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
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news report

MAY 9, 1978

U.S. RIGHTS POLICY NOT SELECTIVE, RATHER PRACTICAL: BRZEZINSKI

WASHINGTON -- THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IS NOT SELECTIVE, BUT RATHER PRACTICAL. THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION IS "LITERALLY...DEALING WITH THE WORLD AS IT IS AND TRYING TO IMPROVE IT AS BEST WE CAN," SAID ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, IN AN INTERVIEW TELEVIEWED ON CBS MAY 7.

MR. BRZEZINSKI EXPLAINED HIS CONCEPT OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S HUMAN RIGHTS EFFORTS AND TOUCHED ON SEVERAL FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES.

ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HE SAID THAT SINCE PRESIDENT CARTER ASSUMED OFFICE "ALL THE WORLD HAS COME TO RECOGNIZE THAT IN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, HOW ONE DEALS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS MAKES A DIFFERENCE... RELATIONSHIPS OF OTHER COUNTRIES TO THIS COUNTRY ARE AFFECTED BY THEIR CONDUCT."

ASKED IF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION HAD DETERIORATED, MR. BRZEZINSKI SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO NOTE RELATIONS WERE PART OF A PROLONGED HISTORICAL PROCESS, THAT IS "NOT GOING TO BE DRAMATICALLY ALTERED, EITHER FOR THE WORSE OR FOR THE BETTER."

CBS NEWS CORRESPONDENT CHARLES COLLINGWOOD ASKED DR. BRZEZINSKI IF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL TO SELL AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL, EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA WAS NOT "A LITTLE BIT LIKE GIVING MATCHES TO PEOPLE IN A PLACE REEKING WITH GASOLINE FUMES?"

DR. BRZEZINSKI SAID "THE ARMS PROPOSALS FOR THESE THREE COUNTRIES ARE THE BEST CONTRIBUTION WE CAN MAKE TO THEIR RESPECTIVE SENSE OF SECURITY, TO THEIR FEELING THAT THEY CAN PROTECT THEMSELVES, AND ALSO TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERATE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SOME KEY ARAB COUNTRIES ON WHOSE MODERATION THE FURTHER POSITIVE PEACEFUL EVOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPENDS."

"WE THINK, THEREFORE, THAT THESE INITIATIVES WILL BE HELPFUL IN CREATING LINKS AND TIES, NOT ONLY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL, WHICH CONTINUE AND WILL CONTINUE, BUT ALSO BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA, ALL OF WHICH IS TO THE COLLECTIVE GOOD," DR. BRZEZINSKI SAID, "... WE'RE TRYING TO SHAPE REGIONAL STABILITY, WHICH WILL BE GOOD FOR THIS COUNTRY, WHICH WILL BE GOOD FOR ISRAEL, WHICH WILL BE GOOD FOR THE WESTERN WORLD."

(MORE)

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DR. BRZEZINSKI ALSO SAID THAT PESSIMISM ABOUT THE PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS UNWARRANTED.

"WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT TODAY WITH (ISRAELI) PRIME MINISTER (MENACHEM) BEGIN, WHAT WE ARE TALKING TODAY WITH EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT (ANWAR) SADAT ARE THINGS WHICH A YEAR AGO WOULD HAVE BEEN UNDREAMED OF," DR. BRZEZINSKI SAID. "WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. WE'RE TALKING ABOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. WE'RE TALKING ABOUT WITHDRAWALS. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT PERMANENT PEACE. WE ARE BEGINNING TO SEE THE OUTLINES OF PEACE, STILL DISTANT, STILL REMOTE, BUT, FOR THE FIRST TIME, WITHIN THE RANGE OF REALISM."

DR. BRZEZINSKI ALSO ANSWERED CRITICISM OF HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP TO PEKING. MR. COLLINGWOOD ASKED IF THE TRIP WOULD NOT ANTAGONIZE MOSCOW.

"WE'RE NOT GOING THERE TO TWEAK THE RUSSIANS," DR. BRZEZINSKI RESPONDED. "WE'RE GOING THERE BECAUSE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IS A CENTRALLY IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIP IN WORLD AFFAIRS."

DR. BRZEZINSKI ALSO SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT AN ESSENTIAL PROBLEM IN THE FUTURE WAS THE POSSIBILITY "THAT SOME HOSTILE POWER WILL ESTABLISH SUPREMACY OVER US, AND THEREBY GAIN WORLD DOMINATION."

"I THINK THE REAL DANGER IS THAT WE HAVE MOVED INTO A PHASE IN HUMAN HISTORY IN WHICH ALL OF A SUDDEN AN INCREDIBLY MORE NUMEROUS MANKIND -- INCREDIBLY MORE NUMEROUS, BECAUSE THAT GROWTH HAS HAPPENED LARGELY IN THIS CENTURY -- HAS ALSO BECOME POLITICALLY AWAKENED, SOCIALLY AND POLITICALLY ASSERTIVE," HE SAID. "AND EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES ARE BEGINNING TO BREAK DOWN. THEY CANNOT ABSORB THIS NEW DEVELOPMENT."

"AND WE ARE THEREFORE CONFRONTED WITH THE TASK OF EITHER DEVELOPING BROADER, MORE DIVERSIFIED FORMS OF COOPERATION WORLDWIDE, NEW INSTITUTIONS, NEW PROCESSES, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FACE THE PROSPECT OF INCREASING TURBULENCE, CONFLICT, ITS EXPLOITATION BY OUR ADVERSARIES, AS, FOR EXAMPLE, WE SEE RIGHT NOW IN AFRICA, BUT EVENTUALLY MORE AND MORE CHAOS, RATHER THAN THE VICTORY OF OUR ADVERSARIES."

"OCCASIONALLY," DR. BRZEZINSKI ADDED, "OUR ADVERSARIES ARE VERY SHORT-SIGHTED WHEN, INSTEAD OF COOPERATING AND FINDING PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO DIFFICULT COMPLICATED, EMOTIONALLY IMPREGNATED ISSUES, THEY INSTEAD TRY TO STIR THEM UP AND MAKE THEM MORE DIFFICULT."

"...OUR TASK, AS CLEARLY THE RICHEST, THE MOST POWERFUL NATION, WHICH HAS A PHILOSOPHY WHICH I BELIEVE IS RESPONSIVE TO HUMAN ASPIRATIONS, IS TO TRY TO FORGE WIDER AND WIDER FORMS OF COOPERATION."

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WHAT'S RIGHT WITH OUR FOREIGN POLICY

AN INTERVIEW WITH ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

IN AN INTERVIEW IN THE FEBRUARY 13 ISSUE OF U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, PRESIDENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER BRZEZINSKI SAYS THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAS HANDLED A NUMBER OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES "REASONABLY WELL" AND SOME OTHERS NOT AS WELL IN ITS FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE. "MY BASIC VIEW," HE SAYS IN SUMMING UP THE YEAR'S RECORD, "IS THAT AMERICA TODAY IS AGAIN PERCEIVED AS BEING CONSTRUCTIVELY ENGAGED IN HELPING SHAPE A MORE CONGENIAL AND DECENT WORLD."

(BEGIN TEXT)

QUESTION: MR. BRZEZINSKI, HOW DO YOU ANSWER CRITICISM HERE AND ABROAD THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION DOESN'T KNOW WHERE IT'S GOING IN FOREIGN POLICY AND HAS NO CLEAR PRIORITIES?

ANSWER: ONE WAY TO ANSWER WOULD BE TO SAY THAT IF, AFTER THE FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE, ALL YOU'RE FAULTED FOR IS THE RELATIVELY ABSTRACT CHARGE OF NOT HAVING A CLEAR SET OF PRIORITIES, THEN PERHAPS YOU HAVEN'T DONE SO BADLY.

AFTER THE FIRST YEAR OF THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, THE ADMINISTRATION WAS ACCUSED OF THE BAY OF PIGS. THE NIXON OR FORD ADMINISTRATIONS AT DIFFERENT TIMES WERE ACCUSED OF CONCRETE, SPECIFIC ERRORS OF POLICY -- AND SOMETIMES WORSE THAN THAT, HENCE AN ABSTRACT, ESSENTIALLY INTELLECTUAL CRITICISM OF THIS SORT IN A WAY IS A FORM OF TRIBUTE.

IN FACT, I THINK OUR PRIORITIES ARE RELATIVELY CLEAR, AND I CAN REDUCE THEM ESSENTIALLY TO FIVE BROAD PROPOSITIONS.

Q: WHAT ARE THEY?

A: THE FIRST IS TO (GARBLED) WITH A CERTAIN MEASURE OF MORAL CONTENT. THE HUMAN-RIGHTS ISSUE IS VERY PERTINENT HERE.

THE SECOND OBJECTIVE IS TO WIDEN THE SCOPE OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD. IN OTHER WORDS, INSTEAD OF BEING PREOCCUPIED WITH THE CONTEST WITH THE SOVIET UNION -- THOUGH THAT CONTEST CERTAINLY CONTINUES -- WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON STRENGTHENING OUR TIES WITH OUR ALLIES, AND ON DEVELOPING CLOSER RELATIONS WITH MANY NEW REGIONALLY, OR INTERNATIONALLY IMPORTANT POWERS THAT HAVE SURFACED IN THE LAST TWO OR THREE DECADES.

THE THIRD MAJOR PRIORITY IS TO CONTAIN U.S.-SOVIET COMPETITION, PARTICULARLY THROUGH A SALT AGREEMENT THAT WOULD INHIBIT THE ARMS RACE. THIS WOULD HELP TO GENERATE BROADER CO-OPERATION.

(MORE)

THE FOURTH MAJOR PRIORITY IS TO GIVE MORE DIRECT ATTENTION TO THOSE CRISES IN THE WORLD WHICH, IF LEFT UNATTENDED, HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR ESCALATING AND GENERATING A SERIOUS THREAT TO WORLD PEACE. MOST IMPORTANT HERE IS THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT ALSO SOUTHERN AFRICA.

AND THE FIFTH PRIORITY IS TO SENSITIZE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AS WELL AS FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF NEW GLOBALLY SIGNIFICANT ISSUES. AMONG THESE, I WOULD RANK NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND THE ARMS-TRANSFERS ISSUES AS BEING THE MORE IMPORTANT.

Q: IN PURSUING THOSE PRIORITIES, HASN'T THE ADMINISTRATION BEEN GUILTY OF A GREAT DEAL OF VACILLATION, AS CRITICS ALLEGE - ANNOUNCING DRAMATIC INITIATIVES AND THEN REVERSING ITSELF?

A: IT'S IMPORTANT TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN VACILLATION AND THE NEED TO OVERCOME GENUINELY DIFFICULT OBSTACLES. THERE ARE SOME PROBLEMS THAT WE CONFRONT WHICH SIMPLY CANNOT BE ASSAULTED HEAD-ON BECAUSE THEY INVOLVE A VARIETY OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC COMPLICATIONS. BUT IF YOU CHART THE PROGRESS OVER A YEAR, I THINK YOU WOULD SEE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN A NUMBER OF FIELDS -- AND PARTICULARLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

AFTER ALL, WE LIVE IN A WORLD THAT IS REAL. IT'S A WORLD OF POWER, OF COMPETITION AND OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS. YOU HAVE TO MAKE SOME ADJUSTMENTS BETWEEN DIFFERING PULLS.

I DON'T FEEL THAT WE HAVE SHOWN VACILLATION. I AM KEENLY AWARE OF THE FACT THAT WE HAVE BEEN PULLED IN A VARIETY OF DIRECTIONS BY THE REALITIES OF THE WORLD.

Q: IS THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY HAMPERED BY THE FACT THAT JIMMY CARTER HAS HAD LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN THIS FIELD, AND YET DOMINATES POLICY MORE THAN MOST PRESIDENTS?

A: I WOULD SAY THAT IT IS CUSTOMARY FOR AMERICAN PRESIDENTS TO BECOME PRESIDENTS WITHOUT TOO MUCH EXPERIENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

WHAT I HAVE TO SAY ABOUT CARTER IS AWKWARD FOR ME TO SAY, BECAUSE I WORK FOR HIM. I FIND HIM TO BE AN EXTRAORDINARILY INTELLIGENT PERSON, TRULY DETERMINED TO MASTER SUBJECTS THAT HE HAS TO DEAL WITH. BEYOND THAT, HE DOES TRY TO OBTAIN INPUTS FROM A GROUP OF ADVISERS AND NOT MAKE JUDGMENTS ON THE BASIS OF JUST A QUICK REACTION.

Q: LET'S TURN TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S HANDLING OF SPECIFIC INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. DID YOU WASTE A YEAR IN THE SEARCH FOR A MIDEAST PEACE BY INSISTING ON A GENEVA CONFERENCE TO NEGOTIATE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT?

A: LET'S JUST STAND BACK AND ASK OURSELVES WHAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE COURSE OF THIS PAST YEAR. AND WHEN I SAY "WE," I REALLY MEAN "WE," BECAUSE WE PUSHED THIS FORWARD.

LOOK AT THE POSITION ISRAEL -- AND PARTICULARLY BEGIN (ISRAEL'S PRIME MINISTER) -- HAS TODAY ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES, AND COMPARE IT TO A YEAR AGO. LOOK AT THE POSITION TODAY OF THE ARABS, NOTABLY THE EGYPTIANS, ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES, AND COMPARE IT WITH WHAT THEY WERE SAYING A YEAR AGO -- 1977 WAS A YEAR OF REALLY REMARKABLE PROGRESS. THAT PROGRESS WOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IF THEY HAD NOT GENERATED THE MOMENTUM. AND I THINK IF WE CAN KEEP THIS PROCESS MOVING FORWARD, WE WILL MAKE '78 A CONSTRUCTIVE YEAR.

(MORE)

Q: NOW THAT A GENEVA CONFERENCE HAS BEEN BYPASSED BY THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TALKS, WHAT ROLE DO YOU SEE FOR THE U.S.?

A: A FEW WEEKS AGO, SOME WERE COOING AND CROWING ABOUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH WE HAD BEEN FORCED OUT OF THE PLAY. NOW EVERYONE IS SAYING HOW IMPORTANT IT IS FOR US TO GET IN AND HELP. WE HAVE NEVER BEEN QUITE AS MUCH OUT OF IT AS IT WAS, NOR ARE WE AS DECISIVE A FACTOR AS SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS NOW ALLEGE. WE ARE A NECESSARY AND CONTINUING ELEMENT IN THE PROCESS.

WHAT WE HAVE TRIED TO AVOID IS THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WILL SEEK TO IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT. THAT WOULD NOT BE WORKABLE; IT WOULDN'T BE STABLE.

Q: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

A: I WOULD HOPE THAT WE CAN, NO. 1, REACTIVATE THE SADAT-BEGIN (DIALOGUE) WHICH OPERATES IN TWO TRACKS -- MILITARY AND POLITICAL. SECONDLY, WIDEN IT TO INVOLVE THE JORDANIANS AND MODERATE PALESTINIANS, MAKING IT POSSIBLE TO DEAL CONSTRUCTIVELY, AT LEAST WITH THE FUTURE OF THE SINAI AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

ONE MUSTN'T ASSUME THAT THE STALEMATE WHICH DEVELOPED RECENTLY IS THE SAME THING AS A DEADLOCK. A NEGOTIATING PROCESS SUCH AS THIS ONE IS BOUND TO HAVE ITS UPS AND ITS DOWNS.

THERE ARE GOING TO BE MOMENTS IN WHICH ONE OR ANOTHER PARTY WALKS OUT. THERE ARE GOING TO BE MOMENTS IN WHICH ONE PARTY ABUSES THE OTHER TO AN INTOLERABLE DEGREE. THERE ARE GOING TO BE MOMENTS IN WHICH ONE SIDE RESPONDS TO THE OTHER BY SAYING, "THIS IS ABSOLUTELY OUT OF THE DISCUSSION; I WILL NEVER DISCUSS IT," AND THEN LATER NEGOTIATES ABOUT IT. THIS IS INHERENT IN THIS PROCESS AND I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD OVERLY DRAMATIZE SPECIFIC INCIDENTS.

Q: TO MAINTAIN U.S. INFLUENCE, WILL THE ADMINISTRATION MEET PRESIDENT SADAT'S REQUEST FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT?

A: I THINK WE'LL HAVE TO GIVE IT VERY SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. AFTER ALL, WHAT IS IMPORTANT HERE IS TO AVOID THE SITUATION IN WHICH THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY TURN TO SADAT AND SAY, "YOU HAVE BURNED YOUR BRIDGES WITH THE SOVIETS, AND NOW YOU HAVE BEEN LEFT IN A DEFENSELESS POSITION." I DON'T THINK THAT'S IN OUR INTEREST. I DON'T THINK THAT'S IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST.

Q: TURNING TO RUSSIA; HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THE SWITCH IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION FROM A TOUGH STAND ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND A STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY TO A SEEMINGLY ARDENT PURSUIT OF DETENTE?

A: THERE WAS A STORY IN THE NEW YORK TIMES THE OTHER DAY WHICH INDICATES THAT THE SOVIETS DON'T PERCEIVE US AS BEING SO ARDENT IN THE PURSUIT OF DETENTE. IT CLAIMED THAT WE ARE NOT PURSUING IT ENOUGH. TO BE SURE, TRUTH IS IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER.

I DON'T THINK WE'RE PURSUING DETENTE PER SE. WHAT WE ARE SEEKING IS A RELATIONSHIP IN DETENTE THAT IS COMPREHENSIVE AND RECIPROCAL -- THEREFORE MORE STABLE, MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

Q: WHY HAS THE ADMINISTRATION ABANDONED ITS SALT PROPOSAL OF LAST MARCH THAT CALLED FOR BIG CUTS IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS?

(MORE)

A: THERE IS A TENDENCY TO OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT WE MADE TWO PROPOSALS LAST MARCH. ONE WAS QUITE MODEST; ONE WAS QUITE AMBITIOUS. WE ARE NOW LIKELY TO OBTAIN SOMETHING IN BETWEEN THEM -- AND SOMETHING WHICH I THINK WILL BE QUITE DEFENSIBLE. BUT IT CERTAINLY DOES NOT BEAR OUT THE PROPOSITION THAT WE HAVE BACKTRACKED, BECAUSE WE DELIBERATELY STARTED WITH THESE TWO OPTIONS.

IF WE GET THE AGREEMENT, IT WILL GIVE US WHAT WE THINK IS IMPORTANT -- NAMELY, GENUINE RECIPROCITY AS WELL AS REDUCTION IN NUMBERS, AND SOME GENUINE RESTRAINTS ON QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS. HOWEVER, I HAVE TO EMPHASIZE THAT'S ASSUMING WE GET THE AGREEMENT WE'RE SEEKING.

Q: ARE SALT NEGOTIATIONS BOGGING DOWN?

A: IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT WE WERE MORE HOPEFUL LAST SUMMER -- AND EVEN LAST FALL -- AS TO THE TIMING OF THE CONCLUSION TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. I'M NOT GOING TO TRY TO EXTRICATE US FROM THAT..

Q: WHAT'S THE HANG-UP?

A: PERHAPS IT'S THE INTRUSION OF OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, SUCH AS INTERNAL SOVIET POLITICS.

IN ANY CASE, THERE IS CONTINUING PROGRESS, AND ALMOST EVERY WEEK SOME ISSUE GETS RESOLVED. BUT IT CERTAINLY MEANS A SLOWER PACE THAN THE ONE WE WERE HOPING FOR LAST YEAR.

Q: (GARBLED) U.S. SILENCE OF LATE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION?

A: WE DID NOT GO OUT OF OUR WAY TO IDENTIFY OUR HUMAN-RIGHTS POLICY AS ONE DIRECTED AT THE SOVIET UNION. EVENTS -- PARTICULARLY IN THE FIRST TWO WEEKS OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION -- CREATED THAT IDENTIFICATION TO SOME EXTENT, ALTHOUGH WE WANTED OUR SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS TO BE A GENERALIZED, GLOBAL PRINCIPLE. AFTER WE BEGAN TO EMPHASIZE MORE AND MORE THE GLOBAL CHARACTER OF OUR INTEREST, WE WERE ACCUSED OF HAVING COMPROMISED AND OF HAVING BACKTRACKED. OUR CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS NEITHER EXEMPTS NOR FOCUSES EXCLUSIVELY ON THE SOVIET UNION.

Q: ARE THE SOVIETS POSING A CHALLENGE FOR THE PRESIDENT WITH THEIR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA?

A: I HOPE WE WILL NOT HAVE SUCH A CHALLENGE. WE'RE NOT SEEKING ONE. I TRUST THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT SEEKING ONE. THE ISSUE BETWEEN SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA SHOULD BE RESOLVED ON A REGIONAL BASIS, INVOLVING THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES THEMSELVES, AND WITH RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NON-INTERVENTION FROM ABROAD.

JUST AS A SOVIET/CUBAN INTERVENTION IS NOW DEVELOPING, IT CAN ALSO BE REVERSED -- AND IT SHOULD BE. I AM SURE MOST AFRICAN COUNTRIES DO NOT WANT FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN AFRICA. I THINK THE SOVIETS KNOW OUR VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT.

Q: GETTING BACK TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S HUMAN-RIGHTS POLICY: ISN'T THERE A DANGER OF LAYING OURSELVES OPEN TO THE CHARGE OF HYPOCRISY BY CRACKING DOWN ON A SMALL AND POWERLESS COUNTRY SUCH AS NICARAGUA, WHILE SEEMING TO IGNORE VASTLY GREATER HUMAN-RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN RUSSIA, CHINA OR IRAN?

(MORE)

A: I'M SURE YOU MUST HAVE CONFRONTED THIS SAME ISSUE IN DIFFERENT WALKS OF LIFE. THE ISSUE ARISES MOST TYPICALLY IN THE APPLICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF LAW. IF YOU CANNOT PUNISH ALL CRIMINALS, IS IT FAIR TO PUNISH THE ONE THAT YOU CAN PUNISH? THE SAME THING APPLIES TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IF, IN FACT, YOU ARE IN A POSITION, WITHOUT DAMAGING YOUR OTHER RELATIONSHIPS, TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE CASE OF COUNTRY 'A' BUT NOT PROGRESS IN THE CASE OF COUNTRY 'B' SHOULD YOU THEREFORE ABSTAIN FROM MAKING PROGRESS IN THE CASE OF COUNTRY 'A'? I WOULD SAY NO.

Q: BUT COUNTRY 'B' ALWAYS SEEMS TO BE THE COUNTRY (GARBLED) THAT WE WANT OR NEED --

A: THAT IS PRECISELY THE PROBLEM THAT ARISES IN THE REAL WORLD. WHAT YOU ARE SAYING IN EFFECT, IS: "DON'T DO ANYTHING AT ALL ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS."

IS IT REALLY UNIMPORTANT THAT WE CAN GET 10,000 POLITICAL PRISONERS RELEASED IN INDONESIA? IS IT REALLY UNIMPORTANT THAT, IN THE CASE OF SOME EAST EUROPEAN OR LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES, WITH SOME CAUTION AND WITHOUT FANFARE, THINGS MAY HAVE IMPROVED BECAUSE OF OUR CONCERNS?

Q: HOW DO YOU JUSTIFY A POLICY ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION THAT PENALIZES SOME OF OUR BEST FRIENDS -- BRAZIL, FOR ONE -- WHILE REWARDING A COUNTRY SUCH AS INDIA THAT FOR YEARS WAS HOSTILE?

A: THERE'S NO WAY OF DENYING THE PROPOSITION THAT OUR INTENTION TO SLOW THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY HAS INTRODUCED COMPLICATIONS IN RELATIONS WITH SOME GOVERNMENTS. HOW DO YOU BALANCE ONE GOOD OBJECTIVE WITH OTHER GOOD OBJECTIVES? WE ATTACH ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE TO GOOD RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL. BUT WE ALSO WANT TO AVOID A SITUATION IN WHICH BRAZIL (GARBLED) ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THE ONLY WAY TO SEEK THAT OBJECTIVE IS TO TRY TO SLOW DOWN THE DISSEMINATION OF A TECHNOLOGY WHICH MAKES MORE WEAPON-POSSESSING STATES MORE LIKELY, AND TO ESTABLISH OTHER WAYS OF USING NUCLEAR ENERGY USEFULLY. THIS IS WHAT WE'RE TRYING TO DO THROUGH THE INFCEP -- INTERNATIONAL FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION PROGRAM -- IN WHICH SOME 40 COUNTRIES ARE NOW PARTICIPATING. IN TRYING TO DO THIS, WE GENERATE SOME FRICTIONS. WHETHER THE COST OF THESE FRICTIONS IS WORTH IT DEPENDS ON A VERY DIFFICULT JUDGMENT.

Q: GIVEN YOUR OBJECTIVE, WHY DID PRESIDENT CARTER PROMISE HEAVY WATER TO INDIA, A COUNTRY THAT ALREADY IS GUILTY OF DIVERTING EARLIER SUPPLIES TO STAGE A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION?

A: THE SPECIFIC PROMISE THE PRESIDENT MADE IS TO REPLACE THAT WHICH THE RECENT ACCIDENT AT THE INDIAN HEAVY-WATER PLANT PREVENTED FROM BEING PRODUCED. IT WAS A GOOD-WILL GESTURE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN EFFORT TO WORK OUT WITH INDIA AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH GETS THE INDIANS TO ACCEPT INTERNATIONAL (CONTROLS) OVER ALL THEIR NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

Q: ANOTHER FOREIGN-POLICY GOAL THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION SET WAS A STEADY CUT IN OVERSEAS ARMS SALES. YET THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN SUCH SALES OVER THE PAST YEAR --

A: WE SAID THAT, AFTER THE FIRST YEAR -- DURING WHICH WE WERE MEETING A LOT OF COMMITMENTS THAT WERE ALREADY MADE -- WE WILL, YEAR BY YEAR, REDUCE FOREIGN ARMS SALES TO THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH ARE NOT OUR ALLIES. WE WILL TRY TO MEET THAT OBJECTIVE.

WE ARE TRYING TO PERSUADE OTHER COUNTRIES THAT SUPPLY ARMS TO JOIN US IN A SIMILAR (POLICY), ULTIMATELY IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR US TO STICK TO THIS GOAL IF OTHERS CONTINUE TO SELL AS MUCH OR MORE THAN IN THE RECENT PAST. WE'RE EVEN BEGINNING TO TALK TO THE RUSSIANS ON THIS SUBJECT NOW.

Q: WHY ARE WE SELLING SOPHISTICATED AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEMS -- AWACS -- TO IRAN AND THE MOST ADVANCED F-15 TO SAUDI ARABIA, IN VIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT NOT TO INTRODUCE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS INTO AREAS WHERE THEY DON'T EXIST?

A: IF WE GO FOR THE F-15s FOR SAUDI ARABIA, WE WILL BE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE LEVEL AND THE SOPHISTICATION OF THE SOVIET EQUIPMENT IN IRAQ, AND PERHAPS ALSO IN ETHIOPIA BEFORE TOO LONG. THERE IS ALSO THE FACT THAT ISRAEL HAS F-15s. SO IT WILL NOT REALLY MEAN INTRODUCING A MORE-SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM INTO THE REGION.

Q: AND THE AWACS TO IRAN?

A: THIS WAS SOMETHING WHICH WAS INITIATED BEFORE WE MADE THE POLICY. IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, THE ALTERNATIVE WAS A MUCH MORE EXTENSIVE SYSTEM, INVOLVING A MUCH LARGER PRESENCE OF AMERICANS AND MANY MORE FACILITIES. WE THOUGHT THAT ON BALANCE, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, THIS WAS NOT A BAD WAY TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM.

Q: IF YOU HAD TO WRITE A TERM PAPER ON THE LESSONS YOU HAVE LEARNED IN YOUR FIRST YEAR, WHAT WOULD IT SHOW?

A: IN FACT, I HAVE WRITTEN A TERM PAPER ON WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. THERE ARE ABOUT 15 OR 20 ITEMS ON THE LIST OF THINGS WE HAVE DONE REASONABLY WELL, AND MAYBE ABOUT 10 ON THE OTHER SIDE.

ON THE PLUS SIDE, IT INCLUDES MOVEMENT TOWARD A MORE COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST; FOCUSING ON THE ISSUES, AND IDENTIFYING THE U.S. WITH THIS ISSUE, ENCOURAGING GREATER GLOBAL CONCERN FOR NON-PROLIFERATION AND ARMS RESTRAINT; NEGOTIATING THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES; WIDENING THE SCOPE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS WHILE INSISTING ON RECIPROCITY AND COMPREHENSIVENESS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM; INITIATIVES TO STRENGTHEN NATO AND TO DEVELOP A GLOBAL RAPID-DEVELOPMENT MILITARY CAPABILITY.

Q: AND THE PRINCIPAL SHORTCOMINGS?

A: WE DIDN'T THINK THROUGH SOON ENOUGH SOME OF THE INHERENT TENSION BETWEEN NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS; WE MIGHT HAVE DEALT WITH THESE PROBLEMS IN A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT WAY -- FOR EXAMPLE, PREPARED THE GROUND FOR GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED FOR A U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT I AM SURE OTHERS CAN EXPAND ON THIS LIST BETTER THAN I.

MY BASIC VIEW IS THAT TODAY AMERICA IS AGAIN PERCEIVED AS BEING CONSTRUCTIVELY ENGAGED IN HELPING TO SHAPE A MORE CONGENIAL AND DECENT WORLD --

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להלן הדברים ומתייחסים למזרח התיכון מתוך ראיון בז'ינטיקה לתכנית
הטלויזיה "לנוכח פני האומה" ב-8.1:

000 HERMAN: MR BRZEZINSKI PRESIDENT SADAT SAID LAST WEEK THAT HE AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, MR CARTER HAVE AGREED ON THE NEXT STEPS TO BE TAKEN. IS THERE A SIMILAR AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL ON WHAT THE STEPS ARE AND HOW TO GO ABOUT PROCEEDING?

BRZEZINSKI: YES I WOULD SAY ESSENTIALLY THAT IS THE CASE. THESE NEXT STEPS ARE IN THE MAIN PROCEDURAL, THAT IS TO SAY WE EXPECT THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO BE ATTENDING THE MEETING IN JERUSALEM WHICH IS TO BE HELD IN SLIGHTLY MORE THAN A WEEK FROM NOW AND THAT MEETING ITSELF WILL ADDRESS ITSELF TO THE LARGER ISSUES BOTH OF SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE.

THOMAS: DR. BRZEZINSKI THERE ARE REPORTS THAT ISRAEL MAY EXPAND ITS SETTLEMENTS IN THE SINAI. WOULD THAT BE A SHOW OF LACK OF GOOD FAITH ON THE PART OF ISRAEL IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IF THAT HAPPENED?

BRZEZINSKI: WELL TO BE PERFECTLY FRANK, I THINK IT MIGHT BE A SIGN OF POOR JUDGEMENT IN THE SENSE THAT THE CREATION OF SUCH SETTLEMENTS AT THIS STAGE IF IN FACT THEY ARE TO BE CREATED -- AND THERE IS SOME UNCERTAINTY ON THIS MATTER--

MIGHT COMPLICATE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. I UNDERSTAND THIS ISSUE IS BEING CONSIDERED VERY SERIOUSLY BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND I AM SURE IT WILL SHOW BOTH GOOD JUDGEMENT AND THE GOOD FAITH THAT WE TRADITIONALLY EXPECT AND HAVE HAD FROM IT.

KALB- WHEN YOU TALKED A MOMENT AGO ABOUT AN IDENTITY OF VIEWS ON THE BROAD PRINCIPLES. I ASSUME THAT ONE OF THOSE PRINCIPLES HAS TO CONCERN THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. ARE YOU SUGGESTING THAT THERE IS AN AGREEMENT ON PALESTINIAN SELF DETERMINATION THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN ACCEPTS?

BRZEZINSKI: NO I SAID THAT THERE WAS AN UNDERLYING AGREEMENT ON THE BROAD OUTLINES AND THE BASIC ISSUES INVOLVED IN A SETTLEMENT. THAT IS TO SAY TODAY AFTER REALLY ONE YEAR OF VERY INTENSE
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EFFORTS LARGELY BY PRESIDENT CARTER HIMSELF, THE PARTIES CONCERNED HAVE COME TO ACCEPT THE NOTION THAT THE CENTRAL ISSUES IN THE DISPUTE WHICH HAVE TO BE RESOLVED, ARE THE ISSUES OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE, A BINDING PEACE, A GENUINE PEACE. SECONDLY, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND THIRDLY, A RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. IF YOU JUST THINK WHERE WE WERE A YEAR AGO WITH REGARD TO THESE ISSUES AND WHERE WE ARE TODAY THE PROGRESS HAS BEEN REALLY REMARKABLE. THIS HAS TRULY BEEN A YEAR OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND A YEAR OF STRIKING PROGRESS WHICH CULMINATED, AS WE ALL KNOW IN THE HISTORIC JERUSALEM VISIT BUT THAT PROGRESS ITSELF HAS INVOLVED BOTH SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE.

KALB: RIGHT. NOW, ON THE QUESTION OF SELF DETERMINATION, IS IT THE AMERICAN POSITION NOW BASED UPON WHAT PRESIDENT CARTER SAID IN HIS LAST INTERVIEW, THAT THE US NOW SUPPORTS LIMITED SELF DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS?

BRZEZINSKI: THE PRESIDENT AFTER HIS MEETING IN ASWAN WITH PRESIDENT SADAT A MEETING WHICH WAS PRECEDED BY INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SAUDI LEADERSHIP IN RIYADH WITH KING HUSSEIN AND THE SHAH IN TEHRAN STATED THAT THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED HAS TO BE RESOLVED IN ALL OF ITS ASPECTS AND THAT ARRANGEMENTS HAVE TO BE FOUND TO ENABLE THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR FUTURE. NOW WE USE THESE WORDS VERY DELIBERATELY - PARTICIPATE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR FUTURE. PARTICIPATE MEANS THAT OTHERS ARE INVOLVED ALSO AND THESE OTHERS ARE OF COURSE JORDAN AND ISRAEL.

KALB: SO THAT IS A FORM OF LIMITED SELF DETERMINATION. THEY ARE INVOLVED IN A PROCESS THEMSELVES BUT DO NOT HAVE TOTAL CONTROL OVER IT.

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I DONT WANT TO USE THE WORD LIMITED, BECAUSE THAT COULD CREATE A MISUNDERSTANDING AS TO WHAT IS INVOLVED. WHAT IS INVOLVED IS AN EFFORT TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE PARTIES DIRECTLY AFFECTED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE ARRANGEMENTS THAT WILL EVENTUALLY RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. THIS MEANS FINDING AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH GIVES MODERATE PALESTINIANS A SENSE OF IDENTITY AN ENTITY WITH WHICH THEY CAN BE ASSOCIATED BUT ALSO ARRANGEMENTS WHICH TAKE FULLY INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS BOTH OF ISRAEL AND OF JORDAN.

THOMAS: DR. BRZEZINSKI, PRESIDENT CARTER SAID THAT BEGIN AND SADAT AGREE IN PRINCIPLE THAT THERE ARE NO DIFFERENCES SEPARATING THEM. HE SAID THAT HE AGREES WITH SADAT AND SO FORTH. SO WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?

BRZEZINSKI: WELL THE PROBLEM IS THAT EVEN AS YOU AGREE IN PRINCIPLE ON THE NATURE OF THE ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED AND EVEN IF YOU AGREE ON THE SHADOWY OUTLINES OF AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT ALL OF THE DIFFICULTIES

STEPS TOWARDS REACHING THAT SETTLEMENT ALL OF THE VERY MANY SPECIFIC ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED PROCEDURAL, SUBSTANTIVE TRANSITIONAL AS WELL AS PERMANENT - ARE ENORMOUSLY COMPLICATED AND VERY PAINFUL AND THIS MEANS THAT THERE WILL BE A COMPLICATED COMPLEX FREQUENTLY PAINFUL NEGOTIATING PROCESS STILL AHEAD OF US.

THOMAS: WELL DOES THAT MEAN THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL GET AN AGREEMENT ON A SET OF PRINCIPLES AT THE START OF THE PLIITICAL MEETINGS WHICH HE APPARENTLY WANTS?

BRZEZINSKI: IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO BEGIN THAT WAY INDEED, BECAUSE IF WE COULD GET A MORE EXPLICIT ARTICULATION OF THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE PROCESS AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION WILL BE BASED, THIS IN ITSELF WILL MOVE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS FORWARD.

THOMS: BUT DO YOU HAVE A FEELING THAT ISRAEL WILL GO FOR THAT??

BRZEZINSKI: I THINK ISRAEL IS APPROCHING THE WHOLE PROCESS WITH GOOD WILL AND A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY. I KNOW THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAS TALKED TO PRESIDENT SDAT ABOUT THE QUESTION OF A BROAD STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLESM. IT IS NOT EASY TO RESOLVE BECAUSE EVERYONE KNOWS THAT SUCH A STATEMENT SETS IN MOTIO CERTAIN THINGS, AND PUTS THEM IN A CERTAIN DIRECTION, BUT IP THINK WE ARE MOVING THAT WAY.

HERMAN: LET ME ASK YOU ABOUT THAT TO QUOTE YOU AS NEARLY AS I CAN, COMPLICATED, FREQUENTLY PAINFUL PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING STILL AHEAD OF US IS THAT SOMETING THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A YEAR? I REMEMBER HOW LONG IT TOK US TO NEGOTIATE VIET NAM IN PARIS AND VARIOUS THINGS OF THAT SORT. CAN THIS DIFFICULT PAINFUL NEGOTIATINN BE SOLVED IN ONE YEAR-?

BRZEZINSKI: I THINK ONLY A FOOL WOULD FIX HIMSELF SO PRECISELY TO A DATE OR A TIME SPAN. MY GUESS WOULD BE --

HERMAN: WELL THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID AS YOU KNOW THAT HE HOPES IT WILL BE IN 78.

BRZEZINSKI: MY GUESS WILL BE THAT 78 WILL MARK VERY SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS PERHAPS THE RESOLUTION OF SOME ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM BUT IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE WHOLE NEGOTIATING PROCESS UNTIL THE FINAL RESOLUTION OF ALL ISSUES MIGHT TAKE US WELL BEYOND 78. AND I DONT THINK THAT IS IMPORTANT IN ITSELF. IF YOU THINK OF THIS CONFLICT OFTHE DIMENSIONS OF THE HUMAN TRAGEDY INVOLVED OF THE COMPLICATIONS POLITICAL AND MORAL, OF THE LAST THIRTY YEARS OF STRUGGLE WHETHER ITS RESOLUTION NOW TAKES ONE YEAR OR TWO YEARS IS UNIMPORTANT. SEVENTY SEVEN WAS A YEAR OF GIANT PROGRESS REALLY SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS. AND I THINK HISTORIANS WILL SAY THAT THIS WAS THE YEAR WHICH SET IN MOTION

THE GENUINE COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. AND WHETHER 78 OR 79 IS THE YEAR OF THE RESOLUTION ULTIMATELY IS I THINK LESS IMPORTANT.

KALB: YOU TALKED A MOMENT AGO ABOUT MODERATE PALESTINIANS, AND I AM SURE THAT YOU USED THE TERM DELIBERATELY AS WELL, AND YOU ALSO ARE QUOTED IN A PARIS MATCH ARTICLE AS SAYING AND NOW BYE BYE PLO. IS THAT TO SUGGEST THAT IN YOUR CONCEPT AT THIS POINT THE PLO REALLY HAS NO EFFECTIVE ROLE TO PLAY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS?

24+3+6, (8) I THAT PARIS MATCH DISCUSSION— I USE THE WORD DISCUSSION ADVISEDLY— I WAS TALKING TO A VERY GOOD FRIEND OF MINE, MARC ULLAM, WHO IS A VERY RESPONSIBLE, VERY SERIOUS EUROPEAN WRITER. I WAS NOT RECORDING WHAT I WAS SAYING HE AS FAR AS I REMEMBER WAS NOT TAKING NOTES ON WHAT I WAS SAYING. WHAT I DID SAY WAS THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE PLO BY MAINTAINING AN INTRANSIGENT POSITION HAD PUT ITSELF OUTSIDE OF THE NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK AND WHETHER IN THAT CONTEXT I THEN ADDED AND SO, IT IS BYE BYE PLO — OR NOT, I HONESTLY DON'T REMEMBER. BUT THE THRUST OF MY REMARK WAS THAT THE PLO TOOK ITSELF OUT OF THE NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK. FOR THE ULTIMATE RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE MODERATE PALESTINIAN WILL HAVE TO BE INVOLVED. WHERE THEY COME FROM IS TO BE DETERMINED. BUT WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT THEY BE MODERATE. WHAT DOES MODERATE MEAN? MODERATE MEANS THAT THEY BE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ON THE BASIS OF THE SAME PREMISES AS THE OTHERS AND THAT MEANS ABOVE ALL ESLE 242 AND 338, IN ADDITION TO WHATEVER PROGRESS IN THE MEANTIME IS MADE.

KALB: SO YOU DON'T DEFINE THE PLO NOW AS AMONG THE MODERATE PALESTINIANS DO YOU?

BRZEZINSKI: I DON'T THINK I SHOULD BE IN THE BUSINESS OF DEFINING ANYBODY. THEY DEFINE THEMSELVES BY THEIR ACTS AND THEIR POSTURES. IF THEY ARE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE —

KALB: NO I UNDERSTAND BUT WE ARE QUOTING— WE ARE QUOTING YOU AT THIS POINT FROM THIS ARTICLE—

HERMAN: AND THE PRESIDENT AT A NEWS CONFERENCE SAID A SOLUTION

KALB: THE PRESIDENT IN EFFECT SAID THAT THEY HAVE RULE THEMSELVES OUT. AND EFFECTIVELY AT THIS POINT, ARE YOU BOTH NOT SAYING THAT THE PLO IS NOT MODERATE AND THEREFORE IS OUT OF THIS PROCESS AT THIS TIME?

BRZEZINSKI: WELL WE KNOW THAT THE PLO IS NOT IN THE PROCESS. WE KNOW THAT IT IS NOT IN THE PROCESS BECAUSE IT HAS NOT TAKEN A MODERATE POSITION. SO THOSE ARE JUST FACTS THAT IS NOT A MATTER OF US CHARACTERIZING IT.

HERMAN: THEN THE PLACE TO GO FROM THOSE FACTS AS YOU PUT THEM IS CAN

WILL THERE BE A SUCCESSFUL PEACE AGREEMENT IN THE AREA THAT NEGLECTS TOTALLY THE PLO?

BRZEZINSKI: I THINK A SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIANS QUESTION WILL REQUIRE THE PARTICIPATION IN IT OF MODERATE PALESTINIANS.

HERMAN: ONLY?

BRZEZINSKI: MODERATE PALESTINIANS. NOW THOSE MODERATE PALESTINIANS CAN COME FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, AND TOWARDS THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF A PERMANENT PEACE THAT PEACE WHICH IS COMPREHENSIVE AND BINDING.

THOMAS: WHY IS IT THAT NONE OF THE SO CALLED PEACE PLANS TAKE IN SOME TWO MILLION PALESTINIAN REFUGEES MAINLY IN LEBANON AND SO FORTH? WHAT HAPPENS TO THEM?

BREZINSKI: WELL WHEN WE SAY THAT THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM HAS TO BE RESOLVED IN ALL OF ITS ASPECTS WE ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE REALITY OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. THIS IS A REALLY STAGGERING PROBLEM, IN SIZE, IN THE SCALE OF HUMAN SUFFERING, IN THE DIFFICULTIES OF ITS RESOLUTION. IF THE SOLUTION THE PEACE SOLUTION ENTAILS SOME PALESTINIAN ENTITY ON THE WEST BANK AND ON THE GAZA STRIP PREFERABLY RELATED TO JORDAN THEN THE QUESTION OF THE REFUGEES MAY BE IN PART SOLVED BY THAT REALITY NAMELY THAT PRESUMABLY THERE WILL BE SOME RESETTELEMENT OF THOSE WHO WISH TO RETURN TO THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA THROUGH SETTLEMENT IN THESE TWO AREAS. BUT WHEN YOU SAY TWO MILLION YOU IMMEDIATELY INDICATE THE LIMITATIONS OF THAT SOLUTION. THEY CANNOT ALL BE ACCOMMODATED EVERY SINGLE ONE OF THEM ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP AND THEREFORE THE PROBLEM IN SOME DIMENSIONS IS ALSO A REGIONAL ONE AND I WOULD ASSUME THAT ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF A SETTLEMENT EVENTUALLY WILL BE ALSO SOME REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN A PLAN WHICH WILL MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE GROWING AND EXPANDING ECONOMIES OF THE COUNTRIES DIRECTLY AFFECTED TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM WHICH HAS SOCIAL HUMAN POLITICAL DIMENSIONS.

KALB: ON ANOTHER AREA HERE-

HERMAN: BEFORE YOU CHANGE MARVIN, LET ME JUST -- I AM NOT QUITE SURE I GOT AN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION BEFORE. I GOT A REPLY BUT I AM NOT SURE I GOT AN ANSWER TO WHETHER YOU THINK AN EFFECTIVE PEACE CAN BE WORKED OUT IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITHOUT THE PLO.

BRZEZINSKI: WELL YOU GOT AN ANSWER MAYBE IT WAS NOT A SATISFACTORY ANSWER. AS I SAID BEFORE I DON'T THINK WE OUGHT TO BE IN THE POSITION OF CHARACTERIZING WHETHER THE PLO IS OR IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PROCESS. ABILITY TO REALIZE ONESELF TO A NEGOTIATING

PROCESS DEPENDS ON THE PARTIES CONCERNED ON THEIR STATE OF MIND ON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT CERTAIN BINDING PRESCRIPTIONS THAT EVERYONE ELSE ACCEPTS. IT IS A MATTER OF ATTITUDE AND RELATIONSHIP IT IS NOT A MATTER OF US DEFINING IT.

HERMAN: BUT IF THE PLO OBJECTS AND REJECTS WHATEVER PEACE AGREEMENT MAY BE REACHED WILL THERE BE PEACE OR WILL THERE STILL BE A STATE OF WAR?

BRZEZINSKI: I HATE REJECT A REASONABLE ARRANGEMENT THAT IS FAIR THAT IS DECENT THAT IS RESPONSIVE TO THE POLITICAL STRATEGIC AND I HASTEN TO ADD MORAL DIMENSIONS TO THE PROBLEM THEN I AM SURE MODERATE PALESTINIANS WILL ACCEPT IT.

THOMAS: WELL WHO IS DOING THE JUDGING? YOU ARE GOING TO JUDGE WHETHER IT IS FAIR AND SO FORTH.

BRZEZINSKI: NO I THINK THAT IT TO BE FAIR IT WILL HAVE TO BE ACCEPTED ALSO BY MODERATE PALESTINIANS AND THERE ARE A GREAT MANY MODERATE PALESTINIANS WHO REALIZE --

THOMAS: WELL WHERE ARE THEY WHEN HAVE NOT THEY PARTICIPATED SO FAR?

BRZEZINSKI: THEY ARE ON THE WEST BANK. BECAUSE AT THIS STAGE ARRANGEMENT HAVE NOT REALLY BEEN MADE FOR THEIR PARTICIPATION, AND THE ISSUE HAS NOT YET COME TO A HEAD BUT IT IS CONCEIVABLE TO ME THAT A LARGE GROUP OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE SUFFERED SO MUCH WHO HAVE SO MUCH AT STAKE IN THIS ISSUE WOULD DELIBERATELY AND TOTALLY ABSTRACT THEMSELVES FROM A NEGOTIATING PROCESS, THE PURPOSE OF WHICH IN PART IS THE CREATION OF CONDITIONS THAT ARE MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE GENUINE AND LEGITIMATE RIGHTS THAT THEY HAVE WHICH WE RESPECT AND WHICH WE HAVE EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZED.

KALB: IS ONE OF THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS TO SET UP AN INDEPENDENT HOME?

BRZEZINSKI: I DON'T THINK THE UNITED STATES AND AFTER ALL, I AM AN OFFICIAL OF THE US GOVERNMENT OUGHT TO BE IN A POSITION OF STATING PRECISELY WHAT IS THE NATURE OF ALL OF THEIR POLITICAL RIGHTS BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS STATED THAT WE FELT THAT ONE ELEMENT OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE OUGHT TO BE AN ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY THE PALESTINIANS HAVE A HOEMALDN OR AN ENTITY THE FULL POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF WHICH AND ITS RELATIONSHIPS TO OTHER STATES IS TO BE DEFINED IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

KALB: THAT IS TRUE, SIR, BUT THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS -- IF THERE

IS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND MR SADAT AND YOU HAVE TALKED ABOUT LEGITIMATE RIGHTS IS NOT THERE AN OBLIGATION TO DEFINE THESE RIGHTS? IMPLICITLY ALL OF THE ARAB LEADERS HAVE SAID THAT AMONG THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS IS THE RIGHT TO SET UP AN INDEPENDENT HOME AND THAT INCLUDES PRESIDENT SADAT.

BRZEZINSKI: THEY HAVE STATED IT AND TO SOME EXTENT THIS IS BOTH A MATTER OF GENUINE COMMITMENT ON THEIR PART TO SOME EXTENT AND THEY ALSO NEED A BEGINNING ON THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. WE ARE NOT A DIRECTLY AFFECTED PARTY. WE ARE AFTER ALL NOT A BELIGERENT IN THE MIDDLE EASTERN ISSUE AND THEREFORE IT DOES NOT BEHOVE US AT THIS STAGE TO BE GOING ON RECORD PRECISELY ON ONE PARTICULAR ASPECT OF THE MANY ISSUES THAT WILL BE NEGOTIATED. IF YOU ASK ME THIS, THEN WHY SHOULD NOT SOMEONE ASK ME ALSO WHAT IS OUR VIEW PRECISELY ON WHAT OUGHT TO BE THE TERRITORIAL LINES?

HERMAN: WHAT IS OUR VIEW?(LAUGHTER)

BRZEZINSKI: WELL WE HAVE STATED IT IN GENERAL TERMS -- NEMELY THAT WE BELIVE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A RETURN FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 67, MORE, TO MUTUALLY ACCEPT IT AND SECURE FRONTIERS.

KALB: INCLUDING EAST JERUSALEM?

BRZEZINSKI: AGAIN THAT IS AN ISSUE FOR WHICH ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE FOUND. AS WE ALL KNOW THIS IS AN ISSUE WHICH IS NOT JUST STRATEGICAL POLITICAL. IT IS A DEEPLY EMOTIONAL RELIGIOUS ISSUE BUT WITH GOOD WILL. I THINK WE WILL FIND A SLUTION WHEREBY THE CITY IS UNDIVIDED-- THE CITY IS UNDIVIDED, ACCESSIBLE TO ALL WITH PROPER ARRANGEMENTS, NOT ONLY FOR RELIGIOUS BUT POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES, OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

KALB: A CITY UNDIVIDED-- MEANING A UNIFIED CITY??

BRZEZINSKI: A CITY UNDIVIDED MEANS A CITY NOT PARTITIONED, NOT PARTITIONED PHYSICALLY BUT A CITY IN WHICH PERHAPS ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE CONTRIVED THAT ARE RESPONSIVE TO THE RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

KALB: DO YOU BELIEVE THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAS THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL STRENGHT AT THIS POINT, TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT FURTHER CONCESSIONS -- AND I ASK THAT BECAUSE ONE OF HIS CLOSEST ADVISERS, SHMUEL KATZ, RECENTLY RESIGNED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT MR BEGIN HAS BEEN GOING TOO FAR?

BRZEZINSKI: YOU KNOW AT ONE TIME GENERAL DE GAULLE HAD SOME OF HIS VERY CLOSE FRIENDS DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM HIM, TOO. I FIND IN BEGIN A REMARKABLE COMBINATION OF QUALITIES. HE IS DEFINITELY A DEEPLY COMMITTED PERSON AND TO HIM SAMARIA

AND JUDEA ARE LIVING REALITIES OF THE JEWISH TRADITION. I FIND IN HIM THE EMBODIMENT OF THE SUFFERING OF HIS PEOPLE. I FIND IN HIM THE QUALITIES OF A COURAGEOUS FIGHTER AND I SENSE IN HIM ALSO THE MAKINGS OF A STATESMAN. A PERSON WHO SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY TO CREATE PERMANENT PEACE FOR HIS PEOPLE AND THAT OPPORTUNITY MAY IN SOME RESPECTS BE IN CONFLICT WITH THESE OTHER QUALITIES WHICH I HAVE MENTIONED — IN ADDITION IN CONFLICT WITH THE VIEWS OF SOME OF HIS ASSOCIATES. I HAVE THE FEELING THAT BEGIN WILL BE AN HISTORICAL FIGURE, AND, JUST AS SADAT ROSE ABOVE THE ANIMOSITIES AND THE SMALLNESS OF SOME OF HIS ASSOCIATES SO WILL BEGIN.

THOMAS: THERE IS A REPORT IN THE WASHINGTON POST TODAY THAT EGYPT MAY GO FOR A SEPARATE PEACE WITH THE DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT LATER ON ON OTHER NEGOTIATING POINTS. IS THAT YOUR READING?

BRZEZINSKI: I DON'T THINK SO AND IN THE COURSE OF THE PREIDENTIAL TRIP WE HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM NOT ONLY WITH PRESIDENT SADAT NOT ONLY WITH OTHER MIDDLE EASTERN LEADERS, BUT ALSO WITH PRESIDENT GISCARD FOR EXAMPLE, AND THE PREVAILING VIEWS IS THAT PRESIDENT SADAT IS GENERALLY COMMITTED TO HIS GETTING A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT, THAT HE SEES HERE AN HISTORICAL OPPORTUNITY TO RESOLVE A CONFLICT WHICH HAS BEEN DESTRUCTIVE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AS A WHOLE AND FROM WHICH IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR EGYPT TO EXTRACT ITSELF ALONE. THUS I AM INCLINED TO FEEL THAT BOTH SADAT AND BEGIN ARE GENUINE IN SEEKING A WAY TOWARDS A SOLUTION THAT WILL BE GENUINELY COMPREHENSIVE.

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news report

170/15/52
DECEMBER 21, 1977

BRZEZINSKI OUTLINES ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW OF THE WORLD

BY ALEXANDER M. SULLIVAN

IPS WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENT

WASHINGTON, DEC. 20 -- PRESIDENT CARTER WANTS THE UNITED STATES TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH WHAT HE SEES AS A WORLD-WIDE DEMAND FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL EQUALITY -- AND HE WANTS TO HELP DIRECT THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORLD SOCIETIES.

IN WHAT HE COMPARED TO A COLLEGE LECTURE, ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI GAVE REPORTERS DECEMBER 20 AN OVERVIEW OF WORLD CONDITIONS AS SEEN BY THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, AND THEIR EFFECT ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

MR. CARTER'S TRIP TO EUROPE AND ASIA DECEMBER 29 TO JANUARY 6, THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS ADVISER SAID, IS DESIGNED TO SHOW THAT THE UNITED STATES "RECOGNIZES...CHANGE, THAT WE WANT TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH IT, AND THAT WE WANT TO GIVE IT POSITIVE DIRECTION." THE COUNTRIES THE PRESIDENT WILL VISIT WILL BE POLAND, IRAN, INDIA, SAUDI ARABIA, FRANCE AND BELGIUM.

(MORE)

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DR. BRZEZINSKI SAID THE "POINT OF DEPARTURE" FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S VIEW THAT THE UNITED STATES NEEDS TO PURSUE "A WIDER FOREIGN POLICY, MORE IDENTIFIED WITH GLOBAL CHANGE, MORE RESPONSIVE TO DIVERSITY," IS THE FACT THAT "WE ARE LIVING IN A TIME IN WHICH THE WORLD IS EXPERIENCING THE MOST EXTENSIVE AND THE MOST INTENSIVE TRANSFORMATION IN ITS ENTIRE HISTORY."

HE NOTED THAT MR. CARTER HAD "FORESHADOWED" THE NEED TO BROADEN AMERICAN POLICY IN HIS ADDRESS TO A UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME CONVOCATION LAST MAY 22.

ONE KEY ASPECT OF THAT TRANSFORMATION, DR. BRZEZINSKI SAID, "IS A GLOBAL POLITICAL AWAKENING. A WORLD POLITICALLY AND SOCIALLY PASSIVE IS NOW BECOMING TRULY ACTIVIST AND THE CONSEQUENCE OF THIS IS A RISING CRESCENDO OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEMANDS WORLD-WIDE."

"IT THUS REPRESENTS," HE ADDED, "AN ALTOGETHER NEW REALITY IN THE TOTALITY OF OUR COMMON EXPERIENCE."

DR. BRZEZINSKI SAID THE WORLD HAS "LIVED WITH" A "PROFOUND TRANSFORMATION OF THE WAY THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD IS EXPRESSED," WITH MOST OF THE CHANGES BEING COMPRESSED INTO THE 1940-1965 PERIOD.

IN THAT TIME FRAME, HE SAID, THE WORLD HAS SEEN THE COLLAPSE OF WESTERN COLONIALISM; THE EMERGENCE OF THAT NATION-STATE AS THE "DOMINANT FORM OF (POLITICAL) ORGANIZATION," AND A DEMOGRAPHIC EXPLOSION THAT WILL DOUBLE THE PRESENT WORLD'S POPULATION BY THE YEAR 2000, WITH MOST OF THE INCREASE COMING IN THE "SOUTHERN ARC" OF SOUTH AMERICA, AFRICA AND ASIA.

INCREASINGLY, DR. BRZEZINSKI SAID, THE NEW POPULATION WAVE WILL BE ATTRACTED TO "CONGESTED URBAN AREAS," ITSELF A TRANSFORMATION FROM THE TRADITIONALLY AGRARIAN LIFE STYLES OF MOST OF THE WORLD.

THE COMBINATION OF URBANIZATION, LITERACY AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS, HE ADDED, WILL HAVE THE EFFECT OF FURTHER STIMULATING INTENSE POLITICAL AWARENESS. LITERACY, WHICH OPENS UP NEW INTELLECTUAL HORIZONS, AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS, WHICH MAKE PEOPLE "KEENLY AWARE OF INEQUITIES IN THE HUMAN CONDITION," DR. BRZEZINSKI ADDED, "WILL HAVE THE EFFECT OF STIMULATING INTENSE POLITICAL AWARENESS."

ASSOCIATED WITH THE AWARENESS, HE SAID, IS A "POTENTIAL-
LY EXPLOSIVE CONDITION OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
TURBULENCE, WITH RISING POLITICAL DEMANDS AND INCREASING
DISSATISFACTION WITH THE STATUS QUO."

CHANGE, DR. BRZEZINSKI INDICATED, HAS ALREADY HAD A DEEP EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS DESIGNED PRIMARILY AROUND THE "ATLANTICISM CONNECTION" OF THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, WESTERN EUROPE, JAPAN AND AUSTRALASIA ARRAYED IN COMPETITION AGAINST THE COMMUNIST WORLD.

THERE HAS BEEN, HE SAID, A "DISPERSAL OF POWER" AND WHILE THE "STRATEGIC CONFRONTATION" REMAINS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND ITS ALLIES VERSUS MOSCOW AND ITS FRIENDS, "UNDERNEATH THAT STRATEGIC CONFRONTATION A NUMBER OF STATES HAVE NOW EMERGED AS REGIONALLY OR INTERNATIONALLY INFLUENTIAL."

HE CITED AS SOME OF THOSE STATES, VENEZUELA, BRAZIL, NIGERIA, INDONESIA, SAUDI ARABIA, IRAN AND INDIA, AND SAID THERE HAS BEEN "A VERY SIGNIFICANT REDISTRIBUTION OF GLOBAL POWER."

AS ONE RESULT, THE POST WORLD WAR TWO INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, "LARGELY BUILT ON THE ATLANTICIST CONNECTION, NO LONGER IS ADEQUATE IN DEALING WITH THE NEW POLITICAL AND SOCIAL REALITIES."

ANOTHER CONSEQUENCE OF THE TRANSFORMATION, DR. BRZEZINSKI SAID, IS THE "FADING OF A SINGLE INDEOLOGICAL MODEL" FOR REVOLUTIONARIES. WHERE ONCE THE SOVIET UNION, CUBA OR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WAS ADOPTED AS A "MODEL" FOR REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETIES, HE SAID, "NO

SELF-RESPECTING REVOLUTIONARY WOULD SERIOUSLY MAINTAIN" TODAY THAT HIS MODEL FOR A NEW SOCIETY WOULD BE ANY OF THOSE COMMUNIST NATIONS.

A FINAL CONSEQUENCE OF CHANGE, HE SAID, IS A "NEW DIVISION OF LABOR" IN THE WORLD. AS DEVELOPING NATIONS SUCH AS BRAZIL, MEXICO, SOUTH KOREA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN) ACQUIRE THEIR OWN CAPITAL GOODS STRUCTURES, FOR EXAMPLE, THEY PLACE COMPETITIVE PRESSURE ON THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD IN SUCH AREAS AS SHOE MANUFACTURE, TEXTILES, SHIPBUILDING AND EVEN STEEL AND AUTO PRODUCTION.

SOME, DR. BRZEZINSKI SAID WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY ENDORSING THE NOTION, HAVE SUGGESTED THAT ADVANCED COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON HIGH-TECHNOLOGY ITEMS, LEAVING A GREATER SHARE OF INDUSTRIAL GOODS PRODUCTION TO THE DEVELOPING NATIONS.

THE CHANGES ENUMERATED, DR. BRZEZINSKI SAID, HAVE FOUR POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES: (1) THE RELEVANCE OF WESTERN DEMOCRACY TO A POLITICALLY AWAKENING WORLD; (2) THE NEED TO BROADEN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS; (3) THE NECESSITY OF ANTICIPATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF REGIONAL CONFLICT AND HEADING THEM OFF; AND (4) THE NEED TO RESPOND TO NEW ISSUES WHICH HAVE BECOME GLOBAL FOR THE FIRST TIME. HE CITED NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, ARMS TRANSFERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS AS SOME OF THOSE NEW ISSUES.

DR. BRZEZINSKI SAID THE WORLD WILL BE "PREOCCUPIED" FOR SOME TIME WITH THE "DIFFICULT PROCESS" OF WIDENING THE SCOPE OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM BEYOND THE "ATLANTICIST CONNECTION."

HE SAID REGIONAL CONFLICTS, WHEN THEY SIMULTANEOUSLY INVOLVE EAST-WEST AND PRODUCER-CONSUMER CONFRONTATIONS, WILL BE "VERY DIFFICULT TO CONTROL." AS EXAMPLES, HE CITED THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, IN

THE MIDDLE EAST, AND IN CENTRAL AMERICA IF THE PANAMA CANAL AGREEMENTS ARE REJECTED BY THE UNITED STATES.

DR. BRZEZINSKI ALSO SAID THAT

DEMOCRACY SHOULD BE "LARGELY ON THE LEVEL OF CREATIVE INNOVATION," MATERIALLY AND SPIRITUALLY, AS THE WORLD SYSTEM SEEKS TO COPE WITH CHANGE.

ON THE MATERIAL LEVEL, HE SAID, IF THE WESTERN WORLD IS WILLING "TO ACCEPT THE REALITY OF INTERDEPENDENCE, AND CHANNEL IT IN CONSTRUCTIVE DIRECTIONS," IT WILL HAVE A "VERY IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY" IN EVOLVING THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. THAT WILL PROVE ESPECIALLY TRUE, HE ADDED, IF THE WEST ACCEPTS "THE NOTION OF A CERTAIN HUMANISTIC RESPONSIBILITY FOR CHANGES WHICH ARE NOT ONLY PROFOUND, BUT POTENTIALLY POSITIVE."

HE SAID THE CHANGES INVOLVED "THE EMERGENCE FOR THE FIRST TIME OF A (WORLD) COMMUNITY IN WHICH THERE IS GREATER RESPONSIVENESS TO THE DEMANDS AND NEEDS OF OTHER SOCIETIES THAN OUR OWN."

HE SAID A "GREAT DEAL DEPENDS ON THE WEST'S COLLECTIVE ABILITY" TO DEAL WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF "CREATIVE INTERDEPENDENCE." THAT IMPLIES, HE SAID, "REFORM OF EXISTING INSTITUTIONS, ADJUSTMENT, ACCEPTANCE OF CERTAIN NEW REALITIES."

ON THE SPIRITUAL PLANE, HE CALLED FOR "ACKNOWLEDGMENT" BY THE WEST "OF THE REALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, DEFINED VERY BROADLY, NOT ONLY IN PURELY LIBERTARIAN TERMS, BUT ALSO IN SOCIAL TERMS."



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news report

DECEMBER 13, 1977

TRANSCRIPT OF BRZEZINSKI ON ABC'S 'ISSUES AND ANSWERS'

WASHINGTON, DEC 11 -- FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSCRIPT OF ABC'S DECEMBER 11 "ISSUES AND ANSWERS" PROGRAM IN WHICH 'ISSUES AND ANSWERS' CHIEF CORRESPONDENT BOB CLARK AND ABC NEWS DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT TED KOPPEL INTERVIEWED PRESIDENT CARTER'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

MR. CLARK: DR. BRZEZINSKI, WELCOME TO ISSUES AND ANSWERS.

WHEN MIDDLE EAST PEACE TALKS BEGIN IN CAIRO THIS WEEK BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT THE UNITED STATES WILL APPARENTLY BE THE ONLY OTHER PARTICIPANT AND THERE IS SOME QUESTION ABOUT JUST WHAT OUR ROLE WILL BE. WHAT DO YOU THINK IT WILL BE? WILL IT BE AN ACTIVE ONE WITH THE UNITED STATES TRYING TO PROD BOTH PARTIES INTO AGREEMENT?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: WELL, I WOULD SAY THAT THE U.S. ROLE REMAINS WHAT IT HAS BEEN THROUGHOUT. THAT IS TO SAY OF AN ENGAGED PARTY THAT IS DEEPLY INTERESTED IN PROMOTING A SETTLEMENT, THAT IS A CLOSE FRIEND OF ISRAEL, IS A CLOSE FRIEND OF SOME OF THE ARABS INVOLVED. THE PARTIES CONCERNED, THE ISRAELIES AND THE ARABS, WANT US TO BE INVOLVED, WANT

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US TO HELP ADVANCE THE PROCESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT AND THAT IS WHAT WE WILL BE DOING IN CAIRO, THAT IS WHAT WE HAVE BEEN DOING PRIOR TO CAIRO, THAT IS WHAT WE WILL BE DOING AFTER CAIRO.

MR. CLARK: PRESIDENT SADAT THIS PAST WEEK HAS GIVEN THE IMPRESSION ON TWO OR THREE OCCASIONS THAT HE THINKS IT IS NOW UP TO THE UNITED STATES TO PRESSURE ISRAEL INTO MAKING THE CONCESSIONS THAT ARE NECESSARY TO A PEACE SETTLEMENT. WILL WE DO THAT, WILL WE BE WORKING ON ISRAEL TO MAKE CONCESSIONS SUCH AS GIVING UP OCCUPIED TERRITORY?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I DON'T THINK OUR ROLE IS THAT OF PRESSURING PARTIES. OUR ROLE IS TO HELP THE PARTIES UNDERSTAND THE CONCERNS OF THE OTHERS. OUR ROLE IS TO TRY TO ASSURE THE PARTIES THAT THEY WILL GAIN MORE THROUGH A COMPROMISE, THROUGH A SETTLEMENT, THAN THROUGH CONTINUED CONFLICT.

THE FACT THAT AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER A PROMINENT LEADER MAY EXPECT THIS OR THAT FROM US DOESN'T ALTER THE FUNDAMENTAL AND CONTINUING NATURE OF THE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THIS PROBLEM, ONE WHICH ANTEDATES, INCIDENTALLY, THIS ADMINISTRATION.

MR. KOPPEL: DR. BRZEZINSKI, YOU HAVE GIVEN THE IMPRESSION OF A CERTAIN SENSE OF CONTINUITY IN AMERICAN POLICY BUT ISN'T IT A FACT IN THE PAST YEAR THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN PUSHING VERY, VERY HARD FOR A GENEVA CONFERENCE AND THAT THINGS WERE REALLY TAKEN OUT OF U.S. HANDS FOR A FEW WEEKS? POSSIBLY WE ARE BECOMING RE-ENGAGED. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN POLICY OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: WELL, LET ME MAKE TWO POINTS ABOUT THAT. FIRST OF ALL IT IS TRUE THAT OUR ROLE HAS CHANGED. IT HAS CHANGED BECAUSE WHEN WE ASSUMED OFFICE WE FELT THAT

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THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION IN MOVING STEP BY STEP TOWARDS SOME ACCOMMODATION MADE IT NOW POSSIBLE TO EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES THAT EXIST AND CONTINUE TO EXIST TO MOVE TOWARDS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT AND THIS IS WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAS DONE THROUGHOUT THE YEAR, QUITE DELIBERATELY, TO ENCOURAGE THE PARTIES, TO THINK AND TO TALK ABOUT THINGS THEY WEREN'T PREPARED TO DISCUSS PREVIOUSLY, TO CONFRONT THE REAL ISSUES AND TO BEGIN DISCUSSING THEM DIRECTLY. I BELIEVE WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THAT LAST OBJECTIVE. WE HAVE ACTUALLY ENCOURAGED THE PARTIES TO TALK DIRECTLY AND BOTH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND PRESIDENT SADAT HAVE STATED THAT. SECONDLY OUR OBJECTIVE HAS NOT BEEN GENEVA. OUR OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN MOVEMENTS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. GENEVA IS A MEANS TO THAT OBJECTIVE. IF THAT MEANS CAN SERVE THAT OBJECTIVE WELL, IT WILL BE USED. IF THAT OBJECTIVE CAN BE APPROACHED THROUGH OTHER STEPS, THOSE STEPS WILL BE PURSUED. ULTIMATELY WE WILL NEED SOME MECHANISM FOR RATIFICATION FOR THE FINAL NEGOTIATION IF AGREEMENTS ARE MADE OUTSIDE OF GENEVA AND THAT INSTRUMENT WILL BE GENEVA. BUT A LOT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO GENEVA AND I BELIEVE WE AGAIN HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE QUITE EFFECTIVELY TOWARDS A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION OF THE DIFFERENCES THAT HAVE DIVIDED THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS IN THE PAST.

MR. KOPPEL: LET ME ASK YOU TO UNDERScore THAT POINT IF YOU WOULD. YOU SEEM TO BE SUGGESTING THAT GENEVA NOW WILL BE PURELY AN ENVIRONMENT FOR RATIFICATION. WOULD THAT BE CORRECT, THAT AGREEMENTS VERY POSSIBLY WILL BE REACHED ELSEWHERE AND THAT GENEVA, RATHER THAN BEING THE BASIS OR LOCALE FOR NEGOTIATION, WILL BE THE LOCALE FOR RATIFYING AGREEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN REACHED IN OTHER PLACES?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: NO, I VERY DELIBERATELY GAVE MYSELF THE OPPORTUNITY OF PLAYING THE FUTURE, IF YOU WILL, IN TWO

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DIFFERENT WAYS. ONE WAY WOULD BE TO NEGOTIATE OUT ALL OF THE DIFFICULT ISSUES IN GENEVA. ANOTHER WAY WOULD BE TO RESOLVE SOME OF THEM, IF NOT ALL OF THEM, OUTSIDE OF GENEVA AND RESOLVE THE REMAINING ISSUES IN GENEVA, USING GENEVA ALSO TO RATIFY THE PROGRESS MADE OUTSIDE OF GENEVA.

TALKING TO SOME OF YOUR COLLEAGUES IN THE COURSE OF THE LAST WEEK I USED THE ANALOGY OF THREE CONCENTRIC CIRCLES. THE FIRST CIRCLE RIGHT NOW INVOLVES THE ISRAELIS AND THE EGYPTIANS TALKING TOGETHER DIRECTLY AND THE UNITED STATES BEING THERE BECAUSE THEY WANT US TO BE THERE. WE THINK IT IS A USEFUL DIALOGUE, WE ARE WILLING TO BE THERE, WE ARE PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL.

THE SECOND OUTER CONCENTRIC CIRCLE INVOLVES THE MODERATE ARABS. WE HOPE TO ENGAGE THEM IN THIS PROCESS. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE MODERATE PALESTINIANS AND THE JORDANIANS BECOME ENGAGED BECAUSE THE ISSUE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IS CRITICALLY RELEVANT AND BOTH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND PRESIDENT SADAT HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT THE ISSUE GOES BEYOND THE PURELY BILATERAL ONE. AND WE WOULD ALIGN THE SAUDIS WHO ARE CLEARLY ON THE SIDELINES BUT ARE VERY GERMANE TO BACK THIS WIDER DIALOGUE. AND THEN THERE IS THE OUTER CONCENTRIC CIRCLE WHICH INVOLVES THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH INVOLVES THE SYRIANS IF THEY CHOOSE NOT TO BECOME ENGAGED SOONER, AND THAT CLEARLY IS GENEVA. AND WHAT WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN GENEVA DEPENDS IN GREAT MEASURE ON WHAT IS AND IS NOT ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO GENEVA. I CANNOT PREDICT THE FUTURE BUT I DO FEEL QUITE CONFIDENT THAT PROGRESS WILL BE MADE. AND IT REALLY DOESN'T MATTER TOO MUCH WHETHER IT IS MADE WITHIN THIS OR THAT FORUM; THE ULTIMATE STEP WILL INVOLVE GENEVA IN SOME FASHION.

MR. KOPPEL: ISN'T THAT A CONSIDERABLE DEPARTURE, THOUGH, FROM PREVIOUS AMERICAN POLICY? I MEAN PREVIOUS AMERICAN

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POLICY OF THIS ADMINISTRATION? IT HAS UNTIL NOW ALWAYS INVOLVED BRINGING THE RUSSIANS INTO THE PROCESS IMMEDIATELY, KEEPING THEM IN THE PROCESS. YOU ARE NOW TALKING ABOUT A THREE-STAGE PROCESS IN WHICH THE RUSSIANS POSSIBLY WOULD BECOME INVOLVED IN THE THIRD AND FINAL STAGE?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: NOT AT ALL. OUR POLICY HAS BEEN FLEXIBLE AND HAS BEEN FOCUSED ON THE OBJECTIVE OF GETTING THE PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE. THE PRESIDENT STARTED VERY DELIBERATELY AND SHORTLY AFTER THE INAUGURAL, TO TRY TO STIMULATE THE PARTIES TO SPEAK MORE OPENLY ABOUT THE CENTRAL ISSUES. HE DID THAT WITH THE FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT IN THE PAST THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO DO SO, WITH THE DETERMINATION TO STIMULATE THEM IN SO DOING. WE THEN TRIED TO MOVE THEM TOWARDS A NEGOTIATION OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES. WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR IN THE COURSE OF THE SUMMER THAT NOT SUFFICIENT MOVEMENT WAS BEING GENERATED WE CONCLUDED THAT THEREFORE THE ALTERNATIVE WAS TO GO TO GENEVA TO TRY TO ORGANIZE A STRUCTURE IN GENEVA IN WHICH BOTH MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL TALKS COULD BE HELD. THIS REQUIRED US TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF HOW TO ORGANIZE GENEVA WITH THE SOVIETS, WITH THE CO-CHAIRMEN, IN ORDER ALSO TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO MAINTAIN A MODERATE POSTURE IN GENEVA AND THIS WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE INITIATIVES TAKEN IN LATE SUMMER AND EARLY FALL. THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW WEEKS HAVE OPENED UP THE OPPORTUNITY AGAIN OF HAVING MORE MOVEMENT THROUGH THE DIRECT INTERCOURSE DEVELOP, RUN ITS COURSE, ENGAGE OTHERS IN IT BECAUSE WE SEE IT AS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. BUT I WANT TO EMPHASIZE IF GENEVA WAS FIRST OF ALL NEVER THE END PURPOSE BUT WAS A MECHANISM WHICH WE DECIDED TO APPLY IN THE LATE SUMMER -- THAT IS TO SAY AFTER SIX OR SEVEN MONTHS OF EFFORT -- TO RESPOND TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAD DEVELOPED IN THE COURSE OF THE SUMMER. WE NOW HAVE DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND WE

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ARE QUITE FLEXIBLE ABOUT USING WHATEVER OPPORTUNITY OR WHATEVER INSTRUMENT IS AVAILABLE TO ADVANCE ALL THE PARTIES TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

MR. CLARK: WHAT MAKES YOU THINK, DR. BRZEZINSKI, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE CONTENT TO SIT ON THE SIDELINES IN THE THIRD PHASE OF THE THIRD CONCENTRIC CIRCLE AND COME IN ONLY WHEN THE SYRIANS COME IN?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: WE ARE PERFECTLY HAPPY, WE WOULD BE ONLY TOO DELIGHTED IF THEY WANT TO COME IN SOONER. ANYONE WHO IS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION BASED ON ACCOMMODATION AND MODERATION, ANYONE WHO DOESN'T SUPPORT THE REJECTIONISTS AND THE EXTREMISTS IS WELCOME TO PARTICIPATE EARLIER. WE ARE NOT KEEPING THE SOVIETS OUT. IF THEY CHOOSE TO COME IN EARLY I AM SURE ALL OF THE PARTIES WILL WELCOME THEM IF THEY COME IN IN THE SPIRIT OF MODERATION AND ACCOMMODATION. IF THEY CHOOSE TO STAY OUT, THIS IS THEIR DECISION, NOT OURS.

MR. CLARK: ISN'T THERE A DANGER IN THIS CONCEPT THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD LINE UP WITH EGYPT AND PERHAPS JORDAN AND YOU WOULD HAVE THE SOVIET UNION BEHIND SYRIA AND PERHAPS THE HARD-LINE COUNTRIES ON THE OTHER SIDE AND LEADING PERHAPS TO THAT BIG POWER CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST THAT NOBODY HAS EVER WANTED?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: THE BIG POWER CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS LIKELY TO OCCUR AS A BY-PRODUCT OF A DIRECT CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IF THERE ARE SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS OR PROGRESSIVELY SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS ON THE ONE HAND AND THE EGYPTIANS, THE MODERATE PALESTINIANS AND THE JORDANIANS ON THE OTHER, THEN THE CHANCES OF A CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH ESCALATES INTO A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED. THIS IS WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE. WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION CHOOSES TO ENGAGE ITSELF IN THAT PEACE-MAKING PROCESS SOONER OR LATER IS A SOVIET DECISION. IT IS NOT OUR DECISION.

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MR. CLARK: IF THIS THREE-PHASE CONCEPT SHOULD NOT WORK OUT AND YOU END UP WITH A SEPARATE PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT WOULD YOU REGARD THAT AS A DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT THAT WOULD INCREASE A LONG-TERM RISK OF A NEW MIDDLE EAST WAR?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I DON'T WANT TO HYPOTHICIZE IN REGARDS TO A DEVELOPMENT WHICH IS PRECLUDED BY THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED. BOTH PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAVE REPEATEDLY SAID -- AND I BELIEVE THEY ARE SINCERE; IN FACT I THINK I KNOW THEY ARE SINCERE -- THAT THEY DO NOT WISH A SEPARATE ISRAELI/EGYPTIAN PEACE TREATY.

MR. CLARK: BUT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAS SAID HE WOULD SIGN SUCH A TREATY.

DR. BRZEZINSKI: BUT THEY REALIZE THAT THIS OUGHT TO BE PART OF A LARGER EFFORT IN WHICH SOME OF THE OTHER ISSUES, IF NOT ALL OF THE ISSUES, HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH.

GIVEN THE VULNERABILITIES OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN SCENE, GIVEN THE INTERDEPENDENCE, ECONOMIC NOT TO SPEAK POLITICAL -- BETWEEN THE VARIOUS ARAB ENTITIES, ONE HAS TO STRIKE A PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN WHAT IS TO BE INCLUDED AND WHAT CAN BE EXCLUDED IN THE PROCESS OF PEACEMAKING AND IF THERE IS PROGRESS BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE EGYPTIANS, IF THE EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE WHICH WAS A COURAGEOUS ONE BY PRESIDENT SADAT, IS RECIPROCATED IN SUBSTANCE AND THEREFORE IF THERE IS SOME ADDITIONAL MOVEMENT IN REGARD TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, WE WILL HAVE A VERY VIABLE AND VERY CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT.

(ANNOUNCEMENTS)

MR. KOPPEL: DR. BRZEZINSKI, PHILLIP HABIB, THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, WAS JUST IN MOSCOW, HAS MET OVER THE LAST COUPLE OF DAYS WITH SECRETARY VANCE IN BRUSSELS. I AM CURIOUS: WHAT IS THE RUSSIAN POSTURE RIGHT NOW? WE HAVE SEEN PRESS REPORTS THAT THEY SEEM TO BE RATHER UPSET WITH THE UNITED STATES. IS THAT ACCURATE?

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DR. BRZEZINSKI: MY IMPRESSION IS THAT THE PRESS REPORTS ARE REASONABLY ACCURATE; WHICH I AM SURE YOU WILL FIND VERY REASSURING. YES, THEY ARE UPSET. I THINK THEY FEEL THAT DEVELOPMENTS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN RECENT WEEKS, FROM THEIR STANDPOINT, HAVE NOT BEEN PRODUCTIVE. THEY ARE NOT HAPPY ABOUT THE CAIRO CONFERENCE. I ASSUME THEY WOULD HAVE LIKED US NOT TO TAKE PART IN IT. BUT WE WILL MANAGE SOMEHOW, I HOPE, OVER TIME, TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES.

MR. KOPPEL: NOW ONLY TWO MONTHS AGO THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION SIGNED A JOINT STATEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SOVIETS, I GATHER, ARE UNHAPPY IN PART BECAUSE THEY FEEL WE HAVEN'T LIVED UP TO THAT

I AM CURIOUS: WHAT ROLE HAVE WE FORESEEN FOR THE SOVIET UNION IN THESE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS? WHAT CONTRIBUTION DID YOU BELIEVE THEY COULD MAKE?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT THE PAST OR ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT THE FUTURE?

MR. KOPPEL: I AM TALKING ABOUT THE PAST COUPLE OF MONTHS. WHEN THAT DECLARATION WAS SIGNED WHAT ROLE DID YOU THINK THE SOVIETS WERE GOING TO PLAY? CLEARLY, THEY DIDN'T PLAY IT.

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I THOUGHT I HAD ALREADY, IN A WAY, ANSWERED THAT WHEN I SAID BY LATE SUMMER IT SEEMED TO US THAT ABOUT AS MUCH PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE OUTSIDE OF FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS AS WAS POSSIBLE, THROUGH INDIRECT CONTACTS, THROUGH THE KIND OF MEDIATION THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD SO SKILLFULLY AND COURAGEOUSLY UNDERTAKEN. THAT THEREFORE THE SETTING WAS RIPE FOR A MULTINATIONAL CONFERENCE IN WHICH ALL OF THE PARTIES WOULD SIT DOWN AND ENGAGE IN FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS.

MR. KOPPEL: I UNDERSTAND THAT BUT I WAS JUST WONDERING WHAT ROLE THE SOVIETS WERE GOING TO PLAY.

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RZYZINSKI: I WILL GET TO THAT.

ON THE BASIS FOR SUCH A MULTILATERAL FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATION WAS GENEVA. THE SOVIETS UNDER GENEVA ARE CO-CHAIRMEN. THEREFORE IT WAS, WE FELT, IN THE COLLECTIVE INTEREST OF ALL OF THE PARTICIPANTS TO ESTABLISH CERTAIN GROUND RULES WHICH WOULD MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE COCHAIRMEN APPROACH THESE NEGOTIATIONS IN A SPIRIT OF MODERATION AND RESTRAINT AND THE ONLY PURPOSE OF THE JOINT STATEMENT WAS TO ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY THAT ONE OF THE COCHAIRMEN IN THE COURSE OF THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ADOPT POSITIONS FAVORING EXTREMIST POSITIONS. THAT WAS ALL. WHAT ROLE WOULD BE PLAYED WOULD, OF COURSE, DEPEND ON THE DECISIONS MADE BY EACH SUPERPOWER. OUR HOPE WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE CONSTRUCTIVELY TO RESTRAIN SYRIANS, TO RESTRAIN THE PLO, TO ENCOURAGE THE MORE RIGID PARTIES INTO A SOMEWHAT MORE FLEXIBLE AND MODERATE POSITION.

MR. KOPPEL: THERE HAVE BEEN SOME SUGGESTIONS COMING FROM THE EGYPTIANS THEMSELVES AND PRESIDENT SADAT HAS HINTED AT IT THAT ONE REASON HE MADE HIS DRAMATIC GESTURE WAS BECAUSE HE WAS SO UPSET ABOUT THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD BROUGHT THE SOVIETS SO DIRECTLY INTO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. HAVE YOU FOUND THAT TO BE CORRECT?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: NO, I HAVEN'T. IN FACT I THINK THIS IS ONE OF A NUMBER OF SPECULATIVE FICTIONS THAT HAVE RECENTLY ABOUNDED. BOTH SADAT AND BEGIN HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED THAT THEY SEE WHAT THEY ARE DOING AS A NECESSARY STAGE ON THE WAY TO GENEVA AND THERE IS NO WAY OF KEEPING THE SOVIETS OUT OF GENEVA. PRESIDENT SADAT'S PRIMARY CONCERN, AND HE HAS STATED THIS BOTH PUBLICALLY AND PRIVATELY IN HIS CORRESPONDENCE WITH PRESIDENT CARTER, WAS THAT THE ROAD TO GENEVA WAS BECOMING STREWN WITH OBSTACLES, THAT THERE WERE PROCEDURAL PITFALLS THAT COULDN'T BE SURMOUNTED, THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A PSYCHOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGH OF HISTORICAL

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PROPORTIONS, AND HE DECIDED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH A BREAKTHROUGH IN ORDER TO OPEN THE ROAD EVENTUALLY TO MULTILATERAL CONFERENCES.

ONE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHAT HE HAS DONE IS HOWEVER THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE LIMITED ACCOMMODATION WITH A SMALLER NUMBER OF PARTIES AND WE ARE NOT AGAINST THAT. WE THINK IT IS USEFUL

MR. CLARK: DR. BRZEZINSKI, WOULD YOU BE CONCERNED THAT THE SOVIET PIQUE OVER THE MIDDLE EAST COULD CAUSE WAVES IN SOME OTHER DIRECTION, THAT IT MIGHT, FOR INSTANCE, REDUCE PROSPECTS FOR A BREAK-THROUGH AND A NEW SALT II AGREEMENT?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: NO, I AM NOT. WELL, OBVIOUSLY THE AMERICAN/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP CANNOT BE TOTALLY COMPARTMENTALIZED INTO SEPARATE SEGMENTS AND CONFLICT IN ONE AREA IMPINGES ON ACCOMMODATION IN ANOTHER AND VICE VERSA. STILL IT SEEMS TO ME THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVE SUCH A DISTINCTIVE AND OVERRIDING MUTUAL INTEREST THAT THEY ARE ALMOST AN AUTONOMOUS PROCESS. THEY ARE NOT ENTIRELY SEPARATE FROM THE CLIMATE OF THE RELATIONSHIP. THEY ARE NOT ENTIRELY IMMUNE TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN INTENSE REGIONAL CONFLICT, BUT WE DO NOT HAVE AN INTENSE REGIONAL CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE HAVE SOME DISAGREEMENTS AND I DON'T BELIEVE THESE WILL IMPINGE ON THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS.

MR. CLARK: IF I MAY ALSO MENTION AFRICA, AND AMBASSADOR ANDREW YOUNG RAISED NEW SUSPICIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS THIS WEEK ABOUT SOVIET MOTIVES IN AFRICA. HE ACCUSED THE RUSSIANS AND THE CUBANS, AND THESE WERE HIS WORDS, OF CONTRIBUTING TO DEATH AND DESTRUCTION IN AFRICA WHERE THE RUSSIANS ARE SUPPLYING ARMS TO A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES AND THE CUBANS ARE SUPPLYING TROOPS IN ANGOLA. WHEN YOU ADD THIS TO CERTAINLY A WORSENING OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE

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SOVIETS IN THE MIDDLE EAST DOESN'T THERE HAVE TO BE SOME SORT OF AN EFFECT ON DETENTE OR PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS WITH THE RUSSIANS?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I THINK IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO REALIZE THAT THE AMERICAN/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN, IS AND WILL REMAIN FOR A LONG TIME TO COME, A MIXTURE OF COMPETITION AND COOPERATION. AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER ONE ELEMENT OR THE OTHER WILL PREDOMINATE. WE HAVE HAD A PHASE RECENTLY IN WHICH THE COOPERATIVE ELEMENT SEEMED TO BE SURFACING. WE MAY HAVE A PHASE FROM TIME TO TIME IN WHICH THE COMPETITIVE ELEMENTS SURFACE AND BECOME DOMINANT OR MORE VISIBLE.

I THINK WHAT AMBASSADOR YOUNG SPOKE ABOUT IS BOTH TRUE AND SERIOUS. WE DO NOT WISH TO TRANSFORM EITHER AFRICAN REGIONAL CONFLICTS OR AFRICAN RACIAL CONFLICTS INTO INTERNATIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICTS. WHAT AMBASSADOR YOUNG SPOKE ABOUT IS SERIOUS. WE FEEL THAT THE SOVIETS' ROLE IN THE AFRICAN HORN IS NOT HELPFUL, THE SOVIETS ARE EXPORTING ARMS WHICH FUEL THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ETHIOPIANS AND SOMALIS WHILE WE ARE REFRAINING FROM THE EXPORT OF ARMS. THE SOVIETS HAVE RECENTLY DEVELOPED A MAJOR AIRLIFT TO ETHIOPIA WHICH IS NOT A CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE AND THIS, INCIDENTALLY, RAISES INTERESTING QUESTIONS CONCERNING OVERFLIGHTS.

THE CUBANS HAVE INCREASED THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFRICA. THIS IS NOT A CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE. WE DEPLORE THIS. IT DOES MAKE US CONCERNED. IT THEREFORE DOES LIMIT THE SCOPE OF AMERICAN/SOVIET ACCOMMODATION. BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS WE WILL BE OPENING A NEW AND IMPORTANT SET OF NEGOTIATIONS DEALING WITH ARMS TRANSFERS IN WHICH WE AND THE SOVIETS FOR THE FIRST TIME WILL TALK ABOUT MEANS OF SLOWING DOWN THE OUTFLOW OF ARMS FROM

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NATIONS, AND WE ARE MAKING STEADY PROGRESS IN SALT.

SO THE POINT I WANT TO GET ACROSS IS THAT THE PUBLIC, ALL OF US, HAVE TO GET ACCUSTOMED TO THE NOTION THAT AMERICAN/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WILL BE A MIXED ONE AND WE MUST NOT HAVE THESE SWINGS OF EUPHORIA, OF EXPECTATION OF GENERAL ACCOMMODATION TO A MOOD OF HOSTILITY, CONFLICT, WHICH IS EQUALLY ALL EMBRACING. IT IS GOING TO BE A MIXED COMPETITIVE/COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP FOR A LONG, LONG TIME TO COME.

MR. KOPPEL: OBVIOUSLY THOUGH, DR. BRZEZINSKI, THE WORLD DOESN'T STAND STILL AS WE GO THROUGH THESE VARIOUS PHASES AND YOU HAVE SUGGESTED ON A COUPLE OF OCCASIONS NOW THAT WE ARE IN ONE OF THE LESS ACCOMMODATING PHASES OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WHAT DOES THAT BODE FOR THE CAIRO CONFERENCE? ARE WE COMMITTED NOW TO GETTING AS MUCH SUBSTANCE OUT OF THE CAIRO CONFERENCE AS POSSIBLE?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: WELL, WE WOULD HOPE THE CAIRO CONFERENCE WOULD FIRST OF ALL PUSH FORWARD THE ISRAELI/EGYPTIAN RELATIONSHIP AND TRY TO SET IN MOTION A PROCESS IN WHICH THESE DIFFERENCES ARE NOT ONLY NARROWED BUT CREATE A BASIS FOR DEALING MORE CONSTRUCTIVELY, EFFECTIVELY, WITH THE OTHER PROBLEMS. AND I HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AS ONE WHICH IS CLEARLY RELEVANT AND IMPORANT. BEYOND THAT, OF COURSE, THERE IS ALSO THE GOLAN. IN ADDITION TO IT THERE ARE A VARIETY OF SECTURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE PART OF ANY PEACE TREATY.

I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT IN ALL OF THIS WE ARE ENGAGED IN A LONG-TERM PROCESS AND ONE OF THE FIRST DECISIONS WE MADE IN THE COURSE OF THIS YEAR WAS NOT TO GO FOR QUICK FIXES, NOT TO GO FOR INSTANT SUCCESSES BUT TO ANALYZE THE NATURE OF THE DILEMMAS WE CONFRONT, IN A NUMBER OF KEY AREAS; IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA, SALT,

(MORE)

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION , ARMS TRANSFERS, PANAMA AND OUR RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD, AND TRY TO SET IN MOTION PROCESSES WHICH OVER THREE OR FOUR YEARS OF TIME WILL HAVE REALLY DEEP STRUCTURAL EFFECTS, ENDURING EFFECTS, EFFECTS WHICH WILL CREATE OVER TIME A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT SET OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS.

MR. KOPPEL (INTERPOSING): CAIRO -- MIDDLE EAST.

WE DON'T EXPECT AN INSTANT RESOLUTION BUT WE ARE SETTING IN MOTION A PROCESS WHICH WE HOPE WILL PAY OFF IN TWO OR THREE OR HOPEFULLY A FASTER NUMBER OF YEARS.

MR. CLARK: BUT ARE YOU IN THIS PROCESS PERHAPS CONFUSING THE PUBLIC -- AND THERE HAS BEEN A GOOD DEAL OF CRITICISM AS YOU KNOW ACROSS THE COUNTRY AND IN CONGRESS ABOUT A LACK OF DIRECTION IN ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICY, BUT PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY MISINTERPRET IT, MISINTERPRET THE LONG-RANGE GOALS THAT YOU WERE SETTING? IS THAT A FAIR CRITICISM IN YOUR VIEW?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I THINK IT IS A CRITICISM WHICH CERTAINLY REFLECTS THE MOOD BUT I THINK THE POINT TO BEAR IN MIND HERE IS FOR THE LAST THIRTY YEARS WE COULD HAVE A CONCENTRATED FOREIGN POLICY WHICH FOCUSED LARGELY ON A SINGLE ISSUE, THE AMERICAN/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, AND EVERYTHING ELSE WAS DERIVATIVE OF IT. WE NOW LIVE IN A COMPLEX REALITY BY GETTING A PROCESS IN MOTION WHICH IN TWO OR THREE YEARS WILL RESULT THEN IN A MORE FUNDAMENTAL AND ENDURING FASHION. WE THINK THIS IS THE MORE RESPONSIBLE WAY TO CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICY. EVEN IF WE CANNOT REDUCE OUR FOREIGN POLICY TO A SINGLE SLOGAN...

MR. CLARK: I AM SORRY, DR. BRZEZINSKI, WE ARE OUT OF TIME. THANK YOU FOR BEING OUR GUEST ON 'ISSUES AND ANSWERS'.
(END TRANSCRIPT)

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1847 :MIDEAST - BRZEZINSKI:

WASHINGTON, DEC 11, REUTER - NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI TODAY PLAYED DOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF
RECONVENING THE GENEVA MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE,
SUGGESTING IT COULD BE REDUCED TO A FORUM MAINLY FOR
RATIFYING AGREEMENTS REACHED ELSEWHERE.

+OUR OBJECTIVE HAS NOT BEEN GENEVA,+ HE SAID ON THE ABC
+ISSUE AND ANSWERS+ TELEVISION INTERVIEW PROGRAMME. +OUR
OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN MOVEMENT TOWARD A SETTLEMENT... IF THAT
OBJECTIVE CAN BE APPROACHED THROUGH OTHER STEPS, THOSE STEPS
WILL BE PURSUED.+

HOWEVER, HE ADDED THAT: +ULTIMATELY WE WILL NEED SOME
MECHANISM FOR RATIFICATION FOR THE FINAL NEGOTIATIONS IF
AGREEMENTS ARE MADE OUTSIDE OF GENEVA, AND THAT INSTRUMENT WILL
BE GENEVA.+

HIS COMMENTS REFLECTED THE GROWING EMPHASIS THE UNITED
STATES IS PLACING ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SCHEDULED CAIRO
TALKS, WHICH, ALTHOUGH ORIGINALLY BILLED BY EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT
ANWAR SADAT AS PRELIMINARY TO GENEVA, HAVE ASSUMED CRUCIAL
IMPORTANCE.

MORE PK

1947 :MIDEAST - BRZEZINSKI 2\WASHINGTON:

SO FAR, HOWEVER, ONLY ISRAEL; THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE AGREED TO SIT DOWN WITH THE EGYPTIANS, WHILE HARD-LINE ARAB STATES HAVE FLATLY REFUSED TO ATTEND.

THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH TWO MONTHS AGO WAS BROUGHT BACK INTO THE THICK OF MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY BY THE UNITED STATES WHEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT CALLING FOR A RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA TALKS, HAS ALSO REFUSED TO GO TO CAIRO.

CALLING THOSE TALKS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, THE SOVIETS HAVE STUCK BY THE ORIGINAL PLAN OF RECONVENING THE GENEVA TALKS, WHICH IT JOINTLY CHAIRS WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND IS HIGHLY DISPLEASED WITH WASHINGTON FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE CAIRO PROCEEDINGS.

MR. BZEZINSKI SAID THE U.S. POSITION WAS NOT A CHANGE IN POLICY AND DENIED ANY ATTEMPT TO REDUCE THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE.

+IF THEY CHOOSE TO COME IN EARLY (BEFORE GENEVA) I AM SURE ALL THE PARTIES WILL WELCOME THEM IF THEY COME IN A SPIRIT OF MODERATION AND ACCOMODATION.

+IF THEY CHOOSE TO STAY OUT, THAT IS THEIR DECISION, NOT OURS.+

REUTER PK

NNNN

« Zbig » sur la sellette

Il est le Kissinger de Carter. Il rêve de son modèle, mais n'a guère connu ses succès. Joël Blocker, du *Point*, a rencontré Zbigniew Brzezinski.

De notre correspondant à Washington

Washington est sans doute l'une des capitales les plus obsédées par la cote dont jouissent ses officiels de haut rang. On la mesure, on l'enregistre, on l'analyse avec la méticulosité d'un médecin qui tient scrupuleusement la feuille de température d'un malade. Or voilà que cet indicateur met aujourd'hui sous les projecteurs un personnage qui restait jusque-là dans l'ombre, dans les coulisses : Zbigniew Brzezinski — dit « Zbig » — le conseiller spécial du président Carter pour la

Et c'est en effet sur lui que tombent toutes les critiques. Comme maître-architecte — un mot qu'il aime bien — de cette politique. Brzezinski est, à tort ou à raison, rendu responsable du « cafouillage » apparent des affaires étrangères. On considère, par exemple, qu'il est coupable d'avoir voulu à tout prix caser une tournée de onze jours du Président dans neuf pays et sur quatre continents — un voyage particulièrement fatigant, donc — dans la période cruciale où allait se décider devant le Congrès le succès ou l'échec du programme énergétique de Jimmy Carter.

On le blâme de ne pas avoir sollicité les avis des experts de politique intérieure de la Maison-Blanche à propos de certaines initiatives de politique étrangère — ce qui eût évité à l'administration un certain nombre de faux pas embarrassants et pas du tout nécessaires, notamment en ce qui concerne le Proche-Orient.

Plus méchamment, Brzezinski est tenu par certains pour le responsable personnel de la politique « anti-israélienne » de Washington. De malveillantes conversations de couloir l'incriminent de penchants « pro-arabes »

un seul homme ! Or ce qui est plutôt sympathique, c'est que Brzezinski accepte volontiers la responsabilité de certaines fautes les plus évidentes. Au cours d'une brève conversation avec *Le Point*, il a reconnu que « quelques-unes des critiques du programme initial du voyage sont justifiées. Nous avons sous-estimé l'élément de fatigue pour le Président. Et de cela, je suis responsable. » Pourtant, remarquent ses défenseurs, ce n'est pas sa faute si le voyage de Carter a dû être reporté : les conseillers de politique intérieure de Carter auraient dû mieux prévoir la durée du débat sur le programme énergétique.

« Après dix mois à la Maison-Blanche, ajoute cependant Brzezinski, si l'on ne peut me blâmer que pour ce projet de voyage, ce n'est pas si mal ! » Les reproches, à vrai dire, ne se bornent pas là. Même si, comme il le dit lui-même, « il rencontre régulièrement » les deux principaux assistants de politique intérieure de Carter, Hamilton Jordan et Stuart Eizenstat, il est clair que « l'entourage géographique » du Président ne lui porte pas une affection excessive. Celui-ci lui attribue les glissements de la politique au Proche-Orient qui ont ôté au Président une partie du soutien de la communauté juive et du Congrès. « Le problème, dit un habitué de la scène politique de Washington, est que Brzezinski doit maintenant convaincre les Géorgiens qu'il est pour Carter un véritable atout. »

Et il devra le faire d'abord à propos du Proche-Orient. Certes, l'idée d'une entité palestinienne ou celle d'un retrait d'Israël dans ses frontières d'avant 1967 sont des éléments de la nouvelle politique des Etats-Unis à propos d'Israël que l'on retrouve dès 1974 ou 1975 dans des articles de Brzezinski. Il ne s'agit nullement d'antisémitisme. Mais il faut désormais se battre pour le faire admettre.

Quant à l'autre accusation, celle d'avoir imprimé à la politique étrangère un air d'improvisation, de vieux amis et collègues de « Zbig » lui donnent une explication : « Comme Carter, disent-ils, « Zbig » a un sens très aigu des buts politiques à long terme. Ils partagent une approche dite millénariste, voire futuriste, des affaires étrangères. Il leur manque ce que l'on appelle le sens de la stratégie. »

La stratégie, c'était à vrai dire la partie forte de Kissinger. La comparaison s'impose lorsqu'on parle de Brzezinski, qui est lui-même hanté par ce modèle. « Mais il ne peut pas suivre sa trace, dit l'un de ses amis. Beaucoup de choses ont changé à Washington. Le pouvoir et les responsabilités sont beaucoup plus diffusés aujourd'hui. Il lui faudra trouver sa route tout seul. »

JOEL BLOCKER



ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI AVEC JIMMY CARTER
Hanté par Kissinger

sécurité nationale et son principal adjoint de politique étrangère.

« Brzezinski fait surface », dit-on. Phrase codée qui signifie tout simplement que cet ancien professeur d'origine polonaise, aujourd'hui âgé de 49 ans, est devenu le principal défenseur public d'une politique extérieure de plus en plus contestée aux Etats-Unis et à l'étranger en raison de « son inconsistance, de son inefficacité et de sa confusion ».

et même d'un certain antisémitisme explicable, suggère-t-on, par ses origines polonaises.

Enfin, le cœur des censeurs — dont beaucoup au sein même du gouvernement — lui reproche cette atmosphère d'improvisation qui entoure des domaines clefs comme les Droits de l'homme, les ventes d'armes et surtout, peut-être, les relations avec l'Union soviétique.

Voilà beaucoup d'accusations pour

Le secret de polichinelle

De notre envoyé spécial en Mauritanie

La France avait voulu, discrète, très discrète, l'arrivée en Mauritanie de ses parachutistes de choc, mais c'est aujourd'hui, ici, un secret de polichinelle.

Ils sont plus de quarante paras, plus de quarante « petits gars » — comme les aimait Bigeard — casquette fixée sur le crâne et tenue léopard impeccable, à camper maintenant au pays des nomades. Les uns à l'abri des dunes ventées de Nouadhibou, les autres au pied de la montagne de Zouérate et les derniers au cœur du vieux massif de l'Adrar, dans la cité caravanière jadis conquise par Gouraud et ses méharistes : Atar.

On sait pourtant qu'il aurait voulu garder l'anonymat, cet avion Transall qui s'est posé, le 4 novembre, sur le terrain d'Atar. Mais au bruit de ses moteurs, les gens ne s'y sont pas trompés. Ils étaient près de six cents à vouloir lui faire fête : nomades à barbiche, anciens gnomiers, femmes mauresques au teint de cuivre. Alors on se demande pourquoi la France a jugé bon d'agir ainsi en catimini : pour ne pas prêter le flanc aux attaques du Front Polisario, qui dénonce chaque soir sur Radio-Alger l'escalade militaire en faveur de la Mauritanie et du Maroc ?

C'est bien possible. Mais, du coup, on s'étonne de tant et tant de maladroitures.

Ce diplomate en poste à Nouakchott peut bien avancer (du bout des lèvres)

que les parachutistes ne sont là que pour apporter une aide technique à l'armée mauritanienne dans un domaine où les moyens lui font cruellement défaut, celui des transmissions. Mais était-il nécessaire, en ce cas, d'appeler des baroudeurs plutôt que des spécialistes des communications ?

Toutes les précautions prises pour entourer de faux mystères l'arrivée des parachutistes laissent songeur.

Si les seize instructeurs français officiant à l'école inter-armes ne craignent pas de se montrer, les neuf paras de la ville, eux, s'activent à huis clos.

Profil de centurion, chevelure poivre et sel, langage militaire, le commandant Dupuis, directeur adjoint de l'école des officiers d'Atar, ne veut pas en entendre parler.

Son seul « boulot » à lui ? Former au plus vite les cent vingt jeunes officiers mauritaniens qui étofferont, dès le mois de juin, la hiérarchie d'une armée encore trop pauvre en cadres. Tâche cruciale que « ce vieux copain de Marcel » (entendez Bigeard) mène tambour battant.

Propagée par le « téléphone arabe », la dernière rumeur en date : les paras seraient munis d'un appareillage sophistiqué leur assurant, une liaison permanente avec Paris.

Dans quel but ? Pour tenir Paris informé en même temps que Nouakchott des progrès de l'état de guerre dans une région où la France se considérerait partie prenante ? C'est effectivement concevable. Pour préparer le déclenchement d'opérations beaucoup plus vastes ? C'est moins plausible.

Mais lorsque le secret (qui n'en est plus tout à fait un) est entretenu comme à plaisir, faut-il s'étonner que jaillissent d'esprits inventifs les plus folles élucubrations ? ● JEROME MARCHAND

UN BREGUET « ATLANTIC » SUR L'AÉRODROME DE NOUAKCHOTT
Précautions pour faux mystères



URSS : la fin du ménage à trois

« Nous sommes contre la polygamie. Nous ne pouvons être mariés avec l'Union soviétique qui ne comprend pas la politique africaine et qui vient d'épouser l'Ethiopie. » Par cette formule colorée, le président de la Somalie, le général Ziyad Barre, expliquait lundi devant plus de 100 000 personnes rassemblées sur la voie Lénine à Mogadiscio sa décision prise la veille d'expulser tous les ressortissants soviétiques (à l'exception de huit diplomates) et tous les Cubains.

Mercredi, un pont aérien de Tupolev



LE GÉNÉRAL ZIYAD BARRE
Contre la polygamie

154 commençait à rapatrier les deux mille ou trois mille experts civils et militaires soviétiques et leur famille (6 000 personnes au total). Les Cubains, beaucoup moins nombreux — une cinquantaine environ — avaient quitté la capitale dès mardi après-midi.

Ces évacuations saluées par une foule euphorique marquent la fin d'une époque. Fini le traité d'amitié somalo-soviétique signé en 1974 à un moment où Mogadiscio devenait l'allié privilégié de l'URSS dans cette poudrière qu'est la Corne de l'Afrique. Finies les facilités militaires accordées à l'URSS, en particulier à Berbera, port en eau profonde où Moscou disposait d'une base stratégique très importante.

De fait, les relations entre les deux pays s'étaient fortement dégradées depuis que l'URSS, jouant sur deux tableaux, avait décidé d'aider le voisin puissant de la Somalie, l'Ethiopie, à laquelle Mogadiscio dispute dans une guerre sans merci une partie de son territoire, l'Ogaden.

Du coup, la Somalie, sous l'impulsion de l'Arabie Saoudite, se ralliait peu à peu au camp occidental. Tandis que l'Ethiopie aux prises avec des difficultés intérieures durcissait son régime au prix de purges sanglantes dont vient d'être victime le numéro deux du gouvernement, Atnafu Abate. ●

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



7.11.77

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

424

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: איגרת להמן לבוחריו

למברקי מ-4 דנא.

מצ"ב נוסח האיגרת שמפיץ להמן לבוחריו בעקבות
פגישתו (עם יוטס) עם ברז'ינסקי.

מברקי מ,

צ. רפיה

העתק: המנכ"ל

המרכז.

משרד החוץ

תל אביב



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL

WASHINGTON D.C.

424

7.11.77

המלך: המלך המאוחד

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WILLIAM LEHMAN
13TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

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Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Rep. Bill Lehman and Rep. Sid Yates

November 4, 1977

Dear Friends,

Because dismay and uncertainty about the Administration's Mideast policy continues to be widespread, I felt it necessary to meet again with President Carter's National Security Advisor, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, who had been characterized in last Sunday's New York Times as "the central target of Jewish animosity toward the Carter Administration."

Dr. Brzezinski came to Capitol Hill on Monday, October 31, at my request, for a private, one-on-one meeting with myself and Rep. Sid Yates, the senior Jewish U.S. Representative.

Yates and I questioned him for over an hour on the concerns and fears voiced especially by our Jewish constituents, but also by others including our colleagues in Congress. We focused particularly on the role of the PLO at Geneva, a possible Palestinian state, Carter's rush for a settlement, the involvement of the Russians, and the future of the West Bank.

Is the U.S. now talking to the PLO? Brzezinski said no. Will the U.S. talk to the PLO if they say they accept U.N. Resolution 242 (which recognizes Israel's right to exist)? He answered yes. Will that mean PLO participation at Geneva? No, he responded, the PLO will not come to Geneva unless Israel agrees and the U.S. will not "squeeze" Israel to do this, Brzezinski said.

A Palestinian state? The U.S. does not favor, does not want, and will not agree to a separate Palestinian state. In fact, he noted, the only Arab nation which truly favors a Palestinian state is Saudi Arabia.

Must Geneva take place this year? No, Brzezinski answered. Although the President wants it as early as possible, the conference could take place late this year or early next year. In addition, "we do not expect the PLO at Geneva," he said, and if Syria does not choose to participate, the conference might convene anyway.

Why were the Russians brought back in? Although the Soviets had been effectively dealt out of Mideast negotiations, the fact remains, said Brzezinski, that they are the co-chairmen of the Geneva conference and cannot be ignored. When Menachem Begin was elected Prime Minister of Israel, he insisted on only face-to-face negotiations with the Arabs, and Geneva is the only available forum for this. As long as the USSR had to be a party, the Administration sought to get them locked into a more moderate position. There is grave question that the Russians will keep agreements, but at least, according to Brzezinski, we've got them on paper.

Despite this explanation, it is clear that the Administration made two major blunders in the way it brought the Russians back into the negotiations. It failed to consult fully with Israel, thereby violating a signed agreement made with the Israelis in 1973. The Administration also failed totally to consult with Congress, a mistake which has contributed to Carter's deepening troubles with the Legislative Branch.

There are also serious unresolved differences between Israel's friends and Brzezinski regarding the future of the West Bank. Brzezinski's own suggestions for an eventual West Bank agreement would include an Israeli military presence along the Jordan River, but not Israeli sovereignty over most of the West Bank. He sees a West Bank which would remain open to free commerce and travel from Israel, but says he does not want sovereignty to become a point of future conflict.

According to the recent agreement between President Carter and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, it will be up to the parties themselves - Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and non-PLO Palestinians - to discuss at Geneva the ultimate fate of the West Bank. The Administration must respect the spirit of this agreement and not pressure Israel for withdrawals which Israel believes would be harmful to her security.

Brzezinski sees the U.S. as having three roles in the Mideast. First, the U.S. has its own national self-interest to protect. This means keeping out the Russians and preserving the flow of oil to the West. Second, the U.S. is playing the role of a mediator to try to bring peace to the Mideast.

The third U.S. role is, and I want to quote him exactly, as "the protector and defender of the State of Israel in the Mideast." In this role, he went on to say, a U.S.-Israel defense treaty, similar to the arrangement our country has with Japan, might be possible. Such a treaty might include a U.S. naval facility at Haifa which, Brzezinski said, could provide better support for the U.S. Sixth Fleet than its present facilities. The defense arrangement might also include stationing American troops at Sharm el-Sheikh to guarantee open shipping in the Straits of Tiran.

While these are interesting proposals, Israel has repeatedly emphasized that outside guarantees in any form cannot be accepted in place of a true peace agreement with the Arabs.

From Brzezinski's answers, it appears that this Administration is genuinely committed to the State of Israel. As Brzezinski said, Israel has asked for years to sit down face-to-face with the Arabs to discuss peace and would benefit immeasurably from a truly successful Geneva peace conference. This, he said, is what the Administration wants and is trying to achieve.

To keep good lines of communication open, I have stayed in close touch with Dr. Brzezinski and others in this Administration. I've asked the questions that are most on people's minds and got the answers which, while not totally satisfying, at least indicate that we are making the Administration aware and sensitive to our apprehensions. As your Congressman, I have tried to convey not only my own anxiety and concern, but also the fears of residents of South Florida, that in the search for peace, Israel's security and well-being are not threatened.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely,

Bill

WILLIAM LEHMAN
Member of Congress

P.S. If you know of other individuals or groups who may also want to receive reports on events concerning the Mideast, please call our District office at 945-7518.

7.11.77

426

אל: מר מ. רוזן, היועץ המשפטי
מאת: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדרון: להמן - ברז'ינסקי

למברקן 56

מברקי 92

מצ"ב חצולם המכתב ששיגר לברז'ינסקי בעקבות

שיחתנו.

ב ב ד כ ה,

צ. רפיה

העתק: השגריר, כאן
מנהל מצפ"א.

Handwritten signature or initials.

17.11.77

THE SECRETARY
GENERAL SECRETARIAT

THE SECRETARY

TO THE SECRETARY

THE SECRETARY

SECRETARY

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November 4, 1977

REPLY TO:

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
National Security Advisor
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Zbig,

Sid and I are most grateful to you for taking the time to meet with us on Monday.

I consider it vital, especially in these times of heightened emotions, to maintain strong and open lines of communication with you and the Administration.

During our talk, we discussed the possibility of eventual negotiations between the U.S. and the PLO, and there is one point on which I would appreciate further clarification.

According to my memory, Sid asked you if the U.S. was now talking to the PLO, and you answered no. Then he asked if the U.S. would talk to the PLO if they said they accepted U.N. Resolution 242, and you answered yes.

We didn't pursue this specific question further, and in checking with the 1975 Memorandum of Agreement with Israel, filed with the Congress, there are two other conditions mentioned before the U.S. would talk to the PLO - recognition of Israel's right to exist and acceptance of U.N. Resolution 338. Did your answer to us about PLO acceptance of 242 also imply PLO acceptance of these two other conditions before the U.S. would talk to the PLO?

Again, I thank you for responding so forthrightly to our concerns and I hope to be hearing from you soon.

With warmest regards, I am

Sincerely,


WILLIAM LEHMAN
Member of Congress

WL/mo

משרד החוץ

מחלקת השער

מברק נכנס-מסווג

ס 77'

אל : המשורר

תש"ל: י"ב

113: מַסֵּס

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התשובה: 050348 ל ו ב 77

זרד. מנהל מופת.

תשופט טננברג אל מוזס והיימן בוקשינר ביקרו היומ אצל בוזינסקי
הייתה שנמשכה כ-40 דקות ושדווח מפורט עליה עוד אקבל, הייתה במסגרת
וועדות ה- COMMITTEE לקראת צאת משלוחם ארצה.
לחץ נקודות עיקריות: בוזינסקי הצהיר על התגדותו להקמת מדינה
פלשתינית עצמאית בגדמק, וציין שבשנה וחצי האחרונות חל שינוי במחשבתו
בנושא זה, מנהיג הגורמים שהביאו לשינוי דעתו חוסר היציבות
הפוליטי, והגורם הטוביטי והגיאוגרפי. יחד עם זאת הכהיר שעל הממשל
לחזור בלשונו כאשר הוא מגדיר התגדותו זו, כי הדי אם עמדתם היא
שעל הצדדים להחליט, חייבים הם בעקבות. להערת בוקשינר שהיפוש עקבות
זו מעמדת הממשל בהצהירו שעל ישראל לחזור לגבולותיה עם שנויים קלים-
לא הגיב.

הוסיף שאיבד כוציא מכלל אפשרות התחליות ישראליות לאורך הירדן

או אפ זכונם של יהודים לחיות באדמע. חזר ודיבר על תקותו

לגמישות ופתיחות ישראלית לגבי פתרונות שאלת הגדה. הזכיר קשור

אנשי עם יודני יי קונדומינ'ומי. אמר שהיה טוב אם ישראל

היתה מחישה מושכותיה בסוגיה מה צריך לקרות בגזרה, וצ"ל ש-

Israel must dispose of the west Bank

גבולות שטח המדינה

הנהגת המערכת תהיה כדלקמן:

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים),
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

מס. 20

נלשח 011830 ג'וב 77

החקבל 020241

ש מ ר

מ י ד י

אל: המשרד

מאת: רושנינגטון

הנכל - י. רביב.

ביוזמת חבר ביה"ב היהודי מפלורידה ביל להמן, בפגש אתמול בזצינסקי, בקפיטול עם להמן וייטס
לשיחה בעניני המזה"ת. להמן עיקרי השיחה כפי שגרשמו ע"י להמן. להמן מתכוון לשלוח
גרסה זה, בשבוע הבא, כאגרת לבחוריו. עם זאת, יתכן מאד וקטעים ממנו יושמטו. מתבטא הסופר
טייטלס. להיכך אין לראות בזה עדיין חומר גלוי.

BRZEZINSKI Meeting with Rep.
S. Yates on LEHMAN 31.10.1977.

ON OCTOBER 30TH, PRESIDENT CARTER'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, WAS CHARACTERIZED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES AS "THE CENTRAL TARGET OF JEWISH ANIMOSITY TOWARD THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION" FOR HIS MIDEAST POLICY.

DR. BRZEZINSKI CAME TO CAPITOL HILL THE NEXT DAY, AT MY REQUEST, FOR A PRIVATE, ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH MYSELF AND REP. SID YATES, THE SENIOR JEWISH U.S. REPRESENTATIVE. THIS FOLLOWED BRZEZINSKI'S REQUEST AS YOU MAY REMEMBER FROM OUR OCTOBER 14TH NEWSLETTER, TO KEEP OPEN THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND ISRAEL'S FRIENDS IN CONGRESS.

YATES AND I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO QUESTION HIM FOR OVER AN HOUR ON THE CONCERNS AND FEARS VOICED ESPECIALLY BY OUR JEWISH CONSTITUENTS, BUT ALSO BY OTHERS INCLUDING OUR COLLEAGUES IN CONGRESS. WE FOCUSED PARTICULARLY ON THE ROLE OF THE PLO AT GENEVA, A POSSIBLE PALESTINIAN STATE, THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK, CARTER'S RUSH FOR A SETTLEMENT, AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE RUSSIANS IN THE MID EAST.

IS THE U.S. NOW TALKING TO THE PLO? BRZEZINSKI SAID NO. WILL THE U.S. TALK TO THE PLO IF THEY SAY THEY ACCEPT U.N. RESOLUTION 242 (WHICH RECOGNIZES ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST)? HE ANSWERED YES. WILL THAT MEAN PLO PARTICIPATION AT GENEVA? NO, HE RESPONDED, THE PLO WILL NOT COME TO GENEVA UNLESS ISRAEL AGREES AND THE U.S. WILL NOT "SQUEEZE" ISRAEL TO DO THIS. A PALESTINIAN STATE? THE U.S. DOES NOT FAVOR, DOES NOT WANT AND WILL NOT AGREE TO A SEPARATE PALESTINIAN STATE. IN FACT HE NOTED, THE ONLY ARAB PARTY WHICH TRULY FAVORS A PALESTINIAN STATE IS SAUDI ARABIA.

THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK? BRZEZINSKI HAS HIS OWN SUGGESTIONS FOR AN EVENTUAL WEST BANK AGREEMENT ALONG LINES FIRST PROPOSED BY FORMER ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON. HE SUPPORTS AN ISRAELI

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כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

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MILITARY PRESENCE AS STRONG AS NECESSARY ALONG THE JORDAN RIVER, BUT NOT ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER MOST OF THE WEST BANK TERRITORY. HE SEES A WEST BANK WHICH REMAINS OPEN TO FREE COMMERCE AND TRAVEL FROM ISRAEL, BUT HE DOESN'T WANT SOVEREIGNTY TO BECOME A POINT OF FUTURE CONFLICT. HOWEVER, IT WILL BE UP TO THE PARTIES THEMSELVES - ISRAEL, EGYPT, JORDAN, AND NON-PLO PALESTINIANS - TO DISCUSS THE ULTIMATE FATE OF THE WEST BANK AT GENEVA. MUST GENEVA TAKE PLACE THIS YEAR? NO, BRZEZINSKI ANSWERED. THE CONFERENCE MAY TAKE PLACE LATE THIS YEAR OR EARLY NEXT YEAR. IN ADDITION, "WE DO NOT EXPECT THE PLO AT GENEVA", HE SAID, AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE CONFERENCE MIGHT CONVEENE WITHOUT SYRIA AS WELL.

WHY WERE THE RUSSIANS BROUGHT BACK IN? THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN EFFECTIVELY DEALT OUT OF MIDEAST NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, WHEN MENACHEM BEGIN WAS ELECTED PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL, HE INSISTED ON ONLY FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARABS AND GENEVA IS THE ONLY AVAILABLE FORUM FOR THIS. SINCE 1973, THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN THE CO-CHAIRMAN OF GENEVA, AND THE CONFERENCE COULD NOT BE RECONVENED WITHOUT THEM.

AS LONG AS THE USSR HAD TO BE A PARTY THE ADMINISTRATION SOUGHT TO GET THEM LOCKED AND DOCUMENTED INTO THE MOST MODERATE POSITION THEY HAVE EVER TAKEN. THERE IS GRAVE DOUBT THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL KEEP AGREEMENTS, BUT AT LEAST WE'VE GOT THEM ON PAPER, ACCORDING TO BRZEZINSKI.

BRZEZINSKI SEES THE U.S. AS HAVING THREE ROLES IN THE MIDEAST. FIRST, THE U.S. HAS ITS OWN NATIONAL SELF-INTEREST TO PROTECT.

THIS MEANS KEEPING OUT THE RUSSIANS AND PRESERVING THE FLOW OF OIL TO THE WEST. SECOND, THE U.S. IS PLAYING THE ROLE OF A MEDIATOR TO TRY TO BRING PEACE TO THE MIDEAST.

FINALLY, BRZEZINSKI SEES A U.S. ROLE AS, AND I WISH TO QUOTE HIM EXACTLY, "THE PROTECTOR AND DEFENDER OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL IN THE MIDEAST." THIS COULD EVEN LEAD TO A JOINT U.S.-ISRAEL DEFENSE TREATY, SIMILAR TO THE ARRANGEMENT THIS COUNTRY HAS WITH JAPAN. THIS MIGHT INCLUDE A U.S. NAVAL BASE AT HAIFA WHICH HE SAID COULD PROVIDE BETTER FACILITIES FOR THE U.S. SIXTH FLEET THAN THOSE THEY ARE NOW USING. IT MIGHT ALSO INCLUDE STATIONING AMERICAN TROOPS AT SHARM EL-SHEIKH.

BRZEZINSKI NOTED THAT IN THIS ROLE AS ISRAEL'S ALLY, THE LEVEL OF U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID WOULD CONTINUE NEXT YEAR AT LEAST THE SAME AMOUNT AS THIS YEAR'S 1.8 BILLION DOLLARS. ++
TO KEEP GOOD LINES OF COMMUNICATION OPEN, I'VE BEEN WORKING STEADILY WITH DR. BRZEZINSKI AND OTHERS IN THIS ADMINISTRATION.

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תש"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

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AS YOUR CONGRESSMAN, I HAVE TRIED TO CONVEY NOT ONLY MY ANXIETY AND CONCERN, BUT ALSO THE FEARS OF THOSE IN SOUTH FLORIDA, THAT IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, ISRAEL'S SECURITY IS NOT THREATENED. I'VE ASKED THE QUESTIONS THAT ARE MOST ON PEOPLE'S MINDS AND GOT THE DIRECT ANSWERS WHICH, WHILE NOT TOTALLY SATISFYING, AT LEAST INDICATE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS AWARE AND SENSITIVE TO THESE APPREHENSIONS.

FROM BRZEZINSKI'S ANSWERS, I HAVE TO CONCLUDE THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION IS GENUINELY COMMITTED TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL. ISRAEL HAS ASKED FOR YEARS TO SIT DOWN FACE-TO-FACE WITH THE ARABS TO DISCUSS PEACE AND WOULD BENEFIT INMEASURABLY FROM A TRULY SUCCESSFUL GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE. THAT IS WHAT THIS ADMINISTRATION IS TRYING TO ACHIEVE.

AD KAN.

RAFIACH==

החם רחם ס/רחם מנכל שהבט ממנכל סמנכל מצפא מאום א ב מזתים חקר רם זמן

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Brzezinski Meeting with Rep. S. Yates
on Lehman, 31 October 1977

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On October 30th, President Carter's National Security Advisor, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, was characterized by the New York Times as "the central target of Jewish animosity toward the Carter Administration" for his Mideast policy.

Dr. Brzezinski came to Capitol Hill the next day, at my request, for a private, one-on-one meeting with myself and Rep. Sid Yates, the senior Jewish U.S. Representative. This following Brzezinski's request, as you may remember from our October 14th Newsletter, to keep open the lines of communication between the Administration and Israel's friends in Congress.

Yates and I had the opportunity to question him (Brzezinski) for over an hour on the concerns and fears voiced especially by our Jewish constituents, but also by others including our colleagues in Congress. We focused particularly on the role of the PLO at Geneva, a possible Palestinian State, the future of the West Bank, Carter's rush for a settlement, and the involvement of the Russians in the Mideast.

Is the US now talking to the PLO? Brzezinski said no. Will the US talk to the PLO if they say they accept UN Resolution 242 (which recognizes Israel's right to exist)? He answered yes. Will that mean PLO participation at Geneva? No, he responded, the PLO will not come to Geneva unless Israel agrees and the US will not "squeeze" Israel to do this. A Palestinian State? The US does not favour, does not want and will not agree to a separate Palestinian State. In fact, he noted, the only Arab party which truly favours a Palestinian State is Saudi Arabia.

The future of the West Bank? Brzezinski has his own suggestions for an eventual West Bank agreement along lines first proposed by former Israeli Foreign Minister Allon. He supports an Israeli military presence as strong as necessary along the Jordan River, but not Israeli sovereignty over most of the West Bank territory. He sees a West Bank which remains open to free commerce and travel from Israel, but he doesn't want sovereignty to become a point of future conflict. However, it will be up to the parties themselves - Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and non-PLO Palestinians - to discuss the ultimate fate of the West Bank at Geneva.

The first of the two main themes of the conference was the role of the state in the economy. The second was the role of the state in the environment. The first theme was discussed in the first two sessions of the conference. The second theme was discussed in the last two sessions of the conference. The first session of the conference was devoted to the role of the state in the economy. The second session of the conference was devoted to the role of the state in the environment. The third session of the conference was devoted to the role of the state in the economy. The fourth session of the conference was devoted to the role of the state in the environment.

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Must Geneva take place this year? No, Brzezinski answered. The Conference may take place late this year or early next year. In Addition, "We do not expect the PLO at Geneva", he said, and there is a possibility that the Conference might convene without Syria as well.

Why were the Russians brought back in? The Soviets had been effectively dealt out of Mideast negotiations. However, when Menachem Begin was elected Prime Minister of Israel, he insisted on only face-to-face negotiations with the Arabs and Geneva is the only available forum for this. Since 1973, the Russians have been the Co-Chairmen of Geneva, and the Conference could not be reconvened without them.

As long as the USSR had to be a party, the Administration sought to get them locked and documented into the most moderate position they have ever taken. There is grave doubt that the Russians will keep agreements, but at least we've got them on paper, according to Brzezinski.

Brzezinski sees the US as having three roles in the Mideast. First, the US has its own national self-interest to protect. This means keeping out the Russians and preserving the flow of oil to the West. Second, the US is playing the role of a mediator to try to bring peace to the Mideast.

Finally, Brzezinski sees a US role as, and I wish to quote him exactly, "The protector and defender of the State of Israel in the Mideast". This could even lead to a joint US-Israel defence treaty, similar to the arrangement this country has with Japan. This might include a US naval base at Haifa which he said could provide better facilities for the US Sixth Fleet than those they are now using. It might also include stationing American troops at Sharm-El-Sheikh.

Brzezinski noted that in this role as Israel's ally, the level of US economic and military aid would continue next year at least to the same amount as this year's 1.8 billion dollars.

To keep good lines of communication open, I've been working steadily with Dr. Brzezinski and others in this Administration.

As your Congressman, I have tried to convey not only my anxiety and concern, but also the fears of those in South Florida, that in the search for peace, Israel's security is not threatened. I've asked the question that are most on people's minds and got the direct answers which, while not totally satisfying, at least indicate that the Administration is aware and sensitive to these apprehensions.

From Brzezinski's answers, I have to conclude that this Administration is genuinely committed to the State of Israel. Israel has asked for years to sit down face-to-face with the Arabs to discuss peace and would benefit immeasurably from a truly successful Geneva Peace Conference. That is what this Administration is trying to achieve.

מסי 556

גשלה: 301420 אוק 77

התקבל: 302126 אוק 77

אל: חשד

מאת: ושינגטון

שכת הנככל, מצפה

FACE THE NATION חי'רעצ לע'יני בטחת לאומי בזינגסקי בות'י'ת

משת CBS

כין השאר התי'חס למזדה'ת'יות, השאלה הראשונה נגעה לשי'תופה של בוחם
 במחלכים המדי'ניים, על ככ השי'ב שגורא'ה לו שבני'גוד לעבר כאשר בוחם לא
 היה מעוני'נת בהט'ור במז'ת חל בשני'ם האחר'ות שי'נו'י לטובה בעמדת
 חס'כיי'טית והוא מקו'ח שא'ם תלונ'ס גנבה מחד'ש ישחקו חס'כיי'טים הפקיד
 חי'ת'י

פא'ר נשאל ותי'ם גנבה ות'ג'ס עד סוף השנה, ענה שהוא אי'נו רוצ'ה לחיות קשה
 באיי'כ מסוי'ים שלעית'ים קרובות קורה שחבר'ים לא מחדשים בדיוק בזמן
 הצפוי, ל'כ לא היה רוצ'ה לעקוב באיי'כ'י לכי'ת'ס גנבה לא בדצמבר,
 לא בי'נואר ואפילו לא בפברואר א'כ הוא רוצ'ה לחבי'ע הקורות שאפשר יהיה
 ל'כ'ס את הועי'ז'ה בזמן הקרוב.

מקשר לכ' הגדיר את עמדות הצדדים כדל'ת'ל'.

The Israeli attitude have been quite constructive, The

Arab attitude have been more fixed.

בשורה לשאל'ה לשתתפות אש'פ ב'ת'יה' ענה שלא יכ'לה להיות השתתפות
 לא קבל'ת 242 שבנוסף על ככ על הצדדים עצמ'ם להכרי'ע בשאל'ת השתתפות.
 הוא ציי'ן שאד'ב עובדת עשיו' עם הצדדים לשתתפות פלשתי'נאית בועי'דה.
 עבר היו דרכים למצוא פת'ות לעי'ות כגון אלו ובחשד לכ'כ הוא רוצ'ה לצי'ן
 שש'ח די'ין מכיר היטב את ראשי העי'ים ביהודה ושומרון ויודע את עמדת'ם
 כלפי' אש'פ.

הוא סירב לענות על שאלות חוזרות לחיות יחד' ספציפי' בג'שא.

פז'ר, ש'ש'ר

שהח רח'מ ס/רח'מ מנכל מנכל ש'ת'ב'ת מצפ'ה מאומ'ג' חס'כ'ה מע'ת מ'ז'ת'ס חקר ר'מ א'ת'ן

תקור אילטר וחוב

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SERIES

IMPORTANT POLICY MATERIAL OF CURRENT INTEREST

TEXT OF REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT'S
SECURITY ADVISER, ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI,
BEFORE THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION IN
BONN, OCTOBER 25, 1977.

Line 4, 3rd. paragraph, page 11, should read as follows:

Not only has there been a dramatic increase in the volume of arms, but those sold today are of ever increasing sophistication.

TEXT OF REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT'S
SECURITY ADVISER, ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI,
BEFORE THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION IN
BONN, OCTOBER 25, 1977.

Washington, Oct. 31 -- Following is text of remarks Oct. 25 by the President's Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, before the Trilateral Commission in Bonn.

(Begin Text)

I want to use this opportunity to speak of American policy and of global change. In doing so, let me stress, first of all, the underlying continuity of that policy. Since 1945, the United States, with its allies, has been engaged in an effort to create a more congenial international setting for our values, for our interests, and for our future. But we have done this while the international political system has felt the pressures of two simultaneous trends: an intense ideological and power conflict, and a remarkable expansion in the scope of its participation, produced by the waning of empires and the resulting tripling in the number of nation-states. This conjunction -- of conflict rooted in ideology, power, and national ambitions, with a sudden expansion in international participation -- has made for extraordinary turbulence in world affairs.

Nonetheless, our basic commitments have remained unchanged from administration to administration. This is especially the case with our collective security -- and our commitment to common defense remains a central and constant element in our policy. What has changed is the international context in which we have sought to maintain these commitments. The nature of that change has often presented us with enormously complex problems of analysis, and even of values. In reacting to global change, what factors should we stress and why? In an era of such rapid change, with some of that change involving values clearly in conflict with our own traditions, is it more important to preserve the status quo, or to try to shape that change in directions that preserve our interests and enhance our values? Or is it possible to do some of both?

Each administration has answered these questions somewhat differently, thereby setting for itself somewhat different priorities. Today, while emphasizing the underlying continuity in American foreign policy, I wish to share with you some thoughts on how the new Carter Administration defines its objectives, and how it responds to continuing as well as to new global dilemmas.

In broad terms, the Carter Administration set for itself four basic priorities:

1. To overcome the crisis of the spirit;
2. To help shape a wider and more cooperative world system;
3. To resolve conflicts that, left unresolved, are not likely to be contained;
4. To engage governments and peoples in responding to new and key global dilemmas.

1. OVERCOMING THE CRISIS OF THE SPIRIT

In some regard, the crisis of the spirit in recent years has been specifically American; in a larger sense, it has been part of the broader malaise of the West; in some respects, it is related to the political awakening of mankind, which has had the effect of transforming heretofore seemingly universal Western values into an apparently parochial perspective. As a crisis of historical confidence and of international relevance to a world that seemingly rejects Western values, its essence has been well expressed by Herman Hesse writing in *Steppenwolf*:-

"Human life is reduced to real suffering, to hell, only when two ages, two cultures and religions overlap. There are times when a whole generation is caught in this way between two ages, two modes of life, with the consequence that it loses all power to understand itself and has no standard, no security, no simple acquiescence."

In its specific American dimension, the crisis of the spirit was stimulated by the Vietnamese War and by the constitutional and moral crisis of Watergate. In Western Europe and Japan, the very pace of the efforts to overcome the traumatic legacies of World War II may still have played a role. Raymond Aron has also recently pointed at the broader implications of the crisis: "A hedonistic civilization, so shortsighted as to devote itself only to the material satisfactions of the day, condemns itself to death when it is no longer interested in the future, and

loses thereby its sustaining sense of history."

This is why the new American President put so much emphasis, as early as in his Inaugural Address, on "The New Spirit." Faced with a world that was losing faith in America, by the widespread global phenomenon of anti-Americanism, the new Administration put high on its list of priorities the needs of advanced industrial democracies. We do not make acceptance of our view on human rights a precondition for specific bilateral relationships; nor do we wish to prescribe our specific norms for other societies. But we do believe that these two words "Human Rights" summarize mankind's social progress; that they represent the genuine historical inevitability of our time; and that neither the United States nor the West should be ashamed of our commitment to the advancement of human rights.

In addition, the revival of popular American concern for events beyond our shores derives in part from the special emphasis that the Administration has placed on relating our foreign policy goals to deeper American values. The reawakened American concern for human rights thus not only reflects the deep convictions of the President and of most Americans; this concern has also played a significant role in overcoming widespread popular disillusion and cynicism about foreign policy, thus enabling the United States again to play a more constructive role across a broad range of international issues.

I believe it is fair to say that the crisis of the spirit in the United States is coming to an end. The changing outlook of the United States on the world today has several dimensions:

-- A revival of American optimism. This is not the mere expectation of good fortune expressed in Bismarck's remark that "a special providence seems to look after drunks, fools, and Americans." Rather, it reflects confidence in the basic strength of our position in the world and of the moral character of that position.

-- A reawakening of American idealism. President Carter does not shrink from affirming our basic values at home and abroad. Americans support him in that. We do not seek to impose our principles on others, but we do not intend to be silent about the things that we believe

in deeply. More, by reaffirming our commitment to basic notions that man is entitled to certain basic human rights, and that the Western democratic system gives people the greatest opportunity for self-expression, we contribute to the spiritual revival of the West. A West that believes only in material consumption has a message of no relevance to the rest of the world. A West that stands for genuine liberty and self-fulfillment of the individual has a message and the necessary point of departure for a dialogue with the rest of the world about basic human needs -- material, social, political, and technological.

-- A rekindling of America's commitment to reform. The current international situation demands a creative effort to devise new habits of conduct and new institutions for dealing with regional and global problems. We accept this challenge with enthusiasm rather than resignation, recognizing that we cannot design solutions unilaterally nor engage the interests and efforts of others without patient and thorough consultations.

I believe that the last ten months have already seen a significant reduction in anti-Americanism abroad. I believe the new, and confident, American approach to world affairs, rooted in our values, is beginning to reestablish the basis for an American role that can truly be morally just and politically effective.

2. TOWARDS A WIDER AND MORE COOPERATIVE WORLD SYSTEM

For us, the point of departure for America's involvement in the world is our relationship with Western Europe and Japan. The bonds of interest and sentiment which link our destinies have a special character. We share a commitment to democratic procedures, civil rights, the market system, open societies. We confront the common problems of post-industrial societies.

We are not merely occasional allies;

We are permanent friends. If we are determined to reassert American leadership in world affairs, we conceive of it as shared leadership; no one country today can have a monopoly or even predominance of wisdom, initiative, or responsibility.

Because of this understanding and belief, we set out immediately in January to bring relations with Europe and Japan to the forefront of U.S. Foreign Policy. This was the symbolism -- and the substance -- behind Vice President Mondale's trip, beginning only 96 hours after the Inauguration. And it was the reason the President made his first foreign trip to Western Europe, whose unity we strongly favor, for the three summits with our major partners. We sought to consult on the many issues with which we are vitally concerned, first and foremost with our industrial state partners.

Our objective in this is not a pursuit of identical policies. But together we must relate our respective national security policies and our economic policies to common efforts to promote reconciliation among nations and to more effective international economic cooperation. In dealing with each other, moreover, we must acknowledge a higher standard of mutual concern than normally marks relations between sovereign states. We must accept a greater commitment to consult, and to adjust our national policies in the light of their impact on our key partners.

The Economic Summit last May was a useful forum for consulting regarding our economic policy. The NATO Summit developed joint steps to enhance our collective security. Furthermore, in Presidential Directive No. 18, the President recently recommitted the United States to a policy of forward defense in Europe and to continued security of our allies in the Far East. But that commitment needs to be defined and refined in the light of changing circumstances, and both its strategic as well as tactical implications will require greater cooperation and joint reevaluation in the years ahead.

Similarly, we must jointly face the danger that the advanced world will soon confront an energy crisis of mounting proportions, and all of us -- and especially the United States, must develop conservation and innovation on an increasingly urgent basis.

A secure and economically cooperative community of the advanced industrial democracies is the necessary source of stability for a broad system of international cooperation. We are aware of the pitfalls of constructing a geometric world -- whether bilateral or trilateral or

pentagonal -- that leaves out the majority of mankind who live in the developing countries. A global structure that would ignore this reality would be inhumane, for it would reflect indifference to the hardships of others; it would be unrealistic, for we cannot ignore scores of nations with whom we are increasingly interdependent; and it would be damaging in the long run, for the problems that we neglect today will come back in a more virulent form tomorrow. We are therefore seeking to create a new political and international order that is truly more participatory and genuinely more responsive to global desire for greater social justice, equity, and more opportunity for individual self-fulfillment. We believe that paying greater attention to this dimension of foreign policy is not only in our own self-interest, and indispensable to an effective working of the global economy; to us it also represents a return to some of the deepest values and historical roots of our own country, while reestablishing the relevance of the west to mankind's universal condition.

It is in this spirit that the new Administration has sought to put our relations with Latin America and with Africa on a new plane. We have abandoned the traditional device of formulating a new slogan to encapsule U.S. relations with Latin America. Instead, we have emphasized that we respect the diversity of the Latin American nations; that we seek to relate to them on a bilateral basis in regard to problems which are more universal. I believe that most Latin American nations respect and welcome this approach. They see in it the rejection of traditional U.S. paternalism and the beginning of more mature and normal relations, similar to those which the United States has with other nations of the world.

Regarding Africa, we have sought and I believe successfully, to identify ourselves with the just aspirations of Black Africans. We have broken with the posture of indifference and insensitivity which at times in the past characterized American attitudes toward those aspirations. In so doing, I believe that we are also making it easier for the United States, as for the West in general, to play a creative role in dealing with some international problems that today confront the African community.

In Asia, where the United States will continue to play a major role, we are encouraged by the progress made in some parts of this vast region. The emergence of ASEAN,

the growing prosperity of the Pacific Basin, the constructive character of recent Japanese initiatives are welcome developments, which will cumulatively contribute to a healthier international order.

In brief, our approach to developing nations is characterized by our willingness to actively seek solutions to remaining "anti-colonialist" issues; by our engagement in the search for answers to the more structural problems of North-South relations; by our desire to collaborate closely with the increasingly influential emerging states; and by our desire to make foreign aid more responsive to the needs of the world's poorest peoples.

At the same time, a wider and more cooperative world system has to include also that part of the world which is ruled by Communist governments. One-third of mankind now lives under Communist systems, and these states have to be assimilated, to the extent that they are willing, into a wider fabric of global cooperation. The objective is thus to assimilate East-West relations into a broader framework of cooperation, rather than to concentrate on East-West relations as the decisive and dominant concern of our times. In the 1950s, world affairs were dominated by an intense confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet bloc. In the 1960s, world affairs were dominated by growing diversity in the Communist world and by a competitive relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. And in the early 1970s, many foreign observers became concerned that the next era would be marked by efforts to create a U.S.-Soviet condominium. An enduring thread runs through these generalizations; whether marked by confrontation, competition, or the feared prospect of a condominium, the nature of U.S.-Soviet relations tended to dominate American foreign policy and, indeed, world affairs.

This should no longer be, or need be, the case. East-West relations, notably U.S.-Soviet relations, involve and will continue to involve elements of both competition and cooperation. We are quietly confident about our ability and determination to compete, economically, politically, and militarily. But managing a relationship that will be both competitive and cooperative cannot be permitted to dominate all our perspectives. Today, we do not have a realistic choice between an approach centered on the Soviet Union, or cooperation with our trilateral friends, or on North-South relations. Instead, each set of issues must be approached on its own terms. A world where elements of cooperation pre-

vail over competition entails the need to shape a wider and more cooperative global framework. We did not wish the world to be this complex; but we must deal with it in all of its complexity, even if it means having a foreign policy which cannot be reduced to a single and simplistic slogan.

This is why we will seek to engage the Soviet Union in wider forms of cooperation. As President Carter said in Notre Dame University, we desire a detente that will be both comprehensive and reciprocal. We desire cooperation in the Indian Ocean, in the Middle East, and in Europe, as well as on wider global issues. We also want to contain the arms race. The arms race is costly, and dangerous. We seek to reduce -- and to keep reducing -- the level of strategic armaments on both sides, to freeze the improvement of weaponry on both sides, and to achieve an agreement in which each side is responsive to more specific strategic concerns of the other. I believe that the next SALT agreement will, in some measure, reflect these three objectives; it will thus provide a useful basis for seeking even more ambitious limits in SALT III, perhaps also paving the way to more comprehensive security negotiations in the European context, beyond the MBFR negotiations.

No architecture for a more stable and just world order would be complete without taking into account the proper role of the People's Republic of China. We recognize not only that peace in East and Southeast Asia depends upon a constructive Sino-American relationship, but that China can help immensely in maintaining a global equilibrium as well. Mutual interest, not sentiment, brought our two countries closer together. We must continue working to make our relationship closer still. Normalization in that relationship is necessary, but even short of it both sides should find it useful to develop a closer consultative relationship, so that each side adequately understands and takes into account the legitimate global concerns of the other. In fact, a deeper consultative relationship can result in an approach to world affairs that is mutually reinforcing and increasingly cooperative.

3. RESOLVING CONFLICTS

The third major objective that we set for ourselves last January was to focus on the three major issues which in our judgment contain the greatest potential for destructive escalation.

The first of these involves the future of the Panama Canal. To most Panamanians and to many Latin Americans this issue is perceived as a vestige of U.S. colonialism, a perspective widely shared in the Third World as well. I must candidly say that the effort to obtain a new treaty which would phase out the U.S. presence in the Canal zone, and which will permit Panama to increase its participation in the operation and defense of the Canal, while retaining for the United States ultimate security responsibility, is not a popular matter in the United States. Yet the new Administration recognizes that efforts to maintain the status quo would poison our relations with Latin America and eventually even jeopardize our ability to keep the Canal open. We are thus determined to demonstrate that the most powerful nation in the world is willing to work with one of the world's smallest nations to fashion a relationship based on partnership and mutual respect. We also hope thereby to demonstrate that watertight zones of Big Power predominance are an historical anachronism, a point which may have some relevance to some other parts of the world as well.

The second major issue we faced last January was in Southern Africa. There we confront the danger that racial conflict might also become before long an ideological war, with external involvement. In cooperation with the African states, we seek in Southern Africa to promote a solution based on justice. Majority rule and one man - one vote reflect our fundamental view of man as a spiritual entity that transcendently is truly equal to all others. And we are willing to play a continuing role in solving the problems of Southern Africa, on terms acceptable to the people who live there. In Zimbabwe this means supporting a rapid transition to majority rule; in Namibia, it means assumption of power by an African government resting on the will of the majority. We recognize also that the situation in the Republic of South Africa is much more complex and will take much more time to resolve. We know that the issue of South Africa involves a fundamental conflict, a philosophy, history, and self-definition. We are anxious to help create conditions that will make accommodation to a new reality -- one more in keeping with the spirit of the times -- as peaceful and palatable to those most affected as is possible.

We are also determined to do our part to make certain that Africa in general does not become the terrain for ideological conflict. This is why we insist that major powers refrain from interference and from fueling conflicts, whether

in Southern Africa or the African Horn. The problems of this continent are painful enough without infecting them with ideological issues derived from another age and from other continents.

The third crucial problem on which we determined to concentrate was in the Middle East. Continued conflict in that region poses a direct threat to international peace, while increasingly radicalizing Israel's neighbors. Such conflict poses a danger as much to Europe and to Japan as to the United States, not to speak of Israel itself. We also perceived that an opportunity existed to move more rapidly towards truly a genuine peace. The Israelis, who have fought so courageously for their survival and to whose survival every morally sensitive person must be committed, have often stated that territories occupied in 1967 were being held until their Arab neighbors were prepared to undertake full scale peace commitments. Our Administration, therefore, building on the step-by-step arrangements attained by the previous U.S. Administration, has sought to elicit and to crystallize growing Arab moderation, thereby making possible direct negotiations between the parties. We hope that a full scale conference may be convened before too long, and that in the meantime all parties will maintain a posture of moderation, bearing in mind that sometimes excessive precision on details is an enemy of accommodation.

The road ahead, however, will be extraordinarily difficult, and we recognize this fact. I believe that Europe and Japan, and indeed most of mankind, share our commitment to promoting a settlement, and in different ways they, too, can exercise a constructive influence in pleading for the necessary spirit of moderation needed to settle a conflict so pregnant with political and moral complexities.

4. RESPONSIVENESS TO NEW GLOBAL DILEMMAS

Finally, our major objective has been to join with others in increasing the level of global sensitivity to two key problems which, in our judgment, have been given inadequate attention in the past. They are nonproliferation and conventional arms transfers.

Our nuclear nonproliferation policy recognizes two needs: to help each nation to secure the energy it needs, and to stop the spread of nuclear weaponry. Thus our policy is not designed to impose artificial prohibitions on

the evitable spread of an essential technology. Rather we have to take a fresh look at the problems of the plutonium fuel cycle, and to concentrate greater attention on the technical alternatives which we believe exist. The policy rests on a firm economic and technical base which has two key elements. First, the energy plans of many nations -- particularly the developed states -- are based on what we regard as inflated estimates of future energy demand. Second, we think that global reserves of uranium and thorium are much larger than was previously estimated.

Our analysis of these considerations impels us to the conclusion that the reprocessing and reuse of plutonium at this time would be premature -- in the U.S. and elsewhere. Therefore, last Spring, the President postponed reprocessing in the U.S. for the indefinite future, and proposed an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation in which developed and developing states could jointly examine these and related issues in an effort to reach mutually agreed answers. I am pleased to report that last week more than 35 nations convened in Washington for the first meeting of this historic undertaking.

We also wish to raise the level of awareness about the dangers involved in growing conventional arms transfers. These transfers have more than doubled over the past decade. Not only has there been a dramatic increase sophistication. While only a handful of states produce such weapons, the number of nations which seek to purchase them is increasing rapidly. The momentum continued to build, despite the enormous burden that is levied on an already faltering world economy. The tragic irony is that resources diverted from economic and social development to buy arms may undermine the very security the arms are intended to purchase.

The United States is moving to meet the global threat to the welfare of mankind. We have begun to restrain our arms exports; at the same time realizing that we cannot deal with this global problem alone, we intend to work with other suppliers to cut back on the flow of arms and the rate at which advanced weapon technologies spread. Equally important, we hope to work with arms importers to reduce the demand for more numerous and costly weapons. While we remain ready to provide our friends with the necessary means for self-defense, we are determined to do what can be done to reverse the spiraling increase of arms exports.

Since the beginning of this Administration, we have been fully aware that these two problems are complex; that

they will require a sophisticated strategy to be worked out over many years; and that they also may complicate relations with our friends and allies represented here. Yet none of us can afford to ignore the implications of failing to deal effectively with either nonproliferation or arms transfers; just as economic interdependence is now a new fact of life for the United States, so this political interdependence is affecting us all.

In these four areas, I have tried to indicate major issues and ideas that have influenced our approach to foreign policy this year. I do not claim that we have succeeded in reaching our goals. Some of them may not be attained during the life of this Administration. But I believe that real progress has been made:

1. Anti-Americanism has waned; there has been a revival of historical confidence in the United States and about the United States; our commitment to human rights is helping to restore genuine meaning to the world democracy, and thus the democracies' relevance to the world.

2. We have made some progress in fulfilling the Summit decisions of last May, but we need to do more, especially in regards to economic growth and the avoidance of protectionism.

We have improved somewhat the climate of North-South relations and placed our relations with Latin America and Africa on a more cooperative and mature basis.

We have also made progress in our continuing efforts to put U.S.-Soviet relations on a stable and equitable basis, without generating the extremes of public euphoria or hostility. Indeed, today we are negotiating on a wider variety of bilateral issues than probably at any previous time in U.S.-Soviet relations.

3. We have signed a just treaty with Panama and are now seeking its ratification; we have engaged U.S. prestige and influence in the effort to obtain fair solutions to Southern African problems; we have made progress in obtaining Israeli and Arab willingness to negotiate on the three key issues in the Middle Eastern conflict: namely, the nature of peace, the relation between territorial and security arrangements, and the Palestinian question. I believe all the parties now realize that the U.S. is serious in its desire to promote a comprehensive peace settlement.

4. We have adopted self-imposed restraints on our arms exports through the obligation to reduce our totals from year to year; we are now engaged in negotiating self-restraint arrangements with other countries. We have also succeeded in generating genuine interest in nonproliferation, despite -- and perhaps even because of -- the friction that this issue initially produced.

If there is a single common theme to our effort, it is this: after World War II our foreign policy, by necessity, was focused primarily on issues connected with the Cold War. This gave it a sharp focus, in some cases making it easier to mobilize public opinion. A concentrated foreign policy could be supported by public emotion.

Today we confront a more difficult task, which calls for support based on reason. We must respond to a wider range of issues -- some of which still involve the Cold War -- issues stemming from a complex process of global change. A concentrated foreign policy must give way to a complex foreign policy, no longer focused on a single, dramatic task -- such as the defense of the West. Instead, we must engage ourselves on the distant and difficult goal of giving shape to a world that has suddenly become politically awakened and socially restless.

The struggle for the shape of the future thus has strong parallels to the experience of Western democracies in the last century and a half. And it is that experience which offers a measure of hope for a more rational and just accommodation on a vastly more complex and larger scale basis. That accommodation, which over time can acquire the character of a genuine global community, cannot be blue-printed in advance; and it will only come about through gradual changes both in the outlook and in the objective conditions of mankind. It is our confident belief that liberty and equity can indeed creatively co-exist. It is our confident view of the future that democracy -- in its many manifestations and with its own many stages of development -- comes closest to meeting the genuinely felt needs of mankind. It is our confident judgment that our collaboration can enhance the chances that the future destiny of man is to live in a world that is creatively pluralistic.


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By George Robb for The Washington Post

A Conversation With Brzezinski

Z BIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, President Carter's national security adviser, came to the White House from the Trilateral Commission, a New York-based floating think tank on problems facing the Western alliance which Brzezinski directed and for which he chose Jimmy Carter, then ending his term as governor of Georgia, as a Southern member. Born in Poland, the son of a diplomat, Brzezinski has written widely on international issues and has specialized in the study of the communist nations, becoming head of Columbia University's Research Institute on Communist Affairs. He was interviewed for The Washington Post by Jonathan Power, a British journalist and columnist for the International Herald Tribune.

One of your fundamental themes is how in a sense this is the age of equality, and that this is very close to the essence of the Christian tradition. And yet many people today — particularly in Europe, where we've had a welfare state in various forms for 30 years — are arguing that the idea of equality has now gone so far that we are in danger of a grayness, a lack of initiative, a lack of inspiration. Yet the urge for equality is quite important in your foreign policy, isn't it?

Well, I wouldn't use the word "equality," although I must confess I've used it at times. I would probably, if I wanted to be more precise, use the word "equity." Equality to me doesn't mean that everybody wears the same kind of suit, rides the same kind of bicycle and reads the same slogans. That's not equality, that's regimentation.

See BRZEZINSKI, Page C5.

The World of Brzezinski

BRZEZINSKI, From Page C1

There has to be a balance struck between equality and the need for liberty, which gives man the opportunity for self-expression, for the fulfillment of the self, for the attainment of his telos, whatever that is, for each individual. The genius of modern democracy, to me, lies in finding the right balance between liberty and equality defined in that sense, or equity. Increasingly, the same combination of issues is becoming central in world affairs. This is why I stress so much that the role of the United States in world affairs should not be that of preserving the status quo, or maintaining balance of power, but rather giving to change, a positive direction, to make possible a just and creative blend between liberty and equity, or, if you will, equality. I think if the United States can do that then it will gain for itself as creative a role as it acquired initially by becoming the standard-bearer of liberty.

COMMUNISM

Do you think there's a chance of great slices of the Third World going Communist?

In my judgment when you use a word like "Communist" we really have to ask ourselves what's hidden behind the word. I don't think that the prospect for the Third World is communism in the first meaning of the word: namely Soviet imperialism, Stalinism, oppression and uniformity of the '50s. I do think that for many of the developing countries undergoing very rapid change Marxism, communism, offers what appears to them a relevant intellectual framework. For example, all of the Eritrean independence movements consider themselves to be Marxists. But in actual application I think we will see two things: tremendous diversity, relatively little loyalty to the Soviet Union or none at all. And probably more frequently, chaos rather than communism. Indeed, if I had to put forth a proposition, I would say both prospects and the threat in the Third World involve not communism but chaos.

Do you go along with the Andrew Young argument when he was asked about Angola? He said Gulf Oil is the reality there and that they need to sell to us, and that will form the relationship more than some ideological package they've formally taken on board.

I don't agree entirely with that because I think what it overlooks is the specific case of a large number of Cuban troops in Angola. The number of Cubans in Angola, relative to the total population, is roughly the same as the number of American troops in Vietnam at the peak of the American engagement. The Cubans in Angola are fighting Angolans: it's an army of occupation.

How much is this kind of thing a threat to the United States and how much can it live with it and let it ride?

I don't think it's a direct threat in the '50s or even '60s meaning of the word "threat." A lot of it probably does not affect us much, or at all. But cumulatively a condition either of chaos or of rampant, even if not-too-sophisticated, Marxism in the Third World will create conditions in the global community that are inimical to the development of more decent relationships, to the advancement of human rights, to the creation of a more congenial world community increasingly capable of cooperatively dealing with its problems. In that sense there is an indirect threat which we should not ignore. If you will, it's the same kind of a threat which one confronts in a city in that it involves a differentiation between a threat from direct physical, criminal violence and the threat inherent in massive

urban decay, and the violence and corruption and degradation of the human condition which that breeds.

Take Eurocommunism, which is obviously going to be a burning issue in the next five years — what would you do if Eurocommunists come to power? Do you feel you would have to do something?

Well, first of all, we do not wish the Communist parties to come to power in Western Europe. Secondly, we have confidence that the West European electorates will use their best judgment to preserve democratic systems and will therefore opt for democratic parties. Thirdly, we have to deal with the world as it is. Fourthly, the existence of Eurocommunist parties, as of themselves, does encourage change in the nature of communism, and it is unwise for the United States to engage in direct interference in domestic affairs of other countries, of the sort that could make the Eurocommunist parties symbols of national independence. Lastly, Eurocommunism is a highly differentiated phenomenon. All it is really is a catchword for West European Communist parties.

The inference in what you're saying seems to be that if it does come to pass, that they do come into power, that you'd have to live with this, and accept. There's no conditions under which you would engage in covert activity to try and unsettle that political position?

Well, I'm not going to make blanket promises as to what we might or might not do because it depends a great deal on circumstances, the degree of legitimacy of the political change involved. But as a general principle I can state flatly that it is the principle of this administration, and indeed it is the American principle, not to interfere with democratic political processes.

Could you say absolutely, definitely, if they did follow the democratic norms as generally practiced in France, Italy or wherever it happened to be, there would be no circumstances in which you would engage in covert activities to unsettle those regimes?

I think if somebody came to me and asked me to make a promise not to beat my wife, I would find that an offensive requirement, and I think if anybody came and asked this country to make that kind of a promise, which is implied in your question, I would reply in a similar fashion.

SOUTH AFRICA

George Ball in the recent issue of Atlantic has written quite a strong attack on present American policy in southern Africa. Ball argued that the United States may provoke upheaval at a faster rate than it will develop if South Africa is left alone. I wonder if you have any doubts about the fairly cracking pace you're putting pressure on South Africa.

I would say what is at stake here is of really major importance, both in international and human terms. What is at stake is how to avoid a transcontinental war, a war which will merge the racial conflict into an ideological conflict. What is at stake is the livelihood of some millions of people, black and white. What is at stake here is how to avoid historical tragedy. There's no doubt that there are compelling reasons why the South African society has to undergo a progressive process of transformation. Its values, its social arrangements are out of keeping with the spirit and moral imperatives of our time. At the same time, what is involved here is a deep legacy of history: 300 years of white society, some of whose people fought for their own independence only 70-some years ago. They have deeply ingrained national feelings, reinforced by history

And you take issue with Ball in believing that cumulative economic, social and political pressures are more likely to help produce a less violent situation, rather than, as he says, have the effect of fueling the pace of violent intervention?

and by the Bible. These are not circumstances which are amenable to easy change. These are circumstances which have to be dealt with with compassion and with a sense of urgency. We're trying to do is to encourage a process of change which will outpace what otherwise looks like a rather apocalyptic alternative.

What seemed to have really upset George Ball and I knew it upset the South Africans, is what Vice President Mondale said at his press conference in Vienna after meeting with Vorster. He said that he really did believe in pursuit, fairly fast, to one man, one vote.

I'm sorry that upset George, for whom not only have I the highest regard, but whom I consider a friend. However, the fact of the matter is that the notion of one man, one vote is rooted in some very basic assumptions of what man is about. Namely, that irrespective of man's formal training, irrespective of social status and certainly irrespective of his color, that man fundamentally is a spiritual being, quite similar, quite equal and entitled to certain fundamental rights. One man, one vote is simply the political expression of that fundamentally important philosophical attitude, which is at the very root of what this society is all about, and which is at the root of what the world hopefully is becoming. I don't think that's an inflammatory statement. That's a definition of an end objective. Moving toward that end objective will take time. Our point is that movement has to accelerate, if it is to outpace the twin horsemen of apocalypse, namely racial war and ideological war.

I have an acute awareness of the limit of my own information and good judgment. And I don't say this in any pride or imperially intellectual or arrogant sense. But my reading of South African developments is that over the last several decades they have moved, in terms of apartheid, not in the right direction. To be sure, there have been some marginal improvements lately. The question is, can that society adapt rapidly enough?

My question was: Do you take issue with Ball's perception that increased economic, political pressure encourages the pace of violence, rather than dilutes it?

That was implicit in my answer. Namely, that it is something which obviously is not changing on its own.

THE SOVIET UNION

One of the great surprises of your writing on the Soviet Union is that you seem to think that Stalinism saved the world from an even more dangerous Russia. Given Russia's traditions and ambition, you feel that even without Stalin, even without communism, Russia would have been some kind of imperial autocracy. This suggests that perhaps communism is not the problem, it's just Dostoevski's old Mother Russia.

I wouldn't use the words "save the world." I don't think it's an issue of salvation. My argument is that Stalinism has sapped the creative intellectual vitality of the Russian people. Stalinism was particularly destructive. It would be hard for me, for anyone, to argue that killing millions of your best people, incarcerating millions more, shooting your entire general staff, executing many of your intellectuals, decimating your political elite, is a particularly constructive undertaking. To boot, the processes of industrialization which were undertaken under Stalin, at tremendous physical sacrifice, were not more impressive than those achieved in other societies with similar results, but at much lower social cost. I consider Stalinism not only to have been an historical crime, but a tremendous historical mistake.

So paradoxically, since Russia will always be an imperial power that would threaten American and Western interests, one has a perverse interest in the maintenance of that gray regime?

No, I don't think it follows that. Only if one assumed that imperial regimes always remain imperial, then that logic would follow. But my point is there are cycles in it. Just as the United States has gone through an imperialist cycle, and then waned, so it is my hope that the Russians will increasingly move into the world in a more cooperative, less imperially assertive fashion and begin participating in what is gradually, truly emerging, namely, a global community. And I believe that this kind of a process is more likely to manifest itself in the context of political, intellectual pluralism or diversity.

I suppose this is the purpose in part of your human rights strategy, yet many people are asking: Can you produce democracy in the Soviet Union? Are the democrats there? One wonders if there's anything in the traditions deep down in that country that can really respond in that creative way to your human rights strategy.

It seems to me that the emergence of democratic values is something which is inherent in the human condition. I'd argue that the lip service that is paid to democracy — the various democratic constitutions that have been adopted in many countries, even if not applied in practice — in itself is an acknowledgement of the compelling power of mankind's demand for human rights. In the final analysis, hypocrisy is a bow to virtue.


It's the compliment vice pays to virtue.

That's right, and the fact that even non-democratic regimes make a big show out of adopting democratic principles in itself is a demonstration of the compelling power of these principles. We are not setting out on a crusade to reproduce the American system in other parts of the world. We are very conscious of the fact that every political system is the product of its own history, psychology, social conditions, even genes. All we're saying is that it's inherent in the human spirit to desire for more individual self-expression. And we as a society, though imperfect, with many blemishes, want to stand for that. And we want to encourage others to stand for it. But what happens in individual societies, including the Soviet Union, is the affair of these countries. And we're not intruding, nor do we wish to intrude, into their domestic affairs. Nor are we

THE WASHINGTON POST

Sunday, October 9, 1977

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White House photo by Karl Schumacher

making their attitude on human rights the sine qua non for normal state-to-state relations.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Kissinger has argued that nuclear superiority is meaningless in an age of overkill. Many people consider him wrong, but I wonder where you stand on that issue?

I don't consider nuclear superiority to be politically meaningless. I can fully acknowledge the fact that at a certain point strategic weaponry ceases to exercise military significance in terms of marginal differences and consequences, if used. However, the perception by others or by oneself of someone else having quite unquote strategic superiority can influence political behavior. It can induce some countries to act in a fashion that sometimes has been described as "Finlandization." And it can induce self-imposed restraint on the party that feels weaker and, last but not least, it can induce the party that feels that it enjoys strategic superiority to act politically in a more assertive fashion. In other words, it has the potential for political exploitation even if in an actual warfare situation the differences may be at best, or at worst, on the margin.

So you don't think we are in a state of obvious military balance, that these small changes that are being argued over are in a sense peripheral, that the general essentials of agreement are being lost in a debate that's raging around marginal issues?

I wouldn't say the debate, if you're talking about strategic arms limitations talks, is raging around peripheral issues. It's raging — although I wouldn't use the word raging — I don't think it's a raging debate, it's a serious discussion — around rather central issues. Namely, what kind of systems are the Soviets deploying which are most threatening to us and viewed by us as most destabilizing in the strategic situation, and what kind of systems that we may be deploying now or in the future are similarly perceived by the Soviets. The name of the game is to identify these concerns, to understand each other's concerns and then to try to strike up an arrangement that is responsive to these concerns while at the same time being symmetrical in its numerical expression and in its political perception. The cumulative need to deal with these three areas: responsiveness to concerns, numerical symmetry, and equality in political perception, given the differentiated kinds of systems we have, is such that it's really very difficult to reach a quick agreement. Even with the best of will on both sides. And I happen to believe that there is the best of will on both sides. I think, in fact I know, that we're negotiating in good faith and very much want to reach an agreement. From everything I have seen in my dealings with the Soviets, they are similarly motivated.

Do you honestly think, in the final analysis, as a human being, a Christian, a father, you could actually recommend to the President to push the button and kill millions of people?

I don't know whether I would. Certainly I think I would and I certainly think I would without too much hesitation if I thought that someone else was launching a nuclear attack on me. Because if I didn't have the conviction that I have the determination and the will to do it, I think I would enhance the probability of war, by eliminating the deterrent effect.

Even though that might make the chance of the regeneration of human society that much more difficult, even impossible?

Well, first of all, that really is baloney. And I do emphasize the importance of the deterrent effect, namely that no one should ever calculate that they can launch a nuclear attack on someone without suffering the consequences. That's essentially important. As far as human society and all that is concerned, it sounds great in a rally. The fact of the matter is — and I don't want this to be understood as justifying the use of nuclear weapons, because we don't want to use them and we're not going to use them first in an attack — the fact of the matter is that if we used all our nuclear weapons and the Russians used all of their nuclear weapons, about 10 per cent of humanity would be killed. Now this is a disaster beyond the range of human comprehension. It's a disaster which is not morally justifiable in whatever fashion. But descriptively and analytically, it's not the end of humanity. It's not the destruction of humanity. People like to use slogans and therefore one of the most frequently used slogans is that the United States and the Soviet Union have in their power to decimate, to destroy humanity.

Well, Kissinger himself used to say that.

It just happens not to be true. It's a good thing to say, however, because it enhances one's reluctance and repugnance for the use of nuclear weapons. And I am all in favor of that. But I am not in favor of giving one party the capacity to say to somebody else: "If you don't do this we'll destroy you." Because I don't think in that context the world would long be stable.

I just think it must be a kind of peculiar courage, a peculiar psyche, that convinces oneself you could actually do it. It's one thing to be a professor at Columbia writing about it...

Do you have children?

I have two little girls, yes.

If somebody killed one of those girls, would you be able to kill that person?

Oh, I think so, but the scale and proportions are totally different.

Not at all. The reaction is exactly the same thing. Namely, if you see something which is totally unwarranted, morally repugnant, completely unjustifiable, you'd react in a strong way. You'd protect these children. When you reach public office in which you're responsible for the security of your country, you have to be able to make it very clear to anyone who threatens the survival of that country that this is not an act which one can undertake with impunity.

You don't find it emotionally difficult to make that jump?

Not at all. Not in the least. If I did, I would feel I shouldn't be here.

By Jonathan Power

מס' 24

גשלה: 031800 אוק 77

אל: המשרד

מאת: רוסינגטון

52/51/52

מצאם לשכת מנכל העתק לשכת שחח גי .
אתמול רואיין יועץ הנשיא לעניני בטחון בזזינסקי בטלויזיה הקנדית . אחד הנשאים
הניקריים עליהם נסוב הראיון היה עניני המזרח התיכון ויחסי ארצב ישראל .
לחלן התעתיק של הקטעים הללו:

QUESTION: DR. BRZEZINSKI AT THE OUTSET OF THIS ADMINISTRATION A GREAT DEAL OF COMPASSION WAS MADE BETWEEN YOUSELRF AND ONE OF YOUR PREDECESSORS, MR KISSINGER. WE WOULD LIKE TO PROBE SOME OF THE ISSUES AND GET SOME INDICATION OF HOW THINGS HAVE GONE. LETS LOOK FIRST AT THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE HAS BEEN A PARADE OF ARAB LEADERS HERE FOLLOWING MR DAYAN AND SOME SUGGESTION WE MAY GET TO A GENEVA CONFERENCE BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. YOU ARE THE MAN INVOLVED? DO YOU THINK YOU HAVE PULLED IT OFF?

BRZEZINSKI: WELL SAYING THAT WE PULLED IT OFF I THINK WOULD BE PREMATURE. BUT WE DO FEEL THAT THE TIME HAS ARRIVED FOR MOVEMENT TOWARD A COMPREHNSIVE SETTLEMENT, THAT THE SMALL STEPS THAT AT ONE TIME WERE USEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE HAVE RUN THEIR COURSE. WE FEEL THAT PRECISELY BECUSE THE PRESIDENT ARTICULATED THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE POSSIBLE SETTELEMENT AND THEREBY CLEARED THE AIR OF A GREAT MANY CONFUTIONS AND FORCED THE PARTICIPATNS TO BE MORE EXPLICIT WE HAVE CREATED THE PRECONDITIONS FOR GOING TO GEVA.

AND I AM REASONABLY HOPEFUL THAT BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR WE IN FACT WILL BE HAVING A CONFERENCE IN GENEVA. THIS CONFERENCE WILL LAST A LONG TIME IT WILL HAVE MANY PITFALLS INDEED EVEN BREAKDOWNS POSSIBLY BUT IT WILL GO ON AND THE OUTCOME WILL BE A SETTLEMENT.

Q: WHAT MAKES YOU THINK YOU WILL GET THE ISRAELIS THERE?

BRZEZINSKI: WELL I THINK THE ISRAELIS ARE SENSIBLE PEOPLE. I THINK THEY WANT PEACE. I THINK THEY WNT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE ARABS. I DONT THINK THEY WANT TO BE LEFT ALONE OUT OF THE PROCESS WHICH HAS A SETTLEMENT AS ITS ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE AND THEREFORE THEY WILL BE THERE.

Q: THERE IS OME INDICATION SIR THAT THE UNITED STATES IS GOING TO BE HARD ON ISRAEL PERHAPS HARDER THAN PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS HAVE BEEN.

BREZINSKI: WELL I DONT THINK THAT IS TRURE. I THINK OUR BASIC COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL THE BASIC HARMONY OF OUR VALUES THE TRULY ORGANIC LINKS BETWEEN OUR PEOPLE PRECLUDE BEING HARDER ON ISRAEL THAN ON THE ARABS. I THINK WE MAY HAVE DIFFERENCES. WE HAVE HAD DIFFERENCES BUT THAT IS ONLY NORMAL.

I THINK THE POINT TO BEAR IN MIND IS THAT THE UNITED STATES S NOT JUST AS INTERESTED BYSTANDER NOT EVEN JUST A BENEVOLENT MEDIATOR. THE UNITED STATES HAS A DIRECT INTEREST IN THE OUTCOME OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN CONFLICT. THE UNITED STATES HAS A DIRECT

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১৯৮৫ সালে প্রথম বারের মতো এম. এ. ডিগ্রি
 প্রাপ্তি পরীক্ষায় প্রথম স্থান অধিকার করেছেন। এছাড়াও
 প্রায় ১০০টির বেশি গবেষণাপত্র প্রকাশিত হয়েছে।
 এছাড়াও প্রায় ১০০টির বেশি গবেষণাপত্র প্রকাশিত হয়েছে।
 এছাড়াও প্রায় ১০০টির বেশি গবেষণাপত্র প্রকাশিত হয়েছে।

2

INTEREST IN OBTAINING A RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT. AND THEREFORE THE UNITED STATES HAS A LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO EXERCISE ITS OWN LEVERAGE PEACEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE TO OBTAIN A SETTLEMENT. AND THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT WE WILL BE DOING.

Q: THE TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS YOU ARE ASKING THE ISRAELIS TO MAKE PUT THEM IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION STRATEGICALLY UNLESS THERE IS PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ARE YOU IN A POSITION THEN TO GUARANTEE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

BRZINSKI: WELL FIRST OF ALL WE ARE NOT MAKING ANY DEMANDS ON THE ISRAELIS FOR TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS. IT IS JUST COMMON SENSE THAT IF THERE IS GOING TO BE A SETTLEMENT THAT SETTLEMENT HAS TO BE BASED ON ARRANGEMENTS THAT ARE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE THAT CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR PEACE.

IF THERE IS GENUINE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THAT AS OF ITSELF ENHANCES THE ABILITY AND THE SECURITY OF THE BORDERS THAT SUCH A PEACE ARRANGEMENT WILL DELINEATE. IN ADDITION TO THAT HOWEVER THE UNITED STATES HAS INDICATED THAT IT IS PREPARED TO WORK TOWARD THE CREATION OF A VARIETY OF BILATERAL AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD FURTHER ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL WHICH IN THE MEANTIME WILL HAVE BECOME A STATE THAT IS ACCEPTED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THAT HAS SECURE AND RECOGNIZED FRONTIERS, AND THAT AS NORMAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH ITS FRIENDS. I THINK THAT FOR ISRAEL INCIDENTALLY WILL BE THE BEGINNING OF A GOLDEN AGE.

I HAVE SAID THIS BEFORE AND I WILL SAY IT AGAIN. WITHIN TEN YEARS OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT ISRAEL IS GOING TO BE THE SWITZERLAND OF THE MIDDLE EAST. AND I FERVENTLY HOPE THAT WE WILL GET THE PEACE SETTLEMENT.

QUESTION: ARE YOU SAYING SIR THAT THE US AND ISRAEL ARE MOVING TOWARD A SECURITY TREATY IN WHICH THE US WOULD GUARANTEE TO GO IN AND PROTECT ISRAEL AGAINST ATTACK. 73-7038, 50 //BECAUSE IN THE END THAT IS THE ONLY WAY OF INSURING PEACE SURELY?

BRZINSKI: I DON'T WANT EITHER TO SAY THAT OR PRECLUDE IT. WE DON'T KNOW.

Q: YOU SEEM TO BE HINTING AT IT.

BRZINSKI: WE DON'T KNOW WHAT WILL COME OUT OF THE PROCESS. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS ACTUALLY THAT IF ISRAEL WAS MORALLY THREATENED ESPECIALLY BY AN EXTERNAL POWER THE UNITED STATES EVEN NOW WITHOUT A SECURITY TREATY WOULD CERTAINLY GO TO ITS AID. BECAUSE NOT ONLY ARE WE CONCERNED ABOUT ISRAEL FROM A NATIONAL INTEREST POINT OF VIEW BUT BECAUSE CERTAIN MORAL VALUES ARE INVOLVED.

I THINK IF WE COULD PRODUCE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND IF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IS ASSURING THE STABILITY OF THAT PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT MADE THAT PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT MORE LIKELY THEN WE WOULD CERTAINLY CONSIDER IT. BUT AS YOU KNOW IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM THIS IS UP TO THE CONGRESS TO DECIDE AND NO ONE CAN PREJUDGE THIS IN ADVANCE.

Q: LET ME ASK YOU PERSONALLY DO YOU THINK THAT THE LIKELY OUTCOME OF ALL THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE ROUNDS WILL BE A US ISRAELI TREATY.

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BRZEZINSKI: YOU KNOW, I GAVE UP THE PRIVILEGE OF ENGAGING IN PERSONAL PREDICTIONS ON JANUARY 21 OF THIS YEAR I GAVE IT UP WILLINGLY.

Q: WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE THAT OUTCOME?

BRZEZINSKI: I WOULD LIKE TO SEE A PEACE SETTLEMENT AS THE OUTCOME AND THEREFORE I WOULD WORK VERY HARD TO MAKE WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS ARE NECESSARY TO MAKE A JUST AND EQUITABLE PEACE SETTLEMENT BOTH POSSIBLE AND ENDURING.

SPECIFICALLY WHETHER IT WOULD INVOLVE A US SECURITY GUARANTEE OR AN ALLIANCE IT IS TOO EARLY TO JUDGE BUT ONE SHOULD CERTAINLY NOT PRECLUDE IT.

Q: DOES NOT THAT HAVE TO COME FIRST BEFORE ISRAEL AGREES TO WITHDRAW FROM THE 67 BORDERS?

BRZEZINSKI: WELL IT MAY HAVE TO COME FIRST IT MAY HAVE TO COME IN CONJUNCTION WITH IT IT MAY HAVE TO FOLLOW IT IT MAY NOT COME AT ALL. I DON'T THINK WE KNOW AT THIS STAGE WHAT THE SEQUENCE OR EVEN THE CONNECTION MIGHT HAVE TO BE.

Q: IS THERE SOMETHING NEW IN THE MIDDLE EASTERN EQUATION NOW THAT TIVES YOU THIS KIND OF OPTIMISM ABOUT A SETTLEMENT?

BRZEZINSKI: YES. I THINK ALL OF THE PARTIES HAVE REALIZED THAT THEY NEED PEACE. THE ISRAELIS KNOW THAT IF THEY DON'T HAVE PEACE THEIR ECONOMY WILL STAGNATE, THEIR NEIGHBORS WILL GET MORE RADICAL AND MORE MODERN AT THE SAME TIME AND THE SOVIETS WILL REENTER AND THEREFORE THE THREAT TO ISRAEL WILL GROW. THE ARABS REALIZE THAT THEY DON'T HAVE THE POWER TO DESTROY ISRAEL. THAT THEIR REPEATED EFFORTS HAVE BACKFIRED, WHILE THEIR ELITES, RELATIVELY MODERATE

MODERATE ARE FULLY COGNIZANT OF THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THEMSELVES OF AN INCREASE IN THE RADICALIZED AND TURBULENT MIDDLE EAST.

AND WE LAST BUT NOT LEAST KNOW THAT UNLESS THERE IS STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST A GREAT MANY OF OUR DIRECT NATIONAL AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS WILL BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED.

SO WE ALL IN A SENSE ARE MOVING TOWARD PEACE. AND I SHOULD ADD THE SOVIET UNION TOO, REALIZES THAT THE SITUATION OF CONTINUED CONFLICT DOES NOT ENHANCE ITS INTERESTS. IT JEOPARDIZES THEM LOCALLY AND IN TERMS OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH US.

I THINK ALL OF THE PARTIES WANT PEACE EVEN THOUGH EACH OF THE PARTIES PERHAPS HAS A DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF THAT PEACE. THAT IS WHAT A PEACE CONFERENCE IS ABOUT TO WORK THAT OUT.

Q: DR. BRZEZINSKI THE FINAL POINT THE MIDDLE EAST DOES NOT IT REALLY SO MUCH HINGE ON THE MEN IN POWER WHETHER IT IS YOU OR MENACHEM BEGIN. THEY SEEM TO REGARD YOU AS PRETTY MUCH OF A HARDLINER. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE MENACHEM BEGIN IS HE HAWKISH? IS HE INTRANSIGENT? IS HE UNCOOPERATIVE?

BRZEZINSKI: WELL I DON'T KNOW WHO REGARDS ME AS A HARDLINER AND ON WHAT ISSUE. I KNOW PRIME MINISTER BEGIN VERY WELL PERSONALLY. I HAPPEN TO LIKE HIM PERSONALLY AND IN SOME WAYS. I CONSIDER HIM A FRIEND. WE JUST GET ALONG VERY WELL. I THINK HE IS A STATESMAN. I THINK HE IS A MAN WHO SUFFERED

BRZEZINSKI: I KNOW I GAVE UP THE PRIVILEGE OF ENGAGING
A PERSON, PROTECTION ON BEHALF OF THIS CLUB

I GAVE IT UP, I KNOW

WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE THE LETTER?

BRZEZINSKI: I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE LETTER
AND HERE ARE THE LETTERS AND THE INVESTIGATIVE
LETTERS, I HAVE THEM HERE

JOHN ROSE: I HAVE THEM HERE
WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE THE LETTERS?
ALL RIGHT, I HAVE THEM HERE

JOHN ROSE: I HAVE THEM HERE

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FOR HIS PEOPLE WHO DEEPLY EMBODIES AND YOU CAN SENSE IT IN HIM THE HISTORICAL TRAGEDY THAT HIS PEOPLE EXPERINCED. HE IS A FIGHTER FOR HIS PEOPLE. HE IS ONE OF THE VERY FEW PEOPLE WHO IN ITS TOTAL SENSE HAVE HAD BOTH THE OPPORTUNITY TO FIGHT FOR A CAUSE AND TO SEE IT PREVAIL. AND NOW HE HAS THE LAST OPPORTUNITY OF HIS LIFE TO GIVE HIS PEOPLE LASTING PEACE. I DONT THINK WHEN HE IS FACED WITH THAT OPPORTUNITY IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS THAT HE WILL SHRINK FROM SEIZING IT.

AD KAN

PAZNER--

שהח דוהמ מנכל שהכט ממנכל סמנכל מצפא הסכרה מעת הקר מזחלים מאום אב רם אמך תעורר
אילטר ו.חוב.

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FOR HIS PEOPLE WHO DEEPLY EMBODIES AND NOW CAN BESE IN IN
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HE IS A FIGHTER FOR HIS PEOPLE. HE IS ONE OF THE VERY FEW
PEOPLE WHO IN HIS TOTAL HAVE HAD IN THE OPPORTUNITY TO
FIGHT FOR A CAUSE IN TO GET TO KNOW AND NOW HE HAS THE LAST
OPPORTUNITY OF HIS LIFE TO GIVE HIS PEOPLE A LASTING PLACE.
I DON'T THINK WHEN HE IS LACED WITH THE OPPORTUNITY IN THE FINAL
ANALYSIS THAT HE WILL BRING FROM THE

AD. H. H.
PASNER-

AND FOR THE PEOPLE WHO DEEPLY EMBODIES AND NOW CAN BESE IN IN
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I DON'T THINK WHEN HE IS LACED WITH THE OPPORTUNITY IN THE FINAL
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הופעת בזזינסקי בפני ה-

בהמשך לשלנו 318.

בהסיכו לשאלה על פעולות טרור דוגמת הפעולה נגד לופטהנזה ועל תקשר של אסף
לפעילות טרוריסטית אחר;

AS FAR AS THE PLO GENERALLY IS CONCERNED LET ME SAY THERE
ARE ELEMENTS IN IT WHICH ARE CERTAINLY AND HAVE BEEN CERTAINLY
INVOLVED IN ACTIVITIES OF THE SORT WHICH WE HAVE JUST DISCUSSED.
THERE ARE ELEMENTS IN IT WHICH ARE OF VERY RAFICAL POLITICAL
COLORATION AND THERE ARE ELEMENTS IN IT WHICH ARE QUALITATIVELY
MODERATE. I THINK IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THESE
DISTINCTIONS. THEY ARE PART OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE MIDEASTERN
SCENE.

PAZNER---

סהח רחמ מנכל שחכס ממנכל סמנכל מצפא מתזים חקר מעת הסכיה רס אמץ
חור/רמ

CTV

Canadian Television Network, LTD.

"CTV Reports"

Interview with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
National Security Adviser

Correspondents: Henry Champ
Michael Maclear
Peter Trueman

Washington, D.C.
Saturday, 1 October, 1977

(Embargoed for use until Sunday, October 2, 1977,

6:00 P.M., E.S.T.)

1 QUESTION: Dr. Brzezinski, at the outset of this
2 Administration, a great deal of comparison was made between your-
3 self and one of your predecessors, Mr. Kissinger. We would
4 like to probe some of the issues and get some indication of how
5 things have gone. Let's look first at the Middle East. There
6 has been a parade of Arab leaders here following Mr. Dayan, and
7 some suggestion we may get to a Geneva conference by the end
8 of this year. You are the man involved? Do you think you
9 have pulled it off?

10 DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, saying that we pulled it
11 off, I think would be premature. But we do feel that the time
12 has arrived for movement toward a comprehensive settlement;
13 that the small steps that at one time were useful and construc-
14 tive have run their course. We feel that precisely because the
15 President articulated the basic principles of the possible
16 settlement and thereby cleared the air of a great many confu-
17 sions and forced the participants to be more explicit, we have
18 created the preconditions for going to Geneva.

19 And I am reasonably hopeful that before the end of
20 this year we, in fact, will be having a conference in Geneva.
21 This conference will last a long time; it will have many pit-
22 falls; indeed, even breakdowns, possibly; but it will go on,
23 and the outcome will be a settlement.

24 QUESTION: What makes you think you'll get the
25 Israelis ^{there?} then?

1 DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, I think the Israelis are
2 sensible people. I think they want peace. I think they want to
3 negotiate with the Arabs. I don't think they want to be left
4 alone, out of the process which has a settlement as its ulti-
5 mate objective; and, therefore, they will be there.

6 QUESTION: There is some indication, sir, that the
7 United States is going to be hard on Israel, perhaps harder
8 than previous Administrations have been.

9 DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, I don't think that's true.
10 I think our basic commitment to Israel, the basic harmony of
11 our values, the truly organic links between our people, preclude
12 being harder on Israel than on the Arabs. I think we may have
13 differences, we have had differences; but that's only normal.

14 I think the point to bear in mind is that the United
15 States is not just an interested bystander, not even just a
16 benevolent mediator. The United States has a direct interest
17 in the outcome of the Middle Eastern conflict. The United
18 States has a direct interest in obtaining a resolution of the
19 conflict. And, therefore, the United States has a legitimate
20 right to exercise its own leverage, peaceful and constructive,
21 to obtain a settlement. And that's exactly what we will be
22 doing.

23 QUESTION: The territorial concessions you are asking
24 the Israelis to make put them in an impossible position

the Middle East. Are

1 you in a position, then, to guarantee peace in the Middle East?

2 DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, first of all, we are not
3 making any demands on the Israelis for territorial concessions.
4 It is just common sense that if there is going to be a settle-
5 ment, that settlement has to be based on arrangements that are
6 mutually acceptable; that create the conditions for peace.

7 If there is genuine peace in the Middle East, that
8 as of itself enhances the ability and the security of the
9 borders that such a peace arrangement will delineate. In
10 addition to that, however, the United States has indicated
11 that it is prepared to work toward the creation of a variety
12 of bilateral as well as international security arrangements
13 which would further enhance the security of Israel which, in
14 the meantime, will have become a state that is accepted in
15 the Middle East, that has secure and recognized frontiers, and
16 that has normal relationships with its friends. I think that
17 for Israel, incidentally, will be the beginning of a golden
18 era.

19 I have said this before and I will say it again.
20 Within ten years of a peace settlement, Israel is going to be
21 the Switzerland of the Middle East. And I fervently hope that
22 we will get the peace settlement.

23 QUESTION: Are you saying, sir, that the U.S. and
24 Israel are moving toward a security treaty in which the U.S.

1 because, in the end, that is the only way of insuring peace,
2 surely?

3 DR. BRZEZINSKI: I don't want either to say that or
4 preclude it. We don't know --

5 QUESTION: You seem to be hinting at it.

6 DR. BRZEZINSKI: We don't know what will come out of
7 the process. The fact of the matter is, actually, that if Israel
8 was mortally threatened, especially by an external power, the
9 United States, even now, without a security treaty, would cer-
10 tainly go to its aid. Because not only are we concerned about
11 Israel from a national interest point of view, but because
12 certain moral values are involved.

13 I think if we could produce a peaceful settlement
14 and if American involvement in assuring the stability of that
15 peaceful settlement made that peaceful settlement more likely,
16 then we would certainly consider it. But, as you know in the
17 American system, this is up to the Congress to decide, and no
18 one can prejudge this in advance.

19 QUESTION: Let me ask you, personally, do you think
20 that the likely outcome of all the Middle East peace rounds
21 will be a U.S./Israeli treaty.

22 DR. BRZEZINSKI: You know, I gave up the privilege
23 of engaging in personal predictions on January 21 of this year.
24 I gave it up willingly.

25 QUESTION: Would you like to see that outcome?

1 DR. BRZEZINSKI: I would like to see a peace settle-
2 ment as the outcome and, therefore, I would work very hard to
3 make whatever arrangements are necessary to make a just and
4 equitable peace settlement both possible and enduring.

5 Specifically whether it would involve a U.S.
6 security guarantee or an alliance, it is too early to judge;
7 but one should certainly not preclude it.

8 QUESTION: Doesn't that have to come first before
9 Israel agrees to withdraw from the '67 borders?

10 DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, it may have to come first;
11 it may have to come in conjunction with it; it may have to
12 follow it; it may not come at all. I don't think we know at
13 this stage what the sequence or even the connection might have
14 to be.

15 QUESTION: Is there something new in the Middle
16 Eastern equation now that gives you this kind of optimism about
17 a settlement?

18 DR. BRZEZINSKI: Yes. I think all of the parties
19 have realized that they need peace. The Israelis know that
20 if they don't have peace, their economy will stagnate, their
21 neighbors will get more radical, and more modern at the same
22 time, and the Soviets will reenter; and, therefore, the threat
23 to Israel will grow.

24 The Arabs realize that they don't have the power to
25 destroy Israel, that their repeated efforts have backfired,

1 while their elites, relatively moderate, are fully cognizant
2 of the consequences for themselves of an increase in the radical-
3 ized and turbulent Middle East.

4 And we, last but not least, know that unless there
5 is stability in the Middle East, a great many of our direct
6 national as well as international interests will be adversely
7 affected.

8 So, we all, in a sense, are moving toward peace.
9 And I should add the Soviet Union, too, realizes that the situ-
10 ation of continued conflict does not enhance its interests. It
11 jeopardizes them locally and in terms of their relations with
12 us.

13 I think all of the parties want peace, even though
14 each of the parties perhaps has a different definition of that
15 peace. That is what a peace conference is about, to work that
16 out.

17 QUESTION: Dr. Brzezinski, the final point, the Middle
18 East doesn't ^(AC) really so much hinge on the men in power, whether
19 it is you or Menachen Begin. They seem to regard you as
20 pretty much of a hardliner. How would you describe Menachen
21 Begin, is he hawkish? Is he intransigent? Is he uncoopera-
22 tive?

23 DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, I don't know who regards me
24 as a hardliner and on what issue. I know Prime Minister Begin

25 I happen to like him personally, and in

1 some ways, I consider him a friend. We just get along very well.
2 I think he is a statesman. I think he is a man who suffered
3 for his people, who deeply embodies, and you can sense it in
4 him, the historical tragedy that his people experienced. He is
5 a fighter for his people. He is one of the very few people
6 who, in its total sense, have had both the opportunity to fight
7 for a cause and to see it prevail. And now he has the last
8 opportunity of his life, to give his people lasting peace. I
9 don't think when he is faced with that opportunity in the final
10 analysis that he will shrink from seizing it.

11 QUESTION: You told us a moment ago, you don't
12 know who regards you as a hardliner. We have a story that when
13 the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was burning, the Ambassador was on
14 the hot line to you, and you said, "Let it burn." True or
15 false?

16 DR. BRZEZINSKI: There is some truth to that, but
17 for an entirely different reason. I don't think that has any-
18 thing to do with hard- or softline. It had something to do
19 with certain arrangements which have to be implemented when
20 they burn the stuff. It's not going --

21 QUESTION: It's trying to singe the Russians.

22 DR. BRZEZINSKI: What?

23 QUESTION: It smacks of trying to singe the Russians.

24 DR. BRZEZINSKI: You know, I'm not quite sure

25 whether it was in Ottawa or some other place, the Soviet Embassy

1 had a fire --

2 QUESTION: Ottawa.

3 DR. BRZEZINSKI: -- and didn't want Canadian firemen
4 in there for actually reasonably good reasons.

5 QUESTION: You wouldn't like to pick up a phone and
6 demonstrate exactly what you said?

7 DR. BRZEZINSKI: We didn't care to have foreign
8 visitors with hoses, or perhaps with something else as well,
9 roaming around the American Embassy; it's as simple as that.

10 QUESTION: So you did say, "Let it burn"?

11 DR. BRZEZINSKI: I'm not sure whether I really said,
12 "Let it burn"; it sounds terribly romantic to say that.

13 QUESTION: You seem to feel -- to demonstrate that
14 detente with the Russians at this point in time is not quite
15 as important as a meeting of minds between North America,
16 Western Europe and Japan in dealing with world problems; is
17 that a fair assessment?

18 DR. BRZEZINSKI: No, it is not. I think that
19 American foreign policy, among many priorities, has three
20 outstanding priorities. The first, indeed, is to promote closer
21 collaboration among the advanced, industrial democracies. We
22 have the same values, similar political systems, we stand for
23 the same things.

24 But, secondly, that collaboration should not be

1 focused on building a wider and more cooperative international
2 system, which means that our second priority is more flexibility,
3 more movement on the North/South relationship to give the newly
4 activated peoples of mankind a greater sense of involvement,
5 constructive involvement in world affairs, political and econ-
6 omic.

7 And, thirdly, it is to ameliorate the East/West
8 relationship, to fit it into the framework of international
9 cooperation; recognizing that for a long time to come, for
10 good, historical reasons, are not necessarily just Menachemian
11 reasons. The American/Soviet relationship will be both
12 competitive and cooperative; and, therefore, there will be
13 both limits on cooperation, as well as opportunities for
14 cooperation. It has to be fitted into this larger framework
15 and not made the only focal point of American foreign policy.

16 QUESTION: Cooperation. Right now the efforts to
17 resume the SALT talks on arms limitations, if this is to have any
18 chance of success, can we take it that the United States is
19 going to be less openly critical of the Soviets on human rights?

20 DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, first of all, there are no
21 efforts to resume SALT talks. SALT talks have been going on,
22 off and on since March.

23 QUESTION: Getting down to real talking.

24 DR. BRZEZINSKI: Yes. And I would say that there is
25 progress. There are still a great many issues to be resolved.

1 There is definitely progress; there's just no doubt about it.
2 And in that sense it is encouraging.

3 At the same time, insofar as human rights are con-
4 cerned, I don't think you can point to any statement by the
5 President, or anyone speaking on his behalf and close to him,
6 that specifically addresses itself to conditions in this or
7 that country. Our position has been, remains, and will remain
8 that human rights and concern for human rights is a fundamental
9 tenet of our foreign policy. But what it means is that we feel
10 that we are now at a stage in which human rights in terms of
11 human history and the evolution of mankind are in the forefront
12 of world affairs in different societies for different reasons,
13 people because of higher consciousness, more literacy, more
14 self-awareness, are demanding their rights. We associate our-
15 selves with that. We want to be in the forefront of that
16 spirit.

17 But we don't make it a condition for bilateral
18 relationships on this or that issue with this or that govern-
19 ment.

20 QUESTION: A lot of people outside, sir, feel that
21 if there was less U.S. moralizing, there would also be less
22 missiles. There is a paradox in that the Nixon Administration
23 "bad guys" brought peace and that you "good guys" --

24 DR. BRZEZINSKI: There may be a lot of people feel-

1 world, so I'm not sure what that proves.

2 The fact of the matter is that we are
3 going to get a SALT agreement which will have fewer missiles
4 than the Nixon agreement. And we will continue to express our
5 concern for human rights, something which we feel is at the
6 root of the Western civilization, something which makes places
7 like Canada, Western Europe, or the United States much more
8 decent places to live in than many other places in the world.
9 And if the West doesn't believe in certain transcendental
10 values, then the West is in a state of dissolution. And I
11 will state affirmatively that we will get an agreement which
12 will have fewer missiles and will remain true to our principles.

13 QUESTION: Dr. Brzezinski, turning to an issue
14 between Canada and the United States, have you worked out what
15 your country will do should there be separation of Quebec?

16 DR. BRZEZINSKI: Oh, I don't like to sort of deal
17 with speculatively apocalyptic outcomes. Canada will undergo its
18 own internal process of change and I am sure that Canadians
19 will work their internal problems in a manner that is satisfactory
20 to them. We're interested in a good relationship.

21 QUESTION: You must be concerned, sir, that it might
22 disrupt the North American defense system.

23 DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, it's really -- this is so
24 speculative that really at this stage it is something that is
25 really very difficult to think of in any real policy sense such

1 as North American defense system.

2 QUESTION: I can't believe that you are not studying
3 it; you're the National Security Adviser.

4 DR. BRZEZINSKI: It just so happens that -- if you
5 saw the stuff that goes through my desk every day, you would
6 realize that -- and there are issues which are so much more
7 immediate, so much more pressing, that at this stage I don't
8 think I need to spend time studying the consequences for our,
9 let's say, security arrangements in North America, or the
10 possible change in the relationships between Quebec and the
11 rest of Canada.

12 QUESTION: In our film profile of you, you were
13 commenting on the caliber of Canadian MPs. I wonder if you
14 aren't more concerned about Canadian security and whether the
15 role in East European trade missions in Toronto and Montreal
16 aren't becoming a kind of backdoor spy hole on the United
17 States.

18 DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, one reason I am not so con-
19 cerned about that aspect is that our own society is so open
20 that I think they can do pretty well even by sitting in New
21 York. It's one of the prices one pays for being an open
22 society. And one always has to make a balanced judgment where
23 do you draw the line between the needs of national security
24 and where to you draw the line between the imperatives of
25 democracy. It's not an easy line to draw, but I think for the

1 moment things are reasonably in balance.

2 QUESTION: Doctor, I'd like to return just briefly
3 to that Quebec issue. When the President asks you, as his
4 National Security Adviser, what your thoughts are on the
5 potentiality of Quebec, what do you tell him?

6 DR. BRZEZINSKI: If he asks me that question and if
7 I respond to him, I would then not thrash it out on Canadian
8 television or talk about it, for obvious reasons, but he hasn't
9 asked me.

10 QUESTION: Sir, in our film profile, someone commented
11 that you seemed to have changed policy the way you changed
12 clothes. How would you reply?

13 DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, earlier in this program, I
14 don't know if it will appear in this program in that fashion,
15 filmed me a light-colored suit. I bought that suit at Filene's
16 in Boston in 1953.

17 QUESTION: Does this mean you have lightweight
18 policies going or what?

19 DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, you said I change policies
20 as often as my suits, I bought that suit in 1958.

21 QUESTION: So this, as I understand it, is the
22 first television interview you have given to ^{any} our network since
23 you have taken office, for which we are honored. Could you
24 tell us how you would like to be remembered during this period
25 of office? You are known as Mr. Zbig. Do you think history

1 will record you that way? What single contribution would you
2 like history to record?

3 DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, you know, that's a very
4 difficult question to answer. I would like to feel that after
5 we have left office, at some point later people will say that
6 there was a team at work here, not just one individual, but a
7 team that together managed to put the United States on a course
8 that over time will accumulatively help to create a new and more
9 cooperative set of international arrangements that are more
10 responsive to the moral and to the political and social con-
11 cerns of mankind that literally in our own life span has
12 become, for the first time, truly politically, socially,
13 intellectually self-conscious.

14 I think in many ways we confront both an opportunity
15 and a challenge like the one that we confronted right after
16 1945. At that time Europe was in shambles, the European world
17 order had collapsed. It was largely the United States which,
18 with a very creative team of people working together, put
19 together a system which for another 20 or 30 years endured.

20 That system began to crumble in the '60s and '70s,
21 and I think under Nixon, we had essentially an holding operation.
22 I think the time now is to do something more, but on a wider,
23 more cooperative basis; not only within our own society but
24 with other countries.

25 QUESTION: Finally, sir, your own, honest gut

1 response to the difference between you and Dr. Kissinger in
2 personal terms.

3 DR. BRZEZINSKI: You know, I can't give you a short,
4 or a gut response. I have, first of all, known Henry for a
5 long time. We started together at Harvard in 1950. So I don't
6 really think I should make that comparison. I do my thing,
7 Henry has been doing his thing; others can make the comparisons.

8 QUESTION: Are you satisfied with the kind of
9 comparisons that are made?

10 DR. BRZEZINSKI: Yes, I don't find them troublesome.
11 Some are good to me, some are good to him. I think it's so
12 far -- I think I have been, I think, so far reasonably fairly
13 treated.

14 QUESTION: It seems you're out to change quite a
15 great deal of his work, however.

16 DR. BRZEZINSKI: I think that we confront an
17 opportunity which in some respects he didn't, in part because
18 of his own priorities, but very much in part because of the
19 context in which he was operating. He was operating at a time
20 of the Vietnamese War, of Watergate; it was really very much
21 a transitional phase, holding operation, by necessity.

22 I think we confront an opportunity because, in part,
23 we have a President who not only has certain political sense
24 of direction, but who is morally dedicated, and that's very
25 important. I think we have a base in our society which is

1 again much more unified and much more confident. And we are
2 historically confident. And I think, lastly, we are dealing with
3 a global context in which there is increasing willingness to
4 work with the United States more cooperatively. It's an
5 opportunity which I think we have to seize.

6 QUESTION: Dr. Brzezinski, we thank you very much.

7 DR. BRZEZINSKI: Okay, thank you.

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end



backgrounder

SEPTEMBER 20, 1977

THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL IN FOREIGN POLICY

BY HUGH O. MUIR

IPS STAFF CORRESPONDENT

WASHINGTON, SEPT. 19 -- THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM WHOSE PROMINENCE HAS WAXED AND WANED SINCE IT BECAME A PART OF THE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM 30 YEARS AGO, HAS UNDER PRESIDENT CARTER EVOLVED INTO THE DISPASSIONATE ROLE OF DEVELOPING MANY OPTIONS FOR HIS CONSIDERATION ON A BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES.

THE NSC WAS CREATED IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, IN A WAVE OF POST-WORLD WAR TWO LEGISLATION THAT ALSO CONSOLIDATED THE UNITED STATES' GROWING FOREIGN POLICY FUNCTIONS IN A NEW DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (COMBINING THE DEPARTMENTS OF WAR AND THE NAVY), THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

SINCE THEN, THE NSC HAS SERVED SEVEN PRESIDENTS IN VARYING CAPACITIES. ALTHOUGH THE OPTIONS IT PRESENTS ARE ONLY FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE PRESIDENT AND ALTHOUGH ALL OF ITS WORK IS DONE BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, THE COUNCIL'S ACTIVITIES STILL FLASH INTO PUBLIC VIEW WHEN LEAKS TO THE PRESS REVEAL NSC DISCUSSIONS ON CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS.

(MORE)

B1

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SUCH WAS THE RECENT CASE OF THE SO-CALLED PRM (PRONOUNCED "PRIM") 10.

PRM STANDS FOR "PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORANDUM" AND IS A DOCUMENT -- SOMETIMES OF A FEW PAGES, SOMETIMES OF MORE THAN A HUNDRED -- THAT IS THE END PRODUCT OF INTERAGENCY STAFF WORK ON AN ISSUE. THE FINAL STEP, TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT AFTER DEBATE AND DISCUSSION WITHIN THE COUNCIL ITSELF, IS THE ISSUING OF A "PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE" THAT PUTS THE DECIDED POLICY INTO EFFECT.

PRM 10, WHICH DEALT WITH EAST-WEST MILITARY-POLITICAL BALANCE AND STRATEGY, SENT RIPPLES THROUGH THE PRESS AND DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY WHEN A LEAK CHARGED THAT THE NSC HAD PROPOSED THAT A PORTION OF WEST GERMANY WOULD BE ABANDONED IN THE EVENT OF A WARSAW PACT ATTACK IN THAT AREA. THE ADMINISTRATION QUICKLY DENIED THAT ASSERTION AND SUBSEQUENTLY PRESIDENT CARTER REAFFIRMED THAT U.S. SECURITY POLICY IN EUROPE REMAINED BASED ON A FORWARD LINE OF DEFENSE AND THAT NO ALLIED AREAS WOULD BE CONCEDED IN ADVANCE.

INITIAL CONFUSION OVER THE INCIDENT STEMMED PRINCIPALLY, THE ADMINISTRATION FEELS, FROM A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE FUNCTION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE PRM'S -- WHICH CAN NUMBER IN THE HUNDREDS OVER A GIVEN ADMINISTRATION (THERE WERE MORE THAN 300, KNOWN AS "NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDA," DURING THE NIXON-FORD YEARS).

FIRST TO BE UNDERSTOOD, ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS POINT OUT, IS THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE NSC ITSELF. BY LAW, ITS MEMBERS NUMBER FOUR: PRESIDENT CARTER, VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE, SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE, AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAROLD BROWN; IN ADDITION, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF GENERAL GEORGE S. BROWN, AND THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ADMIRAL STANDFIELD TURNER ARE ALMOST ALWAYS PRESENT AS ADVISORS.

THIS COUNCIL, WHILE THE NATION'S SENIOR BODY IN HELPING DETERMINE AND CARRY OUT NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS, DOES NOT DRAW UP PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORANDA. IT MAY INITIATE PARTICULAR STUDIES -- AS WITH THE PRESIDENT, FOR EXAMPLE, EARLY THIS YEAR ASKING FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW TO REDUCE MILITARY COMPETITION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA -- AND IT USUALLY OFFERS THE FINAL ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRM RECOMMENDATIONS BEFORE HE MAKES HIS DECISION AND ISSUES HIS DIRECTIVE. BUT THE COUNCIL RARELY BECOMES INVOLVED IN THE SOMETIMES LENGTHY PROCEDURES -- UP TO SIX MONTHS -- IT TAKES TO DRAW UP A PRM.

FOR THIS THERE IS THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF, NUMBERING SOME 100 PERSONS (IT HAS FLUCTUATED UP OR DOWN SOME PERCENT OVER THE YEARS) WHICH MONITORS AND PROCESSES EACH PRM. THE BASIC WORK, IN TURN, IS DONE BY POLICY ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH GROUPS SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. THUS, MILITARY PRM'S ARE WRITTEN INITIALLY IN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, PRM'S ON ALTERNATIVE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES ARE DEVELOPED AT STATE, PRM'S COME FROM THE TREASURY ON ECONOMIC PROGRAMS, AND SO ON.

THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF ALL THIS IS ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI. HE IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. HE IS, FIRST, A PRINCIPAL ADVISER TO MR. CARTER WITH THE TITLE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS. IN THAT ROLE, HE ALSO IS THE STATUTORY CHAIRMAN OF THE "SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE," A CLEARING HOUSE BODY DIRECTLY UNDER THE NSC MADE UP OF THE COUNCIL'S MEMBERS (OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES). MR. BRZEZINSKI'S JOB IS THREEFOLD:

-- HE DIRECTS THE NSC SYSTEM, BOTH AS AN ADMINISTRATOR AND AS ONE WHO FOCUSES ON THE SUBSTANTIVE

OUTPUT OF THE SYSTEM BY PUTTING FORWARD FOR ANALYSIS THE ISSUES HE KNOWS TO BE ON THE PRESIDENT'S MIND.

-- HE ALSO IS AN ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT, EITHER WHEN ASKED OR WHEN VOLUNTEERING HIS VIEWS. HE HAS A CHARACTERISTIC IN THIS ROLE UNIQUE IN GOVERNMENT: HE HAS NO BUREAUCRATIC INTEREST TO SERVE, HAVING NO CONSTITUENCY EXCEPT THE PRESIDENT. (HE ALSO DOES NOT HAVE TO DEFEND HIS VIEWS, OR THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY, IN PUBLIC, NOR CAN HE BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, AS CABINET OFFICERS DO.)

-- FINALLY, IN RECENT YEARS THE JOB HAS BECOME THAT OF SOMETIME SPOKESMAN FOR THE PRESIDENT IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS ABOUT POLICY AREAS WHERE MANY ISSUES (POLITICAL-MILITARY-ECONOMIC) COINCIDE -- A PRACTICE USUALLY KEPT ON A "BACKGROUND" BASIS. (WHEN HENRY KISSINGER WAS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HE ADDED A FOURTH ROLE AT PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S REQUEST, THAT OF PART-TIME NEGOTIATOR.)

WITHIN THE NSC STAFF ABOUT HALF OF THE 100 MEMBERS ARE ISSUE-ORIENTED PROFESSIONALS AND THE REST ARE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT. THE "ISSUE" PERSONNEL FORM SPECIALIST GROUPS (CALLED "CLUSTERS" IN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, A CARRYOVER FROM THE TRANSITION PERIOD BETWEEN THE 1976 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND MR. CARTER'S INAUGURATION, WHEN SCORES OF "CLUSTERS" WERE CREATED BY THE INCOMING ADMINISTRATION TO ANALYZE THE GOVERNMENT). MR. BRZEZINSKI, AND HIS DEPUTY, DAVID AARON (WHO HAD HEADED THE TRANSITION CLUSTER ON THE NSC AND CIA) OVERSEE THE CURRENT CLUSTERS ON, FOR EXAMPLE, EUROPE, EAST-WEST RELATIONS, NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS, GLOBAL ISSUES (SUCH AS NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION), ECONOMIC ISSUES, AND SECURITY ANALYSIS (SUCH AS DEFENSE BUDGET AND ARMS CONTROL).

THE PEOPLE WHO MAKE UP THESE CLUSTERS COME EITHER FROM WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, PRINCIPALLY ON LOAN FROM THE

STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS AND THE CIA, OR FROM THE ACADEMIC AND BUSINESS WORLDS. (MR. BRZEZINSKI IS ON LEAVE AS A COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR.)

SERVING ON THE NSC STAFF IS RARELY A CAREER IN ITSELF. NEW ADMINISTRATIONS BRING IN FRESH FACES; POLICY SUBJECTS AND EMPHASIES CHANGE; CAREER GOVERNMENT PEOPLE USE THE EXPERIENCE TO STEP UP WHEN THEY RETURN TO THEIR ORIGINAL AGENCIES. THUS THERE IS A GRADUAL TURNOVER, IN 2-4-6-YEAR PATTERNS. (VETERAN EAST-WEST SPECIALIST WILLIAM HYLAND HAS SPENT MUCH OF HIS LAST 20 YEARS ON THE NSC STAFF, A SIGNIFICANT EXCEPTION BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS SUBJECT AND HIS EXPERTISE. BUT HE TOO IS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE IN A FEW MONTHS.)

IT IS THE STAFF'S JOB TO MONITOR THE PRM'S AS THEIR DEVELOPMENT PROCEEDS IN THE BUREAUCRACY, MAKING SURE THEY DO NOT FALL INTO BEING "SINGLE OPTION" STUDIES OR AVOID THE HARDER ISSUES OF THE SUBJECT. AT THE END, THE RELEVANT NSC CLUSTER PULLS IN THE PRM TOGETHER AND WRITES A COVERING MEMO. THE DOCUMENT THEN GOES THROUGH MR. BRZEZINSKI AND THEN USUALLY IS REVIEWED BY THE SPECIAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE OR BY THE OTHER CLEARING HOUSE GROUP UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE "POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE," CHAIRED BY SECRETARY VANCE AND INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NSC MEMBERS. THE DOCUMENT THEN GOES TO THE COUNCIL ITSELF.

UP TO THIS POINT THE EFFORT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TOWARD ANALYZING THE PROBLEM, WIDENING THE STUDY, INCREASING THE OPTIONS, BALANCING THE ARGUMENTS. IN AN NSC STUDY, AN OFFICIAL POINTED OUT, "THERE IS ALWAYS ROOM FOR ONE MORE OPTION TO BE CONSIDERED." BUT WITHIN THE NSC ITSELF THE OBJECT IS TO ADOPT THE DISPASSIONATE VIEW, DISCARDING INCONSISTENT PROPOSALS AND ARRANGING THE OPTIONS SO THAT THE PRESIDENT CAN CLEARLY SELECT ONE, OR A COMBINATION, OR PUT

CHOICES IN A SEQUENCE, TO FORM HIS POLICY. IT WAS SOMEWHERE IN THIS STAGE OF THE DEBATE, OF THINKING THROUGH POSSIBILITIES , THAT SOME OF THE PRM 10 DRAFT VERSIONS WERE LEAKED TO THE PUBLIC.

HOW A PRESIDENT USES THE NSC VARIES. PRESIDENT DWIGHT EISENHOWER, IN AN EXTENSION OF HIS MILITARY EXPERIENCE, PREFERRED AN ELABORATE STAFFING SYSTEM THAT CONSIDERABLY REDUCED THE OPTIONS BEFORE A PROPOSAL REACHED HIM. LYNDON JOHNSON TOOK A MORE INFORMAL APPROACH, OFTEN, FOR EXAMPLE, CONDUCTING BUSINESS OVER LUNCH AND SEEKING THE ADVICE OF SMALL, INFORMAL GROUPS. PRESIDENT NIXON REFLECTED THE EXPERIENCE HE HAD AS VICE PRESIDENT WITH GENERAL EISENHOWER AND UNDER MR. NIXON AND DR. KISSINGER A FORMAL SYSTEM OF "OPTIONS PAPERS" DEFINING POLICY ALTERNATIVES WAS DEVELOPED. MR. CARTER, ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAY, HAS ADOPTED A BLEND, DRAWING ON THE RESULTS OF CABINET-LEVEL MEETINGS AS WELL AS OF INFORMAL GROUP MEETINGS AND WRITTEN STUDIES SUBMITTED TO HIM BY SECRETARIES VANCE OR BROWN THROUGH MR. BRZEZINSKI, OR FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HIMSELF.

IN ANY CASE, THE RESULT IS A CONSTANT FLOW OF POLICY-ADVISING MATERIAL THROUGH THE NSC SYSTEM. WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS -- A SPECIAL PRM, FOR EXAMPLE, DRAFTED FOR LAST MAY'S LONDON SUMMIT -- A PRM NEVER DIES; IT BECOMES THE BASIS FOR CONTINUING STUDIES IN THE SAME AREA. AND A PRM'S NUMBER MEANS LITTLE. THE FAMOUS "10" WAS BUT ONE OF SOME DOZEN PRM'S ON WHICH WORK BEGAN SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION TOOK OFFICE. THERE ARE "A FEW DOZEN" IN THE WORKS NOW, ALTHOUGH THE PRECISE NUMBERS -- AND THEIR SUBJECTS -- ARE CLASSIFIED. "AFTER ALL," ONE OFFICIAL NOTED, "THE PRM LIST IS A MENU OF EXACTLY WHERE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN GOING AND WHAT IT IS LOOKING AT."

THUS THE NSC IS AMONG THE MOST SENSITIVE SINGLE ENTITIES IN THE GOVERNMENT, A POSITION INDICATED BY CLOSER PHYSICAL PROXIMITY TO THE PRESIDENT THAN THAT OF ANY OTHER AGENCY. MR. BRZEZINSKI IS ALWAYS THE FIRST PERSON ON THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE EVERY WORKDAY MORNING. IN THE BASEMENT OF THE WEST WING OF THE WHITE HOUSE, BELOW THE PRESIDENT'S OVAL OFFICE, IS THE NSC-OPERATED "SITUATION ROOM," A 24-HOUR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER, INCLUDING A LINK WITH THE "HOT LINE" TO MOSCOW. ADJACENT TO THE WHITE HOUSE, IS THE FIVE-STORY, ORNATE 19TH-CENTURY BUILDING THAT ONCE HOUSED THE ENTIRE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, OF WAR AND OF THE NAVY -- AND WHICH IS NOW ONE OF TWO EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDINGS -- THE REST OF THE NSC STAFF WORKS ON TWO FLOORS FACING THE WEST WING.

AND IN THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF THAT WING, JUST DOWN THE HALL FROM THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE, IS THE HIGH-CEILINGED OFFICE OF MR. BRZEZINSKI. ITS SECLUSION IS IN COINCIDENTAL CONTRAST TO THE ROOM'S PREVIOUS USE: BEFORE DR. KISSINGER TOOK IT OVER FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER IT WAS WORKING SPACE FOR THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS CORPS.

* * * *

25/5/57

משרד החוץ

מחלקת חקשר

מבדק נכנס - מסווג

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

דף מספר מתוך דפים

עודק מספר מתוך 16 עותקים

סודי ביותר

מס 54

נשלח 031800 אוג 77

נהקבל 040154 אוג 77

מ י י י י

אל: המשד

מאת: ושוינגטון

אל:מככל.

א. ברזינסקי נפגש אתמול בקפיטול עם 19 (מתוך 22) חברי ביה"י.
היהודים. לפגישה אליה הוזמנו על ידי ייטס, באו גם פיל ברטון, בינגהם
וצ'לי ולטון מטקסס. אל ברזינסקי נלווה גרי שכטר.
ב. היוזמה לפגישה הייתה של ברזינסקי. עוד לפני כמה שבועות פנה לכמה
י קונגרס יהודים והציע להפגש ולשוחח.
ג. להלן דיווח על השיחה שקבלתי מכמה משתתפים:
ברזינסקי אמר לי כי ואנס נסע למזחה לקים שיחות לגבי סדר היום של גנבה.
הפגישה עם סאזאת הייתה טובה. סאזאת מסכים לעקרון של חוזה שלום
(TREATY)

הבעיות המציקות הן הפלשתינאים והגדה המערבית.
אדוב מנסה למלא עתה תפקיד של מתווך (MEDIATOR)
הכולל מצד אל צד כדי לגשר על פני ההבדלים.
עוד מתווכת אדוב ביחס לפרוצדורה, לאחר מכן היא תתווך ביחס למחות
ולחוב. (SUBSTANCE)

ברזינסקי צופה שועידת גנבה תחבס, תגיע למבוי סתום, תיראה
כאילו היא מתמוטטת ואחרי כן שוב תימשך וחוזר חלילה. אדוב רוצה
שד שיטה שתוכל לקלוט את הזעזועים של העליות והמורדות של ועידת
גנבה.

ברזינסקי העלה כאפשרות ניצול עצת האומ כדי לקיים ביו יורק
שיחות קירבה כפי שהציע בגין.
ברזינסקי אמר כי אינו סבור ששאלת יצוג אשפ חמנע בעד כינוס גנבה.
בעוד ראש הממשלה ישראל היה תקיף (ADAMANT) נגד ייצוג
אשפ בגנבה הוא (בגין) ציין כי אם הם לא יבואו באורח רשמי כנציגי
אשפ יש דרכים ייכלת סביב שאלה זוויי.

ברזינסקי חושב על אפשרות של חמישה ראשי ערים בגדה המערבית
שי ופיעו כנציגי הפלשתינאים בוועידה. אולי הם יוכלו להביא עמם
מזכירים. מי ישאל להוותם- אם הם יבואו כמזכירים של ראשי ערים.

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך — עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז — 1957.

סודי ביותר

TO AGGRAVATE

הבעיה היא שהעתונות תמיד מנסה לסבך

את המצב. העתונאים ישאלו את בגין: נניח שהמזכירים הם אנשי אשף

הוא ברזינסקי - מקווה שהעתונות לא תחטט בענין וכי גישת בגין

הזיה שאנשי אשף יוכלו להשתתף מבלי שיופיעו באי-צטלם רשמית.

HOMELAND

הסוד כולל דורש פתרון בעיית הפלשתינאים. באשר ל-

יש צורך למצוא לפלשתינאים מסגרת לגור בה. אחת משאלות המפתח

HOMELAND

היא הפלשתינאים. כולם יודעים זאת. מהו ה-

ל ככ יש תהל מומ. הערבים אומרים כי ללא אשף לא ייתכן מומ.

אני בדעה שיש זדכים לשחפם. אם אשף לא ישותף הוא יכול להביא

להפרעות כאלו מבחוצ שתבאנה לשבירת המומ מבפנים.

בגין אמר כי לא ינהל מומ עם נציג ידוע של אשף. עם זאת אמר בגין

כי ירשה לפלשתינאים להיות חלק מצוות ירד.

אם אפ צד לא יעורר את הבעיה, ישראל תקבל את הפלשתינאים כחלק

מצוות ירד. אם ירד לא הכריז שיש במשלחת אנשי אשף ואם ישראל

לא תבקש נייירות רקע מפורטים לגבי כל משתתף אזי אפשר יהיה לנהל

מום.

ברזינסקי אמר-עמדתו היא שאשף צריך לקבל את 338,242.

אחד המשתתפים העיר כי יהא על אשף לשנות את האמנה הפלשתינאית.

ברזינסקי הגיב - יעשו את אשר הם צריכים לעשות. אבל קודם כל עליהם

לקבל את 338,242.

ברזינסקי נשאל על ההתחליות ביהודה ובשומרון והשיב:

ארחב נקטה עמדה נגד מצ. לגיטימציה ליישובים בגדה המערבית.

שאלה - האם ארחב מתנגדת משום שהיא חושבת השטחים לכבושים

חשובה - איננו יודעים מי הוא בעליה של הגדה המערבית. איננו

לה- DEFINITIVE OWNERSHIP ואולם איננו

פותר בעייה זו על ידי הקמת יישובים המקשה עוד יותר השגת פתרון.

מוטב שאפ צד לא יגביר רגישות הנושא. כל הנושא של המעמד החוקי

POLITICAL PRACTICALITY של הגדה המערבית הוא מעורפל. אבל

איננו נוצר על ידי הקמת יישובים אלו.

TOTAL IMPEIDMENT עם זאת אמר, לא יהא בכך משום

מום, פעולות כאלו אינן מסייעות למום אבל ארחב איננה

THAT ALARMED

מת.

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים),
תשיז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

דף מספר _____ מתוך _____ דפים

עותק מספר _____ מתוך _____ עותקים

סודי ביותר

= 3 =

ברזינסקי אמר כי הוא צופה שהגדה המערבית תהא מפורזת הגבולות
יהיו פתוחים יהודים וערבים יגורו יחד.

בתשובה לשאלה מי תהא הממשלה גזה המערבית אמר ברזינסקי כי הוא חושב
שאולי תהא זאת ירדן, אב בלי צבא ירדני זה עדיין לא ברור.
IT IS WAY DOWN THE ROAD

אחד המשתתפים שאל- האם יש תנאים מוקדמים שארוב מחכונות לחייל
נל מי מחצידים כדי לחיילם לשולח הדיונים ברזינסקי השיב -לא.
ברזינסקי נשאל- אם ישראל תבקש לעשות ויתורים והיא תסרב האם
הממשל ינקוט באמצעים כמו ה-
REASSESSMENT

שנחיה הנשיא פורדז ברזינסקי השיב -לא. נעשה מאמצים לשכנע את ישראל
אבל לא נשתמש בלחץ פוליטי או צבאי. הממשל חושב שמה שהוא עושה הינו
נכון מבחינה מוסרית. הממשל לא יעשה כל פעולה לאיים על קיומה
של מדינה שכן זהו צעד לא מוסרי. הממשל לא ילחץ על ישראל לעשות
דבר תרצה לישראל כאיום על קיומה.

זה יהיה מעשה לא מוסרי. לדוגמא- אינן שמים אקדח בראשו של אדם
ואומרים לו אם לא תלך לדוגמא- איהו מכ. זהו צעד לא מוסרי.
לעודד אי בטחון באופן מכונן פירושו לעודד את תביכ מצ זה אצל הישראלי.
ברזינסקי אמר- ואנן אינו מזכיר עתה על ה-
COMMITMENTS

שעל ישראל לקבל, אולי ארוב תמלא תפקיד של מתווך כמו
TED KNEEL תווכ ידוע בטכסוכי עבודה ביו יורק.

על ככ הגיב גרייסון (מאחיו) גם אי הייתי מתווכ בטכסוכי עבודה.
מעולם לא תווכנו על ידי הודעות פומביות. ב רונטל כתב מכתב טוב
מאד לשיא בענין זה.

ברזינסקי אמר- נכון זהו מכתב טוב. אינן לנו כל בעיות עמו.
ארוב לא תכפה כל פחדון אלא תמלא תפקיד של מתווכ.
WILL DELIVER ISRAEL

שאלה-הערבים אומרים שקטר
חשובה- הערבים גם אומרים שליחודים יש שליטה על קטר, שהוא נתון
לשפעת הלובי היחודי. המנהיגים הערביים הינם גמישים מאד ביחס
לויחודים שריטוריאליים של מנהיגים ערבים אחרים.

ברזינסקי אמר עוד- הערבים אומרים שהם רוצים הסדר שלום. מי יודע
אולי זה סתם BULLSHIT אבל צריך לבטות.
ברזינסקי נשאל מדוע יש למחר כייכ ומדוע אתם עומדים על פחדון

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים),
תשיז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מבדק נכנס - מסווג

דף מספר _____ מתוך _____ דפים

עותק מספר _____ מתוך _____ עותקים

סודי ביותר

QUICK FIX

בשנה זו, על

QUICK FIX מדינות ערב

תשובה-אין כל הכרח ב-

הגובלות בישראל אומרות שהן מוכנות לחתומעל שלום עם ישראל כי ישראל
נאצה אותן שלוש פעמים. הן מצאו שביריחם איננה ידידת האמיתית
מבחינה מעשית- שנה זו טובה יותר מאשר השנה הבאה והסיכויים
לשיג הסדר בשנה זו טובים יותר.

על ראש הממשלה אמר-אני מכיר את בגין מזמן רב. יש לו שלושה נאחזות
אישיים בחייו (לא פירט) הוא אדם המוכן לנטול סיכונים.
VIBRATES WITH THE SUFFERING OF PEOPLE הוא

הוא אדם שיצמול קשה למען הסדר שלום אמיתי.
ברזינסקי אמר כי אם יושג שלום הדי בעוד 10 שנים יכולה ישראל לזפוכ
לשוייצייה של המזהות, עם גבולות פתוחים, שרותי בנקים, תעשיות
אלקטרוניות מפותחות, תעשיות יחלויים וכו'. ואולם ללא הסדר שלום
חדיה ישראל GARRISON של המזהות

עם אינפלציה דווחת. עד כאן הדיווח שנמסר.
הערה: 1) כמה מחשבותימ אמרו שהפגישה הייתה טובה מאד וכי לאחר
שהיו מוטרדים מאד מעמדת ברזינסקי הם יצאו ממנה רגועים יותר.
2) ייטס תודח לפני הפגישה על ידי השגריר כשטר אבג נכח בתדווכ.
רפיה-

להם רבים ונכח אריה (אליהו) ששן רביז/אריה (רם ואלן-גוש)

QUICK FIX טיפ קליר

על פי חוק המבחן

QUICK FIX

STEFAN WITTE

[illegible][illegible]

VIBRATES WITH THE SUFFERING OF PEOPLE

[illegible]

THESE LOGS MAY BE MADE BY ANY PERSON WHOSE DUTY OR INTEREST REQUIRES THEM TO BE KEPT

[illegible]

הקשרים בין האמנות, המדע וההנדסה הם. חידוש עם המדע והנדסה

מחלקת ש"ס

[illegible]

הערה: 1) עם הזדמנות זו נחפזו שני חסידים מרחבי הארץ להשיב את רצון ה'.

ש"ס ח' אלול תש"ס

8) "THEY ARE THE" POLAROID (C) 1978 POLAROID CORP. MA. U.S. PAT. 3,980,000.

12

$\log(0) = -\infty$

"דבר" (יורם פריז): יותר מרבע הבוחרים לחיפו מפלגה. ארועי הטבועות והיצים האחרונים שלפני הבחירות יקבעו החלטתם של ה"קולות הניידים". מערכות בחירות אחרות מראות כי קהל הבוחרים נעטה פחות מפלגתי. המערת הפוליטית אמנם יציבה אך אינה סטאטית והדבר אינו מתבטא בחוצאות בעקר בגלל שיטת הבחירות. יש סינוי טקולות ניידים יתרכזו בגוש המרכזי. "דבר" (נפתלי בן משה): מטיב למודעה של ד"ס: מחולי ממסלה זו פעוטים לעומת אלו של הקודמת. המדינה אינה טובלת מהעדד דמוקרטיה. מאז קום המדינה קיים הויכוח על שיטת הבחירות - מדוע הסתהה ידין ? ד"ס בורחת מהבעיה המדינית הנועת כדי להנעים החיים בפנים וזוהי צביעות.

"ג'. פוטט" (סדה הוניג): מפלגת העבודה נמצאת במצב נואט לקראת הבחירות לראשות עירית ת"א לאחר שהמועמדים הפוטנציאליים שלה - אורה נמיר, חיים הרצוג ומאיר עמית - טרבו להצעת המפלגה להתחרות על ראשות העיריה. "נ.י. טיימס" (10.1.77): ידיעת אי.פי. על דרישת הליכוד והעתונות הישראלית להמטיך בחקירת ההאטמות נגד עופר.

רדיו סי.בי.אס.: ידיעה על ההיתר טניתן להמטיך החקירה. חקטורה גרמנית: "הנדלסבלט" (רפ"ג): בישראל חוטטים שפרטת פלאטו חטמט כלי בידי האופוזיציה במטע הבחירות. פרטה זו מטחפת גם לענין החברה לישראל. "פ.א.צ." (חבור): המערך חוטט מקרע פנימי. פרס לא טעה להפצרות גולדה להטרת מועמדו. "נ.י. טיימס" (פארל): טדה הקרב הפוליטי של ישראל: רבין מרבה לדבר באחרונה ע"כ טממ' מעבר לא תהטט לפעול לכיוון של מגעים לקראת הסדר במונחים המתקבלים על דעת ישראל. אולם מסקיפים טבורים כי למעטה לאח תהינה התפתחויות של ממט בכיוון זה בטרם בחירות. ירדת כוחה של מפלגת העבודה מחזירה לפעילות איטים כגולדה מאיר הקוראים לחיזוק המפלגה ולאחדותה. כך נפגטה עם פרס בנטיון לטכנעו להסיר מועמדו ראשות הממסלה. פרס טוען כי רק סיניוי בהנהגה ימנע אובדן קולות האינטליגנציה המורים וטכבות הביניים וטואף כי הבחירות לתפקיד רה"מ יהיו בויעדה, אך הסיכוי לכך קלוט. אנטי ידין טוברים כי יצליחו להטיג 25 מנדטים בכנטט - אולם מסקיפים אחרים טוענים כי יזכו ל-10-8 מנדטים בלבד. גוברת הטאיפה לתוצאות טיעניקו לרה"מ מדט ברור.

הנאום הינו' 57 לפי העצמה למי' מו', סיכום זה

הנאום הבא:

הכרה י' כל הצדדים באומדן י' הערכים השונים את הסכנות
של יסוד, ואולי שלום המינסקים יסוד ואינליס, יצורה מדינה
כל שיתארגן לפורע, אישון העולם המבוססים באופן זה את הקיימים
ב-1967 על אסון בטחון, שמירג ויחסיס מאוחד אך ע"י שמי
היורג המכה. ומעט זכר ערביות אנטי ציוני.

● - המחקר המבא מוצא החלטה של הצטננות ליטורל שנה בינו' 57
בזמן הפורפסוריו האחרונים למין שלום המכה - שלא יהיה יסודי הק
היורג המכה הסדי 57 שלם (הערכים) יהיו מוכנים ליצור ולסב את
הבא יסודי כמצבול קבוצה נאציסטית המכה."

- דבר שלילי מהתנתן להבין הצטננות.

● - בקלמ' את הקמיל היסודי - כמין שנה התוצאות לכל ליטורל
היא הפכה 2500 איש. (המליס שפולו באלמט - 11 כיס).

על אסף כנה הצטננות שלם יסודי מחשבה ליטורל זה כן
שנה ינולד לבתור את הפלמנקאי ארם כהן ג'טא ליטורל, ארם
היא מתייג צמה ליטורל מחשבה המלמדה.

הכונה מסק מצביו הצטננות, בטלי 57, שנה היסודי -
שנה מלמ מסק שנה העלמ ליטורל הכה המלמ
הכונה זו ינולד ליטורל הצטננות, ליטורל כנה מחשבה
ליטורל המלמ, כנה שנה ליטורל ליטורל כן

13.1.1977

א. נוכחי פנים:

1. עם הפנים לבחירות:

עתונות בוקר: גברו הסיכויים למיזוג המרכז החופשי והתנועה הדמוקרטית לטינוי. טורח נימה אופטימית לגבי אפשרות המיזוג, רוב חילוקי הדעות בקשר למצע המשותף - נפתרו.

עתונות בוקר: ניטיונות לגיוס תומכים במפ' העבודה לרבין ופרס - להילוך גבוה. בכנס של נציגי אח"ע, אתמול, הובעה תמיכה ברבין. כרמל: נגד "סתלטנות, קרייריזם ותפיסת עמדות-יט לרסן אנשים כאלה". גלילי: המרוץ עלול לגרום להפסד המפלגה בבחירות - דרוס טלטון של טכל קולקטיבי וסליחים נבחרים.

עתונות בוקר: 30 אישים מערי פיתוח נפגשו עם רבין והביעו בו תמיכה. תושבים מההתמודדות על ראשות המפלגה - כסלון של רבין - כמוהו כהודאה בכסלון בהנהגת המדינה, דבר שאיננו נכון.

"מבט", עתונות בוקר: גוש אמונים: לא ירוץ לבחירות מתוך מגמה להסאר תנועה על מפלגתית. דיין: מפלגת העבודה תרכיב גם את הממשלה הבאה, גם ללא רוב בכנסת. המועמדים לקואליציה הם ד"ר והמפד"ל.

עתונות בוקר: מפד"ל: נערכים דיונים סמטרתם להרחיק את רפאל לקראת הבחירות הבאות.

"מבט", עתונות בוקר: ליכוד: הנהלת הליכוד וסיעתה בכנסת, ונציגי הליכוד ברשויות המקומיות החליטו להפריד הבחירות לרשויות המקומיות מהבחירות לכנסת.

"הארץ": לוינסון - חוסר בהירות אם יכנס לחיים פוליטיים, ואם כן האם ילך עם רבין או עם פרס?

"מבט", "הערב הזה", עתונות בוקר: הודעה מדינית של מפ"מ דחתה לטבת הכרעתה אם ללכת לבחירות במסגרת המערך. נראה שהשר אלון יאגק בעד סינוי נוסחת רבין בקשר לפטרה טריטוריאליה, לכוון דרישות מפ"מ. תלמי: "אם יבחר פרס, אז אין מערך".

"מבט": חזן: אין עתיד למפ"מ בלי מפלגת העבודה.

"דבר" (מערכת): אין למפ"מ סיבה מספקת לפרוש מן המערך. אין לכך הצדקה לטווח רחוק. על מפ"מ לטקול אם היא מוכנה לקבל על עצמה הסיכון והאחריות לפירוד.

הופעה פרט: הוגנת ומכובדת. דבריו לא מחודדים די צרכם בצד המדיני רעיוני. על סגנון ההתמודדות להיות מאופק טכן למחרת ההתמודדות תצטרך העבודה לגייס כוחה נגד יריביה.

"הצופה" (מילזיס): רבין סבור כי ניתן לוותר על רבינוביץ כשר אוצר - למרות שהאחרון חמך בו. הציע מטרה זו ללוינסון. פרס מבסס ההתמודדותו על הצורך בטינוי בטלטון - אחת חיפגע קטות מפלגת העבודה. רה"מ מקווה למסוך לצידו את מחנה היונים אולם ספק אם מחנה זה עומד כולו לצידו - מאחר וכאן פועל גם אבן בחאום עמדות עם פרס - במגמה לפגוע בכוחו של רבין במחנה היונים ואינצליגנציה. מותו של עופר יצר חלל ריק במחנה היונים ועתיד לפגוע ברבין.

"הצופה" (מערכת): אין כל וודאות כי רבין יצא מן ההתמודדות בתוך מפלגתו כסידו על העליונה. אם לפני מטפר שבועות הופיע כחכססן - הרי עתה הוא נכון לאור הצרף בטיסו המפלגתי עם התגברות נטיות הפריטה של מפ"מ.

ה'תש"ח ה'תש"ח ה'תש"ח ה'תש"ח ה'תש"ח

7.7 - 2

הכבוד לך אהבתי את הדיבור של יחזקאל אלהי הברכה
היה לי מליצתי בך ונצחתי. אלהי הדיבור של יחזקאל אלהי הברכה
אל שני הדיבורים האלה, מהאברהם האלה - מה כן ומה אלה
הדיבורים האלה? אלהי הדיבור של יחזקאל אלהי הברכה?

1. התאמת א' יסודות העניינים של הממשל, ולא רק א' העניינים הכלכליים.
2. בקלות א' ההתאמה של חוקי הממשל החדש של מדינת ישראל.

כצוהיה הוא מקרה להפוך את הנחל הממשי למאמץ שמצוי השלום
השקף הם מובנים והשלום אתה לבוא להיכלל.

בין היתר בהקדמונה מובא מצינו שאלו 300 באווינג יוני 5.
הם את אלס (17.6), שטוריה לו מבינו בושט, וכו' הולכה 242
בזמן שטוריה אלס מבינו הולכה 17.6, אך לא אלס שבו אלס
17.6 שבו או להבינו 17.6.

[illegible]

א. נושאי פנים:

1. בחירות 77:

עתונות בוקר: רבינוביץ - מארגן מפא"י לצד רבין.. רבין - לארה"ב ב-3 במרס.
נכון - לא נשלים עם כנסת כוחות סוריים לדרום לבנון.
הצעת תקציב אלטרנטיבית אז ל-3 חודשים תוגש היום ע"י האופוזיציה.
המועמד לראשות הממשלה ייבחר במרכז המפלגה.
מתגבש רוב לדחיית הבחירות לרשויות ל-78.
"הארץ" (מערכת): אין להעלות על הדעת שהמערך יעשה קנוניה עם המפלגות הדתיות למניעת חוק ההפלות תמורת תמיכתן בתקציב.
"הארץ" (אמנון ברזילי): מפד"ל "המערך המרובע" שהקים בורג דוחק את רגלי רפאל.
ממתינים לתגובתו. עדיין לא ברור אם יפרוש מהמפד"ל.
"הארץ" (י. טירת): הכנסת העבירה לוועדה 2 הצעות חוק להפרדת הבחירות לרשויות המקומיות מהבחירות לכנסת.
"דבר": הועידה המדנית של מפ"מ החליטה לפרוש מהמערך אם ייבחר פרס למועמד העבודה לרה"מ.
"דבר" (נ. ברנע): אנשי ד"ש מגייסים כספים בקרב יהדות ארה"ב.
"על המשמר" (מארק גפן): מותח ביקורת חריפה על א. יערי ועל העתון שפרסם מאמר בו הוגדר גלילי כ"אמן ניסוחי התרמית".
"על המשמר" (עמיר שפירא): כנס רגבים - בעקבות כנס בית השיטה: תמיכת הכותב במאבק לשינוי פני מפלגת העבודה.
"על המשמר" (מ. טמולר): המשך קיום המערך מותנה בכינון העבודה לפשרה טריטוריאלית בכל הגזרות ובבחירת מועמד לרה"מ שיהיה נאמן על ביצוע מדיניות זו. לדעתו העתונות הגיכה בצורה חריפה על עצם תוכנם לשל התנאים ואופן הצגתם.
"על המשמר" (וילפינד): הקו שנוקטת התנועה בעשר השנים האחרונות הוא סטייה מן הדרך ההסטורית של השו"צ. מפ"מ אינה כת אלא כוון עצמאי גדול והליכה עצמאית לבחירות אינה התאבדות. ניתן להציל את כוחו של הקיבוץ להשפעה ושינוי פוליטי.
"על המשמר" (מ. שפירא): מפלגת העבודה אינה יכולה לפעול תחת אולטימטום של מפ"מ. צריך לעשות הכל לתמיכה מוסרית ופיסית ברבין.
"על המשמר" (נתן ילין-מור): לעומת הארצות בהן מחולק גוף הבוחרים לפי חתכים המהווים קיבוצים אתניים והשקפות רעיוניות-פוליטיות או מעמדות בישראל נוספה לכך החלוקה לפי השקפות דתיות. שיטת בחירות לפי אזורים תמנע ייצוג אמיתי של שכבות רבות.
"ג'. פוסט" (פ. דורון): ד"ש: הופתעה מהקדמת הבחירות. עבודה קדחתנית להכנת המצע.
אין חידושים מיחדים. עקרונות: - ישראל מדינה יהודית דמוקרטית. - חייבים להיות גבולות בטוחים, - הבירה ירושלים.. - צריך להתכונן לויתורים על שטחים. ההבטחה העיקרית לבוחר - שינוי שיטת הבחירות. המצע של התנועה לא ברור בתחומים רבים, צולל שיטת בחירות אלטרנטיבית.
"נ.י. טיימס" (גבירצמן): וואנס מעודד מהצהרות המנהיגים, אך מודאג מהבחירות בישראל והמאבק רבין-פרס. כנראה ינהל שיחות עם פרס ואבן בנוסף לרבין. גם מצב סאדאת עורער והוא יצמד כנראה לקו הערבי, אם כי מעוניין בשלוט.



הקונסוליה הכללית של
ישראל בניו יורק

CONSULATE GENERAL
OF ISRAEL IN NEW YORK

12 ביולי 1977
כ"ו בתמוז תשל"ז

800 SECOND AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

OXford 7-5500

אל: מנהל מצפ"א
מנהל מח' הסברה

מאת: ס/קונכ"ל, ניו-יורק

הנדון: המאבק ההסברתי של ישראל בארה"ב

מאז החל סאדאת, בשלהי מלחמת יום הכפורים, לפעול כלפי ארה"ב בנסיון לתקוע בינה לבין ישראל טריז כלשהו, הלך והתברר שהאתגר העיקרי שלנו כאן הוא בחשיפת התרמית שבמתינות הערבית. בתום מלחמת האזרחים בלבנון ולאחר ועידות קהיר וריאד בסוף 1976, הצטרפו לסאדאת גם ערב הסעודית, סוריה וירדן ואפשר היום לומר שכל מדינות ערב, במדה זו או אחרת תורמות את תרומתן כדי להציג בארה"ב תדמית ערבית חדשה. הערבים השתכנעו שהפוטנציאל שבהליכה בדרך המדינית, קרי - תוך הפעלת ארה"ב כמנוף למענם, עודנו רב ומבטיח. מה שקייסינג'ר הצליח לסחוט מישראל בשיטתו שלו נרשם כתקדים שאפשר לפתחו בכוונים שונים כשהיעד איננו משתנה כוללם.

אינני מחדש דבר במה שנאמר לעיל. אך יתכן שקיימת אצלנו ההרגשה שאם נדחף לפרסום רחב יותר של ההודעות השליליות והקיצוניות הסותרות את תדמית המתינות נשיג את מטרתנו ונחשוף את הטקטיקה הערבית. אם זוהי ההרגשה אצלנו, דומני שהיא מבוססת על הערכה לא נכונה של המצב בארה"ב. מסע המתינות הערבי הצליח ליצור הד חיובי בארה"ב בגלל מידה של עייפות מהסכסוך המז"תי וכן מתוך נכונות הטבועה באופיו של האמריקאני כפרט וכצבור להאמין שאכן חל שנוי לטובה ומסתמנת מכך גם שבירת הקפאון. ישנן מספר התפתחויות נוספות שתורמו לתהליך זה: העובדה שמסתובבים ערבים רבים ברחבי המדינה ורובם המכריע מדברים דברי נועם ומצביעים על האינטרס הכלכלי המשותף לשני העמים; פעילות של גורמי ממשל שונים המתאמצים לתקן את הרושם השלילי של הערבים בכלל ושרר בצבור הרחב; המספר הגדל והולך של חברות ומפעלי תעשייה המעורבים בפעילות כלכלית (מדינות המפרץ ומטבע הדברים רוצים להשתכנע ולשכנע אחרים שאין לערבים קרניים ואינם חפצים אלא בפתוח כלכלי וחברתי ולא חלילה בחסול מדינת היהודים.

כתוצאה מתהליכים וגישות אלו, קיימת יותר מאשר בעבר רתיעה אצל כתבים, עורכי עיתונים ובעלי טורים לפרסם הודעות ערביות קיצוניות. יש נטיה גדולה יותר לייחס הודעות כאלה למשהו בטבע הערבי שאיננו שייך להגיון אלא למנהגים וטבעים של חברה זרה, אך איננו משקף את גישתם האמיתית של הערבים לבעיה. יש להוסיף לנ"ל את העובדה שהאמריקאי, כולל מי שיושב בבית הלבן, ממשיך להאמין (גם אחרי מפלת ווייטנאם) שטבעו השורשי של האדם הוא חיובי וטוב ושעם מאמץ ורצון טוב אפשר לפתור כל בעיה תחת השמש.

אינני ממליץ להסיק מהנתוח דלעיל שעלינו לחדול מלהפיץ את ההודעות הערביות. אך עלינו לדעת שתועלתם מוגבלת ולחפש דרכים כיצד להקנות לצבור האמריקאי את אמונתנו שמדובר בתרמית ערבית רבת-ממדים.

אני מצרף שני ניתוחים שנכתבו ע"י יורשו של זאב פירסט ב-ADL, קנת ג'ייקובסון, שהם מעניינים לכשעצמם, אך שופכים או גם על הבעיה שהצגתי.

ב ב ר כ ה,

י. ח. בן-אהרן

העתק: מר ח. בר-און, הציר, וושינגטון
לשכת המנכ"ל



ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE

OF B'NAI B'RITH

315 Lexington Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10016

MEMORANDUM

To: Benjamin R. Epstein

From: Arnold Forster

Date: June 23, 1977

Subject:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

National Commission

BENJAMIN R. EPSTEIN

Our leadership and professional staff are trying to understand the motivations and reasons for President Carter's Middle East policy assertions in the last six weeks. The attached analysis, prepared by Ken Jacobson of our Middle Eastern Affairs Department, is very enlightening in this regard. It is a remarkable document, for it was prepared not in recent days but at the end of 1976. I commend it to your careful reading.

AF:cl
Attachment

cc: Regional Offices
National Civil Rights Committee

December, 1976

Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Middle East

Zbigniew Brzezinski has served as one of Jimmy Carter's chief foreign policy advisers during the recent presidential campaign, and he figures to play a prominent role in the making of foreign policy in the new administration. His views on the Middle East thus hold a special interest for the American Jewish community.

A reading of what Brzezinski has written over the past few years indicates that he shares two important assumptions with Henry Kissinger on the subject of the Middle East. Like Kissinger, he firmly believes that a policy of inaction represents the most dangerous course for all concerned. On January 7, 1975, in a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations, he said that the need to solve the Middle East conflict "is now more acute than ever before." This was so, he argued, "not only because of its danger to world peace but because of its polarizing effect on American relations with the rest of the world..." He also maintained in that address that a settlement was necessary soon to "create the kind of confidence on which ... the resolution of some of the monetary problems with the oil producers depend."

On several other occasions since 1974 Brzezinski has voiced the opinion that time does not favor the Israelis. In the New Leader of January 7, 1974 he said that without a settlement "Israel will remain the impetus for an Arab modernization which ultimately must spell disaster for that small and surrounded enclave." In the same vein, he wrote in Foreign Policy magazine in its Summer, 1975 issue that it is "hubris" for Israel to think that time is on its side. And a reporter for the Jewish Observer and Middle East Review of June 4, 1976 wrote the following about a Brzezinski interview with an Israeli Television correspondent: "Brzezinski returned several times to the idea that the Arabs were becoming technically more advanced and stressed that the longer the dispute remained unresolved the more radical the Arabs would be in their approach."

A second assumption which Brzezinski shares with Kissinger is that the United States, by dint of its unique ability to engage the trust of both sides, must serve as the catalyst to stimulate the necessary action. He stated his position most clearly in the New Leader of January 7, 1974: "...the attainment of true peace would require active U.S. participation. The reasons for this are simple. Without American involvement, it is likely that the Arabs will be tempted by the mirage of Israel's destruction and that a portion of the Israeli population will continue to advocate an expanded Israeli state. The United States, moreover, is the only power that can bring effective pressure to bear in the Middle East -- and both the Arabs and the Israelis know it." On another occasion (Foreign Policy, Summer, 1975), he called for an "overt American initiative."

Brzezinski parts company with Kissinger, however, in his perception of the form this initiative should take. In this divergence resides the potential for the making of a different kind of American policy in the months ahead.

Kissinger brought a cautious, tactical approach to the issue of a U.S. initiative. He sought to inject American persuasion and American pressure at propitious moments to achieve small gains. Although he seems not to have spelled out his final goals, Kissinger apparently hoped that a succession of such gains would create a momentum and atmosphere conducive to the construction of peace.

(over)

Brzezinski, on the other hand, has stood for a bolder, more comprehensive initiative. The United States, he has written, must spell out the general terms of a final peace settlement "outlining both the substance of an eventual settlement and the required international framework for it." (Foreign Policy, Summer, 1975)

On at least three separate occasions Brzezinski explained his thinking. In his address to the Council of Foreign Relations in January, 1975 he attacked Kissinger's step-by-step approach: "I am doubtful that getting the Arabs and Israelis slowly together will succeed, for that, in my judgment, overlooks the reality of Arab disunion and impatience, which undermines the genuine acceptance by the Arabs of any gradually attained compromise solution; and it is also inhibited by internal Israeli political paralysis and foot-dragging on the negotiating process, which similarly obstructs the attainment of a settlement."

The following summer in his Foreign Policy article (which he wrote together with Francois Duchene and Kiichi Saeki), he reiterated his support for a comprehensive approach on the grounds that partial agreements are attainable only to the "extent to which both the Israelis and the Palestinians feel that a settlement which offers political assurances for the future in the place of the military ones they now seek, can be devised and sustained."

And, in the March/April, 1976 issue of Skeptic magazine, Brzezinski implied that Arab and Israeli leaders actually would welcome an American presentation of final settlement terms: "Neither the Arabs nor the Israelis are in a position to state openly what they would consider a fair settlement to be like, because they are bargaining with each other and they also have internal problems... We are an instrument for this solution, but we can only be effective if we seek very actively that solution."

What these statements suggest is that Brzezinski as National Security Adviser might well call on President Carter to issue a dramatic peace proposal within six months to a year (Brzezinski recently told an Israeli TV correspondent that 1977 would be "a critically important year.") Such a step could generate tremendous pressure on both Israel and the Arabs to respond in good faith. The pressures for movement would most likely be even greater than those which surfaced at the height of Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy," simply because the word "peace" will be dangle before a world thirsting for an end to the seemingly eternal Middle East crisis. Whether in fact movement toward a true peace would then emerge, or whether these pressures would instead fall on Israel alone cannot be predicted.

Brzezinski presented the outlines of a peace proposal in his address to the Council of Foreign Relations (January, 1975). He summarized the important points: "...recognition by all parties, especially Arab neighbors, of Israel's sovereignty and peace treaties establishing normal relations; the creation of a demilitarized Palestinian state; the reinforcement of frontiers based largely on those existing in 1967 by security zones; the retention of a united Jerusalem but with two capitals in it; and a U.S. guarantee for the above. The above could make peace possible for it denies the use of territory for aggression but without making Israeli security dependent on the acquisition of territory which would bound to perpetuate the Arab-Israeli conflict."

(The Brookings Institution report of 1975, to which Brzezinski contributed, differs somewhat in its emphasis on step-by-step trade-offs, but is not inherently contradictory to Brzezinski's own writings.)

Over the past few years Brzezinski has offered both positive and negative opinions on Israel. On the positive side, for example, he wrote in the Bulletin of American Professors for Peace in the Middle East (June, 1976) that the full recognition of Israel is the "gut issue" in the conflict. In the same article, he said that the Arabs must know "that there is not the slightest chance of obtaining a settlement unless they are prepared to formalize and to institutionalize their acceptance of Israel as a permanent and legitimate presence in the Middle East."

Brzezinski has also spoken of America's "moral...commitment to Israel and its survival," and stated in this connection that the "most important" U.S. interest in the Middle East is the "moral one." (Skeptic, March/April, 1976)

On the negative side, he has criticized Israel for its "inflexibility." (Foreign Policy, 1975.) And in the New Leader of January 7, 1974, not long after the Yom Kippur War, he made the following outrageous statement: "In recent years they (the Israelis) have dropped increasingly frequent hints that an eventual peace settlement would have to include considerably expanded frontiers, euphemistically described as 'secure.' The result of this has been the sacrifice of 2,500 lives."

On the PLO, Brzezinski has written that "If Israel continues to ... insist that only it can choose the Palestinians with whom to negotiate, it will condemn itself to living perpetually at war, and bring about the very danger that the refusal to speak to the PLO is designed to avoid" (Foreign Policy, 1975). Similarly, he said in the Jewish Observer and Middle East Review in June, 1976 that Israel would have to recognize the PLO as "part of a future settlement." In July, 1976, however, he told Israeli newsmen in Jerusalem that he "doubted that the U.S. was moving towards recognition of the PLO." This statement could be interpreted to mean that Brzezinski himself now opposes the recognition of the PLO, something he has not said heretofore.

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE

OF B'NAI B'RITH

315 Lexington Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10016

MEMORANDUM

To: Justin J. Finger

From: Dan Mariaschin

Date: July 7, 1977

Subject:

Concern has been expressed recently over the Administration's emphasis on the need for a diplomatic breakthrough in the conflict in the Middle East "in the coming months" of this year. The attached analysis of this issue, prepared by Ken Jacobson of our Middle Eastern Affairs Department, suggests that the Administration's thinking may be based on a series of assumptions which run contrary to certain political realities in the region. The analysis makes the point that an understanding of Israel's call for direct negotiations and a lasting peace are more likely to bring about a resolution of the conflict than moves to bring about a "rushed peace."

DM:pls

cc: ADL Regional Offices
National Civil Rights Committee
Middle Eastern Affairs Committee

Some Comments on America's
"Most Pressing International Problem"

The American Jewish community has been criticizing statements coming out of Washington which seem to point to a United States effort to impose a settlement in the Middle East. Such criticism is necessary and desirable, but may not be sufficient to deflect the Administration from its apparent course. Indeed, evidence to date indicates that the White House is intent on persisting in its course despite Jewish criticism.

If this is so, what then can the Jewish community do, beyond what it has done until now, to influence the Administration?

For one, it might direct some of its criticism at the assumptions upon which the White House is constructing its current policy. By focusing on the bases of the policy, and not only on the policy itself, it may have a better chance to break through that pattern of thinking in Washington that has brought American-Israeli relations to their current state of uncertainty and mutual suspicion.

The first step to take in such a shift in focus is to gain an understanding of what these assumptions are and how they work. What follows, therefore, is an attempt to identify one of these assumptions, and more importantly, to demonstrate how the Carter Middle East policy flows almost inevitably out of this one assumption.

The concept I have in mind is that which holds that time is running down in the Middle East, that no more pressing problem exists today on the international scene, that the world urgently needs a solution to the conflict to prevent an international explosion with devastating military, political, and economic consequences. This concept underlay Zbigniew Brzezinski's approach to the Middle East conflict as he expressed it in several articles published between 1974-1976. And today, reflecting the influence Brzezinski has attained, it underlies the White House approach. Administration officials routinely speak of 1977 as the critical year for peace in the Middle East.. A typical example of this kind of thinking appeared in the June 27 State Department statement on the Middle East. Its opening words read: "We believe strongly that progress toward a negotiated peace is essential this year if future disaster is to be avoided."

The fact that this assumption has prevailed in the Carter White House has had a dramatic impact on U.S. perceptions of the Middle East. This should not be surprising, for a logical schema develops out of this premise which seems almost inevitable in its development. It goes something like this:

If one believes that time is running down in the Middle East and that peace must come to pass in rapid fashion, it then becomes necessary (in order to accommodate oneself to these thoughts and to maintain some sense of control over

one's destiny) to persuade oneself that peace can come to pass in rapid fashion. In order to do this, however, it becomes necessary to persuade oneself that that factor which has clearly functioned as the obstacle to peace for 29 years -- the unrelenting hostility of the Arabs to the very existence of the Jewish State -- no longer stands in the way. One accomplishes this by discovering a new moderation in Arab attitudes toward Israel.

In such a climate, a priori thinking becomes the rule of thumb. Government officials (and media figures) see Arab moderation because they need and want to see it. Of course, they attempt to convince the public (and themselves) that they have concrete evidence of such change; but invariably such evidence turns out to be no evidence at all, or flimsy evidence at best. They make subtle distinctions concerning the degrees of moderation in Arab lands. This lends credence to their claims that they are open-minded in examining attitudes toward Israel within each Arab nation.

Indeed, there are differences among Arab leaders in attitudes toward Israel; but they are essentially differences in tone and style. These differences are inconsequential in comparison to the huge gap that exists between the existing collective hostile attitude of the Arabs toward Israel and that kind of attitude which would bespeak true intent to live in peace with the Jewish State.

Characteristically, those that propose the theory of Arab moderation reject or ignore attempts by critics to demonstrate the inadequacy of their claims. In fact, a mass of material exists which clearly shows that the Arab states and the PLO have not moderated their basic attitude toward Israel.

Relevant in this regard are recent statements by Presidents Assad and Sadat. Assad, speaking to Danish reporters visiting Damascus on June 17, declared that Syria will not recognize Israel, even if it withdraws completely to the pre-1967 lines. He claimed that there is "no international law, international charter or international norm that forces a state to recognize another state." Assad maintained that 242 merely required Syria to end "the state of war" -- not to make real peace with Israel nor to recognize Israel.

Sadat, as reported in the New York Times on July 2, said that he had told President Carter that the Arabs would not accept normalized relations with Israel as part of an overall Middle East settlement: "I told him simply that if we resurrected Jesus Christ and Prophet Mohammed together, they would not be able to persuade Moslem or Christian Arabs to open the borders with Israel after 29 years of hatred, four wars, rivers of blood and massacres."

But all this evidence falls on deaf ears in Washington. And the American Jewish community continues to wonder why its message does not get through. Is it not because the Administration, in order to maintain the stability of the logical schema described above, cannot afford to listen? It is no mere accident that the new perception of Arab moderations coincides with the emergence in the highest circles in Washington of the concept that the Middle East conflict is the world's most pressing problem.

This acceptance of the Arabs as "overnight moderates" has profound consequences. Once the new image takes hold (which translated means that the Arabs no longer appear as unrelenting ideological enemies of a Zionist state, but as people

willing to discuss specific and limited problems toward the goal of live-and-let-live), then the perception of the nature of the Middle East conflict changes dramatically. The conflict shifts from the realm of abnormal diplomacy (as Bernard Lewis recently described it) where it has long resided, where the main and non-soluble issue is the existence of a state, to the realm of normative diplomacy where the main issue becomes the size of the state. It now takes on the appearance of that kind of conflict readily subject to solution through the usual diplomatic give-and-take.

In this context, Arab arguments that Israel must return to its pre-1967 size seem to carry greater weight because the justification for Israel's claims for larger borders -- security against an implacable foe committed to its destruction -- no longer seems relevant. According to this line of reasoning, the Arabs are no longer those nasty people who want to drive the Israelis into the sea, therefore the Israelis should now be willing to make greater concessions. And if Israel isn't willing to make these concessions, it isn't because Israel correctly perceives Arab intentions, but rather because it is intransigent, expansionist, and not eager to make peace with its neighbors. Therefore, it becomes the task of the United States, as Israel's benefactor, to set Israel back on the right road. Or, as George Ball recently put it, America must "... Save Israel in Spite of Herself."

And so we arrive at the current state of affairs between the United States and Israel (a state of affairs which was coming even if Labor had won the recent election in Israel) -- where tremendous U.S. pressure on Israel seems to be building, and where outright conflict between the Democratic President and the American Jewish community is no longer unthinkable.

Again, much of the current difficulty stems from the overly rigid assumption that peace must come soon. Of course, Israel desires a true peace as rapidly as possible; indeed, the new government has reiterated the long-standing Israeli call for direct negotiations between the parties as the way to achieve that peace. But reality demands that one understand that "peace in 1977" may not be possible; to ignore this dictum is inevitably to distort the realities of Middle East life.

The American Jewish community should therefore try to get across to the President that, on the one hand, Israel strongly desires a just peace soon; but that on the other hand, there are worse things than not attaining that peace now -- such as establishing a bad peace, or bringing a breakdown in U.S.-Israeli relations. If it succeeds in getting across that message, it may well help to restore the sense of confidence between Israel and the United States.

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BRZEZINSKI NEWS CONFERENCE APRIL 1

SEARCH FOR S.A.L.T. AGREEMENT JUST BEGINNING (1,000)

BY ALEXANDER M. SULLIVAN

IPS WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENT

WASHINGTON, APRIL 1 -- THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, ACCORDING TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS ADVISER, HAVE EMBARKED ON "THE FIRST PHASE OF AN AMBITIOUS AND FAR-REACHING SEARCH FOR SIGNIFICANT... ACCOMMODATION."

DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, IN AN APRIL 1 NEWS CONFERENCE AT THE WHITE HOUSE, ASSERTED THAT THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL MADE IN MOSCOW EARLIER IN THE WEEK "IF ACCEPTED OR WHEN ACCEPTED COULD SERVE AS THE DRIVING WEDGE" FOR A MORE STABLE STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

PAGE 2 -- BRZEZINSKI

DR. BRZEZINSKI SAID THE UNITED STATES IS AT THE BEGINNING OF AN "EDUCATIONAL PROCESS" IN COOPERATION WITH MOSCOW, AND HE COMPARED THE SOVIET REJECTION OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S COMPREHENSIVE ARMS CONTROL PLAN WITH THE INITIAL "VERY NEGATIVE" SOVIET SCORNING OF THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE BAN IN 1960.

DR. BRZEZINSKI SAID THE "BROAD FEELING" IN WASHINGTON -- AS THE UNITED STATES LABORED TO PRODUCE A "REFINELY CRAFTED" POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC PROPOSAL FOR MOSCOW'S CONSIDERATION WAS THAT "27 YEARS AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE NUCLEAR RACE, THE TIME WAS RIGHT FOR DOING SOMETHING MORE THAN CREATING A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITION."

HE ATTRIBUTED THE "ACERBIC" TONE OF SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO'S UNUSUAL MOSCOW NEWS CONFERENCE TO THE "POLITICAL PERCEPTION" BY THE SOVIETS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS COME UP WITH A PROPOSAL THAT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO EVENTUAL REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS, NOTING THAT THE SOVIET UNION "OVER THE YEARS HAS PRIDED ITSELF AS BEING IN THE FOREFRONT" IN THE DISARMAMENT FIELD.

PAGE 3 -- ERZEZINSKI

HE DETECTED "A TINY BIT OF DEFENSIVENESS AT THE BASE OF COMMENTS AND GESTURES" BY THE SOVIET UNION IN THE WAKE OF SECRETARY OF STATE VANCE'S MOSCOW CONFERENCES WITH MR. GROMYKO AND PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV.

DR. ERZEZINSKI, ASSERTING THAT THE THINKING BEHIND THE SCOPE OF THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL IS AS SIGNIFICANT AS THE PLAN ITSELF, SAID WASHINGTON HAD TWO BASIC PURPOSES ON MIND IN THE MOSCOW TALKS.

FIRST TO GIVE BOTH SIDES THE "POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC PARITY" EACH IS ENTITLED TO -- THAT IS, TO PROPOSE AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD GIVE NO REAL OR PERCEIVED ADVANTAGE TO EITHER SIDE.

THE SECOND PURPOSE WAS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ASSURING EACH SIDE OF "POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY" BY PROVIDING SAFEGUARDS AGAINST DEVELOPMENT OF DE-STABILIZING TECHNOLOGY IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

HE SAID THE PROPOSAL CALLED ON EACH SIDE TO "FORGO" DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF THOSE ELEMENTS IN THEIR ARSENALS WHICH THREATENED THE OTHER SIDE THE MOST.

PAGE 4 -- BRZEZINSKI

THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL, WHICH SPANNED ARMS CONTROL SPECIFICS AND A BROADER AREA OF POLITICAL COOPERATION, FOCUSED ON THE LAND-BASED MISSILE AS THE POTENTIALLY MOST TROUBLESOME OF THE ARCANESYSTEMS OF WEAPONS DELIVERY VEHICLE EACH SIDE FIELDS.

MR. CARTER CALLED FOR A FREEZE ON MODERNIZATION OF INTERCONTINENTAL LAND-BASED MISSILES, AS WELL AS A REDUCTION IN THE OVERALL MIX OF SYSTEMS AGREED UPON AT VLADIVOSTOK BY MR. BREZHNEV AND PRESIDENT FORD IN 1974.

DR. BRZEZINSKI CALLED THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD CEILINGS SO HIGH AND ITS TERMS SO OPEN-ENDED AS TO BE LITTLE MORE THAN AN AGREED-UPON WAY OF CONTINUING ARMS RACE ESCALATION.

THE PRESIDENT THEREFORE PROPOSED TO LOWER THE OVERALL VLADIVOSTOK CEILING OF 2,400 TO A RANGE -- SUBJECT TO FURTHER NEGOTIATION -- OF 1,600 TO QUINPPP LAND, SEA AND AIR OFFENSIVE DELIVERY VEHICLES.

FURTHER, HE PROPOSED, WITHIN THAT CONTEXT, A REDUCTION IN ALLOWABLE MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY-TARGETED RE-ENTRY VEHICLES (MIRVS) FROM VLADIVOSTOK'S 1,320 TO A RANGE OF 1,100 TO 1,200.

PAGE 5 -- BRZEZINSKI

HOWEVER, TO OFFSET THE GREATER THRUST OF THE NEWEST GENERATION OF SOVIET MISSILES, MR. CARTER PROPOSED A CEILING OF 150 ON THE SOVIET'S LARGE MISSILES, CAPABLE OF CARRYING AS MANY AS TEN WARHEADS. THE SOVIETS NOW FIELD 308 OF THOSE WEAPONS.

DR. BRZEZINSKI SAID THAT EVEN WITH SUCH A REDUCTION ON THE SOVIET UNION WOULD RETAIN THE ABILITY TO FIELD MORE WARHEADS, GIVEN THE LARGER SIZE OF SOME OF THEIR MISSILES, THAN DOES THE UNITED STATES ON ITS MINUTEMAN LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILE.

BOTH SIDES WOULD ALSO "FORGO" POTENTIAL MISSILE DELIVERY VEHICLE ADVANCES. THERE WOULD BE A BAN ON MODERNIZING EXISTING MISSILES. THE UNITED STATES WOULD HALT DEVELOPMENT OF THE MX LAND-BASED MISSILE IN BOTH ITS MOBILE AND FIXED-SITE VERSIONS. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ALSO FOREGO DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE LAND-BASED MISSILES.

THE UNITED STATES WOULD BAN ALL STRATEGIC -- THAT IS, LONG-RANGE -- VERSIONS OF THE CRUISE MISSILE, WHICH IS, IN EFFECT, A LOW ALTITUDE PILOTLESS JET AIRCRAFT WHICH FOLLOWS A TERRAIN MEMORY BANK FROM LAUNCH TO TARGET.

PAGE 6 -- ERZEZINSKI

THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ACCEPT RESTRICTIONS ON THE BOMBER CALLED "BACKFIRE" IN THE WEST, PROVIDING ASSURANCE AGAINST ITS USE AS A STRATEGIC WEAPON.

THE UNITED STATES, DR. ERZEZINSKI SAID, WOULD "CONSTRAIN" THE MOST THREATENING -- TO THE SOVIET UNION -- ELEMENTS OF ITS ARSENAL, AND WOULD EXPECT MOSCOW TO DO THE SAME.

DR. BRZEZINSKI RETURNED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE 1966 ANALOGY. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD SPOKEN "PERSUASIVELY" TO SOVIET PREMIER KOSYGIN ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL TO BAN DEVELOPMENT OF ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES, THE INITIAL SOVIET RESPONSE WAS EXTREMELY NEGATIVE.

BUT "OVERTIME," DR. BRZEZINSKI NOTED, MOSCOW CAME TO ACCEPT THE AMERICAN ARGUMENT THAT GIVING EITHER SIDE THE ABILITY TO DESTROY THE OTHER'S IN-COMING MISSILES WAS AN INHERENTLY DE-STABILIZING COMPLICATION TO THE QUEST FOR A SAFER WORLD.

THE MOST IMPORTANT RESULT OF THE FIRST STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS, CONCLUDED IN MOSCOW IN 1972, WAS "PRECISELY THAT WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAD FIRST GREETED" WITH SCORN HE SAID.

PAGE 7 -- ERZEZINSKI

HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT WHEN THE KREMLIN THINKS THROUGH THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FURTHER ARMS RACE, AND THE BENEFITS TO BE DERIVED FROM A FREEZE ON FURTHER COMPETITION, AGREEMENT WILL BE REACHED.

DR. ERZEZINSKI SAID THAT GIVEN "PATIENCE, PERSISTENCE AND GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES" A SIGNIFICANT BREAKTHROUGH CAN BE ACHIEVED IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

HE TOLD QUESTIONERS IT IS NECESSARY TO CALL FOR A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF HEAVIER SOVIET MISSILES BECAUSE AS OVERALL NUMBERS ARE REDUCED QUARTY ASYMMETRY IS ENHANCED." THAT IS, WITH FEWER NUMBERS OF LAUNCHERS INVOLVED, THE MISSILE WITH MANY WARHEADS PROVIDES A "SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES" TO THE SIDE WHICH FIELD IT. THE BACKFIRE BOMBER, HE NOTED, ALSO ASSUMES GREATER IMPORTANCE AT A LOWER CEILING.

HE SAID THE UNITED STATES "MADE THE DARNEDEST EFFORT TO PRODUCE A PACKAGE WE COULD SAY WAS REASONABLY EQUITABLE FOR BOTH SIDES."

HE SAID IN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS, SUCH AS THOSE SCHEDULED NEXT MONTH BETWEEN MR. VANCE AND MR. GROMYKO, THE UNITED STATES COULD IDENTIFY THOSE "ASPECTS" OF THE CARTER PROPOSAL "MOST TROUBLING" TO MOSCOW, AND COULD ADDRESS

PAGE 8 -- ERZEZINSKI

THOSE CONCERNS.

THE UNITED STATES, HE SAID, INFORMED THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IN ADVANCE OF MR. VANCE'S MOSCOW TRIP THAT REDUCTIONS IN MISSILE NUMBERS WOULD BE PROPOSED.

HE SAID HE WANTED THE REDUCTION TO COME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE TOP SOVIET LEADERSHIP BEFORE IT COMES TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTRY WHICH HE SAID EVALUATES ALL U.S. ARMS PROPOSALS.

HE SAID NO ONE IN WASHINGTON

כל המוסר תובן מסמן זה. כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמן
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

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אל: המשרד

מאת: רושינגטון

עברון, מ.רביב.

לזה. נוסח מכתב ששיגר אתמול הרצבדג לבוזינסקי. כמה נקודות מן הדברים
הכלולים במכתב זה גם נאמרו עי הרצבדג לאריק רולו. כגון הסתייגותו מדוח
ברוקינגס (רולו נמצא עתה בארזה לזכנת סודת מאמרים על יחסי ישראל-
ארזה ויהדות ארזה, ובמסגרת זו נפגש עם שינדלר, טורציינר, הרצבדג ואישי
משל. אין לי ספק שגם נפגש עם אנשי בריחה).

DEAR ZBIG.

SINCE YOU AND I HAVE BEEN IN THE HABIT OF TALKING FRANKLY WITH EACH OTHER, I FEEL BOTH THE NEED AND THE OBLIGATION TO WRITE TO YOU AT THIS MOMENT.

I ASK THAT YOU REMEMBER WHAT I TOLD YOU SEVERAL TIMES IN PAST CONVERSATIONS, THAT I WAS EMBROILED WITH GOLDA MEIR THROUGH THE ATE 60'S AND 70'S IN ARGUING FOR DOVISH VIEWS ON POSSIBLE SETTLEMENTS IN THE MIDEAST, ESPECIALLY ON THE PALESTINIANS, AND THAT I REMAIN A DOVE.

NONETHELESS, I FEEL IT MY DUTY TO TELL YOU THAT I AM DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POLICY OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE MIDEAST. I AM NOT PERSUADED THAT IT WILL LEAD TO THE DESIRED END, A SETTLEMENT IN THE REGION. I AM FEARFUL THAT PRESENT POLICY MAY LEAD NEEDLESSLY TO CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL AND WITH ITS FRIENDS IN THE US. ABOVE ALL, I AM CONCERNED THAT WE MAY BE ON THE WRONG TRACK IN FURTHERING THE LONG TERM INTERESTS OF THE US.

FUNDAMENTALLY, I SEE OUR POLICY AS HAVING ACCEPTED TWO CONNECTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE IN RECENT YEARS, ESPECIALLY SINCE 1967 BETWEEN THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND OIL, AND BETWEEN OIL AND THE QUESTION OF ISRAEL. ONCE IT IS ASPECTED THAT ALL THESE PROBLEMS ARE NECESSARILY INTERRELATED, THIS PREMISE LEADS TO THE POLICY PRESENTLY BEING ENACTED, TO ENSURE THAT OIL REMAINS IN FRIENDLY HANDS BY SATISFYING THE PALESTINIANS, WITHOUT DESTROYING ISRAEL. BUT THE ISSUE OF THE OIL SUPPLY IS NOT AN ISSUE OF PALESTINIANS, IT IS AN ISSUE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBVERSION BY RUSSIA. SUCH POSSIBILITIES OF SUBVERSION WILL NOT BE LESSENED BY SATISFYING THE PALESTINIANS. ON THE CONTRARY, THOSE MOST LIKELY TO TURN SUBVERSIVE ARE THE RADICAL WING OF THE PLO AND THE TOTAL REJECTIONISTS, ARE LEAST LIKELY TO COME BACK TO THE WEST BANK AND SETTLE IN HAPPILY AS MINISTERS OF AGRICULTURE OR EDUCATION OF A MINI STATE OR MINI REGION. THE WAY TO ASSURE THE SAFETY OF THE OIL SUPPLY

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VERL. & REV. C.

[illegible]

DEAR ZBIG: SINCE YOU AND I HAVE BEEN IN THE HABIT OF TALKING FRANKLY WITH EACH OTHER, I FEEL BOTH THE NEED AND THE OBLIGATION TO WRITE TO YOU AT THIS MOMENT.

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ESPECIALLY ON THE PALESTINIANS, AND THAT I REMAIN
ATE GO'S AND JOE IN ARGUING FOR OPPOSING VIEWS ON POSSIBLE SETTLEMENTS
CONVERSATIONS. THAT I WAS EMBROILED WITH GOLDA MEIR THROUGH THE
I ASK THAT YOU REMEMBER THAT I TOLD YOU SEVERAL TIMES IN PAST
YOU AT THIS MOMENT.

OF THE US
MAY BE ON THE WRONG TRACK IN FURTHERING THE LONG TERM INTERESTS
AND WITH ITS FRIENDS IN THE US ABOVE ALL I AM CONCERNED THAT WE
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RELATIONSHIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST I AM NOT PERSUADED THAT IT WILL LEAD
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HOWEVER I FEEL IT MY DUTY TO TELL YOU THAT I AM DEEPLY
A DOVE

OF THE US. THE WAY TO ASSURE THE SAFETY OF THE OIL SUPPLY
HAPPILY AS MINISTERS OF AGRICULTURE OR EDUCATION OF A MINI STATE
THE RADICAL WING OF THE PLO AND THE TOTAL REJECTIONISTS ARE
THE PALESTINIANS. ON THE CONTRARY, THOSE MOST LIKELY TO TURN SUBVERSIVE
IT IS AN ISSUE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBVERSION WILL NOT BE LESSENED BY SATISFYING
BUT THE ISSUE OF THE OIL SUPPLY IS NOT AN ISSUE OF PALESTINIANS,
BY SATISFYING THE PALESTINIANS WITHOUT DESTROYING ISRAEL.
ING ENACTED TO ENSURE THAT OIL REMAINS IN FRIENDLY HANDS
OF ISRAEL. ONCE IT IS ASSPECTED THAT ALL THESE PROBLEMS ARE NECESSA-
THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND OIL, AND BETWEEN OIL AND THE QUESTION
THAT HAVE BEEN MADE IN RECENT YEARS ESPECIALLY SINCE 1966 BETWEEN
FUNDAMENTALLY I SEE OUR POLICY AS HAVING ACCEPTED TWO CONNECTIONS
OF THE US.

3/.....

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

"2"

IN DIRECT AMERICAN RUSSIAN NEGOTIATIONS, BY MAKING IT
ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS, AS PART OF OUR GLOBAL DISCUSSIONS
WITH THEM, THAT SUBVERSION THROUGH SURROGATES WILL NOT BE TOLERATED
ONCE THIS CONNECTION IS BROKEN AT THE SOURCE, IT WOULD THEN BE
POSSIBLE FOR THE US TO DEAL WITH ANCILLARY QUESTIONS IN THE
MIDEAST IN THEIR CORRENT PERSPECTIVE. WE SEEM TO BE MOVING TOWARD
AMERICAN QUARANTEES AND MORE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN ORDER TO
SETTLE THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND PACIFY THE REGION. SOME YEARS
DOWN THE ROAD, THEREFORE, IS AN ISRAEL WHICH CAN BE DEFENDED
IN CRISIS ONLY BY DIRECT AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT. IT IS NOT IN OUR
ULTIMATE INTEREST TO BECOME THAT INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY DEFENSE
OF ISRAEL. THE POSSIBILITY OF ISRAEL'S ABILITY TO HOLD ON THE GROUND
WITH ITS OWN TROOPS IN SOME FUTURE MILITARY CONFRONTATION WILL KEEP
ISRAEL FROM EVER BECOMING A VIETNAM KIND OF ISSUE IN THE US.
TO BE PERFECTLY BLIND ABOUT IT, I HAVE A JEWISH INTEREST IN
ARGUING THAT WHATEVER SHOWS OF FORCE THE US MAY HAVE TO MAKE IN
THE MIDEAST BE IN DEFENSE OF ITS INTERESTS IN THE OIL FIELDS, NOT
IN THE FLATLANDS OUTSIDE NETANYA ON BEHALF OF ISRAEL. THE FIRST
IS POLITICALLY POSSIBLE IN THE US, THE SECOND MIGHT VERY WELL
BECOME NATIONALLY DIVISIVE.

WHAT FOLLOWS FROM ALL THIS IS THAT OUR PRESENT POLICY OF SETTLE-
MENT OF ALL THE OTHER PROBLEMS TO BE FOUND THROUGH THE
PALESTINIANS AND, THEREFORE, INEVITABLY THROUGH THE PLO, IS BETTING
ON A HORSE THAT IS NOT REALLY RUNNING IN THE BIG RACE. THIS HORSE
DOES, INDEED, NEED TO BE FED PROPERLY, BUT LET US NOT PRESUME IT
WILL BRING BACK THE ROSES IN THE DERBY. THE PROPER CARE OF THE
PALESTINIANS MEANS ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS. IT MEANS OUR BETTING
ON THE PALESTINIANS AGAINST THE PLO. IT DOES NOT MEAN ISRAEL WHICH
THE US MUST CONTRACT TO DEFEND DIRECTLY.

I THINK IT IS TO THE AMERICAN INTEREST TO QUARANTEE THE SECURITY
OF THE MAJOR OIL STATES (IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT) BY
ASSURING THEM OF AMERICAN MILITARY READINESS TO SUPPORT THEM
AGAINST AGGRESSION OR SUBVERSION, AND NOT TO DISPLACE THIS
ASSURANCE ON ISRAEL. IT IS TO THE INTEREST OF THE US THAT ISRAEL
BE DEFENSIBLE ON THE GROUND IN ITS OWN RIGHT. AND THEREFORE WE HAVE
AN INTEREST IN NOT SUBSTITUTING OUR DIRECT INVOLVEMENT FOR ITS
CAPACITY TO CONTAIN ATTACK. IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE US THAT
WE LEAVE NO UNDERTONATED LAND MINES AS BYPRODUCTS OF FOREIGN
SETTLEMENTS AND IT IS ALSO IN THE INTEREST OF THE US THAT
JUSTICE FOR THE PALESTINIAN NOT BECOME A SPRINGBOARD FOR SUBVERSION.
IN VERY BLUNT TERMS, THIS MEANS THAT OUR POLICY EVEN IN CONSIDER-
ATION OF THE LONG TERM INTERESTS OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE ARAB WORLD,
HAS TO BE IN SETTLING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION BY REDUCING THE
PLO TO IMPOTENCE. A PLO WHICH CANNOT THREATEN THE OIL FIELDS
WHICH IS NOT SUPPLIED WITH MONEY BY EITHER THE RUSSIANS OR THE

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תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

"3"

ARABS. IS REDUCED TO A NUISANCE, ESPECIALLY IF A DOVISH SOLUTION TO THE WEST BANK SATISFIES THE MORE MODERATE PALESTINIANS TO THE HIGHEST DEGREE THAT IS REASONABLY POSSIBLE.

I CANNOT CONCLUDE WITHOUT SAYING TO YOU THAT I THINK THAT THE DISCUSSIONS OF THESE DAYS ARE IN THE WRONG FOCUS. THE PRESS AND THE MEDIA ARE FULL OF CRITIQUES OF ISRAELI MAXIMALISM, ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT THERE IS NO AMERICAN JEWISH CONSENSUS IN ITS FAVOR. THAT IS TRUE, BUT AN AMERICAN JEWISH CONSENSUS DOES EXIST AGAINST MINIMALISM. I, FOR ONE, DO NOT FEEL COMPELLED TO AFFIRM THE BROOKINGS REPORT AS THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO THE TOTAL AND UNDIVIDED LAND OF ISRAEL. WHAT YOU TERMED A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO WHEN YOU MET US "THE CONCEPTS OF PEACE" OF THE ADMINISTRATION, GIVE US DEEP CAUSE FOR WORRY.

I AM SHARING SOME OF THESE WORRIES WITH YOU BECAUSE I THINK IT IS IN EVERYBODY'S INTEREST THAT WE TALK THE ISSUES OUT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND COME TO A MEETING OF THE MINDS. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THERE WILL BE SOME FURTHER CONVERSTATION SOON AND I LOOK FORWARD TO THEM. FOR MY PART, I CONTINUE TO REGARD YOU AND, OF COURSE, THE PRESIDENT, AS MEN OF REASON AND AS FRIENDS, AND I HOPE TO BE ABLE TO REMAIN IN THE SAME CORNER WITH YOU IN THE DIFFICULT DAYS AHEAD.

AD KAN

NAVON.---

שחח רתמ מנכל ממנכל ארגוב עבריון י. רביב מצפא חקר רם

DN/AX

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AD KAN
NAYON.---

BY FAX
DO YOU HAVE A COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 1977 AND 1978?

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Geneva, Switzerland)

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL

7:32 P.M. EST

MR. GRANUM: Before we get started, let me ask that the pool that will be going to the airport gather in the back of the room following the briefing. A staff member will meet you there and escort you out.

Dr. Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, will brief on the meeting. Dr. Brzezinski has only a limited amount of time; he has to return to go to the dinner. As a consequence, the briefing will be relatively short. Dr. Brzezinski will open with a statement and then take questions.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: The meeting between the two Presidents lasted 3 hours and 25 minutes, from 3:50 p.m. to 7:25 p.m. Present at the meeting were President Carter, President Al-Assad; and on the American side, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, namely myself; the Assistant Secretary of State for Middle Eastern Affairs, Mr. Atherton; Ambassador to Syria, Mr. Murphy; Assistant to the President, Mr. Jordan; NSC staff member, Mr. Quandt; and the interpreter, Mr. Sabbagh.

The President of Syria was accompanied by the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Mr. Khaddam; Presidential Adviser, Mr. Daudi; Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. al-Khani; Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Kabbani; Personal Secretary, Mr. Ilyas; and Mr. Assis, the interpreter.

Let me say that the discussions which were extremely valuable, very informative and very friendly, begun by a tour d'horizon provided by both principals. President Carter, recognizing the important international role that President Assad plays, began by giving the President of Syria a very full statement, a very complete account of his recent meetings in London. He described the nature of the summit, the nature of the discussions, the nature of the decisions.

President Assad provided President Carter with a detailed and extremely informative and lucid analysis of modern Arab history, the emergence of Arab nationalism and particularly as it pertains to that part of the Arab world of which Syria is a part.

With regard to the specific discussions, the meeting was designed to establish a pattern of familiarity between the two leaders as part of the process of exploratory talks in which the United States has been engaged since February, in an effort to set the stage for a more sustained and more formal search for accommodation and settlement.

MORE

President Carter emphasized that he considers Syria to be a key participant in these efforts. He welcomed the full and open exchange of views with the Syrian President about the ways of bridging the differences between the parties on the main issues involved in the settlement. They discussed these issues in detail. Most notably, they discussed in detail the question of the nature of peace and the meaning of peace.

They discussed the question of boundaries and the relationship to security. And they discussed the Palestinian question both in terms of the immediate problem of Palestinian representation in informal negotiations and the longer term Palestinian aspects of an eventual settlement.

They agreed that the conference in Geneva to which we are pointing should be well-prepared in order to succeed.

President Carter emphasized his determination to move towards such a settlement. He noted that when the first series of meetings have been concluded, he will be in a better position to make judgments as to how next the United States ought to proceed. Moreover, it is our expectation that at that stage, Secretary Vance will undertake another trip to the Middle East in order to define more precisely the areas of consensus that exist between the parties with whom we have been conducting these exploratory talks.

President Carter and President Assad are now having dinner, to which I hope to rush in a very few minutes, and following dinner they will have a private meeting just between the two of them.

I will now take two or three questions and then I will persist in my determination to get something to eat.

Yes, sir?

MORE

Q Dr. Brzezinski?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: At the end.

Q In other words, nothing of substance was accomplished at this meeting; is that correct?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: The question is whether nothing of substance was accomplished at this meeting. No, that would be a wrong definition of what "substance" is. In a negotiating process which is protracted, which deals with extremely complicated issues, the very process of establishing mutual understanding, the definition of perspectives is a substantive process, and that is exactly what this was designed to do.

It was designed to elucidate the perspectives of the parties so that all of us, and particularly the United States on our side can be in a better position to judge what are the areas of consensus between the parties of the conflict, and in what areas still a great deal of further work needs to be done.

Q Dr. Brzezinski?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Yes, sir.

Q Dr. Brzezinski, on the Palestinian question, do you have any indication that the PLO will accept 242, which is to say, the existence of the State of Israel in return for an Israeli commitment to recognize, or to have a Palestinian state in the Middle East?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Not at this stage.

Q Question?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Right in the back.

Q Dr. Brzezinski, after the meeting with President Assad, do you now feel you have any further insight into how to deal with the problem of the Palestinians, either represented at Geneva or in the longer term?

Q I think he ought to answer the earlier question first.

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I think one has to realize that we are really engaged -- I don't want to repeat that word -- but we are really engaged in a process, and every one of these meetings is an effort to build further, to establish wider areas of understanding to define more precisely the nature of the problems and to begin to explore the nature of possible solutions.

In every one of these sessions such progress has been made and in every one of these sessions there has been some further exploration of possible solutions.

MORE

Now, for obvious reasons much as I regret it, I cannot be more precise than that, but that is what the name of the game is about. It is a process. And I feel that in this session, too, further progress even on that extremely difficult issue was actually made.

This will be the last one.

Yes, sir?

Q Did you talk about the demilitarized zones?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Yes. There was discussion of ways in which security in the region could be assured by the adoption either of demilitarized zones, or of other security arrangements. This was discussed quite fully and very constructively by both Presidents.

Q What did you mean by --

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Thank you very much.

Q What did you mean by "not at this stage"?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I have to go. I really do.

END

(7:40 P.M. EST)

Brzezinski Helping Carter Change the Way Foreign Policy Is Made

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON—In the still incomplete process of evolving a foreign policy, the Carter Administration has modified the way in which policy is made, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser to the President, has influenced these changes.

Mr. Carter has apparently reasserted Presidential dominance and control in foreign affairs. It is no contradiction that, at the same time, there appears to be a more corporate way of developing policy than in the previous eight years during which Henry A. Kissinger, as the national security adviser, first dominated the Secretary of State and then replaced him.

Mr. Brzezinski is impatient with questions whether he may try to emulate his predecessor. "Some people," Mr. Brzezinski said in an interview, "seem surprised that mature people can work together harmoniously. That ought to be considered normal."

In a little more than a hundred days in office, the former Columbia University professor has taken, or helped to take, a number of significant steps.

Recruited Gifted White House Staff

He has recruited a gifted national security staff at the White House, with some new faces and little commitment to old ideas; he has helped redesign the bureaucratic structure of policy development; he has remained a tutor to Mr. Carter, as he was during the election campaign, but has apparently also increased the flow of diversified information reaching the President, and he has probably encouraged Mr. Carter in setting ambitious foreign policy goals.

In a 1974 magazine article Mr. Brzezinski wrote that the time had come for "architecture, not acrobatics." Although associates say he regrets the offense this caused to Mr. Kissinger, the phrase still seems relevant.

Mr. Brzezinski seems less interested in diplomatic improvisations than in what he calls architecture in foreign policy—the creation of new structures, institutions and relationships. As a thinker, he has shown a reverence for world order rather than for a Metternichian balance of power.

His fondness for certain words and concepts gives clues about the man. He speaks often about "collegiality" and of a "more collegial system" and seems to have a golden age in mind as a model.

Looks Back to 1945-50 as Model
"The period 1945 to 1950," he remarked, "was the most creative in history for United States foreign policy."

To him it was an era when a new structure emerged; when a team composed of such men as George C. Marshall, Dean Acheson and Robert Lovett, under President Harry S. Truman, built such policy

landmarks as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine and the policy of containment.

This does not seem to imply any special reverence for old policies. On the contrary, Mr. Brzezinski views the start of the Carter Administration as a time when the old system is disintegrating and there is a unique opportunity to build new landmarks. These ideas have been reflected in statements by Mr. Carter.

However, a good deal of foreign policy had been made before Mr. Carter took office. Although any President begins his term of office with some broad goals and plans, Mr. Carter arrived with views already formed on an unusually wide range of issues.

Many Themes Emerged in Speeches

Mr. Brzezinski was the most important, although not the only, adviser to Mr. Carter on foreign policy during the political campaign. Many themes from the professor's writings emerged in campaign speeches to become pledges and policy.

In the first days of the Administration, major studies of a score of foreign policy issues were begun, in part, said one source, "to make sure we were all using the same sheet of music." Mr. Carter and Mr. Brzezinski have been reading from the same sheet for several years.

Mr. Brzezinski may never attempt, or have much aptitude for, the kind of personal diplomacy Mr. Kissinger practiced. Nor does he have the broad negotiating and operational experience of Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance. "But," said a State Department official, using the security adviser's nickname, "Zbig is a much better conceptualizer." This fond-

ness for concepts and themes strongly resembles the President's own way of thinking.

At the same time, every indication so far is that Mr. Brzezinski is a skillful, nearly intuitive bureaucrat. He thus played a major role in developing the organization, procedures and rules under which the policy is developed.

Open System Avowed as the Goal

Mr. Brzezinski asserts that he has tried to make the system more open. The National Security Council staff has been instructed to act as a better funnel for information and advice from the Departments of State and Defense and other agencies. Although the staff is smaller than under Mr. Kissinger, it is larger and possibly more potent than at any other time since 1947.

Excluding Mr. Brzezinski and his deputy, David Aaron, it numbers 24 permanent professionals and two temporary consultants, as well as supporting staff. The average age is 38.

The group includes some old hands, such as William Hyland, 49, who worked on Mr. Kissinger's staff and now deals with East-West relations and European affairs, and Thomas Thornton, 46, a former State Department official, who studies North-South relations.

But it also has many faces new or relatively fresh to government. Bob Pastor, 30, finished his examination for a Ph. D. at Harvard the day before reporting to work on Latin American questions. Michel Oksenberg, 38, a China scholar from the University of Michigan, has no bureaucratic experience. The Middle East expert, William Quandt, 36, is a former professor and Rand Corporation staff member as well as a former Kissinger aide.

One Was Member of Udall Campaign

Jessica Tuchman, 31, who is the daughter of Barbara Tuchman, the historian, was issues director for the Presidential campaign of Representative Morris K. Udall of Arizona. She is working on questions ranging from human rights to arms sales to world food supplies.

Their State Department counterparts say they are less abrasive, arrogant or given to infighting than most previous staffs. "They are very bright," said one official, "but it is really too early to tell how well they will do."

A widely used mechanism is the so-called Presidential review memorandum, which is designed by Mr. Brzezinski's staff and is written by the State Department or other agencies. Numerous interagency meetings are held before the final version is drafted. These memoranda lay out background data on a given problem and offer alternative policy suggestions.

The memoranda are discussed by a policy review committee at the cabinet officer level. Unlike Mr. Kissinger, Mr.

Brzezinski seldom presides over these meetings, and Secretary Vance has been chairman more than any other official. The committee tries to produce a recommendation for a presidential decision memorandum, with disagreements incorporated in the report.

Mr. Carter makes the final decision, usually at meetings of the National Security Council, which also includes the Vice President and the Secretaries of State and Defense.

Staff Seeks to Encourage Debate

The potential for empire-building or bureaucratic infighting is present in any system. Mr. Brzezinski and his staff say they see their role not in stifling debate and dissent but in prompting it, and this does not appear to be easy.

They say there is a tendency, especially in the State Department, to paper over debate with "caveat" language and "consensus" papers.

"The State Department, in many cases, would really prefer not to give the President a choice," remarked a member of the Brzezinski staff.

"I guess I wouldn't disagree with that," said a State Department official with a smile, when asked to comment.

As a result the White House staff does not hesitate to write brief covering memoranda—which one member calls critiques—and these may have considerable impact on Mr. Carter. However, since he apparently reads more memoranda than most recent Presidents, he is usually exposed to a wide range of opinions.

Because Mr. Brzezinski's staff sees one of its functions as "quality control," a strong-minded member can sometimes simply refuse to pass on material regarded as inadequate or can put it in different form. The argument that "we can't give the President garbage" could eventually become a powerful weapon in the hands of the staff.

Views Differ on Brzezinski's Power

Some State Department officials say they do not think that Mr. Brzezinski is attempting to use the system to enhance his own power. Others are not so sure.

One official contends that the review memorandum system is inevitably open to control by the Brzezinski staff and it is therefore hopeless to do battle at that level. That official favors more emphasis on the meetings of the policy review committee.

The security adviser cannot dominate these meetings and certainly not the full meetings of the National Security Council. Nor does he appear to have tried to do so.

"Zbig is more of a synthesizer than an advocate," said one witness to such meetings. However, many decisions have the appearance of closely fitting opinions Mr. Brzezinski has long held.

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MAY 12, 1977

(EXCERPTS) BRZEZINSKI DISCUSSES CARTER TRIP RESULTS

WASHINGTON, MAY 11 -- FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM A PLANE-BOARD BRIEFING NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI GAVE REPORTERS AS HE RETURNED MAY 10 FROM PARTICIPATING IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S EUROPEAN TRIP. THE BRIEFING WAS GIVEN TO A SELECTED POOL OF REPORTERS AND THE EXCERPTS ARE FROM THE TRANSCRIPT THEY MADE FOR OTHER WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENTS.

(BEGIN EXCERPTS)

(THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION)

QUESTION: WHY IS THE PRESIDENT SO OPTIMISTIC NOW ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST ?

ANSWER: LARGELY BECAUSE WE HAVE A CONFLUENCE OF SEVERAL EVENTS WHICH, FOR THE FIRST TIME, TAKEN TOGETHER, MAKE FOR A CONTEXT, A MIDDLE EASTERN CONTEXT, THAT IS MORE POSITIVE THAN AT ANY POINT IN THE PAST.

LET'S JUST REVIEW THE SITUATION VERY BRIEFLY, THE ARABS WERE DEFEATED IN THE EARLY 1950'S. THEY WENT THROUGH A PHASE OF A GREAT NATIONAL AWAKENING, OF HUMILIATION AND EMBITTERMENT. THEY WENT THROUGH A PHASE OF INTENSE FLIRTATION WITH THE SOVIETS. THEY WENT THROUGH A PHASE OF UNSUCCESSFUL INTERNAL RADICALIZATION. AND ALL IT PRODUCED WAS A SERIES OF WARS IN WHICH THEY WERE SOUNDLY BEATEN BY THE ISRAELIS, WHO WERE MOTIVATED BY HIGHER SPIRIT, GREATER DEDICATION, MORE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY. THIS PRODUCED A TREMENDOUS CHASM ON BOTH SIDES -- THE ARABS THIRSTING FOR REVENGE, THE ISRAELIS FEELING THAT A STALEMATE CAN ENDURE INDEFINITELY.

NOW MUCH OF THAT HAS CHANGED SINCE THE EARLY 1970'S. THE ISRAELIS NOW FEEL MORE SECURE. THEY KNOW THAT THEY CAN DEFEND THEMSELVES. THEY KNOW THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL STAND BY THEM. THEY REALIZE THAT WE WOULD BE DOING VIOLENCE TO OURSELVES IF WE EVER LET ISRAEL DOWN. AND I MEAN THIS ULTIMATELY IN THE DEEPEST MORAL SENSE. AND AT THE SAME TIME, THEY ALSO REALIZE THAT IF THE STALEMATE CONTINUES, THE (ISRAELI) INFLATIONARY RATE OF 30 PERCENT WILL CONTINUE, THE MORAL

(MORE)

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Jerusalem 19, Keren Hayesod Street, Tel. 222376

DEVASTATION OF THAT CRISIS ATMOSPHERE WILL SAP THE VITALITY OF THE SOCIETY. AND THEY ALSO SEE ON THE OUTSIDE ARAB LEADERSHIPS WHICH ARE FOR THE FIRST TIME MODERATE IN THE CONTEXT AROUND ISRAEL, WHICH PAINFULLY HAVE LEARNED THE REALITY OF ISRAEL'S PERMANENCE AND ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT IT, WHICH REALIZE THAT THE ONLY FRIEND THAT CAN BRING ABOUT A CONSTRUCTIVE SETTLEMENT IS THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT PLAYING THE UNITED STATES OFF AGAINST THE SOVIETS NO LONGER MAKES SENSE.

ALL OF THAT CUMULATIVELY CREATES A CONTEXT WHICH IS PROPITIOUS, AND THIS IS WHY THE PRESIDENT, IN CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM, SAID WHAT HE SAID. THE ROAD AHEAD IS GOING TO BE VERY DIFFICULT. BUT WITH FARSIGHTED AND INTELLIGENT ISRAELI LEADERSHIP, WITH COURAGEOUS ISRAELI LEADERSHIP, AND WITH REALISTIC ARAB LEADERSHIP, I THINK THERE IS A CHANCE OF A DECENT SETTLEMENT

Q: DID (SYRIAN PRESIDENT) ASSAD BRING ANY MESSAGE FROM THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (TO HIS GENEVA MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER) ?

A: NO. NO, HE DID NOT. HE DID NOT CONVEY ANY MESSAGES. AS I SAID YESTERDAY IN THAT TERRIBLY RUSHED APPEARANCE AT GENEVA, THIS WAS GENUINE -- AND I MEAN IT GENUINELY -- THIS WAS GENUINELY AN EXPLORATORY MEETING IN WHICH BOTH SIDES PROBED. BUT WHAT WAS, I THINK, INDICATIVE OF THE BROADER CHANGE THAT I WAS SPEAKING OF WAS THE IMPLICIT, AND, IN SOME CASES, EXPLICIT ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY ASSAD THAT PEACE IS A NECESSITY, AND IT HAS TO BE NEGOTIATED, THAT IT HAS TO INVOLVE A MEASURE OF COMPROMISE. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT CHANGE, IF ONE CONSIDERS THAT UNTIL RECENTLY SYRIA WAS CONSIDERED TO BE THE MOST INTRANSIGENT STATE. SO, IN THAT SENSE, I THINK THE EXPLORATORY MEETING WAS IMPORTANT AND IS PART OF THIS PROGRESSIVE SHAPING OF A CONTEXT IN WHICH TRULY SUBSTANTIAL NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE UNDERTAKEN.

Q: THE PRESIDENT ALLUDED IN HIS REMARKS TO ASSAD'S WILLINGNESS TO GO TO A NEW ROUND OF PEACE TALKS IN GENEVA AND TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF A DEMILITARIZED ZONE, WITH OUTPOSTS. IS THIS THE ESSENCE OF THE PROGRESS THAT WAS MADE, IF ANY ?

A: WELL, I DON'T THINK IT WOULD REALLY BE RIGHT FOR ME TO TALK SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THE POSITIONS THE SYRIANS MIGHT TAKE ON NEGOTIATING ISSUES BECAUSE THIS WAS MEANT TO BE A MEETING IN WHICH THEY TALKED TO EACH OTHER VERY DIRECTLY. SO LET ME ANSWER IT IN A SOMEWHAT CIRCUMFERENTIAL FASHION.

HE CERTAINLY INDICATED FLEXIBILITY ON THE KIND OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE SHAPED -- THERE IS NO DOUBT ABOUT IT. AND THIS, I THINK, IS PART AND PARCEL OF A BROADER CHANGE, WHICH IS PARTLY PSYCHOLOGICAL, PARTLY POLITICAL -- NAMELY, NOT ONLY A RECOGNITION THAT IN ANY PEACE SETTLEMENT THE REALITY OF ISRAEL AND ITS MORAL AND POLITICAL RIGHT TO EXIST HAS TO BE ACKNOWLEDGED IN THE SETTLEMENT, BUT THAT IT HAS TO INVOLVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS THAT GIVE A GENUINE SENSE OF SECURITY TO BOTH SIDES ACTUALLY. ISRAEL NEEDS IT MORE BECAUSE ISRAEL CANNOT AFFORD TO LOSE A SINGLE WAR. BUT THE ARABS ALSO FEEL THEY NEED SECURITY AND, AFTER ALL, THEY HAVE LOST MOST OF THE WARS THEY HAVE FOUGHT WITH THE ISRAELIS, SO THAT'S NOT SOMETHING TO BE SURPRISED AT

Q: WHAT'S YOUR TIMETABLE ON THIS ? DO YOU THINK YOU CAN WRAP UP THE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS THIS YEAR ?

(MORE)

N2

A: WELL, WE DON'T HAVE A FIXED TIMETABLE. WE HAVE THE FEELING THAT (A) GENEVA (MEETING) SHOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY WELL-PREPARED SO THAT IF WE GO TO IT THERE WILL BE AT LEAST SOME CONSENSUS ON THE BASIC PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES WILL BE BASED. OUR HOPE IS THAT THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED THIS YEAR BECAUSE THE KIND OF CIRCUMSTANCES I DESCRIBED MAY NOT ENDURE. AFTER ALL, WE'RE DEALING WITH A POTENTIALLY VOLATILE SITUATION IN A NUMBER OF THE COUNTRIES. SO, IN THAT SENSE, THERE IS A CERTAIN MEASURE OF URGENCY IN ORDER NOT TO LET AN OPPORTUNITY PASS. AND I THINK THAT MOST PEOPLE RECOGNIZE IF IT DOES PASS IT MAY NOT COME BACK AGAIN FOR QUITE A WHILE.

Q: PRESIDENT CARTER REFERRED TO RETURNING TO GENEVA LATER THIS YEAR. MIGHT HE RETURN AS CO-CHAIRMAN OF SUCH A CONFERENCE ?

A: OH, I WOULD DOUBT THAT VERY MUCH. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF GENEVA WERE TO RESULT IN A SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES AND THERE WAS TO BE A SIGNING, I WOULD THINK THAT PRESIDENT CARTER MIGHT WELL WANT TO BE PRESENT AT WHAT DOUBTLESS WOULD BE REALLY ONE OF THE VERY MAJOR HISTORICAL OCCASIONS IN OUR LIFETIMES. IF THERE WAS A PEACE WHICH CREATED THE CONDITIONS FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST -- A DEVELOPMENT IN WHICH ISRAEL WOULD CERTAINLY BE ONE OF THE LEADING CENTERS, A DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD GIVE NEW MEANING TO LIFE IN THE MIDDLE EAST -- THEN I WOULD THINK HE PERHAPS WOULD WANT TO BE PART OF IT.

Q: HE SUGGESTED THAT IT COULD HAPPEN LATER THIS YEAR.

A: I DON'T THINK ANY OF US, EVEN THE MOST OPTIMISTIC OF US, AND EVEN THE MOST OPTIMISTIC OF US IN OUR MOST OPTIMISTIC MOMENTS, REALLY THINK THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS REALLY WILL BE CONCLUDED WITHIN THIS YEAR. IF THEY GET SERIOUSLY UNDERTAKEN THIS YEAR, THAT WOULD BE VERY GOOD.

Q: WILL YOU BE ABLE TO LAY DOWN THE "BASIC PRINCIPLES" YOU REFERRED TO THIS YEAR ?

A: NO. IT'S A FEELING WHICH HAS BEEN PROGRESSIVELY REINFORCED AS THE TALKS HAVE GONE ON. AFTER ALL, WE'VE BEGUN BY TALKING TO (ISRAELI) PRIME MINISTER RABIN, AND SINCE THEN WE HAVE HAD VERY EXTENSIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS WITH OTHER LEADERS, AND SECRETARY VANCE HAS MET WITH AMBASSADOR DINITZ MANY TIMES. HE IS MEETING WITH MR. ALLON TOMORROW ... SO WE HAVE HAD EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AND MANY SERIOUS AND GOOD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS..... I HAVE A SENSE OF CONFIDENCE IN THEIR LEADERSHIP, WHICH MAKES ME OPTIMISTIC ... SECONDLY, WE HAVE HAD A SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH INDIVIDUAL ARAB LEADERS. SO THIS IS PART OF THIS CUMULATIVE SENSE THAT PERHAPS THINGS CAN MOVE.

* * * * *

ג'סס, 1970

1/7/71

כ"ו בניסן תשל"ז
14 באפריל 1977

סודי ביותר
28

א ל: מנהל מצפ"א

מאח: מיכאל רון

הנדון: שתי פגישות של מנהיגים יהודיים עם בז'זינסקי

בז'זינסקי נפגש ב-21.3 עם הוועד היהודי האמריקאי (דיווח של גרי שסטאק) ועם המנהיגות היהודית ב-23.3 (דיווחים של טאד מאן ושל איפאק). בפגישה זו נטלו חלק קצר גם הנשיא, סגן הנשיא ואייזנשטט.

יש שוני בין שתי הפגישות בדגשים השונים ושוני בנוסח ובדגשים בין שני הדיווחים מן הפגישה ב-23.3.

1. השלום במזה"ת - דברי הנשיא (דיווח של מאן מ-23.3)

- א. הדגיש את החמסרותו העמוקה לישראל.
- ב. מזה 29 שנים יש עתה סכוי כלשהו להשיג שלום. השלום הוא הכרח דחוף לישראל.
- ג. תפיסת השלום מושתתת על ההנחה ששום שלום אינו יכול להיות בר קיימא, אלא אם העמים המעורבים רוצים בו.
- ד. הבאת השלום - זוהי המטרה ששם לעצמו בערב השנים הקרובות.

2. השלום במזה"ת - דברי הנשיא (דיווח של איפאק מ-23.3)

- א. שאיפתנו לפעול להשגת הסדר במזה"ת כעת.
 - ב. המימשל יקדיש לכך זמן. אין להסיר את ההזדמנות.
 - ג. הוא מרגיש מגמה בקרב מנהיגי ערב לחת בארה"ב אמון יותר מאשר בעבר.
 - ד. התעכב על אחריות המנהיגות של הקהילה היהודית בארה"ב להסביר לישראלים.
- To set the stage for a settlement**
- ה. אמר שאם יוכל למלא תפקיד בהבאת חוזה שלום במזה"ת ירגיש שמאמצי המימשל והמימשל עצמו היו כדאים.

3. דברי בזז'ינסקי על הצורה, החוכן והסגנון (עפ"י מאן)

הצורה - setting

- א. המאמץ לקראת השלום מתאים היום בגלל המצאותם של משטרים מחוננים יחסית. משטרים אלה הגיעו אולי למסקנה שזהו האינטרס החיוני שלהם שיהיה הסכם שלום.
- ב. בריה"מ, ראשונה מאז תקופת נאצר איננה גורם באף מדינה משכנותיה של ישראל.
- ג. ארה"ב מודאגת מסכנות הראדיקליזציה וגידול השפעת בריה"מ במזה"ת. גם ישראל צריכה להיות מודאגת מכך. מצב זה מהווה סכנת מוות לישראל ויביא למלחמת התשה ממושכת, אולי כדוגמת אלג'יר.
- ד. עם בוא השלום יחכן שישראל תהיה תוך 10 שנים סינפור, או יפן של המזה"ת.

4. דברי בזז'ינסקי על הצורה, החוכן והסגנון (עפ"י איפאק)

הצורה

- א. זוהי השנה הראשונה מאז קיומה של ישראל כאשר מנהיגי ערב במדינות השכנות, מגיעים כנראה למסקנה כי ישראל הנה קאזור על מנח להמשיך ולהתקיים. שנראה כי יש להם שאיפה לחתום על חוזה שלום.
- ב. זוהי הפעם הראשונה מאז תקופת נאצר כאשר בריה"מ, או המצרים אינם משחקים בקלף הסובייטי כלפי ישראל.
- ג. אם ישראל העמוד פנים מול פנים מול מדינות ערב הראדיקליות היא תהיה במצב מסוכן ממלחמת התשה ממושכת. ישראל חדמה לאלג'יר שסבלה מאכידות רבות.
- ד. אם יהיה שלום תהיה ישראל מרכז של פתוח במזה"ת כמו סינגפור, או מקור של פתוח טכנולוגי או כלכלי.

5. דברי בזז'ינסקי על הצורה, חוכן וסגנון (עפ"י גרי שסטאק מ-21.3)

הצורה

- א. מדינות ערב התחילו לחשוב במונחים של שלום.
- ב. השלטון בכל מדינות ערב העיקריות הוא עתה מחונן באופן מהותי.
- ג. ארצות ערב אינן מנסות עתה לשחק בקלף הסובייטי.

6. המהות (ועידת ג'נבה, השלום, הפלשתינאים) - עפ"י מאן

- א. לארה"ב אין כוונה ללחוץ על ישראל. לא תנצל את נשוא אספקת הנשק כאמצעי לחץ.
- ב. ברצונם ביחסים של אמון הדדי בין ישראל וארה"ב.
- ג. לארה"ב אין סיכסוך של שלום.
- ד. יחודיות היחסים האורגניים בין ישראל לארה"ב המבוססים על קירבה דתית ועל תחושת אחריותו של העולם המערבי לשואה.

ועידת ג'נבה

- ה. ארה"ב מקווה לחידושה של ועידת ג'נבה.
- ו. הועידה חיכשל אם תהיה רק הכנה במישור הפרוצדורלי.
- ז. הנשיא רוצה להכין מסגרת עבודה יותר קונצפטואלית לדיון בבעיות השנויות ביותר במחלוקת.

ה של ו ס

- ח. הנשיא אמר שהשלום חייב להיות מקיף כדי להיות בר קיימא. הנשיא ביקש לומר זאת לפני כוא המנהיגים הערבים לווינגטון.
- ט. החפיסה (Concept) של הנשיא היא לשבור את הקשר בין ריבונות לכטחון.

גבולות בטוחים

- י. שנוי טריטוריאלי משמעותי אפשרי רק כאשר הצד המנוצח חש באשמה היסטורית. הערבים אינם חשים כך. מכאן שגבולות מוכרים לא יהיו בטוחים וגבולות בטוחים לא יהיו מוכרים.
- יא. מכאן נובעת תפיסת הנשיא על קווי הגנה מעבר לגבולות. האמצעים לכך הם: חכירה, ישובים, אזורי בטחון ומוצבים - שכולם יהיו שזורים בההליך השלום.
- יב. 1. *Israel would retain to a fail asfe capacity*. אם השלום לא יקודם - התהליך יעצר.
- יג. הגדה חייבת להיות מפורזת דה פקטו.
- יד. ההסדרים בגדה לא יהיו בנויים על אמון, אלא על *Fail - safe and Abortable*.

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מולדת לפלשתינאים

טו. הדגיש כי המושג "Homeland" היה ללא משמעויות פוליטיות. כל ישוב שהיה קשורה לירדן חתיה יציבה.

7. המהות (ועידת ג'נבה, השלום, גבולות בטוחים) - עפ"י איפאק

- א. בהשוואה לממשל הקודם - אין כוונה לאיים על ישראל כמו בחקופה העיון מחדש.
- ב. הם מבקשים לדון עם ישראל מתוך הרגשה בטחון, אמון הדדי כנות ויושר ולא מתוך ניצול חלוחה של ישראל (בארה"ב).
- ג. לא יהיה איום או שימוש בצרכיה הכסחוניים של ישראל.
- ד. כיוון שאין לארה"ב נייר סיוטא מגובש שהם רוצים לדבר בצורה פתוחה ולהתייחס לדברים היסודיים.
- ה. לישראל ולארה"ב יש יחסים מדיניים ואורגניים המכוססים על קירכה פילוסופית ודתית. יש אחריות הסטורית של העולם למה שארע בשואה.
- ו. ציין את חקידה של הקהילה היהודית בארה"ב כקשר לישראל.

ועידת ג'נבה

ז. הם תחלו בחידוש שיחות ג'נבה, נראה כי השיחות יכשלו אם יתנהלו רק במישור המרוצדורלי. הם מבקשים לנצל את הזמן לבניית מסגרת כוללנית (קונצפטואלית).

ה ש ל ו ם

- ח. השלום צריך להיות מקיף על מנת להיות בר קיימא ולהוביל ליחסים מגוונים.
- ט. על הערבים לדעה ששלום אינו רק מוראטוריוס על המלחמה והנשיא מבקש שהערבים ידעו זאת לפני ביקורים בווינגסטון וזהו פרי מחשבתו העצמאית.
- י. דיבר על הצורך לשבור את הגשר בין ריבונות ובטחון.
- יא. אומות מקבלות שנוי טריטוריאלי אם הן מנוצחות או מרגישות אשמה. ישראל לא יכולה לנצח 100 מליון ערבים כשהיא (ישראל) בעלת 3 מליון איש.

1944-1945

1. "The first of the war" - 1944-1945
2. "The second of the war" - 1944-1945

3. "The third of the war" - 1944-1945

4. "The fourth of the war" - 1944-1945
5. "The fifth of the war" - 1944-1945

6. "The sixth of the war" - 1944-1945

7. "The seventh of the war" - 1944-1945
8. "The eighth of the war" - 1944-1945

9. "The ninth of the war" - 1944-1945
10. "The tenth of the war" - 1944-1945

11. "The eleventh of the war" - 1944-1945

12. "The twelfth of the war" - 1944-1945

13. "The thirteenth of the war" - 1944-1945
14. "The fourteenth of the war" - 1944-1945

15. "The fifteenth of the war" - 1944-1945

16. "The sixteenth of the war" - 1944-1945

17. "The seventeenth of the war" - 1944-1945
18. "The eighteenth of the war" - 1944-1945

19. "The nineteenth of the war" - 1944-1945

20. "The twentieth of the war" - 1944-1945
21. "The twenty-first of the war" - 1944-1945

יב. Israel should retain a fail safe ability to Abort the process if the Arabs don't live up to its agreements.

הפלשתינאים

יג. הפלשתינאים זקוקים למקום שיהיה שלהם.

יד. יהיה זה מצב יציב וסופי יותר אם הפלשתינאים יהיו בקשר הדוק בענייני חוץ, מדיניות חוץ וכו' עם ירדן.

טו. על הצדדים להחליט ~~על~~ מסגרת עבודה לדיונים בג'נבה.

8. המהות (עפ"י שטאק)

א. ארה"ב לא תאיים על בסחונה של ישראל.

ב. קיומה של ישראל קשור באופן הדוק עם ארה"ב. לארה"ב יחסים אורגניים עם ישראל.

ג. עמדתה של ישראל כי השלום צריך להיות בר קיימא ומקיף.

ד. אם יהיה שלום חהיה ישראל חוץ תקופה קצרה סינגפור של המזה"ת.

ה. שאלת הריבונות צריכה להיות נפרדת מהסדרי הכסחון.

ו. מדינות מנוצחות מקבלות שינויי גבול רק אם הן מאמינות באשמה מוסרית והערבים אינם חשים כך.

ז. החיקונים בגבול צריכים להיות בהקשר של השלום.

ח. לישראל חייבות להיות אלטרנטיבות של "Fail Safe".

9. הסגנון (עפ"י מאן)

א. הרעיונות הנמסרים על ידי דיפלומטים הם חסרי אפקט פוליטי, על כן חייבים להאמר בפומבי על מנח להשפיע על האמריקנים, על הצבור בישראל והצבור במדינות ערב.

ב. הדגיש את תפקידו של הנשיא כמעצב מדיניות החוץ וכמחנך של הצבור.

ג. הדגיש כי התנאי הוא בלבו של הנשיא ויש לייחס לכך את החשיבות הראויה.

1. The first part of the report is devoted to a description of the work done during the year.

2. Results

The results of the work done during the year are given in the following table. The first column gives the number of cases, the second column the number of deaths, and the third column the number of recoveries.

3. Discussion

The results of the work done during the year are discussed in the following paragraphs. The first paragraph discusses the results of the work done during the year, the second paragraph discusses the results of the work done during the year, and the third paragraph discusses the results of the work done during the year.

4. Conclusions

The conclusions of the work done during the year are given in the following paragraphs.

5. References

The references of the work done during the year are given in the following paragraphs. The first paragraph discusses the results of the work done during the year, the second paragraph discusses the results of the work done during the year, and the third paragraph discusses the results of the work done during the year.

10. הסגנון (עפ"י איפאק)

- א. הסגנון הוא חשוב על מנת שיהיה אפקטיבי ובעל השפעה על מדינות לא דמוקרטיות.
- ב. הזכיר כי הנשיא מחדש שני המקידים סמורתיים של מוסד הנשיאות:
 - (1) הנשיא מעצב את הטקסט העיקריות במדיניות החוץ.
 - (2) הנשיא מחנך את הצבור בנושאי מדיניות.

11. הסגנון (עפ"י שסטאק)

- א. סגנונו של הנשיא הוא סגנון פחות.
- ב. הנשיא הוא מעצב ומחנך.
- ג. הנשיא ^{מקל} להציג את הנושאים במחירות וליצור מסגרת עבודה יותר גמישה לפתרונם.

12. הפלשתינאים (עפ"י מאן)

אם אש"ף לא מסכים לעקרונות 242 ו-338 לא יוכל להשתתף במו"מ.

13. הפלשתינאים (עפ"י איפאק)

- א. אם אש"ף יקבל את 242 תהיה זו הכרה גמורה בזכותה של ישראל להחזיקם.
- ב. הגדה המערבית צריכה למעשה להיות מפורזת.

14. "מולדת" לפלשתינאים (עפ"י שסטאק)

- א. המלה "Homeland" הובנה לא כראוי.
- ב. הנשיא הסביר כי דיבר בהקשר של ירדן או פתרון אחר.
- ג. בזד'ינסקי הסביר כי "מולדת" בפי הנשיא היחה ללא השלכות פוליטיות. לא היתה כל כוונה למדינה נפרדת.
- ד. קבלת החלטות 242 ו-338 על ידי אש"ף תהיה משמעותית ותהיה הכרה דה פקטו בישראל.

15. השלום (עפ"י מאן)

קונצפט השלום של הנשיא הוא מוחלט ומהותי ויחזק על כל הצדדים.

16. השלום (עפ"י איפאק)

הגדרת השלום של הנשיא היא כזו שתתקבל על ידי כל הצדדים. שום הסכם אינו אפשרי ללא הסכמת כל הצדדים.

17. השלום (עפ"י שטאק)

להערה כי סאדאם דיבר על השלום לדור הבא השיב בזו"ינסקי שסאדאם יודע שהנשיא מהכוון לשלום מקיף.

18. מירוצ החימוש (עפ"י מאן)

המימשל אינו רוצה בהשלמת מירוצ החימוש וינהגו באיפוק רב. בקשות לנשק החקפי לא העניגה. סביר יותר שארה"ב הענה לנשק הגנחי.

19. תקוני גבול (עפ"י מאן)

לו היה ישראלי היה טוען לתיקונים קטנים ואח"כ מחמק מה הם תיקונים אלה. לו נהגה כך ישראל לא הייתה משפיעה לרעה על עמדת המיקוח.

20. תקוני גבול (עפ"י איפאק)

על ישראל לקבל שנויי גבול קטנים ובוועידה ב"נכה להתמקח בשאלה מה הם שינויים קטנים אלה.

21. תקוני גבול (עפ"י שטאק)

על ישראל להסכים לשנויים קטנים ואח"כ לדון בשאלה מה הם תיקונים קטנים. בזו"ינסקי הציע לשגריר דיני כי זוהי טקטיקה משא ומתן טובה אך השגריר לא קיבל זאת.

22. סירוב הערבים לשלום (עפ"י מאן)

אם הערבים יסרבו לשלום תתמוך ארה"ב בישראל כי תמיכה בישראל היא חמסכה בעצמנו.

23. סירוב הערכים לשלום (עפ"ס טאן)

אם לא תהיה הסכמה עם הערבים ולא יהיה הסדר שלום חמשיך ארה"ב לחמור בישראל.

בזו' ינסקי הדגיש את הקשרים האמיצים בין ארה"ב לאלג'יריה וישראל ומחויבותה של ארה"ב לישראל.

עם זאת אין זה אינטרס של ארה"צ שהערכים יהפכו לאוניברסליים.

24. עליה מברית הסועצות (עפ"י מאן)

א. הנשיא מחוץ לכל מה שאמר בנושא זכויות האדם.

ב. חרות האדם נדרשת בכל מקום בעולם.

ג. ואנש יעלה את השאלה היהודית בקורו במוסקבה. יש לו רשימה של "סרבני עליה" שסופקו לו ע"י ברה"מ.

25. עליה מבריה"ם (עפ"י איפאק)

א. ואנסי יעלה את השאלה בכקורו בבדיה"מ, מש לו רשימה (בוז'ינסקי).

ב. מונדייל אמר שהוא מקווה שהמנהיגות היהודית תצליח על הסיכוחה במישל קרטר בנושא זכויות האדם.

26. החרס הערבי (עפ"י מאן)

א. איזנשטעט הייב שטעטלים בכל הבעיות. הוא מאמין **5** העודות המקור השליליות
תוצאה מחוץ לתוק.

ב. מונדייל אמר כי במערכת הכחירות הצהירו על החיקה נגד החרם וחסימה בישראל וכוונתם למלא את הבטחותיהם.

27. תחוקה נגד החרם (עפ"י מאן)

מונדייל חסר כי במערכת הבחירות הבטיחו כי ארה"ב תעמוד חסיד לצד ישראל ותחוקה נגד החרם והבטיח שכך אמנם יהיה.

בברכה,

מייכאל רוז

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS AND GENUINE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT OUGHT TO TAKE BOTH OF THESE ELEMENTS INTO ACCOUNT.

THE PROPOSAL THAT WE MADE WAS THEREFORE VERY FINELY CRAFTED. WE ATTEMPTED VERY DELIBERATELY TO FOREGO THOSE ELEMENTS IN THE STRATEGIC POSTURE WHICH THREATEN THE SOVIETS THE MOST, AND WE MADE PROPOSALS TO THEM THAT THEY FOREGO THOSE ELEMENTS IN THEIR STRATEGIC POSTURE WHICH THREATEN US THE MOST. WE FELT PARTICULARLY BY CONCENTRATING ON THE LAND-BASED ICBM'S THAT ARE MIRVED WE WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE GREATEST SOURCES OF INSECURITY ON BOTH SIDES.

I TRULY BELIEVE THAT THIS PROPOSAL, IF ACCEPTED, OR WHEN ACCEPTED, COULD SERVE AS A DRIVING WEDGE, AS A HISTORICAL DRIVING WEDGE, FOR A MORE STABLE AND EVENTUALLY MORE COOPERATIVE AMERICAN AND SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. IT IS THUS A PROPOSAL WHICH IS NOT ONLY STRATEGIC, BUT POLITICAL IN ITS CHARACTER, AND SECRETARY VANCE, IN HIS REMARKS IN MOSCOW, PLACED A GREAT DEAL OF EMPHASIS ON THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS PROPOSAL.

IT WAS A PROPOSAL WHICH HAS STRATEGIC AS WELL AS POLITICAL INTENTIONS VERY MUCH IN MIND. BECAUSE OF THAT, IT WAS ALSO A PROPOSAL WHICH WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A SERIES OF OTHER PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO PLACE THE AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP NOT ONLY ON A MORE STABLE BASIS, BUT TO MAKE THE COOPERATIVE ELEMENTS IN THAT RELATIONSHIP MORE COMPREHENSIVE. THIS IS WHY WE HAVE DELIBERATELY MATCHED OR ACCOMPANIED THE S.A.L.T. PROPOSALS WITH INITIATIVES IN REGARD TO SUCH MATTERS AS THE INDIAN OCEAN, AND THE DESIRABILITY OF ACHIEVING MUTUAL RESTRAINT IN REGARDS TO OUR RESPECTIVE MILITARY PRESENCE IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD.

THIS IS WHY WE PROPOSED THAT WE HOLD FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO THIRD PARTIES. THIS IS WHY WE SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST AS A STABILITY-PRODUCING INITIATIVE TO TALK AND DISCUSS OUR RESPECTIVE CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAMS. THIS IS WHY WE SUGGESTED THAT WE TALK ABOUT A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. THIS IS WHY WE SUGGESTED THAT THERE BE CONTROLS ON ANTI-SATELLITE CAPABILITIES AND ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MISSILE TEST FLIGHTS.

ALL OF THAT CUMULATIVELY WAS DESIGNED TO PRODUCE GREATER MUTUAL STABILITY, TO WIDEN AREAS OF COOPERATION, TO INDEED OFFSET THE COMPETITIVE ELEMENTS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP BY A WIDENING PATTERN OF COOPERATION. AND WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE FACT THAT EIGHT WORKING GROUPS WERE SET UP ON THE BASIS OF THESE PROPOSALS, AS WELL AS SOME THAT THE SOVIETS MADE, IN ORDER TO MOVE FORWARD ON THESE ISSUES.

I SHOULD HAVE ADDED, INCIDENTALLY, AND I FAILED TO DO SO, THAT WE ALSO PROPOSED MEETINGS ON NON-PROLIFERATION. THAT WAS PART OF OUR PROPOSAL.

IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT WE PROPOSED A COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE WITH NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY INHERENT IN IT IN ORDER TO STRUCTURE RATHER DIFFERENT AND MORE STABLE AND MORE EQUITABLE U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP.

THAT PACKAGE HAS TWO KEY ELEMENTS IN IT.

FIRST OF ALL, IT CALLED FOR REDUCTIONS WHICH WERE OF A GREATER SCOPE THAN JUST SYMBOLIC. AND THE SECOND EQUALLY IMPORTANT PART OF THE PACKAGE INVOLVED A PROPOSAL FOR A FREEZE, FOR A HALT ON THE MODERNIZATION OF ICBM'S; AND I WILL TALK ABOUT THAT IN MORE DETAIL.

YOU CAN WELL SEE NOW THESE TWO KEY FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS ARE INTERRELATED. WE PROPOSED THE REDUCTION SO AS TO LOWER THE LEVEL OF THE COMPETITION AND WE PROPOSED A FREEZE IN ORDER TO HALT IT QUALITATIVELY AND QUANTITAVELY. THUS, IT IS IN MANY RESPECTS THE FIRST (GARBLED...), GENUINELY DISARMAMENT-ORIENTED PROPOSAL INTRODUCED IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS.

WE PROPOSED MORE SPECIFICALLY THAT THE PRESENT STRATEGIC AGGREGATES WHICH WERE SET AT THE HIGH LEVEL OF 2,400 FOR EACH SIDE BE REDUCED TO A RANGE BETWEEN 1,800 AND 2,000, AND HERE AGAIN IS A DEMONSTRATION OF THE INHERENT FLEXIBILITY OF THE PACKAGE BECAUSE THIS IS SOMETHING WHICH WE WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS.

WE PROPOSED, MOREOVER, THAT WITHIN THAT FRAMEWORK THE PRESENT LEVEL OF MIRV'S, WHICH IS SET AT 1,320, BE REDUCED TO SOMETHING BETWEEN 1,100 AND 1,200. AND WE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IN THAT CONTEXT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE THAT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF THE SO-CALLED SOVIET MODERN LARGE BALLISTIC MISSILES, PARTICULARLY THE SS-9 AND SS-18, BE REDUCED BECAUSE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF LOWERED AGGREGATES THESE LARGE MISSILES WITH THEIR POTENTIAL FOR NUMEROUS MERVING, INDEED THE SS-18 CAN BE MIRVED UP TO 8 TO 10 WARHEADS, BECOMES INCREASINGLY SIGNIFICANT AND INTRODUCES AN ASYMETRICAL ASPECT INTO THE RELATIONSHIP.

ON THAT BASIS WE PROPOSED THAT BOTH SIDES FREEZE THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALL OF THEIR ICBM'S AND BAN MODIFICATIONS ON EXISTING ICBM'S, THEREBY REDUCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF SIGNIFICANT MODIFICATIONS AND ALSO BAN THE DEVELOPMENT TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF ICBM'S AND PARTICULARLY BAN THE DEPLOYMENT, TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT OF MOBILE ICBM'S, A FACTOR, AGAIN, WHICH IF NOT CHECKED, COULD INTRODUCE VERY MAJOR UNCERTAINTY INTO THE U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP.

THIS MORE SPECIFICALLY MEANT THAT ON THE U.S. SIDE WE WERE PREPARED TO FREEZE OUR MINUTEMAN III DEPLOYMENT -- THAT IS TO SAY, THE MIRVED ICBM -- AT 550, WHICH IS WHERE IT IS CURRENTLY. AND WE WOULD FOREGO FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN ALL U.S. ICBM'S AND WE COULD ABANDON THE MX PROGRAM, BOTH FOR SILO AND MOBILE BASING.

AND WE WOULD FOREGO ANY PLANS FOR ANY OTHER ICBM'S. ON THE SOVIET SIDE WE PROPOSED THAT THE SOVIETS FREEZE THE NUMBER OF THEIR STRATEGIC ICBM'S, THE SS-17A, 18'S AND 19'S AT A NUMBER NOT IN EXCESS OF 550, WHICH ACTUALLY MEANS THAT THEY COULD STILL GO UP BECAUSE THEY ARE BELOW THAT NUMBER AND THESE WOULD BE THE SOVIET MIRVED MISSILES. GIVEN THE SIZE OF SOME OF THEM, THIS IS AN IMPORTANT POINT TO BEAR IN MIND FOR IT RAISES THE ISSUE OF EQUITY, GIVEN THE SIZE OF SOME OF THEM, THEIR TOTAL NUMBER OF WARHEADS EVENTUALLY COULD BE GREATER THAN OUR LAND-BASED ICBM'S WOULD PROVIDE. AND WE WOULD EXPECT THAT THE MLBM, OR THE MODERN LARGE BALLISTIC MISSILE COMPONENT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE 550 WOULD NOT BE GREATER FOR A REDUCTION.

Q: COULD YOU REPEAT THAT ?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: WE ALSO PROPOSED THAT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF THE MODERN LARGE BALLISTIC MISSILES WHICH WE WOULD EXPECT WOULD BE THE SS-18S BECAUSE THEY ARE THE MOST MODERN SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILES THAT ARE LARGE, WOULD NOT BE GREATER THAN 150 AND THAT WOULD BE A REDUCTION FROM THE PRESENT TOTAL, BUT THAT WILL BE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF STABILITY BECAUSE THAT LARGE NUMBER OF THE MODERN LARGE BALLISTIC MISSILES INTRODUCES THE DESTABILIZING POTENTIAL INHERENT IN LARGE THROW WEIGHT, AND MANY, MANY WARHEADS.

Q: DO THEY CURRENTLY HAVE 320 ?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHT. WE WOULD ALSO EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO ABANDON THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-16, WHICH IS THEIR MOBILE ICBM, JUST AS WE WOULD ABANDON THE MX.

Q: HOW ABOUT THE SS-20; WOULD THAT ALSO BE ABANDONED ?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: THE SS-20 IN ITS PRECISE CONFIGURATION IS NOT A STRATEGIC WEAPON AND WE WOULD WANT, IN THE COURSE OF THE AGREEMENT, TO DEVELOP ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD PERMIT US TO HAVE THE NEEDED ASSURANCE THAT THE SS-20 IS NOT BEING UPGRADED INTO THE EQUIVALENT OF THE SS-16 BECAUSE AS SOME OF YOU CLEARLY KNOW, THE SS-20, WITH A THIRD STAGE, COULD BE IN EFFECT THE EQUIVALENT OF THE SS-16. WE WOULD THEREFORE WANT TO HAVE SOME ARRANGEMENTS WHEREBY WE COULD CLEARLY DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE TWO.

Q: EXCUSE ME. WHAT DID THAT 308 REFER TO ?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: MAY I COMPLETE AND PERHAPS I COULD ANSWER QUESTIONS ?

FINALLY, WE WOULD PROPOSE TO MAKE AN ARRANGEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE BACKFIRE WHICH WOULD GIVE US SOME ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD NOT BE USED AS A STRATEGIC WEAPON BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THIS IS SOMETHING THAT WOULD BE NEGOTIATED MORE FULLY WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK AND WE WOULD PROPOSE TO BAN ALL STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES, AND THAT, AGAIN, IS SOMETHING WHICH WOULD BE NEGOTIATED. IN THAT CONTEXT, THOUGH, IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAS INSISTED THAT THE BACKFIRE IS NOT A STRATEGIC WEAPON, THOUGH IT HAS A RADIUS OF OVER 2,000 MILES. WE WOULD PRESUMABLY DEFINE THE CRUISE MISSILE AS BEING STRATEGIC AT THE LEVEL LOWER THAN THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

I WOULD SAY THAT IF ONE ANALYZES THIS PROPOSAL IN DETAIL I THINK ONE IS JUSTIFIED WITHIN THE LIMITS OF HUMAN REASON, WITHIN THE CONFINES OF ONE'S OWN BACKGROUND, TRADITION AND CONCERNS WHICH NECESSARILY CONFINE OUR ABILITY TO BE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN ABOUT OUR JUDGMENTS, THAT THIS WAS A GENUINE EFFORT AT AN EQUITABLE ARRANGEMENT.

WE WOULD CONSTRAIN THOSE ASPECTS OF OUR STRATEGIC PROGRAMS WHICH ARE THREATENING TO THE SOVIETS. WE WOULD WANT THE SOVIETS TO ADJUST SIMILARLY IN THOSE REGARDS WHICH ARE MOST THREATENING TO US.

WE WOULD CAP THE ARMS RACE, WE WOULD IMPOSE A LIMIT ON THE NUMBERS THROUGH A REDUCTION, SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION AND WE WOULD IMPOSE RESTRAINTS OF A QUALITATIVE TYPE ON OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. THUS, WE WOULD BOTH TAKE A GIANT STEP FORWARD. I SEE A CERTAIN ANALOGY BETWEEN THE SITUATION IN WHICH WE FIND OURSELVES TODAY AND THE LATER 1960'S. AT THAT TIME SOME OF YOU MIGHT RECALL WE PROPOSED TO THE SOVIETS THAT ABM'S BE BANNED BECAUSE ABM'S INTRODUCE AN INHERENT ELEMENT OF INSTABILITY INTO THE RELATIONSHIP.

THE FIRST SOVIET REACTION TO THAT PROPOSAL BY PRIME MINISTER KOSYGIN WAS VERY NEGATIVE, GIVEN THEIR BACKGROUNDS, THEIR TRADITIONS, THEIR WAYS OF LOOKING AT THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. YET, OVER TIME, THOUGH A CONTINUING DISCOURSE, THE SOVIET SIDE CAME TO RECOGNIZE THE FACT THAT INDEED IN THE AGE OF HIGHLY ADVANCED STRATEGIC SYSTEMS THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ABM ELEMENT INTO THE EQUATION WAS TRULY DESTABILIZING AND THE MOST IMPORTANT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF S.A.L.T. IT WAS PRECISELY THAT WHICH THE SOVIETS EARLIER HAD SO INDIGNANTLY REJECTED. NAMELY, A BAN ON THE ABM SYSTEMS. WE ARE THUS IN THE FIRST PHASE OF AN AMBITIOUS AND FAR-REACHING SEARCH FOR A SIGNIFICANT AMERICAN-SOVIET ACCOMMODATION.

WE BELIEVE IN SOME RESPECTS WE ARE IN THE EARLIER EDUCATIONAL PART OF THE PROCESS IN WHICH BOTH SIDES HAVE TO THINK THROUGH THE IMPLICATIONS, BOTH OF AN UNCHECKED ARMS RACE AND OF THE BENEFITS OF REDUCTIONS AND A FREEZE.

WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE THESE TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS. YOU KNOW THAT THEY WILL BE CONTINUED, ON A TOP-LEVEL BASIS, IN MAY BY SECRETARY VANCE AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, AND WE EXPECT TO HAVE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES PRIOR TO THAT DATE. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE SEARCH FOR SOMETHING TRULY SIGNIFICANT WILL BEAR FRUIT.

I DON'T THINK ANYONE IN THIS HOUSE OR IN THIS CITY, ENGAGED IN THIS PROCESS, EXPECTED THE SOVIET UNION SIMPLY TO ACCEPT THESE PROPOSALS INSTANTLY.

WE WENT TO THEM IN ORDER TO PRESENT TO THEM OUR VIEWS REGARDING WHAT MIGHT CONSTITUTE A TRULY CREATIVE AND HISTORICALLY NOVEL FRAMEWORK FOR OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONS. WE WILL PERSIST IN THAT EFFORT AND WE ARE HOPEFUL, ON THE BASIS OF PRIOR EXPERIENCE AND GIVEN THE OVER-RIDING INTEREST THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE IN STABILITY AND ACCOMODATION, WITH PATIENCE AND WITH PERSISTENCE, AND WITH GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES, THERE WILL BE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS MADE TOWARDS WHAT COULD BE A VERY SIGNIFICANT TURN IN THE AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

Q: WOULD YOU PLEASE CLARIFY TWO POINTS? YOUR DEFINITION OF THE AMERICAN DEFINITION OF THE STRATEGIC CRUISE AND WOULD YOU GO OVER AGAIN, PLEASE, I GUESS I JUST DIDN'T HEAR IT WELL, THE MIRV IDEA? WERE YOU TALKING SIMPLY ABOUT MIRV EQUIVALENCY OR WAS THIS --

MR. BRZEZINSKI: IN REGARDS TO THE CRUISE MISSILE, OUR POSITION IS THAT A CRUISE MISSILE, WHICH IS NOT CAPABLE OF EMPLOYMENT EITHER IN A TRANSCONTINENTAL OPERATION OR WHICH DOESN'T HAVE A RANGE IN EXCESS OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS THAT ARE TYPICALLY CONSIDERED TO BE STRATEGIC, IS NON-STRATEGIC. AND SINCE THERE HAS BEEN AN ONGOING DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIETS AS TO WHAT IS AND IS NOT A STRATEGIC WEAPON, WE WOULD WANT TO REACH A MORE PRECISE DEFINITION OF THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, BANNING THOSE CRUISE MISSILES WHICH HAVE AS THEMSELVES A STRATEGIC RANGE, AND RETAIN FOR BOTH SIDES FLEXIBILITY FOR THOSE THAT ARE NOT.

I SHOULD ADD ALSO THAT IF ANY OF THE CRUISE MISSILES THAT WOULD BE RETAINED BY BOTH SIDES WERE TO BE PLACED, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE BOMBERS, THESE BOMBERS WOULD THEN COUNT AS A MIRV WEAPON AND WOULD THEREFORE BE COUNTED WITHIN THE MIRV AGGREGATE.

SPECIFICALLY TALKING ABOUT THE MIRV'S, OUR PROPOSAL IS TO FREEZE THE LAND BASED ICBM'S THAT CAN BE MIRVED AT 550 AND TO REDUCE PARTICULARLY THE NUMBER OF THOSE VERY LARGE SOVIET ICBM'S WHICH CAN BE MIRVED INTO VERY NUMEROUS WARHEADS, GIVEN THEIR THROW WEIGHT, BECAUSE THAT, IN THE LONG RUN, COULD INTRODUCE AN ELEMENT OF INSTABILITY FOR BOTH SIDES. (GARBLED...) THOSE AMERICAN SYSTEMS WHICH COULD THREATEN THESE LAND BASED ICBM'S ARE NATURALLY AND UNDERSTANDABLY PARTICULARLY THREATENING TO THE SOVIETS.

SO, WE TRY TO TAKE THAT CONCERN OF THEIRS INTO ACCOUNT WHILE REGISTERING WITH THEM WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE A LEGITIMATE CONCERN OF OURS, NAMELY, THAT WE DON'T WANT THEM TO ACQUIRE A CAPABILITY TO VERY SIGNIFICANTLY THREATEN OUR LAND BASE SYSTEMS.

Q: DOCTOR, YOU DIDN'T TALK ABOUT THE SO-CALLED DATA BASE AND I HAVE A QUESTION ABOUT IT.

THE PRESIDENT, AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE HERE IN THIS ROOM SPOKE OF SOME FORM OF VERIFICATION OF THE DATA BASE MATERIAL ONCE IT WAS SUBMITTED BY EITHER SIDE TO THE OTHER SIDE, I GUESS. CAN YOU ELABORATE ON WHAT VERIFICATION WE ARE TALKING ABOUT?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I DON'T WANT TO GO INTO TOO MANY SPECIFICS BECAUSE I WOULD REALLY LIKE TO CONFINE MYSELF TO THE BROAD PACKAGE, TO THE BROAD FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH WE WOULD NEGOTIATE, BUT SPECIFICALLY, WITH REGARD TO THE DATA BASE, LET ME LIMIT MYSELF TO THIS OBSERVATION.

WE WOULD HOPE AND WE WOULD EXPECT THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS INCREASINGLY MORE STABLE AND MORE ACCOMMODATING RELATIONSHIP THAT WE FEEL OUGHT TO DEVELOP BETWEEN US AND THEM IN THE STRATEGIC REALM, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY MORE FORTHCOMING WITH REGARD TO DATA BASE.

MANY OF YOU KNOW ABOUT THIS S.A.L.T. RELATIONSHIP AS MUCH, AND I AM SURE IN QUITE A FEW CASES, MUCH MORE THAN I DO AND THEREFORE YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT THROUGHOUT MUCH OF S.A.L.T. THE DATA BASE ON WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE BASED WAS LARGELY AMERICAN-PROVIDED AND THE PATTERN OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TYPICALLY INVOLVED A SITUATION IN WHICH WE WOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT OUR SYSTEMS, NUMBERS, DIMENSIONS, CHARACTERISTICS, AND THEN WE WOULD SAY TO THE SOVIETS, "AND WITH REGARD TO YOUR SYSTEMS WHICH WE ESTIMATE AT BEING AT SO MANY AND TO POSSESS THE FOLLOWING DIMENSIONS AND TO HAVE THE FOLLOWING CHARACTERISTICS, WE WOULD PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING:"

AND THE SOVIETS WOULD RESPOND AND SAY, "WITH REGARD TO THE STRATEGIC INFORMATION WHICH YOU HAVE PROVIDED US ABOUT YOURSELF, OUR POSITION IS AS FOLLOWS. AND WITH REGARD TO THE INFORMATION THAT YOU HAVE GIVEN US -- THE ALLEGED INFORMATION YOU HAVE GIVEN US -- ABOUT OUR SYSTEMS, OUR POSITION IS AS FOLLOWS:" AND THEY COULD COMMENT ON IT, BUT WITHOUT A TRULY EQUITABLE DATA BASE.

I WOULD HOPE AND WE WOULD EXPECT THAT IN A SYMMETRICAL STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP, WHICH IT HAS NOW BECOME, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PROVIDE US WITH ALL OF THE NECESSARY DATA, JUST AS WE PROVIDED THEM WITH THE NECESSARY DATA, AND WE WOULD EACH HAVE AND RETAIN THE NEEDED MEANS FOR VERIFYING THE ACCURACY OF THAT DATA.

Q: HOW?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: FOR ONE THING, THROUGH SATELLITES, WHICH ARE VERY IMPORTANT SOURCES OF INFORMATION, BUT BEYOND THAT, WITH REGARDS TO THE CRUISE MISSILE, WE WOULD HAVE TO PERHAPS EXPLORE SOME ADDITIONAL WAYS OF VERIFICATION AND I DON'T WANT TO BE TOO SPECIFIC, BECAUSE THAT IS SOMETHING (GARBLED) .. MERELY NOTE THE DIFFICULTY WITH WHICH, AGAIN, MANY OF YOU ARE FAMILIAR.

IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE CRUISE MISSILES WHICH ARE STRATEGIC AND NON-STRATEGIC, THEIR SIZES, DIMENSIONS ARE THE SAME. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN A CRUISE MISSILE, WHICH HAS A NUCLEAR WARHEAD AND THOSE WHICH DO NOT. SO WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE SOME ADDITIONAL, MORE COMPREHENSIVE ARRANGEMENTS TO GIVE BOTH SIDES THE ASSURANCE THAT THEY NEED TO HAVE ON THIS ISSUE.

Q: I AM REALLY NOT ASKING FOR DETAILS --

MR. BRZEZINSKI: LET ME ASK MISS BERVER.

Q: -- BUT IS THIS AN ON-SITE INSPECTION PROPOSAL, BASICALLY?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I DON'T THINK WE HAVE YET REACHED THE STAGE IN WHICH DIRECT ON-SITE EXAMINATION OF ALL WEAPONS SYSTEMS IS FEASIBLE, BUT CERTAINLY, IF THE SOVIET SIDE WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT SOME ON-SITE SOVIET INSPECTION OF SOME OF OUR WEAPONS SYSTEMS SO THAT THIS IN ITSELF WOULD BE SOMETHING WHICH WOULD BE A GREAT CONTRIBUTION TO MUTUAL STABILITY. AND I WOULD HOPE THAT AS SOVIET CONFIDENCE GROWS, AS SOVIET PREOCCUPATION WITH SECRECY DECLINES, THAT THEY WILL FIND THIS IDEA LESS AND LESS ABHORRENT.

Q: YOU TALKED ABOUT THE SOVIET CONCERN FOR THEIR LAND BASED WEAPONS AND THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN A LACK OF SYMMETRY BETWEEN THEIR PRECEPTION OF THEIR DEFENSE NEEDS AND THE U.S., WHICH IS WHY THEY CAME UP WITH A FREEDOM OF CHOICE WITHIN THEIR WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

YOUR PROPOSAL, THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL -- ACCORDING TO WHAT YOU SAY -- WOULD APPEAR TO TAKE AWAY A LOT OF THEIR FREEDOM OF CHOICE AND, AT THE SAME TIME, IT DOESN'T SAY ANYTHING ABOUT SEA BASED MISSILES, WHICH ALSO ARE A THREAT OR THE SOVIETS PERCEIVE AS A THREAT TO THEIR LAND BASED SYSTEMS.

THEREFORE, CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHY, IN YOUR PERCEPTION, THIS IS EQUIVALENT, A THIRD THING: THAT THEY HAVE TO CUT BACK FROM 508 TO 150 IN THEIR SUPERLAUNCH MISSILES AND WE DON'T HAVE TO CUT BACK ANY LAND BASED?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: FIRST OF ALL, AS FAR AS THE FREEDOM TO MIX IS CONCERNED, THAT WOULD STILL BE RETAINED BY BOTH SIDES, THOUGH THERE WOULD BE UPPER LIMITS SET ON WHAT YOU CAN DO, PARTICULARLY IN REGARDS TO LAND BASED ICBMS. THAT LIMIT INDEED WOULD BE SET AT 550. BUT EACH SIDE, OR ONE OF THE SIDES, COULD DECIDE THAT IT PREFERENCES TO HAVE FEWER OF THESE AND MORE SEA BASED. SO, IN THAT SENSE, THERE IS SOME FREEDOM TO MIX, NO DOUBT ABOUT IT.

AS FAR AS THE SOVIET THROW WEIGHT OR LARGE BALLISTIC MISSILES ARE CONCERNED, THEIR REDUCTION IS A NECESSARY CONCOMITANT OF MUTUAL STABILITY, BECAUSE IF THEY ARE NOT REDUCED IN NUMBERS, THEN BY MIRVING THEM, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD GAIN, PARTICULARLY WITHIN THESE LOWER AGGREGATES, A VERY SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE.

I THINK ONE HAS TO RECOGNIZE THE FACT THAT IF YOU HAVE FEWER TOTAL NUMBERS THEN ANY ASYMMETRY BECOMES INCREASINGLY SIGNIFICANT AND THE SOVIETS DO HAVE THAT ASYMMETRY TO THEIR ADVANTAGE IN THE POSSESSION OF THE LARGE BALLISTIC MISSILES WHICH CAN BE MIRVED UP TO 8 OR 10 WARHEADS.

IN ADDITION TO THAT, THERE IS THIS OTHER PROBLEM WHICH I DON'T WANT TO EXAGGERATE, BUT WHICH HAS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN WE THINK OF EQUITY AT THE LOWER AGGREGATES, NAMELY, THE BACKFIRE. WE WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE BACKFIRE, BUT AGAIN, THE BACKFIRE, HOWEVER ONE DEFINES IT, WHETHER IT IS A STRATEGIC OR NON-STRATEGIC WEAPON, BECOMES MORE SIGNIFICANT IF YOU HAVE LOWERED AGGREGATES THAN IF YOU HAVE HIGHER AGGREGATES. IF THESE AGGREGATES ARE HIGH, THEN YOU CAN SAY, WELL, IT IS MORE MARGINAL, BUT IF YOU GO DOWN AT 1800, THEN THE INTRODUCTION OF THE BACKFIRE, AT SOME NUMBER WHICH IS IN EXCESS OF 100, BECOMES A FACTOR AND YET, WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCOMMODATE ON THAT, TOO.

I AM NOT GOING TO ARGUE THAT -- IT WOULD BE SILLY -- THAT THIS WAS AN INFALLIBLE PACKAGE WHICH HAS TO BE TAKEN IN TOTO. ALL I AM GOING TO SAY IS THAT WE MADE THE DAMNEDEST EFFORT TO PRODUCE A PACKAGE WHICH, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF OUR OWN INTELLIGENCE -- AND BY INTELLIGENCE, I NOT ONLY MEAN INFORMATION, I ALSO MEAN WHAT IS IN OUR HEADS -- WE COULD SAY WAS REASONABLY EQUITABLE FOR BOTH SIDES. WE DID OUR BEST TO DEFINE IT THAT WAY AND WILL BE GLAD TO DISCUSS IT AND WE INTEND TO DISCUSS IT. WE WOULD LIKE TO FIND OUT WHAT ASPECTS OF THIS ARE PARTICULARLY TROUBLING TO THE SOVIETS, BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT

NEGOTIATIONS ARE ABOUT AND CONCEIVABLY IF THE CASE IS PERSUASIVE, THIS OR THAT ADJUSTMENT COULD BE MADE IN RETURN FOR THIS OR THAT ADJUSTMENT.

Q: WHAT WAS THE SOVIET REACTION TO THE PACKAGE IN THE GENERAL SENSE? DID THEY REJECT IT OUT OF HAND OR SAY THAT CERTAIN THINGS WERE DIFFICULT?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: TO SAY THAT THE SOVIETS REJECTED IT OUT OF HAND, GIVES IT A DRAMATIC AND CATEGORICAL QUALITY WHICH I REALLY DO NOT THINK THE CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFY.

THE SEQUENCE WAS ESSENTIALLY AS FOLLOWS: PRIOR TO THE VANCE MISSION, WE DID INDICATE TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE WILL BE MAKING PROPOSALS FOR SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS. WE DID THAT DELIBERATELY BECAUSE WE WANTED THE POLITBURO TO THINK ABOUT THESE ISSUES.

AS YOU KNOW, THE SOVIETS DO NOT HAVE AN ARMS CONTROL AGENCY. THE SOVIETS DO NOT HAVE INFLUENTIAL GROUPS IN THEIR SOCIETY THAT ARE CONCERNED WITH ARMS CONTROL. ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS ARE ASSESSED IN THE SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTRY, WHICH HAS CERTAIN INTERESTING IMPLICATIONS AND WE FELT IT WOULD NOT BE PARTICULARLY CONSTRUCTIVE TO SEND IN A DETAILED PROPOSAL WHICH THEN IS STAFFED OUT IN THE SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTRY AND GOES UP TO THE SOVIET POLITBURO WITH A CATEGORICAL CRITIQUE. WE WANTED THE TOP SOVIET LEADERS TO FOCUS ON THIS ISSUE.

THEREFORE, WE DREW THEIR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT WE WILL BE MAKING PROPOSALS THAT CALL FOR REDUCTIONS, THAT WE THINK WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE BROADER NATURE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP AND THEN SECRETARY VANCE PRESENTED THAT AND, AS I SAID EARLIER, NOT ONLY IN ITS STRATEGIC SETTING, BUT ALSO IN ITS POLITICAL CONTEXT WHEN HE MADE HIS OPENING STATEMENT TO THE SOVIETS.

THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP THEN EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR THE DISCUSSION OF OTHER ISSUES, DURING WHICH TIME IT PRESUMABLY WAS UNDERTAKING, AT LEAST, ITS PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THIS PROPOSAL AND THEN IN THE FINAL OR THE PRE-FINAL SESSION, I FORGET WHICH, SECRETARY BREZHNEV THEN INFORMED SECRETARY VANCE THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION, BUT HE COUPLED IT, AT THE SAME TIME, WITH A CLEAR-CUT INDICATION THAT IT IS THE SOVIET EXPECTATION, WHICH IS MATCHED BY US, THAT THESE TALKS, INCLUDING THE SALT ASPECTS, WILL CONTINUE AND THAT, INDEED, THE GROMYKO-VANCE MEETING WILL BE RESUMED DIRECTLY IN GENEVA IN MAY.

SO, IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT I THINK ONE OUGHT TO ASSESS WHERE WE ARE AT AND AGAIN, I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ANALOGY, YOUR ATTENTION TO THE ANALOGY THAT I MADE BEFORE, NAMELY, TO THE INITIAL REACTION BY PRIME MINISTER KOSYGIN WHEN, FOR THE FIRST TIME, HE WAS CONFRONTED AT THE TOP LEVEL AND NOT THROUGH BUREAUCRATIC CHANNELS WITH THE ARGUMENTS WHY AN ABM IS MUTUALLY DESTABILIZING. THIS WAS A NEW ARGUMENT FOR HIM. IT WAS NOT A CONVINCING ARGUMENT INITIALLY, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS MADE VERY PERSUASIVELY WHEN HE MET IN GLASSBORO WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND SECRETARY MCNAMARA AND THEN SUBSEQUENTLY IT BECAME CLEAR THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WAS INDEED IN MUTUAL INTEREST.

Q: DR. BRZEZINSKI, IN MR. VANCE'S NEWS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW, HE ALLUDED TO A SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL BASED ON THE 1976 DISCUSSIONS WITH DR. KISSINGER.

I AM INTERESTED IN WHY THAT COUNTERPROPOSAL WAS NOT NEGOTIABLE?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I DON'T WANT TO ENGAGE HERE --

Q: WHAT WERE ITS CONSTITUENTS AND WHY WAS IT NOT NEGOTIABLE?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I DON'T WANT TO ENGAGE HERE IN A CRITIQUE OF THE SOVIET POSITION BECAUSE AS I SAID AT THE BEGINNING OF MY REMARKS I AM REALLY NOT GOING TO ENGAGE IN RECRIMINATIONS OR A KIND OF SIDE DIALOGUE ON THEIR PROPOSALS VERSUS OUR PROPOSALS, BUT REALLY TO TRY TO EXPLAIN THE RATIONALE AND THE CONTENT OF OURS.

LET ME LIMIT MYSELF, THEREFORE, TO ONE COMMENT. IT IS OUR BROAD FEELING THAT 27 YEARS AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE NUCLEAR RACE THE TIME IS RIGHT IN OUR RELATIONS FOR DOING SOMETHING MORE THAN JUST CREATING FRAMEWORKS FOR CONTINUED COMPETITION. IT IS OUR FEELING THAT THE FRAMEWORK DEFINED BY VLADIVOSTOK IS SO HIGH IN ITS NUMBERS, SO OPEN-ENDED IN ITS CONSEQUENCES, SO SUSCEPTIBLE TO QUANTITATIVE AS WELL AS QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS THAT IN SOME RESPECTS IT COMES CLOSE TO A MISSTATEMENT TO CALL ANY SUCH ARRANGEMENT ARMS LIMITATIONS. ALL IT IS, REALLY, IS AN ARRANGEMENT FOR CONTINUED ARMS COMPETITION AND WE HAVE GONE TO THE SOVIETS WITH A PROPOSAL WHICH WE CRAFTED AS BEST WE COULD IN ORDER TO CONVINCE THEM THAT MAYBE THE TIME IS RIGHT TO TAKE A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD REDUCTIONS.

WE GAVE THEM RANGES SO THEY COULD PICK EITHER THE MORE AMBITIOUS OR THE LESS AMBITIOUS PART OF IT, DEPENDING ON THEIR ESTIMATE OF THE STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF CUTS. THEY HAVE VERY GOOD ANALYSTS. THEY SHOULD BE ABLE, AND I AM SURE THEY ARE ABLE, TO ASSESS WHETHER 2,000 IS BETTER FOR THEM OR 1,800, WHETHER 1,200 MIRVS IS BETTER FOR THEM OR 1,100 AND SO FORTH. SO WE WEREN'T VERY CATEGORICAL ABOUT IT.

Q: DR. BRZEZINSKI, YOU PLACED HEAVY STRESS AT THE BEGINNING ON THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF THIS, AS WELL AS THIS STRATEGIC ASPECT OF THE PROPOSAL. YOU SAID THAT NO ONE EXPECTED THEM TO ACCEPT IT OUT OF HAND, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE WIDESPREAD EXPECTATION OF THE KIND OF FIERCE REACTION FROM THE RUSSIANS, INCLUDING THE PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY BY MR. GROMYKO.

POLITICALLY SPEAKING, DO YOU FEEL THAT THE RECEPTION OF THE PROPOSAL AND WHAT HAS HAPPENED HAS SET BACK SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, OR WERE YOU SURPRISED AT WHAT HAPPENED, AND IF YOU WEREN'T, WAS THIS A MISCALCULATION?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: IF I WASN'T, THEN IT COULDN'T BE A MISCALCULATION. IT WOULD BE A MISCALCULATION IF I WAS. NO, DON. WE DID NOT EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT THIS TOTAL FRAMEWORK ON THE BASIS OF THREE DAYS' TALKS. WE EXPECTED THEM TO CONSIDER IT. OUR JUDGMENT -- AND I HAVE TALKED BY TELEPHONE WITH SECRETARY VANCE WHEN HE WAS STILL IN MOSCOW, I TALKED TO SOME OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION SINCE -- WAS THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WERE GENERALLY CONDUCTED IN BUSINESS-LIKE FASHION, THAT THE SOVIETS' SIDE, THROUGH LITTLE GESTURES, WENT OUT OF ITS WAY TO INDICATE THAT THIS IS AN ON-GOING RELATIONSHIP. THEY DID NOT HIDE THE FACT THAT THEY TOOK A NEGATIVE VIEW OF THIS PROPOSAL AND THEY WERE QUITE EXPLICIT ON IT, BUT THERE WERE NO NASTY POLEMICS IN THE MEETING.

YOU ARE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT IN SAYING THAT SOME OF THE STATEMENTS, MAYBE EVEN SOME OF THE GESTURES THAT WERE MADE IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE SOVIET MINISTER, WERE OF A MORE ASSERTIVE TYPE. BUT I WOULD DESCRIBE THAT PERHAPS AS A REACTION TO THE POLITICAL PERCEPTION THAT INDEED THE UNITED STATES HAS COME UP WITH A PROPOSAL WHICH, IF ACCEPTED, WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO DISARMAMENT.

THE SOVIETS, OVER THE YEARS, HAVE PRIDED THEMSELVES ON BEING IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS AND PERHAPS THERE WAS JUST A TINY TOUCH OF DEFENSIVENESS, THEREFORE IN SOME OF THESE GESTURES AND SOME OF THESE COMMENTS. I DON'T THINK THAT THESE GESTURES AND THESE COMMENTS ARE REALLY THAT IMPORTANT. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT THE RELATIONSHIP INVOLVES CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS, THAT AGREEMENTS WERE READ IN MOSCOW TO DEVELOP WORKING GROUPS ON A LARGE NUMBER OF HIGHLY SENSITIVE ISSUES, AND I READ YOU THE LIST, AND INDEED, THERE WAS A FURTHER ELEMENT IN IT, NAMELY, RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, WHICH IS WHAT THE SOVIETS PROPOSE AND THAT, THEREFORE, THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS CONTINUES AND IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS YOU EXPECT TO BE TURNED DOWN, TO BE PRESSED, TO BE ASKED TO MAKE ACCOMMODATIONS AND CONCESSIONS, BUT THAT IS PART OF THE GAME.

Q: DOCTOR, WHAT DID WE OFFER TO FOREGO THAT THEY WOULD HAVE FOUND MOST THREATENING TO THEIR LAND BASED MISSILES? I AM NOT CLEAR ON THAT.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: PARTICULARLY THE MX, WHICH IN ITS CONSEQUENCES, GIVEN ITS ACCURACY AND SO FORTH, BY THE EARLY EIGHTIES, COULD BE EXTREMELY THREATENING TO THEM AND, IN THAT SENSE, I THINK THAT IN ITSELF WOULD HAVE A SOURCE OF CONSIDERABLE ASSURANCE TO THEM.

BEYOND THAT, IF WE WERE TO LIMIT THE CRUISE MISSILES MERELY TO TACTICAL CRUISE MISSILES, THIS, TOO, IN THE LONGER RUN, WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT ASSURANCE TO THEM.

BEYOND THAT, WE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE SOME ACCOMMODATIONS, GIVEN THE TOTAL NUMBERS IN MINUTEMEN I AND II, AND IN THE POSEIDONS.

BASICALLY, WHAT IT WOULD GIVE THEM IS THE SENSE OF SECURITY THAT THE UNITED STATES IS FOREGOING, AS A BASIC STRATEGIC OPTION, THE ACQUISITION OF FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY AGAINST THEIR LAND BASED SYSTEMS.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.
(END TRANSCRIPT).

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הקונסוליה הכללית של
ישראל בניו-יורק

ש מ ר

800 SECOND AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

CONSULATE GENERAL
OF ISRAEL IN NEW YORK

OXFORD 7-5500

ניו-יורק, 6 בנוב' 1978

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סלר
סלר
ה'ן מאה-סניס

אל : מנהל מצפ"א
מאת : י.ח.בן-אהרן

הנדון: הופעת הרולד סונדרס בפני מועדון הנשיאים

בהמשך למברקנו מה-6 בנוב' 1978, וע"פי בקשתכם (במברק נר 143 מ-3/11),
רצ"ב דו"ח מפורט על הפגישה, שנרשם ע"י איש ה-א.ד.ל. דן מריאשן. אבקש
שלא להתייחס לכותב הדו"ח.

בברכה,

י.ח.בן-אהרן

העתק: מר צבי ברוש, וושינגטון
מר ש. רמתי, נאו"ם

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

A meeting of the Conference of Presidents was held yesterday at 515 Park Avenue. Guest speaker for the session was Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Ted Mann presided. Herewith is a summary of Saunders' remarks:

Saunders said that the first premise which flowed from Sadat's visit to Israel last November is that peace between Israel and Egypt was possible. The second premise was that if peace could be achieved with Israel, then it might be possible to bring about peaceful relations between Israel and the other Arab states.

Real peace cannot be achieved unless the atmosphere is such that over the long term, all states in the Arab world that are party to the Mideast conflict make peace with Israel. Over the long term, moderate Arab support for the proposition that peace can be achieved with Israel is necessary to sustain the pace of peace. That means involving Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other nations in the negotiating process. As we see it, said Saunders, Camp David is only the "cutting edge" of a broader framework to include Jordan and other moderates in the next round of negotiations.

According to Saunders, "everyone" agreed at Camp David that Egypt would "go first" and that it would not "go it alone." Rather, the agreement with Egypt would serve to bring about the momentum to advance American-Israeli-moderate Arab interests.

[At this point, Saunders interjected that the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations at Blair House are "going on well." There are inevitable hard places to overcome, he said, and it's taking a lot of time, "but I think we're down to the last few issues."]

The next question is "what comes next?" Both sides agree that negotiations on the Palestinian-Jordanian front should begin quickly. Saunders said that as he assessed the last year and a half of diplomacy in the Middle East, issues related to the Palestinian question were gone over very carefully. These are very complex issues and the only way to deal with these issues is to break them down into their component parts and put them into a logical sequence. The idea would be to leave most of the difficult issues until the end.

We then have to ask ourselves "into what sequence should we put the issues?" The most fruitful approach is to get down to dealing with the less

complicated issues first. At Camp David we decided that these issues should be discussed over a five year transition period, leaving the question of final borders, sovereignty and Jerusalem put off until late in that period.

It is necessary for us to discuss first who would speak for the Palestinians. We took the autonomy plan of the Israelis as a starting point, not just to provide only administrative autonomy but full autonomy. It is hoped that a self-governing, autonomous Palestinian council would demonstrate that a Palestinian neighbor of that kind would be the kind of entity that Israel could negotiate with.

According to Saunders, we came out of Camp David with Egypt and Israel agreed on an approach toward peace, but no participants from the other sides. If the process is to be a genuine one - we have to develop other partners with which to negotiate. In the second round of negotiations, Jordan and the Palestinians would be added to the process. After Camp David, it was necessary to explain to the second and third round partners in negotiations exactly what Camp David meant. Those partners [presumably Jordan and the Palestinians and perhaps the Saudis] did not feel comfortable with this process. There was a reluctance to go further down the road toward peace when it was not clear about what the exact outcome of this process would be.

We had to go to convince the Jordanians, Palestinians and Saudis - as well as the Moroccans and Sudanese - of the value of this process. We were asked for guarantees about the outcome of negotiations. We didn't commit ourselves to anything. The most important thing was to expand the peace process and to keep the momentum going. The purpose of my recent trip to the Middle East, said Saunders, was not directed against anyone but committed to an expansion of the process built into the Camp David accords and toward the long term situation in the Middle East.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Burton Joseph said that the President apparently had had no problem about the Israeli government enlarging existing settlements for the sake of family reunification. It seems that he (the President) spoke only about his objections to new settlements. If this is the case, why has a non-issue been raised in Washington in such a way so as to bring current peace opportunities to a halt?

Saunders said that settlements was the one issue that was not resolved at Camp David. On the one hand, he said, the Israelis feel there cannot be a future in the region unless they have a right to live in land they feel close to. On the other hand, Palestinians feel that on that land they are entitled to a "homeland" - linked with Jordan or otherwise. There is a feeling there (on the West Bank) that settlements are a means of Israeli annexation.

We have to find a solution to the problem. What we thought at Camp David could be done was to leave this issue of settlements for negotiations later on; negotiations aimed at setting up a self-governing body on the West Bank and Gaza. This was our perception.

According to Saunders, Prime Minister Begin told President Carter he could

not accept a physical limitation on the number of people in the settlements. Originally, the suggestion had been put on the table to bar new settlements and to have no expansion of existing ones as well. It was at that point that Begin raised questions of reunification of families. He responded by saying that as long as the expansion would be for humanitarian reasons it would be acceptable, but that there should be no new "policy efforts" with regard to settlements.

This past week, through a statement of policy on expansion, Saunders said that the Israeli government had overstepped its bounds on this issue. The State Department and Administration felt this was not a question of family reunification but a totally new program calling for a 40% increase in the population of the settlements in question.

Saunders went on to say that "what I have said is if we're in a negotiation the purpose of which is to move from occupation to self-governing authority and to protect Israeli security interests - then we can discuss the rights of Jews to live there." My conversations with Arabs were centered around the question of getting into a discussion beyond settlements and into the topic of how people are going to live with one another. We had hoped to put the issue of settlements off until after the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. But if we're talking about Arab support in the future for that treaty, we had to say something to the Arabs and to the Israelis about settlements before the Arab summit meeting in Baghdad on November 2 where the settlement issue might have caused problems.

Al Chernin then spoke of the necessity to be single-minded about the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and then to worry about bringing the other partners in after the treaty is signed. In essence, Al questioned the advisability of automatic linkage between the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and a second round of negotiations concentrating on the West Bank.

Saunders said that "we're all but agreed in Washington that West Bank negotiations would start promptly after the conclusion of an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. We don't need an Arab summit declaration to get Jordan and Saudi Arabia into the picture.

What was agreed at Camp David is that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty would be the first of a series of treaties. I found in Saudi Arabia and Jordan the feeling that Sadat had made a separate pact with Israel. Sadat needs support; for him to be read out of the Arab League is not the best situation for the peace process and to broaden the scope of negotiations. The Arabs simply won't accept a separate peace.

Somebody has to persuade them that this is not a bilateral pact. There is a deep debate in Israel over what was agreed to at Camp David. Negotiations over the West Bank, an end to military government there, a self-governing authority and full autonomy are all issues that are being debated. "We are caught in a cross fire of Israeli internal debate."

Ivan Novick then asked Saunders about the role of the Jordanians and the Saudis.

Saunders, in his answer, said our relations with those two countries after

Camp David was not simply a question of wielding leverage over Saudi Arabia or Jordan. It now seems, he said, that the Saudis are going to the Arab summit meeting in Baghdad to prevent Sadat "from being excommunicated from the Arab world."

In my discussions with Arabs in the Middle East recently, the posture that I took was an Administration posture. "The document [the U.S. answer to King Hussein's 15 questions]" was signed by Jimmy Carter; it was not a Harold Saunders document. Some parts of the document were not approved by the Camp David meetings. We were simply asked to state our views on certain things and to offer comments about what would happen in the next round of negotiations.

Asked about the status of Jerusalem, Saunders said "there is no way to have a full discussion of the problem in the current atmosphere." It must be remembered that when you talk of Jerusalem, it is a question involving 700,000,000 people who have commitments to the city as well as the Israelis and Arabs who also have an attachment to it. If this will be the last issue to be discussed, Saunders was sure that both sides could work out a solution. He went on to say that "we say East Jerusalem is occupied territory" - ~~not~~ "nobody wants to take Jerusalem away from Israel - nobody wants to divide it."

Alan Pollack expressed his concern that the American rush to achieve a start on West Bank negotiations might jeopardize the "uniqueness" of Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Saunders responded by saying that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty is "well enough along - nothing will jeopardize it." But, unless you have support from the other side [meaning the moderate Arabs], Sadat would be isolated. There must be follow through on the treaty now being negotiated.

Bernice Tanenbaum then asked, "are you implying that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty will be jeopardized if there is no follow through?" She then added, "we are disturbed by statements attributed to you regarding Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem, complete Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Palestinian self-determination."

Said Saunders: "I have not said one of the things you have attributed to me. I don't know how to bridge this dilemma."

Saunders went on to say that "right after Camp David we had to have support in the Arab world." If we can get by this week, we might have a situation that would make it easier for the second stage to take place. You need to explain reasons for the other Arabs to get in.

The next questioner was Rabbi Fabian Schonfeld, who said there was no need for the State Department to have replied so hastily and so bluntly regarding the settlements in what was a vehement slap in the face to Israel. Schonfeld also questioned Saunders on the position of the U.S. regarding Lebanon and aid to Syria.

Saunders said that "we did not criticize Israel before being informed by the Israeli government." Again he stated that "it was our understanding from

Camp David that there be no expansion of settlements of this kind. We simply reaffirm the position that we reached at Camp David that settlements are a matter for negotiations."

He then went on to say, with regard to Lebanon, that the U.S. had played a major role in arranging for a cease fire in Lebanon at the U.N. Security Council. He said that the Syrians are an important factor in Lebanon and with regard to an overall Middle East peace treaty. It must be remembered that they will be an important negotiating partner.

Rabbi Joseph Glazer then stated that there is an inherent confusion in the foreign policy of the Carter Administration. On the one hand, "you say that a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt could be used as a model, but that you had learned from the experiences surrounding Prime Minister Begin's visit in March that it was necessary to 'put off the ultimate issues' until the end of negotiations." Glazer said that "I would have thought that a peace treaty with Egypt would be 'ultimate' - for that without Egypt there can be no war in the Middle East. If peace in the Middle East is the 'ultimate goal,' isn't there a contradiction between the importance of the signing of the treaty and the Administration's emphasis on resolving 'ultimate issues' on the West Bank." Glazer then asked: "When you talk of 'ultimate issues,' are you referring to East Jerusalem and the Palestinian state?"

Saunders again stated that the Camp David framework calls for peace between Israel and each of its neighbors - "that's the objective."

Saunders said there are certain issues that will have to be resolved on the West Bank. The concept is that Egypt's involvement will be a model for future negotiations, but not necessarily in every aspect. The issues are more complex on the West Bank. The point is that Camp David principles are intended to bring about an orderly working out of peace in those different circumstances. Most people in the world say that you won't have peace unless you solve the Palestinian problem.

Rabbi Israel Miller questioned Saunders on the use of his term "occupied Jerusalem." He said that it conjures up in every Jewish mind a picture of what the "ultimate" will be.

To that, Saunders answered that "it is a physical fact that Israel moved across the line. Perhaps we have to look for other words."

The final question came from Jacob Stein. Stein asked Saunders, in light of his visit with West Bank leaders, how does he see the term "full autonomy" applying to the West Bank.

West Bank leadership, said Saunders, has not been governed by any cohesive group. There is no mechanism for making those kinds of important decisions. They are looking for outsiders to help themselves put their governing structures in order. Among those outsiders, according to the West Bankers, are: 1) Jordan; 2) The PLO and 3) Egypt.

Saunders' own view is that where the bulk of West Bankers regard the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, if you look for someone

to represent them, it might perhaps be a combination of King Hussein and tacit support of the PLO. The U.S. government has not supported the concept of an independent Palestinian state, nor have I, he said. The U.S. has always spoken of a "preference that a Palestinian entity be linked with Jordan." These are issues for negotiation.

West Bank moderates are frightened about sticking their heads out because of Israel's military occupation and because of threats for more radical West Bankers. We don't know how the process of this autonomous government would work. There are certain things which we do assume - that it would be full administrative authority over their own affairs, they would run their own budget, would create a police force that would have a relationship with the Israeli military and there would have to be some relationship with the land itself - this latter point would involve the questions of settlement.

The meeting lasted approximately two hours.

בלתי מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת העסק

מברק נכנס

79 139 051030 18703

אל : המודר

ממ: ווענינגטון

מפ"א

מזכיר המדינה ומזכיר המטה המדיני הודו בישיבה המשותפת על ועדת החוץ בבית
לפניהם הדיון על חוק סיוע המדע למדינת ישראל
להלן עיקר המעלות והמחלוקות כפי שהופיעו, מודד המדינה, בעת הדיון.

ח"ר ממשל / 11/11

ROSENTHAL: "HOW MUCH IS THE GRANT ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN?"

BROWN: "THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN IS 30 MILLION DOLLARS."

ROSENTHAL: "WHAT ABOUT SECURITY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE?"

(BROWN I'D NOT HAVE THE FIGURE SO ROSENTHAL QUOTED IT AT 60 MILLION DOLLARS). "WHAT ROLE HAS JORDAN PLAYED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS?"

VANCE: "JORDAN HAS NOT PLAYED A SUBORDINATE ROLE IN THE CAMP DAVID NEGOTIATIONS. IT HAS NOT PARTICIPATED IN DISCUSSIONS. WE'VE HAD BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AND THEY ASKED SOME QUESTIONS WHICH WE ARE FAMILIAR WITH. WE HAVE URGED THEM TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING AND THEY HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY ARE NOT READY."

ROSENTHAL: "DESPITE THIS YOU ARE READY TO GO FORTH WITH ASSISTANCE?"

VANCE: "I DO BELIEVE SO. JORDAN IS ONE OF THE MODERATE STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND A FRIENDLY ONE. I HOPE THAT THEY WILL RECONSIDER THEIR CURRENT DECISION NOT TO PARTICIPATE -- PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATING TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA."

ROSENTHAL: "BUT WITHOUT THEIR COOPERATION THERE CAN BE NO AGREEMENT."

VANCE: "IT IS POSSIBLY NOT DIFFICULT."

ROSENTHAL: "WHAT ROLE HAS SAUDI ARABIA PLAYED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS?"

VANCE: "SAUDI ARABIA IN THE POST-CAMP DAVID PERIOD HAS NOT PARTICIPATED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE ALREADY SAID THAT THEY ARE NOT READY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ARE NOT A PART OF THE PROBLEM IN THAT TROUBLED PART OF THE MIDDLE EAST."

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THE WORLD."

ROSETHAL: "HOW DO YOU DEFINE MODERATE? AT WHAT POINT DO WE CHANGE OUR DEFINITIONS? -- AFTER 30 YEARS OF CONFLICT...?"

VANCE: "WE HOPE IN THE FUTURE THAT THEY MAY RETHINK CURRENT VIEWS AND BECOME SUPPORTIVE." WE HAVE TO TAKE A "BROADER VIEW."

ROSETHAL: WHAT MAKES THEM MODERATE?

VANCE: "JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA HAVE STOOD FOR MODERATE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND BOTH AGREED ALONG WITH EGYPT TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM... BUT THEY DO NOT AGREE WITH THE CAMP DAVID ACCORD BUT AGREE TO A SOLUTION WITH ISRAEL. "LIVING IN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BORDERS."

BROOKFIELD: WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE SITUATION IN IRAN ON THE MIDDLE EAST. DO YOU ANTICIPATE ANOTHER SUMMIT?

VANCE: REFERRED TO ATHERTON'S TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH PARTIES... "NO TANGIBLE PROGRESS OCCURRED." BUT "WE NOW HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE PARAMETERS FOR DEALING WITH THE REMAINING ISSUES." "MY UNDERSTANDING IS TO DEAL WITH THEM AS A PACKAGE." "THE MATTER OF WEST BANK AUTONOMY SHOULD BE RESOLVED AT THE SAME TIME AS THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE." "I BELIEVE THAT THE NEXT STAGE IS A MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING." "AS FAR AS IRAN'S EFFECT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS -- IT SHOWS THE "VITALLY NEEDED STABILITY IN THE REGION" AND I AM "FULLY FAMILIAR WITH THE ARGUMENTS ON BOTH SIDES."

HAMILTON: "THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS 70 PERCENT FOR COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND IS 65 PERCENT FOR THE MIDDLE EAST. THAT IS AN ENORMOUS PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT. IS THIS AN ACCURATE REFLECTION OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST?"

VANCE: "I THINK THEY DO ACCURATELY REFLECT THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. I CAN THINK OF NOTHING MORE IMPORTANT THAN ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BY PROVIDING MASSIVE SUPPORT TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL WE ARE TAKING ACTION NOT ONLY IN THE INTEREST OF THOSE TWO COUNTRIES BUT ALSO PEACE IN THE REGION, OUR OWN NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE WORLD AS A WHOLE."

BINGHAM: I WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT I THINK THERE IS "NO NEED FOR A RATIONALE FOR AID TO THE MIDDLE EAST" ... "THEY NEED IT..."

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AND HATO FOR INSTANCE DOES NOT."

VANCE: AGREED.

BINGHAM: "YOU MENTION IN YOUR STATEMENT (BROWN'S) THE 'DEEP MORAL AND HISTORICAL COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL' YET YOU DON'T MENTION STRATEGIC. HAVEN'T THE EVENTS IN IRAN ENHANCED THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE?"

BROWN: "THE EVENTS IN IRAN URGE STRONGLY UPON ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFLICT THE VALUE OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT. ISRAEL'S SECURITY IS BEST ACHIEVED BY FORWARD MOVEMENTS"....

WINN: "WHAT ABOUT THE PALESTINIANS? JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AND EGYPT HAVE STATED THAT THEY ARE NOT GOING TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION. WHAT IS THE US DOING WITH THE PALESTINIAN SITUATION?"

VANCE: "IF YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT THE PALESTINIANS LIVING ON THE WEST BANK, WE'VE MET WITH MAYORS. IF YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT THE PLO, WE HAVE NOT MET WITH THE PLO."

WINN: I AGREE WITH THE POLICY IN REGARD TO THE PLO, BUT THERE ARE THOUSANDS AND THOUSANDS WHO NEED TO BE CONSIDERED -- NOT JUST MAYORS ON THE WEST BANK."

VANCE: "WE HAVE MET WITH INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN IN THE AREA AND WHO HAVE REPORTED TO US. THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, HAS TO BE RESOLVED". WHEN I SPOKE AT THE UN LAST YEAR I STATED THIS. "THERE WILL NEVER BE A SOLUTION THAT IS PERMANENT TILL THE PALESTINIAN SOLUTION IS TAKEN CARE OF."

WINN: "WHAT PROGRAMS HAVE WE SET FORTH TO INCLUDE THE PALESTINIANS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS?"

VANCE: "THE CAMP DAVID ACCORD PROVIDES THE PALESTINIANS WILL BE INCLUDED INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT, ISRAEL AND JORDAN, IF SHE SO CHOOSES, TO DECIDE ON THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE." "THIS IS ABSOLUTELY CENTRAL TO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORD". "IT IS ONE OF THE KEYS TO THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION." "IT MAKES SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE PEOPLE DISPLACED FROM THE WEST BANK." "THE PROBLEM OF RESOLVING THE BROADER PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM NEEDS A MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY." "IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS BE DONE -- THESE CONTINUE TO BE FESTERING PROBLEMS."

WOLFE: "REGARDING THE OIL SITUATION, IF SAUDI ARABIA CUT OFF OIL TO THE US, WOULD THIS BE VIEWED AS A SECURITY THREAT?"

BROWN: YES. IT WOULD HAVE GRAVE SECURITY IMPLICATION IN A BROAD SENSE."

SOLANZ: REGARDING THE RELOCATION OF AIRBASES, THE FIGURE HAS BEEN QUOTED OF 1 BILLION DOLLARS TO REBUILD THE BASES, AND 2 BILLION DOLLARS FOR THE NECESSARY INFRASTRUCTURE. CAN YOU GIVE US ASSURANCES TODAY, IF AND WHEN THE TREATY IS SIGNED, THAT OUR

PREVENTION AND ACCESSIBLE HEALTH SERVICES

More health care services alone, however, will not necessarily improve the health status of our Nation -- even if these services are affordable, accessible, and efficient. Our national health strategy must direct more attention to health promotion and disease prevention if we are to achieve our goal of improved health status. The Surgeon General will present this year a major report outlining our needs in this area. I will be asking for your help in carrying out many of its recommendations.

We have made great strides in expanding the availability of health care services to rural and low-income urban areas in recent years through the creation of the National Health Service Corps and the establishment of a system of Community Health Centers. If health care is to be accessible to all Americans, these programs must be expanded, and the FY '80 budget provides for such an expansion.

CHILD HEALTH ASSESSMENT

I believe that our health strategy must place high priority on the health of our children. Accordingly, I will submit a revised Child Health Assessment Program to improve the early and preventive screening, diagnosis, and treatment program for lower-income children under Medicaid. This program would cover over 2,000,000 low-income children who are not receiving Medicaid services. An additional 100,000 low-income pregnant women would become eligible for medical services prior to delivery, improving the health of both the mothers and infants. This should be part of a national health plan.

MENTAL HEALTH

Based upon last year's recommendations of the President's Commission on Mental Health, I will be proposing comprehensive mental health legislation this year along with a Mental Health Message. A new Community Mental Health System will make new efforts to link mental health, health, and social services for the chronically mentally ill to enable them to live successfully in the community and will provide new community mental health services. We will emphasize efforts to provide improved recognition and treatment of mental health problems in the general health care system. In addition, we will increase support for mental health research to restore our mental health research capacity, which the Commission found had seriously eroded over the past decade.

The First Lady has helped spearhead the Administration's efforts to sensitize the Nation to the problems in the mental health area. She will continue to work directly with me to implement the pertinent recommendations of the Commission.

DRUG ABUSE

In continuing our efforts to combat drug abuse, my Administration will rely on those programs and initiatives which have proven to be successful in the past year and which serve as building blocks for future programs. Today, in the United States, there are 110,000 fewer heroin addicts than there were in 1975; 1,000 fewer Americans died of heroin overdoses in the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1978 than in the previous twelve months. Seizures of illegal drugs are at their highest level ever. Improved coordination and cooperation among Federal agencies have resulted in a more effective drug program without major budget increases. But much remains to be done and the situation remains serious.

Henry Brandon's Washington Notebook

WHAT interested the members of the United States' National Security Council at one of their first meetings recently, were the contrasting performances of the secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, and President Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. The topic was the policy for the forthcoming Panama Canal treaty negotiations; but far more preoccupying was the following question: would Brzezinski, the brilliant intellectual professor, do to Vance, the more practical-minded problem-solver, what Henry Kissinger did to another, earlier secretary of state William Rogers. Back in the days when Kissinger was President Nixon's national security adviser, he consistently outshone Rogers, finally ending up with the latter's job.

Vance presided over the recent Security Council meeting, raising key issues and asking key questions. But it was Brzezinski who summarised the arguments, adding some of his own and, smartly and unobtrusively, marking the conclusions with his own personal stamp. Everyone was impressed by his command of the facts, his ability to sum up and analyse concisely others' contributions and by his agile mind. Some thought him glib.

In this capital where power is the big game (not money), it is not surprising the question of a challenge between Vance and Brzezinski was raised. Brzezinski is conscious of the competition between the state department and White House bureaucracies and the risk that this could trap him and Vance in various conflicts. He is aware, too, that the American news media like to pit men of power against each other, since conflict makes good copy. Consequently, he does not mind discussing the subject.

Brzezinski, who has moved into Kissinger's old office in the east wing of the White House, has not had time to give it his personal imprint. The bookshelves are still empty, except for a collection of his own works, including their translations into foreign languages, and a dragon figure made of clay by his young son.

Rogers was insecure

Zbig, as he is called, ranges over the roles of his predecessors to prove that history does not repeat itself—and certainly will not as far as he is concerned. Vance is not a Bill Rogers and Zbig is not a Kissinger, he says emphatically. Vance is a secure man who knows how to lead despite his modesty and low-key style and is very knowledgeable about foreign affairs. Rogers was insecure and aware that the job was above his head, which made it easier for Kissinger's sharp-edged intellect ultimately to sever that head. Furthermore, Zbig and Vance have been working together for some years on various projects and have developed an intimate relationship. On election night, for instance, they and their wives waited together for the outcome.

Vance is an establishment figure who wants solely to be judged on his professional ability and the decency of his character; he never arouses jealousies. Brzezinski, on the other hand, had a harder time to get where he is, and has never hidden his ambition. But his emphasis now is on team play, because that is what Carter wants. He also insists



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Zbig has rejected the Secret Service protection that swirled around Kissinger. He has refused to allow his wife or children to be photographed or interviewed, and he walks to his office or drives his own car. He wants to preserve as much privacy as possible and follow the advice Carter gave to his cabinet when he exhorted them not to overdo their official responsibilities: "I don't want your families breaking up just because you felt a loyalty to me," he said.

Zbig and Kissinger have had similar academic training, but Kissinger sought to develop his concepts from history and Brzezinski prefers to plan the future from the present. Where Kissinger is 53, informal and relaxed, Brzezinski, at 48, exudes a more formal, brisk but youthful manner. They were about the same age when they left their homelands—Kissinger was German and Brzezinski Polish—and the differences in their self-assurance may well lie in the difference of their background.

Kissinger is the son of a Jewish schoolteacher, Brzezinski the son of a Catholic diplomat who helped Jews to escape from Europe until he decided to become an exile in Canada when Poland came under Communist control.

They were outstanding students at Harvard, but unlike Kissinger, Brzezinski failed to get the all-important tenure as a

professor and left for greener pastures at Columbia University. Kissinger, despite his professional self-confidence and personal panache, seemed an insecure person. Brzezinski, on the other hand, exudes absolute self-confidence and an unabashed delight at being a leading presidential adviser.

However, as soon as he is asked how much time he spends with the President on his daily morning briefings, he becomes defensive. Power in Washington is judged by the frequency and length of time a man spends with the president. And so Zbig plays down the fact that he sees the president every morning: "Sometimes the meeting lasts two minutes, sometimes 15 or more," he says. He is also vague about the content of his briefings. But he does add: "I am in close daily touch with Cy (Vance); we phone each other several times a day."

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To clinch his arguments, he stressed that Carter is determined to dominate foreign policy. This should subdue any competitive inclinations. The president showed at his first Press conference that he is in command of foreign policy and that he can handle complex foreign policy questions with firmness, conviction and skill.

Ignored the briefing books

He knew how to strike the right tone when he spoke passionately in defence of human rights without resorting to cold war language. He was so relaxed about this first formal encounter with the Press that when members of the cabinet and experts joined him for a final testing half an hour before the "ordeal," he turned it into a lighthearted conversation ignoring the two thick briefing books he had been given the previous night.

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



סודי

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

כח' שבט תשל"ז
15 פברואר 77

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אל: מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

הנדון: ברז'ינסקי על הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי

בשיחה שקיים לאחרונה עם סנטור סטון אמר ברז'ינסקי:

ענה הזמן לעשות שלום עם הערבים. הזמן אינו פועל לטובת ישראל. אם נאחר המועד עלולים הערבים להגיע למצב של רדיקליזציה כפי שהיו האלג'יראים במלחמתם בצרפתים: האלג'יראים היו מוכנים להקריב מליון וחצי אנשים כדי לגרש את הצרפתים. כשהערבים יגיעו למצב כזה הם **OUTNUMBER** את הישראלים.

בברכה,
צבי רפיח

העחק: המנכ"ל

המשנה למנכ"ל

RECEIVED
JAN 17 1974



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.

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The He/She Dilemma

By Edward Devol

THE SEXUAL revolution and the last trace of grammatical gender in the English language are combining to infest the printed page with the ugly and awkward "he or she" and "his or her" forms. They may be only a passing fad, but they offend the traditional eye. They also remind us that no language is perfect.

Feminists object to the old — and indeed never satisfactory — custom of using "he" or "his" to include both sexes when no particular sex is meant. If you translate Karl Marx's slogan as "From each according to his abilities," you risk being accused of implying that women have none. A really determined feminist logic-chopper might even insist that "Every dog has his day" deprives female dogs of opportunity — although there is uncertainty about whether the principle of equality should apply to animals.

Some who detect insults in pronouns apparently believe they grow out of personal bias. Other, more scholarly critics see such insults as a usually unintentional peculiarity of the language itself. The latter is usually the reason, but the outcry has been loud enough that writers good and bad, anxious to avoid being labeled sexual chauvinists, react with sentences like these:

"Any employee who will not reach his or her 40th birthday before January 1, 1977 . . . is eligible." (State Department Bulletin, October, 1976).

"Nearly one of every five employees here failed to get his or her bi-weekly pay."

(Mike Causey, The Washington Post, Dec. 30, 1976).

Even the elegant classicist Gilbert Highet has been so intimidated that his latest book, "The Immortal Profession," contains this agonized and agonizing paragraph:

"The newly fledged Ph.D. must understand that teaching is really necessary for the students: active, energetic teaching. Sometimes he or she does not really believe this. He — I wish there were a handy neutral pronoun meaning 'he or she'; one does not always fit — he (or she) was often a bookworm or a laboratory wizard from early youth. In his heart he believes that anyone can learn anything by dogged application."

Note the vigor of Prof. Highet's struggle to keep in step with the times. He leaps frantically from the timid "he or she" to the bold but immediately qualified "he." He then irritably refers to the difficulty he faces, straddles it again with "he (or she)," and in the final sentence returns wearily (or defiantly?) to the old custom of using "he" and "his" to include both sexes.

THE HE/SHE problem is more acute in English than in other languages. Hundreds of years ago English abandoned the complexities of grammatical gender that still characterize other languages of Indo-European origin — and provide them with firm guides toward the proper and unambiguous pronoun. English grammatical gender once was as formidable as any. In Old English, Si-

meon Potter writes, "woman, queen and wife were synonymous . . . all three meaning 'woman,' but they were masculine, feminine and neuter respectively."

Charlton Laird says of contemporary English: "Of gender there remain scraps, such fragmentary scraps that most Americans do not know what gender is. With us it has become a synonym for sex, which it is not, because distinction on the basis of sex is the only bit of gender we have left, and that appears only in the third person singular pronoun (he, she, it), unless one excepts forms like comedian, comedienne, actor, actress."

I do not know whether feminists in other countries find male chauvinism in their languages. In countries where other Indo-European languages predominate, women presumably have less opportunity for complaint about sexual discrimination in personal pronouns, since the use of such pronouns is determined by the gender of the nouns they modify, or for which they substitute. The sexual chauvinist is not permitted to display his bias in his choice of pronouns. There is no "sexiness" in the German masculine noun for foot, or the French feminine noun for pen, and thus no awareness of sex in using pronouns in their place.

In French and English aphorisms of similar meaning, the difference in the sexiness of pronouns becomes apparent. In *Chacun a son gout*, the noun *gout* is masculine, hence modified by the masculine possessive pronoun. But *son* does not mean "his." It carries no sexual connotation at all, and it has no relationship to *chacun*. In English we say, "To each his own," and "Everyone to his liking." We could just as logically say, "Everyone to her liking." If custom did not dictate use of the masculine pronoun, Pronouns cannot be selected so whimsically in other Indo-European languages. They are ruled by grammatical gender, not by biological classifications.

SOME HAVE claimed that the structure of a language affects the thought processes of those who speak it. Does the completely sexual connotation of English third person singular pronouns prompt us to find sexual significance in their use?

It might be argued that English provides more opportunity for sexual discrimination (intentional or otherwise) because there is often no rule determining whether "he" or "she" should be used. When we mean no particular person, we must choose between them. In languages with systems of grammatical gender no such freedom of choice exists: the pronoun is determined by the gender of the noun, and the writer is spared the pain of deciding. Perhaps English-speakers are simply paying a penalty for their freedom of choice. Like other freedoms of which the English-speaking peoples are so proud, it has problems attached to it.

Another way of avoiding the pronoun dilemma is not to have any separate forms for "he" or "she." Hungarian and Finnish do precisely that, as do most languages outside the Indo-European and Semitic worlds. Some Indo-European languages (Spanish, Italian, Polish, Greek) rarely use their personal subject-pronouns except for emphasis.

Replays

by John Twohey



WASHINGTON — Three times in seven days, Cyrus Vance disagreed in public with foreign policy pronouncements by U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young.

The he/she dilemma has, of course, been noticed in the past and has occasionally been reflected in our literature. Henry Fielding in "Tom Jones" addressed a plea for understanding to "the reader's heart, if he or she have any." But that has the air of an attempt at jocularly, rather than a gesture of appeasement toward females. Walt Whitman, sturdily all-inclusive as usual, wrote, "He or she is greatest who contributes the greatest original practical example." These were statements made for effect, not automatic reflexes to a noisy outside stimulus.

Professional linguists have generally concluded that English is better off for having abandoned the complications of grammatical gender, but they are sometimes troubled by the awkwardness and ambiguity that result from our personal pronoun system. Simon Potter called it a deficiency: "It might be argued . . . that English would be improved as a medium of communication by the adoption of a common or epicene pronoun which might refer clearly to both male and female." Otto Jespersen wrote: "It is at times an inconvenience to have to specify the sex of the person spoken about."

It certainly is, especially when spirited, determined women are poised to complain that they are belittled when a writer refers only to "he" or "his." Even those who stick to traditional usage can feel obliged to apologize or explain. Wyatt Cooper, in his recent autobiography, "Families," suddenly remarks, in a paragraph appearing with as little warning as a summer squall, and without apparent relevance to what preceded it:

"I would like to state loudly and clearly that when I say 'man' or when I use 'he,' I mean 'man and woman' and I mean 'he and she.' I do not so state each time because the use of the masculine form is an ancient and historical one . . . and it is a literary form with which I am comfortable. But that does not mean that I think men are stronger, brighter, more worthy, more steadfast, or more promising than women."

That is quite an old-fashioned point of view. One wonders how many angry letters Mr. Cooper received in response to it.

Devol, a former USIA writer and editor, now freelances from Washington.

This message first appeared on May 4, 1972. We think it is just as timely today.

Stagnation is still the worst form of pollution.

Pollution takes many forms. In the American experience, by far the most damaging form has been stagnation. Economic stagnation.

This is the stagnation that brings a region or a community (or a race, or an economic group) or the whole country to a standstill. It deprives people of upward mobility. It erodes individual ability and self-respect and even hope.

Of all forms of pollution, economic stagnation has been least acceptable to other generations of Americans.

In the 1930s, as part of our response to the Depression, America mounted a great effort to overcome the blight of the South. And of the Dust Bowl, and other rural sectors. In the 1940s, emphasis shifted to the nation's declining small towns; and for a decade, on into the 1950s, our efforts were directed largely at relief for the depressed areas of New England, the Middle Atlantic states, the Midwest, and the Great Lakes region.

During the 1960s, social policy and programs reached out toward new concerns: the hopelessness of the rural poor, the bitterness of the ghetto.

But for all our good intentions, the basic problem will persist until we focus

on root causes: failure to conserve and develop resources; failure to keep pace in fostering the new investment that creates new jobs; failure to encourage sound growth and expansion of the private sector as the sole support of works needed in the public sector. These omissions lead to stagnation. Stagnation has polluted the lives of millions of Americans. It will continue to pollute lives until we as a nation attain the understanding and determination that can stop it. And we can stop it without impairing the environment.

To stop pollution of human existence we must restore a decent priority to economic growth—sound, responsible, adequate growth. Public policy must encourage growth and expansion. It must encourage investment, innovation, and new technology.

Growth carries with it some costs. But they are costs we can afford and may eventually be able to reduce. Economic stagnation brings far larger costs—larger than America can afford—and they multiply inexorably through the generations.

What we inherit when that happens is surely the very worst of all the many forms of pollution.

The Washington Post

OUTLOOK

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1977

Columnists / Editorials

In Search of Brzezinski

The Elusive Ideas of 'Carter's Kissinger'

By Robert Scheer

"We had to clear everything with Brzezinski that concerned foreign policy. Carter would always ask: 'Has Brzezinski seen this?' So finally all staff memos on foreign policy had notes attached that he had approved or seen them."

—Milton Gwirtzman, an issues coordinator in the Carter campaign

IT WAS a dependency that began some four years ago when Jimmy Carter journeyed up from Atlanta to the Carnegie Foundation building on New York's plush East Side to attend meetings of the Trilateral Commission. The elite gathered there had responded to a call from David Rockefeller to help unite the industrialized world and, while they may not have yet accomplished that purpose, they did provide an aspiring presidential candidate with a properly credentialed foreign policy tutor. The relationship worked beautifully: the Georgia governor knew little about foreign affairs and Zbigniew Brzezinski seemed to know everything. Clearing it with Brzezinski became the watchword of the campaign.

But, although the close relationship between the two men has now continued into the White House, little is known about the former Columbia University professor who is currently being billed as "the Polish Kissinger." Despite voluminous writings and previous dry runs as a presidential adviser, he remains an obscure and confusing figure. To some he is a dedicated freedom fighter and to others a fanatical cold warrior fascinated by technological gadgetry. To his family and secretaries, he appears warm and engaging, while critics describe him as a Dr. Strangelove type. He has been on the fringes of public life for decades as a director of the Council on Foreign Relations, a Soviet affairs specialist and recently as head of the Trilateral Commission. But the question remains: What makes "Zbig" Brzezinski run?

"Rewriting History"

BRZEZINSKI'S previous government experience was too brief to provide much basis for speculation about his likely behavior as Carter's special assistant for national security affairs. During the Johnson administration he served for two years on the State Department's policy plan-

ing council, where he gained some attention and criticism for playing to the press.

He was known as a strong supporter of Johnson's Vietnam policies and appeared frequently in university forums to defend the administration's position. However, his major contribution was closer to his area of expertise: Soviet communism. He wrote an important speech for Johnson which called for "peaceful engagement" with the Soviet Union, and it is characteristic of Brzezinski's work that it was not altogether clear whether this was intended as a policy of increased confrontation or conciliation. But it was a good slogan, and the media picked up on it.

Brzezinski is proudly fond of his ability to defy political classification, appearing at the same moment provocative, opinionated, centrist and objective. During the Vietnam war, he came to define his stance as that of a "dawk," a disarming position that allowed him to be a staunch defender of the administration while occasionally disassociating himself from its more distasteful tactics.

Brzezinski, now 48, is aware that he had a reputation as a hard-line cold warrior eager to take on the Russians, and he has most recently been at pains to present a more balanced view of his position. Days before he received his NSC appointment he told me that he was an early proponent of détente with the Soviets and that in 1969 he had gone to Saigon with some peace offers for the Thieu regime.

"It makes me puke how some others who were strong supporters of the war are rewriting history," he said. "I'm not going to do that; it's too self-serving. But someday I'll tell you the story of my own efforts in '69 to end the war." Harvard professor Stanley Hoffmann, who opposed the war and has long been a rival of Brzezinski's, has a more negative assessment:

"I think he is someone who needs very solid brakes put on him. I mean, I remember him arguing about why don't we send counter-subversion teams into North Vietnam . . . in 1965."

"The next day I'm sure he must have forgotten it. That's fine when you're not in power. But when you are, you might try to carry it out on the day itself."

As in the case of Henry Kissinger, assessments of Brzezinski's political stability are often connected with judgments about his personality. But dealing with Brzezinski's personality or political viewpoint is like tracking down the Abominable Snowman — the animal gives off obscure and elusive clues, the experts all disagree on what the clues mean and throughout there is a persistent suspicion that he may not exist at all.

See BRZEZINSKI, Page C2

The Right to Privacy vs. the Right to Know

By Fred C. Shapiro

IT ISN'T spelled out anywhere in the Constitution, but the concept of an American right to privacy was formulated in 1888 when a federal judge, Thomas M. Cooley, decided that citizens had what he termed "a right to be let alone." With certain exceptions — census surveys and income tax filings are two principal examples — the restrictions Judge Cooley imposed on probing by the government into the affairs of individual citizens gained momentum until they were codified in 1974 in the Right to Privacy Act.

Today, however, more than a year after the act became effective in September, 1976, Americans are beginning to question whether these rights to privacy haven't begun to violate another basic right — also not specified in the Constitution — that of citizens to an effective and efficient government.

Are the new privacy regulations, as promulgated in 111 pages of guidelines issued by the Office of Management and Budget, materially hindering government departments, the press and eventually the voters from assessing the effectiveness of more than 300 federal and federally funded programs which cost the taxpayers more than \$33 billion last year?

Primarily at issue now are what sociologists and government investigators call "longitudinal" or followup studies which locate those who have gone through federal programs and assess the effect of the programs on them. At best, this kind of research is expensive. Locating subjects several years after treatment, contacting them discreetly, convincing them that their responses will be protected from law enforcement agencies, interviewing them professionally and collating their responses statistically takes a lot of money — as much as \$250 or \$300 per subject.

A recent followup of 1,853 patients who completed drug treatment three to six years ago, for example, cost the National Institute on Drug Addiction (NIDA) nearly half a million dollars. Was it worth it? Dr. Harold Ginzburg, NIDA's chief of evaluation, thinks so — emphatically.

"I gave us scientific verification of something we've been talking about, but only off the cuff, for a long time: that treatment does work," he said. "Drug usage was down substantially, from 75 per cent of the subjects who used narcotics daily before treatment, down to 6 per cent who are still using them daily. Employment was up 25 per cent, criminal behavior was down substantially."

Equally important, perhaps, was the opportunity given NIDA researchers to compare varying modes of narcotics treatment. The study, collated by Texas Christian University's Institute of Behavioral Research, contrasted methadone maintenance, therapeutic community and outpatient detoxification treatments with a sample number of patients who registered for programs but never actually entered them. In classifications such as employment, time out of jail and abstinence from opiate drugs, the therapeutic, or drug-free, treatment graduates outperformed the other three categories.

See QUEEN, Page C5

See PRIVACY, Page C5

Shapiro is a staff writer for The New Yorker magazine.



God Save The Queen

By Henry Fairlie

I REMEMBER the day when she became my Queen. For some ordinary reason, I had gone to the office early, and as I entered it a colleague said to me: "The King is dead." Not quite taking in what he had said, I nevertheless answered: "Long live the Queen." That is one way in which monarchy works. There is a ritual phrase which can accommodate every occasion. The shout of the heralds, "The King is dead! Long live the Queen!" proclaims that not even for a split second can Britain be without a monarch. With the last breath of the dying sovereign, the new sovereign draws her first, even though she might not know that she had become Queen, as in this case, because she was far away in a treetop in Africa.

That was 25 years ago. Elizabeth II, Defender of the Faith and Head of the Commonwealth, celebrates her Silver Jubilee today, only the third British monarch to do so in 200 years. Does it have any meaning in these times? Does it matter what kind of a Queen she has been? Is there any value any longer to the continuity of which she is the symbol?

Fairlie is a British journalist based in Washington and a frequent contributor to Outlook.

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Adam Gauthier counted on us.

If Red Cross hadn't trained young Lars Alecksen in lifesaving techniques, last summer Adam Gauthier just might have ended up one more drowning statistic. (Adam's alive and well today, thank you, and in the first grade in Manitowoc, Wisconsin.) We're not asking for medals (Lars is the one who deserves them). But we do need your continued support. Help us.

Because the things we do really help. In your own neighborhood. And across America. And the world.



We're counting on you.

Red Cross.

The Good Neighbor.

In Search of the Real Brzezinski



Associated Press

BRZEZINSKI, From Page C1

BRZEZINSKI HAS been an immensely prolific writer — 200 articles and eight books at last count — but many hours spent perusing this output did not leave this writer with a much clearer idea of where he stands. Most of this output affects an offhand, off-the-cuff style, with Brzezinski posing as an historian of the future, predicting with great certainty the course of events in the Kremlin, in East-West relations, the new technocracy which will govern us and the coming failures of Kissinger. Despite the confident prose style, which evidently appealed to Carter, it doesn't hold up that well.

Before the 1968 Czech uprising, he predicted that the Czechs were too placid a people ever to revolt and added that it was not in the U.S. interest to encourage them because an independent Czechoslovakia might be more difficult for the United States to deal with. Once the coup occurred, he supported the Czechs and implied that he had been expecting it all along.

When student radicals had their day at Columbia, Brzezinski wrote that the authorities had used insufficient force. . . . the use of force must be designed not only to eliminate the surface revolutionary challenge but to make certain that the revolutionary forces cannot later rally again under the same leadership. If that leadership cannot be physically liquidated, it can at least be expelled from the country or area in which the revolution is taking place.

But when Black Panther leader Fred Hampton was killed in Chicago, Brzezinski sharply criticized the police for violating Hampton's constitutional rights. In defense of his comments on physical liquidation, he later wrote that he was not advocating such a course but merely describing a logical alternative. He added that, since the original article had been subtitled "but not necessarily," it should have been obvious that it did not apply to Columbia. It should have been obvious that it did not apply to Columbia.

What is surprising is not that events make a hash of prediction but rather that, when that occurs, it apparently has the effect on Brzezinski of increasing his confidence. His positions on Vietnam illustrate that.

In February, 1968, he told U.S. News & World Report:

"Whether we like it or not, we are involved in something very long-term. . . . We must make it clear to the enemy that we have the staying power — we're willing to continue for 30 years and we happen to be richer and more powerful." He added, "I don't think a country like the United States can commit itself to the extent it has and 'chicken out.' The consequence of getting out would be far more costly than the expense of staying in."

The following year, when Nixon and Kissinger were in power, he called for a cease-fire in Vietnam on the grounds that "most of the conditions justifying our original intervention now have been changed." Chief among those, as he predicted confidently to reporters on a visit to Saigon, was that "a certain degree of political vitality is emerging."

"Conceptualizing"

POSSIBLY one of Brzezinski's problems is that, as his longtime friend, Dean Henry Rosovsky of Harvard, observed, he writes or dictates too fast.

"Zbig's style is like high-class journalism. I don't run it down at all, but it can be done pretty quickly. You dictate into a machine, and he's certainly doing his share of that. Zbig also loves expressions like the 'technocratic society,' he has an ear for that kind of stuff."

"That kind of stuff" refers to Brzezinski's ability to "conceptualize," to come up with large ideas that seem to explain a great deal. His writings on the coming "technocratic era," a futuristic view of what the computer hath wrought, helped give him a reputation as something of a Dr. Strangelove to some of his critics.

One critic, Prof. Arthur Mendel of the University of Michigan, wrote that Brzezinski displayed an "almost perfect example of one-dimensional thinking. In part, it is a regression to primitive fetishism, a belief that the ritualistic manipulation of technical agencies by itself assures good and wards off evil."

Brzezinski answered that he was only predicting, not celebrating, such a future. Perhaps. But here, as in much of his writings, he seems to be trying to have it both ways — dispassionate social scientist and advocate.

And there is an enthusiasm in his writings for what he predicts will be the "increasingly cultivated and programmed American society." There is an unmistakable up-beat ring when he writes that the "modernization of labor and the introduction of robots will reduce the chores that keep millions busy with doing things they dislike doing."

In response to those "Luddites" who fear that the new computer technology might lead to an increased centralization of authority, Brzezinski replied: "It is noteworthy that the U.S. Army has so developed its control systems that it is not uncommon for sergeants to call in and coordinate massive air strikes and artillery fire — a responsibility of colonels during World War II."

Brzezinski's most recent "conceptualization" involved the "trilateralism" of the Trilateral Commission, the floating international think tank founded by David Rockefeller in 1972 and directed by Brzezinski for three years. "Trilateralism" seemed to boil down to the idea that the United States, Western Europe and Japan would drive a harder bargain with the rest of the world if they were to cooperate fully. What made the idea seem fresh was the word "trilateralism" and the great energy behind it. Both Rockefeller and Jimmy Carter, an active Commission member, could advance it without hurting their interests.

The capacity for dovetailing his insights into the needs of

those more powerful than himself was noted by Brzezinski's former classmate, Prof. Hoffmann: "Maybe the thing I am most mad at in the case of Zbig — he was a man who could have been an absolutely first-rate scholar. He had it in him. His first books were very good books. And to me he has a little bit prostituted that talent in order to get power."

"Now, he was always clear about it. He told me very early on in the game that the last thing he wanted to become was a Mr. Chips. I'm using his words. 'You simply cannot let yourself be buried alive in the university.'"

"But I think he has carried the escape very far indeed. It has been a willingness to follow intellectual fashions and present views, albeit brilliantly argued, because he thought they would have an impact and be in the stream, even if they were very flimsy or very derivative."

The Private Man

AN ATTEMPT to evaluate Brzezinski's personal drives is made difficult by his own deep sense of privacy. While he thrives on the attention of the media, he tends to treat a news conference as an introductory political science course. He loves to lecture and will treat questions that depart from his chosen subject as so much chitchat.

That generally includes anything that would provide an insight into the man behind the name. He is intensely jealous of his privacy. He conducts his life as one would expect from someone who once won a Jaycees man of the year award and who has the mannerisms of a hard-driving business executive rather than a professor.

Vacationing at his Northeast Harbor, Maine, summer home, he is an interested father to his three children and almost boyish himself as he races about at excessive speeds in his power boat and Mercedes. Even in that situation, he is possessed of a driving energy as he chases after driftwood for his wife's sculpture or for just the perfect water-skiing spot, with the happy gusto of a beer commercial.

Seeing him in Maine, one has the sense of a man who is enormously pleased with the upward mobility of his life and deeply grateful for the opportunities this country presents to its immigrants. But even there, where his closest friend is David Rockefeller, who has an estate in nearby Seal Harbor, Brzezinski does not seem fully to belong.

One is made aware that, for all this upward mobility, he has not been able to break the Polish connection. When I mentioned to him that a number of presidential candidates had thought him a likely prospect for head of NSC or State, he replied:

"Yeah, well, without playing games, I will be willing to give you very high odds, very high odds, against either one of those two possibilities coming to pass. There are a lot of other people who will be in the running who are not of ethnic origin, who don't have a different name; you know, who may just seem more palatable."

I pointed out that Kissinger had made it despite his accent and Brzezinski offered this view of just where the Poles stand in the American pecking order:

"I think it is a fact that WASPs, then Germans who have assimilated into a kind of super-waspsiness, then Jews, then Irish, have become part, to a greater extent, of the accepted framework of Americanism than either Slavs or Greeks or Italians, not to speak of Puerto Ricans or blacks. So, while I don't want to put too much emphasis on my ethnic background, I think it subconsciously probably plays a bit of a role; so does the name."

When Brzezinski thinks about his being Polish, it is from an American rather than foreign point of reference, as his immigrant rather than an emigre. He is concerned with the immigrant movement up the American success ladder rather than with any sense of liberating Poland.

As the child of a pre-World War II diplomat, Brzezinski lived outside of Poland, mostly in Canada where his father was the consul in Montreal until the Nazis took over Poland. He was educated in Canadian private and public schools and went on to graduate work at Harvard after receiving his B.A. from Montreal's McGill University.

He was certainly part of the emigre community, as was his future wife, Mushka (the grandniece of Eduard Benes, the last non-Communist president of Czechoslovakia). But it was a very smooth and sophisticated segment of the exile community. He was raised among diplomats of the old school, and it would be difficult to attribute an excess of passion to that upbringing.

Harvard classmates report that he went into Eastern European studies more because he had a base in Slavic languages and realized it was a rapidly growing field, than out of any sense of political outrage.

Unlike James Schlesinger, a Harvard contemporary remembered as a right-winger, Brzezinski shared the political attitudes of his college peers, which were pro-Stevenson and anti-McCarthy. Harvard's Rosovsky calls it "Cold War liberalism — I think that none of us at that time questioned the major premises of American foreign policy."

Rosovsky does, however, recall Brzezinski having a rather unorthodox teaching style that might have fed reports of a strident anti-Communism: "He had . . . a sense of the dramatic. I remember when I came back from the Army with a black jacket that I picked up somewhere. He was giving a lecture on totalitarianism or something and he borrowed this black jacket and went in there waving it at the students. He was that kind of teacher. . . . Zbig was a bit of a practical joker."

Brzezinski's only real activism at Harvard occurred in 1959 when he was an assistant professor and helped to organize a group of Americans to confront the enemy at the Communist-sponsored World Youth Festival in Vienna.

Sigmund, now a Princeton professor of political science, was an officer of the National Student Association, and it was later revealed that the trip was financed covertly by the CIA. Brzezinski says he does not know whether that would have made a difference. He recalls unfurling a banner proclaiming the cause of Hungarian and Algerian freedom, but recounts it as something of a lark.

Wasps and Jews

BOTH Kissinger and Brzezinski are much more products of Harvard in the 1950s than of an emigre culture. While Brzezinski goes to church regularly and his children are raised as Catholics, he is quick to point out that his version of Polish Catholicism is fundamentally different from, let's say, Irish Catholicism. It's not dogmatic; it's very liberal.

"My father was always very liberal — politically, socially, racially — and it really is more a part of your cultural background than part of any living vital doctrine."

Virtually all of his close friends since college days have been neither Catholic nor Polish. "I guess the two groups I spent most of my life with were either WASPs or Jews. . . . you're with the WASPs, you're more likely to be with the business, banking community or the social community; if you're with professional, intellectual personal friends, they're more likely to be Jewish."

Does Brzezinski feel he has played a pioneering role? "I don't consider myself the Jackie Robinson of the Polish-American community. . . . I'm also very much part of the WASP community, very much a part of the intellectual community. I'm very much a part, in fact, both socially and professionally, of the Jewish community. I guess I live in at least three different communities at the same time."

He indicated his respect for "WASP culture," saying, "I like the sense of tradition, the sense of pride, the element of self-confidence, that certain ability to strive without seeming to strive. I have found these qualities appealing."

I asked if he felt any social insecurity in hanging out with David Rockefeller. In language characteristic of his stiff style, he replied:

"No. I feel a certain asymmetry of my command of resources as compared to his, but that's, I think, an objectively discernable fact. Other than that, no, I don't feel in any way different. After all, I grew up on this side of the ocean. I went, fortunately enough, to reasonably good schools. I grew up with these people."

Asked if he hadn't been selected out by "these people" to administer to their interests, his response:

"Well, to turn serious, I don't think I administer. I think I may contribute to the formulation of more realistic and, subjectively judging it, more socially just perspectives within the elite."

"In a way, if you will, I'm a transmission belt . . . between people like you, who are the elite's supported and appointed critics, and those who actually exercise power and wield it."

Who are those? "Well, those are the decision-makers, those are the people who control the major departments of government, the major banks, the major corporations."

But it is Brzezinski's view that the elite's ability to rule has been seriously challenged and its power fragmented. "It seems to me that at least since the days of Wilson, the three cars had been following us since I was picked up at my hotel by a friend who had a car and knew his way around this old and cold Czech capital."

We were waiting at a red light on a main thoroughfare. Suddenly, as the light began to change, my colleague of mine who had come at the same time said he did not notice anybody following him. After the red light turned across the path of the oncoming traffic and lost the three cars that had been talking us.

"Those goons," my smiling colleague said in broken English, "they never think you would do something illegal to get away from something that is illegal."

We spun around several narrow streets and then parked and waited in a small courtyard for a few minutes to make sure we still weren't being followed.

When we felt safe, we continued our journey to interview two of the Czech citizens who, along with some 300 other people here, had signed "Charter 77." The document, which was slipped out to the West for publication, is a dramatic assertion that Czech citizens are deprived of basic human rights guaranteed them under their own constitution and in internationally ratified pacts such as the Helsinki accords and U.N. resolutions.

"You see, it's not always so serious here," my companion said as we resumed our journey, "we have some fun occasionally."

This thousand-year-old city of spices and ancient squares, however, is hardly a fun place these days. The government crackdown on the signers of Charter 77 has produced a stifling, nasty mood that also extends to the business of trying to find out and report what is happening.

Government tactics appear to be twofold: arrest or otherwise harass and isolate the charter signers, and intimidate Western reporters into keeping away from them. After the charter was published, the signers were told that they were no longer to be interviewed. Jan. 6, the government slowly began disconnecting the phones of all the well-known figures among the signers.

Many of them are writers, playwrights and former members of the Communist Party during the brief fling with liberal Marxism of Alexander Dubcek during the famous "Prague Spring" of 1968. That was before Soviet tanks invaded the city.

Some were arrested. Others had their cars taken away. If reporters wanted to speak to the signers, they now had to go to see them in their apartments. From the outset of a five-day stay here, seemingly endless numbers of plainclothes police followed everywhere. Whenever my taxi stopped, two men would jump from a following car and follow me by foot.

On two occasions, one agent darted into a building I was headed for just before I entered. Within moments, I caught sight of him, always one landing above me on the staircase. Then, when I reached the apartment I wanted, he came rushing down the stairs, brushing up against me and grabbing his most evil look.

The police never actually stopped me from seeing anyone who happened to be at home, although on one occasion, my ring went unanswered after a secret service man had run up to the top-floor apartment first.

For reporters coming here on visits at such a tense time, there is the fear of getting the signers in trouble because the plainclothesmen follow reporters to their interviews. Yet the spokesmen for Charter 77 warn that any newspaper that gets them in one sense, in case they eventually disappear. More important, there is no other way for them to make their side of the civil rights argument known.

The government has branded these signers as traitors, in the employ of the West. As proof, they cite the use of French and British newspapers for the original publication of the charter.

But as the British Communist Party newspaper Morning Star (whose Jan. 10 edition was banned here) points out: "The signers have been denied the possibility of expressing their views openly on the issues raised within the charter . . . yet when they seek other means of making their views known, including through foreign newspapers, they are condemned. It is an impossible situation."

After a second high-speed car chase through Prague, in which my colleague lost three more cars.

Joseph Kraft

Renewing the Chinese Connection

PEKING—No day seems to go by without the Carter administration's putting one in the eye of the Chinese regime. To make matters worse, the slight is inadvertent, springing from negligence of China and its recent troubles in favor of more exciting projects.

But despite Peking's recent fall from grace, the United States has no interest in letting the China connection lapse. So Washington ought to grab at an overture—revealed here for the first time I think—that would keep the initiative going.

The other strand linking the United States and China is bilateral. It centers around the regime in Taiwan, which claims to be the legitimate government of China. Under the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, President Nixon abandoned the view that there could be two Chinas—one on Taiwan, another on the mainland. In spirit, if not in the small print, the communiqué gave the impression Washington would foster the eventual return of control of Taiwan to the Chinese.

But delivering these implicit commitments proved politically difficult—especially after Ronald Reagan and the right wing began to challenge President Chou En-lai had been passed on sideways.

The slight has not escaped the Chinese. They called Carter, in one reference, a "landlord." They have visited small indignities upon American diplomats here—like refusing letters because stamps bearing the picture of Chou En-lai had been pasted on sideways.

In addition, the Carter administration has expressed special interest in the European allies and Japan, in Panama and Latin America, in Africa and the Middle East. China, as one American diplomat here acknowledged, was "obviously at the bottom of Carter's agenda."

The slight has not escaped the Chinese. They called Carter, in one reference, a "landlord." They have visited small indignities upon American diplomats here—like refusing letters because stamps bearing the picture of Chou En-lai had been pasted on sideways.

Michael Geller

'Two Cars Began Following Me . . .

PRAGUE—In the rear-view mirror, we could see the grey Skoda sedan with three men in it. Behind them were the headlights of two black Tatra sedans.

The three cars had been following us since I was picked up at my hotel by a friend who had a car and knew his way around this old and cold Czech capital.

We were waiting at a red light on a main thoroughfare. Suddenly, as the light began to change, my colleague of mine who had come at the same time said he did not notice anybody following him.

After the red light turned across the path of the oncoming traffic and lost the three cars that had been talking us.

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The government has branded these signers as traitors, in the employ of the West. As proof, they cite the use of French and British newspapers for the original publication of the charter.

But as the British Communist Party newspaper Morning Star (whose Jan. 10 edition was banned here) points out: "The signers have been denied the possibility of expressing their views openly on the issues raised within the charter . . . yet when they seek other means of making their views known, including through foreign newspapers, they are condemned. It is an impossible situation."

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The News Business

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George F. Will

Labor's Love Lost

I had not suspected that Shakespeare's works were George Meany's constant companions. Meany, head of the AFL-CIO, is known as a tribune of the proletariat, not as a dramatic critic.

Broadcasting has decided to become a minor partner in the British Broadcasting Corporation's production of Shakespeare's 36 plays, which will be shown on U.S. public stations. And after years of public television in the first half of this year, all foreign programming is expected to constitute less than 10 per cent of total programming.

One of the purposes of public television is to expand the horizons of commercial television, and public television has done this with British imports. ABC's spectacularly popular "Roots" was made possible, in part, by "The Forsyte Saga" and "Upstairs

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

Taking the Sugar Without the Pill

NEWS STORIES seldom fit together as well as two that appeared on page A3 of this paper last Friday. One story said that, according to a Louis Harris poll, the public rated Congress' ethical standards as lower than those of any other public officials, consumer groups or—so help us—the press. Next to that was a story that showed one reason why: It told how the House leadership, by artful scheduling, has pretty well forestalled a floor vote on the pending \$12,400 congressional pay raise before it takes effect automatically on Feb. 20. The congressional raise is part of a package that would also increase the salaries of federal judges and top officials of the executive branch. Legislators who oppose an increase for themselves, and any who are willing to endorse it, may do so at a hearing. But no congressman is going to be required to vote himself 29 per cent more pay and take the heat from his constituents.

The Senate has behaved almost as shabbily. Sen. James B. Allen (D-Ala.) did bring up a disapproval motion on Wednesday, but it was tabled by a 56-42 vote. By doing that, those 56 senators did all that was needed to keep their vote on track without the embarrassment of actually raising it. If braced by their constituents, they can take refuge in parliamentary double-talk: Wednesday, they can say, was not quite the right time to debate the issue. Oddly enough, if members of both houses play this game carefully, the right time for an honest yes-or-no vote will never be found.

This is a piece with the recent news from House Ethics Committee Chairman John J. Flynn's resistance to removing Rep. Robert F. L. Sikes (D-Fla.) from a powerful chairmanship despite his reprimand for conflict-of-interest violations last year. And then there are the tales about the murky finances of House Majority Leader Jim Wright (D-Tex.), who has

used thousands of dollars in campaign contributions to pay off personal debts—apparently without technically violating any law. All this perpetuates the impression of cynicism as a way of congressional life.

Ironically, all this is happening just as that impression is getting a little out of date. A large majority of House Democrats did vote to take away Mr. Sikes' chairmanship. Far more significantly, a special House commission led by Rep. David R. Obey (D-Wis.) is finishing work on tough ethics rules that would, among other things, require full financial disclosure by representatives and their spouses, put strict curbs on outside earned income and abolish private office accounts. Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. (D-Mass.), whose style often seems reminiscent of "The Last Hurrah," is nonetheless said to be fully committed to a strong new code and has already bolstered the ethics committee's membership. Over in the Senate, a special panel chaired by Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.) has also started to devise new rules.

These initiatives are just what the independent Peterson commission had in mind when it concluded that members of Congress could most effectively justify a reasonable pay increase for themselves by coupling it with full disclosure and real curbs on corrupt and questionable practices. The pay raise, so the theory went, would make the ethics code more palatable, like a sugar-coated pill. The ways things are going now, however, the members are going to get the sugar without having to swallow the pill. We would like to believe that solid majorities for real reforms do now exist, and that House and Senate leaders are determined enough to overcome all the resistance that remains. But there is only one way for Congress to convince anybody on that score—and that is for it to swallow a strict ethics code.

Exodus

CHRISTIANITY TODAY, the successful evangelical magazine, which is currently based in Washington, has decided to leave town. Apparently against the wishes of its editorial staff, but at the behest of its board of directors, the magazine will be moving its headquarters to a spot near Wheaton, Ill. All this would be little more than a matter of graceful goodbyes were it not for some rather peculiar reasons that have been given for the magazine's departure. For, in addition to certain editorial and financial conveniences that go with the move (Wheaton is a center of evangelical activity in the country), some of the magazine's board members have cited certain disadvantages that go with being here. Chief among them seems to be what is called the "polluted" moral and spiritual atmosphere of our town.

The most explicit expression of all this we've seen appeared in Newsweek's account, which we quote: "Citing statistics on soaring liquor consumption and illegitimate births in the District—plus examples of Congressional hanky-panky—CT's board chairman, Harold Ockenga, announced last week that the magazine would move. . . . Deleterious things happen to attitudes if a person lives here," said Ockenga. . . . "The time has come to take a stand. After all, our magazine is trying to present Christianity in ethics and lifestyle."

Well, now, just a darn minute. It seems to us that if what Mr. Ockenga says is true, he makes a better case for staying than for leaving. Surely if we are the moral mess he proclaims, in this city, there is every reason for evangelists to stick around and try to change our ways. After all, perhaps the most famous evangelical Christian in the country has just moved into the White House, with a view to doing something along those lines. And what makes Mr. Ockenga think that small-town America is relatively sin-free, anyway? We'd put Peyton Place up against Washington any old day in the moral pollution sweepstakes, or, if you want to get a little classier about it, Yoknapatawpha County or Winesburg, Ohio.

It is, of course, true—we feel bound to tell you—that Wheaton, Ill., is a liquorless place, and no one would make that claim for the District of Columbia, unless he was out-of-his-head drunk. But even so, we think our town is a fit place to house committed Christian evangelists—providing them with just the right amount of inspiration. Of course, we already have lived here for some time, so perhaps you will just have to chalk up our boosterism to one of those deleterious things that can happen to people's attitudes in Washington.

New Hope in Cyprus?

WHAT IS unique about the Cyprus crisis is the extent to which it is bound up with the diplomatic and political style of one man, Henry Kissinger. This is said not to initiate a round of recrimination, which nobody needs, but rather in the spirit of a remark made many years ago by Henry Stimson, when he was asked, "How on earth can we ever bring peace to the world?" He replied: "You begin by bringing to Washington a small handful of able men who believe that the achievement of peace is possible. You work them to the bone until they no longer believe that it is possible. And then you throw them out and bring in a new bunch who believe that it is possible." Leaving aside how applicable it may be to Mr. Kissinger's line of mind when he left office, Mr. Stimson's premonition may well be relevant to any number of international disputes and conflicts now seemingly deadlocked. For today, it is enough to note that no sooner had a "new bunch" moved in than, suddenly, prospects for some movement on Cyprus started looking up. A new American initiative has been launched, with the naming of a special emissary, Clark Clifford, to explore the opportunities for settlement. Almost overnight, the Greek Cypriot majority, huddled in the South, and the Turkish Cypriot minority, settled behind the Turkish occupying army in the North, have started recalculating their odds. So have their patrons in Greece and Turkey. The upshot is that a situation that looked virtually incurable and fraught with peril only a month ago has about it a cast of cautious hope today.


The key has always been in Ankara. As long as Turkey saw that the United States was tying the full re-supply of U.S. Turkish military cooperation to renewed American access to Turkish bases, rather than to progress on healing the Turkish-inflicted wound on Cyprus, then things only got worse. Congress, controlled by forces demanding a rollback of the Turkish occupation of Cyprus, defied Mr. Kissinger on arms and aid for Turkey. The Turks responded by closing bases used by the United States and by edging

toward the NATO exit door. Efforts to promote talks on the island got nowhere.

But Mr. Carter said during the campaign, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance has just restated, that progress on Cyprus must be made before questions of arms and aid can be addressed. Obviously with this in mind, Turkey on Jan. 27 allowed the leader of the Turkish Cypriot minority, Rauf Denktaş, to meet with the Greek Cypriot president, Archbishop Makarios. It was the first such meeting in 13 years, and another is planned on Feb. 12. Various compromise formulas are being discussed to allow the two communities to live side by side in peace under the same governmental roof. The Turkish political opposition is no doubt tempted, as usual, to denounce any display of moderation as a sellout. But there are signs, small but promising, that the Turks realize that the wind from Washington has shifted and that this may be the time to cut the appalling losses in international prestige, in defense readiness and in access to the European economy that their Cyprus policy has inflicted upon them.

The Cyprus crisis is often perceived as the product of profound ethnic rivalries, which are also held accountable for the host of other problems that have rent Greek-Turkish relations and decimated the eastern Mediterranean corner of NATO in recent years. One does not want to dismiss the ethnic factor: Without it there would have been no crisis. But the proximate cause of the crisis was a flawed American policy, and its solution became hopelessly ensnared in executive-congressional combat. This makes it easier, not harder, to try to fix now. A sensible policy is not only likely to untangle Greeks and Turks but to dissolve the executive-congressional tangle. It is a case for quiet diplomacy and meaningful consultation with Congress. Unlike, let us say, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Cyprus dispute, for all the bitterness that has compounded it in the past, may not be quite as intractable as it has sometimes been seen—or made—to be.

"HEY—WAIT FOR ME!"



LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Searching for Solitude

May I add a word to "Solzhenitsyn's Quest for Solitude?"

There are so few of us who can tell the rest of us how it really is that their excessive need for privacy should not only be respected but understood. If I feel (along with E. B. White) that "A person afflicted with poetic longings of one sort or another searches for a kind of intellectual and spiritual privacy in which to indulge his strange excesses and to achieve this sort of privacy—his serial suspension of the selfish spirit—he does not necessarily have to wrench himself away, physically, from everybody and everything in his life . . . but he does have to forsake certain easy rituals, such as earning a living and running the world's errands," how must a man of Solzhenitsyn's stature feel?

Please America, just accept that he lives in Vermont, and allow him to spend all his time writing!

We will all benefit.

Bethesda
HORTENSE MEYERS DAITZ

Familiar Face

The full page advertisement by the South African Committee for Fairness in Sport, which appeared in The Washington Post on Jan. 27, says that all the sportsmen pictured are eligible to represent South Africa. We see there a New Zealand rugby football player whom we know. He has the New Zealand insignia on his clothes. How can he be eligible to represent South Africa?

LLOYD WHITE,
Ambassador,
Embassy of New Zealand,
Washington

So Much for Symbols

On Wednesday, Jan. 26, President Carter opened the Justice Department's big Pennsylvania Avenue doors as a symbol of a new policy.

On Thursday, Jan. 27, I symbolically walked through those doors and was symbolically thrown out. It turns out if you're an average citizen not working for the government, you still have to enter through the side doors of Justice.

Washington
FRANK WARNER

Changing Maryland's Income Tax

The Post, in its Jan. 12 editorial on Maryland tax reform, showed a misunderstanding of the changes being proposed and a lack of knowledge of the impact of these on the state's local governments, and thus drew an utterly wrong conclusion.

The changes in the income tax that could be classed as reforms are really just tinkering with the system. Certainly, the state will not get an increase in revenue, a modest \$29.25 million. The 23 counties and Baltimore City will gain, all together, about half that because, of all the local governments in the state, only their income taxes are tied to the state tax base.

The other 150-plus local governments in the state, the incorporated municipalities, are tied to a different base for their income tax share, a slow growing base. Seven of these municipalities, including Rockville, College Park and Bowie, have larger populations than the counties, and six of them deliver more services to their residents than the nine counties do to theirs. The proposed changes in the state income tax will actually cause the municipalities to suffer a loss in the tax base. So far the tax reform committee has not considered this problem.

The Post, recognizing the rapid tax increase that are making people restless, has suggested that property taxes could be reduced by sums proportional

Accountability for Oil Spills

It was inaccurate to Jack Anderson in a recent column to accuse the American Petroleum Institute of lobbying "to limit the liability" of shipowners in tanker spills. Just the opposite is true. The API has been in the forefront of supporters of legislation and insurance programs designed to place responsibility for damages caused by spills on shippers and cargo owners.

Two voluntary insurance programs API has supported for many years are TOVALOP (Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement on Liability for Oil Pollution) and CRYSTAL (Contract Regarding an Interim Suspension to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution).

Both insurance plans provide for reimbursement to governments for damages resulting from spills. CHRIS

Washington
HARRY H. HARDY,
American Petroleum Institute

Washington
To the Rescue of Spiderman

What kind of intellectual cant is spilling out of the mouth of the kindergarten teacher complaining about the Spiderman comic book, Jan. 27? The concept of the superhero is a weaponless hero; the wrongdoer is always punished or disliked by Spiderman and the good guys. Spiderman proves that good and justice always prevail without the use of weapons. This concept is one small step in the right direction and 100 per cent better than the Duffy Looney Tunes. Long Live The Web-Head!

TERRY RANDOLPH
Chevy Chase

The kindergarten teacher who complained about the addition of the comic strip Spiderman to The Post's pages should have known better. Anything that encourages children to read, rather than watch the tube, is to be welcomed, not protested. The strip is well-drawn (a rarity these days), and

Hyattsville
MICHAEL S. BARSON

Neglecting Past Heroes

By the time this letter is printed, Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.'s birthday will have come and gone, having been observed in a frenzy of appropriate notice throughout the national capital area. Having left Dr. King's birthday, we now approach the birthdays of two American who used to stand prominently placed in the mural of American history and in the mind of every school child. The time has come, in this post-Bicentennial year, to ask just exactly

what the national attitude is toward George Washington and Abraham Lincoln.

Are the national birthdays of these two giants of our history to be considered merely quaint, eccentric legacies of long-ago Congresses? Or excuses for greater sales in the retail market? America's strength has been its willingness to cast aside outworn tradition, that strength has also become a penchant for discarding whatever is old just because it does not happen to be the fashion of the moment, or year, or decade. If this attitude holds ill for the nation, it certainly holds ill for the future respect of current heroes.

Thomas Carlyle has observed that "History is the first distinct product of man's spiritual nature, his earliest expression of what can be called 'thought.' If Carlyle is correct, and our current neglect of past heroes is indicative of current thought levels, it may be appropriate to question whether we are, indeed, a thinking society."

HELEN INGRAHAM FRANCIS
Kennington

The Washington Post

ROBERT MEYER, 1975-1980
PHILIP L. GRAHAM, 1981-1983

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Garrett Park

For the Record

From a statement issued on Jan. 26 by Metropolitan Police Chief Maurice J. Callinan:

As the whole world looked on, the 39th President of the United States was inaugurated on the steps of the U.S. Capitol building. Then, departing from past traditions, President Carter, accompanied by members of his family, walked along Pennsylvania Avenue, greeting the 300,000 people who had traveled from all over the country to witness this historic event.

Clearly, the fact that everything turned out so well, and that there were no serious incidents, was truly a credit to all of the law enforcement agencies who took part in planning the necessary security arrangements.

However, the citizens of the Washington community and the men and women of the Metropolitan Police Department who lined the parade route set the friendly tone for the day. They welcomed visitors from all over the country. It may have been some advice on what sites to visit while in Washington, or maybe some suggestions as to the most direct route back to the parking lot, or perhaps the presence of police officers ensuring their safety. But, when that record number of tourists returned home, they carried with them some very fond memories that they will probably never forget.

As they tell their relatives and friends about their stay in our nation's capital, they will provide a best advertisement for people to visit the District of Columbia that anyone could possibly have developed.

The Great Blizzard of '88

By Judith S. Rosenfeld

It started (they said, after it began) in Michigan, which is a place you might suspect of blizzards starting if you were an Easterner in 1888, although the Dakota territory was more commonly blamed for bad weather.

It lasted, officially, from March 11 to March 14, but that includes the full day it spent crippling Washington and Baltimore before it trundled destructively on to Philadelphia, New York and points north.

There have been bigger snowfalls, worse storms, colder winters, but there is a special place in legend for the awful, monumental, unspeakably terrible and altogether marvelous blizzard of '88.

In 1888, were 220,000 people in Washington, D.C.; Georgetown was not yet a part of the city. There were 1,225,000 people in Philadelphia; 1.8 million in Manhattan, nearly 3 million in the metropolis if one counted the complex of adjacent communities which were eventually to make up a unified New York.


These and neighboring New Jersey towns were linked with Manhattan by ferries, railroads or bridges traveled by horse-drawn trolley cars. Immigrants had stilled the

population of the United States, then totaling almost 60 million, by nearly 5 million in the 1880s, one of the main points of entry was Castle Garden in New York. The Statue of Liberty was 2 years old.

Grover Cleveland was in the White House; he is conspicuously absent in newspaper accounts of the blizzard. So is Congress, Department of the Interior, National Guard, governors of the affected states and government in general. The blizzard of '88 was a disaster, but there were no disaster areas.

The American Bell Telephone Company, which had a total monopoly throughout the whole of the United States, had less than half a million subscribers. In the main, phone service depended on 127,839 miles of wire on telephone poles and on 10,225 miles of wire strung between buildings. There were 17,635 miles of wire buried underground.

The country's vital communications link was the telegraph. In 1888, there were 776,289 miles of telegraph wire in the nation. Outside the cities, telegraph poles were generally strung beside the tracks along which moved another vital communications link, the trains.



Snowbound trolley on the Bowery.



26th Street in New York City.

SUNDAY, March 11, 1888, was a mild, rainy day in a Washington winter which had been notable for its warm weather. That morning, the newspaper's graceless full tribute to the Emperor William of Germany, who had just died, and dealt briefly with the disappointments of a much-touted boxing match between John L. Sullivan and one Charles Mitchell in Chantilly, France.

It had begun to drizzle about 8, unremarkably. At around 11 a.m., as church services were about to begin, the gentle rain turned into a deluge and the temperature rapidly cooled.

"How it did rain!" exclaimed The Washington Post the next morning. It was a swirling, pounding torrent which quickly filled the sewers and overflowed into gutters and streets and it was compounded by a wind which drove stinging spray into pedestrians' faces and penetrated soaked clothing. As the long, unpleasant afternoon wore on, the thermometer fell to 20 degrees. By 6, the torrential rain had become "a flying, blinding snowstorm" and ice glittered on streets and sidewalks, on the furiously lashing branches of trees and, ominously, on the swaying overhead telegraph and telephone lines which faced the city.

At dark, the streets had become a tangle of ice-coated wires, tree limbs and fallen telegraph poles, and shutters and debris were slamming about in a howling wind. "It was the most remarkable storm the city has seen in years," The Post said, adding disgustedly, "and the most disagreeable." The Star, on the other hand, found wonder in it, saying that about 3 p.m. "the immense rain drops turned into snow as by magic."

Slushy snow continued to fall as street lights failed. At the now defunct junction on B and 6th Streets, site of "the Sixth Street Station," live wires barred the way to the depot. G Street was impassable. Lafayette Park was littered with fallen branches. A huge tree limb blocked the snowy driveway to the East Gate within the White House grounds. Police call boxes no longer functioned and the electrically powered fire alarm system failed. Telegraph linesmen worked by the light of swaying lanterns to separate frozen tangles of wire but, in some streets, not a telegraph pole remained standing. By midnight, the city was in darkness except for "a few feeble gas jets."

All overhead telegraph lines to the White House were down and the presidential mansion was linked only by a single underground cable to the Capitol. All "departmental wires" were severed as well, but Washington was not a world capital and such developments were of relatively minor interest.

IT WAS THE AGE of great steam-powered locomotives "engines"—and miles upon running mile of track, of iron men on the railroads and endless movement by rail. Mail moved by train, foodstuffs and perishables, manufactured goods and people and cars packed with bawling livestock. The train depot, in all but large cities, was a center of life, a gathering place, a busy way station

for news from down the track and the site of the local telegraph office, staffed by a green-visored expert in Morse code. Larger centers had "indications officers" whose job it was to decipher, interpret and pass along reports of weather conditions along the road.

The New York train was far behind schedule and anxious people gathered at the depot. Nonetheless, at 10 that night, when there were only two telegraph lines remaining to tie the city with the world outside, the decision was taken to cut the tenuous link with New York and to switch to Pittsburgh and the west, where the weather was clear and unseasonably warm, ranging from 35 to 50 degrees. It was the action of the classic fool who searches for a lost coin on the next block where the light is better, but it was reinforced by the confident prediction of the "indications officer" at the Sixth Street telegraph office that the storm would be over by dawn.

It will probably be warmer tomorrow . . . The storm, in fact, was moving quickly out to sea, beyond the range of Coast Guard observers, beyond the imaginings of forecasters. A few days later the chief predictions officer was to explain, "We are utterly ignorant of what is going on to the east of us and overhead." The blizzard was heading for New York and New England even as it was being officially described as "the result of a storm trough that extended south from Michigan and which finally centered here in Washington."


The results, at any rate, were grim. For many the economic facts of life were supremely simple: A day without work meant no food. For emergency aid there was only the police "poor fund."

THE STORM had "centered" on Baltimore, too, but all wires were down there and the city was unaware of Washington's plight claim to primacy. Baltimore was "at the mercy of fire," with all the alarm boxes inoperative. Gales of 50 miles an hour whipped through the city, with "rooves and chimneys flying along the streets." A long disused watch-tower system was revived in the emergency. Sentinels were stationed in the freezing wind in firehouse bellies to search the city for signs of fire. They were relieved often during a night which old Bay captains said was "one of the worst ever experienced along the Chesapeake Bay."

In a phenomenon which was to be repeated, with many sailors lost, at the Delaware Capes, the cyclonic wind emptied the water out of the harbor. "It has literally blown all the water out into the Bay," said an awed observer.

On Monday morning, the last train from New York came through Baltimore and plowed on to Washington. It had been on the way for 24 hours, including a night's layover on a siding and 10 hours spent by passengers and crew in clearing fallen debris and telegraph poles from the snow-drifted roadbed. At that time, the Pennsylvania Railroad was officially still in service to Philadelphia.

Philadelphia had been told to expect colder weather



Burning holes in the snow after the storm.

than the springlike warmth which had prevailed that month. "Hoist cold wave signals," instructed Sunday's weather report for Monday, but the city was unprepared to find itself, as The Record put it that morning, "almost cut off from the rest of the world by a deep fall of snow which blocked its railroads, filled its streets, obstructed its horse car lines, broke down the telegraph wires and poles and put an almost utter stop to business of every kind. No such storm in its far-reaching effects was ever known in the city's history." The inches of snow had fallen on the city and winds reached 68 miles an hour.

Of 40 vessels in the harbor, only 13 were left undamaged. Thirty crewmen were killed.

"The Niagara Falls express left Ninth and Green Streets in the morning," The Record reported in evident exasperation on Tuesday, "but where it was at 10 o'clock last night was more than (Pennsylvania Railroad) General Manager Swigard could answer. It was up the road somewhere."

UP THE ROAD somewhere might have been used to describe what was happening to the railway system all up and down the East Coast, where trains were stranded, on and off the tracks, singly, in pairs, in convoys, empty and occupied. Railroad men, said The Washington Star, could only "conjecture what is going on along the line, that is all."

The railways were offering unheard-of sums, as much as \$5 a day's work in Philadelphia, to thousands of employees in Brooklyn, to laborers to shovel out the stalled trains or clear huge drifts off the tracks. Thousands, including many immigrants, were put to work, but railroad officials said that "not one-tenth of the needed men were found" and some train crews worked without stop from Sunday night through Tuesday.

Across the six New England states most heavily hit by the blizzard, drifts ranged from 10 to 20 feet deep, with some reported at 50 feet and with whole villages snowed in up to their chimneys.

Efforts to drive even heavy locomotives through the giant bulwarks of snow on the tracks often ended in failure, sometimes in wreckage. In New Jersey, a heavy engine "encountered" a snowbank and bounced off it and into the street. Two "big and powerful locomotives" dispatched to break the blockade on the Philadelphia-New York run "gave it a try and gave up."

NOWHERE was the blizzard worse than in New York, or more destructive. New York was a choice target; it was bigger and busier than any other American city and technologically more developed and, therefore, infinitely more vulnerable. The blizzard, very simply, had more to work on.

There were more people stranded in trains around New York than anywhere else—hundreds of trains were blocked, immobile, within a few miles of the city—more business lost, more stores closed, more wayfarers crowding more hotels, more walkers stopping off at more saloons, more hats blown onto more fire escapes, more shoppers sleeping on the floors of their workplaces, more birds falling frozen out of the lozenge sky, more broken bones, more abandoned wagons, more dead horses with their legs sticking out of snowdrifts, more cases of frostbite, more "benumbed" people, more immigrants stuck in reception centers, more wires down, more damage, more money lost, more heroes, more rogues, more falls, more dead people (2000 and more interment than anywhere else).

Ten inches of snow fell on Manhattan between Sunday night and Monday morning. Ten inches more were to fall in the next day and a half, but that first night served. Although they awoke to a continuing blizzard, with winds up to nearly 60 miles an hour piling tons of snow into gigantic drifts, New Yorkers doggedly embarked on a hopeless course of business as usual.

"It was difficult to see, difficult to breathe and difficult to keep the frost out of the ears," said Harpers Weekly. It was also difficult to walk, to open doors blocked by drifts, to find fresh food in neighborhood shops, to find a cab or, by 9, any wheeled conveyance that could still move.

THE ELECTRIFIED trolleys were kept in their barns, and crowds thronged onto the elevated, pride of Manhattan's new technology. But by about 9, the last switch stood up and the last train stopped between stations. Some passengers spent six hours high above the streets and some paid 50 cents a head to a canny group of profiteers who stretched ladders from second-story workshops to train windows.

"Bankers and brokers paid up to \$40 . . . bidding against one another for the privilege of a place in any kind of horse-drawn vehicle," reported one daily, adding that before noon a block-long "funeral-like procession" moved toward the Stock Exchange; it consisted of shining black hansom, the stagecoaches that nor-

mally serviced Fifth Avenue and covered delivery wagons stuffed with "businessmen and clerks of every degree." The Exchange suspended business—for the first time—after trading only 15,000 shares, representing five stocks. Of the 1,100 Exchange members usually on the floor, only 30 arrived.

The shop girls, who didn't dare miss a day's work, walked "tied up in veils and mufflers, they plucked fought against the wind and snow," one news account said. "A reporter, in walking up the Bowery and Third Avenue, saw at least 20 girls within five blocks. With undaunted courage, they picked themselves up and, refusing aid from bystanders, pushed their way forward. On reaching their stores, many were given a half-holiday and a chance to get home before nightfall." Hundreds simply stayed where they were and bedded down that night on the floor.

"Scores of persons were near perishing of fatigue and cold in the streets of this populous city," said Harpers. Former U.S. Sen. Roscoe Conkling was one. A powerful and athletic man, he struggled for 20 minutes to free himself from snow up to his armpits in Union Square "and he was at the point of exhaustion when he finally succeeded."


So fortunate was Annie Halpin Fisher, who froze to death in her own hallway. "She was once well known in the social world," said an agency report censoriously, "but had fallen into bad habits."

ON TUESDAY, New York began to shovel and plow its way out. With "thousands of Italian" employees to free the hundreds of stalled railway cars and crews working gamely to clear the main thoroughfares, Wednesday saw what Harpers called "the city's deliverance."

"Wall Street resumed its functions, milk came to town, Boston was heard from by way of London, trains ran on the Central and the Erie, and the world generally resumed relations with us."

The city, however, had sustained a blow to its cherished image of invulnerability. "In these few hours," Leslie's Weekly was to comment, ". . . the second commercial city of the world (London, of course, was the first), with its unbounded command of all the resources that wealth and intelligence and energy and organization can give, and all its admirable facilities for travel and communication, was left like a forgotten ruin in the heart of Asia."

The New York Times saw the situation in similar terms: "In looking back over the events of yesterday, the most amazing things to the residents of this



By David Butler for The Washington Post

Business Strikes Back At the FTC

FTC, From Page C1

The FTC has already recruited 82 law graduates from the class of '77. They come from, among other places, Harvard, Yale, Duke, Michigan, Northwestern, Stanford, one-third were in the top third of their classes, half worked on law reviews and 20 per cent are Phi Beta Kappas.

Hardly a day goes by without a FTC news release announcing a new action or investigation. It now has 750 investigations under way of everything from buying clubs to life insurance. It has brought action against nearly every corporate giant in sight, including Exxon, General Motors, Hertz, Avis, Sears & Roebuck, Kellogg, General Foods, International Telephone & Telegraph, Levi Strauss & Co., the American Medical Association.

With extensive new powers, granted by the Magnuson-Moss Act of 1974, the FTC can reach across state borders to clamp down on any business practice "in or affecting" commerce. Previously, it could take action only in matters "in" interstate commerce.

The act also explicitly authorized the agency to impose tough rules of conduct on whole categories of businesses and established precise procedures for doing so. The agency now has 16 such trade regulation rules in the works to tell businesses— hearing aid dealers, vocational schools, health spas, funeral directors, food advertisers— what they can and can't do. A violation of an adopted rule is subject to a maximum \$10,000 a day fine.

The agency also plans to extend rule-making to outlaw practices it considers anti-competitive. For example, it has common practices for shopping center tenants to have veto clause in their leases to keep out competition. The Hecht Company and Waldbaum & Lothrop recently used their veto to keep Dalmato Sales Co., a small discount chain, out of Tysons Corner Center. The FTC later decided that the veto restrictions that shut out Dalmato were illegal and it may soon draw up a rule that would prohibit all such veto restrictions in shopping centers.

Because of this power to impose wide-reaching rules that have the effect of law, Peter A. White of the National Chamber of Commerce calls the FTC "the second most powerful legislative body in the United States." It has the power, he says, to "alter the structure of an industry." Not surprisingly, the FTC's new activities endears it to consumers advocates, despite criticism that the agency still is not as effective as it could be. Nader, for example, has generally praised the new FTC, despite his recent squabble with FTC Commissioner Paul Rand Dixon. (Rand feelings between the two date back to the time of Nader's critical report was issued, when Dixon was FTC chairman.)

Some consumer advocates believe the agency could move faster, get more concrete results and do a better job of structuring priorities and allocating resources. But in October, Rep. John Moss's consumer subcommittee gave the FTC a rare accolade by ranking it number two in effectiveness among nine federal regulatory agencies the SEC was number one. To help it keep up the good work, the subcommittee urged more money, staff and powers, not powers to make it easier to subpoena corporate records.

"Stop the FTC"

IN SOME other circles, however, mere mention of the FTC is enough to set teeth on edge. Businessmen, who used to copy up to the agency, now find it about as approachable as an unleashed tiger. Some in Congress have begun to call it a runaway agency that needs its powers trimmed. After a watch-and-wait period, a definite "stop the FTC" movement is erupting into the open. Though it is still a small backlash, it is vigorous and growing and deserves notice.

In two recent articles, Business Week described the "escalating struggle" between business and the FTC. Business, it said, is fed up and the gloves are coming off. "Until recently," the magazine observed, "it has been rare for top executives to lambaste the FTC. . . . Sassing the cop, most businessmen have felt, is hardly a wise corporate practice. But business has been talking back to the FTC more frequently in recent months. This has meant resisting its over-riding suit against it and opposing the agency's efforts to broaden its authority." Businessmen accuse the FTC of launching investigations that are really fishing expeditions, making unreasonable, costly demands for large amounts of company materials, harassing companies and overstepping its legal authority.

Business is especially up in arms over two cases. One is an FTC decision finding Borden, Inc., guilty of illegally maintaining a monopoly in the processed lemon juice industry by means of a number of practices, such as selectively underpricing its Realmon to drive out competitors. To correct the alleged abuse, an FTC administrative judge ordered Borden to license its Realmon trademark to anyone who wanted it. Borden, fighting mad, called the decision "an unwarranted confiscation of a valuable property right" and is appealing to the full commission.

The other case is an FTC inquiry into the true effect and purpose of cigarette advertising. The agency suspects that tobacco companies may not be telling the truth when they claim their advertising is not aimed at enticing new, presumably young smokers, but only at encouraging present smokers to switch brands. To find out what the industry is up to, the FTC has subpoenaed 12 years of marketing research from the six major cigarette companies.

Now, has asked the commissioners to quash the subpoena. Even the president of Kellogg, smarting over FTC attempts to break up what it calls a four-company cereal monopoly, has joined forces with the cigarette industry, protesting that the FTC is not empowered to "cut cigarette sales."

Businessmen who try to operate as in the old days with the FTC often find the door shut to them. The name of the Washington influence game is to try to negotiate compromises on proposed federal laws or regulations. Recently, Washington attorneys representing proprietary vocational schools sought but didn't get a private meeting with Robert Bada, FTC staff attorney handling the new rule for vocational schools. Bada told them any meeting would have to be open to the press and public or a transcript of the meeting made and put in the public record. Bada says: "All input into rule-making must be public." In his view, behind-the-scenes meetings "where the only purpose is to influence the staff to make a decision based on something other than the hearing record" are improper under the procedures set out by the Magnuson-Moss Act.

As further injury, business claims the FTC looks down at the Macmillan press office that makes the FTC look good at the expense of truthfulness and fairness to business.

Meanwhile, some on Capitol Hill are beginning to find the FTC's new aggressive behavior abrasive. Increasingly, the FTC staff and commissioners are being called to the Hill to explain—not as in the past why they're doing too little, but why they're doing too much. Congressional threats of curbing the FTC's powers are in the air.

Last summer bankers and auto dealers went into near-shock over the FTC's monumental decision to repeal a 200-year-old legal doctrine called "holder in due course" which many states and Congress had refused to repeal. Under this doctrine, for example, a finance company buying a home improvement contract from a cash-short contractor could turn the householder for full payment even though the pledged work was shoddy or never completed. In response, some conservative congressmen talked a House subcommittee into convening to question FTC staff members. Critics claimed the FTC's action was causing financial loss to auto dealers and a severe cutback in consumer credit, allegations which FTC staff rather effectively refuted. Nevertheless, Rep. James T. Broyhill (R-N.C.) cosponsored a bill to suspend the FTC's rule, pending further study.

Burial Costs

TO THE funeral industry, though, goes the credit for giving the FTC the toughest fight so far over its rule-making authority. The funeral directors organized early and well. Tom Clark, attorney for the National Funeral Directors Association, says they have raised over half a million dollars from members to fight the FTC's proposed rule. The FTC says the bereaved are often victimized when arranging for funerals because they cannot make price comparisons and do not know their legal rights. Thus, the rule would require funeral directors to give prices over the phone, display inexpensive caskets alongside expensive ones, get permission for embalming and itemize costs.

The funeral industry fight is fueled by objections not only to the rule provisions, but also to the FTC's "unwarranted intrusion" in a state's rights matter. The funeral industry tried to get an injunction against FTC hearings in New York and, according to FTC attorney Angel, has "mounted all-out opposition, challenging every factual and legal premise" the FTC put forth. The industry even hired former FTC commissioner Everett McIntyre to help prepare its case against the agency.

Angel also accuses the opposition of playing rough and dirty by trying to intimidate witnesses cooperating with the government. He says a priest who was to testify at a Los Angeles hearing was asked by an anonymous, late-night phone caller what kind of embalming fluid he would like right then and whether he was ready for his own funeral.

Clark denies any harassment from his group, but vows he will do everything constitutionally possible to defeat the FTC's proposals. That includes appealing the matter as far as the Supreme Court, if necessary, which could tie up the funeral rule for two to seven years. It also includes heavy lobbying. Clark lobbied personally with Sen. Robert Dole, husband of FTC commissioner Elizabeth Hanford.

Angel says the FTC has received about 100 letters from members of Congress, questioning or commenting on the proposed rule. In the final Washington hearings on the rule, three members of Congress testified against it, including Millicent Fenwick (R), once head of consumer affairs in her home state of New Jersey and counted as a consumer supporter. She, for example, supported passage of the Magnuson-Moss Act and abolition of the controversial "holder in due course" rule.

Fenwick, however, is alarmed at what she sees as an arrogance of power at the FTC and a wrongheadedness in attacking problems. She believes the FTC should stick to matters in which "you have an outstanding demand to hundreds of consumers in a situation which the states can't possibly handle."

She is especially disturbed by the FTC's funeral rule because she thinks it will harm small businesses and be formulated without demonstrated need. "The rule is far too complex and detailed," she says. "Further, the whole investigation was started on the basis of half a dozen letters from people and a number of articles the staff read in magazines. This does not seem to be to be an adequate reason

for spending half a million dollars, especially when you have so many other obvious problems which the states can't handle." (The FTC denies beginning the investigation on such slim evidence.)

Last March a small business subcommittee of which Fenwick is a member summoned the FTC staff to hearings to answer rather hostile questioning about the funeral rule. In October the committee issued a report, based on the hearings, challenging the rule's propriety or necessity. Some at the FTC were appalled by such congressional intrusion before the proposed rule had even been sent to the commissioners for approval.

The report also questioned whether Congress should have given the FTC broad powers to intervene in anything "affecting" interstate commerce. Fenwick predicts legislation will be introduced this year to repeal that part of the Magnuson-Moss Act.

Retreating under Pressure?

CLEARLY, the FTC has stepped on some powerful toes by pushing too hard and far. But some of the disenchantment with the FTC stems from a growing anti-bureaucracy mood in the country and fears among some in Congress that too much legislative authority is being turned over to federal agencies. Rep. M. Caldwell Butler (R-Va.), who also opposes the FTC's funeral rule, says: "I question the political wisdom of allowing individuals who are totally out of the mainstream of our political election system to nullify state laws which have undergone the legislative process." (The funeral rule would override state laws.)

When asked whether she thought the state was too powerful, Fenwick said: "That's the key to the whole thing. I think all these regulatory agencies have gotten out of hand,

if you want to know the truth. . . . I don't know what Congress can do about it, except to take the long laborious way of legislation." Bills have been introduced to give Congress veto power over rules and regulations promulgated by federal agencies, and more are expected this session.


At the moment, the FTC is probably in little danger of having its powers gutted or its money rolled back. Anti-agency forces are not that strong; they reflect conservative, generally Republican concerns in a Congress and administration controlled by Democrats.

Still, the pressure has its effects. Some businesses are already pooling resources to fight the FTC. Those facing rule-making are heartened by the funeral industry's hard-line and, when their own turn comes, may be encouraged to follow suit. This means, among other things, that so many rules dramatically announced may be formally adopted only after years of court delay—or never.

Moreover, continued stiff resistance may erode FTC resolve, especially on the staff attorney level where most battles are won or lost. Some staff attorneys believe they already detect a weakening of spine among some commissioners and top staff. For example, a rule on debt collection agencies has been in the works but not given the go-ahead. These staff attorneys also say bureaucratic delay is on the rise, support for innovative ideas is disappearing and excellent lawyers are becoming discouraged and leaving.

Still, the FTC is due to get a new chairman under President Carter and there is every indication the appointee will be a strong one, committed to keeping the FTC in the forefront of fighting business injustice. It will be interesting to see whether the FTC-business confrontation remains a mere "struggle," as Business Week characterized it, or escalates into a brawl.

If we don't deal now with the energy problem in its entirety, we may soon be facing an even bigger problem—how to sustain our economy and our social structures when there's not enough energy to go around.



Cumberland Electric Corporation is a rural electric cooperative which provides light and power for more than 37,000 farms, homes, businesses and industries in a five-county area of middle Tennessee. Cumberland averages 8.3 megawatts per mile of line; the national average for rural electric systems is four.



Nationwide, some 1000 consumer-owned, non-profit rural electric cooperatives and public power districts serve 25 million consumers in 46 of the 50 states. They own and maintain nearly two million miles of line—42% of the nation's total.

We've said it before; we're saying it again. The longer we delay development of a comprehensive national program to ensure adequate energy for the future, the more unmanageable the problem becomes. The problem is multi-faceted, highly complicated. The answers aren't all that easy to come by. But in every critical situation, there's a point where debate must give way to decision—and action. With energy, we think that point is here.

In the weeks ahead, we're going to be speaking out on some of the tough decisions that must be made . . . pushing for commonsense, people-oriented approaches. It is our responsibility to do so, as meaningfully and forcefully as we can.

America's rural electric systems



God Save the Queen

QUEEN, From Page C1

If my tribute to the Queen is to be understood—and it is a tribute that she deserves—I must put my cards on the table at the beginning. I think the time has come to abolish the monarchy. But that cannot stop me, especially on this day, from paying tribute to the character of the Queen, or to the characters of her father, George VI, and her grandfather, George V.

George V came to the throne just before the First World War, during which the great monarchies of Europe were toppled: in Russia, in Austria, in Germany. It was his remarkable achievement to transform the British monarchy, if not into a democratic institution, at least into a popular institution. His own Silver Jubilee in 1935 evoked a demonstration of popular affection that surprised even the skeptics. A rather gruff man, who tapped the barometer every day and meticulously recorded his weather readings in his diary, he nevertheless managed to make the monarchy less remote than it had been under his grandmother, Queen Victoria, and even under his father, Edward VII.

He also acted with remarkably good judgment on the few occasions when the attitude of the monarchy could be politically decisive. He refused to be influenced by those many of them close to him who thought that he should keep the first Labor government from taking office in 1924. Two years later, he was influential in preventing the Conservative government from taking vindictive measures against the unions in the general strike. By these and other actions, he left to his son a crown that was respected if not revered, the focus of affection if not of awe.

But, of course, Edward VII chose not to take up the crown. Within a year, he had abdicated, and the underlying weakness of a monarchy in this age was revealed in the widespread feeling of many thoughtful people that the monarchy would not survive such a crisis.

He was succeeded by his brother, George VI, the father of the present Queen, and it is with him that our account of her must really begin. He had not been trained for the job; he was a private man, and he had a painful stammer. The stammer was born of some kind of anger. While he was Duke of York, he used to shoot, now and then, across a farm that belonged to a branch of my family in Scotland, and from the time that I was a boy I heard the story of how, when he was once staying there, he was incensed by a dog that was barking at the night, got up and went out and shot it. It cannot have been easy for him to be King at all; it must have been agony for him to have to speak in public, his words forced one by one through that stammer.

But the people were grateful to him and to his Queen, and they liked the fact that there were two young sisters bouncing about the Palace. Then came the Second World War, the Battle of Britain, the bombing of his people's "finest hour." Some of the rich sent their children to America for safety; some of the children of the poor were evacuated from the cities into the countryside. But the King and his family stayed in London. Even when Buckingham Palace was hit by a bomb, they stayed in London. The people took him to their hearts.

His last trusted and admired adviser, Lord Alton, said: "There was a simple virtue in him, an unassuming goodness with which he wore his unwelcome crown. We know from Churchill's account that George VI wanted to land with his troops in Normandy on D-Day; we also know

that, when Churchill ruled that out, George VI retaliated by ruling out Churchill's desire to land with the troops.

IF HER FATHER had been catapulted into the throne in 1936, Princess Elizabeth was catapulted into the succession to it. She had now to be prepared for it, and she was fortunate that it was her grandmother, Queen Mary, who helped to lick her into shape. A magnificent figure of a woman, every inch a Queen in her bearing, she probably did more to form the character of Elizabeth as a monarch than anyone else. The stories of their relationship are many, but one will do. One day when she was a young girl, Princess Elizabeth trotted past a sentry at Buckingham Palace without returning his salute. Her grandmother sent her back to walk—not to salute the sentry again, not merely to return his salute, but to salute him first.

When she then became our Queen, 25 years ago, I do not think there was a man among all my friends who would not, if the opportunity had offered, have thrown his cloak from his shoulders, as Walter Raleigh had done for an earlier Elizabeth, and laid it on the ground for her to walk on. It seems odd now to recall how seriously we talked and wrote then of a "New Elizabethan Age." England would again be young, England would again be green, England would again sing, England had a Queen.

I happened to be in Westminster Abbey for the coronation. The most poignant moment in the ceremony was when she had been stripped of the robes in which she had arrived at the Abbey, and stood alone among her peers and subjects in white silk. At that moment she had been symbolically divested of all power and all pomp. Then, one by one, the Robe was placed on her, the Crown set on her head, the Sceptre presented to her, the Orb put in one hand, the Sceptre in the other, all symbols of her authority, all given to her by her subjects.

Watching her standing so frail in the white shift, one could not help wondering if she could assume so much majesty. But part of the answer had in fact already been given. In the course of reporting the coronation, I was told by a man who was assisting the Palace in the preparation of it that Prince Philip had, about six months before the ceremony, asked the Queen, his wife, for an audience and had suggested that they should be crowned together and share the throne like William III and Mary. Not only did she abruptly turn down the suggestion, but Prince Philip took his place with the rest of the royal dukes and, since he was the most recently created of them, he stood at the bottom of the line. It was from there that he was then the first of her peers to kneel before her and swear allegiance to her for life.

Not only from such stories, which one has to believe on the authority of those who have told them, but from a general impression that began to emerge by the time of her coronation, it became clear that the Queen's strength of character was formidable. "She is as tough as old boots," someone who had some dealings with her once said to me; and one has gone on saying that during the 25 years that have followed.

The home secretary of Britain, the only minister, other than the prime minister, who has direct access to the Queen. He reports to her the proceedings of Parliament, and when the death penalty existed, it was on his advice that the Queen might commute the sentence to life imprisonment. When R.A. Butler was home secretary, he talked to me about the Queen. He praised her as the most trusted and admired adviser, the "best informed person on public affairs in the world today"—and he praised her intelligence—meaning by that "her grasp of essentials, her ability to go to the heart of a matter"—and he told me a story that sums it all up.

Right to Privacy vs. Right to Know

PRIVACY, From Page C1

At NIDA's affiliated Institute in Rockville, the National Institute for Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse (NIAAA), Dr. Donald Patterson, chief of evaluation, says a comparative study of what we have been discussing for some time, "but we haven't had a terrific amount of resources to do it. We did get a reasonable sample for an 18-month period and learned quite a bit, but we know we have to try a longer term."


From Bad to Worse

IF FEDERAL programs are just getting around to taking up this sort of research on a large—and expensive—scale, thousands of state and local programs have been run for years merely on the supposition that the services they support are beneficial, and without any scientific, or even pragmatic, proof that they should be continued.

"I've been pushing for years for somebody to do a follow-up on our students," says Dr. Esther Rothman, principal of New York City's Livingston School, which has been educating emotionally troubled girls since 1958. "Unless one of our old grads happens to drop in, about the only time we hear what happened to them is when one gets involved with the criminal courts, when a probation officer may check her background. I'm sure that a follow-up would prove the school is worth more than the money spent on it [more than twice the per-pupil average of the city school system], but I'll admit I can't prove it. The information system is pathetic."

The danger today is that the information system is likely to be rendered still more pathetic because of restrictions spelled out in the Privacy Act. Its language specifically exempts federal research activities, but the restrictions it imposes on research for the additional requirements for the safeguarding of personal data—fines of up to \$5,000 for government officials releasing it for unauthorized use—threaten to make longitudinal studies a lot more expensive, and therefore still more infrequent.

"It's putting a lot more responsibility on us, both to protect the information and to obtain the consent of the individual to the study," said Martin Duby



By Geoffrey Moss for The Washington Post

federal agencies, but many program evaluators shun them for a very practical reason: "The FBI is certainly going to have to be told who's asking for this information," says Dr. Ginzberg, of NIDA. "Okay, suppose we gave the FBI a list of 100 people we wanted to track. They'd give us the information, but then we'd have given them a list of 100 suspected drug users to watch."

Also less than satisfactory for research purposes is the data obtainable from HEW's own Social Security computers. Although Social Security administrators are a little more liberal with some of their data than other Census Bureau or the Internal Revenue Service, they still are limited by restrictions which predate, and are even more stringent than, the new privacy act.

For authorized research, however, the Social Security administrators will do a certain amount of sampling. HEW evaluators, for instance, can submit a

list of 100 or more Social Security numbers and receive back a report of how many in the sample fell into various income classifications.

"That really isn't even conclusive," a NIDA spokesman pointed out, "when you consider that a lot of the people we may be interested in, even if they're working, may not be covered by Social Security."

In the end, most researchers agree that there is no adequate substitute for follow-up studies of subjects who have gone through—or dropped out of—the programs to be evaluated. To protect these same subjects from their own law enforcement agencies, however, the government sometimes finds it necessary to go to even greater lengths—sometimes all the way to Canada.

The raw data in NIDA's drug addict follow-up, for example, was processed out of the country specifically to insure that individually identifiable records—many containing subjects' ad-

missions of illegal drug use—would not be subject to subpoena in American courts.

Most of the tracking and interviewing for that study was carried out by the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center and then evaluated at Texas Christian. The center's director, Celia Homans, explained that a "link file" was established. "That simply consists of two lists, one of which identifies people and the other identifies data. When our interviewers leave their subjects, they put the surveys into envelopes and mail them directly to Canada. There the names are assigned to a file, the name is stripped off, and the data for each subject is assigned a second number which comes back for research use. The two numbers can only be linked by the file and that remains in Canada."

Are all these precautions really necessary? "It's not clear that they are now," Ms. Homans said, "but there was a time when infiltration of our interviewers by federal agencies presented a serious problem. Even now, we try very hard to check every interview we hire to make sure we're not being infiltrated."

Too High a Price?

IN OTHER AREAS, too, privacy protection has been reinforced—and at the expense of other public purposes. An expensive services agency in Pennsylvania recently denied federal auditors access to its files on protection of privacy grounds. This was one time, however, when privacy lost out. No audit, said the feds, then no more funds, and when they were upheld in court, the records were turned over. A federal court also had to overrule a U.S. attorney in Tennessee who denied records of previous convictions of arrested subjects to the press.

Last year, the Federal Privacy Protection Study Commission, while studying the effect of the new act, heard testimony from Jack Landau, representing the Reporters Committee

for Freedom of the Press, that officials on both the federal and state levels were "waving the Privacy Act around" in order to deny newsmen access to the records of agencies conducting public business and spending public money, and a spokesman for the American Newspaper Publishers Association urged that "the push for privacy not be extended to infringe upon the First Amendment right of the press to gather and disseminate news to the public so that public business shall remain the public's business."

News people are not the only ones kept out of the public's business by interpretations of the new privacy regulations. They apply even to academic researchers, including some who have challenged credentials, like Prof. Daniel Glaser of the University of Southern California, the author of a book considered the model for many follow-up studies: "The Effectiveness of a Prison and Parole System."

Glaser, who followed some federal prisoners for as long as 15 years after their release, acknowledged having to cut through "a lot more red tape" under the new regulations, but I haven't yet heard of any studies being blocked altogether. It's unfortunate, though, because academic studies used to be possible on the street level, but now just about the only way left is to ask the government agency that controls the information to provide the research information itself. It's unfortunate that there can't be any independent data. There are too many people pontificating without data as it is, and now they're making good research much more difficult.

Information in the name of privacy are even beginning to stir doubts among federal officials. Several weeks ago, a group of lower-level HEW officials sought, unsuccessfully, to identify a number of organizations suspected of misusing alcoholic abuse research grants. A report, eventually forwarded to Congress, confirmed abuses, but refused, on privacy grounds, to specify programs and areas where they had been found.

"If all this money being spent is not to be accounted for because of the right of privacy," said a discouraged regional HEW man, "then I say we're paying too high a price for privacy."



"You remember when the Queen was meant to be going to Ghana, and the opposition to Dr. Nkrumah there was threatening to assassinate her if she went? Well, that became a Cabinet matter, and we decided that she should not go. So the prime minister and I went to her with our advice"—which the Queen is constitutionally bound to accept—"and when we had offered it, she paused and then said simply: 'I thank you for your advice, but I have not courage, what am I? I ask you to return to my ministers, and ask them to reconsider my advice to me.' So we went back, changed our advice, and as you know she went to Ghana and her visit was a stunning success. She had seen at once to the core of the question, and she often does that."

If there has to be a monarchy, it had better be a monarchy with that manner. This is part of the majesty, part of the mystery that must somehow be retained in an age that is not very congenial to mystery.

If that sense of majesty and mystery is preserved, then others in the country will cooperate in reinforcing it. Twenty-five years ago, the *Times* of London had bought the exclusive rights to the story of Edmund Hillary's attempt to climb Everest, and magically it was on the morning of the coronation that it was able to publish the story that Hillary had reached the top. Magically? Ah, but it could have been done before. The news was delayed so that it could be published on the morning of the coronation of the new Queen, and it did indeed travel from mouth to mouth among the crowds, adding to the mysterious and joyful sense that a "New Elizabethan Age" was to begin, of majesty and greatness.

THEN IT ALL FELL TO pieces. Bit by bit, the hope fell apart. As the monarchy contributed to this failure and disappointment? My own answer has to be "Yes," as long as it is understood that I am talking of the monarchy as an institution, and not of the character and performance of the Queen. The monarchy has not caused Britain's decline, but it has helped to obscure the reality of it.

When Britain's colonies began to claim their independence, one by one, a very curious thing could be seen to happen. At each successive Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, the Queen had fewer pos-

sessions overseas, but more prime ministers gathered about her at Buckingham Palace. The smaller her empire, the larger the annual photograph of her with the prime ministers. The fiction of the Commonwealth, to which the new nations were attached helped to conceal the reality of what was happening, and it helped to preserve even more dangerous fictions, such as that of the sterling area long past the time when it could sustain Britain's commercial life.

Again, there can be no doubt that the monarchy stands at the head of a class system which encourages many of the worst vices in English life, but above all encourages the deference of the lower and even middle classes to an upper class whose record in governing the nation in the past hundred years has been one of unmitigated disaster. Whatever the greatness of the English governing class in the previous centuries, it has since the middle of the 19th century been selfish, blind, unadventurous and idle; and it is the monarchy that keeps it there.

When Sir Robert Boothby was made a lord, not many years ago, I asked him if it had made any difference to his life. He said: "The difference is unbelievable. When I was just Robert Boothby, M.P., the doorman at the Ritz bowed about 3 inches to me. When I became Sir Robert Boothby, they bowed to their waists. Then on the day I became Lord Boothby, they bowed to their knees. If the Queen makes me a duke, they will be groveling on the floor." Something of this runs through the whole of English life. *Le vice anglais* is not homosexuality, as the French used to say, it is snobbery; and the monarchy helps to keep it alive.

The Queen has tried in 25 years to tinker here and there with the image of the monarchy. She has resisted the commercial uses of the monarchy, she came early in her reign she abolished the Royal Command Film Performance. She has resisted some of the snobish uses of the monarchy; quite early in her reign she abolished the annual presentation to her of debutantes. She moved more slowly to open the Royal Enclosure of Ascot to people who had been divorced, but this adventurous action has really meant opening it only to divorced people of the same old class.

Change comes slowly in Britain. The country came nearest to civil war in the Queen's reign when Earl Marshal, the Duke of Norfolk, issued an edict prohibiting the wearing of hot pants in the Royal Enclosure. She cannot be blamed, therefore, and anyhow there is not all that much that can be done to change the monarchy without making it a monarchy that is not worth having.

The Queen is aware of this, and her really striking achievement has been to change the monarchy slightly so that it is more acceptable, but to keep enough of the majesty and mystery without which it has no purpose.

She has herself said that, if the time comes when the British people make it clear that they no longer want or need a monarchy, "We will go quietly." She says it with a laugh because she knows that it may happen sooner than many people imagine. She or at least her son could be the last sovereigns of Britain, and the very fact that she can contemplate abdicating in favor of Prince Charles is proof enough that the monarchy has already lost too much of that sense of mystery and awe which must attach to it if it is to be real. Queen Victoria never thought of abdicating.

Strong-willed, hard-working, intelligent and with a sense of humor, the real character of the woman who has den behind that much of mystery that still surrounds the throne. But these are her public virtues, and they are by all accounts remarkable in her. They also are enough, and the result can be seen in 25 years of dedication to a job that has no obvious purpose or even definition in this age; 25 years in which not a breath of scandal has ever been heard about her, and in which no serious criticism has ever been made of her own performance.

I would still throw my cloak before her, for her to step on. I feel a personal loyalty to her, simply because of her individual character. I could still subscribe myself her humble and dutiful servant.