מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

5

שלמה

מחלקה: מבקר

ארה"ב - תהליך השלום

בנושא התיכון

1.86-3.88

9739/10/חצ

מס' תיק מקורי: 9739/10

102.1.1 אילון אולף

ס.ר.פ. ס.ב.ר.ק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סווג בטחוני שוב

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"מ 29.3.88

מס' מברק

711

שגרירות ישראל, וושינגטון

התשרד

אל: מצפ"א, לשכת רה"מ

מאת: שחריות

בשיחת אקראי עם דן קורצר העלה ביוזמתו את נושא ביקורו של רוה"מ בוושינגטון ואת כוונותיו של המזכיר לקראת נסיעתו הקרובה לאזורנו.

1. ביקורו של רוה"מ מבחינת ארה"ב היה נשלון והוא מתפלא על כי האוירה הכללית שלוותה את רוה"מ היתה של הישג. לא היתה כל שיבה להסיק כי המזכיר יוותר על יוזמתו או על מרכיבים בה. אלו ששרשו את קבלת הפנים המבוימטר לא נכון גם לא טרחו לקרוא את דבריו המדיפים של הנשיא בטקס הפרדה בבית הלבן.

2. כוונותיו של המזכיר המשכנה להיות רציניות מאוד עד לטלב שאחד הצדדים יאמר לו "לא" בפרוש. בהעדר חשובות כאלו כל הדיבורים על גויעתה של התכנית אין להם על מה לסמוך. אדרבא, המזכיר מאוד רציני ויעשה הכל לקידום הסיבוי לפתיחת ההליך.

3. בביקורו הקרוב במז"ת אין המזכיר מתכוון להכניס לצד הישראלי להמרן את הזיכוי לבנו שאף אויד לא חציע. הוצעות חבינ"ל אותה תוקף רוה"מ איזה ולא היתה הוצידה לה מתכוון שולץ.

4. מציע לקרוא שוב את מאמרו של שולץ (קורצר כותב עבור המזכיר נאומים ומאמרים) שהופיע ביוושינגטון פוסט" למטרה ציאת רוה"מ את וושינגטון. זהו מאמר המגדיר היטב את עמדותיה של ארה"ב מחד, ואת נחישותה לקדם את ההליך השלום מאידך.

5. דבריו של המזכיר בעקבות סיום השיחות עם שבורנדזה, דברים שנשמעו בזיים בהבהרת מילוקי הדעות בין ארה"ב וברה"מ בנקשר לועידה הבינ"ל. צריכים להקרא ולקונטקסט הכללי של יחסי שתי המעצמות. הסוביטים הגיעו לוושינגטון בלי שום כוונה לחת דבר באף אחד מהנושאים ומלבד תאריך לפגישה לא היו מוכנים לשום דיון מהותי. רק מסיבה זו הזה המזכיר Tough, כדי להבהיר לרוסים שהמפתחות לתז"ת בידו.

יוסי גל

יוסי גל

שהיה	רמה	שהעלה	גשל	גלגשל	בירן	בעבור	הלחבב	גלגם	הש"ל
2	3	1	3	1	1	2	1	4	4

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

15737 תאריך : 18.03.88

** יוצא שמור
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102.1.1

חוזם:3,15737
אל:וש/616
מ-:המשרד,תא:180388,זח:1604,דח:מ,סג:שמ
נד:@

שמור/מיידי

ע.ב.ש. 2451

וושינגטון.

להלן ממברק הציר בשגרירותנו בבון על מפגש מומחי מז'ת של הקהיליה הארופית ב- 14/3.

'תכנית שולץ - דנו בבקשת ארה'ב להצהרת תמיכה קהילתית בתכנית, שנמסרה בשבוע שעבר ע'י מרפי. לא נמצא רוב למען פרסום הצהרת תמיכה בשלב זה, לאור אי-בהירות עמדות הצדדים וסוכם לחזור לנושא לכשיתבהרו סכויי התכנית'.

מנהל מצפ'א

אס

תפ: מצפא,אירא

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[illegible] 1245

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וצא **
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סודי

102.1.1

חוזם:2,223
אל:
ני/13,וורש/9,גנבה/13,וינה/6,בנגקוק/4,טוקיו/8,בוירס/9,ברן/4,
קופנהגן/6,אוסלו/5,שטוקהולם/7,מכסיקו/5,מונטבידאו/5,אתונה/7,
בון/8,בריסל/7,האג/6,לונדון/6,פריס/10,רומא/9,אוטבה/6,
קנברה/6,לימה/4,קרקס/8,מילנו/7,מדריד/8,ניקוסיה/5,ניירובי/3,
סינגפור/5,אנקרה/5,קינשאסה/4,בוקרשט/6
מ-:המשרד,תא:070288,זח:1532,דח:מ,סג:סו
נד:@

סודי/מיידי

אל : תפוצת תדרוך מדיני שבועי.

תדרוך מודיעין מדיני שבועי (7.2.88)

א. מסע מובארכ במערב - התהליך המדיני

1. המסע כלל (לפי הסדר) את בון, לונדון, וושינגטון, פאריס, מרוקו, רומא, ירדן ותורכיה. חזר למצרים ב-6. לגבי התהליך המדיני היוותה וושינגטון את הזירה העיקרית.
2. הרעיונות שהעלו האמריקנים לקידום התהליך נתקבלו בהסתיגות ע'י המצרים הממשיכים לדבוק ברעיון הועידה הבינ'ל והחוששים מנסיון אמריקני להסיט את מסגרות הפעילות המדינית למתכונת של ק'ד, תוך שימוש באלמנטים מרעיון האוטונומיה, שלדעת המצרים אבד עליה הכלח.
3. במהלך סיורו עידכן מובארכ את חוסיין וקבל דיווח מפיליפ חביב על שיחותיו של זה בירדן. בשלב זה לא ברור באיזו מידה יש תיאום והסכמה מלאים בין מצרים לירדן הן ביחס ל'יוזמת' מובארכ והן ביחס לרעיונות האמריקנים.
4. בכל הידוע לנו לא קיים מובארכ מגעי תיאום ועידכון מקבילים עם ערפאת. בהתבטאויותיו בוושינגטון התחמק מובארכ מהתיחסות ענינית לשאלת יצוג אש"ף בתהליך המדיני.
5. לסיכום נראה, שמובארכ נכשל בנסיונו לשכנע את הממשל האמריקני לאמץ את 'יוזמתו' במקשה אחת. אולם, מאחר שיש

למובארכ ענין בהמשך העיסוק האמריקני בתהליך המדיני גם בשנת בחירות בארה'ב ינסה כנראה להמעיט בערכם של חילוקי הדעות, ולהבליט את עצם ההישג שבתרומתה המחודשת והמואצת של ארה"ב לעגלת התהליך המדיני.

ב. מסע מובארכ - היבטים כלכליים
1. בוושינגטון תפס הנושא מקום חשוב בשיחות, אך לא הניב תוצאות מיידיות משמעותיות.
2. החוב הצבאי (4.5 מיליארד דולר): הפער בעמדות מנע דיון תכליתי. הנושא יעלה כנראה בביקור שר ההגנה המצרי בוושינגטון באביב.
3. האמריקנים גילו גמישות לגבי שחרור היתרה הבלתי-מנוצלת מסיועם הכלכלי.
4. מובארכ ביקש להקל על ייצוא חקלאי מצרי לארה'ב ולעודד משקיעים מארה'ב.
5. כן הזמינו המצרים לחצים אמריקנים וארופאים על קרן המטבע הבינ"ל לרכך תביעותיה לגבי הרפורמות הכלכליות שמצרים מתקשה לבצע אף על פי שהתחייבה לכך. בנושא זה אין מסתמנת בינתיים פריצת דרך.

ג. מסע חוסיין באירופה
1. עד כה ביקר ברומא ובפאריס. בהמשך: רפ'ג, אוסטריה, בריטניה. סה'כ - כחודש. הנושאים העיקריים במסע: התהליך המדיני, מלחמת המפרץ, רכש. חוסיין מדבר גם כיו'ר פסגת עמאן.
2. בצרפת סוכם על רכש 20 מיראג' אלפיים ושיפוץ 15 מטוסי מיראג' F-1-S.
3. במהלך ביקורו הבהיר חוסיין לתקשורת את עמדת ירדן בתהליך המדיני: המקום היחיד לדיון בפתרון הסכסוך היא הועידה הבינ'ל, בה תשתתפנה חמש הקבועות וכל הצדדים כולל אש'פ 'בתנאי שאש'פ יסכים למה שאנו כולנו מסכימים', כלומר יקבל 242, יפסיק טרור, ויהיה מוכן לדון בפתרון הבעיה הפלסטינית על כל היבטיה. ירושלים אדמה ערבית כבושה מאז 1967. היא צריכה להיות סמל השלום. דיבר על אפשרות קבוצות עבודה גאוגרפיות במסגרת הועידה. חזר כי ההתקוממות בשטחים היא ספונטנית.
4. נראה שבשיחותיו ניסה המלך להניע את האירופים לעמדה תקיפה יותר בנושאי התהליך המדיני והמלחמה במפרץ, במיוחד נוכח טענתו כי ארה'ב מתייצבת לימין ישראל ומתעלמת למעשה מהעמדה הערבית. עם זאת נמנע מלשלול את יוזמתה האחרונה של ארה'ב. אמנם השר לענייני האדמות הכבושות, דודין, דחה היוזמה כ'בלתי קבילה' (1.2), אולם חוסיין עצמו קיבל

בחיוב את הרתמות ארה'ב למהלך מדיני. אמר כי ביוזמה היבטים חיוביים, אך שלל בתוקף את רעיון האוטונומיה. קבע שלא ישתתף בשיחות על כך. משלל ההתבטאויות הגלויות והבלתי גלויות של חוסיין נראה שכללית המלך מרוצה מרצון ארה'ב לצאת מהקפאון אולם מעדיף להמתין לתגובות ישראל ושותפותיו הערביות, ובמיוחד מצרים וסוריה.

ד. אש"ף
1. היעד המרכזי של אש'פ בשבוע הנסקר היה לקיים ההתעניינות הבינ'ל ב'התקוממות' בשטחים ולפעול להגברת הלחץ על ישראל. במסגרת זו:
   א. ראשי אש"פ הדגישו שהמרי מתבצע בשלבים וזריקת האבנים היא השלב השני וכי המנהיגים ישתמשו בנשק בזמן המתאים. תושבי מחנות הפליטים במדינות ערב נקראו לקיים יום הזדהות ב-7.2.
   ב. אש'פ פועל במרץ לשגר אניית המגורשים ב-10.2. לאחר שבעל האניה היווני הסתלק מהעסק הודיע נציג אש'פ ביוון, כי נבחרה למשימה האניה 'לאמאר'.
2. אש'פ דחה לחלוטין את היוזמה האמריקנית ואת שליחות מרפי במיוחד, בראותו בהן חלק מהסכמי ק.ד. וכן אין אש'ף כלול בהן. את רעיון האוטונומיה דחה הארגון מכבר, ואילו מסגרת הדיון על מעמדם הסופי של השטחים לפי יוזמת שולץ לא יעדה כל מעמד לאש'פ.

ה. איראן - מתקפת החורף?
1. מחצית העונה הנוחה למתקפה, עליה כה הרבו האיראנים להצהיר, חלפה ולא ברור האם אכן יתקיפו בעונה זו. יש שיקולים רציניים בעד ונגד ומגיעות הערכות סותרות.
2. מצד אחד מדובר על קשיים בגיוס כוח-אדם ובקליטת נשק. מאידך מסופר שההכנות נמשכות ונזכרים תאריכי יעד (יום המהפכה - 11.2, סיום השנה האיראנית - 21.3, סיום הבחירות לפרלמנט - 8.4).
3. מכל מקום, אפילו לא תבוא המתקפה הגדולה בעונה זו - תמשך מלחמת ההתשה לאורך החזית היבשתית.

המרכז.

מא

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,אמן,[illegible]ברה,מעת,
משב,תרבוה,אבב,כלכליתא',כלכליתב',טקס,קרנס,הדרכה,מחע,מקצב,
ארבל1,משפט,תפוצות,פרנ,מאור,אוקיאניה,מצרים,מצפא,אירא,אירב,
אסיה,מאב,אמלט,מזתים,ארבל2,אירג,מתאם שטחים,לוברני

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

25709 תאריך : 31.03.88

סודי/מיידי

102.1.1 מדינ שלום

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חוזם:3,25709
אל:
אתונה/335,בון/512,בריסל/405,האג/360,לונדון/492,פריס/846,
רומא/435,מילנו/251,מרסיי/167,מדריד/311,ניקוסיה/225,
ניירובי/160,סינגפור/229,אנקרה/189,איסטנבול/191,
קינשאסה/211,פרטוריה/268,גנבה/435,וינה/438,אוסלו/258,
בוקרשט/258,ברן/318,הלסינקי/175,קופנהגן/391,שטוקהולם/302,
ליסבון/293,בנגקוק/596,טוקיו/487,קנברה/287,וש/974,
אוטבה/258,לוסאנגלס/230,ני/1266,ביירס/767,בוגוטה/245,
ברזיליה/365,גואטמלה/191,לימה/356,מונטבידאו/205,מכסיקו/364,
סנחוזה/222,סנטיאגו/314,קיטו/254,קרקס/429,ריו/215,קהיר/178
מ-:המשרד,תא:310388,זח:1440,דח:מ,סג:סו
נד:@

סודי/מיידי

ראשי נציגויות

דו"ח מדיני שוטף 11/88

1. ממרה"מ ושה"ח נועד (31.3) עם ראשי האגפים ומנהלי המחלקות לעדכון על המצב המדיני.

2. להלן עיקרי דבריו:

א. ביום א' הקרוב (3.4) יגיע מזכיר המדינה האמריקאי ג'ורג' שולץ לסבוב נוסף באזורנו. ההגיון העומד מאחורי הביקור הצפוי הוא, שבהעדר תשובה שלילית או חיובית מאחד הצדדים, האמריקאים מניחים שהדרך פנוייה לפעולה ולכן מגיע המזכיר כדי להמשיך ולהניע תכניתו. העדר פעילות מצד האמריקאים היה עשוי להתפרש כהודאה מצדם בכשלון תכניתם.

ב. האמריקאים מודעים למצב הקיים בקבינט. לישראל,

1.1.501 (1) / 2016

ע'פ המציאות הפוליטית הקיימת, אין אופציה במצב של תיקו לאמור כן או לא ליוזמה האמריקאית משום שכל גורם שיביא הצעה לקבינט, ההצעה תיפול כתוצאה מהפרוצדורה של ההחלטה בקבינט.

ג. במהלך ביקור שר החוץ הסובייטי, שברנדזה בוושינגטון התקיימו עשר שעות שיחה בענין המזה'ת, חלקן בהשתתפות שני שרי החוץ, מרביתן בהשתתפות מרפי ופוליאקוב. ארה'ב מתרשמת בעקבות השיחות שבריה'מ לוקחת היוזמה האמריקאית ברצינות ומעריכה אותה, מוכנה להכנס לדיון מפורט, אך חרדה שמא תקופח ויגרע מעמדה במקבילת מאזן הכוחות עם ארה'ב.

ד. עם זאת קיימות מספר בעיות:

אחת, הניסוח הסובייטי בקשר לועידה בינ'ל הוא שהועידה לא תהיה כופה או בעלת סמכות וטו, אך רוצים ב'ועידה סמכותית'. עדיין נותר לברר מה בדיוק עומד מאחורי המושג ועידה סמכותית. מבינים שהכוונה לועידה מתמשכת, שאליה יובאו לאישור או לפורמליזציה ההסכמות שיושגו בין הצדדים. הצדדים אף ידווחו באופן מסודר לועידה ואם יקלעו למבוי סתום יפנו לועידה לקבל סיועה. מוסכם שהפנייה לועידה תעשה בהסכמת הצדדים ועל ידם.

ה. אשר לצד הירדני, יש לירדנים חרדה שמא תסכים בריה'מ למשלחת פלשתינאית נפרדת או תדרוש משלחת ערבית מאוחדת ושמא תעמוד על עקרון הגדרה עצמית נפרדת. רה'מ ירדן, אל-ריפעי יצא למוסקבה וחזר אופטימי. הרוסים מקבלים רעיון המשלחת המשותפת, מסכימים לועידה שאינה כופה ומחייבים הסדר הביניים.

ו. הירדנים עסוקים במהלך תאום נרחב. מעוניינים בתאום עם האמריקאים, הרוסים, הסורים. כמובן שקיים תאום עם מצרים, כאשר המצרים והירדנים אינם רואים, עם זאת, בעין אחת נושא יצוג הפלסטינאים.

חוסיין אומר בפומבי אש'פ, אך מעמיד שלושה

תנאים:

1) משלחת משותפת.

2) קבלת 242 ו-338 ע'י אש'פ שמצידו מוכן לקבל ההחלטות, אך במכלול אחד עם יתר החלטות האו'ם ומועב'יט.

3) הסתייגות מטרור ואלימות. אש'פ מוכן לקבל התנאי, אך רק מחוץ לגבולות ישראל.

ז. אשר לאש'פ, השאלה היא בין האם יקבל אש'פ הזמנה או האם יוזמן אש'פ להשתתף ואין כאן שוני מילולי בלבד.

ח. אש'פ עצמו בהתייחסו למהלך המדיני מתנדנד בין גלי תקווה גבוהים לבין פחדים עמוקים. תקווה על שום ההתנערות בשטחים, שהעלתה הנושא על סדר היום וכן משום שמניחים שההתנערות דוחקת הצדה את ירדן והיא שהביאה את מזכיר המדינה לאיזור. פחדים שמא ההתנערות תתמוטט בסופו של דבר בלי להניב תוצאה של ממש כשהיא מותירה סימני שאלה בלבד.

ט. לוח הזמנים העומד לרשות המהלך האמריקאי מוגבל. אם לא יתרחש דבר עד מאי-יוני עלולה היוזמה להשטף במערכת הבחירות בארה'ב.

כזכור בשלהי מאי עתידה להתקיים במוסקבה פגישת רייגן-גורבצ'וב ומועד זה הופך לתאריך יעד שיש עד אז להניע המהלך קדימה.

י. בביקורו האחרון באיזור הותיר מזכיר המדינה לצדדים את תכניתו. המזכיר נותר נחוש בדעתו שלא להכניס בה שינויים. שולץ מוכן עם זאת לניואנסים כאלה ואחרים כמו ששתי מעצמות העל תשמשנה כ-CO-CHAIRMAN. המזכיר מאמין כפי שהתבטא שיוכל לשכנע המתנגדים לועידה בינ'ל והספקנים משום שהם עצמם יודעים שלאיש אין תכנית אחרת.

יא. בידענו את תמונת המצב כפי שהיא, צריכה ישראל לשאול את עצמה 'מה עושים'? נאמר שנגיד לא לשולץ או שנסייע למותה של תכניתו, מה צפוי לנו אז

[illegible]

12. [illegible]

13. [illegible]

14. [illegible]

15. [illegible]

16. [illegible]

17. [illegible]

18. [illegible]

19. [illegible]

20. [illegible]

בזירה הבינ'ל, בזירה האיזורית ובשטח עליו אנו שולטים?

בזירה הבינ'ל הכרסום במעמד ישראל ילך ויעמיק, ילך ויתמסד. מצבנו היום באירופה אינו מהמשופרים וחלה התדרדרות של ממש במעמדנו, גם במדינות שם נהנינו באופן מסורתי מאהדה. גם בארה'ב חל כרסום מדאיג ביחס לישראל. באם היינו עונים בחיוב או שנשיב בחיוב היינו יכולים להופיע בעולם כמוביל יזמת השלום והדבר היה מקל עלינו.

יב. בזירה האיזורית ישראל נהנית אמנם מהשלום עם מצרים. גם המשך המלחמה במפרץ, שנושאת בחובה דאגות רבות גם לנו, בעיקר מן ההיבט הפונדמנטליסטי, יש בו לטווח הקרוב תועלת אסטרטגית, אך המשך המלחמה יוצר מרוץ חמוש מטורף תוך שימוש בטילים ובגזים.

בהעדר יוזמת שלום, בהעדר התקדמות בתהליך המדיני נשאלת השאלה מה יהא גורל השלום עם מצרים. ממרה'מ ושה'ח מאמין שמצרים תשמור על השלום, אך זה יהא פרובלמטי יותר.

השלכות מלחמת המפרץ, בעיקר השמוש בטילים ובנשק כימי עלול ליצור פיתוי פסיכולוגי לצאת למלחמה. אין להתעלם מהתוצאות הצפויות מפיתוי להשתמש בנשק זה.

יג. אם יזמת שולץ תגוועל לא צפויה התפתחות בתהליך המדיני לפני 1989, כניסת ממשל חדש לתפקידו בארה'ב.

יד. אשר להשלכות הצפויות מאי התקדמות בתהליך המדיני על השטחים, הרי שגם אם צפויה רגיעה כתוצאה מעייפות פיזית וקושי כלכלי, אין להתעלם מהסכנה של מעבר מאורינטציה לאומית קיצונית לאורינטציה פונדמנטליסטית קיצונית, גרעינים לכך אנו כבר רואים בעזה ובמקומות אחרים.

טו. לדברי ממרה'מ ושה'ח הריאליה כפי שעומדת לנגד עינינו, הסכנות הנובעות מגוויעת התהליך המדיני, הם המפעילים אותנו לא לתת ליוזמת שולץ ליפול.

לתת תקווה לתהליך המדיני.

מעולם לא עמד שרות החוץ בפני הכרעה גורלית כל כך הדומה בחשיבותה וגורליותה לימים של ערב הקמת המדינה. כל הכרעה שתיפול תטביע חותם על דרכי עבודתנו.

טז. בתשובה לשאלות התייחס ממרה'מ ושה'ח למה שמכונה 'האופציה הירדנית'. לדבריו עדיפה הישיבה במשא ומתן עם ירדן במסגרת משלחת ירדנית-פלסטינית על פני ישיבה עם אש'פ עצמו. כן יש לזכור שתושבי השטחים היו ונותרו אזרחי ירדן. לדבריו אם תחול הסלמה במצב ולא תהיה התקדמות בתהליך המדיני, תאבד גם האופציה הירדנית והסכסוך יהיה אז בלתי פתיר.

יז. אשר לפגישת מזכיר המדינה עם שני הפרופסורים חברי המל'פ הביע ממרה'מ ושה'ח צער על הפגישה המהווה חריגה. ממרה'מ ושה'ח מעריך שהפגישה מהווה מחד גיסא איתות ורמז לישראל ומאידך מיועדת לתרום לאמינותה של ארה'ב בעיני ירדן.

יח. בענין השתתפותה של בריה'מ בועידה הבינ'ל, הסובייטים הודיעו שיכוננו קשרים דיפלומטים לכשתפתח הועידה. אתמול (30.3) התפרסמו בטאס דברי גורבצ'וב למזכיר המפלגה הקומוניסטית באיטליה לפיהם כבר בשלב ההכנות לועידה תכונן בריה'מ יחסים דיפלומטים עם ישראל.
התנאי שהועמד להשתתפות בריה'מ בועידה בעינו עומד, אך אינו מוצג כתנאי ודרך זו עדיפה על פני רטוריקה מיותרת.

3. לסיכום דבריו שב וציין ממרה'מ ושה'ח חשיבות השבוע הקרוב בו יעשה מזכיר המדינה של ארה'ב באיזורנו. המדיניות שלנו תהא לעשות מאמץ עליון להמשיך התהליך.

לשמנכ'ל

גע.י

[illegible]

[illegible]

(B). [illegible]

(C). [illegible]

(D). [illegible]

[illegible]

3. [illegible]

[illegible]

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102.4.1 תלין אלוף

27

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ל ק ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 30 0830 מרץ 88

מס' מברק

722

המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני

מנכ"ל ראה"מ

תהליך מדיני.

המזכיר הופיע אמש בפני 13 חברי בית הנבחרים. הסביר (לשאלת המילטון) כי מטרתו העיקרית היא להוכיח נחישות וכי תהיה זו טעות לא לעשות זאת. לדבריו, הוא מבקש להמשיך בתהליך עד אשר יתבהרו לחלוטין הדברים (Chips will fall) וכל אחד מהצדדים יבהיר עמדתו. אמר כי אינו מצפה שחוסיין יקבל את היוזמה ולכל היותר יאמר "כן אבל". מצפה שסוריה תתן תשובה שלילית מוחלטת, והוא מקווה בכל ליבו ועל כך חזר מספר פעמים, שישראל לא תאמר לא. באשר לעמדת ירדן הוסיף שהוא מפעיל עליה לחצים דרך מצרים, ולשאלה פרטית של אחד המשתתפים אחרי הפגישה, אמר שגם את הסעודים. לשאלת הברי ווקסמן מדוע חוסיין זקוק לוועידה בינלאומית, ענה שולץ כי ירדן היא מדינה חלשה והמלך "רגיש ועצבני". הסכים להערכת אחד המשתתפים שהארועים בשטחים גורמים לדאגה וחרדה אצל חוסיין וצריכים לשמש כתמריץ עבור המלך להכנס למהלך מדיני.

לשאלה בדבר פגישתו עם שני חברי המל"פ אמר כי המדובר הוא בשני אזרחים אמריקאים, וכי הוא ממשיך למלא אחרי ההתחייבות מ-1975. לוין אמר לו כי אחרי הפגישה ראה על מסך הטלביזיה את אדוארד סעיד אומר כי הפגישה תואמה עם ערפאת ובנקודה זו התפרץ טוריצילי וטען כי לדעתו היה מקום לקיום הפגישה. שולץ אמר כי התעקש בשיחתו עם שני חברי המל"פ כי הייצוג הפלשתינאי יהיה רק במסגרת של משלחת ירדנית-פלשתינאית ואמר עוד לסעיד כי בוודאי זו הסיבה שסעיד אינו מסכים עימו כי הוא, סעיד, רוצה במשלחת אש"ף ובמדינה פלשתינאית עצמאית אך הוא, שולץ, מתנגד למדינה כזו. ממשתתף בפגישה, שניכר עם זאת ששולץ נהנה מהפגישה עם השניים, ובמיוחד מסעיד וציין את הופעתו של האחרון בפני ארגונים יהודיים.

שאלת הטילים במז"ח לא עלתה במישרין, אך שולץ אמר שישראל תעשה טעות אם לא תגיע לשלום בקרוב, כי בעיזון הטילים הולכת ופוחתת השיבותה של ההחזקה בטריטוריה.

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

722 2/2

טופס מברק

דף 2 מתוך 2 דפים

סווג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

עוד לגבי הוועידה הבינלאומית אמר כי יתכן ויחפש דרך על-מנת לבטל את החששות הישראליים מפניה, אך לא פרט, אמר שיתכן ושמיר רואה סטייה בעמדה האמריקאית לאור מה שקרה באוקטובר אשתקד. שולץ הוסיף שציפה אז ששמיר יגיד "לא", חוסיין יגיד "כן" וכמוהו גם הסובייטים. בדיעבד, שמיר אמר "כן", חוסיין "לא" והעניין לא הועלה בפני הסובייטים. סולארז אמר כי המו"מ הישיר הוא הפתרון העדיף, אך זה לא יקרה ולכן היוזמה של שולץ the only game in town.

הנוכחים: ברמן, גילמן, גרין, דורנן, המילטון, ווקסמן, טוריצילי, מל לויין, סנדר לוין, סולארז, לארי סמית, ניל סמית.

ערן

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

21709 תאריך : 25.03.88

יוצא בלמס

102.1.1 תהליך שלום

חוזם:3,21709
אל:
אתונה/271,בון/441,בריסל/331,האג/295,לונדון/396,מדריד/256,
מרסיי/145,פריס/709,רומא/360,אנקרה/154,איסטנבול/156,
ניירובי/127,ניקוסיה/186,סינגפור/192,פרטוריה/224,
קינשאסה/170,וינה/359,אוסלו/213,בוקרשט/205,ברן/260,
הלסינקי/138,גנבה/373,ליסבון/236,מילנו/210,קופנהגן/329,
שטוקהולם/244,ני/1038,ביירס/641,בוגוטה/186,ברזיליה/294,
גואטמלה/151,לימה/290,מונטבידאו/160,מכסיקו/290,סנחוזה/175,
קיטו/206,קרקס/360,ריו/172,סנטיאגו/252,וש/809,אוטבה/212,
אטלנטה/108,בוסטון/109,טורונטו/114,יוסטון/102,לוסאנגלס/192,
מונטריאול/122,מיאמי/124,פילדלפיה/94,פרנציסקו/112,
שיקגו/132,בנגקוק/484,טוקיו/386,קנברה/236,בומבי/111,
הונגקונג/148,וולינגטון/143,מנילה/167,סידני/171,
קולומבו/101,אבידגאן/139,אלכסנדריה/63,לילונגווה/99,
מבבנה/93,מונרוביה/134,קייפטאון/102,ורשה/159,ציריך/55,
יאונדה/173,אקרה/67,טוגו/93,קטמנדו/111,רנגון/77,
אסונסיון/101,האיטי/90,הונדורס/129,להפאז/118,סלבדור/141,
סנטודומינגו/135,סנפאולו/177,פנמה/117,קינגסטון/107
מ-:המשרד,תא:250388,זח:1721,דח:מ,סג:בל
נד:@

בלמס/מיידי

אל:כל הנציגויות

התהליך המדיני

להלן מדברי המנכ"ל המדיני ב-25.3 (קול ישראל 1300)

א.בנושא פגישת שולץ-שוורנדזה והמשך התהליך המדיני:

'...ידענו כל הזמן שכשהסוביטים מדברים על ועידה בינלאומית הם מדברים על ועידה בינלאומית אחרת מזו שהיינו רוצים לראות.שהאמריקאים הין רוצים לראות אן שהירדנים הין

רוצים לראות.באפריל 87 נוצרה הבנה לגבי אופי ועידה בינלאומית שתהווה מסגרת ופתיחה ולא ועידה כופה.ההבנה נוצרה באמצעות האמריקאים,עם הירדנים ועם המצרים,וזה בעצם ההישג הגדול ביותר במדיניות החוץ שלנו בשנים האחרונות.
על הסכם זה אפשר לבנות המשכה של מדיניות שלום במזרח התיכון.
אין לי ספק בזה. מסמך שולץ כפי שנמסר לצדדים מאשרר במידה רבה את מסמך אפריל 87 ולכן הוא הבסיס הרציני היחיד.אינני רואה כרסום במסמך זה,לא מהבחינה הירדנית,לא מהבחינה המצרית,ולא האמריקאית.

השלב הבא אמור היה להיות דיון עם הסובייטים בנושא זה.שלב זה נקטע במידה רבה בגלל הסתייגות ישראלית - וזה חודש רק בעיכוב של שנה. זו רק ההתחלה,היה דיון ראשון רציני בין שולץ לבין שוורנדזה בנושא הועידה הבינלאומית.המחלוקת שהייתה כל הזמן,התבטאה גם בדיון הזה. השיחות הוכיחו שאמריקה עומדת איתנה מאחורי הבטחותיה לנו,היא לא תלך לועידה כופה,היא לא תלך לועידה שתוכל לבטל החלטות במישור הדו-צדדי בינינו לבין הירדנים,וזה הדבר החשוב ביותר עבורנו. אנו לא נופתע,לא נגיע לועידה בה ישתתף אש'פ,לא נגיע לועידה כופה.אני חושב שיש לנו את כל הגיבוי האמריקאי,מי שחושב שהוא יבוא למו'מ מדיני ויהיה משוחרר מלחצים כלשהם - אני אומר שזה בלתי אפשרי.

יש לזכור את קמפ-דיוויד המצב היה אופטימלי מבחינתנו - רק אנחנו,המצרים והאמריקאים.בגין השיג את ההישג המדיני החשוב ביותר שלו,אך נתן את כל סיני,ולכן אינני חושב ישנו 'פטנט' שמאפשר להגיע למו'מ ולא להרגיש נלחץ בצורה זו או אחרת.החלופה למו'מ היא הסדר כפוי או חס וחלילה מלחמה,ואני לא מאמין שמישהו מאתנו רוצה בזה.

..הסורים אמרו:אנחנו לא נלך לזה,אך לא נמנע מאף אחד אחר ללכת לזה. הירדנים מצאו בזה הרבה חיוב ואומרים שהם צריכים להשוב על זה.המצרים חייבו את היוזמה.
אגב אין פה שאלה לגבי הנושא של ירדן.בעצם כל הספור נוצר בגלל עמדתה של ירדן.היא רוצה ועידה,אחרת היא לא היתה מוכנה לחוח במו'מ ישיר עמנו,ולכן כל מהלך שולץ הוא דרך להפגיש בינינו לבין הירדנים.אני רואה בבואו של שולץ,אם אכן יבוא,סימן חיובי מאוד.הוא מוכיח שהאמריקאים מבינים שחייבים להגיע לפתרון מדיני,ושאפשר להגיע לפתרון מדיני עכשיו. לפי דעתי אין לנו חלופה טובה יותר,ועלינו לפלל לבואו של שולץ ולהמשך המהלך המדיני.

ב.בנושא פגישת שולץ עם חברי המל'פ:
'זה לא מפגש ראשון.היו מפגשים לא מעטים מאז 1975.אינני חושב שזה יתרום הרבה לתהליך השלום.הדרך היחידה להגיע למו'מ בנושא הפלשתינאי היא עם משלחת משותפת ירדנית-פלשתינאית - אי אפשר לעשות זאת ללא הפלשתינאים - משלחת שתקבל את 242 ואת 338 כבסיס למו'מ - ותתנער מטרור.זאת הדרך היחידה.אני לא חושב שמפגשים מסוג זה יכולים לתרום לתהליך השלום.אך הפרשנות האמריקאית לגבי חברי המל'פ שונה מהפרשנות שלנו,וזה אינו דבר חדש'.

עד כאן

הסברה/מידע

צש

תפ: שהח,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,אוקיאניה,מצרים,מצפא,אירא,אירב,
אסיה,מאפ,אמלט,מזתים,ארבל2,אירג,הדרכה,מעת,הסברה,ממד

102.1.1

00571 /59 5/8

WALL ST. JOURNAL Feb. 22, 88

King Hussein Doesn't Plan To Meet Shultz

Decision Shows Difficulties U.S. Faces in Promoting Its Mideast Peace Plan

By ROBERT S. GREENBERGER
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON – Jordan's King Hussein, seeing nothing new in the latest U.S. Mideast peace initiative, doesn't plan to meet with Secretary of State George Shultz during the secretary's trip to the region beginning this week, according to U.S. and foreign sources.

The decision by the Jordanian monarch, who is in Europe, to remain there while Mr. Shultz visits Israel, Egypt, Jordan and probably Syria, demonstrates the difficulties the U.S. is having convincing the major countries in the region to negotiate over the future of the Israel-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Israel's coalition government is unable to reach agreement on how to proceed, and Palestinian underground leaders are calling for increased turmoil during Mr. Shultz's visit to demonstrate their distrust of the U.S. effort.

Visits Are Ineffective

A diplomatic source said that during recent visits from U.S. envoys, King Hussein wasn't told anything about the U.S. initiative that he believed could form the basis for more involvement by Jordan. The source added that the Reagan administration ignored until recently King Hussein's warnings that the Arab-Israeli problem would ignite unless the U.S. became actively involved in prodding the parties. As a result, Mr. Shultz's hastily arranged trip is seen by the Jordanians more as an effort in damage control, now that violence has broken out, than as a long-term peace effort.

During his visit, Mr. Shultz is expected to meet with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Syrian President Hafez Assad and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. In Jordan, Mr. Shultz will meet with Crown Prince Hassan Bin Talal, who is King Hussein's brother, and senior officials.

If some unexpected progress is made, however, it's possible King Hussein could meet with Mr. Shultz either in Jordan or in Europe, where Mr. Shultz will attend a North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit in Brussels after leaving the Mideast.

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Differences Are Voiced

The U.S. peace plan, which Mr. Shultz calls a "blend of ideas," calls for quick local-autonomy elections in the Israeli-occupied territories, followed by negotiations beginning in December involving Jordan, Israel and Palestinian representatives over the final resolution of the territories.

Speaking yesterday on ABC's "This Week with David Brinkley," Hanna Siniora, a Palestinian editor, said the Palestinians want Israel to give up all the land it captured in 1967—including the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem—in exchange for Arab recognition of Israel.

However, such an exchange would be unacceptable to the vast majority of Israelis. Mr. Peres, the Israeli official who is the strongest advocate of peace talks, said on the same program that Israel's security concerns prohibit it from returning to the pre-1967 borders from which its Arab neighbors launched five wars in 40 years. "I accept the principle of land for peace, but not all of the land," he said.

21174 **החוץ-מחלקת הקשר**

תאריך : 25.03.88
דף 1 מתוך 2
עותק 25 מתוך 32

סודי ביותר נכנס

102.1.1 נבלים אלוף

מחלון

חודש:3/21174
אל:המשרד
מ-:רוש/נר:584/תא:240388/דת:1900/דח:מ/סג:סב
נד:@

(ג) לתגיב לי

ירמה

סודי ביותר/מידי

אל:מנכ"ל מדיני

מנכ"ל ראה"מ

תהליך מדיני

להלן משיחה טלפונית עם רוס, שהשתתף בחלק של השיחות עם הסובייטים אתמול (23.3).
פתח באומרו שהרושם הברור הוא שהסובייטים מדברים על רעידה עם מליאה בעלת סמכויות שבה יש לנערבים בסכסוך מה לומר אך הוסיפו שאינם 'נשראים לבוסתה מסוימת'.
הסובייטים קדמו בברכה את היוזמה האמריקאית ובמהלך יום אתמול ניסו לבדוק מה יהיה התפקיד שאותו ארה"ב מייעדת להם בוועידה, בעוד שהצד האמריקאי חזר והדגיש שהמדובר הוא לא בתפקיד הנרבע ממבנה הוועידה, אלא ממערכת היחסים שבה"מ תבנה עם הצדדים לסכסוך. הצד הסובייטי ביקש להביע את סיבת ההתנגדות האמריקאית לאופי שבה"מ מבקשת
להעניק לוועידה והצד האמריקאי הסביר שלמעשה אף צד אינו מעוניין בוועידה שלה סמכויות כנייה ווטו. בנסותו לטכם את נקודות ההסכמה בין בה"מ לארה"ב אמר רוס שהן כוללות:

1. הכרה בתפקיד שיש לוועידה בינלאומית (אף כי קיימים חילוקי דעות לגבי אופיה).

2. הכרה בצורך בהסדרי ביניים.

דף 2 מתוך 2
עותק 25 מתוך 32

3. המטרה היא הסדר שלום כולל.

4. ההסדר צריך להרות איזון בין האינטרסים של כל הצדדים המעורבים.

5. כאמור, הסובייטים קדמו בברכה יוזמת ארה'ב.

רוב הרטיף שהסובייטים הדגישו את הדעות הרווחות בעולם הערבי. לגבי יצוג אש'פ הדרו הסובייטים ואמרו שיקבלו כל פתרון שיהיה מקובל על אש'פ, והדגישו שהארגון צריך להיות מעורב אך כי לא קבעו באיזו דרך. הצד האמריקאי הדגיש שאם תהיה התעקשות של מעורבות פעילה וישירה של אש'פ, לא יהיה תהליך.

ערך.==

תפ: שהה,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,המנכל,ר/הרכז,רם,אמן,בירן,מצפא

[illegible]

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

20830 תאריך : 24.03.88

** יוצא **
** סודי 102.1.1 תיק אלף
** **

חוזם:3,20830
אל:ווש/776
מ-:המשרד,תא:240388,זח:1956,דח:מ,סג:סו
נד:@

סודי/רגיל

התקשר זה עתה הממונה היוז ואמר שנתבקש למסור לנו שבשבת יקבל המזכיר את אדוארד סעיד ואיברהים לוגוב.

מנהל מצפ'א
א/ב.ר

תפ: בירן,מצפא

11212 תאריך: 13.03.88

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

סודי יוצא **

**
**
**

102.1.1 גלי צה"ל

חוזם:3,11212
אל:
אתונה/124,ברן/216,בריסל/172,האג/151,לונדון/190,פריס/354,
רומא/184,מילנו/101,מדריד/123,ניקוסיה/83,ניירובי/53,
סינגפור/95,אנקרה/68,קינשאסה/80,גנבה/197,וינה/186,
אוסלו/105,ברקשט/108,ברן/132,קופנהגן/174,שטוקהולם/127,
בנגקוק/234,טוקיו/200,קנברה/131,רוש/438,אוטבה/112,בי/563,
ביירוט/298,לימה/130,מונטבידאו/82,מנסיקו/143,קוקס/201
מ-:המשרד,תא:130388,זת:1846,דת:מ,סג:סר
נד:@

סודי/מיידי

אל: תפוצת הדרון מדיני שבועי

הדרון מודיעין מדיני שבועי (13.3.88)

א. יוזמת שולץ - תגובות בשבוע הנסקר

1. כללי: המנהיג הערבי היחיד שהגיב בחיוב על היוזמה, וזאת פעמיים (4 ו-12 במרץ), הוא מובארק. לצד השלילה בולטים אש"פ וכן סוריה, אך שהאחרונה לא טרקה את הדלת. בירדן תמיכה במעורבות ארה"ב בתהליך, אך לא בעצם מסמך שולץ. הסעודים מתעלמים, במישור הרשמי, מיוזמת שולץ ודבקים בתוכנית פאס. הסובייטים אינם מגיבים רשמית ומותחים ביקורת עניינית בתקשורת. נמנעים מלקנטר את וושינגטון.

2. ירדן: שר ההסברה שב ובירך על עצם יוזמת שולץ והבטיח שירדן תגיב בנפרד לאחר תאום עם מדינות ערב. במסגרת התאום ביקר חוסיין בדמשק (10.3) ובקהיר (11.3) ולפני כן בבגדאד (8.3) ובברית (9.3). כן הזמין את ערפאת לעמאן. שר ההסברה טען שזכויות הפלסטינים צריכות להתבסס על 242. בעתונות הרשמית תביעה לועידה בינ"ל מתמשכת ובעלת סמכויות.

1.1.201 ALT 1984

3. אש"ף: לגד ההתקפות החריפות של ירדמת שולץ מצא ערפאת (8.3) חיוב בקבלת רעיון הועידה הבינ"ל ע"י ארה"ב. אש"ף חותר לחזק מעמדו באמצעות בריה"מ והקולקטיב הערבי. על הפרק ביקור ערפאת במוסקבה לפני פגישת שולץ-שוורדנאדזה. כן מתמקד ערפאת במאמצים לבנס מסגה ערבית האמורה מבחינתו להעניק לאש"ף גושפנקה מחודשת.

4. סוריה: אסד בנאומו (8.3) שלל במשתמע את ירדמת שולץ, אך התיר לבארה להוסיף לנסות דרכים משלו להסדר ובלבד שהדבר לא יוביל לוויתורים בלשהם שמשמעותם בגיעה. אסד הוסיף, בנאומו, לדגול במלחמה בדרך ההתמודדות הישילה. ב-12.3 אמר שה"ח אלשרע שהצעות שולץ בגרתן הנוכחית אינן מקובלות של סוריה או אישהו צד ערבי אחר. הביע תקוה שארה"ב תגבש הצעות ממשיות יותר לסיום מוחלט של הכיבוש ולכינוס ועידה בינ"ל. לפי התקשורת הסורית בבדבר ציפיות שרוחו בזמשק מדברי שולץ, באשר התברר שמדובר בהסדר ביניים ובתובניות אמריקניות ישנות.

5. מצרים: מובארק, בראיון עתונאי (12.3), הצביע על התקדמות נכרת בתהליך המדיני לרגל מגעיו עם שולץ. הוסיף שיש לפתח את הרעיונות החדשים והמעודדים של שולץ. מובארק הזהיר הערבים לבל ידחו את הירדמה אף שלא חייבים להסכים לכולה. עוד אמר מובארק (11.3) שרה"מ ישראל הוא המתנגד היחיד לועידה בינ"ל, אך אין ראייה חותכת שרה"מ דחה את תכנית השלום.

6. סעודיה ותוניסיה: בהודעה משותפת הביעו שליטי סעודיה ותוניסיה דבקות בתוכנית פאס לרגות מדינה פלסטינית עצמאית. התעלמו מירדמת שולץ. קראו לועידה בינ"ל. בתקשורת הסעודית הסתייגות מירדמת שולץ. לא נורסמו פרשנויות לביקור קלבריוס בסעודיה.

7. בריה"מ: מרבי הגיע למוסקבה לשיחות עם עמיתו פוליאקוב בהן אמור להגיע עיקרי ירדמת שולץ. אין בידינו פרטים. בריה"מ נמנעת בשלב הנוכחי מתחייה פורמלית של ירדמת שולץ. עם זאת בתקשורת הסתייגות ברורה. הביקורת עניינית ונוגעת לחבטים שונים. למשל: מבליטים שהתכנית האמריקנית איננה משקפת מאזן האינטרסים של הצדדים, מתעלמת לחלוטין מאש"פ, איננה מתייחסת לסוגיות הגולן ומזרח ירושלים. כן טוענים שהאמריקנים מנצלים יוקרת רעיון הועידה הבינ"ל של מנת לקדם שיחות בילטרליות ישירות

ולהכיר חיים בשיטת קמפ-דיוויד. נראה שעמדתה האמבירולנטית של בריה"מ נועדה בעיקר כדי לצבור נקודות זכות בעיני ממשל ארה"ב.

ב. ירדן-אש"פ: מצגש הועדה המשותפת ואפשרות ביקור ערפאת בעמאן

1. הועדה הירדנית-פלסטינית לטיעון לשטחים (שהוקמה ב-1978) התכנסה בעמאן (9-10 במרץ) בעקבות בקשה דחופה של אש"פ, שכן על הפרק עמדה שאלת הקצאתם של 19 מליון דולר שנתנו ע"י סעודיה. נראה שהדחיפות מבחינת אש"פ נבעה מחששו שירדן תכסה להקפיא הכספים, או לנתבם לערוצים הרצויים לה. הודעת הסיכום של המפגש דיברה במושגים כלליים על ביצול נאות של הכספים, מבלי שנודע עדיין מה היו התוצאות הממשיות.

2. במהלך ביקורו בקהיר (11.3) הביע חוסיין ציפיתו לבקור קרוב של ערפאת בעמאן, בעוד שדוברי אש"פ נמנעים לפי שעה מלנקוב במועד מדויק לביקור זה. אבו גיהאד ציין כי אש"ף איננו רך עתה בתיאום עמדות עם ירדן אלא בחילופי השקפות.

3. חרף המגעים הנמשכים בין ירדן לאש"ף עומד בעינו הפער בין הצדדים:

א. ירדן, המודאגת מהחלשות השפעתה בשטחים בתוצאה מהמהומות, מבקשת לשפר מעמדה בשטחים באמצעות חידוש קשר עם אש"ף בלא ויתורים מהותיים בלפיד. ירדן מעוניינת בחידוש הקשר עם אש"ף עפ"י מרכיבי הסכם עמאן (1985), לרבות משלחת ירדנית-פלסטינית משותפת.

ב. אש"ף, המכשה להבנות מארועי השטחים, נזקק לקשר עם ירדן כדי לחדש נוכחות גיאוגרפית סמוך לשטחים. אולם הוא חש עצמו בעמדת כח ביחס לירדן, וממשיך להצהיר על הסכם עמאן במבוטל, ועל חתירתו להשתתפות בועידה ביב"ל במעמד שווה לכל צד ערבי אחר.

ג. תכונה לבינוס פטגה ערבית מיוחדת בנושא השטחים

1. ב-8.3 בקשה אלג'יריה רשמית בינוס פטגה בנ"ל. מזנ"ל

הליגה הפיץ הבקשה ונמסר ששמונה הסכימו רשמית (סוריה, ירדן, תוניסיה, בורמה, סודאן, תימן, רו"ת ואש"ף). מלך מרוקו קרא לפסגה כזאת כבר ב-17.2. שרי החוץ של המשפ"ם אמורים לדון בנושא בכינוסם ב-15.3. מדובר שהפסגה תדון רק באירועי השטחים והשלכותיהם המדיניות (כלומר, גם יוזמת שולץ). עם זאת, קשה לראות ביצד תוכל הפסגה להתעלם ממלחמת המפרץ, אך העלאת נושא זה נרחבה בחילוקי-דעות רציניים בין תומכי עיראק לבין סוריה, לוב ואולי גם רו"ת. הרחבת סדר היום תקשה אולי על כינוס הפסגה.

2. ירדן מצהירה על תמיכה בפסגה, אך שנראה כי כינוסה נוגד האינטרס שלה, בהיותו לטובת אש"ף. בנוסף הפסגה גם יסיים מעמדו של חוסיין כיו"ר תורן של הפסגה המיוחדת האחרונה. יצויין שיתוף המעולה ההדוק בין אש"ף לאלג'יריה בהנעת היוזמה לכינוס הפסגה. אלג'יריה תומכת בדרך כלל בענין האש"פ-פלסטיני (דבר שגם בא לביטוי בעובדה שהמל"ם האחרונה כונסה באלג'יריה, אשתקד).

3. בין אם תתכנס הפסגה ובין אם לאו - על הפרק סיור ועדת השבע של הליגה לנושא השטחים בבירות חמש החברות הקבועות של מועבי"ט, בתהלך חודש זה. בינתיים מתוכנן אש"ף ממיעוט התמיכה הערבית בד בהקשר לשטחים (לרבות בנושא הכספי).

המרכז.

ת.ב.

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 11.3.88

מס' מברק

המשרד 262

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: עיתונות

תכנית השלום

להלן מה"וושינגטון פוסט" 11.3.88.

רבאלי
עיתונות

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THE WASHINGTON POST

Shultz: U.N. Resolutions Cover Arab-Israeli Talks

On Hill, Secretary Disputes Shamir's View

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State George P. Shultz strongly disagreed yesterday with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's view that a key U.N. resolution calling upon Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab lands does not apply to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Testifying before a House appropriations panel, Shultz said that "each of the negotiations" to be held between Israel and its Arab neighbors under a new U.S. peace plan must be based on U.N. Resolution 242 and 338.

The first resolution, adopted following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, calls for Israel's withdrawal "from territories occupied in the recent conflict" in return for Arab acceptance of peace with the Jewish state. The second, voted after the 1973 war, reaffirms the same principles as the basis for any negotiations.

Shamir replied Wednesday to criticism by 30 senators, many of them strong supporters of Israel, who in a March 3 letter to Shultz said they were "dismayed" by the Israeli prime minister's refusal to accept the "land-for-peace" formula as the basis for negotiations.

Shamir said Israel already had "accepted" and "implemented" this principle when it returned the Sinai to Egypt as part of the 1978 Camp David Accords. But he argued that the same principle does not apply to the West Bank and Gaza Strip because they were occupied "militarily and illegally" by Jordan and Egypt.

"Their status must therefore be determined in the peace negotiations," he said. "I, therefore, fail to understand the reasons for your criticism, which hurts even more because it comes from friends who have Israel's security and welfare at heart," he added.

Shamir's letter, addressed to the two cosponsors of the Senate letter, Sen. Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.) and Sen. Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.), was published in Thursday's New York Times.

Asked by Rep. David R. Obey (D-Wis.), chairman of the House foreign operations subcommittee, whether Israel's return of the Sinai would be "sufficient" to meet its obligations under Resolution 242, Shultz replied bluntly, "No, it wouldn't."

"Each of these negotiations would be based on the Resolution 242 and 338. So the fact that 242 and 338 have, so to speak, been applied to the Sinai doesn't lessen the applicability of them to other negotiations," he said.

Shultz said the same principle "for that matter" would apply if Israel and Syria agreed to negotiate over the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights.

Shamir is due to arrive here Monday on a four-day visit that is expected to focus on the Shultz peace plan. It calls for the start of negotiations by May 1 on interim arrangements for Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the beginning of talks to settle their final status in December.

Shamir is opposed to any negotiations over the "ultimate disposition" of the West Bank and Gaza other than within the framework of the Camp David Accords, which the Arab side has rejected.

He is also opposed to Shultz's proposal for holding new peace talks under the umbrella of an international conference, with the U.N. secretary general issuing invitations to the five permanent member of the security council, including the Soviet Union, and all parties to the conflict.

Moshe Arens, the former Israeli ambassador here who is a close associate of Shamir, discussed his unhappiness with the Shultz concept of the conference at a meeting with Shultz Tuesday.

In a telephone interview yesterday, Arens said he had not visited Shultz to "protest" on Shamir's behalf about "anything," but made it clear that he and Shamir have strong objections to Shultz's concept of an "ongoing conference." He said this would allow the Arab side to take its grievances against Israel to the plenary body whenever there was a deadlock.

Shamir will take "a very firm attitude" against a conference in his talks here next week with Shultz, according to his spokesman, Avi Pazner. He said he doubted Shamir would accept a conference, even if the United States gave explicit assurances that its powers would remain limited, because Shamir is opposed "to the very principle of a conference," Pazner said.

Meanwhile, President Reagan, in an interview with French television yesterday, denied he intends to apply "pressure" on Shamir to accept the U.S. peace plan. "I don't think it's so much pressure as it is just an attempt at persuasion," he said.

מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק
טופס מברק

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אל: מנהל לשכת השר, מע"ת, מצפ"א

יועץ תקשורת לרה"מ, יועץ תקשורת לשהב"ט, לע"מ, דו"צ, קש"ח, מזכיר הממשלה

עתונות, ניו יורק

A Man and His Tricky Mission

Shultz trip: a longshot but by no means an absurdity

New York Newsday
EDITORIALS

Mar. 3, 1988

It just might be that nobody is better suited to this Mideast peace mission than good old solid, plodding, uninsultable George Shultz.

The secretary of state is engaged in a mission that few believe will succeed. But, considering how Shultz has survived the disasters of his own administration, who's to say that he won't be able to inch the process ahead?

Shultz

In fact, it is more important at this moment to keep the process alive — even barely — than to achieve any Camp David-like breakthrough. Invariably, when the United States is not engaged, events in the Mideast spiral out of control.

שם השולח: Mar. 3, 88 מאיר: גלן שטאוקר

71/8 2/12

That's not in anybody's interest, certainly not America's, and it explains why Jordan's King Hussein, Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, Syria's Hafez Assad, and Israel's two leaders, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres all agree on one point: that Shultz should keep trying.

Behind all the seemingly intractable positions are some underlying realities that might make the Shultz mission something less than impossible.

For instance, Israel's military leaders say that there is no military solution to the uprisings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. That is a message even hardliner Shamir can understand. And Hussein realizes that the longer he waits, the more difficult it will be for him to ever reclaim the West Bank territory he once controlled. The little king, nothing if not a survivor, justifiably wants evidence that the Reagan administration will stay a course this time. That Shultz is back in the Mideast today might just help soothe the toothache that sent Hussein to London last week just as the secretary arrived in Amman.

Mubarak

The wild cards are Mikhail Gorbachev and the Palestinians. The assumption has been that the Soviets only wanted to cause trouble. But given Gorbachev's determination to concentrate on his economic problems, it's just possible he is now prepared to play a constructive role. The Palestinians have always proved incapable of taking positive action but the uprising might give them new impetus. It's worth finding out.

Plod on, Mr. Secretary.

102.1.1

news report

DATE: 03/28/88

SHULTZ TRIP TO STRESS EQUITY, BALANCE OF U.S. PEACE PLAN
(Article on State Department news briefing) (1370)
By Russell Dybvik
USIA Diplomatic Correspondent

Washington -- During his forthcoming trip to the Middle East, Secretary of State Shultz will emphasize that the peace plan proposed by the United States this month "represents a fair and balanced approach to the Arab-Israeli problem and that decisions need to be made," State Department spokesman Charles Redman said March 28.

He said Shultz will leave Washington March 31 for Rome where he will meet with Italian officials April 1-2 before continuing on to Israel April 3. While in the Middle East, Shultz also will visit Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia before returning to Washington about April 8.

Redman also announced that Shultz will leave Washington April 19 for talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and other Soviet leaders in Moscow April 21-25 to prepare for President Reagan's May 29-June 2 Moscow summit with General Secretary Gorbachev. Shultz will return to the United States from that trip April 26.

Reporters at the State Department news briefing focused their questions on the Middle East trip -- the secretary's third to the region in the past two months.

Redman was also asked about Shultz's 90-minute meeting March 26 with Dr. Edward Said and Dr. Ibrahim Abu Lughud, two prominent Palestinian-Americans who are members of the Palestine National Council (PNC), often described as the legislative arm of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

The spokesman said the meeting had been "useful," but he emphasized that it had been arranged solely "for an exchange of views. This was not a negotiating format but rather a chance for the secretary to meet with some Americans who have some special insight.

"These two individuals came as American citizens, as prominent Americans who know something about the region, who have some special insight, and with whom the secretary had a useful discussion," Redman reiterated. He declined to respond to public objections to the meeting voiced by some Israeli officials.

USIS
United States Information Service
Tel Aviv, 71 Hayarkon Street, 63903 Tel. 654338 ext. 204
Jerusalem, 19 Keren Hayesod Street, 94188 Tel. 222376

Redman pointed out that the PNC and the PLO "are not synonymous," adding that "our restrictions on dealing with the PLO remain as always. There's been no change in that." He stressed that, "we're not trying to fine-tune words and to find new words to get at this. This was not a meeting with the PLO. What I'm trying to tell you is that nothing has changed."

Asked why Shultz had decided to return to the Middle East even though none of the region's leaders has endorsed the U.S. peace initiative, Redman explained that "from the start, we have emphasized that this is very much a process. It's one in which we are deeply engaged, continue to be intensively engaged, as the kind of contacts that we're talking about continue to demonstrate.

"The secretary has made it clear on many occasions that he's prepared to go to the Middle East whenever his presence can help. At a time when the U.S. proposal is under serious and active consideration by the parties, the secretary will be emphasizing that it represents a fair and balanced approach to the Arab-Israeli problem and that decisions need to be made."

Redman underscored Shultz's willingness to meet with representatives of the Palestinians. "He's certainly ready to do that. Whether or not something will be arranged, we'll just have to see," the spokesman said.

During his last trip to the region, Shultz read a statement at the American Colony Hotel in East Jerusalem, outlining the U.S. position on Palestinian representation in the peace process. He had planned to deliver his message in person to a group of invited Palestinians, but none attended the scheduled meeting after PLO leaders warned them not to go. Redman described the secretary's statement as "a very eloquent exposition of our position."

On the broader issue of a comprehensive Middle East peace, "fundamentally, our position has not changed," Redman declared. "Our policy is that the way to solve this problem is through direct, bilateral face-to-face negotiations. That's what we're for," he said. "An international conference could be a way to launch the negotiations -- face-to-face bilateral negotiations. So we haven't changed our position as to how to get at this problem."

He declined comment when asked about the lack of an Israeli cabinet decision concerning the U.S. peace initiative. "For developments in Israel and how that's appreciated, you should talk first and foremost to the Israelis," Redman said.

"We are engaged in a process. Israel is one of the parties. We're going to be working closely with Israeli leaders as we have in the past, just as we're going to be working closely with the Arab leaders," the spokesman explained. "It's a process. It's an important one. We have a good proposal. It's fair and balanced. Nobody has said 'no,' and we're going to continue to work on this proposal to see if we can't get something going. That applies to any of the parties that you want to name."

Shultz's stop in Rome, en route to the Middle East, is likely to focus on Alliance issues, Redman said. "The secretary will have bilateral meetings with Italian officials on Friday and again on Saturday, and will be heading off to the Middle East on Sunday," he said.

Redman described Italy as "a very important ally of the United States," and said it was "natural" that Shultz would want to confer with the Italian foreign minister and other officials.

"It's been some time since we've been to Italy, compared to a number of other NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries

32

102.1.1 תיק אלף

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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המשרד

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אל : מצפ"א, מע"ת.

דע : לשכת רוח"מ

תהליר השלום

להלן כתבת ה"וושנגטון פוסט" הינם 1-3-88

1/10

יוסי גל.

שלח רק שהמט נשל נלנטל בירן נקבו אבינטל נטמ
ה סברה הקרבן נגב רש אומן פנקר
ב ומיצ ט

Jordan Urging Separate PLO Seat at Talks

Reported Shift Is Seen Likely to Complicate American Peace Effort

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

AMMAN, Jordan, Feb. 29—Jordan will no longer press for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to any Middle East peace talks and will support a separate Palestine Liberation Organization seat at the table, sources familiar with King Hussein's thinking said here today.

The Jordanian position, conveyed to reporters accompanying Secretary of State George P. Shultz, seems certain to complicate Shultz's task of finding a basis for peace talks mutually acceptable to Israel and the Arabs.

The PLO already has told Jordan that it no longer has any interest in a joint delegation in the wake of three months of violence in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Israel has refused to negotiate with the PLO. The U.S. government is forbidden by law to have contacts with PLO representatives until the organization renounces terrorism and recognizes Israel.

U.S. officials have been assuming that any Palestinians participating in new negotiations would be part of a joint delegation with Jordan and would include individuals approved by the PLO.

An aide to Shultz said such a delegation had "always been part of the concept" of a new peace conference and said "it's not an issue." But he would not say whether he thought Jordan would be willing to press the PLO to join a joint delegation.

The Jordanian sources made clear, however, that Hussein is not going to repeat the experience he went through in 1985 and 1986, when he carried out extensive negotiations with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat on a joint platform and delegation.

While agreement was largely reached on a delegation, the king broke off his negotiations with Arafat in February 1986 because the PLO leader would not make clear his stand on recognizing Israel and renouncing terrorism.

The Jordanian sources made clear today that the Arab position generally has hardened in the wake of the uprising in the occupied territories. They said the Arab world regarded the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In their view, it would be the United Nations, not Jordan, that would issue invitations to a new peace conference.

If the PLO wanted, and could obtain, a separate invitation, Jordan would go along with it, the sources said.

A PLO executive committee member, Mahmoud Abbas, was in Amman in mid-February to reestablish contacts with Hussein but also to tell him that the PLO had no interest in a joint delegation.

The Jordanian sources also made clear that Hussein hopes the United States will find a way to open a dialogue with the PLO. They repeatedly referred to the Palestinians who met with Shultz in Washington Jan. 27 as PLO representatives and suggested those talks should continue.

The two were Hanna Siniora, editor of the East Jerusalem newspaper Al Fajr, and Fayez Abu Rahmeh, head of the Gaza Bar Association. They are known to be strong PLO supporters but are not considered formal members, making it possible for Shultz to see them.

Both were also acceptable to Israel as potential members of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation being discussed in 1985-86 before the Hussein-Arafat talks broke down.

Shultz came here today to answer questions the Jordanians raised about his peace plan during his first visit here Saturday. The Jordanian sources said Amman welcomed Shultz's efforts to revive the peace process.

But they said the Shultz plan needed to be detailed further and a commitment to basic principles of new peace talks agreed to.

Shultz still has not presented any formal plan, although he keeps talk-

2 2/3

Washington Post, p. 1.

cont...

ing about a "package" that has to be considered as a whole.

His package envisages only a brief "international event" to start the negotiations, hosted by the United States and the Soviet Union rather than all five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

An aide to Shultz took issue with the Jordanian description that the Arab position was hardening in the wake of the West Bank and Gaza Strip violence.

He said the Jordanians were "certainly seriously interested" in the U.S. plan, the Egyptians clearly supportive and the Syrians interested in continuing their discussions with Washington.

"I don't see any sign that Arab positions are hardening," he said.

Shultz met the same group of Jordanian officials today that he held talks with Saturday, including Crown Prince Hassan, Prime Minister Zaid Rifai, and Foreign Minister Tahir Masri.

Rifai is scheduled to fly to London tonight to brief King Hussein, who is scheduled to meet Shultz Tuesday in London.

2 2/3

WP

END

102.1.1 תיק ירושלים

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

כ"א בשבט התשמ"ח
9 בפברואר 1988
(169)

ש מ ו ר

א ל : מנהל המרכז

מאת : סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"ן

הנדון: יוזמה אמריקנית לקידום התהליך המדיני - תדרוך

מחלקת איסוף במרכז הוציאה התדרוך הנ"ל (חוזם 913) לנציגויותינו במערב אירופה. התדרוך עוסק במספר היבטים ופותח בהיבט האמריקני לגביו מוצגות שמונה שאלות מפורטות על היזמה האמריקנית, יעדיה וכו'.

עם כל הבנתי לענין המרכז במירב הנתונים, נראה לי מוטעה לחלוטין ופסול מדינית לשלוח נציגים דיפלומטיים ישראליים למשרדי חוץ מערביים ללמוד אצלם נתונים על יוזמה אמריקנית הנוגעת לישראל ולמז"ת. משרדי חוץ אלה יסיקו ובצדק מבחינתם מסקנות בלתי רצויות לנו.

ב ב ר כ ה,

יואב בירן

העתק: מנהל מצפ"א
לשכת המנכ"ל

102.1.1 תיק שלום

37

רחיפות: מיידי לבוקר	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	דף: 1 מתוך: 4
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דע: אירופה ג': ממ"ד כיב"ל 1

מאת: יששכרוף

<u>בריה"מ - תהליך השלום</u>

1. רצ"ב מכתב שה"ח שברדנזה שהופץ הבוקר (21/1), בעניין הצעות בריה"מ לקידום תהליך השלום.

2. ההצעה בעיקרה היא לקדם את הרעיון של ועידה בינ"ל כאמצעי היחיד האמין והמציאותי לקדם תהליך השלום. היוזמה בסוגיה, אליבא דבריתמ, היא בידי חמשה חברי מועבי"ט הקבועים וכי המסקנות וההמלצות שיגובשו בדיון פורמלי של מועבי"ט בדרג של שרי חוץ. "דונ"

נאו"ם

שם השולח: ג. יששכרוף

תאריך: 01.21.88

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UNITED NATIONS

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General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
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S/19442
20 January 1988
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-third session
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-third year

Letter dated 20 January 1988 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 19 January 1988 from Mr. E. A. Shevardnadze, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under the items entitled "Question of Palestine" and "The situation in the Middle East", and of the Security Council.

(Signed) A. BELONOGOV

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452 3/4

ANNEX

Letter dated 19 January 1988 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Secretary-General

Recent events have again focused the attention of the international community on the situation in the Middle East. Massive Palestinian demonstrations in the territories occupied by Israel have reached the levels of a popular uprising. They show in a convincing manner the dangerous nature of the delusions of those who try at any cost to keep the land of others acquired through the use of armed force, who believe that time, in the final analysis, works to perpetuate the results of aggression, and who refuse to look in a serious and business-like manner for means of unblocking the situation in the Middle East.

The unabated tensions in the Middle East adversely affect the political atmosphere not only in that region, but also in the international arena as a whole, and hamper progress towards a more secure world. All States that are seriously interested in ensuring general security have a collective responsibility to reverse the dangerous trends in the Middle East.

We in the Soviet Union are gratified that the international community is becoming ever more deeply convinced of the need to find an immediate political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is evidenced by the growing support for the idea of an international conference on the Middle East as the only realistic and reliable means of achieving such a settlement. This support was clearly reflected at the recent forty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly. Of particular urgency now is the need to transform the political will of States reflected in the General Assembly's decisions into specific and practical steps to solve the hard-core problems of the Middle East. Encouraging trends in international life are creating favourable conditions for that process.

We are convinced that the United Nations possesses both the high prestige and the necessary potential to revitalize the process of a Middle East settlement. It has considerable untapped possibilities, which should be utilized to the fullest. Above all, we believe that the Security Council, as the primary United Nations body responsible for the maintenance of universal peace, should be immediately involved in the practical process of setting up and putting in motion the mechanism of the international conference on the Middle East, which should be designed to find, on the basis of multilateral efforts, a reasonable balance among the interests of all the parties and to ensure lasting peace and security in the region.

We suggest that the members of the Security Council proceed to consultations to consider the relevant questions. The initiative in this matter, we believe, could belong to the permanent members of the Council. Conclusions and recommendations arrived at during such consultations could be considered at a formal meeting of the Council. In view of the particular importance of this question for the maintenance of international security, we propose that such a meeting should be held at the Foreign Minister level. We hope that you, for your

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452
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part, will use the means at your disposal and your personal authority to contribute effectively to a general agreement on immediate practical steps for the convening of an international conference on the Middle East.

E. Shevardnadze
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the USSR

20213 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 30.10.83

סודי יוצא **
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102.1.1 תהליך שלום

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אל:וושינגטון/1002/ניו יורק/1261/לונדון/633/פריס/859/בון/514/רומא/548/
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סודי/רגיל

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אל: וושינגטון, ניו-יורק, לונדון, פריס, בון, רומא, האג, בוקרשט, קהיר

המעצמות והתהליך המדיני

המהומות בשטחים יצרו מצב חדש והייבו את שתי מעצמות העל להתייחסות. כתוצאה מכך מסתמנת מגמה ברורה של העלאת הפרופיל הדיפלומטי של המעצמות.

ההיבט האמריקאי

1. בניגוד להערכות הקודמות ממשל ריגאן מאותת על מחויבותו לקידום התהליך המדיני על אף היות 1983 שנת בחירות. המעורבות הפעילה של ארה"ב בתהליך, עליה הודיעו פומבית בימים האחרונים הן הנשיא והן מזכיר המדינה, נועדה לשמור על אמינות ארה"ב בעיני גורמים באזור כמעצמה מובילה בתהליך. לטווח רחוק סביר כי העבודה המושקעת כעת לא תרד לטמיון ויתכן כי תשמש תשתית עבור מאמצי הממשל הבא.

2. הממשל טרם ויתר על עקרון המו"מ הישיר בין הצדדים וממשיך להסתייג מרעיון הועידה הבינלאומית נוסח בריה"מ. עם זאת, מגלה גמישות רבה הכוללת נסיון לבדוק כל הדרכים המעשיות שיובילו למו"מ ישיר, לרבות ועידה בינלאומית.

3. אנו מתרשמים כי נושאי המהות מתחילים לעלות מחדש.

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הממשל מודע היטב לכך שהדיון הפרוצדורלי גרידא לא מקדם את התהליך. המהומות בשטחים מאלצות את הממשל להתמקד בבעיה הפלסטינית ובדרכים העשיות לפתרון הבעיה. אין הממשל יוצא בשלב הנוכחי עם תכניות רחבות או יומרניות, אלא מסתפק בנסיון להניע התהליך על ידי התמקדות בהסדר מעבר (מעין תוכנית אוטונומיה משופצת ומזורזת). הסדר כזה אמור ליצור תקדים ולהמחיש כי הסטאטוס קוו אינו מקובל וכי בתום המשבר הנוכחי אין לשוב אליו.

4. האופציה הירדנית מוסיפה להשאר, לפי שעה, במוקד המאמץ הדיפלומטי האמריקאי. שיגורו של השליח המיוחד חביב לרבת עמון הינו אינדיקציה להמשך המחויבות האמרי' לאופציה הירדנית. פגישת שולץ עם סינירה ואבו-רחמה נועדה להמחיש כי ארה"ב אינה מוכנה לחרוג ממדיניותה הקודמת השוללת עירוב ישיר ונורמלי של אש"פ בתהליך המדיני תוך מאמץ למצא אישים פלסטינים, המקובלים על הצדדים, לרבות על אש"פ.

5. על אף שיפור האווירה ביחסי ארה"ב-בריה"מ, ממשל ריגאן אינו משוכנע, לפי שעה, לגבי נחיצות שיתופה המלא של בריה"מ בתהליך על כל שלביו. הדילמה האמריקאית הינה ביצד להבטיח שבריה"מ לא תשבש את המהלכים הדיפלומטיים המתוכננים. סביר כי הממשל יבקש לנפנף בפני הסובייטים בתקווה כי מדיניות קונסטרוקטיבית מצידם תכשיר אותם להשתתף בתהליך בשלב מאוחר יותר.

ההיבט הסובייטי

6. בריה"מ ראתה במצב החדש בשטחים כר פעולה נוח לפעלתנות דיפלומטית שמטרתה להבטיח שיתופה המלא ובמעמד שווה לזה של ארה"ב. לשם כך היתה בריה"מ מוכנה להתקדם גם לעבר שיפור יחסים עם ישראל ע"י הסכמתה לקבל משלחת ישראלית במוסקבה. אגרת שברדנדזה למזנ'ל האו"ם שהכילה הצעה בדבר החייאת תהליך ההכנות בחסות מועביי"ט וחילופי האגרות בין גורבצ'וב לבין ערפאת היו שימנים מרבהקים לפעלתנות הסובייטית הנ'ל.

7. אנשר שבריה"מ תלתה תקוות רבות כי ההידברות האינטנסיבית עם ארה"ב תוביל גם להבנה אופרטיבית בין השתים לגבי המשך הטיפול בסוגית המשברים האזוריים, לרבות המשבר במזה"ת. להערכתנו, בעילותה הדיפלומטית האחרונה של ארה"ב אינה מקדמת התפיסה הסוב' הנ'ל. הנסיון האמריקאי המחודש לקדם התהליך המדיני באמצעות מהלך חד-צדדי מחדד,

אינרא, את הדילמה הסובייטית. בריה"מ נקרעת בין רצונה להקרין דימוי של מעצמה אחראית וקונסטרוקטיבית לבין האינטרס שלה לשבש, להאיט ולהסרם מהלך אמריקאי חד-צדדי. יצויין כי בשלב זה מסתמנת מגמה סובייטית לחזק קשריה עם בלגי אש"פ השונים. הדגשת המחויבות העקרונית של בריה"מ לאש"פ בנציג חוקי בלעדי ובצד שורה המעמד ליתר הצדדים בתהליך המדיני נועדה להבטיח המשך המעורבות הסובייטית בתהליך המדיני. ברם, עמדה זו אינה מקדמת ההבנה הסובייטית-ירדנית שהינה חיונית לקידום תהליך מדיני חיובי מבחינת מוסקבה. יודגש כי לא ברור בשלב זה כיצד בריה"מ נערכת מול סוריה לנוכח המהלכים האחרונים.

בינ"ל 1/ממ"ד

א/ד

הפ: שהה,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,המנכל,סמנכל,המד,רס,אמן,מצפא,אירא, אירב,אירג,מצרים,ארבל2

102.1.1 רבלין ישראל

משרד החוץ
המרכז למחקר
מדיני

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צפי להתחזקות האורינטציה הפלסטינית בארה"ב
בעקבות גל המהומות בשטחים

1. מאז 1982 מעמיד הממשל האמריקאי את "האופציה הירדנית" במרכז האסטרטגיה המזה"תית שלו. זו היתה תרומתו היחודית של ממשל ריגאן למדיניות ארה"ב במזה"ת. "האופציה הירדנית" היתה בנויה סביב ירדן, האמורה למלא תפקיד מרכזי בשלב הבא של הסדר הסכסוך. על פי מדיניות זו ירדן היתה אמורה להוות הגורם המוביל בנסיון לפתור את הבעיה הפלסטינית כשהממשל האמריקאי מכיר בזיקת הגדמ"ע לממלכה ההאשמית. קו זה עלה בקנה אחד עם "סלידתו" של הממשל השמרני האמריקאי מאש"פ, כתנועה לשחרור לאומי פרו-סובייטית , ועם הישענותו על משטרים פרו-מערביים-שמרנים.

2. בשנים האחרונות לא הניבה אסטרטגיה זו תוצאות כלשהן, למרות המאמץ הדיפלומטי הניכר שהושקע לסירוגין. שנת 1988 הינה האחרונה בכהונת ריגאן כנשיא. בדרך כלל משותק הממשל בשנה האחרונה לכהונתו ותופעה זו מוכרת כממשל LAME-DUCK. להערכתנו בשנה האחרונה יראה הממשל בהעמקת ההידברות עם בריה"מ עדיפות ראשונה במעלה. בהעדר משבר של ממש באזור סביר כי הממשל ישאף להמעיט את עיסוקו בבעית מזה"ת תוך הפנית תשומת ליבו לנושאים בעלי עדיפות גבוהה יותר.

3. האירועים האחרונים בשטחים טרפו במידה מסויימת את התחזית הנ"ל. שוב התמקדה תשומת הלב הערבית על הבעיה הפלסטינית. התקשורת הבינלאומית העניקה מימד דרמטי להתפתחויות בשטחים. סביר שהופעלו לחצים בצינורות הדיפלומטיים על הממשל האמריקאי להדרש לנושא. למרות אי הרצון של הדרגים העליונים בממשל לטפל בסוגית המזה"ת, נאלצה הפקידות האמריקאית לעסוק בנדון מתוקף תפקידה. אין להוציא מכלל אפשרות שהאירועים האחרונים אף שימשו אמתלה נוחה לנהל "מסע לחצים" פומבי כנגד הכיבוש הישראלי. הבעיה הפלסטינית והשפעותיו השליליות של הכיבוש הישראלי עמדו, איפוא, במוקד תשומת הלב הציבורית והדיפלומטית ושימשו אמתלה לגורמים בארה"ב, המבקשים לראות מעורבות אמריקאית גדולה יותר במאמץ לפתור את הבעיה. יצויין כי קיימת מידה ניכרת של הבנה למניעי הפלסטינים אשר התקוממו כנגד הכיבוש המתמשך. לראשונה מזה זמן רב ההתבטאויות האמריקאיות מעמידות על בסיס שווה הן את האלימות הפלסטינית והן את פעולות ישראל להרגעת הרוחות. גם פומביות ורציפות הביקורת מהוות סטיה מהקו שגרס כי המחלוקת בין ארה"ב לבין ישראל חייבת להתברר בצינורות דיפלומטים.

4. ככל שמתקרבים לסיום כהונתו של הממשל סביר כי תגבר הנטיה לעיין מחדש ביסודות המדיניות המזה"תית של הממשל. סביר כי היעדר התוצאות יגביר הנטיה לחפש דרכים חדשות כדי להחלץ מהקפאון המדיני. גם הממשל הבא - יהיה אשר יהיה - יבקש לגבש לעצמו קו יחודי משלו כיצד לטפל בבעית מזה"ת. במכוני המחקר של וושינגטון טרודים בימים אלה בכתיבת תכניות לישוב ההסדר במזה"ת. רעיונות ותכניות אלה ביחד עם סיכומי הממשל היוצא יהוו מעין מאגר אשר סביר שישמש מקור השראה לקו המזה"תי שיתגבש בממשל הבא. יתכן כי קו זה יצטיין באורינטציה פלסטינית מודגשת יותר, זאת לנוכח חוסר היכולת של "האופציה הירדנית" להניב פרי בשנים האחרונות. יודגש כי "הערביסטים" האמריקאים, אשר סברו תמיד שאין להגביל את המגעים עם אש"פ, יראו בחילופי הממשל בארה"ב הזדמנות נאותה להשתחרר מכבלי העבר בסוגיה הפלסטינית תוך הצדקת הצעד הזה בצורך ליצור בסיס נאות לפתרון הבעיה.

5. ממשל ריגאן סלד מאש"פ אם כי נמנע מלכנותו ארגון טרוריסטי. סביר כי הממשל הבא יגלה רגישות רבה יותר מקודמו בסוגית זכויות האדם. שיפור יחסי בריה"מ-ארה"ב יוצר אקלים נוח להתפנות לטפל במוקדי סכסוך אזוריים. אם הקונדנסוס הערבי והבינלאומי יצביע על אש"פ כגורם שאין להתעלם ממנו ואם גלי המהומות יתחדשו סביר כי גם בממשל האמריקאי הבא יתחזקו הגורמים אשר יבקשו להתנער מהמגבלות אשר מנעו בעבר הידברות ישירה בין ארה"ב לבין אש"פ.

6. <u>סיכום</u> - מן הדין לעקוב אחרי אפשרות התחזקות האורינטציה הפלסטינית בתוך הממשל האמריקאי על חשבון "האופציה הירדנית". יודגש כי לא מדובר בדיכוטומיה (קו פלסטיני או קו ירדני) אלא במעין רצף כאשר סביר שבעתיד המטוטלת תנוע יותר לעבר הקוטב הפלסטיני.

נכתב ע"י הרי קני-טל, בינ"ל 1, ממ"ד.

October 27, 1987

DRAFT ONLY--NOT FOR CITATION OR FURTHER DISTRIBUTION

BROOKINGS STUDY GROUP ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

In the mid-1970s, the Arab-Israeli conflict stood near the top of the American foreign policy agenda. The October 1973 war had shown Americans the dangers of leaving the conflict to fester. In addition to the heavy losses during the war on the part of all the combatants, the U.S. and the USSR were drawn into the crisis to the point where a direct confrontation was imaginable.

Well after the war had ended, Americans were reminded of its cost as they saw oil used as a political weapon by the Arab states. Energy prices skyrocketed. In this atmosphere, there was widespread domestic support for the efforts of three successive presidents from 1973 to 1979 to devote major resources to Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. The result was the conclusion of five negotiated agreements in as many years.

While most Americans would still like to see the Arab-Israeli conflict resolved, there is no great sense of urgency such as there was

after the October 1973 war. Since 1979, Egypt and Israel have been at peace. The remainder of the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors seems intractable. And American leadership is no longer so clearly perceived as a primary missing ingredient in the peace process.

American National Interests Still at Stake

Since the dangers associated with the Arab-Israeli stalemate are not so obvious today, and the opportunities to advance the peace process seem slim, many American politicians will conclude that a posture of watchful waiting is all that is called for. This could be a costly mistake, for American interests are still at risk.

If past history is any guide, a gradual deterioration of the political and economic situation in the region could be as worrisome as an acute crisis, and indeed might insure that crises will eventually occur. With this in mind, the U.S. would be well advised to develop policies in non-crisis periods that might postpone or prevent the types of crises that could result in serious threats to American interests. In addition, the United States enhances its reputation and thereby promotes its interests when it is seen as effectively pursuing the Arab-Israeli peace process.

What, then, are those interests today, and what are the main dangers? American interests in the Arab-Israeli conflict can be summarized as follows:

--To insure that the Arab-Israeli conflict not become a source of either U.S.-Soviet confrontation or an issue that allows for increased Soviet influence at our expense.

--To maintain the long-standing American commitment to Israel's security and well-being.

--To protect the American stake in the Egyptian-Israeli peace, which we now subsidize at a rate of several billion dollars each year.

--To help Israel and surrounding Arab neighbors to achieve stable, preferably peaceful relations, both for their own sake and as a buttress for the Egyptian-Israeli peace.

--To encourage political moderation in the region in order to enhance the prospects of the peaceful resolution of conflicts and to facilitate our access to the region and its resources on reasonable terms.

In the absence of further progress in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, these interests are jeopardized in the following ways:

--Large-scale hostilities could break out, especially on the Syrian-Israeli front. While war does not seem imminent today, both sides are heavily armed and war could occur without much warning, with the shadow of nuclear and chemical weapons looming over the conflict. Local hostilities could quickly draw in the superpowers.

--The peace between Egypt and Israel has served American interests well, but will always be somewhat fragile unless there is further progress toward a settlement of the remainder of the Arab-Israeli conflict. And U.S.-Egyptian relations, which have become one of the foundations of the U.S. position in the region, depend heavily on the continuation of Egyptian-Israeli peace.

--At the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the relationship among Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians is volatile and conducive to extremism and violence. Because of the extraordinarily close ties between the United States and Israel, we cannot remain unaffected by these developments. Without progress toward a peace settlement with the Palestinians and Jordan, Israel faces a long-term dilemma of controlling some one and one-half million Palestinian Arabs who lack full political rights. This is a formula for continuing conflict--and for continuing debate within Israel. For the United States, this raises the question of what kind of Israel it wants to support and which side of the debate it wants to encourage through its own policies.

--Without peace, religious extremism is growing in both Israel and the Arab world. This threatens to transform an already complicated, but still negotiable conflict between two national claims into one that leaves little room for compromise or accommodation by evoking powerful historical and religious symbols. Events in Lebanon show how destructive religiously based extremism can be, and indeed Lebanon's ills cannot be seriously addressed unless there is a broader movement toward Arab-Israeli peace.

--In the absence of Arab-Israeli peace, it will be very difficult for the United States to maintain and develop its security relations with friendly Arab countries. Each time a major arms sale is contemplated, Israeli objections have to be confronted. In recent years, this has become a major obstacle to American policy, especially in the Gulf, a region that is likely to remain of vital interest to the United States.

--American credibility has been damaged in the Middle East by a series of policy failures. One need only mention the Iranian revolution, the war in Lebanon, the Iran-Contra affair, and the near-collapse of the Arab-Israeli peace process to realize the extent of the damage. Progress in Arab-Israeli peacemaking would go some distance in reversing the image of the United States as incompetent and unsure of itself.

None of this is so urgent that the new American president in 1989 will be forced to act in the Middle East. The problem is less one of imminent explosion than of continuing erosion. Some may argue that it is best to wait for a crisis before acting, but the test of statesmanship is surely to ward off crises if at all possible. While recent Middle East history supports the view that major diplomatic progress may follow the shocks of war, the risk today is that the forces of erosion could undermine existing governments to the point that, after another major shock, there would be little support for diplomatic compromise.

If the president is to act in the Middle East before an acute crisis confronts him, he will have to move early in his term to assess the new realities of the Arab-Israeli conflict, to examine options for an effective American role, and to begin to lay the groundwork politically -- in the region, in the United States, and with other powers -- to pursue a sustainable policy of promoting Arab-Israeli peace.

We have no doubt that progress toward Arab-Israeli peace will serve American interests. While no panacea for the multiple problems of the region, Arab-Israeli peace would make it easier for the United States to manage both its enduring commitment to Israel and its substantial interests in a number of Arab countries. But is it possible to revive the Arab-Israeli peace process?

No president can tackle the Arab-Israeli conflict with anything like a guarantee of success. Indeed, the process is bound to be frustrating and controversial, and for these reasons many will advise against putting American credibility, and the president's domestic position, on the line in such a risky enterprise. But it can be argued that a serious American initiative, even if not fully successful, will go some distance in restoring a sense of American leadership and will serve American interests in the region. Time is of the essence, however, not because the situation is so explosive, but because peacemaking will inevitably take a long time. An early start in a new presidential term is needed if the U.S. role is to be played skillfully.

A newly elected president will not be able to get his bearings on the Arab-Israeli conflict either by clinging to campaign rhetoric or by evoking the formulas of the past. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the Camp David Accords, and President Ronald Reagan's proposal of September 1, 1982, contain some useful building blocks. For example, these documents introduce concepts such as the exchange of "territory for peace", the establishment of "secure and recognized boundaries", negotiations between the parties concerned "under appropriate auspices", "transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza", "solving the Palestinian problem in all its aspects", and a suggestion that the West Bank and Gaza should ultimately be associated in some way with Jordan. But a serious policy cannot be developed by stringing these formulations together. New realities in the region require that fresh approaches and concepts be considered. As the first order of business, the political environment in the region needs to be changed so that imaginative ideas can help to bring together the parties in the region who favor peace negotiations.

New Realities in the Region

Among the most important of the new realities surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict are the following:

--The peace treaty signed between Egypt and Israel in March 1979 has never evolved much beyond what some have called a "cold peace", a relationship durable enough to prevent a return to belligerency, but not

strong enough to provide much momentum in the search for a broader peace. Indeed, there are many in Israel and in the Arab world who are severely disappointed with the results of the peace treaty and therefore argue against further steps in the peace process. Egypt, while certain to be concerned with encouraging further progress, cannot be expected to play a central role in future negotiations. At best, the Egyptian role will be to help set the stage for peace talks and to encourage the process from the sidelines. Meanwhile, it is of great importance that the Egyptian-Israeli relationship not be taken for granted and allowed to deteriorate further.

--The most complex, if not necessarily the most dangerous, part of the Arab-Israeli conflict revolves around the core relations among Israel, the Palestinians and Jordan. The geographical focus of this complexity is the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem. During the past twenty years since Israel has been in control of these areas, Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians have become deeply entangled in one another's affairs and it will be difficult, and probably not desirable, to try to unravel many of these connections. Economic interdependencies are now a fact of life and could be positive elements in any peace accord. What is lacking, however, is a political formula that provides Palestinians with an identity of their own, the Israelis with recognition and acceptance from their neighbors, and security for all of the parties.

--Arab-Israeli peace has become an extremely divisive issue in the domestic politics of all the concerned parties. There are sharp divisions

over the terms for peace, and even over its desirability. As a result, political leaders are often incapable of acting, whatever their personal preferences might be. This is particularly true in light of the rise of religiously based political movements which tend to redefine the conflict in absolutist terms. This suggests that the parties will not be able to break the stalemate if left entirely to themselves. It is very unlikely that something like Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's dramatic trip to Jerusalem in 1977 could be undertaken today.

--Much of the Arab world is presently distracted by problems other than the Arab-Israeli conflict. These include economic problems, the Iran-Iraq war, and demands for greater political participation and democratization. As a result, effective pressure to change U.S. policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict is unlikely to come from the broader Arab world in the absence of a new crisis. Instead, it is the core Arab group of Jordan, the Palestinians, Syria and Lebanon that will continue to be the most dissatisfied with the status quo and could threaten regional stability.

--Israel has taken actions that raise serious doubts about the feasibility today of a straight-forward "territory for peace" deal in the West Bank and Gaza as envisaged in U.N. Resolution 242. This has called into question the whole concept of the partition of the land west of the Jordan River into two homelands, one for the Jews and one for the Palestinian Arabs. This concept, dating back to the 1930s, has been at the

core of every serious peace proposal and has always had the support of the United States.

Among those Israeli steps that call complicate the possibility of partition are the extension of Israeli law to east Jerusalem and to the Golan Heights; the presence of some 65,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank, and another 100,000 or more in east Jerusalem in territory formerly subject to Jordanian rule. Meanwhile, a whole generation of Israelis and Palestinians has grown up knowing nothing about the "green line" that had separated their two societies from the time of the armistice agreements in 1949 until the 1967 war. In addition, some 100,000 Palestinians cross the invisible "green line" every day to work in Israel.

--Palestinian nationalism has gained in strength in the past twenty years. Few Palestinians are now willing to subordinate their identity within the larger framework of Arabism, and few would entrust their fate to the existing Arab regimes. Even Israeli Arabs are now conscious of their identity as Palestinians and are beginning to assert themselves as a force within Israeli politics. Within the West Bank and Gaza, and certainly within the Palestinian diaspora, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has become widely accepted as a symbol of Palestinian national aspirations, even by those who disagree with specific policies and actions or who criticize its leaders.

The PLO has maintained a two-track policy in recent years. On the one hand, there is the continued resort to violence to achieve its goals. On the other, the PLO has signalled its interest in achieving, through

political means, a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza which would be confederated with Jordan and would coexist alongside Israel. The most moderate expression of the PLO position, supported by many Palestinians, seems to be that the Israeli occupation should end, that the Palestinians should be allowed to exercise their right of self-determination, and that no one who is not authorized by the PLO should presume to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians. Until these points are accepted by Israel, the PLO is reluctant to make what it considers to be unilateral concessions, such as unconditionally accepting U.N. Resolution 242. To many Israelis, this refusal of the PLO confirms their suspicion that the PLO's ultimate goal is the dismantling of the Israeli state, and therefore they refuse to do anything that might legitimize such an organization. Thus, the stalemate persists.

--Israel is deeply divided over the substance of a peace settlement. The Likud Bloc sees a limited version of autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza as forming a sound basis for a long-term settlement. This view is reinforced by an ideological commitment to keep all of the territory west of the Jordan River under Israeli control, while seeking to increase the Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza so as to make its retention by Israel irreversible. While upholding Israel's claim to sovereignty over these areas, Likud has stopped short of calling for annexation, since that step would raise the question of dealing with the political status of nearly one and one-half million Palestinians.

The Labor Party has traditionally placed heavy emphasis on security concerns in the West Bank and Gaza. Labor talks of the possibility of "territorial compromise" and seeks direct negotiations with Jordan. Recently, Labor has shown considerable enthusiasm for the idea of Israeli-Jordanian shared rule over the West Bank, at least as an unspoken interim arrangement, if not as the basis for an explicit agreement.

Demographic trends provide one of the most potent arguments for Israelis who favor a negotiated political settlement based on "territorial compromise". In all the territory now under Israeli control, more Arab babies are born each year than Jewish babies. In time, this could mean that Arabs would become a majority within Israel. And even short of becoming a majority, the Arabs will in any event be a large and problematic minority. For many Israelis, a smaller, but more Jewish Israel would be preferred to a large, binational Israel--provided, of course, that such an Israel could live in peace with its Arab neighbors.

Likud and its allies are less worried by the demographic argument. They believe that the trends are not irreversible, and that in any case the Arabs can be given a political status outside the framework of Israeli politics. An extremist fringe, however, does argue that the solution to the Arab demographic threat is to arrange for the transfer of the Palestinian population to the East Bank, either by providing economic incentives or by force.

--Syria has accepted U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 with the understanding that they call for full Israeli withdrawal from all occupied

territories and Palestinian self-determination. The official Syrian position has not evolved much beyond offering non-belligerency in return for Israeli withdrawal in the Golan Heights area. Syria also wants to be involved in any efforts to resolve the Palestinian issue. The Syrians fear isolation and strongly oppose separate deals; hence, they insist on an international conference with real powers reserved for the plenary.

--Under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet position toward the Arab-Israeli conflict has become more activist and less rigid than in the the 1970s when the Soviets were primarily interested in having the status of co-equal partner with the United States in any peace negotiations. The Soviets have consistently supported U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 and Israel's right to exist as an independent Jewish state. But this has normally been coupled with a fairly conventional posture of support for the Arab interpretation of Israel's obligation to withdraw from all occupied territory and to allow the Palestinians to form a state of their own. More recently, the Soviets have reestablished a dialogue with Israel and have undertaken a number of initiatives with the Arab parties to the conflict. They have simultaneously pressed for PLO unity and for PLO-Syrian rapprochement.

Part of the Soviet objective seems to be to insure that no negotiations can take place outside the framework of a Soviet-supported international conference. But while being very insistent on the principle of a conference, the Soviets have hinted at considerable flexibility on the modalities of negotiating. In essence, the Soviet argument comes down to

the need for parallel movement on the Syrian and Palestinian fronts--and that their participation is essential for making progress in both of these arenas.

While Soviet intentions in the Middle East cannot be known with certainty, it seems that the Arab-Israeli conflict is no longer seen by Moscow as a primary vehicle for advancing Soviet interests in the region. The current Soviet leadership seems to attach far higher priority to internal reform and to relations with the United States than to third-world issues generally. And the Soviets apparently recognize that disruptive, or even rigid policies in the Middle East could jeopardize some of their other objectives, including arms control with the United States. For these reasons, it seems more plausible than at any time in the recent past to believe that some degree of U.S.-Soviet cooperation on Arab-Israeli diplomacy may be a realistic possibility.

Basic Principles From the Past

Just as the day-to-day realities surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict have changed over time and must be fully appreciated by policy makers, it is also worth remembering the basic principles that have been at the heart of American policy since the creation of the state of Israel. Forty years ago, the United States recognized the right of two peoples, one Jewish and one Arab, to achieve their political identities within the territory of what had been British-mandated Palestine. Ever since, U.S. policy has been based on the premise that any peaceful settlement would provide for two distinct political regimes within this area.

While consistently upholding Israel's right to exist as a predominantly Jewish state in a part of historic Palestine, the United States is also on record as recognizing the rights of Palestinians, including the rights of refugees to either repatriation to their homes or compensation. Needless to say, how these competing rights could be reconciled has been the ongoing challenge confronting diplomats, but the principles have remained remarkably constant.

Up until now, the most common proposals for finding a peaceful solution to the competing Israeli and Palestinian claims in Palestine have involved some form of partition of the land between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River. But there have also been proposals based on "functional" partition, or a division of authority that would not necessarily follow clear lines on a map. The United States is on record as still supporting some form of territorial partition, preferably negotiated after a transitional period. At no time has the United States favored a settlement based on exclusive Israeli or Palestinian rule in the area of the former British mandate. The dilemma remains: how can the United States make good on its commitment to recognize two equal political identities within this small area? Before venturing to answer that question, we need to address the question of how, and whether, the United States can exert influence on behalf of these principles.

Thinking about the American Role

In the past decade, the American approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict has spanned the spectrum from passivity and neglect to intense involvement at the highest political level. To some extent, the choice was dictated by circumstance. But it also reflected a philosophical stance toward the peace process.

At least three schools of thought on the proper American role toward the Arab-Israeli conflict can be discerned. One, closely identified with Henry Kissinger in the 1969-75 period, argued for an aloof stance until the right set of regional circumstances presented themselves. Then Kissinger would recommend intense, high-level involvement, with emphasis on trying to persuade Middle East leaders to rethink their positions within a strategic political framework and to move in a step-by-step fashion toward agreements. Kissinger, and President Richard Nixon as well, tended toward the belief that regional crises often opened the way for imaginative diplomacy. This was not an argument for creating such crises, but it did mean that American officials were most prone to become active when there had been a sudden shock to the status quo.

President Jimmy Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance were also proponents of an active American role in the Arab-Israeli peace process, but were less inclined to wait for propitious regional circumstances. They argued that it was too dangerous to wait until a crisis opened new

opportunities for diplomacy. Instead, they felt that American leadership could bring about significant change in the positions of the parties and could help to establish an agreed set of principles to guide negotiations toward a successful conclusion.

President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz have, on the whole, adopted a different approach from that of their predecessors. They have indicated that the United States should not engage its resources in Arab-Israeli diplomacy until the parties to the conflict are already committed to negotiations. They have been concerned about raising expectations too high by holding out the prospect of an active American role. The more the parties come to depend on Washington, they have argued, the less they will be prepared to deal directly with one another.

The basic effort of the Reagan administration has been to encourage Jordan and Israel to engage in direct negotiations, with Palestinians represented as junior partners under Jordan's tutelage. To that end, they have been prepared to explore the idea of an international conference and of U.S.-Soviet sponsorship of direct negotiations. But Arab-Israeli peacemaking has not enjoyed much high-level concern during the Reagan years.

We believe that the next president should draw on some elements of policy from each of his predecessors. Certainly it is wise not to promise more than can be delivered. Certainly it makes sense to keep pressure on

the parties to the conflict to do as much as they can on their own. And certainly one should be on the alert for events which may provide new opportunities for peacemaking. But it is also important to signal that the United States has an interest of its own in seeing the conflict settled. This needs to be articulated if the Congress and public are to support the diplomacy of peacemaking.

Instead of vacillating between passivity and hyper-activism in Arab-Israeli diplomacy, we would like to see a steady, high-level commitment of resources. There is less need for bold new initiatives than for continuing political dialogue, for a conscious wedding of American power to the purposes of the diplomacy of peace. Much can be done through the creative use of existing diplomatic channels, provided that the secretary of state is himself directly engaged. The president too will have to play a part, but more as "court of last resort" on the hard issues than as desk officer for the day-to-day negotiations. A few command decisions will be needed from a new president, but much of the conduct of diplomacy can and should be left to the secretary of state.

We would hope that the new administration could move early in 1989 to demonstrate its commitment to a negotiated Arab-Israeli peace. A new secretary of state will want to visit the region early on as a way of getting his bearings and signalling American interest. Insofar as possible, it will be desirable to project a degree of continuity and consistency on matters of procedure and substance. There is no point in

trying to start from scratch. At the same time, it will be necessary to show that election-year paralysis is a thing of the past and that the United States is again able to focus on its foreign relations with full attention and energy.

A new administration will need to have its own political calendar in mind. If it leaves Arab-Israeli issues for too long, it may run out of time. This is an argument for starting early and trying to maintain a steady pace. Needless to say, this stance will have to be assessed constantly in terms of regional realities. A lucky break may occur that strengthens the case for activism. Or the converse may be true. But unless the administration is intelligently engaged, it will not be able to assess these developments accurately.

A Strategy for the Next Administration

Presidents and their top advisers rarely have the time and inclination to think through their options toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Instead, policy seems to emerge as a reaction to crises, by improvisation, or as a byproduct of domestic campaign rhetoric. One way or another, however, every president will find himself trying to cope with the competing claims of Arabs and Israelis, and with the pull of domestic constituencies who care deeply about the Middle East. Inevitably, policy making is heavily colored by politics.

Even if the policy process often seems disorderly and fragmented, each president eventually has to deal with the following questions: How much do I really care about the Arab-Israeli conflict? Is it worth my while to try to do anything about it, or would I be better off leaving it alone? If I do engage in Arab-Israeli diplomacy, what are the most effective means of advancing the peace process? How should I see the American role--as a mediator, a broker, a catalyst, a full partner, or some of each? How much should I do in public and how much in private? Can I delegate some of my responsibilities to others? Is it preferable to stay away from the day-to-day diplomacy in order to save my clout for the rare moments when a breakthrough may be possible? Should I speak out on the substantive issues, or is this too controversial?

How the next president answers these questions will have much to do with his own political style and his sense of priorities. Nonetheless, we would strongly urge that the next administration look at the Arab-Israeli negotiating process in the broadest possible light. The need is not so much for the artfully crafted statement of policy, or for a novel formula to bring the parties to negotiations. The process of peacemaking has been stalled too long for such discrete steps to lead anywhere.

Instead, the first order of business is to rebuild the political foundations for the peace process. This requires a sense of strategy, a series of connected moves informed by a clear political purpose, and a recognition that choices do exist. The United States need not merely react

to events. It has the capability, when its power is used wisely, to shape events. Leadership is now required if we are to avoid peacemaking by fits and starts in the Middle East.

The United States cannot reinvigorate Arab-Israeli peacemaking by itself, but what it says and does will have a substantial influence on the views of all of the parties and the eventual agenda for negotiation. This means that the United States can make considerable headway, especially with a new administration, by signalling that the Arab-Israeli issue is high on its agenda, that the president and his secretary of state intend to devote time and resources to dealing with this issue, and that a series of political discussions with all of the concerned parties is planned for the early part of 1989.

With traditional friends such as Israel, Egypt, Jordan, this means close consultations on how best to revive the peace process. A wide range of useful steps can be discussed that could substantially improve the atmosphere for negotiations. All this is part of the process of building solid foundations for peace negotiations.

It is not enough, however, to talk just with traditional friends. Syria has for too long been treated as either irrelevant to the peace process, or beyond the reach of diplomacy. Syria has the capacity to complicate the negotiating efforts if ignored, as amply shown from 1982 to 1985. A high-level dialogue between Washington and Damascus is needed to

determine how, and whether, Syria is prepared to contribute to the peace process.

The United States will also need to find ways to include representative Palestinians in these early consultations. Numerous channels for direct and indirect communication exist, even within the strictures set by current law and policy. The point is to use these channels effectively to persuade authoritative Palestinian leaders that they have an incentive to support the next phase of peacemaking.

Much of what we are recommending should be seen as the essence of normal diplomacy. But normal diplomacy is never quite enough in dealing with Arab-Israeli issues. Because these issues are so thoroughly politicized, and so complex, it is essential that the highest levels of our government demonstrate a commitment to the effort of reviving the Arab-Israeli peace process. We need to show by words and deeds that we have a serious approach to peacemaking. We need to restore confidence in America's commitment, consistency and fair-mindedness.

A special word needs to be added on the Soviet Union. We sense that U.S.-Soviet relations may be entering a phase of serious dialogue on a wide range of issues, first and foremost on strategic arms control. The Arab-Israeli conflict should also be on the superpower agenda. We do not have identical interests in the region, but we do share a concern for the consequences of another large-scale war, one that might draw both of us to

the brink of direct confrontation. In addition, we should both be concerned with the possibility of an erosion of commitment to a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its replacement by political and religious extremism.

It is worth exploring how far these common interests can provide a basis for enlisting Soviet cooperation in laying foundations for productive negotiations. We cannot be sure what the Soviet position will be in the absence of concrete tests, but we do know that Moscow has close ties to some of the parties to the conflict. This gives the Soviets some influence, and it is in our interest that they use that influence constructively.

The Need for an International Framework for Negotiations

In the course of political consultations of the sort we advocate, the issue will immediately arise of whether the United States supports the convening of an international conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict. We believe that such a conference cannot be an end in itself and should not become the declared objective of U.S. policy; it should instead be judged in pragmatic terms of whether it is likely to contribute to peacemaking.

We are well aware of the pitfalls of a poorly prepared international conference, but we also recognize that the issues involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict can no longer be dealt with strictly through bilateral negotiations. Some broad international framework will be needed which

ensures participation in the negotiations of the key regional parties and assures a degree of international support for the effort.

Policy toward an international conference cannot be formulated in a vacuum. For several years, the parties to the conflict have been talking about a possible international conference. A degree of consensus has even emerged that includes Jordan, Egypt, part of the Israeli government, the Palestinians, and the United States. American and Soviet diplomats have held promising discussions on the possibility of convening an international conference. We do not believe that all of this history of dialogue should be swept aside by a new administration.

The important judgment to make is how best to build on the progress that has been made to date. At what point, if at all, should the United States push assertively for the actual convening of a conference? Or is the process of talking about a conference a useful device in its own right? Or might there be an alternative of U.S.-Soviet sponsorship of direct negotiations between the parties, bypassing the formalities of a conference?

Certain conditions will have to be met before the United States can commit itself to a specific formula for reviving negotiations. First, the parties to the conflict will have to accept the formula. Second, the U.S. and the Soviet Union should be in broad agreement on how to proceed. Third, some points of substance should have been discussed so that

negotiations can proceed from a common agenda. Extensive political dialogue will be needed to establish whether or not these conditions have been met.

Successful negotiations require firm political foundations, and those are presently missing. But we do see the possibility that discussion of convening an international conference might help to stimulate the parties to refine their own ideas on peacemaking. In the end, that could be more important than the conference itself.

In supporting U.N. Resolution 338, the United States endorsed the concept of negotiations "between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices" as the best way to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is a suitably vague, yet useful, formula, and it was clearly understood at the time that it meant U.S.-Soviet auspices for the negotiations. This is not to say, however, that the United States should limit itself to the formalities of an international conference. Indeed, if an international conference is to be useful, it will be the preparatory phase, the side discussions, and the bilateral talks that accompany it that will provide the real openings for diplomacy. The art will be to use the idea of an international conference as an opportunity rather than to allow it to become a trap.

Four issues immediately arise when discussing the convening of an international conference:

--Who will represent the Palestinians?

--What role will the Soviets play?

--What will be the authority of the plenary with respect to any agreements rea

--How can the Syrians be given a stake in the conference without at the same time having a veto over its outcome?

Without committing ourselves unreservedly to the idea of an international conference, we feel that each of these questions can be answered in ways that would protect American interests and facilitate negotiations.

For the purpose of analyzing the current prospects for an international conference, we should assume that Israel will not change its position of refusal to negotiate with the PLO and that the PLO will not cease to be an organization committed to national liberation and armed struggle. Perhaps these assumptions will prove wrong, and if so the problem of getting Israelis and Palestinians to talk to one another may be eased. For the time being, however, it is probably fair to conclude that the gap between Israel and the PLO will not be easily bridged.

Some have argued that Jordan is therefore the logical alternative to the PLO in any negotiations with Israel. We are doubtful that such an approach can go very far. King Hussein is reluctant to move into

negotiations without Palestinian support, and that support is unlikely to be forthcoming unless the PLO gives the green light to its supporters.

We believe that Palestinians should be represented in any negotiations with Israel by spokesmen of their own choosing. For practical reasons, we see merit in the idea of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. To be credible, Palestinian negotiators would have to receive support from the PLO. Israel will have qualms about such an arrangement, but diplomats should be able to find a formula that is acceptable to all sides. The Soviet Union could be asked to help on this issue; its willingness to work for a reasonable solution would be an early test of intentions.

On balance, we do not see the question of Palestinian representation as an insurmountable problem, nor do we believe that the United States should take a stand on which individual Palestinians should be allowed to participate in negotiations. As a general guideline, we should have no objection to the participation of any party that is committed to peaceful negotiations, can contribute to that objective, and is prepared to relinquish the use of force as the means of achieving its goals.

It is often said that Soviet participation in the Middle East peace process will bring them back into the area. But the Soviets are already present in the region and they are being invited to participate in peacemaking by some of our closest friends. The reason for Soviet

involvement in this stage of diplomacy is the recognition that they have some influence over the positions of Syria and the PLO. If it were possible to think of just an Israeli-Jordanian bilateral peace negotiation, the Soviet role would not appear to be so important. But if Syria and the PLO must be taken into account as well, then the Soviets do have a role to play that derives from their relations with these two parties.

The challenge for the United States, we believe, is to pursue negotiations in ways that will give the Soviets incentives to play a constructive role. In addition to asking the Soviets to help find an acceptable formula for Palestinian representation, we should explore the chances of agreement on several other procedural matters. For example, the Soviets should be asked to endorse the proposition that a peace conference will not be authorized to impose solutions or to veto the results of bilateral negotiations. The Soviets also have a role to play in persuading the Syrians to participate, or at least not to block the convening of a conference. Finally, before a conference convenes, the Soviets should be expected to commit themselves to restoring diplomatic relations with Israel. All of these points will provide opportunities to see how the Soviets play their part before the hard substantive questions come into focus in the negotiations.

The issue of Syrian participation has bedevilled all previous efforts to organize an international conference. Secretary Kissinger spent many hours in 1973 on this matter, only to be told on the eve of the Geneva

conference that Syria would not participate. Nonetheless, several months later Syria did sign a disengagement agreement with Israel under the auspices of the Geneva conference.

If the conditions are met for convening an international conference, we believe that Syria should be invited and that it should be made clear that the United States supports the idea of negotiations between Israel and Syria on the basis of the "territory for peace" formula of U.N. Resolution 242. We do not believe that Israel has unilaterally resolved the future of the Golan Heights by extending Israeli law to these areas and by establishing settlements there. The United States has a primary interest in the stability of the Syrian-Israeli front and should support any peacekeeping measures that will help reduce the danger of war.

The Syrians also want to be assured that their voice will be heard on the Palestinian question. They should understand that the United States will not give them a veto on this issue, but that they are free to use whatever influence they have with Jordan and the Palestinians to insure that their views are taken into account. This is a matter of inter-Arab politics, not of conference procedures. We support the notion that a conference should neither impose its views on the parties, nor should it be empowered to veto the results of bilateral negotiations.

To help convey these points effectively, we believe that the United States should develop a high-level political dialogue with the Syrian

government. We should not treat Damascus as an appendage of the Soviets, nor as an unacceptable partner for diplomatic discussions. Since the Syrians have influence over the outcome of negotiations, and have shown a capacity for independent decision in the past, it is in our interest to have our own channels to the Syrian leadership.

None of this should be taken as unreserved support for the idea of an international conference on Arab-Israeli peace. If better alternatives present themselves along the way, the United States should not slavishly adhere to this particular formula. For the moment, however, there is no other idea that enjoys such wide support and we feel that the United States is well positioned to play its role effectively in such a framework. In addition, the effort to organize a conference may produce some useful political movement.

The Need for Transitional Arrangements

Whatever the eventual framework for negotiations, we believe that there is a need for an agreed near-term objective of the negotiations. While we would not presume to describe in detail our view of a viable concept, we do think that negotiations will deadlock immediately if the first order of business is defined as drawing up the terms of a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

All of the parties to the conflict seem to recognize that some form of transitional process must be built into the next phase of Arab-Israeli peacemaking. We are not arguing for the Camp David formula of autonomy, but we do recognize that the idea of a transitional period, articulated at Camp David and reflected later in another form in the Arab League's decisions at Fez in September 1982, does provide a serious focal point for negotiations.

In the past, the idea of negotiations on transitional arrangements has had little appeal to Arab parties for two reasons: the presumed content of these arrangements held out little of interest to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza; and the link between the transitional arrangements and an overall agreement was left vague. We believe that it is a legitimate, indeed essential, purpose of American diplomacy to try to make the idea of new, transitional arrangements on the West Bank and Gaza attractive to the parties.

For the Israelis, the merit of dealing with transitional arrangements is that Israeli security concerns will be fully protected while new political arrangements are tested. If agreement on a transitional regime for the West Bank and Gaza can be reached through negotiations within an agreed international framework, Israel should be able to enhance its situation internationally, including improved relations with the USSR and with European powers. An agreement would also relieve Israel of some of the problems associated with the demographic challenge. As Palestinians

are allowed to develop their own distinctive political institutions, quite possibly in association with Jordan, they will pose less of a threat to Israeli principles of democracy.

For the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, a transitional regime, to be made appealing, should substantially increase Palestinian control in the following areas: land; water; economic activity; political expression. In each of these areas, the Palestinians could hope to achieve a measure of genuine self-government and to improve their present disadvantageous situation. The United States should urge Israel to be forthcoming. The United States should also maintain and reiterate its belief that there should be no further construction of settlements and should call for a halt to land expropriation while the groundwork for negotiations is being laid.

Syria has little to gain directly from the transitional arrangements that we envision in the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, these arrangements would in no way be a threat to Syrian interests. But more is needed to elicit a positive Syrian attitude. Syria should be given an opportunity to negotiate for new arrangements on the Golan Heights which could enhance mutual security and return territory there to Syrian control. Again, this could be defined as a transitional step. The serious purpose to be served by such an arrangement would be to engage Israel and Syria in the negotiating process; to reduce the danger of surprise attack; to provide a forum in which other issues could be usefully discussed; and to

dissuade the Syrians from trying to block progress on other negotiating fronts.

Could the PLO be persuaded to endorse such transitional steps? On the face of it, there seems little here for the Palestinian diaspora, and this will make it difficult for the PLO to be enthusiastic. Nonetheless, the PLO has no interest in blocking moves that are genuinely beneficial to the one and one-half million Palestinians now living under Israeli military occupation. And the PLO can expect to play a role in the negotiations through Palestinian representatives responsive to its leadership.

A Longer-Term Vision

While we are convinced that negotiations have to be carefully prepared and should focus in the first instance on two sets of transitional arrangements, one for the West Bank and Gaza and one for the Golan, we also recognize the need for a vision of what could lie beyond these transitional measures. The United States should not be in the business of drawing up detailed blueprints. These will either be rejected by the parties out of hand, or treated as irrelevant. But there is considerable need for a vision of the future in which Israelis and Palestinians, as well as Jordanians, Syrians and Lebanese, can coexist peacefully, each with a firm political identity and genuine security. Were this to be achieved, it would significantly strengthen the peace between Egypt and Israel as well.

One appealing model of the future might be a Benelux type of confederal arrangement, which would allow for separate political identities, while recognizing the need for a wide range of innovative arrangements to deal in a positive way with the interdependencies that exist, especially between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but also between the Palestinians and Jordanians. In this vision of the future, borders would not be physical barriers; citizens of one part of the confederation could live safely, and with recognized rights, elsewhere in the confederation; economic transactions and movement of individuals would be subject to few restrictions.

The United States, given its own political history, is well-placed to articulate such a pluralistic vision of a political framework encompassing Israel and its neighbors. Through some such formula, Israelis and Palestinians should be able to achieve and protect their legitimate rights, including their respective rights to security and to self-determination.

Whatever the precise formula that the parties to the conflict eventually decide upon, we believe that new concepts will have to be considered. Political creativity will be needed, and there is an important, even essential role here for third parties as catalysts and innovators. Past experience suggests that Arabs and Israelis often have difficulty accepting ideas directly from one another, but will sometimes find it possible to accept the same idea from a third party.

A vision of a desirable economic future is also needed as a complement to the political settlement that we are seeking. Certainly the parties to the conflict should know that serious steps toward peace will be supported by the United States, as well as by others in the international community, with generous contributions of economic resources. Refugees should be able to look forward to generous compensation to help make up for their losses. Talk of a "Marshall Plan" for the Middle East in the absence of peace is little more than rhetoric; with peace it could become a reality.

Conclusion

We have a relatively simple message for the new administration, but if taken seriously it will involve a difficult, challenging diplomatic task. Our basic point is that the Arab-Israeli conflict deserves priority attention. The now-moribund "peace process" needs to be revived, and American leadership is essential for that to happen.

In the first instance, the American effort should focus on building solid foundations through dialogue with all the interested parties, including the Soviet Union. As part of that dialogue, the United States should seek to focus attention on the negotiation of transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza, as well as for the Golan Heights.

If the parties to the conflict seem prepared for serious negotiations, we believe an international framework will be needed. That means including the Soviet Union in the preliminary consultations and in the structuring of the appropriate international framework for negotiations. An international conference makes sense if it can advance the prospects of agreement. That can only be determined through intensive consultations with all of the parties.

We also believe that the United States is uniquely positioned to articulate a future vision of how Israelis and Palestinians can attain their rights to security and to self-determination through a political formula based on ideas of confederation. The Benelux model offers attractive possibilities for reaching a politically acceptable, just and lasting peace settlement.

Finally, we want to emphasize that the details of an Arab-Israeli peace settlement are not the main concern of the United States. These should be worked out by the parties who will have to live with them. It is the durability of any agreement that should be foremost in our minds. Our interests, we have no doubt, will be well served by widening the circle of Arab-Israeli peace. How that is done is less important than that it be done, and that the process start soon.

102.1.7

official text

DEPARTURE STATEMENT BY SECRETARY SHULTZ

BEN-GURION AIRPORT, APRIL 6 -- FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT DELIVERED BY U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, GEORGE B. SHULTZ, UPON DEPARTURE FROM ISRAEL AT 12 NOON, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 1988:

(BEGIN STATEMENT) AS I LEAVE ISRAEL, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE GREAT CHALLENGE OF THIS MOMENT IS TO SEE THE PATH TO A TRUE PEACE AND TO TAKE IT. PRESIDENT REAGAN AND I BELIEVE THAT THE WAY LIES DIRECTLY BEFORE OUR EYES. THE INITIATIVE WE HAVE DISCUSSED SO INTENSIVELY AND THOROUGHLY OVER THESE PAST WEEKS IS INTACT AND ALIVE. ITS INTEGRITY, STRENGTH, BALANCE AND FAIRNESS ARE EVIDENT AND UNCHANGED. IT IS THERE FOR THE TAKING. THERE IS NO MASKING THE DEEP-SEATED OBSTACLES TO PEACE.

EMOTIONS ARE DEEPLY FELT. PRINCIPLES ARE PROUDLY HELD. GREAT TRADITIONS, CULTURES AND RIGHTS ARE INVOLVED. ALL THESE MUST BE SERIOUSLY ADDRESSED.

THE WILL, THE SPIRIT, THE VISION, AND THE COURAGE TO TAKE UP THIS CHALLENGE MUST MOTIVATE ALL PARTIES AT THIS IMPORTANT TIME. WE NEED THE WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE EXHAUSTIVELY EVERY ANGLE, EVERY ASPECT, EVERY WORD AND EVERY IMPLICATION OF THIS INITIATIVE. NOT IN A SKEPTICAL SEARCH FOR WHAT MAY BE WRONG, BUT WITH A SERIOUS COMMITMENT TO MAKE IT WORK. IT CAN HAPPEN. IN ALL CANDOR, I AM NOT ABLE TO SAY THAT IT IS HAPPENING. WHILE WE HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS, DIFFERENCES HAVE NOT BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY NARROWED, BUT THE COMMITMENT OF THE U.S. IS AS STRONG AND DETERMINED AS EVER. THE DESIRE FOR PEACE AND THE WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH US FOR IT IS GREAT AND GROWING IN THIS REGION. SO WE WILL CARRY THIS INITIATIVE FORWARD INTO A NEW AND MORE DETAILED AND OPERATIONAL STAGE.

USIS
United States Information Service
Tel Aviv, 71 Hayarkon Street, 63903 Tel. 654338 ext. 204
Jerusalem, 19 Keren Hayesod Street, 94188 Tel. 222376

I BELIEVE THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE A REAL POSSIBILITY. YESTERDAY, KING HUSSEIN POSED MANY QUESTIONS TO ME ABOUT OUR PROPOSAL, THUS INDICATING A SERIOUS ENGAGEMENT IN THIS SEARCH FOR PEACE. WHILE KING HUSSEIN CAN BEST SPEAK FOR HIMSELF, HIS IS THE KIND OF APPROACH REQUIRED FOR THIS PROCESS TO MOVE AHEAD. ISRAEL MUST ALSO HAVE SECURITY, AND STRENGTH IS ESSENTIAL. THE UNITED STATES STANDS BY ISRAEL, AND OUR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND WELL BEING WILL NOT FLAG. BUT MORE FUNDAMENTALLY, SECURITY AND PROGRESS FOR ISRAEL COMES FROM PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBOURS, AND IT IS POSSIBLE. IT CAN HAPPEN. SO THE INITIATIVE CONTINUES. I DEPART ISRAEL, BUT I DO NOT DEPART FROM THE INITIATIVE. I HAVE WORK TO DO, TO RESPOND TO JORDANIAN QUESTIONS, AND TO PUT THE FLESH OF SUBSTANCE ON THE OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS WE HAVE PUT FORWARD. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE PEACE EFFORT GOES ON, TIME WILL NOT WAIT FOR US. SAY YES TO THIS INITIATIVE. LET US REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS TO MAKE IT A REALITY. I THANK YOU.

END STATEMENT

102.1.1

official text

4/13/88

PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION ESSENTIAL TO PEACE PROCESS
(Transcript: Shultz interview with Al-Quds)

Amman -- Secretary of State Shultz reemphasized the United States' belief that "Palestinian participation is essential to the success of the (Middle East) peace process" and that because of this he had met with Palestinian leaders in the past and looks forward to more meetings with responsible Palestinian leaders in the future. Shultz' remarks were published last week in the Jerusalem daily newspaper, Al-Quds.

Responding to written questions from the newspaper shortly before he ended his most recent trip to the Middle East last week, Shultz said that one of the objectives of the peace proposal he discussed with Israeli and Arab leaders "is to give Palestinians control over their own lives -- over the political and social conditions under which they live."

However, responding to a question about "self-determination" for the Palestinian people, Shultz said that in the Middle East the term has become synonymous with an independent Palestinian state, and "We do not accept that this is the only means by which Palestinians can achieve their rights."

Shultz also noted that the Reagan administration has "spoken out forcefully and actively on human rights violations in the West Bank and Gaza" and "long opposed excessive use of force, collective punishment, deportation and administrative detention...We have made our concerns known to the government of Israel."

Following is a transcript of the interview:

(begin text)

QUESTION: Upon completion of your third tour of the area, can you summarize the positions of Prime Minister Shamir of Israel, King Hussein of Jordan, President Assad of Syria and President Mubarak of Egypt?

ANSWER: Over the past several days, I've had intensive discussions with regional leaders on the proposal for moving to negotiations on a comprehensive peace. I consider that it is up to each of these leaders, not to me, to characterize their positions. In general, I can say that while there are deep differences we've received some serious and thoughtful comments. Key leaders are

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engaged. They have asked me to continue my efforts. Our commitment is stronger and more determined than ever. We'll continue to work with those who are willing to engage responsibly on the package as a whole in order to develop it further. We're still looking for positive answers all around. We'd have difficulty understanding anyone's decision not to seize this opportunity.

Q: Your meeting with two PNC (Palestine National Council) members in Washington was controversial and condemned by many Israelis as setting a precedent for eventual meetings with the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization). Do you believe it is possible to reach a comprehensive settlement without the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people? Whom do you propose would choose the Palestinian representatives on a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation?

A: I've met with Palestinian leaders because the United States believes that Palestinian participation is essential to the success of the peace process. This was not my first meeting with Palestinian leaders. In regard to the meeting in question, with two prominent Palestinian-Americans, I can't accept any criticism of a positive exchange with American citizens such as that meeting. And I look forward to more meetings with responsible Palestinian leaders. One of the objectives of the package we have been working on is to give Palestinians control over their own lives -- over the political and social conditions under which they live. The package specifies criteria for all the participants in the negotiations. Members of delegations have to be seen as credible representatives, and they also have to be acceptable as responsible negotiators to the other side -- otherwise the process is pointless.

Q: You demand three conditions for starting a dialogue with the PLO, one of which is acceptance of UNSC (United Nations Security Council Resolution) 242. The PLO is willing to do this provided the United States recognizes the Palestinian right to self-determination -- a right enshrined in Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points. How can the United States deny this right to the Palestinian people?

A: I believe the conditions we have set for dialogue with the PLO are entirely reasonable. UNSC 242 is the only agreed basis for negotiations. In the Middle East the term self-determination has become synonymous with an independent Palestinian state. We do not accept that this is the only means by which Palestinians can achieve their rights. Realties in the region suggest that the most practical solution is in the context of Jordanian-Palestinian association.

Q: Do you think the Arab-Israeli conflict will be on the agenda of the upcoming super power summit in Moscow? Do you think that a U.S.-Soviet accord on the conflict is possible?

A: The United States and the Soviet Union have had a number of discussions in recent months concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict. Most recently, I met with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Washington about two weeks ago. He then left a team of experts in Washington for more detailed talks. The Middle East is a continuing issue in our discussions. It will be on the U.S. agenda for the summit. So far, however, the Soviets continue to avoid the decisions they need to make if they are to play a constructive role in the process. I should stress that the United States has no thought of trying to impose a superpower agreement on the states in the region. Rather, it is for the regional leaders to find a way to come together and negotiate their differences. That is what we want to help bring about.

Q: Why did you turn down chairman Arafat's proposal during your last trip to meet with a delegation of non-PLO Palestinians from the

occupied territories and from the diaspora? Under what circumstances would you meet with such a delegation?

A: On my last trip, I invited Palestinian leaders to meet me, and I went to East Jerusalem in hopes of seeing them there. I did so because, as I said before, Palestinian participation is essential to the success of the peace process. I'm sorry they chose not to see me. I have, however, met with Palestinians both before that trip and since then (and) look forward to more meetings with responsible leaders.

Q: Your initiative was taken only after the beginning of the Palestinian uprising, and after many years of U.S. inaction on the Arab-Israeli conflict. How do you explain this?

A: I disagree that our initiative came after "years of U.S. inaction" on the peace process. The U.S. has made repeated efforts over the years to find a way towards peace in this region. I myself was out here last October, well before the unrest began. Ambassador Murphy has made countless visits. We have actively pursued every avenue and we will continue to (do so).

Q: Why have you refrained from addressing the human rights issues of the Palestinian people under occupation. Especially those guaranteed under the fourth Geneva convention? As one who has called for an improvement in the quality of life in the territories, can you justify the continued restrictions on normal life in the West Bank and Gaza? Can there be an improvement in life under occupation?

A: We have spoken out forcefully and actively on human rights violations in the West Bank and Gaza. We've long opposed excessive use of force, collective punishment, deportation and administrative detention. All of these are contrary to the values in which Americans believe. We have made our concerns known to the government of Israel in public and in private. I remain a firm believer in improving the quality of life of Palestinians in the occupied territories. And, I should emphasize again (that) our current proposal would give Palestinians the opportunity through negotiations to end the occupation and gain control over their own lives.

Q: You are widely recognized as a champion of the right of family reunification, as recently demonstrated through your meeting in Jerusalem with Soviet Jews. Do you also support the right of Palestinians in the occupied territories to bring their spouses and children to live with them here?

A: I strongly support the right of family reunification, be it for Soviet Jews, West Bank Palestinians, or families anywhere. The ability to live with one's family is among the most fundamental of human rights. We've raised this issue repeatedly with Israeli authorities. I'm pleased to see that the number of approvals of reunification applications has risen somewhat over the past two years. But much more needs to be done. We plan to continue to work for this cause.

(end text)

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

0830 תאריך : 24.03.88

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Fix, Don't Dismiss, the Shultz Plan

It's hard to keep score on Prime Minister Shamir's visit to the United States, to see whether he did more good or harm to Israel's standing here and to the course of Middle East peace.

There's little doubt that he won the short run political confrontation. President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz promised not to use American aid to press Israel to accept the Shultz peace plan. American Jewish leaders and legislators rallied around, silencing for now their misgivings.

The Israeli leader also noted telling weaknesses in the peace plan. Mr. Shultz is wrong to insist it be accepted in its present form.

Yet all Mr. Shamir had to offer was more of the same. If the Palestinian uprisings continue on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, he would get even tougher in response. If Washington pushed him on negotiations, he would go to his electorate for support. As he and his supporters see it, the risks of compromise outweigh the risks of toughness.

Their judgment cannot be dismissed. It cannot be assumed that the Arabs are prepared to live in peace with Israel. Yet it becomes critical — in terms of costs to Israel and its position in the United States — to test peace possibilities seriously. This is the thrust of the Shultz plan and of the letter by 30 senators endorsing its concept of land for peace.

N.Y. TIMES
EDITORIAL
MAR. 22, 88

שלח דשק אדוק בין דברי אמיתי את הסמיה בנר לדג
בוגים בנצר בשאי בבר הדגדה

תאריך: MAR. 22, 1988 שם השולח: אלי שאובר מרשור:

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Mr. Shamir should not draw comfort from his political victory here. Who wants to fight with an Israeli leader in an election year? The political pushing, however, need not obscure Mr. Shamir's exposure of the Shultz plan's shortcomings.

The plan calls for an international conference under the auspices of the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, Britain and France. The conference would convene the Arab and Israeli parties, but have no power to impose solutions or veto them.

That sounds fine. But if it's so innocuous, Mr. Shamir points out, why are the Arabs so eager for it? Simply for political cover? Or do they expect the conference to evolve into more than a convening body? Israel would be greatly outnumbered at such a conclave. It deserves further guarantees such as a pledge by Washington to walk out if the conference becomes a propaganda exercise, or worse.

The Shultz approach then calls for immediate talks between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation on self-administration for the occupied territories. This period of semi-autonomy would last for about three years, in contrast to the five years called for in the Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt. Mr. Shamir is right to demand the longer period, given all that will be at risk.

The plan's last phase rightly asks the parties to discuss a final disposition of the territories based on the principle of land for peace. But Mr. Shultz would have Israel begin these talks before the start of the self-administration stage and conclude them before the interim period ends.

Such a quick settlement makes sense for the Arabs; they quickly regain control. But Israel could never agree to a final settlement without seeing the results of self-administration. That experience must and will shape the final outcome.

The Shultz plan could be strengthened by the Shamir analysis. The trouble is that the analysis seems a smokescreen for an Israeli leader who has never supported the principle of territorial compromise with any Arab neighbor, and faulted even the Camp David accords. By simply rejecting the Shultz plan, he prevents the critical testing of Arab attitudes and allows Israel to be cast as the obstacle to peace.

ON MY MIND | A. M. Rosenthal

N.Y. Times Mar. 22, '88

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Too Late and Too Much

The United States' plan for an Israel-Palestine solution won't work. It is too late and too much.

It is too late because President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz waited until time and power were running out on them before coming up with their proposals.

It is too much because it would swallow what should be a delicate, day-by-day bargaining process in the political circus of a big international conference at which the Soviet Union will be able to use its influence to reward its friends or punish its enemies.

Those Americans who believe the Soviet Union will not use that power for Arabs, whom they court, and against Israel, a country they do not respect enough to send an ambassador, are perfectly free to do so. It is asking too much for them to insist the Israel Government have the same touching trust in Moscow.

The plan also allows the P.L.O. to participate not only as a member of the Jordan-Palestine delegation but as a "party" to the dispute.

That day may come — but first the P.L.O. must formally renounce its "national covenant." Comments from Yasir Arafat about supporting somewhat opaque U.N. resolutions are not enough.

If Mr. Arafat wants to sit at the table with Israelis it is not asking too much — in fact the bare minimum — of Palestinians to renounce the covenant that among other things:

Condemns Zionism as racist, outlaw, fanatic, aggressive, expansionist, colonial and fascist. Denounces the very establishment of Israel as illegal. Cries for the violent destruction of the state.

Negotiating officially now with the P.L.O. is like negotiating with a man who has signed a death threat to kill you, before his comrades and the whole world. Maybe he has changed his mind — then let him tear up the death threat, before his comrades and the whole world.

The plan essentially demands preparations for Palestine self-rule on a speeded-up timetable. Yet it does not even promise the Israelis that their other Arab adversaries would sign permanent treaties, as did Egypt.

Now, the Prime Minister of Israel happens to hate the U.S. plan and feels it will lead to the destruction of his nation.

Millions of Americans, myself included, do not agree with his stand on the West Bank. But if the U.S. is going

Other flaws in our Mideast peace plan.

to get him, his party and Israelis who support them into negotiations for giving up protective frontiers it has to come up with a more reasonable plan.

Mr. Reagan and Mr. Shultz have proved they have warmth and decent intentions toward Israelis and Arabs, including Palestinians. But they waited too long to try to bring about a solution and then in their hurry threw in too much — take it or leave it.

There are two major tasks in the Middle East. They are intertwined but they have to be seen, understood and approached distinctly, not jumbled together as in the U.S. plan.

One is the objective — a solution that will allow Israeli and Palestinian to live in peace.

If the Shamir Government is unrelentingly opposed to any real movement, the foreign friends of Israel can only wait until an Israeli election, which may make things worse. I believe, without vast evidence, that Mr. Shamir's Likud bloc is moving in the direction of real concessions.

These will not be enough for the P.L.O. and the young men of Gaza. They cannot get all they wish. But to help their cause they must renounce their death-to-Israel passion, in their statements, their hearts and their covenant.

The other task is the road to the objective — setting up and conducting talks with those who do believe in the possibility of peace with safety. Big international conferences at this point will make mischief, not peace.

Direct negotiations are needed but a third party to prevent breakdown and apply the pressure of a friend to both sides is essential. That is the role the U.S. can play and should insist on for itself, one country, not a convention.

That one country needs one person to represent it, not a parade, one diplomat known, respected and trusted in the Middle East as much as any man can be.

It is obvious that Henry Kissinger was and is the man to seek the negotiating road and push down it. The reason he was not called into service was that the Reagan Administration was afraid of being overshadowed by him — a distinct possibility. Other reasons are malarkey.

You do not have to be sentimental about Mr. Kissinger to know he is the best available negotiator for the U.S. You do not have to love Mr. Shamir to know you cannot get him or his party to agree to a plan they see as leading to a whetted knife. □

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Mar. 22, 1988

THE WALL STREET JOURNA

ATIONAL

Shamir Says Uprisings Must Be Quelled If Mideast Peace Is to Have Any Chance

By KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

NEW YORK—After a week of exposure in America to the political and public relations fallout of Israel's policies toward the Palestinians, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir is going home more determined than ever to quell Palestinian uprisings in the Israeli-occupied territories.

In an interview yesterday before departing for Jerusalem, the prime minister indicated his top priority will be to crack down on rioters for the sake of law and order and peace prospects. "If we are interested in the peace process, we have to make an end to this very soon," he said, referring to the disturbances under way now for more than 100 days.

Stiffening Tactics

While it isn't known what President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz told the prime minister last week, if either engaged in arm-twisting it doesn't seem to have worked. During a half-hour interview, the prime minister seemed far more confident than combative.

"Under the pressure of these riots there won't be any progress in any negotiations for peace," he said, discussing his refusal to say yes to a new U.S. peace plan. "The [illegible] are in a euphoric mood. They aren't able to accept any compromise."

Asked if he is ready to stiffen what many of Israel's friends already regard as brutal tactics to control the rock-throwing Palestinians, he said, "It is our duty. We are looking for ways to do it, taking into account our moral restraints."

If Mr. Shamir appeared calmly confident about the work ahead of him, he also seemed realistic. The prime minister didn't try to blame Israel's problems with its fast-growing Palestinian population on a few radicals or the media. He called the rock-throwing by Palestinian youths "a new kind of warfare" and said Israel will triumph over it as it has previous confrontations with its Arab opponents. "I'm sure [the rioting] will also fail," he said, "but we have to prove it."

For the moment, the prime minister seems determined to put the U.S. peace plan behind him and focus on restoring order in Israel. Mr. Shultz's peace plan calls for talks between Israel and a Palestinian-Jordanian delegation in the context of an international conference with the Soviets, Americans, Chinese, French and British present. Mr. Shamir insists such a conference would be a forum for Israel-bashing and he won't attend.

Nor, he said, would he precipitate an early election in Israel to help resolve a bitter dispute between him and his foreign minister, Shimon Peres, who favors Mr. Shultz's peace plan.

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An Internal Problem

"From time to time we take advice from our American friends on how to advance the cause of peace, but I won't take advice on our internal problems," he said when asked if he plans to fire Mr. Peres and allow Israelis an early opportunity to have an election fought out on the issue of how to pursue peace with the Arabs.

Mr. Shamir's second-order priority appears to be removing refugee camps in Israel where some Palestinians have been living, often in squalor, since Israel's creation more than 40 years ago. He said he favors an international conference on the subject because Israel alone can't afford the cost, which he put at $2 billion, of doing away with the camps. "We need an international financial effort," he said.

Exactly where the Palestinians in the camps would go isn't clear. Arab states with the exception of Jordan refuse to give passports and citizenship to Palestinians, in part to keep the pressure on Israel to provide a homeland for the more than one million Palestinians in Gaza and on the West Bank, both occupied by Israel. Some right-wing Israelis talk of evicting the camps' Palestinians to Arab nations. Others would resettle them in new villages elsewhere in the occupied territories.

Invincibility Questioned

The prime minister, like much of the world, professes confusion as to what triggered the outburst of Palestinian anger. He quoted Mideast scholar Bernard Lewis as saying the riots were sparked by a feeling among Palestinians that Israel is no longer invincible. "After the riots started, the Palestinians have seen that Israel is not very mighty at quelling the riots," and this has prolonged them, he implied.

But while some Palestinians have been stirred by Islamic fundamentalism, the Afghan resistance to the Soviets and Iranian resistance to a militarily superior Iraq, the driving force is "hatred for Israel and the Jewish people," he said.

Whatever the motivation, Mr. Shamir seems to have concluded that Israel faces a determined Palestinian opposition that it can't simply wear down but must confront and conquer, and he voiced willingness to take on that task.

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PERSPECTIVE

GANGING UP ON ISRAEL

NEW YORK POST, TUESDAY, MARCH 22, 1988

NORMAN PODHORETZ

NEVER before, not even during the Lebanon war of 1982, has there been such a gang-up on Israel as we are seeing today.

Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan once accused the Carter administration of "joining the jackals" when it voted for one of the innumerable UN resolutions condemning Israel. Now this same Pat Moynihan, along with 29 of his colleagues in the Senate, signs a statement strongly criticizing Prime Minister Shamir of Israel for rejecting a negotiating formula and an international conference designed to force his country into actions that Shamir considers a mortal danger to its security.

Sen. Moynihan is a great friend of Israel. So are they all, all great friends of Israel. So too are a large number of the professors and writers who have signed other statements in recent months branding the Israelis as cruel oppressors of defenseless Arabs. Indeed, to judge by the protestations that invariably accompany chastisements of Israel nowadays, never has a nation been blessed with so many loving friends.

But I must not let myself get carried away by the rich temptations to irony here. Nor would it be fair to put too much emphasis on the hypocrisy of certain Jewish intellectuals who have always been either indifferent or hostile to Israel but who now, in order to lend greater credibility to their denunciations, try to pass themselves off as friends.

Unlike such as these, Sen. Moynihan and his 29 colleagues really are friends of Israel, and they really are acting out of concern for its security and its welfare.

Nevertheless, a friend who tells one unpleasant things for what he considers one's own good is not necessarily right either in what he says or in speaking up.

In the case at hand, the objects of all this solicitous recrimination are split into two camps. One of them consists of Israelis who believe that withdrawing from the West Bank and Gaza would pose less of a danger than continued occupation. The other is made

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up of Israelis who are convinced that under present circumstances withdrawal would mean not peace but another war fought on the most unfavorable terms.

What gives anyone here in America the wisdom to decide between these two groups? And what gives any outsider, no matter how friendly, the moral standing to influence this life-and-death debate?

The same questions apply to outsiders on both sides of the debate. But, of course, practically all the outsiders from whom we have been hearing are concentrated on one side alone. What they want is Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and the establishment (whether immediately or only after a decent interval) of a new Palestinian state there which (whether they admit it or not) would be ruled by the PLO.

Those urging establishment of a Palestinian state are paving the way for a Mideast Munich

Moreover, in clamoring for withdrawal, most of the friendly outsiders do so in a manner that places the onus on Israel for the fact that its Arab neighbors, with the sole exception of Egypt, have for 40 years refused to recognize the legitimacy of a Jewish state of any size or shape or form in "their" part of the world.

In addition, these friendly outsiders rarely bother to mention that Israel's Arab neighbors, let alone the Palestinians now living under Israeli occupation, have given no indication that they are prepared to rest content with the West Bank and Gaza.

On the contrary, the Arab objective remains the whole of Israel. Consequently, there is every reason to think that a new PLO state would become the staging ground for a new round of aggression against a more vulnerable military target.

Which brings us to the issue of historical analogies. The currently fashionable comparisons of Israel with Nazi Germany or even with South Africa are morally cretinous and intellectually misleading. But as a number of commentators have already recognized, there is one analogy that does cast light on the situation of Israel today, and that is with Czechoslovakia in 1938.

Thus, in the months lead-

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ing up to the international conference at Munich that year, the papers in Britain and France were full of attacks on the Czechs similar to the ones that are being made by the media on Israel today. Czechoslovakia was assailed for mistreating the German minority in the Sudeten regions under its control, and it was accused of using the fear of German aggression as a pretext for denying self-determination to the population of those territories.

This combination of charges served to justify forcing the Czechs at Munich to turn over the Sudetenland to Germany. A bit later, it also provided the British and the French with an excuse for forgetting the security guarantees they had given the Czechs at Munich.

So it was that when Germany, which had never had any intention of stopping with the Sudetenland, invaded a fatally weakened Czechoslovakia, the British and the French stood passively by.

The people who are now ganging up on Israel are doing almost exactly what was done to Czechoslovakia in preparing the way for Munich. Presumably, they are also betting, as the British and the French did with regard to Germany in 1938, that the Arab world can be "appeased" by limited territorial concessions.

But the resemblance does not end there. For just as the bet of Munich was based on a willful blindness to Hitler's true intentions, so do many of those urging Israeli withdrawal today in the name of self-determination refuse to believe that the Arab world still wants to wipe Israel off the map.

Anyone who supports the Arabs in that evil purpose is on the right track in ganging up on Israel. But the genuine friends of Israel have no business joining in. Instead of demanding concessions from Israel, they ought to be insisting as a precondition on simple decency from the Arabs in the simple form of a demonstrated willingness to accept and live in peace with a neighboring Jewish state.

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Decoding Shultz peace plan

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER

Tuesday, March 22, 1988 DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON — Secretary of State Shultz has a plan for settling the Arab-Israeli dispute. Shultz is an honorable and serious man, driven by circumstance—the riots on the West Bank—to do something, anything, to break the stale nate. That something is an international conference that will first grant autonomy to the Palestinians, then determine final status of the occupied territories.

A negotiated settlement is everyone's hope. But God is in the details. And the details of the Shultz plan, as set out in a letter sent to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Jordan's King Hussein, are troubling. The letter is couched in Middle East-ese, a language in which big ideas and huge concessions are buried in the most innocuous phrases. Decoding the letter reveals three major problems.

1. Goodbye Camp David. In the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Israel accepted the idea of Palestinian autonomy for a five-year period, leading to negotiations on the final status of the territories. A principal "purpose of the five-year period of transition," said President Reagan on Sept. 1, 1982, "is to prove . . . such Palestinian autonomy poses no threat to Israel's security."

The Shultz plan shortens the autono-



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03/18/88

SHULTZ OUTLINES U.S. APPROACH TO MIDEAST CONFERENCE
(Transcript: Shultz testimony to Senate panel)

Washington -- Emphasizing "this is a time for decisions," Secretary of State Shultz March 17 outlined the U.S. approach to an international conference designed to launch a new round of Middle East peace negotiations.

Testifying before the Senate Budget Committee, Shultz underscored the need for prompt movement in the peace process.

"We are engaged intensively in an active process to achieve a comprehensive peace in the Middle East through negotiations," the secretary declared. He said his recent discussions with the leadership in Israel, Jordan, Syria and Egypt -- and talks this week in Washington with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir -- have focused on the need for realism and movement in the peace process.

Shultz said the United States will not permit an international conference on the Middle East "to become authoritative or plenipotentiary, or to exceed its jurisdiction as agreed by the parties."

The United States expects, if its initiative is accepted, "that people, in coming to the conference, would have agreed to these terms," the secretary said. "We're being very clear and very specific and very up-front about what this conference is and what it is not."

The conference would serve to launch a series of direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and its neighbors and "thereafter may receive reports from the parties on the status of negotiations, in a manner to be agreed by the parties," Shultz said. "All conference attendees will be required to accept United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and to renounce violence and terrorism. The conference will be specifically enjoined from imposing solutions or vetoing what had been agreed bilaterally."

Following is the transcript of Shultz's remarks concerning the Middle East peace process:

(begin transcript)

We are engaged intensively in an active process to achieve a comprehensive peace in the Middle East through negotiations.

This is a time for decisions. The situation on the ground does not serve anyone's interests. Rapid, positive change can occur. My

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discussions with the leadership in Israel, Jordan, Syria and Egypt -- and our talks this week in Washington with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir -- focused on the need for realism and movement in the peace process.

The initiative we developed, which the parties are now considering, is ambitious and compelling. It calls for an early start of two sets of interlocked negotiations -- one on transitional arrangements and another on final status. The final status talks would begin on a date certain, before the implementation of the transitional arrangements. Both of these negotiations will be launched by a properly structured -- I want to underline those words, "properly structured" -- international conference. I should say that final status talks in our initiative would start before the transition arrangements are implemented, but after they have been agreed to, and decisions about final status would take place only well after the transition arrangements had been in place and people had an opportunity to see how they work.

Questions have been raised about such an international conference. And I want to make clear what it is that we have proposed.

The United States has been a consistent and firm supporter of direct, bilateral negotiations between Israel and all of its neighbors as the means to achieve a comprehensive peace. The United States has always been willing to consider any approach which could lead to direct negotiations, including an international conference. The United States opposes, and will not participate in, an international conference designed to replace bilateral negotiations.

In recent months, some parties have focused on an international conference which would have an authoritative role or plenipotentiary powers. In January 1988, the United States vetoed a resolution in the United Nations Security Council which called upon the secretary general to convene such a conference. The United States made clear its opposition to any procedure for achieving comprehensive peace in the Middle East, other than direct, face-to-face negotiations.

The initiative recently launched by the United States aims at comprehensive peace through bilateral face-to-face negotiations, in which all participants state their willingness to negotiate with one another. In other words, if you want to come to the table, you've got to state your willingness to negotiate with Israel. That's by way of recognizing the existence of Israel and the continued existence of Israel.

The procedures in this initiative constitute an interlocked set of safeguards designed to promote such negotiations and prevent a plenipotentiary conference. But these procedures also recognize that the Arab parties require a conference to launch negotiations, and that therefore there will be no negotiations without a properly structured conference.

The strength of the American approach is its integrity" no individual aspect of it can be extracted, finessed or ignored without sacrificing its balance. I've said this is not a cafeteria line. This is a set of things that you have to look at together. The conference launches a series of bilateral negotiations and thereafter may receive reports from the parties on the status of negotiations, in a manner to be agreed by the parties. All conference attendees will be required to accept United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and to renounce violence and terrorism. The conference will be specifically enjoined from imposing solutions or vetoing what had

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03/21/88

THE U.S. PLAN FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE
By George P. Shultz

(The following article by Secretary of State Shultz appeared on the opinion page of the March 18 Washington Post.)

There are few fixed rules for resolving conflicts. Each conflict has a unique history and unique characteristics. Each party to a conflict has its own dreams, concerns and fears. The task is to find the right inducements to draw the parties off the battlefield and into the negotiating room. The success of negotiations is attributable not to a particular procedure chosen but to the readiness of the parties to exploit opportunities, confront hard choices and make fair and mutual concessions.

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, negotiations work. They provide the means for parties to learn to deal with each other. They produce durable and realistic agreements that meet the fundamental concerns of the parties. Experience shows that Arabs and Israelis can make agreements and keep them.

The United States has launched an initiative designed to produce negotiations - direct, bilateral Arab-Israeli negotiations to achieve comprehensive peace. Our concept is based on all the provisions and principles of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which is the internationally accepted framework for negotiations. In the case of the West Bank and Gaza, the initiative involves a two-stage interlocked set of negotiations designed to produce rapid and fundamental change in the way Arabs and Israelis relate to each other.

The United States is a firm and consistent supporter of direct, bilateral negotiations between Israel and all of its neighbors as the means to achieve a comprehensive peace. At the same time, the United States has always been willing to consider any approach that could lead to direct negotiations, including an international conference.

In recent months, some parties have focused on a specific kind of international conference - one that would have an authoritative role or plenipotentiary powers. In January of this year, the United States vetoed a resolution in the U.N. Security Council that called upon the secretary general to convene such a conference. The United States made clear its belief that this kind of conference would make real negotiations impossible. It would be a vehicle for avoiding

meaningful negotiations, not promoting them.

The issue confronting the parties in the Middle East, therefore, is not whether an international conference should or should not be convened. That misses the point. The Arabs require a conference to launch negotiations¿ without a properly structured conference, there will be no negotiations. But the wrong kind of conference should never be convened. The United States will not attend that kind of conference. No sovereign state would agree to attend the kind of conference that would presume to pass judgment on issues of national security.

The issue is whether the moment is here to negotiate an end to the Arab Israeli conflict¿ whether each party is ready and able to confront hard choices and make difficult decisions¿ and whether the requirements of the parties are amenable to a procedural blend that satisfies minimal demands.

The strength of the American approach is its integrity· no individual aspect of it can be extracted, finessed or ignored without sacrificing its balance. The conference we support launches a series of bilateral negotiations and thereafter may receive reports from the parties on the status of negotiations, in a manner to be agreed by the parties. All conference attendees will be required to accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and to renounce violence and terrorism. The conference will be specifically enjoined from intruding in the negotiations, imposing solutions or vetoing what had been agreed bilaterally.

The United States is committed to this integral concept for beginning direct, bilateral negotiations. We will not permit any aspect of our proposal to be eroded, compromised or expanded beyond its meaning. In particular, we will not permit a conference to become authoritative or plenipotentiary, or to pass judgments on the negotiations, or to exceed its jurisdiction as agreed by the parties.

The ingredients for a peace process are present. There is an unacceptable and untenable status quo. There are competing parties willing to shed illusions and temper dreams to the underlying realities. And there are realistic and achievable ideas on the table that meet the fundamental concerns of everyone.

Our task is also clear. We must act with integrity, resolve and tenacity to bring Arabs and Israelis off the battlefield and into negotiations. The initiative put forward by the United States - two interlocked stages of direct negotiations launched by a properly structured international conference - is realistic and compelling.

This is the moment for a historic breakthrough, and this is the plan. The time for decisions is now.

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been agreed bilaterally.

The United States is committed to the concept for beginning bilateral negotiations which has been shared with the parties -- more than shared with the parties -- we had an immense series of discussions out of which we developed these proposals, so we didn't just go into a hole someplace and think this up. We talked and talked and talked and talked and tried to present something that we thought might work. The United States will not permit any aspect of its proposal to be eroded or compromised. As regards the conference, the United States will not permit the conference to become authoritative or plenipotentiary, or to exceed its jurisdiction as agreed by the parties. So we would expect, if our initiative should be accepted, that people, in coming to the conference, would have agreed to these terms. If they don't agree to the terms, then we don't have the conference. And if they try to change them after the conference is convened, then we don't go along with that. So we're being very clear and very specific and very up-front about what this conference is and what it is not.

But the procedural aspects of this plan should not obscure our objective -- a comprehensive peace.

-- Israeli security can be enhanced. Israel can enjoy the recognition and respect which flow from negotiations. Israelis can be free from the increasing human and moral burdens of occupation -- free to devote their considerable talents and energies to improving their quality of life. Most important, Israel can achieve peace with its neighbors.

-- Palestinians can achieve rapid control over political and economic decisions which directly affect their lives. And that could happen right in the transition arrangements. It could happen, I think, quite rapidly if we could get ourselves started. Palestinians can participate actively in negotiations to determine their political future. Palestinians can achieve their legitimate rights and live lives of dignity and self-respect.

--The Arab world can turn a corner by resolving this festering conflict. The refugee problem can be solved. A stable new environment can be created in which the human and economic resources of the Middle East can flourish.

This is a moment of testing for the leaders of the Middle East. All must face up to the challenge of peace and beat back the forces of radicalism. Violence and threats of violence achieve nothing. They stand in sharp, empty contrast to what negotiations can accomplish. The only things that have worked have been negotiations. Negotiations have brought about progress in the Middle East. Nothing else has.

No resolution of this conflict can fulfill all dreams. Compromise is required. The plan we have put forward is compelling. It is an integral whole. We have asked for decisions soon, so that we can proceed rapidly toward a comprehensive peace.

(end transcript)

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my to such a point that negotiations on final status are to start before the autonomy has even begun. In other words, Israel is required to give control of the territories to some Palestinian entity without having seen whether it is truly prepared to end its 40 years' war against the Jewish state.

At Camp David, Israel gave up all of the Sinai for a deal which the U.S. guaranteed. That deal said autonomy would be for five years. A decade later, with the Sinai returned to Egypt, the U.S. says to Israel: Too bad about the transitional period we agreed to at Camp David, but things have changed.

2. Bring on the PLO. Shultz' invitation to the international conference appears to leave out the PLO, but just barely. All "parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict" are invited, so long as they accept UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and renounce violence and terrorism. Now, Yasser Arafat claims to have accepted Resolutions 242 and 338 long ago. In fact, Arafat accepts 242 and 338 in the context of all relevant UN resolutions. That is code for saying nothing, because the other "relevant UN resolutions" declare Israel an illegitimate racist state with no right to exist.

As for renunciation of terrorism and violence, that is done fairly cheaply. Anyone can renounce it today, resume it tomorrow.

3. Bring in the Soviets. The international conference will begin with a plenary session that will include the Soviets. The Shultz letter does say that the plenary session will have no power to "impose solutions or veto agreements reached" by the parties in bilateral negotiations. But, writes Shultz, "the parties to each bilateral negotiation" will have the right to "refer reports on the status of their negotiations to the conference," which is a way of actively involving the Soviets in the actual conduct of negotiations.

That is anathema to Israel. It ought to be anathema to the United States. Since Kissinger, one of the singular achievements of American Middle East diplomacy has been to keep the Soviets out. It is one thing to have the Soviets bless a negotiation by showing up and giving cover to the cowardly King Hussein. It is another to have them reviewing the negotiations as they proceed. We know exactly what negotiating position the Soviets will back: maximalist Arab demands that neither Israel nor the United States can accept. That will make Israel into the intransigent and the United States into Israel's lawyer.

A conference is not an end in itself. The mirage here is that process is progress. It is very nice to get everybody in a room, but unless you know who is going to say what to whom and whether that will be grounds for acceptable compromise, you are setting yourself up for stalemate, disappointed expectations, raised tension, Soviet encroachment and American isolation.

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N.Y. times - Mar. 22, '88 12/13

Gore Backs Israeli Peace Plan Rejection

By BERNARD WEINRAUB
Special to The New York Times

ALBANY, March 21 — Senator Albert Gore Jr. today became the first Presidential candidate to express qualified support for the Israeli Prime Minister's rejection of the Reagan Administration's peace proposals for the Middle East.

Delivering a message clearly designed to broaden his appeal among Jewish voters in a state where Jews cast 22 percent of the votes in the 1984 Democratic primary, Mr. Gore said the objections of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir had been given "short shrift" by the Administration and "deserve a full hearing."

After meeting late Sunday with Mr. Shamir in Manhattan, Mr. Gore said the United States should not apply pressure on him "all of a sudden because Israel is vulnerable." Given Mr. Shamir's objections to the proposal offered by Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Mr. Gore said his view was "to say 'hold on a minute, let's think this thing through.' "

From Shamir to Cuomo

Mr. Gore's Democratic rivals have criticized the Reagan Administration for what they say has been a lack of initiative until recently in shaping a peace plan for the Middle East. But Mr. Gore is the first candidate who seems to concur with many of the Shamir objections to the Shultz plan.

The Tennessee Democrat made his comments late Sunday and early today to reporters in the lobby of the Regency Hotel on Park Avenue, shortly after his 25-minute meeting in Mr. Shamir's suite, and on a flight to Albany.

Shamir's objections 'deserve a hearing,' he says.

In Albany, Mr. Gore conferred for about a half-hour with Governor Cuomo, seeking his support before the New York Presidential primary April 19.

"It's nice of him to come by," said Mr. Cuomo, who added that the Democrats faced "a confused picture politically." The Governor, who has been wooed by virtually all the Democratic candidates, said he was not sure he would endorse any candidate before the New York primary.

Disagreement Over Letter

Mr. Gore and one of his main rivals, Gov. Michael S. Dukakis of Massachusetts, have disagreed over a recent letter signed by 30 Senators who said they were "dismayed" to read that Mr. Shamir was opposed to exchanging occupied land for recognition by Arab states. Mr. Dukakis said he would have signed the letter, had he been in the Senate. Mr. Gore refused to sign it.

"It is important to understand the nature of the friendship and the importance of expressing disagreements privately and in a fashion that would not add to the enormous pressure now being felt by Israel," the 39-year-old

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Tennessean said.

Mr. Gore has been a vocal supporter of Israel and of Jewish causes for years, and was given a warm reception Sunday night before the Council of Jewish Organizations of Boro Park in Brooklyn, representing local orthodox Jewish groups.

In his speech to 800 people in Brooklyn, Mr. Gore objected generally to the Middle East initiative offered by Mr. Shultz. Key portions of the plan include an international conference that would include the United States, the Soviet Union, Israel, Arab nations and a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, with separate talks about establishing a Palestinian administration on the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Worries Over Soviet Role

Later after meeting with Mr. Shamir, Mr. Gore expressed more precise objections. While emphasizing that he did not fully endorse Mr. Shamir's views, the Senator said that "they have sufficient currency" and "substance," and that "the questions raised deserve a full hearing."

Although Mr. Gore said he did not "rule out a conference," he added, "I think it's awkward for the United States to appear to force a conference on an unwilling ally — particularly when the Soviet Union's role is as unclear as I think it is thus far."

Besides expressing concern about Soviet participation in a peace conference, Mr. Gore indicated agreement with Mr. Shamir over what the Senator called "a provision in the Shultz plan which substantially changes the Camp David formula."

In the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty negotiated by President Carter at Camp David in 1979, Israel accepted the principle of a five-year period of autonomy for Palestinians in land occupied by Israel to be followed by negotiations on the final status of the territories.

"The Shultz plan changes that sequence and calls for the follow-on negotiations before the period of autonomy even begins," Mr. Gore said.

A Political Meeting

Flying to Albany, Mr. Gore, whose campaign has faced financial difficulties, said he was preparing for a full-fledged effort in New York, which will send 255 delegates to the party's national convention. Since winning five of the 20 contests on Super Tuesday two weeks ago, Mr. Gore said he had raised more than $1 million, with money coming in at the rate of $75,000 a day.

Expecting to begin a television and radio campaign in New York, Mr. Gore met with David Garth, the media consultant, Sunday night, discussing the possibility of Mr. Garth helping the effort. No agreement was reached, aides to Mr. Gore said.

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מדינון

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הנדון: שיחות פיליפ חביב בקהיר

להלן דווחו של ארט היוז:

השיחות החקיימו ב-19 ו-20 למרץ. חביב נפגש עם מובראק בנוכחות מגיד ואוסמה. כן נפגש בנפרד עם מגיד.

מטרת השיחות היתה עדכון המצרים בהתפתחויות ההליך.

המצרים הביעו שביעות רצון מהמשך היוזמה ומגיד ציין במיוחד את מאמרו של שולץ ב"וושינגטון פוסט" מ-18 למרץ, המוכיח את רצינותו בענין.

הנשיא הביע שמחתו על כוונת המזכיר לחזור לאזור ועודד האמריקאים שלא להרפות על אף הבעיות.

חביב ביקש תמיכה ציבורית ופומבית ושמח שכך נעשה, (במסיבת העתונאים לאחר הפגישה).

חביב ביקש את הנשיא לעזור בעידוד חוסיין לחתוך באופן פומבי ובהיר ביוזמת שולץ. מובראק הבטיח לעשות זאת והנחה את מגיד לעשות FOLLOW-UP בשיחתו בעמן.

חביב דיבר על ההיבט הפלסטינאי עם המצרים, בהקשרי ייצוג וטרור.

בהקשרי ייצוג, טען חביב שכל נסיון של אש"פ לעמוד על ייצוג עצמי בוב"ל, יהרוס היוזמה.

שיחה הדגיש בנשיא גלעדי בירן בקשו לאור בלשים רלוונטי

המצרים, שראו את עראפת בקהיר ובטוניס, טענו שאש"פ רגוע יותר לגבי היוזמה האמריקאית ולכן חושבים שיכולים היום ללחוץ על אש"פ להגמשת עמדותיו.

לטענתם, עראפת מבין חשיבות היוזמה אך האנשים סביבו לוחצים לגיבוש קו נוקשה.

חביב הדגיש שאין מקום לאש"פ אלא אם ימולאו התנאים הידועים. מובראק השיב שיפעל כך שלא יעשה דבר אשר ימנע מישראל לשבת לשולחן המו"מ.

מובראק דווח לחביב על מאמצי מצרים לתאם בין ירדן לאש"פ ועל נסיונו לעודד פגישה בין עראפת למלך, אבל חוסר האמון ביניהם הוא בסיסי ומהותי.

מגיד העלה אפשרות של מחכונת חלת-צדדית (מצרית-ירדנית- פלסטינית). מובראק לא הלך בכוון זה. עם זאת, מובראק לא מנע מאוסמה לפתח הרעיון של תפקיד מרכזי יתר למצרים.

ממגיד הובן שמצרים רואה עצמה כמתווך בין ירדן לפלסטינים, עקב הפער הגדול וחוסר האמון בין שני הצדדים.

המצרים עודדו המזכיר להפגש עם קבוצה של פלסטינאים. מהשטחים ומחוץ לשטחים.

המצרים חושבים שהדרך לקיום מפגש כזה בעמן עודה ארוכה, ובחינת המצרים החשיבות היא לעצם קיום המפגש ולא למיקומו. מוכנים לארח בקהיר אך לא עומדים על כך.

המצרים ביקשו מארה"ב שלא ללחוץ יתר על המידה בענין קצב ההתקדמות ביחסי ירדן-אש"פ.

בהקשר הטרור, חביב ביקש מהמצרים ללחוץ על אש"פ להפסיק הטרור.

הנשיא ושה"ח דווחו לחביב על מתאחם נוכח דברי שמיר באשר למעורבות מצרים ומידת השיתוף שלהם, כביכול, בפיגוע בנגב.

מובראק הודיע לחביב שהמצרים יעמדו בכל התחייבויותיהם בהקשרי הסכם השלום עם ישראל.

1029 3/3

המצרים הודיעו לחביב שהם מוכנים בהקשר מחנה קנדה לשלם את עלות העברת המושפחות (הנושא עלה בהקשרי ההפגנות בצד המצרי של הגבול).

נמרוד ביקש ממר היוז לברר מה עומד מאחורי הרעיון של שיחות טרילטרליות (מגיד) ותפקיד משתעותי למצרים בשיחות הבילטרליות (אוסמה).

היוז הבטיח לברר. הבטיח גם דווח על שיחות חביב בירדן כבר הערב, או מחר בבוקר.

היוז מדווח כי חום פקרינג יחזור ארצה ביום ה' או בשבוע הבא.

יוסף מבין לעשרה

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

המשרד

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טופס מברק

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סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 21.3.88

מס' מברק

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, ממ"ד

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: עתונות

מזכיר המדינה הופיע אתמול (20.3.88) בתכנית "פגוש את העתונות" של רשת NBC.

להלן נוסח דבריו בנושא המז"ת.

יוסי גל

2/4 449

MEET THE PRESS INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ
SUNDAY, MARCH 20, 1988

MR. COCHRAN: Mr. Secretary, the events in Central America have pushed the Middle East now off the front page, but I think you're still very much involved in it. You make much of the fact that Prime Minister Shamir didn't actually say no to your peace plan, but he said no to the international conference, he said no to territory for peace. You have also said that none of the components of your plan can be changed. So in effect, even though the Israeli Cabinet hasn't voted, hasn't he said no? Really?

SEC. SHULTZ: Well, the situation is that we have an approach to getting the peace process going in the Middle East. So far as I can see, nobody else has one. At the same time, the need to move is clear, and everybody acknowledges it -- including Prime Minister Shamir, including Foreign Minister Peres, including the Arab leaders. Everybody says it's time, as it was put to me in Israel -- I think by Prime Minister Shamir -- the page has been turned. We have to write a new chapter.

So, how are we going to write that chapter? It must be through negotiations. How do we get into those direct bilateral talks that have to be the essence of a settlement? And we have proposed a way to do it, and we are talking about it with all of the parties. And everybody is evaluating, and nobody says no and nobody says yes, and it's in the nature of this process.

MS. MITCHELL: Mr. Secretary, Henry Kissinger, for one, has said that he has the gravest doubts about an international conference because the United States would just end up being beaten up by everyone involved, and blamed for everything. What do you say about his analysis?

SEC. SHULTZ: Well, Prime Minister Shamir, to a certain extent, and others who have written against our concept, singling out the international conference we have proposed, have been opposing an international conference that we did not propose. In fact, they have been opposing the kind of international conference that was proposed by the Soviets in the United Nations Security Council, and which we vetoed.

We proposed a conference that is not able to impose solutions on the parties, not able to veto any agreements that are made by the parties, but is a vehicle for getting negotiations started. So that's what we proposed, and that's beginning to become clearer as a result of attacks that people are making on a different kind of conference --

3/4 449

MS. MITCHELL: But as John pointed out --

SEC. SHULTZ: -- which we opposed, too.

MS. MITCHELL: As John pointed out, isn't it dead?

SEC. SHULTZ: I don't think so. We'll see.

MR. COCHRAN: Well, Mr. Secretary --

SEC. SHULTZ: For the sake of the region, it isn't -- as President Reagan said, you don't have to answer to me, you have to answer to your own people in your own region.

MR. COCHRAN: Well, sir, everybody agrees that what you're doing is important. I mean, trying to effect peace in the Middle East, that's God's work. But at some point, you have to say you're beating your head up against a stone wall here. You're inviting a certain amount of, if not humiliation -- at least, can a super power

keep going to people and pleading with them? At some point, don't you have to just say, enough?

SEC. SHULTZ: We're not going to people pleading with them, we're going to people trying to help them. And I don't think you should ever get tired of working for peace.

MR. COCHRAN: All right. Are you ready to go back to the Middle East?

SEC. SHULTZ: Sure.

MR. COCHRAN: What are the chances of your going back?

SEC. SHULTZ: Well, I don't know. I'm ready for the -- if there's something constructive to be done, I've always been ready.

MR. COCHRAN: What's the signal you need to go back? What's the minimum you need to go back?

SEC. SHULTZ: Oh, we'll just evaluate the situation as it goes and see in what way we can do the most good.

MR. APPLE: Mr. Secretary, Mr. Shevardnadze is due in Washington. We're clearly going to have -- or apparently going to have a summit meeting Moscow this spring. I can remember you saying to me, and to others, on a number of occasions, "It's very important not to have summit meetings until you have something ready." Well, we're going to have the summit, and we apparently don't have anything ready. At least not an agreement. Is this a mistake?

END

4/4 449

SEC. SHULTZ: No. I think it is important that summit meetings have content. But, it's also true that we are now evolving into a process where, perhaps, they will come to be a little more normal. Not that they'll ever be like meetings between any other two countries. And I think that's healthy. But there are plenty of things on our plate right now that can come to fruition, other than the Strategic Arms Treaty. But both sides would like to see a Strategic Arms Treaty, if we can get a good one that's solid and we see in our interests, and of course, they have to see it in theirs.

MR. APPLE: But that's not possible. We'll not have any Strategic Arms Treaty at this springs meeting, is it?

SEC. SHULTZ: Oh I think it's possible.

MR. APPLE: You still think it's possible?

SEC. SHULTZ: I think it's very hard work, and it's by no means in the bag, but it's possible. But we're not going to try to have one just for the sake of a treaty. We'll only be willing to go forward, the President will, if it's something we regard as good.

MR. COCHRAN: Mr. Secretary, very briefly, can you tell us how you feel about the Israeli crackdown on the press, on t.v. crews?

MS. MITCHELL: Apparently they've been blocked from the Occupied Territories today.

SEC. SHULTZ: Yes. Well, I think that it's, by and large, a good rule to be open to the press, and let people see what's going on in democratic societies. People want to see what's going on and get an accurate picture.

MR. COCHRAN: So you disapprove?

SEC. SHULTZ: The Israelis have a problem. They have the problem of maintaining order. And it isn't so much trying to prevent people from knowing what's going on, it's the -- in a sense -- incitement that the television camera may give. A person sees a camera, so runs out and throws a rock. So, that person can get beat on. That kind of thing, and the Israelis are worried about that.

MR. APPLE: Sounds a little bit like the excuses made in the American South a generation ago, Secretary.

SEC. SHULTZ: No, I'm not giving excuses, I'm explaining the situation they're in. But as I said to begin with, I think basically the right policy is an open policy.

MS. MITCHELL: Well, our cameras are telling us, unfortunately, that it's time to go. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for joining us here today on Meet The Press.

END DDDDD

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במאמר ב„וושינגטון פוסט" הציג שולץ את תוכנית השלום שלו

„לא נסכים שהוועידה תתערב במו"מ, תכפה פתרונות, ותטיל וטו על שיוסכם"

„כוחה של הגישה האמריקנית", כתב שר החוץ האמריקני ביום שישי, „הוא בשלימותה: אף אחד מגורמיה הנפרדים, אין להשמיטו, לשנותו או לבטלו" □ „כל משתתפי הוועידה יחוייבו לקבל את ההחלטות 242 ו־338 ולשלול טרור"

ג'ורג' שולץ: זה הרגע לפריצת דרך

– מאת **אריאל גינאי**, שליחנו לוושינגטון –

שר החוץ האמריקני נקט שלשום בצעד חריג ופירסם ב„וושינגטון פוסט" מאמר פרי־עטו, על מהותה של תוכנית השלום האמריקנית והוועידה הבינלאומית המוצעת. להלן המאמר במלואו.

„מעטים הכללים הקבועים לפתרון סכסוכים. כל סכסוך, יש לו היסטוריה מיוחדת ואיפיונים מיוחדים. כל צד לסכ־סוך, יש לו חלומות, דאגות וחששות משלו. המשימה היא למצוא את התמריצים הנכונים, כדי להביא את הצדדים משדה הקרב אל שולחן המשא־ומתן. את הצלחת המשא־ומ־תן אין לזקוף לנוהל שעשו בו שימוש, אלא לנכונות הצד־דים לנצל את ההזדמנויות, לעמוד מול ברירות קשות ול־הסכים לוויתורים הדדיים...

„בסכסוך הערבי־ישראלי המשא־ומתן הוא יעיל. הוא מאפשר לצדדים ללמוד לעסוק זה עם זה. הוא מניב הסכ־מים בני־קיימא ומציאותיים, התואמים את האינטרסים הי־סודיים של הצדדים. הנסיון מורה, שהערבים והישראלים מסוגלים לכרות הסכמים ולקיימם.

מו"מ דו שלבי

„ארה"ב פתחה ביוזמה, שמטרתה להביא למשא־ומתן – משא־ומתן ערבי־ישראלי ישיר, רו־צדדי, למען השגת שלום כולל. התוכנית שלנו מבוססת על הקביעות והעקרו־נות של החלטה 242, של מועצת הביטחון, שהיא המסגרת למשא־ומתן, המקובלת מבחינה בינלאומית. בעניין הגדה המערבית ועזה, כוללת היוזמה משא־ומתן רו־שלבי, ששני שלביו קשורים זה בזה, והמיועד להביא לשינוי מהיר ויסו־די בדרכי ההתייחסות ההדדית של הערבים והישראלים.

„ארה"ב דוגלת בצורה איתנה במשא־ומתן ישיר ורו־צד־די בין ישראל ובין כל שכנותיה, כאמצעי להשגת שלום כולל. בד בבד, ארה"ב הייתה תמיד נכונה לשקול כל גישה, שיש בה כדי להוליך למשא־ומתן ישיר, ובכללה גם ועידה בינלאומית.

„בחודשים האחרונים כמה מן הצדדים התמקדו בסוג מיוחד של ועידה בינלאומית – ועידה שיהיה לה תפקיד סמכותי וכוח אכיפה. בינואר השנה הטילה ארה"ב, במועצת הביטחון, וטו על הצעת החלטה, שקראה למזכיר הכללי של האו"ם לכנס ועידה מעין זו. ארה"ב הבהירה, כי סוג זה של ועידה ימנע משא־ומתן של ממש. היא לא תהיה אלא מכ־שיר למניעת משא־ומתן משמעותי ולא לקידומו.

„אם־כן, הנושא שלגביו חלוקים הצדדים במזרח התיכון אינו, אם לכנס או לא לכנס ועידה בינלאומית. הצגה כזו של הענין היא מוטעית. הערבים תובעים ועידה, שתשמש פתיחה למשא־ומתן: ללא ועידה שאופייה ייקבע כיאות, לא יהיה משא־ומתן. ואולם אין לכנס ועידה בינלאומית מן הסוג הגרוע. ארה"ב לא תיטול חלק בוועידה כזו. שום מדינה ריבונית לא תסכים להשתתף בוועידה מן הסוג, שיבקש לפסוק בעניינים הנוגעים לביטחונה הלאומי.

„השאלה היא, אם הגיע הרגע לנהל משא־ומתן על ש־מת קץ לסכסוך הערבי־ישראלי: האם כל צד מוכן ומסוגל לעמוד מול ברירות קשות ולקבל החלטות קשות; והאם אפשר להתאים את תביעות הצדדים לצורה נוהלית, שיש בה כדי לספק את דרישותיהם המינימליות.

„כוחה של הגישה האמריקנית הוא בשלימותה: אף אח־ד מגורמיה הנפרדים, אין להשמיטו, לשנותו או לבטלו, בל־י הקרבת האיזון שלה. הוועידה שאנו תומכים בה נועדה לפ־תוח בסידרה של משא־ומתן דו־צדדי, ואחר תוכל לקבל ריווחים מן הצדדים על מצב המשא־ומתן, בצורה שתוסכם על־ידי הצדדים. כל משתתפי הוועידה יחוייבו לקבל את ההחלטות 242 ו־338 ולשלול אלימות וטרור. ייקבע במפו־רש, כי הוועידה תהיה מנועה מהתערבות במשא־ומתן, מכ־פיית פתרונות, או מהטלת וטו על מה שיוסכם עליו במ־שא־ומתן הדו־צדדי.

נכונות לגנוז אשליות

„ארה"ב מחוייבת לתוכנית זו לשם פתיחת משא־ומתן ישיר ודו־צדדי. לא נרשה, שמרכיב כלשהו מהצעתנו ייש־חק, יועמד בסכנה, או יורחב אל מעבר למשמעותו. במיוחד, לא נסכים, שהוועידה תהיה בעלת סמכויות או בעלת כוח־אכיפה, או שתפסוק לגבי המשא־ומתן, או שתחרוג מסמכו־יותיה, כפי שיוסכם עליהן בין הצדדים.

„המרכיבים לתהליך שלום שרירים וקיימים. הסטאטוס קוו הוא בלתי מתקבל על הדעת ובלתי נסבל. הצדדים היריבים מגלים נכונות לגנוז אשליות ולהתאים את החלו־מות לעובדות המציאות. ועל השולחן הונחו רעיונות מצ־אותיים ובני־השגה, שיש בהם כדי לספק את האינטרסים היסודיים של הכול.

„גם משימתנו ברורה. עלינו לפעול ביושר, בהחלטיות ובהתמדה, כדי להביא את הערבים ואת הישראלים משדות הקרב אל המשא־ומתן. המהלך שיזמה ארה"ב – שני שלבים קשורים בקשר הדדי של משא־ומתן ישיר, שייפתח על־ידי ועידה בינלאומית שהמיבנה שלה נקבע כיאות – הוא מצ־ואתי ומחייב.

„זה הרגע לפריצת דרך היסטורית, וזו התוכנית. עתה הוא הזמן להכרעה".

תגובות

בעמיר בי פירסם מאמרו של שולץ, פירסם ה„וושינגטון פוסט" גם שתי תגובות – האחת של ח"כ משה ארנס, והשניה של פרשנו צ'ארלס קראוטהמר.

כותרת מאמרו של משה ארנס היא: „ועידות בינלאומיות אינן יעילות", והוא מצב[illegible] כך, שלא יעלה על הדעת להציע ועידה בינ[illegible]לאומית לפתרון הסכסוך הבריטי־אירי או האפגני.

ארנס כותב, כי בשנת 1977, כאשר האמריקנים והסובייטים הגיעו להסכמה, ונשקפה סכנה של זי־מון ועידה בינלאומית, חש הנשיא מאראנ[illegible]לירוש־לים, כדי להכשיל את התוכנית. במ[illegible]לחץ המופעל על ישראל, שתסכים לוועידה בינלאומית שאינה יעילה, מוטב לשכנע את ירדן להסכים למ־שא־ומתן ישיר, היכול להיות יעיל.

קראוטהאמר כותב, כי תוכנית שולץ כמוה כ„פרידה מהסכמי קמפ־דיוויד" וישראל לא תוכל לתת אמון בכך, שארה"ב לא תיטוש גם את תוכני־תה הנוכחית, כאשר היא תיראה בעיניה „מיושנת". התוכנית האמריקנית פותחת פתח לשיתוף אש"ף: ומשתפת בתהליך השלום את בריה"מ.

מכל מקום ברור מן התגובות, שמתנגדיו של שולץ סבורים, כי בסופו של דבר הוועידה תיטול לעצמה סמכויות, למרות שאיפתו של שולץ שתימנע מכך. ייתכן, כי השאלה, כיצד להוסיף כוח ש־כנוע לערבות האמריקניות בדבר אופיה הבל־תי־מחייב של הוועידה, תהיה נושא השיחות הדיפ־לומטיות בימים הקרובים. **אריאל גינאי**

מסע שמיר

שמיר וג'ורג' בוש נפגשו ביום שישי לארוחת ערב בוושינגטון ושם הצטלמו כשהם אוחזים בהצהרתו של הנשיא הרי טרומן, המכירה במדינת ישראל. (תצלום: רויטר)

– מאת **חיים שיבי**, שליחנו הנלווה למסע רוה"מ בארה"ב, לוס אנג'לס –

יורדים מישראל וערבים פלשתינאים הפגינו ביחד נגד יצחק שמיר בהופעתו בפני „המועצה ליחסי חוץ", ביום שישי בלוס־אנג'לס. לעומת ההפגנה הקטנה נגד שמיר, שניצבה מחוץ למלון „בנצ'רי פלאזה", הפגינה הקהילה היהודית בלוס אנג'לס עמידה מאוחדת לצד ישראל.

המימסר היהודי המאורגן בעיר עשה בסוף השבוע מאמץ שלא להשוף באירועים פומביים את הביקורת הקיי־מת בקהילה נגד מדיניות שמיר. כרטי־סים שלא נמכרו לארוחת הערב החגי־גית שאורגנה לכבוד האורח – חולקו. נשיא הפדרציה סטנלי הירש, צילצל אישית למספר רב של נכבדים שלא התכוונו לבוא וביקש מהם להגיע לא־רוחה. בניגוד לחששות המארגנים מפ־ני „הצבעה ברגליים", היה בסופו של דבר אולם הנשפים של המלון מלא מפה לפה.

בשתי הופעות בפני קהל רחב – בפני פעילי פדרציה ובונדס ביום חמי־שי, ובפני המועצה ליחסי חוץ ביום שישי – התקבלו נאומיו של שמיר נגד ועידה בינלאומית ונגד הביקורת המוטחת כלפי ישראל בשל פעולתה בשטחים, ללא ביטויי עוינות ולעיתים גם בתשואות.

בהופעה בפני „המועצה ליחסי חוץ" נשאל שמיר אם ישראל עומדת לסייע למורדי הקונטרס נגד „הסנדיניסטים האנטישמים". שמיר: „לא, יש לנו עס־קים משלנו".

בתשובה לשאלה אם איזו מנהיגות פלשתינית תרון ישראל, אם איננה מוכנה לדון עם אש"ף השיב שמיר, כי „תחילה עם פלשתינאים שייבחרו על ידי ירדן במשלחת ירדנית־פלשתינית משותפת".

שמיר הזכיר, כי על פי הסכמי קמפ־דיוויד, בשלב שלאחר כינון האו־טונומיה תיבחר מיד נציגות פלשתי־נית בבחירות דמוקרטיות. „בבחרים אלה יהיו הנציגים הלגיטימיים של הערבים הפלשתינים", אמר. לאחר שסיפר לנאספים, כי יש כבר מדינה פלשתינית באיזור ושמה ירדן, ביקש אחד השומעים לדעת, מדוע לא תכ־בוש ישראל את ירדן ותפתור שם את הבעיה הפלסטינית. שמיר: „אני מודה לך על עצתך". הקהל אהב את ההומור.

בלוס אנג'לס חיכו לשמיר כ־100 מפגינים, שהניפו דגלים פלשתינים ונשאו שלטים שקראו להפסיק את המימון האמריקני לישראל. בתוך קהל הפלשתינים עמדו גם ישראלים. אחת מהם, סוזי מרדכי, 10 שנים בלוס אנג'לס: „לכוחות השלום בארץ אין די כח להחליט על יציאה מן השטחים. הדרך היחידה היא לעודד לחץ אמריק־ני על ישראל".

ביום שישי נפגש שמיר עם קבוצת מפיקים מהוליוד. השחקן ריצ'רד דר־ייפוס, ששאל אותו מדוע לא תיכנס ישראל למו"מ עם אש"ף, אמר אח"כ: „צריך לדבר עם אויבים".

שמיר ושולץ יתעמתו היום פעם נוספת על מסכי הטלוויזיה של ארה"ב. שולץ יהיה אורח תוכנית הראיונות של יום ראשון בבוקר ברשת אן.בי.סי. שמיר הקליט את הופעתו כבר ביום שישי ברשת סי.בי.אס.

אבן: „האינטרס של ישראל הוא לוותר על שטחים תמורת שלום"

– מאת **אן אקשטיין**, כתבתנו בבריסל –

יו"ר ועדת החוץ והביטחון של הכנסת, אבא אבן, נאם אתמול בפורום בינלאומי על השלום במזרח־התיכון הנערך בבריסל. בפורום משתתפים ישראלים ופלשתינים.

„האינטרס של ישראל", אמר, הוא לוותר על שטחים בגדה המערבית ובעזה תמו־רת שלום.

„כיצד נחלק בינינו את השטחים ואת הריבונות – זה כבר עניין למשא־ומתן", אמר אבן, „אבל ברור שאי־אפשר להתכחש לעקרון הח־לוקה, אם באמת רוצים שה־מו"מ יוכתר בהצלחה.

„אינטרסים ישראליים הם הם הגורמים לנו לשלול ולרחות את הרעיון של שלי־טה ישראלית וריבונות יש־ראלית מלאה על כל השט־חים".

לדעת אבן, יש סיכוי שי־שראל תצליח להחזיק בשט־חים באמצעות כוח. „אך אז לא נהיה מדינה יהודית, לא נהיה מדינה דמוקרטית. ישראל תאבד את הרוח ואת המטרה שלשמה הוקמה". אבן תמך בכינוס ועידה בי־נלאומית.

לפניו דיבר חנא סניורה, עורך העתון המזרח־ירושלמי „אל־פאג'ר", שהציע תוכנית שלום בת שבעה עקרונות: ● הכרה בזכויות של כל הע־מים באיזור, ביניהם הפלש־תינים והישראלים. ● הפת־רון מותנה בשימת קץ לכי־בוש הישראלי. ● פתרון הסיכסוך חייב להתבסס על הכרה הדדית בזכויות שוות להגדרה־עצמית ועל דו־קי־ום בשלום. ● כל העמים באיזור זכאים לחיות במדי־נות משלהם, בתוך גבולות בטוחים ומוכרים. ● כל חי־לוקי־הדיעות ייפתרו באמצ־עות מו"מ בין נציגי הצדד־רים.

● תכונס ועידה בינלאו־מית בנוכחות חמש החברות הקבועות במועצת הביטחון וכל הצדדים המעורבים בסיכסוך, שייוצגו על בסיס שווה, כאשר לאש"ף יש הז־כות לייצג את הפלשתינים כפי שלממשלת ישראל יש הזכות לייצג את הישראלים.

● תוכרז תקופת־ביניים בה יוטל מוראטוריום על פעו־לות אלימות ועל שימוש בכוח.

הפורום, שהחל ביום שי־שי ויסתיים מחר, אורגן על־ידי אירגון יהודי בברי־סל, והוא מתקיים באולם שניתן על־ידי מועצת השוק האירופי, שמושבה בבריסל.

תגובות היום

מסר מחריד

מה לא עושה מיגזר שלם מקרב הסופרים, האמנים, אנשי הרוח היש־ראלים, כדי לשכנע את עצמם ואת זולתם, שיש עם מי ועל מה לדבר, גם באש"ף?

על מה לא הצהירו, ועל מה לא ויתרו, מראש וללא תמורה כלשהיא מהצד השני, ובלבד שייפ־תח הדו־שיח הנכסף עם עמיתים פלשתינים?

כמה קריאות, פטיציות ועצומות לא נחתמו על ידי מיטב יוצרי התרבות העברית, כדי שהציבור יאמין, שמדינת פלשתין לצדה של ישראל הוא הפיתרון המקובל גם על אש"ף?

כנות אמונתם ומניעי־הם המוסריים מעולם לא הועמדו בסימן שאלה. רק ותרנותם ללא סייג, והנ־ריבות המופלגת להציע כמעט הכל תמורת לא כלום, עוררה תמיהה על תמימותם הפוליטית של אנשי סגולה ששמם הולך לפניהם.

עד שבא, באלה הימים, שירו של המשורר הער־בי־ישראלי מחמוד דרוו־יש. לא רק משורר דגול בעמו, אלא פעיל רק"ח לשעבר, ומאז שירד, אחר־אי על תיק התרבות בוו־עד הפועל של אש"ף. ואף על פי כן, בעיני עמיתיו בישראל, שלא החמיצו שום הזדמנות להידבר אתו, בעל מוניטין של אדם מתון. רוצה לומר, שואף לדו־קיום בין ישר־אל ופלשתין.

„צאו מכל דבר. צאו מפצעינו, מארמתנו, צאו מהיבשה ומהים, מהכל..." כותב המתון הזה בשירו המחריד.

המסר ברור, ואינו טעון פירושים. זה מסר מתואם, כביכול, עם הקו־צונים שבימין שלנו, שטוענים שאש"ף שואף לפלשתין, מהים עד היר־דן.

וזה מסר מכיך, אם לא קטלני, בשביל השמאל בישראל.

★

נגד ההסתה

עדיין לא ברור אם יו־קרמו הבחירות, ואם כן, למתי.

אבל מערכת הבחירות כבר החלה. ועימה, כמו במערכה ב־81 הזכורה לשימצה, עונת ההשמ־צות, ההכפשות, וההסתה שלוחת כל רסן.

כמו לא די לנו במלח־מות הנכפות עלינו מב־חוץ, בשטחים, ברדום־לב־נון, בטרור, כבר משתוללת בפנים מלחמת יהודים ביהודים.

מצד ימין, אריאל שרון נותן את הטון, בהתקפות בלתי נלאות, ובלתי צוד־קות, על שמעון פרס. דוד־קא שרון, שבסודי סודות כרת בזמנו, עם לא אחר מאשר פרס, את הברית שאיפשרה את כינון ממשלת האחדות.

איך זה מתיישב עם העובדה שדווקא שרון אי־נו חדל להטיף, בצדק גמור, לצורך החיוני לח־דש קונסנסוס לאומי־ציו־ני, מעבר למחיצות המפ־לגתיות?

ישעיהו בן־פורת

ידיעות אחרונות

היום 60 עמודים
כולל מוסף ספורט

יום א׳, ב׳ בניסן, תשמ״ח 20.3.1988, גליון מס׳ 17590 | Yedioth Ahronoth יديعوت احرونوت | רח׳ מזוס 2, תל־אביב | המנכ״ל: ארנון מוזס | העורך: דב יודקובסקי | העורך האחראי הראשון: נח מוזס דיל | יו״ר ההנהלה הראשון: יהודה מוזס דיל | העורך לשעבר: ד״ר ח. רוזנבלום | 60 אג׳ (כולל מע״מ) | 55 אג׳ באילת

סין מכרה לסעודיה טילים לטווח 3,000 ק״מ המסוגלים לפגוע בישראל □ „חלק מהטילים כבר מוצבים ליד ריאד"

שמיר לארה״ב: סלקו את הטילים ארוכי־הטווח שרכשה סעודיה מסין

הטילים נועדו במקור לשאת ראש־נפץ גרעיני □ הנושא נדון בהרחבה בפגישת ראש־הממשלה עם שר ההגנה האמריקני, קרלוצ׳י □ ארה״ב: סין וסעודיה הבטיחו, כי הטילים לא יחומשו בראשי־נפץ גרעיני □ סעודיה: הטילים ישמשו בתפקיד הגנתי מפני תקיפה איראנית

צניחה לאיזור המתיחות

צנחנים אמריקניים צנחו בהונדורס ביום ו׳, במיסגרת „הפגנת כוח" מצד ריינגן. על המשבר במרכז אמריקה – ראה עמ׳ 4־5
(תצלום: „רויטר")

– מאת **אריאל גינאי**, שליחנו לוושינגטון, **וחיים שיבי**, כתבנו המדיני הגילווה למסע ראש־הממשלה בארה״ב –

משרד החוץ האמריקני אישר ביום שישי, כי סין מכרה לסעודיה טילים אסטרטגיים (המיועדים, במקור, לשאת ראש־נפץ גרעיני) בעלי טווח של 2,500 עד 3,000 קילומטר־ים.

טווח זה המאפשר לה לפגוע בכל מטרה במזרח־התיכון, כולל, כמובן, בשטח ישראל. ה„וושינגטון פוסט" מסר, כי טילים אחדים כבר הוצבו מדרום לריאד.

במהלך השיחות, שניהל שמיר בוושינגטון, אמר ראש־הממשלה, כי ישראל רואה בחומרה רבה רכש של טילים בעלי טווח כזה על־ידי ערב הסעודית מסין.

שמיר ביקש, כי ארה״ב תנקוט כל צעד אפשרי לסי־

(סוף בעמוד 12)

חדשות ומשמעותן

סיבה לדאגה



– מאת **רון בן־ישי** –

ישראל עוקבת בדאגה אחר מלחמת־הטילים המת־נהלת בין עיראק לאיראן – והחרדה על רכישת טילים ארוכי־טווח בידי סעודיה, מוסיפה עוד סיבה טובה לדאגה.

סעודיה היא בעלת־בריתה של עיראק, ולפיכך יש לראות את רכש הטילים מסין בהקשר האיראני: אולם החשש הוא, כי מה שיפול מחר על טהרן – עלול ליפול מחרתיים על תל־אביב, אשדוד ואשקלון.

(סוף בעמוד 12)

„סי.אס.אס־2" הוא טיל גרעיני לטווח בינוני, מתוצרת סין העממית. פירוש שמו הסיני של הטיל, אגב, הוא „רוח מזרחית". זהו טיל חד־שלבי, בעל טווח של 2,500־3,000 ק״מ, שהיה למבצעי בשנת 1971. ראש־הנפץ שלו הוא בעוצמה של 2־3 מגטון (פי מאה מעצמתה של הפצצה האטומית שהוטלה על הירושימה). על־פי הידוע עד כה במערב, יוצרו כ־50 טילים מסוג זה, ש־20 מתוכם נפרסו ברחבי סין. הטיל מונע בדלק־נוזלי. אורכו – יותר מ־20 מטרים. משקלו 27 טונות.

צה״ל סרק מצפון לרצועת הביטחון

הסתייע בתותחנים ובחיל־האוויר □ „קול לבנון": נפגעו גם חיילים סוריים

מאת **דני שדה**

בוחות גדולים של צה״ל וצד״ל, בסיוע ארטילריה וחיל האוויר, ביצעו אתמול ביעור של מוקדי מחבלים צפונית לרצועת הבטחון בדרום לבנון, באיזור הכפר מיידון.

כל הכוחות שבו לרצועת הבטחון ללא נפגעים. הכו־חות מצאו באיזור נשק, אר־לם לא נמסר על מחבלים שנפגעו במהלך האירועים.

מקור צבאי בכיר מסר, כי פעולת צה״ל היתה במסגרת פעילות יזומה של פיקוד צפון נגד המחבלים, ללא כל קשר לאירוע כלשהו.

כתבנו, עוזי מחניימי, מוסר, כי לדברי תחנת השי־דור „קול לבנון", גם מספר חיילים סורים השוהים באי־זור העיירה משעארה, צפו־נית לרצועת הבטחון, נפצעו אתמול בהפגזה של צה״ל.

שערי מט״ח

- **סל חדש:** 1.7178
- **דולר יצוא:** 1.5776
- **דולר לנוסעים:** 1.86
- **דולר שחור:** 1.67־1.69
- **מארק שחור:** 1.03־1.05
- **ל״יש שחור:** 3.10־3.15

גישושים למיפגש שמיר־שוורדנאדזה

שר החוץ הסובייטי מגיע לשיחות עם שולץ □ השליח חביב – לסיבוב במזה״ת

– מאת **חיים שיבי**, שליחנו הגילווה למסע ראש־הממשלה בארה״ב, **אריאל גינאי**, וושינגטון, **וצדוק יחזקאלי**, ניו־יורק –

בארה״ב נטען בסוף השבוע, כי נערכים גישושים לקיים פגישה בין ראש הממשלה, יצחק שמיר, לבין שר החוץ הסובייטי, אדוארד שוורדנאדזה.

שמיר מגיע היום לניו־יורק, לאחר סוף שבוע בלוס אנג׳לס. שוורדנאדזה

(סוף בעמוד 13)

ה„שאביבה" הוצאה מחוץ לחוק

המדובר בתנועת־הנוער של הפת״ח, המונה עשרות אלפי חברים □ היתה פעילה במהומות

– מאת **דני שדה**, כתבנו הצבאי **וירוני שקד**, כתב „ידיעות אחרונות" –

תנועת ה„שאביבה", שהיא אירגון־חזית של ה„פת״ח" הוצאה אל מחוץ לחוק. ההחלטה על כך התקבלה באחרונה במערכת הביטחון וכל אדם, שימשיך להיות חבר בה, יהיה צפוי למעצר והעמדה לדין.

על יסוד החלטה זו נסגרו בסוף השבוע ביהודה ושומרון מספר מועדונים, ששימשו מרכזי פעילות של ה„שאביבה".

באירגון חברים עשרות אלפים – כשאל־פים מתוכם מוגדרים פעילים. ה„שאביבה" ממקדת את פעילותה בארבעה מיגזרים עיק־ריים: נוער; סטודנטים; פועלים; נשים.

בשנות השמונים המוקדמות, עם התפור־רות המנהיגות המבוגרת בשטחים, ושינוי התפיסה ב„פת״ח", לפיה יש לפעול גם באי־מצעות המאבק המדיני, במקביל להמשך המאבק הצבאי, החל ה„פת״ח" באירגון ובבי־סוס תשתית בשטחים.

תשתית זו התבססה על חלוקת האזור למיגזרי פעילות שונים. במגמה למשוך לשו־

(סוף בעמוד 13)

במיגזר הערבי: דיון על „יום האדמה"

יחליטו היום אם להכריז על שביתה כללית ב־30 במארס □ הגברה בתסיסה ובפעולות העוינות בתוך הקו הירוק □ בקבוק תבערה פגע באמבולנס ליד ב״ש □ בקבוק תבערה ליד בית שרון בירושלים □ אבנים הושלכו בלוד ובכביש החוף

– מאת **אריה קיזל, רוני שקד, וצבי זינגר** כתבי „ידיעות אחרונות" –

הצעה להשבית את כל המיגזר הערבי ב„יום האדמה", החל ב־30 במארס, תידון היום אחר הצהריים בישיבה מיוחדת של ועד ראשי המועצות הערביות בישראל.

בישיבה, שבה יטלו חלק כל ראשי המועצות הערביות, חברי הכנסת הערביים וכן נציגים מהוועדה המרכזת בהסתר־רות הכללית, תובא ההצעה לדיון וצופים, כי יתנגדו לה כל הגופים המתונים שבתוך הועד הארצי ובהם נציגי מפ״ם.

(סוף בעמוד 13)

חנן זריחן, הנהג, ולילך דוידוביץ, המתנדבת, ליד האמבולנס שנפגע (תצלום: אמיר ויינברג)

גהל מקים בחו״ל חברה שתספק טבק ל„דובק"

סימנים שמתעכבת חזרתו לארץ

זורח גהל

– מאת **אריה אבנרי**, כתב „ידיעות אחרונות" –

מנכ״ל חברת „דובק", זורח גהל, שהצליח להשת־לט באחרונה על החברה בסיועו של איש עסקים שוויצי בשם סיטר לוגן, מקים עתה בלונדון חברה חדשה לשיווק טבק שתספק בעתיד את כל מוצרי הט־בק ל„דובק".

(סוף בעמוד 12)

משרד החוץ-נתקלת דקשר

15293

102.1.1

תאריך : 18.03.88
דף 1 מתוך 1
עותק 1 מתוך 6

סודי ביותר

חודש:3/15293
אל:המשרד
מ-:ורש/נר:405/תא:170388/זת:2100/דת:ב/מס:
נד:@

סודי ביותר/בהול לבוקר

אל:מנב'ל מדיני

מנב'ל ראה'מ, לוס אנג'לס

השגריר, לוס אנג'לס

ירמת שלום.

מרבי מטר שפיליף חביב יוצא מחר לירדן ויפגש עם המלך
בירום ב' הקרוב.

ערן.==

תב: שהח/רהמ/מנבל

מירן סיוה 344

102.1.1

official text

3/17/88

REAGAN URGES ALL PARTIES TO SETTLE MIDEAST CONFLICT
(Transcript: Reagan-Shamir departure remarks)

Washington -- The U.S. Middle East peace proposal is aimed at "progress that will assure the security of Israel and its neighbors and achieve the legitimate rights of the Palestinians," President Reagan said March 16.

After conferring with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir, the president expressed hope, in a departure ceremony, that all the parties "will seize this opportunity" to settle the Mideast conflict.

Following is the transcript of the exchange of remarks between Reagan and Shamir:

(begin transcript)

REAGAN: It's been a pleasure to meet with Prime Minister Shamir again and to have this opportunity to review with him the important issue of peace in the Middle East. We have a unique relationship with Israel, a relationship of trust, friendship, and shared ideals. I think we can be proud of the achievements that we've made over the last seven years in giving more substance and dimension to the strong ties between Israel and the United States. In the remainder of my term, we will continue to work to strengthen those ties.

The main topic of our discussion today was the search for peace in the Middle East. We've seen a new sense of urgency on the part of many in the region, and a wide recognition of the reality that the status quo is unacceptable. Our efforts have been geared toward trying to find a reasonable and practical way to make real progress -- progress that will assure the security of Israel and its neighbors and achieve the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

The present situation is a challenge and an opportunity to move decisively to break the deadlock that has lasted far too long. I hope we will not lose this opportunity. Today, Prime Minister Shamir and I discussed the proposal for moving forward rapidly to peace negotiations, which Secretary Shultz left with Israel, Jordan, and Syria during this recent visit. We believe this proposal offers a realistic and achievable way to change the relationship between Israel and the Arabs. It's a concrete demonstration of my commitment to finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict through a negotiating process that would begin soon. As I told Prime Minister Shamir, the

United States Information Service
Tel Aviv, 71 Hayarkon Street, 63903 Tel. 654338 ext. 204
Jerusalem, 19 Keren Hayesod Street, 94188 Tel. 222376
USIS

United States is prepared to be an active partner in this process, and we hope that all the parties involved will seize this opportunity.

So let's be clear about several things. The United States will not slice this initiative apart and will not abandon it.

And those who will say no to the U.S. plan -- and the prime minister has not used this word -- need not answer to us -- they'll need to answer to themselves and their people as to why they turned down a realistic and sensible plan to achieve negotiations. This is a time for all the parties to the conflict to make decisions for peace.

Prime Minister Shamir and I also reviewed our countries' robust and vital bilateral relationship. As you know, Israel has been designated one of our major non-NATO allies and friends, and we have developed a solid basis of strategic cooperation between our two countries. Strategic cooperation is a symbol of our converging needs and our mutual commitment to ensuring that no wedge will ever be driven between us.

I want to add that Prime Minister Shamir and I both remain very concerned about the many thousands of Jews that remain in the Soviet Union and yearn to emigrate or fully express their Jewish identity. The plight of Soviet Jewry shall remain at the top of my agenda in my discussions with Secretary Gorbachev.

As I bid farewell to Prime Minister Shamir, I wish him and the people of Israel a happy 40th anniversary. Our prayer is that this anniversary will mark the beginning of the era of peace and accommodation in the Middle East.

SHAMIR: Thank you, Mr. President. This visit to Washington has given me an opportunity to meet again with President Reagan, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Carlucci, and Secretary of the Treasury Baker. My colleagues and I have also met with congressional leaders and other friends in the congress, in the administration, and in the general public.

I am indebted to the president for this kind invitation. It affords me the opportunity to discuss matters of common concern, and to deepen the friendship and understanding between our two countries. In the talks with the president and with Secretary Shultz, we reviewed the state of U.S.-Israel relations, and the efforts to advance peace in the Middle East. Mr. President, we have always been in complete agreement with the principle of negotiating from a position of strength for which you have always stood. We have stepped up efforts to seek a framework for conducting direct peace negotiations between Israel and those of its Arab neighbors that we hope will join us in the quest for peace.

Israel has welcomed the American involvement and the secretary's efforts in this search. We have confidence in the American role, because we share the same goal of peace with security for all the countries in the Middle East. I have strong reservations concerning the proposed international conference which, in my view, is not conducive to peace. Some months ago, I accepted a proposal by Secretary Shultz to launch direct negotiations with the blessing of the U.S.-Soviet summit in order to grant international legitimacy for the negotiations for those states desiring it. Unfortunately, it was rejected. Nevertheless, I shall be ready to consider a similar proposal.

Israel firmly believes that those who are prepared to live with each other in peace must learn to negotiate directly with each other. We remain committed to the Camp David accords, which have provided a workable agreed framework for peace between Israel and each of its

Arab neighbors.

Mr. President, these are difficult times for Israel. We shall overcome them in the best possible way consonant with our tradition and our eagerness to prevent the loss of lives.

Mr. President, on the eve of Israel's 40th anniversary, the people and government of Israel are united in hailing the deep friendship and the close cooperation between our two countries. This friendship has reached unprecedented levels under your leadership. We have established a strategic cooperation agreement between Israel and the United States -- a free trade area agreement between our two countries, and the designation of Israel as a major non-NATO ally of the United States. We are confident that a solid foundation of friendship between Israel and the United States will remain unshaken in spite of occasional differences of opinion that may arise.

I am sure I speak for all the people of Israel and for peace-loving persons everywhere when I express our gratitude for your untiring efforts to reduce tensions in the world and to bring peace to our war-torn region. We will continue to do our utmost to cooperate in the search for peace.

I return to Jerusalem confident that with the friendship and understanding of the U.S. government and its people, we shall succeed. Thank you.

(end transcript)

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טופס מברק

דף __ מתוך __ דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 1100 16 מרס 88

מס' מברק

374

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, ממ"ד

מאת: אלי אבידן, וושינגטון

דו"ח ברוקינגס

משיחת הציר עם ביל קוונדט וסאם לואיס.

1. הדו"ח יפורסם רשמית ב-24.3. בכללו (ועל כך שמענו מגורמים אחרים שהשתתפו בעבודה) ובניגוד לדו"ח הראשון לא מדובר בתכנית מבצעית (BLUE PRINT) אלא בהמלצות לממשל הבא כיצד לגשת לנושא המזה"ת. שוני נוסף הוא שהדו"ח יוצא מנקודת מבט של ניתוח אנליטי של המצב באזור. ההתרחשויות בגדמ"ע השפיעו בכך שנלקחו בחשבון אך הדו"ח לא שונה בשל כך.

2. נקודות המוצא הן (א) מצב של שלום בין ישראל ומצרים (ב) היחסים המיוחדים בין ישראל וארה"ב (ג) המכלול ישראל-ירדן-פלס' והחלטת 242. קוונדט ציין שבניגוד להסכם עם מצרים (קוונדט הרבה לעסוק באנלוגיה בשל נסיונו הפעיל בתקופת קרטר) המבוסס על החזרת טריטוריה, הפעם קשה למצוא מכנה משותף במשולש הנ"ל (ד) הסוגיה הפלס' (ה) ניתוח, שקוונדט הגדירו כרציני, של מכלול סוריה-ישראל. (ו) האקטיביזם הסובי' (ז) מסגרת בינ"ל. אין המדובר בועידה בינ"ל אלא במובן של תוכן בינ"ל. מצב של DEAD LOCK יהיה הרסני. מסגרת זו גם מחייבת שלב של הכנות מוקדמות כגון הייצוג הפלס'. קוונדט ציין שבסוגיה הפלס' יש פחות אוריינטציה כלפי ירדן. הכנסת הפלס' למו"מ תעשה אמנם באסוציאציה ירדנית אך לא במצב נחות אלא על בסיס של ייצוג עצמי (SPOKESMAN OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING) בכל מסגרת בתנאי של הכרה בישראל. מבחינה מעשית מחברי הדו"ח לא מאמינים שמשלחת כזו תתייצב למו"מ ללא ENDORSEMENT של אש"פ. אין מצפים להסכמת ישראל לשאת ולתת עם אש"פ, או שהארגון יקבל את 242. המאגר מהם עשויים, לבוא הפלס' הוא, לדוגמה, המועצה הלאומית הפלס'. הדו"ח כך הודגש לא מפרט מעבר לכך.

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סווג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

374

3. מו"מ על הסדרי ביניים. קונדט הדגיש שאמנם יש לסיים הגדרת מצבי הביניים לפני הסופי, אך אם המו"מ יתחיל מסופו דהיינו מחסדר של קבע הוא יכנס לדרך ללא מוצא. כאשר למצבי ביניים, יש בכך יתרונות לשני הצדדים. לערבים - אפשרות לקיים בחירות, פעילות כלכלית, נושאי מים, אדמה וכיו"ב. לישראל - הסדרי בטחון, סיום מצב הלוחמה והחרם ועוד. הקונספציה היא של גבולות פתוחים, פדרציה/קונפדרציה התיישבות חפשית, פעילות כלכלית וכד'.

קונדט הגדיר התפיסה כ- LONG TERM PEACE בין ישראל הטריטוריות וירדן. כאשר ללו"ז, הדגש שאינו מואץ כמו זה של שולץ אך המשך הסטטוס קוו הוא בעיה לא רק לישראל אלא גם לארה"ב בשל גיאוליה עמו לאור מערכת היחסים ההדוקים עם ישראל.

4. בתשובה לשאלות חציר:

(א) מדינה פלס. נשמעו דעות שונות בין משתתפי הדו"ח. הדו"ח מגדירה כמזיקה (DETRIMENTAL). חייב לחול שינוי באש"פ טרם שיוכשר למו"מ

(ב) ירושלים. פחות בעייתית ממה שניתן לצפות. הכרח ביג"ל לבירת ישראל ככל מו"מ לשלום. עדר מאוחדת עם גישה לכל הדתות. הדו"ח לא עוסק באיזה אופן יחולק המנהל העירוני.

(ג) ועידה ביג"ל. פתיחה ביג"ל בראשות ארה"ב וברה"מ כשם שרה"מ שמיר מציע מעניקה לברה"מ מעמד חזק יותר מאשר ועידה המוצעת בחסות האו"מ.

5. קן וולאק אחד מחברי הצוות טיפר בנפרד שישראל יכולה להיות עם הדו"ח ושבסה"כ ההגדרות הם די נוחות לישראל, זאת לאחר מאבק קשה שהוא וסאם לוראים נתלו עם קבוצה קיצונית מבין חברי הצוות היהודים ובראשם ריטה הארזר, הנרי סיגמן, ג'ודית קיפר, ולצדם האל סונדרס. הקבוצה הערבית - ראשיד חלידי, פואד מוגרבי, פול ג'אבר היתה יחסית נוקשה פחות.

אלי אבידן

1988-03-11 20:13 1 1480126 00

102.1.1 אלי קשלה

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טלפס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 11.3.88

מס' מברק

1/2

המשרד 262

אל: מצפייא, מעייט

דע: לשכת רוהיים

מאת: עיתונות

תכנית השלום

להלן מה"רושינגטון פוסט" 11.3.88.

אלי
עיתונות

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262

THE WASHINGTON POST

Shultz: U.N. Resolutions Cover Arab-Israeli Talks

On Hill, Secretary Disputes Shamir's View

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State George P. Shultz strongly disagreed yesterday with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's view that a key U.N. resolution calling upon Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab lands does not apply to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Testifying before a House appropriations panel, Shultz said that "each of the negotiations" to be held between Israel and its Arab neighbors under a new U.S. peace plan must be based on U.N. Resolution 242 and 338.

The first resolution, adopted following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, calls for Israel's withdrawal "from territories occupied in the recent conflict" in return for Arab acceptance of peace with the Jewish state. The second, voted after the 1973 war, reaffirms the same principles as the basis for any negotiations.

Shamir replied Wednesday to criticism by 30 senators, many of them strong supporters of Israel, who in a March 3 letter to Shultz said they were "dismayed" by the Israeli prime minister's refusal to accept the "land-for-peace" formula as the basis for negotiations.

Shamir said Israel already had "accepted" and "implemented" this principle when it returned the Sinai to Egypt as part of the 1978 Camp David Accords. But he argued that the same principle does not apply to the West Bank and Gaza Strip because they were occupied "militarily and illegally" by Jordan and Egypt.

"Their status must therefore be determined in the peace negotiations," he said. "I, therefore, fail to understand the reasons for your criticism, which hurts even more because it comes from friends who have Israel's security and welfare at heart," he added.

Shamir's letter, addressed to the two cosponsors of the Senate letter, Sen. Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.) and Sen. Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.), was published in Thursday's New York Times.

Asked by Rep. David R. Obey (D-Wis.), chairman of the House foreign operations subcommittee, whether Israel's return of the Sinai would be "sufficient" to meet its obligations under Resolution 242, Shultz replied bluntly, "No, it wouldn't."

"Each of these negotiations would be based on the Resolution 242 and 338. So the fact that 242 and 338 have, so to speak, been applied to the Sinai doesn't lessen the applicability of them to other negotiations," he said.

Shultz said the same principle "for that matter" would apply if Israel and Syria agreed to negotiate over the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights.

Shamir is due to arrive here Monday on a four-day visit that is expected to focus on the Shultz peace plan. It calls for the start of negotiations by May 1 on interim arrangements for Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the beginning of talks to settle their final status in December.

Shamir is opposed to any negotiations over the "ultimate disposition" of the West Bank and Gaza other than within the framework of the Camp David Accords, which the Arab side has rejected.

He is also opposed to Shultz's proposal for holding new peace talks under the umbrella of an international conference, with the U.N. secretary general issuing invitations to the five permanent member of the security council, including the Soviet Union, and all parties to the conflict.

Moshe Arens, the former Israeli ambassador here who is a close associate of Shamir, discussed his unhappiness with the Shultz concept of the conference at a meeting with Shultz Tuesday.

In a telephone interview yesterday, Arens said he had not visited Shultz to "protest" on Shamir's behalf about "anything," but made it clear that he and Shamir have strong objections to Shultz's concept of an "ongoing conference." He said this would allow the Arab side to take its grievances against Israel to the plenary body whenever there was a deadlock.

Shamir will take "a very firm attitude" against a conference in his talks here next week with Shultz, according to his spokesman, Avi Pazner. He said he doubted Shamir would accept a conference, even if the United States gave explicit assurances that its powers would remain limited, because Shamir is opposed "to the very principle of a conference," Pazner said.

Meanwhile, President Reagan, in an interview with French television yesterday, denied he intends to apply "pressure" on Shamir to accept the U.S. peace plan. "I don't think it's so much pressure as it is just an attempt at persuasion," he said.

תאריך : 17.03.88

שמור בנבס **
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102.1.1 אירלנד

מזדם:3/9404
אל:המשרד
מ-:בון/נד:94/תא:100388/זח:1300/דח:ב/סג:שמ
נד:0

שמור/בהול לבקר

אל: אירלנה 1

דע: מצפ"א, וושינגטון

מאת: הציר, בון

תכנית שולץ
++++++++++++

להלן מנהל מה מדינות העימות היום (10).

1. מורני ביקר היום למסנר שעות בבון לעדכן את משרד החוץ הרפגי בתכנית ההסדר האמריקאית. הגיע מפריס ומבריסל ויצא למוסקבה לשיחות בנדון עם שבארדנדזה.

2. נפגש עם מנהל אגף המתפתחות שלגינטרייט ובן שיחי והסביר התכנית לפרטיה תוך ציון שהיא מיקשה אחת ולא ניתן לשנות את המרכיבים, כך שעל הצדדים להשיב בכן או לא חד משמעי. להפתעת הגרמנים הערין מורני שרוהם יביא בביקורו לוושינגטון תשובה חיובית. כן הערין שהירדנים ישיבו בסרבו של דבר בחיוב, נולל למשלחת המשותפת הירדנית - פלסטינית ואף אינו רואה בנאום אסד דחיה מוחלטת של התכנית. במוסקבה ינסה לשכנע את הרוסים להמוך או לפחות לא להפריע לתכנית. לשאלת מארחיו במה רפג יכולה לתרום ביקש מורני שיתערבו אצל הסורים למען התכנית ויעבירו המידע לעמיתיהם בקהיליה.

3. מורני הציע להתעכב בבון בשובו ממוסקבה ביום ראשון בדי לתדרן את גנשר, אך נאמר לו שגנשר לא יהיה בבון

בדון

====

תפ: שהה,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,טמנכל,המד,רס,אמן,אירא,אירב,
אירג,מצבא

102.1.1 תלין אלא

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טלפס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סיווג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 10.3.88

מס' מברק 246

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת

דע: לשכת מנכ"ל מדיני

לשכת מנכ"ל רוה"מ

המזכיר שולץ ובית הנבחרים

למברקנו 224

בנפרד כתבה מתוך הוושפוסט דהיום שמשלימה הדווח בשלנו הנ"ל ובדיווחים נוספים.

ראוי לציין במיוחד:

- דברי שולץ, המובאים ע"י המורשה דן גליקמן, שממשל אינו עומד להפעיל לחץ על ישראל.
- דברי שולץ בקשר למכתב הסנטורים ומאמציו לבלום יוזמות דומות.
- דברי יו"ר ועדת החוץ, דנטה פאסל, שאין בכוונת הוועדה להפעיל לחץ על שמיר.

קונגרס

שהיה הזה נשל גלגל בין גבעו אביטל מסת הסברה
2 3 1 1 2 1 1 2

102.1.1 ירון אלון

טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך ___ דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מידי

תאריך/ז"ח 9.3.88 - 21:30

מס' מברק

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

אל : המשרד

225 1/ד

אל : מצפ"א

דע : מנכ"ל מדיני, מנכ"ל רה"מ

תהליך השלום - הקואליציה היהודית הלאומית והמימשל

1. אחמול נאמני ה-"NATIONAL JEWISH COALITION" ביקרו בוושינגטון ונפגשו עם הנשיא. מזכיר ההגנה, היועץ לבטחון לאומי ודיק מורפי.

2. לדברי אחד מהמשתתפים, הנשיא היה טקסי בלבד. קרלוצ'י התלונן על הקיצוצים בתקציבו המגבילים יכולתו להרחיב את הסיוע עבור ישראל (כך - י.ל.); ופאואל התרכז על נושא זכויות האדם, רק מרפי דיבר באופן סובסטנטיבי, אך למעשה חזר על פי רוב על דברים ידועים למדי. עם זאת, מספר נקודות לא מצאו חן בעיני אנשי הקואליציה :

א) הועידה הבינלאומית . חייבת להיות יותר ממטריה. מדובר על ועידה מתמדת (PERMANENT CONFERENCE) אך לא יהיה לו כוח וטו ולא תתפקד כערכאה משפטית בעלת הסמכות הסופית.

ב) השתתפות אש"פ בתהליך השלום. על מנת למלא תפקיד (TO BE A PLAYER) על אש"פ לחזור בו מהשימוש בטרור וכו'. מאידך באשר לתהליך השלום, אש"פ הינו גורם בכל "GAME PLAN" (מרפי לא פירט, אך להערכת המקור הוא רצה לומר כי אש"פ חייב להיות נכלל או מיוצג בתהליך בכדי להבטיח הצלחה).

ג) המו"מ והנייר האמריקאי. מרפי הזכיר כוונת ארה"ב להגיש נייר "כנקודת מוצא" במו"מ על תקופת המעבר. הרעיון מטריד אנשי הקואליציה, החוששים שמא הנייר יגביל מרחב התימרון של ישראל.

ד) באשר לירושלים, אמר מרפי שעמדת ארה"ב לא השתנתה. בסבסו של דבר, העיר חייבת להשאר מאוחדת וחייבת להיות גישה חפשית למקומות הקדושים לכל המאמינים. עם זאת שאלת ירושלים נשארת "מכשול גדול".

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

225 2/7

טופס מברק

דף 2 מתוך ___ דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מידי

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

ג. רצ"ב :

א) הודעה לעתונות על השיחות .

ב) תגובת הקואליציה למכתב 30 הסנטורים.

יוסף למדן

למדן

225 3/7

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
CONTACT: SCOTT LIPPE
202-547-7701

On March 8, 1988 the members of the Executive Committee of the National Jewish Coalition (NJC) met with President Reagan at the White House to express their appreciation for the President's leadership and his firm support for Israel. Among those present were the four officers of the National Jewish Coalition, Honorary National Chairman Max M. Fisher of Detroit, National Chairman Richard Fox of Philadelphia, Co-Chairman Gordon Zacks of Columbus, Ohio, and NJC Co-Chairman George Klein of New York.

Before meeting the President, the NJC leaders met with Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, National Security Advisor to the President General Colin Powell, and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, who has just returned from the Middle East.

Ambassador Murphy told the NJC leaders that the time is right to move to negotiations in the Middle East. The framework proposed by Secretary of State Shultz involves an ongoing international conference to begin in May which would include five members of the UN Security Council, Israel, and those Arab states and Palestinian members of the joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation which have done the following: accepted UN resolutions 242 and 338, renounced terrorism, and agreed to negotiate directly with Israel.

While the international conference would be more than merely an umbrella for talks, Murphy said, the UN Security Council members would have no right to veto decisions made by the Middle Eastern participant. Furthermore, direct negotiations between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and a joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation would take place individually, with talks on both the final status of the administered territories and the transitional process to be held at the same time.

In their meeting with the President, NJC National Chairman Richard Fox reminded President Reagan that the members of the NJC had supported him in 1980 and 1984. "We have been loyal supporters," Fox said, "and we have been happy to serve the most pro-Israel president in our nation's history."

In his remarks to the NJC, President Reagan said, "I appreciated your support in 1980 and 1984 and your help with issues such as the nomination of Judge Bork to the Supreme Court, contra aid, SDI, and our presence in the Persian Gulf. Our greatest goal is freedom for all, including Soviet Jews, and the people of Nicaragua and Afghanistan."

225 4/7

"Our administration has worked to enhance Israel's security," the President continued, "by increasing our strategic cooperation and our commercial cooperation, by agreeing to a Free Trade Area, and by raising the level of our aid to Israel. Our latest peace initiative will not threaten Israel's security."

President Reagan went on to say that "We have pressed the issue of Soviet Jewry with General Secretary Gorbachev. It has been the first item on the agenda in every meeting between American and Soviet officials."

"The Sandinista government in Nicaragua is not just anti-American," said the President, "it is also anti-Israel. The Sandinistas have very strong ties to the PLO. The United Nations has also been very anti-Israel, but our administration has supported Israel against attacks in that body."

The NJC Executive Committee members presented the President with a Steuben crystal statue and a plaque which read, "Presented to President Ronald W. Reagan for his courageous leadership of the free world in the quest for peace with justice and freedom for all."

After meeting with the President there was a short press conference with NJC National Chairman Richard Fox, who said, "The National Jewish Coalition believes there should be direct talks between Israel and her neighbors, and those direct talks can only take place within the framework of UN resolutions 242 and 338. As for Israel trading land for peace, we feel that Israel should do what it has to do in its own interests to achieve peace and at the same time maintain its security. We are not Israelis, we are not there on the scene. It is our belief that the best thing we in the United States who are concerned about Israel's safety can do is let the Israelis develop their own position in their own best interests. We are sure it will be in the best interests of peace as well."

At the NJC Executive Committee meeting which preceded the meeting with the President, the NJC took up the question of how to respond to the letter to Secretary of State Shultz circulated by Senators Levin and Boschwitz. The letter criticizes Israeli Prime Minister Shamir. The National Jewish Coalition released the following statement on this matter:

"On March 3, thirty members of the Senate addressed a letter to Secretary of State Shultz which criticized Israeli Prime Minister Shamir's purported position on territorial compromise. While we know that these distinguished senators are long-time friends of Israel and their motives are well-intentioned, we do however believe that at this most sensitive time in the efforts to initiate the negotiating process, the interference in the ongoing internal political debate within Israel is counterproductive and most untimely."

"We do believe that while the United States should do everything possible to encourage a negotiated end to the conflict in the region, we should take no steps, nor pressure the Israeli government to take steps, which will endanger Israel's national security in the long run."

NJC Executive Committee members at the meeting with the President were:

Gary Abramson--Washington, D.C.
Stan Adelstein--Rapid City, IO
Leonard Bell--Miami, Florida
Paul Borman--Detroit, MI
Matthew Brown--Boston, MA
Michael David Epstein--Washington, D.C.
Joseph and Alma Gildenhorn--Washington, D.C.
Leonard Greenberg--Boynton Beach, FL
Sylvia Hassenfeld--New York, NY
Jerry Hirsch--Phoenix, AZ
Philip Hixon--Washington, D.C.
Jeffrey Lichtenberg--New York, NY
Jacob Stein--New York, NY
Sydney Sussman--Trenton, NJ
Arnold Thaler--New York, NY
Phil Winn--Denver, CO
Randy White--Boston, MA

Chris Gersten--NJC Executive Director
Matt Brooks--NJC Political Director

PHOTOS ARE AVAILABLE

225
5/7

NJC Statement--March 8, 1988 295 6/7

The National Jewish Coalition condemns the continuing violence in the Israeli-administered territories of the Judea and Samaria. The restoration of law and order in these territories and end to the loss of life, injuries, and economic disruption there are of the highest priority.

We support the efforts of President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz to find a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict. The National Jewish Coalition agrees completely with our government's firmly stated policy that negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbors must be direct, face-to-face, and without preconditions. United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 should be the basis and framework for any peace negotiations. Only direct negotiations between Israel and her neighbors can lead to a lasting peace in the region.

On March 3, thirty members of the Senate addressed a letter to Secretary of State Shultz which criticized Israeli Prime Minister Shamir's position on territorial compromise. While we know that these distinguished senators are long-time friends of Israel and their motives are well-intentioned, we do however believe that this letter is both counterproductive and untimely. We hold this position because it is our belief that the letter tends to represent a direct interference in the internal policy debates of the State of Israel.

We do believe that while the United States should do everything possible to encourage a negotiated end to the

conflict in the region, we should take no steps, nor pressure the Israeli government to take steps, which will endanger Israel's national security in the long run.

225 7/7

END

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102.1.1 תיון אלמ

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

200 1/2

המשרד

טיפס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סווג בטחוני רגיל

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 9.3.88

מס' מברק

אל: מצפ"יא, מע"ת

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: יחתונות

תהליך השלום

להלן מה"יוושינגטון פוסט" (9.3.88).

ב/אלבר
עיתונות

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Shultz Vows Not to Change Mideast Plan

Shamir Associate Is Given Message

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State George P. Shultz has told a close associate of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir that he is ready to clarify his proposed Mideast peace plan but not to change its substance or timetable in discussions with Shamir here next week, Israeli sources said.

The blunt Shultz message was also conveyed to the Israeli government through Radio Israel, whose correspondent here, Shimon Schiffer, in a broadcast last night quoted a high administration official as saying Shultz was not ready to change "even one single detail" of the plan.

Shultz reportedly wanted to convey the Reagan administration's message to Israeli leaders before a special cabinet meeting is held today to discuss the controversial Shultz plan.

Meanwhile, Shultz last night dispatched assistant secretary of state Richard W. Murphy to Moscow to brief Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on the plan, a State Department official said last night. Murphy is to travel subsequently to various western European capitals for the same purpose.

Shultz appears determined to keep momentum going in his peace efforts, as well as keeping pressure on Shamir, and to prepare for a meeting here later this month between Shultz and Shevardnadze, where Shultz is expected to seek Soviet support for his plan.

Shultz met yesterday with Moshe Arens, former Israeli ambassador to the U.S. and Israeli defense minister, who protested the U.S. proposal for holding new Arab-Israeli peace talks under the auspices of an international conference.

Arens told Shultz Shamir opposes the conference because he fears it would have too much authority and result in "extreme positions," according to an Israeli spokesman.

The conference, such as Shultz envisages it, would be "a danger" to Israel because it would have the authority to "impose solutions," Arens reportedly told Shultz.

Arens spent an hour with Shultz discussing his plan and the unrest in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, the spokesman said.

Shamir is expected to use the proposed international conference as a main reason for opposing the Shultz peace plan in discussions with Reagan administration officials during his four-day visit here starting next Monday.

The exact powers of the proposed conference as outlined in Shultz's letter to Shamir last Friday remain unclear, but the letter says explicitly that "the conference will not be able to impose solutions or veto agreements reached."

According to the Shultz letter, this is how the conference would work:

The U.N. secretary general would be asked to invite "the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict" as well as the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council two weeks before negotiations start.

All participants would have to accept U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, which incorporate the principle of "land for peace" and renounce violence and terrorism. The letter also proposes that "the parties to each bilateral negotiation may refer reports on the status of their negotiations to the conference in a manner to be agreed."

In addition to bilateral talks between Jordan and Israel on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, others could be held between Israel and Syria on the occupied Golan Heights or between Israel and Lebanon.

Shamir is also reportedly concerned that the U.N. secretary general could invite the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a party "involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict." If the PLO accepted the U.N. resolutions and renounced violence and terrorism, it would then be able to participate in the conference.

Shamir's Likud bloc in the Israeli parliament steadfastly opposes the PLO's direct participation.

Shultz's plan stipulates Palestinian representation in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that is to negotiate with Israel "independently of any other negotiations."

W.P.
p. 1.

102.1.1 תל"ן ירושלים

ב ל ח " ס

9 במרץ 1988
713

אל: שה"ח
מאת: נמרוד

הנדון: הבהרות מארה"ב

1. בעקבות הדיון אתמול בועחו"ב, הפניתי בשמך בקשה לארבע הבהרות באשר למכתב מזכיר המדינה מיום 4 למרץ (רצ"ב תרגום לעברית).

2. הבוקר אישר הממשל כי עמדתו בכל ארבעה הנושאים לא השתנתה והובהרה לממשלת ישראל בכתב ובע"פ במשך החודשים האחרונים. הממשל מקפיד שלא לדבר בלשון שונה לגורמים שונים ועל כן עמדתו אחת וברורה ועיקריה כלהלן:

א. הבעיה: ההתייחסות ל"צדדים" ולא ל"מדינות" נועדה לפתוח הדלת להזמנת אש"פ.

ההתייחסות: עמדתו הידועה של הממשל בנושא זה באה לידי ביטוי בהתייחסות להשגות ראש הממשלה על מסמך לונדון מאפריל 1987. בחשובתו אז קבע הממשל כי הניסוח לא נועד לאפשר השתתפות אש"פ. ההסבר לשימוש במונח זה הוא: "ישראל וארה"ב הסכימו מזה שנים כי הפלסטינאים חייבים להשתתף בתהליך. לא ניתן להתייחס אליהם כאל מדינה". הממשל חזר והדגיש כי הפלסטינאים ייוצגו רק במשלחת ירדנית-פלסטינית כפי שנאמר במכתב המזכיר ומוסיף כי לא רק החלטת מועבי"ט 338 אך גם הסכמי קמפ דויד מתייחסים ל"צדדים" ולא רק ל"מדינות" מאותה סיבה עצמה.

ב. הבעיה: המזכ"ל לא יוכל שלא לזמן את אש"פ לועידה.

ההתייחסות: גם בהקשר זה עמדתו הקבועה של הממשל באה לידי ביטוי בחשובתו לאותה שאלה עצמה דאז וניסוחה: "המזכ"ל אינו חייב לזמן את אש"פ לועידה. למעשה, ההסכם קובע כי כל משתתף חייב לקבל את החלטות מועבי"ט 242 ו-338. המזכ"ל ירצה לכנס ועידה שתביא למו"מ. הוא לא ירצה לפעול כהורס התהליך עוד בטרם החל. אם לא יוכל או לא יפעל בדרך זו, יבין כי ארה"ב וישראל לא ישתתפו ולכן לא תהיה ועידה כלל".

2/..

ג. הבעיה : המכתב אינו מתייחס ל"מו"מ ישיר" אלא רק ל"מו"מ דו-צדדי (בילטרלי)".

ההתיחסות : "הצעת ארה"ב מחייבת מו"מ ישיר. המו"מ הבילטרלי יהיה ישיר, פנים אל פנים, בין המשלחות. כל משלחת המקבלת את היוזמה, מקבלת על עצמה נכונות להתדיין באופן ישיר עם המשלחת הישראלית. ארה"ב אכן מוכנה לסייע בכינון המו"מ אך בעצם הגשת שרותיה הטובים אין כדי לגרוע מהאופי הישיר של המו"מ עצמו".

ד. הבעיה : האפשרות לדווח לועידה נועדה לפתוח דלת להתערבות הועידה במו"מ ולכפות הסדר.

ההתייחסות : "ארה"ב אינה מקבלת הפרשנות לפיה נוהל הדווח מאפשר התערבות במו"מ, שכן הנוהל לדווח אמור להיות מוסכם בין הצדדים ועל הצדדים. נוהל זה ייקבע ע"י הצדדים עצמם. עפ"י מכתב המזכיר אין כל אפשרות או כוונה לאפשר לועידה לכפות הסדר או להטיל ווטו על הסכם אשר יושג בין הצדדים".

נמוגד

9 במרץ 1988
714

אל: שה"ח
מאת: נמרוד

להלן תרגום לעברית של מכתבי אל שגריר ארה"ב מיום 8 מרץ 1988:

אדוני השגריר;

בעקבות דיון חשוב בכנסת, ביקשני מ"מ ראה"מ ושה"ח להפנות אליך בקשתו להבהרות באשר לפרשנות הניתנת למספר מרכיבים במכתב מזכיר המדינה שולץ מיום 4 מרץ 1988:

1. המכתב כולל מספר התיחסויות ל"צדדים" במקום ל"מדינות". הועלתה הטענה כי ניסוח זה נועד לאפשר השתתפות אש"פ במו"מ.

2. הועלתה הטענה כי למזכ"ל האו"מ לא תהיה ברירה אלא להזמין את אש"פ לועידה.

3. המכתב אינו מתיחס אל "מו"מ ישיר" אלא ל"מו"מ דו-צדדי (בילטרלי)". הועלתה הטענה כי בכך יש משום ראיה לעובדה שהמו"מ יתנהל באופן בלתי ישיר -- אולי באמצעות שרותיה הטובים של ארה"ב -- ולא ישירות, פנים-אל-פנים, בין המשלחות למו"מ.

4. הקביעה לפיה הצדדים למו"מ יוכלו "להפנות לועידה דווחים באשר למצב המו"מ" פורשה כפותחת את הדלת לועידה לדון בדווחים אלה ולהגיב עליהם, ובכך יוצרת ההזדמנות לפתרון כפוי.

בהתחשב בבקשת מזכיר המדינה לקבלת חשובת ממשלת ישראל לא יאוחר מאמצע חודש מרץ, מר פרס יעריך מאד קבלת חשובה בהקדם האפשרי.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

נמרוד נוביק
יועץ מדיני לשר החוץ

102.1.1

משרד החוץ – מחלקת הקשר **טופס מברק**

אל:
מנכ"ל רה"מ
מנכ"ל מדיני/משה"ח
השגריר וושינגטון

דף ___ מתוך 3 דפים
סיווג בטחוני: סודי
דחיפות: מיידי
תאריך וזמן רישום:
מס. מברק:
(לשימוש מח' הקשר)

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להלן רשום שיחת ארנס עם מזכיר המדינה שולץ (8.3.88).

ארנס פתח באומרו שאנו עוברים מבחן קשה לישראל והוא מלא דאגה שהמצב טומן בחובו סכנות כמעט קיומיות. לדעתו האלימות אינה סכנה ואין בה איום פיזי למדינה אף כי הפרט פגע בפעולות איבה. הסכנה לדעתו היא בהתפתחויות שנבעו מהאלימות והשפעותיהן מטילות עליו אימה. ביניהן הוא מונה את הקיטוב בישראל. קיטוב פוליטי זה משקף כמובן את הקיטוב באוכלוסיה עצמה. עצמתה של ישראל נבעה בין השאר מתדמיתה של חברה מאוחדת ובתדמית זו חל סחף חמור. תופעה אחרת הוא הפיצול במחנה ידידי ישראל. הדבר מתבטא בהתבאטויות מנהיגים יהודים מסוימים או במכתב הסנטורים. שולץ: "אני לא מעורב". ארנס: "אני יודע. אחרת לא הייתי מרשה לעצמי לפנות אליך בנקודה זו". נקודה שלישית המטרידה אותו, המשיך ארנס, היא תדמית יחסי ישראל-ארה"ב. בשנים האחרונות יצרנו מכשירי ש"פ ותאום ואת חילוקי הדעות ביננו פתרנו ביננו בלא ביטוים פומבים. סה"כ היחסים הקרובים האלו יצר רשת בטחון ולאויבי ישראל היו מחשבות שניות באשר לשימוש בנשק כדי לפתר הסכסוך. אם בתדמית זו יחולו נזק וסחף, המשיך ארנס, יעורר הדבר תהליכים מסוכנים. אין אנו רוצים להלחם מלחמה שבעית. די היו לנו בשש הקודמות.

ארנס אמר כי התמונות מהמאורעות יוצרות כמובן דאגה וגם היא מודאגת מתופעות מסוימות. הוא ניהל שיחות רבות גם עם ערבי ישרל מתוך חרדה לנסיגה במערכת היחסים בין יהודים וערבים בישראל. לדמוקרטיות מערביות יש בעיה בטיפול באלימות המונים. לרוסים ולסורים אין בעיות. בישראל מתנהל וויכוח על דרך הטיפול ויש לרבים וגם לו הסתיגויות ממה שנעשה או נאמר אבל ברור שזה מצב קשה ולא ברור אם צבא מערבי אחר היה מטפל בבעיה דומה ביתר הצלחה. חלק מהתופעה מושפע מהאסלאם הפונדמנטליסטי ואנו נתקלים בתופעות של שנאה לישראל וליהודים. אין בידי המתפרעים טילים כפי שיש לאראנים אך יש להם אבנים. לבריטים היתה בעיה דומה שאח"כ נקראה "המרד הערבי" שגרר את "הספר הלבן" שבין השאר אסר עליה יהודית לארץ ישראל ובכך חשבו הבריטים שיפתרו את הבעיה. הוא, ארנס, משוכנע שלנו תהיה יותר הצלחה בפתרון הבעיה. הנחתו היא שהמאורעות הם שגרמו למזכיר לצאת ביוזמתו.

שולץ קטע דברי ארנס בשוללו הנחה זו. כבר זמן רב הוא חושב כי ישראל פגיעה. א. בשל גדלה של האובלוסיה משוללת הזכויות והסכנה לדמוקרטיה הישראלית כתוצאה מכך. ב. השינוי במערכות הנשק וכניסתם של טילים ויכולת הנזק שלהם. אלו הובילו אותו למחשבה שפתרון שיושג במו"מ עדיף על המצב הנוכחי. זמן רב בוזבז בוויכוח על פרוצדורה. אי אפשר ללכת למו"מ ישיר כי המלך חוסיין לא מסכים לכך בטענה שאין GIVE ישראלי. ישראל אינה מסכימה ללכת לועידה בינלאומית כפי שהערבים דורשים ולמען האמת, גם הוא, שולץ, לא היה הולך אליה. כך הגיעו למבוי סתום. לכן הוא בדעה שיש לדבר על המהות ואח"כ לחזור לפרוצדורה. הוא מתרשם שיש רצון לדיון והוא למשל התרשם עמוקות מהמכתב שקיבל מרה"מ בינואר והתיחס אליו ברצינות רבה. בהתיחסו לארועים אמר שולץ כי דברו איתנו על שיטות טקטיות ולא עם כל מה שעשינו הסכימו. ארה"ב הביעה בצורה ברורה את התנגדותה לגרוש אבל אח"כ הטילה ווטו על הצעות החלטה במועבי"ט וזה לא היה ווטו קל כי ארה"ב נתקלה בבקורת. בכל השיחות שניהל על תכניתו לא התיחס לאלימות אף כי ברור שיש השפעה והוא גם מקווה שקבלת תוכניתו תגרום להפסקת האלימות.

הבסיס החיוני לשלום לדברי שולץ הוא ישראל חזקה ותמיכה אמריקאית בלתי מסויגת בה כך שאויביה יווכחו כי אין כל אלטרנטיבה למו"מ. בקונגרס ול-WAVERING BROTHERS אמר כי אף פעם לא ידוע מי ידידיך אלא בשעת מצוקה זה הזמן

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להוכיח ידידות ולכן הוא התבטא ברוח זו בפומבי על אף שכאמור לא מסכים עם הדרך שבה טיפלנו במהומות. חושב שההצעה לסגור את השטחים לטלביזיה איננה נבונה אף כי ברור שחלק מההפגנות נובע מנוכחותן של המצלמות.

שולץ אמר שדיברו עם כל המעורבים בסכסוך ואפילו בסוריה, כדי שלא יאמרו שם שלא דיבר עמם. צ'רלי (היל) דיבר עם אנשי רה"מ ושה"ח. ניסינו להבין, להעביר רעיונות. שוחחנו עם ירדן ומצרים. לבסוף הצגנו את ה-CONCEPT מתוך תקווה שיתקבל, אך הוא, שולץ, לא יודע מה יקרה בגורל הירדנים שלא לדבר על הסורים. רואים בתכנית תכנית "ישראלית" (WE CARRY SHAMIR'S BAGGAGE) זה נראית להם כתכנית שתיתן זכויות מסוימות לתושבים המקומיים אך אף פעם לא יהיו שיחות על הסטטוס הסופי. לכן ניסתה ארה"ב ליצור משהו שיש בו את ה-INTERLOCK אך שלקח בחשבון את הצעות רה"מ היינו שבתחילה יהיה נסיון לשנות משהו בחיי היום-יום של הפלשתינאים. הוא מסכים עם דברי רה"מ כי יש צרך בנושא של הסדר ביניים שיתרום לשיחות על הסטטוס הסופי. הרעיון הזה נכלל בתכנית האמריקאית. כמו-כן ניסתה ארה"ב לבנות רעיון של ועידה בינלאומית שיהיה מקובל על הצדדים. יש בתכנית גם מו"מ בילטרלי וצרך בהסכם על משטר ביניים לפני שיהיו שיחות על הסופי. אחרי סבובי שיחותיו הוחלט לשים את התכנית על השלחן ועתה כל אחד מורט ממנה חלקים. הירדנים רוצים סיכום על הסטטוס הסופי ורק אח"כ לחזור להסדר הזמני. "מה עושים לגבי היצוג הפלשתינאי?" שאל שולץ רטורית והוסיף "איני יודע". גורם חיובי הוא דאגת הערבים המתונים והרואים סכנה גם עבורם אף כי יש להם יכולת גבוהה ל-RUTHLESSNESS שאיננה מתאימה למדינות דמוקרטיות כישראל. שולץ סיים קטע זה בדבריו באומרו כי אם התכנית תעזור להפסקת האלימות מה טוב, אך לא זו הסיבה ליזמתו.

מר ארנס אמר כי אכן המצב לא יציב אך כל האזור אינו יציב מטבעו ובאופן מוזר לביש המזל ישראל היא אי של דמוקרטיה. יש כאן סחף מהיר במיוחד בראיית ישראל כמדינה חזקה והעולם הערבי כבר איננו רואה אותה ככזאת. הנחתנו היא שיש צרך במו"מ וכאשר זה יתחיל יהיה שיפור במצב (שולץ: "זו גם הנחתי ואני מסכים בכך עם רה"מ שאת יחסי עמו אני מעריך" הנחה זו מבוססת על הנסיון עם המצרים אבל כאן המצב יותר מסוכן. חוסיין גם הוא במצב קשה ולא ברור אם מצבו מדבר בשם הפלשתינאים. שולץ: LESS SO NOW. ארנס אמר כי יתכן שחוסיין יעדיף שלא לקחת כל סיכון ולחזק את מעמדו בתוך ממלכתו. מכל מקום אנו עדיין מאמינים במו"מ אבל המדובר במו"מ קונבנציונלי, ישיר. העובדה שהמלך אומר שאינו רוצה מו"מ ישיר ורוצה בועידה בינלאומית היא הוכחה לקושי וגם לכך שהעולם הערבי מתייחס לועידה כפורום המיועד לדחוף ישראל לפינה. בפורום נמצאות שתי מדינות שלהן אין קשיים דיפלומטיים עם ישראל ושתי האחרות דורשות חזרת ישראל לקוי 67. אין ערבויות שיבטלו סכנה זאת והסובייטים רואים את הועידה כ REFERENCE POINT שולץ הסביר מה אומרת תכניתו בנקודה זו וארנס ענה שזה הרחיק לכת מעבר שניתן להבין כאשר הרעיונות הוצגו לנו בפעם הראשונה. שולץ ענה כי ברור שהועידה אינה יכולה להטיל וטו או לכפות פתרונות ואסד טען כי אינו זקוק לועידה כזו. הוא רוצה בועידה שתכפה על ישראל לסגת מרמת הגולן ולשם שיחות ישירות עם ישראל הוא אינו זקוק לועידה. ארנס אמר כי עובדה שהועידה צריכה לקבל דווח. הערבים יודעים מה תהיה התגובה לדוחו"ת. דאגתו היא לא מפתרונות שיוטל עליהם וטו אלא מהעדר מו"מ ישיר. שולץ: "אבל זה לא יקרה לעולם" לדעתו של שולץ חוסיין רוצה בכניסה למו"מ על הסטטוס הסופי ולכן הוא חוזה סיום וסיכום מהירים של השיחות על הסדר הביניים. מאחר והתקיימו כבר דיונים ממושכים בעבר על חלק מהנושאים זה יאפשר מו"מ מהיר וישום הסדר הביניים. קיימת כמובן מחלוקת על מהותו של הסטטוס הסופי ומה יחשב כהסדר סביר אך יש לקוות שמשהו חיובי יתפתח. מכל מקום, לפחות יהיה משטר ביניים והתחלה של שיחות על ההסדר הסופי בדרג נמוך. השיחות הסודיות אינן תחליף לשיחות הפתוחות שבעצם קיומן יש מעין הכרה.

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מר ארנס אמר שהאפקט הזה יוחלש בועידה בינלאומית. הצד הערבי יפנה לועידה ע"מ להאשים את ישראל בנקיטה בעמדות בלתי מתפשרות. שולץ ענה כי הסיכוי לכך קטן בכל מה שקשור להסדר הזמני כי ישראל מעוניינת בו ובירדן כפרטנר למו"מ וזה יהיה יותר קל מאשר המו"מ עם מצרים כי בשטח יש כבר IMPLICIT STRUCTURE ירדני כגון בתחום החינוך. דווח על חלוקי דעות צפוי לדעתי יותר בשיחות על ההסדר הסופי. ארנס העיר כי כלל לא ברור אם חוסיין מעוניין בהסדר זמני שעלול לפעול כנגד האינטרסים שלו ושולץ ענה שאת חוסיין "יקנה" את מרכיבי התכנית, הוא גם מקבל את ההסדר הזמני. אם תושבי השטחים יראו במה המדובר קרוב לודאי שגם הם ירצו להכנס למו"מ כי זה יספק חלק מדרישותיהם. שולץ הוסיף שכאשר נכנס לתפקידו כבר נפסקו שיחות האוטונומיה אך כאשר קיבל לאחרונה את מכתב רה"מ הוא ביקש לקבל "שעורים" במה כבר הושג ו-IT KNOCKS YOUR EYES OUT הנחתו היא שאם נתחיל נוכל להשלים את הסדר הביניים והדווח יהיה שהוא הושלם. אחרי יישומו ואחרי הבחירות בישראל יתחיל המו"מ על ההסדר הסופי.

מר ארנס העיר כי עלול להווצר מצב שבו חוסיין ימצא תמיכה בעמדות קיצוניות על אף ויתכן שהיה מוכן לקבל פתרונות מתונים יותר. שולץ ענה שאם ההנחה אמנם היא שהמצב אינו יציב הרי שיש שתי אפשרויות. האחת היא להמשיך במצב הקיים ו"לגלגל" הלאה את האילוצים והבעיות והדרך השניה היא להגדיל את הסיכוי למו"מ על הסדר זמני שיוביל לפתרון על הסטטוס הסופי. שולץ אמר כי מובראק תומך בתכנית ועמד בלחץ בנושא יחסי מצרים-ישראל. לא ברור לו מה יהיה תפקיד שימלאו סוריה או חברי מועב"ט אף כי ברור שהם אינם מגיבים ופועלים כפי ארה"ב פועלת. "אין לי ספק" המשיך שולץ "שהרעיון שהמלך ישב לשיחות ישירות לא יעבוד. הוא זקוק למידה של לגיטימיות לשיחות עם ישראל".

ארנס שאל איך מעניקים לו הסובייטים למשל לגיטימיות כזו ושולץ ענה שהבסיס הוא החלטות מועבי"ט 242 ו-338 שאותן כולם קיבלו, כולל ישראל. כאשר מנהלים מו"מ על בסיס החלטות אלו ותחת מטרית מועבי"ט ניתנת לשיחות לגיטימיות בינלאומית. ארנס העיר שהמלך זקוק ללגיטימיות ערבית ושולץ ענה שהוא מקבל אותה מעצם העובדה שמדינות ערב הן אלו שרוצות ועידה אף כי לא כזו המוצעת על ידי ארה"ב. שולץ שוב חזר והדגיש את יחסי ישראל-מצרים ואת העובדה שקיומם מקל על חוסיין וכמוהם חזרת העולם הערבי למצרים. ארנס העיר שיחסי ישראל-מצרים הושגו על בסיס היותה של ישראל חזקה ויחסים הדוקים בין ישראל וארה"ב כדי שאלה יהוו הבסיס למו"מ ולא הנשק.

שולץ סיים השיחה באומרו:

THINK ABOUT IT DEEPLY I'LL appreciate A SIGNAL BEFORE BUT CERTAINLY DURING THE VISIT.

נכחו בשיחה הח"מ וצ'רלי היל.

ע ר ן

עמ 331

7032
תאריך : 08.03.88

יוצא
בלמס

תיק שלום 102.1.1

חוזם:7032,3
אל:רוש/275,אוטבה/57,אתונה/70,בריסל/106,האג/85,לונדון/118,
פריס/204,מדריד/64,רומא/110,מילנו/56,ברן/84,גנבה/115,
קופנהגן/101,שטוקהולם/80,וינה/114,ניקוסיה/48,אנקרה/40,
איסטנבול/58,אוסלו/58,פרטוריה/69,קינשאסה/50,ניירובי/37,
סינגפור/55,בנגקוק/142,טוקיו/127,ביירס/184,ברזיליה/99,
מונטבידאו/57,מכסיקו/94,קרקס/123,ריו/68,הלסינקי/45,
בוקרשט/61,ורשה/42,ליסבון/55,סידני/64,קנברה/79,הונגקונג/55,
קייפטאון/37,וולינגטון/53
מ-:המשרד,תא:080388,זח:1841,דח:מ,סג:בל
נד:פ

תהליך השלום

בלמס/מיידי

ג'נבה - לשלום נר 65
וושינגטון - העבירו לקונסוליות במידת הצורך

להלן נוסח מכתב של מזכיר המדינה האמריקאי ג'ורג' שולץ
לרוה"מ יצחק שמיר:

MARCH 4 1988

DEAR MR.PRIME MINISTER:

I SET FORTH BELOW THE STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH I AM CONVINCED IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE PROMPT OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE.THIS STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDINGS EMERGES FROM DISCUSSIONS HELD WITH YOU AND OTHER REGIONAL LEADERS.I LOOK FORWARD TO THE LETTER OF REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IN CONFIRMATION OF THIS STATEMENT.

THE AGREED OBJECTIVE IS A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE PROVIDING FOR THE SECURITY OF ALL THE STATES IN THE REGION AND

FOR THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

NEGOTIATIONS WILL START ON AN EARLY DATE CERTAIN BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH OF ITS NEIGHBORS WHICH IS WILLING TO DO SO. THESE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN BY MAY 1,1988 EACH OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE BASED ON UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338,
IN ALL THEIR PARTS.THE PARTIES TO EACH BILATERAL NEGOTIATION WILL DETERMINE THE PROCEDURE AND AGENDA OF THEIR NEGOTIATION. ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST STATE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE WITH ONE ANOTHER.

AS CONCERNS NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE ISRAELI DELEGATION AND THE JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN DELEGATION,NEGOTIATIONS WILL BEGIN ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD,WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF COMPLETING THEM WITHIN SIX MONTHS.SEVEN MONTHS AFTER TRANSITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN,FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS WILL BEGIN,WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF COMPLETING THEM WITHIN ONE YEAR.THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE BASED ON ALL THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF UNITED NATIONS SECRUTIRY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242.FINAL STATUS TALKS WILL START BEFORE THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD BEGINS.THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WILL BEGIN THREE MONTHS AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE TRANSITIONAL AGREEMENT AND WILL LAST FOR THREE YEARS.THE UNITED STATES WILL PARTICIPATE IN BOTH NEGOTIATIONS AND WILL PROMOTE THEIR RAPID CONCLUSION.IN PARTICULAR,THE UNITED STATES WILL SUBMIT A DRAFT AGREEMET FOR THE PARTIES' CONSIDERATION AT THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS,AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD.THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WILL BE ASKED TO ISSUE INVITATIONS TO THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL.ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE MUST ACCEPT UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338,AND RENOUNCE VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM.THE PARTIES TO EACH BILATERAL NEGOTIATION MAY

REFER REPORTS ON THE STATUS OF THEIR NEGOTIATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE,IN A MANNER TO BE AGREED. THE CONFERENCE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO IMPOSE SOLUTIONS OR VETO AGREEMENTS REACHED.

PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION WILL BE WITHIN THE JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN DELEGATION.THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE WILL BE ADDRESSED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI DELEGATIONS.NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE ISRAELI DELEGATION AND THE JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN DELEGATION WILL PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY OF ANY OTHER NEGOTITIONS.

THIS STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDINGS IS AN INTEGRAL WHOLE.THE UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDS THAT YOUR ACCEPTANCE IS DEPENDENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EACH ELEMENT IN GOOD FAITH.

SINCERELY YOURS,
GEORGE P.SHULTZ

הסברה/מידע

צמ

תפ: שהח,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,אוקיאניה,מצרים,מצפא,אירא,אירב,
אסיה,מאפ,אמלט,מזתים,ארבל2,אירג,הדרכה,ממת,הסברה,ממד

8

102.1.1 תלין שלו

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טיפס מברק

דף ___ מתוך ___ דפים

סווג בטחוני סודי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 1115 8 מרץ 88

מס' מברק 213

המשרד

אל: אירופה 3

מאת: אלי אבידן, וושינגטון

התקשר אולג דירקובסקי ויעץ בשגרירות הסובייטית דבקש לקבל אם אפשר נוסח באנגלית של מכתב המזכיר לרה"מ שמיר שתוכנו פורסם בעתונות הישראלית.
נית, אמנם לתרגם כאן אך ראשית ראינו חובה לדווח על הבקשה ושמא מצוי בידכם נוסח כזה כגון מהג'רוזלם פוסט. האם ניתן לקבל נוסח מלא באנגלית.

אלי אבידן

אלי

נעמל נ/מעל בין נלבסו איחס
3 1 1 2 1

102.1.1 נלקח שלא

12

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סיווג בטחוני סודי

דחיפות בהול לבקר

תאריך/ז"ח 1400 8 מרץ 88

מס' מברק

179

המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל ראה"מ
מנכ"ל מדיני

שיחת המזכיר-ארנס.

השיחה נערכה היום ונמשכה שעה. במהלך השיחה חזר המזכיר ותאר את תכניתו. השר ארנס הדגיש את הסכנות הטמונות לישראל בתכנית ובמיוחד הדגיש את הסכנה שבוועידה הבינלאומית. ועידה כזו אינה משמשת כפתיחה טכסית אלא כפורום לדווח ואף יותר מזה: פורום כזה רק יקשיח את עמדותיו של המלך חוסיין ולכן עדיף מו"מ ישיר. המזכיר הדגיש כי המלך זקוק ללגיטימציה בינלאומית כלשהיא וכי הוא בדעה שלוועידה לא תהיה השפעה שלילית כזו. לדבריו המלך חוסיין המעוניין יותר בשיחות השלב הסופי ירצה להקל ולזרז השיחות על שלב הביניים ולא להעריס קשיים על סיומן.

הח"מ נושא עמו דווח מלא.

ערן

שיחת רה"מ מנש ממנש בין מפה 2

102.1.1 תדיר אלי

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טרפס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 3 דפים

סווג בטחוני שלוו

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק 131

המשרד

1/3

מלכא, מער-

תדלוק השלום

לחלון כתבר ה"וושינגטון פוסט" (6-3-88).

יוסי ל

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ל ר ה רהג שהבל נשל גלגסל בירן בלבנו אלביטל

ל ר הסברה הלהיכל לחדר רח אוגן

ל ר ו דוד ל

131 2/3

Shultz Details Formula for Mideast Peace

Plan Would Unfold In Interlocking Steps

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State George P. Shultz has set forth a detailed plan for solving the Palestinian problem that stands as the first serious U.S. attempt to spur the moribund Middle East peace process into motion again since the 1978 Camp David Accords.

After 21,000 miles of travel, five rounds of talks with Israeli leaders and two sessions each with the presidents of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, Shultz has come up with a formula for opening the first door to what he hopes will be a comprehensive Middle East settlement.

The first steps would bring limited Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but the plan seeks to integrate and interlock the various stages of negotiations over the ultimate fate of the occupied territories by setting fixed dates beforehand for each step along the way—an "integrated package" as Shultz calls it that must be taken as a whole.

However, there is no similar scheme and "timeline" for negotiating a new status for the Golan Heights between Syria and Israel. Nor does the plan address specifically, as far as is known, what is perhaps the most difficult problem, the fate of Arab East Jerusalem. Israel has annexed it, united it with West Jerusalem and sworn to keep it forever as its capital.

But the Shultz plan opens the door for negotiations on a possible comprehensive settlement of all these issues by fixing a date for final-status talks on the West Bank and Gaza Strip and convening an international conference to oversee the whole process.

The plan marks a striking reversal of Shultz's reluctance to become personally engaged again in the quest for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict since his failure to negotiate a peace accord between Israel and Lebanon in 1983.

Whether his new peace plan will work or break apart on the rocks of impassioned Israeli and Arab politics remains to be seen.

Success would mean uniting a divided Israeli government behind giving up Arab lands, some of which Israel formally, and informally, annexed years ago.

It would also require the Palestine Liberation Organization, now riding high on the crest of three months of sustained Palestinian protests in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, to forgo its ambitions for a separate delegation at the peace table and let Jordan take the lead.

Syria, too, would finally have to come face-to-face with its sworn enemy, and Israel would have to reverse its formal annexation in December 1981 of the Syrian Golan Heights, which it seized in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

The odds seems long on all three accounts.

But Shultz said he believes that three months of upheaval in the occupied territories have changed attitudes and cracked opened doors to the peace process.

Not all details of his "integrated peace package" have been divulged. But based on what Shultz and his aides told reporters traveling on his whirlwind odyssey of Middle Eastern capitals over the past 10 days, the peace process would, in theory at least, proceed as follows:

Some time in early April, an international conference would be held with the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—the United States, the Soviet

WP
3-6-88
p 1... cont...

Union, China, France and Britain—and all the interested parties attending. The conference would be "nonauthoritative," meaning it could not impose its own solutions or veto any bilateral agreements reached.

The conference would meet mainly to approve the start of a first set of negotiations between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians on limited Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories. Shultz would like to see these talks begin May 1 and completed within six months. Palestinians ideally approved by the PLO but also acceptable to Israel would join with Jordan to form a single delegation.

Any "interim arrangements" on Palestinian self-rule would last three years, but they would not go into effect until negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip began in December.

These latter talks would be completed in one year, according to the U.S. scheme, so that the final disposition of the territories would be known during the last two years of Palestinian autonomy.

Shultz said "the guiding principles" for these negotiations would be those spelled out in U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, which call on Israel to withdraw from "territories occupied in the recent [1967] conflict" and for Arab recognition of all states in the region to live in peace within secure and recognized borders.

He admitted that there are differing Israeli interpretations of Resolution 242 regarding which "territories" are involved and said, "We have put forward an interesting way of handling it." But he refused to say what this was.

Shultz said his proposed "timeline" for the start and finish of these various negotiations is "very ambitious." But he argues that nothing will fix attentions and force decisions like clearly set deadlines.

The secretary has carefully crafted his plan to give something to each party and require each to make some important concessions in its present position.

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir had been insisting on a trial period for Palestinian autonomy before moving to a final settlement for the territories. He would apparently attain a three-year autonomy period. But he would also have to accept a fixed date for starting the final-status negotiations, which he has been strongly resisting, and he would also have to accept that those talks be held on the basis of an exchange of land for peace, which he has so far adamantly refused to do.

King Hussein of Jordan, who has been leading the Arab campaign for U.N. sponsorship of the peace talks, would have to settle for a watered-down version of this, with the Security Council's permanent members involved but the United Nations not serving as the official sponsor.

In return, Hussein would receive the assurance he has been seeking that the negotiating process would not come to an abrupt halt once the Palestinian autonomy talks were completed. There would be a fixed date for the start of final-status negotiations, and Shamir would not be given his experiment with autonomy until after they started.

This mechanism would protect Hussein from radical Arab charges—namely from Syria—that he has become party to another "partial and unilateral solution"—one of the main Arab accusations leveled at Egypt's assassinated President Anwar Sadat after the Camp David Accords and that he fears will be leveled next against him if he agrees to become involved in the Shultz plan.

131 3/3

WP
Shultz
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102.1.1 תגלין שלו

מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק

טופס מברק

מאיר

(הדרוש לעדכון)

נושא: מכ"ל לשכת השר, מע"ה, מצפ"א

יועץ תקשורת לרה"מ, יועץ תקשורת לשהב"ט, לע"מ, דו"צ, קש"ח, מזכיר הממשלה

עתונות, ניו יורק

מאת: בלה לן - לבוקר

סווג בטחוני:

תז"ח: 061800

נר: 00135

בקלין - 18

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, MARCH 6, 1988

Shultz and Aides Return With Hope for Mideast

By DAVID K. SHIPLER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 5 — Secretary of State George P. Shultz and his Middle East staff returned to Washington today confident that they had injected a new diplomatic option into the grinding violence of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Officials said their intricate proposal, calibrated to address every competing interest, was designed to provoke each party — especially Israel and Jordan — to re-examine its doctrine and find profit in compromise.

They gave additional details of the proposal as they flew back from a week shuttling between Israel, Jordan, Syria and Egypt.

Under the plan, the officials said, negotiations would begin May 1 on an interim phase of self-administration for Palestinians living on the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. This would involve an election of an administrative council by the Palestinians.

International Conference Seen

Two to four weeks before these talks, an international conference would convene involving Israel, Syria, Egypt, a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and the five permanent members of the Security Council — the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain and France. The conference would have a continuing role, officials said, but could not veto or impose a settlement.

The negotiations on self-administration, which was called "autonomy" in the 1978 Camp David accords, would last six months. By December, talks would begin between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation on the final status of the occupied territories; the interim phase would not go into effect until those talks were under way.

The final talks would last one year, officials said, and whatever solution they produced would take effect three years after the interim phase began.

Although Mr. Shultz said he liked deadlines because they forced people to make decisions, the plan seems as vulnerable as it is imaginative.

Its negotiating mechanism would

תאריך: MAR. 6, '88 שם הדולת: בלין שלאיקר אישור:

lead ultimately to Israel's exchange of tangible territory for the promise of peace, a concept of territorial compromise that arouses deep anxieties among many Israelis and outright opposition from Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and his Likud bloc.

Shamir Seen as Adamant

During his talks with Mr. Shultz, Mr. Shamir was reported to have given no sign of moderating his determination to hold the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under perpetual Israeli control. American officials are keenly aware that the Camp David accord's provision for Palestinian autonomy foundered on Israel's unwillingness ultimately to give up the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Furthermore, the provision for an international conference — included on the insistence of King Hussein of Jordan — means that the plan's success depends on the cooperation of an array of governments and on the Palestine Liberation Organization. "So many people could pull the rug out from under us," a senior official on Mr. Shultz's plane conceded.

Some of Mr. Shultz's staff were pleasantly surprised that nobody pulled the rug during the trip. "No one says no; no one says yes," Mr. Shultz announced, obviously pleased. The one real supporter was President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, who "is in some ways a partner with us in trying to get this going," the Secretary said.

The aversion to being the first to say no may be a matter of image more than substance, however. Mr. Shultz's strategy relies on the assumption that in the current situation, nobody wants to be labeled an obstacle to peace.

Indeed, his initiative has already removed that onus from the Reagan Administration, which had been criticized in recent years for missing opportunities to push for peace.

'It's Russian Roulette'

Now, the responsibility for failure would presumably be laid squarely at the door of Israel or Jordan or the P.L.O. As one Jerusalem resident remarked: "It's Russian roulette, Middle Eastern style: Who will be the first to shoot himself in the foot?"

Mr. Shultz has asked the leaders of Israel, Jordan, Syria and Egypt for reactions to the plan before Prime Minister Shamir visits Washington March 14 to 16.

2/3

135/18

Mr. Shamir's resistance to giving up any territory seems to be a principal target of Mr. Shultz's diplomacy.

The Secretary and his aides who know Israel well understand that direct confrontation on such a point of ideology and security concerns can backfire, that threats of aid cutoffs or other forms of pressure that the Arabs would like to see are impossible politically and counterproductive diplomatically. The siege mentality comes to the surface easily in Israel.

So Mr. Shultz seems to be betting that the violence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip — in which at least 79 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli troops since early December — has been alarming enough to begin to make the Israeli right question its old assumption that Israel can hold those territories with impunity.

Encouraged by Slim Hints

There has been only the slimmest hint among only a few people that such rethinking is taking place, but it has encouraged some American officials to hope that if the negotiating process can begin soon, the Israeli elections scheduled for November can become a referendum on exchanging territory for peace. This also seems to be the goal of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, whose Labor Party has embraced the idea of territorial compromise.

"There are many things about what we're doing that are very ambitious," Mr. Shultz told reporters on his plane Friday, "and the time line is very ambitious. But we also think that there is an attitude of readiness to work to change things that should be taken advantage of by everybody, and so that counsels that it's important to move promptly."

"It's a problem that everybody has to think of," he continued. "Do they want to move into this situation and try to achieve something, or kind of push along for a while, in which case the moment can be lost?"

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135/18

בלמס יוצא

102.1.1 תיק שלום

חוזם:3,5259
אל:אתונה/46,בון/96,בריסל/80,האג/62,לונדון/89,פריס/146,
רומא/81,מרסיי/32,מדריד/44,סינגפור/34,ניקוסיה/34,
ניירובי/24,אנקרה/26,איסטנבול/36,קינשאסה/34,גנבה/81,
וינה/79,אוסלו/44,בוקרשט/32,ברן/59,הלסינקי/26,קופנהגן/66,
שטוקהולם/55,ליסבון/37,ורשה/29,ציריך/8,מילנו/38,יאונדה/28,
אקרה/14,קטמנדו/22,רנגון/16,בנגקוק/102,טוקיו/89,קנברה/55,
בומבי/16,וולינגטון/35,מנילה/42,סידני/42,קולומבו/20,
הונגקונג/38,וש/204,אוטבה/40,לוסאנגלס/52,מונטריאול/27,
טורונטו/31,אטלנטה/32,בוסטון/32,יוסטון/28,מיאמי/36,
פרנציסקו/28,פילדלפיה/32,שיקגו/41,אלכסנדריה/13,אבידגאן/29,
לילונגווה/23,מבבנה/22,מונרוביה/31,קייפטאון/22,פרטוריה/44,
ני/250,אסונסיון/32,האיטי/23,להפאז/33,הונדורס/35,
סנטודומינגו/31,סנפאולו/45,סלבדור/40,פנמה/28,קינגסטון/23,
ביירס/143,בוגוטה/55,ברזיליה/67,גואטמלה/42,לימה/57,
מונטבידאו/40,מכסיקו/73,סנחוזה/42,סנטיאגו/80,קיטו/48,
קרקס/88,ריו/49,בטחון/125
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בלמס/מיידי

S/326

להלן תרגום מכתב המזכיר, המכתב פורסם היום במלואו בידיעות אחרונות.

מזכיר המדינה,

וושינגטון 4.3.88

אדוני רה'מ היקר,

אני מציג להלן את הצהרת ההבנות הדרושה, כך אני משוכנע, להשגת פתיחה בהקדם של מו'מ לשלום כולל. הצהרת הבנות זו

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

נובעת מדיונים שנערכו אתך ועם מנהיגים אזוריים אחרים. אני מצפה למכתב תשובה של ממשלת ישראל לאישור הצהרה זו.

היעד המוסכם הוא שלום כולל שיספק את הבטחון לכל המדינות באזור ואת הזכויות הלגיטימיות של העם הפלסטיני.

המו'מ יתחילו בתאריך מוקדם (אך) קובע בין ישראל לכל אחת משכנותיה הנכונה לעשות כן. מו'מ אלה עשויים להיפתח בסביבות 1.5.88 . כל המו'מ יתבסס על החלטות מועבי'ט 242 ו-338, על כל חלקיהן. הצדדים בכל מו'מ דו-צדדי יקבעו את הנוהל וסדר-היום של המו'מ שלהם. כל המשתתפים במו'מ חייבים להצהיר על נכונותם לשאת ולתת זה עם זה.

אשר למו'מ בין המשלחת הישראלית לבין המשלחת הירדנית-פלסטינית - המו'מ יתחיל לגבי סידורים לתקופת - מעבר, במטרה להשלים אותו תוך 6 חודשים. 7 חודשים לאחר פתיחת מו'מ בנושא תקופת המעבר יתחיל מו'מ על המעמד הסופי, במטרה להשלימו תוך שנה אחת. מו'מ זה יתבסס על כל ההוראות והעקרונות של החלטת מועבי'ט 242. שיחות על המעמד הסופי יפתחו לפני התחלת תקופת המעבר. תקופת המעבר תתחיל 3 חודשים אחרי השגת ההסכם לגבי המעבר ותימשך 3 שנים. ארה'ב תשתתף בשני המשאים והמתנים ותקדם את השלמתם במהרה. יצויין במיוחד שארה'ב תגיש, בראשית המו'מ על סידורי מעבר, טיוטת הסכם לעיון הצדדים.

שבועיים לפני פתיחת המו'מ תיערך ועידה בינ'ל. מזכ'ל או'מ יתבקש לשגר הזמנות לצדדים הנוגעים בדבר בסכסוך הערבי-ישראלי ולחמש החברות הקבועות במועבי'ט של או'ם. על כל המשתתפים בועידה לקבל החלטות מועבי'ט 242 ו-338 ולדחות אלימות וטירור. הצדדים בכל מו'מ דו-צדדי רשאים להעביר לוועידה דיווחים על מצב המו'מ שלהם, בצורה שיוסכם עליה. הוועידה לא תוכל להטיל פתרונות או וטו על הסכמים שהושגו.

הייצוג הפלסטיני יהיה בתוך המשלחת הירדנית-פלסטינית. הנושא הפלסטיני יטופל במו'מ בין המשלחות הירדנית-פלסטינית והישראלית. המו'מ בין המשלחות הישראלית והירדנית-פלסטינית יתנהל בצורה בלתי תלויה מכל מו'מ אחר.

הצהרת הבנות זו הינה מכלול שלם. ארה'ב יוצאת מתוך הנחה שהסכמתך תלויה בביצוע כל רכיב בתום לב.

בכנות שלך

ג'ורג' פ. שולץ

תורגם ע"י אשר גורן.

אס

תפ: שהח,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,אוקיאניה,מצרים,מצפא,אירא,אירב,
אסיה,מאפ,אמלט,מזתים,ארבל2,אירג,הדרכה,מעת,הסברה,ממד

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מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק
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מ: מנהל לשכת השר, מע"ח, מצפ"א
ל: יועץ תקשורת לרה"מ, יועץ תקשורת לשהב"ט, לע"מ, דו"צ, קש"ח, מזכיר הממשלה
אל: עתונות, ניו יורק

A Man and His Tricky Mission

Shultz trip: a longshot but by no means an absurdity

New York Newsday
EDITORIALS

Mar. 3, 1988

It just might be that nobody is better suited to this Mideast peace mission than good old solid, plodding, uninsultable George Shultz.

The secretary of state is engaged in a mission that few believe will succeed. But, considering how Shultz has survived the disasters of his own administration, who's to say that he won't be able to inch the process ahead?

Shultz

In fact, it is more important at this moment to keep the process alive — even barely — than to achieve any Camp David-like breakthrough. Invariably, when the United States is not engaged, events in the Mideast spiral out of control.

Mar. 3, 88
שם השולח: גיל שטאוקר

71/8 2/12

That's not in anybody's interest, certainly not America's, and it explains why Jordan's King Hussein, Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, Syria's Hafez Assad, and Israel's two leaders, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres all agree on one point: that Shultz should keep trying.

Behind all the seemingly intractable positions are some underlying realities that might make the Shultz mission something less than impossible.

For instance, Israel's military leaders say that there is no military solution to the uprisings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. That is a message even hardliner Shamir can understand. And Hussein realizes that the longer he waits, the more difficult it will be for him to ever reclaim the West Bank territory he once controlled. The little king, nothing if not a survivor, justifiably wants evidence that the Reagan administration will stay a course this time. That Shultz is back in the Mideast today might just help soothe the toothache that sent Hussein to London last week just as the secretary arrived in Amman.

Mubarak

The wild cards are Mikhail Gorbachev and the Palestinians. The assumption has been that the Soviets only wanted to cause trouble. But given Gorbachev's determination to concentrate on his economic problems, it's just possible he is now prepared to play a constructive role. The Palestinians have always proved incapable of taking positive action but the uprising might give them new impetus. It's worth finding out.

Plod on, Mr. Secretary.

BY RAYMOND PRICE

Time to call Arafat's bluff and negotiate with the PLO

N.Y. Post
Mar. 3 1988

71/8

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THE old rationales for treating the Palestine Liberation Organization as a pariah and excluding it from the Mideast peace process no longer wash. It's time to call Yasir Arafat's bluff and bring the PLO into the negotiating tent.

True, Arafat has never given Israel the formal guarantee it seeks that the PLO would honor UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and make peace and abandon terrorism, and that it would recognize Israel's right to exist.

But he has shown repeatedly that he and the PLO do, in fact, recognize Israel as a fact of Mideast life.

More to the point, the dispute now playing itself out so dramatically is not going to be settled without participation by the Palestinians — which, in a practical sense, means without the PLO.

"PLO" is a hated name in Israel, and there's no question that the PLO has an appalling record of international terrorism as well as of adamant past denial of Israel's right to exist. But it has nevertheless become a symbol of the Palestinian people's frustrated aspirations for nationhood.

Arafat and his inner circle don't speak for all Palestinians. But neither can any body that excludes the PLO speak for them. And unless someone speaks for the Palestinians, there is no way out of the bitter conflict that threatens to destroy both Israel and the occupied territories.

Wars are not ended by neighborly chats among friends. They're ended by hard negotiations between bitter enemies, whether through third parties or

under the umbrella of an international conference.

The U.S. rightly regarded the North Vietnamese thugs as a blight on the earth, but they were the ones with whom we negotiated an end to the Vietnam war.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a classic example of the situation in which legitimate interests and values are in conflict and there is no good solution — but in which solutions must be found because the alternative is intolerable.

The PLO will have to be a party to the keeping of any Arab-Israeli settlement. So it should have a hand in shaping it and be forced to participate in the process of compromise and accommodation required to achieve it.

Formally recognizing Israel's right to peaceful existence is an essential part of that process. It doesn't have to be a precondition for participating.

Whatever its original justification, adamancy about not dealing with the PLO has by now become less a reason than an excuse for the present Israeli government's failure to face up to the harsh requirements and substantial risks of ending the occupation and negotiating a settlement both sides can live with.

The longer Israel stalls, the less moral claim it has to international respect for the continued primacy of its own security interests. And the longer it oppresses and brutalizes the Palestinian people, the weaker its claim on the world's conscience becomes.

Ray Price was President Nixon's chief speechwriter.

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71/8 11/12

Shamir Softens Stand on Peace Meeting But Maintains Objections to a U.N. Role

By ROBERT S. GREENBERGER
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WALL ST. JOURNAL
Mar. 3, '88

JERUSALEM—Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir slightly softened his resistance to an international peace conference as President Reagan announced Secretary of State George Shultz will return to the Middle East today to continue efforts to get Israel and the Arabs talking.

In an interview yesterday, Mr. Shamir said Israel would attend an international conference, but only if it is ceremonial, not substantive, and only if it is sponsored by the two superpowers, not by the United Nations. This continues to leave Mr. Shamir at odds with his own foreign minister and with most Arab states, which insist on an international peace conference sponsored by the U.N. Security Council and made up of the U.S., the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China.


Yitzhak Shamir

Mr. Shamir opposes a U.N.-sponsored session, fearing that, like the U.N. itself, it would turn into a forum for bashing Israel. "It's absurd," he said of the idea.

Just for Show

But, referring to a superpower-sponsored conference, he said, "I'm ready to accept such an event if it could be useful for opening of negotiations." He insisted, however, that it be brief and have nothing to do with actual peace talks. "With the ceremony, the international event will come to an end and direct negotiations will begin," he said.

When Mr. Shultz floated a similar proposal last fall, suggesting that leaders of Jordan and Israel come to the U.S. for an initial round of peace talks while Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was in Washington, Mr. Shamir made his approval contingent on that of Jordan's King Hussein, who rejected the idea. Yesterday, the prime minister mentioned no such condition. Whether the Jordanian monarch altered his position during talks with Mr. Shultz in London earlier this week is unclear.

Mr. Shamir, who faces a national election in November, appears to be softening his stand somewhat in an effort to balance twin risks. He must hew a hard line to avoid alienating his own political supporters on the Israeli right, yet he mustn't be so intransigent that he gets blamed by the U.S. for sabotaging Mr. Shultz's peace efforts.

President Reagan indicated yesterday in Brussels, where he is attending a meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, that the U.S. is determined to keep trying to break the deadlock between Israel and the Arabs on the Palestinian prob-

71/8 12/12

lem. "It's clear all countries in the region believe it is useful for the United States to remain engaged in this process," the president said. "We'll spare no effort in our search for a comprehensive peace settlement."

Several Stops

Mr. Reagan didn't say how long Mr. Shultz would remain in the region. But in a television interview, Secretary Shultz said he would visit Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Syria, the same stops he made last week.

He faces a difficult task. The Israeli prime minister, who plans to visit Washington this month, clung stubbornly to most of his previous positions during the half-hour interview. He reiterated his opposition to Mr. Shultz's proposal for a quick start to negotiations involving Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians over the final status of the Israeli-occupied West Bank of the Jordan River and Gaza Strip. Instead, he said the occupied territories need a prolonged period of so-called local autonomy to "provide time to see how peaceful cooperation between Israel and Palestinians could be implemented."

Without such a test period, talks on the final disposition of the territories "would come very soon to a failure," he warned. Under Mr. Shultz's plan, following an international conference, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians would hold talks on holding local elections in the occupied territories and by December 1988 would discuss the territories' final status. The only part of the Shultz plan that is of any interest to Jordan is the December date for talks on the final status—the very aspect Mr. Shamir opposes.

Not an Obstacle

The Israeli leader said yesterday he wouldn't let the continuing violence in the West Bank and Gaza interfere with efforts to begin peace talks. "Nobody is ready to take the responsibility for losing time and not doing the maximum for getting peace," he said.

He criticized the news media for "stimulating the riotors" by their presence and for providing a "one-sided view of what is happening" by focusing on Israel's repressive measures. He threatened to bar journalists—who are already banned from some towns—from covering confrontations between Palestinians and Israeli troops.

"It's usual that when such similar situations happen in other parts of the world, that there are some limitations for entrance of media at scenes of confrontation for military reasons," he said. However, such an effort in Israel, which prides itself on being an open society, would be sure to stir hot debate.

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102.1.1 תלין תאלם

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני

מנכ"ל ראה"מ

להלן משיחה עם בוב אוקלי.

א. יזמת ארה"ב - הוא בדעה שבין שלוש בעיות היסוד - הבסיס למו"מ על הסטטוס הסופי, ה- interlock והארוע הבינלאומי בעיית האינטרלוק היא הקשה ולגבי שתים האחרות אפשר להגיע לנוסחה כלשהיא.

באשר לארוע הבינלאומי אוקלי מוסיף שדווקא הבריטים גורמים להם בעיות בהתעקשות על ועידה מלאה, בעוד הצרפתים מגלים גמישות. אוקלי בדעה שהגישה הבריטית מושפעת מגישת המלך חוסיין וגם מהרצון לגלות עצמאות כלפי ארה"ב. נושא הוועידה יועלה על-ידי האמריקאים בעת ביקור שברדנדזה כאן ב-22/3 ואז אפשר יהיה לקבל מכלי ראשון עדכון לגישה הסובייטית.

לדבריו, לא היתה התעקשות של המלך על משלחת נפרדת של אש"ף. כמו כן לא נקבעה בשלב זה כל פגישה של המזכיר עם משלחת פלשתינאית.

ב. לבנון - במידה ולא דווח עד כה על-ידי המשלחת האמריקאית - שולץ הציג בפני אסד רעיון אמריקאי שביסודו החלשת מוסד הנשיאות והטמעת סמכויותיו בתוך הממשלה. אסד לא הגיב בשלב זה. מרפי היה אמור לצאת ללבנון ולדון עם הגורמים השונים בהצעה, אך לרגל מות אחיו העשה זאת אפריל גילספי.

ג. מפרץ - הם ממשיכים במאמץ להשגת החלטה שניה והוא די אופטימי לאור הנכונות הסובייטית לגמישות מסויימת. מאידך, הוסיף, הסובייטים והעראקים משחקים משחק כפול כאשר העראקים שולחים את האמריקאים לסובייטים ואלו מחזירים אותם לעראקים. גם הגרמנים עורמים קשיים, כנראה בגלל קשריהם הכלכליים והאחרים עם איראן.

ערן

לגב' ז. בירן, אירגון, ב. ב. ציר

שהם רחב שהבל בשל אמנם בין בגפו רוגיבב בגב הן אמן ליאור
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news report

2/3/88

U.S. SEEKS NEW BLEND OF IDEAS FOR MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS
(Article on Shultz remarks to foreign affairs panel)
By Russell Dybvik
USIA Diplomatic Correspondent

Washington -- The Reagan administration is searching for "a new blend of ideas" to reinvigorate the Middle East peace process, and, if one is found, the United States will heavily engage in pursuing it, Secretary of State Shultz pledged February 2.

During his testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Shultz was asked about reports that the United States is pursuing a new Middle East peace initiative focusing on early elections to provide Palestinian self-government in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip and a possible international peace conference.

"What we should do now is to think harder about substance and to engage the parties in discussion of substance, perhaps to try to find a new blend of ideas that have been around," the secretary said. "And if we can see some mutually shared set of principles that would represent substance, that might relax people's attitudes a little bit about procedures because they would have a little clearer view of where they are going."

"We've discussed that approach and we have found a receptivity to it," he told the committee. "We have discussed ideas about what that new blend might be." He said this new approach was discussed with Egyptian President Mubarak during his recent visit to Washington, with King Hussein of Jordan during last weekend's mission by Presidential Envoy Philip Habib, and with representatives of the Israeli government.

In a 24-page prepared statement, Shultz asserted that the recent turmoil in the West Bank and Gaza Strip "demonstrates that the status quo in the Middle East peace process is not an option.

"The time has come to reinvigorate the process, by showing Arabs and Israelis that negotiations can produce a better life for people in the occupied territories, ensure Israel's security and well-being, and point the way to a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

"We need to focus less on procedure than on substance, in order to show people that a negotiating process can meet their real concerns. We will be energetic in our consultations with leaders in


USIS
United States Information Service
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both Israel and the Arab community as we seek to spur a new drive toward peace."

When Representative Lee Hamilton asked him about published reports of a new U.S. initiative and for an amplification of his prepared statement, Shultz said the administration is convinced that there "is perhaps a greater willingness to think afresh about what might be done" in the Middle East, and this offers a new opportunity.

"For quite some time now, the discussion of what should be done has been dominated by arguments about procedure. On the one hand, there is the approach of saying we should have direct negotiations, a procedure. On the other hand is the statement that we should have an international conference to somehow grapple with these matters, once again a procedure."

Neither of these procedures seems to have attracted much support, he said, adding, "we've asked ourselves increasingly why?"

The reason, in part, Shultz said, seems to be that those who resist an international conference do so out of a concern that it would be attended by countries that would have a "drastically different view of what should happen" than what people in Israel might think.

As a result, he said, an international conference might produce proposals that would be extreme, not workable, and could result in an "unsatisfactory discussion that would go nowhere but lead to more rancor and more difficulty."

On the other side, he said, there is the question of where direct negotiations would lead.

"If there is a policy that says there should be no change, then what is there to be negotiated about?" Shultz asked. If that were the case, he said, entering into direct negotiations would mean "entering into something that substantively won't go anywhere."

Whether these views "are justified or not, they are real, and they result in a lack of ability to move procedurally in a positive direction," Shultz declared, because both sides have substantive reservations about the procedure they are being urged to accept.

"What we're trying to do is evolve something that people can support," he said, because "we aren't quite there yet." Shultz did not go into specific details.

In exploring the possibilities of finding a new blend of ideas to reinvigorate the peace process, the secretary noted there are two basic factors involved.

"On the one hand, you're talking about what conceivable ideas" there are for "a resolution of this conflict," he said, and "what ideas can we put forward that might result in a sharp change in the nature of life on the West Bank and Gaza insofar as the ability of the residents to have a greater sense of political control over the way they live.

"We've looked at these two things and we have tried to find a blend, substantively and procedurally, that works at them in some related way and we've been discussing this."

There was an extensive discussion of the subject with President Mubarak, Shultz said, which he described as "worthwhile and thoughtful," and Habib had "a lengthy discussion" with King Hussein and Jordan's Prime Minister Rafai about it as well.

"What we need is a new blend of ideas that are there. There are lots of good ideas around and we want to find a way to pull them together, perhaps in a little different way, in a manner that will have some appeal to people and then be able to push forward," the

secretary said.

"We've had so much emphasis on process that substance has gotten too little attention. And if we're going to get people to have confidence in a process, they have to have a better idea of what the substance might be. We're now trying to, as I said, get a new blend of substance to put with another appraisal of process and see if there's something we can move forward with."

Shultz said Richard Murphy, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, may take "a quick swing around" the Middle East "to work on these ideas."

"Bits and pieces emerge that aren't necessarily expressing in a comprehensive manner what we're trying to do," he said. "All of this has the implication in it, that if we can find something that allows us to get going, then the United States will be willing to engage itself heavily, and commit time and resources to this effort. And we have said that we will do that."

That possibility, Shultz declared, is "very widely welcomed."

The secretary said the administration has expressed itself privately "to our friends in the government of Israel" concerning the way Israeli authorities have dealt with recent Palestinian demonstrations on the West Bank and in Gaza. "We have expressed ourselves publicly about certain methods of dealing with these disturbances, and we have taken part in the U.N. Security Council debate and have voted against the deportations that were undertaken," he said.

"But we also recognize that Israel has a very tough problem on its hands," Shultz continued, saying the United States is trying to be Israel's "good friend and counselor."

He reiterated the U.S. position that continual voting by the United Nations Security Council "is not productive, and for that reason, we found ourselves vetoing a resolution yesterday that others supported."

Shultz noted that Israeli citizens have been raising questions about methods used to quell the disturbances in the occupied territories and "as is usually the case in a vibrant democracy, it's the folks at home that you hear from and that you pay attention to, and those voices have been speaking."

SHULTZ OUTLINES U.S. APPROACH TO MIDEAST CONFERENCE
(Transcript: Shultz testimony to Senate panel)

Washington -- Emphasizing "this is a time for decisions," Secretary of State Shultz March 17 outlined the U.S. approach to an international conference designed to launch a new round of Middle East peace negotiations.

Testifying before the Senate Budget Committee, Shultz underscored the need for prompt movement in the peace process.

"We are engaged intensively in an active process to achieve a comprehensive peace in the Middle East through negotiations," the secretary declared. He said his recent discussions with the leadership in Israel, Jordan, Syria and Egypt -- and talks this week in Washington with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir -- have focused on the need for realism and movement in the peace process.

Shultz said the United States will not permit an international conference on the Middle East "to become authoritative or plenipotentiary, or to exceed its jurisdiction as agreed by the parties."

The United States expects, if its initiative is accepted, "that people, in coming to the conference, would have agreed to these terms," the secretary said. "We're being very clear and very specific and very up-front about what this conference is and what it is not."

The conference would serve to launch a series of direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and its neighbors and "thereafter may receive reports from the parties on the status of negotiations, in a manner to be agreed by the parties," Shultz said. "All conference attendees will be required to accept United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and to renounce violence and terrorism. The conference will be specifically enjoined from imposing solutions or vetoing what had been agreed bilaterally."

Following is the transcript of Shultz's remarks concerning the Middle East peace process:

(begin transcript)

We are engaged intensively in an active process to achieve a comprehensive peace in the Middle East through negotiations.

This is a time for decisions. The situation on the ground does not serve anyone's interests. Rapid, positive change can occur. My discussions with the leadership in Israel, Jordan, Syria and Egypt -- and our talks this week in Washington with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir -- focused on the need for realism and movement in the peace process.

The initiative we developed, which the parties are now considering, is ambitious and compelling. It calls for an early start of two sets of interlocked negotiations -- one on transitional arrangements and another on final status. The final status talks would begin on a date certain, before the implementation of the transitional arrangements. Both of these negotiations will be launched by a properly structured -- I want to underline those words, "properly structured" -- international conference. I should say that final status talks in our initiative would start before the transition

arrangements are implemented, but after they have been agreed to, and decisions about final status would take place only well after the transition arrangements had been in place and people had an opportunity to see how they work.

Questions have been raised about such an international conference. And I want to make clear what it is that we have proposed.

The United States has been a consistent and firm supporter of direct, bilateral negotiations between Israel and all of its neighbors as the means to achieve a comprehensive peace. The United States has always been willing to consider any approach which could lead to direct negotiations, including an international conference. The United States opposes, and will not participate in, an international conference designed to replace bilateral negotiations.

In recent months, some parties have focused on an international conference which would have an authoritative role or plenipotentiary powers. In January 1988, the United States vetoed a resolution in the United Nations Security Council which called upon the secretary general to convene such a conference. The United States made clear its opposition to any procedure for achieving comprehensive peace in the Middle East, other than direct, face-to-face negotiations.

The initiative recently launched by the United States aims at comprehensive peace through bilateral face-to-face negotiations, in which all participants state their willingness to negotiate with one another. In other words, if you want to come to the table, you've got to state your willingness to negotiate with Israel. That's by way of recognizing the existence of Israel and the continued existence of Israel.

The procedures in this initiative constitute an interlocked set of safeguards designed to promote such negotiations and prevent a plenipotentiary conference. But these procedures also recognize that the Arab parties require a conference to launch negotiations, and that therefore there will be no negotiations without a properly structured conference.

The strength of the American approach is its integrity: no individual aspect of it can be extracted, finessed or ignored without sacrificing its balance. I've said this is not a cafeteria line. This is a set of things that you have to look at together. The conference launches a series of bilateral negotiations and thereafter may receive reports from the parties on the status of negotiations, in a manner to be agreed by the parties. All conference attendees will be required to accept United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and to renounce violence and terrorism. The conference will be specifically enjoined from imposing solutions or vetoing what had been agreed bilaterally.

The United States is committed to the concept for beginning bilateral negotiations which has been shared with the parties -- more than shared with the parties -- we had an immense series of discussions out of which we developed these proposals, so we didn't just go into a hole someplace and think this up. We talked and talked and talked and talked and tried to present something that we thought might work. The United States will not permit any aspect of its proposal to be eroded or compromised. As regards the conference, the United States will not permit the conference to become authoritative or plenipotentiary, or to exceed its jurisdiction as agreed by the parties. So we would expect, if our initiative should be accepted,

that people, in coming to the conference, would have agreed to these terms. If they don't agree to the terms, then we don't have the conference. And if they try to change them after the conference is convened, then we don't go along with that. So we're being very clear and very specific and very up-front about what this conference is and what it is not.

But the procedural aspects of this plan should not obscure our objective -- a comprehensive peace.

-- Israeli security can be enhanced. Israel can enjoy the recognition and respect which flow from negotiations. Israelis can be free from the increasing human and moral burdens of occupation -- free to devote their considerable talents and energies to improving their quality of life. Most important, Israel can achieve peace with its neighbors.

-- Palestinians can achieve rapid control over political and economic decisions which directly affect their lives. And that could happen right in the transition arrangements. It could happen, I think, quite rapidly if we could get ourselves started. Palestinians can participate actively in negotiations to determine their political future. Palestinians can achieve their legitimate rights and live lives of dignity and self-respect.

--The Arab world can turn a corner by resolving this festering conflict. The refugee problem can be solved. A stable new environment can be created in which the human and economic resources of the Middle East can flourish.

This is a moment of testing for the leaders of the Middle East. All must face up to the challenge of peace and beat back the forces of radicalism. Violence and threats of violence achieve nothing. They stand in sharp, empty contrast to what negotiations can accomplish. The only things that have worked have been negotiations. Negotiations have brought about progress in the Middle East. Nothing else has.

No resolution of this conflict can fulfill all dreams. Compromise is required. The plan we have put forward is compelling. It is an integral whole. We have asked for decisions soon, so that we can proceed rapidly toward a comprehensive peace.

(end transcript)

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U.S. SEES PROGRESS IN FIGHT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
(Excerpts: Bremer Congressional testimony)

Washington -- L. Paul Bremer, U.S. ambassador at large for counterterrorism, says there has been "considerable progress" in the fight against international terrorism, but despite these successes, the overall number of terrorist attacks rose in 1987.

"The most appalling feature of terrorism in 1987 was the sharp escalation of the terrorist bombing campaign in Pakistan, much of it the work of the Afghan secret police," Bremer told a group of U.S. legislators March 17.

Testifying before three House foreign affairs subcommittees on U.S. anti-terrorism policy, Bremer said, "had it not been for this brutal terrorist bombing campaign, the number of worldwide terrorist attacks would have declined significantly."

Following are excerpts of Bremer's testimony, which includes remarks on Syria, Libya, Iran and North Korea.

(begin excerpts)

Over the past two years, the international fight against international terrorism has made considerable progress. The number of incidents has decreased and state sponsorship of terrorism is down. Fewer Americans have been killed. More terrorists have been arrested and convicted by courts from Tokyo to Paris.

According to our latest statistics on terrorism in 1987, the number of anti-U.S. attacks worldwide decreased 25 percent, and terrorism in Latin America dropped 32 percent. In Europe, terrorism is steadily declining; it has fallen 31 percent in the past two years. Terrorism in Europe of Middle East origin is down 41 percent. There were only two terrorist hijackings in 1986, and only one last year, which is the lowest number we have recorded since we began keeping tallies 20 years ago.

In spite of these successes, the overall number of terrorist attacks rose, making 1987 the worst year ever. It was also the bloodiest year; more persons were wounded in terrorist attacks than ever before -- well over 2000 -- and over 600 persons died. These increases can be explained in one word: Afghanistan.

The most appalling feature of terrorism in 1987 was the sharp escalation of the terrorist bombing campaign in Pakistan, much of it the work of the Afghan secret police. The 128 bombings, which destroyed marketplaces and train stations, were calculated to kill and injure as many people as possible. Fully one third of all deaths around the world from terrorism last year and one half of all wounded were caused by this bombing campaign.

Some would-be bombers have been arrested by Pakistani police and have provided startling testimony. For example, the bombers were promised payment based on the number of casualties inflicted and the number of press reports the attack generated. Had it not been for this brutal terrorist bombing campaign, the number of worldwide terrorist attacks would have declined significantly. And the percentage of attacks attributable to state sponsors would have dropped from 23 percent to 9 percent.

The issue of state-sponsored terrorism is of major concern to

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יהלום שלה

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טופס מבר

דף 1 מתוך דפ

סווג בטחוני גלב

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח 3.88

מס' מברק

תיק תכניות שלם

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1/6

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: עתונות

ארה"ב - ועידה בינלאומית

להלן סדרת מאמרי אופ-אד שהופיעו היום (18.3.88) ב"וושינגטון פוסט".

יוסי גל

2/6

Charles Krauthammer

A Formula for Disaster

Secretary of State George Shultz has a plan for settling the Arab-Israeli dispute. Shultz is an honorable and serious man, driven by circumstance—the riots on the West Bank—to do something, anything to break the stalemate. That something is an international conference that will first grant autonomy to the Palestinians then determine the final status of the occupied territories.

A negotiated settlement is everyone's hope. But God is in the details. And the details of the Shultz plan, as set out in a letter sent to Israeli Prime Minister Shamir and Jordan's King Hussein, are troubling. The letter is subtly written. It is couched in Middle East-ese, a language in which big ideas and huge concessions are buried in the most innocuous phrases. Decoding the Shultz letter reveals three major problems.

1. Goodbye Camp David. In the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Israel accepted the notion of Palestinian autonomy for a five-year period, leading to negotiations on the final status of the territories. The whole idea of the five years was to allow time to see whether the Palestinians would be content with the West Bank and Gaza rather than carry on the fight to "liberate" Israel. As the president said on Sept. 1, 1982, announcing the "Reagan plan" for Middle East peace, "the purpose of the five-year period of transition . . . is to prove to the Palestinians that they can run their own affairs, and that such Palestinian autonomy poses no threat to Israel's security."

The Shultz plan shortens the autonomy to such a point that negotiations on final status are to start before the autonomy has even begun. In other words, Israel is required to give control of the territories to some Palestinian entity without having seen in any way whether it is truly prepared to end its 40 years' war against the Jewish state.

The transitional period is more than a detail. It is a precedent, and a bad one. At Camp David, Israel gave up all of the Sinai for a deal that the United States solemnly signed and guaranteed. That deal said autonomy would be for five years. A decade later, with the Sinai returned, the United States says to Israel: too bad about the transitional period we agreed to at Camp David, things have changed. What confidence should Israel have that guarantees for which it makes concessions today will not similarly become outdated the next time Palestinians riot and circumstances change?

2. Bring on the PLO. Shultz's invitation to the international conference appears to leave out the PLO, but just barely. All "parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict" are invited, so long as they accept U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 and renounce violence and terrorism. Now, Yasser Arafat claims to have accepted Resolutions 242 and 338 long ago. When Paul McCloskey, the former California congressman, visited Arafat's bunker in Beirut during the Lebanon war, he emerged with a piece of paper and the startling news that Arafat had recognized Israel. In fact, Arafat had given the neophyte McCloskey the ritual formula that he accepts 242 and 338 in the context of all relevant U.N. resolutions. That is code for saying nothing, because the other "relevant U.N. resolutions" declare Israel an illegitimate racist state with no right to exist.

As for renunciation of terrorism and violence, that is done fairly cheaply. Anyone can renounce it today, resume it tomorrow. The PLO is not required to demonstrate a fundamental change in attitude toward Israel, such as altering its charter, which now calls for the annihilation of Israel. On the other hand, the land-for-peace concessions demanded of Israel are irrevocable.

3. Bring in the Soviets. Labor party leader Shimon Peres is enthusiastic about an international conference, provided that the plenary session, which will include the Soviets, is ceremonial and powerless. The Shultz letter does say that a plenary session will have no power to "impose solutions or veto agreements reached" by the parties in bilateral negotiations. But, writes Shultz, "the parties to each bilateral negotiation" will have the right to "refer reports on the status of their negotiations to the conference," which is a way of actively involving the Soviets in the actual conduct of negotiations.

That is anathema to Israel. It ought to be anathema to the United States. Since Kissinger, one of the singular achievements of American Middle East diplomacy has been to keep the Soviets out. It is one thing to have the Soviets bless a negotiation by showing up and giving cover to the cowardly King Hussein. It is another to have them reviewing the negotiations as they proceed. We know exactly what negotiating position the Soviets will back: maximalist Arab demands that neither Israel nor the United States can accept. That will make Israel into

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2/6

408

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3/6

the intransigent and the United States into Israel's lawyer. Why should the United States set up a conference which will make demands that the United States cannot meet?

In fairness, Shultz is trying to arrange a peace conference, and his plan may indeed be the only one that will attract enough parties to bring it off. But a conference is not an end in itself. The mirage here is that process is progress. It is very nice to get everybody in a room together, but unless you know who is going to say what to whom and whether that will be grounds for acceptable compromise, you are setting yourself up for stalemate, disappointed expectations, raised tension, Soviet encroachment and American isolation.

This is a formula for disaster. Americans like to think that talking is still better than nothing. This summer marks the 50th anniversary of the definitive refutation of that proposition. Munich, after all, was one of the most successful talks of this century. It solved the Czech problem.

© Krauthammer

3/6

408

END

4/6

408

Richard Cohen

An Army of Boys

GAZA—In an army camp here, the captured arsenal was brought in for display. Exhibit 1, black and in one piece, was marked "Uzi" after the famous Israeli weapon. Exhibit 2, also black, but broken into pieces, was marked "Laser Ray Gun." Toys taken from the enemy, the rock-throwing children of Gaza. In the childish imagination of Palestinian kids, countless Israelis lie dead. Bang! Bang!

Mindless of the poignant absurdity of this cache, a battalion commander placed the toys on a platter of oranges and bananas. The platter itself rested in the middle of the table—a Middle East still life representing the frustrations of powerful Israel. Israel could send planes to Baghdad to blow the Iraqi nuclear reactor to bits. Its troops defeated the Arab world in six days of furious warfare. Its commandos rescued hostages at remote Entebbe. And the Pentagon is infatuated with Israel—the Sparta of the Levant, the can-do country, the Rambo nation for lean Ollie Norths and corpulent "Soldier of Fortune" subscribers: "Why can't we do it like the Israelis?"

But now Israel is fighting The Children's War. The enemy is an army of boys—fearless and fleet on sneakered feet. Its weapons are the rocks and rubble of Gaza and the West Bank. Such a rock hit Goliath on the temple, toppling him dead. It is crude but lethal, and no contemporary army has been trained to deal with it. An infantryman kills from 300 meters and an artilleryman from miles away. Here, doctrine is being revised. The troops are being told to move in close.

"You must see the color of their eyes," Gaza's commanding general, Yaakov Orr, tells his officers.

The color of the enemy's eyes—dark with hate—is known. "They hate us," Orr says. "We're two nations." Later, he mentions another Palestinian weapon—despair. "They can't lose anything," Orr said. "It's a most miserable life for them here."

Orr's soldiers have not been trained for this. They have been trained for battle. A young lieutenant, a reservist new to the area, tells the general how he confronted a young rock-thrower in Gaza. He aimed his rifle at him. "He was not afraid," the reservist said of the rock-thrower. The soldier fired warning shots. Still, the Palestinian would not move. "I saw there was nothing more to do than shoot him." The lieutenant shrugged. He could not shoot the youth.

"I was so upset. My feeling was that I was so ashamed of myself as a soldier."

With that, other officers spoke up. Some had similar stories. One even longed for duty in Lebanon. Another said, "I don't want to kill any of them. I don't want to use any fire." The unit was almost a caricature of the diffident Israeli Army—soldiers uniformed according to whimsy, two wearing earings, some wearing flip-flops for the beach. Only their weapons were standard.

Orr listened patiently, and later gently criticized the more senior officers. The unit had been slow to bring force to bear, to assert its authority. It had used its numbers poorly, throwing too few men against too many Palestinians. The soldiers were tired, frustrated. "Frustrated"—the translator said the word over and over again.

Outside, Gaza was quiet. As usual since the beginning of the disturbances, most stores were closed—everything but groceries and pharmacies. A general strike had been called, but even so some people commuted to jobs in Israel, and occasionally a knot of children, uniformed for school, was seen. It seemed that, on this day at least, the Israeli Army finally controlled the major streets.

But once Gaza was administered with 10 percent of the soldiers it now takes, and once the enemy was an occasional terrorist. Now it is the population itself and, especially, the kids. Stones are their chief weapon, but they know how to use television too. A kid armed with a stone is a menace, but one shot because a panicky soldier can't tell a toy gun from the real one is a catastrophe. "You know better than me," Orr said. "The camera is a weapon."

At Gaza, the deep-blue sea clashes with the sandy white of high dunes. The effect is vivid, startling and, for Israel, so intoxicating that it never gauged the mood of the Palestinians or made plans to leave. Here, the toy guns of boys are solemnly displayed for the press. Here, Sampson had his eyes put out. Here, all Israel has gone blind.

Moshe Arens

International Conferences Don't Work

International conferences do not work. They are useless in resolving difficult, stubborn disputes. As a rule, the world shuns them. Has anyone seriously suggested an international conference to resolve the British-Irish problem? The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan? The internecine wars in Sri Lanka, Punjab, Cyprus, Lebanon, Kurdistan, Mauritania or the Philippines?

Anwar Sadat knew that an international conference could not bring peace. When the Vance-Gromyko agreement of October 1977 threatened to implement the Soviet plan for such a conference, Sadat rushed to Jerusalem, nipping the folly in the bud. He understood that in the Middle East, in particular, where the Arab refusal to recognize Israel's legitimacy is a major obstacle to peace, only direct negotiation—which implies mutual recognition—can work.

It is not surprising that the Soviets favor an international conference. They have been floating the idea since the 1960s. It is the only way they can assume the role of "honest broker" on an equal footing with the United States. It is a role they have hitherto been deprived of by Israel's insistence that a country which has supported several wars of aggression against Israel; has assigned thousands of "advisers" to Israel's most implacable enemy and equipped it with the most advanced weapons in its arsenal; has armed, trained and helped the PLO, has called for Israel's expulsion from the United Nations; has sponsored a resolution equating Zionism with racism and has failed to adhere to the Helsinki accords on free Jewish emigration may have trouble being evenhanded as an arbiter in the Middle East.

But, we are told, there is no other way. Jordan can only negotiate in the framework of a conference that would include Syria and the five permanent members of the Security Council, because it needs protection from Arab radicals. One can understand King Hussein's concern. He saw his own grandfather, King Abdallah, assassinated for negotiating with Israel, and he remembers the similar fate that befell Sadat and Bashir Gemayel. But if Hussein is so afraid of radical retribution that he will not even *sit* with Israel for direct talks, is it reasonable to expect that he will consider a single compromise that the radicals—Syria, the PLO, the fundamentalists, the Marxists—do not approve?

We were told that the Hussein-Peres agreement of April 1987, endorsed by the United States, guaranteed that the conference would be just a ceremonial affair: the powers will convene, bestow their blessings on the participants and disappear until the successful consummation of the talks. That King Hussein might not have had quite that innocent a scenario in mind became apparent when he rejected Secretary George Shultz's invitation, accepted by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, to join the leaders of the two superpowers in precisely such an "opening" during the Washington summit last December.

Mr. Shultz now advocates a formula that does not give the conference quite the authority envisioned by the Soviets, but nevertheless structures it as a "tie breaker." If Israel and Jordan do not agree, they may refer their problem to the conference.

What incentive does Jordan have to make even the minutest compromise in a setup so overwhelmingly stacked in its favor? All it has to do is insist on an extreme position, and the disputants will have to go to the conference. The Soviets and the Chinese will then compete with each other in endorsing Arab demands, which at a minimum will be withdrawal from all the areas acquired by Israel in 1967, including the Golan and East Jerusalem. The Europeans will undoubtedly concur. The United States may not go quite that far. But even the American concept—as embodied in the Reagan plan—calls for virtually complete withdrawal, a solution rejected by a vast majority of Israel as suicidal.

Of course, Israel can walk out of the conference. But Israel cannot do so with impunity, even if the United States were to guarantee that it would walk out too. The resultant storm would make today's media-generated disapproval seem like a ripple. And Israel cannot afford the diplomatic isolation, sanctions and international opprobrium that would inevitably follow.

One wonders why so much pressure is being put on Israel to yield to an international conference, which cannot work, instead of persuading Jordan to agree to direct negotiations, which can and do work.

The writer has served as Israeli ambassador to the United States and as Israeli defense minister.

5/6

408

George P. Shultz

This Is the Plan

6/6 408

There are few fixed rules for resolving conflicts. Each conflict has a unique history and unique characteristics. Each party to a conflict has its own dreams, concerns and fears. The task is to find the right inducements to draw the parties off the battlefield and into the negotiating room. The success of negotiations is attributable not to a particular procedure chosen but to the readiness of the parties to exploit opportunities, confront hard choices and make fair and mutual concessions.

"The conference will be specifically enjoined from intruding in the negotiations, imposing solutions or vetoing what had been agreed bilaterally."

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, negotiations work. They provide the means for parties to learn to deal with each other. They produce durable and realistic agreements that meet the fundamental concerns of the parties. Experience shows that Arabs and Israelis can make agreements and keep them.

The United States has launched an initiative designed to produce negotiations—direct, bilateral Arab-Israeli negotiations to achieve comprehensive peace. Our concept is based on all the provisions and principles of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which is the internationally accepted framework for negotiations. In the case of the West Bank and Gaza, the initiative involves a two-stage interlocked set of negotiations designed to produce rapid and fundamental change in the way Arabs and Israelis relate to each other.

The United States is a firm and consistent supporter of direct, bilateral negotiations between Israel and all of its neighbors as the means to achieve a comprehensive peace. At the same time, the United States has always been willing to consider any approach that could lead to direct negotiations, including an international conference.

In recent months, some parties have focused on a specific kind of international conference—one that would have an authoritative role or plenipotentiary powers. In January of this year, the United States vetoed a resolution in the U.N. Security Council that called upon the secretary-general to convene such a conference. The United States made clear its belief that this kind of conference would make real negotiations impossible. It would be a vehicle for avoiding meaningful negotiations, not promoting them.

The issue confronting the parties in the Middle East, therefore, is not whether an international conference should or should not be convened. That misses the point. The Arabs require a conference to launch negotiations; without a properly structured conference, there will be no negotiations. But the wrong kind of conference should never be convened. The United States will not attend that kind of conference. No sovereign state would agree to attend the kind of conference that would presume to pass judgment on issues of national security.

The issue is whether the moment is here to negotiate an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict; whether each party is ready and able to confront hard choices and make difficult decisions; and whether the requirements of the parties are amenable to a procedural blend that satisfies minimal demands.



STEP ONE:

The strength of the American approach is its integrity: no individual aspect of it can be extracted, finessed or ignored without sacrificing its balance. The conference we support launches a series of bilateral negotiations and thereafter may receive reports from the parties on the status of negotiations, in a manner to be agreed by the parties. All conference attendees will be required to accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and to renounce violence and terrorism. The conference will be specifically enjoined from intruding in the negotiations, imposing solutions or vetoing what had been agreed bilaterally.

The United States is committed to this integral concept for beginning direct, bilateral negotiations. We will not permit any aspect of our proposal to be eroded, compromised or expanded beyond its meaning. In particular, we will not permit a conference to become authoritative or plenipotentiary, or to pass judgments on the negotiations, or to exceed its jurisdiction as agreed by the parties.

The ingredients for a peace process are present. There is an unacceptable and untenable status quo. There are competing parties willing to shed illusions and temper dreams to the underlying realities. And there are realistic and achievable ideas on the table that meet the fundamental concerns of everyone.

Our task is also clear. We must act with integrity, resolve and tenacity to bring Arabs and Israelis off the battlefield and into negotiations. The initiative put forward by the United States—two interlocked stages of direct negotiations launched by a properly structured international conference—is realistic and compelling.

This is the moment for a historic breakthrough, and this is the plan. The time for decisions is now.

The writer is secretary of state.

102.1.1 תהליך שלום
יגאל אולמן

מדינת ישראל / המשרד לענייני דתות

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סווג בטחוני סודי

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מס' מברק

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המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני

דע: מנכ"ל לשכת רה"מ

תהליך השלום

מאת מקור מהימן:

שולץ התקשר טלפונית עם מקס פישר. מסר שהענייניים אינם מתקדמים טוב עם הישראלים, ושירצה להתפגש עם פישר, אברם ואשר בשובו לארה"ב.

יוסף למדן
למדן

שמה רחל מנשה בירן גבסו
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שמריה, דר, בירן, אתנ, אביגדן, שמעון, יוסף, ארכיב

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102.1.1 גלון שלא

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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המשרד

אל : מצפ"א, מע"ת.

דע : לשכת רוה"מ

תהליך השלום

להלן כתבת ה"וושנגטון פוסט" הימים 1-3-88

יוסי גל.

Jordan Urging Separate PLO Seat at Talks

Reported Shift Is Seen Likely to Complicate American Peace Effort

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

AMMAN, Jordan, Feb. 29—Jordan will no longer press for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to any Middle East peace talks and will support a separate Palestine Liberation Organization seat at the table, sources familiar with King Hussein's thinking said here today.

The Jordanian position, conveyed to reporters accompanying Secretary of State George P. Shultz, seems certain to complicate Shultz's task of finding a basis for peace talks mutually acceptable to Israel and the Arabs.

The PLO already has told Jordan that it no longer has any interest in a joint delegation in the wake of three months of violence in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Israel has refused to negotiate with the PLO. The U.S. government is forbidden by law to have contacts with PLO representatives until the organization renounces terrorism and recognizes Israel.

U.S. officials have been assuming that any Palestinians participating in new negotiations would be part of a joint delegation with Jordan and would include individuals approved by the PLO.

An aide to Shultz said such a delegation had "always been part of the concept" of a new peace conference and said "it's not an issue." But he would not say whether he thought Jordan would be willing to press the PLO to join a joint delegation.

The Jordanian sources made clear, however, that Hussein is not going to repeat the experience he went through in 1985 and 1986, when he carried out extensive negotiations with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat on a joint platform and delegation.

While agreement was largely reached on a delegation, the king broke off his negotiations with Arafat in February 1986 because the PLO leader would not make clear his stand on recognizing Israel and renouncing terrorism.

The Jordanian sources made clear today that the Arab position generally has hardened in the wake of the uprising in the occupied territories. They said the Arab world regarded the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In their view, it would be the United Nations, not Jordan, that would issue invitations to a new peace conference.

If the PLO wanted, and could obtain, a separate invitation, Jordan would go along with it, the sources said.

A PLO executive committee member, Mahmoud Abbas, was in Amman in mid-February to reestablish contacts with Hussein but also to tell him that the PLO had no interest in a joint delegation.

The Jordanian sources also made clear that Hussein hopes the United States will find a way to open a dialogue with the PLO. They repeatedly referred to the Palestinians who met with Shultz in Washington Jan. 27 as PLO representatives and suggested those talks should continue.

The two were Hanna Siniora, editor of the East Jerusalem newspaper Al Fajr, and Fayez Abu Rahmeh, head of the Gaza Bar Association. They are known to be strong PLO supporters but are not considered formal members, making it possible for Shultz to see them.

Both were also acceptable to Israel as potential members of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation being discussed in 1985-86 before the Hussein-Arafat talks broke down.

Shultz came here today to answer questions the Jordanians raised about his peace plan during his first visit here Saturday. The Jordanian sources said Amman welcomed Shultz's efforts to revive the peace process.

But they said the Shultz plan needed to be detailed further and a commitment to basic principles of new peace talks agreed to.

Shultz still has not presented any formal plan, although he keeps talk-

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Washington Post, p. 1.

cont...

ing about a "package" that has to be considered as a whole.

His package envisages only a brief "international event" to start the negotiations, hosted by the United States and the Soviet Union rather than all five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

An aide to Shultz took issue with the Jordanian description that the Arab position was hardening in the wake of the West Bank and Gaza Strip violence.

He said the Jordanians were "certainly seriously interested" in the U.S. plan, the Egyptians clearly supportive and the Syrians interested in continuing their discussions with Washington.

"I don't see any sign that Arab positions are hardening," he said.

Shultz met the same group of Jordanian officials today that he held talks with Saturday, including Crown Prince Hassan, Prime Minister Zaid Rifai, and Foreign Minister Tahir Masri.

Rifai is scheduled to fly to London tonight to brief King Hussein, who is scheduled to meet Shultz Tuesday in London.

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WP

END

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102.1.1 אין שום

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

571

המשרד

טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 24 פבר' 88 1200

מס' מברק

אל: מנהל מז"ית

פגישת אישים מהשטחים עם קלוריוס. שלך 557

בתוך "תרגילי" בדקתי מה בדיוק נאמר על-ידי קלוריוס. מקור שקרא את הדווח של קלוריוס אומר שבפגישה לא דובר על תקופת מעבר של שלוש שנים (אלא על תקופת מעבר). קלוריוס לא דיבר על יצוג אש"פ בכל דרך שהיא ולא דיבר על בחירות ובוודאי לא על בחירות מוניציפליות. קלוריוס ביקש והפציר בהם לא לדחות את ההזדמנות שנקרתה לידיהם. אם ימשיכו רק לזרוק אבנים ולהפגין לא ישיגו דבר. קלוריוס הוסיף שלכל צד יש השגות, אך שברעיונות האמריקאים יש חלקים שכל אחד מהצדדים יכול למצוא בו משהו חיובי, ועל מה שלא מוסכם ידונו במו"מ.

ערן

שהיה הגה שהכפר הנפל הגנגל כירון הלפני הלגרכ הגלד רם אומן
ליאור הגמש המאום שטחש

102.1.1 תיק אלון

22

רחיפות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	נ: L
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נר : 00780	מ ע : יועץ תקשורת לרה"מ, יועץ תקשורת לשהב"ס, לע"מ, דו"צ, קש"ח, מזכיר הממשלה	
בלחץ - 76	נושא : עתונות, ניו יורק	

N.Y. TIMES
Feb. 27, 1988 - page 1

Shamir Resists Shultz on Parts Of Peace Plan

By DAVID K. SHIPLER

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Feb. 26 — Secretary of State George P. Shultz was reported to have met resistance today from Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to at least two key elements of American proposals aimed at starting Arab-Israeli peace talks.

A spokesman for Mr. Shamir said the Prime Minister had repeated his rejection of an international conference as a framework for negotiations. Mr. Shamir also held firm to his opposition to giving up any of the Israeli-occupied West Bank or Gaza Strip in exchange for peace, another official reported.

In the West Bank and Gaza, where protests against the occupation have gone on since December, four Palestinians were killed in protests aimed at Mr. Shultz's mission and at the occupation. The protests occurred despite a show of force by Israel. [Page 4.]

No Palestinians Come to Meeting

Mr. Shultz was conciliatory to Palestinians after their leaders here refused to meet with him. They had been instructed to boycott the meeting by the Palestine Liberation Organization, which is afraid the United States is trying to encourage the emergence of local Palestinian leadership under Israeli occupation, at the expense of those leaders outside.

Mr. Shultz's party had reserved a room for the meeting in the American Colony Hotel in East Jerusalem, the predominantly Arab sector of the city. No Palestinians came. Mr. Shultz, who

Continued on Page 4, Column 1

תאריך: 2-8-88	שם השולח: בנין שוקר	מאשור:	2

שהיה רמז שהפגש בשל בלבול בין בעלי אבו מזן לבין השגרה
לא בוצע בגלל דרישת פנה לבין האמשלק

~00780 | 76 2/13

Continued From Page 1

knew in advance of the boycott, decided to give some drama to the situation anyway by coming to the courtyard of the hotel, where American officials had set up a lectern for him.

There, beside an orange and a lemon tree, Mr. Shultz read to reporters "a statement to Palestinians."

"Palestinian participation is essential to success in the peace process," he said. "New respect for rights and new readiness for political change must replace old recriminations and distrust.

"Palestinians and Israelis must deal differently with one another. Palestinians must achieve control over political and economic decisions that affect their own lives. Palestinians must be active participants in the negotiations to determine their future."

He also said "Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Palestinians living outside the territories have concerns which need to be resolved."

Six Palestinians from the occupied territories and three from outside have been cleared by the P.L.O., with Egyptian help, to meet with Mr. Shultz when he goes to Cairo on Sunday, Palestinians said. But it is not known whether Mr. Shultz will agree to such a session.

Because of a sharp dispute between Prime Minister Shamir, leader of the Likud bloc, and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, the head of the Labor Party, the two men refused to meet jointly with Mr. Shultz, who had to see them separately. This prompted some Israelis to joke that the main route of Mr. Shultz's shuttle diplomacy should run between the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister's office, not between Jersualem and Arab capitals.

Withdrawal and Security

Mr. Shultz is to fly to Amman, Jordan, and Damascus, Syria, on Saturday, then to Cairo on Sunday and back to Amman on Monday to take additional soundings on his peace plan.

According to American officials, he is trying to get general agreement on several principles that would guide negotiations: an international conference to provide broad legitimacy to the pro-

00780/76 3/13

cess; talks between Israel and Jordan and possibly Palestinians on an interim stage of self-administration in the West Bank and Gaza, and the implementation of self-administration only after the opening of Jordanian-Israeli negotiations on the final status of the territories. The negotiations would take place by the end of 1988.

In addition, Mr. Shultz has indicated, talks on the final status would be based on the concept of territorial compromise, specifically United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which provide for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory and respect for Israeli security.

"Shamir repeated in a very clear way his opposition to the whole thing of an international peace conference," a spokesman for Prime Minister Shamir said after the meeting.

In addition, he said Mr. Shamir had warned against negotiating under the pressure of the violent clashes that have taken place between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli troops since early December.

"If we try to work under pressure," the spokesman said, "this will be interpreted by the P.L.O. as a victory." Previously, Mr. Shamir expressed reservations about starting talks on the final status of the territories by the end of the year, arguing that a longer period of self-administration was needed to build confident relations between Palestinians and Israelis.

Election Issue Raised

Despite the obstacles to the American plan, some Israeli Labor Party members say they are worried that Mr. Shultz's visit may help Mr. Shamir politically by allowing him to portray himself as a supporter of both peace and continued sovereignty over the occupied territories. Israeli elections are scheduled for November.

But some American officials argue that the desire by Mr. Shamir to avoid being seen as an obstacle to peace may also induce him to compromise.

In any case, Israeli leaders generally seem intent on conveying an impression of tough determination not to allow the disorders to soften their position.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

13215 תאריך 23.02.88

שמור דחוף **
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102.1.1 אין שלום

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שמור/מיידי

א.ר. - 410

וושינגטון

פגישת אישים מהשטחים עם קלאריזם.

להלן בקוצרה מדרוח הירעץ לעניינים ערביים בעזה בבוקר.

1. ב-20.2 נפגשה משלחת אישים מהשטחים עם עוזרו של מרפי קלאריזם בבית סגן הקונסול האמריקאי בירושלים. בפגישה נמסר של תוכנית שולץ לקידום תהליך השלום לקראת ביקורו בישראל כאשר המרכיבית כוללת:

א. פרסום הצהרת עקרונות בהסכמת כל הצדדים שבעקבותיה תכונס ועידה בינ'ל בהשתתפות אש'ף אשר יוצג במסגרת משלחת ירדנית-פלסטינית.

ב. קיום בחירות לעיריות בשטחים והקמת 'מועצה נבחרת'.

ג. בעבור חצי שנה מתחילת הירזמה תתחיל תקופת מעבר שתימשך 3 שנים בה תיכון מעין אוטונומיה בשטחים במסגרתה תצא ישראל מהשטחים כאשר הבטחון יהיה באחריותה הבלעדית.

ד. תקופת המעבר תשמש מבחן לטיב היחסים בין ישראל לתושבי השטחים כאשר המתרון הסופי יהיה קשר עם ירדן.

ה. אש'ף שייוצג במסגרת משלחת ירדנית-פלסטינית יכלול

אישים שאינם אנשי אש"ף מובהקים.

1. הבסיס להסדר שלום הוא החלטות מועבי"ם 242 ו-338.

2. בפגישת האישים השתתפו מהרצוגה ערד פאיז אבו רחמה, עצאם אל-שרוא, ערן א-שורא, סאמי אבו סלים ודר מחמד ציאם, ומיו"ש: אליאס בריג', סעיד בנעאן, יאסר עביד, חנא אלאטרש, מ'אלד אלקטב.

3. לדברי פאיז במסר לשליח האמריקני כי תוכנית שולץ כוללת בתוכה את זרעי הכשלון משום שהיא מתעלמת מקיומו של אש"ף, גורסת הכרה בהחלטת מועבי"ם 242 (אותה צריך לשנות) ואינה מבטיחה זכות הגדרה עצמית לעם הפלסטיני. בתגובה הציב קלאריום שעל אש"ף להכיר בישראל ולשנות תפיסותיו.

4. בפגישה ביקש עודדו של מרכז שמשלחת אישים מהשטחים תיפגש עם שר החוץ שולץ בניגוד להחלטת הפגישה עימו באוק' 87 ושעם שהפלסטינים יעשו שגיאה אם לא ייפגשו עימו.

5. בתגובה להצעה מסר פאיז כי השתתפותו בפגישת-אישים עם שה"ח האמריקני מותנת בהסכמת אש"ף בפני שתתפרסם באמצעי התקשורת.

6. לדברי פאיז מטר השליח האמריקאי שתוכנית שולץ הוצגה בפני חוסין ומובראק אשר הגדירוה כתוכנית הטומנת בחובה סיכוי לתהליך השלום אך לדידם של אנשי המשלחת, יוכן תדחה את התוכנית משום שאין היא לוקחת בחשבון את אש"ף והיא נוטה יותר לצד ישראל.

מנהל מזתי"ם

ת.נ.י

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנבל,ממנבל,סמנבל,ממד,רם,אמן,מזתים,מצפא,
מתאמשטחים

[illegible]

1. [illegible]

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6. [illegible]

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8. [illegible]

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102.4.1 תליון אלה

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

המשרד

528

טופס מברק

דף ___ מתוך ___ דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור / רגיל

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח 1600 22 פברי 88

מס' מברק

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: דני בלדך, וושינגטון

הדמוקרטים והתהליך המדיני

בעת שהותי במועצת האיגודים המקצועיים במיאמי שוחחתי עם פול קירק, יו"ר המפלגה הדמוקרטית. הוא אמר כי עד כה לא חש בשינוי עמדות בקרב פעילי המפלגה בנושאים הקשורים לישראל, אך משיחות שונות הוא מעריך כי אם לא תהיה שום תזוזה בכיוון של חידוש תהליך השלום הדבר עלול לבוא לידי ביטוי בועדת המצע דבועידה.

ברוח דומה שוחח עמי הסנטור ג'ון קרי ממסצ'וסטס, שאמר כי דותר ודותר מגיעים אליו דברי בקורת על העדר גמישות מצד ישראל, ובעיקר בשל עמדותיו של ראש הממשלה. השבתי לו כי הרושם הוא מוטעה שכן יש בישראל רצון כנה להתקדם בתהליך השלום וגם ראש הממשלה שותף לכך. אך הוא צריך להיות מודע לבעיות הפוליטיות הפנימיות. הסנטור קרי השיב כי עלינו לדעת כי אם נפעל בהתאם לבעיותינו הפוליטיות הפנימיות אנו עלולים להתקל בבעיות פוליטיות חיצוניות, ועלינו להחליט מה עדיף.

דני בלדך

- 23 -

שהה אנס מלונה בין הלפו הלבנה הלך
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102.1.1 תיק שלם

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רחיפות: בהול	**מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק**	רף: 1
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גר : 00537 87-11	ד ע : השגריר וושינגטון	
	מאת : סגן הקונסול הכללי, ניו-יורק	

המצב בשטחים - תהליך השלום.

1. אתמול (18/2) הופיע השגריר משה ארד בפני ועידת הנשיאים בראשות מורים אברם. מצ"ב תרשומת על הישיבה שהוכנה ע"י ארלין בהר.

2. שתי נקודות הודגשו על ידי השגריר:

א. בשלב זה אין תכנית אמריקאית מגובשת לתהליך השלום.

ב. ההחלטה הסופית בנושא היא בידי ממשלת ישראל.

3. מצ"ב הודעת א.ד.ל. המביעה תמיכה חד משמעית בישראל. ראויה לציון גם הופעתו ועמידתו של לוינסון בועידת נאקראק בלוס אנג'לס. כזכור א.ד.ל. הסיל ויטו על שיגור מכתב לרוה"מ ולממרוה"מ ובו ביקורת על שימוש בכח מופרז. אייב מוקסמן אמר לי במרירות מסויימת כי ידענו להביע ביקורת נגד א.ד.ל. על התבטאותם הראשונה בנושא במחצית דצמבר אך לא שמעו מאתנו דבר מאז על אף שהבהירו קו תמיכתם בישראל באורח ציבורי וחד משמעי. מניח שתמצאו דרך לתקן הרושם שנוצר אצלו.

מרדכי ידיד

שהת רהמ שהקט מנט ממנט בירן מנהפו
ציאור מצתיב אלקיטל מאת הטברה רמ"רבצ ממנ מתיהבטה מ

תאריך: 19.2.1988	שם השולח: מרדכי ידיד		אישור:

S 5710.

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MEETING WITH PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE
Thursday, February 18, 1988 - New York

AMBASSADOR MOSHE ARAD

This closed-session meeting was well-attended (approx. 60 ppl) with top executive leadership of the Presidents Conference. Morris Abram chaired the meeting which lasted approx. 1 1/2 hours.

In his opening remarks Morris gave an overview of the present situation, making reference to the following points:

-Distortions of the media
-Double-standard at the UN
-Immobolility of Hussein
-Aberration in behavior of soldiers (In some cases which may be due to genuine fright of the soldiers, but in some circumstances perhaps due to less honorable motives)
-Elections in both Israel & US
-NACRAC meetings in Los Angeles
-Prospects that present govt. in Israel has potential to move along lines of Begin in terms of peace settlement
-Need for Jewish community to let Congressmen and Senators know of their continued support for Israel (their is no "flood" of letters)
-Shultz expression of appreciation for work of Ambassador Arad

MOSHE ARAD

Amb. Arad gave an overview of events during past month (since his last meeting with the PC).

In response to concerns of erosion in support for Israel, Amb. Arad referred to the recent ADL poll which concluded that there is no such drastic reduction in perception. However, he noted, the cumulative impact of the media reporting out of context, distortions, etc. has been extremely damaging -- but not to the point of damage to entire public opinion. Overall there has been enormous concern and sympathy for Israel's need to confront the violence. Thus, we have to be careful not to mix media coverage with public opinion. Israel, he added, is entitled to get all the views but does not have to accept all the proposals.

Additional points were made on the following:

-Israel's appreciation for extraordinary efforts of Morris Abram
-Despair of Palestinians being used as a weapon
-Statement of non-confidence in the Palestinian leadership- What is emerging is difficult to identify and not expected to be less radical than Arafat, et. al. living outside of Israel. But they may be willing to be more pragmatic since they have to live with Israel.

537/87 3/6

-Israel is being judged by different standards because we are setting the standards
-Aberrations due to duress and provocation in some cases where more force may be used than necessary. Adding that Israel is not licensing use of indiscriminate force, beatings. IDF is not prepared for this kind of warfare. Israel had not felt need to develop a special police force to deal with riots, demonstrations, as such, and proudly so. Israel is using adequate/minimum force necessary. But there are no sterile methods to deal with this kind of warfare.
-Recognition in Israel of need for political dialogue with responsible Palestinian leadership. Events brought home message that issues were dormant/paralyzed - not due to lack of political will but of Arab leadership and willingness to negotiate.
-Expectations of our friends to stand with us. Israeli efforts merit support of the Community.
-Israel welcomes US initiatives and determination to bring parties together. Israel is eager to reach a solution and is ready to be put to test. Ideas being presented are viewed as a new blend of old ideas with somewhat new packaging. This is a high agenda item for Shultz
-Anticipation of excellerated time-table due to elections. Expects talks in Dec. '88 whether or not interim reaches ultimate target. (with '79-'82 autonomy talks as basic ingredients of interim solution)
-Concerns facing Israel a) linkage, between interim and long-term solution; b) difficulty of agenda items.
-Expectation in Israel of an "international event" (does not foresee a full-dressed international conference) with composition of Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to be initially worked out between Egyptains & Jordanians with Palestinians; with subsequent acceptance by Israel
-US and Israel will not let Arafat torpedo present efforts by his presence in Geneva. The UN agenda will not interfere with the peace process
-Israel government has ultimate decision-making responsibility

Q U E S T I O N S

Ambassador Arad took about 10 questions from the floor. While their was some underlying commentary, it was one of concern referring mainly to the deterioration in minds of public here, both Jews and non-Jews, toward Israel with reference to recent NACRAC meetings in Los Angeles. The majority of the questions were well-focused dealing for most part on the composition and components for the expected international "event," future talks and overall prospects.

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Questions/Comments

1) What are chances for coming to an arrangement before the end of the present Administrations in Israel and US?

2) Since the Arabs have swept aside the Camp David Accords what are prospects for coming to an acceptable basis for negotiation?

3) What are prospects for early elections in Israel?

4) In reference to Heckler (AJ Congress) meeting with Hussein & Mubarak a comment was made that Israel should make it clear that the government of Israel will decide for the country what its policies will be.

5) Does the Israeli government have better information on the infrastucture of the arees and community as a results of uprisings.

6) In reference to Arafat and upcoming UN meeting in Geneve - what is Israeli response?

7) Who will choose the international delegation for the international "event" and could you further elaborate on Soviet-American initiatives?

8) Commentary was made on need for better PR efforts needed to combat distorted press. This person felt that the activities of the Jewish community can add to escalation of bad press and should take a "calmer stand"

9) Reference was made to NACRAC meetings in L.A. where opinions left deep and troubling polarization amongst participants.

10) A final comment was made that we are letting the world forget the horrors of the Holocaust and the sufferings of the Jews

ARLENE C. BEHAR
19/2/88

Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith
823 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017 212-490-2525 Telex 649278

LYNNE IANNIELLO
Director, Communications Division

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ADL PRESS OFFICE, Tuesday, February 9,
through Saturday, February 13
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The Breakers Hotel
Palm Beach, Florida

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Contacts: Lynne Ianniello
Jay Axelbank

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Palm Beach, FL, February 13....The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith today unanimously adopted the following resolution at a session of its National Executive Committee meeting here at the Breakers Hotel.

"The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith reaffirms its support for the people and government of Israel. We stand with our brothers and sisters who are redeeming Zion and seeking to maintain a free and just society in the tradition of our forefathers. We call on the Israeli government and people to remain strong in their resolve to preserve civil order in a firm and reasonable fashion and to not yield to the violence of the street and those who would seek to impose their will by threats and pressure.

"Israel has stood ready to meet its neighbors in direct and constructive negotiations to achieve a way of living together in peace. Until all Arab states come to accept Israel as a free and

(more)

legitimate state reflecting the historic rights of the Jewish people, Israel must recognize the dangers it faces and be vigilant to defend its existence. We know that when the hand of true peace is offered, Israel will grasp it eagerly and firmly. We pledge our firm support for Israel and for the justice of Israel's cause."

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 18.2.88

מס' מבוק

102.1.1 תיקון אלות

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המשרד

אל: מצפ"א

מע"ת

מאת : עיתונות

תכנית השלום האמריקאית

להלן תמליל הופעתו של חה"כ אבא אבן בתכנית הבוקר של CBS (18-2-88).

יוסי גל

CBS "THIS MORNING" INTERVIEW
WITH GUEST:
ABBA EBAN, ISRAELI ENVOY AND FORMER
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1988

HARRY SMITH: Former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban met with Secretary of State George Shultz yesterday in Washington, and he joins us now to talk about violence in the West Bank and the Gaza and prospects for peace.

Good morning.

AMB. EBAN: Good morning.

MR. SMITH: You talked with Secretary of State Shultz yesterday. Is his plan still an international peace conference, and is he still talking about trading land for peace?

AMB. EBAN: Yes. I came to bring Secretary Shultz my very strong support of his initiative, support which is shared by a very large section of the Israeli electorate and the Israeli establishment. I believe that all the elements of the plan are sound: the idea of a sustained American initiative; the idea of an American initiative instead of the vacuum that we previously had; the idea of an interim solution in which Israel would disengage from the task of administering the territories; and the idea of a permanent solution based on the only valid principle, which is territory for peace -- a principle that Israel accepted after the

שרה נקל מלנקה כין מיסה יובינקל מטר הסברה
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1967 war, a principle which enabled us to make peace with Egypt -- does anyone think we could've made peace with Egypt asking them for peace while we keep the territories? It is the only formula which has any prospect of bringing an end to this conflict and especially to the last two tragic months, two of the most somber months in our country's history.

MR. SMITH: How do you get past the hurdle, though, that Foreign Minister Shimon Peres is for that sort of an agreement but Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir is not for that kind of an agreement?

AMB. EBAN: I don't usually allow my answers to be affected by questions, but you have really -- (Smith laughs) -- asked the central question. The policy has to change. We have to make a decision. Now, the international conference is not the main element. It's simply the procedure. But I'm baffled by the hypochondria, by the crazy sensitivity of the people who object to what is after all a procedure in our history -- conferences have either done good or they've done no harm. They can't do harm.

And I almost resent intellectually the idea that I hear even in America that Israel and the United States could be isolated in an international conference. If Israel and the United States are together, the other people are isolated. Israel is the strongest military power. The United States is the strongest political power.

Nothing could be done against us. We have a double built-in veto. So that element also is -- I believe should be accepted, and we ought not to decry it. But we must make a decision, and I believe Mr. -- Secretary Shultz's visit will help us to make a decision, because we cannot live as a two-headed entity in which there is -- there are two sides to every question, and the Israel government is for it -- both for and against of both them.

The influence of the United States, the influence of the personal friendship and fidelity of Secretary Shultz -- I think this can help Israel to do what it should do in any case in response to its own public opinion, which is to make a decision in favor of territories for peace and in favor of a fruitful American mediation.

MR. SMITH: Let me ask you this, though, I mean, there is both an emotional and an intellectual aspect to this in terms of your own understanding of it. Intellectually, I think you think that's what needs to happen. Emotionally, do you think the heart of Israel is ready to let that happen?

AMB. EBAN: I believe we should act with -- through the disciplined application of reason. I believe that the 1,030,000 Israelis who voted only three years ago for platforms which said

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that we seek to terminate Israeli rule over the 1,300,000 Palestinians -- on that hard bedrock of rationality and disciplined emotion, I think we can build the same policy.

MR. SMITH: You have said, Israel is more aware of danger than opportunity. It seems to me that perhaps there is a very small window of opportunity now, and it doesn't seem that the nation is aware of that.

AMB. EBAN: When I said that we are more aware of danger than opportunity, I said that as an act of understanding. Our history is tragic, and therefore, when Israelis, as Jews, see a situation, they never say, "What are the opportunities, what are the dangers?" But there must be a limit to that. And there are new opportunties. One of them is created by the very addition of this American initiative. I believe that in the end, and I believe in the early end, our people will opt for rationality and reason and for liberating Israel from the stranglehold of an occupation which is doing much more harm to Israel's interests and vision and image and solidarity and social cohesion than it is to anybody else.

MR. SMITH: It's -- the world is watching Israel now. If something doesn't change, it will be very, very difficult for, at any point it seems to me, for there to be any kind of consensus of agreement on any Israeli policy.

AMB. EBAN: Yeah, I think the key word is "change." Of course, we need change on the other side. The Palestinians have got to change much more than they have so far. They've got to accept those norms of international dialogue which they have been asked to accept and haven't yet done -- not all of them at any rate, perhaps not most of them. But there has to be a revision, I believe, of our own current security policy, and I would like to go back to the days when we wouldn't have entered the village that was presented here. That was a policy of low profile. And above all, I believe, since the United States has a right, I think, to ask to us to consult with them to make the most of Secretary Shultz's visit --

MR. SMITH: Thank you.

AMB. EBAN: -- and to accept his principles.

MR. SMITH: All right. Abba Eban, thank you very much for joining us this morning.

END OF INTERVIEW

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דע:השגריר/וושינגטון

מאת:הקונסוליה הכללית לוסאנגלס

לא-116

יוייר הא.ד.אל שוחח עם שולץ ביחידות בועידת הא.ד.אל. בפלורידה. בשיחתם אמר שולץ שבדעתו להגיע בהקדם לטיפול במהות שמעבר לפרוצדורה. לוינסון שאלו האם הדבר ניתן. היאך אפשר לפטור על הפרוצדורה בשאיננו יודעים מי יהיו הצדדים לדיון במהות.שולץ העיר שהוא מבין שרוה"מ שינה מעט עמדתו בנוגע לועידה אך חסות בינלאומית. לוינסון אמר ששמע שרוה"מ יסכים לועידה בינלאומית למשך 24 שעות בלבד ,מעין פתיחה בינלאומית גרידא.שולץ העיר שניצבת שאלת המהות ומה מוכנים הישראלים לעשות בנושאים המהותיים.לוינסון שוב היקשה עם מי ישוחחו הישראלים על המהות. שולץ אמר כי בביקורו הקרוב במוסקבה ישוחח עם שברדנצה על התוכנית האמריקאית במזה"ת ולברר אם הסוביטים יקבלו את עיקריה (WILL GO ALONG WITH THEM).
שולץ הוסיף שבעבר היה מצבה של כלכלת ישראל בכי רע והוא שולץ, הבהיר למנהיגי ישראל שארה"ב לא תוכל להשלים עם תחלואי הכלכלה הישראלית ולהתגבר עליהם בכספי משלם המיסים האמריקאי. שולץ קרא לממשלת ישראל לבדוק האיכלצייה ולרסנה.לוינסון הגיב שאם משתמעת מדברי המזכיר אנלוגיה לגבי התחום המדיני הרי שהיא

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

איננה תופסת,שכן ההחלטות בתחום הכלכלי היו כולן של ישראל.לא כן בתחום המדיני.לוינסון הוסיף שאולי האנלוגיה נכונה במובן שעל ישראל-גם בתחום המדיני לאחוז השור בקרניו ולא לברוח מקבלת החלטות. כאן השמיע לוינסון באזני שולץ רעיון משלו.לזמן ועידה או פתיחה בינלאומית ובמקביל לנהל שיחות דו צדדיות בין מדינתיות ללא זיקה ביניהן לפורום הבינלאומי , היינו מו"מ במקביל לועידה הבינלאומית ולא בחסותה. שולץ הגיב שאיש מבין עוזריו הרבים לא העלה מחשבה כזאת. לוינסון שאל המזכיר מה תפקיד ייועד ליהדות ארה"ב אם בכלל. שולץ השיב שעל יהדות ארה"ב למלא תפקיד קונסטרוקטיבי במובן של עידוד הקמת קואליציה בישראל שתקיף 70-75 אחוז של קונצנזוס שיהיה בכוחו להתגבר על המסתייגים. שומה על יהדות ארה"ב להשפיע על שתי המפלגות הגדולות למען תיווצר אחדות שתאפשר קבלת החלטות והנעתו מחדש של התהליך המדיני.שולץ הוסיף שיש להזיז התהליך ולהשלים מהלך בלשהו עד סוף השנה,גם אם הדבר כרוך בקבלת החלטות קשות. שולץ הוסיף שאם תהליך קבלת ההחלטות יידחה אל מעבר לכהונת המימשל הנוכחי,קשה יהיה לשכנע המומנטום והאפיק בו החל המימשל לפעול. לוינסון סיכם עוד שלפני ארוחת הצהריים בה שוחח אישית עם המזכיר פנה ביאליקין למזכיר בנוכחות אנשים ללחוץ על מנהיגי ישראל לגבש עמדה אחידה ולתבוע מהם להכניף השיקולים הפוליטיים מפלגתיים להחלטות בקנה מידה לאומי ומתוך אחריות לעתידה של ישראל.

בכבוד.

תפ: שחח,רהמ,מכנכל,ממנכל,בירן,מצפא,תפוצות

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 17.2.88

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המשרד

אל: מצפ"א

מע"ת

דע: יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת

מאת: עיתונות

תהליך השלום

להלן:

1) טור של אבנס ונובק.

2) מאמר מערכת של ה"וול סטריט גורנל".

יוסי גל

407

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Shultz's Mideast Move

Tom Dine, head of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, startled guests at a private dinner last week when he flatly disagreed with Rep. Steve Solarz that the 1988 election year was no time to launch a U.S. peace offensive in the Middle East.

Democrat Solarz, a liberal leader in the pro-Israel congressional bloc, warned that with Israel also holding a 1988 election campaign, U.S. pressure on hard-line Israeli leaders would make peace moves "counterproductive." Dine, the brainy director of the potent pro-Israel lobby, startled the other guests at Pamela Harriman's Georgetown house by saying, in effect: I disagree. I support George Shultz.

With Rabbi Alexander Schindler, the liberal rabbi from New York, and other Jewish leaders also supporting Shultz's surprise Mideast peace plan in the administration's waning months, the question is, what is the secretary of state's goal? Is it to defuse the Palestinian time bomb and end for now the killings that are damaging Israel's reputation? Or is it an international peace conference and overall settlement?

Dine, Schindler and most other pro-Israel U.S. leaders are silent about supporting basic changes in Israeli policy that the Reagan administration knows are essential for West Bank peace. That suggests their objective may be less than the broad Israel-Palestinian peace Shultz says he is out to get.

If so, despite firm rhetoric and announced purpose, Shultz will seek only short-term measures to end Palestinian deaths and relieve the ugly condition Israel finds itself in today.

The secretary's veiled purpose became all the more obscure with his answers to questions at a private Feb. 9 State Department background session—the same day Harriman gave her dinner for some of the specialists who attended Shultz's briefing.

He was asked about President Eisenhower's threat to cut off all aid when Israel dragged its feet on withdrawing from the Sinai after its 1956 Suez invasion. Shultz gave no audible reply. But, in fact, no official believes Shultz would risk turning the pro-Israeli lobby against him by threatening Israel's $3 billion U.S. aid package.

Likewise, Shultz is saying nothing, at least publicly, about Israel's ending its colonization of the West Bank and Gaza. Jewish towns that have mushroomed along the high ridges of the land Israel captured in the 1967 war are a major cause of the revolt. Palestinians regard the land as their birthright.

But some officials here disagree that Shultz has suddenly ended years of personal isolation from the Mideast cauldron just to give Israel short-term relief. They argue that he has moved beyond merely appeasing the pro-Israel lobby by trying to end the nightly TV drama of Arab beatings.

"Shultz has the Mideast bit in his teeth," we were told by one official, who for the past six years had been trying to convince the secretary to use his personal clout with Israel as he did with the Kremlin over Afghanistan and arms control. He claims the conversion is deep and real.

If so, that might explain the self-confidence that has made Shultz almost exuberant on the Mideast. An official of a former administration suggested to Shultz that he might find it easier to bend Israel if President Reagan invited former presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter to help on a first step: getting Israel to stop building new West Bank towns.

Not a chance, said Shultz. He would not "cop out" and he would not "turn this over to someone else." He insisted the job was his and President Reagan's alone.

One participant at the State Department briefing told us the secretary seemed to resent suggestions that he could use the help of the three former presidents. Shultz tells aides that the sole outsider he might recruit is former Mideast envoy Robert Strauss, his close friend and a Democratic insider who is highly regarded by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

But not even his closest aides know how committed Shultz is to the idea of an international conference. Several days after the State Department briefing, Solarz, who was there, told us it was mind-boggling that "following years of playing Rip Van Winkle on the Mideast," Shultz has suddenly admitted during an election year that to get Arab-Israeli peace the United States "has to be fully engaged all the time."

That adds a final element of mystery as to what the secretary has in mind. Having played an activist diplomatic role everywhere except the Middle East, Shultz may have acquired a touch of hubris from his proclaimed success in dealings with the Soviet Union and arms control.

But his own record shows how dangerous hubris or even modest confidence can be in the Middle East, starting with the tragic failure of his 1983 Lebanon-Israel accord.

3/4

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

Shultz in Israel

Secretary of State George Shultz will travel to the Middle East next week to have yet one more try at a final settlement of the 40-year-old problem of Palestinian refugees. Arab riots and demonstrations on the West Bank, in Jerusalem and along the Gaza Strip, and the harsh responses of Israeli troops attempting to restore civil order, once again have focused world attention on the region. These unpleasant events, fully covered by the world's newspapers and TV cameras, are generating a great deal of nervousness among Israel's friends.

At the very center of this storm is Yitzhak Shamir, the doughty little prime minister of Israel. He is fighting a lonely battle to resist a new attempt to "internationalize" the Palestinian problem, principally through a settlement that would be sponsored by the United Nations Security Council. The Soviet Union wants that approach. Mr. Shultz's peace plan, which he has floated with Israeli and Arab leaders and presumably will discuss directly with Mr. Shamir at the end of his visit, envisions international discussions. Egypt and Jordan yesterday appeared to have agreed on the idea of a final settlement with international backing, judging from reports from Cairo. And finally, Shimon Peres, Israeli foreign minister and leader of the party in opposition to Mr. Shamir, supports the internationalization idea.

So surely, one might think, Mr. Shamir's lonely position means he's made a serious mistake? Hasn't Mr. Peres, no less an Israeli patriot but far more flexible, had the right approach all along, as the riots and the buildup of anti-Israeli opinion now make clear? By the time Mr. Shultz sits down with Mr. Shamir a week from Sunday, that truth hardly will be worthy of debate.

Or will it? Let's begin with the venue for these international discussions, the United Nations. Two of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the Soviet Union and China, do not recognize Israel. The U.N. General Assembly is tilted heavily against Israel, as it has demonstrated time and again in its resolutions. It can be argued that the U.N. has in fact prolonged the agony of the Palestinians through the refugee camps that have kept the problem festering for 40 years. So if Mr. Shamir has some suspicion of U.N.-sponsored solutions, it is not altogether surprising.

What about the Soviet interest? The Reagan administration seems to

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think it is dealing with a new kind of Soviet leader in Mikhail Gorbachev. Maybe Mr. Shultz and Mr. Reagan know more about this than we do, or maybe they're fooling themselves. We certainly see no outward evidence of change in the Soviet Middle East policy. Its dynamic was set in motion years ago with Soviet sponsorship of Arab socialism, which has as one of its most important manifestations the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The PLO and Syria, a Soviet client state, effectively have intimidated anyone who might be interested in a peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem, a tactic that has included the murder of moderate West Bank mayors. Does the Soviet Union really want a solution to the Palestinian problem or does it want that problem to remain a thorn in the side of the Americans and Israelis? All past evidence would suggest the latter.

Which finally brings us to the Reagan administration plan, which carries the heading "territory for peace." The Israelis give up territory they have occupied in their wars with the Arabs and they, in turn, are assured of peace. The precedent, of course, would be the Camp David agreement with Egypt.

It's instructive, though, to recall that the Camp David agreement had no Russian participation. It was worked out by Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin, with Jimmy Carter as intermediary. If the true precedent were being followed today, Mr. Shamir would be negotiating the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip with King Hussein and Hosni Mubarak, with Ronald Reagan or George Shultz as mediator.

Any such approach effectively has been blocked by the Soviets and the PLO. Given this set of circumstances, isn't it just possible that when the Soviets and the PLO use the word "territory," what they really have in mind is possession of new bases for operations bent on the ultimate destruction of Israel?

Now, maybe Mr. Shultz has figured out a way to persuade the Soviets, the PLO and the Syrians to get out of the way, allowing Mr. Shamir, Mr. Peres, Mr. Mubarak and King Hussein to work out a truly peaceful solution to the problems of the Palestinians, who certainly have been hostage to Middle East politics far too long. Miracles have happened before. But given the odds, it's hard for us to fault Mr. Shamir and like-minded Israelis for their continued concerns about national survival.

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REVIEW & OUTLOOK

WALL ST JOURNAL - EDITORIAL - FEB 17, 88

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456/70 4/4

DAILY NEWS - FEB 17, '88

Israel and its no-talk, no-progress policy

To see the trouble coming was the easy part. But still it was stunning to hear young Palestinians from a village remote on the West Bank recite the horror of being buried alive by Israeli troops. And that wasn't all that happened. Those who were there said that once the youths were buried, an Israeli sergeant actually ordered a bulldozer to run over them. And they say that would have happened, had the sergeant's order not been refused.

"Even in my worst dreams, I would never imagine such a thing," said Maj. Gen. Amram Mitzna, military commander of the Israeli-occupied West Bank.

How naive. The escalating violence on the West Bank and Gaza Strip has been on television, night after night. Everybody could see the way Israeli troops were being bombarded by rock-throwing Palestinian youths. And everybody also could see the way Israelis replied with rubber bullets. But that did not quiet the rage and the riots. So the troops began to fire live ammunition.

Many were killed and the outrage was great but that was not the end. Israeli troops tried another tactic. They took to grabbing the youths, most just teenagers, and beating them with wooden clubs and rifle butts. The outrage grew and so troops switched back to rubber bullets, but live ammunition was used again, too.

Still, the trouble continued and now comes the incredible charge that Israeli troops actually took some youths and buried them alive. Even as stunning as those charges are, the worst has not happened. Because the State of Israel has locked itself into the same kind of bind as the government of South Africa.

THERE, YOUNG BLACKS have a virtual war against the government. They riot, hurling stones, bottles and whatever else they can, at soldiers and tanks. The young blacks have no rights in their homeland. The Palestinians on the West Bank see themselves as being in the same kind of fix.

Only through negotiations can those kind of differences be worked out. In South Africa, the blacks say they are represented by the African National Congress. The government says it will not negotiate with the ANC until the ANC renounces violence. For years, the ANC tried nonviolent protest. It didn't work. Indeed, blacks were slaughtered in the Sharpeville massacre. So the exiled ANC will not renounce violence, and war in

456/70

51

Young spoke ... but who listened?

the country goes on. Only inside South Africa, no television cameras are allowed to document the horrors taking place.

The Palestinians say the PLO, the Palestine Liberation Organization, speaks for them. The Israeli government refuses to negotiate with the PLO. Why? Because the PLO refuses to acknowledge Israel's right to exist. So the violence continues. And it gets worse. And now, the level in the battle has sunk to where "worst dreams" have become the reality.

In August of 1979, Andrew Young was forced to resign as American ambassador to the United Nations because he dared to meet with a representative of the PLO. Not only are there no negotiations between Israel and the PLO, the United States is also sworn to the no-talk policy. So when Young, who is now mayor of Atlanta, just met with the PLO and that was found out, he was forced to resign.

Late that August, in what was to be his farewell speech at the Security Council, Young defended the meeting that cost him his job. He said the mistake was the no-talk policy, which he called ridiculous. He said it could lead only to more violence and bloodshed. And he said Israel was already paying a heavy price for its hard-line stance. This was 1979, and Young said then that Israel was "rapidly spending, wasting its moral capital."

Maybe it was the best speech of his time at the UN. But Andrew Young did not prevail. The no-talk policy is still in place. Yesterday, the U.S. government was moving to close the PLO office in New York. Israel, though, was coming to its 40th anniversary with a heavy load of exactly the kind of trouble Andrew Young warned of in 1979.

456190

6/16

N.Y. TIMES - pg. 1
FEB 17, '88

p. 2

ARABS CAST ASIDE CAMP DAVID PLAN AS BASIS FOR PEACE

Egypt, Jordan and Others Tell U.S. Parley Is Needed — Hard Line by Mubarak

By YOUSSEF M. IBRAHIM

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Feb. 16 — Many Arab countries, led by Egypt and Jordan, have told the United States that they firmly reject further interim Middle East negotiations based on the Camp David accords.

Instead, according to Arab diplomats, a new coalition of these lands seems determined to push for what they are calling "a complete solution" of the Arab-Israeli problem that would carry the stamp of both superpowers. The diplomats said the coalition included Syria, Morocco and Arab lands of the Persian Gulf, including Saudi Arabia.

Apparently seeking to include Israel in negotiations, the Reagan Administration has suggested steps that would include an arrangement for local self-government for Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, based on the principles in the Camp David accords of 1978 but with the timetable shortened.

The accords provided for a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, which was signed in 1979. They also envisioned steps to resolve the dispute over the Palestinians' political status. The process was to involve a five-year transitional period that would lead to autonomy, or limited self-government, and allow a permanent resolution of the problem to be found. Talks on achieving autonomy began in 1980 but failed to reach agreement.

The reliance on the accords is viewed as important in Washington because Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel has indicated opposition to any plan not based on Camp David, other than direct talks with Jordan. And Jordan has ruled out negotiations with Is-

Continued From Page A1

rael except in the context of an international conference.

The issue is expected to be the focus of Secretary of State George P. Shultz's visit to the Middle East this month.

Driven by more than two months of Palestinian demonstrations in the Israeli-occupied territories, the Arab countries have repeatedly been signaling the United States that they are prepared to discuss only one peace process — an international peace conference supervised by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and attended by the Palestine Liberation Organization, Arab representatives and Israel.

Strong Words From Mubarak

These points were underscored by President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt today, in his strongest public comments about the Middle East initiative being discussed by State Department diplomats in advance of Mr. Shultz's trip to the region.

In comments that were widely published by the Egyptian press, the Egyptian leader warned that any American peace effort must be based on the realization that the Camp David formula for Palestinian autonomy is "a thing of the past whose time has ended."

This was a striking comment for Mr. Mubarak, who pledged after succeeding the assassinated Anwar el-Sadat as President in 1981 that he would remain loyal to the Camp David accords.

Similarly, Prime Minister Zaid al-Rifai of Jordan, who met with Mr. Mubarak on Monday, said, "We are against any project that deals with partial solutions, a dividing approach, or projects that deal with Palestinian autonomy." He said Jordan and Egypt are convinced that the protests have "changed many of the political equations, pushing us to focus on the need to find a fair solution that guarantees the end of the occupation."

'Total Solution' Sought

Mr. Mubarak pointedly noted that while American peace plans for the Middle East are welcome, they must aim at "a total solution" and an "international peace conference without beating around the bush." He added that all "terms or clauses that refer to the Camp David accord" must be avoided if America is to succeed.

Mr. Mubarak's sharp words, coming after a tour of Arab Gulf countries, Western Europe and the United States over the last few weeks, echoed positions expressed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco and other Arab countries, including hard-line Syria.

A senior Egyptian foreign policy official, who asked not to be identified, said by telephone that "the Americans must understand the only way is to go for a complete solution of the Middle East problem now, and not for more bits and pieces like autonomy."

Egyptian, Saudi, Jordanian and other Arab news outlets have given great attention to the daily clashes between Palestinians and Israelis.

Reflecting sensitivity to public Arab pressure, Mr. Mubarak said that his own initiative, floated a few weeks ago, had been misunderstood. In it, he suggested that the Palestinians stop their uprising for six months in return for an Israeli agreement to freeze Jewish settlement in the occupied Arab territories, expanded political rights and the start of peace talks.

Egypt and others are demanding an international conference.

"The uprising is not a motor in a car that you can turn with a key," he said. "This uprising is a bell. This is not the maximum of the uprising yet, if oppression continues."

U.S. Reaction Is Muted

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 16 — State Department officials said today that President Mubarak's remarks appeared to reflect a desire to shape the debate before Secretary of State Shultz arrives in the region.

The officials noted that the remarks came on the heels of equally harsh sounding statements by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel.

The State Department had no official comment on the remarks.

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N.Y. TIMES FEB. 17, '88

For Arabs, a Quiet 'Day of Anger' on West Bank

8/14

8/14

By JOHN KIFNER
Special to The New York Times

HEBRON, Israeli-Occupied West Bank, Feb. 16 — A Palestinian call for a "day of anger" today produced almost total observance of a commercial strike in the occupied territories but only scattered clashes between protesters and the Israeli Army.

Steel shutters were pulled down over shops and the streets were deserted in every village, town and refugee camp in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. But it was a relatively uneventful day, as large-scale demonstrations failed to materialize.

The Israeli Army appeared to be keeping a low profile, and journalists in the occupied territories did not encounter soldiers in any large numbers. There seemed to be no rush of troops, as there had been in the past, to open stores or break up gatherings of stone-throwers or tire-burners.

But there are few here, least of all the Israeli Army commanders, who are ready to say that after nine weeks of violence the relative pause was anything more than tired boxers clinching, as each side tried to figure out new tactics against the other.

'Widespread Violent Uprising'

"What we confront is a widespread violent uprising led by a nucleus of activists, which enjoys the support and cooperation of the masses," the army's deputy chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Ehud Barak, said this afternoon.

General Barak, the country's most decorated combat officer, appeared to contradict earlier assessments from the country's political leaders, who said the unrest was caused by outside agitators with little local support.

"This is due to decades-long frustration, on a personal, political and economic level, not only with being under the control of our security force, but with the other Arab states and the P.L.O.," the general said of the unrest. "It is simmering below the surface and could erupt at any time."

In the last few days, the Israeli Army has abandoned its policy of prying open the doors of shop owners on strike. The army had previously insisted it must keep the shops open because otherwise political ground would be ceded to the Palestinian resistance. But the forced openings appeared only to engender anger among the Palestinian middle class.

In Nablus on Monday, the army confiscated bolts of black, green, red, and white cloth, the colors that women have been sewing into the Palestinian flag. There have been several raids on printing presses in hopes of discovering the source of the leaflets. But the leaflets can now be run off any photocopier.

The civil administration has also put new limits on the amount of money that can be brought in from Jordan in hopes of limiting any influx of Palestine Liberation Organization funds to support strikers.

At the same time, there has been disquiet over the announced policy of beating up Palestinians and over weekend reports that four Palestinians had been buried alive by men using an army bulldozer.

In the Parliament this evening, Defense Minist[illegible]hak Rabin said

456/70

8/14

9/14

Steel shutters were pulled down and the streets were deserted.

there had been "deviations" from policy.

"The most shocking of all was the bulldozer incident which was not carried out in accordance with an order, and was not a fighting unit," he said. "The attempt to pour dirt on Arabs will be dealt with with the full severity of the law. It is inconceivable that such a thing should happen." The four Palestinians who were buried survived the incident.

Mr. Rabin defended his general policy of "force, might, beatings" to quell the unrest.

"I'm responsible for what happened and what has not happened in the territories and if someone wants to, let him sue," Israeli television quoted the Defense Minister as saying tonight.

P.L.O. Threatens Wider Attacks

Special to The New York Times

NICOSIA, Cyprus, Feb. 16 — The P.L.O. indicated today that it might revoke a commitment to limit guerrilla attacks to Israeli territory.

The veiled threat followed attacks in the Cypriot resort of Limassol that killed three senior P.L.O. military officials on Sunday and that crippled a ferry that was supposed to take Palestinian deportees to Israel on Monday.

The P.L.O. blamed Israel for both attacks. Israel's Ambassador here denied Israeli involvement in the three killings; in the boat attack, while Israeli officials had vowed to prevent the voyage, they left it unclear whether Israel might have attacked the vessel. At the same time, callers claiming to represent Jewish and Palestinian extremists took responsibility for the boat attack.

"We had adhered to the Cairo declaration to halt military operations against enemy targets outside the borders of our country," the P.L.O. said in the statement issued here today. "It is not logical or possible for the halt to continue unilaterally. This is a double-edged weapon."

The Cairo declaration was a 1985 statement by the P.L.O. chairman, Yasir Arafat, renouncing worldwide terrorism against civilian targets. The declaration said the P.L.O. would limit attacks to military targets on Israeli soil.

At a news conference in Kuwait today, Mr. Arafat also seemed to threaten to revoke the Cairo declaration, but refused to say explicitly that he had done so.

"Patience has its limits," he said. "The Cairo announcement is not a commitment from one side only. The Israelis must understand that the sword of terrorism has two edges."

He said the P.L.O. was seeking another vessel for its "journey of return," which Israel has vowed to block.

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N.Y. POST - Feb 17, 88

INSIDE REPORT

SHULTZ'S MIDEAST MYSTERY

10/14

BY ROWLAND EVANS AND ROBERT NOVAK

TOM Dine, head of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), startled a private dinner at Pamela Harriman's Georgetown house last week when he flatly disagreed with Rep. Steve Solarz (D-Bklyn.) that the 1988 election year was no time to launch a U.S. peace offensive in the Middle East.

Solarz, a liberal leader in the pro-Israel congressional bloc, warned that with Israel also holding a 1988 election campaign, U.S. pressure on hard-line Israeli leaders would make peace moves "counterproductive."

Dine, the brainy director of the potent pro-Israel lobby, startled the other guests by saying, in effect: I disagree. I support Shultz.

With Rabbi Alexander Schindler, the liberal rabbi from New York, and other Jewish leaders also supporting Shultz's surprise Mideast peace plan in the administration's waning months, the question is Shultz's target:

Is it to defuse the Palestine time bomb and end for now the killings that are damaging Israel's reputation? Or is it an international peace conference and overall settlement?

Dine, Schindler and most other pro-Israel U.S. leaders are silent about supporting basic changes in Israeli policy that the Reagan administration knows are essential for West Bank peace. That suggests their objective may be less than the broad Israel-Palestinian peace Shultz says he is out to get.

If so, despite firm rhetoric and announced purpose, Shultz will seek only short-term measures to end Palestinian deaths and relieve the ugly condition Israel finds itself in today.

The secretary's veiled purpose became all the more obscure with his answers to questions at a private Feb. 9 State Dept. background session — the same day Pam Harriman gave her dinner for some of the specialists who attended Shultz's briefing.

He was asked about

456/70

10/14

11/14

President Eisenhower's threat to cut off all aid when Israel dragged its feet on withdrawing from the Sinai after its 1956 Suez invason. Shultz gave no audible reply. But in fact,

Is his peace plan serious or a device to ease pressure on Israel?

no official believes Shultz would risk turning the pro-Israeli lobby against him by threatening Israel's $3 billion U.S. aid package.

Likewise, Shultz is saying nothing, at least publicly, about Israel ending its colonization of the West Bank and Gaza.

Jewish towns that have mushroomed along the high ridges of the land Israel captured in the 1967 war are a major cause of the revolt. Palestinians regard the land as their birthright.

But some officials here disagree that Shultz has suddenly ended years of personal isolation from the Mideast cauldron just to give Israel short-term relief. They argue that he has moved beyond merely appeasing the pro-Israel lobby by trying to end the nightly TV drama of Arab beatings.

"Shultz has the Mideast bit in his teeth," we were told by one official, who for the past six years had been trying to convince the secretary to use his personal clout with Israel as he did with the Kremlin over Afghanistan and arms control. He claims the conversion is deep and real.

If so, that might explain the self-confidence which has made Shultz almost exuberant on the Mideast. An official of a former administration suggested to Shultz that he might find it easier to bend Israel if President Reagan invited former Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter to help on

456/70

12/14

Secretary Shultz

a first step: getting Israel to stop building new West Bank towns.

Not a chance, said Shultz. He would not "cop out" and he would not "turn this over to someone else." He insisted the job was his and President Reagan's alone.

One participant at the State Dept. briefing told us the secretary seemed to resent suggestions that he could use the help of the three former presidents.

Shultz tells aides that the sole outsider he might recruit is former Mideast envoy Robert Strauss, his close friend and a Democratic insider who is highly regarded by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

But not even his closest aides know how committed Shultz is to the idea of an international conference. Several days after the State Dept. briefing, Solarz, who was there, told us it was mind-boggling that "following years of playing Rip Van Winkle on the Mideast," Shultz has suddenly admitted during an election year that to get Arab-Israeli peace the U.S. "has to be fully engaged all the time."

That adds a final element of mystery as to what the secretary has in mind. Having played an activist diplomatic role everywhere except the Middle East, Shultz may have acquired a touch of hubris as the result of his proclaimed success in dealings with the Soviet Union and on arms control.

But his own record shows how dangerous hubris or even modest confidence can be in the Middle East, starting with the tragic failure of his 1982 Lebanon-Israeli accord.

456/70

Newsday - Feb. 17, '88

13/12

13/14

Israeli Raids Hit Leaders of Revolt

By Timothy M. Phelps
Newsday Middle East Bureau

Jerusalem — In the past 10 days, the Israeli military has conducted a series of midnight raids in Palestinian towns, villages and refugee camps, rounding up hundreds of the young men who have directed the two-month-old uprising in the occupied territories.

According to sources who have witnessed the sweeps, the soldiers came with precise information, including names and addresses. Palestinian sources in several areas confirmed the military had excellent information, and had in fact identified the people responsible for organizing local demonstrations.

While the arrests — combined with weeks of beatings and shooting of demonstrators — seem to have had some effect, a high-ranking Israeli military official told a news conference yesterday that Israel's troubles are far from over.

"In the last few days there has been relatively more calm but the whole thing is not stable. It still simmers under the surface," said Ehud Barak, deputy army chief of staff.

He said Israel is facing a "widespread, violent uprising led by a nucleus of activists enjoying the support and cooperation of the masses," and fostered by "decades of frustration at the personal, economic and political level."

Barak said that the Palestinians may never return to the relative passivity of the past 20 years.

"I am confident that we can restore relative calm and tranquility, but it won't be the same as the situation a year ago. The whole thing is simmering. It will erupt from time to time."

Barak added that for the moment, the army had abandoned the policy of forcing open shops whose owners participated in commercial strikes. This policy had embittered the relatively well off and politically moderate shopowners in Ramallah, where the policy was most enforced.

The real leadership of the uprising has been the young men in the villages, camps and towns, whom the army has been going after, he said.

Asked whether there was also a broader national leadership, Barak said: "There might be some attempt to organize a coherent leadership." But he said that currently, "there is no well-defined hierarchy with a widely accepted leadership who can decide what should be done."

For example, there is a group or a number of groups that have issued a series of seven leaflets calling for "a day of Palestinian rage" and "attacks on Israeli settlements." The leaflets called specifically for general commercial and

456/70

N.Y. POST Feb 17, '88

131

141

transportation strike yesterday as well as violent demonstrations. The strikes were honored but not the call to violence.

Decisions are carried out much more on the intuition of local leaders, Barak said.

An example of local initiative was shown in the village of Mazra El Sharkiya east of Ramallah recently where a leaflet called for a commercial strike but not a halt to transportation.

Organizers in the village added a handwritten note asking residents not to drive that day. Five cars of people who did had their windows smashed the following night, residents said.

Ambassador Zehdi Labid Terzi and Dr. Nasser Al-Kidwa are two distinguished Palestinians. The first was a schoolteacher and businessman, the second is a dentist by profession. Neither has ever handled a gun in his life.

On the other hand, Benjamin Netanyahu, the representative of the Zionist war criminals, is himself a war criminal who from 1967 to 1973 was a member of the Commando Unit 101 established by the war criminal Ariel Sharon and took part as an officer of a platoon of paratroopers in murdering innocent Arab civilians in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Egypt.

Your constant attacks against the UN and malignment of world leaders are a disgrace to American journalistic tradition.

ISSA NAKHLEH, chairman,
Palestine Arab Delegation, Manhattan

LETTERS

Palestinian group rejects characterization of PLO as terrorist

YOUR editorial of Feb. 8, "No place here for terrorists," is dishonest, despicable and un-American. You and the Wall Street Journal are about the only American newspapers which publish editorials supporting the Zionist war crimes.

You are advocating the immediate closure of the United Nations office of the Palestine Liberation Organnzation on the false grounds that the PLO is a terrorist organization.

The PLO is a national resistance movement recognized by 140 states in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America.

We would like to remind you of what your Nazi Zionist friends have perpetrated against the Palestinians.

In 1948-50 they expelled 700,000 Palestinians from 80 percent of Palestine. More than 10,000 Palestinians were massacred in cold blood, frightening other Palestinians so that they fled from their homes.

They looted, pillaged and plundered all the furniture, machinery, equipment, merchandise and all worldly possessions of the Palestinians in 80 percent of Palestine.

In 1967 the Zionist war criminals waged a war of aggression against Egypt, Jordan and Syria and occupied the remaining 20 percent of Palestine, expelling more than 300,000 Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, and murdering more than 20,000 Palestinians, Jordanians and Egyptians. They used napalm bombs and cluster bombs.

They have ruled the West Bank and Gaza under military law and made this area similar to a Nazi concentration camp.

You attack the representatives of the PLO in the UN by calling them terrorists. This is a malicious calumny.

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 17.03.88
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עותק 25 מתוך 32

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אל:מנכל מדיני
מנכ"ל רהמ'

שיחת ארד -מרפי (16.2)

לדברי מרפי הרעיון מאחורי הנסע היה לתת בדמשק ובריאד
תחושה כללית לגבי ה-CONCEPT החדש,כן שלא
תיווצר בשתי בירות אלו הרגשה של אי שיתוף . במעבר
בפריז אמר רינשאי למרפי שגם הוא נוסע לדמשק ומאחר
והוא מתכוון למסור שם את דברי חביב,בדאי שגם מרפי
יהיה יותר מפורט על-מנת שלא יווצר הרושם שוושינגטון
ניסתה להסתיר משהו מהסורים .

בלונדון נגש את שה"ח האו ונקידים אחרים .הבריטים
הביעו דאגה באילו רעיון הועידה הבינלאומית נדחק
לקרן זווית ומרפי ענה שבמשך שנתיים ניסו אותו ושום
דבר לא זז.בעזרת ה- CONCEPT הם מקווים שנושא
זה,של האלמנט הבינלאומי יהיה יותר MANAGEABLE . הבריטים
אמרו שמקבלים אן שנושא הועידה "חשוב".

בסוריה בילה עשר שעות בשיחות עם אסד ועם שה"ח. הסורים
חזרו מסבר בעמים על עמדתם של התנגדות לצעדים חלקיים
,הסדרי ביניים וכו'. ורוצים בהסדר מלא.הסדר הביניים
הוא לדעת הסורים קמף-דיוויד ולכן שאלו האם התכנית
אינה אלא חזרה אל ק.ד. מרפי אמר שהסביר להם ההבדלים
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וזו גם היתה התרשמות הירדנים בשיחותיהם עם הסורים
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הוא כולל וגם הנושא שלהם ולבנון מוביעים בו/מרבי אמר
שענה בהיוב אן שעיקר המטרה היא לטפל בנושא הפלשתינאי.

חלק גדול מהשיחות במד// בדמשק הוקדש לנושא הלבנוני.
מרבי אמר כי ציין בפני הסורים שהשתרשמות ארהב היא
שסוריה אינה מעוניינת בדיאלוג בין שני הצדדים בענין
הרבורמה הקונסטיטוציונית. הסורים הבהישר זאת ואף טענו
שהיו רוצים שזה יהיה לפני הבחירות בפברואר/כך שהנשיא
החדש נבר יקבל מנדט חדש ומערכת יחסים חדשה ביבו לבין
הפרלמנט וביבו לבין הקבינט. מבל מקום /הוסיף מרבי
לארהב אין כל הוכחה שסוריה נמצאת בקשר עם ג'ומאייל
ובינתיים החזבאללה הולך ומתחזק והקיטוב הולך וגדל.

לשאלת ארד על עמדת הסורים לגבי הירדנה חזר מרבי שהסורים
רוצים בהצהרה כללית שארהב דוגלת בפתרון כל היבטי
הסכסוך , ושזה יעשה על ידי הבאת כל הצדדים לשולחן
הדיונים .לשאלה נוספת אמר מרבי כי הסורים יוצר להמשיך
בדו-שיח ויחליטו יותר מאוחר:בשלב זה הם לא סגרו את
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זאת. מרבי הגדיר את הגישה הסורית כ- PUZZLED AND
SUSPICIOUS. THEY HAVE BEEN OUTSIDE FOR TOO LONG
בשלב זה לא הוחלט אם המדביר יסע גם לדמשק אף כי הירדנים
מעוניינים בכך .גם מובארק אמר שצריך להזור שוב אל
הסורים .

בביקור בריאד אמרו הסעודים שהפלשתינאים הם לב הבעייה
ושכל שאר הבעיות באזור הן תולדה של בעייה זו. היו
מעוניינים יותר בשיחות על המערך .

לשאלת השגריר האם הביקור הוליד שינויים ב- COCEPT
אמר מרבי שכפי שנאמר לה'ב' אולמרט, זהו ה- COCEPT
אף כי הוסיף WE ARE STILL DIGESTING . שואל מה היתה
הרגשתם של התכיים מוידור ואולמרט והשגריר עבה שיש
להם הרגשה יותר ברורה של ה-
CONCEPT ושל הקשיים שבו.הה'מ. אמר שאולי שמעו מרוט
רב יותר של מרכיבי הקונסטציה האמריקאית ממה שרוביבשטיין
שמע ומרבי העיר שאבן בביקור בארץ ביבו היה שרוביבשטיין
הרגיש משהו נמו UNFAIR AND
UNCOMFORTABLE. לשאלה ביצד יציגו האמריקאים את ה
CONCEPT

דף 3 מתוך 3
עותק 25 מתוך 32

בבני הסובייטים אמר מרבי שעדיין לא דן על כך עם המזכיר
, אך שהסובייטים ביקשו מבגש בדרג מוגבה ונבחר בשלב
זה.הוסיף שהם מבקשים מהסובייטים תשובה לגבי חמש הנקודות
שהוצגו ביולי,שהסובייטים אומרים שכבר התייחסו אליהן
בצורה כללית חיובית וכי הם חוזרים ואומרים שזו לא
היתה תשובה רצינית.

לגבי ביקור המזכיר אמר מרבי שכל מה שידוע הוא תאריך
היציאה 25.2 ותאריך העזיבה של האזור-1.3

ערן

תפ: שהה,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,בירן,מצפא

102.1.1 תדלין אלון

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

כט' בשבט תשמ"ח
16 בפברואר 1988

2285

אל : לשכת שה"ח

מאת : מנהל מצפ"א

הנדון: הצעה לסדר היום - תשובת שה"ח

"ארצות הברית נוטלת מאז ומתמיד חלק במאמצי השלום באזור וקשה לצפות להתקדמות בתהליך השלום ללא סיועה.

ממשלחת ישראל אינה צופה לחץ מצד ארה"ב ובודאי שאינה מזמינה לחץ כזה. אדרבא, מהלכי השלום נידונים עם ארצות הברית ומתואמים עמה ברוח הידידות וההבנה השורה בין שתי המדינות".

ב ב ר כ ה,

מיכאל שילה

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

32

102.1.1 עניין

פס דבר

דח 1 מתוך דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 16.2.88

מס' מבוק

377 1/4

תמשרד

אל: מצפ"א

מע"ת

דע: יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת

מאת: עיתונות

תהליך השלום

להלן מתוך ה"וושינגטון פוסט" 16-2-88.

יוסי גל

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Shamir Opposes Land-for-Peace Trade

U.S. Formula Can't Be Basis for Negotiations, Israeli Says

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has sent an envoy here to tell Secretary of State George P. Shultz that President Reagan's "territory for peace" principle cannot serve as the basis for Israel's entering new peace negotiations on the fate of the strife-torn occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The envoy, Ehud Olmert, a member of Shamir's Likud coalition in the Knesset, met Sunday with Shultz's executive assistant, Charles Hill, to discuss the proposed new American approach to the Middle East peace process.

The approach envisages initial Arab-Israeli talks on limited autonomy for the occupied territories and then negotiations on their final status, starting within six months, based on the "territory for peace" principle contained in President Reagan's September 1982 speech on the Middle East.

Radio Israel reported that Olmert told Hill that Shamir would "never" accept to negotiate a final settlement for the territories on the basis of this formula and warned that if Shultz continues with this approach, the new American peace initiative is doomed to failure.

Shultz recently told visitors to the State Department that all parties must clearly understand that the new U.S. peace initiative will go forward only on the basis of the "territory for peace" formula and U.N. Resolution 242 guaranteeing peace and security for all Middle Eastern nations.

An Israeli Embassy spokesman confirmed that Olmert met Hill Sunday "for a discussion of the American initiative." He described it as "an important meeting" but said it was "not ground-breaking."

The spokesman, Yossi Gal, said Olmert had been in Palm Beach, Fla., for a meeting of the B'nai

See SHAMIR, A16, Col. 5

YITZHAK SHAMIR
... sends emissary to Shultz

3/4 377 3/4

Shamir Opposes U.S. Plan For Restarting Peace Talks

SHAMIR, From A1

B'rith Anti-Defamation League, where Shultz was the guest speaker Friday. Olmert reportedly met Shultz briefly there but, because he did not have time to discuss the new American initiative, Olmert came here Sunday to see Hill.

Yesterday Shamir, leaving Israel for a visit to Italy, publicly stated his opposition to any negotiations based on the "territories for peace" formula. A State Department official said there would be no comment on Shamir's statements or the visit of his latest envoy.

More than 50 Palestinians have been killed and thousands arrested by Israeli authorities in the territorities in the past two months. The violence has spurred the Reagan administration after months of diplomatic inactivity to search for ways to revive the long-stalled peace process.

Shamir appears to be hardening his position on the issue of peace talks in preparation for Shultz's visit to the region to discuss the new American peace approach starting Feb. 24. Shultz is expected to meet with Shamir Feb. 28-29, after visiting Egypt and Jordan.

Shamir's mounting opposition to opening negotiations on anything other than limited Palestinian autonomy at this time suggests the new U.S. peace initiative calling for final-settlement negotiations as well may be headed for difficulties.

However, Shultz appears to have found an unexpected ally in the American Jewish community, which has been extremely supportive of his new approach and is pressing Shamir to show flexibility. A delegation of 60 Jewish leaders is planning to visit Jerusalem for talks with Shamir at the same time Shultz is there, according to Radio Israel.

The Israeli prime minister is also pressing Shultz to avoid spelling out any American position on the outcome of the final status negotiations ahead of time and to remain noncommittal, according to Israeli sources.

Reagan, in a September 1982 Middle East address, called for Palestinian self-government in the territories "in association with Jordan"

4/4

377 4/4

and Arab-Israeli negotiations "involving an exchange of territory for peace."

Israel would have to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in return for Arab recognition of the Jewish state and guarantees for its security, Reagan said. Shamir has always steadfastly opposed any moves that would lead to such an Israeli withdrawal from the territories, which he refers to by their biblical names, Judea and Samaria.

Israel radio further reported that Olmert has told Hill that Shamir is opposed to any automatic "linkage," or "interlocking mechanism" as Shultz is calling it, between talks on interim arrangements for the occupied territories and subsequent negotiations on their final status.

Both Olmert and another close Shamir associate, Dan Meridor, who was here last week, have argued with Shultz that if Jordan and the Palestinians know in advance that the final status negotiations will begin on a specific date, they will never take the initial limited autonomy talks seriously.

Shamir wants to stick to the limited autonomy plan envisaged by the 1978 Camp David accords, which called for a five-year trial period for Palestinian self-rule in the occupied territories before any decision is reached on their final status. Talks on this plan between Israel and Egypt broke down after 1981, and both Egypt and Jordan have opposed their restitution.

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

סיפס מברק

דף 1 מתוך ___ דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ת 16.2.88

מס' מבוק

376

אל: מצפייא, מע"ח

דע: יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת

מאת: עיתונות

תהליך השלום

להלן תמליל התכנית Night Line בה רואיינו ברזינסקי וקיסינגר מיום ד' 11.2.88.

יוסי גל

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376 2/10 (1)

ABC'S "NIGHTLINE"
INTERVIEW WITH
DR. HENRY KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE AND
DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZENZINSKI, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 1988

MR. KOPPEL: Joining us now from our New York studio is Henry Kissinger, who as Secretary of State, was principal foreign policy advisor to Presidents Nixon and Ford. Following the 1973 Yom Kippur war, Mr. Kissinger was instrumental in mediating between Israel and Egypt to bring about Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, and mediating between the Israelis and the Syrians to bring about Israel's disengagement from the Golan Heights. Joining us here in Washington is Zbigniew Brzenzinski, former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter. Mr. Brzenzinski was a major player in the Camp David process which led to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1978.

Dr. Kissinger, for a mediator to have useful ground on which he can work, both sides have to be not only willing but eager to have a mediator step in. There almost has to be a sense of desperation. Are the Israelis and the Palestinians desperate enough yet, do you think?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know whether the -- I think the Israelis are clearly looking for a way out. And I don't know whether the -- the negotiating partner should be the Palestinians or the other Arab states. I don't think there is a Palestinian group with which to negotiate.

MR. KOPPEL: Well, there is a Palestinian group with which to negotiate. The question is whether the Israelis will be willing to negotiate with them, and that's the PLO.

DR. KISSINGER: And I think it is out of the question for Israel to give up territory on the West Bank -- which is about 25 miles wide -- and give it up to the PLO which has been a group that in its nature, whatever its formal program, which also, incidentally, stands for the distruction of Israel, but which in its -- which in its nature cannot be satisfied with the status quo of -- that might be established by a negotiation. So I think there has to be an intermediate step in which the other Arab states, especially the moderate states -- Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, take responsibility for what territory Israel will give up in Gaza and on the West Bank.

MR. KOPPEL: Dr. Brzezinski, you have just returned from a few days in Israel. Is it your impression that the young Palestinians there now and those YOUNG (speaker's emphasis) Palestinians -- those under the age of 21 -- I've been told that they represent now about 75 percent of the population, for example, on the West Bank -- are they prepared to let the Saudis or the Jordanians or the Egyptians represent them even in preliminary discussions?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, I'm not quite sure whether these young people have any defined political perspective. I think they have a rather clear view of what they do not like. And they do not like the status quo. But one of the problems is that the Palestinians are disorganized, moderate leadership is not in charge and there's no clear Palestinian perspective or even strategy.

MR. KOPPEL: Well, I mean, there is a clear Palestinian perspective it would seem, at least in the minds of the leadership of the PLO. But as Dr. Kissinger has pointed out, the Israelis are not going to negotiate with the PLO. I mean, ultimately, are we just being sucked into some kind of a vortex that has to be resolved in violence, where the two sides simply cannot or will not talk to one another?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, I would hope not. But it does seem to me that one has to, so to speak, go through the options: Can we mediate? Well, Henry mediated back in the '70's and of course, President Carter and his team mediated late in the '70's. But then you had an American leadership that was willing to bite the bullet -- was willing to stick with it. Henry stuck with it for

376 4/10 (3)

day after day, and President Carter stuck with it. That isn't the case today. Secondly, you had an Arab leader willing to take a chance on peace -- Sadat -- even to risk his head for it. That is not the case today. And thirdly, you had an Israeli leadership with a defined strategy which accepted a notion of peace and was willing to bargain for it. And that isn't quite the case today with a stalemate. So that's out.

The second option is to have this large international circus that the administration is talking about. I frankly doubt that this is going to solve the problem and lead to anything tangible.

The third option, the one which I favor personally, is to try to prevail on the Israelis to take some unilateral initiatives right now regarding the West Bank, not trying to resolve the issue ultimately, but trying to create somewhat more propitious conditions. And I think there are some things that they could do.

MR. KOPPEL: Very quickly, if you would, go through two or three.

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, simply two. One is simply impose the autonomy arrangements that were provided for in Camp David. They don't need to negotiate about this with the Jordanians. There are enough Palestinian mayors and officials with whom this could be worked out. Alternatively, have elections in the West Bank. In either case, you'd begin to change the atmosphere, you'd begin to change the rules of the game. And I think that is needed right now.

MR. KOPPEL: I'll tell you what, we're going to take a break in just a moment. But when we come back, Dr. Kissinger, I'd like to raise with you option two that Dr. Brzezinski just mentioned. In the past, you have always been opposed to bringing the Soviets into the Middle Eastern process. But there's a new Soviet leadership these days who is -- I mean, we're talking now about Mr. Gorbachev, who is far more creative in some of his thinking. And I'd like to get your thinking about how useful it might be to bring him into that process. We'll continue our discussion in a moment.

(Commerrial break)

MR. KOPPEL: Continuing our conversation now with Zbigniew

376 5/10 (4)

Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger, during the early '70s you worked very hard to minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East. Is it now time to bring them into the process?

DR. KISSINGER: The problem with Soviet participation in the Middle East is that they can take -- or have taken in the past, the position of their radical Arab friends. And the practical consequence of this is that it would isolate us at any international meeting, put us in the position of a lawyer of Israel, while they are making hay with the Arab countries. Where in fact, the only country that can really bring progress is the United States.

Now, we could have exploratory conversations with the Soviets quietly, in which we can find out what their idea of a political settlement is. If it turns out that they are prepared to ask compromises of their Arab friends, then we can make the determination whether they can play a useful role. Otherwise, I think we will be in the same dilemma in the '80s that we were in the '70s.

MR. KOPPEL: Let me ask you about something that reportedly happened today. Apparently the Attorney General, Mr. Meese, has decided to close down the PLO Office to the United Nations in New York. Question, Dr. Kissinger, if we are going to present ourselves as being, you know, the honest broker ultimately between Palestinians in general and the Israelis; or Arabs in general and the Israelis, was that a smart move?

DR. KISSINGER: Oh, I think that is not a move that I consider of major consequence. I think it is not -- I would

376 6/10 (5)

probably not have recommended making that particular move even though I'm against having the PLO participate in the negotiations. If they were accredited to the United Nations, I think basically we ought to let the United Nations make the determination of what units -- or what organizations are accredited to it. That isn't the key problem. The key problem is do we know what we consider to be a fair settlement? Are we prepared to stand for it? If other nations want to help in principle there's no reason not to have them, but it is a disaster to spent all our time on procedural maneuvers to see how to assemble a conference without knowing what the conference is supposed to do and when a deadlock is the most likely outcome.

MR. KOPPEL: Let me bring you back to your own question. Do we know the elements of a reasonable solution? Would you be able to outline for us, for example, steps one, two and three?

DR. KISSINGER: I have my ideas, but that doesn't mean that this is necessarily what a careful examination and the government would do. I think a number of steps -- one, Israel has to recognize that it cannot continue to govern a hostile population by force. So it has to give up Gaza and part of the West Bank. Second, Israel cannot return to the 1960's southern borders because it would not be defensible. That would leave Israel in the position of Czechoslavakia after Munich. Third, the giving up of any territory on the West Bank would be such a traumatic experience for Israel

376 7/10

that to put the PLO there at the same time seems to me absolutely out of the question.

MR. KOPPEL: So there would be an interim --

DR. KISSINGER: So therefore the moderate Arab states have to recognize this and have to create at least a transitional period in which the process of self-government in the West Bank can be examined. Now if this framework is not acceptable to other nations, assuming our government agrees with that, I see no point in the conference.

MR. KOPPEL: All right, let me, let me --

DR. KISSINGER: If it isn't that framework, there should be some other framework.

MR. KOPPEL: Let me stop you there for a moment and turn to Dr. Brzezinski. Whether now we are to assume that your proposal is implemented or Dr. Kissinger's proposal is implemented, let me draw both of your attentions to the simple fact of the matter that we are now smack dab in the middle of an American presidential election year, and given that fact is any kind of American proposal which is going to cause -- which is going to call on the Israelis to make what Dr. Kissinger correctly refers to as traumatic moves -- is that viable? Is that going to happen until after this election is over?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, I don't think we would be able to implement it at this stage. We don't have the will. As you said, the elections are upon us. We can't focus on this. That's one problem. But I have a further problem with the notion that we ought to have a concrete concept of the eventual settlement, and it is this: at this stage, neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians or the Arabs more generally are prepared

326 8/10 (7)

to agree on what the final settlement ought to be like. And therefore, we need a transitional phase in which both sides get accustomed to cohabitation, to living with each other under somewhat different conditions. And this is why I have always felt that the notion of autonomy for the Palestinians should not be viewed as a single, discrete event, but rather as a process, a process in which the perceptions of both sides towards each other are altered by the fact that they begin to live peacefully, in a more collaborative relationship.

MR. KOPPEL: If I may, let me interrupt. We have to take a break. We'll continue our discussion with Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Brzezinski in just a moment.

(8)

376 P/10

(Commercial break)

MR. KOPPEL: Continuing our discussion now with Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Dr. Kissinger, your reaction, first of all, to the possibilities of doing anything in an American election year.

DR. KISSINGER: Oh, I think we have to formulate a policy. We may not be able to implement it completely. Incidentially, I think that Zbig's idea of a unilateral Israeli step is a very creative idea with which I would concur. The only thing I would point out is this, whatever area is put under self-government, is the area that will eventually have to be put under Arab rule. And therefore, the issue of where the line is of the West Bank cannot be avoided in this manner. If it is a device simply to continue Israeli rule, it will not work. So the Israelis will have to face the fact that the area that is put under autonomy will eventually be the area that international opinion will ask it to put under Arab government.

MR. KOPPEL: You are both dealing with some very sophisticated, and if I might add, at least medium-range, possibly long-range realities. The reality that we're dealing with right now is the one that Avi Posner(?) referred to in the end of that set-up piece, and that is the daily drum beat of propaganda that is created by these pictures that we see coming out of Israel and the Occupied Territories. Now, Dr. Brzezinski, what impact, given my impression that this is going to go on for some time, what impact is that going to have on the possibility of any kind of logical, sensible talks taking place?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Oh, I think it makes it much more difficult. Although when I was in Israel itself, I was rather encouraged by the attitude of the Israeli public. I think there's a great deal of soul-searching going on, and a realization that something has to be done. I think there's a world of difference between the public attitudes in general, especially within the politically active segment of the Israeli people and the Israeli leadership, which is gridlocked and less able to move.

MR. KOPPEL: Dr. Kissinger, we have about 30 seconds left -- a question you probably won't want to answer, but is there any real leadership in Israel right now that is capable of kind of grabbing the reins and saying, painful as it may be, we have to take some tough action?

376 10/10 (9)

DR. KISSINGER: They have an absolute responsibility to develop such a leadership in the course of this year. They cannot ask the United States to solve their internal problems. They must develop a strategy. Right now they do not have it, but they must develop it. It is their obligation for survival.

MR. KOPPEL: Dr. Kissinger, Dr. Brzezinski, I thank you both very much for joining us this evening. That's our report for tonight. I'm Ted Koppel in Washington. For all of us here in ABC News, good night.

END

102.1.1 מגדל עלי

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

כח' בשבט תשמ"ח
15 בפברואר 1988

2279

אל : תפוצת "דף מצפ"א"

מאת : מנהל מצפ"א

הנדון: התכנית האמריקנית"

להלן כמה משפטי מפתח מפי שולץ לגבי התכנית האמריקנית:-

1) "WE SEEK QUICK CHANGE IN POLITICAL CONDITIONS ON THE WEST-BANK AND GAZA WHICH WOULD INCLUDE SUCH THINGS AS CONTROL OVER THEIR DAILY LIVES, SUCH AS LAND, WATER AND POLICE

2) THERE ARE IMPORTANT POSSIBILITIES THAT COULD BE WORKED OUT IN A RELATIVELY SHORT SPACE OF TIME, LIKE, SAY A SIX-MONTH PERIOD FROM WHEN THE GONG RANG , SO TO SPEAK, THAT WOULD, WHEN IMPLEMENTED, BY A TRANSITION AUTHORITY THAT WOULD BE IDENTIFIED THROUGH SOME KIND OF ELECTORAL PROCESS, MAKE THE CONTROL OF LIFE ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IMMEDIATELY QUITE DIFFERENT.

3) IT IS IMPORTANT, ESSENTIAL, TO SET A DATE CERTAIN ON WHICH IT WOULD BE AGREED THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD START; AND THAT DATE CERTAIN SHOULD NOT LAG FAR BEYOND THE END OF THIS SIX-NONTH PERIOD, AND PRECEDE THE ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION OF WHAT WAS AGREED TO DURING THE SIX-MONTHS SO THAT THE ACTUAL FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS WOULD GET STARTED RAPIDLY .

4) THE FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS WILL PROCEED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF FOREKNOWLEDGE THAT IT'S BEEN AGREED THAT THERE WILL BE IN THIS PICTURE THE NOTION OF TERRITORY FOR PEACE.

בברכה,

מיכאל שילה

ISRAEL ישראל

102.1.1

תיק תכנית שולץ

The Shultz plan

Following are extended excerpts from U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz's remarks to the Council of Foreign Relations, delivered in Washington last week.

I think it's well to remind ourselves, before we start delving into the undoubted great problems, that there has been a great deal of progress made over the years in this field (of the peace process).

There is a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel that has lasted. It has been possible recently to work out the method for dealing with the Taba dispute. Egypt has stuck with the peace treaty despite a lot of pressures and being, in effect, boycotted by its fellow Arab neighbours. The Arab countries have now come back to Egypt, so to speak, even as Egypt has held its position.

There have been a great deal of discussions held between people in the government of Israel and people in, at least, some of the other countries. An Arab bank has been established on the West Bank. It seems to be working, or has been working. I haven't looked in the last month or so, but it did get started pretty well. It is impossible for such things to get started unless there are some pretty detailed and careful discussions between the banking authorities in Israel and banking authorities in some other countries, and so on.

What these achievements show is that under the right circumstances negotiations can work.

I suppose if you look around at the rather barren landscape otherwise, you can't help but come to the conclusion that nothing much else works because the violence advocated by the PLO hasn't gotten them very much. In fact, it hasn't gotten them anything. I might say the Israeli invasion of Lebanon didn't exactly turn out that well.

So somehow those kinds of measures, direct measures that have a military or violent component – and I don't mean to compare the two or juxtapose the two in any particular way – have not worked but negotiations have worked.

Let me briefly review, in a very simple way so lots will be left out, a kind of a flow of events over the last three, four, five years. We had a period in which the discussions that we in the United States conducted with others tended to emphasize one element or another of the substance of what be done with problems. The President's September 1 initiative was an outstanding example of a set of substantive suggestions about what might take place.

'There is almost universal joy that the U.S. may get itself heavily engaged.'

Certainly, the so-called autonomy talks under the Camp David agreement were a set of substantive talks about things that might be done on the West Bank and Gaza. So there was a period of work on the substance and, as these discussions were being held, it seemed more and more that there came to be a drive to say, well, maybe there should be a negotiation but before the negotiation can start, I have to have even more substance. I have to know where the negotiations are going to end before I am willing to start.

From the U.S. side, we started to emphasize that, of course, you can't know where it's going to end. People have different positions. But if you can get started in a reasonable way, that's what a negotiation is about. In the end, a right answer is the answer that people, who are knowledgeable and responsible and have to report to their constituencies, agree is a reasonable answer.

So we have to talk about getting into a negotiation. We addressed that, and others did. A lot of progress was made. Nevertheless, we didn't quite get there and there came to be sort of two tracks of discussion. One was, as we said many times and many in Israel said, in the end you have to get into a direct negotiation between Israel and, at least with respect to the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan with a Palestinian part of their delegation. That was an effort to identify a process.

King Hussein was very uncomfortable with that idea and felt, for various reasons – probably, pretty good reasons – that he couldn't enter such negotiations except in connection with some international umbrella or international conference, or some way of legitimatizing the direct negotiations, no doubt referring back in some manner to UN Security Council Resolution 242 and therefore to the United Nations.

So the idea of an international conference got talked about more and more. Once again, a discussion about a process. Many felt, I felt, that as we discussed these processes with key parties, we found ourselves getting nowhere and, in an odd way, the reason seemed to be rather similar no matter who you talked to.

On the one hand, when we talked about direct negotiations, the Jordanians might say – did say – if I entered direct negotiations, where does that take me? We hear the Israelis say, there is no territory to be traded for peace. All of that territory will stay in Israel's hands. And if that's the case, then what's the point of a negotiation? The act of entering negotiation is a big thing. If I'm going to do it, and bite all that off, then I need to feel confident that I've got someplace to go. So I'm uneasy about direct negotiations.

By the same token, at least many in Israel, when an international conference is broached, take the view – not too difficult to understand – will look who would be at the international conference. Who are the friends of Israel there? Who are the people at the international conference who are going to understand all of the difficulties and subtleties and security needs, and so forth, that we have; and what tends to happen, no matter what you say, at the beginning, in the dynamics of a group like that. And isn't it likely that it will sort of seek some extreme and we'll wind up saying that the answer is that Israel must go back to the 1967 borders.

But both (the Jordanians and the Israelis) looked at these processes and they said, we don't want to start because of the substance that seems to be inferred by the process. We see the substance is not going to work, as far as we're concerned, and therefore we're stepping into a hole, so we don't want to do that.

We thought about that pretty hard. We had concluded some time ago that we had to re-orient this picture if we were going to succeed. On the other hand, in order to get any place, people's attitudes had to be such that they really would be ready to make some changes, shift their gears and perhaps look to some positions that they hadn't previously found very agreeable.

The violence on the West Bank and Gaza, which has erupted in the last couple of months, does seem to have had quite an impact on people's thinking, not in response to the violence as such. I think it's very important not to get ourselves in the position of saying, because of the violence, we do such-and-such. But, rather, reflecting on it and perhaps scratching some heads and wondering why, at least, I have found a little more receptivity to thinking about these problems in a fresh way.

So what we have said is, here is this peace process, here is this area, and over a long period of time a great many very smart, very well informed people have thought about it hard, and it's not likely that there is some flash of a new idea that somebody is going to come up. But maybe we can take the ideas that have been lying around and worked on, and particularly somewhere at least a little progress has been made, rearrange them and find ourselves a new blend of potential substance and potential procedure. So we have been trying to do that.

'Odd lame-duck administration. We're working harder than ever.'

I think that one ingredient is clear and that is, if anything important is going to happen, the United States has to really put its back into it and be ready to work hard, and continuously, with the parties on whatever it is that we put into the field.

So, in broad terms, here is the notion of a somewhat new blend of ideas to work with. I will try to use words that are slightly different just in order not to turn people off immediately by saying, oh, well, you just mean this or you just mean that.

First of all, it seems clear that it's important to do some things on the West Bank and Gaza in a relatively short time span that can have the potential of making a genuine and sharp change in the conditions of life there – and by that I mean in the political conditions of life, in the extent to which people have more control and more sense of control, the reality and the sense of the reality over, basically, how they live their daily lives, things that have to do with community services, that have to do with land, water, and the police and so on. So I think there are a number of things that can be done there, and it is our belief that drawing on things that have been worked on in days past, and adding to them, adapting them, that there are important possibilities that could be worked out in a relatively short space of time, like, say a six-month period from when the gong rang, so to speak, that would, when implemented, by a transition authority that would be identified through some kind of electoral process, make the control of life on the West Bank and Gaza immediately quite different.

Second, that kind of a change, while perhaps welcome, should be welcome, certainly isn't sufficient. And no one would be satisfied until we had come to grips with the final-status type issues. And so, rather than have addressing those issues postponed and often at some distant point, we believe it is important, essential, to set a date certain on which it would be agreed that these negotiations would start; and that that date certain should not lag far beyond the end of this six-month period, and precede the actual implementation of what was agreed to during the six months so that the actual final status negotiations would get started rapidly.

So here you have, basically, three substantive things: one dealing with things that can be done quickly; another dealing with the issues of final status; and a third dealing with the inter-relationship between them, a kind of interlocking between these two areas of substance. As we talk with the parties, of course, they want to know more about the details of what you have in mind of those things that can be done immediately and what you have in mind about final status, and in particular, whether there is in this picture the formula of territory for peace, or whether it will go on the basis of Resolution 242.

'That we don't have to worry about the next election is an advantage.'

And the answer to that has to be yes, or you don't start. Now, we have felt that if it turns out that, at least in a broad way but with enough content so that people have a genuine feel, an honest feel for what the content might actually be, if it turns out that in a broad way we can get the government of Israel on board, get the government of Jordan on board, Egypt, with others informed, whether – how supportive they would be of it will vary, I'm sure – but if that can be done, and people then have some better feeling for what the substance would be that would come out of all this, then that would shed a little different light on the procedural issues. Perhaps an international conference under those circumstances wouldn't seem so much of a chance.

And by the same token, if you say that the international conference takes place on the basis that it can't dictate to the parties, can't overturn anything they agree on, and essentially, would know beforehand that out of it will come direct negotiations, perhaps the direct negotiations too won't seem like such a big roll of the dice. So by working the substance in a little different way and trying to put it into people's minds in a secure manner, we have felt then perhaps we can go back to some of these procedural questions, use the good work that has been done, and get the peace process genuinely invigorated again. It won't be just a dry hole.

Now, that leaves an awful lot of room for hard negotiation we know, and many have told me that if we ever do get this started, we'll be sorry because it'll be so difficult; but at any rate, that is what we would like to do, and we are, I think, fairly close to having touched the various bases and getting ourselves in a position of wanting to decide whether it is worthwhile and potentially productive to proceed, and proceed on a strong, energetic basis to try to get the peace process really rolling, and see if we can't come to grips with these issues in a productive and satisfactory way. So, that is, fundamentally, our story.

But our thought here is that because there is concern in the region, people are a little more open than they were. I believe that many in Israel are puzzled what to do. Here are these things happening. They haven't happened quite that way before. And I am convinced that it is also true that in the Arab world, particularly countries around Israel, they are very uneasy about these developments, because as many have said to me, this isn't just an Israeli problem, although they are very critical of Israel, how Israel is handling it. But nevertheless, they are very clear that these developments are things that can affect their country just as much, and so there is a desire to do something with the problem; and I think that's what gives us our opportunity to try a little new blend of substance and procedure, and see if we can get things started that seem to be stuck beforehand.

The actions that have taken place on the West Bank and Gaza, in a sense have identified Palestinians who are there; and just who they are, and whether there is any one, two, or three people that you can think of as leaders is a question mark. But if nothing else, these developments say that the Palestinians residing on the West Bank and Gaza are not too happy with the leadership they have been getting from wherever, and they're kind of taking things somewhat into their own hands.

Now, that is a problem in asking yourself, "How do you find them" but it's a plus in that you have people who are in the geographic area, and part of the people in that area that, at least in the first instance, you want to represent, so there are pluses and minuses here, and of course, if you do get started and you can make the sharp change I was referring to in the conditions, political conditions on the West Bank and Gaza through establishing authority through an electoral process, that process gives you, but its own terms, an outcome in terms of individual people.

On the whole, what we find is that there is almost univeral joy, in a way, at the possibility that the U.S. may get itself heavily engaged and really go to work on this hard. That's welcomed. They want us there. And there is a good responsiveness to the ideas that we've presented, and people want to talk about them. They seem real; they seem to be grappling with the problems as they are, not concocted. So we just have to see.

Now, as far as the Soviets are concerned, their role in all of this, as we have looked back and seen what they've been doing, has not been a helpful role at all. And when King Hussein, for example, worked out his arrangement with the PLO whenever that was, a couple of years ago, the Soviets did everything they could to sabotage it. So their instincts in the past have not been, as we would see it, constructive.

Whether they are prepared to work in this environment and take part in the kind of conference I described, I don't know. But they are very anxious to discuss these issues, and it may be that they will have something to contribute that's positive, I hope so. It remains to be seen.

'It's assumed that we have to work with both arms of the unity gov't.'

Obviously, everybody knows the president and I will not be in office come 1989, so our ability to say what the United States will be doing in 1989 has that constraint on it.

But it isn't a complete constraint, because if what takes place, takes place with a lot of support from the people in this country who are especially concerned with this issue and tends to have bipartisan support in the Congress and is moving in a reasonable direction, then those ideas will be picked up and reinforced, and part of our job, of course, is to try to leave things in as good a shape for our successors as we possibly can.

I also think there are some things, particularly in the interim arrangements area, that can be accomplished with a lot of work and basically gotten more or less in place. So those things can be done before an election.

As far as President Reagan is concerned, there are certain advantages in not being caught up in the campaign. He's an odd kind of lame duck. It's an odd lame duck administration. We're working harder than ever, and there are more things to do. There's more fluidity all over the world right now than there has been in quite a long while, so I think we will be active in this problem and the fact that we don't have to worry about the next election, so to speak, is in some respects an advantage. At least it won't be a distraction to us.

In Israel, obviously, the electoral politics are very much on everyone's mind. We have to approach it sensitive to that, but to a certain extent oblivious to it. That is, we have to say to ourselves that if there is an opportunity to move toward peace here, we should do it, and that is a good thing. And somehow the Israeli electoral politics of whatever happens will sort itself out, and, if it does turn out to be a good thing, we would hope everybody will get on the side of it, and it won't be a divisive issue in Israel.

I believe that in Israel, in any country, if you come to negotiate about the sorts of issues that we have involved here, which goes so deep to the values, to the security, to the historic religious base of the countyr, as these issues do, you really can't expect to do important things unless there is broad support in that country. 51-49 is not the basis on which you can do things that are as difficult as these.

So we have made it an assumption that we have to work with both arms of the national unity government, and both have to be on board if we're going to get anywhere. So that's the way we're going about it.

Now, things having to do with the peace process are the most difficult, and in a way the terms of the national unity government itself sort of specified that this was a subject on which cooperation between the parties was unlikely, but I don't rule it out for that reason.

'If there will not be any give on territory, any movement is unlikely.'

I don't claim to be an expert on Israeli politics, and, as I have probed into it, I find there are very few people who are real experts on Israeli politics. It's a pretty complicated business. But most people who claim to be and look ahead to the election that will take place seem to think that things may change a little, but they're not going to change a lot, which means that as you look to the future, you're going to have these two parties, and, if you're going to do something that is as penetrating as we're talking about, I think you're going to have to have both parties involved and on board.

Finally, let me say – refer you back to what I described as our new blend. Things that can be done immediately, final status, and a connection between them that is set out, all agreed and in broad terms in advance before we go on to the procedural issues. And among those needs to be the facing up to the fact that when we get the final status, 242 and the formula of territory for peace has to be there. And, if it's impossible to face that fact, then it's impossible to get going. So we have to confront that and work at that going in.

I think there has to be the open invitation, so to speak, for an Israeli-Syrian negotiation, an Israeli-Lebanon negotiation, as well as an Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian negotiation. That has to be there if people want to pick it up, and maybe they will, although it seems doubtful.

Our intention, as what we've done already shows, is to make a point of being sure that all of the states surrounding Israel do know what's going on, that we go talk to them, we hear what they have to say, we inform them, and so for that reason we made a point of going early on to Syria, and we have kept the Russians posted in a way. And I will be in Moscow in another, whatever, week and a half or two weeks, and so I'm sure we'll have discussion of the Middle East and get some sense of what the Soviets may or may not be willing to do upon such a situation.

I think the problem to be addressed now as we start, and if we are confronted with the necessity to assume that there will not be any give on territory, then I think there is unlikely to be any movement. So this is something that we're talking about and making plain our opinion, and those in charge in the various countries involved have to look at this and let us know what their view is. And people are struggling with this. It's tough. Real tough.

102.1.1 אילון אלי

הודעה:2/5421
אל:המשרד
מ-:פריס/נר:230/תא:120288/זה:1400/דח:ר/סג:שמ
נד:@

שמור/דגיל

אל:אירופה 1

מאת:השגריר פריס

הירזמה האמריקנית.

מרפי, בדרכו לארה"ב, ביקר בפריס וקיים פגישה עם PEROL,
מזכ"ל הרציף, בהעדר שה"ח הנמצא בסגה האירופית.

מרפי הסתפק בתיאור כללי של הירזמה מבלי להכנס לפרטים.
ציין שבשלב זה מדובר על בחינת רעיונות כדי לקדם
התהליך וזאת לאחר שנתברר שלא הושגה התקדמות בענין
בינוס הועידה הבינלאומית.

דיבר על שילובן של הבנית האוטונומיה וההסדר הסופי
(INTERLOCKED PROCESSES) בהתאם ללוח זמנים מוגן. ארה"ב בוחנת
האפשרות של INTERNATIONAL LOUNCHING OF THE PROCESS.

מרפי הדגיש שהנשיא רייגן נחוש בדעתו לטפל בבעיה
(TO ADRESS THE PROBLEM) ומכאן הירזמה.

בתשובה, פרול הדגיש שצרפת הרגמת בכל כאמץ להביא להפשרת
הקיפאון וחזר על עמדתה המוצהרת של צרפת התומכת בקיום
ועידה בינלאומית בהשתתפות ארה"ב וההבטחת הקבועות
של מועצת הבטחון.

הע: שהח/רהמ/שהבט/מנבל/ממנבל/סמנבל/ממד/רס/אמן/אירא/אירב/
מצנא

שמור

** מבנס **
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102.1 יחל, אלא

הודעה:2/4966
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:170/תא:120288/זת:1300/דת:מ/סג:שמ
נד:@

שמור/מידי
אל:אירופה 2 המרכז
מאת:הציר יועץ לונדון

משיחה עם קמפטון בישוף סעודיה/מפרץ בפוראום

1. קיבלו דיווח קצר מריאד על נגישת מרפי עם המלך. מתברר שעיקר המפגש היווה מונולוג ארוך של כהד על מלחמת המפרץ וההפרעות בשטחים תוך הבעת חרדה למקומות הקדושים. אין כאן פרטים נוספים אולם סבורים כי בדומה לעבר ביקשו הסעודים הבטחות

שארהב לא תזניח אותם במקרה של מערכה מדינית נגד איראן.

2. מינוי הנוהות הפקיסטנים מסעודיה בעיצומו אולם למיטב ידיעתם מתיחסים הסעודים בחוסר רצון בולט לאפשרות שיהיה צורך להמשיך ולשלם לשכירי חרב הן משום ההוצאה הגבוהה וגם מהחשש שלבסוף לא יועילו. ההסדר הנראה להם הינו של משלחות צבאיות בצמוד להבטחת סיוע מסיבית לשעת משבר. סבורים כאן שמצרים הציעו משלחות צבאיות בסדר גודל של מאות אנשים אלא שבאמור ההסכמה הסעודית מותנית בהבטחת שיגור כוחות בעת הצורך. סביר שלמרות הרתיעה המצרית השורה התחתונה תהיה ענין של מחיר.

3. ביקור שהח סעודיה במוסקבה עם שגרירם בוושינגטון איננו מתקבל כאן כמפנה דרמטי ביחסים. נוטים להערין שהביקור היה אכן כפוף לעובדת היותה של סעודיה נשיאת המשפט ורצונו של כהד להעביר אגרות לכל חברות מועביט הקבועות. לא היה בזאת משום ניסוי למגע בילטרלי מיוחד ונוכחות השגריר מואשינגטון מוסברת באישיותו המיוחדת

ובעובדה שהביקור והמגעים נעשו דרכו. מהבחינה הבילטרלית נראה שהסעודים נתנו להבין שחימום אפשרי של יחסי שתי המדינות יבול לבוא רק לאחר פרשת אפגניסטאן ולאחר שישרור שלום במפרץ. אין מעריכים כאן בשום פנים הידרש פורמלי של היחסים הגם ששיפור אפשרי.

4. ביקור של החקלאות הסעודי בסין איננו מבשר תזוזה פוליטית ויחסי סעודיה טאיוואן לא יפגעו. מערכת היחסים עם סין הינה כלכלית גרידא בשלטינים אינטרס במוצרי הפטרו כימיה הסעודים ולאחרונים עכין בשוק הסיני העצום איתו כבר מתקיים כחר זי ענף גם עי המגזר הפרטי הסעודי.

יורם שני

א

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,ממד,אירא,אירב,
בירן,מצפא

102.1.1 תלין שלום

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

315

טופס מברק
דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים
סווג בטחוני: שמור
דחיפות: בחול
תאריך וז"ח: 11/2/88-15:00
מס' מברק

אל: המשרד

אל: מנהל הסברה
דע: מנהל מדיני

תהליך השלום

נראה לי חשוב לקבל נייר על היוזמה האמריקנית ושליחות מרפי.

יש לנו ענין לעורר התעניינות הציבור האמריקני בכלל והיהודים בפרט לתהליך המדיני.

מבחינה הסברתית זו דרך טובה (למרות חילוקי הדעות השנימיים) לחסיט תשומת הלב והשיחות מהמחומות לסיכויי מציאת פתרון מדיני.
תודה.

אשר נעים

שרה גנל מודגם ביון מלפנו ודיסל הסברה
2 3 1 1 2 1

102.1.1

THE JERUSALEM POST
Friday, February 12, 1988

U.S. initiative 'is the only game in town'

Foreign Minister Peres talks to The Post's Menachem Shalev

THE PEACE PROCESS

Mr. Peres, the peace process has been stalemated for a long time. Can you identify new elements in the American initiative which allow you to hope that it will achieve something? What's in it that didn't exist before?

What's new, if anything, is the attempt to integrate procedure and substance. Until now, for the past 20 years, we have tried to discuss substance only to discover that there is no substance which is acceptable to all sides. The return to procedure – that is, to the international opening – was an attempt to break free of the contradictions that exist on the matter of substance.

The Americans are trying to conduct a preliminary examination of the parameters which can bring the sides together in order to soften the opposition of those who have objected to an international opening. After the latter, negotiations will start and the interim settlement and the final settlement will be intertwined within a short space of time. These are new elements.

Have the Americans adopted the concept of an international opening that you recently promoted?

The international conference is not a matter of principle in and of itself. It is the condition which allows Jordan to participate. I don't think that Jordan has retracted its position. What I tried to do is to take away from the international conference any capability of dictating to the sides, and this element remains in the American plan.

Do the Americans have a clear concept of what type of international opening they are advocating?

The Americans must take the Jordanians into consideration. Just as they have difficulties with Israel, they have difficulties with Jordan. So I don't think that there will be any fundamental change. The change will be not in the essence of the conference, but in the softening-up process that will take place before it convenes.

Do you share American optimism on the Soviet response to the peace plan? Can the process advance without Soviet agreement?

I believe that it can. If the Soviets see that Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the U.S. have reached agreement and that they are left with the option of not attending an international conference, they will prefer to come to a conference, even if they don't agree to its substance or to its powers.

What's more, the Americans have already notifed the Soviets that they have initiated this activity. I assume that they will try to reach an understanding with the Soviets. The Americans are encouraged by the Soviet positions because there is apparently movement on the Afghanistan issue.

But you have been insisting that Jordan is apprehensive about the formation of a Soviet-Syrian-PLO axis which will oppose peace moves.

Yes, but I believe that if the Soviets see that they have no veto power, they will prefer not to exclude themselves.

For months you have attempted to bridge the gap between the positions of Jordan's King Hussein and those of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Do you think the Americans can succeed where you have failed?

Look, I am not an objective bystander sitting on the sidelines and placing bets. I will do my best so that the American initiative will succeed. It's the only game in town at this point. All the elements which existed before exist now, only in a tighter schedule and in an intertwined form.

But this also raises difficulties: The Likud will find it very hard to accept a linkage between the interim arrangement and the final settlement because we know that the final settlement is the Reagan plan, and the Reagan plan means territorial division.

When you remove the onus from the international conference, it is then placed on the final settlement. This is the main deficiency of the American plan.

I have a constructive attitude. If this is what they want to do, by all means, I support it.

The Americans propose that the talks on the final settlement will begin even if the talks on the interim settlement are not concluded. In these circumstances, is there any realistic chance for an interim settlement? Why should the Arabs, who have never liked the idea of an interim arrangement, negotiate it seriously?

If the Arabs will be given a commitment regarding the period in which the interim arrangement will be in force, it will make things easier for them. Will they make do with three years? I really don't know.

On the other hand, I don't know if the Likud will accept the Reagan plan. But the very fact that the Americans have launched this initiative, and are trying to bridge the differences, is something which should be welcomed.

THE PALESTINIANS AND THE TERRITORIES

You were quoted this week as telling the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee that we may have made a mistake by ruling out talks with local Palestinian leaders who are identified with the PLO, that perhaps we should have distinguished between the PLO abroad and PLO supporters here. Do you now believe that no arrangment can be reached with the Palestinians without the agreement – at least implicit – of the PLO?

Let met say this. When I look at all the possible partners, I ask a number of questions: First, which is the partner that is capable of making decisions? The PLO, the inhabitants of the territories, or Hussein? And the answer is Hussein.

The second question is: Who is capable of implementing the decisions made? Again the answer is Hussein. He has a state, he has an army, he has a police force.

And the third question: With

whom is Israel capable of reaching an agreement? I say with Hussein more than with the PLO because with Hussein, one can reach an element of demilitarization of territories, one can achieve a situation where the Jordan River is a security border. This is not the case with the PLO.

The Arabs – both Hussein and Mubarak – have said in recent days: Leave the matter of Palestinian representation to us.

I think we should distinguish between those whose political views conform to those of the PLO, and those who actually belong to the organization. We do not censor ideas. We censor weapons. Whoever comes with a gun in his pocket is unacceptable.

In retrospect, I believe that the municipal elections in the territories which were held in 1976 were a very wise move. These were the most democratic elections ever held in an Arab area in the Middle East. Twenty-four mayors were elected. Four, I think, were actual PLO members, three leaned toward the PLO, and 17 were not PLO-affiliated.

Now everyone says a new leadership should be nurtured. How does one do this? There are two possibilities – whether through the municipal avenue or through the political avenue – which is either to allow the formation of parties or to go to the Camp David self-governing authority plan; that is, hold elections throughout the West Bank and Gaza.

What's interesting about the recent disturbances in the West Bank, which everyone knows were not organized by the PLO, is that that the residents of the territories have set down their own rules which contradict those of the PLO. The Palestinian Covenant says that terror is the strategy of the PLO. But they are not employing PLO-style terror and are not using hot weapons. Where did this idea of rocks and bottles and Molotov cocktails, which are also lethal, spring from? Who decided on it?

From this point of view, there is a difference between the PLO in the territories and the PLO abroad. This is what I said.

Do you view the disturbances in the territories as a declaration of independence by the residents, even though they continue to insist that Arafat is their representative?

No matter what they say, they want Arafat to take orders from them, not vice- versa. It's a big difference. I see in it a re-evaluation of their own self-worth.

Have the events in the territories changed your perception of the problems of the Palestinians, or of their image?

I have never been a Palestinian-hater. Like any people, they have their advantages and disadvantages. I don't see things stereotypically. But my conclusions don't start with the Arab side but with the Jewish side; not with what the Arabs are demanding, but with what is required for the Jews, so that we will remain Jews, and have a Jewish democratic state. Mine is not an office for granting licences for a nation to be a nation. This is pretentious. They decided that they are a Palestinian people – then they are a Palestinian people.

Do you share the concern that has been voiced about the effects of the disturbances on IDF soldiers, on the younger generation?

Jewish history is devoid of any desire to rule over another people. I think that what is happening now is a deviation. All the people who ruled over us have been erased from the stage of history. We are the only ones who never ruled over anyone else, and we prevailed.

I don't think that when we renew the independent activity of our people, we should suddenly turn our backs on the moral logic of Jewish history.

I am not concerned about the effects on the soldiers, they will overcome. they are made of good material. The problem is what will be happen with us.

I told the religious Jews that they have become so enamoured with Joshua's patrimony that they have forgotten Mosaic Law.

POLITICS

You speak of a "deviation." You have accused Shamir of rejecting peace. But Shamir and the religious parties represent some 50 per cent of the people. So how can peace be achieved if half the people refuse to accept a policy which supports it?

Look, in democratic states majorities are very slim, three or four per cent. Look at the election results in America. In England, Thatcher got less votes than her rivals. Look at France.

This problematic coalition which you are referring to is one of the leaderships of the parties, not of the religious Jews. I am convinced that there is a considerable moderate element among the religious Jews who once voted for the National Religous Party; but, in the meantime, the NRP has become extreme.

I also believe that there are moderate elements among Likud voters as well. Their leadership has become more extreme. I am very doubtful whether a peace treaty would have been signed if the present leadership had ruled the Likud in 1977. Even former prime minister Menachem Begin supported an international conference then.

I view this coalition with concern because it is a marriage of convenience. The religious parties support the Likud because it is willing to give them everything they want.

What we see from the polls is that many Likud supporters – perhaps 30-40 per cent – are very dissatisfied, also from a religious point of view. The Likud is collaborating in a situation of near religious coercion. And I ask the religious politicans, do you want half of the people to be against you?

You mentioned England and France, but they are not contending with such momentous and vital issues as those presented by the territories.

I remember the Zionist Congress in 1946 which I attended when Ben-Gurion thought that he was in the minority, a matter which was no less grave or crucial. In 1948, BG thought that he was in the minority in his party concerning the matter of the immediate establishment of the state.

If you achieve the desired majority in the next elections, do you think you can lead a move for peace? There is a Middle Eastern theory that only a strong man – the right one – can make peace.

That's nonsense and has never been proven. It is said of Begin, but let's look at the facts: It was Sadat who initiated the peace moves in 1977; Begin didn't have a majority – he was dependent on (then deputy prime minister Yigael) Yadin and (then foreign minister Moshe) Dayan; Camp David wasn't such an ideological issue, having dealt with Sinai and not with Judea and Samaria. Begin would not been able to prevail if we had not supported him.

On the other hand, all of the crucial decisions throughout the history of the state were reached without the Revisionists, without the right. The decision to set up a state on only a part of the Land of Israel, the Rhodes agreements, the withdrawal from Sinai in 1957 – all were reached without their agreement. Even Egypt, you must remember, would not have reached peace without the disengagement agreements which we concluded despite the objections of the right.

But if we have a majority of one per cent, it will immediately be one of 60-70 per cent, because some of the religious will join in.

I do not even rule out having the Likud join as a junior partner. I am interested in the substance, not in the make-up.

The Labour party has undergone quite a bit of upheaval recently. Secretary general Uzi Baram resigned, a steering committee was set up, MK Abdel Wahab Daroushe left the party. Is Labour ready for the elections.

Yes. I do not view these as serious problems. I am sorry about Daroushe. I think he made a mistake, even for himself. He has no political future. The Arab voter will be influenced by the events, not by personalities. We have a hard nucleus of Arab support and Arab intellectuals who understand that voting for (MK Mohammed) Miari and for the Communists is like voting for Tehiya. Their positions are accepted by no one.

Do you rule out a coalition based on the quiet support of the Communists and the Progressive List for Peace?

I don't need to make prophecies, there is no end to speculation.

OTHER FOREIGN RELATIONS MATTERS

How do you view Israel's relations with Southeast Asia, with Japan?

Southeast Asia is the economic address of the future. The Japanese economy is currently in second place in the world, and projections that I have seen show that China will overtake Japan in 2000, 2010. The U.S. will be in first place, China second, Japan third and the Soviets fourth.

The events in the territories have slowed down the recent progress we've made with Japan. Economic events reflect political realities. We were already on the rise, and this has stopped.

We have to make a supreme effort to get there. Even the subsidiary markets of Korea, Taiwan and Singapore are a success story. And India will also recover soon, I believe.

Israel must do three things: turn all of its industry into science-based industries; give its citizens a higher education, and build an infrastructure of good relations in Asia.

You had a well-publicized meeting with the Chinese foreign minister in October in New York. Has there been any movement since then?

Bit by bit, there is always something. In China, short-term planning is aimed at the next hundred years.

What is the state of our relations with Turkey?

We should improve our relations with Turkey, and we have taken some steps in this direction, especially in light of our political setbacks with Greece. But here, too, recent events have harmed these efforts.

Finally, a question on the Foreign Ministry itself: There is a lot of disgruntlement among senior officials who think that you feel that you don't need them like your predecessors did, that you do not need their advice.

Perhaps they dealt more with diplomacy previously, and less with strategy. I do not view myself as the chief diplomat in Israel, but as one who is responsible for diplomacy. I am not a professional, but a statesman. And I have to devote all my energies to the home front. Foreign policy begins at home. It's not a question of an ambassador persuading someone in Denmark to support the international conference. I have to go from place to place in Israel, to convince, to fight for something I believe in. I see my work as a mission, and I hope and expect that Foreign Ministry workers will join me. I didn't come to please, I came to lead.

131/19.2.1988/4.06.03

102.1.1 אל"ן שלא

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

המשרד

338

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פרוייקטים כורלף

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דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 12.2.88

מס' מבוק

אל: מצפ"א

מע"ית

מאת: עיתונות

ברזינסקי

מאמר ה"אופ-אד" דלהלן פורסם היום ב"וושינגטון פוסט" (12.2.88).

יוסי גל

שהה בנוסף גלבוע בין בלפור ואיטלה אל הסכרה
בדנר

2/3 338

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Israel Has to Make A First Move

A bold move, like Sadat's.

Having just come back from Israel, where I had wide-ranging conversations, I feel that it is important to restate certain basic principles and to highlight their implications. I may also add that I came back impressed by the soul-searching that is taking place among the Israeli people and by the degree to which recent violence has caused not only concern but a genuine moral crisis among the decent and democratic Israelis. It is in this context that certain underlying principles need to be reaffirmed:

The U.S. commitment to Israel is primarily of a moral nature. It stems from the American people's deep conviction that the state of Israel corrects a fundamental historical injustice to which much of the world, including America itself, was indifferent. It is this bond that unites America and Israel and creates an *absolute* and unique commitment to Israel's future and security. Anything that tarnishes this central moral dimension ultimately damages Israeli security.

The United States has a wide-ranging regional interest in a good relationship with the Arab peoples, including the Palestinians. The geostrategic importance of the region speaks for itself. It is important to recognize that the American interest in a good regional relationship is central to America's capacity to protect the region from Soviet intrusion, with its radicalizing and destabilizing impact, including on Israel itself. It is to balance that consideration that Israeli and Jewish-American spokesmen often stress that Israel is "a strategic asset" to America. To postulate that, however, is to engage in a bidding that is ultimately relative in nature. How does one measure the relative strategic significance of this or that country? For example, South African spokesmen also have tried to argue that South Africa is "a strategic asset" for America because of its minerals. In contrast, moral commitment involves an absolute standard, not subject to economic or military calculus. It should not be diluted, by words or actions.

There is no alternative to peaceful cohabitation between the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples. Any other solution—domination, expulsion or continued violence—will do damage to Israeli and ultimately American interests. Any alternative solution is likely to pose agonizing choices for America between the moral dimension and the regional interest mentioned above, not to speak of the moral implications of policies that could be in fundamental conflict with deep-rooted American convictions. Cohabitation between the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples is thus a historical imperative, and it is on that plane that the needed solutions must be sought.

Autonomy, as envisaged by Camp David, is not the final outcome but a process toward a deliberately undefined future.

3/3

338

At this stage, neither side can accept the other's view of what the eventual outcome of a peace arrangement might be. But autonomy can create new conditions, new outlooks and a new mutual confidence. That, in turn, can alter the ways the two sides come to envision their long-range relationship.

Diplomatic motion is not a substitute for political action. Attempts to contrive a complicated international procedure as the solution to the current crisis is tantamount to evasion of the current dilemmas. Moreover, diplomatic motion is also not a substitute for effective American mediation. The latter took place at Camp David and elsewhere because the American president and the American secretary of state were prepared to commit their personal time and energy to a sustained effort, and their efforts were successful because, on the Arab side, there was a leader willing to gamble on peace and, on the Israeli side, a leader with a strategy focused on peace. These conditions do not currently exist. Hence a complicated international procedure is not likely to provide an effective substitute for needed political action to deal with problems that threaten to get out of hand.

Under these circumstances, a major unilateral initiative by Israel regarding the current status of the Palestinians is timely. Only Israel can act decisively because it is in effective control of the West Bank and Gaza. The United States will not, while the Arabs are unable to do so because they are the weaker party and even more divided than the Israelis. What is needed is an initiative analogous to the bold move undertaken by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1978. At that time, to most Arabs Prime Minister Menachem Begin was anathema and a direct approach toward the Israelis smacked of treason. Yet Sadat was willing to undertake such an initiative, with the result that today there is peace between Israel and Egypt.

An Israeli initiative, including some symbolic and perhaps even dramatic personal gesture, designed to change the current political and social status of the Palestinians, pending an eventual but more distant peace treaty, is needed. It should be made conditional on a rational and reciprocal Palestinian response, including the termination of civil disobedience and riots, as well as good faith acceptance of some transitional arrangement. Such an initiative would help to defuse the rising tensions and to avoid exclusive reliance on means that eventually can have only damaging consequences for the region's stability, for Israel's well-being and ultimately even for American moral sensibilities.

The writer was national security adviser to President Carter.

102.1.1 32 321 4/6

Shultz May Go to Mideast This Month To Promote New Peace Plan, Aides Say

Feb. 11, '88

By ROBERT S. GREENBERGER
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — Secretary of State George Shultz is seriously considering a trip to the Middle East later this month to promote the Reagan administration's new peace initiative, administration officials said.

It is understood that Mr. Shultz would travel to the region Feb. 25 and remain there until about March 1, shuttling between Jordan and possibly other Arab capitals and Israel. U.S. officials believe that the turmoil on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which has shocked and surprised both Israel and Jordan, has created diplomatic opportunities that Mr. Shultz wants to seize.

Mr. Shultz is awaiting the return from the region later today of Richard Murphy, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, before making a final decision. If he decides to go to the region, an announcement could be made as soon as tomorrow.

So far, the administration has gotten only cautious expressions of interest from Jordan and Israel on its new peace plan. The plan calls for limited self-rule and elections in the occupied territories within months, followed by Israeli-Arab negotiations over the final status of the West Bank and Gaza beginning by year's end.

Nevertheless, Mr. Shultz has stressed recently that he wants to push this process personally, rather than through a special envoy. That represents a sharp departure from the secretary's attitude last year, when he insisted that he wouldn't become deeply involved until the nations in the region make sufficient progress toward an agreement on their own.

In part, Mr. Shultz's new attitude may reflect growing concern that Israel won't be able to quell the rioting in the occupied territories, and that the violence might spill over into Jordan.

Mr. Shultz's task will be to fan the renewed interest in working toward Mideast peace, and, at the same time, to emphasize that the two parts of the plan must remain attached.

Jordan's King Hussein is seeking assurances from the U.S. that Israel ultimately will be willing to give up the occupied territories in exchange for peace. Without such assurances, the king fears that he will be seen by other Arabs as having been used by the Israelis to perpetuate their rule of the occupied territories. If he isn't satisfied, the king might prefer to wait to deal with a new U.S. administration.

King Hussein's darkest fears were stirred anew by statements earlier this week by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir that he preferred a longer period between the so-called autonomy talks and final negotiations on the status of the territories. Mr. Shamir, who faces an election next November, has been attacked by his own right-wing for giving the plan a tentative green light.

Members of Mr. Shamir's hard-line Likud bloc are torn between believing that the turmoil makes it a bad time to negotiate with Palestinians or other Arabs and their feeling that the situation is so dire they have no choice but to begin talks to try to quell the violence. Mr. Shamir's rival, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, continues to advocate an international conference as a starting point for the negotiations, a position that Mr. Shamir and his followers reject.

102.1.1 גלין אלון

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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תאריך/ז"ח 11 פבר' 88

מס' מברק

322

המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני
לשכת ראה"מ
לשכת שה"ח

ארה"ב - מדי"ת

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עזרא

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שהיה רגע שהכל נפל מלמעלה בין הלפיד אבוטל מעל
הסברה ליעור בעיות המיום שמתיר המאורע מלב

The Washington Times
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1988 WASHINGTON, D.C.
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U.S. to go all-out for Mideast solution

By William J. Coughlin
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Reagan administration has decided to put the full weight of the United States behind a major new Middle East peace initiative designed to bring about "a transitional authority" in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip within six months, a high-ranking administration official said last night.

The plan is being favorably received in both Israel and Arab countries, he said.

The administration is seeking "quick change in political conditions on the West Bank and Gaza," the official said, "which would include such things as control by the Palestinians over their daily lives, such as land, water and police."

While some details of the new initiative became known earlier, and were welcomed by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, what was new in last night's statement was the urgency added by a six-month deadline.

The U.S. plan involves an interim solution granting limited self-rule to the 1.5 million Palestinians in the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza strip, where violence over the past two months has taken at least 50 Palestinian lives.

Negotiations between Israel, Palestinian representatives and Jordan would then begin to settle the final status of the occupied territories.

The new heavyweight involvement of the United States was being welcomed at the highest levels of the Israel government, Washington Times correspondent Andrew Meisels reported last night from Tel Aviv.

U.S. envoy Richard Murphy had talks there last night with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. The American official is due to meet today with Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.

Related stories on Page A8.

Mr. Murphy arrived from Cairo after meeting Jordan's King Hussein and the leaders of Syria and Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Shamir, of the conservative Likud Party, met Mr. Murphy at his home, reportedly rejecting the suggestion of the Labor Party's Mr. Peres that the two meet jointly with the U.S. envoy.

Mr. Murphy said after the meeting he had received "great encouragement" to continue his peace mission. He was scheduled to return to Washington today.

Before the meeting, Mr. Shamir indicated he would react coolly if Mr. Murphy proposed a speeded-up timetable for implementing Palestinian self-rule and holding elections

see PEACE, page A11

PEACE

From page A1

in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip this year instead of after a five-year waiting period.

An aide said Mr. Shamir would insist any new peace proposals be based on the 1978 Camp David accords, which envisioned limited autonomy for the Palestinians in occupied areas.

The administration envisages the transitional authority for the occupied territories coming about through "some sort of electoral process," the high administration official said here last night.

"That kind of change, while it should be welcomed, will not be enough," he said. "We must come to grips with final-status issues and set a 'date certain' for the start of negotiations at the end of the six-month period."

The administration has suggested two components to the new initiative — things that can be done quickly and the final status of the territories — and an interlocking mechanism between the two.

The Reagan administration has informed Israel and Jordan that the final solution must be based on the formula of "territory for peace" and U.N. Resolution 242.

"The violence on the West Bank and Gaza has had quite an impact on people's thinking. There is now more receptivity to fresh ideas," the official said. "So we have come up with a new blend of potential substance and potential procedure."

The official confirmed that key congressmen have been briefed about envoy Philip Habib's talks with King Hussein and Mr. Murphy's discussions with Arab and Israeli leaders.

The U.S. mediation effort, according to the official, was welcomed by moderate Arab states that are convinced that nothing can happen without the United States "becoming deeply involved again."

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was briefed on the plan while in Washington in January to meet with President Reagan and gave his approval, the official said.

The U.S. mediation, one high official said, "presupposes the idea that the transition authority and transition period will be welcomed by Israel and perceived by the Arabs as something good. Territory for peace is the end result; there is a lot of room for hard negotiations."

The official explained that the Arab countries, while highly critical of Israel, are uneasy about developments in the West Bank and Gaza and "worried about how it will impact on their own countries."

The administration hopes that a new transition authority, through an electoral process, will produce "valid Palestinian interlocutors who will then sit as part of a Jordanian delegation at an international conference."

Asked what incentives King Hussein has today that he has not had for the past 20 years, one high official replied: "The new blend has elements that King Hussein has been seeking. It also has elements that Prime Minister Shamir and Foreign Minister Peres have been seeking, too. There is almost universal joy that the U.S. is becoming deeply and heavily engaged again. There has been a good response to U.S. ideas."

The official said it was incumbent on the administration "to be oblivious" to elections both in the United States and in Israel. Mr. Reagan, he explained, has the added advantage that he is not running for re-election and is determined to give this initiative "his best shot."

The United States plans to keep both the Soviet Union and Syria, a Soviet client state, fully in the picture. Asked about the Soviet role, the official said that, although the Soviets had not been helpful and had even sabotaged the process in the past, Moscow has indicated that it is "anxious to discuss these issues."

Secretary of State George Shultz will be in Moscow in two weeks and the American Middle East initiative will rank high on the bilateral agenda.

"If there is no give on territory on the part of Israel following the next election, then of course, there will be no movement," the official said.

The administration believes there should be an opportunity for direct negotiations between Syria and Israel, as well as between Jordan and Israel, but doubts that Damascus will avail itself of the opportunity.

"It is, however, important to keep Syria in the picture," the official said.

"One ingredient is clear: We must put our backs into it if anything is to happen, and that is what we have decided to do," he said.

322

3/3

102.1.1 דליק אלון

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דחיפות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ח 11.2.88

מס' מבוק

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311

אל: מצפ"א

מע"ת

דע: יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שה"ח לתקשורת

מאת: עיתונות

מעורבות ארה"ב בתהליך השלום

להלן חמליל התכנית Night Line מתאריך 10.2.88.

דן אלון

יוסי גל

שהה דרש שהכל נגמל מגרעין כיון הדפו אדיבים לפר
הסברה ציורו מצים לחוות שקעת ולאורכ הלך פרנר

ABC'S "NIGHTLINE"
INTERVIEW WITH
DR. HENRY KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE AND
DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZENZINSKI, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 1988

311 2/6

MR. KOPPEL: Joining us now from our New York studio is Henry Kissinger, who as Secretary of State, was principal foreign policy advisor to Presidents Nixon and Ford. Following the 1973 Yom Kippur war, Mr. Kissinger was instrumental in mediating between Israel and Egypt to bring about Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, and mediating between the Israelis and the Syrians to bring about Israel's disengagement from the Golan Heights. Joining us here in Washington is Zbigniew Brzenzinski, former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter. Mr. Brzenzinski was a major player in the Camp David process which led to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1978.

Dr. Kissinger, for a mediator to have useful ground on which he can work, both sides have to be not only willing but eager to have a mediator step in. There almost has to be a sense of desperation. Are the Israelis and the Palestinians desperate enough yet, do you think?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know whether the -- I think the Israelis are clearly looking for a way out. And I don't know whether the -- the negotiating partner should be the Palestinians or the other Arab states. I don't think there is a Palestinian group with which to negotiate.

MR. KOPPEL: Well, there is a Palestinian group with which to negotiate. The question is whether the Israelis will be willing to negotiate with them, and that's the PLO.

DR. KISSINGER: And I think it is out of the question for Israel to give up territory on the West Bank -- which is about 25 miles wide -- and give it up to the PLO which has been a group that in its nature, whatever its formal program, which also, incidentally, stands for the distruction of Israel, but which in its -- which in its nature cannot be satisfied with the status quo of -- that might be established by a negotiation. So I think there has to be an intermediate step in which the other Arab states, especially the moderate states -- Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, take responsibility for what territory Israel will give up in Gaza and on the West Bank.

MR. KOPPEL: Dr. Brzezinski, you have just returned from a few days in Israel. Is it your impression that the young Palestinians there now and those YOUNG (speaker's emphasis) Palestinians -- those under the age of 21 -- I've been told that they represent now about 75 percent of the population, for example, on the West Bank -- are they prepared to let the Saudis or the Jordanians or the Egyptians represent them even in preliminary discussions?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, I'm not quite sure whether these young people have any defined political perspective. I think they have a rather clear view of what they do not like. And they do not like the status quo. But one of the problems is that the Palestinians are disorganized, moderate leadership is not in charge and there's no clear Palestinian perspective or even strategy. 3/1

MR. KOPPEL: Well, I mean, there is a clear Palestinian perspective it would seem, at least in the minds of the leadership of the PLO. But as Dr. Kissinger has pointed out, the Israelis are not going to negotiate with the PLO. I mean, ultimately, are we just being sucked into some kind of a vortex that has to be resolved in violence, where the two sides simply cannot or will not talk to one another? 3/6

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, I would hope not. But it does seem to me that one has to, so to speak, go through the options: Can we mediate? Well, Henry mediated back in the '70's and of course, President Carter and his team mediated late in the '70's. But then you had an American leadership that was willing to bite the bullet -- was willing to stick with it. Henry stuck with it for

day after day, and President Carter stuck with it. That isn't the case today. Secondly, you had an Arab leader willing to take a chance on peace -- Sadat -- even to risk his head for it. That is not the case today. And thirdly, you had an Israeli leadership with a defined strategy which accepted a notion of peace and was willing to bargain for it. And that isn't quite the case today with a stalemate. So that's out.

The second option is to have this large international circus that the administration is talking about. I frankly doubt that this is going to solve the problem and lead to anything tangible.

The third option, the one which I favor personally, is to try to prevail on the Israelis to take some unilateral initiatives right now regarding the West Bank, not trying to resolve the issue ultimately, but trying to create somewhat more propitious conditions. And I think there are some things that they could do.

MR. KOPPEL: Very quickly, if you would, go through two or three.

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, simply two. One is simply impose the autonomy arrangements that were provided for in Camp David. They don't need to negotiate about this with the Jordanians. There are enough Palestinian mayors and officials with whom this could be worked out. Alternatively, have elections in the West Bank. In either case, you'd begin to change the atmosphere, you'd begin to change the rules of the game. And I think that is needed right now.

MR. KOPPEL: I'll tell you what, we're going to take a break in just a moment. But when we come back, Dr. Kissinger, I'd like to raise with you option two that Dr. Brzezinski just mentioned. In the past, you have always been opposed to bringing the Soviets into the Middle Eastern process. But there's a new Soviet leadership

these days who is -- I mean, we're talking now about Mr. Gorbachev, who is far more creative in some of his thinking. And I'd like to get your thinking about how useful it might be to bring him into that process. We'll continue our discussion in a moment.

(Commercial break)

MR. KOPPEL: Continuing our conversation now with Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger, during the early '70s you worked very hard to minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East. Is it now time to bring them into the process?

DR. KISSINGER: The problem with Soviet participation in the Middle East is that they can take -- or have taken in the past, the position of their radical Arab friends. And the practical consequence of this is that it would isolate us at any international meeting, put us in the position of a lawyer of Israel, while they are making hay with the Arab countries. Where in fact, the only country that can really bring progress is the United States.

Now, we could have exploratory conversations with the Soviets quietly, in which we can find out what their idea of a political settlement is. If it turns out that they are prepared to ask compromises of their Arab friends, then we can make the determination whether they can play a useful role. Otherwise, I think we will be in the same dilemma in the '80s that we were in the '70s.

MR. KOPPEL: Let me ask you about something that reportedly happened today. Apparently the Attorney General, Mr. Meese, has decided to close down the PLO Office to the United Nations in New York. Question, Dr. Kissinger, if we are going to present ourselves as being, you know, the honest broker ultimately between Palestinians in general and the Israelis; or Arabs in general and the Israelis, was that a smart move?

DR. KISSINGER: Oh, I think that is not a move that I consider of major consequence. I think it is not -- I would

probably not have recommended making that particular move even though I'm against having the PLO participate in the negotiations. If they were accredited to the United Nations, I think basically we ought to let the United Nations make the determination of what units -- or what organizations are accredited to it. That isn't the key problem. The key problem is do we know what we consider to be a fair settlement? Are we prepared to stand for it? If other nations want to help in principle there's no reason not to have them, but it is a disaster to spent all our time on procedural maneuvers to see how to assemble a conference without knowing what the conference is supposed to do and when a deadlock is the most likely outcome.

MR. KOPPEL: Let me bring you back to your own question. Do we know the elements of a reasonable solution? Would you be able to outline for us, for example, steps one, two and three?

DR. KISSINGER: I have my ideas, but that doesn't mean that this is necessarily what a careful examination and the government would do. I think a number of steps -- one, Israel has to recognize that it cannot continue to govern a hostile population by force. So it has to give up Gaza and part of the West Bank. Second, Israel

cannot return to the 1960's southern borders because it would not be defensible. That would leave Israel in the position of Czechoslavakia after Munich. Third, the giving up of any territory on the West Bank would be such a traumatic experience for Israel that to put the PLO there at the same time seems to me absolutely out of the question.

MR. KOPPEL: So there would be an interim --

311

DR. KISSINGER: So therefore the moderate Arab states have to recognize this and have to create at least a transitional period in which the process of self-government in the West Bank can be examined. Now if this framework is not acceptable to other nations, assuming our government agrees with that, I see no point in the conference.

5/6

MR. KOPPEL: All right, let me, let me --

DR. KISSINGER: If it isn't that framework, there should be some other framework.

MR. KOPPEL: Let me stop you there for a moment and turn to Dr. Brzezinski. Whether now we are to assume that your proposal is implemented or Dr. Kissinger's proposal is implemented, let me draw both of your attentions to the simple fact of the matter that we are now smack dab in the middle of an American presidential election year, and given that fact is any kind of American proposal which is going to cause -- which is going to call on the Israelis to make what Dr. Kissinger correctly refers to as traumatic moves -- is that viable? Is that going to happen until after this election is over?

ABC NIGHTLINE-02/10/88 3-2
KISSINGER, BRZEZINSKI

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, I don't think we would be able to implement it at this stage. We don't have the will. As you said, the elections are upon us. We can't focus on this. That's one problem. But I have a further problem with the notion that we ought to have a concrete concept of the eventual settlement, and it is this: at this stage, neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians or the Arabs more generally are prepared

ABC NIGHTLINE-02/10/88 4-1
KISSINGER, BRZEZINSKI

to agree on what the final settlement ought to be like. And therefore, we need a transitional phase in which both sides get accustomed to cohabitation, to living with each other under somewhat different conditions. And this is why I have always felt that the notion of autonomy for the Palestinians should not be viewed as a single, discrete event, but rather as a process, a process in which the perceptions of both sides towards each other are altered by the fact that they begin to live peacefully, in a more collaborative relationship.

MR. KOPPEL: If I may, let me interrupt. We have to take a break. We'll continue our discussion with Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Brzezinski in just a moment.

(Commercial break)

MR. KOPPEL: Continuing our discussion now with Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Dr. Kissinger, your reaction, first of all, to the possibilities of doing anything in an American election year.

DR. KISSINGER: Oh, I think we have to formulate a policy. We may not be able to implement it completely. Incidentially, I think that Zbig's idea of a unilateral Israeli step is a very creative idea with which I would concur. The only thing I would ponit out is this, whatever area is put under self-government, is the area that will eventually have to be put under Arab rule. And therefore, the issue of where the line is of the West Bank cannot be avoided in this manner. If it is a device simply to continue Israeli rule, it will not work. So the Israelis will have to face the fact that the area that is put under autonomy will eventually be the area that international opinion will ask it to put under Arab government.

311

6/6

MR. KOPPEL: You are both dealing with some very sophisticated, and if I might add, at least medium-range, possibly long-range realities. The reality that we're dealing with right now is the one that Avi Posner(?) referred to in the end of that set-up piece, and that is the daily drum beat of propaganda that is created by these pictures that we see coming out of Israel and the Occupied Territories. Now, Dr. Brzezinski, what impact, given my impression that this is going to go on for some time, what impact is that going to have on the possibility of any kind of logical, sensible talks taking place?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Oh, I think it makes it much more difficult. Although when I was in Israel itself, I was rather encouraged by the attitude of the Israeli public. I think there's a great deal of soul-searching going on, and a realization that something has to be done. I think there's a world of difference between the public attitudes in general, especially within the politically active segment of the Israeli people and the Israeli leadership, which is gridlocked and less able to move.

MR. KOPPEL: Dr. Kissinger, we have about 30 seconds left -- a question you probably won't want to answer, but is there any real leadership in Israel right now that is capable of kind of grabbing the reins and saying, painful as it may be, we have to take some tough action?

DR. KISSINGER: They have an absolute responsibility to develop such a leadership in the course of this year. They cannot ask the United States to solve their internal problems. They must develop a strategy. Right now they do not have it, but they must develop it. It is their obligation for survival.

MR. KOPPEL: Dr. Kissinger, Dr. Brzezinski, I thank you both very much for joining us this evening. That's our report for tonight. I'm Ted Koppel in Washington. For all of us here in ABC News, good night.

END

Time: 14:39 02/11/88 ???
Connect Time : 205 seconds

102.1.1 תיקון שלום

11

שגרירות ישראל וושינגטון

טופס מברק

280

המשך

דף ____ מתוך ____ דפים

סווג מבחוני ____ סודי ____ דחיפות ____ מיידי ____ תאריך/זייח ____ הסלד מן עברי את

אל: מס' ד/דרב"ל ג

מצפ"א

מאת: אלי אבידן, וושינגטון

ברוקינגס.

הדיונים בברוקינגס של הרצאה פעולה לגבי מדיניות ארה"ב במזה"ת מתקרבים לסיום.
שמענו שאחת ההשלכות המרכזיות היא על הענקת אוטונומיה רחבה לתושבים הפלס'
תחת ניהול משותף ירדני-ישראלי.
אפגש עם ביל קוונדטר ב-23 בחודש סדרת הדיונים של הצוות המכין.

אלי אבידן

נשלח מיהן נצפו הלחיצ בלתם
3 1 2 1 4

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

2258 תאריך : 10.02.8[redacted]

דף 1 מתוך 2

עותק 26 מתוך 36 סודי ביותר נכנס **

**

מזרזם:2/2258

אל:המשרד

מ-:פריס/נר:181/תא:090288/זמ:1800/דח:ר/סג:סב

נד:0

סודי ביותר/רגיל.

אל: אירופה 1

דע: לשכת מ"מ רוהם ושהח

מאת: השגריר פריס

היוזמה האמריקנית

מפגישה עם שגריר ארהב JOE RODGERS (9/2)

1.הקריא לי נוסח המכתב ששלח שולץ לשרי החוץ של ה-12.
אני מניח שנוסח המכתב בידכם.אני חוזר מזכרון על עיקריו:
המכתב מנוסח בלשון כללית ואינו נוקב בהצעות קונקרטיות
ומואר את עניינה ומעורבותה של ארהב בתהליך השלום.מדגיש
אי-הצלחתה על פני הפרוצדורה. בפסקה האופרטיבית מציין
שולץ שהמהלך החדש נועד להגיע ל
ACCELERATED SCHEDULE להשגת הסכמה לגבי נושאי ותוכן
הדיונים. המכתב מבקש משרי החוץ להעניק תמיכתם למאמץ
האמריקני

2.רודגרס מסר שלפי בקשת שר החוץ הצרפתי הסכים מורפי
לעבור דרך פריס בדי למסור דיווח על שיחותיו בסוריה
עודיה,ירדן וישראל והפגישה נקבעה ליום ה הקרוב בבוקר

3.רודגרס ציין שהאמריקאים עושים מאמצים לשכנע את האירופים
שלא להפריע למהלך האמריקני עי נקיטת עמדות מנוגדות
רזאת לקראת הפגישה האירופית בשבוע הבא.יש לראות את
ביקור מורפי אצל ריימונד במסגרת מאמץ זה.

[illegible]

4. קיימת סקפטיות אצל האירופים לגבי סיכוי הצלחת המהלך האמריקני גם בשל ההסתייגויות שהשמיעו מובארק ובעיקר חוסיין וגם משום המשכם של האירועים ואפילו החמרתם שאינם מסייעים למאמצים הנל. רוגרס הביע אישית דעה שעל ישראל לעשות כל מאמץ כדי להחזיר השקט לשטחים וזאת משום הכרסום החמור בדימויה בעיקר בארהב

5. רוגרס התרשם משיחותיו שאין הצדקתים להוטים לנקוט יוזמות משלהם או לגלות מעורבות יתר. סיפר שבכל מגעיו עם הממשל אין אנשי שיחו מתייחסים לאירועים בשטחים וזאת בניגוד לנוהגם בעבר ולידיעות על לחצים ערבים על צרפת ללחוץ מצידה על ארהב להתקרב לעמדות הערביות

תפ: שהח/רהמ/שהבט/מנכל/ממנכל/ר/מרכז/רם/אמן/בירן/מצפא/אירא/
אירב

102.1

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 3 דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ת 1145 ו' אדר' 88

מס' מברק

238

1/3

המשרד

אל: איירופה 3

מאת: אלי אבידן, וושינגטון

גרמ"ז

משיחה עם צ'ארלס סקינר ראש מדור סאבאג' (מחמ"ד/גרמ"ז)

1. פיצוציים. אנשי שיחי איקרד שהמזרח גרמנים אמרו לאמריקאים שישנה "צעה כזו" אך הצורה בה טיפל הקונפרנס בעיות היא לגורמת רחם. עתה יהיה על הקונפרנס להתכנס שוב פעם ולנסות מחדש (REFORMULATE) את ההצעה. לשאלתי בדבר כוונת גרמ"ז, השיב סקינר שאכן הם אומרים שרוצים לישב את הסנגיה במשולב עם הפיצוציים לארה"ב ובכך נקדם את נושא הסחר עמה. עמדת ארה"ב מדגיש סקינר היא כמובן חיובית לכך, אך ע"מ שהנושאים הללו ייושבו ע"י גרמ"ז, הדבר חייב לקרות עוד השנה לפני ועידות המפלגות כאן שכן לאחר מכן לא ניתן יהיה לעגן את הקונגרס בכך. הבעייה היא שלגרמ"ז לא אצה הדרך כפי שלארה"ב ולארגונים היהודיים. סקינר מצדד בגישתו של רבי מילר שאסור לתת לגרמ"ז קרדיט מוקדם מדי שכן מצב כזה יוצר ציפיות מופרזות. לעצם העניין הפיצוציים הוא בדעה שניתן לפתוח בתהליך ע"י קביעת גובה הסכום ומכאן לרדת לסידורים האחרים. עם זאת הוא תוזה שתתחליך יחיה איטי וע"פ הקצב שגרמ"ז תקבע.

2. בראיה רחבה יותר הוא אינו משוכנע ע"פ הדעה הרווחת שגרמ"ז בטופו של דבר רוצה לדלג מעל משוכת הפיצוציים ע"מ להגיע לדיון עם הממשל (והקונגרס) בנושא זכויות סחר, קרי פתיחת השוק האמריקאי למוצרים מזרח גרמניים. ראייתי שונה בכך שתעדיפות הראשונה מבחינתם היא השגת לגיטימציה למשטר המזרח גרמני ורק במקום שני ניצב עניין הסחר. הסברו של סקינר הוא שבמרכזים כלכליים ארה"ב לא תוכל להיות שוק מרכזי עבור ייצוא גרמ"ז: במקום ברה"מ או אף בגמת רפ"ג עמה הולך ומתפתח הנושא של מפעלים משותפים. לגיטימציה זו שגרמ"ז מחפשת בארה"ב עברה גם דרך תביעות האזרחים האמריקאים והארגונים היהודיים.

../2

שלח אנשי אירופה 1 אירופה 3 אירופה 2

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טלפס מברק

דף 2 מתוך 3 דפים

סווג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

2/3

יישוב הנושא ייצור לה דעת קהל טובה יותר. הרנקר רכוב על גל הגלסנוסט הסובייטי וביקורו ברפ"ג שואף לקדוע אשנב רחב יותר לארצו במערב.

3. לשאלתי כיצד זה משתקף בזירה הפנימית בגרמ"ז סקינר הטעים שההפגנות לאחרונה שם אינן סימן טוב למשטר, אם כי אין להפריז בהשפעתן. הפתיחות בזירה יחסי החוץ ובייחוד לאור ביקור הרנקר ברפ"ג יצרו שרשרת של ציפיות במגזרים שונים ובייחוד בשניים מרכזיים (א) מה שמכונה האגודה לזכויות האזרח שבראשה עומד קראוצ'יק. (ב) אנשי כהונה (CHURCH VIGIL). אלפיים מהם נאספו להפגנה וב-30 עדים נוספות נערכו "התקהלויות".

4. מגדיר ביקור וייטהד בנובי' 87 כחיובי וכבזה שזכה לסיקור נרחב במושגים של גרמ"ז. במיוחד הוא מציין את הפרסום שניתן, להפתעת הכל, לדבריו בנושא החומה. הרמן אכסן (AXEN) חבר הפוליטביורו והועדה ליחסי חוץ יבוא במאי לביקור פרטי בארה"ב ע"פ הזמנת אחת האוניברסיטאות כאן.

5. סבאג' מצידו הדגיש שיש לראות את ביקור שברנדזה בבון כחיסול "תקרית גבלס" עם הקנצלר קוהל. בעקבות זאת צפוייה שרשרת של פגישות רמות דרג. הנשיא אוטו וייצקר יערוך ביקור רשמי במוסקבה ובעתיד הרחוק יותר גם הקנצלר. לפני כן יגיע לשם שה"ח גנשר. בון מייחסת חשיבות לביקור שברנדזה, מעבר לחיסול התקרית הנ"ל, בשל ראשית השוק הנתונה בידם ומהיותו הכרה בממסד (ESTABLISHMENT) המערב אירופאי. הצדדים חתמו על שלושה הסכמים (א) פרטיכל על הקמת קונסי בלנינגרד ובמינכן לא יאוחר מינואר 89 (ב) הארכת ההסכם הכלכלי (מ-78) ל-25 שנים. (ג) התייעצויות מדיניות אחת לשנה בין שה"ח או סגניהם. הגורמים הנ"ל יתכנסו לאלתר בעיתות משבר. סבאג' רואה חשיבות מיוחדת במיסוד הקשרים, בין שתי הארצות לאור דוקא בהסכמים שנכרתו ביניהם אלא באימוץ המודל האמריקאי של ניהול מגעים עם ברה"מ על בסיס של ועדות כגון ועדה בילטרלית, זכויות אדם (בנושא המיעוט הגרמני בברה"מ) ועוד. בנושא האחרון בון אינה מסתירה שביעות רצונה מהעלאת דרג הטיפול בו ומהצורה שברה"מ מתייחסת אליו. ב-87, למשל, עזבו את ברה"מ 14,500 גרמניים, פי ארבע מאשר ב-86. המכשול העקרי בקידום היחסים הוא נושא ברלין. הטוב' עומדים על כך שסוגיה זו לא תופיע בסדה"י של המגעים הבילטרליים.

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ל ק ס מ ב ר ק

דף 3 מתוך 3 דפים

סווג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

238

3/3

סבאג' מסכם שמתפתח תהליך של חימום אוירה ביניהם אך טרם נוצר שינוי בטיסי על אף ההתפתחות דלעיל. גורבצ'וב פרפולרי בדעת הקהל הרפ"גי, אך ברה"מ עצמה נמפסון עדיין באותה תדמיון שהיתה לה בעבר. נושא הגלסנוסט, הפסגה בוושינגטון, הסכם ה - INF נראים באור חיובי ומבטיח אך הגישה היא ע"פ הגדרת סבאג'

LETS HOLD GORBACHEV BY HIS WORDS

אלי אבידן

אל.א.

END

1090 **המשרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר** תאריך : 19.02.88

שמור דחוף **
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**

102.1.1 תיק יומן אלי

הדס:1090,2
אל:רוש/75,בטחון/13
מ-:המשרד,תא:030288,זח:1534,דח:ר,סג:שמ
נד:@

שמור/רגיל

ע.ב.ש. 2216 - המשך

אל: רוש / ערן, אבידן, מתני, נטבחות

דע: מקשיח / משהביט

בהמשך לחוזב 1035 - הרצאת אורח של בז'ז'ינסקי (לרוש נר 69, לבטחון נר 11 מה-8/2),
להלן סעיף נוסף שנקומר בתרבן המברק בין סעיף 1 לסעיף 2 של חוזב 1035)

בפתח הרצאתו, סיפר בז'ז'ינסקי כי נושא הרצאתו מתבסס בין השאר על דו"ח שהוכן בשנה האחרונה ושהוא נמנה על מחבריו, ואשר הוגש בשבוע שעבר לנשיא רייגן . בועדה, שעסקה בשנה האחרונה בבדיקת הדוקטרינה האיסטרטגית של ארה"ב בשנים הבאות (או ליתר דיוק בעשור הקרוב) השתתפו, בז'ז'ינסקי, קיסינג'ר, מנקדי באי"ר לשעבר, ראשי המטות של ה- ARMY, NAVY
וגנרלים בכירים נוספים.
לועדה היתה נגישות להומר הרגיש ביותר הנוגע לבטחונה של ארה"ב, דבר שאיפשר גיבוש הערכות והמלצות בתחום זה, לקראת העשור הבא.

נודה של נ"ר הנרטים בנדון נולל הדו"ח אר חלקים ממנו.

מצבא

בלמס יוצא

102.1.1 תיק אלם

חודם:2/1035
אל:רוש/69/בטחון/11
מ-:המשרד/תא:080288/זח:1459/דח:ר/סג:בל
נד:0

רגיל

ע.ב.ש. 2216

אל: רוש/ ערן/ אבידן/ מתני/ נסמחוה.

דע: מקשי"ח - נשהב"ט

הרצאת אורח של בז'ידז'ינסקי.

1. אמש/ 6.2.88 נשא בז'ידז'ינסקי הרצאה בירושלים של ידידלמות חדשות במדיניות החוץ האמריקנית' (והשינויים הצפויים בעשור הקרוב) בנוכחות מוזמנים רבים. האירוע נעשה בחסות הקרן האמריקנית ללימודי יהדות ברלין בשיתוף עם המכון ללימודי יהדות ברלין באוניברסיטת אוקסנפורד.

2. להלן עיקרי הרצאתו:-
את הדילמות והשינויים המתבקשים במדיניות החוץ האמריקנית מבקש בז'ידז'ינסקי לבדוק ב- 3 תחומים:
א. בתחום הדוקטרינה האיסטרטגית.
ב. בתחום העדיפויות והאינטרסים הגיאופוליטיים.
ג. בתפקיד הגלובלי האמריקני/ היינו של מנהיגות גלובלית.

בתחום הדוקטרינה האיסטרטגית
ההנחה החדשה מתבססת על הדיוק של נשק גרעיני שיכול לבוא לידי שימוש צבאי הון הסבת נזק סביבתי קטן
(LIMITED COLLATERAL /SOCIETAL DAMAGE)

- בעקבות התקדמות טכנולוגית ויכולתם של ראשי חץ קטנים. בז'יז'ינסקי ציין שהמליצו בדו"ח בין השאר על :-
- הצורך בשילוב מערכות הגנתיות והתקפיות .
- שה- SDI יתמקד במערכות הגנה נקודתיות במקום התכיסה הנרחבת של מערכת כוללנית)
- הצורך בגמישות ומובילות ואי הלות בידידים . והצורך ב- LONG RANGE VERSATILE FORCES.
- לא לבנות 'פלטפורמות גדולות' דוגמת, בסיסים ונושאות מטוסים אלא להתרכז ב- מערכות SEA AND AIR LIFT ו- FORCE MULTIPLIERS.

הביא כדוגמא למכמילי כח, השמדת הטילים הטורים עיי היה"א הישראלי. משימה ששילבה אבירוניקה משוכללת ביותר עם כוח אדם מיומן בעל איכות גבוהה.

השיקולים הגיאופוליטיים

א. הגוש המזרחי - רומניה, יוגוסלביה ופולין נמצאות היום במצב של PRE-REVOLUTION.
הפרסטרויקה - סיכוייה להצליח הם נחות מ- 50% וצפויה אי יציבות פנימית ברה"מ בהמשך.
ולבסוף, אנו עומדים בפני תקופה של חלק עולם בלתי יציב, היינו הגוש המזא"ר.

ב. המזה"ת -

1. התוקפנות הסובייטית נגד אפגניסטן משפיעה על עתידן של פקיסטן ואירן ומכאן נובעת החשיבות האיזורית והעולמית. בז'יז'ינסקי מעריך שהסובייטים מעוניינים לטגת אולם לא לפני 'שישאירו משהו בקאבול'. אי יציבות בפקיסטן יכולה להחריף המצב באיזור ומכאן גם להחריף העימות הבינמעצמתי.
2. המצב באירן - בל עוד, קיימת מעורבות אמריקנית באיזור המפרץ, קיימת האפשרות של עימות עם ברה"מ.
3. התחייבות ארה"ב לישראל ולמדינות המתונות הערביות. ההתחיבות האמריקנית לישראל, איננה רק אסטרטגית אלא בעיקרה מוסרית. בל טיעון המתייחס להיותה של ישראל נכס אסטרטגי הוא יחסי - לנכסים אסטרטגיים אחרים שאולי אף גדולים יותר

מישראל. המחוייבות האמריקנית לישראל היא מוחלטת מהיותה מוסרית (בהקשר זה מבנה הסיבות למחויבות זו).
אם הקונפליקט באיזור ימשך, המצב יחריף. הביע ספק אם בעתיד הקרוב תהיה התקדמות בלשהי מאחר וחסרים מספר אלמנטים: מנהיגות ערבית אמיצה ונועזת, מנהיגות ישראלית מאוחדת ובעלת תפיסה אסטרטגית ומנהיגות אמריקנית המוכנה להקדיש עצמה לקידום מו"מ בין הצדדים. הביע חשש שהאיזור ימשיך להיות סוער וגועש ומקור לדאגה אמריקנית ועדיפות גיאופוליטית.

4. הבעיה הגיאופוליטית המדאיגה ביותר היא מרכז אסיה. אינו צופה שבעיה זו תפתר בקרוב. היא תמשיך, תחריף ותשתלב בבעיות הדמוגרפיות בלבילות חברתיות ופוליטיות של מקסיקו הגובלת בארה"ב - "קרוב לבית". אם בעיה זו תשפיע על ארה"ב הרי שזה ישפיע על תפיסת התפקיד העולמית של ארה"ב.

תפיסת התפקיד העולמי של ארה"ב
הנסיון ההסטורי מלמד שבאשר כוח עולמי נעלם, תפס מקומו כוח אחר. כיום לא קיימת אלטרנטיבה, ואין מדינה המועמדת להחליף את ארה"ב במנהיגה עולמית לא מבחינה כלכלית ולא מבחינה טכנולוגית וצבאית. הסובייטים אינם יריב.
בשנת 2010 עדיין תהיה ארה"ב הכוח הכלכלי העולמי המוביל. באשר ה- GNP שלה נאמד ב-8 טריליון דולר. האפשרות השניה היא שאם אירופה לא תתאחד, סין תהיה המעצמה הכלכלית מספר שניים. אחריה יפן עם 4 טריליון דולר ואחריהן אירופה ובראה"מ עם GNP של "בקושי" 3 טריליון דולר. יפן לא תמשש זאת לבדי כוח צבאי אולם יחד עם ארה"ב תהווה את הכוח הכלכלי העולמי הגדול ביותר.
גם אירופה וגם יפן לא ההיינה מעוניינות בהגדלת כוחן הצבאי ותמשכנה להסתמך על היכולת הצבאית האמריקנית. עם זאת, צופה בזיז'ינסקי שהלחץ האמריקני על יפן ואירופה ילך ויתחזק להגדלת השתתפותן בהחזקת הכוח הצבאי להגנת

המערב.

3. בתשובה לשאלות:
על הנוכחות האמריקנית במפרץ : הנוכחות חשובה מאד במיוחד לאור פרשת אירן שבגעה באמינות האמריקנית . הנוכחות סייעה בחיזוק קשרי ארה"ב עם מדינות המפרץ וזה גם BENEFICIAL לישראל.

על הועידה הבינ"ל : בטימי לגבי השלב הבא של התהליך. הועידה אינה יכולה להוות מנשיר כללי לדיון אלא שעל הצדדים עצמם לשאת ולתת על תוצאות ספציפיות. ללא מעורבות אמריקנית אקטיבית התהליך לא יתקדם. יוזמה ישראלית בעיתה, ואפילו חד צדדית עשויה להיות לעזר רב.

מצפ'א- בינ'ל 1

(הערת קשר: שעיף נוסף מתוכן מבוק זה מועבר בנפרד)

מס

הפ: שהח/מנכל/ממנכל/בירן/מצפא/ר/מרכז/ממד

** יוצא ** שמור
**
**
**

חוזם:2,1090
אל:ורש/75,בטחון/13
מ-:המשרד,תא:030288,זח:1534,דח:ר,טג:שמ
נד:@

שמור/רגיל

ע.ב.ש. 2216 - המשך

אל: ורש / ערן, אבידן, רתני, נטנחות

דע: מקש"ח / נשהב"ט

בהמשך לחוזם 1035 - הרצאת אורח של בז'ז'ינסקי
(לורש נר 69, לבטחון נר 11 מה-8/2),
להלן סעיף נוסף שמקומו בתוכן המברק בין סעיף 1 לסעיף
2 של חוזם 1035)

בפתח הרצאתו, סיפר בז'ז'ינסקי כי נושא הרצאתו
מתבסס בין השאר על דו"ח שהוכן בשנה האחרונה
ושהוא נמנה על מחבריו, ואשר הוגש בשבוע שעבר
לנשיא רייגן . בועדה, שעסקה בשנה האחרונה
בבדיקת הדוקטרינה האיסטרטגית של ארה"ב בשנים
הבאות (או ליתר דיוק בעשור הקרוב) השתתפו,
בז'ז'ינסקי, קיסינג'ר, מנקדי באיטר לשעבר,
ראשי המטות של ה- ARMY, NAVY
וגנרלים בכירים נוספים.
לועדה היתה נגישות לחומר הרגיש ביותר
הנוגע לבטחונה של ארה"ב, דבר שאיפשר גיבוש
הערכות והמלצות בתחום זה, לקראת העשור הבא.

נודה על נירב הפרטים בנדון כולל הדו"ח או חלקים
ממנו.

מצבא

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מס

תפ: שהח/מנכל/ממנכל/בירן/מצנא/ר/מרכז/המד

דחיפות: רגיל	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	רף:
סווג בטחוני: שמר		מת:
תז"ח: 081830	בהול	אל: לשכת השר
נר: 228		רע: ענוג מנהל מצע"א
		מאת: מרדכי ידיד / ס/הקונכ"ל

לאורי סביר.

וולדהייט. בהמשך לשיחתנו.

1. מצ"ב ההודעה הפרלימינרית שאדגר ברונפמן הוציא עוד בטרם הגיע לידיו הדו"ח.
2. ישראל זינגר מבקש שתתקשר אליו מחר ה-9.2 בבוקר שעונכט ולמרות שהמדובר בשעות הקטנות של הלילה פה. טלפון 718-544-3225 או 718-544-9269.
3. ברונפמן אמור להופיע בשתי רשתות טלביזיה הערב בנושא וולדהיים.

מרדכי ידיד

שהה בנמל אירגו בין לפנו תפולה סיכו תביעה
1 1 1 2 1 1 3 2

תאריך:	שם השולח:	אישור:

228
2/2

RCA GA
1072+
236129 WJC UR
CC1 NYC

236129 WJC UR
FEB 08 1986 10:37 7521782
GA

ZCZCUS OJC
BOOK 1

FEBRUARY 8, 1986

TO ALL WJC OFFICES

PENDING A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE AUSTRIAN HISTORIANS' COMMISSION REPORT ON WALDHEIM'S NAZI PAST, THE FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY STATEMENT HAS BEEN MADE BY WJC PRESIDENT EDGAR M. BRONFMAN:

''RE: FINDINGS OF THE AUSTRIAN HISTORIANS' COMMISSION

THIS IS A PROFOUND MORAL INDICTMENT OF WALDHEIM AND BRINGS TO THE FORE AUSTRIA'S ROLE IN WORLD WAR II, IN WHICH IT PLAYED A MORE THAN WILLING PART IN NAZISM.''

NNNNE

ZCC1 NYC

END

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 03.02.88

סודי יוצא **
**
**
** 102.1.1 עניין אלה

חוזם:2,2815
אל:
בון/63,בריסל/43,האג/36,לונדון/47,פריס/92,רומא/65,וינה/31,
נ'/118,ביירס/68,מכסיקו/34,וש/88,אוטבה/26,בנגקוק/51,
טוקיו/43
מ-:המשרד,תא:030288,זח:1722,דח:ר,סג:ס
נד:@

סודי/רגיל

ראשי נציגויות

התהליך המדיני

1.לאור הפעילות הדיפלומטית שקיבלה הדים באמצעי התקשורת להלן מידע נוסף לידיעתכם.

א.בשבועות האחרונים בחנו מספר גורמים את אפשרויות השונות להפשרת הקפאות המדיני, וביניהם - מצרים,גרמניה,בריטניה,ארה'ב ומזכירות האו'ם.

ב.שני גורמים נתנו פומבי למהלכיהם:מצרים (הנשיא מובראק) וארה'ב (מזכיר המדינה שולץ,הנשיא רייגן,פיליפ חביב וכו').
הנשיא מובראק נתן ביטוי לשלב הראשון בתכניתו,שנועד בעצם להכשיר את הקרקע לקראת צעד יותר משמעותי.
בינתיים לאור היוזמה האמריקנית,לא ראה הנשיא מובראק מקום להמשיך ביוזמה נפרדת.

ג.היוזמה האמריקנית כפי שהוצגה בפני נציגי ישראל השונים כורכת בתוכה שלושה מרכיבים (אשר מהווים מקשה אחת):

1.פתיחה בינלאומית

2.מו'מ על הסדר ביניים

3.מו'מ על הסדר סופי.

באשר ללוח זמנים,סדר המרכיבים ופרטים לוגיסטים נוספים - אלה אמורים לעלות לדיון בשיחות בין ארה'ב לבין הצדדים.

ד.ארה'ב תבהיר לצדדים את עמדותיה באשר לכל אחד מהמרכיבים,כאשר ברור לה כי אלה לא תתקבלנה,כמות שהן על ידי הצדדים,אלא תהוונה מסמך פתיחה בסיסי.

ה.ראש הממשלה,מ'מ רוה'מ ושה'ח ונשיא מצרים נתנו את ברכתם לעצם כניסתה המחודשת של ארה'ב למאמץ המדיני.אנו מתרשמים כי גם ירדן מברכת על כך.

2.חשוב להדגיש שדווקא בימים אלה ולמרות שהמהומות בשטחים לא שככו,עושה ממשלת ישראל מאמצים בכוון הפתרון המדיני.

3.במקביל נמשכים מצדנו גם מגעים עם בריה'מ.ב-19.1 התקיימה בהלסינקי פגישה בין יועצו המדיני של שה'ח ד'ר נוביק לבין פקידים סובייטים רמי דרג.בשיחות העבירו הסובייטים תחושותיהם לגבי דחיפות קידום תהליך השלום.

סמנכ'ל אמית'ק

צש.א

תפ: שהח,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,אוקיאניה,מצרים,מצפא,אירא,אירב, אסיה,מאפ,אמלט,מזתים,ארבל2,אירג,הדרכה,מעת,הסברה,ממד

102.1.1

348/34

N.Y. TIMES - FEB. 12, 88

6/7

Shultz Likely to Undertake Mideast Peace Mission

By DAVID K. SHIPLER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 11 — Administration officials said today that Secretary of State George P. Shultz would probably travel to the Middle East at the end of this month to explore the prospects for movement toward Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.

Mr. Shultz, who has kept himself aloof from most direct involvement in the peace efforts during recent years, has reportedly decided to give the matter his personal attention in light of the violent clashes between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli soldiers during the last two months.

He was scheduled to be briefed this evening by Richard W. Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, who has just returned from a trip to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt, where he presented ideas for getting peace talks moving.

None of the parties involved has embraced the American proposals entirely, and each seems to have found something objectionable in them. Consequently, despite the sense of urgency brought by the clashes, some American officials and Middle Eastern diplomats say they are doubtful that dramatic progress can now be made.

Mr. Shultz's projected itinerary has not been announced, but he is expected to visit Israel, Jordan and Egypt. It is not known whether he will also go to Syria and Saudi Arabia.

The Administration is reportedly proposing elections by autumn among the Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip for an administrative council that would conduct municipal and other local affairs during negotiations on the final status of the territories. Those talks would begin late this year or early next, and would be accompanied by some sort of international conference.

Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel said Tuesday that he opposed this version of the autonomy plan, which was first outlined in the 1978 Camp David accords. He said he preferred a longer transition period — Camp David called for five years. But Palestinians fear that since Mr. Shamir's Likud bloc is devoted to maintaining Israeli control over the territories, the process will never get beyond the autonomy stage. This is why the Administration has proposed early negotiations on the final status of the territories.

Appeals for U.S. Action

In part, the Administration's efforts have been forced by circumstance — by the continuing violence in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem; by the persistent appeals for action from Israelis, Egyptians, some Palestinians and some Americans interested in the Middle East, and by a

348/347/7

Unrest in occupied lands spurs effort.

desire not to be seen as the cause of failure. If the United States makes no effort, it will be blamed for not doing so, and if the Arabs and the Israelis rebuff the American attempt, they will have to shoulder the blame.

In his final year in office, Mr. Shultz had reportedly planned to concentrate on the Soviet-American relationship, and he is going to Moscow Feb. 21 to 23 to discuss arms control, Afghanistan and other topics. But he has been criticized in the past for taking too little interest in the Middle East, and he is thought to be sensitive to the way he will be remembered as having performed.

This week, appearing at a closed session of the Council on Foreign Relations, Mr. Shultz was asked why he didn't use the talents of a couple of former special envoys to the Middle East who were in the room — Robert S. Strauss and Philip C. Habib. Mr. Habib went to Jordan two weeks ago to see King Hussein on behalf of the Administration.

According to several people present, Mr. Shultz said firmly that since he was Secretary of State, he would get involved himself.

If he goes ahead with the trip, it would appear to end a long period of aversion to such involvement after his disappointment in 1983 over the collapse of the Israeli-Lebanese security agreement, which Mr. Habib and Mr. Shultz helped arrange. Syria torpedoed the accord by forcing Lebanon to abandon it after it was signed, and Mr. Shultz was said to have felt bitterness toward Arab leaders who he felt had not kept their word.

A panel of Middle East specialists issued a report today urging the United States to strengthen its involvement in the region.

"We believe that matters in the Middle East are progressively deteriorating in ways that, if left unchecked, will cause major damage to Western interests," the Atlantic Council and the Middle East Institute said in the joint report.

One of the specialists, Robert Hunter of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said, "If the United States gets in with the Secretary of State and eventually the President, things can happen. I just hope that if we're going to start something, this Administration, as long as it has breath left in it, will persevere, because otherwise American credibility will go down."

1113 **משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר**

תאריך : 2.02.88
דף 1 מתוך 1
עותק 26 מתוך 36 סודי ביותר נכנס **

מרדכי: 2/1113
אל:המשרד
מ-:ורש/נר:22/ת:010288/ז:700/דח:מ/סג:סב
נד:0

סודי ביותר/מידי

אל:מנהל ממ"ד

שיחות מרבארק באן

לפי דג'ריג'יאן (29.1)

1. השיחות התרכזו בעיקר בתהליך השלום ומרבארק נתן אור ירוק לממשל על הצעות שולץ, הטבים במו כן להפגש עם חוסיין בפריז בירח ג' על מנת לשכנעו להצטרף למהלך.

2. השיחות הבילטרליות נסובו בעיקר על הנושא הכלכלי. בשנים האחרונות הצטברו כ-2.5 ביליון דולר שלא נוצלו והממשל ביקש לזרז את הטיפול במציאת פתרון.

3. בעניין הטנק M-1 ויצורו במצרים עלה בצורה כללית ביותר בשיחה עם קרלוצ'י ולא הוזכר בשום שיחה אחרת (ממקור אחר -סובם על התחלת יצור, ליתר דיוק הרכבה השנה של 555 טנקים במשך עשר שנים בששה שלבים. סה"כ מרבית העבודה תעשה בארה"ב קרוב ל-80 אחוזים).

4. נדון גם עניין המפרץ - המצרים מרבים לשלוח מומחים ומדריכים צבאיים

ערן .==

תפ: שחח/רחמ/שהבט/מנכל/ממנכל/ר/מרכז/רם/אמן/ליאור/מצרים/
בירן/מצנא/ערב1

102.1.1 אלון שאר

רחיפות: מ"ז	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	עמוד: 1
סווג בסחוני:	טופס מברק	עתיד: 10
תז"ח: 31/400		
נר 00726	א ל : מנהל לשכת השר, מע"ת, הסברה, מצפ"א,	
28 בטבת	ר ע : יועץ תקשורת לרוה"מ, יועץ תקשורת לשהב"ט, לע"מ, דו"צ, קש"ח, מזכיר הממשלה	
	מ : עתונות ניו-יורק	

להלן שאר כתבות היום
מה- NY-TIMES

ב'/ה

שיקה נשל מלעקל בימן נב כיו אמיגלל נגת הסברה
ליאור נבגים פנגר לעדה בוגים בנגה בשאי
נבגיר הנשלה

תאריך: 31/1/88	שם השולח: 2/2 '		אישור:

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U.S. Envoy Sees Hussein on Mideast

By DAVID K. SHIPLER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 30 — In a new effort to get Arab-Israeli peace talks under way, President Reagan has sent Philip C. Habib, his former special Middle East envoy, to Jordan to meet this weekend with King Hussein, American officials said today.

Mr. Habib, who has spoken out forcefully on behalf of King Hussein's proposal for an international peace conference, was reported to have delivered a letter from the President containing some thoughts on making a conference palatable to Israel. No details were available, however.

First reports on the American initiative came in news dispatches from Amman.

The hastily arranged trip came after President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, visiting the White House, urged Mr. Reagan to seize the opportunity for progress that may have been created by the violent clashes between Palestinians and Israelis in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

Response Not Yet Decided

The Reagan Administration has still not decided whether it will respond to appeals from Mr. Mubarak, from the Israeli Foreign Ministry and from some Palestinian leaders for a more active and visible American role in the peace efforts, official say.

But the dispatch of Mr. Habib indicates that there is high-level concern over the dangers of appearing inactive. Many officials believe that diplomatic stagnation will lead to further violence.

President Mubarak, in a talk today in Dallas, pointed to the opportunities: "All the Arab leaders I met with a few days ago, and I repeat, all these leaders, including P.L.O. chairman Yasir Arafat, have made it crystal clear that they favored a peaceful settlement. It would be a pity, indeed a tragedy, to miss this golden opportunity. This would be an unforgivable mistake of historic dimensions."

The Habib mission was arranged last Thursday, an Administration official explained, when Mr. Reagan telephoned King Hussein and had a "very general discussion about some ideas that we have," the officials said. The President asked if the Jordanian leader would receive an envoy to discuss the proposals in some detail. King Hussein agreed.

Cease-Fire in Lebanon

Mr. Habib, a retired career diplomat, served as President Reagan's special Middle East envoy in 1982-83 and succeeded in achieving a cease-fire in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which included the withdrawal of P.L.O. troops from Lebanon. But he was unable to bring about any lasting accords. He later served as Mr. Reagan's special emissary to the Philippines after the disputed elections in February 1986 and was instrumental in persuading Mr. Reagan to drop support for President Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was given asylum in Hawaii after he fled the country.

Following that assignment, Mr. Habib was asked by Mr. Reagan to become his special ambassador to Central America, but he resigned last August over the Administration's reported lack of interest in taking the lead in promoting negotiations for a regional peace accord.

It is far from certain that any progress toward peace can be made at this time. Relations between Jordan and the United States have been unusually tense and angry lately, largely because of the Administration's failure

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to get Congressional approval for arms sales to Jordan.

Pro-Israel lobbyists have managed to block recent efforts to sell Jordan sophisticated weapons, and this has reportedly convinced King Hussein that the United States is incapable of resisting the hardest line in Israel. In turn, that has implications for the peace process, since the Jordanian leader would count on Washington to press Israel to make concessions during negotiations.

Criticisms of U.S.

Last Thursday, King Hussein made harsh, public criticisms of the United States, accusing the Reagan Administration of having fallen "under the influence of the extremists in Israel, people who cannot see beyond tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, let alone years from now."

In an interview with The Washington Post and ABC News, he said his country "no longer" enjoyed "the kind of relationship that once existed" with the United States.

He also accused the Reagan Administration of trying to set him up last October, when Secretary of State George P. Shultz suggested that in lieu of a full-fledged international peace conference, King Hussein come to Washington during the Soviet-American summit to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.

Mr. Shamir, who has rejected the concept of an international conference, gave his conditional agreement to a meeting under the auspices of the summit. But King Hussein, who faces threats from radical Arabs, wants an international umbrella to legitimize any direct talks he conducts with Israel. And so he rejected the idea of Soviet-American sponsorship that would have excluded Syria and other Arab countries.

A Bitter Declaration

"I somehow understood what was expected of me was to commit political suicide if I had answered in the affirmative," King Hussein declared bitterly in the interview.

Last spring, the United States helped King Hussein and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres work out a format for a conference that would seem to restrict the ability of the Russians, the Syrians or others to torpedo a Jordanian-Israeli accord. But Mr. Peres's chief political rival, Prime Minister Shamir, refused to go along. Nothing that has happened recently has indicated that the impasse can be broken.

ABROAD AT HOME | Anthony Lewis

Breaking the Stalemate

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1328

WASHINGTON

President Mubarak of Egypt has been here this week urging the Reagan Administration to get actively involved in the search for Arab-Israeli peace. He had a central message, delivered with passion.

What is important, he said, is to get Israel and the others into the conference room. Things look very different when people get to the practical work of negotiating. All the parties would gain so much from peace. Once they are at the table, the logic of peace would take hold.

It must sound visionary, given the complexities of the Middle East and, now, the intensified bitterness between Palestinians and Israelis. But the one treaty that exists between Israel and a neighbor resulted from a visionary gesture, the visit to Jerusalem by Mr. Mubarak's predecessor, Anwar Sadat.

When I was in Israel recently, an American diplomat made a comment that echoed for me in Mr. Mubarak's message. "The moral equivalent of a Sadat visit," the diplomat said, "is getting Arabs and Israelis around a table. Until you get a negotiation started, people won't focus on realities."

'The moral equivalent of a Sadat visit.'

But getting to a negotiation is the problem. All the Arab parties now are ready to go to an international conference that would turn the real work over to bilateral talks: between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, for example. Israel's Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, favors the idea. But the Prime Minister in the coalition Government, Yitzhak Shamir, is utterly, unyieldingly opposed.

President Mubarak cannot break the stalemate as President Sadat did. What made the Sadat visit so powerful a drama was that a major party to the conflict was taking an enormous risk for peace. But Egypt is at peace with Israel now. Mr. Mubarak, commendable as is his effort, is an outsider to the conflict.

Nor is there any real possibility of a dramatic gesture from any leader of the conflicting parties. The Palestinians are politically divided, and neither Jordan nor Syria can speak for them. Israeli politicians are too worried about the upcoming election to do anything risky.

What then? Mr. Mubarak talked

about a moratorium on violence in the West Bank and Gaza, on Palestinian protest and Israeli repression and building of settlements. Those ideas look like non-starters. How would they assure peace negotiations? And without that assurance, how would they persuade the young Palestinians to stop protesting the occupation?

The other possibility, the one that brought Mr. Mubarak to Washington, is American leadership. He wants President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz to take some risks for peace in the Middle East. Though he would never put it this impolitely, he wants them to be serious.

The Reagan Administration's recent performance on Arab-Israeli peace has been frivolous. Secretary of State Shultz apparently promoted the idea that Prime Minister Shamir and King Hussein of Jordan should come to Washington during the Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting. It would have amounted to a photo opportunity.

Now President Reagan is sending Philip Habib to see King Hussein. That at least shows American interest. But what is needed is a real effort in Israel — an effort to make clear what the opportunities are in negotiation, and the risks in holding on to territory inhabited by a hostile people.

In the distance, in the abstract, peace negotiations with an enemy look dangerous. Countries do not enjoy the prospect of giving things up — which is what negotiation entails. But the negotiations with Egypt, helped crucially by the United States, gave Israel enormous gains. That frontier is tranquil, the Sinai demilitarized.

"Once you get into a negotiation," an Israeli lawyer said, "realism must take hold." Perhaps, in a sense, that is why Prime Minister Shamir is so adamantly opposed to an international peace conference. He has an ideological construct: perpetual Israeli control of all the land west of the Jordan River. He fears that if negotiations started, his people would prefer the realism of a smaller but safer country, an indisputably Jewish state.

There is one other source of hope, I think: the American Jewish community. Its leaders have naturally been reluctant to speak out about the wisdom of this peace approach or that, preferring to leave the decisions to the people and Government of Israel.

But now, in the scenes in the West Bank and Gaza, they see a mortal threat to the future of Israel. American Jews on the whole do not want an Israel with a large and growing Palestinian population. They do not want to let things go on as they are, with Arab radicalism becoming more menacing. Many see the urgency of peace, and their voices could make a difference.□

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

102.1.1 אבי קשלר

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המשרד

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דף ___ מתוך ___ דפים

סווג בטחוני בלמס

דחיפות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ד 031400

מס' מברק

מצפייא , מעת

ארזייב-תהליכ השלום

ראו נא ספור מהוושינגטון - פוסט 30.1.88

יוסי גל

שהם חתמו לשל אלמנקל בין בגבור אבוטל לבין
הסברה לאלה בגדים הלבתכ לבמה רק אומן פבנה
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Shultz Urges 'New Blend' for Mideast

Mubarak-Reagan Meeting Appears to Produce No Initiative

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State George P. Shultz called yesterday for "a new blend of approaches" to get the deadlocked Middle East peace process moving again amid indications visiting Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and the Reagan administration have failed to arrive at any agreement on an approach toward a new peace initiative.

"I believe we have come to the point where illusions about the past and old approaches to resolve the problems need to be tested against the new realities," Shultz said in a luncheon toast to Mubarak at the State Department.

"We must find a way to take what's best from past experience and what's imaginative from the present and create a new blend of approaches for pursuing peace in the Middle East," he added.

Shultz's comments followed three days of discussions between Mubarak and his aides and top administration officials, including President Reagan, on ways to relaunch the peace process in a bid to end the violence in the Israeli-occupied territories.

Throughout his official state visit here, Mubarak sought to persuade the administration and Congress to support a U.N.-sponsored international peace conference as an umbrella for direct Arab-Israeli negotiations. Mubarak is scheduled to deliver a speech before the Council on World Affairs in Dallas before departing Saturday evening for France.

Shultz, in a veiled reference to renewed U.S. doubts about the wisdom of pressing for an international conference, warned that such "good ideas" would remain "useless if they do not find an expression in action."

While he said the United States would pursue "any avenue" to revive the peace process, "including an international conference . . . we remain convinced that direct face-to-face negotiations is the way to achieve results."

Mubarak said he had listened "carefully and attentively" to the "new ideas" proposed by the administration during his visit and promised to examine them "thoroughly" in the weeks ahead.

Neither side indicated what these "new ideas" were. But in an interview with the Associated Press yesterday, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir said the talks here had concentrated "on the question of substance, not of procedure" and that the focus was an interim solution allowing for local autonomy of the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Such a solution, he said, would be "more or less" along the lines spelled out in the 1978 Camp David accords signed by Israel, Egypt and the United States but never implemented. Shamir said he was ready to discuss "all these matters in the footsteps of the Camp David agreement" and to discuss "some proposals about changes" in it if necessary.

But Mubarak on Thursday told Senate and House delegations that he thought the Camp David provisions for local autonomy were now "a dead letter" and "an idea whose time has past," according to one congressional participant.

Shamir also said Israel would allow new elections in the territories, adding "these elected persons will be recognized by us as the legitimate representation of the Palestinian Arabs."

The Israeli government has removed, or deported, all but one of the elected Palestinian municipal mayors and has not allowed elections since 1976.

Mubarak said last night on PBS' "MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour" that Israeli officials have told him Israel has ceased all new settlement activity on the West Bank, and Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, interviewed on the same program, said he was "unaware of any plans" for new settlements in the coming months.

As part of their 1984 agreement to establish a coalition government, Israel's Likud and Labor parties vowed they would develop only five or six of the 27 new West Bank settlements that had been planned.

Meanwhile, two envoys close to Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, who strongly favors an international conference, arrived here yesterday. They are Nimrod Novik, a political adviser to Peres, and Simcha Dinitz, former Israeli ambassador here and a prominent Labor Party member.

The two Israeli envoys were believed to be discussing the results of Mubarak's visit here as well as Shultz's "new ideas" for reviving the peace talks.

XXX

WP.

END

18068 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 26.03.88
דף 1 מתוך 2
עותק 25 מתוך 36 סודי ביותר נכנס

מחלקה

102.1.1

תגלין שלו

1/18068:מזהה
אל:המשרד
מ-:דרש/נר:592/תא:270188/זח:1600/דח:מ/סג:סב
נד:@

סודי ביותר/מידי

סמנכ"ל מז"תים

דע: המנכ"ל המדיני

המנכ"ל

מנכ"ל משרד רה"מ

נפגשתי לא"ב הימים עם השגריר אוקלי מהמועצה לבטחון לאומי, לפי בקשתו.

הועלו הנושאים:-

1. תהליך השלום
2. טאבה

1. ביקור מובארק יהווה הזדמנות לא רק לשמוע הצעותיו כפי שהועלו במומבי לפני ביקורו אלא גם לברר אם יש באמתחתו מחשבות קונקרטיות נוספות.
במועצה לבטחון לאומי אינם נלהבים מהצהרותיו של מובארק לגבי הועידה הבינ"ל. עם זאת הם סבורים שיש צורך לנצל את הזמן שנותר לבהונת ממשל רייגן בדי להתקדם בתהליך השלום ולהביא למו"מ בילטרלי בין ישראל-ירדן והפלשתינים. לדעתם עדיף להתרכז עתה בדיונים עניינים על מהות ולא במסגרות. יש לראות גם את פגישת שה"ח שולץ עם חנה סניורה ואבו רחמה בחלק מחיפושי הדרך המתנהלים עתה מצד הממשל.

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* דף 2 מתוך 2
* עותק 25 מתוך 36
*
*2. לנוכח תפקיד המפתח שמיועד לנשיא מובארק בנסיון
*לחדש התהליך המדיני והשפעתו על חוסיין על מנת להביאו
*לשולחן המו"מ על הסדר-ביניים - תגובתה השלילית של
*ישראל להצעותיה של ארה"ב (ביקור סופר בירושלים)
*בנושאי טאבה -מעורימים קשיים בנסיון האמריקני להביא
*להידברות טובה יותר ולשיפור האווירה בין ארה"ב-מצריים
*וישראל. ארה"ב סבורה לכן שחשוב היה שישראל תעיין
*מחדש בהצעותיה של ארה"ב בנושא טאבה ולא לדחותן על
*הסף.
*
*ארד.=
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*תפ: שהח/רהמ/שהבט/מכבל/ממנבל/ר/מרכז/רם/אמן/ליאור/מצריים/
*בירן/מצפא/סייבל

18070 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 18.8.88
דף 1 מתוך 1
עותק 11 מתוך 18 סודי ביותר נבנס

מחלקה 1.1 102

תרגום:18070/1
אל:המשרד
מ-:רדש/בר:606/תא:270188/זח:2000/דח:מ/סגמטה
נד:@

סודי ביותר/מידי

אל:מנכ'ל ראה'מ

מנכ'ל מדיני

צלצל צ'רלי היל מייד אחרי הפגישה, בדי לומר:-

THIS WAS A NON-MEETING AND NOT A MEANINGFUL ONE.
PALESTINIANS REPEATED PARTY LINE. THE SECRETARY
HIT AT THE P.L.O. WHICH HAS A REALITY PROBLEM

לדבריו, המזכיר קיבל את מסר ראה'מ בעניין השניים.

ערן.==

תפ: שהח/רהמ/מנכל/ממנכל/ליאור/בירן/מצפא

שגרירות ישראל • וושינגטון

605

101.1.1

המשרד
נאו"ם

121

דף.....מתוך.....דפים
סווג בטחוני.....קודי
דחיפות.....בהול לבוקר
תאריך וז"ח.....27 ינו' 1830 8
שיטת מס' מברק.....

אל: סמנכ"ל ארבל
השגריר, נאו"ם
מנהל ארבל 2

מועבייט - דוח המזכ"ל, שלכם 866

השגריר העלה הבוקר בפני המזכיר את בקשתנו שארה"ב לא תיתן ידה לדיון והצעות החלטה עקרות ובלתי מועילות לטיפול במצב. השגריר ביקש גם שארה"ב לא תכנס להתדיינות על נוסח זה או אחר.

המזכיר ציין כי כבר הביע עמדתו הנחרצת בנדון, והוסיף שארה"ב אינה רואה טעם בבזבוז זמן בדיון עקר. האו"ם, אמר המזכיר, אינו הפורום לדיון בנושא הסכסוך. הוא עצמו עוד לא ראה נוסח זה או אחר, אך אין לכך חשיבות.

על אף שהדברים לא נאמרו מפורשות, התרשמותנו שארה"ב תתנגד להצעות ההחלטה שעל הפרק.

ערן

102.1.1 תהליך שלום

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

- ס ו ד י -

ז' בשבט תשמ"ח
26 בינואר 1988

2140

אל : השגריר, הציר - וושינגטון

מאת : ממנכ"ל צפ"א

הנדון: התהליך המדיני

מצהרים עם ארתור יוז, הציר בשגרירות ארה"ב:

1. במחמ"ד טרם גיבשו רעיונות אופרטיביים לקידום התהליך. הנחית היסוד של המזכיר היא שאסור להניח לשנה זו לעבור ללא מעש בגלל הבחירות בארה"ב ובישראל משום שהדבר פשוט מסוכן. מאידך אין לעשות פעולה לשם פעולה בלבד והוא מבקש מאנשיו רעיונות.

2. גישתו של שולץ כמזכיר מדינה, בעסקים וכאדם היא שיש להגיע להסדרים בדרך של שכנוע הצדדים בדבר האינטרסים שלהם ולא בדרך של כפיה. זו גישתו כלפי ממשלת ישראל על מרכיביה. בנוסף לכך הוא מסתייג מנקיטת עמדה בין צדדים למחלוקת בתוך ממשלת ישראל. כלפי ישראל ימשיך בדרך השכנוע בוודאי במהלך בקור רה"מ בוושינגטון או אף קודם לכן.

3. קלבריוס היה השבוע בירדן לצורך REVIEW של הנושא עם חוסין. אין שינוי בעמדת חוסין מבחינה זו שהוא קבע את התנאים המינימליים ההכרחיים לו להצטרפות לתהליך המדיני והוא מצפה למילוים.

4. הארועים בשטחים פגעו במעמד המלך חוסין ומרחב תימרונו ובהשגיו בועידת עמאן.

5. יתכן שתהיה שליחות בירור במז"ת (מרפי) ומכל מקום נראה שיעשה מאמץ לבחינה נוספת את הקונטקסט הב"ל המתאים למלך חוסין ושיהיה מקובל על מרכיבי ממשלת ישראל. בהקשר זה העיר שהרעיון שבדק שולץ בבקורו באזורנו - ההקשר לפסגת ראשי מעצמות העל - לא מת לחלוטין.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

יואב בירן

העתק: מנכ"ל מדיני
יועץ מדיני לשה"ח
מנהל מצפ"א

ISRAEL ישראל

21

מחלקה 102.1.1 מדינה ואלה

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

טופס מברק
דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים
סווג בטחוני: שמור
דחיפות: מיידי
תאריך וז"ח: 26/1/88-11:00
מס' מברק

אל: המשרד

543

אל: מנהל מצפ"א
דע: סמנכ"ל צפ"א, סמנכ"ל אמית"ק

ועידה בינ"ל - כנס בני-ברית

אירגון בני ברית קיים כנס של חצי יום ב-22/1 לדיון בשאלה הצריכה ישראל להשתתף בועידה הבינ"ל. בני ברית מקיימת כנסים כאלה לעיתים מזומנות. בספטמבר הנושא היה על יחסי ישראל והתפוצות, באוקטובר על יחסי ותיקן - ישראל והיהודים.
בכנס ב-22/1 השתתפו מצד אחד השגריר אמיל חביב ופרופ' עימנואל סיון ומצד שני השגריר מאיר רוזן ועוזר מזכיר המדינה לשעבר איגלברג.
עימנואל סיון ניתח המצב במז"ת ומסקנתו היא שהועידה הבינ"ל היא הדרך המציאותית היחידה הקיימת לתחילתו של תהליך השלום. לדעתו ישראל היא הצד המעונין נגד הסטטוס קוו ובעד הסדר (כהסכם קמפ-דיויד; הענקת אוטונומיה אולי כולל משטרה אבל לא צבא, מטבע, מכס).
איגלברגר: מסכים שיש דחיפות להסדר אבל לא קיימת הסכמה לתנאי וסמכות הועידה הבינ"ל מצד כל משתתפיה. הרוסים לא קבלו המסגרת המקובלת על פרס-חוסיין-מובארק וכן לא קיימים בין ישראל וירדן קוים מוסכמים לפתרון ביניים או סופי. מכאן - אכזבה מציפיות שווא חמורה מלא לעשות כלום.
חביב דיבר בלהיטות ובשלבים מסוימים שלט בויכוח: הנחיצות המיידית לשלום ברוכה. לא צריך לחכות לבחירות בישראל ובארה"ב. דחיית השלום מפחיתה סיכוייו.
הועידה הבינ"ל צריכה לדון בבעיה הפלסטינית, בעתיד השטחים.
בתקופת המעבר יש לעבור משאלות פרוצדורליות (מי מייצג את מי) לנושאים סובסטנטיביים.
בועידה ידונו לא ב-CONCESSIONS אלא ב- COMPROMISES .
יחסיה ומחויבותה של ארה"ב לישראל כה חזקה שמותר לה להביע דעתה פומבית לפני הבחירות בישראל. בעבר לא היה לאשף מה לתרום ולכן הרחקתו היתה מוצדקת אבל כיום יתכן והמצב השתנה.
מאיר רוזן רואה בועידה הבינ"ל כמכשול למו"מ ישיר, כהעמדת ישראל בפני לחצים פוליטיים אדירים.
אם חוסיין זקוק "למטריה" לענין פרוצדורלי איך הוא יכול לקבל החלטות סובסטנטיביות שלא מקובלות ע"י הערבים הרדיקלים.
הועידה הבינ"ל יוזמה סובייטית מ-1981 ובאו"ם עברה ב-122 קולות מול - 3 (ארה"ב ישראל אנטיגואה).
היה ויכוח עד וש"ת מכל הגוונים והקהל הגיב בחיוב על עצם הדיון.

אשר נעים

שהח רגע נכון מאוד בין מלפנו הבינ"ל הסברה
ומאוכב מאד תפורה

102.1.1 תליך שלום

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

- ס ו ד י -

ז' בשבט תשמ"ח
26 בינואר 1988

2140

אל : השגריר, הציר - וושינגטון

מאת : סמנכ"ל צפ"א

הנדון: התהליך המדיני

מצהרים עם ארתור יוז, הציר בשגרירות ארה"ב:

1. במחמ"ד טרם גיבשו רעיונות אופרטיביים לקידום התהליך. הנחית היסוד של המזכיר היא שאסור להניח לשנה זו לעבור ללא מעש בגלל הבחירות בארה"ב ובישראל משום שהדבר פשוט מסוכן. מאידך אין לעשות פעולה לשם פעולה בלבד והוא מבקש מאנשיו רעיונות.

2. גישתו של שולץ כמזכיר מדינה, בעסקים וכאדם היא שיש להגיע להסדרים בדרך של שכנוע הצדדים בדבר האינטרסים שלהם ולא בדרך של כפיה. זו גישתו כלפי ממשלת ישראל על מרכיביה. בנוסף לכך הוא מסתייג מנקיטת עמדה בין צדדים למחלוקת בתוך ממשלת ישראל. כלפי ישראל ימשיך בדרך השכנוע בוודאי במהלך בקור רה"מ בוושינגטון או אף קודם לכן.

3. קלבריוס היה השבוע בירדן לצורך REVIEW של הנושא עם חוסין. אין שינוי בעמדת חוסין מבחינה זו שהוא קבע את התנאים המינימליים ההכרחיים לו להצטרפות לתהליך המדיני והוא מצפה למילוים.

4. הארועים בשטחים פגעו במעמד המלך חוסין ומרחב תימרונו ובהשגיו בועידת עמאן.

5. יתכן שתהיה שליחות בירור במז"ת (מרפי) ומכל מקום נראה שיעשה מאמץ לבחינה נוספת את הקונטקסט הב"ל המתאים למלך חוסין ושיהיה מקובל על מרכיבי ממשלת ישראל. בהקשר זה העיר שהרעיון שבדק שולץ בבקורו באזורנו - ההקשר לפסגת ראשי מעצמות העל - לא מת לחלוטין.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

יואב בירן

העתק: מנכ"ל מדיני
יועץ מדיני לשה"ח
מנהל מצפ"א

ISRAEL ישראל

102.1.1 תיק שנה

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א - י. בירן
מאת: עודד ערן

ו' בשבט תשמ"ח
25 בינואר 1988

הנדון: צוות חשיבה למדיניות מז"ית

המכון של מרטין אינדיק עומד להקים צוות לניסוח מדיניות מז"ית לארה"ב. בזאת מצויים רבים ממיודעינו, כולל פעילים במערכות בחירות של כמה מועמדים, כמו אן לואיס, היועצת לג'יקסון, בוב ליבר, המייעץ לדוקאקיס וג'ו ניי שגם הוא מייעץ לדוקאקיס. תשומת לבכם לכך שדניס רוס מופיע אף הוא ברשימה. הוא עוזב את המועצה לביטחון לאומי ב-1.3.88. על כך יש עדיין איפול וההחלטה אינה סופית ותלוייה בהתפתחויות המדיניות.

הכוונה היא להכין הדוח עד חודש יוני שנה זו.

בברכה
עודד ערן

העתק:
מנכ"ל מדיני
שגריר, כאן
יועץ מדיני לשה"ח
מנהל מצפ"א

THE
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE
FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

Embargoed until January 28, 1988!

WASHINGTON INSTITUTE PRESIDENTIAL STUDY GROUP ON U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

CHAIRS

Walter Mondale, former Vice President of the United States, is currently with the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney.

Lawrence Eagleburger served as Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs during the first Reagan Administration and is currently President of Kissinger and Associates.

CONVENERS

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Martin Indyk is the Executive Director of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

RAPPORTEUR

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William Schneider Jr. served as Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance in the Reagan Administration and is currently with International Planning Services.

Harvey Sicherman is an adjunct scholar of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. During the first Reagan Administration, he served as Special Assistant to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, and he is currently an adviser to the Haig presidential campaign.

Jed Snyder, currently on leave at the National Strategy Information Center, is Deputy Director of National Security Studies at the Hudson Institute.

Steven Spiegel is a Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Robert Tucker is a Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

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Donald Gregg is Special Assistant to Vice President Bush for National Security Affairs.

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Robert Kurz is with the office of Congressman Richard Gephardt.

Aaron Miller is a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff.

Judith Miller is Washington Deputy Bureau Chief for *The New York Times*.

14848

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 23.01.88
דף 1 מתוך 2
עותק 24 מתוך 32

סודי ביותר נבנס

מדינה

מחלקה

102.1.1 תיק אלון שלום

גיל

הודעה

מזרח

הודעה:14848/1
אל:המשרד
מ-:רוש/נר:481/תא:220138/דת:1850/מ/סג:נב
נד:@

סודי ביותר/מידי

אל:מנכל מדיני

תהלין מדיני

משיחה עם דניס רוס

א.הרבתעד מהמהלך הסרבייתי ועדיין ל א ניבשו עמדה.
התגובה הבנימית הראשונית היא במובן של התנגדות,שכן
ברור שלא יצא מכל הענין דבר.

ב.שלב "הגרוד בראש" עדיין נמשך ועמר גם הוויכוחים
הפנימיים .במחמד יש באלו שעדיין דבקים בתפיון הרועידה
הבינלאומית,אך אלו לא הצליחו לשנות את המזכיר שזו
ארגזיה שיש טעם לדחוף אותה עתה. הם ממשיכים להיות
מוטרדים מהיעדר כל הסכמה כרבסטנטיבית בין המשתתפים
הפרטנציאלים .

ג. יחד עם זאת, הנשיא והמזכיר מוטרדים מהמראות של
מסבי הטלוויזיה, והם היו רוצים לעשות משהו. בשלב זה
מנסחים לשולץ באוזן נרבזי על המדה"ת, אך לא הוחלט
מתי לשאתו ובאיזה בורום .לפי הידוע לי,הנוסחה דומה
בשלב זה לנאום המזכיר בוועידת הדסה.

ד. הראיון היום ב"וושינגטון פוסט" עם נובארק משקף
לדעתם את הנוסחה שאותה הוא יביא.הם מתכוונים להטיל
עליו(על בויטניה) את נטיון הדיבון של חוסיין .

ה.רוס מודה שלא עשו עדיין בדיקה רציניה אצל הוסיין

דף 2 מתוך 2
עותק 24 מתוך 32

על עמדותיו לאור הארועים האחרונים ,ולא הוחלט גם
איך לעשות זאת. הדיון של שיגור מרפי לא נבטל.

ערן

תפ: שהה,רהט,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרנז,רט,אמן,בירן,מצבא

12999 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 01.38.
דף 1 מתוך 6
עותק 24 מתוך 32 סודי ביותר נכנס **

מחלף 102.1.1 עדיף

מזדם:1/12999
אל:המשרד
מ-:ורש/נר:421/תא:200138/זת:2000/מד:מ/סג:סב
נד:ב

סודי ביותר/מידי

אל:סמנכל צב"א

שיחות המנכל המדיני בוושינגטון

א.שיחת המנכל המדיני עם מרכי (19.1)

מרכי פתח בשאלה האם הנאורעות האחרונים בשטחים הם מבשול
או גורם מסייע לקידום תהליך השלום . ביילין ענה שהם
החזירו את הנושא לסדר היום גם בארה"ב וגם בישראל.ההרגשה
עד להתפרצות היתה שבשנת 1988 יתקיימו בחירות בארה"ב
ובישראל ולכן לא יקרה משהו מיוחד בתהליך השלום וכל
שצריך וניתן לעשות הוא לשמור על הסטטוס קוו.לדבריו
של ביילין ,אין כל אפשרות לשמור על סטטוס קוו וקיימת
משום כך סכנה רציונית של התדרדרות.כבר בסיומה של ועידת
עמאן הוסיף ביילין היתה הערכתו שהיא לא היתה הצלחה
גדולה כפי שרבים ראוה. אילו היה תהליך מדיני כי
אז ההלטות עמאן אכן היו יכולות להחשב כהצלחה. בהעדר
תהליך כזה ההחלטות רק מקשות.

הארועים בשטחים באו לכן כהפתעה אף כי לא היתה צריכה
להיות כל הפתעה. אם יש הפתעה הרי זה בכך שההפרצות
לא התחוללה קודם לכן . לא נראה כי היה תכנון מוקדם
ומה שהתחולל הוצת על ידי הגברור בדמות תאונת הדרכים
ורק אחיכי עלו על הגל גם אשכי וגם הפרקליטים .לדעתו
של המנכל המדיני יתעבר אולי הארועים אך בסופו של
דבר יוגעו הרוחות הן בשל האמצעים שישראל תפעיל והן
בשל הלחצים הבלבליים שבהם יעמדו תושבי השטחים .
אך ברגיעה לא צריך לראות פתרון כי היא עלולה להיות

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 6
עותק 24 מתוך 32

זמנית. תושבי השטחים גילו את עצמת ההשפעה של התמרונות המשודרות והמראות ילד ערבי זורק אבן על חיל ישראלי חמוש. משום כך יש צורך בחידוש הפעילות למען מציאת פתרון מדיני. מעבר לאירועים בסיבה לחידוש הפעילות צריך להביא בחשבון שאי עשייה תביא לאבוד אותם הישגים שאליהם הגענו עד כה באמצעות התהליך המדיני. אין מחסור ברעיונות הן לגבי הצד הפרוצדורלי והן לגבי התוכן. אפשר לנסות ולהרחיב את המבנה המשותף לגבי הצד הפרוצדורלי ואפשר גם לדון בהיבטים הקשורים למהות כגון בפתרונות ביניים. גם עמדת בריטניה' טעונה עדיין לימוד והבהרה כך הסובייטים לא הגיבו באופן פורמלי לחמש הנקודות שהעלה מרכז בנני נוליאקוב בקיץ 1987. בשלב זה עברה השיחה לדיון על הודעת גרסימוב על משלחת ישראל למוסקבה ועל פגישת נוביק עם טרסוב בהלסינקי.

השגריר ארד חזר לנסלול השיחה המקורי ואמר שאפשר לדון באפשרות לפתרון ביניים שבתנאים הנוכחיים יותר קל להשיגו. מרכז ענה שהם קראו בעניין מאמרו של עדר ויצמן והוא ביקש לדעת האם הרעיונות שבו הם בחלה רבים בישראל. מרכז הוסיף שגישת המדבר היא שאפשר זר שנת בחירות בארה"ב ובישראל. בשלב זה לא ברור להם עם אילו רעיונות יבוא מובארק. ביילין העיר כי נראה שמובארק מוטרד מאד מהאירועים בשטחים. מרכז הוסיף כי מחמ"ד קיוותה שאפשר יהיה לקדם את פתרון שאלת טאבה. בשלב זה נכנס לשיחה אייב סופר שהעיר כי מנכל משרד רהמ' מבקש שהוא סופר, לא יבוא להמשך השיחות בארץ כי ישראל רוצה לנסות שוב את רעיון הנשרה הטריטוריאלית בטאבה זאת על אף הסרוב המצרי המוחלט לדון באלטרנטיבה כזו.

השיחה חזרה לנושא העיקרי כאשר מרכז שואל האם הסדר ביניים הוא קל יותר להשגה וביילין ענה שבעניינו מהות קשה יותר להשיג היום הסכמה בישראל מאשר בעניין הפרוצדורלי ולאור דווקא על הועידה הבינלאומית. מה שחשוב הוא שתהיה גם מעורבות אמריקאית. יתכן שגם למובארק יש רעיונות כי ברור שהוא חש צורך לפעול. בתד הודק מעמדו בעקבות חידוש היחסים עם מדינות ערב ומאידך הוא נצרך בלחץ שכן הוא מתקן מבית על המשך קיום היחסים עם ישראל למרות האירועים בשטחים.

המנכל המדיני הוסיף שאולי נדאי לחזור גם לרעיון של

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 3 מ[illegible] 6
עותק 24 מתוך 32

הגירסה המוגבלת של הועידה הבינלאומית בחסות שתי המעצמות
מה גם שלא כל פרטיה נבדקו(מרפי: אבן לא נבדקו) מכל
מקום חשוב שהתהליך ימשך . השגריר ארד הוסיף שמאמץ
אמריקאי יתקבל בישראל ביתר הבנה מאשר בעלתנות של גורמים
אחרים שאולי חושבים שהמאורעות בשטחים יצרו פתח לבעלתנות
כזו.וילקוקס שאל האם המשך התהליך יעשה מהמקום שבו
נעצר או תוך עקיפת המנשולים שנוצרו והמנבל המדיני
ענה שצריך להחליט את בסיס ההסכמה המשותפת ולא השרב
ביצד זה ייעשה. מרפי הוסיף שעל אף ההישגים שהושגו
בתחום הפרוצדורה יש הדגשה שבוזבז זמן רב על החוס
ה ולא נעשה המאמץ בעניין המהות מא ד 1.9.82. ביילין
העיר ששני התחומים אינם מבטלים האחד את השני. נדאי
לדעתו לעשות STOCKTAKING (מרפי העיר שהם
מעדיפים את הנרנח
EXPLOZATION) עם כל המערבים
בעניין .וילקוקס חזר ושאל האם קל יותר למצוא בישראל
הסכמה על מהות או על ההליך וביילין ענה שגם הויכוח
על ההליך מייצג וויכוח על המהות אבל יש מבנה משותף
והוא הנכונות להגיע להסכמה על הסדר ביניים

המנבל המדיני העיר שיי'איכות החיים יי אינה יכולה להיות
פתרון ומרפי שהסכים שזה לא תהליך לתהליך המדיני אמר
שבביז נדאי לפעול בתחום זה.מרפי חזר ושאל האם יש
רעיונות נוספים כי בדיקת מצאי בשלעצמה לא תועיל.
ביילין ענה שהכוונה היא לא רק לבדיקת מצאי אלא למשהו
שיתחיל בזה וימשך במאמץ נמשך כמו למשל SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY
שתטפל במציאת הסכמה והרחבתה. סונר שאל האם ביקורים
כאלו עלולים ללבות דווקא הפרעות והפגנות וביילין
אמר שדווקא העדר הנועה עלול להביא לכן .מרפי אמר
שישמח להעביר כל רעיון חדש שלנו למדניו. נכחו בשיחה
מצידם מרפי, דג'ריג'יאן ,וילקוקס,סונר הולצמן וקידבי
ומצדנו ביילין ,ארד, ערן ולשם -שטיין .

ב. שיחת המנבל המדיני עם קולין פאורל- המועצה לבטחון
לאומי(19.1).

פאורל פתח באומרו שהמצב הורע מאד ביקורו של שהבט כאן
(שפאורל נפגש עמו ש.ש.). ביילין אמר שנתנסנו בהפתעה
רגם המחשבה שנוכל להרגיע את המצב בתוך שבוע לא הוכחה
כנכונה. המצב בשטחים הרבה יותר טוב מאשר תחת שלטון

ירדן אבל הצעירים היוצאים לרחובות לא יודעים זאת ואין
להם למה להשורות. ההפגנות התחילו בצורה ספונטנית ולא
היו נראה מאורגנות על ידי אשפ' אך זה עלה על הגל
אולי בדי להוכיח שהרלטות עמאן משוללות תוקן .ואשפ'
נשאר הגורם הדמוקרטי בשטח דבר שהוכר גם בכוח מבחינת
העובדות. נוצרה קואליציה מדהה שבה נמצאים גם אשפ'
וגם החוגים הפונדמנטליסטים עם "צבאי" של בני 16
.14

השאלה העיקרית המשיך ביילין היא מה יקרה אחרי שנשקיט
את המצב והלחץ הבלבלי יעשה את שלו. קיימת סתירה בין
הצורך להמשיך בפעילות פוליטית לקראת השגת פתרון לבין
הלוח הפוליטי המראה על בחירות באן ובישראל. לפני
כמה שבועות היתה אולי תחושה שאפשר להמתין ל-1989 אך
הארועים ומספר ההרוגים החזירו את נושא המדינה לסדר
היום .

נאורל אמר שמסכים עם הניתוח לגבי הדור הצעיר שאין
לו למה להשורות את מצבו ומסכים שיש באן פרדוקס שבן
היום יש לצעיר הפלשתינאי יותר מרחב והופש לבטוי תפוליו.
לדבריו של נאורל יהיה קשה להגיע את ההלין השלום בשל
הבחירות ובשל אי הבהירות לגבי ההבנות שהושגו עם חוסיין.
הבעיה היא איך לטפל בכל זאת בתסכול הדור הצעיר ומבאן
מסקנתם שצרין להשקיע משאבים בהקלת המצב הבלבלי.

ביילין אמר שהוא נבין אמנם את הרצון לשנר את איכות
החיים אך זה לא יספיק כי התסכול איכר על רקע בלבלי.אוקלי
התערב בשיחה ואמר שברגע שצץ מנהיג הוא מיד מוצא
עצמו בכלא אך בירדן .ביילין חזר ואמר שאינו רואה תרומה
משמעותית לפתרון הבעיה בעזרת שיפור איכות החיים .הצעדים
שנקטנו בתחום זה לא מגשר דריקה אפילו אבן אחת.בהעדר
התפתחויות מדיניות לא תהיה תועל בכל הצעדים הבלבליים
דנים רוס אמר שכבוך שהמדינה QUALITY
OF LIFE נתנקס במילה צרכן להבינת הביבוש להיות מקובל
אך הם מתכוונים במונח זה למפשירים שיאפשרו גם בטוי
פוליטי ויהיו גם בבחינת תמריצים למלך חוסיין להצטרף
לתהלין . רוס הוסיף שעלינו למצוא דרכים לאפשר פעילות
פוליטית מסוימת נרחבת יותר ממה שאנו רואים ביום כמו
למשל בחירות לראשי ערים .ביילין אמר שצרין לפעול
ב-1988 בדרך שתאפשר אחינ' את המשך הפעילות .אפשר

דף 5 מ[redacted]ך 6
עותק 24 הדרן 32

לדרך על פעילות כלכלית אך יש גם צורך בפעילות דיפלומטית
כמו בדיקה אצל חברים על מה שניתן לעשות היינו מעין
STOCKTAKING.

דניס רוס אמר שהם מבינים שבוצר בצב חדש המצדיק יותר
URGENCY
ויתכן שאפילו הסעודים רואים זאת כך לאור חשש שהמהומות
בשטחים יהפוך גורל לחקרי במקומות אחרים. ארקלי הוסיף
שכבר אמרו למובארק שהיו רוצים לשמוע על רעיונות חדשים
אך הוא מצידו רוצה לראות מה אתם עושה. ביילין העיר
בשלב זה לא ברור אם יבוא עם רעיונות חדשים אך מצרים
בודאי נתוחה להצעות ורעיונות.

בשלב זה נסתיימה השיחה עם פאול והיא נמשכה רק עם
דניס רוס. האחרון אמר כי עד כה לא התקבלו תשובות
לשאלות של מרכי לכוליאקוב וזה נובע בודאי מכך שאין
הם מרגישים צורך לחץ אך התפתחות כזו המצריכה תשובה
מצידם. זה דומה למצב בנמרץ שגם בו הם משהים תשובה
לגבי החלטת מועביל"ט שניה על אמבורגו ורק לחץ מדינות
ערב מאלצת לחשוב על שנוי בעמדתם. להערכתו של רוס
"ההשיבה החדשה" בנוקבה לא יושמה עדיין לגבי המדהית
וסדר היום של גורבצ'וב עדיין לא כולל את המדית.
על דוסרב אמר שהוא CREATIVE
על פוליאקוב שהוא אינטלגנטי אך מייצג את הקו המסורתי
וכל עוד הוא בתפקידו קשה לצפות לשינוי אך כמובן שהם
האמריקאים ימשיכו ב- PROBING
רוס הוסיף שבשלב זה הם "מגדרים בראש" אך ברור
לו שהם יצטרכו לחזור ולעשות REINVESTIGATING OF
WHERE WE ARE. הרעיון של הסדר ביניים
נראה לו נשורה בדיקה ויתכן שחוסיין יתאא בו ענין גם
ארלי מתוך השאר מעלית כוחו של עוראת. רוס הדהד בקול
ואמר כי המזכיר אמנם אינו אוהב שליחים מיוחדים אך
יתכן שישקול בחיוב הרעיון של שיגור מישהו למדהית.
"יזהו ממשל בשבתו האחרונה והשאלה היא מה ההון הפוליטי
שהוא מוכן להשקיע זאת על אף שהמזכיר מאד מתעניין
באזור".

נבהר מצידם פאול, ארקלי ורוס מצידנו ביילין ערן ולשם
-שטיין.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 6 מ[illegible]ן 6
עותק 24 מהדן 32

ערך

תפ: שהח/רהמ/שהבט/מנבל/ממנבל/ר/מרכז/רנ/אמן/בירן/מצפא

10792

תאריך : 18.01.88

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בלמס

יוצא

102.1.1 אל"ן אל"ר

חוזם:1,10792
אל:ורש/532,מגמת/209
מ-:המשרד,תא:180188,זת:1715,דת:ר,סג:ב
נד:@

רגיל/בלמס
.116

אל: וושינגטון, קהיר ,מגמת

תכנית אמריקנית לכינוס ועידה אזורית לקראת כינוס ועידה בינ'ל.

א. עפ"י העתון הסעודי יאלשרק אלאוסט' (15), המביא לטענתו ממקורות דיפלומטיים מהימניים, כי הממשל האמריקני יציג למבארכ, בעת בקורו הקרוב בורש', תכנית חדשה שתכלול הסכם עקרונות ביחס לתהליך המדיני.

ב. התכנית האמריקנית כוללת כינוס ועידה אזורית של הצדדים הנוגעים לסכסוך: סוריה, לבנון, מצרים, ישראל ומשלחת ירדנית-פלס' משותפת, בחסות ארה'ב וברה'מ.

ג. במהלך הועידה יוסכם על עקרונות ההסדר ועל הזרמים להכשרת הקרקע לקראת כינוס הועידה הבינ'ל.

ד. העתון מסר, כי אחראיים במשה'ח האמריקני הכינו תכנית זאת לאור המגעים שקיים הממשל עם כל הנוגעים בדבר, לרבות ברה'מ, במהלך הרבע האחרון של שנת 87'.

ממ'ד/ערב 1

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,בירן,מצפא,ליאור,
מזתים,ר/מרכז,ממד,רם,אמן

102.1.1 אלוף אלון

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

12/1/88

אל: סמנכ"ל אמית"ק , סמנכ"ל צפ"א

הנדון: סימפוזיון של הועידה הבינ"ל למזרח התיכון

ראו נא ההזמנה שקיבלתי מבני ברית על קיום הסמינר בהשתתפות איגלבורגר, פיליפ חביב, מאיר רוזן ופרופ' עמנואל סיון. לידיעתכם.

אשר נעים

העתק: מנהל הסברה
מנהל מצפ"א

B'NAI B'RITH INTERNATIONAL

1640 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 857-6580
TWX 710-822-0068 / Cable BNAIBRITH WASHDC

Commission
on Continuing
Jewish Education

December 29, 1987

Mr. and Mrs. Asher Naim
Office of the Minister of Info.
Embassy of Israel
3614 International Drive, N.W.
Washington, DC 20008

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Naim:

It gives me great satisfaction to invite you to a Symposium on the question of "Should Israel Participate in the Proposed International Peace Conference?", to be held on Friday, January 22nd from 9:00 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. at the B'nai B'rith International Headquarters, 1640 Rhode Island Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C.

The Symposium will focus upon whether the proposed Peace Conference will result in Israel being coerced into giving up the territory occupied in 1967 without receiving the full peace it so deeply desires, or will be a significant first step on the path to formal peace treaties with Jordan and perhaps other Arab states. The impact of the current unrest in Gaza on the proposal conference will be assessed. Analyses of the peace conference proposal will be energetically presented by four of the most knowledgeable observers of the Middle East, individuals who themselves have had the most serious involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process:

Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs from 1982 to 1984;

Ambassador Philip Habib, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East from 1981 to 1983;

Ambassador Meir Rosenne, Israel's Ambassador to the United States from 1984 to 1987; and

Professor Emanuel Sivan, Editor of The Jerusalem Quarterly, and Director of the Foreign Policy Planning Council for Israel's Prime Minister, 1984-1986.

The depth of your interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict is such that I very much want to have you present at this symposium. We will begin promptly at 9:00 a.m. on January 22nd, and will conclude at 12:15 p.m.

Because of the stature of our panelists, I anticipate a large attendance, so I encourage you to respond quickly to this invitation. Please call (202) 857-6580 and ask for Helana Neumann, who will take the reservations for this event.

I look forward to greeting you on January 22nd.

Sincerely,

Michael Neiditch
Director

MN:vb
0469A

1988-01-05 00:11 1 1480126 03

9

דף 1 מתוך 3 דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך וזמן 4 ינואר 1988 1530

מס' מברק

102.1.1 תגלי ראש

אל:

המשרד

026

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אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א

יועץ מדיני לשה"ח

ועידה בינלאומית - דיון בבני ברית.

ראונא המצ"ב.

ערן

שהה בנמל בלגנסל בין בלפסט

B'NAI B'RITH INTERNATIONAL

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Commission
on Continuing
Jewish Education

26 2/3

December 29, 1987

Mr. Oded Eran
Embassy of Israel
3614 International Drive, N.W.
Washington, DC 20008

Dear Oded:

It gives me great satisfaction to invite you to a Symposium on the question of "Should Israel Participate in the Proposed International Peace Conference?", to be held on Friday, January 22nd from 9:00 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. at the B'nai B'rith International Headquarters, 1640 Rhode Island Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C.

The Symposium will focus upon whether the proposed Peace Conference will result in Israel being coerced into giving up the territory occupied in 1967 without receiving the full peace it so deeply desires, or will be a significant first step on the path to formal peace treaties with Jordan and perhaps other Arab states. The impact of the current unrest in Gaza on the proposal conference will be assessed. Analyses of the peace conference proposal will be energetically presented by four of the most knowledgeable observers of the Middle East, individuals who themselves have had the most serious involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process:

Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs from 1982 to 1984;

Ambassador Philip Habib, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East from 1981 to 1983;

Ambassador Meir Rosenne, Israel's Ambassador to the United States from 1984 to 1987; and

Professor Emanuel Sivan, Editor of The Jerusalem Quarterly, and Director of the Foreign Policy Planning Council for Israel's Prime Minister, 1984-1986.

The depth of your interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict is such that I very much want to have you present at this symposium. We will begin promptly at 9:00 a.m. on January 22nd, and will conclude at 12:15 p.m.

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Because of the stature of our panelists, I anticipate a large attendance, so I encourage you to respond quickly to this invitation. Please call (202) 857-6580 and ask for Helana Neumann, who will take the reservations for this event.

I look forward to greeting you on January 22nd.

Sincerely,

Michael

Michael Neiditch
Director

MN:vb
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END