מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

בריטניה - סקירות והערכות מצב

11.87-3.88

ישראל

נספח

תוכן עניינים

מס. תיק

נבנס ** שמור
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מזהה:19330/3
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון,נר:246,תא:230388,זת:1400,דת:מ,סג:שם
נד:8

שמור/מידי

אל:אירופה 2, המרכז

מאת:הציר-יועץ לונדון

משיחה עם קורט הסנסדן / מזה"ח בבוראון:

1) הדיאלוג האירו-ערבי:

א. לדעתם היה מפגש קבוצת התיאום (18/3) של הקהיליה בנושא זה די מיותר. מתבדר שקליבי בעת ביקורו בבבראור בבון נמנע מלהזכיר קיומם של תנאים כל-שהם לחידוש הדיאלוג ורנ"ג הניחה כנראה שאין לכן בעיה.

ב. יצרו קשר גם עם סגנך הסורי של קליבי בתוניס, שאמר במפורש כי התנאים הסוריים אינם קיימים. מאידך ממשיכה בידוע סוריה לטענ שהליגה תומכת להלוטן בתביעותיה. החלטת המפגש היתה לכן לדרוש מהזב"ל הליגה שיקבל מהמדינות החברות הודעות ברורות על עמדתן לגבי התנאים הסוריים ומצפים שעכשיו זה י יוניע בסדר היום של מפגש שרי החוץ ב-30 בתוניס. העמדה הבריטית תומכת בחידוש הדיאלוג אולם ללא שום תנאי מוקדם.

2) היוזמה האמריקנית:

א. מעריכים שהמלך חוסיין בבעיה מיוחדת לאחר ביקור רוה"מ ישראל בוואשינגטון, שכן כל התבטאות חיובית שלו עלולה להתקבל מעתה בעולם הערבי כויתור ונסיגה. סבורים שהירדנים רואים את מסמך שולץ כבעיתי הרבה

יותר עבור יהודי"ם ישראל מאשר בלבי עצמם ולכן גם לא חשים בצורך להשובה מהירה לגבי עמדתם שלהם.
מטעות הרסיין בעולם הערבי באר בנראה לבדוק אם הפיסגה המתוכננת חיובית עבורו, בלומר אם אין המטרה לשלול הירדמה מחד ולקדם אש"פ מאידך.

ב. קיים קושי בניתוח מערכת היחסים שבין אש"פ לירדן כידם וסביר שלביקורו האפשרי של ערפאת השיבות מיוחדת. מבחינים בלחץ גובר על ירדן להידרש הדיאלוג עם אש"פ ואין גם להוציא מכלל אפשרות פסיגה טקטית מסוית בצד הירדני.

יורם שני

דות

תפ: שהה,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רס,אמן,אירא,אירב

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19796 תאריך : 23.08.88 חוץ-מחלקת הקשר

** נבנס סודי
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5831

חוזם:3/19796
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:257/תא:230388/זה:1800/דה:מ/סג:סו
נד:ב

3.3 (ב)

סודי/מידי
אל:אירופה 2 המרכז
מאת:הציר יועץ לונדון

תיווך אמריקני בין סוריה ללבנון.

1. ממקור בשגרירות ארהב נמסר שהמדובר בעיסקת חבילה פוליטית המתוקדת בממשל המרכזי בלבנון וחלוקת התפקידים שם. אין בידיהם פרטים מרובים אולם למיטב ידיעתם לא מדובר בהתרון אזורי ולכן אין זה סביר שחלק מהסדר יקיף גם נסיגה ישראלית מלבנון.

2. אין לארהב מועמד מועדף לנשיאות והכל נתוח. מבחינת יחסי סוריה לבנון הרושם הינו שהמוטיבציה האמריקנית מבוזנת כולה לכך שלבנון תחזור להתקד בנדינה נורמלית ובמעט ואין חשיבות לשאלה מי שולט בה לטחות לא בזמן הקרוב.

3. העלתי הנושא גם עם הדסקאי הלבנוני בפוראון. לדבריו טוענים האמריקנים שהם משמשים רק כדוורים בין גומאייל לאסד ומעורבותם הפוליטית במוכה ביותר. השתקנות האמריקנית בנושא זה הביאה לכך ששגרירות בריטניה בושינגטון נתבקשה גם היא לברר פרטים.

יורם שני

א

הע: שהה/דהה/שהבט/מנכל/ממנכל/ר/מרכז/רם/אמן/אירא/אירב/בירן/
מצבא/ליאור/מזתים/ממד

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21727 **המשרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר** תאריך : 03.88

נכנס ** שמור **
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5936

מרזם:3/21727
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:280/מא:250388/זת:1500/דת:מ/סג:שם
נד:0

103.3
כרכ

שמור/מידי

אל:אירופה 2

דע:לשכת המנכ"ל הפדיני

מאת:לונדון/שרגרה

הפגישה השגריר עם מנהל-המנכ"ל אמריקה ומזיה בפראגוי.

א.בנהר סגנו של הרמנסרן ראחים.הוידה בפגישה היתה נינוחה
וידידותית ונעקה אך ורק בהערכות על יוזמת שולץ.
לא הושלר נושאים בילטרליים.

ב. בתשובה לשאלות השגריר התיחס נגרו לנקודות הבאות:
1) שיחות שולץ -עבודנצה

הערכה היא שהרוסים שוגרים על אוצירה נתרחות ביחס
לתכנית. אין גינוי ואין דחיה והדבר מעודד.הרוסים
אינם מצהירים על עמדתם עד אשר ישמעו ביצד
הצדדים באזור מגיבים. יחד עם זאת ,הם מערגיגים
עד כמה שיוהר לחוף את הפירוש שלהם לרב"ל.

2) הרקע לתכנית שולץ.
מגרו סבור שהדחף לתכנית היתה הבעת רצון בדעת הקהל
האמריקאית בכלל יהודית לראות בהתקדמות בתהליך השלום
על רקע הסכנה ליציבות באזור בתוצאה מהארועים בשטחים.
שולץ לא היה עושה דבר לולא ידע שדרכה לתביכה יהודית
משמעותית. שולץ לקח אלמנטים מהכנית רייגאן וניסה להכניסם
למסגרת שתתקבל על כל הצדדים. העקרון הוא העברת שטחים

המדרת שלום הבא לבטרי ב-242.בריטניה ואירופה מצהירות
על תמיכתן בירדמה האמריקנית ראמרנתן שנוצרה הזדמנות
להגיע למהרון השכנון. הן מבהירות לערביים הצורך להתמקד
ברצינות בתהלין הדיפלומטי,להכנס לתהלין ולגלות מתינות
ההתאנקות.

ב) עמדת המלך חוסיין.
המלך מתקדם בעדה נוקשים ערבי אן האדירה המתונה בעולם
הערבי מאד נסגת עמאן במשכה. המלך רוצה בהתקדמות על
בסיס תכנית שרלן. הוא עלול:- שמירה קונסנזוס ובמישרת
בעמדה הערבית. לדעת מנהר אנר עדיין רחוקים מהרכבת
השלמת ירדנית- פלסטינית .טרם הוגדרה הנרנטחא.

ג. השגריר עדכן מנהר ביחס לאורעי השטחים. השבאבא
מאמינים שהם יוצרים התנאים למדינה עצמאית. ערפאת
מחד והנרנדמנטליסטים מאידן מנסים להשתלט על האורעים
ולשם כך נעשים נסיונות הדירה בלתי פוסקים של מחבלים
הן בצפון והן בדרום. הדבר גם הסביר את פעילותנו
המוגברת בצפון המיועדה לבלום נסיונות הדירה ולנגוע
במקדות ובנסיסי יציאה. מנהר עבור שהדם המרכזי באשים
מערבין באיפוק כאשר הדובר בפעילות טרור ושימוש בנשק
חם.

מנהר.

אף

תפ: שהה,רהה,שהבט,מנכל,המנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,אכן,אירא,אירב,
הצבא

20899 קשרך המוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 24.03.88

** נבנס שמור
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5931

מרזם:3/20899
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:273/תא:240388/זת:1800/דת:ב/סג:שמ
נד:@

שמור/בהול

103.3

אל:מנהל אירופה 2

דע:מנהל המבדה

מאת:לונדון/הציר

שימרש בנשק כימי ע"י עיראק.

באי"צ עם גולטי הוא העיר שהם מודאגים מאוד מן העדויות המצטברות על שימרש בגז כימי ע"י עיראק. אמרתי שאם על בושא זה רציני שבו אין הילוקי דיעות בין המזרח למערב לא תתבנס מרשב"יט ולא תהורה קו בעולה ברור אז באמת אין לאו"מ כל משמעות. גולטי שאל מה הם יכולים לעשות. אמרתי שאחרי נסיון המבלה במטרש אל-של ע"י הינדאורי נקש המערב בשורת צעדים ברורים בגד סוריה והיתה לכן השבעה מסוימת.

רביב.

אף

תג: שהה/מנכל/ממנכל/אירב/אביטל/המבדה/בירן/מרכ/ברנע/ארבל/
ר/מרכז/ממד

19477 תאריך : 23.03.88 חוץ-מחלקת הקשר

נכנס ** שמור

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5889

תדזם:3/19477
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:246/תא:230388/זת:1400/דת:מ/סג:שמ
נד:@

(0).3
ירב

שמור/מידי

אל:אירופה 2/ מאס/ ממד/בינלי"א

מאת:הציר -ירעץ לונדון

ביקור שה"ח סין שלנס 311.

1. בדרתי הנושא בפוראון והרקראה לגבי הפיסקה מהדו"ח שעוסק במגע שה"ח האר עם עמיתו בלהלן:

א. שה"ח בריטניה קבע שממהלך האמריקני היינו צעד היובי אולם חוסר רצונו של רוה"מ ישראל להסכים ל"אדמה תמורת שלום" או לועידה בינ"ל מהווה קושי מסוים כמו גם העובדה שאין למצוא דובר עבור הצד הערבי.

ב. שה"ח סין הסכים לנאום והרסין שמוצא את תגובות שה"ח ישראל בנמישות ומעודדות.

2. ממקור בשגרירות האמריקנית נמסר ששה"ח סין לא היה מעודכן והשאיר רושם של חוסר ידע בנושא.

3. מאותו מקור גם על ביקור ועדת הליגה בסין ששם נמסר להם כי סין תתמרן רק בעמדה ערבית אחידה. הסינים במעט וגילו חוסר סבלנות לגבי ההבדלים בעולם הערבי וחוסר היכולת לגיבוש עמדה אחידה. תגובה שהכתיעה את המשלחת.

יורם שני

רוה

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1. [illegible]

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[illegible]

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: שמח/מנבל/ממנבל/הדס/אסיה/אירב/בירן/מצבא/מרכז/
ממד/בינל2

21594 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 03.08
דף 1 מתוך 2
עותק 24 מתוך 34 סודי ביותר נכנס **

5937

מזרזם:21594/3
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:274/תא:250386/דת:1100/דה:0/נג:סב
נד:0

103.7
בדר

סודי=ביותר/מידי

אל:מנהל אירופה ב'

מאת:הציר לונדון

להלן מארוחה צהריים עם גולטי עפ"י הזמנתו(24/3).

גולטי אמר שהוא הודה מביקור במצרים ותודיעם ונכתב עבדי
יטחני אנשים (מניה שהכרנה לאנשי אש"ן). הפוראו"ם
ערוך בקפדנות אחרי יוזמת שולץ. האמריקנים דיווחו
להם, בני ששר גם בבירות מערב אירופה האחרות, שרה"מ
לא דחה את הוכניות שולץ. הבריטים קידמו את היוזמה בברכה
אך היו מאוכזבים בהגרבתם כי לא רצו שהערבים יגידו
כי תאצ'ר נועלת בשליחות רייגן. הם מועלים נעת להשיג
הודעה המיכה יותר ברורה ביוזמה האמריקנית מטעם
השוק. הבעיה היא להתגבר על ירון החושש שההודעה לא
תמצא חן בעיני הערבים הקיצוניים. ציינו שבילין הביב
יעבור בלונדון אחרי שיחותיו בעמאן ובטעודיה אך הוא
מחליט לחזור ישירות לוושינגטון. הם היו מעדיפים שממשלת
ישראל תקבל את יוזמה שולץ ולא תסתגק בכך שאינה אומרת
"לא". מטרתי של הדיון בקבינט ב-23, הוא עפ"י מה
שהבנתם.

גולטי המשיך שהמצב הערבי ידוע להם שהוסיפן חושש מהאפשרות
של נטגה ערבית. היוזמה לנטגה באה מאלג'יריה שחשבה
כי מרוקו תקרא לכינוס נטגה ורצתה להקדים אותה.
אם אכן תתכנס נטגה אין לחניה שתגיע להחלטה יותר מתונות
מאשר בועידה נז על רקע המצב בשטחים. מה גם שמצרים
לא תהיה בנטגה.

דף 2 מתוך 2
עותק 24 מתוך 34

בעיה שניה לדברין היא הירקדרות ומאשליה של הפלשתינאים שרב על רקע המצב בשטחים. הוא חושש שהפלשתינאים לא יסכימו כעת לנשלחה ירדנית- פלשתינית אלא יעמדו על משלחת "כל ערבית" וכמיניימום יקבלו משלחת ירדנית פלשתינית-מצרית.

למרות הקשיים גם בצד ישראל וגם מצד הערבי הם מעודדים מהדברים הברורים ששולץ בירר באמרו ב"וושינגטון פוסט" וכן מהודעה דומה ממ"ד ב-23.

במישור הבילטרלי אמר הוא מחכה דרכים כדי לתת ביטוי יותר מודגש לאינטרס הבריטי בישראל. הם מקווים שבמשך השנה יבקרו שני שרים בריטיים בארץ. נדובר בלורד צ'ינסלור, לורד נקיי שיבוא אולי בסתיו ובג'והן מור שר הבריאות שהיה כרוכב עולה בבלגה השנה.

רביב

ידוע

הע: שמה/רמה/שהבט/מנכל/נמנכל/ר/נרנז/רנ/אמן/אירב/בירן/מצפא

Wednesday
30 March 1988

Volume 130
No. 126

HOUSE OF COMMONS
OFFICIAL REPORT

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

Oral Answers to Questions

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Middle East

11. **Mr. Adley:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on moves towards a middle east peace conference.

Mr. Mellor: We support current efforts to promote the convening of an international conference as a framework for negotiations to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict. We hope that all the parties concerned will avoid action which could stifle progress towards a settlement.

Mr. Adley: Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that his phrase about the avoidance of action should apply to the current repression carried out by the Israelis against the Palestinians, which is reminiscent of the tactics used by their South African allies against the non-white population there?

Following the question by the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman), does my hon. and learned Friend think that it would be sensible to discuss with our EEC allies some form of action relating Israel's willingness to move towards peace with a willingness on the part of the EEC to grant concessions to Israeli exports?

Mr. Mellor: There is no doubt that there has been a sharp and regrettable deterioration in conditions within the occupied territories in recent days. Seven people were killed over the weekend, a 50-year-old woman was shot dead today and in the past 10 days several hundred and perhaps more than a thousand people have been detained in circumstances which fall short of proper judicial standards. I should have thought that it would be self-evident to the Government of Israel by now that the Palestinian problem will have to be met by some means other than repression. The opportunity exists, within the framework of the American initiative, for proper talks to take place on the principle of territory for peace. Unless the Israelis are prepared to do that I fear that their 40th anniversary year will be a grave disappointment both to them and to the rest of the world.

Mr. Latham: Does my hon. Friend recall that this year there must be a general election in Israel, when the basic issue must be the peace process? Does he realise that many friends of Israel outside that country are hoping that the electors of Israel will listen to Mr. Peres and others who are putting forward peace proposals?

Mr. Mellor: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that typically constructive comment. It is crucial that, whatever else people disagree about, they agree that the status quo is no longer an option. If it were maintained, there would be more bloodshed and more calling into question of the fundamental principles on which the state of Israel was rightly founded. The sooner that people come to grips with that and begin serious discussion, the sooner we can, I hope, make further progress.

House of Commons

Wednesday 30 March 1988

Oral Answers to Questions

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Palestine

Mr. Archer: While he does not condone the policy of settlement and all that has followed from it, will the Secretary of State recognise the obvious fact that Israel has a strategic problem because of the narrowness of the country? Will he press at least for a demilitarised zone on the West Bank?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: Israel clearly has a security problem. That is why every approach to the solution of the problem emphasises the need for recognition of Israel's right to exist within secure boundaries. It is equally important for the other side of the matter to be emphasised —unless Israel is prepared quite explicitly to recognise the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to proceed on the footing of the vital principle of territory for peace, there is no prospect of a way forward being found.

Mr. Walters: Bearing in mind that over the years every American peace initiative in the middle east has collapsed in the face of Isreali rejection, what hope does my right hon. and learned Friend hold out for the Shultz initiative? Bearing in mind the continuing and appalling acts of repression by Israel on the West Bank, will Her Majesty's Government and the EEC this time intervene to try to give some muscle to bolster up the American initiative?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: The position of the European Community and its member countries, including the United Kingdom, has been clearly and powerfully expressed in support of the principles that I have enunciated. It would be wrong to dismiss in advance the chances of success of the latest initiative being taken by the American Secretary of State. Of course, we should not underestimate the difficulties, but it remains vital to continue every effort to bring the parties together and we welcome it on that basis.

It is quite right that the conduct of Israel in relation to the occupied territories is an important feature that has to be put right as part of the process of finding a way forward.

Mr. Kaufman: Is not the useful initiative by Mr. Shultz seriously undermined by the comfort that President Reagan foolishly gave to Mr. Shamir when Mr. Shamir visited Washington recently? Is it not a fact that the escalating repression in the occupied territories has demonstrated, by what is happening today, including the shooting of a woman on the West Bank and the closing down of the Palestine press service, that the problem will not be solved by repression or force but only by a conference, and that the obstacle to that conference is Mr. Shamir?

Is it not essential that we put pressure on Mr. Shamir and recommend the Americans to do so too, because we will not get an end to the conflict without a conference and we will not get a conference until Mr. Shamir is budged?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I think that the right hon. Gentleman's analysis is very close to the truth. The House must regret that the opportunity was not taken during Mr. Shamir's recent visit to Washington, to confirm Israel's commitment to the current peace efforts being undertaken by Secretary of State Shultz. The right hon. Gentleman is right to say that the continuing escalation of violence is a measure of the urgency of making headway in that direction, above all in the cause of Israel. The policies being pursued by Prime Minister Shamir cannot assure Israel of a secure future. Israel needs peace as much as anyone, and that peace can come about only through real negotiations.

It is entirely right for the House to urge Israel to join the almost universal consensus in support of negotiations on the basis of land for peace through the framework of an international conference. It is equally important for the Arab side to recognise that they cannot afford to miss another chance as they have an equally urgent need for peace. I urge them to work with the plan put forward by the United States.

תאריך : [illegible] חוץ-מחלקת הקשר

נבנס

בלמס

5992

חוזם:4/40
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:342/תא:310388/זת:2000/דת:ר/סג:בל
נד:@

1/03.3

בלמס/רגיל

אל:מנהל אירופה ב'

מאת:לונדון/הציר

להלן תגובת דובר הפוראון לסגירת מרכז התקשורת הפלשתינאי:

THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF 30TH MARCH THAT THE PALESTINIAN PRESS SERVICE IS TO BE CLOSED FOR PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS IS A PROFOUNDLY DISTURBING STEP. THE PALESTINIAN PRESS SERVICE HAS BEEN A GIVEN SOURCE OF INFORMATION FOR THOSE CONCERNED WITH THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FACTS CAN ONLY MAKE IT HARDER TO CARRY FORWARD THE EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE REGION.

אף

תנ: שהח/רהמ/מנכל/ממנכל/שהבס/אירב/ליארד/מזתים/אביטל/משת/
הסברה/ר/מרכז/ממד/מתאשטחים

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

ד' ניסן תשמ"ח
22 במרץ 1988

סודי
247

אל: מנהל אירופה ב'

מאת: הציר, לונדון

הנדון: א"צ עם הציר בשגרירות
ארה"ב רימונד זייץ (18.3.88)

להלן מדברי זייץ:

א. התיחס לבקור רוה"מ בוושינגטון ואמר כי הממשל שאף להנחיל לרוה"מ מסר ברור, שאמירת לא ליוזמת שולץ אינה כלל אופציה אפשרית מבחינתה של ישראל. עם זאת אמר אין להקל בקשיים העומדים בפני שולץ מצד הערבים והסוביטים.

ב. זייץ הרהר לגבי הצפוי לישראל אחרי הבחירות בארה"ב.
אמר שבוש מרוצה מאד מיוזמת שולץ הוא תומך בה בכל לב והיא משחררת אותו מהצורך לגבש קוו משלו לגבי המז"ת.
אם דוקקיס או דמוקרט אחר יבחר לנשיא, החעורר השאלה איזו הבטחות ינתנו לג'סי ג'קסון תמורת התמיכה במועמדותו.
ג'קסון יכול להתנות את תמיכתו במינוי אישי מפתח בממשל הבא כגון מזכיר המדינה. הוא בודאי ינסה להבטיח לעצמו השפעה על קווי מדיניות, במיוחד בכל הקשור לדרום אפריקה ואולי גם המז"ת.

ג. זייץ סיפר שבארוחת צהרים עם מלור הוא שאל אותו למה האמריקנים תמיד שומעים בפוראוף מה עליהם לעשות כדי לבוא לקראת חוסין ואף פעם לא אומרים להם שיש לעשות משהו למען האינטרסים החיוניים של

2/..

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

ישראל. מלור אמר שהפוראוף אינו אנטי ישראלי אלא שחוסין מאד פגיע...

ב ב ר כ ה ,

משה רביב

משה רביב

העתק: המנכ"ל המדיני
המשנה למנכ"ל
מר י. בירן, סמנכ"ל מצפ"א
מנהל המרכז

18869 תאריך : 22.03.88

נכנס ** שמור
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חודם:3/18869
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:230/תא:220388/זה:1300/דה:מ/סג:שמ
נד:0

שמור/מידי

אל:ארבל 1/ איירופה 2/

מאת:לונדון/הציר יועץ

בריטניה-אונסקו/שלכם 185

משיחה עם נורתרן ממחלקת האו"ם בנוראון:-

1.מציינים בהישג אישי את העובדה שמאיור הצליח כמעט קונצנזוס בועידה הכללית בנובמבר/אולם מבדילים בבירור בין ההתיחסות אליו אישית לבין היחסים עם הארגון.

2. בדיעבד טרם הצליחו לתחות על קנקנו שכן הצהרותיו השונות אינן ברורות ולעיתים אף נוגדות בתוכנן. למשקיף הבריטי הסביר שמטרתו בכך היינה לרכוש אמון ציבורי ובינלאומי לארגון שנמצא בשפל מבחינה זו. יתכן ומכגש מועצת המנהלים במאי יהווה הזדמנות ללמוד יותר על תכניותיו. לכאן מכל-מקום יגיע רק ביוני. מעריכים שמאיור נתמך ביום ע"י מרבית מדינות הקהילה לרבות צרפת שנזכור לא הצביעה עבורו.

3.אין בכל האמור בכדי לשנות את היחס הבריטי לאונסקו ומצפים ל"י שינויים רדיקליים" קודם שישקלו אפשרות שכזו. לשאלה השיב כי אין להם שום "רשימת תנאים" וגם אינם מעוניינים להציג כזו בכדי שלא לייצור את הרושם באילו יש מקום בכלל להתדיין לגבי הנושאים השונים. עקרונית מצפים שהארגון יפעל לאמנתו בהתאם ולמטרות שלשמן הוקם.

יודם שני.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

אך

תס: שהה/מנכל/ממנכל/אירא/אירב/ברנע/ארבל1/שגב/ממה יגון

18870 תאריך : 23.03.88

** בבנס שמור 1905
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מזהה:3/18870
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:235/תא:220388/זה:1700/דה:ד/סג:שם
נד:8

103,3
לשכה

שמור/דחוף

אל: אירופה 2, המרכז

מאת: הציר-יועץ, לונדון

להלן ממצא בחבון ליימודים אסטרטגיים בנושא "המלחמה בימית". המודח היה פרופ' מאטון שימש עד 1983 כיועץ מדעי ראשי למשרד ההגנה.

1. אין בנמצא מנגני השבעה שעשויים לנדע מדינות נלהצטייד בנשק בימי. בהשואה לנשק גרעיני הרי שלמדינות המתפתחות אין כמעט בעיה בלרכוש נשק בימי זה או אחר. בעית הבדיקה והביקורת על אגירת נשק בימי קשה ביותר ומוטב להגיע להסכמים על "נתון-זירוי" מאשר על "יאסם גמור" שלא ניתן לאשרר כלל.

2. ההגנה מפני לוחמה בימית יקרה ביותר מאי פעם בעבר הגם שיש להבדיל בכך בין מטרות בייחות ומטרות ניידות. איתורם של מרכיבים בימיים חדשים מקשה עוד יותר על ההגנה וידוע שבאמצעיסטן נעשה שימוש באינקפסיטנטס חדשים.

המרכיבים החדשים נוחים יותר להפעול ולגבי מטרה בייחות דוגמת שדה- תעופה (והסביבה הקרובה) עביר שיידרש המישה טון של חומר ועשרה טילים דוגמת SS21 או SS23 .

3. על רקע הניגוד במחקר הגנתי חדיש יש לגורם ההרתעה חשיבות מיוחדת.

ירדן שני

ירד

תפ: שהה,מנבל,ממנבל,איר ב,ר/מרכז,ממד,רם,אמן,ברב

17287 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 21.03.88

נכנס בלמס

5913

מרזם:3/17287
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/גר:109/תא:210388/זה:1400/דה:מ/מג:בל
נד:מ

בלמס/מידי

אל:מעת

דע:אירופה 2

מאת:עתונות/לונדון

סקירה תקשורת סוף השבוע 20-19 דנא.

א. ביום א' תפס את הכותרות הרצח האכזרי של שני חיילים בריטיים ע"י המון משולהב בבלפאסט. נושא זה היה בעוליים ומלבד "הסאנדיי טיימס" לא טרחו עיי עתוני יום א'. בשבת היה דיווח נרחב יותר שהתרכז בשני הנושאים הבאים:- ביקור שמיר בארה"ב ואירועי יום השיי בשטחים.

ב. השטחים.
בכל עתוני השבת על יום ההזמות ביום שני בר נהרג בלסטיני (לפי הטיימס הבי.בי.סי) אך שניים(אינדפנדנט ודיילי טלגרף) .המוקד עדה. בטיימס(ברנשטיין) סקירת משפטי הנאשמים בקבורת בלסטינים והכאתם. המצאי בבגישתי על תזמרת הבעיה הדמוגרפית. בפיננשל טיימס(ויטלי) שמדיניות ישראל היא שילוב של שנקציות כלכליות ויד צבאית קשה. הצעדים הכלכליים הם בניגוד לאמנה בינלאומית. בפיננשל טיימס ובאינדפנדנט על סגירת הרצועה לתקשורת. בדיילי טלגרף(קוגלין) כתבה על מובארק עורך ודורתר הזובה עתה לירושלים. מאמר של דרברט נוקס על יהדות בריטניה והארועים: הרב הראשי והלורד ויידנפלד תומכים למרות הארועים,מייקל לאטאם מדועדע. הרבנית נויברגר מבקרת קשות. בסאנדיי טיימס(קוגלין) על המגמה החדשה של

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הנהגה המדינית השתית שיירותים אלטרנטיבית. פרטים על התפטרויות הפלסטינים מהמינהל האזרחי. המישה צורתי עלויזיה נעצרו ברמאללה. בני.בי.סי. ביום ששי(גרינס) נתנה מפורטת בנושא זה. באינדפנדנט (ריצ'רדס) על ביקור קט סטיבנס בשטחים. הגנה מעשי ישראל "הטרוריסטיים". המשלחת לא רק אנטי-ציונית אלא גם אנטי-יהודית.

ג.ביקור שמיר בארה"ב.
בכל עתוני השבת ובאובזרבר על שלילה החדשה לארבע בירות ערביות. באינדפנדנט על מינוי למס נרסף של שולץ לאזור.בגארדיין(רוינר) על הצלחת שמיר לדחות התכנית מבלי להגיע לקרע עם ארה"ב. מסעד קבר התכנית.בסאנדיי טיימס(קולבין) שיזנה לקבלת מנין של גיבור מתוגי הימין בישראל.

ד. איראן-עיראק.
כל עתוני סופהשבוע עסקים בהמשך מלחמת הערים/חידוש מלחמת המיכליות והקרבות בצפון מזרח עיראק. בטיימס ובסאנדיי טלגרף מאת כתביהם על החיים בטהראן בכל טילי עיראק. באובזרבר(באטיה) על עימות איראני-סעודי מחודש בענין החאג'. חשש סעודי מחדרה על ארועי שנה שעברה.

ה.שונות.
1) לבנון-באינדפנדנט על תקינת שחרורים בביירות. בסאנדיי טלגרף שטרי- ריית נרצא בידי אימאד מוגניה השיעי. מתיחסים אליו כאל סוכן אמריקני. באובזרבר סיכורו של קולרידג' על חגיגתו.

2) ישראל-כל עתוני השב שעסרדיה רגשה נסין טילים לטווח בינוני בעלי יכולת נשיאת נשק גרעיני. דאגה בישראל ובארה"ב. בדיילי טלגרף שהיעד הסעודי הוא הרתעת איראן. באובזרבר על קרבות בין צהל וצדיל למחבלים בבקעא. במייל און-סאנדיי שהריסר הבורות בריטיות נחקרות ע"י מס'ת הבריטי על מכירת ציוד צבאי לטרוריסטים. RACAL נוקתה מכל חשד של מכירת ציוד קשר לאש"ב ביודעין. בסאנדיי טיימס(בשבועון הצייר) מאמר נרחב של גיטה טרני על משנט דמיניוק. בסאנדיי טיימס על פנק דיכו של ואנונו הצרי ביום ה'. מסמר קבוצות הנתנגדות לנשק גרעיני שולחות נציגים. ההיינה מודעות בעהנות לשחרורו ועצומות. בלדכן מודאג מנצבו הנפשי עקב מעצרו הממושך בבידוד.

מנדר.

אך

הנ: שהה/רהמ/שהבט/מנבל/רמנבל/טמנבל/ממדרם/אבן/קלוורי/מעת/
הסברה/לעם/דרצ-ים/דרצ/נזבר/צנזורצבאי/אירא/אירב/מזהים/
מתאמשמרים

5741

** נבנם שמור
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מודם:3/17676
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:224/תא:210588/זת:1300/דת:מ/סג:שמ
נד:ש

שמור/מידי

אל:ארונה 2 המרכז

מאת:הציר-יועץ לונדון

משיחה עם קמפטון- בישוף סעודיה/ מזה"ת בפוראון

1) המדיניות הסעודית על רגישת טילים לטווח בינוני בסין התקבלה כאן בהפתעה. הדיווחים הראשונים מוואשינגטון ומריאד מתיחסים רק לעצם העובדה הזן המיהה על הקירבה שנוצרה במערכת יחסי סעודיה-סין. סבורים שהמידע הודלף מהבורון ע"י מקור סעודי בעל נגישות גבוהה שלא היה שבע רצון מסוג זה של מגעים עם מדינה קומוניסטית ומה שמצביע אולי על כך שיתכן עדיין לפעול לביטולו של ההסכם. ללא ספק שההחלטה נפלה בשיהוך המלך עצמו.

2) המוטיבציה לרכש הקורה במובן באיום האיראני ובהערכה הסעודית שלטילים העיראקים ישנה בראה השפעה ניכרת יותר של איראן מאשר על אמצעי לוחמה אחר.
הקירבה לנוכחי המאג' ששמה גם היא את שלה וסביר שהסעודים היו רוצים בסולת טילים אחת לגבי חודש יולי בסימבול של יכולת הרתעה. מאליו מובן שסעודיה היתה מעדיפה נשק מערבי אלא שלכן לא היה סיכוי. לדעת קמפטון-בישוף יתכן מאוד שההחלטה הסעודית הפעל בבומרנג מבחינת התגובה של הקונגרס האמריקני לרכש נוסף כל שהוא.

3) לא מעריכים שלקשר הסיני תהיה השפעה גם במישור יחסי סעודיה - ברה"מ הגם שהסוביטים ישאבו זאי עידוד מכן. מערכת היחסים עם ברה"מ היתה אגוז שונה גם

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מבחינת ההתיחסות המערבית רגם מבחינת התגובה הסעודית הבינמית סין איננה מהווה מטרה דתית סעודית ומה ערד שלמוסלמים שם אשרורית של חיי דת בלאים.

4) שתי משלחות פרלמנטריות בריטיות ביקרו החודש בסעודיה והנושא ששלט במגעיהם היה איראן והחשש מהתאג'. כנראה שהצימצום שחל בצורת השגרירות הסעודית בטהרן יסיע להם לצמצם גם את מספר האשרות שינתנו. אמצעי נוסף עשוי להיות שבירתן של צעדות הענק לעבר המסגד לקבוצות קטנות ובמרחקים גדולים ראתת מרעותה. החרדה מכל מקום גבוהה.

5) מעריכים שהסעודים לא יתמכו בבקשת ארגון המודדים המוסלמים בנילינינים להתקבל נחברים לרעידה האיסלאמית. נעבר לשיקול הפוליטי הכללי של ההתיחסות השלילית של ממשלינינים , ארה"ב ואולי אף בריטניה הרי שאין רצון סעודי לסתוח את דלתות הארגון לעשרות קבוצות מוסלמיות המעוניינות כולן להצטרף. יתכן עם זאת שבעבר הניצוי יהיה נסיי.

יודם שני

רות

הע: שהם/רהמ/שהבט/מנכל/ממנכל/עמנכל/ממד/רם/אמן/אירא/אירב

15739 18.03.88

נכנס ** שמור
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**
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הדס:3/15739
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:210/תא:130388/דת:1400/דת:ד/סג:שה
נד:ם

103.3
בר

שמור/דחוף

אל:אירופה 2/ המרכז

מאת:לונדון/ציר יועץ

משיחה עם קולינקרט איראן/ עיראק בפראגון:-

1.המוטיבציה העיראקית שבחידוש מלחמת הערים בעיתוני הבוקחי איננה ברורה וכל ההסברים הידועים אינם עונים על כן במדויק. סבורים שבסופו של דבר היתה זו טעות בשיפוט שנבעה מעודף בטחון מדיני(לא צבאי) לאחר שנה של הצלחות בחזית הזה. בין גורמי הלוואי שדחפו להחלטה היו בבראה עוב חיפוניים בין הדרג הצבאי לפוליטי כשהראשונים בתיסכול מקנאון נמשך ללא הוצאות כאשר בידם גם נשק הדש/קרי טילים שטרם בא לבטוי שבשטח.

2. אין מעריכים כאן שקיימת יכולת ייצור עצמית של טילים בעיראק וגם לא ידוע על משלוחים הדשים שהגיעו לאחרונה. המסקנה לכן שמדובר בהקטנת הם המשקל של הנקאד והגדלה הטווח. הגם שאין בכך משום פריצת דרך הרי שהמערלה דורשת ידע הנדסי ובושר ביצוע. מדיווחים בהשטח מתברר מכל מקום שכוח ההרס של הטיל ירד לשליש מיכולתו המקורית.

3. בין הפעילויות העיראקיות האחרונות שאין להם הסבר ברור, נמצאת גם התכנית ל"ינינוי עדיתי". מתברר שבוצע תרגיל מעשי בבושא זה בבגדד ובוכנו לפי הערכה בין המישים למאה אלף נפש. האנשים הוסעו ברכבים אל מחוץ לעיר ומיד הוחזרו באותם רכבים. לדברי המשקיפים היה התרגיל מגוחך ולא הדגיה כאומה הגם שבבגדד אלו שמבדו

שהדבר יעורר חרדה בארבלוסיה. ארוע נוסף התרחש מיד לאחר הכנצת חיל האויר את בתי הזיקוק ב-27/2. מתברר שמשרד החוץ ריכז את כל השגרירים הזרים במקום תוך הסבר שהפעולה היתה בלבלית בלבד, אולם מצפים להגרבה איראנית מעבר לכל פרובוקציה והמזרח והמערב מתבקשים לגנות איראן מידיה. לא זכור להם בינוס דומה של הצורת הדיפלומאטי בבגדד.

4. מאיראן עצמה לא נגיעים הדים יוצאי דופן . בגיעות הטילים גרמו לכך שמקרב המעמד הבינוני בטהראן החלו לצאת את העיר אולם לא ביכרת חרדה בארבלוקיה כמו שאין גם ביטויים מיוחדים של אחדות. מביחים שאיראן היתה יכולה להגיב בצורה הרבה יותר מסיבית בלפי המתקפה העיראקית ולא רק ביבשה אלא גם בירי טילים. איראן בחרה לבצל הנושא מדיבית ובמידה רבה של הצלחה.

5. לא יפלא איפוא שבהבגש שהיה האר עם טאריק עזיז התבטא הראשון בבעם הון קביעה מפורשת שעיראק אשמה בחידוש מלחמת הערים כמו גם בהכרת הפסקת האש. סר גיפורי סיבם כי הפעולה העיראקית שיחדרה במידה רבה את בריתים מהלחץ המערבי והציבה את איראן באור חיובי יותר. טאריק עזיז הבחיש שעיראק החלה במתקפה והדגיש "שיש ללמד את איראן לקח".

לפי קוליקוס ברמזים דברי שהיה עיראק לכן שקיימת החלטה ממשלתית עיראקית מפורשת בנושא הטילים ולא היתה כאן הדרדרות או בעולה סבונטנית ובלתי מחושבת כל שהיא.

יודם שני.

אף

תפ: שהה, רהה, שהבט, מנבל, המנבל, סמנבל, המד, דם, אמן, איראן, איראב, בזהים

13752 תאריך : 17.05.88 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

שמור נכנס **
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5778

תוזם:3/13752
אל:המשרד
מ-:קונסנהגן/נר:147/תא:160388/זת:1450/דת:מ/סג:שמ
נד:0

שמור/מידי

103.3

אל:אירופה 2
דע:ממנכל

נ"ל

הויכוח בפולקטינג - נאום שהח'

בדיון הקרוב נעביר תרגום מלא של נאום אלמן-ינסן/ותרגום דבריהם של דוברי המפלגות המשתתפות.
דברי שהח' כללו בקורת קשה ונוקבת ואף שהוא מאזכר בקצרה את הנרור האשמי,הוא מטיל כל האשמה על ישראל.ההתייחסו לאשפ' חלקלקה ונועדה לרצות את ה- SF יוזמי הדיון ואת הסד'. בתביעתו להשתתפות אשפ' במומ' הרחיק לכת יותר מנוסח ההחלטה שאומץ ע"י הפולקטינג.
נאומו היה כה חריף עד ש- PELLE VOIGT אמר שהפעם ללא אירוניה הוא מקבל את דברי שהח' במלואם.
ביירגורד/מנהל מזת' ,שעליו הוטלה מלאכת הכתיבה, השביר אמש שבהתרפת הנוסח התכוון השר להוציא הרוח ממפרשי מפלגות השמאל שיזמו את הדיון. הטיעון יפה אך אינו משכנע כלל ועיקר את מי שזכר את אלמן-ינסן בביקורו בארץ בסתיו 1982 בשליחות הקהיליה בירו' מועצת השרים. משיחות עם חברי פולקטינג ואנשי משהח' עולה שאנקר יורגנסן,עליו הוטל להיות הדובר בדיון מטעם הסוציאל דמוקרטים,נטה בערב שקדם לדיון את הצעת ההחלטה שלבסוף אומצה ע"י כל המפלגות להוציא אחת(מקרה נדיר ביותר בנושא הקשור למדיניות חוצ). המעניין בהתפתחות זאת היא השוואה בין הצהרותיו של אנקר יורגנסן מאז שרבו מביקור בארץ, בהן קרא לתקמת מדינה פלשתינאית ולהכרה באשפ' בנציג בלעדי של הפלשתינאים,לבין נוסח ההחלטה שהתקבלה. ראו גא בהקשר זה מברקנו הגלוי 129 בו העברנו

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

כתבות בעיתונות שפורסמו לקראת הדיון בפולקטינג.

גנור==

-

הע: שהח/רהמ/שהבט/מנכל/ממנכל/ממנכל/ממדרס/אמן/אירב/אירא

14050 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 03.88

נבנס בלמס

5794

מרדם:3,14050
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון,בר:184,תא:160388,דת:1800,דת:מ,מג:בל
נד:ב

103.3
כרכ

בלמס/מידי
אל:אירופה 2, לשכת הנבל מדיני, המרכז
מאת:ציר ירוץ לונדון

אשר

בדיוני בית הלורדים מאתמול רבמסגרת שאילתות ותשובות
בנתב נרשם בלהלן:

LORD MAYHEW ASKED HER MAJESTYS GOVERNMENT:
WHETHE THEY HOLD THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRORIST ACTIONS AND IF SO
WHETHER THEY WILL SPECIFY THOSE ACTIONS AND THE
YEARS IN WHICH THEY TOOK PLACE AND WHETHER THEY
TOOK THOSE ACTIONS INTO ACCOUNT IN TAKING THEIR
DECISION TO HAVE NO OFFICIAL CONTACT WITH THE PLO.

THE MINISTER OF STATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LORD GLENARTHUR: THE PLO IS A BROAD-BASED UMBRELLA
ORGANIZATION. SOME OF ITS COMIONENT ELEMENTS HAVE
DEPLORABLE TERRORIST RECORD. INDIVIDUAL TERRORIST
ACTS ASSOCIATED WITH PLO GROUIS, PARTICULARLY
IN THE 1970S ARE TOO NUMEROUS TO LIST. WE DO MAINTAIN
CONTACTS WITH THE PLO AT OFFICIAL LEVEL, AND THE
THEN MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
AFFAIRS MR HURD MET MR FAROUQ QADDUMI IN 1983:
BUT THE PLO'S FAILURE UNEQUIVOCALLY TO RENOUNCE
VIOLENCE IS A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO OUR DEVELOPING CONTACTS
AT CABINET LEVEL.

ירדן שני

א

תנ: שהח,רהנ,שהבט,מנבל,רמנבל,סמנבל,ממד,רס,אמן,אירא,אירב,
הקברה

** נבנס שמור 5602
**
**
**

מוזם:3/9481
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:122/תא:100388/זה:1900/דה:מ/סג:שמ
נד:0

1.נס.3
בנ

שמור/מידי

אל: אירונה 2 המרכז

מאת: הציר-יועץ לונדון

משיחה עם קופיץ מהמכון ללימודים אסטרטגיים:

1. אין זה סביר שעיראק הידרס את חידושו של "מלחמות הערים" ללא סיבות כבדות משקל. נעבר לרצון לעורר ולבנאם מחדש מלחמה רדומה במקצת ואולי אף להרתיע ולסכל מתקפה איראנית אפשרית, הרי שיתכן והסיבה מצויה יותר בזירה הפנים-עיראקית. לפי קופיץ הרי שלאחרונה הגיעו שמועות על ירידה במורל ותיסכול גובר בקרב היחידות בדרום כשמקביל הדים על מצב דומה בצפון משם שמעו אף של מעין "מרידה" (בסוף ינואר). קציבים ביקשו בעולה הפגנתית שלא בתחום היבשה וצדאם הוסיף באמצעות הפיגועים מרחוק נשנה לכן ולמצב בכלו.

2. הדשות במכון חלוקות באשר לנושא טילי הקרקע העיראקיים. יש הסוברים דוגמת דון קר כי המדובר בטקאד B שפוכל באמצעות מאיץ מתוצרת עיראקית שהגדיל את הטווח בעוד כ-100 מיל. אחרים מניחים שאין
סיבה שעיראק תוכל ליצור טיל עצמי בסיוע מומחים ממצרים, ומזכירים גם את סיכור ההנדס הגרמני שהביא הרגתות לכן עוד בתחילת 87. מומחים צבאים מאדינבורו מעריכים שהמדובר בגירסה עיראקית של ה-
V-2 הגרמני. באשר להפצצות ארובות הטווח של חיל האויר הרי שהשמועות על שימוש בשכירי-חרב עדיין "באויר".
מחיר השוק הינו כמאה אלף דולר לשנה מראש, מחוץ לביטוח

היום והטבות מקומיות. ציין אגב כך שלפני כשבועיים נפגש עם טייס ירדני העושה בהשתלמות כאן ששימש יועץ בחיל האויר העיראקי עד נובמבר 87. לדבריו רמת הטיסים העיראקים נמוכה ביותר וגם התחזוקה גרועה.

3. רוב הציוד הצבאי לעיראק מגיע כיום מצרפת, ברזיל ומצרים. האחרונה מספקת בעיקר תותחים, חלקי חילוף ותחמושת. מצרים הכנה בדיעבד לספק הראשי של עיראק בתחמושת לטנקיה כמו גם ליבואנית עבורם כמו לאחרונה מהונגריה ומסנרד. מעריכים את המכירות המצריות לעיראק ב-87 ב-950 מליון דולר בקירוב. התלות העיראקית בגוש המזרחי בתחלין של ירידה.

4. קונציץ אמור להיפגש בימים הקרובים עם טלאבני שהגיע ללונדון. האיש שיצא את איראן בדרכון עיראקי ביקר קודם לכן באיטליה ובגרמניה. מניח שהעובדה כי טלאבני מסתובב חפשי באירופה מרמזת אולי של הכרה גוברת במרכיב הכורדי בעיראק. משיחות הכנה עם חברי המפלגה הכורדית כאן שמע כי בשמונה מאות נפש נסבר בתוצאה מהשימוש העיראקי בלוחמה כימית. איראן מיפקה להם באלפיים מערכות הגנה לרבות מסכות גז בהם מצוידים כיום יחידות העילית של המפלגה.

יורם שני.

יור

תפ: שהה/רהה/שהבט/מנכל/ממנכל/סמנכל/ממד/רם/אמן/איר

5600

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON, W8 4QB
Telephone: 01-937 8050

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

שמור

יט'	באדר	תשמ"ח
8	במרץ	1988
סימוכין:		2536

1.3.3
בדיפ

אל: מע"ת
הסברה/מידע
אירופה 2

הנדון: פעילותינו בתקשורת

א. עשרת הימים האחרונים, מאז שידור הסרט CBS, היו מהעמוסים ביותר מבחינתנו בתקשורת. כבר במהדורת הצהריים של ITN ביום ו' 26/2 (1230) הופיע השגריר בשידור חי כשהוא נשאל על הארוע. ITN הקליטו ראיון ששודר במהדורת הערב. הבי.בי.סי הקליט ראיון שחלקים ממנו שודרו במהדורות 1745, 2100 וניוזנייט. (תמלילים העוברו בדיפ).

ב. החכי"ם מוטה גור ומשה ארנס שהו בלונדון בשבוע שבין 29/2-4/3, הופיעו בתקשורת. כל הראיונות עמם התחלקו בין שני הנושאים: תהליך השלום והתנהגות צה"ל בשטחים (בפרט על רקע פרשת סרט CBS ששודר ביום ו' קודם לכן). ח"כ מוטה גור הופיע בבי.בי.סי (טלויזיה) ב-29/2 וברדיו LBC ביומן הבוקר ב- 1/3.
ח"כ משה ארנס הופיע ביומן אחה"צ של BBC RADIO4 ואח"כ בניוזנייט (ערוץ 2 של הבי.בי.סי) ב- 29/2 וב- 1/3 בתכנית הבוקר של הבי.בי.סי (טלויזיה). תמלילי הראיונות בדיפ.

ג. הבי.בי.סי רדיו מפיק סדרת תכניות רדיו לשנת הארבעים והסדרתי ראיונות לגור וארנס לתכנית זו. הראיונות נמשכו כשעה כל אחד. ח"כ ארנס נפגש גם עם עורך "הטיימס" צ'רלס וילסון בנוכחות השגריר והח"מ. מפגש זה התמקד בתהליך השלום מנקודת מבטו של ח"כ ארנס.

ד. ביום א' 28/2 זימן השגריר לביתו ציבור אנשי תקשורת כדי להפרד מיו"ר מועצת המנהלים של "הג'ואיש כרוניקל" דייויד קסלר. בהזדמנות זו אמר השגריר מילים חמות על תפקידו של עתון זה והיתה זו הזדמנות לצוות השגרירות לשוחח עם עתונאים מיד לאחר פרשת CBS.

ISRAEL ישראל

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

ה. במהלך השבוע החולף הוזמנו להשתתף בתכנית דיון בהנחיית חבר הפרלמנט לשעבר קילרוי-סילק בבי.בי.סי (טלויזיה). ניהלתי איתם מו"מ ממושך אך בסופו החלטתי שלא נשתתף כיון שפורמאט התכנית לא מתאים להשתתפותנו מה גם שהיינו נכנסים לשדה מוקשים של עימות לא רק עם תומכי הפלסטינים אלא עם ישראלים ויהודים שהיו באולפן.

ו. השגריר הוזמן לתכנית הבוקר של הבי.בי.סי (טלויזיה) ביום 7/3 כשהנושא אמור להיות העמדתם למשפט של החיילים שהיכו את הפלסטינים בסרט CBS. לאחר שיקול החלטתי שלא נופיע בתכנית, משום שיש גבול למספר הפעמים שרצוי להופיע בנושא זה מה גם שלא היה בהתפתחות משום חדשה המחייבת תגובה. עדיף להמתין לגמר המשפט.
אסור להגיע למצב של OVER-EXPOSURE ולעתים קרובות אי-הופעתנו מביאה לכך שהנושא כלל לא מופיע במהדורה. כך היה במקרה זה ויצאנו נשכרים.

ז. במהלך השבוע קיימתי פגישות תידרוך:

1. HENRY STANHOPE, כותב מאמרי המערכת בעניינינו ב"טיימס".
2. ANDREW MC EWEN, הכתב הדיפלומטי של "הטיימס" המרבה להתקשר עמי.
3. PETER DAVID, עורך מז"ת של "האקונומיסט" היוצא לארץ להכנת כתבה לרגל שנת הארבעים.

בברכה,

א. מנור.

ISRAEL ישראל

5998 תאריך : 07.03.88 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

** בבנס שמור

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שמור/דחוף

אל:מנהל אכ"ם ארופה 2

דע:בייירוני

מאת:הציר-יועץ לונדון

מושב האביטס

1. הסברתי הנושא בפוראון הון בקשה להמנע מלערב פוליטיקה בארגון מקצועי ובהסתמך על גילוי הדעת האירופאי בכנס בייירוני, המחייב עמדת נגד ברורה.

העלתי גם האפשרות שהנושא הפלסטיני יועלה לדבות טעוניגר נגד הגיגויים האנטי-ישראלים האפשריים.

2. לדברי הפוראון:

א. עמדתם לגבי גילוי הדעת בייירוני הינה ללא שינוי ומתשיגים לתמון בעקרון זה תמיכה מלאה.

ב. מתיחסים בהבנה לכניה ולהסברים אולם אינם מוכנים להתחייב מראש לעמדה זו או אחרת. ההחלטה המשותפת לא תינול לכני ה-6/4.

ג. עמדת הפוראון לגבי החלטה או נושא כל שהוא שיועלה בועידה תהיה תלויה בתוכן, בטגנון ובדקע התנאים המיוחדים של הנושא לדבות עמדת המדינות האופאיות האחרות.

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ירדן שני

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תפ: ממנכל/אירב/מינרבי/אבב/גרנש/ארבל1

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With the Compliments of

The Press Department

CHANNEL 4 TV NEWS - THURSDAY 25 FEBRUARY 1988
REPORT ON AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE, GEORGE SHULTZ'S VISIT TO ISRAEL FOR PEACE TALKS
REPORT BY DAVID SMITH

PETER SISSONS
The American Secretary of State, George Shultz, has arrived in Israel to launch what President Reagan is calling 'a new peace initiative for the Middle East'. But as he begins his mission, there's been more violence in the occupied territories. Two Palestinian youths were shot dead by Israeli troops, one in the West Bank town of Nablus and the other during rioting in the Jenin refugee camp. Earlier, a hundred Palestinians were arrested in Qabatiya, following yesterday's lynching of a suspected Israeli collaborator. President Reagan's remarks about Middle East peace prospects came during his first news conference for four months. He promised new ideas and blamed outside elements for the trouble in the territories.

PRESIDENT REAGAN
We have here intimations that there have been certain people suspected of being terrorists, outsiders coming in not only with weapons but stirring up and encouraging the trouble in those areas, certainly the violence is both ways.

PETER SISSONS
But already the Shultz mission is running into trouble itself, a meeting with moderate Palestinians has been banned by the PLO, and the Israeli leadership is openly divided on his peace plan. David Smith reports from Jerusalem on the problems facing the US Secretary of State.

DAVID SMITH
Rarely have the Americans embarked on such a mission of crisis management, with so little faith in its success. Secretary of State, George Shultz, arrived in Israel tonight, publicly professing cautious optimism. But privately admitting that he had little chance of bringing Arabs and Israelis together.

GEORGE SHULTZ
With commitment and determination, we can make 1988 a year of peace in the region.

DAVID SMITH
Throughout the day, Palestinians on the West Bank have staged violent demonstrations, timed for his arrival. At lunch time another demonstrator was shot dead, the sixty-fourth since the uprising began. The intervention of the super powers then has not brought a halt ot the violence, far from it. But for the moment at least, the Palestinians are saying they will have nothing to do with the American initiative.

Tomorrow night, for example, Mr Shultz had planned to come here to the American Consulate in East Jerusalem, the Arab half of the city, and meet Palestinian leaders from the West Bank and Gaza. But unless they change their minds at the last minute, the Palestinians won't be seeing Mr Shultz, and the American Secretary of State will be leaving the Middle East without meeting representatives of the people whose uprising prompted him to come here in the first place.

FAYEZ ABU RAHME (Lawyer in Gaza)
I met Mr Shultz on the twenty-seventh of January, at the State Department in Washington.....

DAVID SMITH
This is Fayez Abu Rahme, a Palestinian leader in the Gaza Strip who talks regularly to the Americans and the Israelis. But this week he won't be seeing

Mr Shultz, by order of the PLO. Abu Rahme is a lawyer, well known and well liked among the people of Gaza for his work defending political detainees. Although he supports the PLO, he's a moderate by anyone's standards. Typically, he believes passionately in compromise with the Israelis. It's not unusual to find him at his office meeting prominent Israelis or like today, this Jewish author from New York. And it's characteristic of the man that he should quietly criticise both sides in the conflict. He personally would like to see Mr Shultz tomorrow.

FAYEZ ABU RAHME
I think it would have been better to allow us to meet Mr Shultz and to voice our objections to his initiative, and to voice our opinions to him.

DAVID SMITH
Can you convey that feeling to the PLO?

FAYEZ ABU RAHME
Yes, this was conveyed but in vain. We, in the occupied areas, consider the PLO as our leadership, we have to obey the leadership.

DAVID SMITH
Is there an element of fear though, as well?

FAYEZ ABU RAHME
It's a discipline, it's a mixture of discipline and fear.

DAVID SMITH
Ever since this uprising began, it's been impossible to tell whether the PLO leadership in exile has been dictating the pace of events, or whether local Palestinian leaders have been in charge. But now that the diplomacy has begun, Yasser Arafat and the PLO are issuing strict orders. No negotiatons with the Americans unless they talk ultimately to the PLO. The matter that even his old allies, the Soviets, want Arafat to concede. The PLO leader is stopping Palestinians inside the territories doing a deal without him, and no-one will defy him.

ZIYAD ABU ZIYAD (Editor of a Palestinian newspaper)
I thought about publication in Hebrew to speak with the Israelis and to tell them what it is and something about the Palestinian side.....

DAVID SMITH
Ziyad Abu Ziyad is a PLO activist in regular contact with the leadership abroad. They helped him set up his Hebrew newspaper in Jerusalem. He says the PLO is right to stop him meeting George Shultz in Jerusalem tomorrow.

ZIYAD ABU ZIYAD
The Americans and the others, even the Israelis, they should not go and look for sub-titles, they must go to the headlines. They must go to the main siting of the Palestinian people which is the PLO, because if they find anyone if the territories who will be ready to talk to them and make a deal with them, and this man cannot commit the Palestinian people to that deal, they achieve nothing.

DAVID SMITH
But by refusing to even talk to Shultz, aren't you now in a sense making a mockery of the way in which your people have demonstrated and died out on the streets in the past few weeks?

ZIYAD ABU ZIYAD
You may be surprised to know that people here are more militant than the PLO is outside, because they are facing the occupation, day by day, and they are suffering directly from the opressive policy of the Israeli occupation.

DAVID SMITH
It's a measure of that new militancy that the Palestinians are now murdering their own people who are supposedly collaborating with the Israelis. Here in the West Bank village of Qabatiya, a mob attacked the home of a young Arab who worked for the Israeli Military Government. After he shot at people in self-defence Ayhed Rageb was lynched, his body hung from a pylon in the middle of the village. Evidence, if any was needed, of how extremists are filling the political vacuum here. So, where do the Palestinians stand, and what chance if any, does diplomacy have now? As Mr Shultz arrived, we brought together two veteran observers of the West Bank. One an Israeli, the other a Palestinian.

DANI RUBENSTEIN (Israeli journalist)
Until now as can watch from what's going on in the occupied territories, the extremists are becoming stronger.

DAVID SMITH
On both sides?

DANI RUBENSTEIN
On both sides.

JAMIL HAMAD (Palestinian journalist)
As Dani put it, I think the situation in the West Bank and Gaza is moving in the direction of radicalisation, and when you are making a radical show in the West Bank and Gaza, forget all about negotiations.

DANI RUBENSTEIN
I agree, I agree that for Shamir it would be good for Israel in general. It will be good if the Palestinians will reject the American initiative now. it will be good for the Palestinians as well if Shamir will reject the American initiative. So it's the same, and both sides try to emphasise that the other side is controlled by extremists.

DAVID SMITH
Do you agree with that?

JAMIL HAMAD
I want to say one thing. The Palestinians first of all should read what Shultz is bringing with them. The idea of rejecting shultz's plan just without knowing what he's cooking, this is stupidity. I am afraid that the Palestinians are missing another treaty.

DAVID SMITH
Another oppurtunity?

JAMIL HAMAD
Yes..(indistinct)

DAVID SMITH
For Mr Shultz then, damage limitation rather than decisive action seems to be the best bet. Yet the Americans insist they will pursue a settlement for as long as it takes. Symbolically, tonight as the Secretary of State arrived, the demonstrations resumed. Super power diplomacy it seems, cannot persuade either side at this point to seek a truce. let alone dictate the terms of an agreement to begin negotiations.

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BBC1 TV PROGRAMME "BREAKFAST TV" - TUESDAY 1ST MARCH 1988
ITEM CONCERNING GEORGE SHULTZ'S PEACE MISSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
INTERVIEW WITH MOSHE ARENS MK, FORMER ISRAELI DEFENCE MINISTER

JOHN STAPLETON
The American Secretary of State, George Shultz, is in London this morning. It's part of his tour to try to find a solution to the continuing troubles in Israel. He's already been in Egypt, in Syria, in Jordan and in Israel. He's meeting King Hussein here this afternoon. King Hussein's here on a private visit. He's seeing his dentist.

Now earlier this morning, Mike McKaye asked another man who's coincidentally here in London, Moshe Arens, if he thought the peace process would be successful.

MOSHE ARENS MK
It's much too early to say. You know that there's a great deal of admiration for George Shultz in Israel. He's considered to be a great friend and a great Secretary of State and I would say his mission at this stage of the game is really in an embryonic stage and I don't think that we should be giving it any marks as yet. We could give Mr Shultz "A" for effort but he's just getting started.

MIKE McKAYE
He's not said very much of course himself about it so far but do you sense that he's actually making any progress?

MOSHE ARENS MK
It's too early to say. He seems to have exceded to demands made in the Arab world that the negotiations begin in the framework of an international conference. This is with the participation of the Soviet Union. This is something that the Israeli Government, the Israeli Prime Minister, has rejected and I don't think the Israeli Prime Minister will accept. So that's the first point of issue I would say that has sprung up. It may not be the last.

MIKE McKAYE
Isn't it that kind of rejection, the resistance to concessions by Israel, that's going to make the peace process very difficult?

MOSHE ARENS MK
Well no doubt. There's resistance to concessions on all sides. It starts with the fact that there's resistance to negotiations on the part of the Arab world to what Israel's asked for and is asking for to this day is direct negotiations. It seems only reasonable that anybody that wants to make peace with Israel, come to a settlement with Israel, will come to the table and negotiate directly and will not ask that the Soviet Union participate in these negotiations.

MIKE McKAYE
It is the kind of pictures, for example, that we've seen recently on television of individual Palestinians being attacked and beaten - do they not undermine the credibility of the posture that the Israelis are striking?

MOSHE ARENS MK
I don't believe so. What we're dealing with in Israel is mob violence. Mob violence is very easy to control in totalitarian countries ...

MIKE McKAYE
So men with arms, with weapons against often boys with stones?

MOSHE ARENS MK
Yes well, the Syrians would have no trouble controlling that. King Hussein and Jordan would have no trouble controlling that.

MIKE McKAYE
Lastly Mr Arens, are you optimistic about the future or pessimistic?

MOSHE ARENS MK
I'm optimistic about the future because I think Israel's gone a long way in forty years. It started in the War for its very existence.

MIKE McKAYE
But do you think peace is achievable?

MOSHE ARENS MK
Well, we've already achieved peace with Egypt. Unfortunately peace in the Middle East moves at a glacial pace. The Middle East is a very difficult part of the world - maybe the most difficult part of the world today. Look at the Iraqi/Iranian War; look at what's happening in Lebanon. It's much easier in Western Europe nowadays.

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BBC 1 TV "LUNCHTIME NEWS" - MONDAY 29 FEBRUARY 1988
REPORT ON SHULTZ MISSION TO ISRAEL, AND INTERVIEW WITH MORDECHAI GUR, FORMER ISRAELI CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF
REPORT BY KEITH GRAVES

MICHAEL BUERK
The American Secretary of State, George Shultz, is back in Jordan as he continues his initiative for peace in the Middle East. At the heart of Mr Shultz's proposals, is a UN sponsored conference setting first an interim settlement on the West Bank and Gaza and then moving on to a permanent agreement. Israel is unhappy about both the international involvement and the fixed timing of the various stages. Mr Shultz had breakfast in Jerusalem with the Israeli Foreign Minister, before setting off again to Amaan. It's thought he might be meeting Palestinians there. From Jerusalem, Keith Graves reports.

KEITH GRAVES
Meeting Israeli Foreign Minister Peres yet again for breakfast, Mr Shultz refused to be pessimistic despite predictions that his mission will fail. Then he flew the by now well worn air lane to Amaan, to meet the Jordanian Crown Prince. King Hussein himself is staying out of the shuttle diplomacy at the moment, but is likely to meet Mr Shultz in London perhaps as early as tomorrow. And behind the scenes, attempts are still going on to get Mr Shultz and a delegation of Palestinians together. There are, said an American official, still several balls in the air. Back in Israel, the Shultz mission has to some extent been overshadowed by the controversy over mounting evidence of brutality by Israeli soldiers against Palestinians. Scenes like this have shocked Israelis who are starting to question not only the soldiers' methods, but the reasons they're on the occupied territory.

MICHAEL BUERK
As General Mordechai Gur, the former Israeli Chief of Staff and Cabinet Minister. General Gur, are Israelis aware of the damage that those sort of incidents, those sort of pictures are doing, even amongst your admirers abroad?

GENERAL GUR
We are aware because we see also all the pictures, I've been in Washington in all the United States, we know it very well but we wish you know that for us it's a struggle for survival, and although we don't like it very much, and believe me, when we see the pictures it's our kids there, and we don't like it.

MICHAEL BUERK
But does the struggle have to be waged in that way?

GENERAL GUR
Oh, I hope not. I hope not. And I hope that it will stop as soon as possible and political proceedures will proceed, that's as a matter of fact the hope of most Israelis. But as long as the PLO do not change their philosophy, and their followers in the territories use some of these methods, I am afraid that we shall have to go on and make sure that with that kind of activity they will not achieve a lot, and we expect them to come and sit and negotiate with us.

MICHAEL BUERK
But with the criticism of the methods of your troops, what effect is this having on the moral of your soldiers and the moral of your civilian population?

GENERAL GUR
Most Israelis understand that we do it not because we like it, we don't, but we have to in order to survive and if it won't happen in Nablus and Hebron it might happen in Tel Aviv and Haifa, because that's what the PLO really expect.

MICHAEL BUERK
But you don't have to break people's arms to survive as a nation!

GENERAL GUR
No doubt about that, believe me, against that all our authorities will take all the neccessary steps, my kid is going to serve in the army - believe me we have been talking a lot about that. No, we won't accept it as a standard and as the struggle goes on we, the leaders, have to be more extreme about what should not be done. But the struggle, we have to win it.

MICHAEL BUERK
Can I move on to the peace process. Mr Shultz is flying all over the Middle East, but can there really be a peace settlement without direct Israeli negotiations with the PLO?

GENERAL GUR
Of course it can be, I believe that once the PLO will realise that Israelis there do exist, and they will change their philosophy, and I hope they will do, we shall negotiate with any Arab, with any Palestinian that recognises us, and I hope the PLO will change - and the sooner the better.

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CHANNEL 4 TV NEWS - MONDAY 29 FEBRUARY 1988
ITEM ON PROSPECTS FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE, INTERVIEWS WITH YOSSI BEILIN, HEAD OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, AND SARI NUSSEIBEH, A LEADER ON THE WEST BANK
REPORT BY DAVID SMITH

NICHOLAS OWEN
In Israel, another Palestinian has been shot dead by troops on the West Bank. A second man who was shot last week has died in hospital. The trouble came as the United States Secretary of State, George Shultz, moved on to Jordan to promote his peace initiative. He's proposing swifter movement towards self-rule by Palestinians in Gaza and on the West Bank, and an international peace conference. David Smith reports from Israel on Mr Shultz's chances of stopping the violence.

DAVID SMITH
The statistics no longer even begin to tell this story. Today, at least two Palestinians died, more than twenty were wounded. But thousands were involved - providing the stones, being struck by ricochet bullets, and in some cases being arrested. At one point this afternoon, the Israeli army reported disturbances in twenty different locations on the West Bank. They ordered dusk to dawn curfews in at least six of them. Today there was a new weapon in the Israeli armoury - aerosol sprays, designed to irritate the eyes, rather like tear gas.

So far, American Secretary of State, George Shultz, has achieved no breakthrough, during four days of shuttling back and forth between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Last night, once again, Israeli Prime Minister Shamir refused an international peace conference. But for the moment at least, it seems Washington will not take no for an answer. Mr Shultz believes that Israel's politicians should go to the country for an early election, if they cannot decide among themselves. But to keep the pressure up, he plans to see King Hussein in London tomorrow, and then return here, maybe later this week.

Privately, the Americans admit that in the short term the Palestinian uprising helps, if anything, rather than hinders. In the words of one of Mr Shultz's advisors today: 'The Palestinians are clearly not going to stop now.' And the longer it goes on, the greater the pressure on Israel to take a decision about its future.

To examine such super-power logic, we visited the West Bank town of Ramallah. for generations Ramallah has been known as the 'Bride of Palestine'. A haven for wealthy Palestinians, a peaceful, easy-going community, renowned for its hospitality. And the willingness of its opulent middle class to do business with anyone, irrespective of race or religion. This was the morning after an unusually quiet night in Ramallah. For the first time in days, the town's refugee camps blocked off from the world outside had been calm. A glimpse inside suggested why. The days of demonstrations had taken their toll. Very few men here have been to work in weeks, even before the uprising life was a struggle for the average family of six children. Worse still, there's hardly a household in these camps that hasn't had someone arrested or fined or imprisoned.

For weeks now, the Israelis have been predicting that those economic facts of life herald an end to the violence. But time is working against Palestinian resistance. Here, at precisely eleven o'clock, the merchants of Ramallah shut down for the day. No-one gives orders, but everyone seems to obey. And at eleven thirty, a crowd of people gathers outside a Greek Orthodox Church, for a pre-arranged demonstration. What follows is just a sample of what has become a daily appearance in a town like Ramallah.

And how do you explain the way that middle class people like yourself are

taking part?

LOCAL COMMENTS
I don't think this is an uprising for a particular type or a particular group of people, for kids or for women, it's for everybody.

The momentum is still quite high and I think it can go on for quite a few months.

There is momentum. There is determination and there is no going back. We cannot accept the application. We cannot accept things as they were before the uprising. Things have to change. ...

DAVID SMITH
And things will never be the same again?

LOCAL COMMENTS
No, they will never be the same.

If you speak to any Palestinian on the street, you will find out that we are not separate from the PLO. The PLO is not something's that outside and separate from us inside. We're one and you will get this message from every person.

DAVID SMITH
Is that for you the bottom line that the PLO must be included?

LOCAL COMMENTS
Yes. There is no other way.

DAVID SMITH
The Palestinian position then is clear and in the eyes of the Americans the next move rests with the Israeli people. So will Israelis be persuaded by international pressure as the Reagan Administration seems to believe?

Last night in the West Bank town of Nablus Israelis soldiers ... To taste Israel's mood we showed our report from last Friday of the beatings on the West Bank to a group of Israelis. According to one independent eye-witness, this lasted forty minutes. There was obvious anguish, some heart-searching but on all the major issues a difference of opinion.

Israelis comments
Surprised and ... and sad.

That was Palestinian/PLO propaganda.

That was a provocative report.

DAVID SMITH
Your reactions ... is really one of shock and shame?

Israeli comments
The effect this has on me - it just gets me angrier and angrier because I think all you're really trying to do with these films is just show one side.

DAVID SMITH
We asked them what effect the crisis on the West Bank and Gaza is having on the country at large.

Israelis comments
If you go around the country there's not one rural place or office or home in the evening where people don't talk about it. This country is being torn.

When we're threatened by an outside threat, and this is what is happening here, we are definitely altogether, the whole of the country, the Left and the Right together.

DAVID SMITH
Finally we asked if Israelis could imagine themselves bowing to international pressure?

Israelis comments
No. Definitely not.

No.

I think the accumulative view of what Israelis are seeing on Israeli Television or reading in Israeli newspapers written by Israeli journalists will bring a great number of people around to a consensus where they have to say: We somehow have to find a compromise to this ....

Fifty years ago there was the Evyon (?) Conference and the question of the Jews in Germany and Austria were brought before the world and the world with almost totally unanimity said: Let them perish. We remember that and it hasn't changed to this day.

DAVID SMITH
Whatever the emotions, the question remains - can Palestinians and Israelis talk to each other. Today for the first time since the unrest began two politicians agreed to do just that.

From Israel, Yossi Beilin, Head of the Foreign Ministry and the man seen by some as a future Labour Prime Minister. For the Palestinians, Sari Nusseibeh, a leader on the West Bank - a man George Shultz wanted to meet. What followed was what the Americans want here - the two sides talking to each other.

What, if anything, has been achieved by the Shultz visit?

YOSSI BEILIN
Well the most important thing is the new American commitment to be involved in the Middle East; to suggest a timetable and to believe that in '88, in spite of the fact that we are going to have elections both in the United States and in Israel, something can be done and should be done in the course of the peace process.

DAVID SMITH
Do you see any way that Palestinians like yourself can now talk to the Americans because obviously you said 'no' last week?

SARI NUSSEIBEH
Well we didn't quite say 'no'. We said basically that as Palestinians we're prepared to meet with Mr Shultz but the meeting has to be organised by our representative - that's to say the PLO.

DAVID SMITH
So without the PLO there can be no movement?

SARI NUSSEIBEH
Yes, there can be no movement without the PLO and without the involvement of the people outside the territories.

YOSSI BEILIN
What I can say is that unless the PLO does not decide to dismantle its military wing, its terrorist instruments, there will not be a debate in Israel, a real debate in Israel about the question of whether or not to discuss and negotiate with this organisation.

The Palestinians are again making the same mistakes and I'm not saying that we did not make mistakes in the past. I believe that all of us missed so many trains, so many opportunities. Why should we miss another train? I really believe that the mistakes made by the Palestinians were even more than the mistakes made by us.

DAVID SMITH
Have you missed a golden opportunity?

SARI NUSSEIBEH
I don't believe we have missed a golden opportunity. Let's look at this a different way. I mean Mr Shultz has come to the area. He has gone to meet the official representatives of all the parties concerned and the only party whom he has refused to meet have been the Palestinians. He has chosen to meet with individual Palestinians but not with the official party that represents the Palestinian people.

Now how can we part of a process of peace if Mr Shultz chooses to ignore us as a people.

DAVID SMITH
Do either of you ever see a time when you can circumvent the procedure and actually get down to the substance of negotiations?

YOSSI BEILIN
Had it been just the problem of meeting people like Sari and me, I believe that it could be very very easy but the problem is as you see, that the Palestinians who live, who know the problems, who are suffering more than anybody else, are those who are saying: Well, stop it. We're not going to deal with you. You have to meet somebody who lives there in Tunisia or in Baghdad who actually represent us.

SARI NUSSEIBEH
The people in charge of the Israeli Government are not like Yossi here. The people in charge of the Israeli Government basically refuse to deal with the PLO, refuse to deal with us as a Palestinian nation, refuse to address us as a nation with rights to self-determination. Indeed some of them in the Likud Party even refuse to consider withdrawing from one inch of Palestinian territory.

DAVID SMITH
Yossi Beilin, would you personally be prepared to give back the West Bank? Would your Foreign Minister, would Mr Peres give back the West Bank?

YOSSI BEILIN
Well it is not a secret again that I'm a Labour Party Member and the Foreign Minister is a Labour Party Member and the Labour Party is for giving most of the territories back.

DAVID SMITH
Would that be enough, Sari Nusseibeh?

SARI NUSSEIBEH
Well I would accept a solution based on first, withdrawal of the Israeli Forces from the occupied territories and secondly my ability as a people to practise my right of self-determination in those territories, including the right to participate and I am prepared to live in peace alongside Israel in such a State.

DAVID SMITH
It might be a PLO State though.

SARI NUSSEIBEH
It will be a Palestinian peoples' State.

DAVID SMITH
Would you accept that Yossi Beilin?

YOSSI BEILIN
No I don't think that this is the best solution but I don't want to be in a situation in which I exclude any kind of a solution. We have to sit and to talk. Maybe eventually in a generation or two both of us will agree to some ideas which are now totally rejected by us but let's not make a mistake in postponing the solution forever because that. Let's find what is possible. Let's find the realistic compliments. Let's find the common denominator which is there. We can find a solution together.

DAVID SMITH
Sari Nusseibeh, do you have any doubt that you could sit down with a man like Yossi Beilin? You are the next generation after all.

SARI NUSSEIBEH
Let the two sides sit down and talk. In fact this is what I called for - for talks to proceed between Israel and the PLO. Now what more do you want of me to say? I am for negotiations. I'm prepared to settle for a two-State solution. I am prepared to settle for a bi-national State solution. I'm prepared to discuss other solutions through the official representatives of my people.

oOo

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

5663

יב' באדר תשמ"ח
1 במרץ 1988
סימוכין: 2519

אל: ארופה 2

מאת: הציר-יועץ, לונדון

הנדון: הועדה לזכויות האדם

לוטה עותק מההתבטאות הבריטית בנושא כפי שהוצגה ע"י שר המדינה איגר ב- 18/2/88.

בברכה,

יורם שני.

העתק: ארבל 2
אכ"ב

ISRAEL ישראל

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

44TH SESSION

STATEMENT BY MR TIMOTHY EGGAR MP

PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

18 February 1988

HUMAN RIGHTS: THE BRITISH APPROACH

Much of the Commission's time is spent debating the affairs of a small number of countries, where international concern about human rights is focussed. This is not unnatural - nor is it necessarily wrong. It is a sad commentary on man's inhumanity to man that we have so many regular and familiar problems of this kind to review: year after year, Commission after Commission. But I ask you today to stand back for a moment from the detail of the agenda. I intend to look briefly at the principles which underly British policy in the field of human rights, and at the same time to draw some conclusions for our work in this Commission.

There would, rightly, be concern if it were thought that we spent our time here in Geneva debating abstract principles, and ignoring the cries of suffering of the victims of human rights abuses. But we also need to see clearly the fundamental values, which we are seeking to promote. When we look at the record of respect for human rights throughout the world we must all, if we are honest, admit that the temptation is always strong to find excuses for our friends - to concentrate our criticism on governments which we anyway find uncongenial. To succumb to this would be to betray the Charter and to undermine the respect and influence which this Commission rightly enjoys.

I would not claim for a moment that this history has created a perfect society in Britain. But we can point with pride to the rule of law - the means by which rights are safeguarded and the weak are protected from the strong. Without this equality before the law, human rights would inevitably become a prey to the arbitrary use, or abuse, of power.

Of course, in the family of the United Nations there are many countries with very different traditions; different ways of going about their business. We have no ambition to impose our own views of how to organise society. Each government is responsible for the well-being of its own citizens. But we hold to the fundamental principle of the rule of law and we recognise a shared international responsibility. In this organisation we have proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose 40th anniversary we celebrate later this year. We have also adopted the two major International Covenants on Human Rights and many other international human rights instruments.

But most importantly we have established the principle that human rights are a matter of legitimate international concern. We have asserted for ourselves, as the international community, the right to make judgements - and the duty to accept that the actions of our own governments may come under scrutiny. It is a recognition of a common duty - and a common compassion. It is a very fine achievement and it imposes a very special responsibility. The framework of international human rights law and standards is well established. A fact which reflects particular credit on the work of this Commission.

Yet sadly in so many parts of the world these standards are flouted. Our television screens and newspapers catalogue a seemingly endless series of horrors and atrocities - committed in the name of political or religious creed, desire for domination; or simply sheer callous disregard for the rights of others. We shall be outspoken in this Commission in condemning all abuses of human rights, wherever they may occur.

It is a sad fact that violations are not the monopoly of the few countries so often singled out for international censure. The resolutions adopted by the Commission on South Africa, the Occupied Arab territories and Chile reflect the just indignation of the international community at persistent and flagrant violations of civilised standards. Afghanistan too has rightly attracted our criticism. But let us not forget the plight of Soviet prisoners of conscience, and the difficulties of Soviet Jews and others leaving the Soviet Union whenever they wish; let us not forget the long-term prisoners in Ethiopia, or the repressive policies of the authorities in Cuba or Syria. I name but a few examples of problems which too often escape international scrutiny in this Commission.

Let there be no doubt about our condemnation of all these cases. But we must all be on our guard against the selectivity to which I earlier referred. That selectivity is a threat to the whole principle of international scrutiny of human rights. Our approach must be based firmly on the principles of the Charter. If we allow extraneous political elements to creep into our resolutions, we shall be undermining the very foundations of the Commission's work.

I believe that we have a shared duty to examine our consciences, and our votes, with the greatest care. It is all too easy to score political points. But that is not what we are here for. We must be ready to place blame where it is due. We must also be ready to recognise and encourage improvements where they are established.

We share the outrage of the international community at the abhorrent practice of apartheid in South Africa. We have spoken out with our partners in the European Community, about the bannings, the detentions without trial, the forced removals, and other sickening manifestations of a fundamentally evil system. We have voiced our very great concern about Israeli policies and practices in the Occupied Arab Territories. We have consistently joined those who have condemned the violence which has become a ghastly routine on our television screens.

In all these cases, and in many others, we take a clear stand both in public and in private. Our objective is always to secure improvements, to alleviate suffering. We emphatically do not believe that this is a simple matter of seizing the most powerful megaphone and shouting the loudest. When discreet and confidential approaches are more likely to secure our objective, we will pursue these approaches with thoroughness and determination, rather than simply taking the easy way out of joining the baying crowd. There is, of course, a place for public condemnation. There are also times when constructive dialogue in this forum is the best way forward. Again we stand or fall by our ability and willingness to engage in honest and open dialogue, on the merits of each individual situation, resisting the blandishments of political prejudice.

An important element in the Commission's deliberations has been the creation of mechanisms such as special rapporteurs, either to investigate the problems of individual countries, or to concentrate on thematic issues. We believe that this two-track approach is valuable and that the thematic reports have brought a welcome breadth of perspective. They have enabled discreet enquiries to be made which have also brought solutions to some individual cases. I believe that it would be right to expand our work and introduce a new measure to maintain consistency in this field by adopting an appropriate mechanism - such as a special rapporteur - to focus on the problems of political prisoners throughout the world.

Frequently such prisoners are held without charge or trial. In all cases their detention is a denial of freedom of expression, or of opinion or of belief. For too long we have addressed this only selectively and not as a global problem. The Commission now has mechanisms to focus on torture, on executions, on disappearances and on religious intolerance. But the problem of political prisoners does not appear anywhere on the agenda. I believe that the time has now come to recognize that this is an omission which we should put right. The scale of the problem is amply borne out by the reports of those, who have for years campaigned for the release of political prisoners. My delegation will be undertaking broad consultations about our ideas during the course of this session. And I hope and indeed am confident that we will secure a consensus.

I have said that we support a positive, and not just a negative, approach to the problem of human rights abuses. That is why my government has decided to contribute £20,000 to the new voluntary trust fund for advisory services and technical assistance. We warmly welcome the initiative taken to set this up. It is easy to point the accusing finger. But we must also recognise that some countries genuinely need help and advice to resolve their own difficulties. The advisory services programme is a channel for constructive help to governments. Several have already been in touch with the Centre for Human Rights about specific projects. We hope that contributions to the fund will be such that many countries can benefit.

We shall continue to play a full and constructive part in the work of this Commission. We recognise the determination of many other governments to do likewise, as we recognise the vital role played by the NGOs. We welcome their NGOs' close involvement in our discussions. They are in the front line in defence of human rights. We can only admire their courage and their determination. We shall gauge the success of the Commission by the extent to which we can all say that we have held firmly to our principles, that we have made our judgements freely and fairly - and on the basis of fact - above all that we have tailored our responses not to political convenience but rather to secure the maximum improvements for the victims of human rights abuses. It is to the victims that our first duty must lie.

** נכנס **
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שמור 5532

חודש:3/120
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:352/תא:290288/זת:1700/דת:ד/סג:שמ
נד:@

103.3
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שמור/דחוף
אל:אירופה 2 המרכז
מאת:הציר יועץ לונדון

משיחה עם איירס סוריה/מזרח בבוראון

1. מיחסים השיבות מיוחדת ל 1983 מבחינה המאבק על הירושה בסוריה. במבט לאחור אסד של היום איננו אותה אישיות של העבר והירידה במשכה. להערכה שגדידותם חולשתו הפיזית ומצב בריאותו הגזיל הביא להחלשה בשליטה הכוללת וגם להעברת סמכויות מסוימת דרגמת התחום הכלכלי ושאיננה תוצאה של חוסר עניין בתחום זה.
כדבור גם נעלם האיש למסגר ימים בחודש שעבר וגנשר אף דיווח שאסד נראה חולה ועבריוי.

2. מבין המועמדים הרי שלחאדם אין בטים בות והוא עשוי להוריה רק אם יהיה צורך במועמד של פשרה. מהאישים הבולטים מציינים את ראש המודעין הצבאי עלי דובא. רפעת אלאסד בתהליך של העלמות בשום שהעדותו וחוסר היכולת ליצוד בשטח את הנאמנויות לרבות ההטבות הנחוצות. באשר לבנו של אסד קימת כאן סקפטיות הנובעת מגילו הצעיר ומקוצר הזמן הנחוץ לביסוסו. הזכיר אגב דואחא שאלהולי למרות הנקידו בסגן מפקד חיהא עדיין שולט למיטב ידיעתם גם במודיעין של החיל והשינוי במעמדו אף שיפר אולי את מצבו.

3. אין בידיהם פרטים של ביקורי נרבי ושולץ למרות ששאלו את האמריקנים על כן. לדברי איירס המשובות שקיבלו עסקו בהכללות בלבד. סבורים לכן שאין למעשה ציפיה מסוריה ומטרת התרגיל היא לנבוע את הדרשם שהסורים

מחוץ למתרחש ולנטרל חבלה סורית לפחות כל זמן שהם משאירים בתחום להמשך מגע.

4. אין בידיהם שום עדות לכך שכוחות עורדים הועברו לסוריה מאז בסגת עמאן.

ירדן שני

א

תב: שהה,רהמ,שהבט,מבכל,ממבכל,ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,ממד,איר ב

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון
שמור

5466

ז' באדר תשמ"ח
25 בפברואר 1988
סימוכין:

אל: מע"ת
אירופה 2
הסברה/מרחבי

103.3

הנדון: פעילותנו בתקשורת

בשבוע האחרון בוצעו הפעולות הבאות בקרב התקשורת:

א. השגריר והח"מ נפגשו עם עורך "האינדפנדנט" וחברי מערכת נוספים (דיווח בנפרד).

ב. השגריר נפגש לצהריים עם עורך הטיימס ותידרך אותו במכלול ארועי השטחים ויוזמת השלום.

ג. תא"ל (מיל.) אריה שלו נפגש לשתי שיחות תידרוך מטעמנו: עם עורך המז"ת של "הפיננשל טיימס" ANDREW GOWERS ועם MAURICE GENT ו- JONATHAN MARCUS מה- BBC WORLD SERVICE. בנוסף לכך התראיין לבי.בי.סי ויילס ולבי.בי.סי לונדון (רדיו).

ד. השגריר יתדרך בשבוע הבא את ה- GUILD OF JEWISH JOURNALISTS.

ה. הח"מ תידרך את RICHARD BEESTON (כתב דיפלומטי "טיימס") ו- NORMAN KIRKHAM (כתב דיפלומטי "סאנדיי טלגרף").

בברכה,

א. מגור.

ISRAEL ישראל

** נכנס שמור
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5502

חוזם:2,12235
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון,נר:255,תא:220288,זת:1400,דת:ד,סג:שם
נד:8

שמור/דחוף

108.9

אל:ארמה 2 המרכז

מאת:הציר-יועץ לונדון

להלן ממפגש במכון רוסי בנושאי בריה"מ. בין הנוכחים גם הנספחים הצבאים של סין, יוגוסלביה והונגריה וכן אנשי הנוראון:

1) גורבצ'וב נועל תחת לחץ אינטרסים מנוגדים באשר מחד הוא דוחף לרפורמות בבריה"מ ומאידך דוחה אפשרות לשינויים בארצות מזא"ר שם העדיפות הינה ביציבות וחוסר זעזועים. בעניין זה נבו נכשל, ובריה"מ חדלה להתייחס למזא"ר כאל מקשה אחת והמגעים עם האזור תואמים עתה להבדלים בין המדינות מה שמוסיף למבוכה שם. מתהווה תהליך של פשרות ביחסים שאולי ויביא גם לפשרות בהרכבי המנהיגות המזארית ששוב לא יהיו מהגרעין הקשה של העבר.

2) ההערכה הסבירות לגבי אפגניסתאן הינה שבסופו יוקם שם משטר כונדמנטליסטי. בחודש שעבר חילקו הסביטים לבאלטיים מראשי המפלגה הוראות מרדנסות של דרכי פינוי מהמדינה במצב חירום. בעיות עם מיעוטים מוסלמים כמו בטאזאקיסטאן תודמים להתרשה הדהיפות. מאידך נטיגה ללא תנאי תוביח שאם בלחצים מסניק זמן ומספיק טוב גם הרוסים נסוגים.

3) מעריכים שיתרחבו ואף יחריפו הפערים בין תומכיו הנלהבים של גורבצ'וב לבין אלו המעוניינים בשינוי

איטי אם בכלל. בשטח טרם מבחינים בשינויים של ממש והדינמיקה של התהליך מתרחשת יותר בקרב העילית הסוביטית. מתקימת הערכה מחודשת של הדוקטרינה הצבאית בשהרעיון הטקטי החדש הינו כי יש להחזיק במספיק נשק בכדי לקיים בטחון שווה לכל הצדדים. תופעה מעניינת הינה העובדה שארצות מזאר מגיבות בדומה לנערב ארוכה על הסיכונים שבחיסול הנשק הגרעיני והשענות על הקונבנציונלי בלבד.

יורם שני

רות

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תפ: שהח,מנכל,ממנכל,אירא,אירג,ר/מרכז,ממד

אורכ

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

9846 שגרת החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 03.02.88

** בבנס שמור 5414
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תדזם:2,9846
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון,גד:238,תא:180288,זה:1800,דה:ד,סג:שם
נד:0

שמור/דחוף
אל:אירופה 2 המרכז
מאת:הציר יועץ לונדון

משיחה עם פטי עירק/איראן בפוראונ':

1. העלתי בשבית נושא המחויבות המצרית לסיוע לעירק. הסביר כי בזמנו הועלתה הטברה על כן בעת ביקורו של מובארק במצרים (מברק 186). הגם שעדיין נוטים להערין כי הנושא הועלה וגם נדון אין בידיהם שום עדויות שקימת מחויבות מצרית אופרטיבית. באשר לסוביטים הרי שמניחים כאן שאין המסודר במעבר לשיגור רבבת אוירית אלמלחית.

2. מדיוותי שגרירותם מבגדד למדים שמעמדו של צאדם חוסיין מתחזק בתוצאה מהקמאון הצבאי ולמרות האיום האיראני הפוטנציאלי הרי שהבטחון והמוראל הצבא בעליה. החסים עם סוריה הדרדרו למצבם הנורמלי ופטקר המגעים שהיו אמורים להביא לשתף כל שהוא. העבודה בצינור הנפט העירקי בסוריה נפשכת ובדרור גמשהסורים מיעדים אותו לבארות שלהם.

3. מיחסים השיבות מיוחדת לבהירות באנריל באיראן שיהיו משמעותיות יות ר מבעבר. על רקע מכתבו של חומייני הדגר בריצת הדרך במלחמה והמצב הבלבלי בבורים שאם יחולו שינוים רבים בהרכב שרי הממשלה הדבר יצביע על רצון לרבוומות. השוב לעקוב גם אחר שינוים בהיקף התמיכה לה זכה רפסאנגאני.

4. מסר שר הדיכה מלור יבקר בעירק ב 23.2. נקבעו כבר פגישות עם טארק עזיז רמדאן ואחרים. עדיין לא

קיבלנו תשובה לגבי צאדם חוסיין. מלוד יגיע גם לביקור של יום אחד בירדן.

יורם שני

א

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,ליאור,מצרים,
אירב,ממד

7858 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 16.02.88

נבנס ** סודי

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5293

חוזם:2/7858
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:204/תא:160288/זה:1600/דה:ד/סג:סו
נד:@

103.3 בס

סודי/דחוף

אל:אירופה ב' המרכז

מאת:ציר יועץ מדיני השגרירות לונדון

משיחה עם טוסה ממכון "יורוסי":

1. נמצא בקשר שוטף עם דנילוביצקי המזכיר הראשון הסובייטי לנושאי מזה"ת ואפגניסטן. לפי הנמסר לו הרי שברה"מ החליטה עוד באוקטובר כי מאיראן לא תצמח להם שום טובה וגם אין טיבוי להגיע איתם להבנה בענין אפגניסטן. לפי הסוביטי הרי קיים חשש מאוד ממשי בברה"מ מהפונדמנטלי זם והמהפכה האיראנית וחשש זה הינו בין הסיבות לרצונם להשתחרר מאפגניסטן. לדבריו זו גם סיבה מספקת על מנת לדחות את הרעיון המערבי באילו מאימת ברה"מ על חלקה הצפוני של איראן שכן אינם מעוניינים בשום אופן בתוספת של 20 מיליון שיעים קנאים. מבחינה איראנית פנימית רמז שתומכים כספית במוג'הדין ונמובן הי' טודה יי' ממשיכה בשידורים מקאבול.

2. ירדן קנתה את מטוסי המיראז 2000 בתנאי תשלום נוחים ביותר בדומה לתנאים שמשיגה עיראק בצרפת. הטורנדו IDS עדיין על הפרק והוא גם עשוי להימכר יחד עם הפצצה התואמת שלו JP 233
מה שהרגן את העיסקה למפתה יותר עבור ירדן. השאלה במקרה הינה כספית בעיקרה.

3. מהתוכניות הטעודיות לרכש טנקים בהיקף של ב-700

נקנו 200 בלבד מברזיל. טבורים כאן שאפשרי שהיתרה המתוכננת תבוא מתפוקה מצרית ובכן יגיע היקף העסקה כולל תחזוקה ואימון לן-2 מיליאד דולר ב-5 שנים שיסיעו לכלכלה המצרית. המדובר אם וכאשר יתחיל מפעל הטנקים המשותף עם האמריקנים לייצר. העיר אגב כך שבריטניה התנגד לשימוש מצרי בפטנט הבריטי לשריון המיוחד לטנקים אלו ויהיה צורך בתחליפים.

יורם שני

רות

תפ: שהח,רהם,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רט,אמן,אירא,אירב,אירג,
ליאור,מזתים,ממד

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

7090 תאריך : 16.02.88

** נכנס שמור

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5450

חוזם:2,7090
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון,נר:194,תא:150288,זח:1800,דח:מ,סג:שמ
נד:8

מהוקן בגיל

שמור/מידי

אל:ארופה 2 מזח''מ

דע:המרכז

מאת:הציר-יועץ לונדון

ר.ס/
בכ

להלן ממפגש במכון ללימודים אסטרטגיים עם גנרל הגלנד מפקד ''יוניפיל'':

1. למנדט של יוניפיל אין קשר למציאות בשטח ואין לכן אפשרות של תפיסה כוללת של מטרות ואמצעים. התפקיד העיקרי מצטמצם למניעת מעשי איבה.

2. יוניפיל איננו ממלא מקום של סמכות הממשל בשטח והוא מצפה מאמל שיהווה מעין כוח משטרתי-מנהלי. אינם מתערבים במערכת היחסים שבין אמ''ל וחיזבאללה ובדיעבד קיבלו זה עתה הודעה על חידוש אפשרי של הקרבות ביניהם תוך התראה שלא להתערב.

3. מצפה מהמדינות המשתתפות בשיגור היחידות שלא להתערב דרך משרדי הבטחון שלהם בהיבטים האופרטיבים של המתרחש בשטח. מאידך תמיכה דיפלומטית נמרצת בעת הצורך חשובה.

4. הכוח הנייד של יוניפיל הוקם על מנת לשמש ככוח עזר לשעת מצוקה וכן במטרה שכל מפר סדר יתקל ביחידה שבה מיוצגים כל המדינות המשתתפות. היתקלות באזור של יחידה מסוימת לא ישאיר אותה כבעיה של אותה יחידה בלבד.

5. יוניפיל הפך לחלק מתמונת המצב המקומית ופינויו האפשרי בתנאים של היום יגרור חוסר יציבות כמו-גם הודאה אומי"ת בכך שלבנון איננה יכולה להיות עצמאית.

6. בתשובה לשאלות הוסיף:

א. ניתן אולי להגיע להסכם עם ישראל על פינוי חלק קטן מאזור הבטחון שישמש כאזור נסיון לבחון את יכולת יוניפיל והמליציות לשמור על השקט והיציבות שם. שום כוח לא יכול היה לפעול ולהתקיים ללא שת"פ ישראלי.

ב. מעורבות האו"מ בשטחים איננה מעשית. במידה ותוקם פדרציה או אוטונומיה X אוטונומיה והאו"מ יוזמן הרי שישנה אפשרות מעשית להועיל.

יורם שני

רות

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,ממד,אירא,אירב, ליאור,מזתים,ברנע,ארבל2,שחור,לוברני

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E. [illegible]

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C. [illegible]
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נכנס ** שודי

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5228

מ ר ז ם:2,4186
א ל:המשרד
מ -:לונדון,נר:150,תא:110288,זת:1900,דת:מ,סג:סר
ד:@

103.3

מיזי/שודי

אל: אירופה 2, לשכת מנכל מדיני

דע, המרכז

מאת: הציר-ירדן, לונדון

משיחה עם דנאל משגרירות ארה"ב:

1. לא קיבלו עדיין דיווח על ביקור מרפי בדמשק אולם סבורים שארבע שעות של שיחה והעובדה שלא טרקו בפניו את הדלת הינה סימן לאופטימיות. השחקנים הראשים למעילות האמריקנית הינם מובן ישראל וירדן ואילו המגעים עם הסורים הינם יותר למען "שלא יזיקו" מאשר נסיון לרכוש תמיכה. הביקור בסעודיה בא על מנת שלא להוציא מהתמונה מדינה ערבית מרכזית שהינה נשיאה המשמר' וגם בעלת יכולת כספית גבוהה. ממצרים רוצים תמיכה פעילה יותר ושיתופם מומחש באמצעות האשראי שמובארן מקבל על עצם המערבות האמריקנית החדשה.

2. אינם מתרשמים שחוסיין מעיל במיוחד בנושא וקיימת תחושה שהוא חדל שמא תוכר מרכזיותה של הועידה הבינל' בצעדים החדשים. שכר לב שגם הגובתו למתרחש בשטחים פוליטית במידת מה ומתבטאת בעיקרה ב"אמרתי לכם" . מובן שקיים אצלו החשש מהזדרות הארועים והם נוקטים באמצעי זהירות אולם בזאת משתכם במעט יחסם לנושר. ניתן היה לצפות מהמלך לשיקול דעת יותר מעשי לגבי המתרחש בחבל ארץ חירום שכזה.

3. השבוע יקיימו מגע ראשון עם הסוביטים בוואשינגטון. לא ברור לדנאל איזו מן עסקה תוצע לסוביטים, אולם באויר עדיין

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מרחף גם רעיון החסות של שתי המעצמות. הביעה דעה אישית כי
כל המעורבות האמריקנית הכעס מכגיעה ושבירה במיוחד וקיים
החשש שברגע שיעמדו בפני מכשולים קשים כפשוט יפסיקו ויותרו.

יורם שני.

ת כ: שחר/רחמ/שחבט/מנכל/ממנכל/סמנכל/ממד/רם/אמן/אירא/אירב/
אירג/מצפא

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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

כג' בשבט תשמ"ח
11 בפברואר 1988
5068

אל : המנכ"ל המדיני

מאת : מנהל אירופה 2

אם משום מה טרם קיבלת, רצ"ב הטקסט המלא של הראיון עמך ששודר בערוץ 4 בבריטניה ב-7 דנא.

ב ב ר כ ה,

איתן מרגלית

CHANNEL 4 TV - "WORLD THIS WEEK" - SUNDAY 7 FEBRUARY 1988
AMERICAN EFFORTS TOWARDS PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
INTERVIEW WITH YOSSI BEILIN, DIRECTOR GENERAL ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY
PRESENTER- MARY ANNE SIEGHART

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
The Americans are once again taking a direct interest in peace in the Middle East. Richard Murphy, the US Assistant Secretary of State, with special responsibility for the area, is this morning in Damascus with new proposals for an Arab-Israeli settlement. So what lies behind this new American initiative, and does it really stand any chance of success?

The Middle East is a graveyard of failed UN resolutions and peace initiatives. Everybody says they want peace in the region, but it's never been achieved. The international community has been only too forcefully reminded of this fact by recent events. Palestinians in the occupied territories of the West bank and Gaza, have rioted against the occupying Israeli security forces in an attempt to achieve their own homeland. The violent response of the Israeli army, which has left over forty demonstrators dead and thousands injured, has severely damaged Israel's international standing, and shocked the world.

REPORTER
These Palestinian teenagers were on their way to school today, when the approach of an Israeli car was enough to spark trouble. Quickly, the army moved in and put to work the Israeli policy of the iron fist. The conduct and attitudes of Israeli soldiers in implementing that policy of beating suspects, have sparked a major debate here.

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
But on the positive side, two separate peace plans have emerged, from President Reagan and Egypt's President Mubarak. Despite their forthcoming presidential elections, the Americans have started to play a role. Last weekend, Philip Habib, a veteran special envoy for President Reagan, visited the Middle East with a new set of proposals.

They are based on the Camp David peace agreement signed by Israel and Egypt in 1978. It proposed self-government for the Palestinians, but this was subsequently ignored by Israel. The new US plan resurrects this proposal over a much shorter time-scale. Talks between Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinians, would lead to elections for self-governing authorities in the occupied territories by this Autumn. Negotiations on a permanent solution to the problem, would follow within twelve months. President Mubarak's plan is more wide-ranging. He's called for an immediate six month ceasefire in the occupied territories to be matched by a freeze on new settlements by Israel in the area. An international peace conference would follow.

Do either of the plans stand any chance of success? As far as Reagan is concerned, there must be doubts about his commitment to push through so complicated a proposal, particularly as his 1982 initiative ended in disarray. Besides, Reagan is in his last year of office which and puts a higher priority on an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. The plan's chances would be boosted if the US Government were prepared to cut the three billion dollars it gives to Israel, in order to force it to the negotiating table. But at the moment, this doesn't look likely. So what of the Mubarak plan? It did seem to be gaining a lot of international support, not just from Arab countries but also the EEC. But now with the Reagan plan on the table, prospects for further progress look slim.

And what about those on the receiving end? The PLO has rejected the US plan, and will only countenance an international peace conference if it's allowed equal status with all other participants, a demand there's little hope of Israel accepting. What's more, if things already look bleak, they're not helped by the situation in Israel itself. The Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, is opposed to the Mubarak plan. The Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, is in

favour. Both have given a cautious welcome to the US move. But there are those, who say that this conciliatory position may be no more than electoral manoeuvring. Elections are due in November, and the Prime Minister could benefit from an interim solution to the occupied territories, which would stop the violence. But this would undercut the position of his rival, Shimon Peres who has always favoured international negotiations. With Reagan's commitment to his peace plan in doubt, the Palestinians wary, and positions in Israel, is there really any hope for peace in the Middle East?

With me in the studio is Yossi Beilin, Political Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, and closest advisor of the Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres. Yossi Beilin, do you think the US plan has any chance of success?

YOSSI BEILIN
I don't exclude it. Actually, it is not a plan, it is a new initiative, and it is an idea, how can you begin with the substance and not with the procedure. We are speaking about a kind of perhaps shuttle diplomacy,an exploratory mission of the Americans.

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
Are you saying that other initiatives, when they were dealing with procedure, were talking about things like peace conferences rather than talking about the sort of issues you should be facing? Is that what you're saying?

YOSSI BEILIN
Yes, and that was their advantage too. I mean, it was a very important advantage to deal with procedures and then only after that to deal with the substance. But here there is a kind of a deadlock, speaking about procedures in the Middle East. And the new American idea is to perhaps have a shuttle diplomacy for some weeks, in order to see whether there is a possibility to find a common denominator, even a vague one, between all the parties, and then to launch all the procedural courses. So I do see a chance for this plan or initiative to succeed.

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
So Richard Murphy is going around finding out on what issues of substance you might be able to reach some sort of compromise, is that right?

YOSSI BEILIN
Right, right.

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
Yes. In what respect does it differ from the Mubarak plan?

YOSSI BEILIN
Again it is more an initiative or a good willing to do something new in the Middle East. It is an understanding, both of the Arabs and the Israelis and the Americans, that we cannot just go on vacation in '88 because there are elections in the United States and in Israel. It won't work. There is a problem, the Palestinian problem is the heart of the problem, we have to solve it even if it is '88, even if it is the year of elections, and the Mubarak initiative I believe is an important one, it is not a very detailed idea about how to solve problems, but it is not contradictory in my eyes - the American idea.

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
Do you think that the Americans are really serious about their initiative, are they really committed to it?

YOSSI BEILIN
I do think so. I must admit that some months ago there was an undercurrent decision in the American administration, not to do anything in '88, since there was a breakthrough, as you know, in the Middle East discussions in April '87, and since then there was a deadlock. And the Americans decided since there are elections both in Israel and the United States, it would be impossible to do something in '88. And if we could have preserved the status quo until '89, when a new administration is there, but it was I believe a mistake. And they understand now, that they have to move, and they are furious about it.

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
Are they not too worried about the feelings of the Jewish lobby in America?

YOSSI BEILIN
Well, even if there is such a Jewish lobby, I don't know whether this lobby is against a movement in the Middle East, maybe the other way round.

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
Yes. Which initiative would you like to see.

YOSSI BEILIN
As I said, I don't see a real contradiction. I believe that it will be possible to deal first with the substantial common denominator, between Jordan, the Palestinians, the Egyptians and Israel.

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
What is that common denominator?

YOSSI BEILIN
There is one UN resolution which is very important, the UN Security Council's resolution 242 from '67. And this is the common denominator ...

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
Tell us what that says.

YOSSI BEILIN
It says actually that on the one hand there should be security for Israel and on the other hand there should be peace with the Arab States, and it is speaking about territory and peace. This is the idea which is the common denominator, the most important one in the Middle East. This was also the basis for the Camp David accord. Now the Jordanians did not take part in the Camp David accords in '78, and it is important to involve them, and the Palestinians, in the new agreement which will evolve now in the Middle East on the basis of 242. So there is procedural common denominator, there is also a substantianal common denominator in the Middle East, we are not beginning from scratch, so it is possible to continue.

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
Is Israel prepared to negotiate with the PLO?

YOSSI BEILIN
No, Israel will not negotiate with the PLO, and if you ask me I don't think that until the PLO is dismantling its military wings there will be a real serious debate in Israel of whether or not to speak with the PLO. But Israel is ready to speak with the Palestinians, in the West Bank and Gaza, who are not terrorists, and who denounce terrorism and violence.

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
But, are there any Palestinians who will be willing to talk to you?

YOSSI BEILIN
That's a very serious question. I don't have an easy answer. My feeling is that the answer is positive, and that many of them are sick and tired of the PLO leaders, who are perhaps receiving many heads of state but they are not doing anything to solve the real problem of their people.

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
Is that, moving now domestically to Israel, isn't the Government in Israel simply too divided to be able to talk peace at the moment?

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
No, I don't think so. You have to take into account that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, and there are of course shortcomings for such a democracy, but eventually for the long run, this is the biggest effort that we are having.

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
But it's a democracy in which the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister are on completely different sides.

YOSSI BEILIN
Fine, but not about the new initiative, for example, there is of course a debate about the question of the international conference where Mr Peres is for it and Mr Shamir is against it. But when they are speaking about the new initiative, I believe that there is a common denominator in Israel which welcomes this initiative, and I believe that in the coming month we will see a real progress in our part of the world.

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
What about violence inside Israel, are you going to be able to keep a lid on it, haven't you brought it all upon yourself anyway?

YOSSI BEILIN
The problem is there. We have to quell those demonstrations. But I believe that the question is not a military way to quell those demonstrations but a political solution, because after all there are some specific problems which created those new demonstrations, but the problem is basically a political one.

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
What does it help politically if you brought in say, an international peace-keeping force, rather than having Israeli soldiers fighting the Palestinians?

YOSSI BEILIN
I don't think so, I don't think that they will help much, but every suggestion, I mean we will be open to any suggestion which will be suggested to us in the future in this proceedure.

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
So you might consider say, having Jordanians keeping peace in the region?

YOSSI BEILIN
I wouldn't like to exclude any idea, maybe a joint Jordanian-Israeli force, a new one, a multi-national one, I mean there are so many ideas and the imagination is so rich that if you really want peace and you see the importance of peace in our part of the world, you can find it. I'm not pessimistic about it.

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
Can I ask you very briefly - it looks at the moment, as if in the elections in November, the Labour Party, your Labour Party, is actually going to lose seats to the right. What does that mean for peace in Israel?

YOSSI BEILIN
Well, as a civil servant I cannot refer to a political question, but I'm not sure that this forecasting is accurate.

MARY ANNE SIEGHART
Thanks very much, we'll see in November.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
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LONDON, W8 4QB
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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

ט"ז בשבט תשמ"ח
4 בפברואר 1988
סימוכין: 2469

אל: ארופה 2

מאת: הציר-יועץ, לונדון

הנדון: התבטאויות בריטיות

לוטה:

א. ראיון עם שר המדינה מלור מ- 30/1 בנושא הסכסוך.

ב. נוסח נאומו של שגריר בריטניה באו"ם מ- 1/2.

בברכה,

יורם שני.

העתק: המרכז

ISRAEL ישראל

BBC RADIO 4 "TODAY" - SATURDAY 30TH JANUARY 1988
BRITISH VIEW ON ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE
INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN OFFICE MINISTER, DAVID MELLOR MP

JOHN HYMPHRIES
Foreign Office Minister, David Mellor, caused a considerable stir a few weeks ago when he went to the Gaza Strip, and criticised the Israeli occupation. Now Mr Mellor is in the United States, to have talks about the future of the area. He's already met the UN Secretary General, Mr Perez De Cuellar, and the UN envoy, Marrack Goulding, who's also been in Gaza, and on Monday Mr Mellor goes to Washington for talks at the White House. The United Nations are still discussing what action, if any, they might take, and Valerie Jones asked Mr Mellor whether he felt there is now a renewed international impetus to resolve the question of the occupied territories.

DAVID MELLOR MP
I think unquestionably there is international concern at a very high level, and that was evident to me as I sat listening to the Security Council debate yesterday. It's also clear that there are a number of countries within the regions, whose leaders want to try and make progress. I mean we had President Mubarak in London earlier this week. He's now here in the United States talking with the State Department, with the President and others. I think it's easier to recognise that there needs to be progress, more difficult of course to get everyone to agree on what that progress should be. But what is clear, I think, is that the impact of what's happened over the last few weeks, has been to focus people's minds on the problem, and to make them recognise that whatever else happens, this problem isn't going to go away.

VALERIE JONES
There has, you're right, been a lot of talk, but is it actually getting anywhere?

DAVID MELLOR MP
I think that very much remains to be seen. We're in a position where people are still taking stock of the situation, which of course some predicted - Geoffrey Howe was pointing out in October, how difficult it was going to be for Israel to sustain their policies in the occupied territories. Since the trouble began at the beginning of December, more people have come to realise this. But the key thing as far as we're concerned, is to focus on practical ways forward, ... that we can take to improve the lot of the people in the short term, and more importantly promoting the peace process itself in the longer run, and also, of course, using the influence that we have to talk to people within the region and other key countries, about the steps that need to be taken so that the international community is in a position to respond to this problem positively. That means of course, in the case of Israel, being prepared to engage in a conference, modifying the way that they are behaving in the occupied territories. But equallly, of course, it means with regards to the Arab countries, ensuring that they are ready to put forward positive and constructive proposals that could lead to a lasting peace particularly that gives Israel the security requirements that Israel needs - the recognition of Israel's right to exist behind secure boundaries; the need to ensure that the PLO legitimates itself, renounces violence, accepts Israel's right to exist so that the PLO can become what it has always aspired to be but what its past actions have denied it the opportunity to become, that is to say, a fully legitimate player in this difficult and complex game. There are no easy solutions to this, but I do believe that the international community is fully engaged on it and we've all got to do the best we can.

VALERIE JONES

Have you ever had even a quiet moment of regret about being so outspoken about the Palestinian camps, particularly given the hostile reaction of the Israelis?

DAVID MELLOR MP

Well, I think that hostile reaction has followed any criticism, so far as the Israelis are concerned. No indeed. What I spoke out about, was not just about the camps, though I was speaking from a particularly appalling camp, but about the whole situation in the occupied territories. The state of limbo, the lack of hope, the manner in which the occupation forces were conducting themselves, which I think has been obvious and apparent to all who've been watching the television these last few weeks, and mine has merely been one of a number of voices that have been raised on this, but nothing that I've seen since leads me to believe that it was anything other than entirely the right thing to do, and indeed as you know, it's had wide support throughout the country.

oOo

SPEECH BY U.K. PERMENANT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS SIR CRISPEN TICKELL ON THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION DEALING WITH THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND THE RECENT DISTURBANCES IN THE ADMINISTERED TERRITORIES.
MONDAY 1st FEBUARY 1988

SECURITY COUNCIL: SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE BRITISH STATEMENT IN THE DEBATE ON THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, DELIVERED ON 1 FEBRUARY:

THE DISTRESS OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, AND THE STATUS OF THOSE TERRITORIES THEMSELVES, HAVE LONG BEEN QUESTIONS OF GRAVE CONCERN TO MY GOVERNMENT. WE WELCOME THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 21 JANUARY. WHICH SETS OUT THE PROBLEMS CLEARLY AND COMPREHENSIVELY, AND POINTS THE WAY FORWARD. WE ARE MOST GRATEFUL TO HIM, AND WE ENDORSE THE SPIRIT OF THE REPORT'S NARRATIVE AND RECOMMENDATIONS. I ADD OUR THANKS TO MR GOULDING FOR HIS PART IN PREPARING THE REPORT UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH WERE FAR FROM EASY.

IN HIS REPORT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DESCRIBES WHAT WE OURSELVES HAVE SEEN ON TELEVISION AND IN THE PRESS: THE REJECTION BY THE PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF 20 YEARS OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION. WE HAVE ALSO SEEN EXAMPLES OF CONDUCT BY THE SECURITY FORCES OF THE OCCUPYING POWER WHICH SCARCELY CONFORM WITH CIVILISED STANDARDS. WE ARE REMINDED IN MOST UNHAPPY FASHION OF THE FAILURE OF THE EFFORTS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO HELP THE PARTIES RESOLVE THE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT, AND OF THE GROWING COSTS AND RISKS OF THAT FAILURE.

FEW HERE UNDER-ESTIMATE THE COMPLEXITY AND INTRACTABILITY OF THE ISSUES. I HAVE BEEN STRUCK IN RECENT WEEKS BY THE EXPRESSIONS ON MANY SIDES, NOT LEAST IN THIS COUNCIL, OF A READINESS TO TACKLE THEM SERIOUSLY, AND TO AVOID ACRIMONY AND POLEMICS. WE AGREE STRONGLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S APPEAL FOR A REDUCTION IN THE VIRULENCE OF DEBATES ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL CONFLICT, AND FOR CONSCIOUS ACTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PROMOTE UNDERSTANDING. WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR INTERVENTIONS BY COUNCIL MEMBERS IN THIS SPIRIT. I SAW THEM MYSELF THROUGHOUT MY PRESIDENCY. FOR OURSELVES, OUR SIMPLE AIM, AS FRIENDS OF BOTH ASRAEL AND THE ARAB PEOPLE, IS TO HELP FIND THE BEST MEANS OF REDUCING TENSION AND TO PROMOTE A JUST AND HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT.

WE SHARE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CONCLUSION THAT SHORT-TERM MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE SAFETY, PROTECTION AND WELL-BEING OF THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES CAN BE LITTLE MORE THAN PALLIATIVES. OF COURSE THEY STILL DESERVE OUR URGENT ATTENTION. THE PRIORITIES SET BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ARE SENSIBLE, AND WE SUPPORT HIS MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS. IN PARTICULAR WE ENDORSE THE CALL FOR ISRAEL TO ABIDE BY ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION, AND TO ENSURE THAT ITS PRACTICES AS THE OCCUPYING POWER CONFORM TO THEM. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE CONVENTION APPLIES IN FULL TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. WE SEE NO MERIT IN ISRAELI ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY. AS A HIGH CONTRACTING PARTY TO THE CONVENTION, WE SHALL CONTINUE TO DO ALL IN OUR POWER TO PERSUADE THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IN THIS SENSE.

IN THE MEANTIME, WE JOIN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CALL FOR ISRAEL TO TAKE SPECIFIC MEASURES TO MEET URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS. HERE I PAY WARM TRIBUTE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS: ITS WORK IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES REMAINS INVALUABLE. WE WILL GIVE URGENT AND SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION TO ANY APPEAL FOR AN INCREASE IN ITS RESOURCES.

I ALSO PAY TRIBUTE TO THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY (UNRWA), WHOSE ACHIEVEMENTS OVER DECADES OF DEVOTED AND INSUFFICIENTLY RECOGNISED WORK THE SECRETARY-GENERAL RIGHTLY COMMENDS. WE NOTE HIS RECOMMENDATION FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE AGENCY'S MANDATE AND FOR AN INCREASE IN ITS CAPACITY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE REFUGEE POPULATION: WE LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL'S DETAILED PROPOSALS. WE ALSO NOTE THE ASSURANCES BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, RECORDED IN THE REPORT, THAT IT WILL CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH THE AGENCY AND WITH OTHER RELIEF AGENCIES WORKING WITH THE PALESTINIANS. WE WELCOME THESE ASSURANCES. THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED UNRWA AND IS ONE OF ITS LARGEST CONTRIBUTORS. IN ADDITION TO THE RECENTLY ANNOUNCED INCREASE IN OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE REGULAR UNRWA BUDGET, WE STAND READY TO CONSIDER URGENTLY ANY APPEAL FOR EXTRA FUNDS. WE HAVE ALREADY PROVIDED ADDITIONAL EMERGENCY AID THROUGH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

THESE ARE ALL PRACTICAL STEPS, AND IT IS RIGHT FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONCENTRATE ON THEM. WE CONCUR TOO IN HIS VIEW THAT PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES SHOULD BE GIVEN MORE SCOPE TO DIRECT THEIR OWN ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES.

AS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL RECOGNISES, MANY OF HIS RECOMMENDATIONS DEPEND FOR THEIR APPLICATION UPON THE CONSENT AND COMPLIANCE OF ISRAEL. WE URGE ISRAEL TO RESPOND TO THE CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT OF HIS REPORT.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CENTRAL MESSAGE, ECHOED BY MANY OTHER SPEAKERS, IS THAT NO SHORT-TERM RELIEF, NO EMERGENCY PROTECTION MEASURES AND NO ECONOMIC BAND-AIDS CAN MAKE THE OCCUPATION ACCEPTABLE TO THE PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. WE AGREE. SUCH MEASURES RISK TACKLING THE SYMPTOMS, AND NOT THE ILLNESS ITSELF. A REAL CURE REQUIRES TREATMENT OF THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT IN ORDER TO BRING GENUINE PEACE. THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF A SOLUTION HAVE LONG BEEN WIDELY RECOGNISED: THEY ARE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED SINCE 1967, AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE STATUS OF THOSE TERRITORIES: THE GUARANTEED RIGHT OF ALL STATES IN THE REGION, INCLUDING ISRAEL, TO SECURE EXISTENCE WITHIN RECOGNISED BORDERS: AND PROVISION FOR THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, INCLUDING THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION.

THESE ELEMENTS PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A SOLUTION. BUT THAT SOLUTION WILL REMAIN BEYOND OUR GRASP UNTIL THE PARTIES CONCERNED MAKE A CONSCIOUS DECISION TO PREPARE FOR NEGOTIATIONS A SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE AND BY AVOIDING ACTS WHICH MAKE PEACE HARDER TO ACHIEVE. THE FIRST STEP, AND PERHAPS THE MOST DIFFICULT ONE, INVOLVES ACKNOWLEDGING THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS AND GRIEVANCES OF THE OTHER SIDE. AS THE BRITISH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE, SAID IN A SPEECH IN AMMAN IN NOVEMBER LAST YEAR, THAT WILL REQUIRE HARD DECISIONS BY ALL CONCERNED: SOME CHERISHED DREAMS WILL HAVE TO BE ABANDONED ON BOTH SIDES. BUT THE ALTERNATIVES - TERRORIST BLACKMAIL, ARMED STRUGGLE, THE UNSTABLE AND DETERIORATING STATUS QUO - ARE ALL FAR WORSE.

IN OUR VIEW A REAL OPPORTUNITY LIES IN THE PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, INVOLVING ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT AND THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THIS COUNCIL, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS. SUCH A CONFERENCE SHOULD ACT AS A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED. THE MORE THEY CAN TALK TO EACH OTHER DIRECTLY THE BETTER. LAST YEAR MUCH PROGRESS WAS ACHIEVED BY THE PARTIES TOWARDS AGREEMENT ON THE MODALITIES OF THE CONFERENCE. THIS PROCESS SHOULD NOW BE RESUMED, AND IT IS FOR OUTSIDE COUNTRIES WITH INFLUENCE IN THE REGION TO GIVE IT THEIR FULL BACKING.

WE ARE AWARE OF THE IMPORTANT ROLE PLAYED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS STAFF IN PROMOTING THE CONVENING OF SUCH A CONFERENCE, AND WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR ALL THEIR HARD WORK TO THAT END. WE CONTRIBUTED TO IT IN THE PAST, AND WILL HAPPILY CONTRIBUTE TO IT AGAIN. THE CO-OPERATION OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS, WHICH HAS BEEN SUCH A NOTEWORTHY FEATURE OF THE COUNCIL'S WORK OVER THE TRAGIC CONFLICT IN THE GULF OVER THE PAST YEAR, SETS AN ENCOURAGING EXAMPLE OF HOW THEY CAN AND SHOULD WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER TO RESOLVE MAJOR QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

FOR FORTY YEARS WE HAVE SEEN MILLIONS OF PEOPLE TRAPPED IN A CONTINUING TRAGEDY. THE REPORT OF OUR SECRETARY-GENERAL POINTS TOWARDS A WAY OUT. LET US TAKE IT.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
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Telephone: 01-937 8050

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

יג' בשבט תשמ"ח
2 בפברואר 1988
סימוכין: 2456

אל: ארופה 2
מאת: הציר-יועץ, לונדון

הנדון: הודעות דובר הפוראופ

לוטה הודעת הדובר מ 27/1 אודות ביקורו המתוכנן של שה"ח בבריה"מ ועל החטוף הגרמני בלבנון.

בברכה,
יורם שנל.

העתק: המרכז

PRESS RELEASE

FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

No 12

Wednesday, 27 January 1988
1230

VISIT BY SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE SOVIET UNION: 14-17 FEBRUARY 1988

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, will visit the Soviet Union from 14 to 17 February, at the invitation of the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Eduard Shevardnadze.

BACKGROUND

The Foreign Secretary's most recent meetings with Mr Shevardnadze were at Brize Norton on 7 December and last September in New York during the UN General Assembly. They also held talks during the Prime Minister's visit to the Soviet Union from 28 March to 1 April 1987. Mr Shevardnadze visited the UK in July 1986.

The various elements of the Foreign Secretary's programme have yet to be finalised. But his talks with Mr Shevardnadze, which will form the centrepiece of his programme, are likely to focus on bilateral issues, East/West relations and arms control, and regional issues particularly Afghanistan and the Middle East.

News Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Downing Street (West), S.W.1.
01-270-3100

FCO PRESS CONFERENCE: WEDNESDAY 27 JANUARY 1988

GERMAN HOSTAGES TAKEN IN THE LEBANON

In answer to a question, Spokesman said that we were aware of reports of the abduction of a West German citizen in West Beirut earlier today which, if confirmed, is a criminal deed which we strongly condemn.

WEST GERMAN POLICY ON HOSTAGES

Asked about press reports of a statement by a German official at the trial of one of the Hamadei brothers, Spokesman said that all our European partners gave a firm undertaking at the European Council in December 1986 not to make concessions under duress to terrorists or their sponsors. We will naturally be taking up with the FRG Government how these undertakings square with the statements reported to have been made by German officials in court on 26 January on their handling of the extradition of Mohammed Ali Hamadei.

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

יג' בשבט תשמ"ח
2 בפברואר 1988
סימוכין: 2453

אל: ארופה 2

מאת: הציר-יועץ, לונדון

הנדון: איראן - עיראק

1. לוטה עותק מניר שהוכן ע"י הפוראופ. בנושא זה, עבור ועדת הפרלמנט.

2. מענינת הפרשנות הבריטית המתארת כיצד רואה איראן את בריטניה וכן תאורי האינטרסים של המדינות השונות לרבות המדיניות הבריטית.

בברכה,

יורם שני.

העתק: ראש המרכז

ראש צוות פריפריה/המרכז.

SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT

Introduction

1. Iran became an Islamic Republic with the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, and supreme power is vested in the Ayatollah Khomeini. Nearly half of the population, now over 50 million, were still rural dwellers at the time of the revolution, though there has been an accelerated drift to the towns (particularly Tehran, whose population is now over 10 million) despite the Government's attempts to check it. Iran's 628,000 square miles border the Caspian Sea and the USSR to the north, Turkey and Iraq to the west, the Gulf to the south and Pakistan and Afghanistan to the east. Iran is a major oil producer with reserves which will sustain the present rate of production for about 71 years.

2. Iraq became an independent monarchy in 1932. The fall of the monarchy in 1958 was followed by 10 years of short-lived military regimes until the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party seized power in 1968. Under the 1970 Constitition, supreme power is vested in the nine-man Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The population now numbers roughly 15 million; most are Arabs but there are a number of minority groups, the largest of which consists of about one million Kurds. Iraq's 170,000 square miles border Turkey in the North, Iran in the East, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf in the South and Syria and Jordan in the West. Iraq is also a major oil producer with very large reserves which will sustain the present rate of production for about 75 years.

3. The origins of the conflict between Iran and Iraq lie in the centuries-old dispute between the Persians and the Arabs for domination in a strategically important area. In recent times there have been repeated disputes over the precise demarcation of the international border, which runs for 1458 kilometres from Turkey in the North to the Shatt-al-Arab waterway in the South. In the early 1970s, relations between Iran and Iraq became increasingly hostile, with each side supporting dissident activity on the other's side of the border. In early 1975, on the initiative of President Boumedienne of Algeria, the Shah of Iran and Saddam Hussein of Iraq (then Vice-Chairman of the RCC, now Chairman) met in Algiers. They confirmed the land boundary fixed in 1913-14, agreed to demarcate the frontier on the ground on the basis of a 1913 Protocol, and defined the southern boundary, where it followed the Shatt-al-Arab waterway for its entire length, as being the thalweg or deep-water channel, rather than the eastern Iranian side of the waterway as previously. In June 1975 a Treaty Relating to the State Boundary and Good Neighbourliness was signed in Baghdad, with protocols on the land and river boundaries and on border security. In December the same year, an Agreement on Regulations Concerning Navigation on the Shatt-al-Arab was signed, also in Baghdad.

4. These accords meant that Iraq surrendered her sovereignty over the waters of the Shatt on the eastern side of the thalweg. In return, she obtained the withdrawal of Iranian support for the Kurdish rebels in Iraq and Iranian agreement to complete the demarcation of the land border. Detailed regulations for joint navigation in the Shatt were drawn up, control having previously been in Iraqi hands.

5. Correct relations were subsequently maintained until the Shah's downfall in 1979, and remained steady for some six months after the Iranian revolution. By mid-1979, however, the Iraqi press was reporting ethnic clashes in the Iranian province of Arab-populated Khuzestan (adjacent to the southern border with Iraq) and accusing the Iranian Revolutionary committees there of interfering in Arab affairs. At the same time, Iran's media were blaming Iraq for the problems in Khuzestan and among Iran's Kurdish community in the North; and Iran was stirring up trouble among the Shia in Iraq. Thereafter relations between the two countries steadily deteriorated. In mid-1980 there were border clashes in the central region. In September the Iranians shelled border towns and clashes intensified until Iraq invaded Iran late in the month. Iraq occupied large areas of Iranian Khuzestan and significant pockets of territory along the border as far north as Qasr-e-Shirin. In 1981 Iran began to regain much of this land and in June 1982 Iraq withdrew from all but a few pockets of Iranian territory.

6. In late 1982 and early 1983 Iraqi aircraft made the first few attacks on shipping serving Iran, attacks which have since escalated and have been met by continually increasing Iranian retaliation. In April 1983 the first Iraqi missiles hit Dezful, starting a long series of attacks on civilian targets which have continued intermittently ever since and drawn condemnation from the international community. March 1984 saw the first confirmation of Iraqi use of chemical weapons and condemnation by the UN Security Council. In February 1986 the Iranians captured the Fao peninsula, but were unable to press northwards through the marshes to Basra, on the Western bank of the Shatt. The second half of the year was marked by an increase in Iraqi attacks on economic targets inside Iran. Early 1987 saw a long Iranian offensive towards Basra, resulting in huge loss of life but little territorial gain. At sea Iran retaliated against merchant shipping serving the Arab countries for Iraqi air raids against shipping serving Iran. In mid-1987 the the US deployed substantial naval forces to convoy Kuwaiti shipping after a Kuwaiti request to re-register a number of tankers under the US flag. The Iranians undertook extensive minelaying. Attacks by Iranian speedboats became commonplace. Kuwait became a target for Silkworm missiles.

7. The United Nations became seriously concerned about the conflict virtually as soon as the conflict began and Security Council Resolution 479, passed in September 1980, was the first call by the international community for a halt to hostilities. Iraq responded that she would stop fighting only if Iran recognised her "legitimate rights", and Iran retorted that a settlement could only be found if the aggressor were conquered and punished. Over the next four years the UN Security Council passed Resolutions 514, 522, 540 and 552, each calling for an immediate ceasefire, the last also condemning attacks on merchant shipping for the first time. In early 1985 the Secretary-General decided to become more directly involved himself in diplomatic efforts to persuade both sides to come to the negotiating table. By early 1986 international interest was focussing more on the Gulf conflict. That year two Security Council Resolutions were passed. The first of these, SCR 582, drew on its predecessors but this time deplored the initial aggression as well as calling for a ceasefire.

8. After months of intensified fighting on land and growing tension at sea, SCR 598 was passed on 20 July 1987. Not only did this rehearse the previous condemnation of the conflict itself, of the use of chemical weapons, of attacks on civilian targets etc., but for the first time included a mandatory call for a ceasefire and withdrawal and pointed to enforcement measures in the event of non-compliance by Iran or Iraq. This Resolution, voted unanimously, formed the basis of much diplomatic activity in the latter half of 1987. The Foreign Ministers of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council met in New York on 25 September and agreed a "twin-track" approach: the UN Secretary-General would continue his efforts to persuade Iran and Iraq to comply with SCR 598, whilst Representatives of the Five would work on the terms of an enforcement Resolution should the Secretary-General fail. After hesitation on the part of some members, discussions are now starting on an arms embargo.

Iranian Interests

9. Iran seeks the punishment of Iraq as the aggressor. This means the public identification of Iraq as having started the conflict (in return for a ceasefire) and the payment of reparations (in return for withdrawal). Iran has also in the past insisted on the removal or punishment of President Saddam Hussein.

10. Iran sees the UK as a major Western power but distrusts us for what it regards as our previous active intervention in Iranian affairs. She acknowledges our importance as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council but claims to see us as increasingly pro-Iraq. She likewise tends to identify us with the United States (the "great Satan") because of our naval presence in the Gulf, but has been deterred so far from clashes with RN vessels. Her lack of respect for internationally accepted principles of diplomatic behaviour led to the Chaplin incident of May/June 1987 and the subsequent withdrawal of almost all Embassy staff on both sides.

We have at present no UK based staff in the British Interests Section of the Swedish Embassy in Tehran (which has looked after our interests since 1980, when the Iranians warned us that protection of a UK mission could not be guaranteed). Iran keeps one diplomat in its Embassy in London. Diplomatic relations have not been broken. While there are signs that some in Iran are slowly coming to regret the deterioration in relations, there are several factions in the leadership and a wide range of political outlooks. The closure of the Iranian Military Procurement Offices in Victoria Street following the attack on the Gentle Breeze in the northern Gulf in September 1987 inhibited Iran's international arms purchasing capability and sent a firm signal to Tehran that they could not damage British interests with impunity. Disputes with the United States, the UK and France have encouraged Iran and the Soviet Union to move warily closer.

11. Important circles in Iran are committed to the export of those Islamic principles on which the Iranian revolution was based. This involves both propaganda and material support for selected dissident (particular Shia) elements abroad. Her practical priority is to obtain support in the conflict against Iraq, or at least to try to deter those who support Iraq (traditionally Kuwait and Saudi Arabia). She has tried to achieve this by attacking shipping serving Gulf States, in retaliation for Iraqi maritime attacks, and more recently by threatening direct hostilities across the Gulf. She has succeeded in undermining the cohesion of the Gulf Cooperation Council, reducing its political impact. Iran does, however, see a need to remain on reasonable terms with Syria, hitherto her one reliable Arab ally, but facing increased Arab pressure to modify her policy. Syria is currently keeping a delicate balance between Arab and Persian interests: indeed there are reports that Syria is actively trying to mediate in the conflict.

Iraqi Interests

12. Iraq wants the conflict to end as soon as possible with least political damage. Iraq accepts SCR 598 but insists on a strict application of its provisions regarding withdrawal of forces and exchanges of prisoners. Iraq cannot beat Iran militarily. It is in Iraq's interest to draw other powers into the conflict in order to contain Iran and to persuade them that a settlement should be imposed. Iraqi air attacks on shipping serving Iran not only inhibit Iranian oil exports but also provoke Iranian retaliation which (usefully for Iraq) agitates the international community. This tactic has worked well but risks leading to Iraq being regarded as a non-compliant party and liable to enforcement measures which are being considered by the Security Council. Iraq is dependent on financial support from the Arab oil exporting states and on the port of Kuwait for much of her supplies.

GCC Interests

13. The Gulf Cooperation Council states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman) do not have a monolithic policy towards the conflict, although they all see a need for political accommodation with Iran in the longer term. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are staunch allies of Iraq, offering material and financial support, and condemning Iran for her intransigence. The UAE and Oman, however, tend to hold more nuanced views, primarily because their geographical position means that overt support for Iraq could bring easy retaliation by Iran. Bahrain has also risked an Iranian backlash by her provision of port facilities to the US navy. Qatar has sought to avoid any direct involvement with either side. Recently however, the GCC states have united in criticising Iranian procrastination in implementing SCR 598, and the GCC Summit in Riyadh in late December 1987 called on the UN to take appropriate measures immediately.

British Objectives

14. Our major objective is to promote an early negotiated settlement to the seven-year old conflict. Only when fighting by land, sea and air stops, achieving a total ceasefire, will the present dangerous instability in the wider region be removed and will reconstruction work start in Iran and Iraq. Soundly-based economic and political growth in the region, and security of oil supplies at stable prices, is in everyone's interest, and remains a prime objective for the UK.

15. Recent developments, however, have shown that there is insufficient willingness on the part of Iran to take seriously attempts by the international community to find a negotiated compromise solution. Iran's position is unlikely to change as long as Ayatollah Khomeini is alive, and given the probable jockeying for position between contenders for the successsion in the immediate post-Khomeini era, any substantial lessening of commitment to prosecute the conflict is equally doubtful, at least in the short term. An important and additional short term objective, therefore, is to ensure that the waterways are safe for our own shipping while the conflict continues, and, particularly in view of the possibility of renewed mining, thus to contribute to upholding freedom of navigation for all merchant shipping. (This is vital if the safe flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz is to be guaranteed, even if the UK itself at present imports little of it.)

16. A third objective is to limit the spread of Soviet influence in the strategically vital Gulf area. Notwithstanding the welcome increase in dialogue between East and West, as expressed in the Washington Summit in early December 1987, and indeed as shown in the significant unity of the Five Permanent Members (UK, US, USSR, France and China) in the passing of SCR 598 and subsequent discussions, the Soviet Union remains alert to exploit regional conflict to advance its own influence at the expense of the West's. It is therefore a strong Western interest that regional conflict should be halted, lest confrontation take the conflict out of the regional and into the global arena.

British Policy

17. The UK has made a significant contribution to the frequent efforts by the international community to find a peaceful settlement to the conflict. The UK has made a major diplomatic effort over the past year to promote a negotiated ceasefire leading to a settlement. As coordinator of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council we have organised the work of the Five and can claim an appropriate share of the credit for the unanimous adoption of SCR 598. Bilaterally we have been tireless in making representations to those governments whose activities could contribute to achieving the common goal. In particular we remain in close contact with Gulf States who have a rôle to play in seeking to reduce tension in the region; we encourage them to play a more active part in the protection of their own interests and in mobilising international pressure on the belligerents. We cooperate with them in such fields as defence equipment procurement and training to help them in this. This endeavour will continue. The next major task is the adoption of enforcement measures to be applied in the case of non-compliance with SCR 598. This is being taken forward during our Presidency of the Security Council in January 1988.

18. In our bilateral dealings with Iran and Iraq over the conflict our policy has throughout been one of strict impartiality. Our policy on the supply of defence equipment is restrictive and rigorously applied. We refuse to sell military or defence-related equipment which could significantly enhance the capability of either side to prolong or exacerbate the conflict. We have consistently balanced Iran's refusal to enter into serious discussions of a negotiated settlement with Iraq's use of chemical weapons. We have protested to both about attacks on merchant ships, and have urged Iraq's Arab allies to counsel restraint on Baghdad.

19. We have maintained the Armilla Patrol in the Gulf since 1980 to assist shipping under British and Dependent Territory flags or which are majority British owned. A variety of legal and practical considerations mean that the list of ships thus entitled to RN protection is necessarily limited. The Patrol's operating area is restricted to the waters of the Southern Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman, where the risk to merchant ships is greatest. The Patrol, whose size and operating time inside the Gulf were nevertheless increased early in 1987, has performed its non-provocative defensive task with skill and courage, contributing to the safe passage of hundreds of ships. When Iranian minelaying posed a new threat to the Patrol and to merchant shipping in the summer of 1987, the Government despatched a flotilla of minesweepers with afloat support to deal with the problem. Their efficient operations have disposed of a number of mines and have contributed to the safety of navigation from that threat. At the same time the Government have been active in trying to persuade other countries to play a practical part in the defence of freedom of navigation. The

Netherlands and Belgium sent minesweepers which operate closely with RN forces. France and Italy sent separate squadrons. Australia has earmarked a diving team for deployment when needed. The consequences of these and the US deployment are that Iran has been deterred from attacking ships accompanied by Western warships. She has instead concentrated on attacks on merchant ships of countries with no naval forces in the Gulf.

20. While there has been some interest in integrating the naval forces of the Western powers into one coordinated operation in the Gulf, this idea has not been put into practice. Each country tasks its own force. There is a close arrangement between the Dutch, Belgian and British forces in the conduct of joint minesweeping operations. A great deal of informal, local exchange of information enables the Western naval forces to operate efficiently without duplication of effort.

21. The important but necessarily limited rôle of the Western naval forces in the face of increased and provocative Iranian raids on third country merchant shipping has encouraged some shipowners of countries with no naval forces in the Gulf to seek protection from those which do. The US Navy convoys a number of Kuwaiti tankers which have been re-flagged on the US Register. The Soviet Union has leased three vessels to Kuwait and assists their passage with naval vessels. The Kuwait Oil Tanker Company has reflagged a small number of tankers on the UK, Gibraltar and Cayman Islands registers. They have been warned that RN protection in the Gulf is limited to the south and will not be extended northwards to cover new Kuwaiti entries on British registers. There are no plans at present to increase further the size of the Armilla Patrol.

22. At the invitation of the Iranians, UN investigating teams have visited the front on three occasions to check on the reported use of chemical weapons. On each occasion they have confirmed Iraqi use, but on the last visit in May 1987 they were unable to verify Iraqi claims of Iranian use. The UK has consistently and vigorously condemned all use of chemical weapons, and has been at the forefront of international moves towards a comprehensive verifiable and worldwide ban.

Future Policy

23. British efforts at the UN Security Council will continue with support for an enforcement resolution to back up SCR 598. However, despite current willingness among all Permanent Members to start serious work on an arms embargo resolution, it is likely to be a long haul. The Soviet Union is expected to promote the idea of a UN naval force. So far it has not provided any detailed description of the nature and tasking of such a force. In particular, it has not indicated whether such a force would have a peacekeeping rôle (in which case a ceasefire must come first, again underlining the need for UN diplomatic, rather than military, activity); or a shipping protection rôle. In the latter case, apart from the fact that such a force would be unacceptable to, and hence provoke, one of the belligerents, there would be considerable political and practical difficulties (such as actual deployments, port facilities, command and control, language, etc). The Government will press for full details of what is proposed in order to determine whether the idea is a serious contribution to efforts to end the Iran/Iraq conflict or a propaganda device aimed at placing Western navies in the Gulf under a UN flag and thus constrained by an impracticable mandate or even subject to a Soviet veto.

24. On the waters of the Gulf the RN will continue the vital task of assisting our shipping and with friendly navies contribute to upholding freedom of navigation. On land there remains the possibility of renewed fighting on a large scale, and the UK will continue to urge the utmost restraint on all concerned. Both tasks, however, remain extremely difficult.

25. Nothing short of wholehearted acceptance of SCR 598 by both sides will create the right climate for serious negotiations leading to a settlement. Iran has yet to take the necessary political decision to end the conflict peacefully. This remains the key to progress and the focus of UK diplomacy.

Middle East Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
11 January 1988

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM

במשרד החוץ
ירושלים

יג' בשבט תשמ'ח
1 בפברואר 1988
4907

אל : גב' קולט אביטל, סמנכ'ל אמית'ק

מאת : מנהל אירופה 2

הנדון : מאמר מערכת ב"טיימס" 30.1.88

רצ'ב מאמר מערכת מצוין מה"טיימס", שלמרות מילות הביקורת (המתונה וההוגנת מאד), המסר שבו חיובי ביותר מבחינתנו, בעיקר בשל שליטת המסר של הסכנה מהפונדמנטליזם המוסלמי העומדת מאחורי המהומות, והצורך הדחוף בשל כך בהחזרת הסדר על כנו.

מציע להפיץ.

ב ב ר כ ה,
איתן מרגלית

איתן מרגלית

העתק: המשנה למנכ'ל
מנהל הסברה
הסברה/מידע
מזתי'ם
אירופה 1

The Times 30.1.88

ISRAEL'S TACTICS

Israel should equip itself with an anti-riot force without delay. Any such force will still be accused of excesses. But those who wish Israel well, or have no animus towards it, will feel easier if the tactics used against rioting youths in Gaza are appropriate and proportionate.

Israel needs defenders. It has never seemed to lack them among the majority of citizens in the Western democracies, in so far as these things can be judged. That majority might disapprove of some Israeli leaders such as Mr Shamir. It might accept that the state came into being only at the expense of certain Palestinians suffering a great injustice. But most people in the West seem to recognise a democracy threatened by hostile tyrannies when they see one, and that is what Israel is. They understand that, after a war, a democracy might find itself ruling, in an authoritarian way, over the territory of the defeated. Britain, the United States and France found themselves in that position in Germany in 1945.

But they do not believe that the proper way to deal with rioters, even those throwing huge stones, is to open fire on them. The Western majority thinks that rioters are best dealt with by men trained to do so. The result may turn out not to be much different from what is going on in Gaza now. Dangerous youths will still have to be hit, or tear-gassed. But Israel will have shown, not for the first time, that it is prepared to be judged by higher standards than its enemies.

Should it matter to Israel what comfortable Western opinion thinks of it? *In extremis*, no — no more than it would have done to Britain in 1940. But nations often find themselves in situations, short of a final battle for survival, in which it helps to have as much foreign opinion as possible on their side. And although Western majority opinion may still be kindly disposed towards Israel, much influential, vocal or powerful opinion — inside governments, boardrooms, foreign ministries and television newsrooms — is not. Its motive ranges from a *realpolitik* wish to gain favour and profit with Arabs to an ideological desire to do down a country which is seen as part of Western oppression of the Third World. If majority opinion ever joins forces with this influential minority, it will become electorally safer for Western governments to act against Israeli interests even more often than they do at present.

Israel, then, should satisfy Western opinion about tactics in Gaza. Western opinion, however, should not apply unrealistic standards to Israel. All over the world, from Northern Ireland to the Punjab, there are people of one race or persuasion who say that those who rule them have no right to do so. That has been the norm through much history. The homogeneous nation state is the exception. The frequent uprisings of the discontented are met by force. In virtually every case, such force is harsher than that used by Israel in Gaza — witness neighbouring Syria's way with its fundamentalist minority.

Another difference is that, in Israel's case, Mr Rabin was foolish enough to say that the rioters would henceforward be beaten rather than shot at. In cold reality, that represented a less harsh policy. But the disastrous use of the word "beating" made it sound harsh still. Any civilized country should be able to draw a distinction between the necessary use of truncheons or batons against a direct threat and "beating".

This is not to minimise the threat. Israel is faced with the possibility that some sort of organised fundamentalism might establish itself in Gaza — perhaps a militia or at least rioters who might eventually be armed. In preventing such a thing, Israel is doing a service, not just to its own security, but to the moderate Arab world — that is, to the majority of Arabs. In the furtherance of such a policy, Israel will probably be in Gaza and the West Bank for years to come. All the more reason why the men carrying out the policy are trained for it.

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

4361

ז'	בשבט	תשמ"ח
26	ינואר	1988
סימוכין :		2437

אל : אירופה 2

מאת : ציר - יועץ/לונדון

הנדון : ראיונות פארוק קדומי

לוטה שני ראיונות שנערכו עם האיש ב-20.1.

ב ב ר כ ה,

יורם שגיל

העתק : המרכז

ISRAEL ישראל

BBC RADIO 4 THE WORLD AT ONE WEDNESDAY 20TH JANUARY 1988
INTERVIEW WITH FAROUK KHADOUMI
ANDREW ROBERTS
INTRODUCED BY NICK WORRALL

Nick Worrall
Reports from the West Bank this morning say Israel has reimposed a curfew in some areas following fresh reports of rioting. The curfews are the latest move in Israel's attempt to control the wave of demonstrations in the occupied territories in which at least thirty nine Palestinians have died since December. The Palestine Liberation Organisation howver says the protests will continued. Farouk Khadoumi of the PLO's political department is presently in London. Towmorrow he will meet Neill Kinnock and Gerald Kaufman, and as Mr Khadoumi explained to Andrew Roberts, the PLO will not change its policy in the occupied territories whatever the cost.

Farouk Khadoumi
Occupation is terrorism and we are fighting terrorism. Israel is a state who practises terrorim and we have to defend ourselves. This is the right of self-defence, so we started this since 1965 and we continue such struggle and this phase is another state of our struggle against the occupation and terrorism and to regain our rights in accordance with the United Nations Charter that all people should have their right for self-determination and they have the right to resist by all means occupation and colonialism.

Andrew Roberts
Are you at all encouraged by the disagreement if you like within the Israeli government about the use by Israel of force in the occupied territories.

Farouk Khadoumi
It is a nirmal development inside Israel because the time for Israel has come to divide, it is a split. The society is divided because of Israeli practices and using of force against the civilians and armless people, the Israelis involvement in the past in Irangate, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon; four hundred tjousand Israelis went down demonstrating against the occupation of Lebanon. So this is the beginning of stage of Israel dessenting and this uprising also will help to squeeze the Israeli colonial mentality in order to reconsider their attitude and Palestinians should gain the right for self-determination.

Andrew Roberts
How many more Palestinian lives do you think will be lost before that might happen?

Farouk Khadoumi
As long as thei is occupation and as long as there are terrorism there in the Middle East we are concerned to fight terrorism of the state of Israel and to also fight the occupation of the Israelis to our land and to establish the demographic state of Palestine where the Israelis and Palestinians will live together.

BBC WORLD SERVICE 24 HOURS WEDNESDAY 20 JANUARY 1988
INTERVIEW WITH FAROUK KHADOUMI
INTRODUCED BY TUDOR LOMAS

Tudor Lomas
The attack in the North of Israel follows more than fourty days of unrest and violence in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza strip. In London at the moment is the Foreign Affairs spokesman of Palestine Liberation Organisation, Farouk Khadoumi. Martin Lumm asked him how the demonstrations there and Israel's reaction to them has changed the nature of the problem of the occupied territories.

Farouk Khadoumi
The people of Palestine is insisting to end the Israeli occupation to the Palestinian land. This is the first and the second that no peace can be maintained in the Middle East without regaining the national rights of the Palestinian people, right for self-determination, for the establishment of an independent state and to return to their homeland. Israel should withdraw and that all the obstacles in the face of a peaceful solution is the United States and Israel.

Martin Lumm
The troubles in the occupied territories have drawn world attention to the plight of the Palestinians. But to what extent is the PLO now in control of events there and to what extent is it slipping away into the hands of more radical elements, perhaps linked to Islamic fundamentalism.

Farouk Khadoumi
The Westren mass media misinterpreted the uprising inside the occupied territories. Wheter they are moderate or radicals, fundamentalist or PLO, they are within the framework of the revolution, within the framework of the PLO. Therefore we wonder why the differentiate between the PLO and the people of Palestine. This is an uprising to end and terminate the occupation. All of them are Palestinians, all of them are revolutionists, all of them all they want is to end the occupation of Israel to the Palestinians and our land.

Martin Lumm
What about the chances for an international peace conference. There have been signs of closer contact, diplomatic contact between Israel and Moscow. Does this bode well for the chances of an international conference?

Farouk Khadoumi
We hope that an international conference can be convened. But unfortunately the obstacles to convene suc a cinference is the element and attitude of both the Israelis and the United States.

Martin Lumm
Are you prepared to enter a conference accepting unequivocally Israel's right to exist within the pre-1967 borders?

Farouk Khadoumi
I don't think that you expect me to give up my card at the beginning, no. Well, first of all, are the other parties ready to come to the international conference as described by the United Nations resolutions or not. After that, after negotiations, after they recognise the right of Palestinians for self-determination and an independent state, when they really desrve such negative attitude, I think all the nations of the world would think to support the international conference will be hopeful that something will come out of it, but until now I don't think that both sides, the Israelis and the Americans are ready for this step to serve the cause of peace in the Middle East.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

י' בשבט תשמ'ח
29 בינואר 1988
4861

אל : הסברה/מידע

מאת : מנהל אירופה 2

הנדון : ראיונות עם פארוק קאדומי

רצ'ב שני ראיונות רדיו עם הנ'ל ב-B.B.C. מה-20.1.

ב ב ר כ ה,

איתן מרגלית

4943

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

ז' בשבט תשמ"ח
26 ינואר 1988
סימוכין : 2436

אל : אירופה 2
מאת : ציר - יועץ/לונדון

הנדון : הודעות בריטיות רשמיות

לוטה עותקים בנושאים הבאים:

1. ראיון רוה"מ מ-22.1 ובו חזרה על הדחיפות שבהתחלת התהליך, על ההכרח במגעים בילטרליים בין ישראל לפלסטינים ועל רעיון ההגדרה העצמית לפלסטינים הנתמך ע"י בריטניה בצורה של פדרציה עם ירדן.

2. הודעת דובר הפוראופ מ-22.1 בתשובה לשאלה על דברי שר הביטחון בכנסת.

3. נוסח הודעת שגריר בריטניה באו"ם ב-18.1.

ב ב ר כ ה,

יורם שני

העתק : לשכת מנכ"ל מדיני
המרכז

ISRAEL ישראל

PRIME MINISTER INTERVIEW AT No 10 DOWNING STREET

ON FRIDAY 22 JANUARY 1988 INTERVIEWER:HENRY CHAMP NBC

INT:

Prime Minister, if I may change the subject slightly. One of your Ministers was recently a visitor in the Gaza strip, a guest of the Israeli Government. He spoke critically of what he saw there, he was critical of Israeli foreign policy and he seemed to be demanding changes. Does he fully represent your views on what is going on in Israel?

PM:

He came across a fundamental problem that those people in the Gaza strip and on the West Bank do not have self-determination. The United States can decide its own future, Britain can decide its own future, democracies can. They have self-determination. So does Israel. You cannot have it yourself and deny it to others and so we have been trying to get negotiations going so that the Palestinian people can determine their own future. Usually it is thought - and I support it - with a federation with Jordan - we have not succeeded and where there is a real legitimate grievance, if negotiations do not get under way to solve it, then trouble arises. That is what has been happening and it stresses the importance of getting negotiations going between the Palestinians and Israel. They must be bi-lateral negotiations.

INT:

Can we conclude from what you are saying, Prime Minister, that you will continue or at least change foreign policy here to put pressure on Israel to effect these changes ... ?

PM:

We have been trying to put pressure on everyone to get an initiative going. We are very friendly both with Israel and with the Palestinians and in particular with King Hussein of Jordan who had a very excellent summit in Amman, very diplomatic, very wise. We have been trying to do that and we hope that during the last eight years there would be an American initiative. It has not come about. What is happening now stresses the importance of not waiting much longer to get one going.

FCO PRESS CONFERENCE: FRIDAY 22 JANUARY 1988

ISRAELI POLICY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

In answer to a question, Spokesman said that we deplored the remarks in the Knesset by the Israeli Defence Minister, Mr Rabin, that demonstrators in the Occupied Territories should be beaten to control the unrest. We believed that this was a totally unacceptable response to the problems of the Territories. The use of violence and the brutalising effect of such policies could not contribute to finding a solution. Progress towards a political solution was urgently needed; we believed that an international conference offered the best way forward.

LETTER FROM MR SHEVARDNADZE

In answer to a question, Spokesman confirmed that the Soviet Ambassador had yesterday handed to Mr David Mellor QC MP, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, a copy of a letter from Mr Shevardnadze to the UN Secretary General about the Middle East. We were giving careful consideration to its contents.

ADDRESS BY PERMANENT UK REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS, SIR CRISPIN TICKEL DURING THE DISCUSSION ON A PROPOSED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION MONDAY, 18TH JANUARY 1988

MY DELEGATION IS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE COUNCIL WILL NOT ON THIS OCCASION BE ABLE TO REACH AN UNANIMOUS DECISION ON THE MATTER BEFORE IT. WE FIRMLY SUPPORTED EARLIER EFFORTS TO AGREE A STATEMENT TO BE MADE ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL BY THE PRESIDENT. THE RESULT OF THOSE EFFORTS WAS SOMETHING WE COULD HAVE ACCEPTED. IN THE COURSE OF THAT PROCESS, OUR CONCERNS BECAME WELL KNOWN. UNFORTUNATELY, THEY WERE NOT COVERED IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION BEFORE THE COUNCIL. MY DELEGATION WILL ACCORDINGLY BE OBLIGED TO ABSTAIN.

LET IT BE CLEAR THAT MY GOVERNMENT DEPLORES ISRAEL'S ACTIONS, BOTH IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, AND OF THE SORT DESCRIBED BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF LEBANON IN HIS LETTER TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF 6 JANUARY. EQUALLY WE DEPLORE THE CONTINUING CYCLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE AREA, INCLUDING THE USE OF LEBANESE TERRITORY FOR ARMED ATTACKS ON ISRAEL. THE OMISSION OF ANY REFERENCE TO THE GENERAL BACKGROUND OF VIOLENCE AND COUNTER VIOLENCE MAKES THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, FOR ALL ITS OTHER MERITS, UNBALANCED AND INCOMPLETE. THE POSITION WE SHALL TAKE ON IT IMPLIES NO CHANGE IN OUR COMMITMENT TO LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE, UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, NOR IN OUR DETERMINATION TO SECURE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 425.

16226 תאריך : 26.01.08

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

נבנס ** שמור

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5006

הוזם:1/16226
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/גר:262/תא:250188/זה:1800/דה:ד/סג:ש
נד:ם

שמור/דחוף

אל:אירופה 2 המרכז

מאת:ציר יועץ/לונדון

מפגישה עם אריה לוין ב-22.1

1. במבוא "ירושלים"

א. נבחר מנכ"ל הנבון, הוקרים ראיתים ממשרד ההגנה והבוראון.

ב. המפגש התנהל בצורת שאלות ותשובות בשבטיבומד קיבלו המשתתפים סקירה מקיפה בנושא איראן-עיראק לרבות ההכשרות הנרונמטליזם והמעורבות הסובייטית באזור.

ג. מבין הערות המשתתפים ניתן לציין:

- בצרה הכבה לסמל בעולם הערבי המייחס לכיבושה או לכשלון בכיבושה, את נכחונה של מדינה זו או אחרת במערכה כולה. בדיעבד דמהבחינה העיראקית הולכת ובוחתת חשיבותה של העיר והשלבות המשתמעה על יציבות המשטר, בכל שנמשך המאמץ האיראני בלביה.

- אין לאיראן בעיות בגידים מתנדבים אם יעשר שם מאמץ ממשי בכיוון זה. העובדה שאין ריכוזי בוחות גדולים בדרום מעידה אולי על שיבדיי טקטיקה איראנים ומוסר רצון לגרום להרג המוני בבעבר.

- העובדה שעיראק לא עשתה נסיון ממשי לכבוש את כאו בחזרה איננה מעידה בהכרח על חוסר שיראקי מקרבנות. היצאות כוחות איראנים בכאו מרגיזה בעין את האיום האיראני בלבי המפרץ ובדרום והווה חלק מהמדיניות העיראקית לבינאום הנושא.

2. ראש המחקר בנוראוף:
ליבג אידה אותנו לצהריים. השיחה היתה כללית ביותר ראויה לציון התרשמותו כי גורבצ'וב בתהליך של התגברות על בעיות ומחלוקות נבים בשהמגש היבר על המקדמות איטיה ללא דרמטיזציה. לראשונה שילוב הדוק והיזון הדדי בין בנים וחוץ בבריה"מ.

3. במחקר הנוראוף:

המפגש היה עם ליבג ושם מיודענו בדים רגדל הממונה על איראן ועיראק. מדברים:

א. משרין שימשך הקאמץ הפוליטי האיראני נגד עיראק באמצעות מהלכים צבאיים אך אחרים דוגמת גרילה, התרגות מיקוש וכיו"ב. אינם רואים באפשרי שמזב"ל האו"ם יצליח להביא את שני הצדדים לשולחן הדיונים. למרות זאת ובמידה והאו"ם יכניס למסגר תביעות איראניות יתכן והמשטר האיראני שלאחר חומייני יוכל להעביר זאת להמונים בהיעג שבעקבותיו תדעך המלחמה.

ב. ה"נסדראנ"י הנן להיות יחידת שילית וזרוע ביצוע למהפיכה והוא מרגיב כוח חיוני לכל אישיות בממשל. למיטב ידיעתם דובר של הארגון נוטה לצדד ברפסאנג'אני יותר מאשר באחרים.

ג. למרות הירידה בחשיבותו של הצבא אינם סבורים שיפוזר. אין בידם שום איום פוליטי מעורדה הצבא הגם ששומעים על חוסר שביעות רצון בעיקר בקרב סגנאי חיל-האויר. מתבדר שאילו באנשי מקצוע נרתעים יותר מהאחרים מהתערבותם של המולות.

ד. מוצאים שהחולעה העיקרית של המהפיכה X המהפיכה האיראנית הינה בכך שהיא איננה החלטית מספיק (דוגמא בחייו של חומייני) בנושאי בנים דוגמת רפורמה אגרית, תעשיה וכו'.

4. ביקורו של ראש המרכז היה עניין דמרגלה. קיימת כאן סקרנות ורצון להחליף דעות במיוחד בנושא כמו איראן, עיראק והמפרץ שבהם המעורבות והאינטרס הישראלי אינם מרבהקים כל כך.

יורם שני

תפ: שהח/מנכל/ממנכל"ר/מרכז/ממ"רים/אמן/אירב

12854 תאריך : 23.08.88 חוץ-מחלקת הקשר

נכנס ** שמור
**
**
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4801

מרזם:1/12854
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/בר:197/תא:200188/זמ:1500/דת:ד/סג:ש
נד:מ

103.3
(2)

שמור/דחוף

אל:מנהל ביגיל 2/ממד מאף

דע:אירופה 2

מאת:הציר-יועץ לונדון

משיחה עם גרולד מ/מנהל אפריקה בפוראון שנילוה לביור שרת המדינה באפריקה.

מרזמביק
1) נפגשו עם ציסאנו לשיחה ממושכת בה בקשה צ'אקר מהנשיא לערוך חקירה מקיפה ורשמית בנרשת המטוס ולהודיע לממבריטניה את המסקנות. (בין המלליה היו 3 בריטים). הגם שלדברי ג'ארולד לא עסקו במיוון בין מרזמביק למלאווי הסבירה השרה את הנחיצות שבהודעה צעד ברורה לרבות תשלומי ניצויים לנפגעים. לדבריו שיבור היחסים בין השתיים המל בשהחליטה מלאווי להגן על מסילת הברזל המובילה לנמל נקלה. לעצם היירוט הרי שהתמונה איננה ברורה. האזור ידוע במקום קרבות והטיים לא ביקש בנראה רשות מעבר מה עוד שהמטוס דומה למטוסי הכיוע לראנמו.

2) מתרשמים שציסאנו שואף באמת ובתמים לכך שמרזמביק תהיה מדינה בלמ"ית עם יחסים ידידותיים במזרח ובמערב למרות הקשר הצבאי ההדוק עם בריה"מ.מצאו שהבלבלה במקום נשענת במידה רבה על יוזמה פרטית ואיננה בשום אופן מרקסיסטית. הבריטים שאינם בעבר קציגים ממרזמביק נתבקשו ע"י ציסאנו לאמן יחידות צבא שלמות, פעולה בה החלו באוקטובר 87. המדובר ב-4 יחידות מידי שנה

באשר כל יחידה מונה כ-120 איש ומשך האימון בין 10 14 שבועות. דעתם המקצועית על ביצועי הצבא שליליים ועיקר הלחימה נעשה ע"י 12 אלף החיילים מדימבובוה להם גם מטרד בביקור רבע מיליון שטרלינג. את ראנמו רואים כסינדיקט של כנופיות ללא אידיאולוגיה וללא תמיכה שבטית או כברית כל שהיא.

3) אינם סבורים שהקירבה הנוצרת בין מוזמביק למלאווי משפיעה לפי שעה על יחסי האחדנה עם ד.אפריקה,מה עוד שזו החלה בעצמה במגעים ישירים עם מוזמביק לפיתוח סנר להנקת השמל. מעריכים שד.אפריקה מוטרדת יותר מהעובדה שקימה כנראה החלטה ממשלתית במלאווי לעשות לשיפור יחסים עם השכנים כעולה שעלולה בשלב שהוא לפגוע באינטרסיה.

מלאווי.

4) נפגשו עם באנדה. האיש בריא ולמרות בעיות שמיעה שמר על ריכוז כל משך השיחה. מטר להם במפורש שאין בדעתו להכון את יידוש המטרם לגורם שיפגע ביחסי שתי המדינות וברצונו לשמור על היחסים עם מוזמביק ככל שניתן.

5) לגבי הידוש לנשיא ישנם כאן הערכות שונות. גוהן טמבו מתקבל כסוביל לפי שעה בעיקר משום קירבתו לנשיא והיותו בן למשפחת "הגברת". בין המועמדים הנוספים ניתן לזהות גם את בראנאלי שר הבריאות,ואת צ'אראוה שהיה אחראי למנגנון האי עד לשינויים שערך באנדה החודש בממשלה. למרות הביחות שהל עתה במעמדו הוא עדיין שר ומועמד. החלו כאן לשים לב לאחרונה גם למפקד הצבא שמאז המעורבות בלחימה עם ראנמו החל בונה לעצמו פרופיל גבוה מאי פעם בעבר. הגם שאין סימנים שלאיש אמביציה אישית הרי יתכן שיהכון יותר "לממלין בשיאים" מאשר למולן עצמו.

יורם שני

אף

הע: מנבל/מנבל/אירב/הדס/מאב/ר/מרכז/ממד/בינל2

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON, W8 4QB
Telephone: 01-937 8050

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

4944

כט בטבת תשמ"ח
19 בינואר 1988
סימוכין: 2422

1073
כו

אל: ארופה 2

מאת: הציר-יועץ, לונדון

הנדון: דיוני הפרלמנט: איראן ויצוא נשק

לוטה עותקים משאלות ותשובות שהועלו בדיוני הפרלמנט בימים 11-12/1/88 בנושאים הבאים:

א. מדיניות יצוא הנשק למדינות המפירות את זכויות האדם.

ב. משרד הרכש האיראני בלונדון.

ג. שינוי אפשרי בהנחיות היצוא לאיראן.

בברכה,

יורם שני.

העתק: המרכז

נספח צה"ל, כאן.

ISRAEL ישראל

Tuesday
12 January 1988

Volume 125
No. 70

HOUSE OF COMMONS
OFFICIAL REPORT

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

Written Answers to Questions

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Iran (Exports)

Mr. Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he has any proposals for changes in the guidelines issued to British manufacturers to further limit exports to Iran so as to include non-lethal equipment ancillary to lethal military equipment; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Mellor: Subject to any United Nations arms embargo resolution to enforce SCR 598, we have no plans to change the guidelines on the sale of military equipment to Iran and Iraq. These already prohibit the export of all defence-related equipment that could significantly enhance the capability of either side to prolong or exacerbate the conflict. We continue to urge other countries to adopt similar stringent measures.

Tuesday
12 January 1988

Volume 125
No. 70

HOUSE OF COMMONS
OFFICIAL REPORT

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

Written Answers to Questions

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Iranian Arms Procurement Agency

Mr. Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs how many members of staff formerly employed by the Iranian Arms Procurement Agency at 4 Victoria street, London, have left the United Kingdom since his Department announced that it was to be closed.

Mr. Mellor: Following our decision to close the Iranian Military Procurement Offices, all 34 Iranian staff previously employed there have left the United Kingdom.

Monday
11 January 1988

Volume 125
No. 69

HOUSE OF COMMONS
OFFICIAL REPORT

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

Written Answers to Questions

DEFENCE

Arms Exports

Mr. Battle: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what is his policy towards the export of arms to countries with a record of human rights abuses; and if he will make a statement;

(2) what steps will be taken to ensure that none of the equipment on display at the British Army equipment exhibition at Aldershot in June 1988 is sold to, or otherwise reaches, countries with records of human rights abuses; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Sainsbury: Our policy is not to allow the export of defence equipment likely to be used for internal repression or to violate human rights. All exports of defence equipment are subject to strict licensing procedures. In considering applications for licences we look at each on its merits, and the human rights record of the country concerned would be one fact taken into account when deciding whether or not to grant a licence.

** בבנס שמור
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*5
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4257

מרזם:1/11875
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:186/תא:190188/זת:1600/דת:ד/סג:ש
נד:ס

103.360

דחוף/שמור
אל:אירופה 2 המרכז
מאת:הציר יועץ לונדון

משיחה עם מטי עיראק/איראן בנוראוף

עיראק
1. דיווחי שגרירותם מבגדד מגיעים מדרל גבוה בצבא ומצב כלכלי משופר מעט. הסעודים והכווייתים חידשו בידוע טיוע הנפט מהאזור הנייטרלי ועירק עצמה מצליחה לייצא כ 2.5 מחי. הכוחות ליד בצרה בנוכנות עלירנה ובצפיה למתקפה איראנית. מבני המים סביב העיר ובביצות גבוהים השנה במיוחד. גורם שיקשה עוד יותר על הזירה איראנית. התחושה בשגרירות שהעיראקים החלו לסבול למעט מבטחון יתר והאיראנים עוד עלולים להפתיע.

2. במערך יחסי עירק סוריה אין חדש למרות השמועות על מבצעי הגבול השוביים. להבדיל מעבר עירק מחודה בירם את הערתף הפסיבי במשחקי ההתקרבות בין השתים. העירקים רואים את הפעילות הסורית כסמלית וציבית ובכדר שמיועדת לזכות את סוריה בסיוע מפרצי יתר לא. התערבה שם שסוריה גם תצליח בכך. לא למדו עדיין את טיוד מבארן במפרץ אולם לפי מטי קימת כאן סברה באילו ישנה מתיבות מצרית ממשית לעירק במידה ויתחולל משבר צבאי. המדובר בשיגור כוחות מצרים בעיקר בתחום ההגנה האנטי אוירית לבחות עד לרגע שיגיע הסיוע הסוביטי המובטח.

3. מסר שהחזר החובות העירקים לבריטניה מגיע בסדרו ואין בעיה בילטרלית. בעת שהדרדר היחסים עם איראן ועל רקע החלטות מעביט היתה ציפיה עירקית שלא התממשה

למכירות נשק בריטי
מוצרים גבולים נמכרים
ביום לעירק בכמויות גדולות בהרבה מאשר לאירן וב 87
מכרו ציוד קשר ומערכת מחשבים לאג ב הכספים של משרד
הבטחון.

איראן
4. לדברי הממונה האיראני בלונדון הרי שהאופציה צפויה
להתחיל בכל רגע התורים למתנדבים ארוכים מתמיד ואירן
גם מצליחה לייצא את הנפט ללא הפרעה של ממש. מכל האור
החגיגי הזה מסכימים הבריטים רק לסעיף ייצוא הנפט.
מקורות שונים למדו שאחת מהבעיות העיקריות המעכבות
את המתקפה הינו דוקא המחסור במתנדבים.
להערכתם מנסים עתה באיראן לשנות טקטיקה ולחדש בכל
שניתן את שוגי הנשק בכדי לאזן יותר את העדיפויות
העירקיות. שפק הנשק העיקרי ביום הינו סין.

5. בנסיון להעריך את מקורות הכוח באיראן הגיעו למסקנה
שבקבוצה נמצא הכוח העיקרי בידי הפסדראן.
אלו מפוזרים בכל רחבי המדינה ומשמשים מרכיב עיקרי
בבטחון הפנים ובשמירת המהפכה כמו גם במלחמה בחוץ.
לצבא הרשמי אין אפשרות ויכולת לנקוט בפעולה עצמאית
רבה בגבולות וההערכה שאפילו ויתקיים עימות צבאי יגבר
הפסדראן.

6. לזיהוי משמרות המהפכה במקור הכוח העיקרי ישנן השלכות
לגבי האישים בצמרת. ברור גם שהאירגון יתמוך (לאחר
חומייני) רק באישיות נאמנה ואמינה למהפכה וכזו שתמשיך
במלחמה ומכאן גם שלא מצפים לסיומה הקרוב. רפסאנגני
שתמך וקירב את מחמד ריזאעי מפקד הפסדראן אינגר. מסתפק
בכך ומקיים כיום קשרים ישירים עם מפקדים רבים בארגון
באמצעות פגישות הדרכה מבגשי דת והטבות.
בגלרית אישי ההנהגה האיראנית אין לפי שעה פנים חדשות
להוציא אולי את מוהתשמי שפרץ לשורה הראשונה ועושה
הכל להידוק הקשר עם הקומיטה השונים ומכן בעקיפין
גם עם הפסדראן.

ירדם שני

א

תפ: שהח/מנכל/ממנכל/אירב/ר/מרכז/ממד/רם/אמן

9630 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 15.01.88

נכנס בלמס

4339

מדום:9630/1
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:159/תא:150188/דת:1500/דת:מ/סג:ב
נד:ם

בלמס/מידי

אל:אירגון 2

דש:שנדג

מאת:שתרגות לונדון

דיריד מקור

להלן ידיעה של הכתבת הדיפלומטית של "גארדיין" הלה
גיק ב-15 דנא (עמוד ראשון) תחת הכותרת:-

103.3
ברכ

OUTBURST BY MELLOR ANGERED THATCHER

MRS. THATCHER IS DETERMINED THAT BRITAIN SHOULD
PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN ENDING THE CRISIS IN ISRAELI
OCCUPIED TERRITOTRIES. BUT BLAMES DAVID MELLOR
FOR DAMAGING BRITAIN'S ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE
ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AT A CRITICAL TIME. EVEN THOUGH
DOWNING STREET HAS SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED PUBLIC
CRITICISM, MRS THATCHER WAS ANGERED BY THE FOREIGN
OFFICE MINISTER'S WIDELY PUBLICISED OUTBURST AGAINST
ISRAEL'S "BRUTAL OCCUPATION" OF THE GAZA STRIP
AND BY THE DRESSING- DOWN HE GAVE AN ISRAELI OFFICER
DURING HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL EARLIER THIS MONTH.
WHICH COINCIDED WITH HER ABSENCE IN AFRICA. THERE
IS NO DISAGREEMENT WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF MR MELLOR'S
STRICTURES OVER CONDITIONS IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS

AND ISRAEL'S HANDLING OF THE TURMOIL ON THE WEST BANK AND IN GAZA. BRITAIN HAS DIPLORED ISRAEL'S DEPORTATION OF FOUR PALESTINIANS, AND HAD NO HESITATION IN VOTING YESTERDAY FOR THE NEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CONDEMING THE DEPORTATION. DOWNING STREET'S DISAPPROVAL OF MR MELLOR HAS MUCH MORE TO DO WITH WHAT IS SEENAS HIS PUBLICITY-SEEKING TACTICS WHICH HAVE ALIENATED MOST OF ISREAL'S POLITICAL SPECTRUM, AND MAY HAVE LOST THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE, VALUABLE POLITICAL CREDIT IN ISRAEL. SUBSEQUENT BRIEFINGS IN LONDON HAVE FURTHER ERODED MR MELLOR'S STANDING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. LAST WEEKEND, REPORTS EMANATED FROM HIS OFFICE THAT ISRAELS PRIME MINISTER MR YITZHAK SHAMIR, WAS ANGLING FOR AN INVITATION TO BRITAIN. BUT THAT HE HAD BEEN SO DISMISSIVE OF MRS. THATCHER'S MIDDLE EAST POLICIES THAT HE SHOULD NO LONGER EXPECT TO BE ASKED. YET IT NOW EMERGES THAT DOWNING STREET IS UNAWARE OF ANY APPROACHES BY MR SHAMIR TO MAKE AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO BRITAIN, NOR IS THERE ANY INDICATION THAT MRS THATCHER WOULD WISH TO PUNISH HIM BY TURNING HIM DOWN. ON THE CONTRARY, SHE WOULD PROBAPLY WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DIRECT , HARD HITTING TALKS WITH HIM. THE PRIME MINISTER DOES NOT APPEAR TO BLAME THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR MR MELLOR'S ACTIONS AND IS UNLIKELY TO SEE IT AS PART OF A WELL-ORCHESTATE D PLOT BY ITS ARABIST ESTABLISHMENT TO TIP THE BALANCE OF BRITISH POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT IS MORE SIMPLY THAT MR MELLOR IS CONSIDERED TO HAVE PVER-REACHED HIMSELF IN ISRAEL.
THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, WHO HAS DEVOTED MUCH TIME AND EFFORT IN RECENT MONTHS TO AN EVEN HANDED ATTEMPT TO PROD BOTH ATABS AND ISRAELIS INTO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PROBABLY FEELS THIS JUST AS TRONGLY.

MRS THATCHAER, CONVINCED THAT THE UNITED STATES ALONE HAD THE POWER AND INFLUENCE TO BREAK THE MIDDLE EAST DEADLOCK, WAS FOR A LONG TIME CONTENT TO TAKE A DIPLOMATIC BACK SEAT. SHE HAS NOT HIDDEN HER DISAPPOINTMENT AND FRASTRATION OVER PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RELUCTANCE TO INTERVENE. FACED WITH THIS

VOID, WHICH IS CERTAIN TO CONTINUE INTIL THE US
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IS OUT OF THE WAY, THE PRIME
MINISTER SET OUT TO TEST BRITISH INFLUENCE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST. SHE WANTS IT KNOWN THAT BRITAIN UNDERSTAND
S ISRAEL7S PREOCUPATION WITH ITS SECURITY. BUT
SHE ALSO ACCEPTS THAT PALESTINIAN PRESSURE FOR
A HOMELAND HAS TO BE ADDRESSED: BRITAIN IS EAGER
FOR THE PLO TO RENOUNCE VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM
SO THAT IT CAN BE ACCEPTED AS A NEGOTIATING PARTNER.

תפ: עתם,רהם,מנכל,מסנכל,אירב,אביטל,מעת,השגרה

חדזם:1/8016
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:134/תא:130188/זת:1800/דח:ד/סג:ש
נד:ם

שמור/דחוף

אל:אירופה 2 המרכז

מאת:לונדון/ציר-יועץ

103.3

משיחה עם איירס/סוריה/מזה"ת בבוראוף

1.הפעילות הדיפלומטית הערנית של סוריה בשבועות האחרונים עוררה ברגיל למסבר אינטרסים סורים. "השורה התחתונה" לפי איירס,הינו הרצון הסורי לאחר כסגת עמאן,להוכיח לגזברי העולם הערבי כי מעמדה המיוחד ביחס לאיראן מועיל לאינטרס הערבי הכולל כשהרקע לכל הנושא הינו המשבר הכלכלי החריף בסוריה.

2.סבורים כאן שהביקורים בסעודיה ואיראן באו אמנם במטרה להוריד את המתח הכללי בין המשתפ"מ לאיראן אולם במרכז הפעילות נמצאת מאע"מ ולא סעודיה. מתברר שמלחמת הפיכליות והלחץ הגובר של ארה"ב ואחרים על מאע"מ בדבר שירותי נמל וספנות,העלה שם החשש שמא הם עתידים לסבי כגישה איראנית. מהבחינה הסורית מאידך היה נוח יותר להתרכז במאע"מ מאשר בסעודית למשל אך בסעודיה עצמה.

3. הפעילות הדיפלומטית מסיעת גם להשאיר את סוריה במרכז המפה הערבית ובמיוחד עתה כאשר התחרות עם מצרים עוד תגבר. בהקשר מסציפי זה רואים הסורים כמובן בסיפוק את ארדעי השטחים המוביחים שוב לדעתם את "ישגיאותיה" המשמעותיות של מצרים. אין כאן ציפיה להתפתחות דרמטית ביחסי סוריה-עיראק למרות מפגשים שונים ומעשים דוגמת

חידוש קשרי הטלפון בשדות התעופה (שלמיטב ידיעתם מעולם גם לא נותקו) אך השמועות על תחנת גבול משותפת. סוריה לא תבקוש לכי שעה בשום מעולה שתנתק את קשריה עם איראן.

4. מחומד גלוי שמעד על שחרור מספר אסירים של הפת"ח בדמשק שנעצרו בעת הפיגועי מלבנון. לא מעריכים שיתפסי סוריה-אש"פ עוברים מהפך, אולם אין לכי שעה הסבר לעיתוי שחרור העצורים.

5. שגרירותם בדמשק שהתיחסה למשבר הכלכלי איננה תולה תקוות מרובות ברוה"מ החדש שישבר המצב. ההערכה הכללית שם היא שהאיש איננו שמאי מספיק לעמוד למול לחצי המפלגה או הצבא. באותו הענין נמסר על שמועות כי המסע נגד השחיתות נעצר משום שהגיע קרוב מידי לראש הממשלה עלי דרבא. ניום במעט ולא נערכים משפטים ואין פרסום על גזרי דין לצרכי התרעה.

יום שני.

אך

הע: שמה, רהמ, שחבש, מנבל, מתנבל, סמנבל, ממדרם, אמן, איראן, איראב, מדתים

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

6312 תאריך : 12.01.88

** נכנס שמור 4631
**
**
**

חוזם:1,6312
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון,נר:98,תא:110188,זח:1800,דח:ד,סג:ש
נד:8

שמור/דחוף

אל:ארופה 2 המרכז

מאת:הציר-יועץ לונדון

103.3
ירח

משיחה עם רוברטס הממונה על מצרים בפוראוף:

1. נשיא מצרים יגיע לביקור לקראת סוף החודש במטרה מוצהרת להשפיע על ממבריטניה לסייע בהקלת התנאים של קרן המטבע. מתברר שהקרן בדאגה שמצרים איננה עומדת בתנאים ולעמדה הבריטית כשותף השני בגודלו שם לאחר ארה''ב, ישנה משמעות. לפי שעה הנטייה כאן שלא לתמוך במצרים ועל -כך כבר רמז שה''ח בביקורו בקהיר. סבורים שרוה''מ היא שתקבע סופית אולם ההנחה היא שתטיף להידוק חגורה ולצעדים של אומץ-לב וכיו''ב . במגזר הפוליטי יועלו ג ם הארועים בשטחים והביקור במפרץ.

2. מוקדם להסיק לגבי ביקור מובארך במפרץ שטרם הסתיים אולם ההערכה היא שהנשיא מגיע מתוך עמדה של כוח לאחר עמאן וחידוש היחסים וכשלפניו עוד 6 שנות נשיאות. ללא ספק שהביקורים במפרץ, בארופה ובארה''ב יתרמו גם ליוקרתו הפנימית. כביקור רשמי ראשון במפרץ הרי שיש לצפות שמובארך ינסה להוכיח את '' ערביותה'' של מצרים והיותה חלק חשוב ובלתי נפרד מהעולם הערבי. לגבי ההיבט הצבאי הרי שההערכה כאן כי מצרים תימנע מכל שיגור משמעותי של צבא, שכן אין כל רצון מצרי לעמוד בפני הצורך של גיוס לאומי במידה ויפגעו הכוחות.

3. בנושא זה יעשו לכן יותר בכיוון של יצירת תדמית

מתאימה אולם ללא מעשים של ממש בשטח. אין בכך בכדי לבטל את ההערכה הכוללת כי בד בבד נוצרת נטיה גוברת במצרים בכיון של מחויבות פוליטית-צבאית לשעת משבר ממשי ודרמטי אם יחול בעתיד, ובמיוחד לגבי סעודיה. במסגרת ההתפתחויות הללו קימת במצרים גם ציפיה לסיוע שהוא מעבר לקבלת''דמי הגנה'' ובכיון של השקעות לרבות בתעשיה הצבאית.

4. מסר שקיבלו דיווח על ביקור מהדי בלוב. מתברר שהסודנים היו מעונינים בנשק כבד דוגמת טנקים ומטוסים וכנראה שנכשלו. נשק קל מסופק לסודן כידוע גם ע''י איראן ועיראק. ציין אגב כן שמקימים מגעים עם גרנג' לעיתים מזומנות (ולאחרונה בנובמבר) אותו מעריכים כאיש צבא אולם כהדיוט פוליטי שמטרותיו אינן ברורות אף לו לעצמו. הזכיר שמועות על אספקת נשק ישראלית אפשרית למרודים.

יורם שני

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,אמן,אירא,אירב, מצרים

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

5724 תאריך : 11.01.88

נכנס בלמס

4549

חוזם:1,5724
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון,נר:84,תא:110188,זח:0900,דח:ב,סג:ב
נד:@

אלמו
אלמו
ארנון

בלמס/בהול

אל:המשנה למנכ'ל

דע:אירופה ב'

מאת:הציר לונדון

לשלך 11.1.88

ענוג

מלור

להלן קטע מה''טיימס'' של הבוקר.

EFFORTS TO PUT ANGLO-ISRAELI RELATIONS BACK ON COURSE WERE UNDER WAY YESTERDAY WITH BOTH GOVERNMENTS LOWERING THE TEMPERATURE AFTER WHAT AN ISRAELI DIPLOMAT CALLED '' THE MELLOR INCIDENT ''.

MR. DAVID MELLOR MINISTER OF STATE AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE, LAST WEEK SEVERELY CRITICIZED SEVERELY CRITICIZED CONDITIONS IN A GAZA STRIP REFUGEE CAMP HE VISITED. MRS. THATCHER'S STAFF SAID THAT SHE WAS READY TO MEET MR. SHAMIR TH E ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER, IF HE CAME TO LONDON ON A PRIVATE VISIT. THEY DENIED REPORTS IN SOME PAPERS THAT HE HAD BEEN SNUBBED. AND AN OFFICIAL ISRAELI STATEMENT LAST

NIGHT SAID: '' PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR HAS NO PLAN
TO VISIT LONDON AT THIS TIME ''.

אף

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,אמן,אירא,אירב,
מזתים,מתאמשטחים,הסברה,מעת

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

ס4יC

ט"ז בטבת תשמ"ח
6 בינואר 1988
4438

אל : מחלקת מצרים

מאת : אירופה 2

הנדון : קטע עתונות בריטית

רצ"ב לעיונכם שלושה קטעים מן העתונות הבריטית העוסקים במצרים, העשויים לענייננכם.

אם תמצאו לנכון, אנא העבירו לשגרירות בקהיר.

ב ב ר כ ה,

אשר ירדן

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

ט"ז בטבת תשמ"ח
6 בינואר 1988
4438

אל : סמנכ"ל ארב"ל

מאת : אירופה 2

63.3
ב"ר

הנדון : מאמר ב-FINANCIAL TIMES

רצ"ב לעיונך צילום מאמר שהופיע ב-FINANCIAL TIMES ביום 24.12.87 והעשוי לענינך.

ב ב ר כ ה,

אשר ירדן

2708 **משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר**

תאריך: 05.01.88

דף 1 מתוך 3

עותק 10 מתוך 32 סודי ביותר נכנס **

4563

חוזם:1,2708

אל:המשרד

מ-:לונדון,נר:32,תא:050188,זח:1800,דח:ד,סג:סב

נד:@

דחוף/סודי ביותר

אל:אירופה ב', המרכז/איסוף-משה'ח

מאת:הציר-יועץ מדיני השגרירות לונדון

[redacted]

1) נשק הלייזר,

א. מקור הידיעות על השימוש בנשק הלייזר הינם קצינים [redacted] אליהם הגיעו הידיעות מעיראק וכן מאיסוף שלהם על איראן.

ב. כל הפגיעות ארעו ב-1987 [redacted] שדיווחו על כך בנובמבר לא ראו דוגמאות בעצמם. לפי המידע נשלחו הנפגעים האיראניים הראשונים לבתי- חולים בעומאן במקרי לוחמה כימית.הבחינו ביחודה של הבעיה רק כשהתרבו נפגעי העיניים.

ג. בפרוזדורי משרד ההגנה כאן נמסר שהגדרת המודיעין הבריטי היתה כי ''קיימים מפסר רב ומעבר לנורמלי של מקרי פגיעות צריבה ברטיינה''. למטב ידיעתם הנזק לא היה סופי להוציא מקרים בודדים. כל הנושא עולה בקנה אחד עם ההערכות ספקולטיביות במקצת של המודיעין כי הרוסים הצליחו לפתח אפשרות להגדלת העוצמה במדי- טווח רגילים וגם לאור העובדה שמקובל כיום להעריך שמספר ספינות סוביטיות צוידו במתקני לייזר לפגיעה בטייסי

[redacted]

2. ההיבט הסעודי.

א. הדאגה הסעודית מנשק הנמצא בידיים עיראקיות מוסברת בהליכי מחשבה פוליטית- מעשית (להבדיל מהרשמית) ולטווח רחוק הכורכת את סיום המלחמה ב''עייפות החומר'. לדעתם יתקיים אז מצב הדומה לזה שבין ישראל וסוריה כאשר הצבאות משני הצדדים בהמתנה ומלחמה עלולה לפרוץ בכל רגע. במצב כזה העשוי להמשך, ינסה המשטר העיראקי לאתר ''נושא'' מחוץ למדינה והמבט יופנה לכווית.

ב. חשש קבוע קיים אצל הסעודים גם מסוריה. תרחיש סעודי אפשרי הינו שהמלחמה לקראת סיום ועיראק במצב נחות. יתכן שסוריה תסייע לעיראק ואז אין להוציא מכלל אפשרות בליעת החלק הצפוני של עיראק והתרחבות מסוכנת של ההשפעה הסורית.

ג. הסעודים עצמם אינם מודאגים במיוחד מהאיום הצבאי האיראני. הנפנוף באיום זה מאפשר להם הגמוניה במפרץ ובמשפ'מ דבר שלא היה מתרחש בתנאים אחרים ובמיוחד למול התנגדות קשה מצידה של עומאן.

[redacted] שלפי הסעודים פועלות בעיראק שתי ''טחנות אבק'' לערבוב עם חומרים כימיים.

3. ירדן

[redacted] ירדן תקנה 36 מטוסי טורנדו שערכם כ-720 מיליון שטרלינג כאשר התחזוקה חלקי חילוף והאימונים יכפילו את הסכום.

[redacted] הוכנה כאן 'עסקת חבילה' מאוד מפתה, וכנראה שגם הסעודים בתמונה. המדובר בגירסת מטוס הקרב.

יורם שני.

אף

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 3 מתוך 3
עותק 10 מתוך 32

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,בירן,אירב,
מרכזאיסוף

1772 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 01.88

דחוף בלמס

4488

מרדם:1/1772
אל:לונדון/56
מ-:המשרד/תא:050188/דת:0833/דח:ב/סג:ב
נד:0

103.3 60

בהול-בלמס

הציר, עתונות, השגרה

להלן נוסח הטור 'THE MORNING AFTER' (מתחת למאמרי המערכת)
מה-ג'רוזלם פוסט מהבוקר:

THE MORNING AFTER

THE BRITISH MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DAVID MELLOR, WAS SHOCKED YESTERDAY BY THE DISMAL LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE GAZA STRIP. NOT SURPRISING. WHAT GAZA WAS UNDER EGYPTIAN RULE, IT CONTINUES TO BE UNDER ISRAELI RULE.

THAT HE ARRANGED FOR A BUS LOAD OF BRITISH JOURNALISTS TO RECORD AND RELAY HIS ACTIVITIES BACK TO BRITAIN IS ALSO CUSTOMARY PRACTICE FOR ADVANCING WHAT IS DESCRIBED AS PROMISING POLITICAL CAREER.

BUT THE MINISTER OF STATE CLEARLY EXCEEDED THE BOUNDS OF PROPRIETY BY TRYING TO SCORE POINTS, ON CAMERA, AT THE EXPENSE OF AN I.D.F. LIEUTENANT COLONEL WHO WAS GOING ABOUT HIS DUTIES IN THE JABALIYA REFUGEE CAMP. HE MIGHT HAVE CONSIDERED SAVING HIS STRICTURES FOR THE APPROPRIATE FORUM, NAMELY HIS MEETING WITH HIS ISRAELI COUNTERPARTS.

THE NEXT JUNIOR ISRAELI MINISTER WHO GOES TO LONDON ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS SHOULD FIRST TOUR NORTHERN IRELAND. THERE HE MIGHT HAPPEN TO RUN INTO AN IRATE CATHOLIC FATHER WHOSE SON HAS JUST BEEN ARRESTED. IF HE

PLAYS HIS CARDS RIGHT, AND AN ISRAELI TELEVISION CAMERAMAN IS AROUND, OUR MINISTER COULD WELL IMPRESS HIS CONSTITUENCY AT HOME BY SEEKING OUT A BRITISH SPECIAL FORCES OFFICER WHOM HE COULD LOOK FIERCELY IN THE EYE AND SAY: "THIS IS NO GOOD. NO GOOD AT ALL".

[redacted]

שרות תח"ל

מברק גלוי יוצא אל: 1)

(לשימוש תח"ל) של	אל: י. בן אהרן - מנכ"ל משרד ראש הממשלה	דרגת דחיפות: ב. ו. ל
ר 1)	לידיעת: אירופה ב', מע"ת	דרגת דחיפות
ר 2)	מאת: עתונות לונדון	תאריך ושעת התיבה: 5.1.88
דד		
ת	סימן המחבר	לשלי: / לשלך:

בלמ"ס

103.3 מ

מאמר מערכת ב"טיימס" 5 דנא.

GLIBNESS IN GAZA

Israel's raids in Lebanon and the decision to deport nine Palestinians have earned widespread condemnation from other governments [illegible] terrorists. As all this was predictable, one must assume that it was allowed for by Jerusalem. Israel has once more shown the world that it, and it alone, will decide how best to handle its security.

This calculation is unlikely to have been swayed yesterday by the antics of Mr David Mellor, junior minister at the Foreign Office. Refugee camps are depressing places at the best of times and no doubt Mr Mellor was moved by the experience. But the camps have been there a long time. For more than a generation, it has been in the interests of the leaders of the anti-Israeli cause to keep them wretched — not that conditions in them are much worse than those in which Arabs are forced to live in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere.

The Arab world, when it was awash with oil money, could have afforded to improve life in the camps had it really wanted to do so, but chose not to. After the 1978 Camp David agreement, Egypt promised to develop Sinai to provide work for the refugees of Gaza — but has done little.

Arab leaders would retort that it is not for them to take responsibility for the camps because that would be to recognize the permanence of their inhabitants' exclusion from their Palestinian homeland. But this is only to confirm that conditions in the camps are therefore not uppermost in many Arab minds. So it is a good deal more complicated than Mr Mellor seems to think. For him to air his opinions so glibly raises serious questions about his political wisdom.

The attack on guerrilla positions in Southern Lebanon was in retaliation for the hang-glider raid six weeks ago, when Arab terrorists killed six soldiers as they slept. It is hard to defend the morality of revenge. But such actions must be judged against the harsh reality of politics in the Levant, rather than that which obtains in Western Europe. The general stance of Israeli governments is defensive.

The retaliatory attack was late in coming [illegible] least until well after the Washington summit. Jerusalem hawks later complained, however, that it was Israel's inaction which encouraged the subsequent rioting on the West Bank and in Gaza. It was seen by its enemies as a sign of weakness — an impression which at some point had to be corrected.

The decision to expel nine of the Palestinian troublemakers from the occupied territories has also embarrassed Israel's Western allies. Again it must be judged against Israel's need to defuse a potentially explosive situation. By removing the other side's leaders, Israel hopes that the threat of more violence will subside.

Whether this is so remains to be seen. A more pertinent question is whether the action will strengthen or weaken Israeli security — and help or hinder the cause of peace in the Middle East. It certainly provides more fuel for Israel's critics. It raises questions about where the men might go — and puts moderate Arab states in some embarrassment. These, too, are such obvious consequences that they must have been accepted by Jerusalem as a calculated risk.

With the United States and Israel preparing for elections late this year, and Arab minds concentrated on the Iran-Iraq war, the chances of imminent movement in the peace process must be slight. There is thus little alternative to preserving the status quo in the Israel-Palestine quarrel. Israel has suffered appallingly from Arab terrorists and those who harbour them need little sympathy. As no other country seems capable or willing to deal with them effectively, Israel must be let to do so itself.

This cannot, however, be a long-term solution. Successive Israeli governments have been too reluctant to risk ceding the land that would be the price for peace. The courage and determination of modern Israel are not in themselves enough.

שהיה חמג לשל בלבנון אינה אופיטל בת הסברה מנוה
מצנר בדמו לגיאלה בצבים בתחום שטחים

נבנס ** סודי

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**
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4421

חדזם:12/20490
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:278/תא:301287/זת:1800/דת:ד/סג:ס
נד:ם

103.3
(22)

סודי/דחוף

אל:אירופה 2/ המרכז

מאת:הציר יועץ לונדון

משיחה עם קופיץ מהמכון הבינלאומי ללימודים אסטרטגים שחזר מביקור בסעודיה:

1. נפגש בריאד עם מזכל המשפט עבדאללה בישארה ועם אישים נוספים בארגון. למשפט לדבריהם חשיבות בסמל לאחדות המדינות במפרץ ולשם שמירה על אינטרסים משותפים-כלכליים בעיקרם. אין לארגון שום חשיבות צבאית ולדברי המזכל אין גם אשליות בנושא זה. קבע כדוגמא כי הכוח המשותף שונה לחייל אחד לכל 42 מייל מרובע.
החולשה הבסיסית של הארגון נובעת לדבריו מחוסר השיוויון הקיים בין החברות לגבי הגדרת האיום החיצוני ומידת חומרתו. הביא לדוגמא את כורית וסעודיה באשר הראשונה חוששת מפגיעה איראנית בשטחה הטריטוריאלי ואילו הסעודים מתיחסים יותר לאיום האידיולוגי. אינם מיחסים חשיבות מיוחדת לשובה של מצרים לעולם הערבי שכן מבחינתם מעולם גם לא עזבה וידוע שמאות מצרים מאיישים בעיקר את סוללות טילי הגנה האנטי אוירית ומיוחד בכורית.

2. בשיחות שקיים במשרד החוץ הסעודי ועם אישים מקומיים מצא תשומת כבדים
היכולתם של איראן לפגוע בערבי הישוד
הסעודים המתיחסים לקשר שבין המדינה ולמקומות הקדושים ומחסור החשבה ההחלטית לנושא זה. ניסה גם לברר מה תהיה תגובתם אם ישגרו האיראנים שוב מאות אלפים לחאג

ונענה כי לא ניתן למנוע זאת אולם יכסו להכביד ולעכב ככל האפשר.

3. בריאד נפגש גם עם בנו של אחד ממנהיגי הדת הבכירים עם (עירב לזהותו). האיש ההיתם לאיום האידיאולוגי האיראני וציין שאחת התוצאות החיוביות לכך היכה הפורפיל הנמוך ששומרים כעת מאות מהנסיכים בנושא הפזרנות האישית. הסביר שקיים מרדם ויונדי בין אנשי הדת לבית סעוד וכל זמן שהארבלוסיה איננה נפגעת הרי אלו יכולים להמשיך לבנות ארמונות פאר. ציין שהממלכה הסעודית עדין ללא זהות לאומית ונשמרת המסורת של נאמנות למשפחה לשבט לעיר (בריאד לעומת גידה) ולאזור. האיום האיראני הביא לראשונה לליכוד לאומי ברמה מסוימת תופעה שלא קרתה קודם אפילו לא בלבי ישראל. קופיץ התרשם כי ההתיחסות הסעודית לישראל היכה יותר בלבי נושא ירושלים וכי מעולם לא הפכה ישראל לכלי לביטוי ויצירת ליכוד לאומי עם.

4. מסקורות סעודים שמע על כינוי היחידות הפקיסטניות בחודשים האחרונים משום משום הסיבות הבאות:

א. הסעודים בניגוד לכוונית אינם חוששים מאיום צבאי איראני וזאגתם העיקרית היכה מהאיום האידאולוגי.

ב. נוצרו סיבסוכים רבים בין הקציבים פקיסטנים וסעודים עד בדי תגרות ידים כשהפקיסטנים מפגישים עלילנות מקצועית.

ג. הסעודים אינם רואים בישראל אויב המאיים על שלמותה הטריטוריאלי של המדינה ועומדת היחידות הפקיסטניות למול ישראל היתה בבחינת הצגה כשהסעודים מקוים שאלו ישמשו מגן למול כל איום חיצוני. ערכם ירד משהוברר שהיחידות לא יפעלו במקרה של איום איראני.

ד. מחקימים
מגעים קרובים עם מרוקו לשיגור כוחות. היתרונות המידים הינם בידיעת השפה הערבית ובתשלומים נמוכים בהרבה.

5. התענין באשר להעשיות צבאיות באזור ומצא שהרצון המצרי להקמת תעשיה צבאית ולהפוך לספק נשק אזורי נוגד לחלוטין את המדיניות הסעודית. המדיניות הסעודית מבוססת של קניתו של הנשק המתוחכם ביותר במטרה שעצם הידיעה על קיומו תשמש הרתעה. לא נסלו עם זאת אפשרות של השקעה

סעדיה, סמלית בתפעלים.

יורם שני

א

הפ: שחת,רהמ,שחבט,מנבל,ממנבל,סמנבל,ממזרם,אמן,אירא,אירב,
זתים

Mr. A. Margalit

After the tea reception, the Mission (10 people) and IBCA's Committee Members with spouses, are invited to Mr. Furman's apartment at 8 Uri Street (Flat 38), 10th Floor, (100 metres from Wizo House) for cocktails - 7.0 to 8.0 p.m.
Will you please join.

RSVP

4406

THE BALFOUR DECLARATION
1917-1987

ISRAEL, BRITAIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH ASSOCIATION

From The Chairman's Office,
5 Rothschild Blvd.
Tel-Aviv 66881
Tel. 03-5103111

28 December 1987

Dear Member,

We have pleasure in inviting you and your friends to an

AFTERNOON RECEPTION

in honour of the Mission of the Parliamentary

CONSERVATIVE FRIENDS OF ISRAEL

on Wednesday 6th January, 1988 at 5.30 p.m. at Beit Wizo
38 King David Blvd., Tel-Aviv

(Tea/Coffee and Cakes will be served)

COST OF RECEPTION: Members - NIS.8.- each Guests - NIS.10.- each

* *

U R G E N T

In view of the short-notice, reservations should be made immediately by phone to Mr. Furman's Secretary (Frida) (03-5103111) between 8.30 - 2.00 p.m. (Sunday - Thursday). Will you please confirm your reservation, at the same time, for lunch on 21st January 1988, when Mr. Dan Meridor MK will be our guest-speaker.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN FURMAN
Chairman

76 Ibn Gvirol St., P.O.B 16266, Tel: 03-265244 Tel-Aviv

4306

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON, W8 4QB
Telephone: 01-937 8050

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

ג' בטבת תשמ"ח
24 בדצמבר 1987
סימוכין: 2371

אל: הסכרה / ערחכי
מע"ת
אירופה 2

מאת: עימונות לונדון

הנדון: תמלילי ראיונות השגריר בחקשורת

רצ"ב תמלילי ראיונות השגריר בחקשורת שהתקיימו בימים 21-22 דנא.

בברכה,

א. מגור.

ISRAEL ישראל

DISTURBANCES ON THE ADMINISTERED TERRITORIES - AVNER
BBC BREAKFAST TIME, TUESDAY 22 DECEMBER 1987

SALLY MAGNUSSON
Israel says it will increase the size of its forces in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip where there has been serious violence over the past 2 weeks. Yesterday 3 Palestinians were killed by Israeli troops in Arab towns, bringing the total death toll to 19 since the trouble began.

BUTT
Military leaders here were clearly taken by surprise by the overwhelming response to yesterday's strike call and by the extent of the street protests in the West Bank and Gaza Strip which accompanied the stoppage. While the outside world has been criticising the tough methods employed by the army over the past 2 weeks to end the rioting, military commanders here have decided that still tougher measures are needed. Indeed they say that up to now they have been exercising relative restraint and this has been misinterpreted as weakness. From today, the size of the army presence will be increased, troops will respond quicker to incidents and more curfews, arrests and deportations can be expected.

MAGNUSSON
I'm joined now by the Israeli ambassador, Yehuda Avner. Mr Avner, in view of the international criticism of the way that Israel has handled the unrest in the occupied territories, criticism significantly from your friends among others, like America, would agree that this affair has been badly handled, that it was a mistake, for instance, to use live ammunition in putting down that unrest ?

AVNER
I think that the basic problem of riot control in a situation in which you have a very determined, provocative element to fuel and feed those riots the whole time creates situations in which stone throwers can become very, very lethal [?] incidents and there have been casualties on our side. I don't say that everyone of our single actions could be totally justified and there are a number of military personnel, security personnel who are now subject to enquiry. We are a nation of the rule of law. The very first point of departure for everything that has to happen now is what you call in this country law and order.

MAGNUSSON
But what is going to happen now. The response of the government seems to be to step up the military presence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip when in fact what is being called for on a good many sides is ultimately the demilitarisation. Is the government really taking the right steps to handle this right now ?

AVNER
I think you have to be cautious of semantics here. When we use the word to 'step up', if 'stepping up' means to say that we are going to eradicate the trouble makers and restore law and order then that is not escalation, that is de-escalation. By the same token, if demilitarisation means just to pull out and let mayhem and havoc reign, it means to say that is a blow to the moderates of the area and a victory for the PLO radicals who have one goal and

this is the essence of all that has been happening in the last few days, if I may emphasise this, and that is to destabilise our immediate [?] region in order to destabilise the global region in order to bring about a break down of the peace process and with it more [?] war.

MAGNUSSON
Is it worrying to the government that the troops handling the crisis should have produced such strong solidarity among your own Arab-Israeli citizens as we saw yesterday. That surely doesn't hold [?] well for the future.

AVNER
I think that is something that I can understand. By the same token I think that there is a seed of optimism in this whole thing, namely that for these 50 years or more the Arab population have allowed themselves not to be led but to be misled. Now the fanatics have too often taken over and established what the policy should be. What I would hope and pray and it's the season of the year to say it, that out of this situation will emerge a more saner[?] moderate leadership that will be ready to ...[?] down the terrorist PLO to say yes, we do want to sit down with the Jordanians together with, with the Israelis, together with the Jordanians and move on with the peace process.

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17316 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 26.12.87

נכנס ** שמור

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**
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4351

מדום:12,17316
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון,מר:246,תא:241287,זת:1600,דת:ד,סג:ש
נד:ש

103.3
מיכ

שמור/דחוף

אל:אירופה 2, המרכז

מאת:הציר-יועץ לונדון

משיחה עם ברינקלי ממחי בריה"מ בפוראון:-

1.מוקדם עדיין לקבוע אם ביקור חוסיין במוסקבה משמעותו מבנה ביחסים. האינטרס הסוביטי להרחבת השפעה והתקרבות למדינות העולם הערבי מרבן מאליו. ציין אגב-כך כי המרמחים הסוביטים מביאים בחשבון שינויים משמעותיים לטובה ברגע שחיפתר בעית אפגניסטאן ואף אינם מוציאים מכלל אפשרות במקרה זה את חידוש היחסים עם סעודיה. בחינת ירדן הרי שקביית המיג-29 תהווה עדות לשינויים על מקש.

2.סביר שממלך היה מודע לעובדה שביקורו פותח דלת לספקולציות במערב בנושא זה,יתכן אף שנעשה נסיון בידעין לנצל זאת. למרות שאין לחוסיין מכדש לכן הוא מוסיע במיצג הפיסגה דבר שמאפשר לו מרחב תמרון שמעבר ליחסים הבילטרליים ובמרבן טיפול בנושא המרצי. סבורים באן שבנקודה האיראנית כבר קיימת תזוזה סוביטית אל עבר האמבארגו הגם שלפי שעה הם מקשרים זאת בתפקיד המיועד לכוח הימי של האו"ם בשיוקם.

3. בריה"מ הכירה בעובדה שנוצרה מעין אחדות ערבית בעמאן בנושא המערב וכי יש להתחשב בכך ולהשתלב בתהליך. מכאן שמניחים שאם יוכחו הסוביטים כי העמדות הנכונות של אש"ף פוגעות באחדות זו, הרי שיכסר להבאים

לידי ויתורים. בללית מעריכים שחל ביחדת במעמד אש"פ
במדסקבה שהחל עוד קודם לפיסגה, ומודברה העובדה שעראפאת
לא זכה ליחס שציפה לו בעת שהרחר במרסקבה בנרבמבר
שאז התקבל באחד מהרבה אורחים אחרים.

4. בשאלת יחסי בריה"מ- איראן, הדעה כאן שקיימת מידה
רבה של דיסאינפורמציה איראנית הטרשנת לשיפור יחסים
רציני כביכול כשהעובדות בשטח איכן תואמות תמונה
זו. אמנם קרימר מגעים ביקוראס ושיחות בעיקר בתחומי
מתוך הפעולה הכלכלי אלא שברובו של זה מוכנה
לשרותי זכן ארכיים דוגמת צנורות הנפט או מסילת הברזל.
גם בנושא האספקה הצבאית כנראה שמדובר באמל"ח קל
ולבד שכן איך עדויות לאספקת מערכות בשק עיקריות דוגמת
טנקים או טילים. הכל מעיד שבריה"מ מפתחת יחסים אלו
בזהירות ובאיטיות רבה תוך חשש מתמיד מחשש מתמיד
מהבלתי צפוי האיראני.

יורם שני.

אף

הפ: שהת, רהמ, שהבט, מכנל, ממנכל, סמנכל, ממז, רם, אמן, אירא, אירב,
אירג

16818 תאריך : 24.12.87

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

סודי כנס

4374

מדום:12,16818
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון,נר:215,תא:221287,זמן:1730,דת:ר,סג:ס
נד:ס

סודי/רגיל

אל:אירופה 2 מאפ'

דע:המרכז

מאת:הציר- יועץ, לונדון

ארגנדה, קוריה מ'האיחוד הדמוקרטי' בא לראותני:

1. סביר מחקשיים בהם נתקלת ארגנדה בנושא תובעת היבוא מקניה ובמיוחד של הנפט, יובילו לשיחות ולפשרה בל שהיא. מערבים עם זאת, שעל רקע הארועים בגבול נתקבלה החלטה קניתית לשמרת להחלטתה של מרטבני ומעורבתם בשנת תיגבר מעתה. בימים האחרונים נתקיימו גם מגעים עם קבוצתו בנושא אסקקה נשק.

2. קיבל ידיעות למיתם הגבירה גם לוב את מעורבותה ותשגרה שגרה לארגנדה צוותת אויר לובים. ציין אגב כך שאנשיו זיהו בעדה התעדפה הישן של אנטבה 4 מטוסי 'בוקסבט' לובים שיועדו להערבתם להמצבות עומק לעת הצורך.

3. מסר עוד שאנשי 'האיחוד' התליטו על הפעלת מחנת שידור בידת על-מנת להביץ מידע מהימן ולרגוש אמון האוכלוסיה הארגנדית.

יורם שני.

תא

תפ: שהח,מנכל,מחנכל,אירב,הדס,מאפ,ר/מרכז,מפד,רס,אמן

4350

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

א' בטבת תשמ"ח
22 בדצמבר 1987
סימוכין: 9363

103.3
ר"ס

אל: ארופה 2
מאת: הציר-יועץ, לונדון

הנדון: דיוני הפרלמנט: בריה"מ וזכויות האדם

לוטה עותקים משאלות ותשובות בע"פ ובכתב, שהועלו בדיוני הפרלמנט ב- 16/12 בנושאים הבאים:

א. זכויות האדם בבריה"מ.
ב. ועידת וינה.
ג. יחסי מזרח-מערב.
ד. ביקור גורבאצ'וב.
ה. יהדות בריה"מ.

בברכה,
יורם שבי

העתק: מזא"ר
המרכז

ISRAEL ישראל

Wednesday
16 December 1987

Volume 124
No. 66

HOUSE OF COMMONS
OFFICIAL REPORT

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

Oral Answers to Questions

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Soviet Union (Human Rights)

1. **Mr. Conway:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what further details have emerged about Soviet human rights violations over the last 12 months.

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Geoffrey Howe): We are monitoring Soviet human rights performance closely, and are aware that substantial abuses continue. I discussed these issues with Mr. Shevardnadze at Brize Norton on 7 December. While welcoming recent steps forward in Soviet performance, I stressed the need for further major progress in this area and handed over lists of individual cases about which we have received representations.

Mr. Conway: Bearing in mind that 51,000 Soviet Jews were allowed to emigrate in 1979, but as only 7,000 have been so allowed this year, will my right hon. and learned Friend tell the House whether his talks on 7 December gave reasonable hope that the Soviet Union might relax its stringent policy in this regard, and perhaps pay more respect to the human rights that we should all like to see develop in that country?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: The case that I was making to Mr. Shevardnadze, which we have continued to make to Soviet leaders on many occasions, is precisely that put by my hon. Friend.

Although the figures for Soviet Jewish emigration this year — 7,000 — are encouraging, they are very low compared with those achieved in the 1970s, with a peak of 51,000 in 1979. We shall continue to press the Soviet Union for more progress in that and every other aspect of human rights.

House of Commons

Wednesday 16 December 1987

Oral Answers to Questions

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Soviet Union (Human Rights)

Mr. Mullin: Will the Foreign Secretary explain what entitles us to lecture the Soviet Union on human rights, in the light of the number of innocent people in our own gaols? I refer in particular to the 11 innocent people convicted in connection with the Guildford and Woolwich pub bombings.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: Anyone who poses such a question must be blind to almost every aspect of the fact about both societies. The cases to which the hon. Gentleman refers, like any cases of that kind, can be — and are — the subject of massive and extensive public debate in a press that is entirely free; the subject of investigation in a Parliament that is entirely free; the subject of investigation in a court system; and, beyond that, subject to the surveillance of the European Commission of Human Rights, as is every other aspect of human rights. I urge the hon. Gentleman to go back to his school room and study the most elementary facts of international politics.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: Will my right hon. and learned Friend make urgent representations to the Israeli Government about the infringement of human rights of the Arabs, whose countries have been invaded——

Mr. Speaker: Order. Unfortunately, the question is about Soviet human rights.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: Yes, Mr. Speaker, but——

Mr. Speaker: But?

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: I was going to continue, Mr. Speaker, to ask my right hon. and learned Friend whether he would bear true regard to the effect of the influx of population from the Soviet Union to Israel, which resulted in deprivation of human rights among those whose land of birth has been invaded and abused by the military forces of the state of Israel.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I suppose that that question is remotely connected with the one on the Order Paper, and the answer is quite straightforward. In the interests of individual Soviet citizens of Jewish origin who wish to emigrate we shall continue to press the Soviet Union for freedom for those who wish to leave to be allowed to do so. That is an elementary component of the human rights case that we have pressed on the Soviet Union. With equal candour, we shall urge the Israelis to avoid all actions that may exacerbate conditions, create further obstacles to peace, increase the risk of confrontation and disregard the human rights of all the people who live in their territory. Our standards are the same and apply to both places in the same way.

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(HANSARD)

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Vienna Conference

2. **Rev. Martin Smyth:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he is satisfied with progress at the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, Vienna conference, and in particular with the response of the Eastern countries to the proposals in respect of the privacy and integrity of mails and communications put forward by the United Kingdom and other delegations.

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. David Mellor): No, Sir. Some progress has beem made in negotiations on a final document, but movement on human rights and contacts remain slow. There have been no significant developments on privacy and integrity of mails and telecommunications since my reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Bury, South (Mr. Sumberg) on 18 November, at column 599.

House of Commons

Wednesday 16 December 1987

Oral Answers to Questions

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Vienna Conference

Rev. Martin Smyth: Will the Minister accept my sympathy and understanding of his dissatisfaction that progress has not been made, as many of us are also dissatisfied? Does he accept that the article in *The Times* on 8 December about the Shapiro family is one that deserves attention? At this time of the year children all over the world are writing to Santa Claus asking for their Christmas wishes to be granted, and a little girl of 10 has written to Mr. Gorbachev asking that she and her family might be allowed to go to Israel to meet her grandparents whom she has never seen. Does he agree that that letter could be answered positively and will he encourage such an answer to be given?

Mr. Mellor: Yes. I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman. As part of the contact that we have with the Soviet authorities, we take the opportunity to put forward human rights cases in the hope that they can be resolved —a number have been—and to point out to leading figures in the Soviet Union that the growth of trust and confidence between East and West will take place only when human rights are as rigorously observed there as we try to ensure they are observed within our society.

Mr. Thorne: Is my hon. and learned Friend aware of the apparent connivance of the British Post Office in readily accepting the signatures of officials who sign receipts for registered mail in the Soviet Union? It is clear that that mail does not arrive. Should we not take further action in this country to ensure that we accept the signatures only of the people to whom the mail is addressed?

Mr. Mellor: My hon. Friend has raised an extremely important point. He will be glad to know that, as part of the Vienna CSCE process, we have tabled a document calling upon all participants to agree procedures that would mean that only the addressee, or an agent nominated by him—not one put up by the authorities—should be able to give a receipt in those circumstances. We believe that that and a number of other proposals put forward would guarantee much greater freedom for mail than we have any reason to believe exists at present.

Mr. James Lamond: The final document from Vienna has now been postponed for at least six months. Would progress there be much quicker if we were to recognise the spirit of Helsinki and realise that that conference consists of 35 nations of Europe and North America and not groups representing Eastern Europe, Western Europe and non-aligned countries? Should we not try to work together as countries of Europe and North America rather than as groups reflecting political philosophies?

Mr. Mellor: Even though quite a lot of work is done through groups, there are already 140 different proposals on the table and no sign yet that anyone is able to knock those proposals together into something that is acceptable to all. Obviously, we hope that, as the climate improves between East and West, it will be possible to make progress on those issues. None of us wants to see the groups outlive their usefulness. However, at the moment the only prospect of making any progress is by trying to build as large a consensus as possible within groups on matters that can be collectively discussed.

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(HANSARD)

Oral Answers to Questions

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

East-West Relations

4. **Mr. Soames:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a further statement on East-West relations.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: We welcome the results of the Washington summit and hope that the intermediate nuclear forces agreement will lead to further effective and verifiable arms control measures. The more stable and co-operative East-West relationship that we want also requires full Soviet respect for human rights and co-operation over regional conflicts, including early withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Mr. Sackville: Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that while Soviet citizens who apply to emigrate continue to be persecuted, and while religious and political dissidents continue to be subjected to imprisonment, systematic torture and psychiatric abuse, it would not be prudent to regard glasnost as anything more than another exercise in exploring the frontiers of Western gullibility?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: Certainly we should keep in mind the extent to which standards in the Soviet Union and in other Eastern European countries fall well short of those enjoined by the Helsinki agreement. At the same time, we must acknowledge that many subjects that were not previously under discussion are now open for discussion. We welcome that as an important step in the right direction. We want to take advantage of that increased openness to achieve the higher standards for which my hon. Friend rightly presses.

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FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Mr. Gorbachev (Visit)

15. **Mr. Maples:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what improvements in East-West relations he estimates will follow from the visit of Mr. Gorbachev to Britain.

Mr. Mellor: Mr. Gorbachev's visit to Britain permitted a review of the main issues in East-West relations, arms control, regional conflicts and human rights. It demonstrated both the considerable improvement in our own relations with the Soviet Union and the possibilities for wider co-operation if both sides are ready to discuss our problems openly and constructively.

Mr. Maples: May I congratulate my hon. and learned Friend on the positive and constructive role of the British Government, which was illustrated by Mr. Gorbachev's decision to visit Britain on his way to Washington last week? May I ask him to emphasise to Mr. Gorbachev the importance that the west attaches to the internal liberalisation of the Soviet Union and eastern Europe and the substantial contribution that that would make to our relations?

Mr. Mellor: The human dimension is vital to east-west relations and certainly will not be neglected in our discussions.

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(HANSARD)

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Soviet Union (Foreign Minister)

18. **Mr. Wallace:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs when he last met the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union; and what subjects were discussed.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I had talks with Mr. Shevardnadze on 7 December during Mr. Gorbachev's visit. In the short time available we discussed a number of questions relating to arms control, human rights, regional conflicts and Anglo-Soviet bilateral relations. I welcomed the United States-Soviet agreement on intermediate nuclear forces and the prospect of further arms control measures, but made clear that a solid improvement in East-West relations would also depend on parallel progress over human rights abuses and issues such as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Soviet Jewry

Mr. Dykes: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether during recent discussions with Mr. Gorbachev the plight of Soviet Jewry was raised.

Mr. Mellor: Yes. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister welcomed the recent increase in Jewish emigration, but pressed Mr. Gorbachev for further progress in this and other areas of human rights concern. My right hon. and learned Friend also raised these issues with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Shevardnadze, and handed over lists of cases about which recent representations have been made to the Government.

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Soviet Union (Human Rights)

41. **Mr. Nicholas Baker:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what representations he has made about the protection of human rights in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Mellor: My right hon. and learned Friend discussed human rights in the Soviet Union with Mr. Shevardnadze during talks on 7 December at Brize Norton and made clear the importance of a major improvement in Soviet performance for lasting confidence between East and West. He raised two bilateral family reunification cases and handed over updated lists of Soviet prisoners of conscience and Jewish refuseniks about whom we have received representations this year.

48. **Mr. Sackville:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what representations he has received about recent developments regarding human rights in the Soviet Union; and if he will make a statement.

53. **Sir George Young:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what representations he has made about human rights in the Soviet Union.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: We are monitoring Soviet human rights performance closely and are aware that substantial abuses continue. I discussed these issues with Mr. Shevardnadze at Brize Norton on 7 December. While welcoming recent steps forward in Soviet performance, I stressed the need for further major progress in this area and handed over lists of individual cases about which we have received representations.

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Anglo-Soviet Relations

43. **Mr. Leigh:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the United Kingdom's current relations with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Mellor: My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister paid a highly successful visit to the Soviet Union in March and held talks with Mr. Gorbachev in an excellent atmosphere on 7 December at Brize Norton. My right hon. and learned Friend will be visiting the Soviet Union early next year and other high-level visits in both directions are also planned. The current health of the relationship depends on mutual respect and frank speaking, including on issues such as human rights and Afghanistan.

51. **Mr. Andy Stewart:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on East-West relations.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: We welcome the results of the Washington summit and hope that the intermediate nuclear forces agreement will lead to further effective and verifiable arms control measures. The more stable and co-operative East-West relationship we want also requires Soviet respect for human rights and cooperation over regional conflicts, including early withdrawal from Afghanistan.

73. **Mr. Summerson:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the current state of Anglo-Soviet relations.

Mr. Mellor: My right hon. Friend, the Prime Minister, paid a highly successful visit to the Soviet Union in March and held talks with Mr. Gorbachev in an excellent atmosphere on 7 December at Brize Norton. My right hon. and learned Friend will be visiting the Soviet Union early next year and other high-level visits in both directions are also planned. The current health of the relationship depends on mutual respect and frank speaking, including on issues such as human rights and Afghanistan.

12681 המשרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 17.12.87

** נכנס שמור
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4104

מרזם:12,12681
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון,נר:180,תא:171287,זה:1800,דח:ב,סג:ש
נד:ש

בהול-שמור

103.3

אל:מנהל אירופה ב'

דע:ברנע

מאת:הציר לונדון

המצב בשטחים

בשיחה עם סיר דויד מייארס העליתי ענין החלטת מועביט והכרזה לפרסם הצהרה מטעם השרק על המצב בשטחים. אמרתי כי החלטה והודעות חד צדדיות יעודדו את המסיתים להפגנות וישפיעו לרעה על המאמצים הרציניים שאנו עושים כדי להרגיע את הרוחות. מייארס אמר כי הם לא רוצים החלטה חד צדדית אינם רוצים בהחלטה תעמולתית או בהחלטה שתתקבל ברוטו אמריקני. ישנה כבר הצעה מתוקנת הנמצאת בבדיקה. לגופו של ענין אמר הם מאד מודאגים מהתפתחויות בשטחים. לפי שעה יש רק הד צנוני בעתונות שאינכו מתורגם ללחץ פוליטי אך ההד בתקשורת בעתונות ובטלויזיה יוצרים תזמית שלילית מאד לישראל. מדיניותם בוטאה בצורה מוסכמת עי מלוד אמש בפרלמנט. (מלוד אמר כי ממבריטניה מקודה שכוחותיכו יגיבו בצורה הומנית ובלתי מאסלמת הראיל ותשוב לא להגביר את מעגל האלימות. הם מגנים אלימות מאיזה צד שלא יבוא.. האלימות מצביעה על הסכנה הטמונה בסכסוך מתמשך ואת הדחיפות של חיפוש הנדר בר קימא באזור. בטוח ארוך לא יכול להיות בטחון לישראל אם ברגע כמעט חמישים אחוז ואחכ' יותר מתמיעים אחוז מאזרחיה יהיו ערבים כפהרבה מהם לא חשים שהם צריכים להכלל בישראל. טקסט מדויק נשביר לכשנקבלו). אמרתי

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למייארס שבעבר היינו עדין להתפרצויות אלימות ואלה
גלים עולים וירודים. אנו נוהגים במירב האיפוק אולם
אנו לא יכולים לסכן חיי חיילינו. פרטתי הכתוב בחוזם
11856 על מדיניות והתנהגות ברחוב הבטחון. מייארס
אמר כי אי אפשר להתעלם מהעובדה שעד לרעידת עמאן יד
המתרגים היתה על העליונה בעת הרושם בעולם הערבי הוא
שמישראל מונעת רעידה בינלאומית ויד הקיצוניים מתגברת.
אמרתי כי ההקריות התפתחו מאירועים מקומיים והם נוצלו
עי ארגוני נרור המסיתים להמשכם. אין ממבריטניה צריכה
לעודד ההליך זה.

רביב

א

תפ: שהה,רהם,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,אירא,אירב,ליאור,
מזתים,אביטל,הסברה,ברנע,ארבל2,ממד

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

12667

תאריך : 17.12.87

בלמס

בכבס

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תדם:12/12667
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/גר:177/תא:171287/דת:1800/דת:מ/סג:ב
נד:ם

בלמס/מידי

אל:אירופה 2

מאת:שתרכות לונדון

התיחסות משמת הבריטי לאי השקט בשטחים.

להלן הודעת הפוראוף בתשובה לשאלה במסיבת העתונאים
ם 14.12:

OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, SPOKESMAN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE DISCUSSING THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS LATER TODAY. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS CONSERNED AT THE UPSURGE OF VIOLENCE AND DEPLORED THE RECENT DEATHS. SPOKESMAN URGED ALL SIDES TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT. HE ADDED THAT THE CONTINUING SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE REINFORCED YET AGAIN THE NEED FOR PROGRESS ON A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE AREA.

א

תפ: עתת/רתמ/שתבט/מנכל/מתנכל/ר/מרכז/רם/אמן/ליאור/מזתים/
אירא/אירב/אביטל/מעת/הסברה/המז

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16 December 1987

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4852

HOUSE OF COMMONS
OFFICIAL REPORT

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

Written Answers to Questions

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Gulf War

16. **Mr. Corbett:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what reports he has received on the use of chemical warfare in the Gulf conflict.

Mr. David Mellor: A report by a United Nations inspection team confirmed that chemical weapons had been used in April by Iraq against Iranian troops and civilians. It also mentions chemical weapons injuries to Iraqi troops, but it is unable to aportion blame. There were unconfirmed reports of further chemical weapons use by Iraq in October. We unreservedly condemn all use of chemical weapons, and we are in the forefront of moves to obtain a global ban on these hideous weapons.

26. **Mr. Page:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what further steps he is taking to seek to bring to an end the conflict in the Gulf.

Mr. Mellor: We continue to believe that the best hope of achieving a lasting peace in the Gulf is through the immediate implementation of Security Council resolution 598 in full. To this end, we fully support the United Nations secretary general in his efforts to obtain compliance by Iran and Iraq.

We are also playing a leading role in discussions on implementation of Security Council resolution 598 within the Security Council. Along with others, we are pressing for work to begin on enforcement measures, as agreed by the Foreign Ministers of the Five on 25 September. My right hon. and learned Friend raised this most recently with Mr. Shevardnadze on 7 December.

57. **Mr. Michael Welsh:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will seek to convene a meeting of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to try to find a way of ending the Gulf war.

Mr. Mellor: The Five Foreign Ministers met in New York on 25 September and agreed a twin-track approach to ending the conflict via the implementation of Security Council resolution 598. The secretary general would continue his efforts to persuade Iran and Iraq to comply with resolution 598 whilst the representatives of the Five worked on enforcement measures. The representatives of the Five in New York continue to meet to monitor progress on the first track, and we seek to begin serious work on the second. We continue to believe that this approach offers the best way forward.

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Iran-Iraq War

32. **Mr. Carrington:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on progress in attempting to bring about a ceasefire between Iraq and Iran.

Mr. Mellor: The secretary general has now received preliminary responses from Iran and Iraq to his detailed plan for the implementation of Security Council resolution 598, of which a ceasefire is the first and crucial element. He has had recent discussions on this with emissaries from Tehran and Baghdad. However, there is unfortunately little sign of progress. We are continuing to press for early work on enforcement measures in case the secretary general's untiring efforts are not successful.

Gulf (Navigation Rights)

50. **Sir Giles Shaw:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps he is taking to seek to promote recognition of the right to freedom of navigation in the Gulf.

Mr. Mellor: We have consistently stressed our determination to uphold the vitally important principle of freedom of navigation in international waters and straits used for international navigation. Support for this principle in the Gulf is demonstrated tangibly by the presence of vessels from the Royal Navy and other navies. We also take every opportunity to promote widespread recognition that freedom of navigation in the Gulf is an important interest of the whole international community.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

11342 תאריך: 16.12.87

נכנס בלמס

6115

חוזם:12,11342
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון,נר:155,תא:161287,זח:1200,דח:מ,סג:ב
נד:8

103.3

בלמס/מידי

אל: מעת'

דע: אירופה 2

מאת: הסברה/לונדון

להלן מאמר מערכת שהתפרסם הבוקר ב''טיימס'' בכותרת:
THE PERES SOLUTION

THE VIOLENCE IN THE GAZA STRIO OVER THE PAST SEVEN DAYS IS THE MOST SUSTAINED UOTBREAK SINCE GAZA WAS OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL, IN SELF-DEFENCE, TWO DECADES AGO. THE TWO SIDES DISPUTE THE REASON UNDERLYING THE CURRENT UNREST. ACCORDING TO ISRAELI SOURCES IT IS THE REACTION TO A CLAMP-SOWN BY BORDER POLICE AN ACTION WHICH WAS INTENDED TO PREVENT THE GAZA STRIP AND A REFUGEE CAMP ON THE WEST BANK FROM BECOMING ''NO-GO'' AREAS FOR THE ISRAELI OCCUPYING FORCES. THE PALESTINIANS WOULD HAVE IT THAT THE MEW, TOUGH POLICE ATTITUDE IS A REACTION TO THE HANG-GLIDER ATTACK ON ISRAEL LAST MONTH WHICH KILLED SIX ISRAELI SERVICEMEN.

WHAT IS NOT IN DISPUTE IS THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF TEENAGE PALESTINIANS, POSSIBLY URGED ON BY THE PLO YOUTH MOVEMENT AND INFLAMED BY ISLAMIC FEVOUR ARE MOUNTING VIOLENT PROTESTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE RESPONSE FROM THE ISRAELI ARMY

HAS BEEN RATHER TOUGHER THAN APPEARS WARRANTED.
RATHER THAN MOUNTING A GRADUATED ATTACK ON YOUNG
PALESTINIANS THROWING STONES, STARTING WITH TEAR
GAS AND BATONS. ISRAELI SOLDIERS APPEAR TO HAVE
SHOT TO KILL FROM THE START. DOUBTLESS THE POSSIBILITY
OF USING RIOT POLICE, WHO UNDERSTAND CROWD CONTROL
RATHER THAN YOUNG CONSCRIPTS WILL TURN ITS ATTENTION
WHEN THE PRESENT DISTURBANCES END. BUT THERE IS
A DEEPER ISSUE AT STAKE THAN HOW THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES SHOULD BE POLICED: THE POLITICAL FUTURE
OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP. SINCE COMING UNDER
ISRAELI DOMINION WITH THE 1967 WAR, THE PALESTINIANS
IN THESE TWO STRETCHES OF LAND- WHO NUMBER MORE
THAN 1.25 MILLION - HAVE LIVED IN A POLITICAL LIMBO.
THE ISRAELIS LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT THEY HAVE ENJOYED
GREATER MATERIAL BENEFITS THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN
POSSIBLE UNDER ANY ARAB GOVERNMENT. THAT IS TRUE.
MANY THOUSANDS OF ARABS FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND
THE WEST BANK TRAVEL DAILY TO WORK IN ISRAEL.
BUT THIS HAS NOT ELIMINATED THEIR DESIRE FOR A POLITICAL
VOICE AND, IDEALLY, A PALESTINIAN HOMELAND. FOR
DEMOGRAPHIC REASONS, THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF
THESE PALESTINIANS BEING ABSORBED INTO ISRAEL AS
FULL CITIZENS WITH VOTING RIGHTS. WHEN THE TOTAL
NUMBER OF ARABS ALREADY LIVING IN ISRAEL IS COMBINED
WITH THOSE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, IT ACCOUNTS
FOR ABOUT 45 PERCENT OF THECURRENT ISRAELI POPULATION.
BY THE END OF THE CENTURY, THAT WILL RISE TO ABOUT
50 PER CENT. THE EASIEST OPTION FOR THE ISRAELI
GOVERNMENT IS TO LEAVE THE SITUATION AS IT IS AND
CONTINUE TO OPERATE, IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
A SYSTEM WHICH IS AKIN TO ARARTHEID IN CREATING
A LARGE GROUP WITHOUT POLITICAL REPRESENTATION.
YET THIS POLICY MAKES IT EASIER FOR DEMAGOGUES
AND RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISTS TO EXPLOIT YOUNG
PEOPLE AND PROVOKE THE ISRAELIS INTO EXCESSES.
IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THOUGH THAT THESE EXCESSES
ARE MILD IN COMPARISON WITH THE WAY THAT MOBS ARE
DEALT WITH IN ARAB COUNTRIES, AND WOULD BE DEALT
WITH IN ANY INDEPENDENT PALESTINE. BUT WE DO NOT
JUDGE ISRAEL BY THE STANDARDS OF SUCH COUNTRIES.
A SECOND OPTION, FAVOURED BY ISRAEL'S FAR RIGHT

IS TO INSTITUTE A POLICY OF MASS EXPULSION. A
THIRD -INTERIM-OPTION WOULD BE FOR THE ISRAELIS
TO TAKE UP THE SUGGESTION OF MR. SHIMON PERES TO
HOLD AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE PALESTINIAN
PROBLEM - AN IDEA STRONGLY BACKED BY BRITAIN.
IT MUST BE HOPED THAT THE CURRENT VIOLENCE WILL
STRENGTHEN, RATHER THAN DETER,MR PERES' MANY SUPPORTERS
IN ISRAEL IN THEIR BILIEF THAT IT IS TIME TO
SEEK AN ACCOMMODATION ON THE PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIANS.

יעל רובינשטיין

יור

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,אמן,אירא,איר,
הסברה,מעת,מתאמשטחים,מזת'ים

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

11346 תאריך : 16.12.87

נכנס בלמס

4116

חוזם:12,11346
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון,נר:156,תא:161287,זח:1300,דח:מ,סג:ב
נד:8

בלמס/מ'ד'

אל: מעת

דע: אירופה 2

מאת: הסברה/לונדון

להלן מאמר המערכת שהתפרסם הבוקר ב''אינדפנדנט''

HOPELESS IN GAZA
THE GAZA STRIP IS A SYNONYM FOR DESPAIR. IN A PIECE OF LAND SOME 30 MILES LONG BY SIX MILES WIDE ARE CRAMMED MORE THAN HALF A MILLION PEOPLE, TWO THIRD OF THEM LIVING IN MOST BASIC CONDITIONS IN REFUGEE CAMPS, DEPENDENT ON THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THEIR BARE SUBSISTENCE, FOR EDUCATION, AND EVEN TO REPRESENT THEIR CASE TO THE WORLD. EACH DAY, 40 000 OF THEM TRAVEL INTO ISRAEL PROPER, MANY TO TAKE PART IN A DEGRADING PRE-DAWN LABOUR AUCTION WHERE ISRAELI EMPLOYERS TAKE ONLY THE FITTEST AND CHEAPEST. IT WAS AN ACCIDENT INVOLVING AN ISRAELI ARMY TRUCK IN WHICH FOUR OF THESE GAZA WORKERS WERE KILLED THAT SPARKED OFF THE PRESENT UNREST SO FAR, NINE PALESTINIANS HAVE BEEN KILLED, AS RIOTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS FEED UPON THEMSELVES.
THE BASIC CAUSES OF THE TROUBLE IN GAZA ARE EASY TO UNDERSTAND. BEFORE 1967 THE STRIP WAS ADMINISTRATED BY EGYPT, WHICH TEARED THIS CONCENTRATION OF PALESTINI

ANS ON ITS BORDER JUST AS MUCH AS THE ISRAELIS FEAR THEM NOW. THE RESULT WAS CONTRUCTIVE NEGLECT BY CAIRO. A POLICY OF CONTAINING POTENTIAL TROUBLE BY KEEPING THE PEOPLE OF GAZA PENNED IN. IT IS A POLICY WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAVE COPIED AND IMPROVED UPON, EVEN MORE FEARFUL OF THIS RESERVOIR OF VIOLENCE IN THEIR MIDST. BACK IN THA LATE 1960S, LIFE IN GAZA WAS DANGEROUS FOR BOTH ISRAELI ADMINISTRATORS AND THE FIRST SETTLERS - SETTLERS IN AN AREA WHERE THE POPULATION DENSITY IS 1,500 TO THE SQUARE KILOMETRE. AN EXTRIMIST PALESTINIAN GUERRILLA GROUP THE POPULAR FRONT, HAD LEFT CELLS BEHIND, AND SHOOT, AMBUSH AND SABOTAGE, THE NOST RUTHLESS OF ALL ISRAELI GENERALS, ARIEL SHARON, WAS SENT TO SUBJUGATE THE STRIP. HE DID SO BY BULLDOZING WIDE SWATHES OF CLEAR ROADS THROUGH THE TEEMING SHANTY TOWNS, DESTROYING DWELLINGS AND UPROOTING PEOPLE. HE CREATED USEFUL FIELDS OF FIRE, ACCESS FOR MILITARY VEHICLES, AND AN ENDURING LOATHING FOR ALL THINGS ISRAELI. THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL, WHICH IN MANY PARTS OF THE ARAB WORLD HAS PASSED ITS PEAK, IS ONLY NOW REACHING IT IN THE GAZA STRIP: LIVING IN DEGRADATION AND FRUSTRATION, THE YOUNG MEN HAVE TURNED TO ISLAM AFTER THE FAILURE OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION TO DO ANYTHING TO IMPROVE THEIR LOT. ISRAEL HAS ANSWERED THE VIOLENCE WITH BULLETS. FOR REASONS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THE ISRAELIS SEND POLICE AND TROOPS ARMED ONLY WITH RIFLES AND LIVE AMMUNITION AGAINST SCHOOL-CHILDREN THROWING STONES. PERHAPS FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS, PERHAPS BECOUSE OF PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS UNCLEAR TO THE REST OF THE WORLD, THE ISRAELI AUTHORITI ES HAVE ESCHEWED THE USE OF SHIELDS, WATER CANNON BARRICADES AND WEIGHT OF NUMBER IN FAVOUR OF LIVE AMMUNITION AND IMMEDIATE PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT OF YOUTH CAUGHT IN RIOT AREAS. THE RESULT OF IT ALL IS A CYCLE OF VIOLENCE WHICH BRUTALISES THE ISRAELI FORCES WHILE IT COWS THE DEMONSTRATORS.

THE TRAGEDY IS THAT THERE IS NO PRESCRIPTION FOR PEACE IN GAZA, NO MAGIC FORMULA WHICHCAN BE INVOKED TO STILL THE PASSIONS, MAKE LIFE ENDURABLE AT LEAST AND PAVE THE WAY FOR A PEACEFUL FUTURE. THE LONG

TERM GOOD OF ISRAEL DEMANDS AN AMELIORATION OF
THE CONDITIONS IN GAZA, UNHAPPILY, SHOTR-TERM POLITICAL
CONSIDERATIONS MAKE IT UNLIKELY THAT WILL HAPPEN.
IN FEW OTHER PLACES CAN FORECASTS OF CONTINUED
HORROR BE SO CONFIDENTLY MADE.

יעל רובינשטיין

יור

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,אמן,איראא,איר,
מזת"ם,הסברה,מעת,מתאמשטח"ם

BBC RADIO 4 PROGRAMME "THE WORLD THIS WEEKEND" - SUNDAY, 13TH DECEMBER 1987
ITEM CONCERNING PROPOSED ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS IN AUSTRIA OF 'ANSCHLUSS'
REPORT BY DIANA GOODMAN
PRESENTED BY GORDON CLOUGH

4338

GORDON CLOUGH
In March 1948 Austria became part of the German Reich, it was the 'Anschluss'. It is obviously a significant anniversary and the Austrians are trying to decide how best to commemorate it but equally obviously that's a difficult decision because of the contradiction between the enthusiasm with which Hitler was received and the fact that Austria was declared by the Allies, to have been the first victim of his expansionist policies.

Things have been made even more difficult by the election of President Waldheim and the controversy that's stirred up about attitudes in Austria to the country's past. Our Bonn Correspondent, Diana Goodman, went to Austria to compile this report:-

DIANA GOODMAN
When Hitler's army marched into Austria on March 11th 1938 Paul Gross was just thirteen years old. Today he's the President of the Jewish Community in Vienna, having survived the Holocaust because he was hidden. All these years later he's still visibly moved by the memory of what happened after Hitler arrived.

PAUL GROSS
I wasn't so much fear at the beginning but were depressed because so many people who were our neighbours and we thought we were in good with them, all of a sudden turned out that they didn't love us at all it seemed. I would say they hated us and within a fortnight the house had to be Judenrent (?) - free of Jews. One day walking to school I heard that Hitler would pass by and ... it and so I crawled up on one of the street cars to see that he was riding by in a black limousine in his uniform and cheers, cheers - everybody cheered - and I was afraid naturally and lost in a sea of happiness. I knew that he is bad for me but I didn't know that he was bad for everyone.

DIANA GOODMAN
And it's the welcome which Hitler received which makes it so difficult for Austrians to justify the Moscow Declaration made by the Allies which spoke of Austria being the first victim. There was some brave resistance of course but reports at the time told how many Austrians were delighted to see the persecution of Jews and other undesirables. Dr Peter Eppel, an historian with the Archive of the Austrian Resistance says all of this will come up again because of the Anschluss anniversary.

DR PETER EPPEL
It's going to be difficult because some people who live in Austria were victims and other people who live in Austria were people who persecuted those victims and then there is a large majority of people who did nothing for and nothing against national socialism and also many of these people have very ambiguous feelings about the idea of dealing with those times.

DIANA GOODMAN
The Austrian Government is taking the anniversary so seriously that it's set up a top level committee, headed by the Chancellor Dr France Vinitsky. Outsiders might consider it unfortunate that one idea being considered is that President Waldheim should address a special sitting of Parliament but there will also be historical exhibitions and seminars and Dr Vinitsky is keen that Austria should cease the opportunity finally to come to terms with its past.

DR FRANCE VINITSKY
After the War Austrians did not bother very much about what happened to their fellow Austrians who had to leave the country in 1938. Almost nobody asked what happened to them; where have they been, are they still alive; do they need help etc? And I think we have to deal with that in a very open minded and outright and frank attitude. So 1988 must not be used to sweep rubbish under the carpet - just the opposite - lift the carpet and open the windows, open the doors to do everything to avoid anything like that to come back to this country and to its population.

DIANA GOODMAN
How much more difficult do you think the whole thing is going to be because of the fact that President Waldheim is the President at this time?

DR FRANCE VINITSKY
This will be a point which one cannot completely let out for discussion but without being naively optimistic there will be a good chance that it's not going to be the major point.

DIANA GOODMAN
There seems little hope though that Dr Vinitsky's optimism will be rewarded. At the Salzburg Festival for example, the organisers are already bracing themselves for anti-Waldheim demonstrations. Like Austria, the Festival has a difficult past. In 1938 Jewish composers and performers were banned but the Austrian nobility never withdrew their patronage. According to Dr Richard Schober, there's no reason why President Waldheim should not enjoy the music at Salzburg along with everyone else. He's President of the Austrian Veterans Association and he's not alone in suggesting that the rest of Europe failed Austria in its hour of need.

DR RICHARD SCHOBER
Of course March 1938 is a very sad day for Austria because that was when our country lost its independence but when you're considering the Austrian situation it's important to say clearly that the Allies were at fault for not doing anything to help Austria even though there were cries for help in the years leading up to 1938 and in 1938 itself. Naturally we are great friends with the Allies today but I have to say that if Britain had taken some action then, the outcome would have been very different.

DIANA GOODMAN
Many young Austrians though say all of that is now irrelevant. Among them, Dr Jorg Heider, who's the fresh faced leader of the increasingly successful Right Wing Freedom Party. He grows impatient with discussions about Austria's past and he dismisses claims that once again there's growing anti-semitism in the country.

DR JORG HEIDER
In Austria we are sure that ethnic groups inside State community and enrich this community and we have to do strong measures to support their existence. I am sure that anti-semitism in Austria exists only in the newspapers.

DIANA GOODMAN
Young Jews like Martin Engleberg though, say that anti-semitism is as Austrian as the Sachertorte.

MARTIN ENGLEBERG
Anybody who really dares to say that there is no anti-semitism in Austria is just lying to himself and lying to the public and lying to everybody and with that is hindering again a psycho-analysis of the Austrians. Some politicians in view of 1988 would like to just erase anti-semitism from the face of Austria but this is something which you just hide with the makeup and in 1989 will be gone and the face of Austria will be again the old one.

DIANA GOODMAN
Back at the Jewish Community Centre, Paul Gross is more hopeful about what the anniversary could mean.

PAUL GROSS
This anniversary will be a chance for everybody involved so to say, to think again. People don't want to come to grips with their past, don't want to acknowledge what happened, don't want to be confronted with the facts that they were part of a system that was inhumane. This is the game that is being played in Austria and even if not a question of guilt is being put to them, not "I have sinned" but to say what happened then was wrong. Their knowledge and willingness to acknowledge - this is the sin.

4297

Zapbile

CHANNEL 4 NEWS - FRIDAY 11TH DECEMBER 1987
EXTRACT OF INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE
- POST GORBACHEV/REAGAN SUMMIT
INTERVIEWER: PETER SISSENS

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PETER SISSENS
Do you think it will be wise to link say, Afghanistan to the achievements of a deal on strategic weapons?

SIR GEOFFREY HOWE
I think a linkage of that kind is not a sensible thing to do. What one can say, is what I've said many times - that the whole prospect of progress depends upon building confidence between the two sides and I've identified three things as being the touch-stones of confidence; one, how far can we get headway on verification? Well in this INF deal there's been very good progress made on verification. Two, how far are we making ... headway on human rights? There, so far, not so very good but we're keeping at it and three, are we making headway on setting free the people of Afghanistan? No real progress there yet. So we have to go on working at all of these things. The greater our success on any of them, the greater the foundation of trust, the better the prospects for the future.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

סודי

מבנם

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מרזם:12/5708
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:127/תא:111287/דת:1400/דת:ד/סג:ס
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סודי/דחוף

אל:אירופה 2, מאיר

דע:מרכז

מאת:הציר-יועץ לונדון

אוגנדה.

קראתי מ"מאיחוד הדמוקרטי של אוגנדה" קבל זה עתה דיווח מודיעיני צבאי מהשטח בלהלן:-

1.מספר הלובים באוגנדה ברגע 1200. לצידם כ-110 קרונים הנמצאים תחת ניסוי של יערן שכני אזרחי. מכונאים מזרח-גרמנים עוסקים בהרכבת מטוסים ליד שדה-התעופה בנאקסונגולה. צבון קוריאנים מסיעים בהדרכה צבאית ובהשגרה אידיאולוגית.

2. בידי הצבא האוגנדי 9 מטילי רקטות (40) קנים ששבע ממהם מסוקמים ליד קמפלה ו-8 מסוקי תקיפה. תוחתי 122 מ"מ וטילי סאם 7 ממוקמים בקרבת הגבול עם קניה ונמצאים בסיכוח לובי.

3. מוסבני מתיר לאנשי המאוקנדה לעבור דרך אוגנדה ללוב וחזרה לקבלת אימון צבאי וכן מצייד האנשים בדרכונים אוגנדיים.

מנ"

תנ: שהת,מנבל,ממנבל,איר,הדק,מאמר/מרכז,ממד,רם

שדר בכנס **
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3957

חדם:12/6961
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/בר:101/תא:091287/דת:1500/דח:מ/שג:ש
נד:@

103.1

מדר/מידי

אל:מנהל אירופה ב'

מאת:הציר לונדון

מפגש תאצ'ר -גורבצ'וב בבריאת נורטון (7.12)

המפגש נולד כשהתברר שמטוסו של גורבצ'וב יצטרך לתדלק בדרך לארה"ב.

תאצ'ר הזמינה את גורבצ'וב לתישאר בבתים של חיל האויר המלכותי ומנהיג ברה"מ הסכים ברצון למפגש. שברר 30 שנה מאז הביקור האחרון של מנהיג סובייטי על אדמת בריטניה. בבואה למפגש היתה תאצ'ר מצוידת בהצהרת קרמלין של תמיכת השוק בהסכם INF ויכלה לדבר בשם אירופה.

פירוק נשק גרעיני

הנושא המרכזי בשיחה היה תמיכה בהסכם ה- INF ובחינה ראשונית של השלב הבא. בהר"מ של צמצום הנשק הגרעיני (START).
גישתה של תאצ'ר להמשך המו"מ מבוססת על האלמנטים הבאים:

1) היא תומכת בהסכם בין שתי המעצמות על המשך קיום ההתחייבויות תחת הסכם ה- ABM לתקופה מוגבלת. היא מציעה ל-7 שנים.

2) הסכם בין ארה"ב וברה"מ על לוח זמנים קבוע מראש

למחקר ה-

SDI כן שיובטח שאף אחת משתי מעצמות העל אינה שואפת להשיג עליונות על השניה. דברי גורבצ'וב שאישרו שגם ברה"מ עוסקת במחקר "מלחמת הכוכבים" חיזקו את עמדתה בנידון.

3) תאצ'ר רואה בהסכם של צמצום בחמישים אחוז של הטילים האיסטרטגיים קו אדום. היא מאמינה שאסור למערב לחצות את הקו הזה הואיל והיריבות בין הקומוניזם למערב יימשך ואסור שארה"ב והמערב יתפרקו מנשק גרעיני בכלל. בלשונה:

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD NEVER BE DISINVENTED

ואם יהיה נסיון להתפרק בליל מנשק גרעיני תגבר הסכנה של מלחמה קונבנציונלית כשכל צד יכסה להגיע ראשון לנשק גרעיני. משיבה זו היא הגיבה עמדה נוקשה כשגורבצ'וב הציע שלום שהמאגר הגרעיני של בריטניה ייכלל בשיחות של צמצום החימוש הגרעיני. היא עומדת בתוקף של כך שבריטניה תמשיך להיות מעצמה גרעינית. היא מבחינה בין אירופה הרפשית מנשק גרעיני ואירופה חופשית ממלחמות.

4) לדעת תאצ'ר שלבי המו"מ צריכים להיות: הסכם ה-INF, הסכם על צמצום הנשק האסטרטגי ב-50 אחוז, הסכם על ביטול הנשק הכימי, הסכם על צמצום בנשק קונבנציונלי, הסכם על המשך מחקר ה- SDI.

בעמדה זו היא דבקה מאז ביקורה במוסקבה במרס 1987.

תאצ'ר של גורבצ'וב

לדעת תאצ'ר גורבצ'וב הוא מנהיג שרנה מכל מנהיג סובייטי אחר שהכרנו וניתן לשוחח ולהתווכח עמו על כל נושא. המתמחויות הכלכליות בתוך ברה"מ תפסו חלק ניכר מהשיחה. היא תומכת בפרסטרויקה ובגלסנוסט ובדיסטרויקה ותיארה את גורבצ'וב כ-

" BOLD DETERMINED AND COURAGEOUS "

יש לשמה המשלהמת בין שני המנהיגים השפעה ישירה על

6963 תאריך : נשבר.מחוץ-למחלקת הקשר

סודי נכנס **
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3958

מרזם:12,6963
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון,נר:109,תא:091287,דת:1800,דח:מ,סג:ס
נד:ם

103.3
ברק

סודי/מידי

אל:מנהל אירופה ב', לשכת שה"ח, מדא"ר

מאת:ציר-יועץ מדיני השגרירות לונדון

ביקור גורבאצ'וב
משיחת השגריר עם אלן מונרו-ס/מנכל הפוראוף. נבחר עודדת איפית והח"מ.

1.לבקשת השגריר ,מירט מנרו את מהלך הפגישות ב-7/12:
א. שיחת רה"מ-גורבאצ'וב
בדיעבד הועלו שני נושאים בלבד. בראש צמצום הנשק והיבטים השונים של המאזן בין הנושים גזל את מרבית הזמן. ההדגש הבריטי היה בשילוב ההדרגתי של צמצום הנשק הגרעיני במקביל עם סוגי הנשק האחרים קרי הכימי והקונבנציונאלי.

בנושא איומת הביטוח בשטח, היתה תחושה גוברת של בטחון ביכולת לעשות זאת.

נושא זכויות האדם הועלה ע"י רה"מ במיוחד בהיבט ההגירה היהודית מבריה"מ בזכל איחוד משפחות. רה"מ עיבחה ההתקדמות שחלה בחודשים האחרונים, תוך הרצון שהתהליך יימשך ויגבר. גורבאצ'וב הביב באיפוק תוך הקביעה שיצטרכו לעשות את שיעורם שלהם.

רה"מ מצאה את גורבאצ'וב במצב רוח חיובי ותחושתה הברורה כי קיימת מציזר מחויבות מבורשת להמשך "הגלסנוסט והפרסטרויקה".

ב.שיחות האו- שברדנצה.
לאחר שעברדנצה קבע שליחים הבילטרלים בין בהים לבריטניה יש כבר דינמיקה משל עצמה נדון במרבית הזמן נושא צמצום הנשק כאשר העמדה הבריטית הדגשה יותר. ההגובה הסובייטית בנושאי הנשק הבימי והקרבבצירבאלי '' לא היתה נגטיבית''.

בנושא זכויות האדם נדון בהרחבה דשה'ח העלה גם רשימת שמות מעודכנת. שברדנצה שברדנצה קבע שבריה'ם מעדניכת בדיון רציני בנושא זכויות האדם ואף הבטה את תשומת הלב לראיון גורבצ'וב לרשת אן.בי סי הדגיש את עניין טעיף ''בטחון המדינה'' הון הערה שמדינות רבות נרקגות בן. שה'ח האר בטל הערה זו לחלוטין בסקום.

בנושא הסנרץ הועלה כשהאר הדגיר את הסכם במרשביים לגבי 596 והצורך במימוש ההחלטה ובצעדים נוספים. שברדנצה הסכים עקרונית אולם קבע שלדעתם לא מרצו עדיין כל הדרכים והמזכ'ל טרם סיים את טיפולו.

בסיכום הוחלט:-
א) שה'ח האו יבקר במדסקבה בנראה בסבבראר.
ב) סובס סדר יום ובו נושאים אזוריים לרבות תוליין השלום.

מנדר עוד הוסיף שזכויות האדם יועלו רשה'ח יגיש עם רשימה מעודכנת לזמן הנגישה.

2) השגריר הודה במילים חמות לרה'ם ולשה'ח על שמצאו בנרק הזמן הקצר את ההזדמנות לדון בנושא זכויות האדם ויהודי בריה'ם דבר שהיוה למעשה את האחד מהון שניים או שלושה הנושאים שהועלו בסגש. בשמה לאחר מכן ניתח השגריר את ראיון גורבצ'וב תוך הבעת דאגה לגבי העתיד והצורך להמשיך ולדרוש בנושא זה ללא הרף.

יורם שני.

אאסף

תפ: שהה,רהם,שהבט,מנבל,ממנבל,סמנבל,ממד,רם,אסן,אירב,אירג,
אירא,נרב

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

יז' בכסליו תשמ"ח
8 בדצמבר 1987
סימוכין: 2326

אל: ארופה 2
מאת: הציר-יועץ, לונדון.

הנדון: דיוני הפרלמנט: רוה"מ

לרוה עותקים משאלות ותשובות שהועבר לרוה"מ ב- 1/12
בנושאים הבאים:

1. בני הערובה הצרפתים.
2. זכויות האדם בבריה"מ.

בברכה,
יורם מנ'.

העתק: המרכז
מזאר

Tuesday
1 December 1987

Volume 123
No. 55

HOUSE OF COMMONS
OFFICIAL REPORT

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

Oral Answers to Questions

PRIME MINISTER

Mr. Hargreaves: Many hon. Members and many thousands of people throughout the country who have been campaigning for Anna Chertkova who has been imprisoned in a psychiatric hospital in Russia for 13 years simply for being a Christian will share my delight at the recent announcement that she is likely to be released in January. When my right hon. Friend meets Mr. Gorbachev will she thank him for the progress in Anna's case so far? Will she also urge him to ensure that the release takes place?

The Prime Minister: I share my hon. Friend's hope that Mrs. Chertkova will be released. I am aware that a number of people have been released since I went to Moscow and indeed before that—*[Interruption.]* I am surprised that Opposition Members find this a laughing matter.

I left a long list of cases with the Soviet Government and a number of people have been released. However, there are many thousands more inside. We hope that Mrs. Chertkova will indeed be released in January. It will be a comparatively short meeting on Monday, at which I shall not be able to raise individual cases although, of course, human rights will be raised, as always.

Tuesday
1 December 1987

Volume 123
No. 55

HOUSE OF COMMONS
OFFICIAL REPORT

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

Oral Answers to Questions

PRIME MINISTER

Mr. Brittan: In view of yesterday's deeply deplorable French hostage deal, will my right hon. Friend take the opportunity today of re-affirming the Government's long-standing policy of not doing such deals with terrorists or their sponsors? Does my right hon. Friend agree that such deals virtually guarantee that more hostages will be taken in future?

The Prime Minister: I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend that treating with terrorists only leads to more kidnappings and violence. That is why we will not do that. The best defence against terrorists is to make it clear that we will never give in to their demands. That has been, and will continue to be, our policy.

Mr. Steel: When the Prime Minister goes to the European summit in Copenhagen next week will she raise this matter, as the European Community is supposed to have a common policy in this respect?

The Prime Minister: The matter is bound to come up at the European summit later this week. I shall reiterate our policy then. I believe our policy is the best policy and the only policy to defeat terrorists.

3982

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

103.3

יז' בכסליו תשמ"ח
8 בדצמבר 1987
מספרנו: 2328

אל: ארופה 2

מאת: הציר-יועץ, לונדון.

הנדון: הודעות דובר הפוראום

לפה הודעות הדובר מ- 30/11-2/12 בנושאים הבאים:

א. שחרור החטופים הצרפתיים.

ב. מעטפת נפץ בבירות.

ג. שגריר בריטי חדש בירדן.

ד. קורט וולדהיים.

בברכה,

יורם שני.

העתק: המרכז

FCO PRESS CONFERENCE, WEDNESDAY 2 DECEMBER 1987

Change of Ambassador at Amman

Spokesman announced that The Queen had been pleased to approve the appointment of Mr Anthony Reeve CMG to be HM Ambassador to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in succession to Mr A J Coles CMG, who would be taking up a further Diplomatic Service appointment.

British Embassy Beirut: Suspected parcel bomb

Spokesman said that he wished to correct press reports that a parcel bomb had been delivered yesterday to the British Embassy in Beirut. A suspect parcel had indeed been delivered. However, following a controlled explosion carried out by the Lebanese security forces, it had been established that the contents of the parcel were entirely innocent.

Release of French Hostages

In response to a question, Spokesman confirmed that the British Ambassador in Paris had called yesterday on the French Foreign Ministry and had been given a detailed account of the events of the last few days. The Ambassador had received certain assurances about the actions of the French government. Spokesman drew attention to the French Prime Minister's denial that any ransom had been paid for the release of the hostages, and to the explanation of the legal aspects of Mr Gordji's departure given to the Secretary of State by the French Foreign Minister, M Raimond.

FCO PRESS CONFERENCE, MONDAY 30 NOVEMBER 1987

Release of French Hostages

In answer to a question, Spokesman said that the European Council Declaration of December 1986 precluded any deal by the French government to secure the release of the hostages, and he noted M Chirac's public rejection of any ransom having been paid. Spokesman drew attention to HMG's long standing and unequivocal policy on hostages. This was that we remained convinced concessions led to more hostage-taking and increased the pressure on other countries whose nationals were held hostage. A "no deal" policy minimised risks for our own citizens.

In answer to further questions spokesman said that the British authorities would be in touch with France for any information which MM Normandin and Auque might have on the fate of other hostages held in the Lebanon. Spokesman also said that HMG would contact the French authorities at a high level about the circumstances which led to the release of the French hostages.

Dr Kurt Waldheim

In response to a question, spokesman confirmed that the FCO and the MOD had conducted three rounds of investigations into allegations of Dr Waldheim's involvement in the murders of British prisoners-of-war. The conclusion had been that there was no evidence of criminal activity on Dr Waldheim's part. The British Government remained ready to consider any relevant evidence with a view to determining whether it was new.

PRESS RELEASE

FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

No 158

Wednesday 2 December 1987
1230

CHANGE OF AMBASSADOR AT AMMAN

The Queen has been pleased to approve the appointment of Mr Anthony Reeve CMG to be HM Ambassador to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in succession to Mr A J Coles CMG, who will be taking up a further Diplomatic Service appointment.

MR ANTHONY REEVE CMG

(Designated as HM Ambassador at Amman)

Mr Reeve was born at Wakefield, Yorks, on 20 October 1938 and was educated at Queen Elizabeth Grammar School, Wakefield, Marling School, Stroud and Merton College, Oxford, graduating in English in 1961. For the following four years he worked in commerce, mainly with Lever Bros & Associates Ltd.

He entered the Foreign Service via the 1965 Open Competition (Method II) and took up his appointment as a Third Secretary that autumn. After an Introductory Course he joined Malawi and Zambia Department of the Commonwealth Office as a Second Secretary and a year later was assigned to MECAS at Shemlan, Lebanon, for full-time Arabic language study. On completion of that course early in 1968 he was posted to Abu Dhabi for two years as Assistant Political Agent, gaining promotion to First Secretary in 1969. From 1970 to 1973 he served in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, first in North African Department for a few months and then in Arabian (later Middle East) Department. Early in 1973 he was appointed First Secretary in Chancery at Washington and five years later was promoted sur place to become

Counsellor (Politico/Military) for the last few months of his posting. In the autumn of 1978 he was assigned to Chatham House for six months on an Arms Control Study Visit prior to taking up the appointment of Head of Arms Control and Disarmament Department in the FCO. From 1981 to 1984 he was Counsellor at Cairo and for several months in 1983 went on temporary duty to Beirut. In mid-1984 he returned to the FCO once again, at first as Head of Southern African Department and from April 1986 to November 1987, following a further promotion, as Assistant Under-Secretary of State (Africa).

Mr Reeve was made a CMG in the 1986 Birthday Honours.

In 1964 he married Pamela (Margaret) Angus, a teacher, who was born in 1938 at Hastings. They have a son, born in 1968, and two daughters, born in 1972 and 1977. Mr Reeve's outside interests include writing and music.

November 1987

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

י"ז כסלו תשמ"ח
8 דצמבר 1987

אל: אירופה 2

מאת: ציר-יועץ, לונדון

הנדון: ביקור גורבצ'וב - ראיון רוה"מ

לוטה עותק ממסיבת העתונאים שקיימה רוה"מ
ב-7/12 בתום ביקורו הקצר של גורבצ'וב כאן.

בברכה,

יורם שמי

העתק: מזא"ר

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER, MRS. THATCHER, AT BRIZE NORTON, ON MONDAY, 7 DECEMBER 1987

PRIME MINISTER:

Mr. Gorbachev, I am sure, appreciated what I had to say and I found his account, particularly of the progress of perestroika, absolutely fascinating. He is a bold, determined and courageous leader and I hope that he succeeds in his colossal task, for in doing so he will enlarge the sum of human freedom and happiness.

QUESTION: (James Morrison Washington Times)

Did you say that you have not contacted President Reagan yet. I am wondering whether you planned to talk to him later today and secondly on the issue of human rights, what did you say to Mr Gorbachev and what was his response?

PRIME MINISTER:

I have talked to Mr Gorbachev on human rights on each occasion when I see him. As you know, far more people have been able to leave the Soviet Union and as far as we are concerned we note in particular the reunification of families appears to have been right at the forefront of their mind in the number of people they have let leave the Soviet Union; what I have said it is that I hope that that will be stepped up. As you know, the numbers are vastly increased this year over last year but they are nothing like up to where they were when Mr Brezhnev was in power shortly after the Helsinki accords and therefore although we are pleased that more have been allowed to leave we hope that the policy will be stepped up very considerably.

QUESTION: (Charles McClean NBC News)

Prime Minister, you said earlier you told Mr Gorbachev you welcome what has been done in human rights but just yesterday some KGB agents allegedly beat up some Refusenik (phon) and some news men in Moscow. Did you bring that incident up with Mr Gorbachev in your talks today and do you think the timing of that incident is going to have any effect on the summit?

PRIME MINISTER:

No I did not. We are on the very broad issues as I have indicated the whole time and when you are translating - this is why I say two hours is much too short because part of it of course was over lunchtime - so I did not bring up that particular incident. I spoke about the generality of human rights. May I say this to you?

From time to time there are things - and that was tragic one must keep the broad progress and the direction of the progress in mind and not sacrifice the progress and the possibility of further progress and increased progress and acceleration of human rights. One must never sacrifice that when these tragic occasions do occur. The important thing is that the progress on human rights goes on. The important thing is that Perestroika and Glasnost succeeds. The important things is that this new spirit of arms control continues. It is perhaps the slight difference between the media and politicians that inevitably the incident of the day when it is tragic can dominate the news, but what matters in the term of enhancing the sum of human freedom and human happiness that where you are together going in the right direction, do everything both of you, all of you to ensure that that direction continues.

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

If I could just add on that that human rights was a topic that took up quite a lot of the time in my discussion with Mr Shevardnadze. It is, I suppose, the fifth or sixth time that we have discussed it. And the point that I emphasised that if one is to secure the necessary steady improvement in confidence that is going to secure further progress on arms control, that is going to make it easy to get verification of the INF agreement then manifest continued progress on human rights is also important. They are closely linked. They all help to underpin confidence.

QUESTION: (John Doiman CNN TV)

Do you feel that President Reagan needs some urging, perhaps by you, to share your view of Mr Gorbachev, his sincerity about the changes he is making, that the changes are real and need to be responded to by the West?

PRIME MINISTER:

No. Mr Reagan has had very long talks as you know with Mr Gorbachev and I think both President Reagan and I would take the same view that Mr Gorbachev is a quite different leader from any other kind we have ever had in the Soviet Union and that you can talk and discuss easily and debate over a very wide range of things. I do not think we would take any different view of that and I think that we would both hope that an enlargement of human freedom within the Soviet Union would succeed. After all we are talking about human rights. We are urging more. You cannot be urging more about human rights and then not support Glasnost and Perestroika which is an enlargement of human responsibility, is saying that less central control because you are not really going to get results unless the individual is involved. You cannot say "Please have more human rights" when you are trying to modify your economic system in order to get increasing significance of the role of the individual. You cannot say then "We do not support it". You have got to support it. They are both part and parcel of the same thing.

5351 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 03.12.87

נבנס ** סודי

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3984

מדזם:12/5351
אל:המשרד
מ:לונדון/נר:72/תא:071287/דת:1600/דת:מ/סג:ס
נד:ס

103.3
C

מרדי/מידי

אל:אירופה ב' המרכז מח' מצרים

מאת:השגריר לונדון

מצהריים עם השגריר המצרי YOUSEF SPARARA
(70.21.7)

1. השגריר אמר שסוריה מבודדת במיוחד לאחר פסגת עמאן וישראל העשה בתבונה אם היא תמנע מתגמול בסדר גודל שיראלץ המתונים לצדד בסוריה.

2. לדבריו הדעה הכללית הרווחת בקהיר שנושא הסכסוך -אין לו פרם עדיפות בדיוני הפסגה. במידה והנושא יתעורר בשיחות שולץ-שברדנצה, יהיה זה יותר בגלל יוזמה סובייטית מאשר אמריקנית.

3. מצרים ממשיכה לקיים קשר עם אש"ף והתירה את פתיחתו מחדש של משרד אש"ף בקהיר בדי לעקוב אחר המתרחש בארגון זה ולהתערב בעת הצורך. הדבר נעשה חשוב במיוחד מאז שחוסיין מסרב לקיים יחסים עם אש"ף. אם ובאשר יבחנו שמות למשלחת המשותפת פלסטינאית-ירדנית הקשר המצרי יהיה חשוב במיוחד בדי לשכנע את ערפאת לקבל את השמות אשר יהיו מקובלים על ישראל. המצרים יודעים להביר את ערפאת לאמיתו לא פחות מאשר חוסין אן אם הקשר יבוטק לגמרי קיימת סכנה שהארגון ייכול ליפול הסורים וה"משורפים" יי הנתמכים ע"י סוריה.

4. לדעת השגריר המצרי, עם חידוש היחסים של רוב העולם הערבי עם מצרים מרגיש מובארק יותר בטחון עצמי במכלול

יחסיו עם ישראל.

אבנר

סמ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממז,רם,אמן,מצרים,איר ב

בלמס נכנס

3986

מרזם:12/5338
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:74/תא:071287/זת:1900/זח:ד/סג:ב
נד:8

103.3
ברכ

בלמס/דחוף

אל:אירופה 2

דע:המרכז

מאת:הציר-ירושלים לונדון

להלן מתפנש במכתן לליעדים אסטרטגים בנושא איראן.
הירצה באמנס שגריר בריטניה לשעבר באיראן ובאו"ם.
מדברים:

1. יחס איראן לאו"ם נקבע על בסיס ארועי קיץ 1980 כאשר הפלישה העיראקית לא גררה מעורבות וצעדים משמעותיים של מועבי"ט. מרגע זה החלה גם הדרישה האולטימטיבית האיראנית לזיהרי התוקפן.

2. 1987 היא שנת השינוי, כאשר האינטרס האיראני למלחמה מקדמית נכנע לאינטרס העיראקי לבינאום. התקוה העיראקית היא שאיראן תגיב נגד ארה"ב ואז יהנו העיראקים מהתוצאות ומהחסות מעצמתית ישירה.

במקביל גוברת מעורבות האו"ם כאשר ברקע החרדה שמא בשלון עיראקי יביא להתפרקות המדינה ולשינויים בלתי צפויים במזה"ת. ספק רב אם תצליח מועבי"ט לקיים אחדות גם מעבר להכרזות מילוליות רבות שיצטרכו להוציא דברים אל הפועל.

3. אין שום אמצעי לכפות הפסקת המלחמה ורק "עיכות החומרי" תוביל לכן. השלב הבא הינו מצב של לא שלום

ולא מלחמה (בדומה למדה"ת). שום מנהיגות איראנית
לא תעיז להודיע על חוסר הצלחה לאחר מליוני
נפגעים וצילו של חומייני יתקיים גם לאחר מותו. אין
לצפות בעתיד הקרוב לשינויים ממשיים.

יורם שני

רות

תפ: עתח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מדבד,רם,אמן,ממד,אירא,אירב

4018

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

ש מ ו ר

ט"ז כסלו תשמ"ח
7 בדצמבר1987

אל: מנהל אירופה ב'

מאת: הציר, לונדון

1033
ב"ד

להלן מספר נקודות מתוך שיחה בארוחת צהרים בבית הציר בשגרירות ארה"ב רימונד זייץ ב-4.12. השתתפו: שגריר מצרים א-שרעה, סיר דויד מייארס, פרופ' ואטיקיוטיס, יאנג, הממונה על המפרץ בפוראוף, רובין רפאל, גב' האריס, אמריקנית המפרסמת ספר על מצרים במסגרת צ'טהם האוס (היא גם אשתו של גולטי) והח"מ.

א. ועידת עמאן. הוחלפו הערכות על הועידה שתאמו את הדברים שקבלנו מהמרכז. לדברי המשתתפים אין לפי שעה אישור לידיעות שאסאד קיבל סכומי עתק מסעודיה עבור השתתפותו בועידה. שגריר מצרים אמר כי העובדה שמצרים אינה חברה בליגה הערבית אינה מפריעה לה בכלל ואפילו מעניקה לה יותר חופש תמרון.

ב. המפרץ. סיר דויד מייארס אמר שרק כעת מתברר איזו סכנה נשקפה לכווית אילו האירנים היו ממשיכים במיקוש מימי המפרץ מסביב לכווית ללא התנגדות. תוך זמן קצר הם היו מצליחים לחסום כל גישה לכווית. לדברי מייארס מסתמנת נכונות סובייטית להפעיל השפעה, אם לא לחץ על איראן. אם המערב יהיה מוכן להסכים לנוכחות אף סמלית של כוח בינלאומי במפרץ ייתכן ונתן יהיה להשיג תמיכה סובייטית בהחלטה של מועבי"ט על סנקציות על איראן. זייץ הבהיר שארה"ב לא הסכים לכך.

2/..

ISRAEL ישראל

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON, W8 4QB
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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

כששאלתי את מייארס אם תאצ'ר תסכים לכוח בינלאומי אמר כי נכון שגם תאצ'ר לא מאמינה בתועלת שתצמח מכוח כזה אך אם תשתכנע שזה מה שיביא ללחץ סובייטי על אירן, אולי תסכים.

ג. הועידה הבינלאומית. שגריר מצרים ודוויד מייארס טענו שהועידה הבינלאומית הינה הדרך היחידה לקדם את תהליך השלום. שאלתי למה חוסין בכל זאת דחה לחלוטין את האפשרות השניה ששולץ הציג בפניו בשיחות לונדון. שגריר מצרים אמר כי כדי לשמור על חייו, חוסיין חייב לקבל תמיכה בינלאומית רחבה ככל האפשר ורק ועידה בינלאומית מורחבת תעניק למלך את הבטחון הנדרש.

ד. מפגשי ריגן גורבצ'וב ותאצ'ר-גורבצ'וב. היתה מעין הסכמה כללית שהסכסוך יופיע כאחד מהנושאים האחרונים בדיונים עם גורבצ'וב. זייץ הדגיש את הקשיים הצפויים לקראת אישרור הסכם ה- JNF בסנט.
בארוחה עמד עוד להשתתף אלפרד אתרטון שחלה ונבצר ממנו להגיע.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

משה רביב
משה רביב

העתקים:
מר י. ענוג, המשנה למנכ"ל
מר י. בירן, סמנכ"ל
מנהל מצפ"א

ISRAEL ישראל

4339

BBC RADIO 4 PROGRAMME "TODAY" - MONDAY, 7TH DECEMBER 1987
INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE CONCERNING THE INCIDENTS IN MOSCOW INVOLVING SOVIET JEWS
INTRODUCED BY PETER HOBDAY

PETER HOBDAY
Turning specifically, Sir Geoffrey to your talks with your opposite number, Edward Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minster, what will you be saying to him when you meet him this morning at Brize Norton over those scenes in Moscow yesterday when a demonstration seemed to be broken up by Soviet security men in the context of the Human Rights subject that you'll be raising with him?

SIR GEOFFREY HOWE MP
Those scenes of course were seen on Western television but probably not on Soviet television underline the importance that we attach to progress on Human Rights throughout the Soviet Union and its allies. They are always on the agenda on talks of this kind. In general terms we look for improvement in the conditions within the Soviet Union as her allies and we will raise specific individual cases as we always do and the scenes on television last night underline for the Western world the importance of that agenda item.

PETER HOBDAY
But does that final point from you, Sir Geoffrey, change what many people see as an historic week in the relationship between the Super Powers and indeed for Europe?

SIR GEOFFREY HOWE MP
I think it casts a certain shadow over the agenda certainly but it doesn't really alter the agenda. It's very important in conducting this attempt to improve relations between East and West not to be distracted from the main objectives by an item that may happen here or there from today til tomorrow. There are always going to be stresses and strains in the relationship - for the foreseeable future there are likely to be things like ... - so we must keep our eye on the main agenda; the improvement of confidence; continued headway on arms control; a watchfulness, confirmed for our own security certainly, but are willing to business on reasonable terms.

BBC2 TV PROGRAMME "OUT OF COURT" - FRIDAY, 4TH DECEMBER 1987
ITEM CONCERNING THE WAR CRIMES ISSUE
PRESENTED BY SUE COOK

4337

SUE COOK
War Crimes are so huge that they cry out for justice and yet even justice itself cannot encompass their enormity. This week though the Government announced that it was urgently considering a change in the law so that those suspected of Nazi War Crimes could be brought to British justice.

DAVID JESSEL
But is it justice or mere vengence when a man is brought face to face with crimes committed in another country half a century distant?

SUE COOK
American and Soviet investigators have identified more than fifty suspected War Criminals in Britain. Of these the Home Office confirms that sixteen are still alive and living in a dozen or so towns around Britain. Most of them are believed to come from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia - States which were over-run by the Germans in the early years of the War. Many in these Baltic States served in SS regiments and in Nazi controlled police units. Some subscribed to the fascist philosophy; others calculated that collaboration with the occupying Germans was preferable to conquest by the Russians.

DAVID JESSEL
With the defeat of Germany and the absorption of the Baltic States into the Soviet empire, many came to Britain as refugees from Stalin's massacres but evidence from anti-fascist groups suggest that some Baltic citizens were more than merely passive participants in Nazi horrors. Local people certainly participated in the mass execution of thousands of Jews in Vilna, the Lithuanian capital. One man now living in Britain is said to have relished jumping into the death pits to finish off the victims of the firing squads; another to have performed medical experiments on Jews in Latvia; a third rose to become an SS chief who sent more than a quarter of a million Jews to death camps.

SUE COOK
As yet Britain doesn't have the laws to prosecute War Criminals. The Genocide Act doesn't apply to past crimes and murder proceedings cannot be brought where the victim was not British and the crime was committed abroad and the terms of the British Nationality Act make it almost impossible to strip someone of his citizenship for the purpose of deporting him to an alien jurisdiction.

DAVID JESSEL
But even in countries where the law allows war trials justice has been compromised.

Last year the French brought Klaus Barbie to trial but the French themselves had granted an amnesty to their own soldiers found guilty of atrocities in the Algerian War and because of the Statute of Limitations, Barbie was not charged with the crimes he almost certainly committed while he was the Gestapo Chief of Lyons. Instead he faced the vaguer charges of crimes against humanity.

SUE COOK
So even changing the law might not guarantee justice. We could of course leave it to other countries laws but extradition brings new dilemmas. The United States recently sent two aged War Criminals to the Soviet Union - both were sentenced to death. Britain might not be prepared to send its own citizens to the summary justice of an alien jurisdiction.

DAVID JESSEL
The United States also consented in the extradition to Israel of John Demjanjuk where he was accused of being a sadistic guard at the Treblinka death camp who whipped the naked and shivering into the gas chambers. But that trial too has already raised questions abut the impartiality of Israeli justice and the reliability of witness evidence.

Is the empassioned statement: "I remember those eyes" adequate proof of identity after 45 years and is there a moral if not a legal Statute of Limitations on crimes committed so long ago.

SUE COOK
Moral considerations apart, what are the British Government's legal options?

It's considering an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill which is now progressing through Parliament or alternatively, it could ratify the United Nations Convention against torture giving British Courts retrospective powers to prosecute for crimes which were committed abroad.

IVOR STANBROOK MP
There are really two problems. One is a legal problem and the other's a practical one. The legal problem is that there is no jurisdiction in any British Court at the moment to try offences committed abroad by foreigners. You can change that. You can't change or should not change the rules of evidence against, for example, heresay. Against the admission of secondary documents because there's a great incentive on the part of the Russians, for example, to provide forged documents which as far as written evidence is concerned might well have to be accepted by a Court as being genuine but the practical objection is this. I have been at the Bar nearly thirty years and I know from experience that a witness, even after only twelve months from the incident, finds his memory very fallible and is unable to recall with any clear detail what happened and to give any proper account to a Court.

Now in this sort of case after forty years, it must follow that witnesses will not be able to give that sort of evidence with any credibility.

SUE COOK
In Britain, the Jewish Community remembers its dead. It feels that ... has at last persuaded the Government of the need for retrospective justice. The survivors do not forget - to them it is a moral mission to track down and bring their persecutors to justice. A double duty - first to remind future generations of the Holocaust, then to protect them by ensuring that such crimes cannot go unpunished.

RABBI HUGO GRYN - Concentration Camp Survivor
The trials would establish facts. They would identify and I like to think perhaps probe at some depth the motivation of people who were the killers. What were the bystanders? And perhaps something also about the victims because there was a great danger, I think, that things become glossed over. Things that have no business to recede into the past will be allowed to do just that and there is that old cliche, that any society or any generation that doesn't learn from its history is likely to be doomed to repeat it.

DAVID JESSEL
But there's another community in Britain which feels threatened by the new talk of War Crimes trials. They're the Lithuanians and others from the Baltic States who say they came to Britain not as accomplices in Hitler's atrocities but as refugees from Stalin's massacres.

Today they see themselves as sacrificial pawns in an international power-play. They believe the pressure for War trials is part of a Soviet plot to punish them for their past and continuing opposition to Communism.

JARAS ALKIS - Chairman, Lithuanian Association
Our Community has experienced a very hard and unfair press in this country. We were called as Nazi collaborators and many other names which we do not deserve to be called. We came here as refugees. We were actually trying to warn the Western powers about the dangers of Communism and we could not possibly return home because it would mean death and perhaps hard labour for many many years for many of our people.

RABBI HUGO GRYN
I don't think myself that the Lithuanian Community as such ought to be that defensive. I think it's very important for any Community, if they have a dark patch somewhere in their history to identify it, to expose it perhaps - not to be so defensive about it.

IVOR STANBROOK MP
There is something even more important in this country than retribution or bringing people to justice and that is the duty of British Courts to provide a fair trial which shouldn't interfere with that duty.

DAVID JESSEL
Do you think vengence, that is retribution as you say, inform too much the views of the Jewish Community?

IVOR STANBROOK MP
I've got a lot of Jewish friends and I fully understand their feelings about it but I think the ordinary British person is more concerned to, I think, accept that after a time one is bound to think that those matters should be forgotten. In regard to some people it is true - they will never forget these terrible matters and one can quite understand that. Nevertheless it runs contrary (?) to the British system of the justice.

RABBI HUGO GRYN
I do not believe that any British legal system would collude with vengence and in any case, who is there, as it were, to takes one's ... off? What would be the ultimate punishment even? There cannot be vengence for something like the Holocaust but there needs to be some kind of an account.

1906 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 12.87.

נכנס ** שמור

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3826

חדזם:12/1906
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/גר:27/תא:021257/זת:1800/דת:ד/סג:ש
נד:ם

שמור/דחוף

103.3

אל:מאק/ בינלא 2/ אירופה 2

מאת:ציר-ירושלים לונדון

אוגנדה

1. להשומת הלב בתבתו של אוקיין בגיר אפריקן של דצמבר אודות המודקים בצפון.

2. השתדלנאי הובא לשטח עי מיודשנר וילסון שלידוה אותו במשך שבועים.

מורם שני

א

תס: מנכל/ממנכל/אירב/הדם/טאס/ממד/בינלא2

21868 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 1.12.87

נבנס ** שמור 3256
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חדם:21868,1
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון,בר:353,תא:301187,זת:1600,דת:מ,סג:ש
נד:@

שמור/מידי

103.3
כב

אל:מנהל אדבל 1, איירנה 2

מאת:בר-יוסף לונדון

מנבל ארגון הבריאות
מישיחה עם למדנס ממנהל אדם בפרנאוף

1. הסדיניות הבריטית המוצהרת לפי שעה היא בייטרליות קונסטרוקטיבית ובמבדרש איכם עושים בפשות לשרם מועמד לרבות לוקאס. הקריא לבני ממכתב ממחצית בובמבר שהופנה לנציגים הבריטים דבר הוראה בי בתיאום עם משרד הבריאות ושל רקע העובדה שאין מועמד בולט במיוחד העדיף על בני אחרים אין לגלות תמיכה פעילה או לפסול שום מדמד. ציין עם זאת בי איכם הוזרים מסה שכבר נמסר לי בשעתו קרי הסעודי איכנו מקובל עליהם.

2. המפגש בלונדון של האירופאיות יתקיים ב 14.12. בהשתתפות המזרח אירופאיות לרבות ס/שר הבריאות הטרבייטי. לשאלתי האם אין באיחוד מחוייבות בריטית מסוימת לבני מועמד בל שהוא השיב שהיוזמה למפגש היא צרפתית והבריטים נשכר. מבל מקום סביר שיתליטו תון בדי המפגעים שיתקיימו בבינוס.

3. ציין שארהב מעלה עבור מאסידר שביקר באן ב 30.10 ושאיר רושם טוב. גם מדניקסן ביקר באוקטובר. לא ברור אם הצרפתים עדיין תומבים בר אולם הגישה הצרפתית בזמנו היתה שלארגון הבריאות ייבחר אמריקני.

. סיכמנו להיפגש לאחר הכנס.

ידרש שני.

א

תפ: המנכל/אירא/אירב/ברנע/ארבל/הרצוג/בריאות

19542 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 11.87

נכנס ** שמור 3759
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חודם:11,19542
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון,גר:322,מא:261187,זה:1700,דה:מ,סג:ש
נד:0

103.3

מסור/מידי

אל:מנהל מזאר', אירופה ב' המרכז

מאת:הציר, לונדון

השיחה עם HEMANS המנהל החדש של מח' בריהמ' בפוראוף.
הימס חזר לפני זמן קצר ממוסקבה שם ביקן ביועץ מדיני
בשגרירותנה. הימס אמר כי בשטח מדיניות החוץ ה'גלסנוסט'
מוגבל מאד. גורבצ'ב משתמש בגמה סיסמאות כמו INTERDEPENCE
ו- COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE
אך הם לא משנים את האילוצים הבסיסיים בהם פועלת מדיניות
החוץ הסובייטית. עקב ה'פרסטרויקה' בריהמ' הקציב
כחות משאבים לבטחון ויותר לכלכלה ותשתדל להשיג את
השלותיה בדרכים שאינן מוליבות לעימות. עם זאת היא
מוכרחת לתפקיד יותר בולט בזירה הבינלאומית ורוצה להיות
מעורבת בכל מהלך חשוב לדוגמא:
תמיכתה בועידה בינלאומית של המזרח'. זה חלק חשוב ממה
שהימס כינה IMAGE BUILDING של פי גישת גורבצ'וב תדמית
יותר חיובית בלוס שיכוריים טקשיים מסוימים יכולים לקדם את
מטרותיה של בריהמ' טוב יותר מעימות מתמיד עם המערב. ניוון
המדיניות הסובייטית באזור המפרץ אינו קל. על מוסקבה להוכיח
בו-זמנית שהיא מועלת לסיום המיר של מלחמת איראן- עיראק
להשיג מעמד לגיטימי כמו של יתר המעצמות באזור המפרץ.
לא להרגיז את הערבים, להוציא ביוזמת בארמ'. כל אלה
בשברקע הגבול המשותף של אלפיים מיל ביבה לבין איראן
וההתעוררות האיסלמית בתוך האוכלוסיה המוסלמית בבריהמ'.
מעין תחליף ללאומנות.

גורבצ'וב ידע שהשיכוריים הכלכליים והחברתיים שהוא מציע

ייתקלו בהתנגדות קשה. אולם בני שהשביר לו אחד ממקורביו
של מנהיג בריתמי, כמו סטלין כן גם גורבצ'וב משוכנע
שבחברה הסובייטית אי אפשר להנהיג שינויים שיימשכו
עשרות בשנים. אם יש צורך בניתוח יש לעשותו מהר ובצורה
דרסטית ולפעמים בברוטליות בני שנהג בפרשת ילצין. הויכוח
מתוך בריתמי של 'גלסנוסט' ו'פרסטרויקה' הוא קשה
ורציני. מול גורבצ'וב נצבת קואליציה המורכבת מן
הבירוקרטיה החוששת להפסיד את מעמדה ואת ההטבות.
אלמנטים שמרניים בק.ג.ב. ומספרים בלתי מבוטלים של
'האיש הפשוט' החושש מאנרכיה ראינו מבין את המורכבות
של הגישה החדשה ראינו דואה בארוך את היתרונות הבלבליים
הנובעים ממדיניות גורבצ'וב. אלה יתחילו להסתמן רק
בעוד 5-3 שנים ובינתיים תבוא אבטלה מעקבות הייעול.
לצידו של גורבצ'וב האינטלקטואלים שלפי שעה הם הנהנים
הראשיים ממדיניות גורבצ'וב ביניהם הרבה יהודים.
אולם הרוסי הפשוט תמיד חשש מחופש אינטלקטואלי ואם
יסתמן זעם נגד האינטלקטואלים הוא יקבל בקלות גורן
אנטישמי חריף. לשאלה, 'האם אבותינו נאבקו למען המהפכה
כדי להגיע לפלורליזם ולדצנטרליזציה' יש מהלכים.
מבחינת השליטה גורבצ'וב יכול להעביר את רוב החלטותיו
בפוליטביורו אך אין לו רוב אוטומטי לכל הצעה. בודאי
ובודאי שלא מובטח לו רוב בועד המרכזי. על כן יעשה
מאמץ שבכנס הועד המרכזי ב 20 בינואר יצורפו לועד
כחודש צעירים המתנכרים בקו שלו. בבריטניה הבקר כעת
ABEL AGANBEGYAN הידוע הבלבלי הבכיר של גורבצ'וב ואבי
רעיון ה'פרסטרויקה'.
גורבצ'וב שיבר אותו כדי שיסביר לתאג'ד את הפילוסופיה
הבלבלית של מדיניותו.

דביב

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנבל,ממנבל,טמנבל,ממד,רס,אמן,אירא,אירב,
אירג

Vol. 490
No. 41

Wednesday
25 November 1987

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
(HANSARD)

HOUSE OF LORDS

OFFICIAL REPORT

Nuclear Materials: Alleged Black Market

Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are aware of the Channel 4 programme "Dispatches", of Friday 30th October at 20.15, in which the alleged existence of a black market in weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium was illustrated by reference to their alleged possession by Israel, Iran and Iraq, and whether they propose to take action to combat these dangers.

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Glenarthur): My Lords, we are aware of the programme, but we have no evidence to support allegations in it of a black market in weapons grade plutonium or enriched uranium. We have full confidence in the present system of controls on such material. There is a long history of hoaxes in this field.

Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for that reply. Is he aware that his confidence may be misplaced? The information contained in the programme was of a factual nature and it seems likely that there is a large quantity of plutonium and enriched uranium floating around the world today, some of which comes from Sellafield or Dounreay. Is the Minister not aware that once a quantity of this material falls into the hands of Iran, Iraq or Israel, as has been asserted already to have taken place, the situation could be serious because it is only one stage from that to the hands of terrorists?

Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I can assure the noble Lord that we are by no means complacent. Great efforts in collaboration with others are made to control the export of sensitive nuclear materials, and we keep a close eye on any attempts to circumvent those controls.

House of Lords

Wednesday, 25th November 1987.

Nuclear Materials: Alleged Black Market

Lord Mayhew: My Lords, will the noble Lord give an assurance that no plutonium or enriched uranium of British manufacture is missing?

Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I can give that assurance in so far as it is possible to account for anything other than the tiniest amounts of such material. British Nuclear Fuels Limited and the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority produce an annual balance sheet of material which is unaccounted for. The 1985–86 figures were published in November 1986, and they show no adverse trends and gave rise to no concern over either the safety or the security of United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and British Nuclear Fuels Limited plant.

Lord Irving of Dartford: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that if the ownership of nuclear weapons goes much further, as it will if the programme was accurate, that will go a long way to invalidating the agreement which is about to be signed between Russia and America? Secondly, is the Minister aware that Admiral Turner—who has been a friend to this country and whom some remember as Commander of the Sixth Fleet and later Director of the CIA—said in the programme that during his time as director he was aware of the black market and that one of the inspectors of the atomic authority is also aware that what has been said by the authority is not correct? Will the noble Lord look into the matter more thoroughly?

Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, the International Atomic Agency reported in July that in 1986, as in previous years, the secretariat did not detect any anomaly over safeguarded nuclear material that caused it concern. Naturally, this area requires continual refinement in order to ensure that things cannot go wrong, but I firmly believe that the safeguards at present in train are adequate.

Lord Mayhew: My Lords, while the Minister's reply to my question was reassuring, can he say how much of such material of British manufacture is missing in total?

Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, included in the 1986-1987 figures there are two instances in which specific items of material could not be accounted for. At Sellafield one piece of a broken fuel pin was missing when its container was opened. A subsequent inquiry concluded that it had probably been included with active stainless steel waste. The inquiry could not believe that it was outside the shielded facility at the Sellafield site. In a shipment of high enriched uranium coupons (18 grammes per coupon) from Winfrith to Dounreay, it was found that one can contained 149 coupons instead of a listed 150. An inquiry concluded that the weight of the evidence indicated that the missing coupon had been loaded into another can and therefore no loss had occurred.

Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, does the Minister agree that the amount of processing now going on and the amount of plutonium that is passing around the world as a result of reprocessing in this country and elsewhere means that the situation is sufficiently grave to merit very close examination? If these reports are true—and many of them seem to be very factual—the consequences will be very great, almost unbelievable.

Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, of course it is a serious matter. But, as I said, we believe that the safeguards that we have and at which we continually look are adequate.

Lord Mellish: My Lords, can the House have an assurance that there is no such black market in Putney?

Tuesday
24 November 1987

Volume 123
No. 50

HOUSE OF COMMONS
OFFICIAL REPORT

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

Written Answers to Questions

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Uranium

Mr. Galbraith: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1) if he has had any recent communication with the French Government over the alleged sale of plutonium and enriched uranium from facilities in the European Economic Community on the black market in Khartoum;

(2) if he has had any recent communications with the Belgian Government over the alleged sale of plutonium and enriched uranium from facilities in the European Economic Community on the black market in Khartoum;

(3) if he has had any recent communication with the West German Government over the alleged sale of plutonium and enriched uranium from nuclear facilities in the European Economic Community on the black market in Khartoum.

Mr. Eggar: This has been discussed in the course of regular official contacts with the French, Belgian and German Governments. These discussions have confirmed our view that there is no evidence to support the allegations that weapons grade nuclear material has been on sale on the black market in Khartoum or elsewhere.

Thursday
19 November 1987

Volume 122
No. 47

HOUSE OF COMMONS
OFFICIAL REPORT

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

Written Answers to Questions

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Plutonium

Dr. Dafydd Elis Thomas: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1) if he will initiate at the next meeting of the Council of European Foreign Ministers a task force of experts to investigate recent evidence that weapons grade nuclear materials from facilities under safeguards in the European Community have been illicitly sold on the black market in the Sudan; and if he will make a statement;

(2) what information he has about alleged illegal attempts by the Governments of (i) Israel, (ii) Libya, (iii) Iran, (iv) Iraq, (v) India, (vi) Argentina, (vii) South Africa, and (viii) Pakistan, to obtain unsafeguarded plutonium and enriched uranium on the black market, particularly in Khartoum, which have been diverted from facilities in the European Community; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Mellor: We have no evidence to support allegations that weapons grade nuclear material has been on sale in the Sudan or indeed elsewhere. We also have full confidence in the stringent security precautions and accounting systems that exist at United Kingdom and other Community nuclear installations.

18668

תאריך : משרד הפנים-מחלקת הקשר

נכנס **
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שמור

3731

תודם:11,18668
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון,נד:305,תא:251187,זת:1800,דת:1,סג:ש
נד:ש

שמור/דחוף

103.3

אל:אירופה 2 המרכז

מאת:הציר יועץ/לונדון

משיחה עם סטבנסון משגרירות שבדיה:-

1. הגיע לבאן בספטמבר ידיעות משירות במוסקבה. לדבריו התחדשה בחודש הסוביטי שבריה"מ עומדת לכבי חידוש יחסים עם ישראל. סטבנסון הדובר רוסית שמע ממדענים שונים לדבות מחברי מפלגה כי לאחרונה מתקיים מסע מאורגן של הצאות במקומות שונים בנושא המזה"ת. הדוברים מדגישים שהיתה זו שגיאה לנתק את היחסים עם ישראל וכי הדבר מקשה על פעילותה של בריה"מ במעצמה החותרת לשלום בעולם בכלל ובמזה"ת בפרט. בני שיחו רואים בכך נסיון ברור להכין טלקטיבית את דעת הקהל הסוביטית לאפשרות של חידוש יחסים.

2.משגרירותם בטהרן שמע כי האיראנים עומדים בקרוב לשחרר בערבות את העציר הבריטי קוסר וללא מתן היתר לצאת את איראן. הבריטים רואים בכך צעד ראשון ומהותי לקראת שחרור הסוכני שכן הדבר יעיד שהאשמות נגדו מחוסרות בסיס. השבדים שנידון מיצגים את הבריטים בנושאים קונסולריים בלבד, אינם יכולים להצביע על הסיבות לעיתוי.

יורם שני

אן

תפ: שהח/רהמ/מנכל/מחנכל/אירב/אירג/ר/מרכז/ממז

Tuesday
24 November 1987

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No. 50

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Thursday
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Vol. 490
No. 41

Wednesday
25 November 1987

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
(HANSARD)

HOUSE OF LORDS

OFFICIAL REPORT

Nuclear Materials: Alleged Black Market

Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are aware of the Channel 4 programme "Dispatches", of Friday 30th October at 20.15, in which the alleged existence of a black market in weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium was illustrated by reference to their alleged possession by Israel, Iran and Iraq, and whether they propose to take action to combat these dangers.

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373ף

ג' בכסליו תשמ"ח
24 בנובמבר 1987
105.1 ברט
2370 בלמ"ם

אל: ארופה 2
מאת: הציר-ירעץ, לונדון

הנדון: דיוני הפרלמנט: בריה"מ

לוטה עותקים משאלות והשובות שהועלו בדיוני הפרלמנט ב- 18/11 בנושאי זכויות האדם, רפיוסניקים, תקשורת ואיחוד משפחות.

103.3

בברכה
יורם שבי.

העתק:מזא"ר

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

18 NOVEMBER 1987

MR ROGER KING (BIRMINGHAM, NORTHFIELD): TO ASK THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, IF HE WILL MAKE A FURTHER STATEMENT ON SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

No 1

SIR GEOFFREY HOWE

THERE HAVE BEEN SOME DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE RECENTLY, IN PARTICULAR THE RELEASE OF A NUMBER OF PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE AND A MODEST INCREASE IN JEWISH AND OTHER EMIGRATION. BUT THERE IS A VERY LONG WAY TO GO. INDIVIDUAL GESTURES ARE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ABOLITION OF REPRESSIVE LEGISLATION AND AN END TO THE USE OF STATE POWER TO CRUSH INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS. WE CONTINUE TO PRESS THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES ON THESE MATTERS, BOTH IN BILATERAL CONTACTS AND AT THE CSCE VIENNA MEETING.

18 NOVEMBER 1987

* MR DAVID ATKINSON (BOURNEMOUTH EAST): TO ASK THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, WHAT IS HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT S RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO HOLD A CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN MOSCOW WITHIN THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE PROCESS.

No 53

MR DAVID MELLOR

WE BELIEVE THAT THE AMBITIOUS PROPOSAL ON THE HUMAN DIMENSION TABLED BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES OFFERS THE BEST MEANS OF MAINTAINING THE CSCE DIALOGUE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONTACTS AFTER VIENNA. WE ARE CAREFULLY MONITORING SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON HUMANITARIAN ISSUES IN VIENNA AND THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. WE DOUBT WHETHER IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO HOLD A HUMANITARIAN CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW.

18 NOVEMBER 1987

* MR IVAN LAWRENCE (BURTON): TO ASK THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, WHETHER HE WILL SEEK A FURTHER OPPORTUNITY OF RAISING WITH THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER THE PLIGHT OF THOSE LONG TERM REFUSENIKS, SUCH AS PROFESSOR ALEXANDER LEMER, WHO ARE STILL WAITING FOR EXIT VISAS.

NO 66

MR DAVID MELLOR

WE CONTINUE TO PRESS THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO ALLOW ALL REFUSENIKS TO LEAVE. WE HAVE WELCOMED THE RECENT RESOLUTION OF SOME LONGSTANDING CASES, INCLUDING THOSE OF VLADIMIR SLEPAK AND IDA NUDEL, AND HOPE THAT OTHERS LIKE PROFESSOR LERNER WILL BE SIMILARLY SUCCESSFUL IN OBTAINING EXIT VISAS SOON. MY RIGHT HONOURABLE AND LEARNED FRIEND WILL OF COURSE HAVE SUCH CASES MUCH IN MIND WHEN HE NEXT MEETS MR SHEVARDNADZE.

18 NOVEMBER 1987

* MR DAVID SUMBERG (BURY SOUTH): TO ASK THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, WHETHER HE WILL MAKE A STATEMENT ON PROGRESS MADE AT THE CONFERENCE FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN VIENNA IN RESPECT OF PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION AIMED AT ENSURING FREEDOM OF TRANSIT OF POSTAL COMMUNICATIONS.

No 79

MR DAVID MELLOR

WE, TOGETHER WITH A NUMBER OF WESTERN COUNTRIES, TABLED A PROPOSAL PROMOTING RESPECT FOR THE PRIVACY AND INTEGRITY OF POSTAL AND TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATIONS AT THE VIENNA CSCE MEETING ON 18 FEBRUARY. THERE APPEARS TO BE BROAD AGREEMENT THAT A PROVISION ON THESE GENERAL LINES IS DESIRABLE AND WE ARE OPTIMISTIC THAT IT WILL FEATURE IN ANY FINAL DOCUMENT AGREED IN VIENNA.

IN PUTTING FORWARD THE PROPOSAL, OUR CSCE DELEGATION HAS REPEATEDLY DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR CLOSER OBSERVATION OF THE SPIRIT OF THE CONVENTION OF THE UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION AND THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION CONVENTIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER EASTERN COUNTRIES.

18 NOVEMBER 1987

* DR JOHN G BLACKBURN (DUDLEY WEST): TO ASK THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, WHETHER HE WILL RAISE AGAIN WITH THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER THE QUESTION OF THE RE-UNIFICATION OF DIVIDED FAMILIES AND OF PARTICULAR CASES OF HARDSHIP, INCLUDING THAT OF THE KHOLMIANSKY FAMILY.

No 92

MR DAVID MELLOR

WE REGULARLY MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES ON BEHALF OF DIVIDED SOVIET FAMILIES AND CONTINUE TO RAISE CASES LIKE THAT OF THE KHOLMIANSKYS AT EVERY SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY. MY RIGHT HONOURABLE AND LEARNED FRIEND WILL HAVE SUCH ISSUES MUCH IN MIND WHEN HE NEXT MEETS MR SHEVARDNADZE.

Thursday
12 November 1987

Volume 122
No. 42

HOUSE OF COMMONS
OFFICIAL REPORT

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

Written Answers to Questions

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Security Conference (Vienna)

Mr. Atkinson: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement of progress on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe review conference at Vienna.

Mr. Mellor: Some progress has been made in negotiations on a final document, including in the areas of military security and economic cooperation. But movement on human rights and contacts has been painfully slow, despite protestations of good faith by the Eastern side. We are making it clear that without adequate progress in these areas there can be no agreement at Vienna. We wish to bring the meeting to a substantial and balanced conclusion by Christmas, if at all possible, but are prepared to go on longer if constructive work remains to be done.

- אלוש -

שגרירות ישראל בבריטניה

נספחות צה"ל

103.30

אל: מפקד היחידות אלוף מנור.

הנדון: תקיר אלטבה.

אלי יודע שאתה עסוק אבל אלחנן מעוניין מאוד לדבר אתך בדחיפות. מדובר בבקשה שנדבא בידיו הערבות של ~~[illegible]~~ דיוויד אפוולב שמאבן כפי שכתב משקיר לתת לנו את זה. בחינם - תמורת אינה מתנה. טיקסים כל שהוא.

אלחנן שהו כובים שבאנגלים ישנו אלוף של מחוה מעניין בדבר ולכן בקשנו מאתך לדבר עימו לעמוד לרשות אין נדר לקבל את זה לידיו. לעמוד יש עדיף ואולם לא מאוד אם ויכמן מעמיד בזה לגבינות. אם אתה מקיים מאוד כרטיס נ.ל - אלי יאלן.

תודה.

מיכאל

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON W8 4QB
Telephone: 01-937 8050

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

20th November 1987

Mr. David Irving,
81 Duke Street,
London, W.1.

Dear Mr. Irving,

Thank you very much for your letter of 2nd November.

The matter referred to in your letter is being considered and we will get back to you once we have an answer.

Yours sincerely,

Yehuda Avner
Ambassador of Israel

Dear Dr Avner,
Alternatively I should be willing to make a gift of a permanent copy of the Entebbe report to your Government, provided the handover could be assured adequate publicity (a small ceremony, perhaps!)

DAVID IRVING

November 25, 1987

COPY

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

FILE No.

OPENED

CLOSED

SUBJECT

SECRET

Indexed Under

Initials

FILE No.

REFERENCE TO OTHER PAPERS

TRANSIT LADDER

QUESTION TO AND ANSWERS FROM UO/871 LT FULUGENSIO BYARUGABA

- 2IC 'B' COY MMSRR

I took cover

Q A 1 : Where were the weapons stored?
Q 1 : They were with the troops.
A 2 : What about the APCs?
Q 2 : Some APCs were taken to Katabi and a few were left at the airport.
A 3 : How many APCs were at Katabi?
Q 3 : There were seven at Katabi and 3 at the airport.
A Q 4 : How were the three at the airport deployed?
Q A 4 : One was at the Kigungu radar, one near the apron and another at the old terminal building.
A Q 5 : Why did you take the 7 APCs to Katabi?
Q 5 : Because we had no cover for them at the airport.
A Q 6 : Who gave you the order to take the APCs to Katabi?
Q 6 : When the Base Commander Lt-Col Yassin came to brief us he instructed us to move the APCs to Katabi.
A 7 : Did you as experts advise him that cover could be improvised?
Q 7 : As we saw there was no cover we found his advise was appropriate.
A 8 : When the hijacked plane landed did you receive any fresh orders different from those you had before?
Q 8 : There were no fresh orders.
A 9 : Who was overral commander?
Q 9 : Late Capt Ariga was our OC.
A 10: Was there any other person?
Q 10: Lt-Col Yassin was above us all.
A 11: Did you see Lt-Col Sule?
Q 11: I used to see him but he never briefed us on matters related to the plane.
A 12: Didn't late Capt Ariga inform you that Lt-Col Sule was ovveral commander?
Q 12: No.
A 13: Where were you during the attack?
Q 13: I was in the room where I used to sleep.
A 14: Where were the Coy arms?
Q 14: They were with the soldiers, as they were all on guard duty, but we had a small armoury where weapons of those on pass-leave were kept.
A 15: How did you know Lt-Col Yassin was overral Commander?
Q 15: Because when we were going to Entebbe we were told that we would fall under Entebbe Airforce Base.
A 16: Was the grenade that hit you thrown directly at you?
Q 16: It was aimed at me but I didn't see the person who threw it.
A 17: You had troops under your control, why did you hide?
Q 17: I didn't hide, I only took cover.
A 18: What orders did you give as an army officer?
Q 18: All my troops run away so I could not give orders to anybody.
A 19: You ran away to Katabi. Whom do you think was to control the troops?
Q 19: There was nobody to command because all troops ran away.
A 20: Did you have radios?
Q 20: We had no radios. In the past we used APC radios but all these were out of order.
A 21: Did you have any other radios?
Q 21: No.
A 22: How did you communicate?
Q 22: We used telephones. We were on ordinary guard duties as such we didn't need communication radios.
A 23: What are the duties of a Company 2IC?
Q 23: Administration within the Company, to check on how many soldiers, arms and how much ammunition. You do this in co-ordination with the Colour Seargent.
A 24: Don't you think that, as a Coy 2IC you are responsible for equipment, radios and the like?
Q 24: Yes, infact we had one radio at first but ran short of radio cells.
A 25: With whom did you communicate on this radio?
Q 25: We used it for sending messages to Malire.

all we could to extinguish the fire. We got a vehicle and a communication radio and proceeded to the scene of the fire. We located the fire brigade, proceeded to the airport and did all we could to stop the fire.

At 0600 hrs H.E. and Chief of Staff wondered that since the start of these sad events nothing had been heard of Lt-Col Sule. They feared he might have been killed in the fighting. H.E. contacted me on the small radio we had taken and instructed me to locate Lt-Col Sule.

Arriving at the New Airport hotel reception desk I had to use my cigarette lighter to locate Lt-Col Sule's room number from the guest list sheet. I found that he had been booked in Room 14. When I got there I knocked on his door several times. He eventually came to the door wrapped in a towel and asked me what was wrong. I told him we had been attacked. He dressed up and when we came down I showed him the refilling machine and the dead bodies of our soldiers which included our dead officers. I instructed that the bodies be collected together and identified accordingly to number, rank, name and unit.

We then all left for State House ~~I then took Lt-Col Sule to State House~~. There the Chief of Staff said he wanted to address the troops. Marines were left in charge, to take over from Malire.

That is all I know Of these events.

Signed: .....(COL MALIYAMUNGU - GSO I OPs/TRG)

Date: .....

toilet

STATEMENT BY UO/900 LT RAPHAEL OSACHA

OF STATE RESEARCH

On the 29/6/76 I received a telephone call from Mr. Okot of Special Branch. He told me that a plane which was making noise outside had been hijacked. I dressed up and went out. I found a plane was moving slowly surrounded by Military Police. The fire services were standing by. I went up the Presidential Office and rung State House. The operator told me the French Ambassador had already informed H.E. The former had told H.E. that the plane was running out fuel. The operator further informed me that H.E. had directed me to take the plane to the old airport. When the hijacked plane had bee n directed to the old airport I saw trucks loaded with soldiers from Marines under the command of Major Taban (now Lt-Col). The above soldiers surrounded the hijacked plane. I saw many Senior Officers who included Col Maliyamungu, Lt-Col Sule, Lt-Col Yassin Maj. Moses and soldiers from State House.

At 0600 hrs the hijackers whom I didn't know at this stage, asked to talk to the ambassador. At that time H.E. arrived and when I got close to him he told me to go to the new airport and that he would be coming there. The Base Commander gave me a lift and on the way he told me that the hijackers were Palestinians and that among them there was a woman armed with two pistols at the gate of the plane. He further told me that there were 275 people on board.

H.E. came to the new airport at 1000 hrs. The French Ambassador then arrived. At the new airport there were many telephone calls seeking information regarding the hijacked plane. There too were many journalists who had come by other flights and wanted to go and interview the hijackers and take photographs. Their request was rejected. The Mnager of the French Airlines together with the French Ambassador requested the President to allow the passengers to disembark as they could easily die due to the heat. This request was granted and the hostages disembarked. They requested for food and H.E. directed the manager to prepare the food.

On the 3/7/76 when H.E. arrived back from Mauritius at about 1900 hrs an East African Airways plane landed first and H.E.'s plane landed soon after.

On his way up, H.E. went through the transit lounge because the lift to his office was not functioning. On knowing the lift was not working H.E. remarked that things around did not look alright. In his office, H.E. said that his wife should be taken home. He also said he did not want many people around. At about 2030 hrs H.E. left for the old airport in the company of Chief of Staff, Col Maliyamungu, Lt-Col Sule and his bodyguards. As I thought H.E. would come back I stayed around with the waiters up to 2300 hrs. Then we saw the officers he had gone with return back. They had their supper. Lt-Col Sule told me before they left that, that night we had to be very alert. I told the staff not to remain around too long. I thought Lt-Col Sule would come back so that I could direct him to the Presidential lounge where there was an automatic telephone line. I came down and after about 10 minutes I heard firing from the old airport. I first thought the Palestinians were fighting our soldiers. I went to the girl who had the key to the Presidential lounge and went together with her upstairs. As we went up I saw a section of soldiers advancing towards the terminal building. As we stood observing, six others were behind us. We then moved to the lift. Just then some two soldiers were coming up the stairs. I wanted to shoot at them but the range was big. Then when they got close enough I fire and saw both of them fall down. Some others came down trying to assess what was happening. I ran out and on reaching the ticked sales counter I was halted by an enemy soldier. I refused pointing my pistol at him. He ducked and took cover. I run up and hid in a ladies toilet. Later somebody came and knocked at the door of this toilet. I shot at him but unluckily this was not an enemy. This person went and reported that an Israeli was hiding in a toilet. Later Col Maliyamungu, Lt-Col Itabuka and Lt-Col Sule with a group of other soldiers in civilian dress came. They asked me t

QUESTIONS TO AND ANSWERS FROM UO/900 Lieut.

RAPHAEL OSACHA - STATE RESEARCH.

Q1. At what time did you come out of the toilet?.
A1. At dawn, when the Israelis had already left.
Q2. Lt. Col. Sule left you at the VIP lounge. Where did he go after?.
A2. To the old airport and he said he would be back.
Q3. Where was Lt. Col. Sule sleeping?.
A3. He was first of all staying at Lake Victoria Hotel but later H.E directed him to move to the new airport terminal-building where he was given Room 14 in the hotel.
Q4. How many routes are there to room 14?.
A4: There are many routes.
Q5: When leaving, did you tell Lt. Col. Sule where he would meet you?.
A5. There is only one way to the Presidential lounge and that is through the VIP lounge where I was waiting.
Q6: Do you think Lt. Col Sule would have found you in the VIP Lounge?.
A6. Yes that is where we always wait.
Q7: When the French airbus landed were you detailed to do any job in connection with it?.
A7. I was not given any special duty in connection with the plane, I was connected with Lt. Col Sule only in relation with my usual duties.
Q8. So you were on ordinary duty?.
A8. Yes, I even sent my RSM to the old airport to get details of the hostages' passports but he was chased away.
Q9. When H.E returned from Mauritius, did you see the Airport Commandat?.
A9. He was there but from about 2000hrs, I did not see him again.
Q10: When Chief of Staff, Col. Maliyamungu and Lt. Col Sule had eaten, where did they say they were going?.
A10. Lt. Col Sule told me he was going to the old airport and that I should stay around.
Q11. When you heard the shooting, you went up with a lady to open the Presidential lounge, you heard the sound like that of a C 130. Where was the noise coming from?.
A11. It was around the new airport and it was as if a plane was stopping.
Q12. What do you think the whole thing was when you heard the first shooting?.
A12. I thought the Palestians were fighting our soldiers.
Q13. Why did you think like this?.
A13. These Palestineans are Guerrillas and they did not even agree with their leader.
Q14. Had you seen any disagreement between the Palestians and our troops?.
A14. Yes from the way they were answering our troops roughly and on one occassion they answered the Chief of Staff roughly to which the Chief of Staff answered that they had no discipline.
Q15. Did you give Lt. Col Sule any information in the course of your duties?.
A15. I wrote down the names of the journalists who had wanted to interview the hijackers. I saw to it that these journalists boarded their planes and went.
Q16. Where you around when H.E came back from Mauritius?.
A16. Yes, I was around. There were also many senior Officers around.
Q17. Did you dine with the senior Officers?.
A17. I was just around.
Q18. Did you ever know the Israelis would come?.
A18 No, all I heard was on radio that the Israelis had agreed to release the Prisoners asked for.
Q19. When did you start working at the new airport?.
A19. From 1/3/76.

81 DUKE STREET
LONDON W.1
TELEPHONE 01-499 9403

2nd November 1987

Your Excellency,

I wish to offer to the Israeli Government an historical document which may be of interest to future scholars. From the desk of Idi Amin, no less, a friend obtained the original typescript report of Amin's Commission of Inquiry into the famous Entebbe operation. The two hundred pages of testimony contain the entire blow by blow account of what happened during the Israeli operation to liberate the hostages.

If terms could be agreed, I should be happy to provide an archivally permanent copy, or even the original document.

Yours faithfully,

David Irving

H.E. the Ambassador,
The Israel Embassy,
2 Palace Green,
London,
W8

Just a sample!

David Irving

81 Duke Street
Mayfair
London W.1.

Tel: 01-491 3498

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

ל'	באב	תשמ"ט
31	אוגוסט	1989

אל: גב' לילי תבמי, מע"מ מבקרים
מאת: דן אשכל, לונדון
933

הנדון: פרס בטלוויזיה הבריטית על הסופר א.ב.יהושע

ראי נא המכתב המצ"ב מהי.בי.סי המודיע על כוונתם להכין סרט בן 50 דקות על הסופר א.ב.יהושע.

בכוונתם הצוות להגיע ארצה לקראת סוף אוקטובר - תחילת נובמבר 1989. נראה לי שהסיוע היחיד שיידרקר לך מאיתנו יהיה תאום האילוצים בבתים עהל בו משרת בנו של יהושע.

נודיע לך הודיעיני בהקדם מה על הצוות לעשות ע"מ להשיג האישורים הדרושים.

בברכה

דן אשכל

העתק: קשתו"ם
הסברה
אירופה 2
גב' מ. בן-יוסף, לונדון

Radical Round Up

Irving in Australia

Rejected by both Doubleday and Macmillan the British revisionist historian, David Irving, published his latest work *Churchill's War* in Australia this September. The book develops the thesis that Winston Churchill, not Hitler, is to blame for the death of millions of allied soldiers and civilians in the Second World War and is probably Irving's most crudely anti-Jewish work to date. Best known for *Hitler's War*, in which he claims that the Führer was unaware of the Nazi campaign to exterminate the Jews, Irving accused the 'literary establishment' of suppressing his book and praised his Australian publishers, Veritas, for 'their courage'.

The history of Veritas says much about the nature of Irving's book. Veritas specializes in publishing and/or distributing the writings of political extremists—mostly on the right but also on the left. Titles include *None Dare Call It Conspiracy*, Noam Chomsky's *The Fateful Triangle: The USA and The Palestinians* and Alfred Lillenthal's *Zionist Connections* which even a local Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) newspaper called 'paranoid anti-Zionism'. Veritas' managing director, R. P. White, denies any formal connection with Australia's oldest far-right antisemitic organization, the Australian League of Rights, but links do exist. Veritas' publication list is virtually identical to the reading list promoted by the League's leader Eric Butler (author of *The International Jew*) and many League members receive *unsolicited* mailings from Veritas. Veritas was backed by this year's seminar of the Anglo-European Fellowship organized by the League of Rights in Melbourne at which David Irving delivered the final paper. In Britain Veritas books are distributed by Bloomfield Books, the official publishers of the British branch of the Crown Commonwealth League of Rights. It remains, however, a mystery as to where Veritas gets the money to ship, as Irving claims, 'twenty tons' of *Churchill's War* to Britain. Irving says the project is privately backed by Australians and Americans 'for political reasons'. It is worth noting that the Crown Commonwealth League of Rights belonged to the now-expelled neo-Nazi faction of the World Anti-Communist League, a faction generously funded by King Feisal of Saudi Arabia.

The central thesis of *Churchill's War* is that the British Prime Minister started and prolonged the war for his own purposes instead of making peace with Nazi Germany in 1940, a peace according to Irving, which would have preserved the British Empire and prevented the Nazis from unleashing mass extermination. Irving does not discuss what would have happened to continental Europe if it had been left under Hitler nor whether the Nazis would

42 Ibid., 42.
43 Bernard Willms, *Die Deutsche Nation* (The German Nation) (Cologne 1982).
44 Walser, 49.
45 Willms, 157.
46 Ibid., 205.
47 Ibid., 208.
48 Hans Ebeling, *Neue Reden an die Deutsche Nation?* (New Addresses to the German Nation?) (Freiburg and Munich 1984), 12.
49 Ibid., 77.
50 Ibid., 86.
51 Ibid., 41-3.
52 Gerd Bergfleth *et al*, *Zur Kritik der palavernden Aufklärung* (Criticism of a Verbose Enlightenment) (Munich 1984), 11.
53 Ibid., 181.
54 Ibid., 182.
55 Ibid., 182.
56 Ibid., 4, 185.
57 *Wir Selbst*, no. 3/4, 1982, 4-7.
58 *Links*, September 1983.
59 Gunnar Heinsohn, *Menschenopfer, Monotheismus, Tötungsverbot, Apokalyptik, Judenhasse* (Human Victims, Monotheism, the Prohibition to Kill, the Study of the Apocalypse and Jew-hatred) (Bremen 1984).

DR MICHA BRUMLIK is Professor of Education at the University of Heidelberg. His most recent publication is *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland nach 1945* (Jewish Life in Germany after 1945) (Frankfurt 1986). He is currently working on a research project funded by the German Research Association (DFG) about the history of Nazi persecution of the Gypsies.

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have kept their word not to invade Britain.

What were Churchill's own purposes? First, Irving argues, Churchill only adopted an anti-Nazi platform after Hitler snubbed him in 1932 whereupon he was 'bought' by a group of wealthy Jews – most notably Sir Henry Strakosch, the South African mining magnate and Sir Robert Waley Cohen of Royal Dutch Shell. They formed the Focus, a conspiratorial group which systematically poisoned Anglo-German relations in order to precipitate war with Germany. Second, Irving begins to interweave anti-Americanism with antisemitism, claiming that Churchill was a 'gentleman of much mixed blood' through his American mother and that America's postwar hegemony was achieved by the deliberate financial impoverishment of the British Empire.

Churchill's War has been dismissed by leading Australian academics. Dr Robert Manne, a political scientist at Latrobe University wrote in the *Melbourne Age* that

> *Churchill's War* . . . is at every level a dreadful book. It is littered with misprints . . . It contains the silliest of factual errors . . . Its central thesis – the recommendation of British surrender to Nazi Germany – is ill-thought out and, in the deepest sense, subversive . . . Churchill is too large a figure to be diminished by pinpricks . . . Churchill possessed, in a quintessential English way, greatness. Perhaps this is what nettles Irving most deeply. What he has written is Iago's history of Othello (30 September, 1987).

John Foster, a historian at the University of Melbourne quoted one of Hitler's last conversations

> in which he explained that Britain had made a great mistake: 'If fate had granted to an aging and enfeebled Britain a new Pitt instead of this Jew-ridden, half-American drunkard the new Pitt would have at once recognized that Britain . . . allied to a united Europe . . . would still [have retained] the chance of being able to play the arbiter in world affairs . . . [But] I underestimated the power of Jewish domination over Churchill's England' (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 9 October, 1987).

He concludes that the real author of Irving's thesis is Hitler.

The Australian media, however, have not dismissed Irving so quickly. According to Dr Gerard Henderson in the *Asian Wall Street Journal* (29 September, 1987)

> It is an indictment of Australian educational standards that so many young Australian journalists have been incapable of even challenging, let alone refuting, Mr Irving's so-called history. David Irving's extremist views do not go unchallenged in Britain, the United States and Western Europe. Yet in Australia, so far, he has had a remarkably easy run. It is not that the Australian media is sympathetic to fascism. Indeed Australian journalists, like their American and European counterparts, are predominantly left-liberal. The problem is that the current generation of young Australians has little understanding of contemporary history. As well, many left-liberal journalists have been imbued with an anti-British and anti-American bias which, from time to time, they express.

Irving is a controversial figure whose books have, over the years, attracted opprobrium for their personally defamatory nature. He has twice been sued for libel, both cases having been decided to his disadvantage. More generally, he has been accused of being an apologist for Hitler and an advocate of the Communist authorities in Hungary (*Uprising: One Nation's Nightmare. Hungary 1956*). Irving's kind of history is no longer a matter of

strictly Jewish concern. Irving's new book, for instance, not only defames Churchill, but traduces the entire wartime record of the West in standing up to and defeating Nazi totalitarianism. As Dr Henderson concludes

> Irving would have us believe that the Second World War was not a just war and that, by implication, those who lost their lives between 1940 and 1945 died in vain . . . If such a view were to prevail then the will of democracies to defend themselves against totalitarian aggression (of either left or right) would be sapped.

MICHAEL DANBY
with additional material by MARIA BALINSKA

MARIA BALINSKA is Editorial Assistant of PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE.
MICHAEL DANBY is a journalist and Editor of the *Australia/Israel Review*.

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

כו' בחשוון תשמ"ח
19 בנובמבר 1987

שמור
2261

אל: מע"ת
אירופה 2
המרכז
הסברה/מרחבי.

מאת: עיתונות לונדון.

103.3

הנדון: ישראל בראי התקשורת הבריטית.

1.

א. התקשורת הבריטית חזרה בשבועיים האחרונים להתעמק בישראל, אם כי במימדים צנועים יותר מאשר לפני הקיץ. אין ספק שמלחמת המפרץ הסיטה ומסיטה את תשומת הלב התקשורתית מסכסוך ישראל-ערב לכיוון מלחמת אירן-עיראק; הדבר משתקף גם באופי הדיווחים על פסגת עמאן, כאשר הדיווחים התרכזו בהיבט המפרצי של הנושא ולא בהקשר הערבי-ישראלי.
יחד עם זאת, הכתבים השונים חזרו אט-אט לביתם בישראל והוחלפו ע"י כתבים אחרים, והסיפורים הישראלים חזרו ושבו לעמודי החוץ.

ב. שוב היינו עדים לסיפורים על מעורבותנו במלחמת אירן-עיראק, אספקת נשק לאירן וש"פ צבאי עם דרא"פ. הפיננשל טיימס כינה אותנו " הספק העקבי והמשמעותי ביותר של נשק לאירן במשך שבע שנות המלחמה"; הסאנדיי טלגרף דאג להרחיב הדיבור על ש"פ הצבאי והטכנולוגי-צבאי (מכשור אלקטרוני בפרט) בינינו לבין דרא"פ, ש"פ אשר הביא לדרא"פ השגים במלחמתה באנגולה.
התקשורת האלקטרונית, אשר התעלמה מאיתנו זמן רב, חזרה גם היא לדון בנושא חביב ומוכר- המאבק בין קצונים ערבים וישראלים. דייויד סמית, כתב ITN לשעבר בישראל, ערך כתבה ארוכה במהדורת ITN המשודרת בשעה 4 בנושא זה. לדבריו, הפוליטקאים משני הצדדים אינם קובעים יותר את קצב ואופי הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי, אלה המנהיגים הדתיים-פונדמנטליסטים.
הסכסוך לובש אופי של סכסוך דתי ולא לאומני. סמית מדגיש הבעיה הדמוגרפית מכמה היבטים: ערבים-ישראלים, דתיים-חילוניים בישראל.
דרך אגב, סמית פנה אלי וביקש כמה הצעות לראיונות בבריטניה. בהמלצתי ראיין את הרב הוגו גרין, אחד הרבנים הרפורמים הבולטים כיום בבריטניה.

2/. . .

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לונדון

ג. היום הופיעו שני מאמרים (בטיימס מאת מוראיי ובאינדפנדנט מאת ריצ'רדס) שעסקו בעשור לביקור סאדאת בישראל. שני המאמרים הדגישו את "השלום הקר" ואת חוסר שביעות הרצון משני הצדדים ביחס לשלום: מצד ישראל- חוסר התפתחות בנורמליזציה; מצד מצרים- אי הרחבתו למדינות נוספות וחוסר הפתרון לבעיה הפלסטינית שהפכו אותו לשלום נפרד בין ישראל למצרים. אולם שניהם מציינים את ההישג שבעצם חתימת הסכם השלום והמשכיותו למרות ארועים שאיימו עליו כגון מלחמת לבנון, רצח סאדאת ועוד.
בנוסף למאמרים אלה ודאי יבואו מאמרים נוספים בימים הקרובים בעתונים נוספים.
תידרכתי בנושא את איש הבי.בי.סי MAURICE GENT (המשדר ב- WORLD SERVICE) אך טרם קיבלתי את תמליל כתבתו.

ד. ארועי "יום בלפור" נסתיימו בתיקו 1:1: מאמר בגארדיין (אנטי ישראלי) ומאמר באינדפנדנט (של מרטין גילברט). מהגארדיין נודע לי שנתקבלו 250 מכתבים בענין המאמר השלילי (שניים- מאת מזכיר ועד שליחי הקהילות ושל ס/מנהל ביפא"ק פורסמו) ורובם המכריע תקף את המאמר והתיזה האנטי ישראלית שבו.
בסה"כ עורר הענין פחות הדים מן הצפוי.

ה. התקשרתי עם ד"ר קונור קרוז או'בריאן והשגתי הסכמתו לכתוב מאמר על החלוקה (כ"ט בנובמבר). הוא גם הבטיח להכניס המאמר לגארדיין. אני תקוה שאכן יעמוד בשני התנאים. ברוס קשדן, אשר נמצא באירלנד, התקשר עמו ונאמר לו שאו'בראין עוסק בכתיבת המאמר.

ו. בסיכומו של דבר ניתן להמשיך ולומר שלמרות התעוררות מסוימת בענין בנו, המז"ת בימים אלה סינונימי עם המפרץ ולא עם הסכסוך שבאזורנו. אני נתקל בכך גם בניסיוני להסדיר ראיונות בטלויזיה לשה"ח פרס: הענין אינו רב במיוחד. התחושה בציבור העתונאי והיהודי עמו אני בא במגע היא: ירדו מעלינו.

2. שנת הארבעים.
אנא לתשומת ליבכם סקירה מעודכנת על הנעשה בתחום זה שנשלחה בנפרד לר' אמית"ק ולמנהל מע"ת. לא אחזור על הדברים כאן.

3/ . . .

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לונדון

3. ארועים מיוחדים.

א. ביקור השר שריר, שר התיירות והמשפטים. השר שריר היה כאן בביקור רשמי כאורח עמיתו הבריטי. הבריטים ארגנו לו מספר ארועים תקשורתיים בתיאום עם לשכת התיירות כשאנו צרפנו לארועים את הכתבים הישראליים בלונדון. השר קיים ב- 5/11 מסיבת-עתונאים מיוחדת לנושא האופרה "נאבוקו"; מסיבת עתונאים מיוחדת ב- 10/11 מטעם סיריל סטיין ו- HILTON INTERNATIONAL-LADBROKE; נטיעת עץ בהייד פארק (שקיבלה כיסוי מסוים בעתונות השדה) ומסיבת עתונאים משותפת עם מארחיו הבריטים ב- 12/11.

ב. ביקור ברוך אסקרוב, יועץ ממרה"מ ושה"ח. התלויתי למר אסקרוב בפגישותיו בלונדון שהתרכזו בנושאי מסע הבחירות והבחירות בבריטניה ביוני 1987. דיווח על כך הועבר לאירופה 2.
במסגרת פגישותיו, הסדרתי עבורו שיחה עם הכתב המדיני (מדיניות פנים ומפלגות) של הגארדיין JAMES NAUGHTIE. מר נוטי הוא אחד הכתבים הפוליטיים העולים בבריטניה וצופים לו עתיד גדול. להלן הנקודות העיקריות משיחתנו איתו:

סודה של תאצ'ר הוא באישיותה המגנטית, בעקשנותה בחתירה ליעדים ובחזונה. הסכנה היא שאם תכונותיה אלה תיהפכנה בעיני הציבור לדימוי של עקשנות, הרי יתרונה יהפוך חסרונה. לליבור כיום אין מנהיג שיכול להופיע בעיני הציבור במעמד שווה לתאצ'ר. תאצ'ר שינתה את המערכת הפוליטית בבריטניה. היא שכנעה את הבוחרים שלא אהבו אותה ללכת איתה כי תכניתה נוגעת בעתיד בריטניה כולה. היא טענה שאין טעם להפסיק את מדיניותה באמצע למרות הסבל שנוצר לציבור מאלמנטים מסוימים של מדיניותה.
היא הצליחה לשכנע הציבור להקריב היום עבור עתיד טוב יותר. מול מדיניותה ההחלטית והכוללנית היה הלייבור מלא בלבול, יריבויות אישיות וספק עצמי ביכולת ההשרדות שלו לטווח ארוך. התוצאה: נצחונות לתאצ'ר.

4. מפגישותי הבולטות:

א. NIK GOWING, כתב דיפלומטי, ITN (חדשות רשת 4). כתב ידידותי וחביב אישית. בכלל, אנו נהנים עתה מקונסטלציה חיובית בחדשות רשת 4: הכתב והמגיש TREVOR MC DONALD ידידותי, גאוינג ידידותי וגם עורך החוץ GRAHAM WALKER בחור ישר וטוב.

4/. . .

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

בעייתנו היא בשובו של דייויד סמית, הזכור לרע מתקופתו ככתב ITN בישראל, והנחשב ל"מומחה המזת"י של הרשת. גאוינג מסווג את הענין בנושא הישראלי - ערבי כיום בתחתית סולם העדיפויות, מאחורי המו"מ הבינגושי לפירוק נשק, הפסגה בוושינגטון, המפרץ ועוד.

ב. LARRY HODGSON, מנהל מחלקת חדשות וענייני דיומא, רדיו וטלביזיה אזוריים, בי.בי.סי. הודג'סון סבור שהנהלת החדשות החדשה בבי.בי.סי. תגביר חשיבות הדיווח המקומי והאזורי. הכיסוי בנושאי חוץ הוא מעולה ומקיף אך לא כך בחדשות הפנים והאזורים. אמרתי לו שקל יותר לדווח על צרותיהם של אחרים. הודג'סון הסביר לי את המבנה החדש של מנהלת החדשות של הבי.בי.סי.: המנהל RON NEIL ומתחתיו שלושה מנהלי יחידות: גב' JENNI ABRAMSKY (יהודיה אך מאוד מסוייגת) - מנהלת חדשות וענייני דיומא - רדיו. מר TONY HALL - מנהל חדשות וענייני דיומא - טלביזיה. מר LARRY HODGSON (ידידותי ומסייע) - מנהל חדשות וענייני דיומא - רדיו וטלביזיה אזוריים.

ג. ROBIN LUSTIG, עורך פנים, האובזרבר. לשעבר כתב העתון בארץ. את מקומו ככתב במז"ח תפס SHYAM BHATIA שהעביר את מקום מושבו לקהיר. אריק סילבר הוא הסטרינגר בישראל. לוסטיג סבור שבעתונות יש כעת סנטימנט חיובי ומבין כלפי ישראל . שיחתנו עסקה בעיקר בסצנריו שונים לפתרון הסכסוך כאשר הוא קופץ מתסריט לתסריט ואני מכניס מקלות בגלגליו להכעיס. סופו של דבר שהודה שנהנה משיחתנו משום שסוף סוף הפעיל את מוחו כפי שנהג לעשות בויכוחים בישראל בשונה מהמצב כיום כאן בבריטניה. ההערכה שאני שומע עליו היא שהוא יגיע רחוק וכי הקשר עמו חשוב למרות שאינו עוסק יותר בתחומנו.

ד. PETER DAVID, עורך מז"ח, אקונומיסט. דייויד סיפר לי שעוסק עתה בכתיבת SURVEY על ארצות ערב להוציא המגרב. המוסף יתרכז בהיבטים מדיניים ויעסוק גם בשאלה הפלסטינית ותפקידה המורכב בעולם הערבי. יוצא לארה"ב לשבוע כדי לפגוש אישים ואקדמאים ואוסף חומר רב. הצעתי לו לשמוע גם את מומחינו ונתתי לו את שמו של פרופ' סופר מהאוניברסיטה העברית הנמצא כאן בשבתון וכן תיאמתי עם יוסי גל בוושינגטון שיפגוש את אלי אבידן ועוד שבתוניסטים כפי שירצה. גם דייויד

5/...

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

סבור שהעתונות הבריטית אינה מצטיינת בדיווח על עניני פנים ומצליחה יותר כשמדובר בעניני חוץ. לדבריו, הדבר קשור עם חוש ה-CAMARADERIE בין ה-CIVIL SERVICE והעתונות (הכתובה בעיקר). סיפר בשם ידיד המשרת בשגארה"ב בקהיר על הצלחתו הגדולה של שגריר עירק בוושינגטון להתקרב למנהיגות היהודית בארה"ב. הדבר הוביל אותנו לשיחה ארוכה על הצורך והתפקיד של נציגות וחשיבות קשרי עובדיה עם מדינת השירות.

ה. JENNI ABRAMSKY, מנהלת חדשות ועניני דיומא, רדיו. בחורה יהודיה, כבת ארבעים, אך עם יחס מסויג כלפי ישראל, הנובע מרקע משפחתי יהודי אנטי - ציוני. באתי לברך אותה על תפקידה הבכיר החדש ונתקבלתי בסבר פנים יפות. רוב שיחתנו נסבה על שנת הארבעים והכיסוי התקשורתי כאשר אני מבקש להתרכז בדיווחים הפעם בישראל גופא. כמו כן סקרתי לבקשתה את הערכותינו ביחס לפסגת עמאן, השלכותיה ועשור להסכם השלום עם מצרים.

ב ב ר כ ה,

א. מנור

העתק : מנהל הסברה
לע"מ

Deputy Speaker

Jerusalem, 18 November 1987
26 Cheshvan 5748

Dear Mr. Kaufman,

Your speech in Brighton on 30 September, 1987 concerning the Israeli-Arab conflict, has been brought to my attention and I read it very thoroughly. As a matter of fact, I was officially designated to represent my party (Labour) at your conference but I could not attend because of a previous commitment at the same time in Europe. Nevertheless, before I knew I would not be able to attend, I read a lot of material in preparation for my scheduled participation in the conference and therefore, I am well acquainted with the issues you dealt with. I would like to comment only on the Israeli-Arab conflict and the statements you made, in this regard, in your speech. As I have many comments to make, I shall deal with your speech paragraph by paragraph. First I shall quote your paragraph and then comment on it.

Paragraph No. 1

You say: The Arab-Israeli conflict is only one of a number of conflicts in the Middle East of which the Iran-Iraq war has been the most significant in recent months. I hope that some way can be found to resolve that terrible conflict.

My comments: You state that the Israeli-Arab conflict is not the only one in the Middle-East. But why do you mention only the Iran-Iraq war? You must know that there are many more such conflicts in the Middle-East that have no connection whatsoever with the Israeli-Arab conflict. Please allow me to list some of the most signficant:

a. There is a latent hatred and tension between Turkey and Syria, from the time that Turkey annexed the Alexandrette Zone. Syria retaliated by granting patronage to the Kurds who fight against Turkey in order to achieve autonomy for the Kurdish Zone.

b. The Kurds in general want to establish an independent State and therefore they fight the Turks, the Iraqis and the Iranians. (By the way, why is nobody voicing his support for self-determination for the Kurds and their right to have a State of their own?

c. There is constant tension between Iraq and Syria about sharing the waters of the Euphrates.

d. There is constant tension in Syria because the ruling cast belongs to a tiny minority, the Alawites, while the Moslem majority does not agree with it, as is manifest by the terrorist activities of the Moslem brothers against the government. Only a couple of years ago, more than 10,000 citizens of Homs were killed by Assad's troops.

e. A large number of minorities have been slaughtered in Iraq - (Assyrians about 300 thousand) and in Turkey - (Armenians about 1 million).

f. The civil war in Lebanon has been going on for 100 years! - long before the Balfour Declaration... Druse, Moslems and Maronites continue to slaughter each other to this very day.

g. The Jordanian Crown was, from the beginning, backed by the bayonets of the soldiers of the Arab Legion, mobilised by the British (Glub Pasha), financed by them and backed by 300 thousand Beduin who lived in the southern part of Transjordan and who were willing, if well paid, to protect the Hashemite family in Amman, though alien to the Middle East. The family and it's entourage was "imported" from the Arab Peninsula after Ibn Saud chased them out of Chigaz.

The Arabs do not love this family. They drummed Feisal (Abdulla's brother and Hussein's grandfather) out of Damascus where the British tried to crown him as the King of the Grand Arab State. Later, when the British made him King of Iraq, his dynasty did not last long: his son was killed and his corpse was dragged through the streets of Baghdad.

Therefore, the very existence of the Hashemite kingdom (though it is favoured by Israel) is actually a pain in the neck to all the Pan-Arabs of the Middle East.

h. The Arab Emirates along the Persian Gulf, including Kuwait, were a source of unrest in the Arab world long before the war between Iran and Iraq broke out. As you may recall, Iraq wanted (and still wants) to annex Kuwait and other Emirates. It did not carry this out because of the opposition of Saudia and the threat of the U.S.A.

i. Saudia itself poses a big problem, trying to retain the power in the hands of a decadent family against the will of its young generation to modernise not only the oil fields and the harems, but also the way of life of the population.

j. Yemen has split into two separate countries, while the southern one, being a Marxist State, has become a nucleus of danger and a threat to its northern neighbour and to Saudia.

k. Egypt invaded Yemen in 1964 and used their chemical weapons against the civil population. This invasion, too, had nothing to do with the Israel-Arab conflict.

l. Lybia is at war or in a state of semi-war with Sudan, Chad, Egypt and Tunisia. It is a source of unrest for th whole of North-Africa.

m. And last but not least Morocco has a big problem with the Polisario, who want independence for the southern part of Morocco.

As you can see, I have mentioned only 13 main conflicts (there are dozens of others) that have nothing to do with the existence of Israel in the Middle-East. They are tangible proof that the Middle East is undergoing a social, economic, cultural and political upheaval and revolution. It is their good fortune that the Jews decided, after two thousand years, to come back to their historic homeland and thus furnished them with an excellent common denominator that enables them to unite at least in one respect, their hatred of Jews and of Israel.

I well understand that having only five minutes to present your case before the Convention, you could not dwell longer on your opening point, namely that the Israel-Arab conflict is not the only one in the Middle-East, and therefore you mentioned only the Iran-Iraq war. For the sake of the record I found it necessary to help you out by showing how right you were with your opening statement....

But I cannot agree with the totally inadequate sentence that ends your first paragraph. I quote: "I hope some way can be found to resolve that terrible conflict". Come now, Mr. Kaufman. A war that has already destroyed one million young lives is a conflict that you only hope to resolve? Why don't you find it necessary to alert the attention of your party to the fact that much more than vague hopes must be expressed and that action must be taken by the modern world in the East and in the West, to stop this horrible massacre of innocent young lives?

It is most surprising that afterwards, when you deal with the Israel-Arab conflict, you are much more sure what must be done in order to resolve the conflict, and obviously, at the expense of Israel.

Paragraph No. 2

You say: The Labour party manifesto strssed that any Middle East initiative should take account of 1) the security of the State of Israel and 2) the right to self-determination for the Palestinian people. I shall attempt to achieve both these goals and shall not try to curry favour with one group or the other. To this end I shall be saying exactly the same thing to Poale Zion today.

My comments: In the this paragraph you say that the manifesto of the Labour party stresses the right of Israel to exist within secure borders and the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. I cannot but agree with this manifesto, and we, the Jews, acted according to it long before your party made up it's mind about the Middle-East:

a. We agreed to the first partition of Erez Israel in 1922, when Mr. Winston Churchill (then Minister of the Colonies) decided to cut off Transjordan from the Jewish Homeland which was promised to us in the Balfour Declaration, and which was handed over in trust to Britain as care-taker, by the League of Nations.

b. We agreed to a second act of partition, this time of the western part of Palestine, in order to enable the establishment of a Jewish State, in accordance with the decision of the United Nations on 29 November, 1947.

And who did not agree that the Jews should have their own State? The Palestinians!! They started to shoot on 30 November because five Arab governments promised them that they would invade Palestine after its evacuation by the British and that they would throw all the Jews into the sea...

The sad fact, Mr. Kaufman, is that until this very day, the Arabs, and the Palestinians in particular, though living in refugee camps and being scattered over the whole Middle-East, do not agree with the right of Israel to exist as an independent State!

This and more. You know, just as surely as I, that Hussein had 19 years at his disposal to establish a Palestinian State on the West Bank with East Jerusalem as its capital. Why didn't he and the other Arab States carry out what they now want from us? Isn't it another trick to "correct the mistake", that you bring up in paragraph 4 in the words of an Arab Ambassador, "that Israel was founded in the first place"?

As I shall show later on, Israel was ready to agree to a Palestinian State after 1967 as well, but in the meantime, please note Mr. Kaufman: the Arabs and the Palestinians do not acknowledge the right of the Jews to self-determination until this very day. Instead, Arafat and the PLO want to establish a "Secular Democratic State" not alongside of Israel but instead of it. This is still written in the Palestinian Contract. Therefore, the Palestinian problem cannot and will not be solved, so long as their attitude towards Israel's right to exist will not change. And it wil not change as long as worthy people like you, with all their good intentions and understanding, will continue blindly to back one side - the Arabs - and to demand all the concessions from the other side - the Israelis!

Paragraph No. 3

You say: It is almost 40 years since the foundation of the State of Israel and Israel has become not only the most powerful military force in the Middle East, but one of the most powerful in the world. But among the states set up after the War, Israel is unique in that it is powerful but not secure. It is unique in that it has not been recognised by many countries and is technically at war with all except one of the surrounding states. One must ask: where has Israel gone wrong?

My comments: In the this paragraph you ask, "where has Israel gone wrong?" You wonder, but cannot understand why, such a strong country as Israel is not recognised by so many countries and is at war with most of it's neighbours.

Well, you are mistaken, Mr. Kaufman! Israel has not gone wrong. From a stage of total unacceptance by the Arab world (unacceptance that was accompanied by scorn and abuse for those "death-worthy" Jews who dared to challenge the overwhelming Arab majority), we have succeeded in establishing a Jewish State that is able not only to withstand the joint military strength of the Arab powers but is forcing the Arab world, slowly but surely, to accept the Israeli presence in the Middle-East. Countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Tunis (before the last change in power) and also Sudan (before the ousting of General Numeiri), declare it openly and behave accordingly. (Egypt made peace with us and Morocco has a de-facto peace with us). Jordan acutally observes a day-to-day peace with us through the open bridges and the normal inter-change of people, money, merchandise and matriculation examinations and the constant meetings of the heads of the two States to discuss peace.

Only recently, all the Arab States convened in Amman and acknowledged the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, by renewing diplomatic relations with Egypt while she continues to retain, and even to develop the peace with Israel! Look at what we have achieved in only 40 years, Mr. Kaufman, bearing in mind that Jewish reestablishment in the Middle East must be a very long process which will demand a lot of patience and understanding.

So why are you so impatient with us? Has the world solved, after 40 years, the problem of a divided Berlin? Are you also so impatient with Spain and France who have failed to grant autonomy to the Basques? And do you see a promising end to the bloodshed in Northern Ireland?

Please, Mr. Kaufman, give some thought to the things that have already been achieved. They are outstanding, so why do you push us so hard and especially on one side only? Can you not see that the other side also has to move towards us, and may do so if you and your friends will try persuading them instead of leaning only on us.

Paragraph No. 4

You say: Some people, such as an Arab Ambassador I spoke to recently, thought the problem was that Israel had been founded in the first place and from his point of view this was fair. But as Israel does exist, he admits he has to be realistic and accept the fact. I believe that Israel cannot be faulted for any of the wars before 1967. But the 1967 victory made the Israelis believe they were invincible. The victory was seen as a solution in itself. The Israelis considered themselves supreme and did not look for a lasting peace which could have been achieved. They became complacent. This led to the 1973 war where the Egyptians achieved early successes although they were later driven back. The shock of almost being invaded led, disasterously to the election of a chauvanist militaristic government in Israel which committed the crime (and a crime not only against the Lebanese but the Israelis who fell needlessly) of the invasion of Lebanon.

My comments: This paragraph is a mass (presumably due to lack of time) of inaccurate facts and wrong conclusions:

a. You say: "I believe that Israel cannot be faulted for any wars before 1967". Here I must disagree with you completely. In my opinion, David Ben-Gurion made a very big mistake when he joined forces with Britain and France whose aim was to recapture their hold on the Suez Canal. This was not our war and we should not have participated in it. The culmination, a military flop on the Anglo-French side, and a hasty retreat on ours, due to American-Russian pressure, only proved the big mistake made by all the involved parties and especially by us.

   If Israel had stayed at home and had not joined forces with Britain and France, Nasser would perhaps have made peace with us. The fact that the

confiscation of the Suez Canal had added to his prestige, might have encouraged him to dare to talk with us, in the same way as the Egyptian achievements in the first phase of the October war gave Sadat the courage to come to Jerusalem.

The mere fact, Mr. Kaufman, that Britain was involved in the Suez war is no justification for it.

b. You give the impression, in this paragraph, that Israel is to be blamed for the 1967 war and especially for the complacency in Israel that followed the victory. This attitude, you argue, led to the October war and all the disasters that came after.

Once more I cannot agree with you. First of all I am sure that you are aware that we were quite happy with the 1949 borders. I can assure you that if the Arabs would have come to us prior to June 1967 and suggested total peace on the basis of those borders, the entire Jewish population in Israel would have agreed, as they agreed later, to the peace contract with Egypt.

Moreover, in June 1967 we established a National Unity Government which included Mr. Begin. That Government announced immediately after the war that, if the Arabs would agree to make peace with us, we would be ready to fall back to the 1949 borders with only Jerusalem must remaining united. This was the official standpoint of our Government until September 1967 when all the heads of the Arab countries convened in Khartoum and agreed resoundingly on the three no's:

No negotiation with Israel
No acknowledgement of Israel
No peace with Israel

And so the last chance to induce Israel to retreat to the 1949 borders and to solve the Palestinian problem simply evaporated.

So my dear Mr. Kaufman, no lasting peace could have been achieved during the years 1967 - 1973, because the Arabs simply did not want to make peace. They waited to become strong enough to launch another attack and to complete the job they had not succeeded in completing in 1949...

I am sure you remember how delegates of many member countries of the United Nations danced in the corridors in October 1973, when the first news reached New York that the Arabs had won the war.

c. The 1973 war did not lead to the establishment of a chauvinist military government. The seeds of this government were sown in 1967 when the Arabs said "no" to every Israeli intitiative including the Allon Plan. This negative attitude encouraged the radical factors in our society to claim that there were no Arab partners with whom to make peace, thus compelling them to "establish facts", such as Jewish settlements in the Arab population centres of the West Bank.

   It is sad to relate that the Labour Party in Israel did not succeed in convincing the Jewish public that despite the refusal of the entire Arab world to negotiate with us, the hope of finding an Arab partner for territorial compromise should not be abandoned. This was the main factor which enabled a chauvinistic government, headed by Mr. Begin, to come to power.

d. The Lebanon war as it developed after the first 5-6 days, surpassing the 45 km limit was a big mistake, I agree with you on this point. The biggest mistake was to employ "ZAHAL" (the Israel Defence Army), in order to achieve political ends. You should know that Ben-Gurion had a purpose in

> calling our army, "Defence Army". This name was intended to define its role as a defending force, because we Jews came to this country to sow and to build and, only if attacked, to defend ourselves. Since then, Zahal has never been involved in missions to attain political aims.

Mr. Begin broke this unwritten law (he also used to omit the word 'defence' from the full name of Zahal so as to emphasize his disagreement with Ben-Gurion's limiting definition of the role of Zahal) and ordered Zahal to enter Beirut in order to impose a peace agreement on Lebanon.

My party, the Labour Party, backed the operation as long as it was intended to drive the PLO back (45 km) from our northern border. But once this promise to us (we were then in opposition) was broken, we opposed the war and practically forced the government to stop it. As soon as Mr. Peres became Prime Minister, Zahal was ordered to pull out of Lebanon.

Mr. Begin and all his government paid a very heavy price for this mistake: Mr. Begin has resigned and has confined himself to total isolation from public life; an inquiry committee investigating the Sabra and Shatila massacre by Christian Lebanese, forced Defence Minister, Arik Sharon, the Chief of Staff, Rafael Eitan, the commander of intelligence and the commander of the Beirut front, to resign their posts. The Likud party in consequence lost its decisive strength in the public arena and was forced to share government with the Labour party after the 1984 elections.

But, although agreeing with you on this point, it does not justify your description of the Lebanon war as a crime! First of all, I beg to remind you that for 23 years our border with Lebanon was the quietest. Our relationship with all Lebanese governments was outstandingly good. We used to ponder and say that Lebanon will be the second Arab country to make peace with us, knowing that it would not dare to be first.

Only when Hussein chased the PLO out of Jordan, after September 1970 (Black September), and they moved their headquarters to Lebanon, the border with Israel was kindled like dry straw. We had to enter Lebanon as early as 1978 (the Litani Campaign) in order to smash the PLO stronghold in the South of Lebanon. So it is not a new or surprising story. But you did not say a word about the situation that led to the Lebanon war; nor did you find it necessary to point out that the border with Jordan was hostile and flammable from 1949 until 1970 while the PLO was in that country with the Lebanese border being as peaceful during that time as the border between England and Scotland; and that since 1970 with the border between Jordan and Israel now quiet and friendly, the Lebanese border became a hell.

I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding between us: the insurgence into Lebanon weakened the PLO while the military arrangements we made and maintain in South Lebanon enable our people in the northern settlements to live in relative quiet. We shall be ready at all times to take action against those intent on endangering us. Every government will move very swiftly to eliminate any source of danger to Israel, whatever the reaction of world opinion, just as your government did in the past so many times when British interests were involved, as in the case of the Falklands.

I also want to protest very strongly against the use of the word crime in the context of the Lebanese war. Is it your undeclared intention to connect the Israeli government, by this word, to other war crimes such as those of the second world war? If so, you are stretching out a perilous hand which will be grasped by the racist and anti-semitic forces in the world who succeeded in passing a resolution in the United Nations that Zionism is a racist movement and that the Jews behave on the West Bank as the Nazis did in Europe!

There is no greater lie and smear than this. I am amazed at your "courage" to present such a theme to Poalei Zion. If a military effort to stop cold-blooded killers of infants, women and old people from carrying on with their dastardly deeds is a crime, how would you describe the military actions of your governments during the last seventy years.

* Yielding to Hitler in Munich and selling a whole country (Czechoslovakia) in order to gain time because no English government had prepared Britain for the forthcoming war (1938).

* Ignoring the ongoing slaughter of Jews in Auschwitz and all over Poland and suppressing plans to bomb the camps and the railroads leading to them, an action that could have saved millions of lives during the holocaust (1944).

* Attacking Egypt in order to take back the Egyptian held Suez Canal (1956).

These are only a few examples out of many more that could be added to "the list of crimes" that you mentioned in your speech, and that concern you country only. Now imagine how many "crimes" like the one mentioned by you have been committed by the whole family of modern and western countries.

Paragraph No. 5

You say: The problem now is that, as Israel failed to take advantage of her 1967 victory to achieve a lasting peace, the West Bank has been occupied for over half the history of the State. Children have grown up and joined the army with no experience of any other situation other than the present one.

My comments: In this paragraph you continue to blame Israel, and Israel only, for failing to achieve peace. Do you really think that only Israel is to be blamed for not achieving peace? I have already dwelt on the subject of the Arab refusal to any solution that has the slightest component of compromise, so I shall not repeat it here. But I really think that putting all the pressure and blame on Israel, in this respect, encourages the Arabs to continue to be stubborn in their refusal to approach any sort of solution.

You are right in saying that in the meantime a new generation has grown up, on both sides, who have become frustrated because of the lack of any solution, and therefore drift more and more towards extremism. And since, for the time being, we are stronger than the Arab population on the West Bank and in Gaza, time is running out for them. If people like you continue to totally justify the Arabs, and accuse only us for not making peace, the coming generation on both sides will be unable to even look at each other.

No wonder that such dreadful solutions to the conflict, as presented by the fascist Kahane, find an echo especially in the young Jewish generation, that does not see any positive solution to the conflict in the future, and therefore becomes frustrated and bitter.

Paragraph No. 6

You say: The Palestinians under occupation have no civil rights and no political rights. What saddens me is that the Palestinians are now doing the work which the pioneers did in earlier times. They are a lower class of labour. They are often bussed into Israel in the morning and then bussed out again in the evening because they are not allowed to live in Israel. It may be that the standard of living in the area has risen slightly. I do not know. But the question is: do the Palestinians live as well as the Israelis, and the answer is no. The government of Israel subsidizes people to live on the West Bank and they live there and work in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. They build villas on the side of the hills. Such people are "commuter pioneers".

My comments: In this paragraph you lay the ideological basis for labeling Israel as a racist country, and for including her in the defiled group of nations: South Africa, Taiwan, South Korea, Chile, etc. You run away from the slightest intellectual effort to understand the day-to-day problem on the West Bank, and in order to get away with it, you maneuver the facts your way so that they fit the statements and accusations that you want to make and emphasize. Let me point out some of your fallacies in this paragraph:

a. The civil rights of the Palestinians on the West Bank were untouched by Israel since the occupation. The Jordanian Civil Law prevails there and people receive their rights and are prosecuted for violations of this law exactly as was the case during the Jordanian occupation of the West Bank. If an Israeli commits a crime on the West Bank (including a traffic offence) he will be brought before a judge in a court on the West Bank and be tried according to Jordanian law.

It is true that apart from the civil law, the Israeli Army has also introduced a military law, in accordance with the Geneva Convention, as every other military power (for example, the British commander of Berlin) in an occupied territory. But this power is used only against those who involve themselves in terrorist activities.

This is how Hussein ruled the West Bank, and the Egyptians, the Gaza strip for 19 years (1949-1967) and nobody raised their voice (not even when Hussein slaughtered thousands of Palestinians or attacked with force and bayonets anti-Jordan demonstrations in old Jerusalem, Nablus and other cities during his rule in the West Bank).

Now, what sort of civil rights in your opinion are the Palestinians lacking? I presume that you do not point to the Jordanian civil rights because these already exist, you want the Palestinians to receive the same rights that Israelis have in Israel. As soon as we give them this it will immediately become an act of annexation. Do you want Israel to annex the territories? [Even the Histadrut, the Israeli TUC, is unable to register Arab members from the territories in its organisation (65% of the Arab workers who are Israeli citizens are members of the Histadrut) because such a step would also become an act of annextion!].

So after 1967 we had two choices: to isolate the territories from any contact with Israel and therefore to leave them in the neglected condition

that prevailed during the entire period of Jordanian and Egyptian rule or to enable them to come to work in Israel and improve their standard of living. We chose the second way.

You might also differentiate between the permanent population of the territories and the refugees living beside them in camps. The first receive every sort of help from the Israel authorities to transform their primitive agricultural methods into the most modern methods. A whole new educational system has been built up from scratch, including universities, teachers seminaries and technical schools; the municipal system has been improved, and the citizens have learned how to run their cities and care for good municipal services; tens of thousands of new houses have been built (most of them private homes and not apartment houses); electricity, sewage, running water and telephone systems have been introduced and the general standard of living has risen steeply.

It is true that the situation of the refugees in the camps has improved only moderately, and even this rise is due to the higher income they now have owing to many of them working in Israel. But the camps were not evacuated, new cities and neighbourhoods have not been built for them - mainly because they will not accept any personal solution other than a return to their previous residences. Failing a political solution to the whole problem and the stubborness of the refugees, it is true that the Palestinians do not live as well as the Israelis. But bear in mind that when I say Israelis, I mean all of them including the 800 thousand Israeli Arabs.

What puts a question mark on the objectivity of your speech is the fact that when it comes to the good things that Israel has done on the West Bank and in the Gaza strip, you suddenly become ignorant, or as you put it, and I quote: "It may be that the standard of living in the areas has risen slightly, I don't know". But you certainly do know that the Palestinians don't live as well as the Israelis. By the way, do the Indians, the Pakistanis and all the other immigrants to your country live as well as the neighbouring white British people? English? If the answer is "yes", why do they so often burn the

slums they live in? You demonstrate such a detailed knowledge that might prove that the Palestinians are discriminated against. Why are the fences on your doorstep not mended first?

And do the Catholics in Northern Ireland live as well as the Protestants? If they do, why is the percentage of unemployed Catholics greater by 2.5 times than that of the Protestants? Why, for instance, does the large concern, "Short Brothers" which employs 7000 workers, not employ more than 5% Catholics? If one continues along your lines, one might easily come to the conclusion that Northern Ireland is the English Soweto...

But the West Bank is not an Israeli Soweto. I have already proved above that the standard of living has gone up and I want to add some figures (regarding the West Bank and the Gaza strip). Some of the figures are only from the seventies, so you can imagine in what a poor situation they were in 1967:

		West bank	Gaza strip
Number of people	1967	586,000	381,000
	1986	836,000	545,000
percentage of gas & electric ranges for cooking	1974	32.7%	12.7%
	1985	84.6%	86.1%
Percentage of elecrical refrigerators	1972	13.8%	5.7%
	1985	66.3%	77.8%
Percentage washing machines	1974	13.8%	3%
	1985	37.2%	38.9%
TV - black & white	1972	10%	7.5%
	1985	66%	76.5%
TV - colour	1981	3.4%	0.7%
	1985	12.8%	8.2%
Tape recorders	1974	4.8%	2.9%
	1985	55.8%	54.7%
Solar heaters			
	1981	25.8%	41.1%
	1985	45%	69.3%
Number of private cars	1970	1,626	1,293
	1986	35,349	15,893

Educational institutions	1967	821	166
	1986	1,135	296
Number of classes	1967	4,402	1,746
	1986	8,647	3,940
Number of pupils	1967	142,216	80,050
	1986	290,601	166,584

Do these figures point to a decline in the standard of living on the West Bank or do they show an astonishing growth and development? Have you another example anywhere in the world of such a high rate of development in a territory that is under military occupation?

Yes Mr. Kaufman, the West Bank is under military occupation, and if the Arab countries want to develop it, they are invited to do so. But they do not care even though our Defence Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, invited western and Arab capital to invest in the West Bank and King Hussein has said that he would welcome world wide investment in the West Bank to the tune of $500 million.

So while nobody is coming forward, Israel's military authorities do what little they can. We have no incentive to invest, because we have proclaimed to the whole world for the last twenty years, that we do not see it as our land. Now just imagine if we had started to develop the West Bank as we do in Israel. What an outcry there would have been in the world! What accusations of Israel annexing the West Bank de facto!

So we help only Jewish settlers who want to settle on the West Bank, and we help especially those who comply with the Alon Plan. This is the only reason the standard of living on the West Bank is higher among Jews than among Arabs.

Paragraph No. 7

You say: I used to find it offensive when people compared the State of Israel with the Republic of South Africa. Now it is undeniable. There is an Israeli Soweto. The invasion of Lebanon was appalling, totally inexcusable. I must stress that, like any other country, I do not expect Israel to be perfect. But I do expect minimum standards.

My comments: In this paragraph it seems to me that your unfounded accusations are repeated in the hope that repetition will penetrate the minds of your listeners.

No Mr. Kaufman, we are not South Africa: 850 thousand Israeli Arabs live together with us in complete freedom and equality. In our country we carry out the principle of "one man one vote" for all our citizens.

The West Bank is not a part of the State of Israel; we stay there in the role of a military regime because the Arabs launched a war against us in 1967 (have you forgotten?). And how we behave there and what are our achievements in the region, I have already detailed above.

Israel is not perfect in all she does, but many countries, even in Europe (and not only the Germans) can come to learn from us how to behave in a conquered territory and how to comply with correct human standards. If you do not believe me ask the Algerians about France; ask the Angolians and Mozambiquians about Portugal; ask the Zairians about Belgium; ask the Ethiopians about Italy; ask the Afghanistans about Russia - do I need to go on?

Paragraph No. 8

You say: What is required is a change in Israeli policy. The Palestinians and the neighbouring Arab States all want an international peace conference and I agree with them. I agree also that the PLO must take part in these negotiations. The Israelis may not like it but they must face up to reality. The PLO are accredited representatives of the Palestinian people. The Israelis claim that the PLO is unelected. But that is because there is no mechanism available to the Palestinians.

My comments: Now what you say in paragraph eight is really beyond the pale: you try to create the impression that the Arabs are the ones who invented the international convention! Have you forgotten that this is the original idea of Mr. Peres? Have you not heard about his speech in the United Nations? Have you forgotten Mrs. Thatcher's visit to Israel and Jordan in 1985, after which she invited a Jordanian-PLO delegation to visit London (with the understanding and

approval of Israel expressed by Mr. Peres). And what came of it? A PLO refusal to sign an agreement for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the peace talks!

You forget also that only recently, in November 1987, King Hussein received his final clearance (from Syria, Iraq and other countries) to go to an international conference: until then he and the PLO were the real obstacles to such a conference.

At the same time we had and still have our internal difficulties. We are struggling to overcome them and yet you do not give us the slightest credit for our efforts. Its true that Mr. Shamir does not agree to the international conference, but neither do the Russians who want to come to the table without resuming diplomatic relations with us and without letting our brothers and sisters out of the Soviet Union. And neither do the Chinese as far as diplomatic relations are concerned. Where is the international pressure on them? Their 'Chutzpa' in trying to gain access to the conference without making the slightest gesture,is not even mentioned by you. Can you imagine Mr. Shamir's situation if these two giants had changed their attitude towards us? He would have been placed be in an impossible situation and would have been compelled to agree to some sort of an international conference, just as happened with the Taba dispute.

So the situation is as follows:

* Israel, through its then Prime Minister, Peres, creates and pushes forward the idea of an international conference.

* The Arabs hesitate to accept it.

* Russia and China do not want to resume diplomatic relations with Israel.

* Russia does not acknowledge the right of Jews to be accepted as a nation and their right to be united with their brothers in Israel.

* The PLO continues to fight for a Palestinian secular and democratic State instead of the State of Israel.

And you call all this an Israeli refusal to participate in an international conference!

I can and must assure you of one thing: we shall not sit or meet with the PLO as long as they terrorise our people everywhere and continue to strive to destroy Israel. This will be our standpoint notwithstanding the question if the PLO is an elected or non-elected body.

Paragraph No. 9

You say: The international conference must have no preconditions and that means none at all. It amazes me that the Israelis demand that Arafat recognise Israel. Is Israel so insecure that, even after forty years, recognition from the PLO makes such a great difference? The suggestion is ridiculous. Begin was a terrorist but Britain accepted him as the representative of Israel and he was received by Mrs. Thatcher. Kenyatta was labelled a terrorist, as was Mugabe, now a respected leader. One does not negotiate with friends, but with enemies, and one does not have to forgive one's enemies to talk to them.

My comments: When Henry Kissinger came to Israel the first time, and visited the Jordan river, which so small and unimpressive, he said "Look what public relations can do to a river". These words came to mind when I read your ninth paragraph: "Look what brain-washing can do to such an intelligent man as Mr. Kaufman".

Of course, one makes peace only with enemies, and of course we shall have to sit also with the representatives of the PLO when the time comes to make peace. But on one condition, that both sides are ready to acknowledge each other on equal terms and foreswear terrorism.

Your comparison of Begin and Kenyata to Arafat is an insult to your listeners; how can you compare? Did Begin or Kenyata ever challenge the right of England to exist. There was only the question: will they stop shooting at English targets in their countries? Once England said that it was ready to evacuate these countries they stopped shooting and came to the negotiation table.

So the precondition of powerful England to those tiny underground forces was to stop shooting, this was its precondition and nobody blamed you for it.

Here we are confronted with a two-fold problem: the PLO does not agree to acknowledge our right to exist as an independent State and its members continue to employ terrorist activities. Now Mr. Kaufman, in your third paragraph you say that it is unique, that after 40 years of existence we are technically at war with all our neighbours except one, and in this paragraph you sneer at our feeling of insecurity as far as negotiations with Arafat are concerned.

Yes Mr. Kaufman, we are worried about and afraid of partners at the negotiation table who openly say that their ultimate goal is to destroy us.

First of all, it is not ethical and not just, to accept such an attitude from a future partner to a lasting peace.... Secondly, I can not understand why peace seekers like you are ready to achieve peace only at our expense? Is it so difficult and unethical to dare to say to the PLO, that if they really want peace they should alter their covenant as far as the right of Israel to exist is concerned?

Mr. Kaufman, we are afraid of the PLO and we are not ashamed to admit it. The PLO is part of a big, frightening and hate-filled Arab world. The question is, not what are the present proportions of strength between Israel and the PLO, but how they might develop once a Palestinian State is established as a solid beginning of a constant effort to destroy Israel.

You have to use your imagination about how it is going to look, from a Palestinian capital on the West bank, packed with communist Embassies, with Russian sophisticated arms and hundreds of thousands of Iranian volunteers ready to sacrifice their lives in order to "free Jerusalem from the Jewish dogs".

Your government is not ready to sit at the negotiation table with the IRA as long as they continue to be militant, though they are no threat to the very existence of England and they do not represent blood-thirsty enemies who surround England by the hundred millions. It is much easier to demand it from others...

Paragraph No. 10

You say: The PLO are the acknowledged and accredited representatives of the Palestinian people and, in order to play my part in the peace process, I am perfectly willing to talk to, and negotiate with, representatives of the PLO. Only if one is prepared to be realistic will peace come to the Middle East.

My comments: In your last paragraph you make statements that are misleading, if not innacurate. For instance, many Arab States, including Jordan, Syria, Libya and South Yemen, do not acknowledge and accredit Arafat as the sole representative of the Palestinians. The last summit in Amman, too, did not accept the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians but gave a decisive role also to Jordan and its King.

So as you see, the Arabs themselves have not decided yet on this crucial question, and therefore the chairman of our Party, Mr. Peres, has suggested a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the peace talks. This is a realistic approach, and if you want to play a realistic role in helping to solve the Israel-Palestine conflict please be as decisive in your advice to the PLO as you are towards us; perhaps such an approach will make them more realistic in their attitude towards Israel, especially if they are, as you say, weaker and smaller than we are.

Yours sincerely,

Dov Ben-Meir, MK

P.S. As my long letter was written in November 1987, prior to the riots on the West Bank and the Gaza strip, I find it necessary to add a few important remarks:

1. We must look upon the sad developments and riots as a part of the whole picture described above. We regret every misbehaviour of our soldiers or settlers and the army is investigating and punishing all such misbehaviour. Of course, the public and the world see only what is caught by the cameras and this is quite horrible as all such sad events are. But do not forget that this is also a collision of two scales of values: while we cannot accept a situation where soldiers shoot and beat women and children, the Arabs have no compunction whatsoever in sending women and children to the front exactly as the Iranians sent thousands of young children to be live mine detectors in front of their advancing army.

   It is a tragic situation, but what can we do? We cannot start withdrawing without a political agreement because we know that the Palestinians will not be satisfied with only the West Bank and the Gaza strip. An opinion poll, conducted by Tel-Aviv University (Prof. Yaar), in January 1987 in the above territories, brought the following answers to the question: What is your ideal solution to the Israel-Arab conflict?

   33% said that they want all the Jews to go back to the countries they cam from.
   33% said that they want a Palestinian state according to the PLO conception: a

democratic secular state instead of Israel.
25% said that they wanted a Palestinian state alongside of Israel.

2. But a lot has to be done also on the Israeli side. As the Israeli public is divided on this issue, almost half and half and, according to my calculation, the coming elections will not bring a political breakthrough. (Even if Labour or Likud will succeed in forming a government alone, it will be a weak one. And we shall not be able to carry through a political solution without a national concensus of at least 80%!) The two parties must hammer out, together, a third plan that will enable both of them to back it. Such a plan is outlinedin another article that I have written, concerning the 40th anniversary of Israel. I am also enclosing this article for your attention.

I am sorry that I am imposing so much paper on you, but the issue is very complicated and it calls for a very thorough discussion. This is what I have tried to do and ask for your forgiveness for being so lengthy.

SPEECH BY GERALD KAUFMAN M.P. IN BRIGHTON 30/9/87

The Arab-Israeli conflict is only one of a number of conflicts in the Middle East, of which the Iran-Iraq war has been the most significant in
1 recent months. I hope that some way can be found to resolve that terrible conflict.

The Labour party manifesto stressed that any Middle East initiative should take account of 1) the security of the State of Israel and 2) the right to self-determination for the Palestinian people. I shall attempt to achieve
2 both these goals and shall not try to curry favour with one group or the other. To this end I shall be saying exactly the same thing to Poale Zion later today.

It is almot 40 years since the foundation of the State of Israel and Israel has become not only the most powerful military force in the Middle East, but one of the most powerful in the world. But among the States set up
3 after the war, Israel is unique in that it is poweful but not secure. It is unique in that it has not been recognised by many countries and is technically at war with all except one of the surrounding States. One must ask: where has Israel gone wrong?

Some people, such as an Arab ambassador I spoke to recently, thought the problem was that Israel had been founded in the first place and from his point of view this was fair. But as Israel does exist, he admits he has to be realistic and accept the fact. I believe that Israel cannot be faulted for any of the wars before 1967. But the 1967 victory made the Israelis believe
4 they were invincible. The victory was seen as a solution in itself. The Isralis considered themselves supreme and did not look for a lasting peace which could have been achieved. They became complacent. This led to the 1973 war where the Egyptians achieved early successes although they were later driven back. The shock of almost being invaded led, disasterously to the election of a chauvanist militaristic government in Israel which committed the crime (and a crime not only against the Lebanese but the Israelis who fell needlessly) of the invasion of Lebanon.

The problem now is that, as Israel failed to take advantage of her 1967
5 victory to achieve lasting peace, the West Bank has been occupied for over half the history of the State. Children have grown up and joined the army with no experience of any situation other than the present one.

The Palestinians under occupation have no civil rights and no political rights. What saddens me is that the Palestinians are now doing the work which the pioneers did in earlier times. They are a lower class of labour. They are often bussed into Israel in the morning and then bussed out again in
6 the evening because they are not allowed to live in Israel. It may be that the standard of living in the area has risen slightly. I do not know. But the question is: do the Palestinians live as well as the Israelis, and the answer is no. The government of Israel subsidizes people to live in the West Bank and they live there and work in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. They build villas on the side of hills. Such people are "commuter pioneers".

7 I used to find it offensive when people compared the State of Israel with the Republic of South Africa. Now it is undeniable. There is an Israeli Soweto. The invasion of Lebanon was appalling, totally inexcusable. I must stress that, like any other country, I do not expect Israel to be perfect, but I do expect minimum standards.

8 What is required is a change in Israeli policy. The Palestinians and the neighbouring Arab States all want an international peace conference and I agree with them. I agree also that the PLO must take part in these negotiations. The Israelis may not like it but they must face up to reality. The PLO are the accredited representatives of the Palestinian people. The Israelis claim that the PLO is unelected. But that is because there is no mechanism available to the Palestinians.

9 The international conference must have no preconditions and that means none at all. It amazes me that the Israelis demand that Arafat recognize Israel. Is Israel so insecure that, even after forty years, recognition from the PLO makes such a great difference? The suggestion is ridiculous. Begin was a terrorist but Britain accepted him as the representative of Israel and he was received by Mrs. Thatcher. Kenyatta was labeled a terrorist, as was Mugabe, now a respected leader. One does not negotiate with friends, but with enemies, and one does not have to forgive one's enemies to talk to them.

10 The PLO are the acknowledged and accredited representatives of the Palestinian people and, in order to play my part in the peace process, I am perfectly willing to talk to, and negotiate with, representatives of the PLO. Only if one is prepared to be realistic will peace come to the Middle East.

13616 מאירין : משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

3578

** נכנס סודי
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מרזם:11,13616
אל:המשרד
מ-:לרנדון,נר:224,תא:181187,זת:1600,דת:ד,מגם
נד:מ

103.3

סודי/דחוף

אל:ארגנה 2 המרכז

מאת:הציר-יועץ לרנדון

משיחה עם להשיך מנהלת הארגון לבטחון ארגנה המערבית:

1. חזרה קבני שבועיים מביקור באנגולה לשם הגיעה לבקשת מיימ דרום-אפריקה במטרה לאתר עדויות לשימוש בלחימה כימית ש"י הקובנים.

יחד איתה הוזמנו צרנתי העובד במכון ללימודי בטחון בברים בהנהלת אדמירל לקוסט ואדם בשם האלאוק המשמש כתב צבאי לנאטו. מצאו עדויות ברמה של קטגוריה C.

2. לפי המלצה של הבטחון "ארגניטה" CASITO OCUIMBO נלקחו 2 יועצים סוביטים (שהיו במדים) בשבוע, יחד עם 15 קובנים ליד הבסיס הסוביטי ב- CUITO - CUNIVALE בבסיס הינבז גבוה של נגקים, משוקים טילי סאם דחתת רדאר.

מעריכים את מספר הקובנים כיום ב-28 אלף לעומת ב-34 לפני ב- שנה חודשים.

יודם שני

תפ: שהח,מנכל,ממנכל,אירא,אירב,אירג,בירן,מרנ,ר/מרכז,ממד,רס,
אמן

13605

תאריך : 18.1.1 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בלמס נבנס

תוזם:11,13605
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון,גר:227,תא:181187,זת:1830,דת:מ,סג:ב
נד:ם

103.3
ברכ

מידי/בלמס

אל:אירופה ב'

מאת:הציר לונדון

בתשובה לשאילתא בברלמנט אמר הילס סיר בפרי האר שבריטניה
וה 12 יצאו בעד ועידה בינלאומית. אחת הזדמנות שהם
תומכים בה היא של המלך חוסין. ארהב לא עשתה זאת.
בריטניה תמשיך במאמצים לשכנע את ארהב וישראל שהועידה
הבינלומית הינה הזדמנות ולא מלכודת או אירוע. ברור
שהסטטוס קוו אינו משרת את המטרה של אף אחד. אין אלטרנטיבה
להתקדמות אלא עי ועידה בינלאומית. גרלד קאופמן הציע
שבריטניה תשתמש בהשפעתה על ארהב כדי שתפעיל לחץ על
רהם ישראל כדי שתקבל את מדיניות שהם לאמור: שהועידה
הבינלאומית פותחת את ההזדמנות הטובה ביותר להשיג
שיבטיח בטחון לישראל והגדרה עצמית לפלסטינים.
האר השיב שזה נושא בר קיימת תמימות דעים בשני צידי
הבית. בריטניה תמשיך ללחוץ בעד קיום ועידה בינלאומית
על בסיס העקרונות שקאופמן הזכיר. עד כאן עיקרי הדברים.
טקסט מדויק נעביר לכשנקבלו.

רביב

א

תב: שהם,רהם,שהבט,מנבל,ממנבל,סמנבל,ממד,רס,אמן,אירא,אירב,
מזהים,מצפא

3600

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON W8 4QB
Telephone: 01-937 8050

כ"ה בחשוון תשמ"ח
17 נובמבר 1987
סימוכין : 2241

אל : אירופה 2
מאת : הסברה/לונדון

הנדון : דיוני הפרלמנט: שובות

לוטה עותקים משאלות ותשובות שהועלו בדיוני הפרלמנט ב-6-12.11 בנושאים הבאים:

א. סוריה ודו"ח אמנסטי.
ב. בריה"מ והסכם הלסינקי.
ג. הגנה על אופוזיציה לובית ואיראנית בבריטניה.
ד. פרסום אנטישמי.
ה. הגבלות על פלסטינים = מוסטפה נאטשה.

ב ב ר כ ה,

יורם שני

העתק : המרכז

6 November 1987

Mr Ted Leadbitter (Hartlepool): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, if he will make it his policy not to sanction further European Economic Community contacts with President Assad's regime in Syria so long as human rights abuses, as high-lighted by the recent Amnesty International report, persists.

NO 214W

MR DAVID MELLOR

We are studying the Amnesty International report carefully and drawing the attention of our partners in the Twelve to the very serious allegations in it.

Vol. 489
No. 34

Thursday
12 November 1987

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
(HANSARD)

HOUSE OF LORDS
OFFICIAL REPORT

Written Answers

HELSINKI AGREEMENT: SOVIET COMPLIANCE

Lord Orr-Ewing asked Her Majesty's Government:

Whether they will list those factors in the Helsinki agreement which the USSR have (i) honoured in full; (ii) honoured in part; (iii) dishonoured or evaded.

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Glenarthur): The detailed information sought is not readily available in the form requested and can only be obtained at a disproportionate cost. I last provided a general assessment of Soviet compliance with their Helsinki commitments in my Answer to my noble friend Lady Gardner of Parkes of 23rd July (*Hansard* cols. 1565 to 1571).

Friday
6 November 1987

Volume 121
No. 39

HOUSE OF COMMONS
OFFICIAL REPORT

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

Written Answers to Questions

HOME DEPARTMENT

Iranian and Libyan Nationals

Mr. Atkinson asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what steps are being taken to protect leading members of the Iranian community living in the United Kingdom and known to be opposed to the Khomeini regime, and of the Libyan community known to be opposed to the Gaddafi regime; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Hurd: Members of the Iranian and Libyan communities living in the United Kingdom who are believed, or consider themselves, to be at risk are seen by the police and given advice about their personal security.

Thursday
12 November 1987

Volume 122
No. 42

HOUSE OF COMMONS
OFFICIAL REPORT

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

Business of the House

Mr. Greville Janner (Leicester, West): Will the right hon. Gentleman ask the Attorney-General to make a statement to the House on his deplorable decision not to initiate prosecution proceedings against the perpetrators of the offensive, racist and lying document entitled "Holocaust News", which has been circulated, not only widely in my constituency but, I believe, to every hon. Member? Will he at least seek to confirm that there must be some law in the land to prevent that sort of offence from being given by way of political pornography of the worst and most vile sort?

Mr. Wakeham: I recognise the hon. and learned Gentleman's concern in these matters, and I shall certainly refer the matter to my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General.

11 November 1987

Mr Bruce Millan (Glasgow, Govan): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, whether he will make representations to the Government of Israel regarding their refusal of an exit visa from Mustafa Natchew, the mayor of Hebron.

No W67

MR DAVID MELLOR

We have raised this matter informally with the Israeli authorities.

11650 תאריך: 17.11.87

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בלמס בכנס

מרזם:11650,11
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון,נר:182,תא:161187,דת:1700,דת:מ,מב:ב
נד:מ

מידי/בלמס

אל:מנהל אירופה ב'

מאת: הציר לונדון

ב 14 בנוב התקיימה אירועת ערב השנתית של ה LABOUR FRIENDS OF ISRAEL באירועת נאמו הלורד גלנאמרה רב אלון מיל מ לרי ויחור הנרלמנט בריאן גולד שר המסחר בממשל הצללים.

לורד גלנמארה תקף את התנהגותו של גראלד קאופמן בנלקבול להלן קטע מדברי גלנמארה:

NOW THERE IS ONE POINT THAT I WANT TO MENTION TONIGHT. I AM SORRY I HAVE TO MENTION IT BUT I FEEL I MUST BECAUSE IT IS THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY I HAVE HAD. I HAVE BEEN , THROUGHT ALL MY ADULT LIFE I HOPE A LOYAL MEMBER OF THE LABOUR PARTY, AND HOPE I ALWAYS WILL BE ONE. BUT I DEPLORE AND I REJECT MANY OF THE SENTIMENTS WHICH WERE EXPRESSED BY OUR OWN LABOUR PARTY FRONT BENCH SPOKESMAN ABOUT ISRAEL IN A SPEECH TO A FRINGE MEETING AT THIS YEAR'S LABOUR PARTY CONFERENCE. THEY DON'T REPRESENT MY VIEWS, AND IN MY VIEW, AND I THINK I KNOW AS MUCH ABOUT THE LABOUR PARTY AS ANYBODY, THEY DONT REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF LABOUR PARTY AS MEMBERS THROUGHT THE COUNTRY, WHO ARE PROUD TO SUPPORT THIS LITTLE ISLAND OF DEMOCRACY IN A VAST SEA OF THROUGHLY UNDEMOCRATIC STATES

WHERE NO DISSENT IS PERMITTED, AND WHERE FREEDOM AS WE UNDERSTAND IT IS UNKNOWN.

חבר הפרלמנט בריאן גרלד מתיחס בנאומו באריכות לנאום ממלא מקום ראש האו"ם. להלן הקטע מדבריו בנדון:

I WOULD LIKE TO PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE IMPORTANT SPEECH WHICH THE FOREIGN MINISTER, SHIMON PERES, MADE TO THE UNITED NATIONS AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER. BECAUSE I THINK IN THAT SPEECH WE SAW A GREAT DEAL OF WHAT WAS IMPORTANT IN ISRAEL'S CURRENT ATTITUDE TO THE VERY REAL AND PRESSING PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST. VERY MUCH THAT WE IN THIS ROOM WOULD BE GLAD TO SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO PURSUE.

BUT BEFORE I LOOK AT THAT PRECISE QUESTION, LET ME JUST SAY IN PARENTHESIS, IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THAT I BELIEVE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THE PATH THAT IT OUGHT TO TAKE IN RESPECT OF ONE MAJOR ISSUE THAT AFFECTS THE WORLD.
AND THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICA. THE ISRAELIS HAVE DECIDED TO PURSUE A POLICY OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, AND I BELEIVE THAT IS A LESSON THAT OUR OWN GOVERNMENT WOULD DO WELL TO LEARN.

BUT TO RETURN TO SHIMON PERES SPEECH, I THINK WE WOULD ALL RECOGNISE THAT WHEN HE CALLED FOR PEACE IN THE GULF, A CEASEFIRE IN THE GULF, AND WHEN HE CONDEMNED THE FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE RELIGIOUS FANATICISM WHICH THREATENS PEACE IN THAT AREA, HE WAS ALSO RIGHT TO LINK IT TO THE CONTINUING HOSTILITIES AND BELIGERENCE WHICH THREATENS PEACE IN THE SHAPE OF THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT. AND I THOUGHT THAT WHAT HE HAD TO SAY ON THAT ISSUE WAS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE FUTURE OF THAT REGION, AND CERTAINLY MUCH OF EHAT HE SAID WERE POINTS WHICH COULD THOROUGHLY SUPPORT.

I PARTICULARLY WELCOMED, AS WE ALL DO, THE GUARDED BUT NEVERTHELESS WELCOMING TERMS IN WHICH HE SPOKE OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE INITIATIVE. HE WAS RIGHT WHEN HE SAID THAT THE NEXT FEW MONTHS ARE GOING TO BE CRUCIAL TO THAT INITIATIVE. WHEN HE SAID THAT CONFIDENCE, FRAGILE AS IT IS, WHICH HAS BEEN BUILT UP OVER THE LAST YEAR OR SO, MUST NOT NOW BE JEOPARDESED, THAT IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT THE LEADERS OF THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES INVOLVES AND OF THE SUPER POWERS SHOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE FORWARD THAT WORK AND BRING IT TO FRUITION.

I BELIEVE THERE IS GREAT HOPE IN THE REMARKS OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER WHEN HE TALKED OF THE PSSIBILITIES OF ARAB- ISRAEL NEGOTIATION AND COPPERATION, AND WE WOULD ALL WELCOME I AM SURE THE CONSTRUCTIVE REMARKS HE HAD TO MAKE ABOUT PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF EGYPT, THE WELCOME HE GAVE TO KING HUSSAN IN HIS CALL FOR PEACE AND THE EQUAL WELCOME HE GAVE TO THE REMARKS AND ATTITUDES OF KING HUSSEIN. AND I KNOW FROM CONVERSATIONS EVEN THIS EVENING THAT THERE ARE VERY REAL POSSIBILITIES THAT, TO THAT LIST OF MODERATE ARAB LEADERS, CAN BE ADDED YET MORE NAMES.

NOW THAT IS A GREAT SIGN OF HOPE AND TO THAT MUST ALSO BE ADDED THE WILLINGNESS OR THE APPARENT INCREASING WILLINGNESS OF MUCH PALESTINIAN OPINION TO PARTICIPATE IN A JOINT JORDANIAN- PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATING TEAM WHEN THAT PROCESS FINNALLY GETS UNDER WAY.

BUT YOU KNOW WHEN I READ THAT SPEECH, IT SEEMED TO ME THAT IN SOME WAYS, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT PASSAGE WAS WHEN SHIMON PERES SAID, WE HAVE HAVE ALL MATURED POLITICALLY. IF YOU THINK ABOUT THAT PHRASE FOR A MOMENT YOU WILL SEE THAT THERE HE IS SAYING NOT JUST THAT THE OBLIGATIONS REST ON OTHERS, THAT MISTAKES IN THE PAST HAVE BEEN MADE BY OTHERS, HE IS, I THINK WITH REFRESHING CANDOUR, SAYING 'YES WE HAVE ALL MADE MISTAKES THROUGH IMMATURITY, THROUGH EXTREME

ATTITUDES PERHAPS, THAT THE RESPONSABILITY RESTS
UPON ALL OF US IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ARAB AND ISRAELI
I THINK IT IS EXACTLY THAT SORT OF ENLIGHNMENT
THAT SORT OF TOLERANCE, THAT SORT OF OUTWARD LOOKING
ATTITUDE WHICH IS NOT ONLY THE KEY TO PEACE IN
THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT WHICH IS WHAT, QUITE RIGHTLY
MAKES PEOPLE ON THE LEFT IN THIS COUNTRY, MEMBERS
OF THE LABOUR FRIENDS OF ISRAEL, MAKES US FEEL
A KINSHIP WITH ISRAEL AND ITS GOVERNMENT. BECAUSE
THOSE ARE THE VALUES THAT WE ALSO STAND FOR AND
IT IS REFRESHING AND ENCOURAGING TO SEE THEM CARRIED
INTO POLICY IN THE WAY THAT I BELIEVE IS REPRESENTED
BY THAT PHRASE FROM SHIMON- PERES'S SPEECH.

3561

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
קינגסטון

כא' בחשון תשמ"ח
13.11.87
236

אל: מנהל אמלט

מאת: השגריר קינגסטון

הנידון: רצב

103.3

הרצב הועבר אלי מהשגריר הבריטי בקינגסטון.

אולי המצא בזאת ענין.

בברכה

הכהן יהושע

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THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION

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JAMAICA

Verbatim Service

VERBATIM SERVICE VS042/87 TUESDAY 6 OCTOBER 1987

PRODUCED BY LONDON PRESS SERVICE, CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION

FRIENDS OF ISRAEL LUNCHEON

FOLLOWING IS A SPEECH BY SIR GEOFFREY HOWE, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, TO THE CONSERVATIVE FRIENDS OF ISRAEL LUNCHEON AT BLACKPOOL, 6 OCTOBER 1987:

In the last couple of years, exchanges between the Israeli and British Governments have become even more frequent and cordial. I might single out Mr Peres' visit in January 1986 and the first ever journey to Israel by a British Prime Minister - Mrs Thatcher's highly successful visit in May 1986.

Shortly after I last spoke to you, I myself paid my first visit to Israel. It made a striking impression on me. Israel's achievements during her first 40 years need be seen on the spot to be fully appreciated.

No-one can fail to be moved by what Israel has created in such a short period. The vitality and spirit of the people are famous, and for good reason. The world has much to learn from Israel's example. And for Britain, the current strength of our relations with Israel should be a source of deep satisfaction.

Britain and Israel have many things in common. One is heart-felt concern for human rights. Nowhere is this illustrated more graphically than in support for the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. I know how much this means to Israel. I myself have made a point of raising Jewish emigration in my many meetings with my Soviet opposite number.

I should say for the sake of greater accuracy, my Soviet opposite numbers because Mr Gromyko who had been there for 27 years when I arrived, I have finally outlived him in the office and it must be said that there has been a significant change in style in the response to my attempts to raise this issue at meetings of that kind.

On one of the occasions, I think in Stockholm in 1984, when I first raised it with Mr Gromyko, he replied simply, if one can believe this, by rebuking me for having lowered the tone of the conversation and on another occassion he failed to respond at all. So there has been great change and when I raised this on the last occasion on our visit to Moscow with the Prime Minister in March, then I had the privilege of meeting Joseph Begun, Andrei Sakharov and

their wives. That in itself is symbolic of the change that has taken place.

That shared interest in human rights binds Britain and Israel together. So does trade. The figures illustrate the mutual benefit. Israel has become our second largest market in the Middle East, behind Saudi Arabia. Bilateral trade is set to reach one billion pounds sterling this year., three times the volume of our trade just ten years ago.

We must not be complacent: this increasing trade reflects as much the overall buoyancy of the Israeli market as it does the close British/Israeli relationship. Our market share has been falling: from nearly 12 per cent in 1976 to just under 9 per cent last year - a standing challenge to British exporters and to us in our trade promotion efforts. As a result we are taking a fresh look at how we can improve our services to British business in Tel Aviv.

So I am very glad to say that our relationship is solid and growing.

But a true friend does not tell you only what you want to hear. A friend has a duty to speak frankly when necessary. And we must always bear in mind that the affairs of Israel, our relations with her and her role in regional affairs are bound to remain unsettled as long as she lives uneasily alongside her Arab neighbours in unresolved conflict.

Of course Israel yearns for peace. If that sounds like pious protestation, I will cast it in harder currency: Israel understands that her long-term future and security can by guaranteed only through a negotiated, comprehensive peace with all her neighbours.

I use the word 'security' deliberately. Let me stress once again that the right of all states in the region - including Israel - to secure existence within recognised borders will always remain a fundamental pillar of our policy. But there is a school of thought - which may by gaining ground in Israel and elsewhere - that Israel's security can best be guaranteed by the status quo, by defiant self-sufficiency., and that current moves to establish negotiations within the framework of an international conference are, in themselves, a threat to Israel's security.

There are, indeed, those who assert that Israeli security is fundamentally incompatible with the other essential pillar of any just settlement: the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self determination. But those two things, I stress, as strongly as I can, are not incompatible. In my view the underlying challenge to Israel's security can be defused only when the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people are satisfied. Zionist patriots should be the first to recognise the patriotism of Palestinians. Unless patriots are prepared to salute and live with each other they risk turning each other into fanatics - terrorists or tyrants. An unhappy choice.

Patriotism, particularly the patriotism of small nations above all, should recognise the patriotism of others.

No-one doubts Israel's ability - and determination- to preserve

her security. But the costs of maintaining the status quo are heavy. The military effort produces economic and social strains, as shown most painfully in the decision to cancel the Lavi fighter project and in the continuing military presence in Southern Lebanon. I think too of the brutalising effects of two decades of occupation of Arab territories and the measures - some contrary to international law - employed in the administration of those territories. Such measures breed resentment and resistance, which in turn provoke further repression and consequent international censure. They do damage to Israel herself.

These costs will be compounded by demographic pressures. The Arab population of Israel and the Occupied Territories is rapidly growing and may reach 45 per cent of the total by the end of this century. As Abba Eban and many other distinguished Israelis have said, these facts are striking. How can Israel come to terms with them, while preserving her security and the democratic values for which she is so widely admired? Not surely through inhuman proposals for ''relocation'' of the Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territories. Nor by clinging on to the status quo, with all the costs I have described. Nor by condemning ever more members of Israeli society to second-class status: that would not live up to the standards which I heard President Herzog proclaim in his outstanding address at the Middle Temple in 1984 when he said: ''Perhaps the outstanding aspect of Jewish civilisation is its inherent justice and the fact that the concept of justice occupies paramount place in its principles''.

None of these approaches can bring the enduring peace and security Israel - and her neighbours - deserve. Only a negotiated settlement can do that. But that will require greater confidence and trust between the parties than now exist. Outsiders cannot impose solutions. But we can -- all of us - help to bring the two sides together. We have no axe to grind in this dispute., the British interest lies clearly in peace, stability and good relations with both our Israeli and our Arab friends.

This is why this Conservative Government is fully committed to injecting new impetus into the vital search for peace.

I have referred already to the proposal that an international conference could serve as a framework for negotiations. Support for a conference has grown steadily. There is also growing realism about how such a conference should be structured and how it should proceed. Much hard work has been done to develop it to the point where I am convinced that it offers the best - indeed the only practical - way forward. As I said recently in New York ''virtually the whole world now accepts the idea of an international conference under UN auspices''.

A firm basis for a conference has been agreed, with great courage and vision, by Shimon Peres and King Hussein. Mr Peres has just put forward to the UN General Assembly eight principles forming the most comprehensive statement yet of how a conference might operate. The Twelve member states of the European Community have twice this year affirmed their strong support for a conference. The United Nations Secretary-General is undertaking informal consultations aimed at helping the parties to the conflict reach the essential measure of common ground for a conference to achieve a settlement. We are doing

everything we can to help., I talked to George Shultz and Shimon Peres, as well as the Egyptian and Jordanian Foreign Ministers, in New York a fortnight ago. We look forward to further consultations with many of those concerned in the weeks ahead.

To sum up, I see a unique opportunity to achieve peace and - let me stress this again - in a manner which, far from threatening Israel's security, and that of the other states in the region, will provide the only durable route to that security.

Certainly, many problems remain to be solved. But those most commonly cited - the involvement of the two permanent members of the UN Security Council who have no diplomatic relations with Israel., and the need to ensure representation of the Palestinians in the negotiations - have in them the seeds of their resolution. They are not easy., but we must not shirk the challenge.

Many in Israel already share the view that a conference is the essential next step towards peace. But some see it as a trap, a lure to entice Israel into a forum where solutions will be imposed and her right to negotiate subject to veto by others. This is not what we are talking about. No proposal for negotiations on such a basis would deserve - or get - our support.

From this platform of friendship and concern for Israel's future, I urge renewed efforts to ensure that the present opportunity is not missed. The last forty years offer all too many examples of failure to take the necessary step forward. Let us not allow mistrust and suspicion to create unnecessary extra barriers to peace., let us rather work for better understanding through contacts and negotiations.

In the speech I have already quoted, President Herzog said: ''We dream in Israel of the day when peace will come''. I hope with all my heart that our Israeli friends will not let the disappointments of the past blind them to the present opportunity to bring that day nearer. Israel has never lacked courage or vision. I am sure that the Israeli people, who have so often endured the challenge of war, will now rise to the challenge of peace and once again set an example of which her friends - and the whole free world - can be truly proud.

As friends of Israel, we shall continue to work closely with her Government and people., and to support fully all those who are working with such courage to open the way to a just and durable peace between Israel and all her neighbours.

ENDS VS042/87

Thursday
12 November 1987

Volume 122
No. 42

HOUSE OF COMMONS
OFFICIAL REPORT

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

Business of the House

Mr. Bill Walker (Tayside, North): Has my right hon. Friend had an opportunity to look at early-day motion 281:

[That this House expresses its grave concern at the allegations made in the Scottish Television programme dealing with the financial affairs of Dundee Labour clubs and the Dundee Labour Party and a number of individuals who were named in the programme and who were active in public affairs in Dundee during the period when substantial financial losses were incurred by the Dundee Labour clubs; and calls upon the Government and the law officers to report at an early date on the effect the financial losses have had on Dundee District Council's rent and rates collection.]

If so, may we have an early opportunity to debate its contents, which relate to a television programme that was shown in Scotland concerning the affairs of Dundee district council and the Labour party in Dundee; allegations that large sums of money have disappeared, and that, indeed, there have been acts of homosexuality.

Four hon. Members were named in the programme —the hon. Members for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran), for Dundee, West (Mr. Ross), for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Mr. McKelvey) and for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Galloway, and if——

Mr. Frank Dobson (Holborn and St. Pancras) *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I think that that was an unacceptable slur on the hon. Members involved.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order. If the hon. Member for Tayside, North (Mr. Walker) wishes to reflect on the conduct of any hon. Member, he must do so on a motion.

Mr. Bill Walker *rose*——

Mr. Wakeham *rose*——

Mr. Dobson: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. That was a most clear inuendo—if there is such a thing—against four of my hon. Friends. I put it to you that things have been said by Labour Members that have led to you demanding that they be withdrawn, and they have either been withdrawn or the hon. Member has been asked to leave the Chamber.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I agree. I think that it would be right for the hon. Member for Tayside, North (Mr. Walker) to withdraw what he said.

Mr. Bill Walker: I never completed my sentence, Mr. Speaker. [HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw."]

Mr. Speaker *rose*——

Mr. Bill Walker: Please, Mr. Speaker, this is fundamental. I am trying to defend——

Mr. Speaker: Order. Will the hon. Gentleman complete his sentence by withdrawing any allegation about any hon. Member.

House of Commons

Thursday 12 November 1987

Business of the House

Mr. Bill Walker: I am making no allegation, Mr. Speaker. I want to make that quite clear. I am not making an allegation. Two of those hon. Members are friends of mine. The remarks were made in a television programme that was seen throughout Scotland, and those hon. Members have two courses by which to clear their names —one is in this place, where we have an opportunity to raise such matters, and the other is through legal action. I am trying to help them.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I call the Leader of the House.

Mr. Wakeham: Would it be in order for me to answer the question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Tayside, North (Mr. Walker), because these are important matters? The Government's view on the need to strengthen local government accountability for its financial behaviour is well known. By their actions they will continue to press for that accountability to be the subject of the voting judgment of those electors it affects.—[HON. MEMBERS: "Disgraceful."]

Mr. Cryer: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker: Please sit down.

Despite what the hon. Member for Tayside, North has said, I have not seen the programme, but I note that the thrust of his question was an allegation against hon. Members of the House. I ask him now, please, to withdraw that.

Mr. Bill Walker: If I have made any allegations against the integrity of any Member of the House, I withdraw them without hesitation. However, I was not making any allegation. I was referring to them in the context of the programme.

Mr. Speaker: I asked the hon. Gentleman if he would withdraw any allegation without any qualification.

Mr. Dobson: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker: Order. In the aftermath of yesterday, and with exchanges such as this today, let me say that the reputation of our House of Commons is in the mouths, actions and behaviour of hon. Members. What went on yesterday, and matters of this kind in the House, bring the House into grave disrepute. I hope that we will give a lead to the nation by our good behaviour in this place and by good standards. That was not a full withdrawal of his comments, so will the hon. Member for Tayside, North now withdraw them unreservedly?

Mr. Bill Walker: I unhesitatingly — I mean unhesitatingly — withdraw. I said earlier that two of the Members named are friends of mine. They may be on the Opposition Benches, but they are friends.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order. Friendships span across the Chamber. The hon. Gentleman has unreservedly withdrawn his comment, and I accept that.

Mr. Dobson: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I am sorry to go on. The hon. Gentleman has now apparently withdrawn the accusation that he was making against four of my hon. Friends, but what perturbs me just as much —it is related to my previous point of order—is that the Leader of the House came to the House prepared to answer that very question, which was out of order. It is outrageous that he should have come so prepared.

Mr. Wakeham *rose*——

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I shall take any points of order that may arise on this after questions. Who was next?

Points of Order

Mr. Speaker: I have been notified of a point of order from the Opposition Front Bench.

Mr. Donald Dewar (Glasgow, Garscadden): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I understand that, earlier this afternoon, the hon. Member for Tayside, North (Mr. Walker) made some gratuitously offensive allegations about some of my hon. Friends. At this stage, it is not appropriate for me, or for any hon. Members, to debate the issues raised in the recent television programme in Scotland. I do not want to follow the hon. Member for Tayside, North in his reckless course of conduct in that respect.

It should be put on record that no specific allegations were made about hon. Members in the programme. The procurator fiscal, who has the proper responsibility for these matters, has been asked to investigate any matters that may arise from the programme. Indeed, he was asked to do so some weeks ago by members of the Dundee Labour party and by my hon. Friends who were referred to in the outburst made by the hon. Member for Tayside, North.

I rise to make this point because I hope that you, Mr. Speaker, will advise the House, as I am sure that you would want to, that it would be better in these circumstances if hon. Members—even the hon. Member for Tayside, North — showed a proper and decent restraint and were not tempted into making irresponsible speculation and provocative suggestions which can only complicate the task of those who are properly looking into the issues that have been raised. Such behaviour reflects no credit on the House or on any hon. Member responsible for such opportunism.

Mr. Speaker: I accept what the hon. Member has said about the matter. I hope that we can conduct the affairs of this House on the basis of mutual respect and mutual honour. I trust that we will not have allegations of that kind made across the Floor of the Chamber.

The Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Wakeham): There was a suggestion earlier that there was a planted question on this point. I owe it to the House to explain the position, and I can do that perfectly easily. The position is that any hon. Member who tables an early-day motion in the House is entitled to expect the Government to consider it and that, when the Leader of the House comes to the House for business questions, he should come with an answer to that early-day motion. My hon. Friend the Member for Tayside, North (Mr. Walker) raised a question specifically on early-day motion 281. The hon. Member for Halifax (Mrs. Mahon) raised a question on early-day motion 282 and the hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Smith) raised a question about early-day motion 214. I came prepared with answers to all early-day motions on the Order Paper and naturally I try to help the House. To do less would be a discourtesy.

Mr. Speaker: I hope that the House will leave it at that.

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

3420

יח' בחשוון תשמ"ח
10 בנובמבר 1987
סימוכין: 2218

103.3

אל: ארופה 2,

מאת: הציר-יועץ, לונדון.

הנדון: המכון ללימודים אסטרטגיים.

לוטה הקטע המדה"ת מהפירסום השנתי של המכון אודות המאזן הצבאי.

בברכה,
יורם שבן.

העתק: המרכז.

The Middle East and North Africa

This section now includes Djibouti, Mauritania, and the Somali Republic, all members of the Arab League, formerly listed in Sub-Saharan Africa. This change has been adopted to reflect the Islamic nature of the states themselves as well as their links to the League. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is also a member; its elements are listed under Lebanon.

The Persian Gulf

The problem of assessing the nature and extent of deliveries of materiel to Iraq and Iran continues to be intractable. Neither of the two protagonists is willing to state details of procurement, let alone strengths and losses, and estimates continue to be imprecise. The Soviet Union, along with Egypt, still provides most of Iraq's munitions and spare parts. Iran continues to have difficulty in purchasing its needs from commercial sources, but has managed to acquire sufficient avionics spares to put into combat service some 10 of its F-14s. It is also believed to have some 10 Chinese J-6 interceptors. Both sides have used Soviet surface-to-surface missiles. Iran claims to be building a battlefield missile with a shorter range than the *FROG*, called the *Oghab*. It is also reported to have the Chinese HY-2 (US: *Silkworm*) coastal defence missile, which is apparently being deployed by both the Navy and the Revolutionary Guard (*Pasdaran*). The *Pasdaran* maritime element is believed to be manning a number of fast patrol launches to intercept merchant vessels plying to Kuwait and other Gulf ports. A *Pasdaran* air element is believed to be responsible for some portion of the air defence role. It also has some pilots, though no aircraft are known to be assigned to it.

Elsewhere in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia has formed a 1,500-man corps of Marines, comprising a naval infantry regiment equipped with light infantry combat vehicles. It has also created an independent Air Defence Force which controls much of the air defence equipment formerly assigned to the Army. The relationship between it and the interceptor elements within the Air Force is unknown. The Saudi Air Force has begun to receive the *Tornado*, and a small decline in the number of F-5s is noted.

Eastern Mediterranean

A slight reduction in Israeli military manpower may have occurred. There appears to have been a slight increase in the number of tanks and artillery, and the slow modernization of the air inventory continues. Budgetary considerations have forced the abandonment of earlier plans to produce the indigenous *Lavi* fighter in favour of the acquisition of a US aircraft. This should improve funding prospects for some of the less prominent yet important programmes in all three Services.

Syria has apparently reorganized its ground forces, which have reportedly absorbed the *Saraya ad-Difer*, a guard force for government offices. Despite this, both the Army and the Air Force have reduced their numbers, which may reflect a lower level of alert status as well as a desire to economize. Little new equipment is reported, though the Navy is believed to have ASW helicopters, and the Air Force could be getting MiG-29s by the end of 1987.

The Lebanon continues to be divided on factional lines. Our entry for the PLO cites the groups and their strengths; we have been unable to ascertain the nature and extent of the arms inventories of each.

North Africa and the Maghreb

Morocco's extension of the 'wall' to and along the Mauritanian frontier puts further strains on the Moroccan Army, which deploys a reported 100,000 men to garrison it and has had to add additional forces in order to do so. It has, however, forced *Polisario* to use Mauritanian territory if it wishes to reach the coast. *Polisario* continues to make sporadic probing attacks, and both sides claim to have caused casualties, while denying serious loss to themselves. The cost to Morocco, however, remains more economic than military in nature.

A squadron of Algeria's MiG-23s have been identified as interceptors; there is no change in the total held. The Air Force, however, has received additional Mi-24 helicopters. The Tunisian Navy is to receive additional patrol craft. The civil war in the Sudan continues; the Army may have received some equipment from Egypt.

Egypt's procurement programme, by which it planned to replace Soviet equipment and improve overall military capability has been seriously hampered by increasing financial constraints. Orders are being delayed or curtailed, and the status of many is in doubt. It has, however, received French *Mirage* 2000EM and two E-2C *Hawkeye* airborne early-warning aircraft.

Reports suggest that Libyan Armed Forces strengths have increased slightly. Libyan equipment losses in Chad, though politically impressive, are of little real military consequence, given the large inventory held. The Libyan Air Force has received a further 40 *Fitter* FGA and the reconnaissance version of the MiG-25. The Air Defence Force is installing a command and control system known as '*Senezh*' about which no details are available.

Political Agreements

Details of bilateral agreements with external powers and agreements within the region are to be found on pp. 89–90 of *The Military Balance 1986–1987*. No significant developments under these headings have been noted.

Peacekeeping Forces

The United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO), which contains some 298 officers and men including the Observer Group, Beirut (50), continues to patrol Israel's northern border. In the Golan Heights the UN deploys the 1,410-man Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) with contingents from Austria (532), Canada (226), Finland (495) and Poland (157). Finally, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) consists of some 5,533 men from France (500), Fiji (640), Finland (495), Ghana (690), Ireland (746), Italy (51), Nepal (800), Norway (864) and Sweden (774).

The Egyptian/Israeli border is patrolled by the 2,665-man Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) set up under the Israeli/Egyptian Peace Treaty; contingents come from the US (1,186), Canada (136), Britain (38), Colombia (500), Fiji (500), France (40), Italy (90), the Netherlands (105) and Uruguay (70).

Economic Developments

The Middle Eastern recession continues unabated. Regional GDP declined by a further 3.1% in 1986, following the fall of 3.8% in 1985. Moreover, the region has experienced an average inflation rate of 11% over the year. To a large extent this was due to the dramatic fall in the oil price (55% between 1985 and 1986) to a level 15% below the 1978 price in real terms. As a result of this and a low output quota (about 13.4 million barrels per day in 1986), Gulf oil exporters have been forced to draw heavily on their reserves; Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iran each drew well over $1 billion in 1986. As a further result, regional debt increased by $15 billion, from about $130 billion to $145 billion.

While most of the oil producers have considerable financial reserves – Saudi Arabia's cash reserves alone stand at $46 billion – the non-oil-producing or minor oil-producing Middle Eastern states can only resort to borrowing. In terms of debt/GDP ratios, Morocco is the region's largest debtor with $16 billion (110% of GDP), followed by Egypt with $44 billion (about 80% of 1986 GDP). The Egyptian figure includes the bulk of the country's military debts (some $11 billion, $4.6 billion of which is owed to the United States) but excludes military debt to the Soviet Union of an estimated $3 billion. Iraqi war-related expenditure has led to an accumulated debt estimated at about $50 billion (excluding about $40 billion of presumably non-repayable debts to the Gulf Co-operation Council). In Iran, which has no major long-term credit debt, the short-term commercial debt appears to remain at a level of about $1 billion (underwritten by about $5.5 billion in cash reserves, excluding the country's unknown

gold holdings). Israel's debt, in per capita terms the world's highest, has stabilized at around $30 billion. Moreover, its inflation rate has settled at a manageable 20%. The Lebanese economy, near to total collapse, has seen its currency devalued by over 300% in one year, forcing the 'government' to sell off 20% of its gold holdings. The Sudan, certainly the poorest of the Middle Eastern countries, continues to slide into debt, with the 1986 total of at least $13 billion equal to some 300% or more of its actual export income.

Regional per capita income continues the decline which began in 1979 (despite the extremely high per capita income in the Gulf Co-operation Council countries). In 1986 it slipped by a further 3.7%. In a region with some of the world's highest population increases (between 3 and 6%) economic progress is constantly being eroded. The disparity between the rich oil producers and those with few, and often badly managed, resources has visibly increased regional tension. Not only the Iran–Iraq war, but that between Chad and Libya, the Sudanese civil war, Moroccan–Algerian tension over *Polisario*, and the Lebanese civil war all contribute to, and in some measure also reflect, underlying economic stress and pressures. The appeal of Islamic fundamentalism is also in part prompted by this economic malaise.

Regional exports declined further to about $115 billion (compared to $253 billion in 1980). Only in the arms export market have Egypt and Israel seen notable earnings improvements; it is estimated that each exported armaments to a value of about $300 million in 1986. Moreover, Egypt appears to be committed to the establishment of a substantial military-industrial complex, encouraged not only by the Iran–Iraq war, but by future arms requirements in the whole region. Recent joint Turkish-Egyptian arms production agreements are an indication of this development.

Defence outlays in the region have, however, decreased. Even Iraq and Iran have had to spend less, while Saudi Arabia, the region's largest defence spender, has reduced its outlays by over 40% in the past three years. Nevertheless, in most countries of the region, defence spending remains the single largest expenditure item in their budgets.

ALGERIA

GDP	1985:	D 295.00 bn ($58.67 bn)	
	1986:	D 325.00 bn ($69.12 bn)	
growth	1985:	3.2%	1986: 2.9%
Inflation	1985:	10.8%	1986: 10.0%
Debt	1985:	$18.4 bn	1986: $18.7 bn
Def bdgt*	1986:	D 5.46 bn ($1.16 bn)	
	1987:	D 5.81 bn ($1.24 bn)	
$1 = D	(1985):	5.0278	(1986): 4.7023
	(1987):	4.6995	

D = dinar

Population: 23,550,000

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	2,687,000	1,518,000
Women:	2,587,000	1,609,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 169,000 (70,000 conscripts).
Terms of service: 2 years Army only; 6 months basic, 18 months 'National Service' (= civil construction).
Reserves: Army: up to 150,000, to age 50.

ARMY: 150,000 (70,000 conscripts).
6 Military Regions.
2 armd bdes (2 tk, 1 mech, 1 arty, 1 engr bns, recce coy, ATK, log bns).
5 mech bdes (2 mech, 1 tk, 1 arty, 1 engr recce, ATK, log bns).
9 mot inf bdes (3 inf, 1 arty, 1 engr bns).
1 AB/special force bde.
28 indep inf bns.
4 para bns.
5 indep arty bns.
5 AD bns.
4 engr bns.
12 coys desert troops.
Equipment:
Tks: 910: 95 T-34, 390 T-54/-55, 325 T-62, 100 T-72. **lt:** 40 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 140 BRDM-2. **MICV:** 690 BMP-1.
APC: 770: 460 BTR-50/-60, 310 BTR-152.
Arty: 780:
guns: 400: 76mm: 85 ZIS-3 (M-1942);
85mm: 85 D-44;
122mm: 110 M-1931/37, 70 M-1974;
152mm: 50 ISU-152 SP.
howr: 280: 122mm: 50 M-30, M-1938, 170 D-30;
152mm: 60 M-1937.

MRL: 100: 122mm: 70 BM-21;
240mm: 30 BM-24.
Mor: 100: 120mm: M-43; 70mm: M-43.
ATK: guns: 195: 57mm: 145 ZIS-2; 100mm: 50 SU-100 SP.
RCL: 155: 82mm: 110 T-21; 107mm: 45 B-11.
ATGW: AT-3 *Sagger* (some SP/BRDM-2), *Milan*.
AD: guns: 850: 14.5mm: 65 ZPU-2/-4;
20mm: 100; 23mm: 60 ZU-23; 37mm: 150;
57mm: 75; 85mm: 20; 100mm: 150;
130mm: 20 towed; 210 ZSU-23-4 and ZSU-57-2 SP.
SAM: 65 SA-6, SA-7/-8/-9.

NAVY: 7,000.
Bases: Algiers, Annaba, Mers el Kebir.
Subs: 2 R-class.
Frigates: 3 *Koni* with 1 × 2 SA-N-4 SAM.
Corvettes: 3 *Nanuchka* with
4 SS-N-2B/C SSM, 1 × 2 SA-N-4 SAM.
FAC(G): 12 with 4 *Styx* SSM: 2 *Osa*-I, 10 *Osa*-II.
Patrol craft, coastal: 1 *Zhuk* (?operational).
MCMV: 1 T-43 ocean minesweeper.
Amph: LST: 2 Brooke; **LSM:** 1 *Polnocny*.
Coastguard (under naval control): 550:
24 vessels: 6 *Kebir* FAC (1987); 18 patrol craft ((2 P-6, 16 Baglietto (6 *Mangusta*, 10 Type-20 GC)).
(On order (status uncertain): 2 corvettes, 3 *Kebir* (Brooke Marine 37-m) FAC.)

AIR FORCE: 12,000;
some 346 combat ac, 45+ armed hel.
FGA: 141: 8 sqns:
1 with 12 Su-7BM;
3 with 51 MiG-17;
3 with some 60 MiG-23BM;
1 with some 18 Su-20 (*Fitter* C).
Interceptors: 155: 10 sqns:
8 with 125 MiG-21MF/F;
1 with 15 MiG-23.
1 with 15 MiG-25 *Foxbat* A.
Recce: 1 sqn with 6 MiG-25R *Foxbat* B.
MR: 10: 1 sqn with 8 F-27-400 (Navy-assigned), 2 *Super King Air* B-200T.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 8 An-12, 11 C-130H *Hercules*, 6 C-130H-30, 1 Il-18, 1 *Mystère-Falcon* 20, 2 *Caravelle* Super B.
Hel: 9 sqns:
attack: 3 sqns with 45 Mi-24;
tpt (hy): 3 sqns with 29 Mi-8 (some may be armed), 4 Mi-6;
(med): 2 sqns with 40 Mi-4, 5 SA-330 *Puma*;
(lt): 6 Hughes 269A, 4 SA-318C *Alouette* II.
Misc: 2 CL-215 SAR, 12 *King Air*, 12 *Sierra* 200, 3 *Queen Air*.
Trg: 56: **combat:** 17 MiG-17, 8 MiG-21U, 3 Su-7U, 6 MiG-23U, 3 MiG-25U, 3 MiG-15U, 10 MiG-15, 6 T-34C;
basic: 63: 22 CM-170 *Magister*, 41 *Gumhuriya* (Bücker-181 type).
AD: guns: 3 bdes+: 85mm, 100mm, 130mm.
SAM: 1 regt: 30 SA-2 (96 msls), some 20 SA-3.
AAM: AA-2 *Atoll*.

PARA-MILITARY:
(Ministry of Interior): *Gendarmerie* 30,000;
44 Panhard AML-60/M-3 APC.

* Excl eqpt and internal security costs.

BAHRAIN

GDP	1985:	D 1.75 bn ($4.65 bn)	
	1986:	D 1.50 bn ($3.99 bn)	
growth	1985:	−7.0%	1986: −14.0%
Inflation	1985:	−2.5%	1986: −2.0%
Debt	1985:	$330.0 m	1984: $375.0 m
Def bdgt*	1986:	D 50.70 m ($134.84 m)	
	1987:	D 51.70 m ($137.50 m)	

$1 = D (1985/6/7): 0.3760
D = dinar

Population: 298,500 (excl some 150,000 expatriates)

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	77,000	65,000
Women:	47,000	24,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 2,800.
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 2,300.
1 bde:
1 inf bn.
1 armd car sqn.
1 arty, 2 mor btys.
Equipment:
Tks: 60 M-60A3.
AFV: recce: 8 *Saladin*, 20 AML-90, 8 *Ferret*.
APC: some 10 AT-105 *Saxon*, 90 Panhard M-3.
Arty: guns: 105mm: 8 lt.
howr: 155mm: 7 M-198.
Mor: 81mm: 6.
ATK: RCL: 120mm: 6 MOBAT.
ATGW: 60 BGM-71A *TOW*.
AD: SAM: 50+ RBS-70.

NAVY: 300.
Base: Jufair (Manama).
FAC(G):
2 Lürssen type 62-001 (62-m) with 2 × 2 *Harpoon* SSM;
2 Lürssen 45-m with 4 *Exocet* MM-40 SSM.
FAC: 2 Lürssen 38-m.
Amph: LCU: 1 40-m.

AIR FORCE: 200;
12 combat ac, no armed hel.
FGA: 1 sqn with 6 F-5E, 6 F-5F.
Tpt: 1 *Gulfstream* II (VIP).
Hel: 1 sqn with 10 AB-212, 3 BO-105, 2 Hughes 500D.
AAM: AIM-9P3 *Sidewinder*.

PARA-MILITARY (Ministry of Interior):
Coast-Guard 180; 23 coastal patrol craft, 2 landing craft, 1 hovercraft.
Police 2,000; 2 Bell 412, 2 *Scout* AH-1 hel.

* Excl a $1.0-bn GCC subsidy, shared between Bahrain and Oman, probably used for equipment purchases and military construction projects. Also excl internal security costs, est at D35 m for 1986 and 1987.

DJIBOUTI

GDP	1983:	fr 65.90 bn ($370.81 m)	
	1984:	fr 60.23 bn ($331.96 m)	
Def exp	1985e:	fr 5.70 bn ($32.20 m)	
Def bdgt	1986:	fr 5.29 bn ($29.90 m)	
FMA*	1985:	$2.4 m	1986: $1.9 m
$1 = fr	(1984):	181.44	(1985/6/7): 177.00

fr D = Djibouti francs

Population: 417,000

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	41,000	29,000
Women:	39,000	28,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services incl *Gendarmerie*, form part of the Army):
Active: 4,230 incl 1,200 *Gendarmerie*.
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 2,870.
1 inf regt, incl mor, ATK platoons.
1 armd sqn.
1 spt bn.
1 border cdo bn.
1 para coy.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: some 10 BRDM-2, 4 AML-60, 16 AML-90. **APC:** 12 BTR-60.
Mor: 81mm; 120mm; 4.
ATK: RL: 89mm. **RCL:** 106mm.

NAVY: 60.
Base: Djibouti.
Patrol boats, coastal: 3(: 2 *Plascoa* 23-m, 1 *Tecimar*.
Amph: LCU: 3(.

AIR FORCE: 100;
no combat ac or armed hel.
Tpt: 1 *Mystère* 20 (VIP), 2 N-2501 *Noratlas*, 2 C-212.
lt: 1 Cessna 206G, 1 Socata 235GT.
Hel: 2 SA-315B *Alouette* II, 3 AS-355 *Ecureuil*.

PARA-MILITARY: 1,200.
Gendarmerie: 1 bn, 1 patrol boat.

* Excl French military assistance.

EGYPT

GDP	1985/6:	£E 36.04 bn ($51.49 bn)	
	1986/7e:	£E 44.50 bn ($63.58 bn)	
growth	1985:	5.1%	1986: 2.9%
Inflation	1985:	13.3%	1986: 22.5%
Debt*	1986:	$39.0 bn	1987: $44.0 bn
Def exp	1986/7e:	£E 3.65 bn ($5.22 bn)	
	1987/8e:	£E 3.20 bn ($4.57 bn)	
FMA†	1986:	$1.2 m	1987: $1.3 m
$1 = £E	(1985/6/7): 0.6999‡		

Population: 52,000,000

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	5,884,000	4,150,000
Women:	5,571,000	4,293,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 445,000 (some 250,000 conscripts).
Terms of service: 3 years (selective).
Reserves: 604,000; Army 500,000, Navy 14,000, Air Force 20,000, AD 70,000.

ARMY: 320,000 (perhaps 180,000 conscripts).
2 Army HQ:
4 armd divs (each with 2 armd, 1 mech bdes).
6 mech inf divs (type: 2 mech, 1 armd bdes).
2 inf divs (each with 2 inf, 1 mech bdes).
1 Republican Guard bde.
1 indep armd bde.
3 indep inf bdes.
2 airmobile, 1 para bdes.
3 indep arty bdes (2 more to form).
2 hy mor bdes.
7 cdo gps (1,000 men).
2 SSM regts (1 with *FROG-7*, 1 with *Scud* B).
Equipment:§
Tks: MBT 2,250: 900 T-54/-55, 600 T-62, 753 M-60A3. **lt:** 15 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 300 BRDM-2.
MICV: 200 BMP-1, some 250 BMR-600P.
APC: 2,500: OT-62, *Walid* (to National Guard), *Fahd* (being introduced), BTR-50, 1,200 M-113A2.

Arty: guns: 122mm: 48 M-31/37; 130mm: M-46.
gun/how: 152mm: 12 M-1937 (ML-20).
how: 122mm: M-1938, D-30 (some SP); 155mm: some 100 M-109A2 SP.
MRL: about 300: 80mm: VAP-80-12; 122mm: BM-21/*as-Saqr*-18/-30; 130mm: M-51/Praga V3S; 132mm: BM-13-16; 140mm: BM-14-16; 240mm: BM-24.
SSM: 12 *FROG-7*, 9 *Scud* B.
Mor: 82mm: 400; 120mm: M-43; 160mm: M-43; 240mm: M-1953.
ATK: RCL: 107mm: B-11.
ATGW: 1,000 AT-1 *Snapper*; AT-2 *Swatter*; AT-3 *Sagger* (incl BRDM-2); *Milan*; *Swingfire*; 480 *TOW* (incl 52 on M-901 (M-113) SP).
AD: guns: 1,000: 14.5mm: ZPU-4; 23mm: ZU-23-2, ZSU-23-4 SP; 35mm: GDF-002; 57mm: S-60, 254 ZSU-57-2 SP.
SAM: SA-7/*as-Saqr*, SA-9.
(On order: 90 M-113, some 305 BMR-600P APC; some 100 M-109A2 155mm SP how; *as-Saqr* (SA-7), 25 btys (384 msls) *Chaparral* SAM.)

NAVY:§ 20,000 (10,000 conscripts).
Bases: Alexandria, Port Said, Mersa Matruh, Port Tewfiq; **Red Sea**: Hurghada, Safaqa.
Subs: 12:
10 R-class (4 Ch Type-O-33); 2 Sov W-class.
Destroyers: 3:
2 Sov *Skory* (1 with 1 × 2 *Styx* SSM) (?non-operational);
1 Br Z-class (trg).
Frigates: 6:
FFG: 4: 2 Ch *Jianghu* (1 on refit) with 4 *Hai Ying-2* SSM;
2 Spanish F-30 (*Descubierta*) with 2 × 4 *Harpoon*;
FF: 2 Br (1 *Black Swan*, 1 *Hunt*).
FAC(G): 30:
6 *Ramadan* with 4 *Otomat* SSM;
8 Sov *Osa-I* with 4 SS-N-2A SSM, SA-7 SAM;
6 *October*-6 (P-6)(with 2 *Otomat*;
6 *Hegu* (*Komar*-type)(with 2 *Hai Ying-2* SSM;
4 *Komar*(with 2 SS-N-2A SSM.
FAC(T): 10 P-6(.
FAC: 22:
6 *Shershen* with BM-21 (8-tube) 122mm or 1 BM-24 (12-tube) 240mm MRL, 1 SA-7 SAM;
12 P-6(with 1 × 8 BM-21;
4 *Shanghai* II (plus 4 in reserve).
Patrol craft, large: 41:
12 Sov SO-1 (some with SA-7 SAM), 8 Ch *Hainan*, 12 *Timsah*, 9 *Swift* 93-ft.

MCMV: 12 minesweepers:
ocean: 10: 6 T-43, 4 *Yurka*;
inshore: 4: 2 T-301, 2 K-8.
Minelayers: 3 SRN-6 hovercraft.
Amph: LSM: 3 *Polnocny*;
LCU: 14 (10 *Vydra*, 4 SMB1).
Coastal defence unit (Army tps, Navy control):
guns: 130mm: SM-4-1.
SSM: 30 *Otomat* and *Samlet*.
(On order (lack of funds delays deliveries):
4 *Lüda* DDG; 2 *Tripartite* MCMV; 10 *Timsah*, 3 Hyundai patrol boats; 11 SRN-6 hovercraft; 6 LST; *Stingray* torpedoes; 16 *Harpoon*, *Otomat* SSM.)

AIR FORCE: 25,000 (10,000 conscripts);
some 441 combat ac, 53 armed hel (incl AD comd).§
Bbr: 1 bde (sqn): 9 Tu-16.
AD/FGA: 102: 2 bdes (4 sqns): 70 *J-6*, 32 F-4E.
FGA: 83: 2 bdes (4 sqns) with 54 *Mirage* 5SDE, 14 *Mirage* 2000EM, 15 *Alphajet* MS-2.
Interceptors: 161: 6 bdes (8 sqns):
5 sqns with 100 MiG-21
1 with 19 *J-7*;
2 with 42 F-16A.
Recce: 20: 1 bde (2 sqns) with 6 *Mirage* 5SDR, 14 MiG-21.
ELINT: 2 EC-130H *Hercules*, 2 E-2C *Hawkeye*.
Hel: 15 sqns:
attack: 1 bde (2 sqns) with 24 SA-342M *Gazelle* (*HOT*), 24 SA-342L (20mm gun).
ASW: 1 bde (sqn) with 5 *Sea King* Mk 47.
tac tpt: 3 bdes: **hy:** 1 sqn with 15 CH-47C *Chinook*. **med:** 4 sqns: 3 with 27 Mi-8, 1 with 19 *Commando* Mk 2 (1 VIP). **lt:** 1 sqn with 18 Hiller UH-12E.
Tpt: 2 bdes (3 sqns) with 21 C-130H, 5 DHC-5D *Buffalo*, 3 *Mystère-Falcon* 20 (VIP), 2 *Gulfstream* III, 4 Boeing 707, 1 Boeing 737.
Trg: incl 16 MiG-19, 30 *Alphajet* MS-1, 20 L-29 (being replaced), 35 *Gumhuria* (Bücker-181 type), 10 PZL-104 *Wilga*, 4 JJ-6 (2-seat), 6 *Mirage* 5SDD, 6 F-16B, 12 EMB-312 *Tucano*, 4 DHC-5 *Buffalo*.
AAM: AA-2 *Atoll*, **Matra** R-530, *Sparrow*, R-550 *Magic*, AIM-9P3/-9L *Sidewinder*.
ASM: AS-1 *Kennel*, AS-5 *Kelt*, AGM-65 *Maverick*, *HOT*.
(On order: Some 40 J-7, 80 F-16C/D, some 26 *Mirage* 2000EM, 4 -BM, 16 *Mirage* 5E2 ftrs, 26 J-6; 5 E-2C AEW, 6 Beech 1900 ESM (2 MR), 3 C-130H tpt, some 18 *Tucano* trg ac; 12 *Sea King* ASW, AS-332 *Super Puma*, 24 AH-1 *Cobra* with *TOW*, 15 CH-47, 18 Hiller UH-12E, 24 *Gazelle* (some 12 with *HOT*

ATGW), 4 Bell 222, 1 AS-61 tpt hel; *Sparrow*, 560 *Sidewinder* AAM; *Exocet* AM-39, *Maverick* ASM.)

AIR DEFENCE COMMAND: 80,000 (50,000 conscripts).
12 centres under construction.
AD: 4 divs: regional bdes,
100 AA bns.
65 SA-2, 60 SA-3 bns.
Radar bns.
Equipment:
Arty: guns: 2,500: 20mm, 23mm, 37mm, 40mm, 57mm, 85mm; 100mm.
SAM: some 400 SA-2, 240 SA-3, 75 SA-6, 9 btys *Improved HAWK* (108 launchers, 389 msls), 16 *Crotale*, SA-9.
Some 18 *Amoun* AD systems (*Skyguard*/AIM-7F *Sparrow* – some 36 twin 35mm guns, some 36 quad SAM).
Radar: msl/gun: AN/TPS-43/-59/-63, AN/TSQ-73, *Fan Song*, *Flat Face* P-15, *Spoon Rest* P-12, *Low Blow*, *Straight Flush*; **swng**: *Squint Eye*, *Long Track*.
(On order: Ch CSA-1, *Spada*/*Aspide* SAM, LPD-20 search radar.)

Forces Abroad: Oman, Sudan, Somalia, Zaire.

PARA-MILITARY: 439,000.
Central Security Forces 300,000.
National Guard 60,000 (getting *Walid* APC).
Frontier Corps 12,000.
Defence and Security 60,000.
Coast Guard 7,000; 3 *Nisr*, 6 *Crestitalia*, 6 *Bertram* patrol boats, 34 rescue launches.

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* Est military debt $11 bn, of which some $3 bn is owed to the USSR and some $4.6 bn to the US.
† Excl credit arrangements with individual suppliers.
‡ Egypt operates five exchange rates; for consistency, the principal rate is used here.
§ Most Soviet eqpt now in reserve, incl MBT, some combat aircraft. Some shown as Soviet has been rebuilt with Western, Chinese and domestically produced components.

IRAN

GDP	1984/5:	r 14.60 bn ($158.86 bn)		
	1985/6:	r 12.90 bn ($147.04 bn)		
growth	1985:	–0.1%	1986:	–12.0%
Inflation	1985:	4.4%	1986:	30.0%
Debt	1985:	$0.8 bn	1986:	minimal
Def bdgt*	1986/7e:	r 465.00 bn ($6.07 bn)		
	1987/8e:	r 436.00 bn ($6.11 bn)		
$1 = r	(1984/5): 91.902	(1985/6): 87.733		
	(1986/7): 76.550	(1987): 71.411		

r = rial

Population: 49,900,000

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	5,153,000	3,831,000
Women:	4,848,400	3,574,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 654,500.
Terms of service: 24 months.
Reserves: Army: 350,000, ex-service volunteers.

ARMY: 305,000 (perhaps 250,000 conscripts).
(?3) Army HQ.
3 mech divs (each 3 bdes: 9 armd, 18 mech bns).
7 inf divs.
1 AB bde.
1 Special Forces div (4 bdes).
Some indep armd, inf bdes (incl 'coastal force').
12 SAM bns with *Improved HAWK*.
Ground Forces Air Support units.
Reserve: '*Qods*' bns (ex-service).
Equipment:†
Tks: perhaps 1,000: T-54/-55, 260 Ch T-59, T-62, T-72, *Chieftain* Mk 3/5, M-47/-48, M-60A1.
lt: 50 *Scorpion*.
AFV: recce: 130 EE-9 *Cascavel*.
MICV: 180 BMP-1.
APC: 500 BTR-50/-60, perhaps 250 M-113.
Arty: some 750+:
guns: 130mm: M-46, 175mm: 30 M-107 SP.
how: 105mm: M-101, 36 Oto Melara; 155mm: M-109A1 SP; 203mm: 10 M-110 SP.
MRL: 12 × 107mm: Ch Type-63; 40 × 122mm: 65 BM-21.
SSM: *Scud*; local manufacture msls reported incl *Oghab* 40-km range (*FROG*-type).
Mor: 81mm; 107mm: M-30 4.2-in.; 120mm: 3,000.
ATK: RCL: 57mm; 75mm; 106mm: M-40A/C.
ATGW: *ENTAC*, SS-11/-12, M-47 *Dragon*, BGM-71A *TOW*.
AD: guns: 1,500: 23mm: ZU-23 towed, ZSU-23-4 SP; 35mm: 92; 37mm; 57mm: ZSU-57-2 SP.
SAM: *Improved HAWK*, SA-7, some 300 RBS-70.
Avn: ac: incl 56 Cessna (185, 310, O-2A), 2 F-27, 5 *Shrike Commander*, 2 *Mystère-Falcon*;
hel: (attack): AH-1 *Cobra*; **(hy tpt)**: CH-47C *Chinook*.
(270 Bell 214A, 35 AB-205A, 15 AB-206 were also held.)

(Captured Iraqi eqpt in service.)
(On order: no confirmed information.)

REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (*Pasdaran Inqilab*):
Ground Forces: some 300,000; 11 Regional Commands: loosely org in bns of no fixed size, grouped into perhaps 8 divs and many indep bdes, incl inf, armd, para, special forces, arty incl SSM, engr, AD and border defence units, serve indep or with Army; small arms, spt weapons from Army; controls *Basij* (see below) when mobilized.
Naval Forces: strength unknown, five island bases (Al Farsiyah, Halul (oil platform), Sirri, Abu Musa, Larak); some 40 Swedish Boghamma Marin small launches armed with ATGW, RCL, machine guns. Italian SSM reported. Controls coast defence elms incl arty and Ch HY-2 *Silkworm* SSM in at least 3 sites, each 3–6 msls.
Marines: 3 bdes reported.
Air Forces: forming; to have AD role in static defence of major installations. Some pilots, possible 'manned bomb' suicide role. May have 22 F-6.

NAVY: 14,500, incl naval air and marines.†
Bases: Bandar Abbas (HQ), Bushehr, Kharg, Bandar-e-Anzelli, Bandar-e-Khomeini, Chah Bahar (building).
Principal Combatants:
Destroyers: 3 (believed non-operational):
1 Br *Battle* with 2 × 4 *Standard* SSM, 1 × 4 *Seacat* SAM;
2 US *Sumner* with 4 × 2 *Standard* SSM reported.
Frigates: 4 *Vosper* Mk 5 with 1 × 5 *Seakiller* SSM (1 possibly operational).
Corvettes: 2 (?1) US PF-103 (non-operational).
Minor Combatants (few operational):
FAC(G): 11 *Kaman* (*La Combattante* II) (? 10 serviceable) fitted for *Harpoon* SSM (none now held).
Patrol craft, large: 4 *Cape*; **hovercraft**(: 6 BH-7 Mk 4, **coastal**: 3 S. Korean 30-m.
MCMV: **coastal**: 1 US MSC 292/268.
Amph: LST: 4 *Hengam*. **LSM**: 4 Neth.
Spt: 1 replenishment, 2 Bandar Abbas oiler fleet supply, 1 repair ship.
Msls: SSM: c 200 HY-2
Marines: 3 bns.
(On order: 6 Type-1200 subs; 1 more sub stated to be under domestic construction, may be for *Pasdaran*.)

NAVAL AIR: ?1 combat ac, ?14 armed hel.
MR: 1 sqn with 5 P-3F *Orion* (?1 operational)
ASW: 1 hel sqn with ?12 SH-3D
} may have combined.
MCM: 1 hel sqn with 2 RH-53D.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 4 *Shrike Commander*, 4 F-27, 1 *Mystère-Falcon* 20 ac, 7 AB-212 hel.

AIR FORCE: 35,000;
?60 serviceable combat ac, no armed hel.†
FGA: 8 sqns:
4 with some 35 (?20) F-4D/E;
4 with some 45 (?20) F-5E/F.
Interceptor: (?10) F-14; 10 J-6.
Recce: 1 sqn (dets) with some 5 F-5, 3 RF-4E.
Tanker/tpt: 2 sqns: 17 Boeing (10 707, 7 747).
Tpt: 5 sqns: 26 C-130E/H *Hercules*, 9 F-27, 2 *Aero Commander* 690, 4 *Mystère-Falcon* 20.
Hel: 10 HH-34F (S-55), 10 AB-206A, 5 AB-212, 39 Bell 214C, 10 CH-47 *Chinook*, 2 S-61A4.
Trg: incl 26 F-33A/C *Bonanza*, 7 T-33, 46 PC-7, 2 J-6.
SAM: 5 sqns with *Rapier*, 25 *Tigercat*, CSA-1 (Ch. version of SA-2).
AAM: *Phoenix*, AIM-9 *Sidewinder*, AIM-7 *Sparrow*.
ASM: AS-12, *Maverick*.

Forces Abroad: Lebanon: Revolutionary Guard 1,000.

PARA-MILITARY:
Basij 'Popular Mobilization Army' volunteers, mostly youths: strength varies to as high as 1 million during periods of offensive operations. Org in up to 500 300–350-man 'bns' of 3 coys, each 4 platoons and spt; grouped in named formations/forces with a strength of up to 130,000; small arms only.
Gendarmerie (45,000 incl border guard elm): Cessna 185/310 lt ac, AB-205/-206 hel, patrol boats, 96 coastal, 40 harbour craft (purchased, some lost).†
Savama secret police.
Kurds: Kurdish Democratic Party armed wing *Pesh Merga* ?12,000.

OPPOSITION:
Kurdish Communist Party of Iran (KOMALA) strength unknown.
Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (DPIK): perhaps 10,500.

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* Excl some $0.8 bn available from the development fund, and $2.8 bn in foreign exchange for military purchases.
† Losses and incomplete reporting of resupply makes eqpt estimates very tentative. Reports of Chinese tk and ac deliveries possible but unconfirmed; MRL identified. Operational states of US-source eqpt impossible to confirm.

IRAQ

GDP	1985: D 6.80 bn ($21.87 bn)	
	1986: D 5.50 bn ($17.69 bn)	
growth	1985: –14%	1986: –22.0%
Inflation	1985: 25.0%	1986: 28.0%
Debt*	1985: $48 bn	1986: $50.5 bn
Def exp	1985e: D 4.0 bn ($12.866 bn)	
	1986e: D 3.60 bn ($11.58 bn)	

$1 = D (1985/6): 0.3109

D = dinar

Population: 15,900,000

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	1,423,000	1,274,000
Women:	1,743,000	1,132,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 1,000,000.
Terms of service: basic 21–24 months, extended for war.
Reserves: Peoples Army (Para-military) c 650,000

ARMY: 955,000 (incl perhaps 480,000 active reserves).
7 corps HQ.
5 armd divs ('type': 1 armd, 1 mech bde; varies).
3 mech/mot inf divs.
30 inf divs (incl Peoples Army/volunteer inf and Reserve bdes).
1 Presidential Guard Force (3 armd, 1 inf, 1 cdo bdes).
6 special forces bdes.
Equipment:†
Tks: some 4,500: T-54/-55/-62/-72, 1,500 T-59/-69 II, 150 *Chieftain* Mk 3/5, M-60, M-47, 60 M-77.
lt: 100 PT-76.
AFV: about 4,000:
recce: incl BRDM-2, FUG-70, ERC-90, MOWAG *Roland*, EE-9 *Cascavel*, EE-3 *Jararaca*.
MICV: 1,000 BMP.
APC: BTR-50/-60/-152, OT-62/-64, VC-TH (with *HOT* ATGW), M-113A1, Panhard M-3, EE-11 *Urutu*.
Arty: 3,000:
guns: 122mm: D-74;
130mm: M-46, Type 59-1;
155mm: some 5 GCT SP.
gun/how: 152mm: M-1937;
155mm: 40 G-5, 40 GHN-45.
how: 105mm: M-56 pack;
122mm: D-30 towed, M-1938, M-1974 (2S1);
152mm: M-1943, M-1973 (2S3) SP;
155mm: M-114/M-109 SP.
MRL: 200: incl 122mm: BM-21; 127mm: 60 *ASTROS* II; 132mm: BM-13/-16.
SSM: 30 *FROG-7*, 20 *Scud* B.
Mor: 81mm, 120mm, 160mm.
ATK: RCL: 73mm: SPG-9; 82mm: B-10; 107mm.
guns: 85mm; 100mm towed; 105mm: 100 JPz SK-105 SP.
ATGW: AT-3 *Sagger* (incl BRDM-2), AT-4 *Spigot* reported, SS-11, *Milan*, *HOT*.
Avn (Army Air Corps): (?150) armed hel.
attack (?40) Mil Mi-24 *Hind* with AT-2 *Swatter*; 50 SA-342 *Gazelle* (some with *HOT*); 10 SA-321 *Super Frelon*, some with *Exocet* AM-38 ASM; some 30 SA-316B *Alouette* III with AS-12 ASM; some 56 BO-105 with AS-11 ATGW; 86 Hughes (26 -530F, 30 -500D, 30 -300C).
tpt: (hy): 10 Mi-6 *Hook*, **(med):** 100 Mi-8, 20 Mi-4, 10 SA-330 *Puma*.
AD: guns: 4,000: 23mm: ZSU-23-4 SP; 37mm: M-1939 and twin; 57mm: incl ZSU-57-2 SP; 85mm; 100mm; 130mm.
SAM: 120 SA-2, 150 SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-9, 60 *Roland*.
(Captured Iranian eqpt in service.)
(On order: 250 EE-9 *Cascavel* AFV; 80 GCT 155mm SP guns, Bell 214 ST hel.)

NAVY: 5,000.†
Bases: Basra, Umm Qasr.
Frigates: 5:
4 *Lupo* with 8 *Otomat*-2 SSM, 1 × 8 *Albatros/Aspide* SAM, 1 hel, held in Italy.
1 Yug (trg).
Corvettes: 6 *Assad* all with 1 × 4 *Albatros/Aspide* SAM;
2 with 2 *Otomat*-2 SSM, 1 hel;
4 with 6 *Otomat*-2 (completed, held in Italy).
FAC(G): 8 *Osa* (6 II, 2 I) with 4 *Styx* SSM.
FAC(T): 4 P-6((may not be operable).
Patrol craft: large: 3 SO-1; **coastal:** 5 *Zhuk(*.
Minesweepers: ocean: 2 Sov T-43, 3 *Yevgenya(*; **inshore/river:** 3 *Nestin(*.
Amph: LSM: 3 *Polnocny*; **LST:** 3 mod cargo.
Spt ships: 1 *Stromboli* (held in Italy); 2 *Polnchat* torpedo spt, 1 *Agnadeve* tanker, 1 tpt.

AIR FORCE: 40,000 incl 10,000 AD personnel; 500+ combat ac, no armed hel.
Bbrs: 2 sqns:
1 with Tu-22, 1 with Tu-16.
FGA: 11 sqns:
4 with MiG-23BM;
4 with *Mirage* F-1EQ5 (*Exocet*-equipped), *Mirage* F-1EQ-200;
3 with Su-7 and Su-20.
(Su-25 reported.)

Interceptors: 5 sqns:
Some 25 MiG-25, some 40 MiG-19, some 200 MiG-21, 30 *Mirage* F-1EQ.
(MiG-29 reported.)
Recce: 1 sqn with 5 MiG-25.
Tpt: ac: 2 sqns:
10 An-2 *Colt*; 10 An-12 *Cub*, 6 An-24 *Coke* (retiring); 2 An-26 *Curl*, 19 Il-76 *Candid*, 19 Il-14 *Crate*, 1 DH *Heron*.
Trg: incl MiG-15/-21/-23U, Su-7U, *Hunter* T-69; 16 *Mirage* F-1BQ; 50 L-29 *Delfin*, 40 L-39 *Albatros*, 50 PC-7 *Turbo Trainer*, 21 EMB-312 *Tucano*.
AAM: R-530, R-550 *Magic*, AA-2/-6/-7/-8.
ASM: AS-30 *Laser*, *Armat*, *Exocet* AM-39, AS-4 *Kitchen*, AS-5 *Kelt*.
(On order: no confirmed information.)

PARA-MILITARY:
Frontier Guards.
Security troops 4,800.

OPPOSITION: Kurds.
Kurdish Democratic Party KDP: 10,000 (20,000 more in militia); small arms, some Iranian lt arty, MRL, mor, SAM-7.
Kurdish Workers Party: strength unknown; breakaway from KDP, anti-Iran, Syria-based.
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK): 4,000 combat (plus 6,000 spt).
Eqpt: **MBT:** 6 T-54/-55, **mor:** 450: 60mm; 120mm, **RCL:** 106mm, **AD guns:** 12.5mm: some 200, **SAM:** SA-7.
Socialist Party of Kurdistan: 71,500 armed.

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* Excl $35–45 bn in economic and military subsidies from GCC members over the past seven years.
† Losses and incomplete reporting of resupply makes eqpt estimates very tentative.

ISRAEL

GDP	1985: NS 25.97 bn ($22.03 bn)	
	1986: NS 32.98 bn ($22.16 bn)	
growth	1985: 2.6%	1986: 1.6%
Inflation	1985: 185.0%	1986: 25.0%
Debt	1985: $23.8 bn	1986: $25.0 bn
Def bdgt	1986: NS 8.27 bn ($5.56 bn)	
	1987: NS 8.18 bn ($5.11 bn)	
FMA*	1986: $1.7 bn	1987: $1.8 bn
$1 = NS	(1985): 1.1788	(1986): 1.4878
	(1987): 1.6001	

NS = new shequlim

Population: 4,450,000

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	457,800	408,000
Women:	435,000	414,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 141,000 (110,000 male and female conscripts).
Terms of Service: officers 48 months, men 36 months, women 24 months (Jews, Druze only; Christians and Arabs may volunteer). Annual training as reservists thereafter to age 54 for men, 34 (or marriage) for women.
Reserves: 504,000: Army 494,000; Navy 1,000 immediate recall; Air Force 9,000 immediate recall. Reservists complete establishments incl HQ staffs. Others, such as *Nahal* (*Noar Halutzi Lohen* – Pioneer Fighting Youth) act as a Home Guard.

STRATEGIC:
Recent unconfirmed reports from a single source suggest that Israel may have produced some 100 nuclear warheads. The IISS has no further evidence to confirm or deny these reports.
Nuclear-capable delivery systems could include aircraft or the *Jericho* SSM (range up to 450 km or, in modified form, some 800 km), first reported as having been developed from the French MD-620/660. Again we cannot confirm whether these systems are actually developed for delivery purposes.

ARMY: 104,000 (88,000 conscripts, male and female); some 598,000 on mobilization.
11 armd divs (many cadre; on mobilization comprise 33 armd bdes (each 3 tk, 1 mech inf bns)).
9 mech inf bdes.
3 inf bdes.
5 para bdes.
12 territorial/border inf bdes with *Nahal* militia.
15 arty bdes (each 5 bns of 3 btys).
2 AD btys (with *Vulcan/Chaparral*).
Equipment:†
Tks: 3,900: incl 1,100 *Centurion*, 600 M-48A5, 1,300 M-60/A1/A3, 250 T-54/-55, 150 T-62, 500 *Merkava* I/II.
AFV: recce: about 400 incl *Ramta* RBY, M-2/-3, BRDM-2, **APC:** 5,900 M-113, BTR-50P, 4,000 M2/-3 half track.
Arty: guns: 130mm: 85 M-46;
175mm: 140 M-107 SP.
how: 105mm: 70 M-101;
122mm: 100 D-30;
155mm: 300 Soltam M-68/-71, M-839P/-845P, L-33 SP; 120 M-50, 450 M-109A1/A2;
203mm: 36 M-110 SP.
MRL: 122mm: BM-21; 160mm: LAR-160; 240mm: BM-24; 290mm: MAR-290.
SSM: MGM-52C *Lance*, *Ze'ev* (*Wolf*).
Mor: 81mm: 1,100; 120mm; 160mm (some SP).

ATK: RL: 82mm: B-300; **RCL**: 106mm: 250.
ATGW: BGM-71 *TOW*, M-47 *Dragon*, *Picket* 81mm, *Togger* (*TOW/Sagger* derivative).
AD: guns: 20mm: 900; 30 M-163 *Vulcan*/M-48 *Chaparral* gun/msl systems; 23mm: ZU-23-2 and 50 ZSU-23-4 SP; 37mm and 40mm: L-70.
SAM: MIM-42A *Redeye*.
(On order: *Merkava* MBT, *Re'em* AFV; M-107 175mm SP guns; *Lance* SSM, *TOW*, *Dragon* ATGW.)

NAVY: 9,000 (3,300 conscripts), 10,000 on mobilization.
Bases: Haifa, Ashdod, Eilat.
Subs: 3 Type 206.
Corvettes: 4:
2 *Aliya* (*Sa'ar* 4.5) with 4 *Gabriel* II, 4 *Harpoon* SSM, 1 Bell 206 *Kiowa* ASW hel.
4 *Romat*.
FAC(G): 22:
8 *Reshef* (*Sa'ar* 4) with 4 *Gabriel* III, 8 *Harpoon* SSM;
6 *Sa'ar* 3 with 3 *Gabriel* III, 1 × 2 *Harpoon*;
6 *Sa'ar* 2 with 2 *Gabriel* II;
(1 *Dvora* with 2 *Gabriel* III is export sales prototype only);
hydrofoil: 2 *Shimrit* (*Flagstaff* 2) with 2 *Gabriel* III, 4 *Harpoon* SSM.
Patrol craft, coastal: 36(: 32 PCBR Mk 1 *Dabur*, 4 *Yatush*.
Amph: LSM: 3; **LCT**: 6; **LCM**: 3.
MR: ac: 7 *Seascan* 1124N.
Spt: 1 tender, 2 armed tpts, 2 trg ships (1(), 4 coastal patrol auxiliaries(.
Naval edo: (300), 1 *Firefish* III attack craft.
(On order: 1 sub, 20mm *Phalanx* AD systems.)

AIR FORCE: 28,000 (19,000 conscripts, in AD), 37,000 on mobilization;
some 676 combat ac (perhaps 90 stored), 76 armed hel.
FGA/interceptor: 15 sqns:
2 with some 52 F-15;
5 with 128 F-4E;
5 with 135 *Kfir* C1/C2/C7;
3 with 68 F-16A, 8 -B (F-16C/D to replace, being delivered).
FGA: 4 sqns with 130 A-4N/J *Skyhawk*.
Recce: 14 RF-4E, 5 RC-12.
AEW: 4 E-2C.
ECM: 6 Boeing 707 (some comd).
Tpt: 1 wing incl 10 Boeing 707 (3 tanker mods), 22 C-130E/H, 18 C-47 (Douglas DC-3), 2 KC-130H.
Liaison: 1 BN-2 *Islander*, 16 Dornier (5 Do-27, 11 Do-28D); 20 Cessna (18 U-206C, 2 180); 12 *Queen Air* 80; 2 *Westwind*; 30 *Super Cub*.
Trg: incl 20 TA-4H/J *Skyhawk*, 10 *Kfir* (incl TC-2), 16 F-4E, 80 CM-170 *Magister/Tzugit*.
Hel: attack: 3 sqns: 2 with 40 AH-1S, 1 with 36 Hughes 500MD;
ECM/SAR: 1 sqn with 20 Bell 206, 212;
tpt: (hy): 33 CH-53A/D; **(med)**: 9 SA-321 *Super Frelon*, 17 UH-1D; **(lt)**: 2 sqns with 50 Bell 206A, 212.
Drones: *Mastiff* 3, *Scout*, Teledyne Ryan 124R, MQM-74C *Chukar* II, *Delilah*.
SAM: 15 bns with MIM-23B *HAWK/Improved HAWK*.
AAM: AIM-9/-9L *Sidewinder*, AIM-7E/F *Sparrow*, *Shafrir*, *Python* III.
ASM: *Luz*, AGM-65 *Maverick*, AGM-45 *Shrike*, AGM-62A *Walleye*, AGM-12 *Bullpup*, *Gabriel* III (mod).
(On order: 75 F-16 ftrs; 60 *Kfir*-C7/-TC-2 trg ac; 25 AH-1S, 12 AS-365 *Dauphin* hel; 200 *Improved HAWK* SAM; 200 *Sidewinder* AAM.)

Forces Abroad: Lebanon (1,500).

PARA-MILITARY:
Border Guards 4,500; BTR-152 APC.
Arab Militia; small arms.
Coastguard; 3 US PBR, 3 other patrol craft.
Gadna (youth bns), volunteers 15–18, pre-military service trg by Defence Force.

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* US military aid has so far reached a total of some $22.5 bn, of which $12.2 bn is to be repaid.
† Does not include captured PLO equipment: T-34, T-54 MBT, APC, 130mm guns, BM-21 MRL, ZSU-23-4 AA guns, SA-9 SAM.

JORDAN

GDP	1984:	D 1.57 bn ($4.10 bn)		
	1985c:	D 1.61 bn ($4.10 bn)		
growth	1985:	1.9%	1986:	2.6%
Inflation	1985:	3.0%	1986:	1.0%
Debt	1985:	$4.2 bn	1986:	$3.8 bn
Def bdgt*	1986:	D 249.60 m ($713.35 m)		
	1987:	D 276.60 m ($830.13 m)		
FMA	1985:	$420.0 m	1986:	$450.0 m
$1 = D	(1984):	0.3841	(1985):	0.3940
	(1986):	0.3499	(1987):	0.3332

D = dinar

Population: 2,762,000 (excl West Bank)

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	256,000	158,000
Women:	204,000	147,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 80,300.
Terms of service: voluntary; conscription, 2 years authorized.

Reserves 35,000: (all services), Army 30,000 (obligation to age 40).

ARMY: 70,000.
2 armd divs (?each 2 tk, 1 mech inf bdes).
2 mech inf divs (?each 2 mech inf, 1 tk bdes).
1 indep Royal Guards bde.
1 Special Forces bde (3 AB bns).
16 arty bns.
4 AA bdes.
Equipment:
Tks: some 986: 200 M-47/-48A5 (in reserve), 225 M-60A1/A3, 270 *Khalid*, 291 *Tariq* (*Centurion*).
AFV: recce: 140 *Ferret*. **APC**: 1,200 M-113, 30 *Saracen*, some EE-11 *Urutu*.
Arty: some 247:
guns: 155mm: 17 M-59.
gun/how: 155mm: 180 GH N45.
how: 105mm: 36 M-101A1;
155mm: 38 M-114 towed, 20 M-44, 108 M-109A2 SP;
203mm: 4 M-115 towed (in store), 24 M-110 SP.
Mor: 400: 81mm, 107mm and 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 300 106mm.
ATGW: 300 BGM-71A *TOW*, 310 M-47 *Dragon*.
AD: guns: 20mm: 100 M-163 *Vulcan*; 40mm: 250 M-42 SP. **SAM**: SA-7B2, SA-14, *Redeye*.
(On order: EE-11 *Urutu* APC; *APILAS* 112mm RL; *Javelin*, *Rapier* SAM.)

NAVY (Coast Guard): 300.
Base: Aqaba.
Patrol craft: 6 (2 armed(.

AIR FORCE: 10,000;
109 combat ac, 24 armed hel.
FGA: 3 sqns with 66 F-5E/F.
Interceptor: 2 sqns with 32 *Mirage* F-1CJ/EJ.
OCU: 1 sqn with 5 F-5B, 6 F-5F.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 6 C-130B/H *Hercules*, 2 C-212A.
VIP: 1 sqn with 2 Boeing 727, 2 *Mystère-Falcon* 50 ac, 4 S-76 hel.
Hel: 4 sqns:
2 with 24 AH-1S (with *TOW* ASM; for eventual transfer to Army);
1 with 5 SA-316B *Alouette* III, 14 S-76, 8 Hughes 500D.
Trg ac: 17 T-37C, 18 *Bulldog*, 1 C-212, 18 Piper (12 *Warrior*-II, 6 *Seneca*-II).
AAM: AIM-9 *Sidewinder*.
ASM: *TOW*.
AD: 2 bdes:
14 btys with 112 *Improved HAWK* SAM.
3 btys with 12 SA-8 SAM.
3 btys with 12 SA-13 SAM.
3 btys with 36 ZSU-23-4 guns.
(On order: 14 C-101/5 *Aviojet* trg/COIN, 2 CN-235 tpt, 1 C-212 lt tpt ac; 6 *Maverick* ASM.)

PARA-MILITARY: 6,500:
Public Security Force 4,000.
Civil Militia 'People's Army' 2,500: men 16–65; women 16–45.
Palestine Liberation Army: 1,500; bde.

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* Excl some D 25 m for 'internal security, civil defence and Islamic Justice'.

KUWAIT

GDP	1985/6:	D 5.94 bn ($20.10 bn)		
	1986/7:	D 5.10 bn ($17.56 bn)		
growth	1985/6:	−12.0%	1986/7:	−14.0%
Inflation	1985:	1.5%	1986:	1.0%
Debt	1985:	$3.7 bn	1986:	$4.3 bn
Def exp*	1986/7e:	D 403.00 m ($1.39 bn)		
	1987/8e:	D 390.0 m ($1.42 bn)		
$1 = D	(1985/6):	0.2957	(1986/7):	0.2904
	(1987):	0.2757		

D = dinar

Population: 1,780,000 (incl 1.15 m expatriates)

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	225,000	169,000
Women:	201,000	139,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 15,000 (excl Navy).
Terms of service: 2 years (university students, 1 year).
Reserves: conscript force; exists, no details.

ARMY: 13,000.
2 armd bdes.
2 mech inf bdes.
1 SSM bn.
Equipment:
Tks: 90 Vickers Mk 1, 10 *Centurion*, 160 *Chieftain*.
AFV: recce: 100 *Saladin*, 60 *Ferret*.
APC: 200 M-113, 100 *Saracen*.
Arty: guns: 155mm: 40 AMX Mk F-3 SP.
how: 18 M-109A2 SP. **SSM**: 4 *FROG-7*.
Mor: 81mm.
ATGW: *HOT*, BGM-71A *TOW/Improved TOW* (incl 56 M-901 SP), *Vigilant*.
SAM: SA-6, SA-7, SA-8 *Gecko*.
(On order: *Scorpion* lt tks, some 4,000 *Improved TOW*, SA-7, SA-8 SAM.)

NAVY (administered by Ministry of the Interior): 1,100.
Base: Kuwait City.
FAC(G): 8 all with 4 MM-40 *Exocet* SSM:
6 Lürssen TNC-45.
2 Lürssen FPB-57.
Patrol craft, coastal: some 50 (15 armed).
Amph: **LCM**: 4 *Loadmaster*; **LCU**: 6.
Spt ships: 3 320-ton.
Marine cdos: c 50.
(On order: 20 *Sofan* patrol craft; 6 SRN-6 hovercraft; SA-365N *Dauphin* II hel; *Exocet* MM-40 SSM.)

AIR FORCE: 2,000 (excl foreign personnel); 80 combat ac, 23 armed hel.
FGA: 2 sqns with 30 A-4KU, 4 TA-4KU *Skyhawk*.
Interceptor: 1 sqn with 32 *Mirage* F-1CK, 2 F-1BK.
COIN/trg: 1 sqn with 12 *Hawk*.
Tpt: 2 DC-9, 4 L-100-30; used also in civil role.
Hel: 3 sqns:
attack: 23 SA-342K *Gazelle*;
tpt: 12 SA-330 *Puma*, 5 AS-332 *Super Puma*.
Trg: incl 9 BAC-167 *Strikemaster*.
AD: 1 bn (4 btys) with 8 twin *Improved HAWK* SAM.
AAM: R-550 *Magic*, Super R-530, AIM-9 *Sidewinder*.
ASM: AS-11/-12.
(Store: 12 *Lightning*, 9 *Hunter*.)
(On order: 6 AS-332F *Super Puma* hel; 12 AM-39 *Exocet* ASM; AD radar and command system.)

PARA-MILITARY:
National Guard: Palace, Border Guard, 20 V-150, 62 V-300 *Commando* APC.

* Excl capital expenditure.

LEBANON

Given the continuing conflict, the development of at least two economies, the political impotence of the Presidency and the National Assembly, and the existence of several armed forces, it is at present impossible to provide macro-economic and population data. However, the Government reported a defence budget of some $100 m for 1986, while admitting a defence debt of about $1 bn (for 1984–5) to the US and France.

There are no longer any truly 'national' forces. Even the respective sectarian militia forces vary in their degrees of cohesion. They all have small active cadres, rapidly expanded by mobilizing reserves. Much of the equipment of the former national forces is held by these groups; some is stored unserviceable. The militias have their own sources of supply, and it is not possible to determine types and quantities accurately.

CHRISTIAN:

ARMY: some 15,000.
5 nominal brigades.
Equipment:
Tks: some 90 M-48 A1/A5, **lt**: 50 AMX-13 (35 with 75mm, 15 with 105mm guns).
AFV: **recce**: 80 *Saladin*, 20 *Ferret*;
APC: 300 M-113, *Saracen*, 20 VAB-VTT.
Arty: **guns**: 130mm: M-46;
how: 105mm: 15 M-101A1;
122mm: 18 M-102, M-1938/D-30;
155mm: 36 M-50, M-114, M-198.
Mor: 200 81mm; 120mm.
ATK: **RL**: 85mm: RPG-7; 89mm: M-65;
RCL: 106mm;
ATGW: *ENTAC*, *Milan*, BGM-71A *TOW*.
AD: **guns**: 20mm; 23mm: ZU-23; 30mm: towed; 40mm: M-42 SP.

NAVY: some 500.
Base: Juniye.
Patrol craft: **coastal**: 1 Esterel FV 38-m, 3 *Byblos* 20-m.
Landing craft: 2 Fr EDIC 670-ton.

AIR FORCE:
1 operational base (Juniye–Jubayl highway strip).
Equipment (?operational):
Ftrs: 7 *Hunter* F-70 (5 operational).
Hel: 1 sqn:
attack: 8 SA-342 *Gazelle* with SS-11/-12 ASM;
tpt: **(med)**: 7 AB-212, 12 SA-330 *Puma*;
(lt): 9 SA-315/-316 *Alouette* II/III.
Trg: 5 *Bulldog*, 3 CM-170 *Magister*.
Tpt: 1 *Dove*, 1 *Turbo-Commander* 690B.

PARA-MILITARY:
Ministry of the Interior:
Internal Security Force 8,000 (largely ineffective: law courts closed); 30 *Chaimite* APC.
Customs: 1 *Tracker*, 5 *Azter* patrol craft.

MILITIAS:

Lebanese Forces Militia (*Kata'eb* – Phalange): 5,000 active, 30,000 reservists.
Equipment:
Tks: some 100 T-34, T-55, M-48, M-4A/E-4, **lt**: some 20 AMX-13 tks.
APC: M-113.
Arty: some 100: 105mm, 122mm, 130mm, 155mm.
Mor: 60mm, 81mm, 120mm.
ATK: RPG-7.
AD: 12.7mm, 14.5mm, 23mm guns.
Patrol boats: 1 *Tracker*, 2 *Dvora*.

Guardians of the Cedars: (Right-wing): ?300.

Marada Brigades (Zehorta Liberation Army) (pro-Syrian): 400 active, 600–1,000 reservists.

South Lebanon Army (SLA; Israeli-backed): 75% Maronite, 25% Shi'ite: (varies; perhaps 1,200 active, 1,500 militia).
Equipment:
Tks: 40 M-4, 30 T-54.
Arty: 122mm: M-1938; 130mm: M-46; 150mm: Fr; 155mm: M-198.

DRUZE:

1 nominal army bde.

MILITIA:

Progressive Socialist Party (Jumblatt): c 5,000 active; perhaps 7,000 reservists.
Equipment:
Tks: 50 T-34, T-54/-55.
APC: BTR-60/-152.
Arty: 122mm, 130mm. **MRL**.
Mor: 82mm.
Patrol craft: 18 small.

SUNNI:

2 nominal army bdes.

MILITIAS:

Al-Mourabitoun (independent Nasserites; underground): c 400.

October 24 Movement (secular; pro-Syria).

Islamic Unification Movement (*Taweed*; Tripoli): c 1,000; some arty and mor, small arms incl ATK.

Jundullah ('soldiers of God'; PLO-financed; *Taweed* ally): (?few hundred).

Popular Liberation Army (pro-Palestinian; Sidon).

SHI'A:

2 nominal army bdes.

MILITIAS:

Amal (orthodox pro-Syria; Berri): c 5,000 active; some 10,000 reservists.
Equipment:
Tks: M-48, 50 T-54/5.
AFV: **recce**: *Saladin*, **APC**: VAB, BTR, M-113.
Arty: **guns**: 130mm, **how**: 105mm, 122mm, 155mm, **MRL**: 107mm, 122mm.
ATK: **guns**: 85mm, 100mm, **ATGW**: AT-3 *Sagger*.
AD: **guns**: 23mm ZU-23, **SAM**: SA-7.

Al Amal al Islam (Islamic Amal; break-away faction, links with Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps): 600.
Equipment incl
Arty: 130mm, **mor**.
ATK: **RL**: RPG-7.
AD: **guns**: 20mm ZPU-2.

Hizbollah ('The Party of God'; fundamentalist, pro-Iranian): c 3,500.
Equipment incl:
AFV, arty, RL, RCL, ATGW, AA guns.

Islamic Resistance Movement: c 400.

Islamic Jihad (*Imad Mugniyah*): elms function under many names, often chosen for particular op.
Equipment:
ATK: **RL**: *Grad* (single launchers of BM-21 122mm).
ATGW: AT-3 *Sagger*.

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO):

(Strength: est active – militias perhaps three times strengths shown).
al-Fatah (Arafat): 1,500.
Fatah dissidents (Abu Musa): 1,200.
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP; Hawatmeh; pro-Soviet): 600.
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP; Habash): 900.
PFLP (General Command) (PFLP (GC); Jibril): 500.
Popular Struggle Front (PSF): 100.
Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF): 100.
as-Saiqa (pro-Syria): 600.
Palestine Communist Party: 100.

OTHER:

Lebanese Arab Army (Lebanese Army deserters; pro-Syrian): c 300, numbers decreasing.

Lebanese National Resistance Front (umbrella for anti-Israeli forces in South Lebanon).

LIBYA

GDP	1985c: D 6.70 bn ($22.64 bn)	
	1986c: D 5.90 bn ($18.80 bn)	
growth	1985: –11.0%	1986: –12.0%
Inflation	1985: 13.0%	1986: 15.0%
Debt*	1985c: $4.0 bn	1986c: $5.0 bn
Def bdgt	1986c: D 442.00 m ($1.41 bn)	
	1987c: D 380.00 m ($1.29 bn)	
$1 = D	(1985): 0.2960	(1986): 0.3139
	(1987): 0.2939	

D = dinar

Population: 3,800,000

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	485,000	415,000
Women:	400,000	282,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 76,500.
Terms of service: selective conscription, term varies – 3 to 4 years.
Reserves: People's Militia, some 40,000.

ARMY: 60,000.
1 tk div (2 tk, 1 mech bde, 1 arty regt).
2 mech inf divs (each 2 mech, 1 tk bde, 1 arty regt).
30 tk bns.
50 mech inf bns.
1 National Guard bde.
41 arty, 2 AA arty bns.
14 para/cdo bns.
6 SSM bdes.
3 SAM bdes.
Equipment:†
Tks: 2,100 T-54/-55/-62, 180 T-72.
AFV: recce: 280 BRDM-2, 180 EE-9 *Cascavel*.
MICV: 800 BMP. **APC:** 700 BTR-50/-60, OT-62/-64, 100 EE-11 *Urutu*, Fiat 6614.
Arty: some 1,300:
guns: 122mm: 60 D-74;
130mm: 350 M-46.
how: 105mm: some 60 M-101;
122mm: 330 D-30 towed, 126 M-1974 SP;
152mm: 48 M-1973, *DANA* SP;
155mm: 190 *Palmaria*, 18 M-109 SP.
MRL: some 600: 107mm: Type 63;
122mm: BM-21/RM-70; 130mm: 36 M-51.
SSM: 48 *FROG-7*, 80 *Scud B*.
Mor: 450: 81mm, 120mm, 160mm, 240mm.
ATK: RCL: 200 106mm. **ATGW:** 3,000: *Vigilant*, *Milan*, AT-3 *Sagger* (incl BRDM SP).
AD: guns: 600: 23mm: ZSU-23-2, ZSU-23-4 SP, 30mm: M-53/59 SP; 40mm: L/70;
57mm: S-60.
SAM: SA-7, 32 quad *Crotale*.
(On order: Fiat 6616 recce, *ASTROS* II, SS-40 MRL.)

NAVY: 6,500.
Bases: Tarabulus, Benghazi, Darnah, Tubruq, Ras Hilal, Al Khums.
Subs: 6 Sov F-class;
2 R-2 *Malá* 2-man diver vessels.
Frigates: 2:
1 Vosper Mk 7 with 4 *Otomat* SSM, 4 *Albatros/Aspide* SAM;
1 *Koni* with 4 SS-N-2C SSM, 1 SA-N-4 SAM.
Corvettes: 7:
4 *Assad* with 4 *Otomat* SSM.
3 Sov *Nanuchka* II with 2 × 2 SS-N-2C SSM, 1 × 2 SA-N-4 SAM.
FAC(G): 24:
9 *Sharara* (*La Combattante* II) with 4 *Otomat* SSM;
12 Sov *Osa*-II with 4 SS-N-2C SSM;
3 *Susa* with 8 SS-12M SSM.
Patrol craft, large: 7: 4 *Garian*, 3 100-ft *Benina*;
coastal: 1 Thorneycroft 78-ft.
MCMV: 8 Sov *Natya* ocean.
Amph: LST: 2 PS-700; **LSM:** 3 *Polnocny*;
LCU: 2 C-107 57-m.
Drone craft: 50.
(On order: 1 *Koni* FFG, 13 SAR-33 large patrol craft.)

AIR FORCE: 10,000;
some 544 combat ac, 52 armed hel.†
Bbrs: 1 sqn with 6 Tu-22.
Interceptors: 3 sqns and 1 OCU:
some 26 *Mirage* F-1ED, 4 F-1BD, 131 MiG-23 *Flogger* E, 49 MiG-25 *Foxbat* A, 49 MiG-21, 12 MiG-25U.
FGA: 5 sqns and 1 OCU:
45 *Mirage* 5D/DE, 13 5DD, 14 *Mirage* F-1AD, 44 MiG-23BM *Flogger* F, 14 MiG-23U, some 90 Su-20/-22 *Fitter* E/F/J.
COIN: 1 sqn with 30 J-1 *Jastreb*.
Recce: 1 sqn with 5 *Mirage* 5DR, 10 MiG-25.
Tpt: 2 sqns:
18 An-26 *Curl*, 13 Lockheed (8 C-130H, 3 L-100, 2 L-100-30), 2 Boeing 707, 20 G-222, 2 *Mystère-Falcon*-20, 2 C-140 *Jetstar*, 2 CL-44, 19 Il-76 *Candid*, 1 *Corvette* 200, 2 *King Air*, 5 F-27-600, 18 L-410.
Hel: 9 sqns:
attack: 2 with 27 Mi-24 *Hind*;
ASW: 2 with 25 Mi-14 *Haze*;
SAR: 1 with 7 SA-321 *Super Frelon*.
tpt: (hy): 1 with 19 CH-47C *Chinook*;
(med): 1 with Mi-8, 2 AB-212;
(lt): 1 with 5 AB-206, 1 with 11 SA-316B *Alouette* III, 9 AB-47.
Trg: 4 sqns:
2 with 61 G-2 *Galeb* ac;
2 with 20 Mi-2 (*Hoplite*) hel;

2 Tu-22 *Blinder* D, 85 L-39ZO, 12 CM-170 *Magister*, 133 SF-260WL.
AAM: AA-2 *Atoll*, AA-6 *Acrid*, AA-7 *Apex*, AA-8 *Aphid*, R-550 *Magic*.
ASM: *Swatter* ATGW (hel-borne).
AD Comd: ε 13,000.
'Senezh' AD comd and control system.
3 SA-5A bdes: each 2 bns of 6 launchers, some 4 AA gun bns; radar coys, 2 AD schools.
3 Regional Sections: 2 bdes each 18 SA-2, 2–3 bdes each 12 twin SA-3, 73 bdes each 20/24 SA-6/-8.
(On order: MiG-25, MiG-23 ftrs; 25 EMB-121 *Xingu* tpt, 50 SF-260M trg ac; SA-342 *Gazelle*, 2 A-109 hel; Super 530 AAM.)

Forces Abroad:
Chad: ε 2,000; 2 mech bns, 2 tk bns: T-55 tks, BMP-1 MICV, MRL, AD guns, SAM, 5 SF-260W ac, 3 Mi-24 *Hind* hel.
Sudan: 700–1,000 reported.

PARA-MILITARY:
Liwa Haris Al-Jamahiriya (Revolution Guard Corps).
Egpt: **MBT:** T-54/-55/-62. **AFV:** armd cars. **APC:** **arty:** MRL. **AD:** ZSU-23-4, SA-8 (Army inventory).
Islamic Pan-African Legion, some 2,500; 1 armd, 1 inf, 1 para/cdo bdes.
Egpt: **MBT:** some 75 T-54/-55. **MICV:** EE-9. **APC:** BTR-50/-60 (Army inventory).
Muslim Youth.
People's Cavalry Force; parade unit.
Customs/Coastguard (Naval control).
Egpt: 12 SAR-33 Lürssen-type FAC; 3 *Benina*, 3 *Jihad* patrol craft.

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* Excl ε $5.0 bn military and commercial debt to the USSR.
† Much egpt, incl 1,200 MBT, 450 combat ac (Tu-22, MiG-21/-23/-25, Su-22) in storage. Syrian pilots also reportedly fly Libyan ac, while some Soviet, Korean and Pakistani personnel act as instructors. Some 2,000 Soviet personnel reportedly man the SA-5 complexes. Expatriates form a large proportion of the technical support staff.

MAURITANIA

GDP	1984: OM 44.500 bn ($697.46 m)	
	1985c: OM 55.04 bn ($714.00 m)	
growth	1984c: 0.4%	1985: 3.0%
Inflation	1985: 12.0%	1986: 7.0%
Debt	1985: $1.5 bn	1986: $1.6 bn
$1 = OM	(1984): 63.803	(1985): 77.085

OM = ouguiyas

Population: 1,942,000

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	181,000	129,000
Women:	186,000	136,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 14,870.
Terms of service: voluntary; conscription (2 years) authorized.

ARMY: 14,400.
2 inf bns.
1 arty bn.
1 Camel Corps.
3 armd recce sqns.
2 AA btys.
1 engr coy.
1 para coy.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 15 EBR-75 hy, 39 AML-60, 14 -90, 12 M-3A1. **APC:** 40 M-3 half-track.
Mor: 81mm; 120mm: 8.
ATK: RCL: 57mm: M-18; 75mm: M-20; 106mm: M-40.
AD: guns: 14.5mm; 23mm: ZU-23-2; 37mm: 6 M-1939. **SAM:** SA-7.

NAVY: 320.
Bases: Port Etienne (Nouadhibou).
Patrol craft: 9: 1 Fr *Patra*-class; 3 Sp *Barcelo*; 4 Fr Esterel((2 32-m, 2 18-m), 1 launch(.

AIR FORCE: 150;
13 combat ac, no armed hel.
COIN: 6 BN-2 *Defender*, 5 Cessna 337 (2 armed, 3 forward air control).
MR: 2 *Cheyenne* II.
Tpt: 1 DHC-5D *Buffalo*, 1 *Caravelle*, 2 *Skyvan* 3M, 2 BN-2 *Islander*, 1 *Broussard*, 1 AL-60.
Hel: 4 Hughes 500 tpt.

Forces Abroad: Mozambique elms 1 bn reported.

PARA-MILITARY: 6,400.
Gendarmerie 2,500; 6 regional coys (Defence Ministry).
National Guard 2,800.
Border Guard 100.
Auxiliaries 1,000 (Interior Ministry).

MOROCCO

GDP	1985: D 122.00 bn ($12.12 bn)	
	1986: D 137.60 bn ($15.11 bn)	
growth	1985: 4.3%	1986: 6.2%
Inflation	1985: 1.0%	1986: 1.0%

Debt	1985:	$14.1 bn	1986: $16.0 bn
Def bdgt	1986:	D 6.84 bn ($750.99 m)	
	1987:	D 7.19 bn ($848.61 m)	
FMA	1985:	$77.0 m	1986: $74.4 m
$1 = D	(1985):	10.0620	(1986): 9.1040
	(1987):	8.4750	

D = dirham

Population: 23,362,000

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	2,943,000	1,595,000
Women:	2,945,000	1,684,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 203,500 incl *Gendarmerie*.
Terms of service: conscription 18 months authorized; most enlisted personnel are volunteers.
Reserves: obligation, details unknown.

ARMY: 170,000.
2 mech inf bdes.
1 mot inf bde.
1 lt security bde.
1 para bde.
4 mech inf regts.
4 mot inf regts.
Independent units:

9 arty gps.	1 cav bn.
1 AA gp.	1 mountain bn.
7 armd sqn gps.	3 sigs bns.
29 inf bns.	10 engr bns.
3 camel corps bns.	9 log spt gps/bns.

Equipment:
Tks: 110 M-48A5. **lt:** 110 AMX-13.
AFV: recce: some 325: 20 EBR-75, some 60 AMX-10RC, 175 AML-90, 30 AML-60-7, 40 *Eland* 90mm.
APC: some 850: 390 M-113, some 300 VAB (270 -VTT/VCI, 20 with 120mm mor, 30 other mods), 70 UR-416, 30 *Ratel*-20, 30 -90, 20 M-3; some 45 OT-62/-64 may be operational.
Arty: guns: 151: 85mm: 30 D-44;
105mm: 36 lt (L-118) SP;
130mm: 15 M-46;
155mm: 70 AMX-F-3 SP.
how: 170: 105mm: 40 M-101 towed, 35 HM2 (Fr M-101A1);
155mm: 35 M-114 towed, 60 M-109 SP.
MRL: 122mm: 25 BM-21.
Mor: 1,690: 60mm: 595; 81mm: 625; 82mm: 70; 120mm: 400.
ATK: RL: 66mm: *LAW*; 88mm: M-20 3.5-in., *STRIM*-89.
RCL: 370: 75mm: 200 M-20; 90mm: 30 M-67; 106mm: 340 M-40.
guns: 90mm: 25 M-56; 100mm: 10 SU-100 SP; 105mm: 110 Steyr SK-105 *Kuerassier* SP.
ATGW: M-47 *Dragon*, *Milan*, BGM-71A *TOW*.
AD: guns: 14.5mm: 180 ZPU-2, 20 ZPU-4; 20mm: 70 towed, 55 M-163 *Vulcan* SP; 23mm: 105 ZU-23-2; 37mm: 25 M-38/-39; 100mm: 15 KS-19 towed.
SAM: SA-7, 35 M-730 *Chaparral*.

NAVY: 7,000 incl 1,500 naval infantry.
Bases: Casablanca, Safi, Agadir, Al Hoceima, Dakhla.
Frigate: 1 *Descubierta* with 4 MM-38 *Exocet* SSM, 1 × 8 *Albatros/Aspide* SAM.
FAC(G): 4 *Lazaga* with 4 MM-38 *Exocet*.
FAC: 2 PR-72.
Patrol craft, large: 4: 1 *Sirius* ex-MCMV, 2 CMN (1 174-ft, 1 133-ft), 1 Esterel 104-ft;
coastal: 11: 6 P-32, 2 *Arcoz* 31, 3 *Ifni*.
Amph: 4: **LSM:** 3 *Batral*; **LCU:** 1 *EDIC*-type.
1 naval inf bn.
(On order: 6 *Lazaga*, 2 *Osprey* patrol boats.)

AIR FORCE: 15,000;
117 combat ac, 24 armed hel.
FGA/recce: 4 sqns:
2 with 21 *Mirage* F-1C, 17 F-1E;
2 with 28 F-5 (5 A, 14 E, 3 B, 4 F, 1 RF-5A).
COIN/recce: 1 sqn with 5 OV-10 *Bronco*.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 17 C-130H *Hercules*,
3 KC-130H, 1 *Gulfstream*, 4 *King Air*,
3 Do-28D.
Hel: attack: 24 SA-342 *Gazelle*.
tpt: (hy): 8 CH-47 *Chinook*; **(med):** 29 SA-330 *Puma*, 30 AB-205A; **(lt):** 16 AB-206, 4 AB-212.
Trg: 23 *Alphajet*, 24 CM-170 *Magister*, 10 T-34C, 9 AS-202/18A *Bravo*.
AAM: AIM-9J *Sidewinder*, R-530, R-550 *Magic*.
(On order: 20 IA-58 *Pucara* COIN, 25 *Gepal* Mk IV trg ac; 381 AGM-65 *Maverick* ASM.)

ROYAL GUARD: 1,500.
1 Royal Guard bn.
1 Royal Guard cav sqn.

DEPLOYMENT: South West Sahara: some 100,000.

Forces Abroad:
Equatorial Guinea: 300.

PARA-MILITARY: 35,000.
Gendarmerie Royale: 10,000;
1 bde, 2 mobile gps; coastguard unit; air sqn.
Equip: armd cars, 7 fast patrol boats; 2 *Rallye* ac; 8 SA-315/-316 *Alouette* II/III, 6 *Gazelle*, 6 *Puma* hel.

Force Auxiliaire: 25,000 incl Mobile Intervention Corps (5,000).

OPPOSITION:
Polisario: Military Wing: Saharoui People's Liberation Army: 15,000 (perhaps 4,000 active) org in bns, spt elms.
Eqpt: T-55 tks; BMP-1, 20–30 EE-9 *Cascavel* MICV; M-1931/37 122mm how; BM-21 122mm MRL; 120mm, 160mm mor; AT-4 *Spigot* ATGW; ZSU-23-2 23mm SP AA guns; SA-6/-7 SAM.
(Captured Moroccan eqpt incl AML-90, *Eland* AFV, *Ratel*-20, Panhard APC, Steyr SK-105 105mm SP ATK guns.)

OMAN

GDP	1985:	R 3.57 bn ($10.35 bn)	
	1986:	R 2.34 bn ($6.10 bn)	
growth	1985:	2.0%	1986: −33.0%
Inflation	1984:	0%	1985: −1.1%
Debt	1985e:	$2 bn	1986e: $3 bn
Def bdgt	1986:	R 601.00 m ($1.56 bn)	
	1987e:	R 580.00 m ($1.51 bn)	
FMA	see note*		
$1 = R	(1985):	0.3454	(1986/7): 0.3845

R = rial

Population: 1,330,000

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	145,000	125,000
Women:	125,000	87,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 21,500 (excl Royal Household tps, but incl some 3,700 foreign personnel).
Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: National Volunteer Reserve Force (Army): 1,000; obligation to age 35–45.

ARMY: 16,500.
2 bde HQ.
1 armd regt (2 tk sqns, 1 SP arty bty).
3 arty regts (2 lt, 1 med), 1 lt AA bty.
1 recce regt (2 armd car sqns).
8 inf "regts" (bns).
1 sigs regt.
1 fd engr regt (2 sqns).
1 para regt.
Equipment:
Tks: 6 M-60A1, 33 *Qayid al-Ardh* (*Chieftain*).
lt: 30 *Scorpion*, 6 VBC-90.
AFV: MICV (VAB): 2 VCAC with *Milan*, 2 VD (AD; 20mm), 2 PC.
APC: 6 VAB VCI, 15 AT-105 *Saxon*.
Arty: 93: **guns:** 105mm: 39 ROF lt;
130mm: 12 M-1946.
gun/how: 88mm: 18 25-pdr.
how: 155mm: 12 FH-70, 12 M-109A2 SP.
Mor: 60mm; 81mm: L-16; 107mm: 12 M-30 4.2-in.; 120mm: 12.
ATGW: 10 BGM-71A *TOW*, *Milan*.
AD: guns: 16: 23mm: 4 ZU-23-2;
40mm: 12 *Bofors* L/60. **SAM:** *Blowpipe*.

NAVY: 2,000.
Bases: Muscat, Raysut, Ghanam (Goat) Island, Wadam Alwi.
FAC(G): 3 *Province* with *Exocet* SSM: 2 with 2 × 4, 1 with 2 × 3 MM-40.
FAC: 4 *Al Wafi*.
Patrol craft, inshore: 4 60-ton.
Amph: LST: 2 (1 comd); **LCM:** 3; **LCU:** 2.
Trg ship: 1.
(On order: 1 *Province* FAC(G).)

AIR FORCE: 3,000;
53 combat ac, no armed hel.
FGA: 2 sqns with 20 *Jaguar* S(O) Mk 1, 4 T-2.
FGA/recce: 1 sqn with 12 *Hunter* FGA-73, 4 T-7.
COIN/trg: 1 sqn with 13 BAC-167 *Strikemaster* Mk 82.
Tpt: 3 sqns:
1 with 3 BAC-111, 1 *Mystère-Falcon* 20;
2 with 7 BN-2 *Defender/Islander*, 15 *Skyvan* 3M, 3 C-130H *Hercules*.
Hel: 2 sqns:
tpt: (med): 20 AB-205, 4 AB-212, 2 AS-332 *Super Puma*, 5 AB-214B. **(lt):** 3 AB-206.
AD: 2 sqns with 28 *Rapier* SAM.
AAM: AIM-9 *Sidewinder*, R-550 *Magic*.
(On order: 8 *Tornado* ftr; 1 C-130H, 2 DHC-5D *Buffalo* tpts; 6 Bell 214ST hel; 300 AIM-9P *Sidewinder* AAM; 2 S-713 (3-D radar) systems, 28 *Blindfire* radars.)

ROYAL HOUSEHOLD:
1 Royal Guard bde.
1 special force regt.
Royal Yacht: 1.
Royal flt: 1 *Gulfstream*, 1 DC-8, 1 VC-10 tpts; 2 AS-202 *Bravo*.

PARA-MILITARY:
Tribal Home Guard (*Firqat*): 5,000.
Police Coastguard: 15 AT-105 APC, 11 coastal, 3 inshore patrol, 13 spt craft, 28 speedboats.
Air Wing: 1 Gates *Learjet*, 2 Do-228-100, 2 *Merlin* IVA, 2 DHC-5 *Buffalo* ac, 5 AB-205, 3 AB-206 hel.
Musandam Security Force (Shikuk Tribal Militia): 85.

* $1.8 bn military subsidy from GCC between 1984 and 1991.

QATAR

GDP 1985: R 19.65 bn ($5.40 bn)
1986: R 16.70 bn ($4.59 bn)
growth 1985: –10.0% 1986: –15.0%
Inflation 1985: 1.1% 1986: –1.0%
Def bdgt 1983/4: R 604.00 bn ($165.94 bn)
$1 = R (1983/4/5/6): 3.6399
R = rial

Population: 310,000 incl expatriates (indigenous population c 85,000)

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 7,000.
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 6,000.
1 Royal Guard regt.
1 tk bn.
5 inf bns.
1 arty bty.
1 SAM bty with *Rapier*.
Equipment:
Tks: 24 AMX-30.
AFV: recce: 10 *Ferret*. **MICV:** 30 AMX-10P.
APC: 25 *Saracen*, 136 VAB, 8 *Commando* Mk 3.
Arty: gun/how: 88mm: 8 25-pdr.
how: 155mm: 6 Mk F-3 SP.
Mor: 81mm.
ATK: RCL: 84mm: *Carl Gustav*.
ATGW: *Milan*.
AD: SAM: 18 *Rapier*, *Blowpipe*.

NAVY: 700 incl Marine Police.
Base: Doha.
FAC(G): 3 *La Combattante* IIIB with 8 MM-40 *Exocet* SSM.
Patrol craft, large: 6 Vosper Thornycroft 120-ton; **coastal:** 43(: 2 75-ft, 4 *Tracker*, 2 13-ton, 7 P-1200-type, 25 *Spear*, 2 *Interceptor* (SAR), other.
Coast defence: 3 MM-40 *Exocet*.

AIR FORCE: 300;
23 combat ac, 3 armed hel.
FGA: 14 *Mirage* F-1 (12 -E, 2 -B), 2 *Hunter* FGA-78, 1 T-79, 6 *AlphaJet*.
Tpt: 1 BN-2 *Islander*, 1 Boeing 727, 2 707.
Hel: 3 SA-342 *Gazelle*, 17 Westland (2 *Whirlwind*, 3 *Commando* Mk 2A, 1 Mk 2C, 8 Mk 3, 3 *Lynx*), 6 AS-332 *Super Puma*).
SAM: 5 *Tigercat*.

PARA-MILITARY: Police: 3 *Lynx*, 2 *Gazelle* hel.

SAUDI ARABIA

GDP 1985: R 339.22 bn ($93.65 bn)
1986: R 305.30 bn ($82.44 bn)
growth 1985: –7.0% 1986: –9.0%
Inflation 1985: –1.0% 1986: –3.0%
Def bdgt 1986: R 64.09 bn ($17.30 bn)
1987: R 60.80 bn ($16.23 bn)
$1 = R (1985): 3.6221 (1986): 3.7033
(1987): 3.7450
R = rial

Population: 11,500,000*

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	1,458,000	1,415,000
Women:	1,430,000	813,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 73,500+ (incl 10,000 National Guard).
Terms of service: voluntary; conscription, males aged 18–35, authorized.

ARMY: 45,000.
2 armd bdes.
4 mech bdes.
1 inf bde.
1 AB bde (2 para bns, 3 special forces coys).
1 Royal Guard regt (3 bns).
5 arty bns.
18 AA arty btys.
33 SAM btys:
16 with 128 *Improved HAWK* (each 3 msls);
17 with 68 *Shahine* (*Crotale*) fire units (each 6 msls) and AMX-30SA 30mm SP AA guns plus 73 fire units (each 6 msls) as static defence.
Equipment:
Tks: 550; 300 AMX-30, 150 M-60A1 (converting to A3), 100 M-60A3.
AFV: recce: 200 AML-60/-90. **MICV:** 350 AMX-10P. **APC:** 800 M-113 (incl *TOW*/APC/comd/spt variants), 30 EE-11 *Urutu*, 130 Panhard M-3.
Arty: 505: **how:** 105mm: some 24 Model 56 pack, 100 M-101/-102;
155mm: 72 FH-70, 34 M-198 towed, 224 M-109, 51 GCT SP.
MRL: 127mm: some *ASTROS II*.
Mor: 81mm: 200; 107mm: 360 M-30 4.2-in.
ATK: RCL: 75mm, 90mm, 106mm.
ATGW: BGM-71A *TOW* (incl 200 VCC-1 SP), M-47 *Dragon*, *HOT* (incl AMX-10P SP).
AD: guns: 40mm: M-42 SP; 90mm: 15 M-117.
SAM: FIM-92A *Stinger*, 500 FIM-43 *Redeye*, *Shahine*, MIM-23B *Improved Hawk*.
(On order: 60 AMX-10P; EE-11 *Urutu* APC; 8 M-198; some 400 JPz SK-105 SP ATK guns; *ASTROS II* MRL; *TOW* ATGW.

NAVY: 3,500;
20 armed hel.
Bases: **Western Fleet:** Jiddah (HQ), Al Wajh, Yanbu. **Eastern Fleet:** Jabayl (HQ), Al Qatif, Ras Tanura, Al Dammam, Ras al Mishab.
2 Fleet HQ.
Frigates (FFG): 4 F-2000S with 8 *Otomat*-2 SSM, 1 *Crotale* SAM, 1 AS-365 hel.
Corvettes (FLG): 4 PCG-1 with 2 × 4 RGM-84A *Harpoon* SSM.
FAC(G): 9 PGG-1 with 2 × 2 *Harpoon* SSM.
FAC(T): 3 *Jaguar* (Lürssen).
Patrol craft, large: 1 (100 tons); **coastal:** 45(.
MCMV: 4 MSC-322 coastal.
Amph: LST: 3; **LCU:** 4 US Type-1610; **LCM:** 8 US Type-6; **LCVP:** 4.
Spt: 2 *Durance* log spt ships; 2 Royal Yachts.
Hel: 24 AS-365N *Dauphin* 2 (4 SAR, 20 with AS-15TT ASM).

MARINES: (1,500).
1 naval inf regt.
Eqpt: **MICV:** 140 BMR-600P.

(On order: 2 *Atlantic* II MR ac; 100 *Harpoon*, *Otomat* coast defence SSM; AS-15TT ASM.)

AIR FORCE: 15,000;
226 combat ac, no armed hel.
FGA: 3 sqns with 60 F-5E.
10 *Tornado* (being delivered).
Interceptor: 3 sqns (1 forming) with 45 F-15C.
Recce: 1 sqn with 10 RF-5E.
AEW: 1 sqn with 4 E-3A (more being delivered).
Tkr: 1 sqn with 2 KE-3A (more being delivered).
OCU: 2 with 20 F-5F, 15 F-5B, 17 F-15D.
Tpt: 3 sqns: 35 C-130E/H *Hercules*, 8 KC-130H, 2 VC-130H, 9 L-100-30HS (hospital ac), 2 CN-235, 35 C-212, 2 C-140 *Jetstar*.
Hel: 2 sqns: 15 AB-206B, 15 AB-205, 15 AB-212, 15 KV-107, 5 *Sea King*.
Trg: 39 BAC-167 *Strikemaster* Mk 80, 14 PC-9 (replacing Cessna 172), 6 *Tornado* IDS.
AAM: AIM-9J/L/P *Sidewinder*, AIM-7F *Sparrow*.
ASM: *Maverick*.
(On order: 56 *Tornado* (32 IDS FGA, 24 ADV fts); 1 Boeing 747, 10 CN-235, 5 C-212-200 tpts; 6 Boeing KE-3A (707-320C), 2 *Jetstream* 31, 30 *Hawk*, 16 PC-9 trg; 22 AB-212 hel; 1,000 AIM-7F *Sparrow*, 3,000 AIM-9L/P *Sidewinder* AAM; 400 *Maverick* ASM.)

AIR DEFENCE FORCES: Strength unknown:
A separate force, of equal standing with the Army and Air Force. Provides fixed and mobile point defence of key targets throughout the Kingdom.

Equipment:
AD: guns: 20mm: 100 M-163 *Vulcan*;
30mm: AMX-30SA; 35mm: 180.
SAM: 60 *Shahine*, 70 MIM-23B *Improved HAWK*.

PARA-MILITARY:
National Guard c 50,000 (10,000 active, c 15,000 reserve; c 25,000 tribal levies):
Bde HQ:
8 all-arms, 16 active, 24 irregular inf bns.
1 ceremonial cav sqn.
spt units.
Equipment:
APC: 240 V-150 *Commando*.
Arty: how: 105mm: 50 M-102. **mor:** 81mm.
ATK: RCL: 106mm. **ATGW:** *TOW*.
AD: guns: 20mm: 30 M-40 *Vulcan*.
(On order: 489 *Commando* incl V-300 APC, V-150 SP 20mm AA guns, SP *TOW*, 90mm armed AFV.)

Foreign contract military personnel: some 10,000 (1 bde).

Ministry of Interior:
Counter-terrorist unit; hel.
Frontier Force and Coastguard 8,500; 8 BH-7, 16 SR-N6 hovercraft, 132 coastal, 300 inshore patrol craft.

General Civil Defence Administration units; 10 Kawasaki hel.

* Total indigenous Saudi population c 6,900,000 in 1987; expatriates c 3,500,000 in 1985.

SOMALI REPUBLIC

GDP 1984c: S sh 27.60 bn ($1.379 bn)
1985c: S sh 39.47 bn ($1.00 bn)
growth 1985: 4.0%
Inflation 1985: 37.8% 1986: 41.0%
Debt 1984: $1.6 bn 1985: $2.0 bn
Def bdgt 1984: S sh 2.60 bn ($129.93 m)
Def exp 1985: S sh 5.30 bn ($134.22 m)
FMA 1985: $33.0 m 1986c: $19.1 m
$1 = S sh (1984): 20.019 (1985): 39.487
(1986): 72.000
S sh = Somali shillings

Population: 7,010,000

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	555,000	399,000
Women:	368,000	408,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 65,000.
Terms of service: conscription (males 18–40), 18 months selective.

ARMY: 61,300 (?30,000 conscripts).
4 'corps', 12 'div' HQ (formations in name only; below establishment in units, men and eqpt).
4 tk 'bdes' (bns).
45 mech and inf 'bdes' (bns).
4 cdo 'bdes' (bns).
1 SAM bde.
3 fd arty bdes.
30 fd, 1 AA arty bns.
Equipment:*
Tks: 30 *Centurion*, 123 M-47, 30 T-34, 110 T-54/-55, **lt:** 10 M-41.
AFV: recce: 30 BRDM-2, 15 AML-90.
APC: 64 BTR-40/-50/-60, 100 BTR-152, 310 Fiat 6614/6616; BMR-600 reported.
Arty: guns/how: 144+: 76mm: M-1942;
85mm: 60 D-44;
100mm: M-1944;
122mm: 84 M-1938.
how: 105mm; 155mm: 18 M-198.
Mor: 81mm: M-1941; 120mm: 50 M-1943.
ATK: RL: 300 *STRIM*-89. **RCL:** 106mm: M-40.
ATGW: 100 *Milan*, *TOW* on 22 M-113.
AD: guns: 23mm: ZU-23, 4 ZSU-23-4 SP;
37mm: M-1939/Type 63; 57mm: S-60;
100mm: 24 KS-19.
SAM: 40 SA-2, 10 SA-3, 20 SA-7.

NAVY:* 1,200.
Bases: Berbera, Mogadishu, Kismayu.
FAC(G): 2 *Osa*-II with 4 SS-N-2 SSM.
FAC(T): 4 *Mol*.
FAC: 2 *Cormoran*-class.
Patrol craft: 5 *Poluchat(*;
1 ex-Ethiopian Swiftship 105-ft reported.
Amph: LCT: 1 *Polnocny*; **LCM:** 4 T-4.
(On order: 1 105-ft patrol vessel).

AIR FORCE: 2,500;
71 combat ac, no armed hel.*
FGA: 3 sqns with 12 MiG-17, 8 *Hunter* (FGA-76, 1 T-77).
Ftr: 3 sqns with 8 MiG-21MF, 30 J-6.
COIN: 1 sqn with 5 SF-260W.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 4 BN-2 *Islander*, 3 An-24, 1 An-26, 4 Cl-222, 6 C-212 (2 VIP), 2 P-166-DL3 recce/tpt, 3 An-2.
Hel: 1 sqn with 10 Mil (6 Mi-4, 4 Mi-8), 5 Agusta-Bell (1-204, 4 -212 (2 VIP)).
Trg: incl 2 MiG-15UTI, 8 SF-260W, 2 Cessna 150, some Yak-11.
AAM: AA-2 *Atoll*.
(On order: S-211 COIN ac; 4 Agusta-Bell hel.)

PARA-MILITARY: 29,500.
Police 8,000; 2 Do-28, 2 Cessna (1 185, 1 150) ac.
Border Guards 1,500.
People's Militia 20,000.

OPPOSITION:
Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS) perhaps 1,200.
Somali National Movement (SNM).

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* Spares are short, particularly for Soviet eqpt, and much eqpt is unserviceable.

SUDAN*

GDP	1983/4c:	£S 7.61 bn ($6.82 bn)		
	1984/5c:	£S 10.40 bn ($8.00 bn)		
growth	1985:	−5.0%	1986:	−7.5%
Inflation	1985:	45.0%	1986:	38.0%
Debt	1985:	$10.5 bn	1986:	$13.0 bn
Def bdgt	1985/6:	£S 875.00 m ($350.00 m)		
	1986/7:	£S 1.10 bn ($440.00 m)†		
FMA	1985:	$14.0 m	1986:	$6.0 m
$1 = £S	(1983/4):	1.1164	(1984/5):	1.3000
	(1985/6/7):	2.5000		

Population: 23,500,000

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	2,700,000	2,300,000
Women:	2,635,000	2,450,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 58,500.
Terms of Service: voluntary; (conscription legislated, not implemented).

ARMY: 54,000 (incl AD).
10 Regional Commands.
1 armd div HQ.
1 Republican Guard bde.
2 armd bdes.
10 inf bdes.
1 para bde.
3 arty regts.
1 engr regt.
Air Defence (3,000):
2 AA arty bdes.
1 SAM bde (3 btys) with SA-2.
Equipment:*
Tks: 155 T-54/-55, 20 M-60A3.
lt: 60 Ch Type-62.
AFV: recce: 6 AML-90, 15 *Saladin*, 50 *Ferret*, BRDM-1/-2. **APC:** 40 BTR-50/-152, 30 OT-62/-64, 36 M-113, 100 *Walid*.
Arty: guns: 85mm: 12 D-44; 88mm: 40 25-pdr;
100mm: 20 M-1944; 122mm: Type-60;
130mm: 36 M-46 and Ch 59-1;
155mm: 11 Mk F-3.
how: 105mm: 18 M-101 pack;
122mm: 64 M-1938/Type-54/D-30.
MRL: 122mm: *Al Saqr*-30.
Mor: 81mm, 120mm: 100.
ATGW: *Swingfire*.

AD: guns: 20mm: M-167 towed, M-163 SP;
23mm: ZU-23-2; 37mm: 120 M-1939/Type-63; 40mm: 60 L/60;
85mm: KS-12; 100mm: KS-19 towed.
SAM: 20 SA-2, SA-7.

NAVY:‡ 1,500.
Base: Port Sudan.
Patrol craft, large: 7: 4 Yug PBR, 3 70-ton; **coastal:** 4 10-ton; **river:** (3 reported).
Amph: LCT: 2 Yug DTM-221.

AIR FORCE: 3,000;
43 combat ac, no armed hel.‡
FGA/interceptor: 1 sqn with some 8 MiG-21.
FGA: 1 sqn with 8 J-5 (MiG-17 type), 6 J-6 (MiG-19 type), 10 MiG-17.
COIN: 1 sqn with 3 BAC-167 *Strikemaster* (?operational).
MR: 2 C-212.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 4 C-130H *Hercules*, 4 C-212, 3 *Mystère-Falcon* 20/50, 1 DHC-5D *Buffalo*, 6 EMB-110P2 *Bandeirante*.
Hel: 1 sqn with 20 IAR/SA-330 *Puma*, 10 BO-105, 4 AB-212.
Trg: incl 3 *Jet Provost* Mk 55 (?operational), 3 MiG-15UTI, 2 MiG-21U, 2 JJ-5 (2-seat J-5), 2 JJ-6 (2-seat J-6).
AAM: AA-2 *Atoll*.
(On order: 6 J-6 ftr, 2 C-130 tpt ac; 6 AB-212 hel.)

PARA-MILITARY: 3,000:
National Guard 500; Border Guard 2,500.

OPPOSITION: Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA): ?20,000 org in bns; mainly small arms incl 60mm mor, 14.5mm AA, SA-7 SAM; arty reported; operating only in southern Sudan.

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* Due to the internal security problems and the economic situation it is difficult to arrive at an accurate economic and defence profile.
† Excl £S 450 m for internal security.
‡ Eqpt serviceability questionable.

SYRIA

GDP	1985:	£S 79.55 bn ($20.27 bn)		
	1986c:	£S 80.50 bn ($20.51 bn)		
growth	1985:	0.7%	1986:	−2.5%
Inflation	1985:	8.0%	1986:	5.7%
Debt*	1985:	$4.5 bn	1986:	$5.0 bn
Def bdgt	1986:	£S 14.46 bn ($3.68 bn)		
	1987c:	£S 15.50 bn ($3.95 bn)		
$1 = £S	(1985/6/7):	3.9250		

Population: 11,250,000

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	1,005,000	745,000
Women:	988,000	755,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 407,500.
Terms of service: conscription, 30 months.
Reserves (to age 45): 272,500. Army 270,000 active, Navy 2,500.

ARMY: 300,000 (130,000 conscripts, 50,000 reservists). Has absorbed *Saraya ad-Difer* (defence coys).
HQ: 2 corps.
5 armd divs (each 3 armd, 1 mech, 1 arty bdes).
4 mech divs (each 2 armd, 2 mech, 1 arty bdes).
(1 bde per armd and mech div at cadre strength).
3 arty bdes.
1 special forces div (9 para/cdo bdes).
7 indep special forces regts.
3 SSM bdes:
2 (each 3 bns) with *FROG*, *Scud*;
1 (2 bns) with SS-21.
9 SAM bns (27 btys) with SA-6.
Coast Def:
2 bdes with SS-C-1B *Sepal* and SS-C-3, arty and msl bns.
(Reserves: 9 mech and inf bdes.)
Equipment:
Tks: 4,000†: 1,800 T-54/-55, 1,100 T-62M/K, 1,100 T-72/-72M.
AFV: recce/ATK: 800 BRDM-2.
MICV: 1,800 BMP-1.
APC: 1,300 BTR-40/-50/-60/-152, OT-64.
Arty: guns: 2,800;
122mm: 100 M-1931/-37 (in store), ISU-122; 150 M-1974 (2S1) SP;
130mm: M-46;
152mm: ISU-152 SP;
180mm: S-23.
gun/how: 152mm: M-1937.
how: 122mm: M-1938, D-30, 36 T-34/D-30 SP;
152mm: D-1, M-1943; 60 M-1973 (2S3) SP.
MRL: 122mm: BM-21; 220mm: BM-27;
240mm: BM-24.
SSM: 24 *FROG*-7, some 36 SS-21 reported, 18 *Scud*-B; SS-C-1B *Sepal*, SS-C-3 coastal.
Mor: 120mm, 160mm, 240mm.
ATK: guns: 100mm: T-12.
ATGW: 1,300 AT-3 *Sagger* (incl BRDM-2 SP), AT-4 *Spigot* and *Milan*.
AD: guns: 1,700: 23mm: ZU-23-2 towed, ZSU-23-4 SP; 37mm: M-1939; 57mm: S-60, ZSU-57-2 SP; 85mm: M-1939/-44;
100mm: KS-19.
SAM: SA-6/-7/-8/-9/-13 SAM.

NAVY: 2,500.
Bases: Latakia, Tartus, Minet el-Baida.
Subs: 3 R-class.
Frigates: 2 *Petya* II.
FAC(G): 24 with SS-N-2A/C SSM:
6 *Osa*-I, 12 *Osa*-II (4 msls), 6 *Komar* (2 msls);
FAC(T): 8 P-4 25-ton.
Patrol craft, large: 1 Ch; **coastal:** 6 *Zhuk*.
MCMV: 9: **ocean:** 1 *Natya*, 1 T-43;
coastal: 2 *Vanya*, **inshore:** 5 *Yevgenya*.
Amph: LSM: 3 *Polnocny* B.
Hel: ASW: 12 Mi-14, 5 Ka-25.

AIR FORCE: 45,000;
some 478 combat ac; some 110 armed hel.‡
FGA: 8 sqns:
2 with 85 MiG-17;
1 with 15 Su-7;
2 with 28 Su-17;
1 with 19 Su-20;
2 with 50 MiG-23BM *Flogger* F.
Interceptor: 13 sqns:
1 with 30 MiG-25 *Foxbat* E;
9 with 175 MiG-21;
3 with 70 MiG-23 *Flogger* E/G.
(MiG-29 to be delivered 1987–8.)
Recce: 6 MiG-25R.
Tpt: 2 sqns:
4 An-24 *Coke*, 6 An-26 *Curl*, 4 Il-76 *Candid*, 6 Tu-134 *Crusty*, 3 *Mystère-Falcon* 20F.
Trg: incl 90 L-39, 20 L-29, 20 MBB-223.
Hel: attack: 50 Mi-24 *Hind*, 35 SA-342 *Gazelle* (ATK), perhaps 25 armed Mi-8;
tpt: 60 Mi-8, 30 Mi-17 (mod-8), 10 Mi-2 *Hoplite*;
ASW (Navy-assigned): 3 Ka-25 *Hormone*, 20 Mi-14 *Haze*.
AAM: AA-2 *Atoll*, AA-6 *Acrid*, AA-7 *Apex*.
ASM: AT-2 *Swatter* ATGW.
(On order: 12 SA-342 *Gazelle* hel; AAM.)

AIR DEFENCE COMMAND: ε 60,000;
20 AD bdes (some 95 SAM btys):
11 (some 60 btys) with some 392 SA-2/-3;
9 (27 btys) with some 200 SA-6, AA arty and radar.
2 AD regts (each 2 bns of 2 btys) with some 48 SA-5.

Forces Abroad: Lebanon: 2–3 indep bdes (?a div equivalent): 12,500.

PARA-MILITARY:
Ministry of Defence:
Internal Security Force: Republican Guard: personal presidential and VIP protection; 1 bde with T-72 tanks, arty.
Saraya as-sra' (struggle coys): special task group.
Desert Guard (Frontier Force) 1,800.
Palestine Liberation Army 4,500; 2 bdes (in Syria/Lebanon, some Syrian officers, nominally under PLO);
Egypt: 90 T-54/-55 MBT; 105mm, 122mm, 152mm how; MRL; AT-3 *Sagger* ATGW; SA-7 SAM.
Ministry of Interior: Gendarmerie 8,000.
Ba'ath Party: Workers Militia (People's Army).

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* Excl some $15–19 bn owed to USSR and eastern-bloc countries, probably half for military eqpt.
† Tanks with unity and training, perhaps 2,800; remainder as static anti-tank or reserve.
‡ Some aircraft believed to be in storage.

TUNISIA

GDP	1985:	D 6.90 bn ($8.27 bn)		
	1986:	D 7.11 bn ($9.41 bn)		
growth	1985:	2.6%	1986:	−2.1%
Inflation	1985:	8.0%	1986:	5.8%
Debt	1985:	$3.8 bn	1986:	$5.6 bn
Def bdgt	1986:	D 413.57 m ($547.77 m)		
	1987:	D 434.12 m ($525.06 m)		
FMA	1985:	$86.6 m	1986:	$86.6 m
$1 = D	(1985):	0.8345	(1986):	0.7550
	(1987):	0.8268		

D = dinar

Population: 7,115,000

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	907,000	536,000
Women:	887,000	610,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 42,100 (27,000 conscripts) (incl *Gendarmerie*).
Terms of service: 12 months selective.

ARMY: 31,000 (25,000 conscripts).
2 mech bdes (each with 1 armd, 2 mech inf bns).
1 Sahara bde.
1 para-cdo bde.
1 armd recce regts.
1 ATK regt.
1 fd arty regt.
1 AD bde (2 AA regts).
1 engr regt.
Equipment:
Tks: 14 M-48A3, 54 M-60A3. **lt:** 45 AMX-13, 10 M-41, 50 Steyr SK-105 *Kuerassier*.
AFV: recce: 20 *Saladin*, 23 AML-90.
APC: 100 M-113A1/-2, 24 EE-11 *Urutu*, 90 Fiat F-6614.
Arty: how: 78: 105mm: 58: 48 M-101A1/A2, 10 M-108 SP;
155mm: 10 M-114A1, 10 M-109 SP.

Mor: 81mm: incl M-125 SP; 82mm; 107mm: 12 M-106A2 SP; 120mm: 18.
ATK: RL: STRIM-89. **ATGW:** MGM-71A *TOW* (incl 35 M-113 SP), *Milan*, SS-11.
AD: guns: 20mm: 26 M-163 *Vulcan* SP; 37mm: 10 M-1939/Type-55; 40mm: 10 M-42.
SAM: 60 RBS-70, 25 MIM-72 *Chaparral*.
(On order: 57 M-198 155mm towed how.)

NAVY: 5,000 (700 conscripts).
Bases: Bizerte, Sfax, La Goulette, Kelibia.
Frigate: 1 US *Savage*.
FAC(G): 6:
3 *La Combattante* IIIM with 8 MM-40 *Exocet* SSM;
3 P-48 with 8 SS-12 SSM.
FAC: 2 Ch *Shanghai* II.
Patrol craft, large: 5: 1 *Le Fougeux*, 2 *Adjutant* ex-MCMV, 2 Vosper Thornycroft 103-ft;
coastal: 12: Esterel 32-m and 25-m, 1 Tunisian 20-m.
(On order: 2 Lürssen 23-m FAC; 9 20-m patrol craft.)

AIR FORCE: 4,100 (700 conscripts);
31 combat aircraft, no armed hel.
FGA: 8 F-5E, 4 F-5F.
COIN: 1 sqn with 8 MB-326K, 4 MB-326L.
Tpt: 2 C-130H *Hercules*.
Liaison: 4 S-208M ac.
Trg: 17 SF-260, 7 MB-326B, 12 T-6, 12 *Safir*.
Hel: 1 wing with 4 SA-318 *Alouette* II, 7 SA-316 *Alouette* III, Bell UH-1H, 1 SA-330 *Puma*, 18 AB-205, 6 Bell 205, 6 AS-350B *Ecureuil*, 1 SA-365N *Dauphin*.

PARA-MILITARY: 9,000:
Gendarmerie (Public Order Brigade, part of armed forces) 2,000; 3 bns; 110 Fiat 6614 APC.
National Guard 7,000.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE)

GDP	1985:	Dh 94.10 bn ($25.63 bn)		
	1986:	Dh 81.50 bn ($22.20 bn)		
growth	1985:	−7.4%	1986:	−21.0%
Inflation	1985:	3.0%	1986:	1.0%
Def bdgt	1986:	Dh 6.90 bn ($1.88 bn)		
	1987c:	Dh 5.80 bn ($1.58 bn)*		
$1 = Dh	(1985/6/7):	3.671		

Dh = dirham

Population: 1,300,000 (including foreigners)

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	202,000	353,000
Women:	84,000	84,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:†
Active: 43,000 (perhaps 30% foreign)
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 40,000.
3 regional commands: Western (Abu Dhabi), Central (Dubai), Northern (Ras al Khaimah).
1 Royal Guard 'bde'.
1 armd bde.
1 mech inf bde.
2 inf bdes.
1 arty, 1 AD bde (each 3 bns).
Equipment:
Tks: 100 AMX-30, 36 OF-40 Mk 2 (*Lion*).
lt: 80 *Scorpion*.
AFV: recce: 90 AML-90, VBC-40.
MICV: 30 AMX-10P.
APC: 30 AMX VCI, VCRTT, 300 Panhard M-3, VAB, 66 EE-11 *Urutu* (some with *TOW* ATGW).
Arty: guns: 105mm: 50 ROF lt;
155mm: 20 Mk F-3 SP.
how: 105mm: 18 M-56 pack.
Mor: 81mm, 20 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 84mm. **ATGW:** *Vigilant*, *TOW*.
AD: guns: 20mm: 60 M-3VDA SP; 30mm: 30 GCF-BM2. **SAM:** *Rapier*, *Crotale*, RBS-70.
(**Store:** 70 *Saladin* armd, 60 *Ferret* scout cars; 12 *Saracen* APC.)
(On order: 42 *Improved HAWK* SAM, 343 msls.)

NAVY: 1,500.
Bases: **Abu Dhabi:** Dalma, Mina Zayed; **Ajman; Dubai:** Mina Rashid, Mina Jabal 'Ali; **Fujairah; Ras al Khaimah:** Mina Sakr; **Sharjah:** Mina Khalid, Khor Fakkan; Taweela (under construction).
FAC(G): 6 Lürssen TNC-45 with 2 × 2 *Exocet* MM-40 SSM.
Patrol craft, large: 6 Vosper Thornycroft;
coastal: 3 Keith Nelson.
Spt: 2 Cheverton tenders.

AIR FORCE (incl Police Air Wing): 1,500;
65 combat ac, 7 armed hel.
Interceptor: 2 sqns:
24 *Mirage* 5AD, 3 5RAD, 2 5DAD.
FGA: 1 sqn with 3 *AlphaJet*.
COIN: 1 sqn with 8 MB-326KD/LD, 2 MB-339A.
Tpt: incl 5 C-130H *Hercules*, 1 L-100-30, 1 Boeing 707-320B, 1 G-222, 4 C-212, 1 HS-125, 5 BN-2 *Islander*, 9 DHC-5D *Buffalo*, 1 Cessna 182.
Hel: incl 7 SA-316 *Alouette* III with AS-11, 8 AB-205, 6 AB-206, 3 AB-212, 3 Bell 214, 9 SA-330 *Puma*, 10 AS-332F *Super Puma*, 10 SA-342 *Gazelle*.

Trg: some 20 PC-7, 21 *Hawk* (15 Mk 63, 6 Mk 61), 6 SF-260TP, 2 MB-339A.
AAM: R-550 *Magic*.
ASM: AS-11/-12.
(On order: 36 *Mirage* 2000 ftrs (incl 3 recce, 3 trg), 3 *Alpha Jet* FGA/trg, 1 G-222, some 24 *Hawk* (8 Mk 61, 16 Mk 63) trg ac; 30 A-129 *Mangusta*, *Lynx* hel; *Skyguard* AD system with twin 35mm guns.)

PARA-MILITARY: Coastguard (Ministry of the Interior): 57 coastal patrol boats/craft.

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* Federal defence outlays have been substantially reduced, but procurement and project costs are not affected, since individual emirates finance these separately.
† The Union Defence Force and the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah) were formally merged in 1976; Abu Dhabi and Dubai still maintain a degree of independence. Non-nationals incl some 500 Moroccans.

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC (NORTH)

GDP	1985: R 23.70 bn ($3.69 bn)	
	1986e: R 33.00 bn ($4.46 bn)	
growth	1985: 5.0%	1986: 6.0%
Inflation	1985: 27.0%	1986: 40.0%
Debt	1985: $2.4 bn	1986: $2.7 bn
Def bdgt	1986: R 2.77 bn ($373.75 m)	
Def exp	1987: R 3.72 bn ($413.79 m)	
$1 = R	(1985): 6.4143	(1986): 7.3980
	(1987): 8.9900	

R = rial

Population: c 9,600,000

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	885,000	510,000
Women:	993,000	680,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 36,800 (perhaps 25,000 conscripts).
Terms of service: conscription, 3 years.
Reserves: Army: perhaps 40,000.

ARMY: 35,000 (perhaps 25,000 conscripts).
6 armd bdes (bns).
3 mech, 9 inf bdes (1 reserve).
1 Special Forces bde.
1 para/cdo bde.
1 central guard force.
6 arty bdes.
3 AA arty bns, 2 AD bns (1 with SA-2 SAM).
Equipment:
Tks: 125 T-34, 460 T-54/-55, 34 T-62, 64 M-60A1.
AFV: recce: 50 *Saladin*, *Ferret*.
APC: 90 M-113, 300 BTR-40/-60/-152, *Walid*.
Arty: guns: 76mm: 200 M-1942;
100mm: 30 SU-100 SP;
122mm: M-1931/37.
how: 105mm: M-101; 122mm: M-38;
155mm: M-115.
MRL: 122mm: 65 BM-21.
Mor: 200: 82mm, 120mm.
ATK: RL: *LAW*. **RCL:** 75mm: M-20; 82mm.
ATGW: 20 *Vigilant*, BGM-71A *TOW*, 24 M-47 *Dragon*.
AD: guns: 20mm: 52 M-167, 20 M-163 *Vulcan* SP; 23mm: ZU-23, ZSU-23-4; 37mm: M-1939; 57mm: S-60. **SAM:** SA-2/-6/-9.

NAVY: 800.
Base: Hodeida.
Patrol craft: 6†:
3 Sov (2 *Zhuk*, 1 *Poluchat*);
3 US *Broadsword* (?non-operational).
MCMV, inshore: 2 *Yevgenya*.
Amph: LCM: 4: 2 T-4, 2 *Ondatra*.

AIR FORCE: 1,000;
73 combat ac,* no armed hel.
Ftrs: 5 sqns:
2 with 30 MiG-21;
1 with 11 MiG-17F;
1 with 11 F-5E;
1 with 15 Su-22.
Tpts: 2 C-130H *Hercules*, 2 C-47 (Douglas DC-3), 2 *Skyvan*, 3 An-24 *Coke*, 3 An-26 *Curl*.
Trg: 4 F-5B, 2 MiG-21.
Hel: 23 Mi-8, 8 AB-206, 5 AB-212, 2 SA-315 *Alouette*.
AD: 1 regt with 12 SA-2 SAM.
AAM: AA-2 *Atoll*, AIM-9 *Sidewinder*.

PARA-MILITARY:
Ministry of National Security Force 5,000.
Tribal levies at least 20,000.

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* Some 15 ac in storage.

YEMEN: PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (SOUTH)

GDP	1983e: D 326.8 m ($946.149 m)	
	1984e: D 378.2 m ($1.095 bn)	
growth	1983: 1.5%	1984e: 4.5%
Inflation	1983: 15.0%	1984: 10.0%
Debt	1983e: $1.3 bn	1984e: $1.5 bn
Def exp	1983: D 59.0 m ($170.816 m)	
	1984: D 67.0 m ($193.978 m)	
$1 = D	(1983/4/5/6): 0.3454	

D = dinar

Population: 2,300,000

	18–30	*31–45*
Men:	225,000	130,000
Women:	236,000	161,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 27,500 (perhaps 18,000 conscripts).
Terms of service: 2 years.
Reserves: Army: 45,000.

ARMY: 24,000 (perhaps 18,000 conscripts).
1 armd bde.
3 mech bdes (status uncertain).
8 inf 'bdes' (regts) (some being mechanized).
3 arty bdes.
10 arty bns.
2 SSM bdes with *FROG*-7 and *Scud* B.
2 SAM btys with SA-2/-3.
Equipment:*
Tks: 470 T-34/-54/-55/-62.
AFV: recce: BRDM-2; **MICV:** some 100 BMP-1.
APC: 300 BTR-40/-60/-152.
Arty: guns: 350: 85mm: D-44; 88mm: 25-pdr; 130mm coastal: M-46, SM-4-1.
how: 122mm: M-38, D-30.
152mm: D-20 reported.
MRL: 122mm: BM-21; 140mm: BM-14.
SSM: 12 *FROG*-7, 6 *Scud* B.
Mor: 82mm, 120mm, 160mm.
AD: guns: 200: 23mm: ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 SP; 37mm: M-1939; 57mm: S-60; 85mm: KS-12.
SAM: 6 SA-2, 3 SA-3, SA-6/-7/-9.

NAVY:* 1,000.
Bases: Aden, Perim Island, Al Mukalla.
FAC(G): 6 *Osa*-II with 4 SS-N-2B SSM.
FAC(T): 2 P-6†.
Patrol craft: 2 *Zhuk*†.
Amph: LST: 1 *Ropucha*; **LSM:** 3 *Polnocny*; **LCM:** 5 T-4.

AIR FORCE: 2,500.
62 combat ac, some 15 armed hel.*
FGA: 3 sqns:
1 with 5 MiG-17F;
1 with 12 MiG-21;
1 with 15 Su-20/-22.
Interceptor: 3 sqns with 30 MiG-21F.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 3 An-24, 3 C-47 (Douglas DC-3).
Hel: 1 sqn with 15 Mi-24, 30 Mi-8.
SAM: 1 regt with 48 SA-2, 2 btys SA-3.
Trg: 3 MiG-15UTI.
AAM: AA-2 *Atoll*.
ASM: AT-2 *Sagger*.

PARA-MILITARY:
People's Militia 15,000.
Public Security Force 30,000 (increasing):
1 *Tracker* 2, 4 *Spear*, 1 *Interceptor* patrol craft.

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* Reports suggest 145 tanks and up to 80% of naval and 90% of air eqpts were destroyed or seriously damaged as a result of the civil war. Data on resupply is inadequate. Some eqpt believed in storage; some ac believed flown by Soviet and Cuban crews.

6505 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 09.11.87

בלמס נבנס

3313

חדזם:11/6505
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:110/תא:091187/דת:1800/דח:מ/סג:ב
נד:@

בלמס/מידי
אל:מעת
דע:אירופה 2
מאת:עתונות לונדון

03.3

דוח תקשורת 5-8 דנא

א. חדשות החוץ העיקריות שרבבות סביב ברתם וחגיגות 70 השנה למהפיכה. עתוני טרפהשבוע מלאים בכתבות מצולמות ומאמרים בנושא. המזת אינו במוקד החדשות כולל כסגת שמאן.

ב. המזת
1. בכל העיתונים בתקופה הנדונה של הפסגה בשמאן. ההערכה קודם לפסגה היא שהשפעתה על סיום מלחמת המפרץ תהיה מועטה כמו גם סיגריים להשפיע על הסכסוך הישראלי ערבי ולקייע לפתרון בעית לבנון. הסיכוי להשיג אחדות ערבית מול איראן אפסי. העדרו של המלך באחד היא אכזבה לחוסיין.
לפי הטיימס ביסק 7 הסורים ילחצו להתמקד בבעיה הפלשטינית בעוד לבנון תבקש סיוע נספי באשר כל ארצות ערב מאמינות בהתמוטטותה הסופית. לפי הפינכשל טיימס 7 שני הנושאים העיקריים שיידונו עי שתח הירדני, המפרץ והחזרת מצרים לעולם הערבי. העיתון סבור שאין לפסגה סיכוי לפתור בעית המפרץ והסכסוך באזורנו כאשר הבעיה כאן היא שאלת ייצוג הפלשטינים בועידה. יתכן וכמה מדינות תחדשנה ביחסיהן עם מצרים. צפרייה שורה של החלטות ממוסמסות. בגרדיאן 7 הירסט שחוסיין זכה להצלחה מעצם הכינוס. המפרציות פוחדות מעירק ואינן רוצות להרגיז איראן. הסורים ייחלצו להגנת איראן. המינימום הצפוי, תמיכת סוריה ושאר ארצות ערב בהחלטת מועביט

598. בדילי טלגרף קופלין 7 שעצם בואם יחד של אויבים בסאדאם אסד ודרפאת היא חידבית.

2. ביירות. בטיימס 7 ניסק ששני צרפתים ורפגי שמדו להשתחרר לסוריה אן חוטפיהם שינו דעתם. מדובר בהשלום בוכר רג. בגרדיאן רויטר 7 ששחרור קורדש הרבגי יעלה 2 מיליון דולר. בעתוני ה 6 השביתה הכללית בעיר.

3. סוריה. בטיימס 5 שבדוית מאיימת בהפסקת סיוע לסוריה אם תמשיך לתמוך באירן. גם בשם טעדיה. בסנדיי טלגרף שממבריטניה תעיין מחדש בניתוק היחסים, הוכחות שאסד מנסה לשפר היחסים: אל חולי הדדה והועבר למס 2 בחיל האויר. יחד עם זאת אין הכניות לחידוש מידי של היחסים כיון שתאצר דואה בעמדתה התקיפה הצלחה בשכנוע סוריה לנטוש עידוד הטרור.

4. בכל עתוני יום א על התפיכה השקטה בטוניס. הסיבה: סנילות. אשף יוכל להשאר, בסאנדיי טיימס שהשליט החדש בן עלי שמרן ונוטה למערב וימשיך במדיניות המסורתית של טוניסיה.

5. בטיימס מוראיי 6,5 שני מאמרים על מצרים: הבילוס המתיבש והמאמצים להכניס חקלאות למדבר המערבי.

ג. ישראל.
1. דמיניוק. בעתוני ה 5 שהעד טולסטוי איים לפרוש. בדיילי טלגרף קופלין שטולסטוי טוען שהמשפט איבו הוגן.

2. בסינבשל טיימס (ויטלי 6) שצבא ארהב ירכוש ציוד צבאי בישראל בסך 20 מיליון דולר. באותו עיתון ויטלי 5 שישראל מודאגת מאפשרות קיצוץ באספקת נשק אמריקני לישראל.

3. בטיימס 7 שסילבסטר סטאלונה עוזב ישראל שקב חוסר ישילות ואמינות מצד חברת ההפקה הישראלית.

4. בדיילי טלגרף 7 על הידיעה במעריב ששמיר וחוסיין נפגשו בלונדון אן השיחות נכשלו.

5. בסאנדיי טיימס איזקוביץ שישראל מבחישה שהיא מוכרת חלקי נכטום לאירן.

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6. בגרדיאן רויטר 6 שהפילהרמונית יצאה לסיור ראשון בפולין והונגריה.

7. 70 שנה להצהרת בלפור. בגרדיאן 6 בעמוד העולם השלישי (במה עוינת להשמצת ישראל- אמ) תקציר הרצאה של NADIA HIJAB שנישאה בקיסטן
הרעיון המרכזי: רק מדינה פלסטינית תוציא אותנו מהבוץ המזרחי.

ד. המפרץ.
בטיימס ביסק 5 שלמפרצירות יחס אמביבלנטי לציים הזרים: שמחה והשענות על שירותי ההגנה של הציים אך דאגה שתחזור תיסמנת ביירות. אסון אחד וכל הציים יפנו האזור ואז תישארנה המפרצירות חשופות לחסדי איון. בגרדיאן 5 שהנסיון הביכל להשיג הסדר הפסקת אש עומד על סף כישלון. איון ועירק השיבו בשלילה למזכל האום פסגת שמאן לא תוכל לפתור הסכסוך וגם ווורנצוב נכשל.
בדיילי טלגרף 6 על נערי ביתם האירניים שהפכו לעילית הלוחמת. בגרדיאן 6 שהצי הבריטי משגר שולות מוקשים שלו צפונה. באינדפנדנט ובגרדיאן 7 ובן בתקשורת האלקטרונית על תקיפת המיכלית הפנמית בבעלות אמריקנית עי איון.

א. מנור

א

תפ: שחח,רחמ,שהבט,מנבל,ממנבל,סמנבל,ממד,רס,אמן,קלוורי,מעת, הסברה,לעמ,דרצ-ים,דוצ,פזנר,צנזורצבאי,איראא,איראב

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

5238 תאריך: 07.11.8[redacted]

נבנס ** סודי

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3269

מרכז:5238/11
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:95/תא:061107/זת:1630/דח:ד/שג:ס
נד:ס

103.3
קרן

דחוף/סודי
אל:מנהל אוקיאניה , אירופה 2
מאת:הציר -ירון לונדון

פיגי שלבם 21.10

משיחה עם בארנס מנהל מחלקת דרום הפסיפיק בפרהאוף

1. לבריטניה אין בעיה של חברה במשטרם שכן היא מכירה במדינות ולא בממשלות. פיגי לא הפכה כאן לגושא פוליטי שגורר במחלוקת כמו באוסטרליה לדוגמא ששם בשיבקר שהח פיגי בעוד מספר שבועות הוא יתארח בסידני ולא בקנברה. יחסי הירום ירום שבין פיגי לבריטניה נמשכים ללא הפרעה.

2. סימן שאלה קיים לגבי החוקה החדשה שכן זו תגשים ללא ספק את הציפיות למיהם יגדל החלק הפיגיאני בפרלמנט (נבחרה ל 36 מושבים) עמי לקבוע שליטה מוחלטת. אפליה ברורה כל כך במסגרת חוקתית השפיע ללא ספק על אפשרות המשך חברותה של פיגי בקומנולת ויתכן שפיגי אף תימנע לכן מלכבות מחדש. אין שם זאת מקום להשוות בין פיגי לדרום אפריקה ובכל מקרה גם באמריקה קיימת פעילות של שגרירויות.

3. המשטר לפי שעה הינו משטר מגביל בשאנשים אינם יכולים לצאת את המדינה בארבן חופשי שהדים נסגרים ואפילו קרו מקרים של בתיחת שקי דואר דיפלומטי. ישנם סימנים ראשונים של התהלכן התחלתי להפיכה פיגי למדינת משטרה. קיימת ספקולציה באשר להתנגדות ההוקית שנעשה בין הערבות של התנגדות פסיבית להתנגדות אלימה ואין עם זאת להוציא מכלל אפשרות פשרה כל שהיא בין הפיגיאנים להודים.

4. לסיכום הרי שהתוקפה החדשה שתוגש בנראה עד סוף השנה עלולה לעורר הדים בינלאומיים שליליים והיציבות המדינית של השלטון תהא ברורה לחלטין. לא יהיה לנו אמצעים של מדינות אחרות העומדות לפתוח שגרירות במקום. למרות כל האמור לעיל התרשמתי מהשיחה שכתיחת שגרירות תושבת שלנו לא תעורר בחוגים הרשמיים כאן תגובות שליליות.

יורם שני
א

תפ: שמח,מבבל,ממנבל,אירב,הדס,אוקיאניה

שמור נכנס **
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3257

חדש:11/4040
אל:המשרד
מ-:לונדון/נר:83/תא:051187/זת:1800/דת:מ/סג:ש
נד:ם

103.35

שמור/מידי

אל:אירופה 2, מצרים/המרכז

מאת:הציר-יועץ לונדון

משיחה עם רוברטס מצרים/ מזה"ית הפנראון

1. בשיחות שה"ח של פיסגת עמאן, הבחינו לראשונה בקוצר רוח מסויים בצד המצרי מבחינת רצונם לראות בתוצאות מידיות. קימת חלוקה ברורה במצרים בין רעיון החזרה לעולם הערבי שכלפיו הציפיות מתונות ביותר, לבין האופטימיות וקוצר הרוח המתגלה בנושא היחסים הבילטרליים.

נקבו אפילו בשמות כמו עיראק, נוויה ומאע"מ. לדברי רוברטס מעבירים המצרים מסר מעורפל למנהיגים הערבים לפיו, במידה ולא החול התפתחות חיובית בנושא זה הרי שתהיה לכן השלכה של מצרים-סנים ותתגבר השפעה המופנדמנטליסטית- באשר ברקע האיום הסבקולטיבי של יצירת "איראן השניה".

2. הועלתה האפשרות של משוברות צבאית מצרית במפרץ אולם למיטב ידיעתו לא קיים שום הסכם ספציפי על כך. מניחים שנתקיימו חילופי הצהרות ואולי אף קימת הבנה ערטילאית כל שהיא ותו-לא.

מצאר מאיזן תחושת רתיעה כללית ובמיוחד בשורות הצבא ממשוברות צבאית משבר לגבולות המדינה. לדברי רוברטס הרי שאבו ע"זאלה מוטרד הרבה יותר מנושאים אותם הוא מעדיף בקשורים ישירות לאינטרס הלאומי המצרי. מה שמתרחש

בכורית איננו מהותי לגבי מצרים והקשיים במפרץ אינם מאיימים על בטחונה. בללי המשחק משתנים כמובן אם מגיעים הקשיים לים-סוף. בהשואה הרי הנושא הישראלי היינו מהותי ונוגע ללב ליבו של האינטרס הלאומי המצרי.

3. הנושא הלובי הועלה בקונטקס הסודאני כאשר המצרים מתיחסים לקדאפי בלבלתי שפוי ומגלים מאידך הוסר אונים באשר ליחסים שלהם עצמם עם סודאן. איננו מאמינים להכחשות הסובייטיות על הנוכחות הצבאית הלובית ומעדיפים להאמין למידע ההכון המגיע מצ'אד. גיוס הדרוזים והפלסתינים לעזרת לוב לא הועלה בשיחות.

4. היתה תחושה כללית של בשלון בכל הנוגע לפרשת לבנון.

5. הממשלה המצרית החדשה שזכתה באון לכינוי "מועדון פריזי" משום ריבוי הפרנקופונים שבה, איננה מרשימה והשינויים לגבי קודמתה מזעריים. רוה"מ צדקי זכה ליותר סמכויות בתחומי הכלכלה ויחיסים הבינלאומיים הקשורים לכן ואילו לגבי זכי בדר קיים עדיין סימן שאלה.

נוטים להערין כי למרות השמועות שקשיחותו כלפי הקיצוניים ערערה את מעמדו ישאיר אותו מובארק בתפקידו.

מצאו גם שהתחושה הכללית היא שהממשלה יודעת את הכיוון הנכון לפתרון המשבר הכלכלי המצרי, הגם שלבריטים עצמם נראה משבר זה מאיים בויוק בבעבר.

יורם שני

הע: שחח,רהה,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רס,אמן,אירא,אירב,
מצרים

מרזם:11/2950
אל:המשרד
מ-:לרנדרן/נר:63/מא:041187/זת:1700/דת:מ/שגש
נד:ש

103.3
(כ)

שמור/דחוף

אל:איירנסה 2, מאף, המרכז

מאת:לרנדרן/הציר -יועץ

משיחה עם טאקנדס מחימערב אפריקה בנדראדף:-

צ'אד
1.צ'אד מרכזת כוחות צבא בגבול רצועת אאוזו והמדבים עתה ב-14 אלף בקירוב. במשלך קרבות שנת 1987 הפסד הצ'אדים שלל צבאי שמברדיסים נאן מערבים את שרכן בעולה של מיליארד דולר ובין היתר טנקים, שילי טאס-6 ו-13 לרבות תותחים כבדים. אין לפי שעה איטור לכן שהצ'אדים מנשילים נשק זה ובהתבחה שאין להם את הידע לכן.ידוע שמנסים לאתר מומחי צבא להדרכה בנושא.

2.ארגון א'חא שאמור היה לקבל משמרים מהדמכים טענות שני הצדדים עד ל-30/10 קבל המומר רק מצ'אד. לכן לא עשתה זאת למרות התחיבותה. הברדיסים עצמם הגישו לאח'א מסמכים ההדמכים בעמדת צ'אד (1899). העבודה שלוב טרם בעלה בנדרש לא גרמה הדרורות בשעה זיתכן שמתקיימים מגעים להשגת נשרה כל שהיא. שגריר ברדינים בצ'אד שביקר עם בשעה לפני כשבוע הרשם שהצ'אדים שבעי רצון מהמצב הנוכחי ומעדיפים לפי שעה להרכיח למכהיגי הלבשת ולגיבוריות את עמדתם המתנה לעומת הקיבוניות הלרבית והסירוע הערבי לרבות זלדולם באח'א. לדעת השגריר לא יפגיע האברה(?) לעדם נשרה בנושא הרצועה אלא אם הרבר הבונה צ'אד עליה.

3. הבריטים מוטרדים מהעובדה שלרב המתיות בערבים בלחימה בשטח ומבטים עתה ללמוד אם מתהווה קרע בין הדינות האמריקניות לעולם הערבי. טיפר גם כי הצרפתים החרדים מאוד להזדמנות האמריקנית והערבית, המתקדמת בכל זאת בשטח ותם ערוכים עתה ליד ABECHE שבצפון צ'אד.
שלל לחלוטין האפשרות שמתבצעת ברגשה ברית אוראנים שכך היו יודעים על כך. למעשה טרם הוקמה שבבד הצ'אדי של חרי הטיבסטי יש אוראנים כמה בבד של ביגר ומעולם גם לא בערך שם מחקר מדעי.

בורקינה פאסו

4. טאקנוס סינם דיווח של אנשי שגרירותם בווש המבקרים הכנות בואגאדוגו. ההתרחשויות מתלו ביוני כאשר התחולל קרע בשורות המפלגה השלטת בין הדרם ובתוכו קומפאורה שרבו לקיים מעין חדית שתאפשר שיתופם של בלתי מפלגתיים לרבות אקדמאיים לבין המיעוט שדרש הקמת מפלגה במתכונת המפלגה האיתנית. שבקרה אושב של"הגדר". החליט בסוף שנסמבר להמון בפלג המרכסיסטי.

5. קומפאורה והבריו שהניחו שימיהם סבורים בבמיוחד בשלמדו של בעילות האבנון הסדרים שהקים שבקארה לעצמו ושהחל במשגר אנשים ללא משטה בעלו מיוחדת ובהצלחה, לדברי טאקנוס היתה התנגדות טעמה של נבחרים בדרום המדינה והמצב בינם יציב, למרות הרוגז הקיים בעיקר בקרב סטודנטים ואקדמאים של מותו של סבקרה שהיה פופולרי ביותר. בנראה גם שפופולריות זו היא שהבריעה את חנף בעד מותו.

6. מעריכים כאן שקומפאורה מתון יותר ״ומערבי״ יותר מקודמו ואין בל סימנים המעידים על המקבותו בביכול ללוב באשר בל המגעים שהתקימו עד עתה היו ביוזמת הלובים. סביר שקומפאורה יקיים מגע עם בל מי שיהיה מוכן לתרום ולסייע. בדו״ח שגרירותם הבוטס גם המתונה הזמני האמריקני שהחריע בסני מתמ״ד בי יש להזהר מלאמץ את הדיווחים המגיעים מפאריז באילו שקרב קומפאורה לקדאפי.

יורם שני

תפ: שהה/רהמ/שהבט/מנכל/המנכל/ר/מרכז/המדרס/אמן/אירא/אירב/
מאפ

Tuesday
3 November 1987

Volume 121
No. 36

HOUSE OF COMMONS
OFFICIAL REPORT

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

Written Answers to Questions

DEFENCE

Gulf War

Mr. Terry Fields asked the Secretary of State for Defence what preparations have been made for specialist British troops to be used in a supportive capacity for a possible United States land operation in the Gulf region; what specialist training such British forces have received; what circumstance their troops will be used; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Ian Stewart: No preparations have been made for participation by specialist British troops in any such operation.

Vol. 489
No. 28

Tuesday
3 November 1987

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
(HANSARD)

HOUSE OF LORDS

OFFICIAL REPORT

Written Answers

UNRWA RELIEF SUPPLIES: BEIRUT

Lord Chelwood asked Her Majesty's Government:

What has prevented the United Nations Relief and Works Agency from gaining access to Burj el-Baranjneh and Shatila Palestine refugee camps in Beirut where thousands, many of them women and children, face the winter without a roof over their heads; and whether they will use their maximum influence to persuade AMAL, through the Lebanese Government or otherwise, to allow this essential humanitarian work to proceed at once.

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Glenarthur): Limited UNRWA relief supplies are reaching the camps but failure by both sides to implement the AMAL/Palestinian ceasefire agreement of 11th September is impeding reconstruction work. We continue to urge all parties concerned to allow relief agencies to carry out their work unhindered.