum. Foreign military sales constitute major foreign policy decisions involving the United States in military activities and potential de facto commitments without sufficient deliberation or participation by those outside the confines of the executive branch. These matters require serious consideration by the Congress in an institutionalized fashion, and should not be within the exclusive domain of the executive branch.

If Congress is serious about exercising its full constitutional duty in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy, it must clearly fashion substantive tools with which to forgo a responsible arms control policy.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, we have discussed this amendment at the staff level and the subcommittee level and at the full committee level with the Senator from Wisconsin. It is a good amendment. It fills in a void in the present Arms Export Control Act, and I recommend that we adopt it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment was agreed to.

SENATOR GAYLORD NELSON

(202)224-5323

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

77-105

WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 16 - The Senate late yesterday accepted an amendment offered by Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.) strengthening the role of Congress in the U.S. arms sales process. The amendment was adopted as part of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act.

"I am encouraged by President Carter's forthright stance stemming the heavy flow of U.S. arms abroad," Nelson said. "This is not a partisan issue, however. It is a question of the constitutional need for substantive informed input by the Legislative Branch into the process by which this country relates to others. This requirement speaks to the proper Congressional role, and is independent of Executive intent."

Nelson's amendment requires the President to submit more comprehensive and analytical information on the objectives and impact of a proposed arms sale at the time Congressional notification is given, rather than simply making that information available to Congress at a later point in the review process.

Specifically, the amendment requires the Executive Branch to provide detailed information on such questions as:

- *the anticipated impact of the sale on overall U.S. foreign policy, arms control policies and ongoing negotiations.
- *the anticipated impact on regional balances and arms races.
- *the reasons why the arms are needed by the purchasing country.
- *the reasons why the sale is in the national interest of the United States.
- *the number of U.S. personnel expected to be involved in carrying out the terms of the sale.

Current law does not require sufficient information about a proposed sale, at the point of notification, for Congress to make "an intelligent, reasoned judgment," Nelson said. Presently, the only information required to be transmitted to Congress with the sale notification is the name of the buyer, the value of the sale, a

12



Add One - Arms Sales

description of the articles or services, the name of the U.S. military service involved, and the sales commission being paid.

United States foreign military sales have grown from less than \$1 billion in 1970 to more than \$14 billion in Fiscal 1976. The weapons and equipment, which formerly went chiefly to NATO allies, now flow in vast quantities to underdeveloped countries in tension-ridden areas of the world, Nelson said.

"One lesson learned in the closing days of the last Congress - when President Ford dumped on Congress a \$6 billion-plus package of proposed arms sales on the eve of the Labor Day recess - was that Congress should have at its disposal greater executive justification for the arms sales the Executive Branch proposes to Congress for approval."

Nelson has been a leader in the effort to secure Congressional influence in decisions to sell American arms to other countries. Congress first gained a role in arms sales decisions with passage of the Nelson Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, which requires the President to submit to Congress any proposed foreign military sale in excess of \$25 million. Congress then has 30 calendar days to study and veto the proposal, if both Houses concur.

#

F1671gck


11
11/10

11


TELEX
TELEX
TELEX
TELEX

15146 24 JAN 77

TELETYPE UNIT



11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100



TELEX
TELEX
TELEX
TELEX

T
DURING
ON
IS
E
NT
CREASE
UT
ND
IONAL
BUT I
HAT IS
NG TO
ITY OF

1550 24 JAN 77

TELEX

TELEX

TELEX

EMENT ON
TAL FROM

100 L
GET. REPT

VERAL
D THE
D. COUNT

PROTECT

05172

Term began: 1967

Home town: Sylacauga

Committees: Armed Services

Biographical Data: Born October 16, 1918; Religion, Methodist; Army, World War II; Career, Alabama House of Representatives, Alabama State Senate, Vice-President Fertilizer Company, President Parker Cotton Gin Company, 1947-66.

District: Nichols' district houses the Army's Fort McClellan. The remainder of the district is made up of cotton agriculture and small towns.

Bill Nichols was a George Wallace floor leader in the Alabama Senate. Since his election in 1966, he has been continuously returned to Washington with more than 75 percent of the vote.

Nichols has never cosponsored any major resolution or declaration in support of Israel. However, he did vote for the Jackson-Vanik freedom of emigration amendment and the \$2.2 billion emergency military authorization after the Yom Kippur War for Israel. He visited Israel and Egypt in 1975 with the Armed Services Committee. After his visit, he said in a statement: "Jerusalem and the State of Israel are important to our Christian world for it was here that Christ was crucified." He noted that Jerusalem is an inter-religious city and concluded after visiting Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt that "no one wants war."

J. C. ...
...
...

12 mont / 9



Handwritten notes: ~~456~~ and $\frac{15}{15}$

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30308

PHONE 875-7851

805 PEACHTREE ST., N.E.
SUITE 656

אסלנטה, 7 בפברואר 1979
י בשבט חל"ס

215.10.7.2 (2018)

אלימר צבי רפיה, וושינגטון
מאת: הקונסוליה הכללית, אסלנטה

הנדון: סנסור נן-ביקור דאנג בארה"ב

סנסור נן, שהופיע ב- (4/2/79) בראיון בטלביזיה, אמר שלדעתו על ארה"ב לנקוט בעמדה מעורפלת ולא לגלות מראש מה תהיה הגובחה במקרה וסין תנסה לכבוש את טייוואן בכוח צבאי. הוא הוסיף שהקונגרס עשוי למכוא דרך להביע המחויבות של ארה"ב לטייוואן באופן נמרץ, אם כי לא תהיה חזרה ליחסים דיפלומטיים.

לדעתו של הסנסור אין ברה"מ יכולה לבוא בטענות כלפי ארה"ב על הצהרותיו של דנג בנושא ההשתלטות הסוביסית. הוא הביע דעות אלה בשיחותיו עם הסנסור ב-1975 ובביקורו השני בסין לפני זמן קצר, ואלה דעות ידועות, והעובדה שהכיען על אדמת ארה"ב אינה צריכה לפגוע בסיכוויי החהימה סאלט 2.

בברכה,
מאיר רומס
קונסול

העמק: קונכ"ל
מר א. בנצור וושינגטון
מצפא ✓
מאסו"ק
מזא"ר



Handwritten notes: } ~~ק"פ~~
מ"ן קולנועים (15)

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30308

PHONE 875-7851

805 PEACHTREE ST., N.E.
SUITE 656

אטלנטה, 7 בפברואר 1979
י בשבט חל"ס

215.10.7.2 (2018)

אליזמר צבי רפיח, וושינגטון
מאחז קונסוליה הכללית, אטלנטה

הנדון: סנסור נז-ביקור דאנג בארה"ב

סנסור נז, שהופיע ב- (4/3/79) בראיון בטלביזיה, אמר שלדעתו על ארה"ב לנקוט בעסדה מעורפלת ולא לגלות מראש מה תהיה תגובתה במקרה וסין תנסה לכבוש את טייוואן בכוח צבאי. הוא הוסיף שהקונגרס עשוי למנוע דרך להביע המחויבות של ארה"ב לטייוואן באופן נטרף, אם כי לא תהיה חזרה ליחסים דיפלומטיים.

לדעתו של הסנסור אין ברה"מ יכולה לבוא בטענות כלפי ארה"ב על הצהרותיו של דנג בנושא ההשתלטות הסובייטית. הוא הביע דעות אלה בשיחותיו עם הסנסור ב-1975 ובבקורות השני בסין לפני זמן קצר, ואלה דעות ידועות, והעובדה שהכיען על אדמת ארה"ב אינה צריכה לפגוע בסיכוויי החהימה סאלט 2.

בברכה,
מאיר רומם
קונסול

העתק: קונב"ל
מר א. בנצור וושינגטון
מצפא ✓
מאסו"ק
מדא"ר