

סלופיה, אונק

127

מדינת ישראל
גנוד המדינה

א

7041/309

43/4

שני מכתבים אל ראש הממשלה, יצחק רבין.
מכתבים בנוי נשיא איכסור הגבולות "לכאף פלמ"ח.

02/1975 — 03/1975

שם תיק: שני מכתבים חתומים בידי נשיא ארצות-הברית
ג'רלד פורד אל רה"מ

מזהה פנימי: 7041/5-א

מזהה פריט: 000w8y2

כתובת: 3-312-5-8-3

תאריך הדפסה: 09/06/2016

127

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

ה' בתשרי תשל"ו
10 בספט' 1975

סודי - ביוחר
לנמען בלבד

אל : ראש הממשלה
מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

רצ"ב שני מכתבים חתומים על ידי הנשיא שקיבלתי מהמזכיר בפגישתי אתו ב-9 לספטמבר. מכתב אחד נוגע להבטחות בקשר לרכש, התאום המדיני וסוריה; המכתב השני מעביר את ההצעה האמריקנית בדבר הנוכחות במעברים.

למותר לומר שהמזכיר חזר והדגיש שתוכנו של המכתב הראשון הוא סודי ביוחר וכל הדלפה אפילו על עצם קיומו תעמיד אותם במצב בלתי אפשרי הן במסגרת הדיונים שלהם עם הקונגרס והן מבחינת מעמדם בעולם הערבי. הבטחתי למזכיר שאני מעביר המכתב לידינו של רה"מ ולידיעתו האישית בלבד.

ברכות חתימה טובה

שמחה דיניץ

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 1, 1975

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In the context of Secretary Kissinger's discussions with you on the agreement between Egypt and Israel now being concluded, I am transmitting the attached proposal as part of that agreement. I am simultaneously transmitting the attached proposal to the President of Egypt.

Our receipt of the attached proposal signed by a representative of your Government will constitute acceptance subject to the signature of the same proposal by a representative of the Government of Egypt.

As soon as the Congress of the United States has given its approval to United States participation in the early warning system I will notify you, and this proposal shall be regarded as an agreement between us.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Gerald R. Ford". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized "F" and "D".

His Excellency Yitzhak Rabin
Prime Minister of Israel
Jerusalem

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 1, 1975

SECRET

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I wish to inform you that the U.S. recognizes that the Israeli-Egyptian Interim Agreement entailing withdrawal from vital areas in the Sinai constitutes an act of great significance on Israel's part in the pursuit of final peace and imposes additional heavy military and economic burdens on Israel.

I want to assure you that the U.S. will make every effort to be fully responsive within the limits of its resources and Congressional authorization and appropriation on an ongoing and long-term basis to Israel's military equipment and other defense requirements as well as to Israel's economic aid needs, all of this based on the requests submitted by Israel, joint studies and previous U.S. Presidential undertakings.

Further to those undertakings, it is my resolve to continue to maintain Israel's defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft. The United States Government agrees to an early meeting to undertake a joint study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with the view to giving a positive response. The U.S. Administration will submit annually for approval by the U.S. Congress a request for military and economic assistance in order to help meet Israel's economic and military needs. Realizing as I do the importance

SECRET

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-2-

of the Interim Agreement to the Middle Eastern situation as a whole, the U.S. will make every possible effort to assist in the establishment of conditions in which the Agreement will be observed without being subjected to pressures or deadlines.

In the spirit of the special relationship existing between the United States and Israel and in light of the determination of both sides to avoid a situation in which the U.S. and Israel would pursue divergent courses in peace negotiations, the U.S. will take the position that these are negotiations between the parties. As I indicated to you in our conversation on 12 June 1975, the situation in the aftermath of the Israeli-Egyptian interim agreement will be one in which the overall settlement can be pursued in a systematic and deliberate way and does not require the U.S. to put forward an overall proposal of its own in such circumstances. Should the U.S. desire in the future to put forward proposals of its own, it will make every effort to coordinate with Israel its proposals with a view to refraining from putting forth proposals that Israel would consider unsatisfactory.

The U.S. will support the position that an overall settlement with Syria in the framework of a peace agreement must assure Israel's security from attack from the Golan Heights. The U.S. further supports the position that a just and lasting peace, which remains our objective, must be acceptable to both sides. The U.S. has not developed a final position on the borders. Should it do so it will give great weight to Israel's position that any peace agreement with Syria must be predicated on Israel remaining on the Golan Heights. My view in this regard was stated in our conversation of September 13, 1974.

Sincerely,



Gerald R. Ford

His Excellency
Yitzhak Rabin
Prime Minister of Israel

1. The first part of the report is a general introduction to the subject of the study. It discusses the importance of the study and the objectives of the research.

2. The second part of the report is a detailed description of the methodology used in the study. It includes information about the sample, the data collection methods, and the statistical analysis techniques.

3. The third part of the report is a discussion of the results of the study. It presents the findings of the research and discusses their implications for the field of study.

4. The fourth part of the report is a conclusion and a list of references. The conclusion summarizes the main findings of the study, and the references list the sources of information used in the research.

PROPOSAL

In connection with the early warning system referred to in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as an integral part of that Agreement, (hereafter referred to as the Basic Agreement), the United States proposes the following:

1. The early warning system to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the attached map will be entrusted to the United States. It shall have the following elements:

A. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel [their locations are shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement]. Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.

B. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and Giddi Passes as will be shown on a map to be agreed between the United States and the Parties. These stations shall be operated by United States civilian

personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established three unmanned electronic sensor fields at both ends of each pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from those stations.

2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connection with the operation and maintenance of these stations.

A. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph 1 A. above, United States civilian personnel will verify the nature of the operations of the stations and all movement into and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authorized role of visual and electronic surveillance to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force.

B. At each watch station described in paragraph 1 B. above, the United States civilian personnel will immediately report to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force any movement of armed forces, other than the United Nations Emergency Force, into either pass and any observed preparations for such movement.

C. The total number of United States civilian personnel assigned to functions under this Proposal shall not exceed 200. Only civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under this Proposal.

3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by this Proposal, except for small arms required for their protection.

4. The United States personnel serving the early warning system shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the system.

5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to have such support facilities as are reasonably necessary to perform their functions.

6. The United States personnel shall be immune from local criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction and may be accorded any other specific privileges and immunities provided for in the United Nations Emergency Force Agreement of February 13, 1957.

7. The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the Basic Agreement.

8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Proposal, the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. In the latter case the Parties to the Basic Agreement will be informed in advance in order to give them the

opportunity to make alternative arrangements. If both Parties to the Basic Agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this Proposal, the United States will consider such requests conclusive.

9. Technical problems including the location of the watch stations will be worked out through consultation with the United States.

ACCEPTED: _____

Notes of the Conversation
between the ~~Sec~~ Dr Kissinger
The Secretary of State and
Mr Y. Labri The Prime

As initiated by
Under Sec of State J. Sizoo
and Ambassador S. Dimont
on Sept. 1, 1975

SECRET

September 1, 1975

DRAFT OF LETTER BY PRESIDENT FORD TO PRIME
MINISTER RABIN

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I wish to inform you that the U.S. recognizes that the Israeli-Egyptian Interim Agreement entailing withdrawal from vital areas in Sinai constitutes an act of great significance on Israel's part in the pursuit of final peace and imposes additional heavy military and economic burdens on Israel. (the)

I want to assure you that the U.S. will make every effort to be fully responsive within the limits of its resources and Congressional authorization and appropriation on an ongoing and long-term basis to Israel's military equipment and other defense requirements as well as to Israel's economic aid needs, all of this based on the requests submitted by Israel, joint studies and previous U.S. Presidential undertakings.

Further to those undertakings, it is my resolve to continue to maintain Israel's defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft. The United States Government agrees to an early meeting to undertake a joint study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with the view to giving a positive response. The U.S. Administration will submit annually for approval by the U.S. Congress a request for military and economic assistance in order to help meet Israel's economic and military needs.

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Realizing as I do the importance of the Interim Agreement to the Middle Eastern situation as a whole, the U.S. will make every possible effort to assist in the establishment of conditions in which the Agreement will be observed without being subjected to pressures or deadlines.

In the spirit of the special relationship existing between the United States and Israel and in light of the determination of both sides to avoid a situation in which the U.S. and Israel would pursue divergent courses in peace negotiations, the U.S. will take the position that these are negotiations between the parties. As I indicated to you in our conversation on 12 June 1975, the situation in the aftermath of the Israeli-Egyptian interim agreement will be one in which the overall settlement can be pursued in a systematic and deliberate way and does not require the U.S. to put forward an overall proposal of its own in such circumstances. Should the U.S. desire in the future to put forward proposals of its own, it will make every effort to coordinate with Israel its proposals with a view to refraining from putting forth proposals that Israel would consider unsatisfactory.

The U.S. will support the position that an overall settlement with Syria in the framework of a peace agreement must assure Israel's security from attack from the Golan Heights. The U.S. further supports the position that a just and lasting peace, which remains our objective, must be acceptable to both sides. The U.S. has not developed a final position on the borders. Should it do so it will give great weight to Israel's position that any peace agreement with Syria must be predicated on Israel remaining on the Golan Heights. My view in this regard was stated in our conversation of September 13, 1974.

Sincerely,

August 31, 1975

SECRET

DRAFT OF LETTER BY PRESIDENT FORD TO PRIME
MINISTER RABIN

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I wish to inform you that the U.S. recognizes that the Israeli-Egyptian Interim Agreement entailing withdrawal from vital areas in Sinai constitutes an act of great significance on Israel's part in the pursuit of final peace and imposes additional heavy military and economic burdens on Israel.

I want to assure you that the U.S. will make every effort to be fully responsive within the limits of its resources and Congressional authorization and appropriation on an ongoing and long-term basis to Israel's military equipment and other defense requirements as well as to Israel's economic aid needs, all of this based on the requests submitted by Israel, joint studies and previous U.S. Presidential undertakings.

Further to those undertakings, it is my resolve to continue to maintain Israel's defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft. The United States Government agrees to

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an early meeting to undertake a joint study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with the view to giving a positive response. The U.S. Administration will submit annually for approval by the U.S. Congress a request for military and economic assistance in order to help meet Israel's economic and military needs.

Realizing as I do the importance of the Interim Agreement to the Middle Eastern situation as a whole, the U.S. will make every possible effort to assist in the establishment of conditions in which the Agreement will be observed without being subjected to pressures or deadlines.

In the spirit of the special relationship existing between the United States and Israel and in light of the determination of both sides to avoid a situation in which the U.S. and Israel would pursue divergent courses in peace negotiations, the U.S. will take the position that these are negotiations between the parties. As I indicated to you in our conversation on 12 June 1975, the situation ^{in the aftermath of} ~~created subsequent to~~ the conclusion of the Israeli-Egyptian interim agreement

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in such circumstances,

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-3

will be one in which the overall settlement can be pursued in a systematic and deliberate way and *hence does* ~~in the first instance by negotiations between the parties at Geneva.~~ *not require the U.S. to put forth proposals if its own* ~~in the future to put forward proposals of its own, it will make every effort to coordinate with Israel its proposals with a view to refraining from putting forth proposals that Israel would consider unsatisfactory.~~

The U.S. will support the position that an overall settlement with Syria in the framework of a peace agreement must assure Israel's security from attack from the Golan Heights. As I said to you in our conversation of 13 September 1974, the U.S. has not developed a final position on the borders and in doing so will give great weight to Israel's position that any peace agreement with Syria must be predicated on Israel remaining on the Golan Heights.

Sincerely,

SECRET

DRAFT OF LETTER BY PRESIDENT FORD TO YOMI
MINISTER RABIN

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I wish to inform you that the U.S. recognizes that the Israeli-Egyptian Interim Agreement entailing withdrawal from vital areas in Sinai constitutes an act of great significance on Israel's part in the pursuit of final peace and imposes additional heavy military and economic burdens on Israel.

I want to assure you that the U.S. will make every effort to be fully responsive within the limits of its resources and Congressional authorization and appropriation on an ongoing and long-term basis to Israel's military equipment and other defense requirements as well as to Israel's economic aid needs, all of this based on the requests submitted by Israel, joint studies and previous U.S. Presidential undertakings.

Further to those undertakings, it is my resolve to continue to maintain Israel's defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft. The United States Government agrees to an early meeting to undertake a joint study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with the view to giving a positive response. The U.S. Administration will submit annually for approval by the U.S. Congress a request for military and economic assistance in order to help meet Israel's economic and military needs.

SECRET

Realizing as I do the importance of the Interim Agreement to the Middle Eastern situation as a whole, the U.S. will make every possible effort to assist in the establishment of conditions in which the Agreement will be observed without being subjected to pressures or deadlines.

In the spirit of the special relationship existing between the United States and Israel and in light of the determination of both sides to avoid a situation in which the U.S. and Israel would pursue divergent courses in peace negotiations, the U.S. will take the position that these are negotiations between the parties. As I indicated to you in our conversation on 12 June 1975, the situation in the aftermath of the Israeli-Egyptian interim agreement will be one in which the overall settlement can be pursued in a systematic and deliberate way and does not require the U.S. to put forward an overall proposal of its own in such circumstances. Should the U.S. desire in the future to put forward proposals of its own, it will make every effort to coordinate with Israel its proposals with a view to refraining from putting forth proposals that Israel would consider unsatisfactory.

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Sincerely,

check list.

. N/A - for now . I ✓

Annex. . II ✓

Proposal. . III ✓

. N/A (IV)

memo of Agreement V ✓

unref.
Duration - now . VI ✓

. N/A now . VII ✓

non-resort to force.
now . VIII ✓

. N/A to now IX ✓

! - assurances : and \bar{x}

116 \bar{x}_I

116) \bar{x}_{II}



