

מדינת ישראל

משרד ⁹ הממשלה

משרד

מאג: 124

הס. כנגד

הספקה II - חלק הספקה, אלאים

ח/כ"ס, 3' תמ"ס

חלק ב'

3.90 - 3.91

מחלקה

מס' תיק מקורי 7/5885/7
7/7385/7

שם תיק: סגן השר בנימין נתניהו - הסברה 2 -
מזהה פיוז: **7385/7-ג**
מזהה פריט: R0003hy2
כתובת: 2-107-11-4-7
תאריך הדפסה: 09/02/2022

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איליה

WITH COMPLIMENTS

ת: הסברה

אמר נתנו לך
 מל"ג ני"ב עמנו לכולם
 עם מתנות הגסכה במשך זמן
 הולדה הענייני שלי - אלא כן
 הוסבה תונני אלו ממילא. וגם זו
 ארבע! אין מקווה שתוכלו לתקן זאת -
 ראו באופן חלקי, עוד בשנת התקציב הנכונה
 בגבול 3 כ"ב - בנוי בק"מ

Talia

האתגר שלום - 1



לכבוד:

משה רביב

יוסי גל

שמי צור

משרד החוץ, ירושלים

17.3.1991

האתגר - סרט בשם "האתגר שלום"

על פי בקשתכם, אני מסכם כאן מספר איפיונים של הסרט, כפי שהתחילו להתגבש בדיונים ביננו, ובתוספת כמה רעיונות חדשים משלי. כמו כן מצ"ב תקציב - **משותף עם אולפני הבירה** - ולוח זמנים.

1. המטרה

- סרט הסברה שימש את אנשי משרד החוץ, בכל העולם.
- סרט רקע עובדתי: הסרט יציג מידע אמין ומעניין, שיש בו כדי להאיר ולהסביר את המדיניות שנוקטת ישראל - סרט "רקע" למדיניות הנוכחית.
- בגוף הסרט עצמו לא נביא את העמדות האקטואליות העכשויות של ישראל.
- יש לשאוף לאורך חיי מדף של שנים אחדות.
- הסרט ישפר את תדמיתה של ישראל כמדינה שוחרת שלום.
- העובדות המובאות בסרט צריכות לדבר בעד עצמן, ולשכנע.
- סרט באיכות גבוהה, סרט מעניין וחזק, שהקהל ירצה לצפות בו.

2. קהל היעד ואיפיוני השימוש

- תחנות טלוויזיה וכבלים ברחבי העולם.
- הכוונה שהסרט ישודר בטלוויזיות, אם במלואו ואם בקטעים מתוכו. אם הסרט יהיה עשוי היטב - יש סבירות גבוהה שישודר במלואו בתחנות בדרום אמריקה, מזרח אירופה וכיו"ב. בצפון אמריקה ובאירופה המערבית, סביר שילקחו ממנו קטעים לשיבוץ בתוכניותיהם.
- הקרנה בפני קהל במפגשי הסברה, באסיפות, כנסים, במרכזים קהילתיים באוניברסיטאות וכיו"ב.
- בשני הערוצים האלה, יגיע הסרט אל הקהל הרחב. הסרט יוכל לעמוד בפני עצמו, או לשמש פתיח להרצאה, דיון ושאלות.

3. הפורמאט והסגנון

- סרט באורך 27 דקות.
- אינפורמאטיבי, בסגנון סרט דוקומנטארי-עתונאי "אובייקטיבי".
- איכות ביצוע בסטנדרד גבוה (בקנה מידה של חו"ל).

4. המסרים העיקריים

הסרט יציג את הרקע ההיסטורי, את המורכבות והקשיים בדרך אל השלום.

- במסגרת זו הועלו כמה תכנים ומסרים, אותם יש להמשיך ולגבש:
 - הדרך אל השלום קשה, ארוכה ומורכבת.
 - לישראל נסיון קשה מן העבר (מלחמות וטרור).
 - מדינות ערב עדיין מאיימות במלחמה, מאמינות שאפשר לפתור את הסכסוך בכוח ומתכננות להשמיד את ישראל (כאן יש חפיפה מסויימת עם הסרט "ג'יהד", אך אין בזה פסול).
 - הפלסטינאים, נוקטים בטרור ורוצים גם הם לחסל את מדינת ישראל כולה.
 - הצורך בשלום עם מדינות ערב - במקביל ובנפרד לפתרון הבעיה הפלסטינאית.
 - אם הערבים ישנו את גישותיהם הבסיסיות, ימצאו בישראל פרטנר נח.
 - עבור ישראל השלום הוא אינטרס לאומי, יעד למדיניות וגם ערך תרבותי.
 - ישראל רוצה בשלום - והוכיחה זאת בעבר.

5. נושאים ספציפיים

- עדיין לא דנו דיון של ממש בתכנים הספציפיים, ולכן מוקדם עדיין שאמנה אותם כאן, קל וחומר ראשי פרקים לתסריט. יחד עם זאת אמנה כאן כמה מחשבות ורעיונות כלליים שכבר הועלו:
 - תולדות הסכסוך: מלחמות העבר.
 - תולדות הפלסטינאים.
 - אש"ף והטרור.
 - האיום הנוכחי והצפוי מצד מדינות ערב.
 - הלאומיות הערבית.
 - האיסלם הפנאטי.
 - ישראל כגורם זר באיזור (לא מוסלמית, דמוקראטיה)
 - משמעות השטחים וגבולות בטחון.
 - תולדות "הסרוב".
 - השאיפה לשלום מצד ישראל, כאינטרס מרכזי וכערך תרבותי.
 - הוכחות לנכונות ישראל לשלום (קמפ-דיויד וכו').

6. רעיונות ראשוניים למסגרת וויזואלית

אני מוכן להפריח כאן שלושה רעיונות מהסוג שאולי יוכלו לשמש כקו מנחה לבניית תסריט וכמסגרת וויזואלית. מטרתם רק להצביע על כיווני מחשבה אפשריים. מכיוון שעדיין לא הוחלט במדויק על תכנים ומסרים - הרי שעדיין מוקדם לדון ברעיונות יצירתיים בתחום התסריט. כמו לרתום את העגלה לפני הסוסים... שכן הרעיונות הוויזואליים והתסריט הם תולדה של התכנים והמסרים, ומטרתם לשרת ולחזק אותם. אבל, להעלות מחשבות תמיד אפשר...

רעיון אחד הוא שהסרט יהיה מנוסח כשאלה מגרה ומסקרנת, שתופיע גם כתובה בגרפיקה וגם בקריינות, כנקודת המוצא. למשל: "מי רוצה שלום?...". או: "כמה זמן עוד צריך עד שיהיה שלום!?" או: "מי מתעקש על מה?" או אולי: "איפה כאן הדרך לשלום?"

במהלך הסרט תפורק השאלה הראשית לשאלות משניות. כל שאלה כזו תוצג גם היא באופן גראפי על המרקע, ותהווה ראש פרק לקטע שאחריה. שאלות המשנה תהיינה בנוסח כמו למשל: "על מה בעצם הסיכסוך?", "מי הכוחות הפועלים?", "מה הם רוצים?", "מי הם הפלסטינאים", "של מי 'השטחים' האלה?", "מי כבש מה ומתי?" וכו'.

אם למשל השאלה הפותחת היא "איפה כאן הדרך לשלום?" הרי שאפשר לעצב את השאלה כשל מי ששואל הוראות דרך כיצד להגיע לרחוב מסויים בעיר, ואז הסרט כולו יהיה מעין מפת דרכים, גם מבחינה רעיונית וגם וויזואלית. כל השאלות תנוסחנה בסגנון של מסע במבוך אל המטרה הנכספת, הלא היא "הדרך לשלום".

בסוף הסרט, בכותרת הסיום תוצג תשובה אחת קצרה וקולעת לכל השאלות, תשובה שתבטא את המסר המרכזי שעוד יש להחליט עליו.

- רעיון אחר - הוא לנקוט אותה שיטה כמו בסרט "ג'יהד": פורמאט וויזואלי של עיון בתיק מסמכים. תיק שמדפדפים בו ומדי פעם נפתחים גם פרקי משנה חדשים, ואלה יוצגו וויזואלית וגרפית.

בסרט "ג'יהד" נמצאה השיטה הזאת כמתאימה מאוד, ויש לה פונקציה כפולה: א. הכותרות הגראפיות מחלקות את הסרט ל"נתחים" קטנים וקלים לתפיסה, ובסה"כ הם מעניקים לסרט מבנה הגיוני שלצופה קל לעקוב אחריו. יש חלוקה ברורה לפרקים - ולצופה קל יותר לעקוב אחרי הסיעון ולקלוט אותו. ואם קל להבין ולקלוט - גם קל יותר להסכים!

ב. נוצרת מיסגרת וויזואלית, מעין סיפור מסגרת. במקרה של סרט ה"ג'יהד" המסגרת היא שהצופה מעיין בתיק מסמכים (במיקרה זה של המודיעין, אך בנקל אפשר להסב את הרעיון הזה לתיק אחר).

רעיון שלישי, יותר שיגרת, בסגנון סרט טלוויזיה דוקומנטארי: הסרט יהיה סיפור "אישי" של מקום ישוב או של משפחה. למשל: בית במוסררה על קו התפר, או קיבוץ שסבל מהפגזות הסורים, או שיכון ברמת-גן שנהרס בהתקפת סקאדים, או משפחה על דורותיה בארץ, מהסבא החלוץ ועד הנכד המשרת בצה"ל, או אולי שתי משפחות - אחת יהודיה ואחת ערבית, וכו'. במקרה כזה יהיה הסיפור האישי החוט המקשר בין הקטעים ההיסטוריים, קיטעי הרקע המדיניים והצבאיים. יהיה פינג-פונג בין תמונת המקרו ההיסטורית, לבין הסיפור האישי.

כאמור, אין טעם עדיין להכנס לדיון ברעיונות היצירתיים והוויזואליים - כי אלה צריכים להיות תולדה של המסרים והתכנים הספציפיים. כשאדע בצורה מדויקת מה התוכן - אדע גם להלביש אותו בצורה וויזואלית ודרמאטית נכונה וטובה. תוך כדי העבודה על התכנים גם יצוצו הרעיונות הנכונים.

העבודה על המסרים והתכנים העיקריים צריכה להיות משותפת, שלי מול אישיות בכירה מאנשי ההסברה של משרד החוץ. אח"כ אוכל להציע רעיונות וויזואליים מגובשים וחסריט.

תקציב

ההפקה בפועל תהייה משותפת לסליה הפקות ולאולפני הבירה בירושלים.

הערכת התקציב הראשונית שלהלן היא פרי שיתוף הפעולה הזה.

6000	ימי צילום (עבור 7-12 דקות נטו) 4 ימים..
6000	עריכה Off Line, 25 ימים
6500	עריכה On Line +אפקטים, 5 ימים
500	חומר גלם
	חומר ארכיוני, חיפוש וזכויות
6000	2. ראה הערה מס' למטה
	3. ראה הערה מס' גרפיקה
1000	קריינות ושיכתוב אנגלית
1500	מוזיקה ומיקס
250	כותרות תרגום
4500	תחקיר
3000	תסריט
8000	בימוי
3000	מנהל הפקה

 סיכום ביניים \$ 46,250
 + 25% שונות, בילתי צפוי, הפקה,
 הוצאות משרד, ביטוח וכו' \$ 11,500

סה"כ \$ 57,750 - ראה הערות 1-4.

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(המחירים בדולארים ולא כוללים מע"ם)

הערות:

1. התקציב שלהלן הוא הערכה ראשונית בלבד. לכשיהייה מוכן התסריט, נוכל להכין גם תקציב מדוייק ומפורט.

2. התקציב הנ"ל לא כולל תשלום עבור חומר גלם ארכיוני. זאת משום גורם אי הוודאות הגדול שיש בתחום זה.

התקציב מניח שרק כ-7 עד 12 דקות מתוך הסרט יהיו פרי צילומים חדשים שיעשו בארץ, וכל היתר (20-15 דקות) יהייה חומר ארכיוני. את התקציב הנוסף הדרוש לכך אפשר בשלב זה רק לשער:

א. אנחנו מעריכים הוצאות בסדר גודל של כ-4000 \$ תשלום לידי הארכיונים עבור חיפוש קטלוגי והעתקת חומר גלם.

ב. התשלום עבור זכויות השימוש עשויים לנוע בין -15,000 \$ עד -40,000 \$ - תלוי איזה חומר נצטרך מאיזה ארכיון. יתכן גם שיש למשרד החוץ גישה לחומר ארכיוני בתנאים מועדפים.

אנו מציעים שהתשלום עבור חיפוש וזכויות בחומר ארכיוני יעשה לאחד מעשה, על פי ההוצאות שהיו בפועל. אפשר גם שבסופו של דבר יהייה בסרט יותר חומר מקורי חדש (ז"א נצטרך יותר ימי צילום), אך במקרה כזה יש להניח שהתקציב עבור ימי צילום נוספים יתקזז עם ההוצאה על זכויות חומר ארכיוני.

3. הסכום בתקציב עבור גרפיקה נראה לנו כסביר. יחד עם זאת, תוספת תקציב בתחום הזה יכולה מאוד לשפר את המראה של הסרט ולהעניק לו יותר ברק.

4. ככלל, התקציב הנ"ל נראה לנו כמספיק על מנת להפיק סרט ברמה ישראלית גבוהה. אולם אם משרד החוץ יהייה מעוניין להשיג רמה בין-לאומית גבוהה ללא פשרות - כדי להגדיל את הסיכוי שהסרט אכן יוקרן בטלוויזיה בחו"ל, כולל במערב אירופה ובצפון אמריקה - יש צורך להגדיל את התקציב כולו, לא רק בתחום הגרפיקה, אלא גם בימי הצילום (לצורך שיחזוריים קטנים) ובתחקיר (כדי להגיע לתסריט חדשני ומפתיע יותר).

לוח זמנים:

1. השלב הבא הוא סיכום עקרוני, בכתב, על הזמנת עבודה ועל תקציב.
2. מהרגע ששלב 1. חתום, יחול לו"ז כדלקמן:

- גיבוש תכנים, תחקיר ותסריט (מדיונים ראשוניים ועד אישור סופי של תסריט מפורט ע"י המשרד): 2-4 חודשים
 - איתור חומר ארכיוני וצילומים: 1 חודש
 - עריכה גסה: 1 חודש
 - ביקורת, תיקונים ועריכה סופית: 1 חודש
-
- סה"כ: 5-7 חודשים.

תכל'ס

לדעתי הגיעה השעה לגבש את התכנים והמסרים לפירטיהם.
חשוב מאד למקד ולחדד את המסר העיקרי.

אני מצדי אעשה הכל כדי להפוך את התכנים האלה לסרט מעניין, חזק ומשכנע.

בברכה ובכבוד רב,


בניה בן-נון
סליה הפקות בע"מ

העתק:

בנימין נתניהו, סגן שר החוץ
עליזה גורן, דוברת משרד החוץ,
עידן הר-19, אולפני הבירה

מ
הסברה

משרד החוץ

מחלקת ההסברה

כ"ט אב תש"ן
20 באוגוסט 1990

אל הנציגויות

טאדס חוסין - מנהיג המטמל אומץ וכבוד ערבי
RAYMONDA HAWA TAWIL
THE RETURN , JUNE-JULY 1990

"THE RETURN" הוא כתב עת פלסטיני היוצא לאור בווינגטון;
המו'לית שלו היא רימונדה טאויל העומדת גם בראש סוכנות
הידיעות JERUSALEM PRESS SERVICE, הממוקמת במזרח ירושלים.

במאמר שפורסם בגליון יוני-יולי של THE RETURN, שהופק לפני
הפלישה העיראקית לכווית, מרעיפה רימונדה טאויל דברי שבח
והערצה על טאדס חוסין ומשווה אותו לאברהם לינקולן.

מניחים שחמצאו שימוש לדבריה, המבליטים את השותפות באמצעים
ובמטרה בין הפלסטינים לעיראקים.

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EXCLUSIVE
INTERVIEWS:

The PLO's Farouk Qaddoumi
U.S. Representative Lee Hamilton



RAYMONDA HAWA TAWIL

FROM THE PUBLISHER

Saddam Hussein—A Leader Who Symbolizes Arab Courage and Dignity

Baghdad, the city that hosted the recent Arab summit, is a proud Arab city, a cradle of civilization, rich with history and culture. Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, has made Baghdad into a monumental cultural and scientific center, filled with museums and majestic monuments to glorify past and future generations.

Saddam Hussein is a proud leader who symbolizes Arab courage and dignity. He epitomizes people who are defiant, willing to fight until they are victorious. His victory, after eight years of a gruesome war with Iran, is telling of this new breed of a leader.

Saddam Hussein stood up to those who have arrogantly declared themselves masters of the universe, to superpower bullying, and declared to George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, who were meeting in Washington, that he is willing to fight for the freedom of occupied and oppressed Arabs, based on the same principles for which Abraham Lincoln fought and died. Men are born free and equal, and that is what Saddam Hussein wants for the Arab people.

In response to Israeli intransigence, Saddam Hussein has vowed to destroy half of Israel if attacked. With these words, he endeared himself to millions of Arabs as the Arab leader who is willing to stand up to Israel without fear and out of deep conviction.

The Palestinian people owe much to Saddam Hussein and the great people of Iraq. Hussein and his people have shared selflessly their fortunes with the people of Palestine, providing refuge, political and financial support, and a base for training.

History will record Saddam Hussein's contributions to the newly found glory of the Arab people. ♦

5
הצורה

דון לונדון

שלום לכם חוסייני, נוסייבה ושאר המנהיגים האותנטיים

השבוע הוכחתם לי שבמשך שנים רבות הייתי טיפש גדול והתיימרת לי לדגל בשאיפותיכם, שאינן שאיפותיכם כלל וכלל • השמאל הציוני והשאלה הפלשתינית

המוסרי, שהוא את משתי הרגליים שעליהם עומד השמאל הציוני. המלח מה שמנהלים הפלשתינים כדי לפרוק את עולה של ישראל, אינה הזכות כי הם שואפים למימוש זכותם להגדרה עצמית, אלא רק הזכות שמאסו בנו. מאיפתם בנו אינה מחילה עלינו שום ציוני מוסרי. זה לא יותר מהלך נפש שכדאי להתחשב במשמעותיותו.

איך יודעים למה הפלשתינים שואפים? אמרתי אני לא מאלה הסבורים שבשביל לדעת מה חושב ערבי, צריך לפוצץ לו את הראש. אבל זקק הייתי לכך שהעיראקים יפוצצו לכוויתים את הראש, כדי שארע מה חושבים הפלשתינים. עכשיו אני יודע: רובם המכריע רוצה בצלאח אדין מורדני, מנהיג שיאחד את העולם הערבי ויגרש את האל-ערבים מהמזרח התיכון. באימפריה האיכות החדשה של צלאח אדין הבראדי, אין מקום לזריות לאומיות נפרדות של עמי המזרח התיכון.

ואם בחזונו של טראם חוסיין - זה החזון שבו, כפי שהסתבר השבוע, תומכים הפלשתינים - אין מקום לכווית, לגנסיכויות המפרץ ולערב הסעודי, רית, מדוע שיינתן מקום ליישות מדינית פלשתינית ומדוע צריך השמאל הישראלי לתמוך כשאיפה אשר, כמסתבר, איננה שאיפתם של הפלשתינים עצמם?

השבוע נדרשו פרשנים אחרים, ביניהם ערבים ישראלים, לסוגיה הזאת. הם הסבירו שהדוב הפלשתיני כה מיואש ממצבו, עד שהוא מוכן להיות לוח בכל תקופה, תהיה מרוחקת ככל שתהיה, ובלבד שמשוה יחוו. הייתי נאחו בהסבר הזה, לו היו גשמעיים בפרהסיא, בקול גדול, גם קולות אחרים, קולותיהם של ערבים המבינים את ההשלכות המורידות שיש לפאן-ערבי ות על גורלם של הפלשתינים. אף קול שכוה לא הורם ואם יישמע עכשיו, באיחור כה רב, כבר לא אוכל לתת בו אמון.

ובכן, שלום לכם חוסייני, נוסייבה, שלבייה, ושאר המנהיגים האותנטיים. השבוע הוכחתם לי שבמשך שנים רבות הייתי טיפש גדול והתיימרת לי לדגל בשאיפותיכם, שאינן שאיפותיכם כלל וכלל. כאשר תשובו ותבקשו את אהדתי לזכויותיכם הלגיטימיות, תגלו שצדחת העידוד שלכם לסאראם סתמו לי את האוזניים.

שני יסודות מרכיבים את יחסו של השמאל הציוני לשאלה הפלשתינית. היסוד האחד הוא פרגמאטי: אנו סבורים כי שליטתנו בעם אחר היא לנו לרועץ. הכיבוש מחליש את החברה הישראלית וגורע מביטחונה הפיזי של המדינה. היסוד האחר הוא מוסרי: אין זה מוסרי, כך אנו חושבים, לשלול את זכות ההגדרה העצמית של קבוצה לאומית כלשהי, מה גם שבניה של הקבוצה הלאומית השרויה עמנו בריב, שילמו מחיר כבד עבור תקומת ישראל.

די ביסוד הראשון כדי לאשש עמדה פוליטית הרוגלת בהסתלקות מהשטחים, אבל היסוד השני, המוסרי, מקנה משנה תוקף לעמדה זו.

זכות ההגדרה העצמית מבוססת על השאיפה לממש את הזכות הזאת. יסודות היסטוריים משותף, תרבות משותפת, לשון משותפת, כל אלה אינם אלא תומכים העשויים ליצור את השאיפה להגדרה עצמית, אך לא בהכרח יוצרים אותה. אפשר שקבוצת אנשים תעבור את מבחן הקלסטר הלאומי ובכל זאת לא תשאף להגדרה עצמה כעם הזכאי לטריטוריה משלו. הדבר כות" אינה מותנית במסקנותיהם של עיונים אובייקטיביים אודות שורשיה תה של הקבוצה התובעת את הזכות. הזכות היא השאיפה והשאיפה היא הזכות: אני רוצה, סימן שאני עם. זאת התשובה למי שמערער על הלגיטימיות של התביעה היהודית להגדרה עצמית וזאת התשובה הנאותה לכל גילוי רומה אצל קבוצות אחרות.

השמאל הציוני קיבל את טענתם של הפלשתינים כי יש להם זהות לאומית, הנפרדת מזהותם של ערביי הסוד הפורה, וכי הם שואפים לתרגם את זהותם למונחים פוליטיים. קבלת הטענה הזאת הוליכה למסקנה הפוליטית המוסרית כי את המו"מ על גורלם של הפלשתינים יש לנהל עם מי שהם רואים כנציגיהם. טיעוני השמאל התקבלו גם על דעתם של האחרים: מאין פלשתינים של גולדה מאיר, התגלגלו הדברים עד להכרזתו של מנחם בגין בזכויות הלגיטימיות של הפלשתינים.

אם יאבד האימון בכנותם של הפלשתינים, בשאיפתם הכנה לכונן יישות פוליטית המושתתת על שאיפתם להגדרה עצמית, יתערער הטיעון

סודי

יוצא **

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חוזם: 8,10819
אל: בון/286, רומא/240, ני/2055, לונדון/279, פריס/394
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סודי/מידי

אל: בון, רומא

דע: ניו-יורק, לונדון, פריס

עירק - אש"ף: לקראת ביקור השר

1. בחומר השוטף הועבר אליכם שפע מידע על קשרי עירק-אש"ף. בדיפ' פרסומים הקרוב תקבלו גם תמונת חיבוק ערפאת-סדאם וחומר הסברה בנושא. מניחים שאת התמונה תוכלו להשיג בינתיים מפרסומים בעיתונות במקומותיכם.

2. בישיבה אצל ס/השר סוכם כי תפעלו מיידית אצל גורמים ידידותיים לפרסום מודעות בעיתונות המרכזית עם תמונות השניים ועם כיתוביות המדגישות את השותפות המלאה ביניהם.

3. דווחו-נא.

הסברה - אירופה

אק

תפ: שהח(2), סשהח(1), מנככל(1), ממנככל(1), הדס(1), איר(2), איר2(2), רביב(1),
הסברה(3), בנצור(1), מצפא(3)

750 6408
מספר תלמידי משרד החוץ, תל אביב, 1987

תנ"ך הסברה

משרד החוץ

מחלקת ההסברה

י"ז אב תש"ן
8 באוגוסט 1990

א ל ה נ צ י ג ו י ו ת

הפלגים הפלסטינים של הג'יהאד האיסלמי.

סקירת רקע על ארגון הג'יהאד האיסלמי ופלגיו

השונים, שהוברה אליכם בחוזם 3,22120 מה - 27.3

במארס, מצ'ב בתרגום לאנגלית.

174/8.7.90/2.06.02

Islamic Jihad -- Goals and Principles

1. In early July 1990, a leaflet was found in Judea-Samaria signed by the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, dated June 15, 1990 and entitled "The Islamic Jihad — Goals and Principles."
2. The leaflet opens with a historical review of the advent of the Islamic Jihad in the region. The Islamic Jihad Movement is presented as the natural continuation of the Jihad movement in Palestine, from the time of Sheikh Az al-Din al-Kassem and Abd el-Khader al-Husseini to the period of the intifada and the Revolution of the Knives.
3. According to the leaflet, the Islamic Jihad movement is "the true answer to the people's wishes and their current history." In this context, the leaflet defines the principles of the movement as follows:
 - a. Recruiting the Islamic masses in the occupied homeland to continue the holy war (*jihad*) against "the larcenous Hebrew entity."
 - b. Supporting the poor and weak masses in the occupied homeland is a top priority of the Islamic Jihad movement on the road to cultural change.
 - c. Developing mass consciousness of Islam in a revolutionary fashion, corresponding to the masses' hopes for liberation.
 - d. Establishing a new and unified Islamic front, which will be able to lead the people to an Islamic liberation of Palestine.

- e. The Islamic Jihad views the struggle against Zionism as "essentially eternal, historical, and cultural in nature — a struggle until the day of reckoning." This struggle will not end as long as "the Palestinians' presence in Palestine is part of a religious phenomenon based on an all-embracing confrontation with Israel, [this being] an illegitimate international phenomenon directed against the Muslim nation."
- f. Waging holy war (*jihad*) for the liberation of all of Palestine, because the forfeit of even a small part of the country, coupled with recognition of Israel, constitutes a betrayal of Islam, the [Muslim] nation, and [its] history. Therefore, the mission of the Islamic Jihad in the "occupied homeland" is to lead the masses to *jihad* until final liberation is achieved.
- g. Creating conditions that will permit the development of an "independent Palestinian cultural identity, completely free of foreign influences."
- h. The Islamic Jihad in Palestine maintains that "Palestine is the [Muslim] nation's central problem, and *jihad* is the only way to unite the nation throughout the Islamic homeland, the occupied homeland in particular." Thus the Jihad and the revolution in Palestine are a holy torch leading the struggle for liberation. (The road to Palestine is the road to Khalafism, sacrifice, and unity.)

- i. Armed *jihad* is the only way to resolve the struggle against the Jewish entity on Palestinian land (revolutionary Islamic ideology — armed *jihad*).
- j. Unity of the masses based on conviction and revolution toward the fulfillment of their historic role. The Islamic Jihad movement therefore opposes political struggle among Palestinian groups. The top priority is the struggle against the primary enemy — Israel. This goal should unite all forces with the Islamic Jihad.
- k. The continuing struggle with Israel and the West is based on faith. ("You will discover that the greatest enemies of the believers are the Jews and those who believe that Allah has partners.") "It will not be long before you kill the Jews — you east of the river, and they on its west."
- l. Freedom and independence are the means for continuing the struggle. Independence is antithetical to Israeli and Western custodianship on all levels, political and ideological.
"The revolutionary ideology of the Islamic Jihad is based on the annihilation of the Hebrew entity existing on the land of Palestine."
- m. The Islamic Jihad regards the Arab regimes as treasonous, since they have fought against Muslim unity throughout history. The Arab regimes are one side of the coin whose other side is Israel and the Western assault on the Islamic nation. (The Islamic

Jihad, together with the rest of the Islamic vanguard, espouses the overthrow of these regimes.)

- n. All-out struggle against all manifestations of Western civilization, which aspires to neutralize the masses from the conflict. All-out struggle against the ideological invasion, since secularism and Westernization are the bases for the Western attack on the Islamic nation.
 - o. Strengthening relations with all revolutionary Islamic forces in the region, based on the centrality of the Palestinian issue.
 - p. The Islamic Jihad and the bond with Palestine are religious imperatives. The Palestinians' existence in the occupied homeland is a religious phenomenon.
4. Tasks of the Islamic Jihad movement:
- a. Escalating the uprising and leading the masses to a comprehensive military *jihad*: "Declaration of a comprehensive Islamic holy war against the Hebrew entity."
 - b. The Islamic Jihad in Palestine has no political or organizational affiliations with the PLO. Any such inference is tantamount to a betrayal of history and of the masses and a distortion of the facts. It follows that the Islamic Jihad movement, which is responsible for all *jihad* activity outside the region, has its own leadership. The Islamic Jihad movement is opposed to contact of any kind with any political body outside Islam.

c. The Islamic Jihad is not represented in the PNC and has no intention of joining this body in the future. Its activity will be solely within the framework of the United Islamic Front. Its strategic and incremental goal is to consolidate the united Islamic plan; hence the call for the establishment of the United Islamic Front, based on the religious nature of the conflict with the enemy.

The Islamic Jihad emphasizes that it bears responsibility for igniting the uprising. Thus keeping the fires of the uprising burning is fundamental to its plan, based on constant confrontation with and struggle against Israel. The Islamic Jihad is a revolutionary vanguard rooted in the nation and founded upon it.

5. The leaflet ends thus: "Long live the Islamic revolution in Palestine; long live free, Islamic, Arab Palestine from the river to the sea."

Palestinian Factions in the Islamic Jihad

General:

1. The Palestinian factions in the Islamic Jihad are Palestinian reflections of the Islamic Jihad movements that surfaced in the Sunni Arab world during the 1970s. These movements, outgrowths of the fundamentalism of the Muslim Brotherhood, were noted for their disagreement with the Brotherhood's "armistice" with most existing regimes in the Arab world. Therefore the essential difference between them and the Brotherhood is, and has always been, the preaching of violence as a major means of transforming governance and society.
2. The Islamic Jihad group that came into being in the "territories," especially in Gaza, was influenced in its formative period by the Jihad organizations in Egypt during the 1970s, and subsequently by the Iranian revolution. It is unique by virtue of its conspicuous Palestinian-national facet — struggle against the "Israeli/Jewish occupier" until all of Palestine is liberated. This is in addition to its Islamic/universalistic posture on the transformation of governance and society.
3. Since their earliest days, some of the Palestinian factions within the Islamic Jihad have maintained strong relations with Fatah activists (the "Western Front"), because Fatah, since its inception, has had groups with

Islamic leanings, and its founding fathers (including Arafat, Abu Jihad, and Abu Iyad) have "flirted" with the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza and Egypt. It should be emphasized that some of the prominent activists in the Islamic Jihad today once belonged to Fatah and "returned to the faith," some while in Israeli jails.

4. Four main Palestinian factions took shape within the Islamic Jihad during the 1980s, primarily on the basis of personal quarrels, ideological nuances, and affiliations with various organizations and countries. Despite this, personal relations and mutual assistance continue among some of the activists of the different groups. Deportees from the "territories" and persons freed in Israeli prisoner-exchanges with terrorist organizations (in 1983 and 1985) play a prominent role among the activists.

Factions in detail:

5. The Islamic Jihad units (*Siraya al-Jihad al-Islami*) —
Fatah/Arafat:

- a. A faction that has developed since 1985 out of a growing awareness that the Islamic awakening in the "territories" should be exploited, as well as out of a personal feud between the group's founders and Abu Jihad. The group was established by Bassam Sultan and other activists of the Committee 77 of the Fatah Western Front, who enlisted radical Islamic leaders and Fatah activists who had "returned to the faith" in order to carry out attacks in the "territories." However, the faction continues, as in the past, to

be based also on non-religious recruits and activists.

- b. The deaths of the faction's leaders in February, 1988, in Cyprus temporarily disrupted its activity. In 1989, the "official" connection with Fatah was re-established. Mu'in was elected to Fatah's Revolutionary Council. The faction has recently made a conspicuous effort to concentrate its activities in the Gaza Strip via Egypt.
- c. This faction, connected with Fatah, was prominent in carrying out domestic attacks in the "territories."
- d. Fatah is apparently interested in keeping a "safe distance" from the faction, so that Fatah and Arafat can maintain some flexibility in carrying out terrorist activities against Israel while ostensibly remaining faithful to their declared policy of disavowing terrorism.

The faction of Sheikh Assad Tamimi (Beit al-Maqdas):

- 6. Sheikh al-Tamimi, born in Hebron (he preached in the al-Aqsa Mosque until his expulsion in 1970), is permanently domiciled in Amman. Al-Tamimi has close ties with Iran and maintains that Shi'ism constitutes a supplementary legal system (*madhab*) within orthodox Islam. The religious-political significance of this philosophy includes the possibility that Shi'ites should not be regarded as infidels and that one can cooperate with them.

7. Tamimi's faction currently acts independently. A relatively large cell was uncovered this year in Judea-Samaria (14 members were arrested), acting under the instructions of Assad Tamimi and his assistant Ibrahim Sarbal (responsible for the faction's military activity in Jordan). Two other small cells was uncovered late in the year before they managed to perpetrate attacks.
8. In the course of 1989, Fatah tried to lure this faction by promising it financial aid. The faction also continues to maintain good relations with Iranian elements.
9. In 1989, Assad Tamimi was joined by a number of prominent activists formerly of Shakaki's faction, led by Ahmed Matna.

The Shakaki-'Ouda faction:

10. This group came into being in Gaza in the early 1980s. Its leaders were influenced by the Islamic Jihad in Egypt, where several of them studied. The leaders of the faction, Dr. Fathi Shakaki and Abd el-Aziz 'Ouda, both born in Gaza, conduct most of their operations today from Lebanon, to which they were deported in 1988.
11. In 1989, the faction strengthened its ties with Syria and, especially, with Iran; the latter gave them financial aid, guidance and, possibly, also weapons.
12. In the course of 1989, the leaders of the faction made an effort to renew its activist base in the Gaza District. A very large cell within the faction was uncovered in the Gaza Strip late in the year; 130 people have been

arrested so far. The cell comprised two arms: political and military. Members of the organization surrendered armaments including six firearms, two grenades, cartridges, and ammunition. Its members had made final preparations for a terrorist attack.

13. Over the course of the year, the faction explicitly or implicitly claimed responsibility for several border attacks from Jordan and a number of domestic attacks, some of which were apparently not carried out by the faction's members.
14. In view of the faction's relatively small scale of military activity, several of its members, led by Ahmed Matana, "defected" to Sheikh Assad Tamimi's camp.

Jabbar 'Amar's faction:

15. The faction is headed by Jabbar 'Amar, a former member of Fatah who became religious while imprisoned in Israel and was released by Israel in the November, 1983 prisoner exchange with Fatah. (Akhrum 'Ajouri, a veteran Fatah activist, assisted him in his activities.) Amar trains his conscripts in his base in Sudan. He is close to Sheikh Assad Tamimi and maintains contact with him. He probably collaborates with Tamimi from time to time, and receives financial and operational aid from Fatah.
16. A very large cell within 'Amar's faction was uncovered this year (72 people were arrested); it was about to smuggle arms into Rafiah by sea, by means of divers.

17. Jabbar 'Amar is working to re-establish the faction in Egypt and Jordan.

Cells uncovered in 1989:

18. Twenty Islamic Jihad cells were discovered in the "territories" and within the "Green Line." (We should add to this number a group that penetrated from Sinai and attacked an IDF outpost on the Israeli-Egyptian border; this group was connected with a Fatah activist close to Jabbar 'Amar.) Twelve of the cells were associated with the Siraya al-Jihad al-Islami, three with Tamimi in Jordan, one with Dr. Fathi Shakaki, and one with Jabbar 'Amar in Sudan. The remaining eleven cells were operated by local activists affiliated with Islamic Jihad groups. Fifteen of the cells operated in Judea-Samaria and the Jerusalem area (of which ten had ties with activists abroad). Thirteen cells were uncovered in the Gaza Strip (of which seven had "foreign" ties).
20. The discovered cells that had relations with "outside" agents carried out eight attacks this year (seven by the Siraya al-Jihad al-Islami faction and one by Jabbar Amar's group). Another eight attacks were carried out by local Islamic Jihad cells.

On March 22, 1990, the Islamic Jihad circulated a leaflet calling for suicide attacks.

Palestinian agony

IT WOULD be all too easy to dismiss the recent *Time* cover story on the Palestinians' "long, bloody search for nationhood" as yet another sad case of journalistic standards sacrificed on the altar of tendentiousness. It is wellnigh incredible that this normally highly-professional magazine could assign an Arab refugee to write about the intifada; illustrate a news story with a two-year-old photo; give a caption to a photograph which describes what the picture is *not*; refer to Edward Said as "a Palestinian American author" without mentioning his closeness to Arafat and membership in the Palestine National Council; call men caught throwing petrol bombs "activists," and feature a photo of an Arab farmer clearing stones from his land beneath an "Israeli settlement," which is in fact clearly an Arab village with a mosque cutting the skyline. These glaring blunders can be explained only as a consequence of a passion so blind that it countenances the most glaring journalistic aberrations.

But what is far more regrettable about the *Time* story is that it seems accurately to convey the Palestinian Arabs' mood, moulded by long years of suffering, frustration and bitterness. It is a mood characterized by a sense of martyrdom, the inability to soberly assess realities, a quick readiness to blame others and an all-encompassing refusal to assume responsibility for past errors. Throughout the long, anecdotal and sympathetic exposure of the Palestinian soul, there is no evidence of contrition, not an iota of remorse. Nowhere is there a willingness to acknowledge that it was the Palestinians and their Arab allies who rejected the two-state solution in 1948; who invaded and sought to destroy the Jewish population; who turned the ancient Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem into cesspools and rubble; whose support for Nasser's call to push Israel into the sea in 1967 led to the occupation of Judea, Samaria and Gaza; who have committed unspeakable atrocities on their own people; who have sent – and are continuing to send – terrorists to murder women and children, and who even today cheer Iraqi vows to "incinerate half of Israel."

The Palestinians routinely portray Israel, in grossly distorted terms, as the source of all their problems. The IDF becomes the embodiment of evil and brutality – *Time* seldom bothers to verify the horror stories – and the Palestinians are all costumed as innocent vic-

tims and martyrs. They bemoan their own fate, their painful search for national identity, but ignore their own ceaseless efforts to deny Jewish historical and cultural links and national rights to the land. They say their hatred is not directed against Jews as such, only against the Zionists. But the distinction, which has become part of the cant, is insidious. It avers that Jews have rights as individuals, but no rights to nationality and sovereignty. In any other context, this would be scorned as unadorned antisemitism.

Some Arabs, it is said, have acknowledged that the policies of the past, the wars and the terror, were disastrous for the Palestinians. Some are even willing to accept Israel "as an established fact," albeit reluctantly and therefore temporarily. This is of little comfort to Israelis. The wars and the suffering caused by Arab rejectionism and hatred were not simply tactical errors; they were acts of criminal aggression. Thousands of innocent people – most of them Arabs – have been killed and many more wounded in the name of the still-pursued anti-Israel "jihad."

Unless this moral responsibility is recognized and articulated within the Palestinian community and the Arab world, no change in Arab conduct can be expected. Wars and terrorism will go on, and more tales of suffering and martyrdom will be tirelessly recited to anyone who lends a sympathetic ear. And as the Palestinians' agony continues unrelieved, the number of those who believe in accommodation will diminish. *Time's* most telling story is of philosopher David Hartman, the Israeli guru of the "peace camp." While driving to the Hebrew University campus, he was hit by one of those intifada stones to which so many glorious paeans have been composed. Hartman's concept of what constituted legitimate protest was suddenly transformed. Pointing to the stone which had injured his cheek, Hartman declared, "This is not an instrument of protest; this is an instrument of murder!"

The Palestinian catastrophe is self-inflicted. It will not be reversed by favourable media tales, sympathetic governments or even the Arab world's might. If what the Palestinian Arabs want is a change in their destiny and peace with Israel, they will first have to face their history directly and unflinchingly, without the distorting myths and self-delusions to which they, and much of the world, have become addicted.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת ההסברה

י"ז אב תש"ן
8 באוגוסט 1990

אל הנציגות

לא נעלמו ההכנסות מהנפט הערבי?

"ARAB OIL AND GAS", 1.3.1990

בהמשך לכתבה של סבר פלוצקר בנושא, שהתפרסמה ב"ידיעות
אחרונות", (חוזר הסברה -163/6.7.90/2.04.08), מצ'ב מאמר
באותו ענין, שפורסם בעתון "ARAB OIL AND GAS" (1.3.90) היוצא
לאור בפאריס.

האכסניה הזרה עשויה לתת משנה תוקף לענין עצמו קרי: "הבזבוז"
המשווע בעולם הערבי הבא על חשבון הפיתוח, הקידמה ורווחתם של
מרבית תושביו.

173/10.8.90/2.04.08

**\$1,121 BILLION IN 10 YEARS
WHERE HAVE ARAB OIL REVENUES GONE?**

from *Arab Oil & Gas*, March 1, 1990

In absolute terms, and even more so in real terms, Arab countries' oil revenues have fallen sharply over the past 10 years, dropping in current dollars from an all-time high of \$217.15 billion in 1980 to \$55.84 billion in 1986, about the same as in 1974, before recovering to \$79.15 billion in 1989. In nominal terms, the total value of Arab oil exports last year represented only 36.4% of the 1980 level, despite an increase of 29.14% over 1988. In real terms, taking account of inflation and movements in the value of the dollar vis-à-vis other major currencies, the purchasing power of Arab oil exports in 1989 amounted to only 12.4% of the 1980 level.

That vertiginous drop was caused both by the fall in oil production and exports up to 1985, and above all by the decline in prices from 1981 to 1985, the collapse of the oil market in 1986 and the general weakness that characterized it in 1987-89, and OPEC's failure to adjust its reference price to allow for inflation and the depreciation of the dollar.

Over the 1980-89 period, Arab oil exports totalled \$1,121 billion in current dollars, nearly half of which was generated from 1980 to 1982 and the rest between 1983 and 1989. These overall figures nevertheless conceal substantial disparities from one country to another. As the table below indicates, Saudi Arabia accounted for the lion's share of the total, earning revenues of \$478.49 billion over the period, or 42.6% of the total oil revenues of the 13 Arab oil-exporting countries. In second place comes the United Arab Emirates (representing 11.1% of the total), followed by Iraq (10.7%), Libya (9.3%) and Kuwait (9%). Those five countries alone

accounted for 82.7% of the 13 Arab oil-exporting countries' total oil export revenues between 1980 and 1989.

An analysis of the utilization of these revenues can be made using figures of the balances of trade and payments and the annual government budgets of the countries concerned. Given that the majority of these revenues are incorporated in national budgets, their utilization within the framework of budgetary allocations for each fiscal year can be estimated in proportion to their contribution to each country's government receipts.

In the light of these remarks and the official figures available, the utilization of Arab oil revenues over the 1980-89 period breaks down roughly as follows:

a) Defense and security: \$426 billion (38% of the total)

This is by far the most important item. It covers purchases of arms and other spending related to military and security needs. Because of the Gulf war in particular, the Arab-Israeli conflict and, to a lesser extent, conflicts in Chad and the Western Sahara, Arab countries continued to rank among the world's biggest arms importers during the 1980s. The amounts allocated to defense and security vary considerably from one country to another, exceeding 60% of total public expenditure in some countries.

b) Development projects: \$267 billion (23.8% of the total)

This item, the second in order of importance, includes the different credits allocated to economic and social development, in particular for projects in the sectors of industry, agriculture, infrastructure, education and professional training. The available statistics are not

sufficiently detailed for the purposes of making a precise breakdown of development spending as such and the current spending that accompanies it. Furthermore, since 1986 there has been a substantial fall in capital investment and development expenditure in favor of current spending, which was a direct consequence of the sharp drop in oil prices and revenues in 1985-86.

c) Current government spending: \$211 billion (18.8% of the total)

This item covers the current expenditure of government departments and state agencies in the 13 Arab oil-producing countries, as opposed to government capital spending.

d) Others: \$217 billion (19.4% of the total)

This item encompasses public investment and financial assets abroad, loans and grants to other countries, debt service charges, and miscellaneous spending that is not broken down in official statistics.

The main features highlighted by this analysis of the utilization of Arab countries' oil revenues relate, firstly, to the preponderance of defense spending as a proportion of total government expenditure, and secondly, to the decline, especially since 1985-86, in allocations to development projects, as well as the reduction in imports. Furthermore, there are growing disparities between those Arab countries which have financial surpluses and relatively limited development needs, and the others which generate insufficient oil revenues to finance public expenditure and have had increasingly to resort to borrowings.

That disparity can be expected to get worse in the next five

to 10 years because oil production is expected to increase specifically in those countries that already enjoy the highest revenues, whereas in other countries production will rise only a little, if not stagnate or even decline. On the basis of the most plausible scenarios for the development of oil production and prices over the coming years, in 1995 Saudi Arabia can expect to earn oil revenues of \$77 billion while Iraq's oil revenues would amount to \$40 billion, Kuwait's to \$27 billion and the UAE's to \$21 billion. At the other extreme, Tunisia and possibly Egypt will cease to be oil exporters by the second half of the 1990s unless, of course, sufficiently large discoveries are made between now and then to offset the growth in their domestic consumption. Algeria and Qatar are relying above all on natural gas to increase their hydrocarbon revenues in the future. Three newcomers to the oil scene: Syria and the two Yemens, can look forward to a rapid increase in their oil exports in the coming years, but most other small or medium-sized exporters can only, for want of sufficient reserves, hope for an improvement in prices to increase their oil revenues and meet their enormous financial requirements.

All in all, however, given the expected increase in production both in a good number of Middle Eastern countries and, to a lesser extent, in North Africa, and taking account also of the anticipated rise in prices, the recovery in Arab countries' oil revenues that started in 1989 should continue in the 1990s.

The end of the Gulf war and the cooling of some other regional conflicts open up the prospect of a reduction in military spending and the allocation of a larger share of oil revenues to economic and social development projects and to the satisfaction of needs in an Arab world whose population is

forecast to increase from 203 million inhabitants in 1988 to around 280 million by the year 2000. One of the major challenges lies in the fact that nearly two-thirds of that population is concentrated in countries such as Egypt, Morocco and Sudan, which possess limited or very limited oil and financial resources.

Value of Arab Countries' Oil Exports
(\$ millions)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	
Algeria (1)	12,647	12,985	10,770	9,467	9,189	
Bahrain	1,218	1,399	1,105	1,060	945	
Egypt (2)	2,653	2,800	2,457	2,192	2,354	
UAE	19,558	18,815	15,337	12,235	12,978	
Iraq	26,296	10,422	10,096	7,816	9,354	
Kuwait	17,678	13,790	8,827	9,736	10,740	
Libya	21,378	15,254	12,769	11,900	10,631	
Oman	2,720	3,272	3,060	3,445	3,546	
Qatar	5,406	5,348	4,108	3,110	4,386	
Saudi Arabia	105,813	116,183	75,732	42,809	34,234	
Syria	1,335	1,036	994	1,020	984	
Tunisia (2)	449	582	559	460	394	
North Yemen	-	-	-	-	-	
Total	217,151	201,886	145,814	105,250	99,705	

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989 ⁽³⁾	Total
Algeria (1)	9,170	4,819	6,057	4,988	5,350	85,442
Bahrain	987	740	739	516	580	9,289
Egypt (2)	2,630	1,073	1,533	775	990	19,427
UAE	11,842	7,453	8,665	7,352	10,250	124,485
Iraq	10,685	7,183	11,416	10,952	15,300	119,520
Kuwait	9,817	6,905	7,520	6,295	9,700	101,008
Libya	9,962	5,787	6,011	5,169	6,300	105,161
Oman	4,100	2,550	3,480	2,882	3,400	32,455
Qatar	3,068	1,720	1,829	1,709	1,950	32,634
Saudi Arabia	24,180	16,975	19,271	19,500	23,800	478,497
Syria	890	448	580	700	760	8,747
Tunisia (2)	414	187	177	149	240	3,611
North Yemen	-	-	-	310	530	840
Total	87,745	55,840	67,278	61,297	79,150	1,121,116

(1) Including gaseous hydrocarbons. (2) Value of net exports.
(3) Provisional estimates.

Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 1988. Arab Oil & Gas Directory 1989 and the official statistics of the countries concerned.



תש"ן כ"ו תמוז
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אל ל איל אורב - מזל סאן סה החוץ
מאת : מנהל מדור הפקה/הסברה

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הנדון: תערוכת צילומים - טבע ונוף בישראל

1. שמחים להזמין לפתיחת תערוכה שהפקנו לאחרונה בנושא טבע ונוף בישראל.
2. בתערוכה 36 תמונות צבע מרהיבות המתארות את המגוון הרחב של נופים המייחדים את ישראל וכוללים את: פסגות החרמון המושלגות, יערות אלונים ירוקי עד, מפלי מים בחורף ומרבדי פריחה באביב, מצוקי סלעים, כנרת כמקור המים, הירדן שנשפך אל ים המלח ולצידו מעיינות מים מתוקים, הרי יהודה ומדבר הנגב.
3. לתערוכה מצורפות כיתוביות המתארות את המקום ופסוק מהתנ"ך המתקשר לנוף שבתמונה. כמו כן הופקה דפדפת נאה למבקרים (עותק רצ"ב). הכיתוביות והדפדפות הופקו בשפות המקום בו תוצג התערוכה.
4. התערוכה תוכנה והופקה בעיקר עבור נציגויותינו במזרח אירופה ועותקים כבר נשלחו השבוע למוסקבה וורשה.
5. התערוכה תפתח במשרדנו ע"י סגן שה'ח מר בנימין נתניהו, ביום חמישי ה-26.7, בשעה 11:30 במח' ההסברה, ביתן 5.

ב בר כ"ה, [Handwritten signature]
שמי צור

העתק: סגן שה'ח
המשנה למנכ"ל
סמנכ"ל הסברה
סמנכ"ל מזא"ר
מנהל הסברה



PHOTOGRAPHS

1. Winter at the summit of *Mt. Hermon*, the northernmost and highest point in Israel.
2. *Ayoun waterfall*— runoff from the snows of Mt. Hermon, flowing into the Jordan River.
3. *Tel Dan Nature Reserve* — the springs that feed the Dan River and thence the Jordan.
4. *Zavitan Stream* — ponds amid the volcanic landscapes of the Golan Heights.
5. *Monfort Castle* — a Crusader redoubt amid forests of natural evergreen oak in the Upper Galilee.
6. Spring blossoms in an *Upper Galilee* olive grove.
7. *Rosh Hanikra* — Caves in the cliffs abutting the Mediterranean at the Lebanese border.
8. *Sea of Galilee* — Israel's largest body of fresh water.
9. Pistachio groves at the foot of *Mt. Tabor*.
10. Spring.
11. *Jezreel Valley*— grove of date palms (*Phoenix Dactylifera*) abuts a fish pond.
12. Winter blossoms — cyclamens in a replanted oak forest.
13. *The Mediterranean shore* — tulips in the Habonim Nature Reserve.
14. Wild tulips, forebears of today's "domesticated" strains.
15. *Caesarea* — ruins of the ancient Roman port on the Mediterranean.
16. *Judean Hills* — traditional terrace agriculture.
17. *Beit Guvrin Caves*— ancient man-made caves, in the Judean foothills.
18. *Sabras* (prickly pear) — sweet on the inside, thorny on the outside.
19. *Iris* (*Iris Atropurpurea* and *Ophrys Sintenisii*) — among Israel's distinctive species, protected by law.
20. *Ophrys* (*Ophrys Carmeli*), hyacinth (*Hyacinthus Orientalis*), anemone (*Anemone Coronaria*), and tulip (*Tulipa Sharonensis*).
21. *Mar Saba* — ancient Greek Orthodox monastery in the Judean Desert.
22. *Judean Desert* — view toward the Dead Sea at twilight.
23. *The Dead Sea* — morning at the lowest place on earth (-400 m.).
24. *Dead Sea* — salt formations.
25. *'Ein Gedi oasis* — ibexes in the 'Ein Gedi Nature Reserve on the Dead Sea shore.
26. *Dead Sea shore* — driftwood from a flash flood.
27. *Desert oasis* — 'Ein 'Avdat, spring and pool in the Zin Canyon, Negev Desert.
28. Winter twilight in the *Negev Desert*.
29. *Nagariyya* ("Carpentry") — one of the special phenomena in the Makhtesh Ramon Geological Park.
30. Desert landscape.
31. Dunes.
32. Doom palm (*Hyphaenethebaica*) — an African palm in the 'Arava, the northernmost area of its habitat.
33. *Mountains of Eilat* — landscapes of the African-Syrian Rift.
34. *Mountains of Eilat*.
35. *Gulf of Eilat* — view of the Gulf of Eilat, Israel's southernmost point.

Photo exhibition



Nature & Landscape
in Israel

PHOTOGRAPHS BY SHAI GINOTT

Israel, as the narrow land bridge connecting the continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa, is blessed with a variety of landscapes, different climates, and a rich world of flora and fauna.

In the winter, the north of the country has snowcapped hills and flowing streams. There, too, is the Sea of Galilee, Israel's largest body of water; forests of evergreen oak; and an abundance of flowers in winter and spring.



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
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NATURE AND LANDSCAPE in Israel

The Mediterranean Sea is Israel's western border. Alongside the coast are white rocky cliffs with caverns that admit seawater at high tide, shorescapes of serrated rocks, and the remnants of ancient ports — gateways to distant countries of the ancient world.
The Jordan River pours into the Dead Sea, the lowest place in the



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world. While biologically dead, the Dead Sea contains breathtakingly beautiful salt formations. Its beaches feature fresh-water springs that create oases teeming with plants and animals.

Over the Dead Sea loom the Judean Hills — a desert range on one side and a formation of verdant slopes on the Mediterranean side, where ample rain falls in the winter. This area has been a mainstay of the country's agriculture since time immemorial.

To the south is Israel's desert. Much of this area, comprising half of the country, is unsettled. Mountains and hills coexist with springs, oases, and vast, windswept plains. Here are unique geological phenomena such as "craters" (canyons of colorful sandstone, surrounded by mountains), the largest of which is Makhtesh Ramon; Eilat, at the southernmost point of the country, provides a panorama of colorful, rugged landscapes of granite escarpments.


Through the camera lens the landscapes make their presence felt and their colors and forms change from hour to hour, season to season. The result is a display of Israel's special scenery, a picture of the present that sheds light on the Israel landscape accounts in the Bible.



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Ms. Shai Ginott was born in Jerusalem (1958). After studying biology at the Hebrew University, she worked as the photographer of the Israeli Nature Reserve Authority. At present, she is a freelance photographer. Several books and calendars are illustrated with her photographs, and her work is regularly published in various magazines.



ФОТОГРАФИИ

1. Зима на вершине горы *Хермон*, в самой северной и самой высокой точке Израиля.
2. *Айонский водопад*, берущий начало в снегах Хермона и несущий свои воды в Иордан.
3. *Заповедник Тель-Дан* — ручьи, питающие реку Дан, а затем, через нее, — Иордан.
4. *Завитан* — водоемы посреди вулканических ландшафтов Голанских высот.
5. *Замок Монфор* — твердыня крестоносцев среди естественных вечнозеленых дубовых лесов Верхней Галилеи.
6. Весеннее цветение оливковой рощи в Верхней Галилеи.
7. *Рош-Ханикра* — пещеры в скалах, спускающихся к Средиземному морю у Ливанской границы.
8. *Галилейское море* — крупнейший израильский источник пресной воды.
9. Фисташковые рощи у подножия горы Тавор.
10. Весна.
11. *Изреельская долина* — роща финиковых пальм (*Phoenix Dactylifera*) на берегу рыбного садка.
12. Зимние цветы — цикламены — во вновь насаженном дубовом лесу.
13. *Берег Средиземного моря* — тюльпаны в заповеднике Хабоним.
14. Полевые тюльпаны, предки нынешних "домашних" сортов.
15. *Кесария* — развалины древнего порта римлян на Средиземном море.
16. *Холмы Иудеи* — традиционные террасы для ведения сельского хозяйства.
17. *Пещеры Бет-Гуврин* — созданные человеческими руками, в предгорьях Иудеи.
18. Сабры (*опунции*) — сладкие внутри и колючие снаружи.
19. Ирисы (*Iris Atropurpurea*) и *Ophrys Sintensis* — в числе особых видов израильской флоры, находящихся под защитой закона.
20. Офрис (*Ophrys Carmeli*), гиацинт (*Hyacinthus Orientalis*), анемон (*Anemone Coronaria*) и тюльпан (*Tulipa Sharonensis*).
21. *Мар-Саба* — древний греческий православный монастырь в Иудейской пустыне.
22. *Иудейская пустыня* — вид в сторону Мертвого моря; сумерки.
23. *Мертвое море* — утро в самой низкой точке земли (-400 м).
24. *Мертвое море* — соляные образования.
25. *Оазис Эйв-Геди* — каменные козлы в заповеднике Эйв-Геди на берегу Мертвого моря.
26. Берег Мертвого моря — плавник после короткого наводка.
27. Оазис в пустыне — Эйв-Авдат, ручей и водоем в каньоне Цин, пустыня Негев.
28. Зимние сумерки в пустыне Негев.
29. *Нагария* ("Плотники") — один из особых феноменов в геологическом парке Махтеш-Рамона.
30. Пустыня.
31. Дюны.
32. Африканская пальма (*Nurphaenethebaica*) — в Араве — на самом севере ареала своего обитания.
33. *Эйлатские горы* — ландшафты Африкано-Сирийского разлома.
34. *Эйлатские горы*.
35. *Эйлатские горы* — вид Эйлатского залива, самой южной точки Израиля.

ФОТОВЫСТАВКА



ПРИРОДА И ЛАНДШАФТ
ИЗРАИЛЯ

ФОТОГРАФИИ ШАЙ ГИНОТ

Израиль, эта узкая полоска земли, мостик, соединяющий три части света — Азию, Европу и Африку, располагает немалым разнообразием ландшафтов, климатических зон, а также богатым миром флоры и фауны.

Зимой на севере страны можно видеть горные вершины в снежных шапках и струящиеся потоки рек. Здесь же находится Галилейское море, основной источник пресной воды в Израиле. Север радует глаз своим вечнозелеными дубравами и изобилием цветов в зимние и весенние месяцы.

Средиземное море — западная граница Израиля. Вдоль побережья тянутся белые скалистые утесы с пещерами, куда попадает морская вода во



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ПРИРОДА И ЛАНДШАФТ ИЗРАИЛЯ

время высоких приливов; среди каменных уступов встречаются следы древних пристаней — ворот, открывавших путь в дальние страны античного мира.
Река Иордан впадает в Мертвое море, расположенное в самой низкой точке планеты. Биологически это море по-настоящему мертво, но в нем попадаются соляные образования поразительной красоты. Удивительная особенность его пляжей



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
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
наличие пресных источников, которые превращают окрестности в оазис, богатый растительностью и животностью.
Над Мертвым морем маячат очертания Иудейских холмов — пустынная, выжженная солнцем горная цепь, однако со стороны Средиземного моря являющая собою склоны, которые зеленеющих склонов, на которые зимой выпадают обильные дожди. Эта область с незапамятных времен была оплотом сельского хозяйства страны.
К югу простирается Израильская пустыня. Большая часть этого региона, включающего в себя половину страны, не заселена. Горы и холмы соседствуют здесь с ручьями, оазисами и широкими, открытыми всем ветрам равнинами. Тут же мы встречаемся с таким геологическим феноменом, как "кратеры" (каньоны живописных песчаников, окруженные горами), крупнейшим из которых является Махтеш-Рамон. В Эйлате крайней южной точке страны — открывается панорама красочных, неровных ландшафтов, создаваемых гранитными нагромождениями.
Сквозь линзы фотокамеры эти пейзажи предстают живыми: возникает осязаемый эффект присутствия; их краски и формы изменяются в соответствии с часом суток или временем года. В результате перед нами уникальные виды Израиля, показывающие страну сегодня, но при этом озаренные и проникнутые светом ее библейского прошлого.



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Г-жа Шай Гинот родилась в Иерусалиме в 1958 г. Изучала биологию в Иерусалимском Университете, после чего работала фотографом в Израильском Комитете по Охране Природы. В настоящее время она — "вольный стрелок", т.е. независимый фотограф. Ее работами илл. построены многие книги и календари; ее фотографии регулярно публикуются в различных журналах.



FOTOGRAFIE

1. Zima na szczycie góry *Hermon*, najbardziej wysuniętym na północ i najwyższym punkcie w Izraelu.
2. Wodospad *Ajun* — wody ze śniegów z góry *Hermon*, wpadające do rzeki *Jordan*.
3. Rezerwat przyrody *Tel Dan* — dopływy które zasilają rzekę *Dan* wpadającą do *Jordanu*.
4. Potok *Zawitan* — stawy wśród wulkanicznego krajobrazu Wyżyny *Golan*.
5. Twierdza *Monfort* — reduta Krzyżowców wśród lasów wiecznie zielonych dębów w Górnej *Galilei*.
6. Wiosenne kwiecie w gaju oliwnym w Górnej *Galilei*.
7. *Rosz Hanikra* — jaskinie w ścianach skalnych, na styku *Morza Śródziemnego* i granicy *libańskiej*.
8. *Morze Galilei* — największy zasób świeżej wody Izraela.
9. Gaje *Pistacji* u podnóża góry *Tabor*.
10. *Wiosna*.
11. *Dolina Jezreel* — gaje palm daktylowych (*Phoenix Dactylifera*) nad stawem rybnym.
12. *Zimowy rozkwit* — cyklamen w nowo zasadzonym lesie dębowym.
13. *Wybrzeże Morza Śródziemnego* — tulipany w Rezerwacie Przyrody *Habonim*.
14. *Dzikie tulipany*, przodkowie dzisiejszych "oswojonych" odmian.
15. *Cezarea* — *Cezarea*, ruiny starożytnego portu rzymskiego na *Morzu Śródziemnym*.
16. *Wzgórze Judejskie* — tradycyjne rolnictwo na zboczach stoku.
17. *Jaskinie Beit Guwrin* — starożytne jaskinie wykute ręka ludzka, na wzgórzach *Judejskich*.
18. *Sabras* /kolczasty owoc kaktusa, słodki od wewnątrz, kolczasty na zewnątrz.
19. *Irys* (*Iris Atropurpurea*) i *Ophrys Sintenisii* — wśród wyróżniających się gatunków izraelskich, chronionych przez prawo.
20. *Ophrys* (*Ophrys Carmeli*), *Hjacynt* (*Hyacinthus Orientalis*), *anemon* (*Anemone Coronaria*), i *tulipan* (*Tulipa Sharonensis*).
21. *Mar Saba* — starożytny klasztor grecko-ortodoksyjny w pustyni *Judejskiej*.
22. *Pustynia Judejska* — widok na *Morze Martwe* o zmroku.
23. *Morze Martwe* — poranek na najniższym miejscu na kuli ziemskiej (-400 m.).
24. *Morze Martwe* — formacje soli.
25. *Oaza Ein Gedi* — dzikie kozy w Rezerwacie Przyrody *ein Gedi*, na wybrzeżu *Morza Martwego*.
26. *Wybrzeże Morza Martwego* — drzewo unoszone przez wodę po nagłej powodzi.
27. *Oaza pustynna* — *Ein Awdat*, źródło i basen w *Kanionie Cin*, *Pustynia Negew*.
28. *Zimowy zmrok* na *Pustyni Negew*.
29. *Nagaryja* — jedno ze specjalnych zjawisk w *Parku Geologicznym Machesz Ramon*.
30. *Pustynny krajobraz*.
31. *Wydmy*.
32. *Potępiona palma* (*Hyphaenethebaica*) — palma afrykańska w *Arawa*, najbardziej na północ wysunięty obszar tego środowiska.
33. *Góry Eilat* — krajobrazy *Rozpadliny Afrykańsko-Syryjskiej*.
34. *Góry Eilat*.
35. *Góry Eilat* — widok na zatokę *Eilat*, izraelskiego punktu najbardziej wysuniętego na południe.

Wystawa Fotografii



Przyroda i Krajobraz w Izraelu

FOTOGRAFIE — SZAI GINOTT

Wystawa fotografii Izraela, będąc wspaniałym pomostem lądowym łączącym kontynenty Azji, Europy i Afryki, błogosławiony jest różnorodnością krajobrazów, odmiennych klimatów i bogatym światem flory i fauny. W okresie zimowym, północna część kraju ma góry pokryte czapą i pełna jest wartkich strumieni. Na północy, znajduje się Morze Galilejskie, które zawiera największy zasób wody w kraju. Są tam również lasy wiecznie zielonego dębu i bogate kwiecie zarówno w lecie jak i w



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


PRZYRODA I KRAJOBRAZ w Izraelu

zimie. Morze Śródziemne jest zachodnią granicą Izraela. Linia wybrzeża pełna jest białych stromych ścian skalnych z pieczarami, które napelniają się wodą morską w czasie przypływu. Wybrzeże jest też urozmaicone ostro zarysowanymi skalami jak też pozostałościami starożytnych portów, wrót do dalekich krajów starożytnego świata. Rzeka Jordan wpływa do Morza



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Martwego, najniższego miejsca na kuli ziemskiej. Aczkolwiek martwe względem biologicznym, Morze Martwe zawiera przepiękne formacje solne, wybrzeże i plaże tego morza cechują słodko-wodne źródła, które tworzą oazy pełne roślinności i zwierzyny. Ponad Morzem Martwym mającą Wzgórza Judejskie — pustynny obszar po jednej stronie i formacje zielonych zboczy, po stronie śródziemnomorskiej, cieszącej się obfitymi opadami deszczu w czasie zimy. Od zarania wieków ten obszar był zawsze śpichrzem rolnym kraju. Ku południu kraju rozciąga się pustynia izraelska. Większość tego obszaru, stanowiąca połowę terytorium kraju, jest niezamieszkała. Góry i wzgórza współistnieją tam ze strumieniami, oazami i szerokimi równinami opływającymi przez wiatry. W tych miejscach występują rzadkie zjawiska geologiczne, takie, jak "kratery" / kanyon z kolorowych, otoczone przez góry/, z których skal piaskowych, największy jest Machtesz Ramon. Natomiast Eilat, miasto portowe i najbardziej na południe wysunięty punkt kraju, stanowi panoramę pełną barwnych widoków, nierównych granitowych szkarpowan. Obiektyw kamery fotograficznej utrwala koloryt i formy krajobrazu, który ulega zmianie z godziny na godzinę, i z jednej pory roku w drugą. W rezultacie objawia się szczególna sceneria izraelska, obraz teraźniejszości, który rzuca światło na krajobraz Izraela opiewany w Biblii.



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Pani Szai Ginott urodziła się w Jerozolimie /1958/. Po ukończeniu studiów w dziedzinie biologii na Uniwersytecie Hebrajskim, była zatrudniona jako fotograf w Izraelskim Zarządzie Rezerwatów Przyrody. Obecnie, jest wolnopracującą fotografem. Szereg książek i kalendarzy jest ilustrowanych przez jej fotografie i jej prace są stale publikowane w różnych czasopiśmie.



ג' תמוז 1990
26 ביוני 1990

אל : לשכת השר
סגן השר
משנה למנכ"ל
סמנכ"ל הסברה
מנהל מע"ת
מדור מידע

מאת : עקיבא טורק, הסברה/מידע

הנדון : סוכנויות ידיעות - היבטי הסברה
25-26.6.90

ישוב העולים

גם היום, הצהרות שמיר ושרון בנושא עומדות במרכז תשומת לב התקשורת. בסוכנויות שטף ההצהרות, המכתבים והאיגרות מלשכת רה"מ נתפס כ'מבצע דיפלומטי' לשכנע את ארה"ב וברה"מ שאין ישראל מיישבת עולים בשטחים.

בניגוד לדיווחים היום בעתונות הישראלית, תגובת מחמ"ד מצטיירת בסוכנויות כחיובית בעיקרה. כך בדויטר, לדוגמא:

The United States on Monday welcomed Israel's pledge not to settle Soviet Jewish immigrants in occupied territories. State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutweiler called Sunday's announcement by Israeli Housing Minister Ariel Sharon "a step in the right direction."

מכתב שמיר אל גורבצ'וב ('אשר שמיר עצמו מתאר אותו כלא שגרתי' - לשון הכתבה) מצוטטת בהרחבה בכתבה ארוכה של רויטר.

נושאים אחרים אשר נסקרו היום

ב-A.P. - כתבות קצרות על המטען בחוסררה, ביקור נשיאי הפרלמנטים מהגרמניות, והתמודדות רבין-פרס. בדויטר - דיווח על הפגישה המתוכננת בין שרנסקי למנדלה בלוס אנג'לס. הפגישה אמורה להתקיים ביום שישי.



הסברה/מרחבי
טל' 3350

י"ט תמוז
12 ביולי
תש"ן
1990

13890

אל : מר יעקב לוי, הקונכיל, בוסטון

מאת : הסברה/מרחבי

הנדון: חומר הסברה ברוסית

רצ'ב חומר הסברה בשפה הרוסית עבור פרופ' אריה מוצקין לפי בקשת מר אייל ארד מלשכת ס/שה'ח מה-4.7.90 עם הסברים ו/או החומר בתרגום מאנגלית.

להלן פירוט הפרסומים:

1. JERUSALEM והגירסה ברוסית
2. ISRAEL TODAY והגירסה ברוסית
3. AGRICULTURE IN ISRAEL והגירסה ברוסית
4. HOW TO DO BUSINESS IN ISRAEL A GUIDE FOR RUSSIAN BUSINESSMEN - בשפה הרוסית
5. "אריאל" 1989 ו"אריאל" 1990 - שניהם בשפה הרוסית
6. "הכירו: ישראל" - אלבום בצבעים בשפה הרוסית, תל-אביב 1989
7. LETTER FROM ISRAEL והגירסה הרוסית

ב ב ר כ ה,

דב סחת

העתק: מר א. ארד, לשכת ס/שה'ח ✓

ה'י ר'כ'ח'מ

משרד החוץ
מחלקת ההסברה

רא תמוז התש"ן
4 ביולי 1990

אל: הנציגות

ראיון ראש הממשלה
לשבועון המצרי "MAYO"
18.6.1990

ראיון שנתו ראש הממשלה מר יצחק שמיר, לכתב השבועון
המצרי "MAYO" התפרסם ב-18.6.1990.

לוח התרגום לאנגלית של הראיון, המתייחס לתהליך השלום
ולמדיניות הממשלה.

162/ 6.7.1990/1.02.18 (1.01.032)

**An Interview with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, published by
the Egyptian weekly Mayo, June 18, 1990**

Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel gave the following interview to Mayo correspondent Khamis Abu el-Afiah. It is the first interview given by Shamir to an Arab paper since the Knesset's endorsement of his new cabinet. We are publishing this interview in order to get to know Yitzhak Shamir's views on the question of peace, even though we differ with many of the views he expressed. The Arab reader should know how the Prime Minister of Israel thinks. Here below is the interview in full:

Question: Secretary of State James Baker has greatly criticized Israel lately, saying to its government, "When you are ready for the peace talks, get in touch with us." This shows that he is putting the blame on you for not being serious with regard to the peace process. What will you do to prove that you have serious intentions for peace -- do you have a program or a plan to break the ice in the peace process?

Shamir: First of all, I would like to point out that we have received clarifications from the USA that when Secretary Baker said, "When you are ready for the peace talks, get in touch with us," he meant all sides and parties interested in the peace process: if you are serious, then you have to do "this and that." Therefore, Baker's recent call was not meant for Israel alone.

Secondly, I stated on the day that the Knesset endorsed my government (with a majority of 62 out of 120 Knesset Members)

that the government under my premiership holds fast to the Camp David Accords, as well as to the peace plan that was agreed upon here on May 14, 1989. I said that we are committed to every word in the plan, and that we do not retreat from anything stated in our plan. Therefore, I believe that we have a peace plan, and that this plan is a good and a realistic one that I would like to work on in cooperation with Egypt, which has an important role in the peace process, as well as in cooperation with the United States of America.

Question: There is a common belief among observers that the Israeli right, under the leadership of the Likud, is the only one with the ability to achieve peace, just as Menachem Begin did in 1977. Do you support this belief?

Shamir: Experience has proven that this belief is correct. But will it be achieved in the future? We shall see! In any case, this is the truth: the right in Israel has brought about peace with Egypt. We in Israel are very much interested in peace.

Question: The Labor Party leader, Mr. Shimon Peres, has attacked or criticized you, saying that your talk about peace is nothing more than "lip service." In light of this, how do you expect the Arabs to believe that you have serious intentions towards peace, when your partner of yesterday is casting doubts on your peaceful intentions and your commitment to a peaceful solution?

Shamir: This is one of the reasons that led to the breakup of the National Unity Government. There was no harmony or cooperation among the partners of the previous government that broke up three months ago. Today, however, there is a new

government, with one plan and one voice. That is why the Arab countries should take seriously what I and my colleagues in the government say about our wish to work towards finding a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, in accordance with our suggestions. I repeat and reiterate that this is the peace plan that was endorsed on May 14, 1989, based on the Camp David Accords which commit Israel to this day, and which also commit Egypt, since President Anwar al-Sadat signed them, well as the USA.

Question: You have said more than once that you are committed to the peace process and to the Camp David Accords, but your government has elements that object to this process and describe it as a "catastrophe for the State." Are you not afraid that in the event it is started, your partners in the government will make it fail?

Shamir: True, there are different views even inside the government, but this is the result of the election system used in Israel, which always makes it necessary that a coalition government be formed. In every coalition government there are representatives of various parties and groupings, but the determining factor is the peace plan that is stated in the basic guidelines endorsed by this government.

Question: In an address delivered recently by Syrian President Hafez el-Assad, he said that the Arab countries will strive to find a solution with Israel under the condition that the latter return the Arab countries' lands to them. Do you, Your Excellency, accept this proposal and say to Syrian President Hafez el-Assad, "Ahlan wa-sahlan in Israel"?

Shamir: If the Syrian President wishes to come to Israel to hold talks with us without prior conditions, we shall welcome him. Here I would like to mention that Sadat also came to Israel in a surprising step. His speech at the Knesset was "cruel" with regard to us, to Israel. In spite of that, we held talks and reached the peace agreement. If Syrian President Hafez el-Assad wants to follow in the steps of President Sadat, I would say to him, "*Ahlan wa-sahlan*."

Question: Permit me to say that the peace process that was initiated by President Sadat ended successfully. Egypt retrieved its land, and justice was done. If the Syrian President also launched a peace process, would he attain the same results?

Shamir: I am speaking about negotiations without prior conditions. I do not want, nor am I able to say a thing about the result. If the Arab countries want to reach a solution to the conflict, we have to start the talks and then we shall see the result. Without talks it is not possible to reach anything.

Question: A few months ago, and in face of the great wave of immigration [of Soviet Jews to Israel] you said, and I am quoting you: "This immigration requires a big Israel." Now, after the great wave of protest your declaration caused, do you regret saying that, and what do you mean by the words "big Israel"?

Shamir: I have explained many times that Israel could not be big in area because it is a small country, and that we are unable to change the geography of this country (Israel). But I

want Israel to be strong in its society, in its cultural standard, and its economy.

Question: Do you see yourself, at any stage, sitting with the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization at the negotiating table?

Shamir: I do not think that the road of talks with Arafat will lead to peace, because I believe that Arafat does not want peace with Israel.

Question: Then what does Arafat have to do to prove his good intentions towards Israel?

Shamir: To dissolve the PLO. Israel's policy today is to hold talks with every neighboring Arab country, and also with representatives elected by the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, and not to talk with the PLO. This is our policy.

Question: But every person elected in the (West) Bank and the [Gaza] Strip will be an unofficial representative of the PLO. Don't you think it would be better to shorten the way by speaking directly with the important leaders in the PLO -- with those who have the authority to determine things?

Shamir: I do not know what every Arab thinks, but what the PLO thinks, it also does. To this day, it says it will not, and will never, change the Palestine National Covenant, in which the PLO commits itself to the destruction of the State of Israel! I do not see any possibility of holding talks with the PLO. As for talks with the Arab countries, my answer is "yes,"

and [I say] "yes" to talks with the elected representatives of the Palestinians. I repeat and reiterate saying "no" to the PLO and "no" to terror organizations.

Question: Allow me to interrupt you. The head of the PLO, Mr. Yasser Arafat, recognized, in a speech he delivered in 1988 before the Palestine National Assembly, UN resolutions 171, 242, and 338, which meant the negation of the Palestine National Covenant and recognition of Israel.

Shamir: There is a huge difference between what Arafat says and what he does. The proof of that is the recent terrorist operation attempted (but failed) by the group of Abu el-Abbas, Arafat's friend, on Shavuot (Pentecost).

Question: Some experts believe that if Arafat fails to achieve peace, his failure will strengthen extremist elements inside and outside the PLO, one of which is the Islamic Hamas movement. Are you not afraid that this would lead to escalation of the situation, which might lead to the eruption of war in the Middle East?

Shamir: All fanatic elements in the Arab world will bring catastrophes to the Arab nation. We do not fear these fanatic elements. I believe that these elements, with their fanaticism, constitute a danger to the Arabs. In my opinion, the PLO and Hamas movement are both fanatic factors that cause the failure of peace and destroy the chances for peace.

Question: President Mubarak has proven, and proves, that he is a wise and sensible leader, and that he is moderate. This was shown at the Baghdad Summit, where President Mubarak tried to

soften the tone of the resolutions. Don't you think this is a sufficient factor to make you offer concessions to the Arabs in everything concerning the peace process?

Shamir: In my opinion and according to our peace plan, we must have close cooperation between Egypt and ourselves, to work together to bring about peace in the area. I would have liked to see more cooperation between Israel and Egypt in persuading the Palestinians and other elements for the sake of creating and preparing a different atmosphere in the area...a positive atmosphere that would push the wheel of peace forward. I had expected President Mubarak not to add his voice to that of the "Arabs" against the immigration of the Soviet Jews to Israel, because "immigration," where Israel is concerned, is like oxygen for breathing. Any Israeli, even the most moderate toward the Arabs, would not abandon the matter of immigration, because whoever rejects immigration is rejecting the entity of the state. The story of the settlement of the immigrating Jews in Judea and Samaria is not true and without basis. Everyone living in the country knows very well that the immigrants do not go to the settlements. Peace between Egypt and Israel should be the cornerstone for the comprehensive peace in the area. We are ready to do everything in our power to strengthen President Mubarak's efforts in bringing about peace for the area. (A remark by Mayo: President Mubarak does not object to immigration; he objects to settling the Soviet Jews in the occupied territories which are still disputed.)

Question: Those who follow the Arab press can see that the Arab protest is against settling the immigrants in the "territories." Don't you think it would be better if you would

declare publicly that Israel has no intention whatsoever of settling the immigrants in the "territories"?

Shamir: It is true that such news appeared in the Arab press, but I have said tens of times that Israel's policy is not to direct the immigrants to live in Judea and Samaria or in any other place. The truth is that they do not go there. The Arabs, however, make it their excuse to fight immigration. By so doing they are proving that they are not only striving to liberate the "territories," but that the existence of Israel in this area embarrasses them. The Jewish people feels that, and that is why we cannot be asked to believe the intentions of anyone who fights immigration. Those who fight against the immigration are fighting against the existence of Israel. Therefore, the Arabs are wrong when they fight against immigration.

A hypothetical question: Suppose that a few thousand of the Jewish immigrants would decide to go to the settlements. Would the Israeli government prevent them from doing so?

Shamir: Israel is a democratic country. We do not say to anyone: go here or go there. Everyone does what he wants. We do not make laws to prevent one from going anywhere in Israel. Just as it is impossible to ask Americans to stop Jewish immigrants from going to San Francisco or elsewhere.

Question: Can you take stock of all that happened in the past year with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict and your expectations for the coming year: will it be a year of peace and settlement between the Arabs and Israel?

Shamir: First of all, I would like to see a year of peace and settlement between the us and the Arab countries. But there is no doubt that we must stop the intifada, this chain of demonstrations and daily confrontation between the Arabs and Jews. I believe that the support given by the Arabs to the intifada hinders the advancement of the peace process. This is clear to the Arabs in Israel and the Arab countries. The intifada as it is will not bring any benefit to the Arab people. The only way to attain progress in the peace march is the way of negotiations. We suggest negotiations. Let us abandon the intifada which is causing pain to the citizens and leading to the fall of victims -- which we do not want to happen. We are sorry for this state of things which pains us. Let them stop that and start negotiations. We suggest negotiations based on Camp David. President Mubarak stated to a Kuwaiti paper two years ago that he was sorry for the halting of negotiations in connection with the implementation of the Camp David Agreements. He said something like this: "If we had not stopped the negotiations, the Palestinians would have gained plenty in time. Thus, time was wasted." Therefore, I say it is a pity that time has been lost. Let us learn from the past. Let us renew the negotiations and sit around the "table" to negotiate within the framework of the Camp David Agreements and within the framework of the peace plan that was endorsed on May 14, 1989, and embark on negotiations.

Question: What is your opinion of President Mubarak?

Shamir: President Mubarak is a great Arab leader, the leader of a very important Arab country. It is he who has realized many and momentous achievements and we would like to work with him for the sake of peace.

משרד החוץ
מחלקת ההסברה

י"ב תמוז תש"ן
5 ביולי 1990

אל : הנציגויות

"הגנבים מבגדד"
תרגום מ"ידיעות אחרונות", 29.5.90

לבהשת מספר נציגויות תורגם לאנגלית מאמרו של
סבר פלוצקר, שפורסם ב"ידיעות אחרונות" מה 29.5.90
ושוגר אליכם עם חוזר הסברה מספר 153/8.6.90/2.04.08

163/6.7.90/2.04.18

The Thieves from Baghdad — Where's the Money?

Where Did \$2,000,000,000,000 Go?

by Sever Plotsker *

The oil money: \$1 trillion invested in wars and armies * hundreds of billions sunk into adventurous investments and ventures * After the oil bonanza, the Arab world remains as undeveloped as ever.

There's a certain question that did not and will not come up around the table of the Arab leaders convened at the Baghdad summit conference. It's a totally practical question. Where's the money?

It's quite a bit of money, too: \$2,000,000,000,000 (two trillion dollars). That's what the Arab countries have earned by exporting oil in the 16 years that have passed since the first oil shock of 1974. In 1973, Arab countries exported oil for \$20 billion; the oil commanded \$3.00 per barrel on the established market. In 1980 they earned a record \$220 billion, extracting nearly \$35 per barrel from a panicky market.

In the 1980s, the industrialized world learned to conserve energy. Alternative oil resources were found, and the member-states of the cartel began lying to each other. Prices — and income — began to tumble. Still, the Arab countries have no reason to shed tears. Their oil revenues this year are expected to reach \$70 billion.

* Translated from *Yedioth Aharonoth*, Tuesday, May 29, 1990.

Two trillion dollars in 16 years is a significant sum indeed. It's the largest tax collection in modern times. The countries of the world have paid out this sum in the form of an oil tax to the Arab countries that belong to or cooperate with OPEC. In the West, the oil shock triggered inflation, unemployment, and a protracted economic retreat. What did the lucky-winner countries do with the money? Where did it go to?

Destruction. At least \$1 trillion were invested in wars and armies. The Iran-Iraq war cost \$500 billion, more or less. The arms budgets of Libya, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries consumed additional hundreds of billions. What for? No one will ask this question at the discussion table in Baghdad.

Business losses. \$500 billion were "recycled" and invested in the financial system of the West, especially in capital markets of London and New York. Some were properly invested, in government bonds or high-performance shares. Most, however, gravitated to adventures and risks on the principle of "easy come, easy go." Oil surpluses migrated to South American countries in the form of credit, bringing Arab countries' losses from the South American debt crisis to hundreds of billion dollars. Who is responsible? Not us, say the distinguished delegates to the Baghdad summit.

Waste. The landscapes of Arabia are punctuated with showy projects devoid of economic sense or logic. We will never know the corruption surrounding them. Nor will we ever be able to gauge the mountains of wealth that the oil merchants have accumulated for themselves. One hundred billion dollars? two

hundred? The Baghdad agenda won't allocate a minute to discussion of this issue.

* * *

What about development? The Arab countries invested only the slightest remainder in the construction of an industrial, educational, and social infrastructure, with which they might prepare their growing population (burgeoning at a world-record rate of 2.7 percent per annum) for the post-oil-windfall era to come. Even this investment is distributed inequitably. The neediest beneficiaries, such as the Egyptians and the Palestinians, receive the least, while the well-to-do such as the Saudis and the Kuwaitis, who live on top of the oilfields, get the most.

Thus the results, too, are grim. The economic situation in the Arab world, except for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, is bad. Very bad.

- * Education per capita is on the decline. Illiteracy creates backwardness, ruling out any possibility of arresting the population explosion.
- * There is no industry, let alone the high-tech or export kind. The dynamic Asian countries have swiftly overtaken the Arab states, even though they do not produce oil.
- * There are no productive jobs. More than a quarter of the Arab labor force is unemployed, overtly or covertly. Anyone who does not go to the Gulf for work sits at home disgruntled or takes up work in the civil service for a pittance.

- * The market structure is distorted. Governments are bloated and leave no room for private enterprise. Wasteful subsidies emasculate the budgets.
- * Standards of living have not risen in at least ten years. Rather than escaping poverty, people sink into it. The cities are overcongested and Islam is beginning to preach against growth.

* * *

Those \$2 trillion dollars, an undeserved windfall for the Arab world, could have turned this region into an economic power and ensured its future. This historic opportunity was totally missed. Only Egypt made an effort to establish a modern economy, and its success, too, is dubious. The other rulers preferred war and the amusements that money provides.

OPEC will fall apart for good in the 1990s. Alternatives will be found, energy conservation will sink deeper roots, and inexpensive and efficient production methods will come into use. When all this happens, 280 million people in the Arab countries will huddle together in frustration and disgruntlement, deprived of democracy, having no future. What will become of them? This is the question that failed to come up today in the Baghdad summit.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת ההסברה

י"ב תמוז תש"ן
5 ביולי 1990

אל : ה נ צ י ג ו י ר ו ת

דברי רהמ' יצחק שמיר
בעת הצגת הממשלה בפני הכנסת
----- 12 ביוני 1990 -----

לוט, בתרגום לאנגלית, נאום ראש הממשלה יצחק שמיר

בכנסת בעת הצגת הממשלה החדשה. (12.6.1990)

161/6.7.90/2.04.18 (1.10.034)

**Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's Address in the Knesset
on the Formation of the Government**

June 12, 1990

Mr. Speaker, Esteemed Knesset:

On Friday, Nisan 15, 5750, June 8, 1990, I informed the President, in accordance with Paragraph 13 (B) of the Basic Law: The Government, that I had succeeded in forming a Government. In accordance with this, it is my honor to present the Government to the Knesset and to request its confidence.

Esteemed Knesset:

One of the manifestations of the strength of our democracy is the basic rule that what the majority decides obligates the entire public. Hence is derived the assumption that a government that enjoys the support of a relatively small majority of Knesset members is exactly as valid as one that enjoys a large majority. In the history of the State there have been governments with small majorities that functioned efficiently and reliably and there have been governments with large majorities whose performance was overshadowed and impeded by crisis.

The Government I now present before you represents the majority of the people and unifies within it many forces endowed with ability, experience, and accomplishments in many areas. Most of its members served in previous governments or in responsible governmental positions. It embraces all the national forces that have fought and worked for the Land of Israel and for the settlement of the Land of Israel in all its

areas. It represents the traditional, religious, and ultra-Orthodox public in all their variations, alongside a broad public of residents of cities and development towns, and of old and new agricultural and pioneering settlements. I believe it correct to say that the concept that the Land of Israel is a value, and not merely a piece of land, unifies all the constituent elements of the Government. I know that all its members are prepared to assume the task of managing the affairs of the State and serving the public at a time of many problems and challenges.

The basic guidelines of the government, which were placed on the table of the Knesset, reflect the aims and policies of the National Government.

The National Unity Government, which preceded the Government that I present before you today, lasted for about fifteen months. When I presented it to the Knesset, on Tevet 14, 5749 (December 22, 1988), I insisted that a national unity government was the need of the hour. I explained that the challenges that the State of Israel must face in the coming years require the cooperation of all forces that want to and can lend their efforts to the national tasks.

I doubt if there was anyone who fought and argued for a national unity government more than I. Time after time I advocated the establishment of such a government, and I struggled for it with my party colleagues. We yielded on party positions and advantages, we accepted no little criticism — all for the sake of that unity which I believed to be critical for the people and the State at this time. Unity is not a

mechanical matter. Unity requires taking a unified stand vis-a-vis the outside world, at least in matters that are basic and vital to the state. This approach was not taken, to my regret, by some of our partners in the Government.

The growing accumulation of obstacles and problems impeded the outgoing Government's ability to function. Speaking with two voices instead of one clear voice, the frustration of Government policy by members of the Government, continual undermining of the Government in order to bring it down and replace it with a different one — all these turned the National Unity Government into a body whose disadvantages often overshadowed its benefits. Everyone who has the well-being of the State in mind, and, with it, the assurance of its ability to cope auspiciously with the problems and challenges it faces, grieves over what occurred, over the difficult crisis that was caused, and over the damage done to the image of the Government and the state.

Personally, I neither rue nor regret the efforts that I invested, together with my colleagues, for the Unity Government. I continue to believe that we need unity -- true, maximum unity. But I saw no place for the inclusion within the Government of those parties that had caused the failure of the National Unity Government.

I wish to devote a few words to the public and legislative activity toward change in the system of government in Israel. I do not think the system of government we have now is the embodiment of perfection and is suitable for us in all respects. Therefore, I do not object in principle to changes,

if the majority of those elected by the people deem them appropriate. I am only concerned that, in the great fervor for change and the great opposition to the existing system, against the background of the political crisis that occurred in the last few months, things will be done hastily, the good will be thrown out with the bad, and we will find ourselves trapped in a system that is different but not necessarily better than the existing one. Every system of government in the world has advantages and disadvantages. All such systems are implemented by human beings subject to pressures, temptations, and human weaknesses. Even the best system can stagnate and be exposed to exploitation for malicious purposes and to crises. Hence the need for common sense and for great consideration of the fact that Israel's conditions of life in this generation are unique in many senses, and that the system of government appropriate for Israel must be adjusted to these conditions.

Jewish Immigration

At the top of the agenda of the Government and the State are immigration and absorption. The State of Israel was established and exists for the sake of the entire Jewish people. It is the national home of the Jewish people, and every Jew everywhere can and should find his place in it and live in it as a Jew. This being our goal, we are filled with excitement and joy of action as we observe the waves of immigrants reaching our land. An entire limb of the body of the Jewish people has been reattached after seventy years'

detachment. Jews so distanced from their roots as not to know the meaning of Judaism and Israel, Jews who were not circumcised and did not know what the Jewish holidays were, are coming to us and rediscovering their Jewish identity and heritage. The statement of the prophet Samuel is coming true before our eyes: "The Eternal One of Israel will not lie." For even though the body of a Jew was distanced, wounded, and tortured, its Jewish spark was not extinguished. The day has come that the spark has been reignited and joined with its origins in the ancestral homeland. No one will cease to sing this refrain. We shall absorb every immigrant with all our abilities. The Israeli public at large deserves full praise and esteem for the understanding and spirit of generosity it has shown in order to assist the immigrant and alleviate all aspects of his absorption. I call upon the citizens of Israel to increase their involvement for the sake of this wonderful and lofty goal. The phenomenon of tens of thousands of Jews returning to their land has aroused our enemies that surround us. I say "our enemies" explicitly, because anyone who rises up against the immigration of Jews to the Land of Israel is hostile to the Jewish people and works against the Jewish State. Today it is clear, beyond any shadow of doubt, that the matter of settling immigrants in the Judea-Samaria and Gaza regions — and we stated and again state that we have no policy of directing immigrants specifically to these areas — was a transparent and expedient excuse. The true aim of the outcry that has arisen is to prevent the coming of Jews to Israel.

We repeatedly assert in the ears of statesmen and leaders throughout the world: the Arabs' animosity toward the very existence of the State of Israel has not yet subsided, to our regret, and the malicious intent to put an end to its existence has not yet ceased. We have stated and restated that neither what they call the "occupied territories," nor what they call "settlements," nor the libel about human rights violations, is the cause of the effort against us. Neither is the question of the status and the political future of the Arabs living in Judea-Samaria and Gaza the true problem; it is not the obstacle to peace between Israel and the Arabs. All these problems could be solved if there were a true desire for peace and coexistence with the State of Israel. The Camp David accords and the Israeli government's Peace Initiative include good proposals for this. The problem is the Arab states' rejection of the very existence of Israel. They, and only they, can overcome this obstacle, since everyone knows that the State of Israel and all its inhabitants have always yearned for peace as for air to breathe. Anyone who claims otherwise is propagating a groundless libel.

The unprecedented pressure campaign that the Arab states are carrying out against the immigration of Jews is decisive proof that their policy has not yet changed. We can only grieve over the fact that Egypt, which has made peace with us, a peace which we are striving to develop, has joined this campaign and has given its support to the decisions of the Arab summit in Baghdad on this and other subjects.

Immigrant Absorption and the Economy

When I presented the National Unity Government on October 20, 1986, I said, among other things: "Economic growth means, first of all, creation of the conditions that will make it possible for us to fulfill the Zionist goals of the state, aliya first among them. This means we must concentrate on those changes that will make it possible for new immigrants to live and to earn a living in the country.... The challenge is the creation of an economic system that will facilitate the creation of jobs suited to people whose professional skills make them sought-after throughout the world.

At that time, almost four years ago, Jewish immigration to Israel was a hope, for the realization of which one had to prepare and anticipate. Today, it is a fact, the dimensions of which exceed all estimates. Unlike other countries, Israel will never impose quotas as a means of easing the absorption process. We shall be able to deal with the waves of immigration only if we are willing to break conventions and institute changes, even if they interfere with one interest group or another. Above all, the absorption of mass immigration is essentially an economic task of the highest order. The two major tasks in immigrant absorption are providing a home for every family and jobs for its breadwinners. The government will spare no effort to achieve both.

A healthy national economy, which ensures prosperity for its citizens at home and is able to compete with outside

forces, is also the principal guarantee of social justice, maximum security, and a respected international position.

The Israeli economy itself needs to be put in order. The tremendous changes in the world and the massive Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union present us with additional challenges. For all these, a great effort by all of us, and especially by the new Government, will be needed.

The economy can and must grow quickly. It can be assisted by domestic resources and foreign investments only on condition that we assure its stability for years to come and reduce government intervention.

The government will work to reduce bureaucratic intervention in the economy. The government's economic activities should be navigated by means of the laws of the State, regulations adopted by the Knesset, and macro-economic imperatives. The efficiency of the economy will be ensured by free, real competition within the country and outside it. This will also ensure appropriate remuneration to the inhabitants who are partners in this effort.

The government will make an effort to sell its business assets and to use these and additional resources to help new and promising economic efforts. The government, for its part, will initiate processes for assuring employment to veteran citizens and new immigrants alike, as well as for assuring housing, particularly for demobilized soldiers and young couples, and, of course, for new immigrants.

Together with the absorption of immigrants, the government will take care of the weak classes and will provide

them with orderly and dignified assistance. Human resources and social services, including education, health, and local government, will be administered according to clear and fair laws, regulations, and rules. The government will do everything it can to diminish the scale of unemployment.

Only a few years ago, Israel experienced hyper-inflation. Although inflation has been largely eradicated, its embers still glow — and we are duty-bound to remain vigilant. Unfortunately, despite the continued recession and severe unemployment, our inflation is still much higher than that prevailing in the developed countries that are our target markets.

This situation interferes with our ability to increase exports and international trade, which are vital to the assurance of economic growth. Therefore, it must be fought — and we will indeed fight it.

Even though the tax burden is relatively heavy, the State revenues do not suffice to meet the needs of its budget. We shall therefore have to adjust our budget expenditure priorities in terms of minimum outlays for maximum results.

The Peace Process

The government is committed to peace and to the advancement of the peace process, the purpose of which is true peace between Israel and its neighbors. Our striving for peace and our belief in the intrinsic blessing of peace originates neither in military weakness nor in concern about political pressures. We have extended, still extend, and will continue

to extend our hands to our Arab neighbors. We shall be forthcoming toward anyone who truly wants to live with us in peace. We shall work actively for this.

The history of wars and peace agreements shows clearly that there is no substitute for direct talks for the sake of terminating war, ending a state of war, and attaining peace between peoples and states. The first and only peace that has been attained with an Arab neighbor thus far could not have been effectuated without direct negotiations. Therefore, we repeat our call for direct negotiations with each of the Arab countries toward the conclusion of contractual and durable peace. Our call for direct negotiations is not a proclamation meant to discharge a duty. It is a true and sincere appeal to our neighbors to abandon hostility and warfare and come to the negotiating table. Thus their willingness to make peace will be tested. We completely reject the idea of an international conference, for this is a means of coercion rather than of agreement. Therefore, we shall attend no such conference under any circumstances.

The Government of Israel has an international commitment to a framework that paves the way to a peace arrangement. This framework is the Camp David Accords, in accordance with which the Peace Treaty with Egypt was concluded and according to which the Israel Government's Peace Initiative of Iyyar 9, 5749 (May 14, 1989) was phrased. Both the Accords and the Peace Initiative have come under criticism. We have never thought that they were ideal agreements. They were the result of compromises between different positions. But if we insist

on upholding their full contents and their spirit, permitting neither their emasculation nor their selective enforcement, it seems to me that they contain sufficient guarantees for the interests of the State of Israel and for peace in the Middle East. We shall continue, in concert with the United States Government and with willing Arab agencies, to work for an arrangement by which the peace process may progress.

It is impossible to progress toward a settlement and to promote the status of the Arabs of Judea-Samaria and Gaza at a time when all the Arab countries, except for Egypt, maintain relations of enmity with us, subject us to an economic embargo, wage brutal incitement and political warfare against us, aid terror activities against us, and fight against Jewish immigration. The recent Arab summit conference in Baghdad cast the Arab countries' stance on Israel into an even more extreme mold and revealed, blatantly and explicitly, uncompromising hostility toward the State of Israel. We shall neither accede to nor accept the misrepresentation of the conflict as a matter of the Israeli-Palestinian equation alone, concealing the truly dangerous component of the Arab countries with their resources and their armies. It would be an act of madness on our part to agree to any concession in an area that constitutes Israel's "soft underbelly" when we are surrounded by a hostile ring with unprecedented military might.

Israel-Egypt relations and the Camp David Accords represent the cornerstone of the peace process and a barometer of peace. The good news is that relations exist. However, there is much room for improvement in the area of bilateral

relations. Beyond this, Egypt may fulfill a key role in the advancement of peace and the fulfillment of the Camp David Accords. The time has come for Egypt to stop vacillating and maneuvering between the inclination to peace and the Arab forces that are dedicated to uncompromising hatred. The time has come for Egypt to stand up and act in concert with us to renew negotiations on the second part of the Camp David Accords. If President Mubarak needed proof of what the PLO and Khaddafi's Libya are, the terror operation that they plotted and that Abu al-Abbas's terrorists perpetrated on the Shavuot holiday suffice to illustrate their substance unequivocally.

The area of the other Arab countries' attitude toward Israel is of secondary importance these days compared with the recent Arab summit conference in Baghdad. We have long been trying, by various means, to communicate to the heads of several Arab states the message that any action vitiating the state of warfare toward us, such as revoking the economic embargo or rescinding the equation of Zionism with racism, would be gladly accepted and would have a favorable effect on the peace process. Instead, the Baghdad summit adopted a series of grave and extreme resolutions against Jewish immigration to Israel, in favor of militancy in principle, in support of the PLO and the acts of violence and terror against us, and others. Iraq has now returned in full force to the role it had begun to play before its war with Iran: that of a peace rejectionist and a denier of the existence of Israel. We are also alert to Iraq's massive arms buildup, including biological and chemical weapons that it threatens to use

against us. There is no Israeli threat against Iraq; this is the figment of a sick imagination. Therefore we again call on the Arab countries to stop fanning uncompromising enmity and to move toward peace -- peace of coexistence, peace under which all the area's peoples will prosper and flourish. We also call for an international arrangement for the banning of chemical and biological weapons, thus cleansing the world of these terrible tools of destruction.

Our Peace Initiative embraces all components of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, i.e., strengthening the peace with Egypt, renewing the commitment of Egypt and the United States to the Camp David Accords, rehabilitating the refugees, terminating the state of war with the Arab countries, and effectuating autonomy for the Arabs of Judea-Samaria and Gaza.

The obstacle to progress in the peace process, which stands a chance to succeed, is the PLO and the status conferred upon it by various parties in the international community. The Government will make it unequivocally clear that the PLO and peace are contradictions in terms. Every act that has the effect of conferring status and legitimacy upon the terror gangs known as the PLO reduces the prospects of reaching a settlement. Furthermore, recognition of the PLO and conducting a dialogue with it encourage the continuation of the acts of violence and terror against us, because this is how the terror leaders construe governments' decisions to recognize them.

Several Labor Party leaders have expressed themselves in the media in favor of the continuation of the United States' dialogue with the PLO. How do they reconcile their advocacy of this dialogue with their opposition to negotiations between Israel and the PLO? Do they see no obstacle and no choice before them but to accept the PLO's Phased Plan: First an American dialogue with the PLO, followed by an Israeli dialogue with the PLO, and finally an Arab Palestinian state led by the PLO? These statements indicate a loss of the way, betrayal of the foundations of our existence, and a search for solutions motivated by despair, panic, and loss of faith in the future. I am convinced that many good members of the Labor Movement will stand up and rebel against these momentary deviations and restore this movement of theirs to the road of sanity and belief and confidence in the rectitude of our path.

The position of the Government is that we are willing to conduct, and are even interested in conducting, a dialogue with elected and legitimate representatives of the Arabs of Judea-Samaria and Gaza, in order to improve their status and promote the self-administration of their affairs. I call on the Arabs of Judea-Samaria and Gaza not to follow those who preach and incite to violence. Disruptions of order and strikes have improved neither their status nor their prospects by an iota. Those who benefit from their suffering and exploit it for their own gain are the PLO terrorists, who tour from capital to capital, articulating dreams that do not stand a chance of coming true. It is possible to achieve a dignified dialogue and arrive at a fair settlement, in which many of the

desires of this population will be realized. The Government will continue to strive for this objective despite the difficulties. Those who choose the road of violence and terror will be treated with the full severity of the law. We have the tools and the ability to deal with them, and shall not hesitate to wield these tools. I would like to conclude by calling once again, from the depths of my heart, to the Arab countries and the Arabs of Judea-Samaria and Gaza: enter into a dialogue with us, for the sake of peace -- the peace of our children and of your children.

Mr. Chairman:

Security

The Government will place full trust in the IDF, the security services, the Israel Police, and all security forces that stand guard over our country and its safety, and will offer its support as in days gone by, in order to enable them to fulfill their vital role.

All possible steps will be taken, and new ways will be considered, to terminate the acts of violence and the attacks against traffic on the country's highways; the torching of fields and other property; and the stoning of people and vehicles. Every Jew and every other citizen or resident living anywhere in Israel is entitled to security and protection of his life, his family's lives, and his property against attackers and marauders, and we will do all within our power to ensure these.

Jerusalem

Our prophets long since uttered everything that could be stated in human language about Jerusalem. They expressed in their divine language the eternal connection of the People of Israel with Zion and Jerusalem. "For the sake of Zion, I shall not be still, and for the sake of Jerusalem I shall not keep silent," pronounced the Prophet Isaiah, "until the glory of its righteousness be known and its salvation burn brightly."

Jerusalem, united and whole, building and expanding in all directions, is the capital of Israel forever and is not a subject for negotiations or bargaining. The city is open to visitors and pilgrims of all faiths. The holy sites are better protected and more secure than ever before in the city's history. But the City of David has been and will remain the jewel in the crown of the People of Israel and its state. As stated by the Prophet Zechariah: "Thus said the Lord of Hosts: I will rescue My people from the lands of the east and from the lands of the west, and I will bring them home to dwell in Jerusalem. They shall be My people, and I will be their God -- in truth and sincerity."

The Arabs of Israel

We are aware of the changes affecting Israel's Arab citizens and the tendencies towards extremism being encouraged by hostile and irresponsible forces. The Arabs of Israel have embarked upon a path that promotes their status and their rights greatly. The Government of Israel is interested in continuing to promote this process, motivated by feelings of partnership and fairness. Therefore I call on all Arab

citizens not to pay heed to the voices of incitement, rather denouncing and isolating them, and to do nothing liable to endanger the status and the achievements of the Arab population.

Foreign Policy

Amazing changes have taken place in the international constellation in the past year. The barriers between blocs and many countries have fallen, and there is reason to hope for a better and more secure future for mankind. This is welcome news for the Jewish people, which in part is still dispersed throughout the world, and which has more than once paid a dear price as the result of hostility and strife between peoples.

Our people has been blessed with an additional achievement -- the opening of the gates of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc for our brothers who yearn to immigrate to Israel. The Eastern European states, one after another, are renewing diplomatic relations with us. It is particularly noteworthy that every democratic regime that has been established has seen fit to form ties with Israel and to turn its back on extremist and pro-PLO forces within the Arab world. In the past, the PLO enjoyed the backing and support of the totalitarian regimes that have left the scene, and we hope and expect that the new democratic regimes will remove all traces of the PLO terrorist organizations from within their borders and will adopt a balanced and responsible policy regarding our region, one that will help promote a peace settlement.

To our dismay, the Soviet Union is still delaying the restoration of normal relations with the State of Israel. The Soviet government's fear of Arab pressure and extortion are most surprising. Much weaker countries have stood up to Arab pressure, exposed its worthlessness, and suffered no harm whatsoever. We continue to hope that the Soviet Government -- despite great internal difficulties and challenges -- will tailor its Middle East policy to the present era of openness and will shortly reach a decision to renew relations with Israel without political or other preconditions.

The Arab countries have not yet been influenced by the momentous changes in the international arena. In the Middle East, peoples still struggle under tyrannical and oppressive regimes; extremist and oppositionist movements threaten to destabilize countries and their governments. It is against this background that many rulers invest vast resources in the acquisition of sophisticated weapons and armaments, including non-conventional arms, and continue to lay the foundation for Arab unity on the artificial basis of fomenting hostility toward Israel. The unequivocal conclusion: the stronger democracy grows, and the more freedom exists in the Arab countries, the more positive the effect will be on the prospects of peace and stability in this region.

U.S.-Israel Relations

The relations of alliance and friendship between Israel and the United States continue to constitute the cornerstone of Israel's foreign policy. Over the years, a relationship has

developed of mutual affinity, of cooperation in many and varied areas, and of unparalleled friendship between the two peoples. We believe Israel is America's most reliable ally in our complex and tension-ridden region. The strategic cooperation that has been cemented over the past few years is a manifestation of this position.

It is true -- and it is no secret -- that there exist several differences of opinion between ourselves and the U.S. Administration concerning the peace process. This is not surprising, if only because this matter is a vital, life-and-death issue for us but not from Americans' perspective. The differences of opinion between us originate, above all, from the Administration's attitude toward the PLO and toward its dialogue with it, which, in our eyes, constitutes a severe blow to stability and the chances of peace. We are convinced that the hopes that the Administration has pinned on this dialogue have not, and could not have, produced any favorable outcome. The terrorist organizations have not met any condition or assurance promised by Arafat because these are opposed to the PLO's very essence and *raison d'etre*. Experience has shown that whenever the Arab countries observe any fissure in the wall of friendship between Israel and the United States, they entertain fresh dreams of aggression against Israel. We are convinced that close and fruitful ties between Israel and the United States contribute much toward stability in the Middle East. We will try with all our might to convince the United States Government that our stance is correct, and will strive for a maximum of understanding and

cooperation with the U.S. toward the promotion of peace in our region. Concurrently, we shall work hand-in-hand with the United States to strengthen the alliance, the friendship, and the cooperation between us in various areas -- the strategic system, implementation of the Free Trade Zone Agreement, and close coordination in the international political arena.

The Government will bolster its efforts to communicate to the countries of Europe the message of Israel, its pro-peace policy, and its desire for bilateral cooperation. We attach great importance to our relations with all European countries, including those of the European Community, for historic, political, and economic reasons. We hope these countries will understand, after years of experience, that support of the PLO whets extremism and does nothing to bring peace closer.

The Jewish World

Although the focus of Jewish history has returned in this generation to the Land of Israel, the homeland of the Jewish People, a large portion of our people are still dispersed around the world. We call in encouragement and fraternity to the Jewish communities in distress: in Ethiopia, the Arab countries, Iran, and Syria. We hear their prayers and their yearnings, and do not forget them for even a moment.

The scourge of anti-Semitism has not expired, and, to our astonishment, has recently resurfaced in full force. Along with Jewish communities everywhere, we must fight this infuriating phenomenon, denounce it, and bring about its eradication.

For all our brethren in the Diaspora, we reiterate the words of the ancient prayer: "May You ingather us to our land from the four corners of the earth." We are one people by virtue of our wonderful tradition and the devotion of our forefathers throughout the generations to this prayer and to the vision of a Return to Zion and the renewal of our existence in the land of our ancestors. Therefore, we urge the sons of our people to immigrate to Israel and to join us in building the country, developing it, strengthening it and fulfilling the vision of the prophets of Israel and the prayers of our forefathers.

With your permission, I shall also touch on several internal matters:

The Government will continue and amplify its efforts to reduce the bloody toll exacted from us in traffic accidents and will consider all possible steps toward this end.

The plague of drugs continues to spread and to claim innocent victims. The Government will continue to encourage the Anti-Drug Authority and will assist it in coordinating activities against this blight.

The Government will support education and science in Israel, fields that guarantee an improved and progressive society.

The woman in Israel is the backbone of the family and of society. The Government will act to improve the status and the rights of women in general and working women in particular.

Mr. Chairman,

When the first National Unity Government was established, the two major partners expressed the hope that such a unity government would moderate the style of political confrontations and prevent verbal violence among us. After six years of unity government, I cannot say that this hope has been fulfilled. Differences of opinion will always exist among the political factions. This notwithstanding, I appeal once again to all political parties and circles to maintain suitable decorum and mutual respect.

Members of the Knesset,

The people of Israel is returning to its land, building its homeland, and returning to its roots. In this context the Prophet Jeremiah said, "Hear the word of the Lord, O nations, and tell it in the isles afar. Say: He who scattered Israel will gather them, and will guard them as a shepherd his flock. For the Lord will ransom Jacob, redeem him from one too strong for him" (Jer. 31-10-11). These verses express a microcosm of Jewish history in our generation: Israel's redemption and resurrection, the ingathering of the far-flung Jewish exiles, the security of Israel, and the reconstitution of its international relations. These eternal processes will continue, God willing, until we attain haven, stability, and peace.

And now, Mr. Speaker, it is my honor to present the Knesset with the Government I formed after being entrusted with this task by the esteemed President of the State, according to Paragraph 15 of the Basic Law: The Government. I

hereby ask the Knesset to express its confidence in the Government. Below are its composition and the distribution of functions among its members:

Yitzhak Shamir --	Prime Minister, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, and Minister of the Environment
David Levy --	Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Moshe Nissim --	Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Industry and Trade
Ehud Olmert --	Minister of Health
Rafael Eitan --	Minister of Agriculture
Moshe Arens --	Minister of Defence
Arye Deri --	Minister of the Interior
Zevulun Hammer --	Minister of Education and Culture
David Magen --	Minister of Economics and Planning
Yitzhak Moda'i --	Minister of Finance
Ronnie Milo --	Minister of Police
Dan Meridor	Minister of Justice
Yuval Ne'eman --	Minister of Energy and Infrastructure, and Minister of Science and Technology
Yitzhak Haim Peretz --	Minister of Immigrant Absorption
Raphael Pinhasi --	Minister of Communication
Gideon Patt --	Minister of Tourism
Moshe Katsav --	Minister of Transport
Avner Hai Shaki --	Minister of Religious Affairs
Ariel Sharon --	Minister of Construction and Housing




שאר/איש

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לשאר רבי לבי, 3/3, אה

מדינת ישראל דואר רשמי



מחיר/מכירה

(להחזרת פנימית במשרדי הממשלה)

מזכר

תאריך 25.6.90	אל: לשכת סגן השר - חר. ה. ג. ז. ז. ז.
תיק מס'	מאת: מכתב 3/28

הנושא: מכתב מס' 3/28

על פי

אני יודע שסגן השר האצט לא יודע

על מכתב מדיניות ששלחתי לך בעבר.

אשר אליו יודע שישנה התייחסות

אליו מכל עיני, כפי שאתה יודע (!).

אשר לך שסגן השר יודע

מכתב 3/28 (המכתב)

לפיכך, יש לי (מכתב) 2 כח-3

מכתב 3/28. כפי שאתה יודע

לפיכך יש לי, הרי, הרי, הרי

מכתב (לפיכך) מכתב. (אין ספק)

מכתב וכן חוקים בתקנים (!)

יש לי מכתב, אשר שאלתי יודע

2/22

מכתב 2/22

3/28

מכתב 1010

אשר לי מכתב, מכתב, מכתב

CONTEMPORARY MIDEAST BACKGROUNDER

to: *no 110, 10/21/87*

date: March, 1990

BACKGROUNDER No. 266a

Is There an Arab "Glasnost"? Part II - Iraq

Iraq's Position on Israel

With Iraq's fixation on its war with Iran (the two countries have yet to conclude a peace treaty) and its forging of close ties, bordering on dependency, with the pro-Western camp in the Arab world during the war, Iraqi leaders issued several relatively moderate statements on the conflict with Israel as early as 1983 (e.g., by Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to *Le Monde*, 8 Jan. 1983).

The experts stress, however, that all such statements were made by the second and third echelons of Iraqi leadership and meant for foreign consumption. Even at the height of the fighting, Saddam

See also Backgrounders Nos. 266,207,168,139,125,124,97,68,14.

**Media
Analysis**

- 1 -

Center P.O. B 13169 Jerusalem 91131, Tel. 705344/5

Hussein depicted Israel as Iraq's No. 1 enemy (Ofra Bengio, Dayan Center, *Haaretz*, 18 Aug. 1988). Because this ostensible moderation was a consequence of the pressures of the war with Iran, it was exceedingly fragile. The only moderation that survived the war was a wait-and-see, non-committal posture on the political process. Even so, however, Iraq has never abandoned the option of radicalization.

In a speech to the foreign ministers of the Arab Cooperation Council in Amman, **Saddam Hussein** revealed his basic position on Israel in the following words: "The (Jewish) immigrants are multiplying, amplifying Israel's aggressive ability... With their help Zionism will practice what it preaches. **The argument that they do not need to settle in the lands occupied since 1967 is insufficient, since the immigrants provide Israeli society with new strength wherever they are**" (*Iraqi News Agency*, 19 Feb. 1990).

It must be remembered that Iraq has a long tradition of extremism on Israel and has been actively involved in all wars against it. Iraq (as we have seen) has a powerful army, fully capable of dispatching at least some of its forces to the Israeli front. The volatility of inter-Arab relations, which do much to determine Iraq's policy, and the status of its autocrat-ruler who can execute sudden volte-faces, would easily push Iraq into a more concrete manifestation of its traditional radical stance.

The Iraqi media almost never refer to Israel by name, calling it "the Zionist entity" to this very day. "The launching of the *Abed* missile," the Iraqi newspaper *Al-Qadissiya* boasted in an editorial (4 Jan. 1990), "has shifted the balance of forces between the Arab nation and the Zionist entity to the Arabs' advantage." Another frequently invoked expression is "occupied Palestine" with reference to all of Israel within the Green Line. For example, the

Iraqi newspaper *A-Thawra* (21 Jan. 1990) assailed "American aid to the Zionist entity and the transport and settlement of world Jewry in occupied Palestine."

Speaking before an audience of bereaved families, Saddam Hussein stated that the Palestinians "had paid a double and triple price in order to defend Palestine within the 1948 borders, and it hasn't been returned thus far. With Allah's help, however, Palestine will be returned when the Arabs become able to act to realize the aim of the return of Palestine" (*A-Thawra*, 3 Dec. 1989).

Iraq is an enthusiastic supporter of the uprising in Judea and Samaria: "Victory in this uprising is every Arab's aspiration... This is an historic opportunity for the Arab people... to use the uprising to bring the enemy to his knees" (editorial, *A-Thawra*, 8 Dec. 1989). The newspaper also congratulates the National Front, established by the Baath Party to support the uprising, for meeting in order "to mobilize the forces of the Arab masses and organize their support for the intifada." *Al-Qadisiya* asserted (9 Jan. 1990) that victory was at hand, since "the situation of the Zionist entity is deteriorating daily..."

Richard Cohen, a liberal American columnist normally critical of Israel's policies, asks the following question in connection with the Arab countries' rapprochement with Iraq, which made use of chemical weapons against the Kurds: "How can Israel be assured, that an Israel substantially rid of the Palestinians, that it will not be open to gas attack? Would it not be better to hold the Palestinians hostage? By supporting Iraq", Cohen continues, the Arab states "bring peace no closer, do nothing to advance the Palestinian cause and have encouraged thug regimes that someday may turn on them" (*Washington Post, IHT*, 19 Sept. 1988).

Iraq's Involvement in Terrorism

Since the PLO was driven out of Lebanon (some 2,000 PLO activists heading for Iraq), Baghdad has been one of the two major PLO centers, primarily of Arafat's Fatah, including the organization's security apparatus. Part of the Palestine Liberation Army and Fatah are stationed in Iraq, which trains and arms them (including Palestinian pilots).

Iraq has granted similar refuge to the terrorist organizations affiliated with Abu Al-Abbas (the Palestine National Front), which today supports Arafat and is a member of the PLO's executive committee; the Iraqi-founded Arab Front for the Liberation of Palestine, today a pro-Arafat group; and the May 15th organization of Abu Ibrahim (Muhammad Amri), who is known for his expertise in preparing sophisticated explosive charges for planting them aboard aircraft.

Iraq provided this organization, set up in 1980, with a permanent base and installations, as well as intelligence and logistical support (documents, escape routes) for the terrorist activities it carried out in the early 1980s against Jewish and Israeli institutions in Western Europe. The organization was disbanded in 1984, but Abu Ibrahim and his men are still active in various terrorist groups, including the special Fatah (Arafat) operations group under Al-Huwari, with which he had always maintained close ties. In December 1983 and June, 1984, the organization attempted to smuggle a sophisticated bomb onto an El Al plane in London.

On 25 Dec. 1987, a cell of three terrorists was caught in the Jordan Valley after cutting through the security fence. The three, members of Abu Al-Abbas' organization, had been trained for the operation in Iraq, which they had left three days previously. En route they stopped in Jordan, where they met with Abu Al-Abbas himself. Their mission in Israel was to attack vehicles on a main highway and kill as many civilian travellers as possible.

Subsequently, in Tunis, Abu Al-Abbas asserted his responsibility for the operation "in order to raise the morale of the Palestinians in their rebellion in the territories (*Maariv*, 27 Dec. 1987). In 1985, it was again Abu Al-abbas who hijacked the Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean, killing an American passenger on board.

Iraq is said to have recently authorized reopening an office of Abu Nidhal's Fatah Revolutionary Council (currently based in Libya).

Not only abroad does Iraq display its contempt for diplomatic immunity, as mentioned above. In February 1989, agents of the regime assaulted and injured two West German diplomats in Baghdad, apparently against the backdrop of the West German government's efforts to prevent the export of know-how and equipment for the manufacture of chemical weapons and missiles by German companies.

Ironically, Iraq was taken off the U.S. State Department's villain list of states sponsoring terrorism last year...

Oppression of the Kurds

As for the bitter fate of the Kurds, the periodical *Middle East*, published in Great Britain (Oct., 1988) asserted that Saddam Hussein could always rely on the world's indifference. The West preferred not to know about the Kurds; the UN is unwilling to jeopardize its fragile success to bring about a ceasefire between Iraq and Iran for the sake of "embarrassing minority rights in Iraq."

A *New York Times* editorial (12 Sept. 1988) commented that the UN Security Council, following the March 1988 chemical slaughter of 5,000 Kurds in Halabja and further gas attacks in Aug. 1988, never managed to censure Iraq for its repeated and proven use of chemical weapons in the Gulf War. The *Arab Press Service* (Nicosia, 19 Sept. 1988) believes that the UN considers the Kurdish problem

an internal Iraqi affair.

The UN even refuses to investigate the atrocities; since Kurdistan is not a UN member, it has no right to "self-determination" or autonomy (William Safire, *New York Times*, 24 Nov. 1989), just as no ethnic, religious, or national minority has thus far attained self-determination or genuine autonomy in the Arab or Muslim world.

Even though members of the U.S. Senate and the British Parliament have advocated sanctions against Iraq (*Washington Post*, editorial, 9 Sept. 1988; Jim Hoagland, *Washington Post*, 14 Sept. 1988), the Western countries compete with one another in their courtship of Iraq, mainly in pursuit of trade and arms deals (See above.)

Most Arab countries openly supported Iraq throughout the war, including Iraq's use of chemical weapons, which many of these countries are developing and which some of them have already used. David Hirst of *The Guardian* (19 Jan. 1990) quotes an Iraqi source as predicting that "Saddam would be willing to gas his people just as he gassed the Kurds."

From time immemorial Iran and Iraq have struggled to pacify the Kurds within their borders while ensuring that the Kurds in the neighboring country continue to agitate. The Iraq-Iran war exacerbated the struggle between the Kurds and the Iraqi regime, escalating the oppression of the Kurds to levels unknown hitherto. The war further sharpened the dividing line between the two national groups in Iraq: the Iraqis, chiefly Sunni and Shi'ite Arabs, and the unassimilated Kurds. Hence the absence of cooperation between Shi'ites and Kurds in their struggle against the regime, for the two groups are ethnically, nationally, and religiously opposed. Notably, the idea of an Islamic republic, supported by some Shi'ites, does not take the Kurds' national aspirations into account.

In the conclusion of her book on the *Kurdish revolution in Iraq* (Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1989, Hebrew), Ofra Bengio, a researcher on Iraq with the Dayan Center of Tel Aviv University, asserts that the Kurds lost ground with respect to both national independence and integration in Iraq during the war. The autonomy that Iraq's Baath government had offered the Kurds since 1970 "was doomed to failure... because it was by its very nature utterly contrary to the pattern of the central government, which was highly totalitarian and centralized. Indeed, it was under the camouflage of autonomy that the Baath regime took the severest measures ever adopted by an Iraqi regime against the Kurds and their national movement... The Baath managed to preserve the country's territorial integrity, but only by subjecting the country's Kurds to total oppression." For its part, the Kurdish national movement failed to convert its achievements in the struggle against various governments in Baghdad into real political accomplishments.

Although there are fewer Kurds in Iraq than in Turkey and Iran, their proportion of the population is higher in Iraq than anywhere else: between 15.9 percent and 18 percent (2.5-3.5 million out of a total of 17.25 million). The 1920 Sevres Treaty did in fact grant the Kurds autonomy, with an option of full independence in large areas of Kurdistan (which had been under Ottoman rule until then). The facts in the field, however, were determined not by the treaty but first by Ataturk's Turkey and subsequently, in 1925, by the annexation of the Mosul district into British-rule Iraq.

The Kurds are a separate national/ethnic group with a distinctive linguistic and cultural character, shaped largely by geographical conditions, i.e., their deeply rooted association with the Taurus Mountains in the north of Iraq, western Iran (5,000,000 Kurds), southeastern Turkey (9,000,000), and northeastern Syria (600,000). Against this background, the severity of the blow dealt to the Kurds' very identity by the Iraqi policy of "resettling" them in

barren, flat regions, will be understood. As mountain dwellers, too, they have been relatively secluded from foreign and modernizing influences.

Although they had been involved in dethroning King Faisal II in 1958, the Kurds did not achieve the degree of autonomy they had expected from the regime of Abd Al-Karim Qassin. The policy of "Arabizing" the Kurds began with the Baath regime's implementation of its so-called March Declaration (1970) on Kurdish autonomy. Although the declaration recognized the existence of a Kurdish people and acknowledged Kurdish one of the area's languages, the language was banned from the schools, many areas were excluded from the autonomy arrangements, and the government reserved the right to appoint the area's governor and autonomy council.

There was an attempt to eliminate the Kurdish majority in the strategic oil area of Kirkuk and Khanaqin by settling it with Arabs from the south and by prohibiting Kurds' building houses or selling their houses to other Kurds. Policy became even more sweeping and brutal following the failure of autonomy and the collapse of the Kurdish revolt or "the fifth Kurdish war" (1974-75) in the 1975 Algiers agreement with Iran. (The previous wars took place in 1931-32, 1944-45, 1958-61, and 1964-66).

The Iraqi Baath decided to obfuscate the Kurdish national identity, smash the traditional leadership, deny the Kurds outside aid, and ban them from strategic areas. Since then, the regime has carried out, in addition to the execution of hundreds of Kurdish fighters, mass exile from rural Kurdish areas to "model villages" in the north and Shi'ite towns and districts in the south. As of April, 1989, these actions were still going on.

Former Information Minister Tariq Aziz spoke (1976) about the "re-education" of Kurds in special camps. Numerous villages were utterly razed. There was talk at the time of establishing a Kurd-free *cordon sanitaire* 10-20 km. wide along Iraq's northern border. Kurdish districts were gerrymandered to facilitate their control. Kurdish place names were Arabized. The teaching of the Kurdish language was forbidden in areas outside the autonomy zone, and restrictions were imposed on the activities of Kurdish institutions everywhere. In the summer of 1982, for the first time, the Baghdad government appointed a Kurd to the Revolutionary Command Council, but the appointee, Taha Muhi a-Din Marouf, is thought to be a lackey of Baghdad.

In 1983, after an Iranian offensive at Haj Omran in which the Kurds took part, the regime exempted the Kurds from army service outside Kurdistan (which service had led to the execution of many deserters and their families). At the same time, the regime engaged in extensive reprisals against Barazani's fighters (8,000 men disappeared) and numerous civilians.

In November, 1985, there were demonstrations and clashes between Kurdish civilians and the Iraqi army in Suleimaniya, Arbil, and Dohuk. More than 90 people perished when the army used helicopters to bombard towns, leveling entire neighborhoods.

Since 1987, anti-Kurdish operations have been orchestrated by Ali Hassan al-Najid, a cousin of Saddam Hussein and governor of the Kurdistan district. In the spring of 1987, as the war with Iran wound down while Kurds were being conscripted en masse, the Barazani and Talabani parties united with Shi'ite opposition organizations for what they dubbed an "intifada" - an uprising against the regime. With this, Iraq's scorched earth policy against the Kurds reached its climax, with deportations meant to create a 30 km.-wide buffer along Iraq's northern border with Iran and

Turkey.

On 25-29 Oct. 1988, after Iran decided to retreat from the Haj Omran area, Iraqi planes dropped mustard and Taboun gas bombs on more than 50 Kurdish villages (According to several sources, biological weapons were used as well, Cf. *Sunday Telegraph*, 25 Sept. 1988). Some 100,000 Kurds fled to Turkey and Iran. At roughly the same time, hundreds of Kurdish Peshmerga soldiers and entire families were massacred in the Bazi valley and in Dohuk. Some 300,000 Kurds were driven from their homes in this period alone. Recent reports quoting British experts speak of an Iraqi attempt to poison thousands of Kurdish refugees in their camps in southeast Turkey by lacing their bread (*The Independent*, 3 Feb. 1990; Note Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iranian towns during the war.) This slaughter exhausted the Kurds' ability to mount military resistance in the area of Iraq's northern border - until the next stage of their struggle.

In Qala' Disa and Raniya, two towns in the Arbil district, 10,000 residents were given 17 days' notice to evacuate by 25 April 1989, when the army would arrive to demolish everything. The towns were empty by mid-June. Some 400 villages have been razed in the last two years. A million Kurds have been forcibly "resettled" and another half-million sent to camps in distant desert localities near Ramadi on the Jordan border.

One of the main obstacles in the Kurds' national struggle is their internal fragmentation on both the party and the tribal/familial levels. At least two parties engage in perpetual strife: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), each comprising thousands of armed fighters. Rampant friction prevails between the **Talbani** and **Barazani** families (and between two Barazani sons, Masoud and Idris, following the exile of their father, Mustafa Barazani, in 1975).

Another small party, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), operates from bases in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley of Lebanon, primarily against Turkey.

Each of the larger parties oscillates between rapprochement with the regime, cooperation with other opposition forces (the Shi'ite Da'wa, the Communist Party), and reliance on neighboring outside forces, chiefly Iran (but also Syria and Turkey). A typical example of relations with the regime surfaced in negotiations between the Baathists and Jalal Talabani's party in late 1982. In the midst of the talks, the Baghdad government executed 11 supporters of Talabani's group, including his brother and two of his daughters.

The Shi'ites in Iraq

The Middle East editor of *The Independent* reported (26 Jan. 1990) that 30 Shi'ite towns and villages in the Basra, Nasiriya, and Amara districts were attacked between 10-23 Jan. 1990.

A Shi'ite human-rights organization headquartered in London reported that thousands of people had been killed or injured in a military operation in which artillery and helicopters had been used. The apparent purpose of the operation was to create a Shi'ite-free strip along Iraq's southern border with Iran, similar to that fashioned along the Kurdish northern border.

Despite significant differences - which we explore below - between the Shi'ites and the Kurds in terms of their status in Iraq, the Shi'ites, too, have fallen prey to Saddam Hussein's reign of terror and oppression. In 1974, he executed five leaders of the Shi'ite Da'wa party. In June 1979, he arrested and subsequently executed the foremost and most beloved Shi'ite religious leader, **Sayid Muhammad Baqr a-Sadr**, and his sister (One reason Al-Sadr had gained this status was his Arab origin, in contrast to the Iranian origin of the other high-ranking Shi'ite religious figures). The

demonstrations that subsequently erupted in Baghdad's major Shi'ite neighborhood, Al-Thawra, were put down ruthlessly.

In early 1980, after several Shi'ite terrorist attacks in Baghdad, Saddam Hussein expelled 30,000-100,000 Shi'ites of Iranian origin who had resided in Iraq from time immemorial, driving them across the Iranian border. Additional tens of thousands of Shi'ites of Iranian origin are living as refugees in the Sit Zeineb neighborhood of Damascus. The 500 or so members of the Shi'ite elite liquidated during that period include the director of Iraq's nuclear energy authority, Dr. Ala' al-Shahristani. In 1983, 90 members of the family of Muhsein al-Hakim (the predominant Shi'ite religious authority - before a-Sadr - who died in 1970) were arrested; three of his sons and four of his grandsons were executed. Another ten members of Al-Hakim's family were executed in March 1985. In Khartoum in January 1988, agents of Saddam Hussein murdered the brother of Bakr al-Hakim, the Shi'ite leader exiled to Teheran. All the above are in addition to the detention, torture, and execution of rank-and-file Shi'ites during the 17 years of Iraqi Baath rule.

Despite the lack of reliable information on the composition of Iraq's population, all experts assess the Shi'ites as being the country's majority ethnic group - slightly over 50 percent of the population (56 percent according to the 1932 census; the proportion of Sunnis and Shi'ites has been a state secret since then). They are certainly a majority if we bear in mind that the Iraqi ruling elite represents only part of the Sunnis and does not include Sunni Kurds (some 18 percent of the population). Most of the inhabitants of the capital, Baghdad, are Shi'ites.

The phenomenon of a deprived majority ruled by a minority - a potential source of instability - is, of course, not unknown in the Arab world. In striking contrast to the position of the Kurdish

minority, it is a fact that the regime has managed not only to repress any separate Shi'ite political organization but also to achieve a high degree of Shi'ite integration into the state. One of the main reasons for this is that although the Shi'ites are differentiated along ethnic-religious lines, they share the same national identity. By contrast, the Kurds, although Sunnis, are not Arabs. In an era in which the weight of national identity is so overwhelming, this facilitates the securing of Shi'ite loyalty to the Iraqi state.

Iran's failure to attract the loyalties of Iraq's Shi'ites in the eight years of the war (and even earlier) is impressive evidence of the precedence of Arabization in Shi'ite identity concepts (Saddam Hussein, for his part, was mistaken with regard to the loyalty of the Shi'ites in the area of Khujistan, who displayed no Iranian separatist tendencies).

All this makes little difference for the inferior status of Shi'ites in Iraq, which is rooted in a policy of discrimination against the Shi'ites during the Ottoman period.

The Shi'ites are concentrated in the south of the country, between Baghdad and the Gulf, in a primarily rural region partly cut off by marshes. Until several decades ago they pursued a semi-nomadic, traditional, tribal way of life. These factors impeded modernization processes among them.

Religion is the major cause of the friction between the Iraqi Shi'a and the Sunni regime. Iraq is the cradle of the Shi'ite trend in Islam and the home of its four holy cities: Najaf, Karbala, Kazimiya (today part of Greater Baghdad), and Samara. These cities became magnets for pilgrims and religious scholars from throughout the Shi'ite world; the religious centers were always focal points of political ferment. In connection, the following must be remember:

1. Feelings of deprivation, which are cultivated by the Shi'ite religion.

2. Ecstatic Shi'ite rites that emphasize the historical Shi'ite enmity toward the Sunni and that have on more than one occasion turned into violent demonstrations against the regime.

3. The basic principle of Shi'a, which withholds legitimacy from any regime not administered by descendents of Ali and his successors among the Shi'a.

The gaping abyss between the Shi'ites and the Sunnis in Iraq was created to no small extent by the *Ulama*, the Shi'ite clerics, who zealously maintained their conservative religious education system, hermetically sealed against any innovation. Another major actor in this paradigm is the predominant Persian element among the Shi'ites, whose links to the modern Iraqi state are the weaker.

Since 1920, when modern Iraq was established, and primarily since the secular Baath rose to power in 1968, the status of the Shi'ite clerics (whose number was in any case much smaller, relative to the population, than in Iran) has eroded. The activity of large numbers of Shi'ites in secular parties, primarily the Communist Party (from the 1930s onward; the party was almost completely wiped out in 1963 and 1979) indicates that at least certain parts of the community left the religious sphere of influence. It also attests to the continuing presence of Shi'ite feelings of discrimination and frustration that simply found a new avenue of expression.

Another important factor in the diminution of Shi'ite political power was the dissolution of their military strength through two developments: the compulsory conscription law of 1934 and the military coup of 1936, after which the Shi'ite tribes were disarmed.

Today, although a majority of Iraqi army personnel are Shi'ite (including approximately 70 percent of all junior officers, according to *Mideast Markets*, 20 Feb. 1989), they have no foothold in key positions in the army or the regime in general. The few Shi'ites who have attained high-ranking positions - e.g., Naim Haddad, a

member of the Revolutionary Command Council in the 1970s, who was stripped of all his functions in 1986; perhaps two out of nine members of the Revolutionary Council in June, 1982; several representatives in the national Baathist leadership, and Sa'adun Hamadi, a senior figure in the Iraqi Foreign Ministry today – do nothing to change the picture of discrimination, particularly since, as stated, Saddam Hussein has systematically weakened the status of the Baathist party in all Iraqi institutions.

Religious ferment, both Shi'ite and Sunni, seems to predate the present conflict. In 1977, riots broke out in Najaf and Karbala (apparently inspired by Khomeini, then in Najaf); a report presented to the 1982 Baath Convention referred to the infiltration of religious ideas into the party and the re-adoption of religion by certain circles.

The regime responded – as it had previously – with both the “stick” of repression and terror (primarily against the leading echelons) and also the “carrot,” i.e., integrating larger numbers of Shi'ites into the ruling apparatus. The Shi'ite regions were promised a larger share of state resources (no reliable information is available as to whether such intentions were implemented).

But from 1980 onward, under the influence of the Iranian revolution, Shi'ite underground movements began to gather momentum. Chief among them are the Da'wa party (established in the 1960s); the Mujahidin; Al-Amal al-Islami, whose leaders, unlike those of Da'wa, are of Iranian origin (on 1 June 1988, this organization detonated a car bomb with a suicide driver at the large oil facility in A-Dura); and Ulama al-Mujahidin. The regime's relentless campaign of repression against these movements forced them to relocate their centers of activity to Iran (the Supreme Revolutionary Islamic Council in Teheran), Syria, and Western countries. They have managed to carry out several terrorist attacks

in Iraq, primarily in Baghdad (1982-83), but have never presented a genuine threat to the regime.

Two additional factors are responsible for the weakening of these organizations: non-cooperation with other opposition forces such as the Kurds, and internal Shi'ite fragmentation on both the organizational and religious levels. In the latter context, some clerics remained faithful to Khomeini during the war, while others (like most of the Shi'ites in Iraq) dissociated themselves from Iran.

The repression and liquidation of the clerics who headed opposition movements (e.g., the sons of Muhsein al-Hakim; see above) was only one of many repressive measures taken by the regime to break the Shi'ites' connections with their religion, its leaders, and its institutions. Such steps included:

A prohibition on holding processions commemorating the death of Hussein, son of Ali; monitoring by security agents of Friday sermons and *Ashura* rites; interference in the appointment of religious functionaries at holy sites; closure of religious academies in the Shi'ite area and nationalization of the Shi'ite college at Najaf; diminution of the historical stature of Najaf by transferring to Karbala the traditional point of departure for *hajj* to Mecca; granting of permission for *hajj* only to Iraqis who had not yet fulfilled this precept (by decree in 1983), and many other measures meant to vitiate the autonomy of the holy places and increase the dependence of Shi'ite clerics on the regime.

The entire Shi'ite area is conspicuously deprived in the allocation of resources for development. Between 1968 and 1982, not a single mosque was built in the Shi'ite areas of Najaf, Missan, Qadissiya, and Mathneh. Thirty-one mosques were built in the other three heavily Shi'ite-populated areas, compared with hundreds in Sunni areas. Discrimination in the provision of services is especially blatant in the vast, impoverished Shi'ite neighborhood of Al-

Thawra in Baghdad (which was renamed "Saddam Town" after the outbreak of the war).

With all these measures, in addition to the expulsion of clerics and thousands of Shi'ites of Iranian origin (see foregoing) and stringent security measures in the most remote villages, the Shi'ites remain leaderless. On the one hand, this prevents their becoming a threat to the state. On the other hand, it attests to the regime's sense of threat and its awareness of the great potency of religious ideology, even when confronted by a durable secular Baath regime. So threatened did the Iraqis feel that they believed it necessary to thwart the menace by means of arms, in the war with Iran.

On the ideological level, Saddam Hussein has acted to bring about a rapprochement between the Baath on the one hand and the Shi'ites and the Kurds on the other, by switching his emphasis from pan-Arabism to particularistic Iraqi nationalism. Even the conflict with Iran has been presented, for the first time, as national in nature. However, the regime's vacillations in this area are evident in Saddam Hussein's attempts to pander to religious sentiments by frequenting Shi'ite holy places, attending their ceremonies, and flaunting his family lineage, which he purports to trace back to Ali ibn abu-Talib.

Summing up, whereas the Iranian revolution served the Iraqi Shi'ites as a model for emulation and an organizational, political, and moral "rear", even offering the possibility of confronting the regime and modifying the balance of forces in their favor, Saddam Hussein's war with Iran has destroyed this conception, forcing them once again to give priority to their national rather than their religious allegiances. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that any Iraqi regime, aware of the threat the Shi'ites already represent, will have to weigh the results of depriving them and pay a political price in order to avert the Shi'ite menace to its stability.

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
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Middle East military balance 1989-90

* Active forces ** Reserve forces
e = estimate



זרקור למזרח התיכון

מחלקת מעקב, מרכז ההסברה, ת"ד 13169, ירושלים 91131

יוצא לאור אחת לחודש

דמי מנוי לשנת 1989 - 24 ש"ח

למבקש להיות מנוי, אנא מלא ושלח הטופס שלהלן, במעטפה הלוטה בזה:



מס' עותקים _____

אבקש לשלוח לי גליונות קודמים שמספרם באינדקס _____

שם / המוסד / הארגון _____

כתובת: רח' _____ מס' בית _____

ישוב _____ ת"ד _____ מיקוד _____

דמי המנוי ישולמו:


לחשבון בנק הדואר של מרכז ההסברה מס' 0-157108

ע"י המחאה הרצ"ב

למנויים תשלח קבלה

מקור: רוז אליוסף, מצרים, 26.3.90





אידיאולוגיה, שאינה יותר מאשר "לכסות תחת מעטה של סימנים מסורתיים (זקן, רעלה וכדומה) את התפרצותה הבלתי-נמנעת של המודרניות החומרית... המשחק הוא חברתי, פוליטי וחילוני; כלי המשחק מצויים באיסלאם, כיוון שהוא מאגר עשיר, מורשת נהירה של סמלים אותות וסימנים... התנועות המכוונות תנועות תחייה איסלאמית הופכות בכך לעוד מרכיב אחד מתוך הכוחות הדיאלקטיים, הפועלים בחלל הסוציו-פוליטי הכללי... מטרתיהן, דברי המחאה שלהן והתוכניות המעשיות שלהן הם חילוניים לחלוטין, כמו אלה של יריביהם או מדכאיהם" (בקובץ: *The Politics of Islamic Revivalism, Diversity and Unity*, Ed. Shireen Hunter, (Indiana Univ. Press, 1988, p. 184

אינטלקטואלים אחרים כגון, איש מדעי החברה דר' חלים ברכאת (בעבר באוניברסיטה האמריקנית של ביירות), וההיסטוריון פרופ' הישאם שראבי (שניהם מאוניברסיטת ג'ורג'טאון, וושינגטון), תוהים על עצם יכולתם של האינטלקטואלים הערביים לתרום לקידום החברה. חלים ברכאת, במאמר "המשכילים הערביים בני דורנו" (מובא בקובץ בעריכת מתי שטיינברג ומנחם קליין, שם), עומד על נטייתם החזקה של אינטלקטואלים ערביים להתקשר למעמדות השליטים, וגם אלה מביניהם ששורשיהם כמעמדות עממיים, מתבוללים ומתנכרים למקורותיהם. מהפיכה אמיתית בחברה הערבית צפויה לדעתו כאשר יושג גיבוש בין האינטלקטואלים שלה למעמד העמלים.

הישאם שראבי, עורך "הג'ורנל אוף פלסטיין סטאדיז" של אש"ף, מתייחס לנושא בפרק מתוך ספרו, שפורסם ב- *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 1 1987. תחת הכותרת "מבקרי תרבות של החברה הערבית בת-זמננו", הוא סוקר את מידת הצלחתם של האינטלקטואלים להפנים באורח אמיתי ומושלם את ערכי תרבות המערב, שעה שהם נטועים בחברה (או שמוצאם ממנה). הנתונה במשבר והמוגדרת על ידו כ"ניאו-פטריארכאלית" – לא מסורתית לחלוטין ולא מודרנית באורח אותנטי. "ניתן לטעון", כותב שראבי, "שאותם 'משכילים' נשאר ללא שינוי באוריינטציה שלהם. להוציא סיגולה של מומחיות טכנית או מקצועית מסויימת, הם דבקים באותה השקפה ודפוס מחשבה, המאפיין את גידולם הניאו-פטריארכאלי ואת רקעם, אם בצורתו השמרנית, הרפורמיסטית או החילונית... (אלה מביניהם החיים בעולם הערבי) מיגבלתם נובעת מהתנאים בהם הם חיים – התנאים הפוליטיים, האידיאולוגיים והכלכליים, המאפיינים את הסטטוס-קוו הניאו-פטריארכאלי, עם המגבלות שהוא מטיל על חופש המחשבה והביקורת".

בין מאפייני אותם אינטלקטואלים, המבקרים את החברה הערבית, הוא מונה את יכולתם הטובה בהצגת דיאגנוזה וחולשתם בהתוויית פרוגנוזה כלשהי. גם הישאם שראבי עצמו מבטא לבסוף את הכמיהה ל"תיאוריה כוללת", שבלעדיה כל הביקורת "אינה מסוגלת לספק יעד פוליטי מוגדר".

סעודיה מגדלת רגנים במדבר, בסיוע מקצועי אמריקני, מעבר לצרכיה ואף מייצאת אותם. תוך סיבסוד הגידול במליארד דולר ב-1989. מחיר חיטה מיובאת באותה כמות היה מגיע ל-120 מליון דולר בלבד. גם אם ההשקעה כדאית, ולו על-מנת לגוון במעט את המשק הסעודי, הרי הבעייה היא שמקורות מי התהום, שסעודיה שואבת לשם כך, הם מסוג שאינו מתחדש. 90% מהמים שסעודיה צורכת באים ממקורות כאלה, שעלולים להתייבש בקצב השאיבה הנוכחי, תוך 10-20 שנה.

בלוב נטולת הנהרות, מתכנן קד'אפי פרוייקט דמיוני של "הנהר מעשה ידי אדם", בעלות של 25 מליארד ד' לפחות, להובלת מי מאגר תת-קרקעי מהמדבר אל איזור החוף. אלא שמחיר המים שיישאבו, יהייה כה יקר, שלא יוכלו לשמש לגידולים חקלאיים.

רק 4% משטחה של מצרים ראוי לעיבוד, ואלה מתכלים והולכים גם הם. בשל קצב העיור המהיר על אותם שטחים. ה"מידל איסט איקונומיק דייג'סט" (25.5.90) מביא מדברי מומחים בסמינר שהתקיים לאחרונה בלונדון בנושא זה. הם צופים גרעון של 10,000 מליון מ"ק מים במצרים כבר בשנת 2000. גידול האוכלוסין לדבריהם הוא גם כאן שורש הבעייה, כאשר הסיכוי להגדיל את אספקת המים באופן משמעותי הוא קלוש. החקלאות המצרית, התורמת 25% מהתוצר הגולמי המקומי (GDP), צורכת 90% מהמים.

מצרים מתכננת על-כן השבחת קרקע מדברית בקנה מידה גדול. אלא שלצורך עבודות ההשבחה האלה דרושים משאבים רבים שאינם בנמצא (עפ"י התוכנית יהיו דרושים 2.25 מליארד ד' לשנה), כל עוד כלכלתה של מצרים במצוקה, בשל אותו ריבוי האוכלוסין המואץ. המגדיל את קצב העיור - והמעגל נסגר.

המומחים דוחים את תוכנית ההשבחה גם מסיבות הידרולוגיות, וממליצים על-כן, להעדיף השקעה בשכלול שיטות ההשקיה, כדי שתהיינה חסכוניות הרבה יותר, במחקר להגדלת נפח היבולים ובהשבחת קרקע באיזורים נוחים יותר בדלתא הצפונית.

אין ספק מסכם ה"אקונומיסט" (שם), ש"ממשלות ערביות יצטרכו להסתגל לרעיון, שאם אתה חי במדבר 'בטחון מים' ו'בטחון מזון' הם תרתי דסתרי".

סיכויי השינוי בעיני אינטלקטואלים ערביים

דר' מתי שטיינברג, במסתו הנזכרת (שם, ע"ע 93-91), מתאר את נימת היאוש ומפח הנפש בה רוויות התבטאויותיהם של אינטלקטואלים ערביים בשנים האחרונות. הלך הרוח הזה נובע מהכרתם בכשלון האידיאולוגיות החילוניות בעולם הערבי, כולל חזון האחרות הערבית. כיום עומד גם רפוס מדינת-הלאום הטריטוריאלית, זו העושה קודם כל לביתה, על עברי פי-פחת. ניכר באליטה האינטלקטואלית הזו רעב לאידיאולוגיה, המסוגלת לתת מענה לבעיות הקיומיות הקשות. רבים מהם שבים ומעלים את יעד האחרות, אך הפעם, תוך מיקודו כמתן מענה לאתגר הכלכלי הטכנולוגי, ולא במאוויים חובקי זרועות עולם.

פרופ' מוחמד ארקון, מנהל המכון ללימודים ערביים ואיסלאמיים בסורבון, אינו מבחין בבשורה של שינוי אמיתי ועמוק גם בתנועות התחייה האיסלאמית. הוא סבור כי גם הן מציגות

מחצית אוכלוסיית סוריה מועסקת בחקלאות, שרובה ככולה תלוייה במי הפרת, שמקורותיו כולם בתורכיה. עיראק חוששת כמו סוריה מסכר "אתאתורק" שבנתה תורכיה על הפרת. אך היא חוששת גם מסוריה. ב-1975, כאשר סוריה בנתה את סכר ה"ת'אורה" על הפרת, עיראק טענה שהוא מוריד את מפלס הנהר בשיטחה לרמה בלתי נסבלת, והחשישה צבא לגבול סוריה. סוריה בונה עתה סכר שני.

בינואר 1990 נקטה תורכיה בצעד דראסטי כאשר חסמה לחודש ימים את זרימת הפרת דרומה, על-מנת למלא את אגם סכר "אתאתורק". צעד זה הצליח להפגיש את נציגי סוריה ועיראק לגיבוש הסכמה כלשהי בנושא חלוקת המים והעמדה כלפי תורכיה. אבל, נוכח היחסים העכורים בין שתי המדינות קשה להאמין בהתמדתה של הסכמה זו (יחסה של סוריה להסכמים הוכח למשל ב-1982, כאשר הפסיקה לעיראק את זרימת הנפט בצינור העובר דרכה בעיצומה של המלחמה עם איראן).

עבור תורכיה משמשים המים גם נשק פוליטי נגד סוריה, המסייעת למורדים כורדיים באנאטוליה. המתיחות בגבול בין שתי המדינות הגיעה בנובמבר 1989 להפלת מטוס אזרחי תורכי ע"י "מיג" סורי. תורכיה מנסה גם לפייס את שכנותיה הערביות בעזרת תוכנית "צינור השלום" שלה, שאמור להוביל מים עד סעודיה, בעלות של 21 מליארד דולר, ע"י הטיית שני נהרות - צ'יהאן וסייהאן - הנשפכים לים-התיכון. בעיני הערבים התוכנית איננה יותר מאשר תכסיס תעמולתי, נוכח העובדה שביצוע מלא של התוכנית הגדולה באנאטוליה (GAP), המתבצעת כיום, כבר תגרם לקיצוץ חלקן הקבוע בפרת, של סוריה ב-40% ושל עיראק ב-80%.

בכל מקרה, אין לצפות למימוש קרוב של תוכנית "צינור השלום", בהתחשב בקשיי מימונה, בעיות ביורוקרטיות, אי-היציבות הפוליטית בעולם הערבי, רתיעתן של מדינות ערביות רבות מפני התלות הצפויה בתורכיה הלא-ערבית וכן המחסור החמור במים, שתורכיה עצמה סובלת ממנו (למשל בעיר כאיסטנבול); היא תזדקק על-כן לעודפי המים שלה קודם כל לצרכיה היא.

שה"פ בין תשע המדינות שעל גדות הנילוס ויובליו, על-מנת ליעל את ניצול מימיהם, אף הוא אינו מתקדם דיו. בוועידת שרים, שנערכה בקהיר ב-1987, לא הגיעו המשתתפים להסכמה. שיחות טכניות, שנערכו בינואר 1988 בקהיר, עם סודאן, אוגנדה וזאיר, גם כן לא הניבו כל תוצאה מעשית. הניגודים הפוליטיים, ובעיקר המלחמות המתנהלות בסודאן ובאתיופיה, מונעים אפשרות לתכנן, קל וחומר לבצע, פיתוח רציני של אגן הנילוס (כגון, תעלת ג'ונגולי להטיית הנילוס הלבן בסודאן). על בסיס ש"פ אזורי ("ערב פרס סרוויס", ניקוסייה, 12.3.90).

נוכח מצב משק המים בעולם הערבי, אין להערכת מומחים ("אקונומיסט", 12.5.90) כל סיכוי שמדינות ערב יוכלו לממש את מה שמכונה "בטחון המזון" או להגיע לאספקה עצמית של המזון שהן צורכות. בשנתיים האחרונות היתה ירידה כוללת בתפוקת הרגנים של המזה"ת, במיוחד בעיראק, סוריה, תוניסיה ואלג'יריה, ולמעט בסעודיה ובמרוקו (ג'ודן ב. בארקר, "מירל איסט אינסייט", ינ'-פבר' 1990).

בה בעת, האמונה באספקה עצמית היא כה חזקה ומושרשת עד שהיא גורמת למדינות כסעודיה ולוב ליזום פעולות חסרות כל היגיון כלכלי, וללא כל סיכוי שיהייה בהן אי-פעם בעתיד היגיון כזה:

תעשייה חקלאית משגשגת, כעוד הכסף מהמפרץ והאוכלוסיה המצרית יקימו תעשיות מוצרי צריכה מוצלחות". בשעה שהמקור היחיד של משאבים הדרושים לכל תוכנית כלכלית בינערבית מצוי במדינות המפרץ בלבד, הגה דווקא האיחודים הבינערביים שקמו בשנים האחרונות הפרידו את מדינות המפרץ מעל כל יתר המדינות בגוש משלהן ("המוצעה לשת"פ של המפרץ", GCC).

בתוך "המועצה הערבית לש"פ" עצמה (מצרים, ירדן, עיראק וצפון-תימן), קיים ניגוד אינטרסים בין מצרים לעיראק, שאמנם הירקו את קשריהן בעת המלחמה עם איראן, אך עתה בולטים ביתר שאת הניגודים ביניהן על רקע מדיני (מחויבותה של מצרים לתהליך השלום) ותלותה הכלכלית של מצרים בארה"ב (3 מליארד דולר סיוע בשנה). ספק על כן אם מצרים נוטה להיגרר אחר רוח התוקפנות כלפי המערב וישראל, הנושבת מכיוון בגדאד, מעבר לביטויי הסולידאריות המילוליים עם עיראק "המותקפת".

שיקולים פוליטיים מעיבים גם לאחרונה על שה"פ המתחדש בין מצרים ללוב, בשל תוכנית האיחוד של לוב עם סודאן, מדינה הנחשבת בעיני מצרים כשייכת לתחום השפעתה ("זה מידל איסט", בריטניה, אפריל, 1990).

מאפיין כלכלי חשוב, המצביע על הקושי בפניו עומדים כל הגופים הכלכליים הבינערביים הוא גודלו הזעיר של הסחר ההדדי בין חברות הארגונים האלה לבין עצמן. לעומת חלקו של הסחר שלהן עם מדינות מחוץ לעולם הערבי, בעיקר עם המתועשות שבהן: רק 5% מהסחר בין ארבע חברות המשפ"ע הוא בינן לבין עצמן; קשריו הכלכליים של האיחוד המערבי (AMU) מופנים כולם צפונה, לעבר אירופה, ולא אל שכנותיהן ממערב או ממזרח; חברות מועצת שה"פ של המפרץ מדברות מזה שנים על הסרת המכסים ביניהן, אך אין לכך כל חשיבות, שכן ממילא אינן מעוניינות בנפט של שכנותיהן, ומוצרים אחרים כמעט שאינם קיימים.

יש לציין, שמיעוט הסחר ההדדי מאפיין גם את כל מדינות האיסלאם המאוגדות ב"ארגון הוועידה האיסלאמית", שמרכזו בג'דה (לא יותר מ-10% מכלל הסחר). זאת, למרות שורה של מוסדות כלכליים ופיננסיים, שהוקמו ע"י הארגון לקידום שה"פ הכלכלי בין חברותיו ("זה מידל איסט" מאי, 1990).

"ריבוי של מוסדות (בינערביים) מפוארים לא יוליד השקעות בינערביות בקנה מידה משמעותי. מנגנונים ביורוקרטיים אלה אינם מסוגלים לספק את היציבות הפוליטית והכלכלה המסבירה פנים למשקיע", מסכם ה"אקונומיסט" (שם).

ג. "בטחון המים" ו"בטחון המזון"

בעיית המים אולי לא תצית אש מלחמה במזה"ת, אבל היא לבטח בעייה חמורה ביותר עבור העולם הערבי.

ירדן וסוריה סובלות באורח שיגרתו מחסור במים בקיץ, בעיקר בעריהן הגדולות. לירדן אין סיכוי להגדיל את נפח מקורות המים שלה, אך היא יודעת שאוכלוסייתה תכפיל את עצמה תוך 20 שנה. סכר ה"זוחרה" על הירמוק, שבהקמתו תלוייה אספקת המים של ירדן בשנים הקרובות, אינו מוקם בשל העדר הסכמה עם סוריה וישראל.

"שהמשקים של מדינות ערב השונות אינם משלימים זה את זה.

א. עושר הנפט במושיע ?

בין זינוק מחירי הנפט ב-1973 לסוף שנות השמונים הגיעו הכנסות העולם הערבי מנפט ל-1.5 טריליון דולר. ובכל זאת אף מדינה ערבית לא הגיעה למשהו קרוב להמראה כלכלית, כפי שמתרחשת בכמה ממדינות המזרח הרחוק.

תושבי חצי-האי-ערב מהווים רק 7% מכלל האוכלוסיה בעולם הערבי, אך זוכים למרבית הכנסות הנפט שלו. הם השתמשו בהן להקמת תשתית משובחת, שירותי רווחה נדיבים ולהעשרת אוכלוסייתן. ואולם הן נכשלו בהקמת תעשייה משלהן שתתחרה בַיבוא, פרט לכמה תעשיות הנשענות על סובסידיות גדולות. כיום, אחרי חמש שנות מיתון, רק בסעודיה ניכר לאחרונה שינוי קטן לטובה.

במובנים רבים התגלה עושר הנפט כהפכפך: מחירי הנפט אינם יציבים; הוא גורם, כאמור, עיוותים בכלכלת המדינות המפיקות ומעמיק את הפער בין עשירים לעניים בעולם הערבי. יתר על כן, בתוך אופ"ק עצמו האינטרסים של מדינות ערביות שונות חופפים אך לעיתים נדירות.

מדינות ערב המפיקות נפט מתחלקות בעיקר לשתי קבוצות: מדינות כעיראק ואלג'יריה, הרעבות למטבע קשה, לעומת נסיכויות המפרץ הקטנות המעדיפות שמירה על נתח השוק, על ידי קביעת מחירים נמוכים יותר. גורם פיצול נוסף באופ"ק הוא נתיבי ההשקעה השונים של חבריו - כוויית, המשקיעה בשירותי הדלק באירופה, לעומת עיראק, המשקיעה בשיקום כלכלתה ואף קוראת לחידוש השימוש בנשק הנפט (צדאם חוסיין בנאום בפברואר 1990).

במלחמת המפרץ תרמה מועצת שיתוף הפעולה של המפרץ 40 מיליארד דולר למימון המלחמה של עיראק עם איראן. רק חלקיק מתוך סכום זה, אילו הושקע במצרים, היה משנה את פני כלכלתה.

טובת ההנאה היחידה שצמחה למדינות ערב מעושר הנפט היא יצוא כוח האדם אל המדינות המפיקות, על חלקם המשמעותי של התקבולים, שהועברו ע"י העובדים לארצות מוצאם, בהכנסתן הלאומית של רבות מהן.

ב. "מועצות ערביות לשיתוף פעולה"

להערכת ה"אקונומיסט" (12.5.90), תקוות הערבים להפוך את המועצות הבינערביות השונות לשיתוף פעולה (GCC, ACC, AMU) לגרעיני שוק משותף עפ"י הדגם האירופי היא תקוות שווא. "אלה בראש ובראשונה היערכויות פוליטיות, שהכלכלות שלהן תמשיכנה לא להשלים האחת את השנייה", ובתחום הפוליטי עצמו לא תמו כידוע היריבויות והסכסוכים בעולם הערבי. כמה מדינות ערביות, יש לציין, אינן שותפות באף אחד מהגושים הנ"ל, ובראשן סוריה. דר' ח'אלד פואד שריף, מרצה למינהל באוניברסיטה האמריקנית בקהיר, סבור כי "שילוב (כלכלי) יוכל לעבוד כאשר היחסים בין מדינות ערב יעברו תהליך דה-פוליטיזציה... וזהו 'אם' גדול" (טוני ווקר, "פייננשל טיימס", 17.5.90).

בתיאוריה, הכסף הסעודי בצירוף האוכלוסיה והפוטנציאל החקלאי של סודאן היו יכולים ליצור

המסורתיים, המצטופפים סביב המלך. הגישה הרווחת לעשיית הון היא להתקרב ככל שניתן לחוגים השליטים, על-מנת לזכות מהם לחוזים.

ממשלות ערב, מוסיף פילד, אינן מצליחות לענות על שאיפות בני מעמדות הביניים בערים, שהם גם משענתם הפוליטית העיקרית. במדינות רבות הולך וגדל הפער בין הציפיות למשאבים. נותרים אז רק המסורת (הנטייה באיסלאם להשלים עם משטרים אוטוריטאריים), והפחד שמטיל המשטר, כמקור לגיטימיות כלשהי למשטרים אלה.

החוב החיצוני המצטבר של מדינות ערב תפח מ-70 מיליארד דולר ב-1982 ל-140 מיליארד דולר (185 מיליארד ב-1989, עפ"י APS, ניקוסיה, 11.9.89). המימד המדאיג בחוב זה, מוסיף מייקל פילד (שם) הוא שהוא מהווה במוצא שני שלישים מהתמ"ג (GDP) במדינות ערב ויותר מ-100% של התל"ג של מצרים, סודאן ומרוקו.

הן צערי הריסון, שננקטו במדינות רבות (בין היתר ע"מ לזכות בפריסת חובות מ"קרן המטבע הבינלאומית"), והן הניסיון לעודד עסקים פרטיים, עוררו לחצים עד כדי מהומות (כגון, באלג'יריה, באוקטובר 1988 ובירדן, אפריל 1989). אלה גרמו מצידם לנכונות להנהיג ליברליזציה פוליטית מסוימת כנזכר לעיל.

בפועל, הביורוקרטיות הענקיות בחלק ממדינות ערב הופכות כמעט כל פרויקט, שעבורו מגיע סיוע חיצוני, לבלתי כלכלי. לעיתים גם התשתית הנחשלת - כגון בסודאן - מונעת הקמה או הפעלה רווחית, אפילו של מלון מודרני.

בעיה יסודית נוספת היא שאנשי העסקים הערביים, כדברי מייקל פילד (שם), הם יותר סוחרים מאשר משקיעים, דבר הנובע בחלקו ממסורת וחלקו מחוסר היציבות באיזור. כתוצאה מכך מחזיקים אנשי עסקים פרטיים ממדינות ערביות עשירות הון, הנאמד ב-120 מיליארד דולר בחו"ל, ואילו מהמדינות העניות (כולל מהגרים ותיקים) מחזיקים כ-50 מיליארד דולר בחו"ל. אין לצפות שבקרוב תהיה זרימה משמעותית הביתה של ההון הזה, כל עוד לא חלה דמוקרטיזציה של ממש במדינות ערב; ליצירת סביבה נוחה לקליטת השקעות, אומר הדיפלומט המצרי הוותיק תחסין בשיר, "יש צורך בשלטון החוק ולא בשלטון על פי צווים אישיים" ("אקונומיסט", 12.5.90).

סולידאריות בינערבית כפתרון?

מדינת-הלאום הבודדת, שהתגבשה בעולם הערבי בשני העשורים האחרונים, אינה מצליחה להתמודד עם האתגרים הכלכליים והטכנולוגיים הניצבים לפניה. אינטלקטואלים וכמה מהמדינאים בעולם הערבי מרגישים כיום - לא מעט בהשפעת התגבשות הגושים הכלכליים במערב המתועש - את המרכיב הכלכלי והחברתי כמוקד שאיפת האינטגרציה הבינערבית, פחות מהמימד הצבאי והפוליטי שהודגש בעבר (מתי שטיינברג, במסה על "עתיד העולם הערבי בעיני אינטלקטואלים ערבים", בקובץ בעריכתו ובעריכת מנחם קליון, "העולם הערבי בשנות ה-80", מכון דיווידס ליחסים בי"ל, 1990 ע"ע 95-96). ואולם גם השגתם של יעדים מוחשיים יותר מסוג זה של האחדות הערבית אינה מובטחת. הבעיה היא, טוען מייקל פילד ב"פייננשל טיימס", (17.1.90).

לבין צרכי המשק ומקורות התעסוקה, נוצר עודף עצום של בוגרי אוניברסיטאות. זה ציבור המהווה, כנזכר לעיל, את כר הפעולה הנוח של הארגונים הפונדמטליסטיים. גם שיעורי הפשיעה, ורמת הקיצוניות שלה בקרב הדור הצעיר נמצאים בקו עלייה.

במקביל, אין מערכת החינוך מסוגלות להתמודד עם מספרם הרב של המצטרפים אליה ושיעור הבערות עדיין גבוה במדינות ערביות רבות - 49% במצרים (כ-87% בקרב הנשים). רוב המדינות המתפתחות, שרבות מהן במזה"ת, מוציאות עד פי שניים ופי שלושה יותר על חימושן וצבאן, מאשר על חינוך ובריאות גם יחד ("זה מידל איסט" בריטניה, מאי 1990).

כאשר שינוי המגמה בגידול האוכלוסיה תלוי במידה רבה בהשכלתה של האישה, עדיין מצויות הנשים בתחתית הסולם בתחום זה במרבית מדינות ערב. כהיות הנשים המחנכות העיקריות של ילדיהן בחברות אלה, יש השפעה מרחיקת לכת למצב זה של השכלתן. המגמה לישום מחמיר של ההלכה המוסלמית במדינות רבות, אף בולמת עוד יותר את קידום מעמד האישה.

כ-50 מיליון ילדים בעולם הערבי מצויים מתחת לקו העוני; יותר משני שלישי מהילדים סובלים מתת תזונה; כ-15 מליון ילדים נמצאים מחוץ למערכת החינוך. נוכחות הבנות בבתי הספר אינה עולה במרבית מדינות ערב על 52%; למעלה מ-15 מיליון ילדים חשופים למחלות קטלניות; מימדי הפשיעה בקרב ילדים גדלים בשיעור ניכר. הם סובלים מניצול בשוק העבודה עד כדי סחר בילדים, ההופכים לעיתים לעבדים ("מידאיסט מארקטס" הבריטי דיווח כ-16.4.90 על שיח"ים עשירים באבו-ד'אבי, הרוכשים ילדים קלי משקל לתחרויות הגמלים שלהם, ומגדלים אותם למעשה בתנאי עבדות).

על פי התחזיות יהיו בשנת 2000 במדינות ערב 120 מיליון ילדים, אך רק 22 מיליון מתוכם יזכו לשירותי מזון, בריאות וחינוך די צורכם; עוד כ-45 מיליון יקבלו את המינימום ו-53 מיליון יוותרו מחוץ לכל טיפול ודאגה.

פרופ' הישאם שראבי, מאוניברסיטת ג'ורג'טאון, כותב באחד מספריו על "הדיכוי בחברה הערבית", המורכב מדיכוי העוני, דיכוי האישה ודיכוי הילד. פרופ' חלים ברנאת, איש מדעי החברה המלמד באותה אוניברסיטה, במחקר על "החברה הערבית המודרנית", יורד לשורשי בעיותיה בבית ובמשפחה: "המשטר הטוטאליטרי השורר בבית האב שואב כוחו מפילוסופיית חינוך, המבוססת על הפחדה וכפייה ולא על הסברה ושיכנוע" (מתוך: חיים רביב, "כמחנה", 13.12.89, וכן גליון 21.11.89; "אל-מוצור" המצרי, ב"הארץ", 6.9.89; "זה מידל איסט", מאי 1990).

בלמי פיתוח כלכלי

להערכת מייקל פילד, מה"פייננשל טיימס" (17.1.90), המשטרים הטוטליטריים בעולם הערבי הם גם אחד הבלמים החשובים בפני פתרון הבעיות הכלכליות הקשות המעיקות עליו, שכן אינם מסוגלים לספק תנאים ליוזמה פרטית וחופשית של ממש ולמשיכת השקעות מבחוץ. היוזמה החופשית בכל מקום נתונה לפיקוח. פירושו של דבר שבמדינות העניות היא כמעט ולא קיימת בחלקים חשובים של הכלכלה. כמו כן, אנשי עסקים רבקים במנטליות של סוחרי המזרח התיכון

עדיין נמצא בקו עלייה, משום ששיעור תמותת התינוקות, שעדיין אינו מגיע למקובל במערב, ממשיך לרדת בהדרגה. מספר הלידות לאישה במצרים הוא עדיין 5, כאשר בצפון טימן הוא מגיע ל-8. התוכניות לתכנון המשפחה במצרים, שתגיע בסוף המאה ל-75 מליון נפש (בקצב גידול של מליון ל-9 חודשים), לא הניבו שינוי משמעותי כלשהו. יש מדינות, כגון במפרץ, לוב ובעיקר עיראק, שאף מנהיגות תמריצים כלכליים לעידוד הילודה.

בין המניעים לרמת הילודה הגבוהה בעולם המתפתח בכלל, מונים המומחים את המניע הפסיכולוגי והחברתי של בסוס מעמד הגבר בחברה הפטריארכאלית המסורתית, המניע הכלכלי הקיומי של הבטחת פרנסתם ורווחתם של ההורים לעת זקנה בחברה נחשלת ונעדרת שירותי רווחה מפותחים. מניע חשוב לא פחות הוא הדתי, הניזון בין היתר מאנשי דת מהדרגים הנמוכים, הקרובים אל העם והשוללים את המסרים, המופצים לעיתים על ידי הממסד הדתי כיום, לטובת תכנון המשפחה.

יש להוסיף, כי המנהיגות - למשל במצרים - החוששת מעימות עם אנשי הדת וההמונים הנתונים להשפעתם, אינה מגלה בנושא זה עמדה נחרצת, ומשדרת לעיתים קרובות מסרים כפולים (הרצאת פרופ' גר גילבר, המרכז ע"ש דיין, יום עיון בנושא "אתגרים דמוגרפיים והתפתחויות פוליטיות במזה"ת", אוניב' ת"א, 9.5.90). האוכלוסיה הגדלה בעולם הערבי, וכן השינויים במנהגי תזונה, מגדילים בהתמדה את שיעורי ההוצאות על יבוא מזון, בעיקר במצרים, עיראק, ירדן ואלג'יריה. מצרים מייבאת כיום כ-60% מתצרוכת המזון שלה (בעלות של 4 מליארד ד' לשנה), סעודיה 65%, רזרבות המים והקרקע במרבית מדינות ערב אינן מסוגלות לספק את צרכי האוכלוסיה הגדלה. תוכניות ש"פ בתחום זה עם מדינות בעלות שפע משאבים בלתי מנוצלים (כגון סודאן) לא מומשו עד כה (ר' להלן).

אחת התוצאות מהפער בין שיעור גידול האוכלוסיה לצמיחה הכלכלית היא שיעורי אבטלה גבוהים - במדינות כמצרים 25%, תוניסיה 40%. שיעורי האבטלה גבוהים במיוחד בקרב בוגרי האוניברסיטאות והמכללות (כ-30% בירדן). במקביל גדל שיעור המהגרים לשם מציאת פרנסה.

אחת ההשלכות השליליות של ההגירה היא החיכוכים, שנוצרים בין המהגרים לבין המדינות המארחות, בשל היחס המפלה, ואף תופעות של התנכלויות כלפיהם. אלה מעכירים את היחסים בין המדינות האלה למדינות המוצא של העובדים, כפי שקרה לאחרונה בין מצרים לעיראק. אחרי שנים של דיונים לא הצליחו מדינות ערב להגיע לחתימת הסכמים ביניהן, שיסדירו את בעיות העובדים האלה. לפחות כ-2.8 מליון מצרים עובדים במדינות ערביות אחרות. ירדן, בה עובדים כ-300 אלף מצרים, היא בעצמה גם יצואנית כוח אדם, שכן חסרים בה מקומות עבודה המבוקשים על ידי משכיליה.

במדינות המפרץ, שאוכלוסייתן דלילה, מהווים העובדים הזרים עד כדי 60% מהאוכלוסיה, ושיעור אף גבוה יותר מכוח העבודה. הן מעדיפות כיום עובדים לא-ערבים, בין היתר משום שאינם דורשים אזרחות, על הזכויות הכלולות בה. אלפי עובדים ערבים גורשו בשנים האחרונות ממדינות המפרץ חזרה לארצותיהם, והכבירו עוד יותר על שוק העבודה במדינת האם.

כיוון שלא היתה התאמה בין התרחבות מערכת הלימודים האקדמיים במדינות כמצרים וירדן

הזעום להתקוממות, וכן היחס המתנכר למה שנראה להם כהנהגה חסרת סמכות ולגיטימציה ברורה ביו"ש ובעזה, ובעיקר כלפי מרכיביה האיסלאמיים הרדיקליים.

החשש מאי-יציבות ומתהליך לכנוניזציה הוא גם המניע העיקרי של כמה מהמשטרים הערביים להמר על רפורמות פוליטיות, ולו ראשוניות ושבריריות ביותר. תוצאות הרפורמות שהונהגו במדינות בירדן, כוויית (בה נעצרו לאחרונה 12 מראשי התובעים יתר דמוקרטיה - יוסף איברהים, "ני. טיימס" 20.5.90), אלג'יריה ותוניסיה עדיין לוטות בערפל. במדינות רבות כסוריה, עיראק, לוב וחצי-האי-הערב, לא חל שינוי. בשום מדינה ערבית לא נוהגת עדיין דמוקרטיה של ממש. בה ניתן לאופוזיציה כלשהי לנצח בבחירות ולהחליף את השלטון (ר' זרקור מס' 10 - כרך 13 על "הגלאסנוסט בעולם הערבי").

להערכת "האקונומיסט" הבריטי (12.5.90) הבחירות, למשל במצרים, עדיין אינן יותר מאשר "קישוט נאה"; הפרלמנט שנבחר חסר כל סמכות של ממש. בירדן, למרות הבחירות לפרלמנט, המלך הוא זה שעדיין מנהל את המדיניות, ממנה את הממשלה וראשה ואת הסנאט, ובירדן הסמכות לדחות או לקבל כל חוק; החוקה מייפה את כוחו להדיח את הממשלה ולפזר את הפרלמנט.

חופש העיתונות היחסי, שהונהג בירדן ובמצרים הוא מוגבל. הביקורת בירדן נעצרת בשערי הארמון. היא מוגבלת ביותר באשר לנשיא מצרים. במצרים אין צנזורה, המכבידה את ידה כבעבר, אך "אין גם לעיתונים גישה למידע חשוב ומבוסס, ולא נותר להם אלא להדפיס שמועות ורכילות". כללו של דבר, החופש שניתן והרפורמות השונות הם בבחינת "מתת שהעתיר עליהם המלך (או הנשיא) ולא מסכת של זכויות, המעוגנת במערכת של ריסונים ואיזונים" ("אקונומיסט, שם); את החירויות שהוענקו יכול המשטר לשלול בנקל.

"עד אשר לא ישנו את המערכת הזו ויעשו אותה חופשית יותר", טוען מייקל פילד מ"הפיינגשל טיימס", "לא תהייה כנראה ממשלה שיהייה לה הבטחון העצמי לקבל את ההחלטות הבלתי-פופולריות הדרושות" (25.1.90). במצב הנוכחי, אין לדעתו לממשלה הכוח הסמכותי לנצל את הלך הרוח הקיים על-מנת לחולל שינויים. סמכות כזו יש רק לדיקטטור כנאצר או לממשלה הנהנית מלגיטימציה, כפי שיש רק לדמוקרטיה אמיתית.

במילכוד הרמוגרפי והכלכלי

הבעיה בה"א הידיעה, המעיבה על עתידו של העולם הערבי היא בעיית האוכלוסיה. העולם הערבי נתון בעיצומה של התפוצצות אוכלוסין בלתי-ניתנת לבלימה. עם קצב הגידול הממוצע של כמעט 3% בשנה הוא מונה כבר היום קצת יותר מ-200 מיליון נפש, ואוכלוסיה זו תכפיל את עצמה תוך פחות מחצי יובל (מפקדים אמינים כמעט אינם קיימים במדינות ערב). התוספת העיקרית תהיה בכמה מדינות, כמו אלג'יריה ומצרים, שכבר כיום מתקשות לספק מזון ועבודה לאזרחיהן. יש מספר משאבים, כגון מים, המנוצלים עד תום ואין כל סיכוי שיגדלו.

כמעט בכל מדינות ערב, כ-40% מהאוכלוסיה היא מתחת לגיל 15. בחלק מהמדינות קצב הגידול

ואסייט, חזקת יותר הקבוצות האיטלאמיות האלימות, להבדיל ממרבית "האחים המוסלמים", השמרנים והמתונים יותר באמצעיהם. אלכסנדר בוצ'יאנטי מתאר ב"לה מונד" ("הארץ", 17.5.90) כיצד די בשמועות חסרות שחר על "צלבנים" שאנסו נערות מוסלמיות, ע"מ שארגון ה"ג'יהאד האסלאמי", ורכים אחרים המתחרים זה בזה, יתפרצו בהתקפה על אזרחים ורכוש קופטיים. המשטר אמנם נלחם בתקיפות בארגונים אלה, ולאחרונה נהרגו 10 מאנשי אחד מהם, בתוכם מנהיגו שאוקי א-שיח'. אלא שמאגר המתגייסים מבין בוגרי התיכון והאוניברסיטה המוכבטלים גדל. השלטון "אינו ערוך לכרסם בהשפעתו הזוחלת (של האסלאם הפונדמנטליסטי), שלו סיכויים רבים יותר לטווח ארוך להכות שורש בקרב אוכלוסייה, הנמחצת ע"י משבר כלכלי ועליות מחירים" (ראה גם כתבות בנושא של קארול מורלו ב"פילדלפיה אינקוויירר", 7.5.90, ודר' רפעת א-סייד ב"אל-אהאלי" המצרי, 11.4.90).

הסוציולוג המצרי, דר' סער א-דין איברהים מהאוניברסיטה האמריקנית בקהיר, שחקר רבות את התופעה במצרים, משרטט קווים מאפיינים של המוסלמי המיליטנטי: "הם צעירים משכילים מהמעמד הבינוני הנמוך, ממוצא כפרי ומערים קטנות. לעיתים קרובות הם הראשונים במשפחה הלומדים בבית ספר גבוה ומייצגים את התקווה לעתיד טוב יותר. אבל באוניברסיטה, לראשונה הרחק ממשפחותיהם, הם לומדים מהר שסיכוייהם קלושים... לכל היותר הם יכולים לצפות למשרה ממשלתית תוך 5 שנים, בשכר של 20 דולר לחודש. כך, מתמוססים חלומותיהם הצנועים להתחתן, להקים משפחה ולעזור להוריהם, לכדי מרירות וכעס. צעירים אלה הם העצב החי של החברה הזאת והם נגררים לקיצוניות ע"י התנועות האיטלאמיות..." (מצוטט ע"י קארול מורלו, "פילדלפיה אינקוויירר", 7.5.90).

באורח פרדוכסלי, מצוין ה"אקונומיסט" (שם), מסייעת התעצמות הרדיקליזם האיטלאמי לביצור ה"לגיטימיות" של המשטרים החילוניים הקיימים, הן בחוץ, במערב, והן מבית, רבים מעדיפים את המשטר הקיים, אפילו הטוטליטרי, על פני חליפתו הפונדמנטליסטית ברמות המשטר האיראני. לכך עלולה להיות במקרים רבים השפעה בולמת על תהליכי דמוקרטיזציה של משטרים, שבטחונם העצמי גובר.

סכנת האופוזיציה

דאגת המשטרים הערביים ליציבותם והמשך קיומם היא המניע הראשי למדיניותם בכל תחום שהוא. דר' אמציה ברעם, מהחוג ללימודי המזה"ת באוניברסיטת חיפה, מצביע על החשש מאופוזיציה כגורם עיקרי להרעת יחסי עיראק עם בריטניה וארה"ב. הוצאתו להורג של העיתונאי פרזאד באזופט (מרס 1990) נבעה מהצורך להוכיח שעיראק אינה רומניה, ושאינה אופוזיציה מבית שיכולה לסכן את המשטר. גם הפתיחה במלחמה עם איראן היתה קשורה באופוזיציה הפנימית השיעית (יום עיון על "התגבשות מדינת הלאום העיראקית - הישגים ואתגרים", המרכז ע"ש דיין, אוניב' ת"א, 18.3.90).

דוגמא אחרת לגישה זו יש ביחסם של המשטרים הערביים להתקוממות ביו"ש ועזה, אשר עוררה בהם חרדה, שמא יתפשטו הלכי רוח והשפעות פוליטיות מסוכנות להם. מכאן הסיוע החומרי

האיסלאם זוכה גם ממשבר הזהות, שיצרה ההיגררות אחרי המערב, ממשבר הציפיות שיצר עושר הנפט, שלא הביא רווחה לרחבי העולם הערבי ומהנוחם שהרת מביאה להמונים החיים ברוחק של קשיי היום-יום.

העבר המפואר של האיסלאם רב-העוצמה משיב כיום הערכה עצמית ומעניק משענת גם לרבים בקרב העילית בעולם הערבי, ולא רק לשכבות עממיות. הגישה המהפכנית, החותרת לשינוי הסדר הקיים מעיקרו, מגולמת כיום בעיקר בזרמים האיסלאמיים.

מפלגות המייצגות את המגמה האיסלאמית זוכות בהצלחות משמעותיות בכל מקום בעולם הערבי בו מתקיימות בחירות חופשיות יחסית – במצרים, ירדן, תוניסיה ואלג'יריה. בהקשר רחב יותר, שיש לו ודאי השפעה על העולם הערבי, מתבטאת עליית האיסלאם ברשימת הסכסוכים האתניים בהם מעורבים מוסלמים, ברחבי העולם המוסלמי, אשר חלקם גולש לאלמות גם בימים אלה: בקשמיר, אזרביג'אן, חבל קוסובו ביוגוסלביה, התורכים בבלגריה, אריתריאה, הפיליפינים, קפריסין ועוד.

לא במקרה מצוין יורש העצר הירדני הנסיך חסן את התפשטות התנועה המוסלמית הרדיקלית כראגתו הראשונה: "תנועה איסלאמית פונדמנטליסטית רבת-השפעה מתפשטת בחברות המוסלמיות מדרום מזרח אסיה עד צפון אפריקה, עלולה להפוך פעילה בהתקוממות הפלסטינית... זו תהיה מלחמה לא בין מדינות-לאום אלא נגד מדינת-הלאום" – במאמר שפירסם ב"אינטרנשיונל הראלד טריביון" (28-29.4.90).

בקרב "האחים המוסלמים" באשר הם מתרוצצים עדיין שני זרמים: זה הדוגל בהשרשת האיסלאם בחברה בדרכי נועם, עפ"י תורתו של חסן אל-בנא מייסד הארגון; והקיצוני יותר הדבק בדרך שהתווה סייד אל-קוטב (הוצא להורג במצרים ב-1965), על-פיה יש לצאת לג'יהאד למען תיקון החברה המוסלמית הסוטה והמושחתת.

זהו איסלאם, כפי שמציין וויליאם פפאף ב"לוס אנג'לס טיימס" (IHT, 27.4.90), "הרואה בדמוקרטיה כפירה מערבית; על החברה לציית לחוק האלוהי ולא להצבעת הרוב". מתחזקים בו היסודות הקיצוניים האלימים: באלג'יריה ה"חזית האיסלאמית" בראשות עבאס מדאני ובמצרים הקבוצות האיסלאמיות. הדוגלות בהשלטה בכוח הזרוע של חוקי האיסלאם בחברה, שהושחתה ולקתה בכפירה.

מגמה רדיקלית זו גורמת לפגיעה מתמשכת בנוצרים ברחבי המזה"ת, ולפיחות מתמיד במעמדם ובמספרם – כפי שמראה "טיים מגאזין" בסקירתו ב-23.4.90. "קומץ הנוצרים פשוט אינם רצויים בעולם האיסלאמי", נאמר שם. הם סובלים מאפלייה והתנכלויות מצד התנועות המוסלמיות באיסטנבול, בית לחם וביירות. אחד משיאי המתרחקות בבית לחם היה כאשר הארגונים האיסלאמיים הפלסטיניים הכריזו על יום השלושים למותו של השיח' הפלסטיני עבדאללה עזאם, שנהרג באפגניסטאן, ולא על יום הארבעים המסורתי, כעל יום אבל ציבורי ושבתה, על מנת שיחול בדיוק בחג המולד. רק אחרי שראשי הכנסייה הקימו קול זעקה "ויתרו" הארגונים ודחו את יום האבל.

לאחרונה התרבו הפגיעות בקופטים במצרים. מחוץ לקהיר, בערים הקטנות יותר, כגון מיניא

זרקור למזרח התיכון

סיוון-תמוז, תש"ן
יוני, 1990

קניין נחלת י"ו, 120 עמ"ה

אל:

זרקור מס' 14, כרך 13

נושאי מוקד

איומים ואתגרים בעולם הערבי

חלק II

מהפכות איסלאמית

כוחות האופוזיציה החילונית על זרמיה השמאליים הסוציאליסטים והליברליים, נמצאים מזה זמן רב בתהליך נסיגה בעולם הערבי. את מקומם תופסות התנועות הדתיות האיסלאמיות. הפטרות מכל תווית של רעיון מיובא וזר, ונבנות במידה רבה ממחדלי הזרמים החילוניים. שנבשלו בהגשמת יעדי האחדות והקידמה ונחלו תבוסות רבות.

– נא ראה גם זרקורים: 10, 13, כ' 13; 14, 18, 19, 34, 37, 38, 42, 56, 64, 83, 87, 88, 91, 92. כ' 12.

* תיקון טעות: בחלק I (זרקור מס' 13) בעמוד 10 הושמט תאריך הראיון של נביל שעת' ל"אל-יום"

– 4.4.90



הסברה/מרחבי
טל' 3218

ח' תמוז 1
תש"ן 1990
1 ביולי

Handwritten signature and notes in blue ink.

13555

אל : לשכת שה"ח
לשכת ס/שה"ח

מאת : הסברה/מרחבי

הנדון : סקר דעת קהל של ה-ADL מ-11/6/90

א. מבוא

ב-11/6/90 ערך ה-ADL סקר דעת קהל בארה"ב בנושאינו. להלן מובאות המסקנות הראשוניות כפי שדווחו להנהלת ה-ADL מהחברה שערכה את הסקר.

ב. כללי

1. ניתוח תוצאות הסקרים שנעשו כשנתיים האחרונות מראה שקיימת שחיקה משמעותית במעמדה של ישראל בדעת הקהל האמריקנית. לראשונה האהדה הבסיסית האמריקנית נוטה יותר לצד הפלסטינאים בשטחים מאשר לישראל, ביחס של 33% ל-31% באוכלוסיה הכללית, וביחס של 48% ל-25% ב"מנהיגות" (משכילים, בעלי הכנסה של מעל 50,000 דולר וכו').
2. מעולם, גם לא בתקופת מלחמת לבנון, לא הייתה התרחקות כה דרמטית מישראל בדעת הקהל האמריקנית.
3. הסקר נערך לפני הצגת המשלה החדשה. לדעת עורכי הסקר תוצאותיו היו חמורות עוד יותר לו נעשה מספר ימים מאוחר יותר לאור הכיסוי השלילי ביותר לו זכתה המשלה לאחר הצגתה.

ג. להלן מספר תוצאות והערכות משמעותיות שעלו מהסקר

1. רה"מ שמיר - הפופולריות של רה"מ שמיר נמצאת ברמה נמוכה מאד. משמעותית היא גם העובדה שאחדים ממנהיגי העולם הזוכים לפופולריות רבה (הנשיא בוש, האפיפיור, מנדלה, גורבצ'וב) מבקרים את מדיניות הליכוד ובכך תורמים לירידה באהדה לישראל.



2. ממשלת ישראל - לשאלה על דעתם של האמריקנים על ממשלת ישראל 48% הביעו דעה ביקורתית לעומת 25% שהביעו דעה חיובית.
3. השפעת הנשיא בוש - בוש מחשיך לזכות בפופולריות גבוהה במיוחד בציבור האמריקני ובקרב מובילי דעת הקהל (משכילים ובעלי הכנסה גבוהה) אפילו גבוהה מהמחוצע הארצי. אי לכך לביקורת ו/או להתבטאויות של הנשיא או של בייקר השפעה רבה על נטיות דעת הקהל בארה"ב.
4. מובילי דעת הקהל - מסקרי ה-ADL עולה שלעיתים קרובות המגמות המתגלות כיום בקרב "מובילי דעת הקהל" (משכילים ובעלי הכנסה של מעל 50,000 דולר) מקדימות (FORESHADOW) ומנבאות את התוצאות שתהיינה בדעת הקהל הכללית בסקר שלאחריו. חשובה ביותר היא על כן העובדה שבכל שאלה שנשאלה התוצאה היא בקרב "המובילים" חמורה יותר מאשר בדעת הקהל הכללית.
5. אש"ף - ערפאת - אש"ף וערפאת ממשיכים לקבל תוצאות גרועות בסקר. למרות זאת האמריקנים מביעים תמיכה רבה לקיום הדיאלוג ארה"ב - אש"ף.
6. מולדת לפלסטינאים - האמריקנים בכלל, ועוד יותר מכך מובילי דעת הקהל, תומכים בהקמת מולדת לפלסטינאים.
7. סיוע חוץ - האמריקנים ממשיכים להאמין שישראל מקבלת סיוע חוץ גבוה מדי. משמעותית היא העובדה שבמהלך 18 החודשים האחרונים אחוז הסבורים כך עלה ב-20% ומגיע כיום ל-65%. אפילו בקרב תומכי ישראל המובהקים, כאשר נשאלו אם הם תומכים בהצעת הסנטור דול - אחוז 43% שהם בעד הקיצוץ של 5% לעומת 40% שהתנגדו. 53% מהאמריקנים ו-61% ממובילי דעת הקהל, מאמינים שהיקף הסיוע האמריקני מקנה לארה"ב את הזכות ללחוץ על ישראל לקיים מו"מ עם הפלסטינאים.
8. לחץ אמריקני בתהליך השלום: 52% מהאמריקנים, ו-67% מה"מובילים" מאמינים שלחץ אמריקני על ישראל מסייע לתהליך השלום.

ד. משאל ה"ניו-יורק טיימס" ו-CBS

משאל ה"ניו-יורק טיימס" ו-CBS שיפורסם השבוע גם כן עולה שקיימת שחיקה רבה במעמד ישראל.

לדוגמא:

1. סיוע חוץ - 33% קוראים לקיצוץ בסיוע האמריקני (לעומת 25% במאי 1988).
2. אהדה לפלסטינאים - 38% סבורים שארה"ב צריכה לגלות יותר אהדה לפלסטינאים (לעומת 26% ב-1988).
3. מולדת לפלסטינאים - 47% בעד (לעומת 40% ב-1988).



(המידע על תוצאות משאל זה נמסר לרות ירון עם בקשה להבטיח סודיות עד לאחד פרסום הכתבה).

ה. סיכום:

תוצאות 2 הסקרים מלמדים על שחיקה ניכרת במעמדה של ישראל בארה"ב. חמורה במיוחד העובדה שבקרוב בעלי הרשפעה (משכילים והכנסה גבוהה) השחיקה רבה עוד יותר.

בברכה,
ארתור קול

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

דף 1 מתוך 3 דפים
סוג בטחוני: שמור
דחיפות: מיידי
תאריך רו"ח: 29/6/90
מס' מברק:

המשרד
1515
נ"ו - יו"ר ק
37
1/3

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א. סמנכ"ל הסברה. לשכת שה"ח
דע: סביר/נ"י. יועץ תקשורת לרוה"מ. יועצת תקשורת שה"ח. מע"ת.
הסברה. השגריר ארד/באמצעות מצפ"א

משאל דעת קהל

ראו נא המזכר הפנימי המצ"ב של "הועד היהודי האמריקני" ביחס למשאל
דעת קהל של "ניו-יורק טיימס" ו- CBS ביחס לישראל וסיוע החוץ העומד
להתפרסם בשבוע הבא ב"ניו-יורק טיימס". המידע נמסר לנו עם בקשה
להבטיח סודיות, ואי-פרסום ממצאיו עד לאחר פרסום חכתבה. אנא.

3
סברה - עתונות ירו
3-11
3 2 1 3 1 1 3
שהת 3 אשהת רהמ אג אג אג אג אג
1 2
הסקרה 1

VIA FAX
CONFIDENTIAL

2/3

1515

37

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date June 28, 1990

to Shula Bahat, Ron Kronish, Jon Levine, Mort Yarmon, Ira Silverman, David Singer

from David Harris

subject FORTHCOMING NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE

I received a call today from Bill Schmidt, the Times bureau chief in Chicago and a friend of Jon Levine's. Jon put him in touch with me.

Schmidt is doing an article, which is likely to appear next week, that will accompany a report on the results of a Times/CBS poll on attitudes towards Israel and foreign aid. The poll was taken during the first week in June. Schmidt has travelled to Baltimore and Saginaw, Michigan for focus groups and man-on-the-street interviews to try to determine what are current attitudes towards Israel and foreign aid, and what changes in these attitudes are at work.

He shared with me on an off-the-record basis some of the key poll data. I would ask you to respect his request for confidentiality of the data until the results are published in the Times next week.

Question one deals with the level of foreign aid to Israel -- should it be increased, decreased or kept at current levels.

	<u>Washington Post Poll (1989)</u>	<u>New York Times (June 1990)</u>
Increase aid	6%	8%
Decrease aid	25%	33%
Same level	66%	53%
Don't Know	2%	6%

Question two deals with basic sympathies to Israel versus the Arabs.

Sympathies more for Israel	40%
Sympathies more for Arabs	19%
Neither	12%
Both	4%
Don't know	25%

Question three deals with Israel's handling of protests in the West Bank and Gaza.

	May 1988	June 1990
Too harsh	34%	35%
Too lenient	10%	7%
About right	22%	27%

1515
3/3 37

Question four deals with the question of whether the U.S. should be more sympathetic to the Palestinians living in Israel.

	July 1988	June 1990
Yes	26%	38%
No	49%	37%
Don't know	25%	25%

Question five deals with attitudes towards a Palestinian homeland.

	July 1988	June 1990
Favor	40%	47%
Oppose	24%	25%
Don't know	36%	28%

Question six deals with whether Israel is a dependable ally of the United States.

	June 1990
Yes	45%
No	40%
Don't know	15%

[Notes: This information was provided over the phone. I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the wording of the questions or the numbers.

Many of the cross-tabulations still need to be done, but a preliminary finding is that two of the weakest pockets of support come from liberal Democrats and Blacks.)

Conclusion: It is a safe bet that the poll results, and the accompanying article that will reflect Bill Schmidt's interviews, are likely to add to the growing impression of an erosion in support for Israel in the U.S.

DAH:dw



מנהל הסברה
טל' 3218

י"ח סיון תש"ן
11 ביוני 1990

12981

אל : מר משה רביב, סמנכ"ל הסברה

מאת : מנהל הסברה

הנדון: ביקור מטה - הסברה
בואנוס איירס 27-30.5.90

במהלך סיורי באמל"ט, שהיתי בבירת ארגנטינה במשך שלושה ימים ובחסגרת תכנית ביקור שאירגנה השגרירות נפגשתי עם השגריר, יצחק שפי, עם רפי אלדד, יועץ הסברה ועם סגל השגרירות. נפגשתי לשיחת תידרוך עם עורך העיתון המקומי באנגלית (B.A. HERALD), ערכתי מסיבת עיתונאים לנציגי העיתונות היהודית, ראיון לרדיו וביקור מקיף בקהילה היהודית.

אני מציין בסיפוק את התייחסותה הרצינית של השגרירות לנושא ההסברה, רמת המודעות לנושא ההסברתי גבוהה מאוד והשגריר מהווה דוגמא אישית בנושא. עם זאת, המערך הנוכחי של עבודת ההסברה (בעיקר ה-CIDIPAL עליו ארחיב בהמשך) מיושן ודורש הערכות חדשה ותכנית הבראה מסיבית מצידה של השגרירות, תמיכה וגיבוי - כספיים ולוגיסטיים מצד המשרד.

המשבר הכלכלי הקשה הפוקד את ארגנטינה עלול בטווח הארוך להשפיע גם על עבודתו של מכון התרבות באשר קשיים כספיים מעיבים כבר עתה על פעילותו הברוכה.

להלן סיכום הערותי:

א. הסידור (CENTRO DE INFORMACION Y DOCUMENTACION DE ISRAEL PARA AMERICA LATINA) שאמור היה במקור - כי שמרמז שמו - מרכז הסברה כלל-לטינו-אמריקאי, אינו מספק היום אפילו את צרכיה של בירס. המרכז "אינו מתפקד" כהגדרת השגריר שפי ואכן ביקורי במקום הותיר בי רושם עגום מאוד. נציגויות רבות היו מתברכות במבנה גדול ומרשים ובכח עזר מסוג זה המצוי בסידור אלא שהיום - מסיבות היסטוריות - המקום משמים, אינו יוזם ואינו גורם בעל משקל. ב"מרכז האינפורמציה הלטינו-אמריקאי" אין היום מנהל בעל משקל (המוזכרה הקודמת, קודמה לתפקיד זה), אין ציוד מינימלי (מכשיר טלביזיה, מחשב וכד') ומכונת הצילום היחידה מושבתת זמן רב ומשמשת ככוננית לספרים.



על דעת השגריר סוכם כי השגרירות תגיש בהקדם האפשרי תכנית הבראה מקפת ושלבית להחייאתו של המרכז. תכנית שתכלול הגדרת תפקידים, הגדרת צרכים, מבנה ודירשה תקציבית על מנת שניתן יהיה לקבל החלטה לגבי המשך פעולתו. נקודת מפתח להערכת השגרירות (הערכה המקובלת עלי) היא שקיים צורך למצוא מנהל בכיר, יוזם ובעל מעמד לנהל המקום גם אם פירושו של דבר שינוי מבני ברמת השכר.

ב. פרוייקט הרדיו - שדרים - לפי הדיווחים שידר אבי נדרה עד כה לשלוש תחנות:

1. ריבדביה - בואנוס איירס: אין כל הוכחה שהתחנה השתמשה אי-פעם בחומר של אבי נדרה. רפי אלדד לא שמע אותו אף פעם וכך גם אחרים. המלצת ביירס לגבי תחנה זאת היא לבדוק אפשרות לשדר לתחנה אחרת אחרי שהשדר ישוחח עם התחנה גלויות ויבדוק מדוע חומר לא משודר. ההצעה היא שהתחנה הבאה תהיה RADIO AMERICA.

2. רדיו קורדובה: השידורים פסקו בגלל סיבות לא ברורות. מציעים להמתין ולבדוק גם שם מעבר לתחנה אחרת.

3. רוסדיו: גם שם לא הצליח איש ההסברה למצוא הוכחות כי החומר משודר בוודאי לא על בסיס מסודר וקבוע.

בקצרה בכל שמונת חודשי שהותו של אלדד בביירס לא עלה בידו לשמוע את השדר.

ג. קלטות רדיו -

1. קלטות קול ישראל - מוסיקה קלאסית בביצוע ישראלי מגיעות באופן סדיר ומשודרות באופן קבוע ב-RADIO NACIONAL. איש ההסברה בשגרירות מעלה ספק האם קיים בכלל ערך הסברתי לשידורי מוסיקה כאשר מלבד איזכור קצרצר בתחילת התכנית כי מדובר בתזמורת ישראלית אין כל קשר ישיר לישראל. אלדד מציע לנסות מוסיקה ישראלית פופולרית.

2. קלטות אבי יפה שכללו שירים ליום הזכרון ויום השואה טובים רק לאירועים פנימיים ולשימוש הקהילה.

3. מגזין הרדיו - מגיע באופן לא סדיר. רדיו ריבדביה מקבל החומר ומשתמש בו. ממליץ להגביר השימוש בו.

4. "חדשות מארץ הקודש" - מגיע מניו-יורק באופן בלתי סדיר ומופן לרדיו של הכנסיה.



ד. קלטות וידיאו - הקלטת השבועית המועברת ע"י מדור הפקה היא, לדברי השגרירות, "אוצר בלתי רגיל". מועדון "הכח" הגדול המקומי ומכון התרבות מקרינות אותה מדי שבוע בליווי תרגום צמוד. איכות הקלטת בד"כ טובה. השגרירות ביקשה וקיבלה אישור לא להחזיר הקלטות בתום השימוש.

באשר לקלטות מחלקת ההסברה - ישנה תנועה ערה של קלטות הנלקחות לפרק זמן קצוב ע"י בודדים ומוסדות ובמידה פחותה ביותר גם ע"י תחנות סלביזיה. השגרירות הצביעה על חוסר בסרטים על הנושאים: סרט תירות מעודכן במקום THIS IS ISRAEL שהתיישן, סרט על מקומות קדושים וסרטים על חידושים והמצאות במדע.

ה. JERUSALEM DATELINE (שרות המאמרים) - ביום בו ביקרתי בשגרירות פירסם CLARIN - העיתון הגדול ביותר בארגנטינה קטע מתוך 'שרות המאמרים' שלנו. השגרירות נתבקשה והסכימה להראות יתר אגרסיביות בדחיפת שרות המאמרים לכל עיתון אפשרי. בהתאם תבקש השגרירות עותקים נוספים של הפרסום ממחלקת ההסברה.

ו. פירסומים - בכל הנוגע לפירסומים פוליטיים, התמונה מעורבת: פירסום כמו "סימלי אש"ף" זכה כאן לתפוצה רחבה ביותר בעוד שלפירסום על "זכות השיבה" לא נמצא שימוש.

עקרונית השגרירות מאמינה כי הפירסומים טובים ויש בהם שימוש טוב. בביקור במחסני הסידיפל נתגלו מלאים רבים וחומר מיושן. השגרירות נתבקשה להיפטר מן החומר מיושן ולהפיץ בצורה יזומה את כמויות החומר הרב (כולל פוסטרים) הנמצאים בסידיפל.

ז. סמנה - אורורה - השגרירות מקבלת 25 עותקים של "סמנה" ו-40 עותקים של "אורורה". העיתון האחרון עדיף בהרבה לדעת השגרירות, כאשר "סמנה" ביקורתית ביותר כלפי מדיניות הממשלה. מבקשים להמשיך ולקבל את אותה כמות.

ח. משלחת הנוער - לשנה הבאה מבקשים לקבל זוג ילדים ל-3 שבועות. כינו תוכנית בהתאם לבואנוס איירס ועיר באינטריוור - קורדובה.

ט. תקציב - השגרירות קיבלה השנה את אשר ביקשה ומקווה כי תוכל לעמוד במשימות בסדר גודל זה של תקציב. השגרירות ברכה על כך שלראשונה מקבלת השגרירות הקצבה דולרית לצד המטבע המקומי שאינו רלבנטי כלל בגלל האינפלציה המטורפת.



י. מרצים - הנסיון של השגרירות עם שני מרצים שנשלחו מהארץ בשתי פ עם ההסתדרות הציונית (שניידר ופרחה) היה טוב מאוד. סוכם כי השגרירות תצביע על מועמד לסיור נוסף. המחלקה תאשר אם תיווכח כי תוכנית העבודה שתוכן למרצה אכן תהיה מקיפה.

יא. משלחת עיתונאים - השגריר העלה בעיית חוסר ההענות של גורמי המשרד לבקשתו לשלוח עיתונאים, אם מחוסר תקציב ואם מחוסר זמן וכ"א לטיפול. סוכם כי מחלקת ההסברה תממן שהותם של 2 עיתונאים מארגנטינה אם מחלקות אמל"ט, מאו"ר ומע"ת תהיינה אחראיות לתכנית עצמה.

רצ"ב הדוח שהכינה השגרירות לקראת הביקור.

ב ב ר כ ה,

יוסי גל

העתק: סגן שה"ח
המנכ"ל
המשנה למנכ"ל
סמנכ"ל לחינוח
סמנכ"ל אמל"ט
המפכ"ל
מנהל אמל"ט 2
ראשי מדורים - הסברה
השגריר, ביי"ס
ר. אלדר, ביי"ס



בואנוס איירס, כט' באייר תש"נ

24 במאי 1990

מספר: 77

אל: מנהל הסכרה

מאת: רפי אלדר - ביירס

הנדון: ביקור מטה - נושאים

1. מצבנו בתקשורת ובדעת הקהל

כבואי לסקור מצבנו בדעת הקהל בארגנטינה עלי להסתמך בעיקר על תחושותי ותחושות חברי סגל השגרירות בעבר וכיום.

אחד הדברים הראשונים אותם ניסיתי לעשות מיד כאשר הגעתי לביירס, היה לבדוק אפשרות של עריכת סקר דעת קהל מקצועי שיוכל להבהיר לנו בצורה מקצועית, מצבנו בדעת הקהל ובציבורים שונים עימם אנו פועלים מזה שנים רבות. הפרוייקט גובש אולם לא ניתן היה להוציא אותו לפועל, בגלל העלות הכספית (15 אלף דולר). ייתכן ובעתיד נצליח לעשות זאת.

מכל מקום הרושם שלנו הוא כי, בסיסית ובקרב שכבות נרחבות של האוכלוסיה, יש ראייה חיובית של ישראל כמדינה קטנה וצעירה שהצליחה, תוך מאבקים קשים על קיומה ועצמאותה, לפתח מדינה מתקדמת מבחינה טכנולוגית, מדעית ותרבותית. אולם יחד עם זאת קיימת ביקורת על התנהגותה של ישראל כלפי שכנותיה ובמיוחד כלפי תושבי השטחים. על כן בצד הביקורת על ישראל, כפי שלמשל היינו עדים לה במהלך התקרית החמורה בראשון לציון קיימת אליה הערכה בסיסית ותמיכה בלתי מעורערת בזכותה להתקיים בשלום. על אף שישראל זוכה להופיע כמעט יום יום בתקשורת מורגש חוסר ידע וחוסר הבנה ^{ממשל} לגבי הארועים באזורנו. חוסר הידע הזה מאפיין לא רק את הציבור הרחב אלא גם אנשי תקשורת ורבים בחוגים הפוליטיים והאחרים.

הדיעה הרווחת היא שקיימת הערכה רבה לגבי יכולתה של ישראל כמדינה מפותחת ומתקדמת מבחינה מדעית וטכנולוגית. קיימת הערכה להשיגים הללו שהושגו בעמל רב ותוך כדי היות המדינה נתונה במאבק עם שכנותיה. לעומת זאת הכיסוי המאסיבי ואופיו של כיסוי זה מאז תחילת האינתיפדה, העמיד אצל רבים (כמו במקומות אחרים בעולם) בסימן שאלה את חוסנה המוסרי של ישראל והכתים בצורה קשה את תדמיתה כמדינה שוחרת שלום והמקפידה על זכויות האדם.

למרות האמור לעיל, נראה לי כי הפגיעה אינה כה חמורה כפי שידוע לנו עליה באירופה ואף בארה"ב, ובסך הכל אם ניתן היה לסכם את תדמית ישראל, הרי שהיא חיובית.



אני אומר זאת על סמך מיפגשים רבים בתוך ומחוץ לקהילה היהודית ועל סמך מגע עם אנשים רבים מתחומי התקשורת, האמנות, אוני' וכו'...

2. פעולות הסברה בולטות בחצי השנה האחרונה.

- במהלך מחצית השנה האחרונה בוצעו מיגוון רחב ביותר של פעולות הסברה ותרבות. בכך יש לנו שותפים חשובים המסייעים לנו במלאכה זו והם קודם כל הקהילה היהודית על כל מוסדותיה וארגוניה הבאים במגע עם התקשורת והמארגנים מיגוון רחב של פעילויות המסייעות בעקיפין להסברתנו וכן מכון התרבות כאן והמכונים באינטריוור המבצעים עבודה יקרה מפז כתחומי התרבות ומפציצים את ישראל היפה.
- הארוע ההסכרתי המרכזי היה כמוכך ביקור הנשיא הרצוג על תוצאותיו התקשורתיות וההסכרתיות המרשימות.
- יריד הספר הבינלאומי בו השתתפנו עם ביתן מיוחד. היריד זכה לביקור של מאות אלפים ובמהלכו נעשו פעולות תרבות שונות.
- ראיונות לתקשורת של השגריר וכן של הח"מ. אנו מנצלים כל הזדמנות אפשרית על מנת להגיע עם המסר שלנו לתקשורת. במסגרת זו רואיין פעמים רבות השגריר בטלוויזיה, ברדיו ובעיתונים שונים. הראיונות בהזדמנויות כגון יום העצמאות, ארוע מיוחד אחר, או כאשר מתאפשר לנו הדבר הן ביוזמתנו או בפניה של התקשורת. התוכניות אינן רק בנושאים מדיניים אלא מקיפות תחומי ~~ההתקשורת~~ ^{התרבות} וההסברה של ישראל היפה (קטעי עיתונות לרוב וקלטות הועברו למח' ההסברה). המגע עם התקשורת הינו כמעט יום יומי וכולל משלוח חומר, פגישות וארוח עיתונאים ותידרוכים בנושאים מיוחדים (כדוגמא ניתן לתת המיפגש בבית השגריר עם שלושה מראשי העיתון פחינה 12, ~~מיפגש עם עיתונאים בא"צ בבית מול העיתון אל דאיה~~, מסיבות עיתונאים עם העיתונות היהודית והכללית וכו'...).
- פעולות תרבות- כגון תערוכה מיוחדת שהפקנו כאן ואשר הוצגה במרכז סן מרטין ועתה מנויידצת באינטריוור.
- שבוע ישראל במר דל פלטה וברוסריו. שבועות ישראל שנקבעו בסו חואן, טוקומן, לה פלטה, קורדובה ובבירס.
- נשלחו ארצה ר/ע ביירס ור/ע קורדובה. עיתונאי מקלרין שראיין הנשיא לקראת ביקורו. שני עיתונאים נוספים האחד מרוסריו והשני מקורדובה. נשלח הסופר והעיתונאי אנטוניו רקני לכנס סופרים, נשלח פרופ' סוונסיני שהכין מופע אודיו ויזואלי על האמנות בישראל.
- שבוע סרטים ישראלים כסינמטק בשיתוף הסינמטק והכראיקה אשר כלל בוואו של הבמאי דני ווקסמן.
- הפצת חומר רב אם ע"י השגרירות ואם באמצעות סדיפל לתקשורת ולציבורים נרחבים. אלה חלק מן הפעולות בחצי השנה האחרונה.
- פירוט גדול יותר ינתן בע"פ.



3. התאמת חומר ההסברה מן הארץ לצרכים

החומר המגיע מהסברה בדרך כלל טוב ושימושי. מגיעה אלינו כמות עצומה של תדריכים הן של הסברה והן של ממ"ד שרק חלק קטן ממנה ניתן להפצה ולשימוש חיצוני. החומר ממרכז האינפורמציה ברובו מתאים להפצה ואכן מופץ לגורמים שונים. מאמרי שירות המאמרים גם הם מופצים כל פעם על פי הנושא וכל מאמר נדון לגופו. מאמרים אלה ישמשו אותנו בהפקת הכולטין של השגרירות שאנו מקווים יראה אור במהלך יוני. קלטות הוידאו זוכות להצלחה רבה "ולתנועה" ערה להשאלה הן לפרטים והן למוסדות שונים. קלטות רבות אף מוחדרות להקרנה בתחנות טלוויזיה בכבלים או אף ארציות. על כך שולחים דוחות תקופתיים.

תוכניות הרדיו גם הן מוחדרות לתחנות רדיו. אנו מקבלים בעיקר תוכניות מוסיקה קלאסית שמוחדרות באופן קבוע לרדיו נסיונל.

לגבי קלטות עם מגזינים בנושאי רפואה מדע וכו'... אנו מקבלים חומר מועט ביותר והיינו יכולים, אילו קיבלנו יותר, לעשות בהם שימוש ולהחדירם לתחנות רדיו.

4. תקציב ההסברה

במצב הכלכלי של ארגנטינה, אין משמעות לתקציב ההסברה כפי שהוא נתון במטבע מקומי. אני שמח לראות שהשנה כללו רובריקה מיוחדת המציינת הסכום בדולרים. אני מניח שנוכל להסתדר בסכום הזה השנה. בחודשים האחרונים חלה עליה תלולה במחירים בדולרים.

אם מגמה זו תימשך אנו עלולים למצוא עצמנו די מהר ללא תקציב. בנושא זה יש לזכור שרבות מאוד מן הפעולות ממומנות ע"י גופים אחרים (שבועות ישראל בערים שונות ע"ח הקהילה או המכון המקומי, תערוכות וכו'...). אולם עלינו להקדיש תקציב גדול יותר לפרוייקטים מיוחדים כגון יריד הספר שהוא אולי ארוע ההסברה המרכזי שלנו במשך השנה.

5. כוח אדם להסברה

באשר לכח אדם מזה כחצי שנה אנו עוברים משבר קשה מאוד. עד לפני שבוע, היינו ללא קצין עיתונות. למרות זאת הוקדש מאמץ רב לקשר עם העיתונות וזאת כמוכן תוך נסיון להמנע עד כמה שניתן מלפגוע בתחומים אחרים. בסדיפל מזה כחצי שנה ויותר אין מזכירה במשרה מלאה, והמזכירה כחצי משרה אינה מתפקדת כראוי אנו מקווים שימצא פתרון לבעיה זו בקרוב. מזה כחודש אנו מחפשים מחליף לאיש צוות סדיפל^{ASR} אולם במשכורת המוצעת אין אפשרות להשיג עובד ברמה סבירה. יש לתת הדעת על נושא זה, בדחיפות, על מנת שאולי בעזרת כוח אדם טוב יותר, נצליח להעלות את סדיפל על פסי פעולה טובים יותר. בנושא סדיפל, תיפקודו וכח האדם נרחיב הדיבור בע"פ.



6. כלים ואמצעי הסברה

כנושא כלים ואמצעי הסברה יש מקום רב לשיפור. בסדיפל אין מכשיר וידאו V. HS ואין טלויזיה ואין רדיו ואין מכונת צילום ואין מחשב ועוד ועוד... כל נושא הציוד דורש לדעתי הקצבת תקציב מיוחד לביירס על מנת להצטייד כראוי לשגרירות בגודל כשלנו ובעלת פעילות אינטנסיבית ועניפה כשלנו.

7. הצעות לשיפור הקשר עם מח' הסברה

רעיונות והצעות לשיפור הקשר נכתבו מידי פעם. לצערי ללא התקדמות גדולה. נושא קבלת תדריכים בספרדית על אף פניותי החוזרות ונשנות ועל אף הסיכום שלכם בארץ לא מצא את פתרונו וחשנו זאת היטב ב"משבר" הנוכחי של הארוע בראשון לציון. דברים נוספים בהקשר זה יידונו בע"פ.

כ כ ר מ ה
ר. אלדר



מנהל הסברה
טל' 3218

י"ז סיון תש"ן
10 ביוני 1990

12977

אל : מר משה רביב, סמנכ"ל הסברה

מאת : מנהל הסברה

הנדון : ביקור מטה - הסברה - שגרירות קיטו

במסגרת ביקור המטה שלי באמל"ט שהיתי בבירת אקוודור יום אחד (25/5/90) ובמהלכו נפגשתי עם השגריר, אברהם סיטון, ועם רויטל פולג, הממונה על הסברה בשגרירות. ביקרתי גם בשגרירות ועמדת מקרוב על נהלי וסדר העבודה במחלקת הסברה. כמו-כן נלוויתי לשגריר בביקור אצל אמן אקוודורני שביקר ביוזמתנו בארץ והמכין תערוכת ציורים להצגה כאן.

כבר בתחילה אני מוצא לעצמי חובה נעימה במיוחד לציין את התרשמותי העמוקה מהסדר, הרצינות והמקצועיות של אנשי השגרירות במקום זה. אקוודור מהווה צרכן שאינו יודע שבעה של חומר הסברה בכל צורותיו ולפי התרשמותי גם מנצלת אותו בצורה מקצועית ויעילה. קשה שלא להתרשם גם מיחסי החברות הנעימים השוררים בשגרירות זאת.

להלן סיכום הנקודות שעלו עם אנשי הצוות:

1. חומר הסברה מברקי - החומר הנשלח מן הארץ עונה על הצרכים ובדרך כלל גם מתאים. החומר הפוליטי שאין בו שימוש רב נשמר בצורה מסודרת למקרה הצורך. מברק העיתונות היומי מהווה כלי עבודה חשוב ואין צורך לעשות בו שינויים.
2. חומר הסברה כתוב - החומר בכללו טוב ונעשה בו שימוש רב, חסר חומר בנושאים א-פוליטיים כמו נושאי חינוך, נוער ותנועות נוער, ישראל היפה, קיבוץ, מדע, מעמד האשה, חידושים והמצאות. מציעים לשקול פרסום תקופתי בשפה הספרדית שיענה על צורך זה. להערכת אנשי השגרירות יהיו לקוחות רבים לחומר כזה במדינת אמל"ט האחרות.



3. רדיו - ככלל הרדיו מכשיר חשוב ביותר וככל שנרבה בשליחת חומר הוא ינוצל היטב.
מבין התכניות הנשלחות לשגרירות מגיעה באופן קבוע תכנית המוסיקה הקלאסית. התכנית מניו-יורק "חדשות מארץ הקודש" אינה מגיעה באופן קבוע. התכנית על חידושים במדע וברפואה מגיעה אף היא, לא על בסיס קבוע.
- פרויקט הרדיו - שידוריה של חנה בריס חשובים מאד בגלל גודלה ומרכזיותה של התחנה. ניתן לנסות אפילו להרחיב את השידורים אליה. אין כל טעם לנסות ולבקש שרתחנה תשלם את השיחות של הכתבת אליה.
4. פרסומי הסברה פוליטית - השימוש בעלוני ההסברה הפוליטיים, קטן מאד. בגלל חוסר העניין, אין צורך לשלוח כמויות של עלונים מסוג "זכות השיבה", "סמלי אש"ף" וכד'.
5. פוסטרים - תערוכת נופי התנ"ך המיועדת למדינות מזרח אירופה תצלח כאן מאד. מבקשים לשקול אפשרות להפיק אותה גם בספרדית. בעיקרון לכל תערוכה שתהיה "פשוטה", צבעונית וקליטה" מובטחת כאן חשיפה ושימוש.
6. קלטות וידאו - יש חוסר ניכר בקלטות. עד כה שודרה כל הפקה שנשלחה ממחלקת ההסברה. מוצע כי נבדוק עם משרדים אחרים (תיירות וכד') ונרכוש עבור הנציגות כל קלטת אפשרית על ישראל.
7. הקלטת השבועית עם תכניות האקטואליה - רעיון טוב וחשוב מאד. מבקשים להמשיך באותה מתכונת. ביקשו - וקיבלו אישור - לא להחזיר את הקלטת בתום השימוש בגלל העלות הגבוהה של המשלוח. מוצע כי השגרירות תשמור את הקלטות בארכיב מסודר.
8. JERUSALEM DATELINE (שרות המאמרים) - השגרירות עושה במאמרים שימוש אופטימלי. תבקש עותקים נוספים כדי להימנע מן הצורך לצלם ועל ידי כך לאבד אפקט הצבעוניות של כותרת הדף. השגרירות מבקשת להתרכז יותר במאמרים קצרים במקום כתבות ארוכות.
9. אורורה - מקבלים 20 עותקים ומבקשים להמשיך באותו סדר גודל. ממליצים להמשיך להסדר.
10. מרצים - לשגרירות בקיטו אין שימוש במרצים והיא מצויידת, לדבריה, כדי לענות על כל הדרישות להופעות ולהרצאות. כל זאת להוציא מקרים בודדים בהם הנושא מוגדר היטב והוא מתחום הרוח והמדעים.
11. משלחת הנוער - הנסיון עם המשלחת של '89 היה מעולה. הנערים שנשלחו השנה היו רחוקים מלהרשים ושהותם בקיטו היתה קצרה ביותר (שבוע אחד). לשנה הבאה מבקשים לשלוח זוג לזמן רב יותר - עד חודש ימים. מחשיבים את המשלחת כפרוייקט חשוב וממליצים בכל פה להמשיך בו.



12. סרטי 16 מ'מ בקיטו יש עוד שימוש לסרטים כאלה. מבקשים לשלוח להם את כל מה שנותר (אם נותר) במחסנים.
13. תקציבים - האבחנה בין סעיפי התקציב - אינה מציאותית. השגרירות מבקשת - ולהערכתי נימקה היטב בקשתה - להגדיל תקציבה הן בסעיף העובדים המקומיים והן בסעיף הפעולה. הובטח להענות לבקשתה כאשר הסכום המדוייק עוד ייקבע.
14. ציוד - מעל לכל, מבזבזת השגרירות זמן, כוח אדם ומשאבים בגלל שטרם אושר לה מחשב לעבודת ההסברה. להערכת אנשי השגרירות, יוכלו לשפר משמעותית את עבודת ההסברה אם יעמדו לרשותם מכשירי פאקס ומחשב אישי.

סיכום

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- א. הביקור בקיטו והמפגש עם אנשי השגרירות היה משב רוח מעודד. השילוב של אווירה נעימה, מוטיבציה גבוהה ומקצוענות הסברתית, בהחלט ניכר לעין בשגרירות זאת.
- ב. על מחלקת ההסברה והמשרד לתת בידי השגרירות את הכלים הבסיסיים (מחשב ופאקס) על מנת לאפשר הרחבת והעמקת העבודה.
- ג. רצ'ב סקירת מערך ההסברה כפי שהוכנה ע"י השגרירות לקראת ביקורי.

ב פ ר כ ה,
10/1
יוסי גל

העתק: סגן שה"ח
המנכ"ל
המשנה למנכ"ל
סמנכ"ל למינהל
סמנכ"ל אמל"ט
המפכ"ל
מנהל אמל"ט 2
ראשי מדורים - הסברה
השגריר, קיטו
ד. פולג, קיטו



קיטו, כ"ב אייר תש"ן

- בלמס -

140

17 במאי 1990

אל : מנהל הסכרה

251.01/אקד

מאת : השגרירות, קיטו

הנדון: סקירת מערך ההסכרה - שגרירות קיטו.תקשורת ודעת קהל.

- א. כללית נהנית ישראל באקוודור מדמוי חיובי וגישה אוהדת הן מצד הממשל והן מצד התקשורת והצבור בכללותו. ישראל נחפסת כמדינה מתקדמת ומפותחת, אשר השגיה במישורי החיים השונים, (אשר הושגו למרות ועל אף הקשיים האוביקטיביים העומדים בפניה) ראויים לחקוי ולהערכה ע"י המדינות המתפתחות דוגמת אקוודור.
- ההיכט הפוליטי, אשר הוא אחד ממוקדי הפעילות ההסכרתית הישראלית זוכה כאן לתשומת לב מעטה יחסית. בקרב הגורמים השונים קיימים חוסר ידע, בקיאות ו/או עניין בנושאי המזה"ת והסכסוך, ומעטיח הם אלו מבין מקבלי ההחלטות אשר להם הכנה כלשהי בנושא.
- יצויין בהקשר לכך, כי הבקורים בארץ של אותם אחמ"ם תורמים רבות להעלאת סף המודעות לנושאים הללו, וזהו מכשיר מצויין הו ללמוד נושא הסכסוך בצורה בלתי - אמצעית, ולהכרת ישראל, והן לרכישת ידידי - אמת.
- רב הידיעות החדשותיות בנוגע לישראל והמזה"ת מפרסמות כאן מקורו בסוכנויות ידיעות, וככלל - המידע אינו מעורר הדיח.
- הגובחנו לכן, נשקלת לגופו של עניין ע"פ מידת העניין הצבורי שכדאי לעורר בהקשר לנושא המוזכר, או ע"פ חשיבות הנושא בראיה ההסכרתית הכוללת של המשרד.
- כך למשל: ארועי הרובע הנוצרי - כמעט ולא הוזכרו כאן בתקשורת, וממילא לא עוררו הדים.
- נושא מכירות הנשק לקולומביה ("שכירי החרב הישראלים") זכה (באופן טבעי) לכסוי תקשורתי נרחב, ולמספר מאמרים מיוחדים וגדולים.



ב. לשגרירות קשרי עבודה ורעות מפותחים ביותר עם נציגי התקשורת השונים, ונתן לומר כי אנו נהנים מיחסי אמון כריאים ומיחס רציני כלפי החומר הנשלח ו/או המוצע מטעמנו.

הפעילות השוטפת כוללת:

- שגור הודעות לעתונות בנושאים בעלי ענין לנו (שת"פ כיון אקוודור וישראל - המתיחס בעיקר לפעילות מש"ב לסוגיה, בבקורי אחמי"ם אקווטוריאנים בישראל, מידע על פעילות תרבותית של השגרירות וכד').
 - הפצה קבועה של מאמרי שרות המאמרים (יפורט בהמשך).
 - הפצת קלטות רדיו וטלוויזיה (יפורט בהמשך).
 - קיום ראיונות לשגריר באמצעי התקשורת השונים בסמוך לציון ארועים מיוחדים (ראש השנה, יום העצמאות וכד').
- ארועים הסברתיים מיוחדים זוכים לטיפול נפרד בהתאם לחשיבות הנושא, ולכך מספר אופני בטוי:
- תגובת השגרירות לפרסומים בחקשורת (כיון אם ביוזמתנו או ביוזמת נציגי התקשורת).
 - יזום שיגור מכתבים למערכת (למשל: בנושא הרג הנוצרים כלכנו, בשנה שעברה, יזמה השגרירות כתיבת מספר מכתבים למערכת מטעם ידידים ומקורבים לנו, וע"ס מידע ונתונים שהבאנו בפניהם. הדגש הושם על הסיוע ההומני שמושיטה ישראל לנוצרים באזור רצועת הכטחון).
 - בנושאים בעלי חשיבות עליונה כגון: הכרה במדינה פלסטינית, יוזמת השלום של ממשלת ישראל, קבלת 5 הנקודות של בייקר וכו', פעלנו להבאת עמדתנו בצורה הרחבה ביותר ובכל אמצעי החקשורת: השגת זמן שידור בתכניות החשובות והפופולריות ביותר, קיום מסיבות עתונאים, שיחות עם בכירים בתקשורת ועידודם לכתוב מאמרי מערכת, הפצת מידע רלבנטי לקובעי מדיניות ועוד.
 - לרגל התערוכה החקלאית "אגריטק 90" - קיימה השגרירות מכצע הסברתי נרחב שתכליתו מחד, ארגון משלחת חקלאים ותעשיינים לבקור בארץ; ובו זמנית - הפצת השגי החקלאות והטכנולוגיה הישראלים.
- לצורך זה הופץ מידע רלבנטי לגורמי תעשייה וחקלאות, היום מפגש עם העתונאים המכסים את התחום - במהלכו דבר השגריר על השגי ישראל במישור החקלאי, והוקרן בפניהם סרט וידאו על הנושא. החוצאה: משלחת בת למעלה מ- 50 איש (הגדולה מסוגה שהגיעה מאקוודור לישראל), בראשות מ"מ שר החקלאות, נציגי משרד החקלאות, והשגריר עצמו, בקרה בארץ בחודש מרץ האחרון. במהלך הבקור נוצרו קשרים מסחריים, נרכש מיכון חקלאי והונחו יסודות לשת"פ בעתיד. מכצע זה מהווה דוגמא מוצלחת לשילוב בין פעילות הסברתית לכלכלית ולתועלת כל הצדדים.

ה י ר י ב :

כלליה יצוין כי באקוודור מצויות שגרירות מצריח וקונסוליה
לכנונית כלכד. שאר מדינות ערב מיוצגות כאן ע"י שגרירים
לא - חושבים, המגיעים לבקור שנתי קצר וחז - לא.
קולו של היריב מיוצג כאן בעיקר ע"י קהילת אקווטוריאנים ממוצא
לכנוני ו/או פלשטיני היושבים כאן (רובם בגואיקיל), מספר קטן של
חברי קונגרס אוהדי העניין הפלשטיני, ונציג אש"פ כלימה הממונה גם
על אקוודור ומגיע מדי פעם לביקורים.
נקודה חשובה לציון היא כי רב עחונות גואיקיל נחונה כבעלות ערכי
מקומית, ומכאן שהצלחתנו לחדור לחקשורת בעיר חשובה זו,
אינה מוכנת מאליה.

הנשיא כורחה מתנגד לפתיחת משרד אש"פ כאקוודור, וסרב לדבר עם
עראפת בעת שהותו כבלגראד לרגל כנס הבלמ"ז בספטמבר 89.
זאת למרות נסיונות חוזרים של עראפת לצור עמו קשר.
הצלחתו הגדולה של נציג אש"פ הייתה פגישה עם שה"ח קורדובז -
לפני למעלה משנה, וזאת במסגרת מדיניותו של שה"ח לשוחח עם כל מי
שמעוניין לדבר עמו.
נסיון של אוהדי אש"פ להעביר בקונגרס החלטת חמיכה כדבר הקמת
מדינה פלשטינית נכשל על הסף - עקב פעילות נמרצת מצד השגרירות,
בקרב חברי הקונגרס.

אמצעי הסברה:פ ר ס ו מ י ס . א

- מחלקת ההסברה של השגרירות מקיימת פעילות הפצה שוטפת של פרוסודי
ההסברה העומדים לרשותנו. זאת ע"ס רשימות חפוצה הנמצאות
בחהליך מחמיד של עדכון.

חופצים הפרסומים הבאים:

צבור היעדשם הפרסום

אנשי רוח תרבות ואמנות,
מוסדות תרבות, עחונאי תרבות וכד'.

"אריאל" - "קשת"

הסקטור הדתי, כולל פקולטאות ללמודי
דתות, מוסדות דת וכד'.

"חיים נוצריים בישראל"

משה"ח, פקולטאות ליחב"ל ומדעי המדינה.

VISION DEL MEDIO ORIENTE -

סקטור חקלאי ואגרו - תעשיתי (פרטי-עבורי).

"קדימה (מש"ב) -

סקטור תעשיתי וכלכלי.

INOVATIONS (תמ"ס) -

עחונאים, קהילה, ידידי השגרירות.

AURORA , SEMANA -



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- פרסומי ההסברה הכלליים מופצים לצבור המעוניין ע"ס בקשות ופניות אישיות, או בפעולה נלווה לארוע של השגרירות. הצרכנים העקריים: תלמידי תיכון וסטודנטים, מוסדות שונים, בתי"ס, משתלמי מש"ב הנוסעים ארצה, מקרים ואורחים שונים ועוד. כן נוהגת השגרירות לחלק מעטפות חומר הסברה לכל משתתף בקורסים הניידים המתקיימים כאן במהלך השנה.
- הספריות השונות (עירוניות, אוניברסיטאות) מצויות אף הן ברשימות המוזכרות לעיל - ע"פ נושא הפרסום והרלבנטיות.
- מידע תרבותי ספציפי מופץ ע"פ זמניות הגעתו מהארץ, לגורמים המתאימים (קטלוג מוסיקה בישראל, מחול, מדע, ספורט ועוד).

התאמת הפרסומים לצרכינו:

- לפי כרטיסי המעקב המנוהלים על ידינו (רצ"ב דוגמא) - נחן ללמוד כי הפרסומים המכוקשים ביותר הם: חקלאות בישראל, קבוץ, ישראל - הארץ, נשים בישראל, ומכתב מישראל.
 - במילים אחרות: אלו אותם נושאים המהווים אלמנט מרכזי במרכיב הדמוי החיובי של ישראל באקוודור.
 - בהמשך לאותו קו אנו מרגישים בחסרון פרסומים בנושאים הבאים:
 - * חינוך בישראל (מבנה מערכת החינוך, גווינה, כמות ואיכות וכו').
 - * נוער בישראל (פעילות בלתי-פורמלית, תנועות נוער וכד').
 - * פעילות התנדבותית (ארגוני מתנדבים, ארגוני נשים, מסורת ההתנדבות וכד').
 - * מדע וטכנולוגיה (פרסום כללי ויצוגי).
- יצוין כי החוסר במידע הנ"ל נכון גם לסרטי וידאו.

כנוסף בגלל עלית חשיבות הנושא והמודעות אליו, מוצע לשקול הפקת פרסום בנושא שמירת איכות הסביבה בישראל - פארקים לאומיים, הגנת הטבע, בתי - ספר שדה וכד'.



כ. אמצעים חזותיים.

סרטי הוידאו הם אמצעי הסברה מבוקש ביותר כאן ע"י גורמים שונים. כבר בעבר ציינו כי הבקוש עולה על ההיצע. מחלקת ההסברה מבצעת מעקב אחר הסרטים המושאלים באמצעות טופס מיוחד (רצ"ב העתק), על השימוש בקלטות אנו מדווחים באופן שוטף בסקירת התקשורת השבועית.

הקלטות מושאלות לתחנות טלוויזיה (ארציות ופרובינציאליות), לארגונים שונים (ארגוני נשים, מוסדות דת, ארגוני נכים ועוד). למוסדות צבוריים (הבנק לסיוע, ארגוני חקלאים, גורמי צבא ועוד), בתי ספר, מחלקות תרבות של עיריות שונות ועוד.

יצויין כי סרטי ה - 16 מ"מ אשר הפקתם בארץ הופסקה, מהווים כאן עדיין מצרך מבוקש. מתוך הסרטים שכרשותנו, רק כודדים ביותר הם ברי - שימוש ואקטואליים.

כפי שצויין - יש מקום להפקת קלטות וידאו בנושאים נוספים (חינוך, נוער, פעילות התנדבותית, טבע וארץ ועוד), וכן קלטות בנושאי תרבות ואמנות - אשר נעדרות כמעט לחלוטין מההיצע העומד לרשותנו.

מוצע לחשוב על הפקת "קלטת וידאו - מגזין" (כ - 3-4 פעמים בשנה) ובה סקירה על פעילות התרבות בארץ, במכצע זה כדאי לשתף את קשתות ואת מינהל התרבות של משרד החינוך. כמסגרת המגזין המוצע נתן לכלול - תערוכות חשובות, ירידים, פסטיבלים חשובים, מחול, מוסיקה, ארכיטקטורה, תיאטרון, וכל מה שיש בו כדי לייצג היבט זה של העשייה הישראלית, ואשר אינו כפוף לאקטואליה. (ע"מ לחזור ולהשתמש בחומר ככל הניתן).

ג. רדיו.

הרדיו - אמצעי תקשורת פופולרי, זמין וזול (מבחינת עלות ההפקה), ומציע מגוון רב של תכניות הפונות לסקטורים שונים, אותו ניתן לנצל לחועלתנו.

בנפרד - אנו מצרפים רשימת חחנות רדיו עמן אנו מקיימים קשר שוטף והפצה של חומר.

יש מקום להפיק בתדירות גבוהה יותר קלטות שירים - אותן ניתן לשדר כתכניות בפני עצמן, או כשילוב עם ראיונות רדיו (כפי שמקובל עלינו כאן), וכרקע לפעולות אחרות.

בקשות להפקת תכניות מיוחדות - אותם הפנינו למדור הפקה/הסברה נענו בחיוב (למשל: תכנית מיוחדת על הקבוץ והמושב), והחומר הלם את צרכינו.



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ד. מאמרי השרות JERUSALEM DATELINE.

מאמרים אלו מופצים בקביעות למספר רב של עתונים כרמה הארצית והפרובינציאלית (רצ"ב פירוט). הפרסום לו זוכים המאמרים הוא רב, ודיווח שוטף וחקופתי בנדון מועבר למחלקת ההסברה.

יש מקום לשים יתר דגש על מאמרים בעלי אורך בינוני ולהוסיף בכמות המאמרים הקצרים (SNAPS) - אשר להם סכוי רב יותר לפרסום. כדומה, נתן להפחית בכמות המאמרים הארוכים, ולהסתפק בהפחתם רק כאשר מדובר בנושאים מיוחדים כגון: חג המולד, יום העצמאות - (כד') ואשר בשל כך הסכוי לפרסום הוא גדול יותר מעצם הענין בנושא.

אנו ממשיכים בהפצת מאמרי JERUSALEM DATELINE לחחנות הרדיו השונות: לכך יתרון רב מבחינת הגדלת היקף ההפצה (לעומת קלטות) ובחירה אישית של עורכי התוכניות לאותם מאמרים בעלי ענין ורלבנטיות לצבור המאזינים שלהם, בזמן ובמקום בו הם מוצאים לנכון.

מאמרי השרות "יש - אל" מתפרסמים אף הם בעתוני אקוודור, אך מופצים ישירות מהארץ.

ה. מכרקי המידע השוטפים:

חשיבותם העקרית בעדכון שוטף של אנשי הנציגות, כאשר לארועים וכסמוך להתרחשותם. בנוסף, משמשים חומר רקע טוב לכתיבת מאמרים או שיחות עם גורמים שונים. המתכונת הנוכחית (בשילוב עם המידע הקבוע המגיע מהמרכז) - היא כהחלט מספקת ועונה על הצרכים.

ו. שרות חדשות בטלפון.

השגרירות מפעילה שרות חדשות טלפוני יומיומי בשפה הספרדית והעברית, המתבסס על דיווחי החדשות מהארץ.



ז. שיגור אורחים.

- כפי שצוין כראשית הדברים, הנסיון מלמד שביקורים בארץ מהווים אחד המכשירים המעולים ביותר להקניית ידע על ישראל והמזה"ת ולרכישת ידידי - אמת.
- בשנה האחרונה בקרו בישראל האישים הבאים:
1. שר הבריאות פלוטרקו נארנחו - המשמש כיום כיו"ר ועידת ארגון הבריאות העולמי, ובמסגרת זו סייע למניעת מתן מעמד של מדינה לאש"פ באקוודור.
 2. נשיא הקונגרס - וילפירדו לוסרו, וראש סיעת מפלגת השלטון - אפרן קוסיוס, אשר שמשו שושבינים ראשיים בסיוע לשגרירות להעברת החלטת הקונגרס לבטול המשואה ציונות - גזענות.
 3. סנטיאגו חרכיס - עורך עתון "EL COMERCIO", החשוב בעתוני המדינה.
 4. אשת נשיא המדינה - כרמן כורחה, אשר בקרה בקור מקצועי בחוקף היותה נשיאת המוסד לילד ולמשפחה, ומצאה בישראל כר נרחב ופורה לשח"פ בתחום זה.
 5. השגריר הרנן אסקודרו - אשר השתתף בסמינר לדיפלומים בכירים, מונה לאחרונה לסמנכ"ל משה"ח ליחסים כי-לטרואלים.
 6. ראש עיריית קיטו - רודריגו פז - השתתף בכנס ראשי ערים.
 7. מ"מ שר החקלאות - חורחה הנאלסר - בקר בארץ לרגל "אגריטק 90" ובמקביל קיים סדרת פגישות ובקורים מקצועיים בנושאי שח"פ שונים.

ח. פעילות מש"ב כחלק ממערך ההסברה:

כאופן טבעי, במדינה כמו אקוודור בה הפעילות המשכ"ת מהווה אחד האלמנטים המרכזיים לפעילותנו, הופך נושא זה לאחד התחומים המנוצלים ביותר לצרכי הסברה.

מומחי מש"ב המגיעים לכאן זוכים למירב החשיפה האפשרית: הודעה לעתונות על הקורס המתקיים, ותמונות מטקסי הסיום הם כמעט בכחינת שגרה עבורנו. בנוסף אנו מארגנים למומחים ראיונות לרדיו, לעתונות ולטלוויזיה - ע"פ העניין הספציפי וחשיבותו הצבורית כאן.

דוגמא: מדריכות הקורס "מנהיגות נשים" (התקיים בקיץ האחרון) השתתפו בתכנית טלוויזיה מיוחדת המשודרת כל יום בשעות אחה"צ, ומטפלת בנושא נבחר במשך שבוע שלם. המדריכות רואינו ל - 5 תכניות רצופות, אשר דנו בהיבטים שונים של נושא מעמד האישה עם השלכות ודוגמאות מישראל.

בקור המומחים מנוצל גם לצורך קיום הרצאות מקצועיות כקרב צבורי היעד המתאימים; בין אם זה ארגוני חקלאים, פקולטאות אוניברסיטאות שונות ועוד.

כמו - כן אנו נוהגים לקיים מפגש של מועדון-שלום סביב כל בקור של מומחי מש"כ, זאת הן לצורך חיזוק הקשר ביננו למשתלמים לשעבר, והן לצורך - מתן הרצאות (אשר אליהן אנו מזמינים גם את הצבור ככללותו).

משתלמי מש"כ החוזרים משהות בארץ, יכולים לשמש שגרירים של רצון - טוב ולתרום לפעילות ההסברה - כאותם מעגלים מקצועיים וחברתיים אשר אליהם הם משתייכים.

כך למשל: הגב' סוזאנה טורס - פעילת מפלגת השלטון אשר חזרה מהארץ בדצמבר 89, מקיימת סדרת הרצאות בפני פורומים של נשים כרחבי המדינה - על נסיונה בישראל, ההרצאות מלוות כשקופיות וסרטי וידאו המושאלים מטעמנו. וכמותה אנו משתדלים להפעיל משתלמים נוספים.

פעולות הסברה בתקופה האחרונה.

* ד"ר יפתח טריגרמן - אשר נשלח כיוזמה משולבת של צוות העיון והסוכנות היהודית (ספטמבר 89) קיים מספר הרצאות - בפני סטודנטים באוניב' סנטרל, בפני מחנכים ומפקחי חינוך של הפרוכינציה, בפני הקהילה ועוד.

* כסיוע השגרירות, אורגנו לפרופ' מרסלו דסקל מאוניב' ת"א (אשר הגיע לכקור פרטי) הרצאות באוניב' הקתולית והרצאות נוספות פתוחה לצבור, בנושאי התמחותו (לינגוויסטיקה).

* הארכיאולוגית רנה סיון בקרה בקיטו במסגרת הסכם התרבות והמדע אשר נחתם כאן ביוני 89. הארכיאולוגית קיימה סדרת פגישות וסיורים מקצועיים וכנוסף נתנה שתי הרצאות פתוחות לצבור בנושאי ארכיאולוגיה בירושלים, אשר נתנו בבית התרבות המרכזי.

* בקור משלחת הנוער (מרץ 90) - אמצעי הסברה חיובי ומומלץ, מאפשר מגע עם שכבה רחבה של כני נוער וצעירים ממסגרות שונות. הפתיחות לארוח הצעירים כמוסדות החינוך השונים היא רבה, והאפשרויות לניצול שהותם עולות על הזמן הקצר אשר הועמד לרשותנו.

* במסגרת קונגרס לאומי בנושאי מדע וטכנולוגיה, נתנה הח"מ הרצאה על מערכת המדע והטכנולוגיה בישראל, ותכנית הסיוע הבינלאומי.

* הרצאות שונות על ישראל (מהיבטים שונים) נתנו בכתי ספר יסודיים ותיכונים, כמו גם בביה"ס היהודי - ע"י קצינת העתונות והח"מ.

* פעולת ההסברה המרכזית כעבודתנו בחדשים האחרונים היתה - הכנת הרקע והבאת הקונגרס לידי קבלת החלטה השוללת את המשוואה ציונות - גזענות.

כשלב הראשון אושרה ההחלטה בועדת החוץ של הקונגרס כחודש מרץ 90, ומליאת הקונגרס אשרה את ההחלטה ב - 17.5.90.

כך באה על סיומה עבודת "נמלים" יסודית שכללה שיחות ופגישות אישיות עם כל חברי הקונגרס הנוגעים לדבר, עם אישים בעלי השפעה בקרב המפלגות השונות, שרים ועוד.

פעולות מתוכננות.

* תערוכת צילומים "מורשת יהדות ספרד" - בשתוף עם חב' "איכריה", פתיחה: 19.6.90 - תוצג כשבועיים בלוחי של בית המלון הגדול בעיר.


* ספטמבר 90 : סמינר דו-לאומי בנושא מנהל צבורי.

* אוקטובר 90 : קונצרט התזמורת הסמפונית המוקדש ליצירה הישראלית המוסיקלית בת זמננו.

* אוקטובר 90 : השתתפות מומחה ישראלי בכנס פסיכיאטריה והרצאות נוספות במסגרות אקדמיות ומקצועיות.

* נובמבר 90 : תערוכה והוצאה לאור של ספר, ובהם רשמים אקווריאניים מישראל - במכחול ובעט.

* ינואר 91 : שבוע קולנוע ישראלי.

כ כ ר כ ה

רויטל פולג

נספחים:

- כרטיס מעקב - פרסומי הסברה
- טופס השאלת חומר אור-קולי
- כרטיס מעקב - אורחים
- רשימת פעילות רדיו
- רשימת תפוצה J.D.





מנהל הסברה
טל' 3218

י"ז סיון
10 ביוני
תש"ן
1990

12973

אל : מר משה רביב, סמוכ"ל הסברה

מאת : מנהל הסברה

הנדון: ביקור מטה - מח' הסברה - מדור אור-קולי
הקונסוליה הכללית בניו-יורק

במסגרת ביקורי בניו-יורק נפגשתי ב-21/5, יחד עם ציר ההסברה וקונסול ההסברה בקונסוליה, עם מיירה כהן המופקדת על המדור האור-קולי במחלקת ההסברה בקונסוליה. רצ'ב דו'ח שהוכן ע"י הקונסוליה לקראת ביקורי שם.

א. מדור הרדיו והטלביזיה בקונסוליה צורך את עיקר משאבי ההסברה של הקונסוליה. בתקציב המאושר לשנת 1990/91 הוקצבו לתכלית זאת 210,000 דולר המהווים 55% מסה"כ תקציב פעולות ההסברה של הקונסוליה (381,000 דולר).

ב. בתחום הטלביזיה עוסק המדור בשני נושאים עיקריים:-

1. הפקת (VIDEO NEWS RELEASE) VNR'S והפצתם באמצעות חברה מסחרית (SHERIDAN ELSON). כל קטע VNR הוא הפקה עצמית בת 60-90 שניות המבוססת על חומר גלם שצולם ע"י מיירה כהן בישראל במסגרת ביקורים מיוחדים שנועדו לתכלית זאת (כ-32,000 דולר הוצאו למטרה זאת בשנה שחלפה).
2. הפצת קלטות מערך ההסברה ע"י חברה מסחרית (MODERN TALKING) ומעקב אחרי השימוש והניצול שלהן (בעלות כוללת של כ-60,000 דולר).

ג. בתחום הרדיו עוסק המדור בהפצתן של מספר תכניות רדיו המופקות בארץ. העיקריות שבהן:-

- ISRAEL MAGAZINE תכנית שבועית בת 28 דקות.
- ISRAEL PRESS REVIEW תכנית שבועית בת 14 דקות.
- VISTAS OF ISRAEL תכנית שבועית בת 14 דקות.
- IN THE HOLY LAND תכנית חדשית בת 14 דקות.



בנוסף מופקות ע"י הקונסוליה בניו-יורק מספר תכניות רדיו המופצות לתחנות ברחבי ארה"ב ובספרדית גם ברחבי אמל"ט.

עלות שיכפול והפצת קלטות האודיו גבוהה. לדוגמא: תכנית ה- ISRAEL MAGAZINE עולה כ-60,000 דולר, סקירת העיתונות כ-50,000 דולר וכדומה לגבי התכניות האחרות.

הקונסוליה הגישה לי דוחות ניצול מפורטים המצורפים כולם לדו"ח זה.

להלן מסקנותי והמלצותי:-

1. הפקת VNR'S - לפי הדיווחים הופקו ע"י הקונסוליה 12 VNR'S מאז יולי '88: האחרון שבהם בנובמבר '89. עד כה היתה שיטת ההפקה כרוכה בנסיעתה של הגב' כהן וצילום FOOTAGE במגוון של נושאים. מחומר גלם זה נערכה אח"כ בניו-יורק סידרת כתבות VNR. לשיטה זו חסרונות ניכרים ולא הבלתי חשוב שבהם הוא חוסר המעודכנות והרלבנטיות של החומר.

על מנת לשפר את יעילות ה-VNR ופוטנציאל השימוש בו, נראה לי כי כדאי ורצוי לעבור לשיטה שונה: במקום נסיעות של הגב' כהן לישראל, תאתר הקונסוליה נושאים בעלי יכולת חדירה ותודיע על כך מברקית למחלקת ההפקה, זאת תצלם חומר גלם ותשלח לניו-יורק שם יערך החומר סופית וימשיך להיות מופץ בשיטה הקיימת. לאחר 3-4 הפקות, תעשה הערכה מחדש של השיטה.

2. הפצת קלטות מחלקת ההסברה - המציאות היא שאין כל סיכוי להחזיר סרטים שלנו לרשתות הארציות המסחריות ומלכתחילה כל המאמץ מרוכז כלפי תחנות מקומיות ותחנות כבל קטנות ביחס. אם לקבל כפשוטם את נתוני ההקרנה של החברה המפיצה הרי שסרטים שלנו הוקרנו 520 פעם לכ-13 מיליון צופים אמריקאיים מאז תחילת השנה. סטטיסטית המספר נשמע מרשים, אך בדיקה מעמיקה מגלה שהתחנות המשדרות החומר והזמן ביממה בו הוא משודר, מעמידים בספק את כדאיות הפרוייקט - אם תמצא לו אלטרנטיבה טובה יותר. לדוגמא: הדיווחים על הפצת הסרט על ארמניה (AGONY AND HOPE) מראים כי הוא הוקרן עד כה ב-7 תחנות טלביזיה - 2 מהן מסונפות לרשתות המסחריות והיתר תחנות כבל קטנות. בתחנות המסחריות שודר הסרט בשעות 04:16 לפנות בוקר ובשעה 06:30 בבוקר. בדומה, הסרט 'ילדי העולם מציירים את ירושלים' - שודר בשעות בהם הצפייה היא זניחה (05:43 בבוקר ו-14:50 אחה"צ).

למען שלמות הדיווח רק נציין כי גופים חשובים רבים משתמשים באותה שיטת הפצה וביניהם משרד התיירות הקנדי, הקונסוליה הכללית של גרמניה המערבית, מחלקת המדינה ועוד.

מומלץ כי הקונסוליה תבדוק שנית אלטרנטיבות לסוג זה של פעילות בתקשורת האלקטרונית. עד למציאת חלופה טובה יותר מומלץ להמשיך בהפצה במתכונתה הנוכחית.

3. פרוייקט רדיו - כבר בשלב מוקדם גילינו תוך בדיקה שגרית כי תכנית הרדיו הכוללת סקירת העיתונות היומית נעשתה ללא כל אוריינטציה הסברתית ללא כל בדיקה בארץ ו/או בניו-יורק וכי תועלת הפצתה להסברה הישראלית היתה מפוקפקת.



בעניין זה נטלנו כבר לאחריותנו את כתיבת התכנית וזאת נעשית היום במסגרת המחלקה (בעבר נערכה ע"י אנשים פרטיים עובדי 'קול ישראל').

מעבר לכך לא נעשתה בדיקה ו/או סקר משתמשים בקלטות האודיו, כבר שנתיים. חובה לקיים סקר כזה בהקדם לגבי כל אחת מתכניות הרדיו. תחנות שלא תתייחסנה לשאלון שיצורף לקלטת, תורדנה מרשימת מקבלי החומר.

הקונסוליה תעשה סקר כזה בהקדם.

סיכום:

1. כדאי ורצוי לבדוק את יעילות הפצת החומר בשיטה שבה נעשה הדבר עד כה. קשה להגזים בחשיבות הרדיו והטלביזיה בארה"ב ומכאן חשיבות הפעולה כלפיו.
2. שוחחתי עם הקונסול והבאתי בפניו המלצותי. הביע הבנה מלאה ואמר כי הקונסוליה תפעל בהתאם.

בברכה,
10/1
יוסי גל

העתק: סגן שה"ח
סמנכ"ל למינהל
השגריר, וושינגטון
ציר הסברה, וושינגטון
הקונסול, ניו-יורק
ראש מדור הפקה/הסברה
ראש מדור מרחבי/הסברה
אורי פלטי, ניו-יורק



מנהל הסברה
טל' 3218

ט'ו בסיון התש"ן
8 ביוני 1990

12934

אל: סמונכ"ל הסברה

מאת: מנהל הסברה

הנדון: ביקור מטה - הסברה
הקונסוליה הכללית - ריו דה ז'נירו

בין התאריכים 3.6 - 31.5 ביקרתי בריו דה ז'נירו. נפגשתי עם הקונסול הכללי ועם צוות ההסברה של הקונסוליה במסגרת יום עבודה.

אני מבקש לציין כבר בתחילת הדו"ח את רמת המודעות הגבוהה של צוות הקונסוליה לנושאי ההסברה והתקשורת ואת רמתם האישית הגבוהה של צוות העובדים המקומיים המסייעים ליד הקונסוליה בנושא.

רמתו המקצועית הגבוהה של הקונסוליה משליכה בברור על עבודתה השוטפת של הקונסוליה בתחומים האמורים. כמעט טבעי שנציגות זאת מצויינת באמצעים החסרים משום מה במקומות אחרים ביבשת - מכשיר פאקס ומחשב אישי.

1. פרויקט הרדיו - הקונסוליה הגיד כי במשך שהותו כאן (קרוב לשנתיים) טרם שמע את שדר הפרוייקט אף לא פעם אחת. רדיו 'גלובו' אליו משרד קורילנדי הוא אמנם רדיו פולרי אך קהל מאזיניו מורכב בעיקרו מהשכבות הנמוכות. גם אנשי הקונסוליה האחרים נטו לקבל את קביעת הקונסוליה ומסקנתו החד-משמעית שגם לו שידרה תחנת גלובו את קורילנדי (דבר הנתון בספק) ספק אם כדאי להשקיע בעניין.

2. חומר פרסומים - בעיקרו החומר הלא פוליטי טוב ושמיש. הקונסוליה יוזמת הפצת כל חומר כזה לרשימה ממוחשבת ומנהלת מעקב אחרי קבלתו. סוג החומר שהקונסוליה מבקשת לקבל יותר הם פרסומים בנושאים בסיסיים כמו: קיבוץ, מושב, חומר של משרד התיירות וכד'.

חומר פוליטי - השימוש בו מוגבל וסלקטיבי. הפרסום על סמלי אש"ף הגיע משום-מה רק לפני שבועיים.



3. כרזות ופוסטרים - הקונסוליה מבקשת לקבל כמה שיותר כרזות בעלי אופי תיירותי - נוף וטבע. כרזות על ירושלים, אתרים מקודשים לנצרות ונופים בארץ.

הקונסוליה תשמח לקבל את תערוכתה של שי גינות ותדאג להציגה במקומות מתאימים.

4. עבודה מול מערכות העיתונות - החומר ההסברתי השוטף המתקבל מהארץ מוצא דרכו למערכות העיתוניים במקרים מסויימים במלואו (כמו בדוגמת ISREAL AT 41 שנכנס כולו לעיתון היהודי) וכך גם במאמרי מערכת רבים שעקבות התדרוכים שלנו ניכרים בהם. מתקיים מעקב סדיר אחרי הנושא.

בכלל, הקונסוליה בריו - בגלל העומד בראשה - מגלה פעילות רבה בתחום התקשורת ככלי הסברתי ראשון במעלה. לפי התוצאות היא עושה זאת בהצלחה רבה.

5. JERUSALEM DATELINE (שרות המאמרים) - בעבר נהוג היה לקבל את חומר שרות המאמרים בפורטוגזית. סידור זה נפסק משום-מה. אם ניתן לחדש אותו בשפת המקום, ירחיב הדבר את אפשרויות הפעולה של הנציגות. הקונסוליה נתבקשה לשלוח דוחות קבועים על ניצול שרות המאמרים כדי לאפשר לנו מעקב.

הקונסוליה מעירה כי החומר טוב יותר כאשר הוא קצר יותר ומבקשת להתרכז בעתיד ב-SNAPS ולא במאמרים ארוכים.

6. קלטות וידיאו - הקונסוליה טוענת על כך שכבר שנתיים לא נשלחו סרטי וידיאו חדשים - להוציא כמה חריגים בלתי מתאימים לריו. הקונסוליה ביקשה לעשות מאמץ מיוחד בתחום זה ולרכוש עבורה סרטים עבור בתי-ספר יהודיים, כנסיות, חוגי נשים, אוניברסיטאות וכו'.

הנושאים המבוקשים הם הנושאים הקלאסיים: קיבוץ, ירושלים, יהדות, מוסיקה, תרבות, חקלאות, היסטוריה של עם ישראל וכו'.

אם יתקבלו סרטים חדשים ניתן יהיה גם להחזירם לטלביזיה. גם כאן לסרטים עם פס קול בפורטוגזית סיכויים רבים יותר לשימוש.

סרטי 16 מ"מ של הקונסוליה מופצים עבורה ע"י חברה מקצועית. גם שם הסרטים מיושנים ולא מעודכנים.


7. שיקופיות - לקונסוליה נחוצות כמה סדרות של שיקופיות - נוף, טבע, ירושלים, אתרים נוצריים, תעשייה וחקלאות.



8. תערוכה - הקונסוליה תברך על קבלת כל תערוכה, ביחוד אם נושאה נוף וטבע או אחד הנושאים המוזכרים בסעיף 7.

הקונסוליה ממליצה גם על הפקת תערוכה על קליטתם של יהודי ברית המועצות.

9. כח אדם - כח האדם המועסק בהסברה מתאים בהחלט לתפקידים. כדאי לחשוב על תוספת של מחצית המשרה לצוות.

בברכה,

יוסי גל

העתק: סגן שה"ח

סמנכ"ל אחל"ט

סמנכ"ל לחינוח

המפכ"ל

חנהל אחל"ט 1

ראשי מדורים - הסברה

משרד החוץ

מחלקת ההסברה

כ"ב בסיון תש"ן
15 ביוני 1990

אל הנציגויות

נאום סגן שר החוץ במועצת הבטחון

ב-25 במאי 1990 התכנסה מועצת הבטחון בג'נבה לדיון בהצעת אש"פ

להציב ביש"ע משקיפים מטעם האו"ם.

לוט נאום סגן שר החוץ בנימין נתניהו בדיון; תוכלו להעזר בטיעוניהו

להבהרת עמדתנו בנושא.

155/15.6.1990/1.03.23(4.04.30)

SPEECH BY ISRAEL DEPUTY MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, GENEVA,
MAY 25, 1990

Israel believes there is no justification for the convening of this special meeting of the Security Council. We say that for four reasons.

First, the Council was convened not to advance peace and security, but to retard it; it was convened to inflame passions and to incite violence. That that is so is readily demonstrable by examining the different attitudes of Israel and the Arab side to the attacks on Jews. It is instructive to compare the Arab responses to attacks on Jews.

I begin with two recent examples. I am afraid we have had many, many examples of attacks by Arabs on Jews, but I will cite two recent bus attacks. The first is a horrific incident in which bus No. 405 en route to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv was sidetracked into a ravine of death by a Palestinian who knifed the driver. Sixteen people died in horrible agony -- innocent passengers -- and 25 were wounded, all Jews.

The second incident a few months later was in Ismailia in Egypt, where an Israeli tourist bus was attacked by two Palestinian gunmen who riddled the bus with bullets. I stood at the foot of the aeroplane that brought back the bodies. I shall spare the Council a description. Seventeen others were wounded, some terribly -- all Jews.

What was Israel's response to these outrageous massacres? Did we call for revenge? Perhaps we exhorted our population,

our citizens, to riot against the Arabs in their midst. No, we did not; we did nothing of the kind. We called for restraint. We said again and again that the solitary actions -- in the case of bus No. 405 -- of a single Arab madman did not reflect on the entire Arab community.

In the other case, when it was not a question of madness -- I am not sure that it was in the first case either, but that is not the point -- when it was clear that the two killers were sent as emissaries of a terror organization, there was again restraint. Those calls worked. There was no violence, no revenge.

What was the Arab response to those same massacres, Arabs killing Jews? The PLO hailed the killers as heroes and it promised on the PLO radio from Baghdad and other PLO voices more such heroic actions. That was met with frenzied approval from most Arab capitals. In undertones more applicable for the West, Basam Abu Sharif said "This is a natural human reaction to deprivation and oppression. In any case there will be more." So much for restraint. Perhaps we should ask: What about justice, what about bringing any of those killers to justice? On the contrary, they are not brought to justice; they find haven; they are promoted.

Some members of the Council were present and will remember when we discussed the Achille Lauro cruiseship murder. I remind those with short memories that that was a killing of a retired old man in a wheelchair. He was first murdered and then thrown overboard, to the glee of his killers. The mastermind of that outrage, a man called Abu

Abbas, was convicted in an Italian court of the murder. What happened to him? He was elevated in his position in the PLO Executive Committee. He now serves as Yasser Arafat's right-hand man. I suppose if Arafat had more hands he would be even closer.

They talk about justice, except for murderers in Egypt. There is one grim fact that emerges about justice in the entire history of the Arab-Israeli conflict over many decades: not a single Arab terrorist killer of Jews has ever been brought to trial or punished by an official Arab body or Government. That is what happens when Arabs kill Jews.

Now let us see what happens when a Jew kills Arabs. Let us examine the two reactions.

"Unfortunately these things happen," President Mubarak said after an Egyptian soldier went berserk in Ras Burka and gunned down Israeli tourists. "They cannot reflect on the entire country." He was right. They do happen. They happen in the United States, Britain, and probably, I am afraid, in many of the other countries represented here today. They seldom happen in Israel. I am hard pressed to find such examples in our history, but it did happen last week -- once.

What was our response, when a solitary mad individual went berserk and killed these innocent people? Did we say "That was a natural human reaction to the state of siege that the Arabs have forced upon us, to the five wars they launched against us, to the 15,000 Israelis they have killed that now make Israel one big bereaved family"? Of course not.

What we said is what we felt. We felt shock. We felt revulsion. We felt grief. We felt sympathy for the victims of this horror. The leaders of Israel, the President, the Prime Minister, every one of them expressed shock. Mr. Shamir said "This is a criminal act, a shocking act of lunacy." He said "I am saddened that innocent people were killed, murdered, through no fault of their own. We cannot allow this act to transpire ever again among us." We apprehended the criminal immediately, and we will bring him to justice. That was the Government's reaction.

What about the reaction of the people of Israel? It was shock, grief, revulsion, sympathy, yes, but also throngs flocking to hospitals, calling hospitals, donating blood to help the Arab victims.

What about the Arab reaction? What was a day of tragedy for so many people around the world was a day of joy for some, a day of opportunity for the PLO, for many Arab regimes. Here was a chance not to reject violence but to foment it, not to restrain it but to incite it. Yasser Arafat said "Here is an opportunity to use this incident as a new starting-point, as a new escalation" -- and they have ways. The Palestinian population was told: "Israel was behind this. Israel organized this mass killing." I think the Ambassador of Bahrain pretty much used the same language when he asked that this meeting be convened.

Many Palestinians believed this nonsense, this preposterous PLO canard. They took to the streets and attacked Israeli cars with Molotov cocktails and rocks. I should be

specific about the rocks. They were not as small as this ashtray I am holding up, but three times as big. I talked to the father of a four-month-old baby, Ahikam Siman Tov. They were riding in a car when a small boulder three times as big as this ashtray went through the reinforced windshield, hit the four-month-old child on the head and cracked his skull. Babies on both sides are hurt.

They attacked with Molotov cocktails and boulders and then embarked on a rampage of burning and rioting. We moved in, as we had to, as is our right, our obligation, under international law, to restore order. Inevitably when one does that a number of casualties ensue and, as often happens in riots, some innocent bystanders are hurt as well.

We deeply regret the loss of any innocent lives, Arab or Jewish. But I must tell the Council that the PLO for its part prayed for this blood the way a farmer prays for rain after a long drought, because the intifada has been drying out, or more precisely it has been turning on itself. In the past six months, as all responsible international bodies, including those very critical of Israel, report, two thirds of the casualties and fatalities caused in the intifada were not caused by Israeli troops, in confrontations of Palestinians with Israeli troops, but by PLO death squads, with the PLO murdering the very people it purports to represent: nurses, doctors, teachers, pregnant women. They are not shot in the head or neck: their heads are lopped off and rolled so that everybody can see them in the alleys of the bazaars in Nablus.

To fuel the intifada, to fuel the world-wide media campaign against Israel, to fuel the political and other warfare against the Jewish State, the PLO needs Arab blood shed by Jews, and the more blood the better, enough blood to inflame passions in the territories, to energize the international Arab front against Israel and to convene this sorry spectacle here today in Geneva.

Having incited, promoted, fanned the violence, spreading it as far as possible, the PLO now has the Security Council convened to condemn Israel for putting it down. Its convening will, of course, foment more violence, because there can be only one message to the perpetrators of violence from such a meeting.

That is the first reason why these meetings should not be taking place. The Security Council should not assist in the incitement of violence.

There is, however, a second reason. It is that this meeting is a transparent attempt to violate international law and more precisely to encroach on Israel's right, duty and responsibility to govern the territories. The Fourth Geneva Convention is absolutely explicit about that. I hear calls in the Council for observers, and the assertion is that Israel has not acted with sufficient restraint in putting down the violence. I want to examine that proposition. In the face of severe mob violence, in the face of the mass riots, the number of fatalities in the past few days has been respectively 6, 4, 0, 0, and 2. Each loss of life is tragic, but we should ask how it compares with the record of other countries.

For example, the Ambassador of Jordan, who preceded me, might provide some records, but if he does not I will cite some examples of how Jordan puts down violence. It did not have an intifada, but I shall give examples of how it addressed the problem of disturbances in the very territories in question when it ruled them for 19 years.

In October 1954, in two days, the Jordanian forces killed 90 and wounded 117. On 24 April 1963 they killed 12 and wounded 185. On 22 November 1966 they killed and wounded 50. I do not recall anyone -- since it was in 1966 I guess the PLO could have been anyone -- asking for the Security Council to be convened and for observers to be sent.

In the early 1980s various PLO factions engaged in an intramural slaughter, slaughtering thousands of Palestinians. There was no call for convening the Council or of sending observers.

Nor do I remember any call to convene the Council in 1982, when Syria in one afternoon killed over 10,000 in Hama. Nor do I recall a request to convene the Council in 1988, when Algeria put down its own version of the intifada, killing 500 in one day.

We do not want to be compared to the Arab Governments. After all, they are dictatorships. We want to be compared to the democracies where we belong. So the question is how the democracies of North and South America, Europe and Asia deal with their confrontations. They have had ethnic strife, secessionist movements, racial violence. What have they done when it broke out in their major cities and market places and

religious shrines? I am not sure I want to spell out every example or to give any by name, but the members of the Council know them. There are cases among the democracies in which these outbreaks of violence have been put down with a casualty and fatality toll that exceeded in one day the total fatalities of the intifada in two and one half years. There is a conflict right now in a disputed territory involving a democracy in Asia. A total of 460 people have died since the beginning of the year, with 60 in one day a few days ago. In Africa yesterday 50 students were gunned down. There was no call for the Security Council to meet. There was no call for observers to be sent.

So it appears that we are dealing with three sets of standards by which to judge countries -- one for the Arab dictatorships, a second for democracies and yet a third, unique standard, for Israel.

Well, members of the Council, I wish to inform you that Israel is prepared to be held to a higher standard, but not to a double standard, and certainly not to a triple standard.

Why have the Arabs asked to have observers brought in? They say they want to protect the Palestinian population. Protect them from whom? Last year's total brought to 216 the total Palestinians that they themselves have killed. Is that what they want observers for -- to protect the Palestinians against the PLO?

They say they want to introduce observers to monitor events, to see that things are taken care of, as if the

territories lack observers. There are thousands of newsmen, camera crews, reporters as well as hundreds of politicians, senators, diplomats, perhaps members of this audience here as well, either covering or regularly visiting these territories. Equally, the Palestinian population is free to express its grievances, at news conferences and in newspapers -- I think there are some dozen papers that, of course, did not exist under Jordanian rule. There are endless briefings to the media and even before the Israeli Supreme Court. None of this existed before 1967, before the Israeli "oppression".

This must be the most reported, the most observed, the most monitored patch of earth anywhere; so it does not need additional observers, although we never stop private individuals coming.

So what is the real call, the real reason, behind this attempt to bring in, insert, United Nations observers? It is to usurp our rights and duties under international law as the responsible governing Power in the territories. The Fourth Geneva Convention specifically authorizes the Governing Power "to maintain orderly government of the territories and to ensure the security of its forces, their facilities and their lines of communication". Those powers are given exclusively to the governing authority and no one else.

As for observers, there is no precedent that we know of for sending them to help protect the civilian population in internal disputes or in what are termed occupied territories. If observers have been sent in at all, it has been to supervise an armistice or peace agreement that has already

been concluded and with the mutual consent of all parties concerned. None of this applies here. The only result of introducing United Nations observers would be to provide the professional inciters with yet an additional incentive and focus to promote and provoke violence, and it would erode international precedent and international law. That is the second reason the Council should reject this idea. But if it does not, Israel will.

There is a third reason the Council should not convene, and I suppose we are indebted to the PLO for making it so eminently clear. It is that it serves as a springboard for total war on Jewish immigration. I note that they talk of the territories. That is what concerns them: the territories, they say here; in the Arab world they say something else. Here, they say: "We are not against immigration to Israel, only to the territories, because Israel is directing this human tide into the territories, displacing Arabs, Palestinians, destabilizing Jordan" and, we are told, even from responsible quarters in the Arab world, "This will lead to war." It is remarkable. I heard here a statement that no land is left in Israel and only Palestinian lands are left and that is where the Soviet immigrants are going. Where are they going? Ninety-nine and a half per cent -- actually a little more, if one can believe it -- are going to the "Palestinian territories" of Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem and Beersheba -- all within the Green Line.

If the Council wants to know the precise magnitude -- how many -- have crossed the Green Line, the great engulfment into

Judea, Samaria, the West Bank and Gaza, I can say that it comes to a grand total of 200. This is nonsense, but it is dangerous nonsense. It is also purposeful nonsense.

If the Council wants to know the purpose, the PLO will tell it -- but not in Geneva. It will say this, for example in Al Majalla, a Saudi newspaper, on 13 March this year -- here I quote Abu Mazin, a member of the PLO Executive Committee and of the Fatah Central Committee:

"When Israel began the number of its residents was 600,000. I am sure that had the number remained as it was in the past Israel would not have been able to last until now. The immigration for Israel is like an important artery connected to a man's heart. It nourishes Israel in its economy, its soldiers, its workers and its farmers."

Precisely. That is why this war against immigration is launched, not war against the territories, but war against immigration to Israel. By the way, it is not new: it began in 1922, when the Arabs sent a delegation to Churchill, who threw them out, and continued in 1936, when they started Arab riots, and then in the 1950s and again in 1982, when they had a resolution passed in the United Nations against immigration to Israel. In none of those cases were territories mentioned.

Then in August 1989 in the Fatah conference they formed a special committee to organize the war against immigration. Not a word about territories. They have learned that they cannot talk like that to the civilized world, so they cooked up this canard. But they will fight, because they are fighting a war against Israel's very existence and its right, like that of

any other sovereign nation, to accept people, to absorb people, and they will use other means.

They threaten to. Yasser Arafat says this in Al Majalla:

"First, I want to say clearly, open fire on the new Jewish immigrants, be they Soviet, Falashas or anything else. I want you to shoot on the ground or in the air, it makes no difference if they live in Jaffa or Jericho. I give you explicit instructions to open fire."

That was on 10 April, just a few weeks ago.

It so happens that they do not live in Jericho, but they do live in Jaffa. The PLO has just called here for the right of return. By that it means the flooding of Jaffa, Acre, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem with millions of Palestinians sworn to Israel's destruction, so they say. What they want is to prevent Israel from exercising its sovereign rights and to bring about our dissolution through their demographic engulfment.

At one time that campaign succeeded, because from 1936 through 1939 the campaign to block Jewish immigration succeeded. The Great Powers gave in and there was no Jewish State and those Jews went up in smoke -- they did not rise in Israel, but in Auschwitz and Treblinka. But there is a Jewish State today and there are responsible Governments represented here that should know the difference, that should have learned the lesson of history. We will stand up and insist on the support of all responsible Governments and the right of every Jew to come to the Jewish homeland.

This campaign on immigration, I have said, is being touted as a pretext for war. This brings me to my fourth and final reason why the Council should not be convened -- because it is a prelude to a war council that will meet next week in Baghdad. It will be an Arab summit, convened at the behest of and with the patronage of Saddam Hussein, who the other day promised to incinerate half of Israel -- by the way, to the wild applause of most Arab capitals and especially the most fervent applause from none other than Yasser Arafat, who said "We will liberate Jerusalem with the aid of the Iraqi Al Abid missile."

Make no mistake about it: there are rumblings of war in Baghdad. On 8 May Saddam Hussein's Foreign Minister said:

"War with Israel is inevitable. Iraq expects the Egyptian Army to join it within two weeks."

His Deputy Prime Minister said on 19 May:

"I haven't the slightest doubt that this will mean the end of the existence of Israel."

And Saddam Hussein has called for an eastern front, using the territories of Syria and Jordan to enable the Iraqis' 50 divisions to enter the battle with Israel.

On 23 May Arafat spokesman Al-Hasan agreed that an eastern front was a PLO objective, and offered to enlist Syria's support to join it. Some peace! Some change! Some détente! The change is a tactical one -- what can be said here, but not what goes on there.

So we have four reasons to reject this Council meeting. It is an invitation to incite violence. It is a challenge to

international law. It is part of a total war against Jewish immigration, and it is a prelude to a war council.

In the face of those four challenges the Security Council should do three things. First, it should send a clear message to the dictators. The international community, especially the democracies, has a tragic record in dealing with such dictators. They should not be assuaged. They should not be appeased. They should be stopped. Gentlemen of the Security Council, are you stopping them? What is the message you are sending to Baghdad? What is coming out of this meeting? Are you going to encourage them or discourage them? If you bring Israel into the dock on these preposterous charges, what effect do you think you will have on the trend towards peace or the trend towards war in the Middle East? That is what you will have to vote on, and nothing else.

The second thing we should do in these halls is to insist on the truth, because a peace based on lies will not hold. Arafat talked about peace here. He talked about it today and he talked about it over a year ago, when he made what was termed his famous breakthrough towards peace.

That is, of course, what he says here, but we listen to what he says over there, and on 1 May, three weeks ago, he said this to the Libyan news agency:

"The Palestinian people's struggle ought to be assisted under the complete liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea. We will fight until the last bullet, until the last drop of blood."

That is the PLO No. 1. What does No. 2 say? That is Abu Iyad. In Al-Anba Kuwait, on 18 December 1988, after the grand spectacle here in Geneva, he said:

"At first a small State, and with the help of Allah, it will be made large and expand to the east, west, north and south. I am interested in the liberation of Palestine step by step."

What does No. 3 -- Mr. Farouk Qaddoumi -- say? On 5 April 1989, again after the famous breakthrough for peace, this time uncharacteristically on the BBC -- in fact the only quotation that I have here, and I have many, that was broadcast by the BBC, but on the BBC Arabic Service -- he said this in Arabic:

"The recovery of but a part of our soil will not cause us to forsake our Palestinian land. We shall pitch our tents in those places which our bullets can reach. Those tents shall then form the base from which we shall later pursue the next phase, and the next phase and the next phase."

And then there are some lowly officials. One, for example, Faruk Natshi, the PLO representative in Saudi Arabia, a member of the Fatah, explained what the difference is between the Fatah and the fundamentalists, Hamas, as follows:

"Hamas says all of Palestine is ours and we want to liberate it from the river to the sea in one go."

But Fatah, which leads the PLO,

"feels that a phased plan must be pursued. Both sides agree on the final objective. The difference between them is the way to get there."

I think Arafat summed it up best when he said on 2 January to the Saudi news agency:

"The PLO offers not the peace of the weak but the peace of Saladin."

For those uninitiated I explain that in 1192 Saladin could not defeat the Crusaders, so he made a peace treaty with them and then massed his forces and shortly thereafter drove them out of the Holy Land. We do not want the peace of Saladin; we do not want the peace of the grave; we want peace.

So much for Arafat the peacemaker. I cannot possibly leave this point without dealing with Arafat the cartographer. He produced a coin. I invite anyone interested to look at the coin. It has an engraving of an ancient symbol with an ancient background. I doubt very much they had cartographers at that time. This menorah dates from the period of the Second Temple, roughly two millennia ago. I am not sure they knew the outlines of the Middle East at that time.

If you look closely, Mr. President, you will have to exercise not only extraordinary eyesight but extraordinary powers of imagination and a capacity to leave fact and enter the real of high fancy. This is a joke.

But here is something that is not a joke. If we are dealing with a map, here is a map. It is on the cover page of Arafat's speech delivered here today at the United Nations. There is a symbol here. It is small, so I wish to enlarge it. Here is an enlargement of what the PLO tapes on its masthead. It includes the territory, as Arafat said so often, "between the river and the sea" -- the West Bank and Gaza, sure, but

everything in between, too: Palestine, in their terms, Israel -- Haifa, Jaffa, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem.

Since the Council might think there is a difference between the moderates and the radicals, as we are often told, I have produced here the maps and the masthead of everyone in the PLO, all the constituent factions. They all carry the same maps. Some of them, like the Fatah, have crossed rifles and blood and fire. Some of them, like the PFLP, include also the map of Jordan, with an arrow beginning with Jordan and then penetrating the sea as a second stage.

It is understandable that among friends there will be differences on how to achieve the organizational objective, but the objective remains the same. Whatever the name, the aim is the same.

If Mr. Arafat does not want to read his own stationery, he can look at the blue patch on his shoulder. Here it is enlarged for your benefit, gentlemen. It includes all of Israel.

We do not need ancient coins and babblings. We need facts. If we are to have real peace, we need truth. It must have a foundation of fact.

Our third and final suggestion is that this body support the real forces of peace. That begins with an understanding of what produces peace and what is the relationship between peace and violence in the Middle East. We are often told that the absence of progress towards peace produces the violence. It is understandable that people may think that way. But in the Middle East it is often the opposite; it is often that the

presence of violence prevents progress towards peace. It is true whether one is dealing with Saddam Hussein, Qadaffi, or Assad, who threaten Arab leaders and Governments that might be disposed towards peace. It is equally true of the PLO and Hamas and their campaign of murder against Palestinians who would take up our peace plan, because we believe there is a different track that can be followed. We believe there is an option for peace. We are committed to it. We have presented it. It relies on two foundations. The first is non-belligerency pacts between us and the Arab States. The Arab States are going to Baghdad. I challenge them to make a statement there. I ask them this: say that you will resolve your conflict with Israel, not by military means, but by political ones -- no concessions, except a concession to deal politically and not through war.

Secondly, we have offered a path towards a political solution between us and the Palestinian Arabs in the territories of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. We have included free elections, the rehabilitation of refugee camps and a period of autonomy followed by negotiations over the final status of those territories.

Peace with Arab States? Yes. Aspirations of the Palestinians? Yes. But those that can be accommodated with the existence of Israel; but the nullification of its existence is not one such aspiration.

We stand by our peace plan, and a new Government, when it is formed, will pursue it. We want to make peace with our enemies. But we can do so not with those who use the words of

peace for the purposes of war, but with those who genuinely want peace.

This is our most fervent dream. It is our deepest hope. It is our most profound aspiration. There is no people that has prayed for peace, that has sacrificed for peace, that has yearned for peace more than the people of Israel. We are prepared to grasp the hand of any Arab who shares in that equal vision. And when such Arabs muster the courage to grasp our hand in return, when they summon the will to resist the war cries of the Saddam Husseins, the Qadaffis and the Arafats of this world, then we may expect Arabs and Israelis alike to see the vision of the prophet Isaiah materialize in our own time, in our own day.



ת"ד 1000

ADDRESS BY
MR. MOSHE ARENS
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AT THE OPENING OF THE
SUMMER SESSION OF THE KNESSET

JERUSALEM
7 MAY 1990

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Breakthrough in Relations with Eastern European Countries

With the defeat of Germany forty-five years ago, the full magnitude of the crime perpetrated against the Jewish people during the years of the war came to light. The presumed allies of the Jewish people had in fact abandoned it. They did nothing to stop the Nazi annihilation machine. Most countries closed their borders to Jews who had succeeded in fleeing the Nazi tentacles; gravest of all, Great Britain slammed the gates of Palestine in the faces of Jewish immigrants in the very midst of the Holocaust.

The Holocaust notwithstanding, Israel, the Jewish state, came into being about three years later — an island in an ocean of Arab and Muslim countries, the only democratic state in the area, surrounded by states ruled by totalitarian regimes.

After the end of World War II, a Cold War ensued between the democratic world and the communist sphere, i.e., the Soviet Union and its satellites. As time passed, the communist world adopted a policy hostile to Israel, supporting the most extreme Arab positions without reservation, equipping the Arab armed forces, and training the PLO terrorists. Confronting Israel were not only the Arab armies but also Soviet military advisors and, at times, Soviet troops and pilots.

Forty-five years after the Allies' triumph over Germany, democracy triumphed over Bolshevism. This time it was a bloodless victory. The idea prevailed. Both the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe acknowledged the superiority of democracy and the free market.

It is no coincidence that when the countries of Eastern Europe disengaged from Soviet rule and made the transition to democratic

governance, they also decided to abandon their anti-Israeli policies and restore the diplomatic relations with Israel that had been severed twenty-three years ago. As they made this transition, they expressed regret for past decisions and their wish to maintain intimate, friendly relations.

The first country to make this move was Hungary. In September, 1989, I signed a protocol in Budapest for the restoration of relations with Hungary. Relations with this country have gained strength in the past year. Agreements have been concluded with Hungary in the areas of culture, science and technology, youth and sports exchanges, and aviation and trade.

In January, Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn visited Israel, as did Minister of State Imre Pozsgay, a leading figure in the reformist group that wrought the democratic revolution in Hungary. Concurrently, reciprocal visits by businesspeople, artists, authors, and athletes have continued.

The second Eastern European country to resume diplomatic relations with Israel was Czechoslovakia. Shortly after the political upheaval in that country, the new president, Václav Havel, announced his willingness to resume ties.

In early February this year, I signed an agreement in Prague confirming the resumption of diplomatic relations. About two weeks ago, President Havel of Czechoslovakia was the first Eastern European head of state to pay Israel an official visit.

An additional agreement signed during my visit to Prague provides for scientific, technological, and cultural cooperation. During President Havel's visit in Israel, we signed a bilateral economic cooperation agreement with the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister.

Diplomatic relations between Israel and Poland were renewed in late February during my visit to Warsaw. Relations with Poland have expanded in all fields this year. The two countries exchanged delegations. Their national airlines inaugurated direct flights. An agriculture and food production agreement was concluded. Cultural, economic, and aviation accords are on the way.

Bulgaria was the fourth Eastern European country to resume relations with Israel. Only a few days ago I returned from a visit to Sofia, during which I signed the agreement restoring full diplomatic relations between the two countries, and signed a memorandum of understanding for economic cooperation.

A Watershed in Relations with East Germany

Israel and East Germany have never maintained diplomatic relations. In early January, 1990, the GDR government expressed its willingness to establish such ties. Consequently, two rounds of talks between Israeli and East German delegations were held in Copenhagen. Our delegates conditioned progress in relations on East German acknowledgment of the responsibility of all Germans for the horrors of the Holocaust; on concrete measures (legislative and educational) reflecting this responsibility; on a change in East Germany's attitude towards Zionism; on a change of its Middle East policy; and on East German willingness to enter into negotiations on Jewish and Israeli material claims.

As we know, the newly elected GDR parliament has affirmed the guilt and responsibility of all Germans for the Holocaust, and the GDR Foreign Minister has recently expressed his desire to establish relations with Israel promptly. The East German and Israeli delegations are to meet soon for another round of talks.

Relations with the USSR: Slow Progress

Even as one Eastern European country after another restores its diplomatic relations with Israel, relations with the Soviet Union are progressing slowly.

The Soviet Union continues to attach political strings to the resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel. It has gone so far as to elevate the status of the PLO legation in Moscow to that of an embassy of the "State of Palestine." This year, as before, Soviet policy on the Middle East does not seem to have changed in any real way. We do not fully understand why the Soviet Union is lagging behind Eastern Europe in correcting its positions toward Israel. Perhaps in view of the magnitude and urgency of the problems besetting them, the leaders of the Soviet Union have not been able to devote the time they need to subject their traditional positions on the Middle East to a thorough re-examination.

The central element in Israeli-Soviet relations, of course, has been the immigration of Jews to Israel from the Soviet Union. The opening of the gates is the most important factor in our relations with the USSR. It is our consular delegation in Moscow, still operating under the patronage of the Embassy of the Netherlands, that shoulders the heavy burden of handling those Jews who wish to settle in Israel. The delegation's manpower resources are meager, and all our requests and appeals to the Soviet government to allow us to expand them have not yet been answered positively. I personally took up the subject of our delegation's

working conditions in Moscow when I met with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze during the U.N. General Assembly deliberations in New York last September. During my talk with the Soviet Foreign Minister, I also brought up the need for direct flights from Moscow to Israel. Following our talks, representatives of the Soviet airline Aeroflot were instructed to open talks with El Al. These contacts led to an agreement to maintain a direct air route, which, however, has not yet been approved by the political echelon in Moscow.

A "New Leaf" in Relations

While visiting Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw this year, in order to attend the ceremonies in which the resumption of diplomatic relations was confirmed in writing, I emphasized the bitter fate of Europe's Jews during World War II. An Israeli foreign minister visiting these countries cannot but be reminded that the soil of Eastern Europe is saturated with the blood of millions of Jews. The countries of Eastern Europe expressed their desire, upon the resumption of relations with Israel, to turn over a "new leaf" in their relations with the Jewish people. I hope that this indeed comes to pass, and that good and friendly relations, transcending the ordinary framework of bilateral ties, take shape between Israel and the countries of Eastern Europe.

This watershed in the Eastern European countries' attitude toward Israel heralds a highly significant improvement of our international status. For decades the communist sphere — almost half of the world — was hostile to Israel and supported our enemies without reservation. Today, much of this sphere has traded hostility for friendship, and it seems to me that even those countries that still hesitate, such as the Soviet Union and China, will eventually join the ranks of countries that maintain congenial relations with us. These changes undoubtedly do much to strengthen Israel in every respect.

The changes sweeping the Soviet Union prompted the opening of that country's gates to Jews wishing to immigrate to Israel. In response, our enemies have launched an international campaign against this exodus. The very idea of wanting to prevent the return of Jews to their homeland, only fifty years or so after the Holocaust, is an insult to any thinking person's intelligence.

The Foreign Ministry is massing its political and informational efforts with intent to stress to the community of nations their moral obligation to excoriate this attempt by the Arab countries and the PLO terrorist organization to try and reconsign the Jews to the bitter fate of homeless victims of persecution.

The sweeping changes in Eastern Europe, the mass immigration from the Soviet Union and the resumption of Jewish immigration from Ethiopia, the worrisome revival of anti-Semitism in various parts of the world, and the continuing need to deal with the fate of Jewish communities in distress; all of these will be given a central place on our agenda.

The Ministry has established a special unit, headed by the Advisor to the Minister on Diaspora Affairs, to focus these efforts and coordinate activities with all relevant institutions in Israel, overseas missions, and the Jewish leadership in the United States and the other free communities.

Public Information Efforts

This year, as before, the Foreign Ministry has continued its efforts in the field of public information. The Deputy Foreign Minister, entrusted with this task, administers the information system by means of our embassies and missions worldwide. The Ministry has produced written material, video films, and radio programs for dissemination among hundreds of stations around the world. We receive hundreds of visiting journalists, send dozens of lecturers abroad, and brief thousands of overseas guests visiting Israel. The information effort is of great importance, and the Foreign Ministry will step up its efforts in our struggle to confront the Arab propaganda machine.

Economic Relations

The Foreign Ministry has placed great emphasis in its activities on the economic aspects of international relations. Today economics represent a major component of international relations, and Foreign Ministry personnel invest great efforts in strengthening Israel's economic ties with countries around the world.

The Ministry's Economic Department is the liaison between the economic agencies in Israel and their foreign counterparts.

Israel's American Alliance

The United States is Israel's great friend and ally. The alliance between the American and the Israeli peoples is strong and steadfast, rooted in friendship and shared values and interests. This special relationship has manifested itself in many ways over the years, the past year included. Bilateral strategic cooperation continues to develop. The United States has stationed itself at the forefront of the struggle against the PLO's

attempt to attract international recognition for its declaration of the establishment of a "State of Palestine." The U.S. Administration continues to treat Israel as an ally, takes a positive interest in this country's strength and well-being, and manifests this attitude in practical ways now as before. Our joint efforts to open the gates of the Soviet Union to Jewish immigration have paid off, and our cooperation on ensuring an orderly, unhindered exodus of Jews from the Soviet Union to Israel continues.

The Congress, too, has on several occasions this year expressed its support for Israel and the special relations between the peoples and the two countries. Congress expressed its support for our peace initiative, acted for the inauguration of direct flights for immigrants from the Soviet Union, gave prominent expression to the American people's desire to continue helping Israel maintain its strength, and voiced its opinion that united Jerusalem is the capital of Israel.

There is no concealing the fact that disagreements, too, have arisen between the governments of the United States and Israel. We do not always see eye-to-eye on how to promote the Middle East peace process. As we know, the basic U.S. positions on this question, though more amenable to us than those of other countries, nevertheless differ from those of the majority of people in Israel.

Another issue on which we disagree is the U.S. Administration's dialogue with the PLO. We believe that dialogue with terrorists who continue to engage in terror is incongruent with the values we share with the United States and certainly cannot further progress toward peace.

Disagreements between friends are natural and should be viewed within the broad context of U.S.-Israel relations. These intimate and special relations continue to exist and, it is reasonable to assume, will continue to represent the cornerstone of Israel's foreign policy in the years to come.

The European Community

The Foreign Ministry has done much this year to expand Israel's political and economic dialogue with the countries of the European Community. On the political level, the Community's stance on the Israel-Arab conflict manifested itself in the Madrid declaration of June, 1989. This declaration admittedly welcomed our proposal to hold elections in Judea-Samaria and Gaza, and called on the Arab countries to maintain peaceful relations with us. However, it also reflected the disagreements between ourselves and the Community, disagreements which have, in

fact, existed for many years. We continue to make every effort to clarify our positions to the Community. We continue to tell the countries of Europe that their major contribution to the peace process may lie in influencing the Arab countries to terminate the state of war and embark on a process of normalization with Israel.

The new prime minister of Greece, Constantine Mitsotakis, declared upon the presentation of his government in Parliament that Greece will shortly establish full diplomatic relations with Israel.

On the economic plane, following the decision of the European Parliament to suspend scientific cooperation with Israel, and in view of the Commission's attitude against an expansion of such cooperation, the Foreign Ministry has girded for extensive diplomatic activity in the capitals of the European Twelve. I met with my colleague, the Foreign Minister of West Germany, and sent messages to my colleagues in the other EC countries, and was informed in response that the Council of European Community Foreign Ministers does not support the imposition of sanctions on Israel.

The Far East

The past year witnessed positive developments in our relations with China. During the General Assembly deliberations in New York, I met with my Chinese colleague and reached agreement on the opening of a permanent Israeli center in Beijing within the framework of the Israel Academy for the Sciences and Arts. This center indeed began to operate several weeks ago, at which time China opened a permanent representation in Israel as part of a tourism delegation.

In the past year the Foreign Ministry placed much emphasis on expanding relations with Japan. Immediately upon taking up my position, I issued instructions calling for greater efforts and pledged greater resources to our operations in Japan. As part of this effort, I visited Tokyo last November and met with leading Japanese officials, reaching agreement on the establishment of a joint committee that would meet periodically to promote bilateral economic and political cooperation. The committee held its inaugural meeting about two months ago.

The Foreign Ministry will act to make the current year, characterized by increasingly closer ties between Israel and Japan, a starting point for placing the relationship between the two countries on a more solid basis.

Our relations with additional countries in Asia expanded, with the regrettable exception of Sri Lanka, which decided to shut down the

Israeli interest office. This year marked the continuation of Israel's sound, amicable relations with Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. The development of relations with Thailand was especially conspicuous, as manifested in visits by a senior minister and the Thai Crown Prince in late 1989.

Africa

During the past year, Israel's relations with Africa focused on the expansion of ties with the twelve countries that already maintain full diplomatic relations and the pursuit of contacts with countries that are considering renewing them.

On November 3, 1989, Ethiopia restored relations with Israel after a 16-year hiatus. The major task of the Israeli ambassador in Addis Ababa is to facilitate the immigration of Jews from that country to Israel. The president of the Central African Community visited Israel this year, as did numerous government ministers and officials from various African countries.

With respect to South Africa, we have continued to implement the Government resolution of September, 1987, suspending relations in various areas.

Israel welcomes the reforms under way in South Africa and will continue to follow the liberalization process in that country sympathetically.

Latin America

Israel's relations with the countries of Latin America improved perceptibly during the past year. Elections were held in a considerable number of Latin American countries last year, marking continued progress in the democratization process sweeping the area. For Israel, this process brought with it an increase in contacts with members of these countries' parliaments, political party activists, and the media.

Just last week the Foreign Ministry finalized an agreement restoring diplomatic relations with Nicaragua.

The President of Israel paid official visits to Argentina and Uruguay during the year. Government ministers and the Speaker of the Knesset represented Israel at the inaugural ceremonies of the presidents of El Salvador, Venezuela, and Argentina, and I visited Mexico. In turn, many prominent personalities from all parts of Latin America visited Israel.

Egypt

The resumption of relations between Egypt and the Arab countries has proceeded apace in the past few months, culminating in the restoration of Egypt's ties with Libya and Syria.

Israel believes that Egypt, under President Mubarak, wishes to expand the circle of peace. Egypt is committed to the Camp David Accords, on which Israel-Egypt relations and the principles for dealing with the Palestinian problem rest. Israel expects Egypt, especially after its return to a leadership position in the Arab world, to act to induce additional Arab countries to embark on direct peace negotiations with Israel. Israel expects Egypt to take vocal exception to expressions of hate and the desire to destroy Israel on the part of the leaders of Arab states, and to raise its voice in condemnation of the declarations of war uttered around the Arab world.

No substantive change took place in Israel-Egypt relations this year. On various occasions this year, as in the past, we expressed reservations to the Egyptian government about continued Egyptian media depictions of Israel in a highly negative light, including expressions of hate and anti-Semitism. The volume of bilateral trade remains low; only the area of agricultural cooperation showed signs of growth this year, including the signing of agreements promoting and expanding it.

We shall continue to aspire to strengthen the fabric of ties with Egypt, a fabric built of relations on various planes, which will make the present Israel-Egypt peace a one-way street that permits no turning back. An important element in the weaving of this fabric would be to increase the number of meetings between senior personalities of the two countries. Regrettably, the Egyptian Foreign Minister has not responded to our invitation to visit Israel.

Aspirations for Peace

Because everyone in Israel wishes to attain peace, this is a major objective of Israeli foreign policy. On five separate occasions the Arab countries have sought to annihilate us in war; after each war, we again called on them to change direction, recognize our right to exist, and conclude peace treaties with us.

The people of Israel are truly disciples of Aaron, not only loving peace but pursuing it. There is no better proof of this than the peace treaty we signed with Egypt. After having been attacked five times and achieving victory five times, we were willing to undertake a maximum of concessions. Such willingness to concede so much for peace is unprecedented in the annals of humankind.

After the Framework for Middle East Peace was signed twelve years ago at Camp David, and in the aftermath of the tremendous price we paid for it, we in Israel hoped that other Arab countries would enter into direct negotiations with Israel and join the peace circle. This, of course, did not happen. Arab tyrants who do not want peace, together with the Palestinian terror organizations, did everything they could to terrorize the other Arab leaders and prevent their joining those who have opted for peace. They persisted with their enmity and nourished their hostility. Various attempts were made to persuade King Hussein to enter into direct peace negotiations with Israel within the Camp David framework; all were fruitless. Assad's threats and Arafat's terror meant more to Hussein than Israel's hand, outstretched in peace.

About two years ago King Hussein, in a change of policy, announced his disavowal of responsibility for the residents of Judea-Samaria and Gaza, most of whom hold his country's citizenship and reside in territory that he had ruled until 1967.

This change forced Israel to reassess its own policy. Subsequently, the Government of Israel came out with a far-reaching peace initiative that took account of the need to initiate contacts and dialogue, thus facilitating step-by-step progress toward accommodation and agreement. The initiative is rooted in the presumption that the Middle East conflict is composed of two circles: a large Arab-Israeli circle and a small Palestinian-Israeli one. Anyone familiar with the Middle East and the history of the conflict knows that any genuine attempt to promote the peace process in the area must address itself to both circles at once. It is difficult to attain peace with all the Arab countries without dealing with the Palestinian issue, and it is impossible to arrive at an accommodation with the Palestinians outside the context of peace with the Arab countries.

In the past year we worked strenuously to establish contacts with the various Arab countries and modify their hostile stance toward Israel. We tested various methods, some public, others not. We tried to avail ourselves of the United States, Egypt, and other countries to convince the Arab leaders to depart from past policy and engage in direct talks with Israel. We know that various countries attempted to help us in this regard. Everyone knows how the Americans tried to persuade the Arab countries to show some evidence of change, even the slightest, in their position, by asking them to call off their attempt to revoke the credentials of the Israeli delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. Regrettably, this attempt, too, failed. The Arab countries continue to reject peace with Israel and persist with their hostility toward her. Even

though they sometimes try to camouflage their intentions behind a Palestinian smokescreen, we — and the Palestinians themselves — know that the Palestinian cause has never been at the forefront of their concerns. Now as before, they continue to exploit the Palestinians' suffering cynically to advance their own ambitions.

The most recent and most terrifying manifestation of Arab hostility surfaced in Saddam Hussein's speeches, in which he threatened to destroy half of Israel with chemical weapons.

Thus Saddam Hussein, who has already used chemical weapons in his war with Iran, who has already murdered innocent civilians in this terrible way, threatens to use chemical weapons against Israel. He has already given the orders and has installed launchers aimed at us. May we never forget, and may others, too, bear in mind, that when this tyrant went to war with Iran, he claimed that Iran had been the aggressor. We must recall that Saddam Hussein construes our very existence as an act of aggression. His most recent comments merely provide further reason to press for vigorous international action to foil his schemes.

After the Iraqi leader came out with these statements, I summoned the ambassadors of many countries, foremost among them the United States, Japan, the European Community, and Egypt, and urged them not to disregard the Iraqi dictator's utterances. I explained the need to take real action in view of the threats of a man who had not hesitated to use chemical weapons against a peaceful civilian population.

This is the region in which we live; these are the threats facing us. Under these circumstances we continue to make every effort to create contacts, establish communications, and build a bridge for peace, motivated by a sincere yearning for peace and genuine concern for Israel's security.

In the past year, as is known, we also acted to move the Palestinian-Israeli circle forward. We tried to convince the leaders of the world's industrialized countries to support in our efforts and act to rehabilitate the refugee camps, those breeding grounds of hatred and violence. The only elements lacking are the resources that Israel cannot procure by herself. We shall continue trying to persuade the affluent countries to help bring our initiative to fruition, thus rehabilitating the camps and solving their residents' plight.

The Peace Initiative and Its Implementation

It was the fourth point of Israel's peace initiative — Israel's willingness to hold free, democratic elections among the Arab residents of Judea-Samaria and Gaza, in order to conduct negotiations with those elected in accordance with guidelines suggested in the Camp David Accords — that attracted most of the attention during the past year.

A year has passed since this plan was presented, but it has proven impossible to hold the elections thus far. Let us ask ourselves why the elections, one of the major keys to energizing the political process, have been stymied. Why have the Arab residents of Judea-Samaria and Gaza not gone to the polls to this very day? Is it because our proposal is unfair? Is it because they have no wish for elections and negotiations?!

Everyone knows this is not the case. Our proposal is fair and far-reaching, and most of the Arab residents of Judea-Samaria and Gaza want to enter into negotiations with us after electing their authentic representatives.

The major difficulty in holding the elections originates in PLO terror. The PLO, having appointed itself as the Palestinians' sole representative, has no interest in democratic elections and the development of authentic leadership in Judea-Samaria and Gaza. PLO leaders continue to try to secure their personal interests at the expense of the Palestinians' interests. They attempt to rule out any political process that does not include PLO participation, representation of the so-called "Palestinian Diaspora," and the so-called "right of return," i.e., the elimination of Israel. In order to secure these interests, the PLO continues to invoke violent, brutal terror, aimed chiefly at the Arab population of Judea-Samaria and Gaza. Arafat and his pack are planning, as he says, to reach Jerusalem along with the Iraqi missile.

They want a Palestinian state. They want Jerusalem. And they want to flood our country with the descendants and the descendants' descendants, unto the tenth generation, of Palestinians who fled our country in the course of a war in which they tried to annihilate us.

They do not want elections that will lead to negotiations, as our initiative prescribes. They continue to train their guns at the heads of anyone who may disobey their dictates. This terror, now as always, is the major obstacle to holding the elections.

An additional difficulty on the road to the elections is that quite a few players, including some with good intentions, have despaired of the prospects of neutralizing the PLO as a prerequisite to free elections.

Some have begun to talk with the PLO in the hope that the organization would perhaps agree to deal itself out and permit elected representatives to take over. From the very first, we noted the danger of this approach and insisted that it did not stand a chance. Anyone who desires a political process must not hand the keys to the process to terrorists. Acquiescence to terrorists cannot lead to peace. Dialogue with the PLO leads necessarily to the neutralization of the chance for free elections. Neutralizing the PLO gives the election plan a chance.

There is no concealing the presence of another difficulty that has arisen during the past year: as everyone knows, several members of the national unity government have acted contrary to its basic guidelines and its peace initiative. These matters are well known and I shall not spell them out in this forum. It happened with respect to Mubarak's Ten Points, which the government did not accept but which were publicly supported by several members. It happened with respect to certain ministers' willingness to embrace the American Five Points at once and in their original form. Thus, while we were in the midst of difficult negotiations with the United States concerning Israel's security, several government members signaled to the Americans that the talks were altogether unnecessary. Worst of all, several members of the government expressed willingness to include the residents of East Jerusalem in the election constituency, thus making a proposal wholly contrary to the Israeli peace initiative.

This constant undermining of the foundations of unity created conditions under which Israel could not possibly ensure its interests in the political process.

It is not easy to make peace in the Middle East; neither is it easy to arrive at an accommodation in an atmosphere of hostility and hatred. The road to peace is lengthy and heavily mined. It has no short-cuts.

The Government of Israel is committed to its peace initiative in word and spirit. It will continue to act to convince the Arab countries to forsake the path of hostility and take the road to peace.

Notwithstanding all the difficulties and obstacles, we shall continue to act relentlessly to attain true peace and to continue strengthening the security of Israel.

ISRAEL INFORMATION CENTRE

משרד החוץ
מחלקת ההסברה

כ"ב סיוון
15 ביוני
תש"ו
1990

אל הנציגויות

דברי שר החוץ בפתיחת הדיון המדיני בכנסת
ה-6 ביוני 1990

לוט נאום שר החוץ משה ארנס, בפתיחת הדיון המדיני בכנסת (6.6.90).

בנאום מתייחס השר לנושאים הבאים:

- * הפיסגה הערבית בגדד
- * אש"פ והדיאלוג
- * יחסי ישראל-ארצות הברית
- * מועצת הבטחון בג'נבה
- * היחסים עם אירופה ועמדת מדינות השוק המשותף
- * עולים מברית המועצות.

תוכלו להעזר בדבריו בתדרוכים ובתשובות לשאלות.

158/15.6.1990/1.02.21

Remarks by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moshe Arens
in the Knesset, June 6, 1990

The Baghdad Summit

Peace in the Middle East took a beating last week in Baghdad, where the summit meeting of Arab countries, convened by the initiative of the PLO, turned into a summit of darkness -- a summit in which the Arab countries did not rescind their stance on the existence of a state of war with Israel and rejected her hand outstretched in peace.

Just before the summit, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein threatened to destroy half of Israel with chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein already used chemical weapons in his war with Iran and killed innocent civilians with this terrible weaponry. The Iraqi tyrant had gone to war with Iran alleging that Iran had attacked him, and he views Israel's very existence as an act of aggression against the Arab world. The reactions in the Arab world to Saddam Hussein's threats were troubling, reminding us of the grim days of Nasser's threats to annihilate Israel. At the summit, the Arab countries resolved that Iraq was entitled to take what they called "all measures to ensure Iraq's national security," thus lending their support to Saddam Hussein's aggressive policies. Israel views this with the utmost gravity and will continue to pay close attention to the practical implications of this resolution.

The centerpiece of the summit conference deliberations was the PLO's effort to sabotage Jewish immigration to Israel. The summit called on all countries to refrain from providing this immigration any assistance and even threatened implicitly to impose sanctions on those countries that facilitate such immigration.

At the Baghdad summit, the Arab countries added another chapter to their campaign of incitement against the immigration of Jews to Israel. The Arab campaign against this immigration is an extension of their attempts to deny the refugees of the Holocaust the possibility of finding shelter in this country.

From this podium I would like to appeal to all the countries of the Free World to condemn and excoriate this attempt of the Arab countries and the PLO terror organization to return the Jews to their bitter fate as homeless victims of persecution.

The countries of the world are bound by a moral responsibility and an obligation of conscience to do everything to ensure the free immigration of Jews to their homeland.

The gravity of the Baghdad resolutions, however, lies in what they do not contain. They contain no recognition of Israel. They contain no willingness to enter into direct peace negotiations with Israel. And they contain no resolution abolishing the Arab boycott and the Arab states' hostile anti-Israel propaganda. Therefore, the results of the Arab summit are profoundly disappointing.

All those around the world, as well as members of this House, who blame Israel for the absence of progress in the peace process should peruse the Baghdad resolutions.

As for Egypt, it did play a moderating role in the summit. But the fact that Egypt, a signatory to a peace treaty with us, also signed the summarizing communique of the Baghdad summit is a source of disappointment and concern.

The PLO and the Dialogue

The PLO was the driving force of the Baghdad summit. The PLO is the primary obstacle to progress in the process of dialogue between Israel and the Palestinian population of Judea-Samaria and the Gaza District. This organization, which for the past two years has been trying to mislead the entire world, has never desisted from terror. Even in the past two years the PLO has engaged in terror, not only against Jews but also against the Arab population of Judea-Samaria and the Gaza District.

On the Festival of Shavuot the world was given a further reminder of the PLO's continued involvement in terror. Abu al-Abbas, however, is not the only practitioner of terror. Fatah, Hawatmeh, Habash, and other PLO factors have never ceased their terror operations. Since Arafat proclaimed his renunciation of terror in Geneva, his organization has continued to practice terror under slogans of "continuation of the uprising" and "legitimate armed struggle."

The PLO's directives to its legions occasionally disclose an intent to try to conceal the fact that Fatah/Arafat

continues to engage in terror. The facts, however, speak for themselves. Since December 15, 1988, 359 Fatah units have been found to be active in Judea-Samaria and the Gaza District and within the Green Line. Since December 1988, Fatah has carried out 201 attacks against Israeli civilians and local Arab residents.

Since the dialogue between the American Administration and the PLO began, we have been presenting the Administration with proof that the PLO continues to engage in terror. Nevertheless, the United States has continued the dialogue.

After the recent attempted attack by Abu al-Abbas, a member of the PLO Executive Committee, we presented the Administration with evidence, pertaining to this event, attesting that the PLO has not abided by the conditions the American Administration had set for the continuance of the dialogue.

I hope the attempted terrorist attack by Abu al-Abbas will open the entire world's eyes and persuade the world that there is no room for any dialogue with the PLO.

It is hard to imagine that any country whatsoever would abet Arafat's tricks of deception and shut its eyes to his organization's terror activities. At stake is the credibility of the American assertion that it will not continue its dialogue with the PLO if this organization persists with its practice of terror.

The United States and Israel share the view that one does not negotiate with terrorists and that terror must be fought. Now that the evidence clearly shows that the PLO terror

organization has not met the conditions set by the United States itself, the United States should be expected to draw the appropriate conclusions. It should be hoped that the United States will continue to lead the struggle against international terror, in which the PLO plays a central role.

The prospects of progress in the Middle East peace process would improve if the countries of the free world were to terminate their relations with the PLO and deny this organization legitimacy.

Israel-U.S. Relations

The United States is Israel's ally. The alliance between the American and Israeli peoples is strong and steadfast, and is based on friendship and shared values and interests. Our bilateral strategic cooperation continues to develop. Our joint efforts to open the gates of the Soviet Union to Jewish emigration have succeeded. We continue to work in concert with the United States to ensure the Soviet Jews' orderly and undisturbed departure for Israel. In this context it should be noted that following the remarks by Soviet President Gorbachev, American Secretary of State James Baker repeated that the United States' support for free immigration of the Jews is unconditional.

In the political field in the past few weeks, the United States frustrated the PLO's attempt to have the Security Council resolve to send U.N. observers to the Middle East. Moreover, the United States rejected calls for the granting of an entrance visa to Yasser Arafat.

The governments of the United States and Israel have their disagreements. One cannot expect a total absence of differences of views between two friendly countries.

Neither should it be ignored that Israel and the United States have differed in the past two years concerning the American Administration's dialogue with the PLO.

As stated, one hopes that the American policy toward the PLO will change, and that the attempted attack along Israel's shore will convince the Administration that the assumption underlying its dialogue with the PLO was mistaken.

The government of Israel was and remains committed to its Peace Initiative of May 1989. The new government, once it is inaugurated, will continue to take all necessary measures to promote its peace initiative in its four components.

Israel will continue to act to promote the peace process, cooperating closely with the United States. Those who speak of an unprecedented deterioration in Israel-U.S. relations would do best to view such matters in proportion.

The Security Council

Following the despicable murder in Rishon Lezion, a deliberate Arab attempt was made to cynically exploit the murder in order to attack Israel and incite to violence.

As part of this effort, the PLO and the Arab countries sought to convene the Security Council and use it as a forum for anti-Israel incitement. Yasser Arafat wanted to obtain an American visa so he could address the Security Council in New York. Once he understood that the United States would not

respond favorably, however, the Security Council session was relocated to Geneva.

During the Security Council deliberations in Geneva, Arafat's duplicity revealed itself again. The PLO chief delivered a speech replete with anti-Israel agitation and again attempted to fuel his propaganda machine with falsehood. The Arab countries and the PLO asked the Security Council to adopt a resolution dispatching U.N. observers to the Middle East. Following this initiative, Israel declared its opposition to any resolution to send U.N. observers to the area. The Arab draft resolution was frustrated by a veto cast by the United States. Israel congratulates the United States for its stance, but expresses its sorrow about the votes in favor cast by various countries, including those of the European Community.

Europe

The Jewish people has a lengthy history of tragedies in Europe. The Jewish people in Europe was devastated not only because there were some who wished to destroy it, but also because no country wanted to give the Jews shelter; all abandoned the Jewish people during the Holocaust years. Even the gates of Eretz Israel, which, it had been decided, was to serve as a National Home for the Jewish people, were closed during the Holocaust years. One might have thought that the tragic history of the Jewish people in Europe would lead to a special commitment on Europe's part toward the State of Israel, but throughout Israel's history we have not sensed any

such commitment. Neither did we receive substantial assistance from the countries of Europe in the years when Israel fought for her life after being attacked by the Arab countries.

Lately we have heard various declarations from the countries of the European Community. However, we have not heard the voice of the countries of Western Europe after the anti-Israeli resolutions adopted at the Arab summit in Baghdad, nor have we heard that the countries of Europe have taken measures of any kind against Libya, from whose port in Benghazi the PLO terrorists set out for the coast of Israel on the festival of Shavuot. We deeply appreciate the European Community's concern for peace in the Middle East, but the Jewish people, which lost six million on European soil and 17,000 of its sons in Israel's wars, does not need to be prodded to make progress toward peace. The State of Israel, which has paid so heavy a price for the absence of peace, wants peace more than anyone else -- no less, too, than the countries of the European Community.

Immigration to Israel from the Soviet Union

Since the dawn of the Zionist movement, there have been some who have tried to deny the Jewish people the right to return to its homeland. The campaign against Jewish immigration to Israel reached its pinnacle when Jews fleeing Hitler's terror found the gates of Eretz Israel locked and were sent back to the gas chambers.

When the State of Israel was established, we etched the struggle for Jewish immigration into our banner as a major

objective of our policy. Throughout the years, the State of Israel has acted to open the gates of countries that had closed them and had denied Jews there the possibility of immigrating to Israel. In the past twenty years, the centerpiece of the struggle for free immigration has been the struggle to open the gates of the Soviet Union. Recently, when the Iron Curtain in the USSR was lifted, the gate of Jewish immigration, too, was flung open. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who engineered the revolution of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, transformed his country's emigration policy as a central plank in the liberalization he introduced in the Soviet Union.

The State of Israel deeply appreciates the President of the Soviet Union for having opened his country's gates to Jewish emigration, and we cannot imagine that the USSR will change its emigration policy, thereby retreating from *glasnost* and harming the image it has acquired in the Free World over the past year.

The State of Israel deeply appreciates the United States for standing at Israel's side in the struggle for free emigration and for opening the gates of the Soviet Union. It is important to note that following the Soviet President's recent remarks, American Secretary of State James Baker stated that the United States supported the free emigration of Soviet Jews unreservedly and unconditionally.

President Gorbachev also knows that the enactment of an emigration law is a condition for the Most Favored Nation

status that the USSR desires in its trade with the United States.

The State of Israel is a free country. The Soviet Union, now going through a process of democratization, must understand that in a free and democratic country people are not steered to this or that location and that every citizen chooses his place of residence as he sees fit.

The Soviet regime also knows that the number of Soviet immigrants who have settled in Judea-Samaria and the Gaza District is negligible, a fraction of one percent, and that this certainly cannot serve as a pretext or reason of any kind for a change in Soviet emigration policy.

Summary

Israel finds it hard to understand how, in a period when a conference of Arab countries turns into a conference of anti-Israel aggression, in a period when the PLO proves time and again that it has not abandoned its path and its goals, in a period when the entire Arab world mobilizes against Jewish immigration to Israel -- there are still those at home and abroad who shower Israel with criticism and assign her the blame for the absence of progress in the Middle East peace process.

It is high time that the world's countries sober up from the delusion that one can restrain the PLO murderers by being obsequious or by granting legitimacy to Yasser Arafat.

Countries that wish to help promote the peace process should come out firmly against PLO terror and desist from any dialogue with this organization.

Countries that wish to help promote the peace process should condemn the Arab states' refusal to terminate the state of war with Israel and should bring all their influence to bear on the Arab countries to embark on a process of normalization with Israel.

Countries that wish to help promote the peace process should, moreover, terminate all aid to countries such as Libya and Iraq that are building their military capabilities.

Countries that wish to help promote the peace process should demonstrate unreserved support for the four points of the Peace Initiative of the Government of Israel.

THE ARAB STRUGGLE AGAINST JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL

Arab leaders have stated that one of the key focuses of next week's Arab League summit in Baghdad is to reach agreement on measures aimed at stopping Jewish immigration to Israel. The hysterical Arab opposition to the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel reflects an aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict that the Arab states have been attempting to play down in recent years by focusing on the Palestinian-Israeli aspect of the conflict, as if a solution to this problem alone could bring peace to the area. The Arabs have concentrated on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict because it can be explained in acceptable terms such as self-determination, political rights for the Palestinians, and territory. The Arab conflict with Israel, on the other hand, is harder to explain, since it is based on the rejection of Israel on ideological, religious, cultural, and other grounds.

Even for politicians and journalists in the moderate Arab states Jewish immigration to Israel symbolizes the realization of the Zionist ideology, which the Arabs oppose in principle. It is disturbing to learn that even an Arab country at peace with Israel, i.e., Egypt, has sided with those opposing Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel. President Mubarak, speaking at the Socialist International in Cairo (May 22, 1990, Middle East News Agency) expressed his opinion that "the Socialist International must join the campaign against the danger of Soviet Jewish immigration to the occupied Palestinian land, which threatens to torpedo the peace process and put the whole

region on the verge of a new bloody confrontation." Not a single Arab believes that the Jews should have their own country "of right and not on sufferance"; immigration signifies Israel's "right" to exist, whereas the Arabs have always viewed the state as a concrete expression of colonialism — the implantation of a foreign body in the heart of the Arab world — that must be limited. This also explains the basic Arab view that the very existence of Israel is a Christian and Western plot against the Arab world, and that Israel is an imperialist agent involved in a web of conspiracies, responsible for the weaknesses of the Arab world, and bent only on expansion.

The immigration of Jews to Israel is not perceived or represented as harming only Palestinians, but as constituting a threat to the entire Arab world. This explains the unbridled onslaught of the media in the Gulf states, which are far from the conflict in both geographical and practical terms.

All the above explains:

- * Why Arab statements and writings hardly distinguish between Jewish immigrants residing in the territories and those living in the rest of Israel.
- * The revival of the theme of a pan-Arab confrontation with Israel, with calls for the establishment of a unified Arab front.
- * Opposition to Jewish immigration because it strengthens Israel; anything that strengthens Israel necessarily weakens the Arabs as a whole.

- * The growing number of anti-Semitic articles and caricatures.
 - * Why Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union is described as the "second greatest calamity" to have befallen the Arabs since the establishment of the State of Israel, and hence the resurgence of Arab opposition to the establishment of the State of Israel.
 - * Why the Arabs view the immigration of Jews as disturbing the demographic-strategic balance and as a concrete danger, although their territory and population are many times greater than that of Israel, with its four million inhabitants. This would seem to indicate that for the Arabs the term "Greater Israel" implies a stronger and qualitatively superior Israel and not necessarily an Israel with a larger territory or population.
- A. The Conflict as a Pan-Arab Struggle for Existence**
1. *Al-Qabas* (Kuwait, January 23, 1990): A religious leader is quoted as saying: "our war with the Jews is a war of survival or destruction," and must be pursued to the end.
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 3. *A-Rai Al-'Am* (Kuwait, January 31, 1990): "The struggle between the Palestinians and Israelis is a struggle for survival, a *kulturkampf*, a life-or-death struggle; it is

a struggle that concerns not only Palestine but Arab nationhood as a whole, threatened by Israel in the form of new Jewish immigration, which will bring with it the Greater Israel."

4. *A-Siyassa* (Kuwait, February 13, 1990, February 17, 1990): Dr. Su'ad Abdallah Al-Mubarak A-Sabah (apparently a member of the royal family) claims that history is about to repeat itself, since the establishment of Israel — with Eastern and Western assistance — was the means invoked by the countries of Europe to solve the problem of anti-Semitism. Now that anti-Semitism is resurfacing in Eastern Europe, the countries of Europe, with U.S. assistance, are again seeking to solve the problem precisely as they had done previously, from the Balfour Declaration to the establishment of the State of Israel. Like the Egyptian Ahmed Baha A-Din, she too views Jewish immigration to Israel as the "crime of our age" (*A-Siyassa*, February 13, 1990). She proposes the establishment of a missile-borne nuclear deterrent, whatever the price, and insists that the Arabs must not discard their chemical warfare capability.
5. *Al-Qabas* (February 22, 1990): The cleric Dr. Yussef Al-Karsawwi: "The problem of Palestine is a struggle between two faiths, two cultures, and two nations." The just solution is that Palestine return to being as it was before Jewish immigration; but a phased solution is also possible, as adopted by Saladdin, until the problem was eliminated and the land purged of the Crusader presence

and their kingdom vanished. "The existence of Israel is unlawful; the just solution is that Israel cease to exist and that the Jews remain as individuals in a Palestinian state, if they so wish. However, those who came from here, there, or anywhere must return to their own lands." "This is true justice. . . . What was taken by force will be restored only by force, through the Islamic jihad (Holy War)."

6. *Al-Ahram* (Egypt, February 20, 1990), Ahsan Bakhar: "We would not be exaggerating were we to say that the calamity of Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union to occupied Palestinian land is equivalent to the loss of Palestine in 1948. . . . Immigration from the Soviet Union may bring about the failure of a political settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1990, and may even be the cause of further wars. This is because 'Greater Israel' constitutes a real threat to Arab national security."

B. Closing the Ranks and a United Arab Strategy

1. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, at the summit of the Arab Cooperation Council: "The Arab counterattack does not have to be along the same axis as that chosen by the enemy. We can engage the enemy along the axis it has chosen, while attacking along another line. We must think of ways to utilize our combined strength in order to be effective. The Arabs have shown that they can unite, for example in 1973 and in Lebanon, where Israel was defeated

by some of the Arabs, despite the tales of its invincibility. The use of the oil weapon is an example of Arab strength. . . . Our weakness is merely the result of our lack of trust among ourselves. Our motto should be: United we stand, divided we fall." (Radio Amman, February 24, 1990)

2. Saddam Hussein, to a conference of the foreign ministers of the Arab Cooperation Council (February 16, 1990): "The immigrants are proliferating and enhancing Israel's aggressive and expansionist capability wherever they take up residence inside the occupied territory, while also enhancing the influence of the Zionist entity. They will realize the goal of Zionism. The argument that they must not live in the Arab lands occupied since 1967 is not enough, since the immigrants, wherever they are, add new strength to Israeli society." (Iraqi News Agency, February 19, 1990).
3. King Hussein, in his opening address to the conference of the Arab Cooperation Council: "The new wave of immigration intensifies the danger and confronts all of us with a concerted act of aggression directed against the entire Arab nation and the Palestinians, bearing within it the seeds of a new expansionist onslaught that threatens this portion of the Arab homeland." Hussein warns that this immigration threatens not merely Jordan, but also the heart of the Arab homeland and Arab national security; it is an obstacle to peace and a further blow to the Palestinian people's uprising and struggle for its

freedom and independence on its national territory.

(Radio Amman, February 24, 1990)

4. *A-Rai* (Jordan, February 24, 1990): "The Arab blocs are in need of a strong pan-Arab momentum that will lead to the consolidation of a united Arab entity with international influence, along the lines of the large political entities that exist today. At the very least, a united Arab entity must be established in a large portion of the Arab world, in order to keep the Israeli aggressors from carrying out their design to build Greater Israel. This aggressive design can be thwarted only through a large and united Arab entity. Such an entity cannot be formed through random efforts, especially since the Israeli aggressors are currently concentrating the new immigrants and developing their military industry in readiness for carrying out their design."
5. *A-Dustour* (Jordan, February 19, 1990): Muhammad Milhem, a member of the PLO executive committee, described Soviet Jews emigrating to "occupied Palestine" as "an army bent on conquering unoccupied Arab lands indiscriminately. This immigration also torpedoed all peace efforts in general, and the Palestinian peace initiative in particular." Milhem calls on Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and the PLO to work towards eliminating their differences, to close ranks, and to repair any breaches that the enemy is attempting to penetrate, since the situation bodes ill and approaches a situation of life-or-death.

6. King Hassan II of Morocco (February 1, 1990): "The Arabs cannot accept this colonialist policy. . . . We would not deprive the Soviet Jews of their right to visit Israel or to meet relatives, but we cannot agree to their entering Israel and then the occupied territories without a passport enabling them to leave Israel whenever they wish." (Agence France Presse, February 2, 1990)
7. Chadli Klibi, Secretary-General of the Arab League, told Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Tarasov that a catastrophe of historic proportions would occur if the Soviets allowed large numbers of Jews to come to Israel and called for an end to Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union (Agence France Presse, February 2, 1990).

C. War and Threats of Terrorism

1. *A-Riad* (Saudi Arabia, January 29, 1990): "Our struggle against Israel cannot end through good will as long as the Zionist ideology exists. We cannot imagine that Israel will accept the principle of natural co-existence with the Arabs. This problem can only be solved through the power equation."
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occupied territories turn into an inferno for those who come to settle there."

4. *A-Dustour* (Jordan, February 23, 1990): "If talks on the establishment of a joint Iraqi-Jordanian training squadron aroused such panic among the Israeli enemy, the Arabs must turn the words into legitimate practical action, since the best way to resist renewed dangers lies in the existence of an Arab military framework in which the Arab states participate. This is the only language Israel understands and fears."
5. *A-Rai* (Jordan, February 23, 1990): "The revival of the eastern front is one of the most important elements in Arab national deterrence and support of the Palestinian uprising. It is also a safety valve to prevent Israel from a possible invasion of Arab lands in Syria and Jordan, aimed at relocating the conflict outside Palestine and implementing the policy of forced emigration or transfer. The revival of the eastern front will also foil Israel's plans to spread the gospel of an alternative homeland. This revival of the eastern front in a pan-Arab context, based on a comprehensive Arab security strategy, may require the support and sympathy of all Arabs. This is a difficult task, which rests on the shoulders of the rulers of the Arab countries that make up this front; if they are successful, it will constitute a firm basis for the establishment of other Arab fronts, able to impose and obtain peace and restore the Arabs' lost honor."

6. Bassam Abu Sharif describes the settlement of 200 Soviet Jews in Nablus as "an act of war" that will lead to an escalation of hostilities. He threatens that the PLO will halt the political process and start thinking of other ways to defend its land (Reuter, February 22, 1990).
7. *Al-Anba* (Kuwait, February 7, 1990): "Not one [Arab leader] has dared state that opposing immigration and preventing the Jews from settling is an Arab responsibility." The only way is "to set all airports and harbors in the occupied land on fire with the corpses of holy martyrs and the corpses of the immigrants."
8. *A-Thawra* (Syria, quoted by Saudi News Agency, February 28, 1990): "Every new Zionist immigrant makes the situation more grave and pours oil on the flames of war, bringing the area to the brink of a new calamity. This fact obliges all the Arab masses to fight against the Zionist danger. The existing settlements are not large enough to contain the vast numbers of Zionists, unless the land is evacuated and its original owners deported, and it becomes a transit point for the entire area in order to realize the Israeli vision and re-establish the state of Biblical times. The next battle with the enemy will be a life-or-death struggle. It brooks no weakness, and no Arab can escape it. It is a war of survival."
9. Yasser Arafat, in a meeting reported by *Al-Muharrar* (April 10, 1990), threatened: "First, I want to say clearly: Open fire on the new Jewish immigrants—be they Soviet, Falasha, or anything else. It would be disgraceful of us


were we to see herds of immigrants conquering our land and settling our territory and not raise a finger. I want you to shoot, on the ground or in the air, at every immigrant who thinks our land is a playground and that immigration to it is a vacation or picnic. From today on, the ball is in your court. I don't want to hear anyone say that political decision makers prevent us from taking military action against the immigrants. It makes no difference if they live in Jaffa or in Jericho. I give you explicit instructions to open fire. Do everything to stop the flow of immigration. Neither Security Council resolutions, nor American, Soviet, or European political activity will stem the flow."

- 10 The Islamic fundamentalist Hamas movement sent a sharp warning (*Qatar News Agency*, April 13, 1990) to the Jewish immigrants en route to the occupied territories. A spokesman of the Islamic movement said in a "people's assembly" held in Amman on April 13, attended by 20,000 residents, that killing the immigrants was permissible and that Hamas groups would treat them as direct targets without quarter. The spokesman described these immigrants as invaders and warmongers who strengthened the war machine and represented a backup force with which the Zionist military establishment would carry out its expansionist and aggressive objectives; they would also participate in the bloody atrocities of Zionist violence and terror against our people and its blessed uprising. These immigrants serve to perpetuate the occupation and

settlement at the expense of our homeland, our strength, our land, and our people; moreover, they presented a threat to Arab and Islamic security and survival.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת ההסברה



ירושלים, י"ב באדר תש"ן
9 במארס 1990

אל הנציגויות

ההתנגדות הערבית לעליה ומשמעותיה

ההתנגדות הערבית לעלית יהודים מברית המועצות:

* מזכירה את מלחמתם בעליה היהודית בשנות ה-30 שנבעה מהחשש לרוב יהודי בארץ והקמת מדינה יהודית.

* נובעת מהפחד שהמדינה תתבסס ותתחזה ועל ידי כך יחלשו סיכוייהם להתמודד איתה.

* מחזירה אותנו לשורשי הסכסוך הערבי-ישראלי שמקורו בסירובם של הערבים לנוכחותה של מדינה יהודית באיזור מסיבות הסטוריות, דתיות, תרבותיות ואידיאולוגיות.

לוט ניר בנדון שהוכו על ידי ממ"ד, הכולל ציטוטים מתוך העתונות הערבית בנושא.

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The Implications of the Arab Opposition to Aliya

The almost hysterical Arab opposition to aliya reflects an aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict that the Arab states have been attempting to play down in recent years by focusing on the Palestinian-Israeli aspect of the conflict, as if a solution to this problem alone could bring peace to the area. The Arabs have concentrated on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict because it can be explained in acceptable terms such as self-determination, political rights for the Palestinians, and territory. The Arab conflict with Israel, on the other hand, is harder to explain, since it is based on the rejection of Israel on ideological, religious, cultural, and other grounds.

Even for politicians and journalists in the moderate Arab states aliya symbolizes the realization of the Zionist ideology, which the Arabs oppose in principle. Not a single Arab believes that the Jews should have their own country "of right and not on sufferance"; aliya indicates Israel's "right" to exist, whereas the Arabs have always viewed the state as a concrete expression of colonialism — the implantation of a foreign body in the heart of the Arab world — that must be limited. This also explains the basic Arab view that the very existence of Israel is a Christian and Western plot against the Arab world, and that Israel is an imperialist agent involved in a web of conspiracies, responsible for the weaknesses of the Arab world, and bent only on expansion.

Aliya is not perceived or represented as harming only

Palestinians, but as constituting a threat to the entire Arab world. This explains the unbridled onslaught of the media in the Gulf states, which are far from the conflict in both geographical and practical terms.

All the above explains:

- * Why Arab statements and writings hardly distinguish between aliya to the territories and to the rest of Israel. Only Egypt's official statements make specific reference to aliya to the territories.
- * The revival of the theme of a pan-Arab confrontation with Israel, with calls for the establishment of a unified Arab front.
- * Opposition to aliya because it strengthens Israel; anything that strengthens Israel necessarily weakens the Arabs as a whole.
- * The growing number of anti-Semitic articles and caricatures.
- * Why aliya from the Soviet Union is described as the "second greatest calamity" to have befallen the Arabs since the establishment of the State of Israel, and hence the resurgence of Arab opposition to the establishment of the State of Israel.
- * Why the Arabs view aliya as disturbing the demographic-strategic balance and as a concrete danger, although their territory and population are many times greater than that of Israel, with its four million inhabitants. This would seem to indicate that for the Arabs the term "Greater Israel" implies a stronger and qualitatively

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6. *Al-Qabas* (February 23, 1990): Dr. Abd el-Aziz Kamal draws a comparison between the "new Jewish invasion (attack) and previous attacks against the Holy Land." In his opinion, the Al-Aqsa mosque is a symbol of the jihad and of staunch adherence to territory and religion. Jerusalem's message throughout history is: "The fate of the region will be decided here. Here lies the key to

victory or defeat." As in the past, Jerusalem calls on Muslims to liberate their land, and the message is: we are currently involved in a further stage of our long struggle . . . in which victory will come about through cooperation between Arab and Muslim elements. . . . The threat is not to Jerusalem alone, or to Palestine alone."

7. *Al-Ahram* (Egypt, February 20, 1990), Ahsan Bakhar: "We would not be exaggerating were we to say that the calamity of Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union to occupied Palestinian land is equivalent to the loss of Palestine in 1948. . . . Immigration from the Soviet Union may bring about the failure of a political settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1990, and may even be the cause of further wars. This is because 'Greater Israel' constitutes a real threat to Arab national security."

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halt the political process and start thinking of other way to defend its land (Reuter, February 22, 1990).

7. *Al-Ittihad* (UAE, February 23, 1990): "Since 1948 Israel has been in a perpetual state of war with the Arabs. Moreover, the 'Zionist gangs' began their massacres against the Palestinians many years before that. Now Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union to the occupied territories and settlement there has opened a new chapter in the criminal Israeli war against Palestinians and Arabs." The author concludes that the only thing that will deter the loathsome Israeli war against the Arabs is a just Arab war, through the unification of the Arab nation.
8. *A-Rai Al-'Am* (Kuwait, February 15, 1990) calls on Arabs and Palestinians "to man the front lines before the Zionist serpent breeds a nest of vipers whose venom will penetrate the Middle East from the Nile to the Euphrates."
9. *Al-Anba* (Kuwait, February 7, 1990): "Not one [Arab leader] has dared state that opposing immigration and preventing the Jews from settling is an Arab responsibility." The only way is "to set all airports and harbors in the occupied land on fire with the corpses of holy martyrs and the corpses of the immigrants."
10. *A-Thawra* (Syria, quoted by Saudi News Agency, February 28, 1990): Every new Zionist immigrant makes the situation more grave and pours oil on the flames of war, bringing the area to the brink of a new calamity. This

fact obliges all the Arab masses to fight against the Zionist danger. The existing settlements are not large enough to contain the vast numbers of Zionists, unless the land is evacuated and its original owners deported, and it becomes a transit point for the entire area in order to realize the Israeli vision and re-establish the state of Biblical times. The next battle with the enemy will be a life-or-death struggle. It brooks no weakness, and no Arab can escape it. It is a war of survival.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת ההסברה

12941

כ"ב בסיון תש"ן
15 ביוני 1990

אל הנציגויות

ערכי מוסר תחת לחץ: צה"ל והאינתיפדה

מאת מהס זינגר

ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1990 VOL.4

מאמר על התנהגות צה"ל בשטחים פורסם לאחרונה בכתב העת האמריקאי:

ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1990

המחבר, שאינו מתעלם מחריגות, מתייחס במאמרו לדילמה של מוסריות

בתנאי קרב, מצביע על אופי האינתיפדה שבמקרים רבים מציבה את

החיילים מול ילדים ונשים ומדגיש את עקרון טוהר הנשק בצה"ל.

לידיעה ולשימוש סלקטיבי ומבוקר במקומותיכם.

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1990 Volume 4

Ten Dollars

Moral Standards Under Pressure: The Israeli Army and the *Intifada*

Max Singer

After seeing pictures of Israeli soldiers clubbing women and children, some Israelis and others have talked about how Israel is losing its soul because of the immoral actions of the Israeli army. Others argue that it is not the Israeli army that has failed to uphold moral standards under pressure, but rather those who have issued shallow denunciations of the Israeli army—denunciations which confuse, and thus reduce, the power of the moral rules that control a soldier's conduct.

If parents find that their son is stealing from the house to pay for drugs, and they have tried every way they can to help him, they may finally have to kick him out of the house. This cruel act would not demonstrate a lack of love, nor mean that the parents have lost their souls. The moral failure would be if they were not strong enough to do what is right, however much it hurts them to do it.

Israelis are the Palestinians' rulers (occupiers), not their parents. Very few Israelis love the Arabs like sons; but few of them like having to club them or shoot them. The question is whether they are doing the morally right thing under the circumstances.¹

¹ When a soldier kills an enemy soldier in combat he is not acting less morally than when he peacefully goes about his business at home. Morality's command to him has changed. At home morality says, "Do not kill"; in combat morality commands him to "kill." (But the command of morality in combat is not only to kill enemy soldiers; it is also to spare enemy noncombatants.) Circumstances may require morality to drop some rules temporarily, but morality never says, "Anything goes." This distinction—between the specific rule and the general obligation—is the basic foundation for understanding the moral limits on the use of force. It underlies all considerations of morality in combat. The moral limits on the use of force depend on circumstances. But there are no circumstances under which Israeli soldiers are exempt from the obligation that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) calls *tohar haneshkek* or "purity of arms," even though the specifics commanded by that doctrine depend on the situation.

Doing something that is hard, that feels wrong, and that under normal circumstances is wrong, but that has to be done, does not have to brutalize a person. Of course people can be damaged by such challenges—either because they cannot face the need to do what has to be done, or because they cannot do it and maintain their values. But much of the growth and strengthening of life comes from experiences where circumstances make it necessary to overcome reluctance or aversion to doing or accepting something that cannot be avoided. People who are lucky enough to be rich and safe without having to make hard choices are not stronger or more moral than ordinary people, who at various points in their lives have to do some things they would rather not do. In the real world, the moral man is usually not the man who does no wrong—the moral man is more often the one who, over his life, has fulfilled his responsibilities and made as good a set of moral choices as can be expected.

A soul that is not strong enough to withstand the need to do hard and distasteful things, when they are morally required by the circumstances, is a soul that is too weak for a nation that has to live in the Middle East.

The Israel Defense Force (IDF) has always believed that war is primarily a matter of people, not machines. It is convinced that Israel's security depends primarily upon the morale and character of its soldiers and officers, and that these cannot be strong unless they reflect the moral values of Judaism and of the Israeli people. So the IDF has always put a lot of emphasis on the moral code of the Israeli army—sometimes called *tohar haneshek*, or "purity of arms."

Traditionally, *tohar haneshek* has concerned itself with two main issues: protecting noncombatants while fighting Arab armies and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorists² and respecting Arab civilians who are under the power of Israeli troops.

The international laws of war provide that armies should fight other armies and take care to avoid harm to noncombatants. There are two parts to this provision. First, an army should separate itself from its own civilians so that it does not draw enemy fire onto them. Second, when firing at the enemy the army should be careful not to hit

² Guerrillas are soldiers who use guerrilla tactics in fighting an enemy army and government (i.e., no fixed front or lines of communication, light arms, hit-and-run tactics, etc.). Terrorists are those who attack innocent people in order to frighten or pressure someone else. The definitions are instrumental and have nothing to do with politics or the goals for which the force is fighting. The definitions apply both to states and to other kinds of organizations. (There is no need to accept that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.")

noncombatants. (Civilians are not considered noncombatants if they are actively engaged in supporting their military forces.)

In recent years, it has become commonplace for some armies and terrorist forces to violate the laws of war and morality by trying to protect themselves by placing themselves in close proximity to noncombatants—e.g., putting ammunition storage and anti-aircraft guns in or near schools or hospitals—in other words, using women and children to protect soldiers, rather than using soldiers to protect women and children. This immoral tactic was used extensively by the Viet Cong in North and South Vietnam, by the PLO in the war in Lebanon in 1982, and by the FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) in their attack against the cities of El Salvador last November.

The PLO practice of hiding behind civilians has produced severe tests for the IDF. For many years, Israeli soldiers and flyers have had to make difficult judgments about what kind of firing at the PLO would produce too much risk of hurting civilians as well. While particular cases are difficult, the legal principles are well established. The doctrine of "military necessity" is a central part of the laws of war. It says that if a soldier has to fire to protect himself, or to accomplish a legitimate military task, he is authorized to do so even if it will result in killing noncombatants. But he must not use more than "proportional force"—that is, an amount of force that is proportional to the military purpose he is trying to achieve. International law is clear that if a noncombatant is hurt because a soldier has been staying close to him, that soldier is responsible, not whoever fires at him and hits the noncombatant.

In practice, this means that Israeli officers regularly have to decide how much to risk their own lives and the lives of the men they are commanding. How much risk should they take by avoiding firing at places where PLO fighters are or may be hidden among Arab civilians?³

Several years ago, the IDF commissioned a training film that dramatized this and other issues of *tohar haneshek*. In the climactic moment of the film, an Israeli officer is ordered to shell an occupied Arab house where a PLO fighter has taken refuge. Instead, the officer

³ In his autobiography, *Warrior*, Ariel Sharon, Israeli defense minister during the Lebanon war in 1982, describes a long meeting of Israeli officers in the middle of the night after the second day of that war, "in which moral issues, not tactical or strategic ones, dominated the discussion." The advance of the Israeli forces had been dangerously delayed that day, with a number of casualties, because of PLO fighters hidden in houses and using civilians as hostages and as cover. Sharon reports, "There was one obvious solution . . . we could use our air force to destroy whatever buildings were in the way . . . that would open the road and save us considerable casualties, but it would also cause a heavy toll among the civilian population. . . . Every single officer present . . . recommended that we not use the air force . . . [and] that was the decision I took."

runs into the house by himself and is shot by the enemy before he can kill him. The film illustrated the dilemma so that the soldiers could be prepared—and to show that the army wanted them to think about and care about morality in combat. It also illustrated that different individual officers have different standards. Some are willing to expose themselves, or their men, to greater risks to protect Arab civilians than others. Each has to decide for himself. There is no way to define precisely how much is too much risk. And during officer training, Israeli soldiers spend hours arguing about how to handle particular cases. (The training film was so dramatic and realistic that it became a commercial success in Israel and is being distributed abroad with the name *Ricochets*.) In the war in Lebanon, dozens of Israelis were killed or wounded because of their reluctance to protect themselves by endangering or killing the Arabs among whom the PLO were hiding.

The second major theme of *tohar haneshek* concerns respect for human dignity. It arises when Israeli soldiers come in contact with Arab civilians—patrolling through towns and villages, searching houses, checking identity papers, and stopping cars.

The IDF doctrine of *tohar haneshek* orders Israeli soldiers always to treat Arab citizens with dignity and respect. When he is required to search an Arab's house or person, to look for hidden weapons, *tohar haneshek* tells the soldier that his words and manner should show respect for the Arab's humanity. If necessary, a soldier may have to interfere with an Arab's privacy, and perhaps handle him roughly, but he is taught never to do more than what is necessary to get the job done, and never without as much respect for the Arab as is possible under the circumstances. (*Ricochets* showed an Israeli soldier delaying going into a room in an Arab house to avoid embarrassing an Arab woman while she was nursing her baby.)

In this aspect of *tohar haneshek* also, there are striking differences in the thinking of individual Israeli soldiers and officers. Some of them accept the IDF's command to respect Arab civilians, and some reject it. Many soldiers who start by trying to respect the Arabs find that the pressure of Arab hatred and of danger, as well as the temptation of power, leads to an increasing—or at least occasional—failure to maintain standards. Others learn and grow morally, and improve their behavior as a result of mistakes they make when they are forced to exercise power.

A constant struggle exists concerning both parts of *tohar haneshek*. First, a struggle takes place inside many of the soldiers and officers. And second, those officers and sergeants who accept the army's doctrine of *tohar haneshek* struggle regularly to teach and control some of the men under their command. It is never easy to maintain purity of

arms. But the army as an institution is an influence for higher standards.

The civilian uprising against Israel in Gaza and the territories that began in December 1987, and that the Arabs call their *intifada*, presented a new challenge to *tohar haneshek*. The Arabs used crowds of civilians, including many women and children, to attack Israeli troops with stones and Molotov cocktails. They also attacked with invective and insults—and with spit and excrement—deliberately trying to provoke the army to do things that would be embarrassing or politically harmful to Israel.

This article will not attempt to evaluate the justice of the Arab cause in attacking the Israeli occupation forces. The nature of their cause is in dispute—some say that it is to end Israeli occupation of the territories, but the rioters often say that it is to send the Jews “back to where they came from”—and it may be changing. It is clear that there is justice on both sides, but there is not enough justice to go around.

It is also clear that the war, of which the uprising is only one part, involves more than the two adversaries confronting each other in the streets. Another major element of the struggle is the Arab states who have always rejected peace with Israel, and behind them the Soviet Union, which finds it useful to attack the U.S. indirectly by supporting Arab attacks on Israel. Finally, it is clear that no solution to the broader problem, no resolution of the Arab demand for justice, can be achieved quickly enough to deal with the need to end the violent uprising.

But the discussion of the morality of the Israeli army's behavior is not at all handicapped by omitting consideration of the justice of the Israeli position. The moral obligations of a soldier in combat are the same whether his cause is just or unjust. The government decides whom and whether or not the army will fight; the soldier and the army are not responsible for those decisions. The military are responsible for fighting in a moral way, whether their government has put them on the right side or the wrong side.⁴

The new challenge to *tohar haneshek* presented by the uprising includes a special example of the usual problem of the soldier's need to protect himself while avoiding unnecessary harm to noncombatants. In the case of the uprising, the soldier is not protecting himself from gunfire but from mobs of civilians with stones, knives, and Molotov cocktails. And the “combatants” in this strange combat are civilians, often women, children, and old people.

⁴ Some will say that the soldier—or at least the higher officer—has an obligation to refuse to go into combat if the cause is manifestly unjust; but here we are only discussing the morality that should guide soldiers who are in action.

Another special problem is that, in the uprising, the army does not just have the assignment of fighting an enemy army, or of providing security so that the police and government can restore order. Part of the army's job has been to make the uprising so costly and painful to the Arabs that they will stop it.

The army has told the soldiers that when they are attacked, they should fight back with enough nonlethal force so that the civilian attackers are not only repulsed, but also discouraged from making such attacks again. This practice appears to be one of using the army not as a fighting or security force but to punish or hurt the rioting civilians, and normally it is not right to use an army to hurt civilians.⁵

It also seems that there was a period during which at least part of the army believed that it had been ordered to deliberately break the bones of people who were not then rioting, and who were not caught in hot pursuit after their participation in rioting. This is a distinct step beyond the current orders. While it is not clear what level of military leadership was responsible for that brief policy—or exactly what was intended at various levels of command—it does seem that there was a retreat from it due to its incompatibility with *tohar haneshek*, and/or its politically harmful effect on Israel.

The whole issue of the duty of the soldier to respect Arab civilians becomes very different when those civilians are trying to demonstrate to the soldiers their resentment of them and the people they represent, and when these civilians become "combatants," participating in politically motivated, violent attacks on the army and the government.

Is *tohar haneshek* suspended in the current conflict? Has the IDF decided that when it is attacked by a substantial share of a civilian population, it no longer has a moral obligation to that population? Certainly not. The army may not be exactly sure of the content of its obligation toward the attacking Arab population, but the IDF is very clear, and it works hard to deliver the message to the troops that *tohar haneshek* should continue to be the guiding principle.

Israel's army still feels, and strongly expresses, obligations to the civilians who are attacking it, as well as to the other Arab civilians. For example, when soldiers had buried Arab rioters alive (though not so deeply that they could not free themselves), they were punished. Also, we know that the army does not approve of firing lethal ammunition at rioters unless it is necessary to protect Israeli troops. Officers have been punished for that too. More important, the small numbers of Arab

⁵ This principle does not forbid the use of the army to execute the order of a military court, after some appropriate procedure, to blow up the house of a terrorist's family.

casualties demonstrate the success of the army's commitment to restraint. This is not an effort to justify everything done by the Israeli army. First of all, not all of the facts are clear. Second, some of the things the army is doing are probably wrong. But most important, there is no need to make a claim that all of the policies or decisions of the Israeli army are morally justified. (And of course there can be no doubt that some of the soldiers and officers acted wrongly—how could it be otherwise?)

There is no debate on the question, "Have Israeli soldiers done terrible things?" Of course they have. And of course some of the actions of the IDF have been wrong. The question is whether on balance the IDF has acted about as well as a human institution can act, given the circumstances.

Throughout the uprising the IDF has maintained an unusually strong official commitment to high moral standards—with the support of the majority of Israelis. It is clear that the army as an institution and the country care a great deal about their moral obligations to their enemies—although there is a substantial minority that has different views of this obligation.

A very high percentage of soldiers and officers have acted properly, in the circumstances, almost all of the time (although there has been so much confrontation that there have been a large number of examples of soldiers acting improperly). In most cases in which soldiers acted badly, they were under pressures great enough to extenuate their guilt, without justifying what they did.⁶

One result of this consciousness has been a very low rate of Palestinian casualties. Another result is that the Palestinians have

⁶ In judging individuals there are two different kinds of defense for actions that are normally wrong—justification and extenuation. If an act is justified it means that if the same situation happens again, law and morality tell the person that he should do again exactly what he did before. Extenuation, on the other hand, means that although the person did something wrong, he should not be held to be guilty of a crime because special circumstances made it so hard to avoid his wrongful action. A person who is found not guilty because of extenuating circumstances is told, "You are not being condemned, but do not do it again."

Extenuation includes circumstances where it would not be abnormal for a soldier to be so excited, or frightened, that he makes a mistake and does something that he should not do—such as shooting into a crowd—or when he loses control of his emotions because of extreme provocation. In such cases one does not hold the soldier criminally responsible even though he did something he should not have done that ordinarily would be a crime.

A similar distinction exists for the army as a whole. Some very rough treatment of civilians that normally would be completely unacceptable may be justified by the circumstances; that is, it may be the morally required policy of the army. But armies, too, make mistakes in extenuating circumstances. Saying that an army has a good moral record does not mean justifying everything it does. It means some of its normally forbidden actions were justified, and there were extenuating circumstances for much or all of what it did that was wrong.

continued to risk their lives on the basis of their confidence in the restraint of Israeli soldiers. In other words, Palestinian conduct testifies to Israeli good behavior. (It will be interesting to see how this lesson will influence the Palestinians when they confront other enemies.)

Is there reason to think that any other army would have acted more morally, with greater restraint? Has the IDF displayed moral standards about which the Israeli people should be embarrassed? Even though there is much to criticize about many aspects of the IDF performance, there is little room for doubt that the answer to both these questions is "no!"

The overall conclusion is that, although many Israeli soldiers acted badly and the IDF has done some things that are wrong, generally, the IDF and the Israeli soldiers have achieved a higher moral standard than could be expected from any army in the world. Therefore, the Israeli army can be proud of its moral record although, as the IDF itself recognizes without embarrassment, work needs to be done to further improve its behavior.⁷

The IDF, when comparing itself to other armies, accepts a double standard, and even a triple standard, but a quadruple standard is too much. A double standard means not being judged by what the Arabs would do. A triple standard means needing to do better than the United States or Sweden or other Western democracies. But a quadruple standard, which means doing better than it is possible for a human institution to do, is too much.

In war, it is not only the soldier with a gun who has an obligation to act morally. Those who speak in the name of morality also become obligated when they tell the soldier how he should act, or when they condemn armies for immorality. Crying "wolf" when there is no wolf damages the cause of morality, and weakens its power to control behavior in the future.

In economics, Gresham's Law says that bad money drives good money out of circulation. Similarly, unless shallow morality is resisted,

⁷ There are some different criticisms that have been made against the morality of the IDF that have a good deal of merit: 1. By failing to act more promptly and strongly to put down the uprising, the IDF and the Israeli government probably increased the direct and indirect casualties, damaged the prospects for peace, and increased the difficulty of governing the territories in the future. ("More strongly" does not necessarily mean more killing or more beating. It means an earlier acceptance of the need to convince the Arab population that the uprising would be painful and costly to them and that it had no chance of success. It also means more cleverness in finding legitimate ways of hurting the Arabs—by their values—and of dividing them, as well as more decisive action by deportation and other means against the leaders and organizers.) 2. In a significant number of cases the IDF used too much restraint on, or wrongfully disciplined, officers. It is hard to know whether mistakes in this direction were greater or smaller than mistakes in the other direction. Inappropriate restraint can be as harmful to moral values as too little restraint.

it can drive serious moral judgments out of circulation and reduce the power of morality to make people act better.

Moral judgments must be practical if they are to be more than an art form or a sentimental self-indulgence. Serious morality is not easy and obvious. It requires a willingness to take the trouble to make subtle distinctions and to evaluate complex situations with long and broad histories. If moral judgments exist to help people make the world better, they must deal with the tragic complexity of the world as it is.

Many people who have claimed to be voices of conscience, have badly served the moral values they claim to speak for by condemning the IDF without evaluating the facts, or without knowing the law and realities that determine morality of soldiers in combat. It is doubly wrong to judge an army by impossible standards—condemning it for failing to do better than it is possible to do. Not only is it unjust to those wrongly condemned, but it also weakens the power of the moral claim. To be effective in improving conduct, a moral standard must distinguish between those who act well and those who act poorly. A standard that is so low that no one fails, does not do much to uplift conduct. But neither does a standard that is so high that no one passes.

Many people, including some Israelis and Jews in other countries, have found it easy to condemn the Israeli army for the way it has responded to the Palestinian uprising in Gaza and the territories. And there is no doubt that the IDF and Israeli soldiers have done some very bad things. But if the morality of the behavior of the Israeli army is evaluated with the rigor necessary to make moral claims an instrument of human betterment, there is no basis for condemning it. Rather, much of the condemnation of the IDF should be seen as the moral offense.

Viewed with the kind of morality that can make the world a better place, the performance of the IDF should be commended. Of course a person, and even more an army, can be proud of their morality while recognizing the need to do better. No one is so good or pious that he should not feel the need to improve.

Moral values and standards can make the world better. The passion of this article is not in defense of the IDF but in defense of a commitment to moral values in national and international behavior.

משרד החוץ
מחלקת ההסברה

כ"ב בסיון תש"ן
15 ביוני 1990

אל הנציגויות

ביקורת על עיראק בתקשורת הסובייטית

השבועון הרוסי היוקרתי ARGUMENTY I FACTY (גליון 26.5/21 - 1.6)
פרסם במדורו "נקודת מבט" מאמר תחת הכותרת "עיראק ללא סטראוטיפים".

המאמר, שנכתב על ידי שני מזרחנים סובייטיים ופורסם ערב ועידת
הפיסגה בבגדד, כולל ביקורת חסרת תקדים על עיראק.

לוט המאמר בתרגום לאנגלית.

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Iraq Without Stereotypes

Yu. Georgiyev and Yu. Dahab
Argumenty i Fauty (No. 21, 26/5 - 1/6), Moscow

Few reports thus far have reached the open Soviet media on the events taking place in Iraq, a country only several hundred kilometers from our southern borders.

What kind of political regime has this Arab country, with its population of 18,000,000? Contrary to many predictions, the regime, headed by President Saddam Hussein, has not only survived its eight-year war with Iran -- a conflict that cost the state dearly in lives and property -- but actually gained strength, riding the crest of a wave of nationalism that surged after the Iranian armies penetrated Iraqi territory. The country's economy suffered grievous damage, but because of tremendous oil reserves and a flow of foreign capital, one may consider its chances of rehabilitation rather favorable. The foreign press reports that Saddam Hussein feels stronger and more secure than ever. The armed forces -- with about 1,000,000 hardened soldiers, almost 5,000 tanks, and approximately 500 war planes, as well as missiles and chemical weapons -- are the major pillar of the regime. So large an army makes Iraq capable of carrying out large-scale offensives, although no one knows what direction they may take. Iraq presents itself as the major steamroller in the Arabs' anti-Israeli front. In the meantime, the Iraqis have transferred a recent large weapons shipment, including a great many tanks, to the rightist Christian Lebanese forces under

General Aoun, regarded as Syria's major rival in the complex, multi-lateral conflict. A second major pillar of the regime is the Baath Party: its full name, the Arab Socialist Revival Party. The party has armed units of its own, to which most of the civilian members of the party belong. The state's political leadership thinks these formations should serve as a counterweight, so to speak, to the regular army.

The third pillar of the regime is the security service, which penetrates all strata of society. As British journalist W. Mallet remarks, "Iraqis are afraid to voice their thoughts even among family members -- so terrifying is the governmental security apparatus and so efficient its system of informers. Executions (broadcast on television) are a daily occurrence."

A Bloody Temple of State Power

The Baathists first rose to power in Iraq in 1963 following a military coup, but for only a few months. During that time they managed to "distinguish" themselves only in a brutal purge of Communists and Kurds, whereupon they were toppled by the army. Back then, the Soviet government and the Soviet Communist Party openly condemned the Baath actions.

The Baathists came to power again in 1968, and, for some time, it seemed as if they had learned from the blood-soaked lessons of the past. Socio-economic reforms were instituted. The Baathists viewed their main task as "effectuating a plan of socialist change throughout Iraqi society." For more than 10 years, the country was headed by General Al-Baqr (Prime Minister of the first Baath government in 1963). Everyone,

however, knew that the real leader was his relative, young, energetic Saddam Hussein. In 1979, Hussein put the elderly general on pension and became the country's full-fledged ruler, with the title of President. The first time anyone heard of Saddam Hussein, an attorney by profession, was in 1959, when he took part in a thwarted attempt to assassinate the dictator at the time, Kassem.

The Iraqi President hails from the small town of Tikhrit, as does, in fact, the entire upper echelon of the party and the state. As an American journalist wrote, "The Iraqi leaders have engaged in backstabbing for so long that they can no longer trust anyone and believe they must join forces with those of their own city." Saddam Hussein, however, reserves no pity even for "his" men of Tikhrit if he believes they threaten his ascent; as chief of the party's security service, he systematically removed all obstacles to his progress.

The history of Baathist rule is an unbroken chain of conspiracies, purges and executions, and periodic elimination of groups of "traitors." When officially becoming President in 1979, Hussein's first move was to eliminate (with characteristic lightning speed, with neither trial nor investigation) most members of the Revolutionary Command Council. Before the purge was announced, *Pravda* reported that "The traitors were dismissed from their positions."

A Trap

All of this happened in 1979, 11 years after the Baath first rose to power. At the beginning of Baqr's tenure, by

contrast, Hussein strived to cultivate a highly favorable image at home and abroad -- chiefly with regard to the Soviet Union, toward which there was a "strategic orientation." One indication that the Baathists had climbed aboard the progressive train was the establishment, in 1973, of a united front with the Communists. This, however, quickly proved to be nothing more than a ruse. At that particular point in time, the Iraqi regime needed above all else to solve the problem of the Kurdish rebellion, and it temporarily neutralized the Communist Party, so as later to damage it with repression of the most brutal kind. In the late 1970s, thousands of Communists, who were declared traitors, were murdered. They were literally hunted down. The homes and offices of persons suspected of membership in the Communist Party were broken into, and the people literally killed in the streets as their relatives and colleagues looked on. The scale of Iraq's execution of Communists may have been equalled only by similar events in Chile following the 1973 military coup and the bloodbath in Indonesia in 1965. A few Iraqi Communists successfully went underground or fled to the mountains of Kurdistan to the north; the major forces of the Communist Party, however, were wiped out. On this occasion, neither the Soviet government nor the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee lodged any official protest with the Iraqi government.

Solving the National Problem, Baath-Style

Nor did they protest when the central regime carried out on a war of many years' duration against the Kurds, who struggled for autonomy in the north. Granted, the regime agreed to award the Kurds autonomy in 1974, but it was rather truncated, while the regime made off with territories that had been Kurdish from time immemorial and were, moreover, rich in oil. Again the Kurds refused to accede, and again a protracted partisan war broke out. Finally, the Iraqi Kurds, approximately 3.5 million strong, found themselves on the verge of a national disaster. After smashing the Kurdish liberation movement and wiping out the rebel forces, the government organized a genocide, no more, no less, against the civilian population, using not only its 70,000-man army (August 1988) but also chemical weapons. In their attempt to flee the lethal gas, more than 100,000 Kurds crossed into Turkey. At least that many people had crossed the Iranian border previously. A thousand Kurdish villages were destroyed in 1987, whereafter a 30-kilometer-wide *cordon sanitaire* was set up, all the Kurdish population being forcibly expelled. According to reports, by early 1988, only 1,000 out of 4,000 Kurdish villages survived, and one third of the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan was "liberated" from a people who had lived there for hundreds of years.

Why Were We Silent?

The key to understanding this silence was a ruse no less successful, this one in the area of foreign policy: the signing of a friendship and cooperation treaty with the Soviet

Union in 1972. At first, everything was conducted as if according to the prescriptions of our own foreign policy planners. Iraq nationalized its oil resources which had belonged to foreign monopolies, undertook socio-economic reform, and moved towards socialism without deviation. The Soviet Union, for its part, helped Iraq actively by helping construct the country's industrial and energy systems.

Slowly, however, the emphasis in relations increasingly shifted to the military domain. We found it more profitable to sell weapons, for which Iraq paid in hard currency. According to foreign reports, in just five years, 1982-87, the Soviet Union supplied Iraq with weapons totalling \$10 billion, and this supply began in 1958. Of course, financial considerations were not the only factors at work. Iraq's important geopolitical status could not but be taken into account, but, basically, political/ideological rationales were even more evident.

The actual state of affairs in Iraq was not considered very important by our leaders, even after the purge of Communists went into high gear, compared with the possibility of "signing up" yet another country in the "unimpeded expanding realm of socialist influence and expansion." In its foreign policy, as in its domestic policy, the bureaucratic regime of the stagnation period could not get by without exaggerating and "bluffing." Brutal terror and ruthless repression ensured Saddam Hussein, now 53 years old, the possibility of creating an unlimited dictatorship. He -- President of the Republic, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed

Forces, Secretary-General of the Regional Baath Leadership, Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Chairman of the Supreme Council for the War on Illiteracy, "Knight of the Arab Nation," Hero of Nation Liberation, and "Leader-Warrior." His portraits are ubiquitous, omnipresent.

Afterword

As we publish this vitriolic essay, an exceptional piece in our press, the *Argumenty i Factly* editorial board notes a certain bias in the authors' attitude toward the modern history of Iraq. We believe it correct to point out the Iraqi Communists, too, after the 1958 coup, made serious mistakes in their policy toward the Baathist people which led to bloody clashes with them. Even though the assessment of the Baghdad regime is largely correct, it should not be forgotten that our history, too, is replete with many instances of governmental genocide against our own people and others. Governments come and go; peoples should not be judged on their basis. The same emotions of friendship and trust that Iraqi and Soviet individuals feel toward each other remain the basis for our relations.

A final remark: thus far, representatives of this or that friendly country or party that has been unflatteringly depicted in any Soviet publication immediately protest to the Soviet Foreign Ministry or the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. They seem to be convinced that these institutions, of all agencies, had initiated the publication of the material that displeased them. Parenthetically, that

used to be the case quite often. Now, however, we believe it is high time to permit the frank articulation of opinions that do not necessarily reflect the viewpoint of these official institutions or others that manage our foreign policy, and, if warranted, to criticize it.

משרד החוץ
מחלקת ההסברה

ט"ו בסיון תש"ן
8 ביוני 1990

12838

אל הנציגויות

הפסקה בבגדאד

ההערכה הראשונית על הודעת הסיכום של הפסקה הערבית בבגדאד, שהוכנה

על ידי ממ"ד, מצ"ב בתרגום לאנגלית.

הסקירה מתמקדת בנושאים הנוגעים לעניינינו.

152/6.8.1990/2.05.02

The Baghdad Summit -- Summarizing Communiqué

General

1. The phrasing that was adopted seems at first to be the result of an effort to find low common denominators embracing the various attitudes, and an attempt to bridge contradictions, chiefly between the positions represented by President Mubarak of Egypt (and, to a certain extent, by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia) on the one hand, and the radicals -- Saddam Hussein, Arafat, and Kaddafi -- on the other.
2. The communiqué as phrased projects neither a spirit of peace and conciliation nor the espousal of a clear-cut political settlement meant to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict by way of negotiations. The communiqué expresses neither recognition of Israel's existence nor willingness to enter into dialogue with it (even rejecting an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue). Resolutions 242 and 338 are not mentioned (the reference to the Algiers and Casablanca summits was done on the side, a concession to satisfy Mubarak.) By contrast, Israel, Jewish immigration to Israel, and Israeli policies are described as menaces and threats to the Arab Nation and its security.

Soviet Immigration to Israel

3. The immigration of Soviet Jews to "Palestine and the occupied Arab lands" is perceived as a "dangerous threat" that warrants the collective marshalling of forces and

treatment, including international supervision under a resolution that the Security Council is asked to adopt. (Mention of "Palestine" in this context may definitely include Israel.) In the context of the present immigration, it was decided to establish a follow-up committee of Arab foreign ministers that will present its recommendations to the next Arab summit, scheduled for November 1990, in Cairo.

The Peace Process and a Political Settlement

4. The communiqué expresses nothing new in the political field. No reference is made to political action taken during the year, but rather to the "Palestinian peace initiative," with emphasis on the urgent need to convene an international conference under U.N. auspices, with the participation of all sides to the conflict, including the PLO as a partner with "equal status." The "right of return," "self-determination," and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state are reiterated.

The Intifada

5. The summit lauds the escalation of the intifada and emphasizes the need to provide it with material and political aid of all kinds -- official and grass-roots alike -- so that it may attain its goals.

Iraq

6. The summit firmly sides with Iraq against "the threats, the hostile and tendentious political and informational

attacks, and the measures of scientific and technological embargo taken against Iraq." The summit expresses its identification with Iraq, stressing the commitment to the "joint Arab defense agreement." Graver still is the emphasis in the communiqué on "Iraq's right to take all measures that will ensure the defense of its national security." This represents an achievement for Saddam Hussein, since it confirms and supports the positions he has taken in his statements since April 1990. It also seems, at least from the phrasing of the communiqué, that Iraq has successfully persuaded the other Arab countries to agree to take "whatever means they deem appropriate to safeguard their security and sovereignty." This further strengthens Saddam Hussein's doctrine of reacting by any means he believes suitable.

Middle East Disarmament -- Iraq

7. The contents of this paragraph represent another achievement for Saddam Hussein in that the summit espouses "total dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction in the area, not one type only." It approves and legitimizes Iraq's possession and development of non-conventional, chemical, and biological weapons, and does not call upon Iraq, at the present stage, to destroy such weapons and halt their development. True, the initiative was Mubarak's, but the summit leaders' assertion that the "fixation on dismantling only one type of mass destruction weaponry in the Middle East is tantamount to

adopting a selective method toward the region" lends pan-Arab support to Saddam Hussein's position and the destructive weaponry he possesses.

The United States

1. With the exception of Israel, only the United States is subjected to a lengthy list of condemnations. The United States is deemed responsible for the tension in the area because of its aid to Israel. The backing and massive military and economic aid that typify the positions of the U.S. Congress (in the contexts of Jerusalem and the financing of Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel) are condemned, as are the Senate resolution on Jerusalem, American attempts to rescind the U.N. resolution equating Zionism with racism, American threats to use force against Libya, and the American economic "seige" against that country. This condemnation is accompanied by the summit's demand that the embargo be lifted.
9. By contrast, in a conspicuous omission, no mention is made of the letter sent by the State Department to the Secretary-General of the Arab League shortly before the summit convened. That letter called on the summit to express positive attitudes in its resolutions (recognition of Israel, direct negotiations, refraining from insistence on urgently convening an international conference, etc.).

משרד החוץ

מחלקת ההסברה

ט"ו בסיון תש"ן
8 ביוני 1990

אל הנציגויות

דברי נשיא המדינה, מר חיים הרצוג בפני הקהילה היהודית
של הלסינקי

24 במאי 1990

במסגרת ביקור ממלכתי ראשון של נשיא מדינת ישראל בפינלנד, הופיע

מר חיים הרצוג גם בפני הקהילה היהודית של הלסינקי.

לוט תעתיק של נאום.

151//8.6.1990/1.02.15

Address by the President of Israel, Mr. Chaim Herzog
to the Jewish Community of Helsinki
May 24th, 1990

I am honored and moved to address this distinguished gathering representing the Jewry of Finland on the occasion of the first State Visit of the President of the State of Israel to this country.

Eighty-four years ago the third Conference of Russian Zionists took place in Helsingfors in December 1906 when the so-called Helsingfors Program was adopted. The Convention formulated the idea of "Synthetic Zionism" which stood for the simultaneous integration of parallel political and practical work in Zionism. The program postulated the principle that the achievement and international recognition for a Jewish Eretz Yisrael would be the end, not the pre-condition of systematic aliya and settlement work. Those who participated in that historic convention included Vladimir Jabotinsky, Leo Motzkin and Isaac Grunbaum.

This small community has lived through the tragedies, the trials and tribulations of the Finnish people as part of the magnificent Finnish nation which made its sacrifice on the altar of Finnish freedom and independence.

I stand here before you filled with emotion, not only because of the solemnity of the occasion, an occasion which your parents and grandparents and, indeed, the Jewish people over the centuries, would have given their right hand to live to see.

Yesterday I received on my arrival in Helsinki the full honours due to a visiting Head of State. I have by now made many visits across the world, yet I cannot take these ceremonies for granted. Each time I stand and receive the honours, hear the strains of 'Hatikva', and see our flag proudly fluttering in the breeze, and from a distance see the Jewish welcoming delegation failing to restrain their tears, it is always the same. I find it very difficult to control my emotions.

We tend to take our independence for granted. After all many in this audience and, indeed, in this community have never known a world without an independent State of Israel. But to those of us, as myself, who have been witness to the ravages of the Holocaust, who have borne arms against unbelievable odds in the defence of our small community during the epic of our War of Independence, it is impossible to take our independence for granted. In that grim and bitter struggle for our independence, outnumbered and poorly equipped as we were, a small population of 600,000 withstood an invasion of seven Arab armies, determined to destroy us and throw us in the sea. As I think of our sacrifices in that heroic struggle under the leadership of the great David Ben-Gurion, as I think of the losses we incurred, including one percent of our total population killed - I am incapable of taking for granted the outward expressions of our independence.

As I stand here before representatives of this special community, I cannot but think back to my encounters as President of the State of Israel with Jewish communities throughout the world.

As I drove eighteen months ago along the Champs Elysees, in Paris, bathed in our national colors, and laid a wreath at the Arc de Triomphe in homage to the glory of France, my mind wandered back to the years of nightmare, some 48 years earlier. I thought of the parades and ceremonies reviewed by Hitler that had taken place in the Champs Elysees and at the Arc de Triomphe. I looked at our flags lining the length of the Boulevard, and listened to the strains of 'Hatikva'. At that moment I thought to myself: would that our brothers and sisters who were fleeing, who were languishing in Drancy, who were packed into the trains on the way to Auschwitz, could have dreamt for one moment that the scenes taking place in the Champs Elysees would, indeed, ever take place.

There are moments in the life of an individual that, however articulate he or she might be, are impossible to articulate. Such were my feelings when I stood in Bergen Belsen, during a State Visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, unveiling the stone that I had brought with me from the hills of Jerusalem and swore never to forget and never to forgive.

What, I ask, could give more profound and eloquent expression to the miracle that has occurred to the Jewish people over the past 42 years, than what happened sixteen months ago in the center of Paris, the scene in Bergen Belsen on my visit not so long ago, and what occurred here yesterday and today.

Our society, a free and democratic one, is engaged in an open debate as to its approach to the problem of peace. The society facing us and all those around us are not free to conduct such an open debate. The Palestinians are not free to debate publicly the issues facing them, because if they openly

express an independent opinion they will become targets for assassination.

When evaluating our problem you must look the facts in the face. All in Israel want peace. None wish to rule another people, but there are differences of opinion as to how to achieve the peace.

It is no secret that I have left Israel in the midst of a political crisis which I hope will soon be resolved. In the meantime, however, in Israel a major debate is taking place in our free, democratic society on various aspects of the ongoing peace process and the projected negotiations with the Arab World. I, personally, am confident that despite the debate in our midst, the process will move forward. Suffice it to say that this indicates the great historic breakthrough that has occurred in the Middle East since President Sadat's historic visit, namely, that the idea of negotiations with Israel is now universally accepted by a great part of the Arab world.

Unfortunately the situation on the Arab side is not at all clear. No Palestinian in the Judea and Samaria district of the West Bank and Gaza will dare risk an assassin's bullet in order to express independent views. In the past two years, hundreds of Palestinians suspected of views different to those of the PLO or the Islamic Fundamentalists have been cruelly and summarily executed. This means that today the majority of Palestinian casualties are being caused by Palestinians.

In two-and-a-half years of the so-called Intifada, 795 Palestinians have lost their lives. This we very much regret.

But what is not realized abroad is that almost 40 percent of those killed, were killed by Palestinians. Since the beginning of this year, roughly 60 percent of the Palestinians killed are being killed by their fellow Palestinians. They are, in fact, in the midst of a bloody civil war.

We are by now immune to the double-talk which characterizes many of the statements issued by the PLO - each statement adapted to the audience to which it is delivered, immediately to be followed by another statement issued to another audience saying just the opposite.

Arafat publicly foreswore the use of terror. However, acts of terror continue unabated. Since Arafat made a statement in Geneva on 14.12.88 undertaking to abstain from acts of terror, 333 terrorist groupings of his organization, Fatah, have been uncovered by our Security Authorities, and 195 acts of terror perpetrated by Arafat's organization have taken place. As a result, within the confines of the so-called Green Line, namely, in Israel proper, 24 Israeli citizens have been killed and 251 wounded. So much for Arafat's credibility. After all, who knows him better than King Hussein, whom I personally heard stating on Jordanian Television that Arafat's word is not his bond.

The fact is that Arafat does not in effect control his organization. Indeed, in addition to the break-away Abu Mussa group in Syria, components of the PLO such as Talaat Ya'akub, Habash's Popular Front, Hawatme and Gibril, refuse to go along with him. What validity can one give to the statements made by an individual who obviously does not control constituents of the organization which he purports to lead. Why, ask many of

Why, ask many of our people, should we be more lenient in evaluating the credibility of the leaders of the PLO than are the Arab Heads of State?

I emphasize again, that the people of Israel want nothing more than peace. I know of no way to achieve peace without negotiation with the other side. One day a great man came forward in the Middle East, the late President Anwar Sadat, made his demands to the Knesset, entered into negotiations and today buses leave Jerusalem and Tel Aviv daily for Cairo and vice versa.

The choice facing us today in Judea, Samaria and Gaza is unfortunately not between law and order, on the one hand, and negotiations on the other hand. The choice is between maintaining law as a basis for bilateral negotiations, or allowing the situation to deteriorate into a new edition of Beirut or Teheran. That is the cruel choice which faces us today.

True, there is criticism, at times, of Israel's handling of the maintenance of law and order, and nowhere more pointedly than in Israel, in the Knesset or in the media. However, I have yet to see other countries facing similar situations without the use of force. What more effective methods should we use? Those used by our neighbors including, for instance, the killing of 30,000 in the Syrian town of Hama, the killing of 500 demonstrators in two days in Algeria in the summer of 1988, or during the riots in the inner cities of Britain, or in Northern Ireland, or in the streets of Western Europe, or those that were used in the riots in the U.S. cities? The

Chinese solved their problem in their particular way last June. Should we use the same methods?

It is because of the human and democratic restraints which exist in our society that the methods used by others, who were incidentally the first to criticize us, will not be tolerated in Israel.

But what society can turn a blind eye to a continued flagrant attempt to disrupt daily life? True, there are problems, but in the cruel distorted prejudiced coverage by the media of events in the Middle East the situation as portrayed bears little resemblance to realities on the ground. Otherwise, how can we explain the fact that we are today experiencing an unprecedented tourist boom, and that incidents of violence in our country constitute proportionately 10 percent of the violence in the U.S. and some 30 percent of the violence in Western Europe?

My friends,

For years we prayed that the Iron Curtain would be raised and that our Jewish brothers and sisters in the Soviet Union would rediscover their roots and would rejoin us and become an integral part of the Jewish people. That miracle is now occurring. I sensed the grandeur of this miracle at the Seder table last Pesach, when together with the bulk of the people of Israel, I hosted a Russian Jewish family which had arrived a few months earlier from Kiev, a couple and their young son of 17 who was already speaking Hebrew fluently. The grandparents of this couple - he is a construction engineer - were massacred at Babi Yar. They themselves grew up barely

aware of the fact that they were of Jewish origin and here they were, sitting at the Seder in the residence of the President of Israel. The grandchildren of those massacred in Babi Yar announcing that this was the first Seder they had ever experienced in their lives! Here you have encapsulated the miracle of our generation and the miracle which we are today living and experiencing. This miracle is a challenge which neither we in Israel, nor any Jewish community throughout the world dare fail to meet. This is a time for all of us in Israel and for the Jewish community - I would say, the Jewish family throughout the world - to join together to ensure that never in history will we be accused of having failed to meet the challenge which history has posed to us.

Just as in the days of the British Mandate, when Arab pressure was brought to bear to prevent the rescue of Jews from Hitler's terror and the concentration camps by bringing them to Palestine, so today our enemies in the Arab world and elsewhere are uniting in order to prevent the rescue of our brothers and sisters in the Soviet Union. This dangerous and sinister movement coincides with a rising wave of anti-semitic excesses in various countries.

Our enemies today are mounting a twin-pronged attack on the Jewish people - the living and the dead. On the one hand an all-out assault led by the PLO, supported by the Arab world and their sympathizers in the free world and elsewhere, against the rescue of Jews from the Soviet Union and their repatriation to Israel. Parallel to this is the ghoulish attack on and desecration of Jewish cemeteries. It is all part of a pattern which we have seen before and is so horribly reminiscent.

A few days ago, a demented Israeli killed seven innocent Arab workers in a most tragic event, which was condemned by myself, by my Government and universally by the people of Israel. As I view the world reaction to this tragic event and compare it with the reaction to equally tragic events in which innocent Jews have been killed, I cannot but express my horror and revulsion at the international double standards which have found expression on this occasion.

Not so long ago, an Israeli tourist bus in Egypt was attacked by terrorists with a heavy, tragic loss of life and many injured. Some time earlier, a demented Arab caused the crashing of an Israeli bus over a precipice near Jerusalem, with the loss of sixteen killed and many injured. Some years ago, a demented Egyptian soldier opened fire on Israeli tourists in Sinai, killing seven in cold blood, including four children. Did the world react to these tragic occasions in the same way as it is reacting today? Was the blame on those occasions placed on the shoulders of an entire nation? Was the Security Council convened to discuss these events, or even more terrifying events which took place in other parts of the world? Or is it that the newly emerging anti-semitism to which we are witness in many parts of the world is giving rise to double standards even in reaction to the actions of demented individuals? I shudder to think that what we are seeing today is a reflection of such double standards, which distinguish between blood and blood, and are becoming a guideline for international behaviour and reaction in the United Nations and elsewhere. It is time, I believe, that the Jewish people rise and express its refusal to accept this new ominous expression of racism and discrimination.

When will the world learn that it always began with the Jews, but never ended with them and that the attacks on our people were inevitably the forerunners of tragic events for mankind and humanity in general?

On this solemn occasion, we the Jewish people must once again rally together to ensure that nothing will stand in the way of the rescue of our brothers and sisters who are on the move again in order to save themselves and their children and to come home. We must close our ranks in order to meet the new anti-semitic wave which is threatening our people again.

My Friends,

We have faced many problems and we have been through many vicissitudes and struggles. As I look at the balance sheet, we have every reason to be proud of ourselves and of what we have done.

As I looked out upon the Assembly of Nations at the U.N. some years ago, in the first appearance of an Israeli head of state in the history of the U.N., I computed what the delegates in the hall represent in lack of freedoms, in concentration camps, in prisons, in torture, in disease, in malnutrition, in lack of education and opportunity, in the absence of the basic freedoms of press, of thought, of expression, of movement, of political opposition. I could see before me the hundreds of millions whom they represent who have never known and will never know the taste of the basic freedoms which we take for granted. I looked out on this vast Assembly and saw before me the misery, unhappiness, human sadness and tragedy which is represented by the majority in the hall. I then thought of the country which I had the honor to represent,

this small country with its unbelievable and seemingly insurmountable problems, and saw before me our free, open and multi-racial society in which all the basic freedoms of man are guaranteed.

I thought of the amazing progress which we have made, and the unselfish support which we have given to other developing countries. I thought of all this, accomplished in an atmosphere of freedom and human dignity in which the dignity of man is the supreme value. I thought of the Jewish people, their commitment one to the other, of our history, of our values or traditions, our contributions to society, and what we stand for and respect.

I looked out from the rostrum and saw them all. I thought of what I represent. And believe me my friends, my only feeling was one of pride, pride to belong to such a people, pride to represent such a nation, pride to head such a country. I was proud - very proud, to be a Jew, to be a Zionist.

Yes, my friends, we have very much to be proud of, each and every one of us. And it is in this spirit of pride in ourselves as Jews that we must go forth inspired and fortified by what we have done and dedicated to the task we have set before ourselves as a great and ancient people.

השקעה

28.5.90

החברה נכנסה לפעילות
ב-28.5.90
השקעה

↓

122

הוא מביא
לפיכך

~~122~~

כי תחזור למצב אחר אל תהיה
עם הנחיה אמנות

הוא מביא עם האלוקים וכל אלוקים ברוך

לדויה מוכה (יום ראשון?) והיא לפני

השמים

יום

2/4
TALKING POINTS

RECENT ADMINISTRATION POSITIONS ON THE PLO

1. Under-Secretary Kelly, 28 February 1990 (before the House M.E./Europe Subcommittee):

- "It was and remains in our interest to hold the PLO to the commitments it undertook in December 1988."
- "The PLO has become more aware of the need for a practical approach..."
- "We view the dialogue as an important tool towards ending Palestinian radicalism, including terrorism."
- "The PLO, as a result of our dialogue, has adopted publicly more moderate positions."

In response: Each one of these points can be challenged.

- In general, it is regrettable that the Administration fails to note that the PLO is involved in a sophisticated deception campaign, aiming at U.S. public opinion, while at the same time, it continues to be involved in terrorism, to endorse a violent assassination campaign against Palestinians in the territories.

3/4

- In practice, the US-PLO dialogue has and continues to undermine the Israel Peace Initiative which the US endorsed and made considerable efforts to advance.
 - The dialogue only serves to boost the PLO's stature, and, therefore, sends the wrong signal to moderate elements in the territories.
3. Secretary of State Baker, 1 May 1990 (before the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee):
- "For 22 years, Israel has tried to speak with Palestinians, but it is only since December 1988 that such a dialogue has a chance to take place."
 - "There will be no dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians unless it is acquiesced to."

In response:

- By extension, the U.S. position grants a role to the PLO in the dialogue. A different stand might well have 'produced' a Palestinian delegation other than one dependent on the PLO.
- Solid U.S. support of the emergence of local candidates in the territories for elections and preliminary discussions thereon, might have shifted the course of events.

- Israel cannot be expected to 'wink' at 'back-door' PLO involvement in the dialogue. Such involvement will only be disruptive to an already complicated process.

- Since 1967 (and well before), Israel has had regular talks with Palestinians of every rank and walk of life in the territories.

- For 22 years, Israel has tried to foster the emergence of local Palestinian leaders. For their part, they continue to miss one opportunity after the other. They publicly lend their support to an organisation that continues to insist that Israel, in the final analysis, can only be dealt with through the 'barrel of a gun'.

One cannot have it both ways: How can it be that U.S. positions not to push Israel into a dialogue with the PLO and, at the same time, to assert that no dialogue will start unless it is agreed to by the PLO. The contradiction is all too apparent.

May 16, 1990

Review Of The U.S. State Department Report
on PLO Commitments Compliance

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Executive Summary

As required by U.S. law (The PLO Commitments Compliance Act of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act), on March 19 the State Department submitted a report to Congress dealing with PLO actions and statements over the last fifteen months. The report intended to test the degree of PLO compliance with commitments undertaken by Yasser Arafat in Geneva on December 14, 1988. At that time, Arafat declared that the PLO would desist from terror, recognize Israel, and accept UN resolutions 242 and 338.

Regrettably the State Department report does not present a full portrayal of PLO actions since 1988. Neither does the report present the main thrust of public statements by PLO leaders on Israel and terrorism.

In both cases important information on PLO actions and statements is lacking from the State Department report. Much evidence which raises serious doubts about PLO adherence to its commitments is not included in the report.

- * The report does not mention numerous terrorist raids staged by constituent PLO groups since December 1988. Only cross-border raids are tallied and no hint appears in the report of the many terror attacks on civilians by Fatah operating inside Israel proper.
- * The report makes no mention of the heavy PLO involvement in violence by Palestinians against other Palestinians .
- * The report cites quotations from PLO leaders in an extremely selective manner. PLO leaders speak often in an open and brutal manner about their real intentions with regard to terror attacks and the Phased Plan. The report's assertion that "PLO official statements have been generally consistent with the commitments undertaken by Arafat" ignores these many clear signals of intent.
- * The PLO has not in any way disassociated itself from terror attacks, nor has it disciplined members implicated in such actions. The fact is played down in the report.

Review of the facts leads to only one conclusion: The PLO has not stood by its commitments, by any standard.

Background:

U.S. Conditions for Dialogue with the PLO

In 1984 the United States reaffirmed and codified its policy regarding the PLO in the U.S. Congress Amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill (Title XIII, Section 1302). The amendment forbade negotiations with the PLO (except in emergency or humanitarian situations) "unless and until the Palestine Liberation Organization recognizes Israel's right to exist, accepts United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and renounces the use of terrorism."

On December 15, 1988, based on Arafat's Geneva declaration, the United States began a dialogue with the PLO.

On December 22, 1988, Ronald Reagan, then President of the United States, wrote to Prime Minister Shamir:

"I am under no illusion about the PLO. Their words will have to be supported by action, namely a continuing renunciation of terrorism and disassociation from those who perpetrate it..."

According to the policy statement issued by the State Department to Ambassador Robert Pelletreau Jr. in Tunis, and which was delivered to the Government of Israel by the U.S. Ambassador to Israel Thomas Pickering in December 1988:

- * No American Administration can sustain the dialogue if terrorism continues by the PLO or any of its factions.
- * The PLO was required to publicly disassociate itself from terrorism by any Palestinian group operating anywhere;
- * The PLO was expected to condemn publicly any terrorist action carried out by any element of the PLO and also to discipline those responsible, at least by expelling them from the PLO.

Speaking at a sub-committee of the Senate Appropriations Committee on March 15, 1989, Secretary of State Baker said:

"...if the PLO resorted to terrorism, failed to keep their commitment to renounce terrorism, it would be an occasion for the United States to break off its dialogue."

Point by Point Review of the State Department Report

PLO Attacks on Civilian Targets Since the Geneva Declaration:

A. The State Department report notes "thirty border and rocket attacks by Palestinian groups against Israel, at least nine of which have involved constituent groups of the PLO."

The report completely neglects to cite the many terrorist attacks against civilians launched by Fatah cells within Israel's pre-1967 borders since the Geneva declaration. These attacks were planned and carried out by Fatah or the Fatah strike-organs, Western Sector or Force 17:

- 1) February 24, 1989 - Molotov cocktail thrown at private car near Nazareth by Force 17.
- 2) March 20, 1989 - Bomb placed at hospital bus station in Petah Tikva by Force 17.
- 3) March 21, 1989 - Bomb placed again at same location by Force 17.
- 4) March 23, 1989 - Molotov thrown at private automobile near Kibbutz Kfar Hakhoresh by Force 17.
- 5) March 29, 1989 - Handgrenade thrown at public bus on Nazareth - Afula road by Force 17.
- 6) March 31, 1989 - Bomb placed at entrance to Kfar Avraham synagogue by Force 17.
- 7) April 11, 1989 - Bomb placed in irrigation station near Afula by Fatah.
- 8) April 16, 1989 - Bomb placed next to apartment building in Pardes Katz by Force 17.
- 9) April 30, 1989 - Bomb placed on main thoroughfare of Ramat Gan by Force 17.
- 10) May 15, 1989 - Bomb placed in industrial zone near Petah Tikva by Force 17.
- 11) May 16, 1989 - Bomb placed in Liberty Bell Park, Jerusalem by Western Sector.
- 12) June 5, 1989 - Bomb placed in central Tel Aviv by Force 17.

In addition, tens of Fatah operatives were arrested prior to carrying out attacks. One was killed when his bomb exploded during preparations for an attack in Tel Aviv.

B. Of the thirty armed attacks by Palestinian groups, the State Department report says that, in most cases, the intended target was unclear. The report mentions only three cross-border attacks in which civilians appeared to be the intended target.

The report fails to cite the following five attempted terror attacks and katyusha shellings on Israeli border towns. In these cases, the attackers' objective was clearly civilian:

1) March 2, 1989 - Five DFLP (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine - headed by Naif Hawatmeh) men were intercepted by the IDF on their way to Zarit, a civilian farming village. Four of the men were killed in the clash and one escaped. The DFLP communique, released the same day to the Lebanese newspaper Al-Nahar, said: "The squad attacked positions of the occupying army in the settlement of Zarit which is located in occupied northern Palestine." The PLO systematically refers to civilian objectives as military targets.

2) October 6, 1989 - Infiltration attempt across Israel's northern border by the PLF (Palestine Liberation Front - headed by Abu al-Abbas). The PLO faction took responsibility for the attempted raid against Israeli kibbutz Misgav Am. Documents found with the terrorists declared the operation was intended to show that "the Palestinian fighter is capable of reaching into your own home."

3) January 26, 1990 - Infiltration attempt across Israel's northern border by the DFLP. The terror squad was on its way to attack the Israeli kibbutz Misgav Am, as proven by the map carried by the terrorists charting their route to the kibbutz. Moreover, the DFLP leadership proclaimed that Misgav Am was their intended target.

4) February 3, 1990 - Following the infiltration attempt by members of the Palestine Liberation Front (Abu al-Abbas faction) on the Lebanese border, the organization claimed responsibility for the intended attack into Israel's territory. In a radio broadcast, it was announced that the aim was to reach a civilian target.

5) March 16, 1990 - Three heavily-armed terrorists were intercepted while on their way to a raid into Israel. In an announcement claiming its responsibility for the infiltration attempt, the DFLP identified the intended target as the village of Zarit.

It should be noted that the PLF, DFLP, and PFLP are important PLO factions which accept Arafat's leadership of the PLO, and the decisions of the PNC ("Palestine National Council"), the supreme policy-making body of the PLO.

C. The State Department report says: "We have no evidence in those cases or any others that the actions were authorized or approved by the PLO Executive Committee or Arafat personally."

However, terror operations do not require a formal decision by Arafat or the PLO Executive Committee. The three organizational bodies within Fatah responsible for terror attacks (the Western Sector, Force 17, and the Hawari Apparatus) are headed by senior Fatah officials in Arafat's inner circle. These organizational bodies derive their authority from Arafat and Executive Committee backing.

In addition, Arafat himself currently commands Western Sector. Force 17 is headed by one of Arafat's closest associates, Abu Tayyeb.

From the policy statement issued to Ambassador Pelletreau in Tunis, it is clear that the U.S. Government regards Arafat as responsible for the actions of the PLO as a whole, including all of its member organizations and bodies.

Moreover, in refusing to grant a visa to Arafat (on November 26, 1988) the Department of State addressed Arafat's personal responsibility for the terrorist acts carried out by Fatah, and concluded that:

"...As Chairman of the PLO, Mr. Arafat is responsible for actions of these organizations (Force 17 and the Hawari Apparatus) which are units of Fatah, an element of the PLO, of which he also is chairman and which is under his control..."

D. The State Department report mentions the terrorist attack on an Israeli tourist bus in Egypt, concluding that the responsible groups were not PLO members.

The report conspicuously fails to note the absence of PLO condemnation of the attack as required by U.S. Government policy. Similarly, the report does not note the tidal wave of anti-PLO criticism that swept the Egyptian press following PLO failure to condemn the attack.

E. The State Department report addresses the issue of U.S. extradition requests for Muhammad Rashid and Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas), two PLO members involved in terrorist attacks in which American citizens were injured and killed.

Abu Abbas, PLF head and member of the PLO Executive Committee, was responsible for the attack on the Achille Lauro cruise ship in October 1985 in the course of which a U.S. citizen, Leon Klinghoffer, was murdered.

The State Department states that "there is no current U.S. extradition request for Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas) because there are no pending U.S. criminal charges against him."

Actually, a criminal charge was laid against him and the U.S. Government requested his extradition in October 1985. These were cancelled in November 1987, even though he had already been convicted by an Italian court.

Furthermore, one of the bases for the U.S. government determining that Arafat was sufficiently associated with terrorism to deny him a visa, was Abu Abbas' membership on the PLO Executive Committee.

The State Department report ignores these facts.

PLO and the Intifada

The State Department reports "an alarming increase in violence by Palestinians against other Palestinians." It does not weigh the role of the PLO, in the guise of the Unified Command, as a major killer of Palestinians.

No mention is made of Arafat's role in initiating the process of Palestinians killing Palestinians. In January 1989 he threatened Palestinians, such as Bethlehem mayor Elias Freij, with "ten bullets in the chest" for thinking of stopping the intifada (from a State Department recording, January 1989).

No mention is made of Arafat statements in which he takes direct responsibility for authorizing summary executions of Palestinians on a mass scale.

In the Jordanian newspaper Al-Rai (October 10, 1989), Arafat stated:

"...I gave them [the Unified Command in the Territories] the authority of the General Commander to sign the execution warrants, just as I granted this same authority to the regional commander in South Lebanon."

Similarly, in the Egyptian weekly, Al-Mussawar (January 25, 1990) he declared:

"The decision to impose death sentences must be made by the Unified Command unanimously... We tell them: If you can, send us the file, and we will examine it. In any case, if this is difficult, there is no choice but to send the files after the executions, so that they can be examined."

Abu Iyad (A.F.P., August 29, 1989) and Bassam Abu Sharif (BBC Arabic Service, September 19, 1989) also admitted large scale PLO involvement in the killings and justified them.

PLO Covenant

The State Department report contends that the PLO "is willing" to consider revision of its Covenant in the context of an overall peace agreement.

However, this is not supported by any official decision made by any constituent organ of the PLO, and in fact the Covenant has been neither cancelled nor amended. Moreover, as Arafat himself explained (in a May 3, 1989 interview on Radio Europe, according to A.P.), only the PNC is authorized to do this. Significantly, he has never raised the issue of amending or cancelling the Covenant before this forum of the PLO.

Even though the U.S. has not explicitly demanded that the PLO cancel its Covenant it is clear that the Covenant constitutes a fundamental contradiction to the whole thrust of Arafat's Geneva statement, and its remaining in force is an ongoing violation of the U.S. condition that the PLO recognize Israel's right to exist.

PLO Statements

The State Department report emphasizes statements by key PLO leaders made in the Western press for European and American ears, while ignoring emphatic statements to the contrary made by these same people for domestic consumption in the Arabic press. As such, the report puts forward a skewed perception in which men like Abu Iyad and Naif Hawatmeh are made out as moderates.

PLO Statements on Terrorism

The report quotes PLO leaders selectively and does not present a true picture of their stated opinions.

On page 8 the report cites Naif Hawatmeh as opposing attacks on civilian targets. But other readily available Hawatmeh quotes that convey the contrary message do not appear. For example, on March 2, 1989 Hawatmeh spoke to a Reuter correspondent in Damascus following an attempted DFLP raid on the farming village Zarit. He vowed to mount more attacks against Israel.

The State Department report makes no reference to the Hawatmeh statement even though it was published by a major news wire service.

Yasser Arafat's encouragement of terrorism found recent expression in his exhortations to shoot new immigrants (Al-Moharer , April 10, 1990). The article appeared after the State Department report was issued. The Paris-based weekly reported on a meeting between Arafat and Western Sector staff in which Arafat ordered Western Sector to open fire on Jewish immigrants to Israel. The Al-Moharer report provides a rare glimpse at the discreet but close coordination between Arafat and Fatah bodies responsible for planning terror attacks.

PLO Statements on the Strategy of Phases

The report quotes Salah Khalaf's (Abu Iyad) article in the Spring 1990 issue of Foreign Policy , in which he endorses a two-state solution. But no mention is made of the following statements by Abu Iyad to the Kuwaiti Arabic-language press:

"At first a small state, and with the help of Allah, it will be made large, and expand to the east, west, north, and south.... I am interested in the liberation of Palestine, step by step."

Al-Anba (December 18, 1988).

"There was no PLO recognition of Israel, neither in the PNC [Palestine National Council] decisions in Algiers nor in Arafat's address to the UN in Geneva."

Al-Watan (February 11, 1989)

Similarly, the report quotes Nabil Sha'ath as a model of moderation. But the report does not cite the following statement made by Sha'ath in the Arabic press:

"Unlike Arafat... the concessions given by Sadat were not rhetorical but were actual. The strategic situation is crystal clear. I want to liberate a part of the Arab soil and that cannot be achieved by war...we shall then have to liberate the rest."

Al-Anba (February 28, 1989)

The report leaves the mistaken impression that only George Habash (page 10) sees a West Bank state as a stepping stone to a larger Palestinian state in place of Israel . In fact, almost all prominent PLO leaders, including Yasser Arafat, have expressed themselves in this vein.

Conclusion

The PLO has not lived up to commitments made by Arafat in Geneva in December 1988. The State Department report's conclusion "that the PLO has adhered to its commitments" is not supported by the evidence.

The State Department report contains factual inaccuracies. Numerous terror attacks from across Israel's borders as well as inside Israel are not recorded in the report.

Quotations from PLO leaders are presented selectively. The radical statements made by these same personalities in the Arab press do not appear in the report.

The State Department report does not adequately address the pervasive PLO involvement in Palestinian violence against other Palestinians in the occupied territories.

The PLO has never disassociated itself from terror attacks or disciplined its members that were involved. The State Department report broaches this topic only in the most cursory manner.

The State Department report sums up:

"The policy of this Administration is to measure PLO actions and statements against the commitments the PLO undertook in December 1988."

A full review of the facts shows that the PLO has not stood by its commitments, by any standard.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM



משרד החוץ
ירושלים

THE PLO: HAS IT COMPLIED WITH ITS COMMITMENTS?

May 1990



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Nearly a year and a half has passed since Arafat's remarks at a press conference in Geneva (December 14, 1988), during which he supposedly renounced terror and recognized Israel's right to exist. His statements became the basis for the U.S. decision to begin a dialogue with the PLO.

On March 19, 1990, pursuant to a law passed by Congress ("The PLO Commitments Compliance Act of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act"), the U.S. State Department submitted to Congress a report which largely dealt with PLO activities and statements since December 1988. The report, however, did not adequately address the PLO's blatant and severe violations of its commitments to the United States. In the ten areas stipulated in the U.S. law, the PLO clearly maintains its fundamental line of terrorism and rejection of Israel's right to exist.

- 1) PLO statements and actions continue to pursue a course of terrorism and the rejection of Israel's legitimate existence. (pp. —)
- 2) PLO terrorists have not been penalized for their actions during the past months, and the PLO continues to advocate the "armed struggle." (pp.)
- 3) The PLO Covenant stands as the ideological credo of the PLO, and the statements of PLO leaders point out that no attempt has been made by the PNC to repeal the Covenant or change any of its provisions advocating the elimination of Israel. (pp.)
- 4) The PLO's "Phased Plan" remains the key PLO strategy for implementing its Covenant, and PLO leaders reaffirm that the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories would be just a prelude to expanding such a state in "all of Palestine". (pp.)
- 5) The PLO has not only refrained from encouraging the Arab states to recognize and negotiate directly with Israel, but has tried to intensify the confrontation of the Arab states with Israel, and even draw them into war. (pp.)
- 6) The PLO terror units have been reorganized and strengthened. (pp.)
- 7) All of the PLO factions which participated in the November 1988 PNC have engaged in infiltration attempts since December 1988, and Arafat, instead of trying to halt the terror operations, has endorsed them. (pp.)
- 8) The PLO has called for escalating the violence of the intifada, and has been responsible for the murder of scores of Palestinian Arabs. (pp.)

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- 9) The PLO has opposed the extradition and prosecution of PLO terrorists wanted for attacks abroad. (pp.)
- 10) The PLO has refused to acknowledge its responsibility for PLO terrorism, and has not compensated American victims. (pp.)

The PLO's recent campaign against Jewish immigration to Israel (pp.) and the PLO's alignment with Libya and Iraq (pp.) are also indicative of the PLO's true nature.



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I. INTRODUCTION

At a press conference in Geneva on December 14, 1988, Yasser Arafat made a statement which supposedly met U.S. conditions for initiating a dialogue with the PLO. Among those conditions were the renunciation of terror and recognition of Israel's right to exist.

On December 15, 1988, the United States began contacts with the PLO. At the first U.S.-PLO meeting, the U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia made the U.S. requirements for maintaining the dialogue eminently clear to the PLO:

- * No American Administration could sustain the dialogue if terrorism by the PLO or any of its factions continued;
- * The PLO must publicly disassociate itself from terrorism by any Palestinian group operating anywhere;
- * The PLO was expected to discipline those of its elements responsible for terrorism -- at least by expelling them from the PLO.

The U.S. policy, first enunciated by the Reagan Administration, also found expression in the early months of the Bush Administration. Speaking at a sub-committee of the Senate Appropriations Committee on March 15, 1989, Secretary of State Baker said that the U.S. would have to take a second look at the dialogue and would have serious questions about continuing the dialogue if there was a "resort to terrorism by Arafat and the elements of the PLO which he controls or has the ability to control." Secretary Baker stated, "if the PLO resorted to terrorism, failed to keep their commitment to renounce terrorism, it would be an occasion for the United States to break off its dialogue."

However, subsequent events and PLO statements clearly show that the PLO has violated the commitments it was said to have made. The PLO continues to advocate and carry out acts of terrorism. The PLO continues to seek the elimination of Israel, and in its statements, almost all of them in Arabic, the PLO does not hesitate to say that a Palestinian state would be the instrument for achieving that objective.

On March 19, as required by U.S. law (The PLO Commitments Compliance Act of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act), the U.S. State Department submitted to Congress its report which largely dealt with PLO activities and statements.

The State Department report does take notice of "thirty border and rocket attacks by Palestinian groups against Israel," the "alarming increase in violence by Palestinians against other Palestinians," and "numerous examples of contradictory and ambiguous statements by leading PLO officials and constituent groups." However, the report's observations does not adequately address the PLO's blatant and severe violations of its commitments to the United States.



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In recent weeks, the PLO has engaged in an intense campaign, together with the Arab world, against Jewish immigration. Moreover, Arafat has aligned the PLO with the threatening policies of Libya and Iraq. Once again, the PLO is proving that, regardless of what it says in the West, it is an enemy of peace and stability in the Middle East.



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II. PLO STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS

Both in word and deed, the PLO continues to practice and preach terrorism and violence, and seeks to undermine Israel's existence.

Terrorism and Violence

Since Arafat's December 1988 statement, and by early May 1990, no less than 22 infiltration attempts were launched by various PLO factions which had participated in the deliberations of the PNC (the PLO's "Palestine National Council") in November 1988 and had accepted the PNC's decisions. In most cases, the PLO squads, intercepted by the Israel Defense Forces before reaching their targets, were clearly planning to carry out wholesale massacres of innocent civilians. Among the attempted raids was one carried out in Israel's south on December 5, 1989 by a squad belonging to Arafat's FATAH.

Since the adoption of the PLO Covenant, "armed struggle" has been the term used by the PLO to characterize terrorist attacks on innocent civilians. Not only did Arafat say on Austrian television on December 19, 1988, just five days after speaking in Geneva, that he "did not mean to renounce" terrorism, but he and other leading figures in the PLO have on numerous occasions stated that the "armed struggle" has not ended. Only a little over a week after Arafat's Geneva press conference, Salim Zaanoun, Deputy PNC Chairman and member of the FATAH Central Committee said, "The armed struggle must continue, everywhere, against the Zionist enemy and his allies... We have no alternative but to carry out armed activity in order to vanquish the enemy and establish our state" (Al-Anba, Kuwait, December 23, 1988).

Arafat openly contradicted his December 1988 statement "renouncing" terrorism, when on June 6, 1989, at a press conference in Kuwait, he said, "The PLO will not stop the armed struggle" (Associated Press). Arafat told the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Anba on February 12, 1990, that that PLO has not given up the rifle, and that he remains the General Commander of PLO forces.

Arafat's Number Two, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), said on March 28, 1989 (Akhbar Al-Khaleej, Bahrain), "The PLO has no intention of ending the armed struggle." Hani al-Hassan, one of Arafat's closest advisors, told the Qatar newspaper Al-Rayah on January 13, 1990, "The Palestinian armed struggle has not come to an end...."

On August 8, 1989, at the meeting of Arafat's FATAH in Tunis, a resolution was adopted calling for the "continuation, intensification and escalation of the armed struggle in order to liquidate the Zionist occupation of our Palestinian land." On January 31, 1990, the PLO Executive Committee, convening in Tunis, called for a continuation of the armed struggle.

The PLO's supposed renunciation of terrorism is also contradicted by its continuing encouragement of terror and the threats it continues to make. Arafat's Number Two, Salah Khalaf, said on January 22, 1990 (Associated Press), "The Middle East peace efforts have reached a stalemate.... The PLO now has no alternative but to escalate armed struggle outside the occupied territories in support of the uprising."



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Following the gun-and-grenade attack on Israeli tourists in Egypt on February 4, 1990, Salah Khalaf told the Algerian daily Al Sha'ab that if the Israeli mentality is maintained, "they must expect similar operations (in the future)" (Reuter, February 8, 1990).

The PLO has also openly backed PLO terrorism against Palestinian Arabs. PLO death squads have been responsible for many of the murders of Palestinian Arabs since the intifada began, and Arafat himself has openly justified and taken responsibility for ordering such killings.

Rejecting the Existence of Israel

Numerous statements made in past months by leading figures of the PLO have indicated that the PLO has not abandoned its goal of destroying Israel. The PLO insists that the establishment of an independent Palestinian state is the opening move in a strategy for taking over "all of Palestine." Arafat himself recently made this clearly when he said "The Palestinian people's struggle will continue until the complete liberation of the Palestinian land. ...The Palestinian people's struggle ought to be assisted until the complete liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea. ...We will fight until the last bullet, until the last drop of blood, and until the last stone in our land" (May 1, 1990, Libyan News Agency, also quoted by Agence France Presse).

On February 11, 1989, Salah Khalaf said, "There was no PLO recognition of Israel, neither in the PNC [Palestine National Council] decisions in Algiers nor in Arafat's address to the UN in Geneva" (Al-Watan, Kuwait). Sheikh Abd Al-Hamid Al-Sayeh, (Chairman of the PNC, said in January 1989 (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Saudi Arabian newspaper published in London, January 13, 1989), "If you read the political statement [of the Algiers PNC] carefully, you will find that what some term recognition of the Zionist entity is untrue."

PLO statements are replete with references to the PLO's "Phased Plan", the program for liquidating Israel in stages. Another indication of PLO intentions is its demands concerning the "right of return", a code for overwhelming Israel with millions of hostile Palestinian refugees opposed to its very existence. Arafat himself has indicated on more than one occasion that the "right of return" is a PLO precondition. On January 13, 1989, Arafat said, "The Palestinian uprising will in no way end until the attainment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return..." (Qatar News Agency). On December 9, 1989, he said on PLO Radio from Baghdad, "There will be no peace other than through realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, first and foremost -- the right of return, self-determination, and establishment of a Palestinian state, with its capital in Jerusalem."

Rafik Al-Natshe, member of the FATAH Central Committee, explained the PLO's interpretation of the "right of return" when he said in Arafat's presence in Riyadh on January 1, 1989 -- at a commemoration of the 24th anniversary of the beginning of FATAH activities against Israel: "Our return to Palestine and our victory will be possible only with



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Allah's help and with our return to Faluja, Jaffa, and Haifa" (Saudi News Agency, January 2, 1989). Sheikh Abd Al-Hamid Al-Sayeh, PNC Chairman, said on January 29, 1989, "The PLO is following the path which it must pursue until the return [of Palestinian refugees] is achieved.... We want the whole of Palestine" (Okaz, Saudi Arabia).

The fact that the PLO Covenant, which calls for Israel's destruction, has not been abrogated or even revised provides additional evidence regarding PLO intentions. Arafat's FATAH echoed the Covenant's denial of Israel's legality, when the FATAH conference in August 1989 declared:

"The Zionist conquest came at the beginning of this century to uproot the Palestinian people, end their civilization, and implant a Zionist entity.... The Palestinian people have held out in the face of this Zionist-colonialist barbarism.... The crime was consummated by the partition of Palestine and the establishment of the Zionist entity state in 1948."

The PLO's continued rejection of Israel's right to exist is also embodied in its vociferous campaign against Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel. The PLO opposition to Jewish immigration to Israel is total, regardless of boundaries, and is aimed at depriving Israel of its very *raison d'être* as the home for the Jewish people. While the PLO has, as in other cases, camouflaged its intentions when speaking to Western audiences, the real PLO position on the issue of Jewish immigration is exposed by such PLO spokesmen as Muhammad Daoud Odeh and Mahmoud Abbas.

Muhammad Daoud Odeh (Abu Daoud), Member of the FATAH Revolutionary Council and Member of the PLO's PNC, told the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Qabas on April 23, 1990 that steps must be taken against Jewish immigration since its cessation would lead to the extinction of the Zionist state, i.e. Israel. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Maazen) told the Saudi London-based newspaper Al-Majallah (March 13, 1990) that had the Jews from the Arab countries not emigrated to Israel, leaving the Jewish state with a small population since 1948, Israel would not have lasted: "The immigration for Israel is like an important artery connected to a man's heart, and it nourishes Israel in its economy, soldiers, workers and farmers. Therefore, we consider the immigration to be the most important challenge facing the Arab Nation, without relating to its approach and origin."

PLO aims, vis-a-vis Israel, are also evident in the PLO's desire for coordination with the extremist Islamic fundamentalist organization, HAMAS, also operating against Israelis and Palestinian Arabs in the territories. On PLO Radio, broadcasting from Baghdad on February 13, 1990, Arafat sent a message calling for strengthened unification with various extremist Palestinian factions, including HAMAS and the "Islamic Jihad" (the "Islamic Jihad" claimed responsibility for the February 14 terror attack on Israeli tourists in Egypt).

In calling for cooperation with HAMAS, the PLO explains that, notwithstanding tactical differences, both organizations share the same ultimate objective. Thus, one of Arafat's closest advisors, Hani



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al-Hassan, declared, "the disagreement between the PLO and HAMAS is not ideological" (Al-Rayah, Qatar, January 13, 1990). Rafik al-Natshe, a member of the FATAH Central Committee, told the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Qabas in an interview on December 26, 1989, "[HAMAS says] All of Palestine is ours and we want to liberate it from the river to the sea at one go. But FATAH, which leads the PLO, feels that a phased plan must be pursued. Both sides agree on the final objective. The difference between them is the way there."



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PLO Leaders on Terrorism and "Armed Struggle"

Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO:

Q: "Mr. Arafat, last week at this famous press conference you renounced terrorism. Have you done this due to American pressure?"

A: "I did not mean to renounce.... Actually, I only repeated what our Palestine National Council had accepted.... I am still now committed to what I said in Cairo in 1985."

(December 19, 1988, Interview with Viennese TV)

Note : While proscribing terror operations outside of Israel, Arafat's Cairo Declaration of November 1985 said that the PLO would continue to carry out operations inside Israel and the territories. The FATAH, as well as other PLO factions, violated this PLO commitment to abstain from terrorism abroad: one major acts of international terrorism was the April 1986 bombing of a TWA flight over Greece, carried out by the "Hawari Apparatus" of the FATAH.

"The PLO will not stop the armed struggle. I did not ask anybody to refrain from military operations."

(June 6, 1989, Speaking at a press conference in Kuwait, Associated Press)

Note: The PLO has on numerous occasions referred to attacks on innocent civilians as "military operations" against "military targets." This was seen, for example, when FATAH/Arafat terrorists seized a bus on the Beersheba-Dimona highway on March 7, 1988, killing three civilians, including two women.

Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Second to Arafat:

"We must concentrate all our thoughts and our plans in order that the 'Palestinian Rifle' will continue and escalate to a greater intensity than ever before ..."

(December 16, 1988, Al-Qabas, Kuwait)

"We have never interpreted [renunciation of] terror as meaning a suspension of military operations."

(March 4, 1989, Radio Monte Carlo)

"The PLO did not agree with the U.S. that the definition of terrorism includes the armed struggle.... The PLO has no intention of ending the armed struggle."

(March 28, 1989, Akhbar Al-Khaleej, Bahrain)

"The PLO adheres to the principle of armed struggle, but its scope is to be determined in accordance with the political circumstances."

(April 17, 1989, Al Ousboa Al Arabi, Lebanon)

"The Middle East peace efforts have reached a stalemate.... The PLO now has no alternative but to escalate armed struggle outside the occupied territories in support of the uprising."

(January 22, 1990, Associated Press)



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Farouk Kaddoumi, Head of the PLO's Political Department in charge of the PLO's foreign affairs:

"The rifle is one of the principal and necessary tools of our struggle in the past and in the future... We change our methods in every phase of our national struggle. However, the rifle will remain in our hands until we regain our land... We will pitch our tent in those places which our bullets can reach. The extent of the Palestinian People's might will determine the location of this tent, which will then form the base from which we will later pursue the next phase."

(April 4, 1989, Interview with the BBC Arabic Service)

Q: "Arafat has renounced terrorism in Geneva .."

A: "That is a misrepresentation of Chairman Arafat's statements. ... We denounce terrorism, especially the state terrorism by Israel."

Q: "Does that mean that the words that made Shultz begin a dialogue are null and void?"

A: "Shultz can go to hell. I suppose he is already on his way there."

(May 18, 1989, Interview with Politiken, Denmark)

Hani Al-Hassan, Senior Arafat Advisor and Member of the FATAH Central Committee:

"The Palestinian armed struggle has not come to an end and the PLO will not abandon the uprising in the occupied land."

(January 13, 1990, Al-Rayah, Qatar)

Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Maazen), Member of the PLO Executive Committee and Member of the FATAH Central Committee:

"The words 'renewing the armed struggle' leave the impression that we decided to end it -- something that is not true."

(March 4, 1990, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Saudi newspaper published in London)

"The peace policy is one thing and the armed struggle another. I want to state and emphasize that we never declared a freeze on the armed struggle and its cessation. That is a big lie and I do not know who is spreading it."

(March 13, 1990, Al-Majallah, Saudi newspaper published in London)



Rafik Al-Natshe, Member of the FATAH Central Committee and PLO Representative in Saudi Arabia:

"There is nothing, beyond the borders of the uprising and beyond the places where the masses are concentrated, to prevent the use of the armed struggle and attacks on Israeli military targets. I include myself among those who believe that weapons must not be used in the uprising, but when Arab land neighboring Palestine is found, through which the Palestinian and Arab leadership will be able to mobilize the military resources of the Palestinian people, then the use of weapons will be natural.

(March 23, 1990, Al-Hawadath, Lebanese newspaper published in London)

Nabil Sha'ath, Senior Political Advisor to Arafat and Chairman of the PNC Political Committee:

"The Palestinian side did not and never will accept any decision to end the armed struggle."

(January 9, 1990, Al Sha'ab, Egypt)

Salim Zaanoun, Deputy PNC Chairman and FATAH Central Committee Member:

"The armed struggle must continue, everywhere, against the Zionist enemy and his allies... We have no alternative but to carry out armed activity in order to vanquish the enemy and establish our state."

(December 23, 1988, Al-Anba, Kuwait)

Muhammad Daoud Odeh (Abu Daoud), Member of the FATAH Revolutionary Council and Member of the PLO's PNC:

"Israel is an imperialist entity. ...We must intensify the attacks and the blows from all sides.In my view, all the Arab fronts surrounding the occupied land are fronts that are open to us, whether they like it or not. ...Even were there to be an Arab state whose border stretches for just two kilometers with the Palestinian land, we would use that border to maintain the armed struggle through it."

(April 23, 1990, the international edition of Al-Qabas, Kuwaiti newspaper)

Naif Hawatmeh, leader of the DFLP ("Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine"), the PLO's third largest faction:

"We have recently launched a series of attacks against Israel and will launch more. Such attacks are a sacred right for our people."

(May 21, 1989, speaking in Abu Dhabi, quoted by Reuter)



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Yasser Abd Rabbo, Deputy Secretary-General of the DFLP and Head of the PLO delegation to the U.S.-PLO talks in Tunis:

"In not a single meeting with the Americans did the PLO promise to adhere to a halt in military operations against Israeli military targets.... The PLO, while expressing its opposition to terrorism, feels that the struggle by all its various methods against the Israeli occupation is not considered to be terrorism."
(June 12, 1989, Middle East News Agency)



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PLO Leaders On Recognition of Israel

Yasser Arafat, PLO Chairman:

"The land of Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinians, and the homeland of the Arab nation from the Ocean to the Gulf. ...The PLO offers not the peace of the weak, but the peace of Saladin."
(January 2, 1989, Saudi News Agency)

Note: In 1192, Saladin concluded a peace treaty with the Crusaders. Soon thereafter, the Moslems attacked the Crusaders and drove them out of the Holy Land.

"The Palestinian uprising will in no way end until the attainment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return...."
(January 13, 1989, Qatar News Agency).

"There will be no peace other than through realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, first and foremost -- the right of return, self-determination, and establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem."
(December 9, 1989, PLO Radio in Baghdad)

"The Palestinian people's struggle will continue until the complete liberation of the Palestinian land. ...The Palestinian people's struggle ought to be assisted until the complete liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea. ...We will fight until the last bullet, until the last drop of blood, and until the last stone in our land."
(May 1, 1990, Libyan News Agency, also quoted by Agence France Presse)

Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Second to Arafat:

"There was no PLO recognition of Israel, neither in the PNC [Palestine National Council] decisions in Algiers nor in Arafat's address to the UN in Geneva."
(February 11, 1989, Al-Watan, Kuwait)

Sheikh Abd Al-Hamid Al-Sayeh, Chairman of the PNC:

"All Palestinian elements and citizens, regardless of their inclinations, must direct their power against the enemy. And when we get rid of him, the Palestinian will then be able to exercise his right to self-determination.

"If you read the political statement [of the Algiers PNC] carefully, you will find that what some term recognition of the Zionist entity is untrue.... Anyone who says that the decisions we made in Algiers contain recognition of Resolutions 181, 242, and 338 is not right and I urge him to read the clause again."
(January 13, 1989, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Saudi newspaper published in London)



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Sheikh Abd Al-Hamid Al-Sayeh (cont.):

"The PLO is following the path which it must pursue until the return [of Palestinian refugees] is achieved.... We want the whole of Palestine."

(Okaz, Saudi Arabia, January 29, 1989).

Hani Al-Hassan, Senior Arafat Advisor and Member of the FATAH Central Committee:

"The disagreement between the PLO and HAMAS is not ideological, but is centered on the manner in which the conflict with the enemy will be conducted."

(January 13, 1990, Al-Rayah, Qatar)

Rafik Al-Natshe, Member of the FATAH Central Committee and PLO Representative in Saudi Arabia:

"Our return to Palestine and our victory will be possible only with Allah's help and with our return to Faluja, Jaffa, and Haifa."

(January 2, 1989, Saudi News Agency)

"[HAMAS says] All of Palestine is ours and we want to liberate it from the river to the sea at one go. But FATAH, which leads the PLO, feels that a phased plan must be pursued. Both sides agree on the final objective. The difference between them is the way there."

(December 26, 1989, Al-Qabas, Kuwait)

Muhammad Daoud Odeh (Abu Daoud), Member of the FATAH Revolutionary Council and Member of the PLO's PNC:

"Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union to occupied Palestine is part of the Zionist philosophy, for Zionism exists at its foundation upon immigration. Zionism is not feasible without immigration, and similarly a Zionist state in Palestine is not feasible without immigration. When immigration will cease, the 'state' will begin a process of disintegration and extinction. ...We must take steps against the immigration; moreover, steps must be taken against every immigrant, everyone who takes in the immigrants, every financier, everyone who helps, and every one through whom or through whose airlines assists in transporting the immigrants."

(April 23, 1990, the international edition of Al-Qabas, Kuwaiti newspaper)



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Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Maazen), Member of the PLO Executive Committee and Member of the FATAH Central Committee:

"In order to understand the danger in this immigration, we must remember that when Israel conquered 78 percent of Palestine, the number of its residents was 600,000, and therefore immigration activities began from Iraq, Yemen, Egypt, and Morocco to close this gap. I am sure that had the number remained as it was in the past, Israel would not have been able to last until now. The immigration for Israel is like an important artery connected to man's heart, and it nourishes Israel in its economy, soldiers, workers and farmers. Therefore, we consider the immigration to be the most important challenge facing the Arab Nation, without relating to its approach and origin."

(March 13, 1990, Al-Majallah, Saudi newspaper published in London)

Zayid Wahbe, FATAH representative in Lebanon:

"When we call for the establishment of a Palestinian state on any part of the land of Palestine -- that does not mean that we have relinquished our historic rights in Palestine. ...If the state will be established in the areas I have indicated [the West Bank and Gaza], and I am a native of the village of Sasa in the Galilee, I will see this as a victory in Safed, Haifa, and Jaffa. My return to my village in the Galilee will draw nearer."

(January 17, 1989, As-Safir, Lebanon)

Muhammad Abbas (Abu Al-Abbas), PLO Executive Committee Member and leader of a faction in the PLF ("Palestine Liberation Front"):

"We certainly consider the land occupied since 1948 a major part of the struggle arena...."

(March 1-7, 1989, Al-Majallah, Saudi newspaper published in London)

George Habash, Leader of the PFLP ("Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine"), the PLO's second largest faction:

"The decisions of the PNC did not mention in any manner whatsoever the recognition of Israel and did not mention in any manner whatsoever the recognition of Israel's right to exist. Please read the leaflets of the uprising which have not stated or recognized that Israel has a right to exist.... We did not recognize Israel."

(April 9, 1989, from a speech in Dubai, PFLP's Al-Hadaf)



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III. NON-PENALIZATION OF TERRORISM

At the outset of the U.S.-PLO dialogue, the United States made clear to the PLO that no American Administration could sustain the dialogue if terrorism by the PLO or any of its factions continued. Indeed, the United States insisted that one of the conditions for maintaining the dialogue would be PLO penalization, at the very least expulsion, of any of its elements engaged in terrorism.

In its book, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988 (published in March 1989), the State Department defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience." Attempted attacks on a kibbutz or bombs planted at bus stops, synagogues, and in parks certainly meet this definition, even if the attack is thwarted in time.

Nevertheless, the PLO refuses to consider the attacks it launches against innocent civilians to be acts of terrorism. Instead, it chooses to use such euphemisms as "armed struggle" and "military operations/target" to characterize its activities. Little wonder, therefore, that the PLO has, since December 1988, been denying that it promised the United States an end to such violence. Certainly, the PLO has taken no action to penalize any of its constituent groups engaged in terrorism.

The stark contrast between the U.S. and the PLO's view of terrorism was evident when on July 6, 1989 a passenger bus was forced off a cliff into a ravine along the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway. The U.S. State Department called that act -- which claimed 16 innocent lives, including an American citizen, and injured 25 passengers, some critically -- an act of terrorism. Leading PLO figures, however, as well as Wafa, the PLO's news agency, did not hesitate to express their support for the act. Bassam Abu Sharif, Advisor to Arafat, said, "This is not terrorism" (July 6, 1989, Radio Monte Carlo), while Wafa termed it "a heroic prelude to a popular revolution" (Associated Press, July 8, 1989).

When asked by a Danish reporter (Politiken, May 18, 1989) about Arafat's renunciation of terrorism in Geneva, Farouk Kaddoumi, in charge of the PLO's foreign affairs, called that assertion "a misrepresentation of Chairman Arafat's statements." Kaddoumi said, "Shultz can go to hell" in answer to a question as to whether Arafat's words that made Secretary of State Shultz begin a dialogue are null and void.

Arafat's Number Two, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), said on March 28, 1989 (Akhbar Al-Khaleej, Bahrain), "The PLO did not agree with the U.S. that the definition of terrorism includes the armed struggle. On February 5, 1990, Salah Khalaf told the Lebanese newspaper Tadamon, "We did not promise the Americans or others to stop the armed struggle, but we decided, in accordance with our wishes, to reduce the scope of the armed actions so that the uprising will be the dominant phenomenon in the eyes of the world." In that same interview Salah Khalaf also added that alongside the intifada, armed actions would be



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carried out to fulfill the national objectives of the Palestinians. He talked about "escalating the armed struggle far from the areas in which the uprising is taking place, a symbiotic relationship existing between them."

Yasser Abd Rabbo, Deputy Secretary-General of the DFLP and Head of the PLO delegation to the U.S.-PLO talks in Tunis said on June 12, 1989, "In not a single meeting with the Americans did the PLO promise to adhere to a halt in military operations against Israeli military targets.... The PLO, while expressing its opposition to terrorism, feels that the struggle by all its various methods against the Israeli occupation is not considered to be terrorism" (Middle East News Agency). Radio Monte Carlo reported on February 15, 1989 that Abdallah Hourani, member of the PLO Executive Committee and a member of the PLO delegation to the first talks with the United States, "stressed that the PLO intends to resume its operations against Israel even if these operations arouse U.S. doubts about the PLO's desire for peace... The U.S. remarks which cast doubt on the PLO's credibility and desire for peace, will not make the PLO change its policy toward armed struggle."

Instead of penalizing terrorism, Arafat praises it. Following an attempted terror attack (June 4, 1989) on Kibbutz Misgav Am by a DFLP squad, the Gulf News Agency reported that at a press conference on June 6 in Kuwait, "The PLO Chairman praised the participation of Kuwaiti martyr Fawzi Abd Al Rasul Al Majadi in Sunday's commando raid on Israeli targets in occupied Palestine, saying Fawzi's blood has mixed with that of the two Palestinian martyrs, who died with him in the operation." Early in 1989, Arafat's colleague in the FATAH, Farouk Kaddoumi, said, "The PLO is not prepared to condemn operations which any Palestinian organization or faction undertakes" (Reuter, February 28, 1989).

The PLO factions responsible for attempted terror incursions continue to have a free hand, and no PLO individual or group has been taken to task. Individual PLO terrorists who managed to flee when their squad was intercepted by the Israel Defense Forces have not been punished for their part in attempted raids. On April 21, 1989, Reuter in Damascus was informed by Naif Hawatmeh, the leader of the "Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine" (DFLP) that PLO leaders had met in Tunis and had agreed to coordinate future raids against Israel: "The agreement was endorsed with the presence of all factions of the PLO including FATAH." The twelve infiltration attempts since Hawatmeh's interview attest to the continued adherence to terrorism by all PLO factions, including Arafat's own FATAH.



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IV. ADHERENCE TO THE PLO COVENANT

"The PLO Covenant is the basis of the political and military activity of the PLO." (Al-Watan, Kuwait, January 8, 1989)

The above statement, made by Rafik Al-Natshe, member of the FATAH Central Committee, encapsulates the centrality of the PLO Covenant in PLO doctrine.

The PLO Covenant, with its provisions that call for Israel's elimination, provides that organization with its credo and raison d'être. The articles of the PLO Covenant advocating Israel's elimination include inter alia:

- Article 15 -- "The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national duty and it attempts to repel the Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland, and aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine. Absolute responsibility for this falls upon the Arab nation -- peoples and governments -- with the Arab people of Palestine in the vanguard...."
- Article 19 -- "The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the State of Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time...."
- Article 20 -- "Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history and the true conception of what constitutes statehood. Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own; they are citizens of the states to which they belong."
- Article 21 -- "The Arab Palestinian people, expressing themselves by the armed Palestinian revolution, reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine...."
- Article 22 -- "Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement, and a geographical base for world imperialism placed strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland to combat the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity and progress. ...the liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist and imperialist presence...."
- Article 29 -- "The Palestinian people possess the fundamental and genuine legal right to liberate and retrieve their homeland...."

PLO terrorism (the "armed struggle") is also an integral element of the Covenant as seen in such articles as:

- Article 9 -- "Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it...."
- Article 10 -- "Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This requires its escalation, comprehensiveness and mobilization of all the



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Palestinian popular and education efforts and their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution...."

The PLO has taken no steps to revise, let alone repeal, its Covenant. Only a 2/3 majority of the PNC can make any revisions in the Covenant, and the PNC has not done this.

On June 1, 1989, Salah Khalaf, Arafat's Number Two, told the Kuwaiti daily Al-Seyassah, "Neither Arafat, Salah Khalaf nor any other leader can cancel the Covenant because it belongs to the PNC." As for repealing a particular provision, Salah Khalaf told the Saudi daily Okaz on January 23, 1989, "We in the PLO do not accept the removal of Article 19 from our Covenant."

Arafat's vague "caduc" phraseology in Paris in May 1989 did not constitute a change in the PLO Covenant. Arafat's colleagues in the PLO stressed, as did Arafat himself, that "caduc" has several meanings and that Arafat does not have the authority to abrogate the Covenant.



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PL0 Leaders on the Covenant

Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO:

Q: "You said in French that the Covenant is 'caduc', that is to say nullified --"

Arafat: "That is your translation. Would it make sense for me to teach you how to translate?"

Q: "Let's say that it has expired [Arabic: Faata 'alaihi al-zaman]-- "

Arafat: "It has aged [Arabic: Taqaadamat]."

Q: "Fine, the translation is: 'It has aged'?"

Arafat: "The term 'Taqaadamat' appears in many verses in the Koran with regard to other [earlier] verses. Does this mean that these other verses were nullified? No."

(May 3, 1989, Interview with Radio Monte Carlo)

Q: "Why don't you say [that the Covenant is] 'Abrogated'?"

Arafat: "It is not up to me to say that. It is a decision that must come from the Palestine National Council."

(May 3, 1989, Interview with French Radio 'Europe 1', quoted by Associated Press)

"[The term Caduc] was legally the most appropriate description of the current state of this fundamental document.... One of [my] advisors had suggested using the word 'obsolete'. I said no, 'obsolete' is not the right term."

(May 5, 1989, Interview with Agence France Presse)

Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Second to Arafat:

"We in the PLO do not accept the removal of Article 19 from our Covenant."

(January 23, 1989, Okaz, Saudi Arabia)

"Arafat used the French term 'Caduc' at the proper time and in the proper meaning.... As for the abolition of the Covenant, it was not abolished, since only the PNC is empowered to do so.... Arafat did not concede anything to Mitterrand."

(May 29, 1989, Interview with Lebanese newspaper Tadamon, published in London)

"Neither Arafat, Salah Khalaf, nor any other leader can cancel the Covenant because it belongs to the PNC. All the Americans and Israelis who demanded the revocation of the Covenant are trying to escape from the peace initiative."

(June 1, 1989, Al-Seyassah, Kuwait)



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Nabil Sha'ath, Senior Political Advisor to Arafat and Chairman of the PNC Political Committee:

"Arafat did not give up the Covenant. However, its first five articles have become aged.... All Arafat did was to clarify to the Europeans this lack of clarity.... Arafat hasn't the authority to nullify the Covenant, and he did not declare that he had nullified it."

(May 15, 1989, Rose El Youssef, Egypt)

Rafik Al-Natshe, Member of the FATAH Central Committee and PLO Representative to Saudi Arabia:

"The PLO Covenant is the basis of the political and military activity of the PLO."

(January 8, 1989, Al-Watan, Kuwait)

Hakkam Balawi, PLO Representative to the PLO - U.S. Dialogue:

"Yasser Arafat's use of the term 'Caduc' in describing the PLO Covenant doesn't at all mean that the Covenant has been nullified, since this word has many definitions, as is proven in dictionaries. ...The West can choose whichever [definition] it desires. The Palestinian leadership, however, has the right to adhere to the definition which it believes to be correct and which expresses its intentions."

(May 6, 1989, Interview with the Tunisian newspaper Al-Sabbah, quoted by Iraq News Agency)



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V. THE PHASED PLAN

The PLO's "Phased Plan" is a key strategy for achieving Israel's annihilation. The "Phased Plan" grew out of the Arab failure to destroy Israel militarily in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In the wake of that failure, the PLO adopted in Cairo, on June 8, 1974, a three-step program:

- 1 -- Establishment of a Palestinian state in areas vacated by Israel;
- 2 -- Use of that Palestinian state for continuing the war against Israel;
- 3 -- Triggering a general war to annihilate Israel.

The key articles outlining the three steps in the "Phased Plan" are as follows:

- Article 2 -- "The Liberation Organization will employ all means, and first and foremost armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the independent combatant national authority for the people over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated...."
- Article 4 -- "Any step taken towards liberation is a step towards the realization of the Liberation Organization's strategy of establishing the democratic Palestinian state specified in the resolutions of previous Palestinian National Councils.
- Article 8 -- "Once it is established, the Palestinian national authority will strive to achieve a union of the confrontation countries with the aim of completing the liberation of all Palestinian territory...."

The top leaders of the PLO continue to proclaim their adherence to this strategy. Salah Khalaf, Arafat's Number Two, said, just four days after Arafat's Geneva press conference, that the PLO aims to establish "at first a small state, and with Allah's will, it will be made large, and expand to the east, west, north, and south. I am interested in the liberation of Palestine, step by step" (Al-Anba, Kuwait, December 18, 1988). Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the PLO's Political Department in charge of the PLO's foreign affairs, voiced PLO thinking when on April 5, 1989, in an interview with the BBC Arabic Service, he said, "The recovery of but a part of our soil will not cause us to forsake our Palestinian land.... We shall pitch our tent in those places which our bullets can reach.... This tent shall then form the base from which we shall later pursue the next phase."

Sheikh Abd Al-Hamid Al-Sayekh, the Chairman of the PNC, declared, within a few weeks after Arafat's press conference in Geneva, that the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories is just one phase: "In the next phase, after the recognition of the Palestinian state, we will work to implement our sovereignty over the land of Palestine.... Our presence in Palestine is dependent upon the elimination of the other [Zionist] culture" (A-Sharq Al-Awsat, Saudi newspaper published in London, January 13, 1989).

The PLO's activity in the diplomatic arena since late 1988 has been an extension of and cover for its "Phased Plan." This fact was stated by



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Salah Khalaf prior to the convening of the PNC in November 1988 and Arafat's visit to Geneva in December 1988: "We face a stage which requires a fundamental step consistent with current developments.... In view of these developments, we must propose a political initiative which is not new in terms of the Phased Plan.... The initiative will provide a new instrument for moving the Phased Plan along" (Al-Anba, Kuwait, September 7, 1988). Rafik Al-Natshe, a member of the FATAH Central Committee and the PLO's representative to Saudi Arabia, told the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Watan on January 8, 1989, "Our present political approach is rooted in the Phased Plan.... We must aim at harmonizing the various political decisions with the Covenant and the Phased Plan."



PLO Leaders on the Phased Plan

Yasser Arafat, PLO Chairman:

"The Palestinians are not fighting merely for the sake of fighting, but for a political objective, namely, the liberation of the Palestinian soil and the establishment of a Palestinian state over every part of it from which Israel will be removed."
(March 6, 1989, Qatar News Agency)

"The land of Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinians, and the homeland of the Arab nation, from the Ocean to the Gulf.... The PLO offers not the peace of the weak, but the peace of Saladin."
(January 2, 1989, Saudi News Agency)

"The Palestinian people's struggle will continue until the complete liberation of the Palestinian land. ...The Palestinian people's struggle ought to be assisted until the complete liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea. ...We will fight until the last bullet, until the last drop of blood, and until the last stone in our land."
(May 1, 1990, Libyan News Agency, also quoted by Agence France Presse)

Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Second to Arafat:

"At first a small state, and with the help of Allah, it will be made large, and expand to the east, west, north, and south.... I am interested in the liberation of Palestine, step by step."
(December 18, 1988, Al-Anba, Kuwait)

Farouk Kaddoumi, Head of the PLO's Political Department, in charge of the PLO's foreign affairs:

"The recovery of but a part of our soil will not cause us to forsake our Palestinian land.... We shall pitch our tent in those places which our bullets can reach.... This tent shall then form the base from which we shall later pursue the next phase."
(April 5, 1989, interviewed by BBC Arabic Service)

Sheikh Abd Al-Hamid Al-Sayekh, Chairman of the PNC:

"Even if the PLO succeeds in establishing a state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, this would not prevent a continuation of the struggle until the liberation of all of Palestine... If we succeed in gaining a part of Palestine upon which we will establish a state, we will later be able to demand from the entire world, while positioned upon Palestinian soil, to act to enable us to get our rights as a state and a nation... We are working to achieve what is possible in the present phase, and next, we will demand more."
(December 21, 1988, Al-Seyassah, Kuwait)



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Sheikh Abd Al-Hamid Al-Sayekh (cont.):

"In the next phase, after the recognition of the Palestinian state, we will work to implement our sovereignty over the land of Palestine. ...Our presence in Palestine is dependent upon the elimination of the other [Zionist] culture."
(January 13, 1989, A-Sharq Al-Awsat, Saudi newspaper published in London)

Rafik Al-Natshe, FATAH Central Committee Member and PLO Representative to Saudi Arabia:

"The PLO Covenant is the basis of the political and military activity of the PLO. Our present political approach is rooted in the Phased Plan.... We must aim at harmonizing the various political decisions with the Covenant and the Phased Plan."
(January 8, 1989, Al-Watan, Kuwait)

"[HAMAS says] All of Palestine is ours and we want to liberate it from the river to the sea at one go. But FATAH, which leads the PLO, feels that a phased plan must be pursued. Both sides agree on the final objective. The difference between them is the way there."
(December 26, 1989, Al-Qabas, Kuwait)

George Habash, Leader of the "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine" (PFLP), the PLO's second largest faction:

"The establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza will be the beginning of the downfall of the Zionist enterprise. We will be able to rely on this defeat in order to complete the struggle to realize our entire goal, which is the complete liberation of the national Palestinian soil."
(June 9, 1989, Interview with "Voice of the Mountain" Radio, Lebanon)

"We seek to establish a state which we can use in order to liberate the other part of the Palestinian state."
(April 9, 1989, the PFLP's Al-Hadaf)



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THE PLO AND THE ARAB STATES

The PLO has not called upon the Arab states to recognize and directly negotiate with Israel, or end their economic boycott of Israel. Instead, at Arab League summits, such as the one that was held in Casablanca in May 1989, the PLO actively promotes an atmosphere of confrontation and enmity towards Israel. Every year at the UN General Assembly sessions (and in other UN organizations), the PLO is one of the driving forces behind shrill anti-Israel resolutions as well as the vain Arab attempt to reject the credentials of the Israeli delegation to the General Assembly. The recent frenzied campaign to mobilize the Arab world, as well as others, against Jewish immigration to Israel is another integral component of the PLO's efforts to maintain a hostile atmosphere.

At its conference in Tunis in August 1989, the FATAH/Arafat called for involving the Arab states in the conflict with Israel:

- Resolution 1 -- "The Palestine question is the core of the Arab-Zionist conflict."
- Resolution 4 -- "...respecting the right of the Palestinian revolution to perform its militant tasks through any Arab land."
- Resolution 6 -- "Calling on the Arab countries, especially those on the confrontation lines, to unify their forces and mobilize their masses in order to confront the Israeli aggression."

The PLO, moreover, speak in terms of obtaining Arab support for terror activities across the Arab borders with Israel, confrontation, and war. Thus, George Habash, leader of the PLO's "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine" has urged attacks across Arab borders, "What is now needed is to support the uprising by escalating combat activities through all the Arab borders, and launching attacks and carrying out ambushes outside the areas of the uprising" (Al-Istiqlal, Nicosia-based PLO publication, January 20, 1990).

On April 11, 1989, PLO Radio from Baghdad broadcast the message of Leaflet #38 of the PLO-affiliated "Unified National Command". That leaflet called "upon the Arab regimes to upgrade their methods of supporting the Palestine question through opening their borders to the fighters of the Palestinian revolution so that they can exercise their legitimate struggle rights...."

Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Arafat's Number Two, said on February 8, 1990, "Jewish emigration [to Israel] means the Israelis are thinking of plunging the region into a new war. Hence the need for uniting Palestinian, Jordanian and Syrian efforts to rebuild the Eastern front" (Reuter, February 8, 1990). By calling for the rebuilding of the Eastern Front, the term denoting an Arab military alliance along Israel's eastern borders during a future war against Israel, the PLO is trying to draw the Arab states into such a war.

Hani al-Hassan, Arafat's political advisor, also called for the establishment of an Eastern Front, comprised of Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and "Palestine", and noted that this move would cause Israel immediate



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anxiety (Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Anba, quoted by the Kuwaiti News Agency on February 17, 1990).

The recent tension in the region emanating from Libya's chemical weapons plant at Rabta and Iraq's development of a chemical weapons arsenal, as well as long-range missiles and a nuclear weapons capability, has also exposed the PLO's position.

On March 18, 1990, the Associated Press, quoting Libyan Radio, reported that Yasser Arafat expressed "solidarity with the Libyan Arab People and its leader, who are facing U.S. threats" against the Rabta plant. Arafat added, "We will stand by our people in the great Jamahiriyah [Libya] with our blood."

On March 30, Associated Press reported that Arafat, speaking to a rally in Baghdad on March 29, said "I tell them [the Israeli leaders], we will fight you with stones, with rifles and with Al-Abed" (Al-Abed is the name of the long-range Iraqi missile that was tested in December 1989).

Arafat's Number Two, Salah Khalaf, followed his lead in aligning the PLO with Iraq. Salah Khalaf, Arafat's Number Two, told the Iraqi News Service in Tunis on April 23, that Saddam Hussein knows how to address the needs at every political stage on the basis of permanent and strategic principles, and that the Iraqi President had set the basic lines of confrontation with the "Zionist entity."

The PLO is not adverse to taking the Arab states to task when their support for the PLO is deemed insufficient, and even uses threats in order to obtain that support. This was illustrated when, commenting in January 1989 on the fact that many Arab states have not honored financial pledges to support the intifada, Arafat warned, "If the present situation continues, I will be forced to contemplate aloud other means of convincing them to fulfill their obligations, even though these would not be in keeping with the character of the diplomatic phase, or its present course" (Al-Qabas, Kuwait, January 29, 1989).

Nabil Sha'ath, a close advisor of Arafat and Chairman of the PNC Political Committee, said in January 1990, "We need the Arab position. The Arab forces are enormous and they have no limit. For example, they have not withdrawn one cent from New York banks in order to pressure the United States and in order to stress that the Arabs place the Palestinian problem at the top of their priorities" (Al-Anba, Kuwait, January 16, 1990).

Moreover, on February 13, 1990, in the Bahrain newspaper Akhbar Al-Khaleej, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) called on Egypt to re-examine the validity of its peace treaty with Israel in light of the Jewish immigration to Israel. Abu Iyad's extremist statements, including his support for the gun-and-grenade assault on Israeli tourists in Egypt on February 4, 1990, were not repudiated by anyone in the PLO. They



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did, however, infuriate the Egyptians who, in the Egyptian media, accused Abu Iyad and the PLO leadership of exploiting the Palestinians.



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VII. THE PLO TERROR UNITS

The PLO has not disbanded any of its terror units. On the contrary, it set up a new unit called the "National Security Committee", incorporating groups, such as "Force 17", which over the years have become internationally known for their terrorist activities. The head of the "National Security Committee" is Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), the Arafat's Number Two, and one of Khalaf's two deputies is Hakkam Balawi, who has a leading role in the PLO's dialogue with the United States. While the PLO terror units, such as "Force 17" and the "Hawari Apparatus," are directly responsible for carrying out acts of terror, they derive their authority and have the backing of Arafat and the PLO Executive Committee.

Moreover, PLO terrorists in southern Lebanon, especially in Tyre and Sidon, now number several thousand. Seventeen of the twenty-two infiltration attempts since December 1988 were launched from southern Lebanon.

VIII. THE PLO FACTIONS AND TERROR RAIDS

Virtually every faction of the PLO has engaged in terrorism since Arafat supposedly "renounced" it. Of the 22 infiltration attempts since December 1988:

- 7 were carried out by Naif Hawatmeh's "Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine" (DFLP);
- 4 by the Tala'at Ya'akub faction of the "Palestine Liberation Front" (PLF);
- 3 by the Abu Al-Abbas faction of the "Palestine Liberation Front" (PLF);
- 2 by Samir Ghosha's "Popular Struggle Front" (PSF);
- 2 jointly by Tala'at Ya'akub's PLF faction and George Habash's "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine" (PFLP);
- 2 by George Habash's PFLP;
- 2 by Yasser Arafat's FATAH.

All of the above factions participated in the November 1988 PNC in Algiers and acknowledge the authority of Yasser Arafat.

Moreover, since December 1988, Arafat's FATAH has carried out 13 terrorist attacks against civilians inside Israel's pre-1967 borders. In these attacks, explosives, hand-grenades, Molotov cocktails, and other weapons were used. The attacks included the planting of bombs at:

- a bus stop near Beilinson Hospital in Petah Tikva, a town north-east of Tel Aviv, on March 20, 1989;
- a synagogue in Kfar Avraham (near Petah Tikva) on March 31, 1989;
- the Liberty Bell Park in Jerusalem on May 16, 1989.



PLO Infiltration Attempts and Attacks From Across Israel's Borders
Since Arafat's "Renunciation" of Terrorism in December 1988

A. From Southern Lebanon

- 1) December 26, 1988:
A four-man squad belonging to Samir Ghosha's PSF ("Popular Struggle Front") tried to infiltrate Israel by sea. Bad weather and the failure of an outboard motor swept the boat north. Three terrorists drowned and one was washed ashore.
- 2) December 28, 1988:
Three terrorists from the Tala'at Ya'akub faction of the PLF ("Palestine Liberation Front") were killed after cutting through the border fence while trying to infiltrate Israel near Kibbutz Manara in the north.
- 3) February 5, 1989:
Five terrorists belonging to George Habash's PFLP ("Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine") and the Tala'at Ya'akub faction of the PLF were killed in the southern Lebanon security zone while on their way to seize hostages in one of the Galilee communities.
- 4) February 23, 1989:
A three-man DFLP ("Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine") squad was intercepted and its members killed while making their way towards Israel where they had intended to carry out a major operation against civilians.
- 5) March 2, 1989:
Five DFLP terrorists, on their way to take hostages and murder civilians in Zarit, a civilian farming community in the Galilee, were intercepted. Four of the terrorists were killed; the fifth escaped.
- 6) March 12, 1989:
The Tala'at Ya'akub faction of the PLF claimed responsibility for sending a three-man squad across the Israeli northern border near Kibbutz Manara. The terrorists were killed when intercepted by a patrol of the Israel Defense Forces.
- 7) March 30, 1989:
Five terrorists belonging to George Habash's PFLP, in cooperation with the Lebanese Communist Party", were intercepted while headed towards the Israeli border. Two of the terrorists were killed in the clash.
- 8) April 8, 1989:
A rubber dinghy carrying terrorists on their way towards Israel was spotted by an Israeli navy patrol boat near Rosh Hanikra. The two terrorists aboard the dinghy were killed; leaflets carried by the infiltrators identified them as having been sent by Samir Ghosha's PSF.



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- 9) May 28, 1989:
A Katyusha rocket attack and infiltration attempt were simultaneously launched against Metulla. The rocket wounded an eight-month-old baby, but the heavily-armed terrorist infiltrators were intercepted before reaching their objective and carrying out a wholesale massacre. Two of the terrorists were killed, and two others were captured. The PFLP and the Tala'at Ya'akub faction of the PLF claimed responsibility, and evidence indicated they were also aided by Hizbullah.
- 10) June 4, 1989:
A three-man DFLP squad, on its way to seize hostages, was intercepted by an Israel Defense Forces patrol west of Kibbutz Misgav Am. The terrorists, who were carrying Kalachnikov assault rifles, LAW rockets, grenades and other explosives, were killed in the clash with the patrol.
- 11) August 1, 1989:
Three terrorists belonging to the Tala'at Ya'akub faction of the PLF were intercepted on their way to attack the residents of Kibbutz Manara along Israel's northern border. The terrorists, who were killed in the ensuing clash, carried Kalachnikov assault rifles, dozens of grenades, and LAW rockets.
- 12) August 12, 1989:
A terrorist squad belonging to Naif Hawatmeh's DFLP was intercepted after being spotted two kilometers northwest of Kibbutz Misgav Am. One of the terrorists was wounded in the ensuing clash and apprehended; the others escaped. According to press reports, the captured terrorist admitted that the squad's aim was to carry out a massacre in one of Israel's northern communities.
- 13) October 6, 1989:
A terrorist squad belonging to the Abu al-Abbas faction of the PLF was intercepted on its way to attack the Israeli kibbutz Misgav Am. A leaflet found with the terrorists declared the operation was intended to show that "the Palestinian fighter is capable of reaching into your [the Israelis] own home."
- 14) October 12, 1989:
Three DFLP terrorists were intercepted four kilometers from the Israeli community of Margaliot: one of the terrorists was killed, and two escaped. The weapons and other equipment which they were carrying indicated that they were on their way, according to unverified reports, to carry out a terror strike inside northern Israel.



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- 15) January 26, 1990:
A squad of DFLP terrorists, on its way to attack Kibbutz Misgav Am, fired at a patrol of the Israel Defense Forces and escaped. The next day one of the terrorists was captured. A map carried by the terrorists charting their route to the kibbutz, as well as a statement by the DFLP leadership that Misgav Am was their intended objective provided proof that an Israeli civilian community was the target.
- 16) February 3, 1990:
On their way to attack an Israeli community near the Lebanese border, two PLF (Abu Al-Abbas) terrorists, carrying Kalachnikov assault rifles, grenades, RPGs, and LAW rockets, were intercepted and killed in the clash. Leaflets were found in their possession declaring in Arabic that the only way to "free the Holy Land" is through armed struggle. The PLF also openly claimed responsibility for the intended attack into northern Israel.
- 17) March 16, 1990:
Three heavily-armed terrorists belonging to the DFLP were intercepted and killed while on their way to a raid into Israel. The intended target of the terrorists was the agricultural community of Zarit. The DFLP took responsibility for the attempted incursion.
- B. From Jordan
- 18) March 17, 1989:
A PLO terror squad infiltrated from Jordan near the Israeli community of Hatzeba, thirty miles south of the Dead Sea. Encountering a patrol of the Israel Defense Forces on the way, the squad fled back into Jordan after the clash, and were arrested by the Jordanian authorities. The PLF ("Palestine Liberation Front") faction led by Abu Al-Abbas, who is also a member of the PLO's Executive Committee, claimed responsibility, as did the pro-Syrian faction of the FATAH led by Abu Musa.
- 19) September 2, 1989:
A terrorist crossed the Jordan River near Kfar Rupin and attacked an Israel Defense Forces patrol, killing two Israeli soldiers. The terrorist was killed during the attack. In a communique, the Tala'at Ya'akub faction of the PLF claimed responsibility for the infiltration into "occupied Palestine."
- 20) September 7, 1989:
Katyusha rockets were fired upon Kibbutz Sha'ar Golan in the Jordan Valley. George Habash's PFLP claimed responsibility for the Katyusha attack.



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C. From Egypt

21) March 14, 1989:

Two terrorists, armed with Kalachnikov assault rifles, sub-machine guns, and grenades crossed into Israel southeast of Rafiah in the Sinai. The terrorists, belonging to the "Islamic Jihad" special branch of the FATAH, were apprehended after throwing a grenade on an army position.

22) December 5, 1989:

A five-man FATAH/Arafat squad was intercepted after crossing Israel's southern border at Har Harif in the Negev. Heavily armed and carrying 50 grenades and five Kalachnikov assault rifles, its aim was to carry out a massacre of Israeli civilians.



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IX. THE PLO, THE INTIFADA, AND PALESTINIAN TERRORISM AGAINST PALESTINIANS

The intifada fills another page in the violent history of the PLO. The systematic murder of Palestinian Arabs by PLO death squads is another form of PLO terrorism.

The PLO sees the intifada as another facet of its campaign against Israel. In a leaflet distributed by FATAH operatives in Ramallah on October 23, 1989, the FATAH declared that "the struggle in which our people is engaged is not a struggle for the purpose of reaching a settlement or a political solution and initiatives as others think and feel." The leaflet continued by noting that the PLO's "investing in the diplomatic course and in political events from time to time is a political cover and temporary tactic."

In its leaflets and radio broadcasts, the PLO urges "escalation". In Leaflet #32, the PLO-affiliated "Unified National Command" declared, "[We] call on you to escalate the struggle and the popular resistance with the stone, Molotov cocktails, the war of knives, the setting of the occupation's institutions on fire..." (PLO Radio, Baghdad, January 7, 1989). Leaflet #37, distributed by the "Unified National Command" urged, "All forms of our intifada struggle must be escalated: such as the use of knives, hatchets, Molotov cocktails, and the expanded use of large rocks thrown from rooftops" (PLO Radio, Baghdad, April 1, 1989). In Leaflet #47, distributed in October 1989, the "Unified National Command" designated October 15, 16, and 17 as "days of escalation".

The PLO has also not hesitated to exploit children in its violent activities. Thus a leaflet distributed by PLO operatives in the territories in February 1989 urged, "Every child must carry the stone and throw it at the occupier. The Molotov cocktail heroes of all ages must burn a fire in the face of the enemy and fight him face-to-face." Arafat, interviewed in the Jordanian newspaper Al-Rai on February 12, 1990, said, "Our slogan is that any person who gets tired [of the intifada] should rest and send his children."

The murder of Israeli civilians as a part of the intifada is encouraged by the PLO. When a Palestinian terrorist stabbed two elderly Jews to death and wounded three others in Jerusalem on May 3, 1989, Yasser Arafat justified the incident, saying, "We will continue the uprising with renewed determination. The uprising will continue wave after wave, until the Palestinian flag is hoisted over Jerusalem" (Radio Monte Carlo, May 3, 1989).

PLO leaflets and radio broadcasts have exhorted and instructed local operatives to carry out attacks against Jews and Arabs (referred to as "agents" by the PLO). For example, Leaflet #38, broadcast by PLO Radio on April 11, 1989, designated April 26 as "the 'Day for Executing Judgement Against Agents'". On this day the 'Assault Groups' and the branches of the 'Unified National Command' are to go out and punish the agents and those deviating from the national line, for cooperating with the occupation authorities." On August 17, 1989, PLO Radio from Baghdad broadcast Leaflet #44 which said:



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"More must be done in order to shatter the apparatus of the Civil Administration. More action must be taken against people who are prominent agents in this Administration.... It is necessary to intensify the throwing of rocks and the use of knives and to set on fire the ground below the feet of the soldiers of the occupation and to set on fire his borders, his settlers, and his agents, for the language of strength, the language of causing casualties, is the only language he understands...."

Coercion of Palestinians is one of the tactics used to promote confrontation. Local PLO operatives have, using the threat of vandalism and violence, pressured Arab shopkeepers to close businesses, and -- by causing damage to private Arab vehicles, attacking public transportation, and even burning buses -- have forcibly prevented Arab workers from commuting to their jobs within Israel.

The ultimate form of pressure -- deadly assaults on specific Palestinian individuals and their families -- has also been applied by the PLO. Since the intifada began in December 1987, more than 200 Palestinians were murdered by fellow Palestinians, many by PLO death squads: of the 200, more than 180 were murdered since Arafat's press conference in December 1988, and over 60 since Israel raised, in April 1989, its proposals for elections and a negotiated peace settlement (officially formulated in May 1989 in the Government of Israel's Peace Initiative). Arrogating for itself the title of "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinians, the PLO is trying to ensure that no other alternative will emerge.

Arafat took the lead in calling for such murders when in January 1989, less than a month after his press conference in Geneva, he warned Palestinians, such as Elias Freij, the Mayor of Bethlehem, "Whoever thinks of stopping the intifada before it achieves its goals, I will give him ten bullets in the chest." (On January 19, 1989, the U.S. State Department Spokesman informed reporters at the daily briefing that the U.S. has a tape recording of Arafat's threat.)

On October 10, 1989, Arafat took direct responsibility for authorizing such attacks, saying that such killings are "a decision that was made by the Unified National Command in the Territories and I gave them the authority of the General Commander to sign the execution warrants" (Al-Rai , Jordan). On January 19, 1990, although urging caution in carrying out the killings, Arafat again gave his endorsement, telling the Egyptian newspaper Al-Mussawar , "We tell them: 'If you can, send us the file, and we will examine it. In any case, if this is difficult, then there is no choice but to send the files after the executions, so that they can be examined.'" Arafat's cynicism was illustrated when he added, "After we reviewed the files, we saw that two of the 118 (who were executed) were wronged. We held new investigations, and added them to the martyrs of the uprising."



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The savagery of these murders was illustrated by a PLO-affiliated death squad that was apprehended in the Nablus Casbah (marketplace) on December 1, 1989. The group was responsible for 15 murders (and several murder attempts), including five women and two elderly men. In one case, a woman was axed to death, and in another, a man, who was hospitalized after an attack by masked men, was shot to death in the hospital.



Internecline Palestinian Killings, December 1988 - March 1990

Month	Number of Killings
=====	=====
December 1988	1
January 1989	4
February	2
March	5
April	12
May	12
June	18
July	17
August	15
September	19
October	16
November	14
December	10
January 1990	15
February	19
March	13



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X. THE EXTRADITION AND PROSECUTION OF PLO TERRORISTS

The PLO has opposed the extradition of its terrorists for prosecution. This has been the case with Abu Al-Abbas, responsible for the hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship and the murder of Leon Klinghoffer in 1985, and Muhammad Rashid, who is accused of bombing a Pan Am airliner over Honolulu in 1982.

However, the PLO goes one step beyond opposition to extradition. It gives high honors to its terrorists. Abu Al-Abbas was subsequently made a member of the PLO Executive Committee and was a full participant in the November 1988 PNC.

XI. NO COMPENSATION FOR AMERICAN VICTIMS OF PLO TERRORISM

The PLO has not compensated the American victims of PLO terrorism or their families. Over the years, the PLO has carried out several attacks which have taken a toll in American lives. Arafat, himself, gave the orders for one such act of terrorism in March 1, 1973 when U.S. Ambassador Cleo Noel and another U.S. diplomat were among three Western diplomats murdered by FATAH terrorists who seized the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum. Abd Al-Latif Abu Hijlah headed the PLO office in Khartoum at the time of the attack and served as Arafat's representative in contacts with the Sudan authorities: he was subsequently arrested and the PLO office was temporarily closed by Sudan. Today, Abu Hijlah directs the PLO's Political Department under Farouk Kaddoumi and is also a member of the PLO delegation in dialogue with the U.S.

Although guilty of murdering U.S. citizens, the PLO has consistently evaded acknowledging its responsibility. On the other hand, the PLO has adopted a cynical approach to violent assaults on innocent civilians. Abu Al-Abbas, during the November 1988 PNC, compared the murder of Leon Klinghoffer to an automobile accident and with a half-smile said, "Maybe he was trying to swim for it" (New York Times, November 13, 1988). On December 16, 1988, Abu Al-Abbas told the Lebanese newspaper, Al-Wattan Al-Arabi, published in Paris: "It wasn't us who carried out this [Achille Lauro] operation, but the Americans. They are the ones who made this thing up. The Americans are trying to play the role of 'cowboy.'"

Abu Al-Abbas' attempt to blame others for his act of terror and even make light of it brings to mind another similar expression of PLO cynicism by Farouk Kaddoumi who, speaking in the UN Security Council on October 10, 1985 (S/PV.2619) after the Achille Lauro hijacking, unabashedly suggested that Leon Klinghoffer may have died from illness. Kaddoumi said:

"Is there evidence that those hijackers killed that civilian? Where is that evidence? He was 69 years old and his family stated that he had frequently suffered before from heart attacks. He was also suffering from paralysis."

On December 4, 1985, speaking at an Arab League luncheon at the UN, Kaddoumi told an audience, which included the UN Secretary-General and the General Assembly President, that Klinghoffer was killed by his wife for the insurance money (this statement was reported by the New York Times and Washington Post the next day).



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The same contempt for the victims of terrorism was displayed by the PLO representative in Cairo, Said Kamal, who on February 10, 1990 (Middle East News Agency) accused Israel of having carried out the terrorist attack on Israeli tourists in Egypt on February 4.



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CONCLUSION

The PLO cannot have it both ways. Either it has abandoned terrorism, or it has not. Either it has accepted Israel's right to exist, or it has not. It has not.

The PLO still advocates and carries out acts of terrorism, and the PLO leadership has not disassociated itself from them. The PLO still advocates the "Phased Plan" which is its strategy for achieving the goals of its Covenant, i.e. the elimination of Israel.

The preceding pages have enumerated the many acts of terror and extremist statements of the PLO since December 1988. What is most disturbing is that, in addition to the PLO's use of the Western media to promote its false image, the PLO participants in the talks with the United States are themselves representatives of terror and extremism.

Yasser Abd-Rabbo -- Naif Hawatmeh's Deputy in the "Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine", a PLO faction responsible for six attempted terror raids since December 1988 and such atrocities as the 1974 massacre of schoolchildren at Ma'alot -- has headed the PLO delegation in talks with U.S. representatives. Abd Al-Latif Abu Hijlah, another member of the PLO delegation, was involved in the murder of U.S. diplomats in Khartoum in 1973. At one point in 1989, even Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) had contacts with U.S. Ambassador Pelletreau: the former head of FATAH's "Black September" terror apparatus, responsible for the 1972 massacre of Israeli athletes in Munich and the 1973 attack in Khartoum, Salah Khalaf openly advocates the continuation of terrorism today .

These are Arafat's representatives in talks with the United States. Considering PLO terrorism, past and present, they are, indeed, authentic representatives of the PLO.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת ההסברה

הסברה
1

א' בסיון תש"ן
25 במאי 1990

אל הנציגויות

טיעוני הסברה לקראת ג'נבה ובגדד

עם כינוס מועצת הבטחון בג'נבה ב-25.5.1990 ולקראת ועידת הפיסגה
הערבית בבגדד ב-28.5.1990, מצ"ב ארבעה נירות לשימוש הסברתי:

- * האיום העיראקי (146/25.5.1990/3.06.04)
- * התנגדות הערבים לעליה (145/25.5.1990/3.03.01, 3.09.031)
- * קריאת ערפאת לפגיעה בעולים לישראל (144/25.5.1990/3.09.031)
- * הרצח בראשון לציון (147/25.5.1990/3.05.02).

תוכלו להעזר בחומר בתדרוכים, בהרצאות, במענה לשאלות ובכל דרך
נוספת שתמצאו לנכון, בכפופות להתייחסות לנושאים במקומותיכם.

149/25.5.1990/3.05.01

5000

THE MURDERS IN RISHON LE-ZION AND THEIR AFTERMATH

1) The gun attack on Arab workers from the Gaza District on May 20 was the act of a crazed individual. The murders were strongly condemned and revulsion was expressed by Israeli government leaders, military commanders, public figures, and by all sectors of the population. The perpetrator is under arrest and awaits trial.

2) Israelis have themselves fallen victim to mass killings perpetrated by deranged individuals. This was the case on October 5, 1985, when an Egyptian soldier opened fire on Israeli tourists at Ras Bourka in the Sinai, killing seven, including children. On July 6, 1989, a Palestinian Arab forced a bus (No. 405) off a cliff into a ravine along the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway, killing 16 passengers. The reaction in the Arab world in both cases was one of praise and justification.

3) Murderous assaults by crazed persons have occurred elsewhere as well. Examples include:

- * 1966: A young man climbs to the top of the campus tower at the University of Texas in Austin, and shoots 14 people dead.
- * 1984: A gunman massacres 20 people at a McDonald's restaurant in San Ysidro, California.
- * 1987: A heavily armed young man kills 16 persons, and wounds 14 others during a rampage in Hungerford, England.
- * 1989: A gunman kills 14 women and wounds 13 other people in a classroom building at the University of Montreal.

On January 3, 1988, the New York Times carried a report by Associated Press which dealt with the phenomenon of mass killings. Quoting a book by two researchers, a criminologist and sociologist at Northeastern University, they noted that in the United States an average of three mass murders take place every month.

4) Following the killings in Rishon Le-Zion, Judea-Samaria and the Gaza District erupted in widespread violence, openly encouraged by the PLO and other extremist militants. In recent months, the intifada had entered a lull. At a time when Arab casualties in violent confrontations with Israeli security forces were decreasing, the murder of Palestinians by Palestinians were mounting as the PLO and Islamic fundamentalist extremists tried to reinvigorate the intifada. The murders in Rishon Le-Zion on May 20 were seen as an opportunity to be exploited.

5) IDF adherence to strict regulations in dealing with riot situations was one of the main reasons behind the drop in Palestinian Arab casualties in past months. In facing the renewed mob violence (attacks with rocks, Molotov cocktails, and sharp objects), the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have exercised the same maximum restraint in order to keep the number of Palestinian casualties down. When other democratic countries have had to deal with the kind of widespread violence that

Israel has faced during the last few days, they have done no less than Israel.

6) Israel's standards in contending with mob violence are, however, very different from those of its neighbors. When Algeria faced widespread violence in 1989, hundreds were gunned down in just a few days. When Syria's Assad faced opposition in the town of Hama in 1981, he settled the matter by wiping out most of the town and killing thousands. Iraq has used poison gas against its own citizens, as seen in the Kurdish town of Halabja in 1988. In 1970, the Jordanian army, faced with the growing internal threat of the PLO, massacred hundreds of Palestinians. Neither Jordan nor Egypt, when they controlled the areas of Judea-Samaria and Gaza during the years 1949-1967, refrained from using massive force against the local population on a number of occasions.

المحرر

AL MOHARRER

أسبوعية سياسية متحررة

مخبر اخضر اجتماع لكوار الانتفاضة والقطاع الفري عرفت: العرب دفعوا ١٨ مليارا للأفغان ومليارين للمنظمة طخوا قطعان المهاجرين • موسكو باعنا بصفقة مع هينغ

انه معمر سؤاا وتترك الجوار عليه القسطنطي الذي سيكشف ما يعني طينا اليوم على أي حال. ارجو الاتفهام من كلامي اننا نريد انشاء موقف القسومة من محاسن. ليس هذا قصدا. وان يكون. فتن احرض الناس على وحدة الداخل وتلاحم جواهر الانتفاضة هناك. واننا دائم الحوار والعمل مع قادة الاخوان المسلمين. في العالم العربي. لتعزيز اواصر الاقوة والتعامل مع محاسن. حتى لا تنقل تصدع امر اسانيه في تشكيل صفوف الانتفاضة. وقرىبا سائرا الاخوان. وهناك سائس الى لقاء قادة الاخوان للبحث مجددا في علاقتنا مع محاسن... وبالمناسبة. اريد ان احدث على مسعكم جميعا. للاخوة القاطنين في الساحة العربية. واقول لهم ديورا. بانكم حيا من النقط الذي بدأت تنجح معناه للاطلاع بين الاخوان والقسطنطين هناك. لقد وصلتني نسخ من منشورات سورية موقحة باسماء عمال وشبهات فلسطينية وعربية. تتجاهل الحكم والشعب في الارض الشقية. واننا اعزم ان «المرءة» هو الذي يلق وراها مستهزاة الفت بالحماسيات الفلسطينية. والسلم والرحمة الوطنية. وجاهض الثورة الديمقراطية. واخذ ان تلخو حيا ان قوربا في منتج. كان وما يزال عدم التدخل في الشؤون العربية. سواء في ايام الانتفاضة الثانية او في معونات تشكيل الاخوان السياسية حاليا. لم تدخل في الانتفاضة. وان يكون السنتح. عزت داخل الارض ناي حال. وقد طلت من اعضاء منجج التواجدين في الارض. القليل. نشاطهم العمالي. وبين العمومات الفلسطينية. ووقف أي معونات او معاضدات هناك. معاً قاترا الثقة والشعير المشترك بالخطر الاسرائيلي. ونحن من العلاقات الفلسطينية - الفلسطينية في الساحة العربية.

علاقتنا مع الارض معاترة. وهي منجبة على حسن الثقة والشعير المشترك بالخطر الاسرائيلي. ونحن من جانبنا ننظر بارتياح الى تعريضهم الديمقراطية. ونحرص على تصحيحها واستمرارها لا لها من فوات على ثقافتنا والتفاهة شعنا. ومستقل الشعب العربي الشقيق. ونحن نعلم تماما ان اسرائيل لا يودى اياك هذه التنازح. ونحن على اجابته. اما بتحويل الارض. او بالتمسك بركاز الوحدة الوطنية هناك.

قبل الانتفاضة الثانية جازى الاخ عد السواق العربي (ممثل منظمة التحرير في الارض) والاشواق موقفي من المشاركة في الانتفاضة او عدمها. وقلت له: ليس لنا مصلحة في التدخل فيها سلباً او ايجاباً. ويهوننا الاخ بعد التنازح فوسم خطا: افك القاطنين والاصدح مع. والاشواق. التتر من شرح عدم ممانا لدعوا الناس في الارض الى عدم المشاركة في الانتفاضة. الامر الذي ارتضاه في القسطنطي ومن خلفنا سلامة اصدقاء. والعقبة ان عدم التدخل. لا يعني اننا كنا ضد مشاركة القسطنطين في الارض في الانتفاضة. وانما يعني نذرة الناس هناك احراراً في اتخاذ قرارهم وفق قناعتهم.

والعمل على يد غورباتشوف الذي قابض الصلح بالياري. واحاط نفسه او احاطت به مجموعة شريفة من النظيرين اللقارب مع امريكا والصهيونية. وفتح ارباب الهجرة اليهودية الى فلسطين المحتلة. تصوراً لقد اشربنا وبتصاننا هذه الضلالان السوفياتي والهجوم الاسيركي. غير ان ثورة وجدت لتلقى وتتمتع على ذاتها وشعبها وامثالها. لتسنا شعرك بهد اليوميوت كوتشيليه. الاكثوريين شأن الجاهدين الاكفان الذين حركتهم امريكا في اثناء الحرب الباردة ثمانية السوفيات في افغانستان. والتي باتت تسبق بعم ذرياً ان بعدما تسحب السوفيات من معاتلة الصراع الدولي.

لقد قدم الاميركان الى الجاهدين الاقل احدث الاستحمة. وشكرا بانكسار على الوقوف الى جانب هؤلاء الجاهدين والى تقديم القاعدة الجغرافية لهم. كما مزبوا. لبعض الدول العربية اعمية لتقديم المساعدة المالية لهم. وقد بلغت ١٨.٥ مليار دولار. فيما بلغت قيمة المساعدات المالية العربية لشعبة التحرير سنة ٢.٥ مليار دولار فقط لا غير.

كنت اقول ان الاسيركيين قد فعلوا للجاهدين الاقل كل هذا في بداية الامر لتكتمهم اليوم على وشك التنازح عنهم. بعدما ذهبت نصيبات السوفيات والفرع الاميركية لوجوههم. انظروا كيف تصفهم الصحافة الاميركية والوقاير السياسية في واشنطن بانهم شعرا مخدورات وبعثاء نصيبات مهمتها القتل والقيام بمسلمات الانتفاضة والوقاير (انما التقت ابي عامر الى عدد من سادات منجج القراشي كن بين المصنوع وقل معترفا يا اخواني لهذا الكلام فقد استندت في القسطنطي على شيكوت وجوكرن) حتى ان السيدة سحرمت بولو (والدة رئيسة وزراء بكتلار) قاتت في حينها التفتها مؤخرأ. ان هؤلاء الجاهدين بزمان. فقدوا زمام المبادرة. وما عادوا يظلمون ابدأ. وقد بلغت بانكسار كلها لتكتمهم وتضليل زوراً بزفرتهم. ويومها ذكرت السيدة بيوتوما توصلت اليه من تلتح وساطة قاتت انا بها قبل اكثر من عام بين الجاهدين وحكومة كابول.

وبهذا قدمت الى كامل هرباً لآلة الجاهدين. وهي بتشكيل حكومة وحدة وطنية اقلية يائض الجاهدين فيها ٨٠ بالمئة من القاعد ويضغط الصهيونيون على سبيلها ٢٠ بالمئة فقط. وعندما عرضت الامر على الجاهدين بيويداه. لغرضه وشاء على تصحبة الاميركيين. وهكذا ضاعت عليهم فرصة تاريخية ثنية. وياتوا يظلمون اليوم بما هو اقل ولا جدوى. وكل ذلك لانهم سرحلتون للقرار الاميركي وليس لارادة الشعب الفلسطينية.

على الاتصال دائم بالاخوان المسلمين



سجدوا على قطع يميني اذا زلت أي لتفاح سلمي بسنتي الكرة في برمايك. فلا تلتوا ان القرار السياسي يمتدنا من العمل العسكري ضد المهاجرين. سواء سكتوا يافا او ارمضا.

كلامي اليوم هو ام مباشر لكم بساطح. باطلاق الوصاى. باي عمل لوقف لتفاح سائسة المهاجرين الذين لم يتساق سياسي تقويم به لدى الاميركان والسوفيات واوروبا. الامر بعد اليوم لكم. فاستمروا في الثورة الفلسطينية. انما اصحت رجلاً معزواً لأماسي شام او عاصم للعمل. ثم سائسي الاقل الصندوب. وللشعير العربية من بعضي قضية فلسطين ما زالت معقدة. فان الموارد والمفاوضا لم يربعا قط شياً من ارض وشركم لم تات بقران من الدول العظمى. حتى تتنتج بقاء شخ من تلك البقايا.

بلانا مشترا. ويضطل الهجرة اليها سياحة اوتروية. بعد اليوم الكرة في برمايك. فلا تلتوا ان القرار السياسي يمتدنا من العمل العسكري ضد المهاجرين. سواء سكتوا يافا او ارمضا.

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انه الخطر اجتماع سوي يعقد ابو عمار في بغداد للتسولين عن الانتفاضة. وكوار القطاع الغربي. فل يصعبه الامر معهودا العمل العسكري. طخوا. قطعان المهاجرين السوفيات برأجوا. لقد باعنا. موسكو منذ العام ١٩٨٢ بصفقة مع القسطنطي هينغ. اما العرب. فقد دفعوا الى الاقفاين اكثر من ١٨ مليار دولار. ودفعوا لنا مليارين ونصف المئار فقط المحرور. حضرت الاجتماع. وكان القدم جاهزاً لتلق ما قاله الرئيس القسطنطي بلا لاف او مواربة. قد يعني وقت طويل قبل ان يعرف المراقبون ماذا دار بالتصديق داخل اجتماع العمل السري الذي عقد في بغداد قبل اسبوعين برئاسة ابو عمار. وفي اليه الضرب على الانتفاضة من منتج. وكوار القطاع الغربي.

كل ما يمكن قوله الان ان ايز ما سيجل في هذا الاجتماع الكلام العاصم الذي قاله ابو عمار. على سبيلها. وكلفه في التنازح عن حنة خلقنا سياسية خيرة. بعدما اصدر اوامر معقدة في اثناء تصحبة العمل العسكري في الارض المحتلة.

ليرة الرئيس عمارت منذ بداية الاجتماع حتى اخبره احدثت سائر المحضور الذين تجاوز عددهم ١٥٠ قائداً وكثيراً ثورادوا على العاصمة العراقية من مثاقف الشاعرات العربية. وكان ابرهم شلانا من اعضاء اللجنة المركزية لثورة منتج. وهو ابو الوليد مسؤول الامن القومي الفلسطيني. ومحاسن ركسي المشرف على فعاليات الانتفاضة. ومحمد جهاد المسؤول العسكري عن القطاع الغربي بالاضافة الى زعيم مناصرة ومحمود العاليل وجرعنا من اعضاء المجلس الثوري لمنتج. ممن يتلون معونات العمل في الارض المحتلة منذ سنين.

مالا قال. «ابو عمار. بانصاف في الخطر احاديثه الصريحة»

المحرور. كانت هناك في القاعة المظلمة دست لها. ويصعد كل كلمة لشعور قاهم الرئيس القسطنطي. وان كانت ان تشرع هنا - كعادتها - ما يمكن اعترافه في منتج عديته المطلق انتقد ابو عمار. كثرة المحضور وقال: انتي اريد لقاء مع ياسين موهجنا فأخاطباً وقد طلت قلة من القادة المشرفين. واپس اغلب الكوار العاتلة في شؤون الانتفاضة والقطاع الغربي. فلهذه من الاضاح كما ادرت التنازح. في الفصل السيل لتعريض الانتفاضة وتكثيف ضا طية جماعيتها لتكثيفها من الانتفاضة الى مرحلة ثورية

على ان هذا ليس مقصدي. وبعده من هذا الاجتماع. بل اريد بانك ان ابدأ حديثي. ان اقل لكم ما اقول. انظروا النار على المهاجرين اليهود التدد سولياتنا كانوا او فلاحا او من الجن الاثيق.

من النار طينا ان نرى قطان المهاجرين يتشكل بلادي وتتسوق ارضية ولا نكرهنا ساكناً اريحا. ان تظلموا في الص. ان في الجو على كل معاهد يتسوق

وتتوقف باذن الله. الا حين تتفاح السمر.

اليوم اصدر لكم الامر في استبداد ام العنف ضد المهاجرين. وامي بعبر او يتفاح ساضعه في السجن. ولا تتعدوا كلامي محرر تهديد. وانما هي الحقيقة. وسأجسكم بعد اليوم. وبسائس من لا يتفاح الرامري. ولا تشكروا المنسكم على الحبس والساطة فقد سئل ان احييت شعراء فلسطينيين. واطعنا مجلس ثورية يرمال بين علماء الخطا. ليس عدوي لعية منسقة. وقرازي وتمار منتج. لشعور الى الشعب. يجب ان يائض طريفة كل التثنية التمد. حتى يعرف الجاهدين ومن ذواتهم الاميركان والسوفيات معاً ان قرارية السياسي والعسكري وعن بارادته وليس ارادة عهبة. وان رعنا على استعادة ارضية واقامة دولتنا الفلسطينية المستقلة. والقسم عاصمتها. ليس معطفاً على نجان شامير او عهبة ميرين. لورسي السوفيات. ولقب الاميركان.

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عنا انهم ايها الاقوة ان التناكيد سائ قرارتنا السياسي والعسكري. وعن بارادته نحن وليس بارادة احد. ويوق في ان الساق في حنة التنازح. ومع حاجة الى التخرج والتصميم. ما عهد اليك من منتج في منتج حركة محاسن. كن تراه على منتج ومنسقة التحرير

وكنا نلاحظ برجل عريبيات ومسي استديولف الذي كان منسقا القضاة العربية. وقد وعد بتحويل ميزان التناكيد السوفياتي الذي مال في حلال عدوان ١٩٨٢ لكن السوت لم يهبط. ويصدر منشوراه الى استراتيجية كاتمة وجدت طريقها الى التثنية العاصي

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An independent political weekly

[Our correspondent] was present at a meeting of officials responsible for the intifada and the western sector (Israel).

Arafat: The Arabs gave \$18 billion to Afghanistan and [only] \$2 billion to the Organization (the PLO).

* "Attack the immigrants. * Moscow and Haig have 'sold us' [in the Lebanon War of 1982]."

Here are excerpts from Arafat's words at this meeting, as reported in Al-Muharar, a Lebanese weekly published in Paris, April 10, 1990:

"First, I want to say clearly: Open fire on the new Jewish immigrants—be they Soviet, Falasha, or anything else. It would be disgraceful of us were we to see herds of immigrants conquering our land and settling our territory and not raise a finger. I want you to shoot, on the ground or in the air, at every immigrant who thinks our land is a playground and that immigration to it is a vacation or picnic. From today on, the ball is in your court. I don't want to hear anyone say that political decision makers prevent us from taking military action against the immigrants. It makes no difference if they live in Jaffa or in Jericho. I give you explicit instructions to open fire. Do everything to stop the flow of immigration. Neither Security Council resolutions, nor American, Soviet, or European political activity will stem the flow."

"We know the Americans are liars. Our dialogue with them has reached what appears to be a dead end, especially now that their arrogance has grown in the wake of Soviet retreat, which allows Washington a monopoly on the international scene."

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IRAQI WAR THREATS AGAINST ISRAEL

1. Iraq invaded Israel at birth in 1948, its armies crossed the Jordan at Naharayim, south of Lake Kinneret, and, in tandem with the Jordanian 'Arab Legion', occupied Samaria. The Iraqi attempt to bisect Israel in two at Natanya was defeated by the IDF. Following the Armistice Agreement with Jordan (to which Iraq was not a signatory) Iraqi forces withdrew from the front-lines facing Israel.
2. In 1967 Iraq participated in the war against Israel, and Iraqi jets bombed Israeli targets. Iraqi armor moved into Jordan.
3. In 1973 Iraqi armor fought alongside the Syrians against Israel on the Golan Heights.
4. Iraq consistently supported Arab terror against Israel whether indirectly, via the PLO or Abul-Abbas (of "Achille Lauro" fame) or directly through the "Arab Liberation Front" (which specialized in attacking childrens' quarters in Israeli kibbutzim).
5. The Iraq-Iran war distracted Iraqi attention but did not signify a change in Iraqi aims. Frequent statements throughout that war reminded Iraqis that the enemy was Israel, and that Iraq would return to deal with Israel as soon as Iran was defeated.
6. Saddam Hussein, two years ago, on Feb. 18, 1988, said (according to the Gulf News Agency):
"Iraq believes in the liberation of Palestine, not as a slogan, or for domestic consumption, but as an aim to be concretely attained."
7. At a military ceremony on April 1, 1990 (Iraqi News Agency, April 2), Saddam Hussein threatened Israel with destruction:
"In the name of Allah, we shall cause fire to devour half of Israel, should she try to do anything to Iraq ... we have binary chemical weapons ..."
8. Speaking to the Union of Arab Workers, on April 18, 1990 (Iraqi News Agency) Saddam Hussein said:
"We can cross other countries to strike at Israel ... we have a joint Arab defense pact, making all Arab lands one ... our planes and missiles will reach Israel ... indeed we have sited our missile launch pads facing West, not East."
9. PLO Leader Yasser Arafat came to see Saddam Hussein in Baghdad on April 19, 1990. The Lebanese magazine "Al-Muharir", a reliable

reporter of Iraqi affairs, published their discussions on May 10.
The following are extracts:

Saddam Hussein:

"There are Israeli military and civilian targets, as well as British and US naval targets, all within our range. These will be obliterated if Iraq, or her leadership, come under attack. My own death will not prevent our response, but will hasten it, whether it be against Israel, or foreign warships, in the Gulf or elsewhere."

"Iraq is familiar with every inch of Palestine, every (Israeli) airfield, base, factory and research facility. We have been able to photograph all the targets we need, deep inside Israel. We started to do this when the war with Iran ended. Israel knows, and we know she knows."

"The age of lightning battles is over: Should war break out, we will not cease fire, even if it lasts for a century. But we Arabs know it will not last for years, at most - a couple of months."

"Should there be an American attack against us, the results will be no different. With the help of Allah we shall rid this region of American influence. After the (US) Senators were here, I received a letter to say that the USA regarded Israeli missiles as a threat to her interests. No more, no less! Our missiles cannot reach Washington. But if they could, we would hit there as necessary. However, we can still strike at Washington in other ways, at other US targets in the world."

"Iraq, today, is more powerful than Israel in weapons and equipment. We have to make Israelis fear us. As for Syria and Jordan; those who don't want to fight (against Israel) should let us cross their territory if we need space in which to manoeuvre our divisions towards Israel."

"My brother President Arafat, from now on we will not be needing any more political effort or (Arab) concessions, which are useless anyway."

Yasser Arafat:

"That is why we said "Absolutely no" to Baker, to America, when they tried to harm our rights, our representation."

Saddam Hussein: "From now on we must escalate our demands I am still loyal to the three "No's" of Khartoum (1967) - no peace, no recognition, no negotiation".

"We must help the Intifada with planes and missiles, that can hit the enemy and defeat him, (perhaps) even without (needing) a land battle or a clash at sea. We have not reduced the size of our army, but are developing it steadily."

10. The commander of the Iraqi Air Force, Sa'ab Hassan:
"We can preempt an enemy strike even before it happens. ... we are preparing against Israel." (interviewed in the military magazine "Hurras-al Wattan," Baghdad, April 22, 1990).
11. Saddam Hussein, speaking at the "Solidarity with Iraq" Convention in Baghdad, INA, May 8, 1990):
"As for (tension with) Israel - (I am asked) how can we calm things down? Why should we, though, before we get all that we demand, and in full? We demand the rights of the Palestinians. The enemy has turned the West against Iraq. If we let matters subside without fully carrying out our counter-offensive, it means they will have beaten us... we have no choice except to stand up for Arab rights, Arab honor and be ready for all the sacrifices, glorious sacrifices that Allah has ordained for us."
12. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz told a visiting PLO delegation ("Al-Muharrir," May 8, 1990):
"War with Israel is inevitable. The Palestinian masses of the Intifada, who constitute the largest fighting force in the occupied country, must be well prepared for battle."
Speaking to senior Ba'ath party members, Aziz also said:
"Iraq expects the Egyptian army to join the battle on her side, two weeks after the outbreak of war, despite the limitations of Camp David."
13. Iraqi Information Minister Latif Nasif Jasem (INA, May 10, 1990):
"Any new war with Israel will be a long one, and all the Arabs will take part."
14. "Al-Thawrah" (Baghdad, May 10, 1990):
"Iraq means what she says, Israel and the West must understand that war, when it comes, will bring victory to the Arabs".
15. Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Nizar Hamdoon warned that "the flood of Soviet immigrants to Israel could lead to war"
(Mail on Sunday", London, May 13, 1990)
16. Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Taha Yasin Ramadan ("Al-Sharq al-Awsat," Paris, May 18, 1990):
"We are sure that should Israel be involved (in war) this will mean the end of her existence on the soil of Palestine. I have not the slightest doubt."
(Ramadan repeated his threat to "Al-Ray Al-Amm," Kuwait, May 19, 1990.)



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL

שגרירות ישראל

3 מאי 1990
ח איר תש"נ

251.1/501

הסברה

קיון

אל: סמנכ"ל הסברה, מנהל הסברה
מאת: השגריר, הלסינקי

הנדון: זכות השיבה של אשף

הדפדת שהופקה על ידי הסברה לחשיפת כוונות אשף על זכות השיבה -
נראת לנו עשויה היטב ובעיתה. לכן הוצאנו אותם כאן בשפה הפינית.
הדפסנו 5000 עותקים.
בחלקה מופצת באמצעות אגודות הידידות ובחלקה השגרירות מפיצה סלקטיבית.
אני מקווה שנצליח להביא לפרסומה באחד העיתונים.
רצ"ב עותק.
לידיעתכם.

ב ב ר כ ה
✓
אשר נעלים

העתקים: 1. אירופה 2
2. שג' שבדיה (אם תפיקו בשבדית שלחונא לנו כ - 500 עותקים)



משרד החוץ

מחלקת ההסברה

כ"ג באייר תש"ן
18 במאי 1990

אל הנציגויות

עמדת ערפאת כלפי מדינת ישראל

עמדתו של ערפאת כלפי מדינת ישראל צוטטה בסוכנות הידיעות הלובית

ב-6 בינואר 1990.

ההתבטאות, הקוראת להעלמה של מדינת ישראל, מצ"ב לשימוש אפשרי במערך

ההסברה, בכפיפות לשיקולים מקומיים.

הגלויה הופקה בשש שפות, לוט טופס הזמנה.

137/18.5.1990/3.09.03

THE LAW OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK

SECTION 10

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BRICKS AND STONES

By Eugene V. Rostow

In the past several weeks the long-standing American objection to further Israeli settlements in the West Bank has been pressed by the Bush administration with new vehemence. The outcome of this argument is crucial. It will affect the substance, fairness, and durability of any peace that may emerge.

With varying degrees of seriousness, all American administrations since 1967 have objected to Israeli settlements in the West Bank on the ground that they would make it more difficult to persuade the Arabs to make peace. President Carter decreed that the settlements were "illegal" as well as tactically unwise. President Reagan said that the settlements were legal but that they did make negotiations less likely. The strength of the argument is hardly self-evident. Jordan occupied the West Bank for nineteen years, allowed no Jewish settlements, and showed no sign of wanting to make peace. Yet if the West Bank were 98 or 100 percent Arab when the parties finally reached the bargaining table, the impulse to accept a peace that ceded the whole of the West Bank to an Arab state would be tempting to Americans and Europeans, and even to some weary Israelis. The growing reality of Israeli settlements in the area, on the other hand, should be a catalyst for peace, by imposing a price on the Arabs for their refusal to negotiate. But the American government keeps reciting the old formula.

Secretary of State James Baker has gone beyond previous American positions by threatening to cut aid if the Israelis build more settlements in the West Bank. He spoke after Arab protests against the possibility of large numbers of Soviet Jews settling in Israel, particularly in the West Bank. Wouldn't it have been more useful if Baker had told his Arab interlocutors that if they want any parts of the West Bank to become Arab territory, they should persuade Jordan and the Arabs living in the occupied territories to make peace with Israel as rapidly as possible? Since 1949 the U.N. Security Council has repeatedly urged and occasionally commanded the Arab states to make peace, most recently in Resolutions

242 and 338. Thus far, with the exception of Egypt in 1977, they have simply refused to comply. But Baker yielded to the Arab outcry, and is trying to maneuver Israel into a position that no Israeli majority can accept: to renounce the right of settlement "of the Jewish people"—in the words of the Mandate—in any part of the West Bank.

The Jewish right of settlement in the West Bank is conferred by the same provisions of the Mandate under which Jews settled in Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem before the State of Israel was created. The Mandate for Palestine differs in one important respect from the other League of Nations mandates, which were trusts for the benefit of the indigenous population. The Palestine Mandate, recognizing "the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country," is dedicated to "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

The Mandate qualifies the Jewish right of settlement and political development in Palestine in only one respect. Article 25 gave Great Britain and the League Council discretion to "postpone" or "withhold" the Jewish people's right of settlement in the Transjordanian province of Palestine—now the Kingdom of Jordan—if they decided that local conditions made such action desirable. With the divided support of the council, the British took that step in 1922.

The Mandate does not, however, permit even a temporary suspension of the Jewish right of settlement in the parts of the Mandate west of the Jordan River. The Armistice Lines of 1949, which are part of the West Bank boundary, represent nothing but the position of the contending armies when the final cease-fire was achieved in the War of Independence. And the Armistice Agreements specifically provide, except in the case of Lebanon, that the demarcation lines can be changed

by agreement when the parties move from armistice to peace. Resolution 242 is based on that provision of the Armistice Agreements and states certain criteria that would justify changes in the demarcation lines when the parties make peace.

Many believe that the Palestine Mandate was somehow terminated in 1947, when the British government resigned as the mandatory power. This is incorrect. A trust never terminates when a trustee dies, resigns, embezzles the trust property, or is dismissed. The authority responsible for the trust appoints a new trustee, or otherwise arranges for the fulfillment of its purpose. Thus in the case of the Mandate for German South West Africa, the International Court of Justice found the South African government to be derelict in its duties as the mandatory power, and it was deemed to have resigned. Decades of struggle and diplomacy then resulted in the creation of the new state of Namibia, which has just come into being. In Palestine the British Mandate ceased to be operative as to the territories of Israel and Jordan when those states were created and recognized by the international community. But its rules apply still to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which have not yet been allocated either to Israel or to Jordan or become an independent state. Jordan attempted to annex the West Bank in 1951, but that annexation was never generally recognized, even by the Arab states, and now Jordan has abandoned all its claims to the territory.

The State Department has never denied that under the Mandate "the Jewish people" have the right to settle in the area. Instead, it said that Jewish settlements in the West Bank violate Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which deals with the protection of civilians in wartime. Where the territory of one contracting party is occupied by another contracting party, the Convention prohibits many of the inhumane practices of the Nazis and the Soviets before and during the Second World War—the mass transfer of people into or out of occupied territories for purposes of extermination, slave labor, or colonization, for example.

Article 49 provides that the occupying power "shall not deport or transfer part of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies." But the Jewish settlers in the West Bank are volunteers. They have not been "deported" or "transferred" by the government of Israel, and their movement involves none of the atrocious purposes or harmful effects on the existing population the Geneva Convention was designed to prevent. Furthermore, the Convention applies only to acts by one signatory "carried out on the territory of another." The West Bank is not the territory of a signatory power, but an unallocated part of the British Mandate. It is hard, therefore, to see how even the most literal-minded reading of the Convention could make it apply to Jewish settlement in territories of the British Mandate west of the Jordan River. Even if the Convention could be construed to prevent settlements during the period of occupation, however, it could do no more than sus-

pend, not terminate, the rights conferred by the Mandate. Those rights can be ended only by the establishment and recognition of a new state or the incorporation of the territories into an old one.

As claimants to the territory, the Israelis have denied that they are required to comply with the Geneva Convention but announced that they will do so as a matter of grace. The Israeli courts apply the Convention routinely, sometimes deciding against the Israeli government. Assuming for the moment the general applicability of the Convention, it could well be considered a violation if the Israelis deported convicts to the area or encouraged the settlement of people who had no right to live there (Americans, for example). But how can the Convention be deemed to apply to Jews who have a right to settle in the territories under international law: a legal right assured by treaty and specifically protected by Article 80 of the U.N. Charter, which provides that nothing in the Charter shall be construed "to alter in any manner" rights conferred by existing "international instruments" like the Mandate? The Jewish right of settlement in the area is equivalent in every way to the right of the existing Palestinian population to live there.

Another principle of international law may affect the problem of the Jewish settlements. Under international law, an occupying power is supposed to apply the prevailing law of the occupied territory at the municipal level unless it interferes with the necessities of security or administration or is "repugnant to elementary conceptions of justice." From 1949 to 1967, when Jordan was the military occupant of the West Bank, it applied its own laws to prevent any Jews from living in the territory. To suggest that Israel as occupant is required to enforce such Jordanian laws—a necessary implication of applying the Convention—is simply absurd. When the Allies occupied Germany after the Second World War, the abrogation of the Nuremberg Laws was among their first acts.

The general expectation of international law is that military occupations last a short time, and are succeeded by a state of peace established by treaty or otherwise. In the case of the West Bank, the territory was occupied by Jordan between 1949 and 1967, and has been occupied by Israel since 1967. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 rule that the Arab states and Israel must make peace, and that when "a just and lasting peace" is reached in the Middle East, Israel should withdraw from some but not all of the territory it occupied in the course of the 1967 war. The Resolutions leave it to the parties to agree on the terms of peace.

The controversy about Jewish settlements in the West Bank is not, therefore, about legal rights but about the political will to override legal rights. Is the United States prepared to use all its influence in Israel to award the whole of the West Bank to Jordan or to a new Arab state, and force Israel back to its 1967 borders? Throughout Israel's occupation, the Arab countries, helped by the United States, have pushed to keep Jews out of the terri-

teritories, so that at a convenient moment, or in a peace negotiation, the claim that the West Bank is "Arab" territory could be made more plausible. Some in Israel favor the settlements for the obverse reason: to reinforce Israel's claim for the fulfillment of the Mandate and of Resolution 242 in a peace treaty that would at least divide the territory. For the international community, the issue is much deeper and more difficult: whether the purposes of the Mandate can be considered satisfied if the Jews finally receive only the parts of Palestine behind the Armistice Lines—less than 17.5 percent of the land promised them after the First World War.

The extraordinary recent changes in the international environment have brought with them new diplomatic opportunities for the United States and its allies, not least in the Middle East. Soviet military aid apparently is no longer available to the Arabs for the purpose of making another war against Israel. The intifada has failed, and the Arabs' bargaining position is weakening. It now may be possible to take long steps toward peace. But to do so, the participants in the Middle East negotiations—the United States, Israel, Egypt, and the PLO—will have to look beyond the territories.

The goal of Yitzhak Shamir's election proposal is an interim regime of Arab autonomy in part of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the Camp David Accords; the goal of the PLO is to establish a Palestinian Arab state in the whole of the territories. It is hard to be sanguine about the possibility of reconciling those positions through negotiations. Establishing a cooperative relationship between Israel and the Arabs who live in the occupied territories is a crucial part of the Palestine problem, but it is not the whole of it, and surely not an end in itself. The last thing Israel wants is

an Arab Bantustan. If the status of the occupied territories is viewed in isolation, negotiation will be excruciatingly difficult, and every item on the agenda will be a tense and suspicious haggle on both sides.

The prospects for peace would be less forbidding if the question were approached as one element in a plan for achieving a larger goal: a confederation involving at least Israel, Jordan, and the occupied territories. Membership could perhaps be open to poor Lebanon as well, or parts of it. Even Syria, behind its ferocious words, may be preparing to move toward peace. Syria and Israel have congruent interest in Lebanon and elsewhere, and neither country wants a state dominated by the PLO as a neighbor.

The idea of a Palestinian confederation has been the recommendation of every serious study of the Palestine problem for more than fifty years. It was the essence of the partition proposals of the Peel Commission in 1936, and of the General Assembly's 1947 partition plan, at least for Israel and the West Bank. With different boundaries, it was also the basic idea of Israel's 1967 peace offer, which will always correspond to Israeli public opinion: Palestine divided into a Jewish and an Arab state, united in a common market, with special arrangements for Jerusalem and as much political cooperation as the traffic will bear. Before the intifada started, it was the notion behind the de facto Israeli-Jordanian condominium for the West Bank, which was both effective and practical.

After the past year's events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, who can say that progress in the Middle East is impossible?

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APRIL 16, 1990

TERRORISM LITE

Three times a year, by congressional mandate, the Bush administration must issue the Palestine Liberation Organization a report card, a written assessment of how closely it has abided by Yasir Arafat's forswearing of terrorism in December 1988. The first of these came in mid-March, and the PLO passed with flying colors. The State Department report asserts at the outset "that the PLO has adhered to its commitment . . . to renounce terrorism." Most who follow the Middle East will wonder about the honesty of such an unnuanced verdict, and even the uninitiated observer would have only to read the rest of the report to become similarly skeptical. Yes, it goes on to concede, at least nine of the thirty attacks launched against Israel by Palestinians since the PLO renounced terrorism have "involved constituent groups of the PLO." But this isn't to say, you understand, that the PLO hasn't kept its word.

The convolutions through which State Department logicians reached this conclusion are instructive. In most of these nine "border and rocket attacks," the report noted, "the intended target of the attack was unclear," and therefore can't be presumed to include civilians; thus it is impossible to say on which side of the PLO's fine line between "armed struggle" and "terrorism" these attacks fall. True, three PLO attacks were undeniably directed at civilians, such as a rocket attack on a border town in which an Israeli child was wounded (or "lightly wounded," as the report put it). But "we have no evidence . . . that the actions were authorized or approved by the PLO Executive Committee or by Arafat personally." Well, no, we don't. Even the new, upstanding Yasir Arafat hasn't yet opened the PLO's executive deliberations to C-SPAN. By this absurd standard of proof, it would be hard to prove that the PLO was *ever* involved in terrorism in a big way.

Now, it is true that the PLO isn't IBM, and that this chairman can't control the behavior of everyone who carries his logo. Though the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—both of which have plainly persisted in terrorism—occupy seats on the PLO's executive board, they are hardly Arafat's subordinates. (And

still less is Arafat able to yank the leash of many fundamentalist militant Palestinians within the occupied territories, whose violence—which includes, by the way, the annual murder of many Palestinians suspected of collaboration—may in some sense be directed as pointedly at Arafat as at Israel.) But bear in mind that various Palestinian terrorists once thought to be rogue groups—remember Black September?—turned out to be part of Fatah, Arafat's own PLO faction. Moreover, the U.S. dialogue that was officially sanctioned at the end of 1988 was not framed as being with Fatah alone, but with the PLO.

Besides, to get bogged down in a debate over what Arafat can and can't control, what he did and didn't approve, is to miss much of the point. The central, irrefutable, and intrinsically troubling fact is that since Arafat renounced terrorism, though Fatah itself has scaled down its direct involvement in terrorism, and *perhaps* ended it (Israel not implausibly contends otherwise), PLO factions have regularly been launching attacks against Israel. That means one of two things: either Arafat isn't trying to keep the PLO away from terrorism, or he isn't capable of doing so. Either way, one is forced to ponder the value of doing business with this man.

Of course, these two hypotheses aren't mutually exclusive, and both, as a matter of fact, have some truth. Still, there is value in distinguishing between them; it helps isolate what is most wrong-headed about the administration's bowdlerizing of the PLO's recent record.

The apparent aim is to keep the peace process alive. The decision in late 1988 to open communications with the PLO was premised on its continued renunciation of terrorism, and Secretary of State James Baker's fear seems to be that casting much doubt on Arafat's fidelity to this oath might lead Congress to step in and end the dialogue. So Baker chooses, in the name of the greater good, to see no evil.

This is dishonesty of the worst kind: the unproductive kind. Consider again our two hypotheses. To the extent that Palestinian terrorism continues because of



Arafat's sheer impotence, things look bleak for the Middle East's immediate future in any event. For the Palestinian problem ever to reach peaceful resolution, Palestinians must have enough political coherence to entrust one person, or one organization, or at least one reasonably unified coalition, with their voice. Obviously, if Arafat and the PLO don't fit that bill, no one else now does. To be sure, if the peace process acquires momentum, and Arafat comes closer to the prize of real Palestinian statehood, his power within the PLO may in some measure grow. And certainly, in that regard, the lack of recent progress is far from being all Arafat's fault; the Israeli government hasn't been showering the Palestinian people with auspicious overtures. But the larger point remains: to the extent that the State Department is right—that Arafat lacks the power to sharply curtail PLO terrorism—things look unpromising regardless of what the State Department does or doesn't say.

To the extent, on the other hand, that Arafat is able but unwilling to stifle terrorism, then things may look better—but only if his attitude changes. It is in this light that the danger of the administration's sophistry is most glaring. Obviously, if Arafat doesn't get his hand slapped when a few PLO missiles find their way into an Israeli town, missiles are likely to keep flying. And once they stop "lightly wounding" and start killing, lasting peace will be more remote than ever.

Actually, the State Department says it *has* slapped Arafat's hand. Shortly after insisting that he can't be blamed for the PLO's behavior, the report states: "We have made it clear to the PLO that these activities raise serious questions about the PLO's commitment to renounce terrorism. We are disappointed that the PLO has

not found a more authoritative way to distance or disassociate itself from activities undertaken by constituent groups acting independently. . . ." Disappointed? At the first official meeting between the United States and the PLO, in December 1988, the United States warned that the new dialogue would be ended if terrorism "by the PLO or any of its factions" continued, and it stressed that the PLO would be expected to condemn publicly all Palestinian terrorism. Now, fifteen months later, PLO factions have persisted in terrorism, and Arafat and his colleagues have done their best to avoid clearly condemning it. (Last summer, after fourteen passengers on an Israeli bus were killed by a Palestinian terrorist, Bassam Abu Sharif, a close adviser of Arafat's, said, "This is not terror. Shamir and his government are the terrorists.") And now the United States declares itself to be *disappointed* with the PLO's performance? How about an expression of, say, outrage? Or perhaps even words to this effect, stated publicly: "If terrorist attacks by the PLO continue at their present rate over the next year, we will have to reassess the value of sustaining a dialogue with the PLO."

The administration's aversion to issuing a warning even this fuzzy seems to lie in its fear that the bluff will be called: if Arafat can't or won't stifle terrorism, then the United States will sooner or later have to make good on its threat to stop talking to him, thus throwing a wrench into the works. But again, if Arafat is unable, even under pressure, even after the application of whatever political lubricant he possesses, to make the machine run, then the works are pretty thoroughly messed up to begin with. One more wrench is unlikely to hurt appreciably, and it could end up helping.



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INTOLERABLE DANGER

President Saddam Hussein is not given to euphemism, but his oath this week to "let our fire consume half of Israel", should that country attempt a pre-emptive strike against any Iraqi industrial plant, clothes the most horrible of intentions in an almost romantic vagueness. Iraq's fire means this: droplets of chemicals spreading through Israeli towns and cities, paralysing people, filling their lungs with deadly mucus, burning, blinding and maiming them, killing thousands.

Against modern chemical weapons, gas masks are poor defence. The poisons permeate clothing and skin. The use of these weapons has been outlawed since 1925, under the Geneva Protocol which Iraq has legally bound itself to observe.

President Saddam's insistence that Iraq would only launch chemical warfare if attacked does not, even if it were to be believed, alter the plain fact that Iraq has stated its readiness to commit an illegal act. It may be bluff. But even a first strike cannot be ruled out, given the ruthlessness and contempt for law of Iraq's totalitarian regime.

Iraq has already shown no compunction about using chemical weapons offensively, against civilian as well as military targets, in war and even in peacetime and against its own citizens. The evidence, meticulously documented by UN missions, has been greeted by near-silence from the international community, and Iraq's apparent impunity from sanctions has made it a hero to other countries tempted to produce the "poor man's atom bomb". Having hitherto tried to deny that it had, or had used, chemical weapons, Iraq now boasts of the sophistication of its chemical arsenal and its willingness to use it.

President Saddam's speech raises the stakes in the Middle East balance of terror. It confirms Iraq's readiness to flout international treaty law. It has been applauded by other Arab countries, including Jordan, and by the PLO. It represents a clear threat to international security in the meaning of the UN Charter. The Charter provides for collective action in these circumstances. Failing that, a threatened

country has the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.

If Iraq is not challenged this time, the world can give up any hope of enforcing the Chemical Weapons Convention which is entering the final negotiating stages in Geneva. Iraq's threat, while directed against Israel, has global implications.

Intervention to secure Iraqi compliance with international law would be wholly justified, including pre-emptive military strikes, on the lines of Israel's destruction of the Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981. That is clearly what Iraq now fears.

Iraq has installed missile launchers along its border with Syria, from which both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem are in range, exposing Israel to dreadful retaliation should it attempt to repeat the service to humanity it performed in 1981. It is hard to believe that any intervention by third parties — such as the great powers operating under some UN mandate — would relieve Israel of this same threat. Since, for the time being, it would appear that this gruesome balance of terror in the Middle East must be left without military resolution, concerted diplomatic pressure must be tried — as it has not been so far.

Where Iraq's nuclear capability is concerned, sanctions such as tighter controls on exports of Western technology might still just be effective. Western technology, thanks to weak controls and what amounts to official complicity in exports of "non-lethal" materials, has already transformed it into a chemically-armed power, able to manufacture space rockets, and missiles capable of delivering chemical warheads. Exporting such materials to Iraq should be made the most serious of international offences.

The entire world community, East and West, must state unequivocally that it regards the development of chemical and nuclear weapons by Iraq as intolerable. It must make that clear before the chorus of Arab adulation persuades President Saddam that terror is the key to the leadership of the Arab world he has sought for so long.

Some people say that
Israel should talk to the PLO.
How about if we just listen to what they say?



"The **State of Israel**
is one of the outcomes
of World War II and
must disappear,
just as the Berlin Wall
and other results of that
war are disappearing."

Yasser Arafat and
Muammar Khaddafi, agreement
quoted in Libyan News Agency
official release, January 6, 1990.

Israel will not bury its head in the sand.
Neither should the world.

משרד החוץ

ירושלים.

סוג _____

תאריך _____

אל: _____

מאח: לשכת סגן השר

הנרון: _____



נייר לה הפגנה.

צברי סאוצהמאסין

ניטש אשלי.

אשלי

בברכה

אום-צחור

ווצנונה

1. אלה היקוניה שרש בהאבה -
הביאו אצנו **אישור** לפני שנתנו להצפסה
צחור אהילה!

2. דקימא יבא אר ויקוצה א צנה ה- S.O.
בה צרף אצא - צחור שותקו רוצה
אליהם אלה.

מני
צחור
צחור



May 16, 1990

Review Of The U.S. State Department Report
on PLO Commitments Compliance

Executive Summary

As required by U.S. law (The PLO Commitments Compliance Act of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act), on March 19 the State Department submitted a report to Congress dealing with PLO actions and statements over the last fifteen months. The report intended to test the degree of PLO compliance with commitments undertaken by Yasser Arafat in Geneva on December 14, 1988. At that time, Arafat declared that the PLO would desist from terror, recognize Israel, and accept UN resolutions 242 and 338.

The State Department report does not present an accurate portrayal of PLO actions since 1988. Neither does the report present commensurately the full gamut of PLO leadership statements publicly-made since the initiation of the dialogue with the United States.

In both cases the State Department report is specious and misses evidence damning for the PLO in terms of compliance with its Geneva commitments:

- * The report does not mention numerous terrorist raids staged by constituent PLO groups since December 1988. Only cross-border raids are tallied and no hint appears in the report of the many terror attacks on civilians by Fatah operating inside Israel proper.
- * The report makes no mention of the heavy PLO involvement in violence by Palestinians against other Palestinians .
- * The report cites quotations from PLO leaders in an extremely selective manner. PLO leaders speak often in an open and brutal manner about their real intentions with regard to terror attacks and the Phased Plan. The report's assertion that "PLO official statements have been generally consistent with the commitments undertaken by Arafat" ignores these many clear signals of intent.
- * The PLO has not in any way disassociated itself from terror attacks, nor has it disciplined members implicated in such actions. The report completely understates this fact.

Review of the facts leads to only one conclusion: The PLO has not stood by its commitments, by any standard.



-2-

Background:

U.S. Conditions for Dialogue with the PLO

In 1984 the United States reaffirmed and codified its policy regarding the PLO in the U.S. Congress Amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill (Title XIII, Section 1302). The amendment forbade negotiations with the PLO (except in emergency or humanitarian situations) "unless and until the Palestine Liberation Organization recognizes Israel's right to exist, accepts United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and renounces the use of terrorism."

On December 15, 1988, based on Arafat's Geneva declaration, the United States began a dialogue with the PLO.

On December 22, 1988, Ronald Reagan, then President of the United States, wrote to Prime Minister Shamir:

"I am under no illusion about the PLO. Their words will have to be supported by action, namely a continuing renunciation of terrorism and disassociation from those who perpetrate it..."

According to the policy statement issued by the State Department to Ambassador Robert Pelletreau Jr. in Tunis, and which was delivered to the Government of Israel by the U.S. Ambassador to Israel Thomas Pickering in December 1988:

- * No American Administration can sustain the dialogue if terrorism continues by the PLO or any of its factions.
- * The PLO was required to publicly disassociate itself from terrorism by any Palestinian group operating anywhere;
- * The PLO was expected to condemn publicly any terrorist action carried out by any element of the PLO and also to discipline those responsible, at least by expelling them from the PLO.

Speaking at a sub-committee of the Senate Appropriations Committee on March 15, 1989, Secretary of State Baker said:

"...if the PLO resorted to terrorism, failed to keep their commitment to renounce terrorism, it would be an occasion for the United States to break off its dialogue."



Point by Point Review of the State Department Report

PLO Attacks on Civilian Targets Since the Geneva Declaration:

A. The State Department report notes "thirty border and rocket attacks by Palestinian groups against Israel, at least nine of which have involved constituent groups of the PLO."

The report completely neglects to cite the many terrorist attacks against civilians launched by Fatah cells within Israel's pre-1967 borders since the Geneva declaration. These attacks were planned and carried out by Fatah or the Fatah strike-organs, Western Sector or Force 17:

- 1) February 24, 1989 - Molotov cocktail thrown at private car near Nazareth by Force 17.
- 2) March 20, 1989 - Bomb placed at hospital bus station in Petah Tikva by Force 17.
- 3) March 21, 1989 - Bomb placed again at same location by Force 17.
- 4) March 23, 1989 - Molotov thrown at private automobile near Kibbutz Kfar Hakhoreh by Force 17.
- 5) March 29, 1989 - Handgrenade thrown at public bus on Nazareth - Afula road by Force 17.
- 6) March 31, 1989 - Bomb placed at entrance to Kfar Avraham synagogue by Force 17.
- 7) April 11, 1989 - Bomb placed in irrigation station near Afula by Fatah.
- 8) April 16, 1989 - Bomb placed next to apartment building in Pardes Katz by Force 17.
- 9) April 30, 1989 - Bomb placed on main thoroughfare of Ramat Gan by Force 17.
- 10) May 15, 1989 - Bomb placed in industrial zone near Petah Tikva by Force 17.
- 11) May 16, 1989 - Bomb placed in Liberty Bell Park, Jerusalem by Western Sector.
- 12) June 5, 1989 - Bomb placed in central Tel Aviv by Force 17.

In addition, tens of Fatah operatives were arrested prior to carrying out attacks. One was killed when his bomb exploded during preparations for an attack in Tel Aviv.



-4-

B. Of the thirty armed attacks by Palestinian groups, the State Department report says that, in most cases, the intended target was unclear. The report mentions only three cross-border attacks in which civilians appeared to be the intended target.

The report fails to cite the following five attempted terror attacks and katyusha shellings on Israeli border towns. In these cases, the attackers' objective was clearly civilian:

- 1) March 2, 1989 - Five DFLP (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine - headed by Naif Hawatmeh) men were intercepted by the IDF on their way to Zarit, a civilian farming village. Four of the men were killed in the clash and one escaped. The DFLP communique, released the same day to the Lebanese newspaper Al-Nahar, said: "The squad attacked positions of the occupying army in the settlement of Zarit which is located in occupied northern Palestine." The PLO systematically refers to civilian objectives as military targets.
- 2) October 6, 1989 - Infiltration attempt across Israel's northern border by the PLF (Palestine Liberation Front - headed by Abu al-Abbas). The PLO faction took responsibility for the attempted raid against Israeli kibbutz Misgav Am. Documents found with the terrorists declared the operation was intended to show that "the Palestinian fighter is capable of reaching into your own home."
- 3) January 26, 1990 - Infiltration attempt across Israel's northern border by the DFLP. The terror squad was on its way to attack the Israeli kibbutz Misgav Am, as proven by the map carried by the terrorists charting their route to the kibbutz. Moreover, the DFLP leadership proclaimed that Misgav Am was their intended target.
- 4) February 3, 1990 - Following the infiltration attempt by members of the Palestine Liberation Front (Abu al-Abbas faction) on the Lebanese border, the organization claimed responsibility for the intended attack into Israel's territory. In a radio broadcast, it was announced that the aim was to reach a civilian target.
- 5) March 16, 1990 - Three heavily-armed terrorists were intercepted while on their way to a raid into Israel. In an announcement claiming its responsibility for the infiltration attempt, the DFLP identified the intended target as the village of Zarit.

It should be noted that the PLF, DFLP, and PFLP are important PLO factions which accept Arafat's leadership of the PLO, and the decisions of the PNC ("Palestine National Council"), the supreme policy-making body of the PLO.



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C. The State Department report says: "We have no evidence in those cases or any others that the actions were authorized or approved by the PLO Executive Committee or Arafat personally."

However, terror operations do not require a formal decision by Arafat or the PLO Executive Committee. The three organizational bodies within Fatah responsible for terror attacks (the Western Sector, Force 17, and the Hawari Apparatus) are headed by senior Fatah officials in Arafat's inner circle. These organizational bodies derive their authority from Arafat and Executive Committee backing.

In addition, Arafat himself currently commands Western Sector. Force 17 is headed by one of Arafat's closest associates, Abu Tayyeb.

From the policy statement issued to Ambassador Pelletreau in Tunis, it is clear that the U.S. Government regards Arafat as responsible for the actions of the PLO as a whole, including all of its member organizations and bodies.

Moreover, in refusing to grant a visa to Arafat (on November 26, 1988) the Department of State addressed Arafat's personal responsibility for the terrorist acts carried out by Fatah, and concluded that:

"...As Chairman of the PLO, Mr. Arafat is responsible for actions of these organizations (Force 17 and the Hawari Apparatus) which are units of Fatah, an element of the PLO, of which he also is chairman and which is under his control..."

D. The State Department report mentions the terrorist attack on an Israeli tourist bus in Egypt, concluding that the responsible groups were not PLO members.

The report conspicuously fails to note the absence of PLO condemnation of the attack as required by U.S. Government policy. Similarly, the report does not note the tidal wave of anti-PLO criticism that swept the Egyptian press following PLO failure to condemn the attack.

E. The State Department report addresses the issue of U.S. extradition requests for Muhammad Rashid and Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas), two PLO members involved in terrorist attacks in which American citizens were injured and killed.

Abu Abbas, PLF head and member of the PLO Executive Committee, was responsible for the attack on the Achille Lauro cruise ship in October 1985 in the course of which a U.S. citizen, Leon Klinghoffer, was murdered.



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The State Department states that "there is no current U.S. extradition request for Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas) because there are no pending U.S. criminal charges against him."

Actually, a criminal charge was laid against him and the U.S. Government requested his extradition in October 1985. These were cancelled in November 1987, even though he had already been convicted by an Italian court.

Furthermore, one of the bases for the U.S. government determining that Arafat was sufficiently associated with terrorism to deny him a visa, was Abu Abbas' membership on the PLO Executive Committee.

The State Department report ignores these facts.

PLO and the Intifada

The State Department reports "an alarming increase in violence by Palestinians against other Palestinians." It does not weigh the role of the PLO, in the guise of the Unified Command, as a major killer of Palestinians.

No mention is made of Arafat's role in initiating the process of Palestinians killing Palestinians. In January 1989 he threatened Palestinians, such as Bethlehem mayor Elias Freij, with "ten bullets in the chest" for thinking of stopping the intifada (from a State Department recording, January 1989).

No mention is made of Arafat statements in which he takes direct responsibility for authorizing summary executions of Palestinians on a mass scale.

In the Jordanian newspaper Al-Rai (October 10, 1989), Arafat stated:

"...I gave them [the Unified Command in the Territories] the authority of the General Commander to sign the execution warrants, just as I granted this same authority to the regional commander in South Lebanon."

Similarly, in the Egyptian weekly, Al-Mussawar (January 25, 1990) he declared:

"The decision to impose death sentences must be made by the Unified Command unanimously... We tell them: If you can, send us the file, and we will examine it. In any case, if this is difficult, there is no choice but to send the files after the executions, so that they can be examined."

Abu Iyad (A.F.P., August 29, 1989) and Bassam Abu Sharif (BBC Arabic Service, September 19, 1989) also admitted large scale PLO involvement in the killings and justified them.



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PLO Covenant

The State Department report contends that the PLO "is willing" to consider revision of its Covenant in the context of an overall peace agreement.

However, this is not supported by any official decision made by any constituent organ of the PLO, and in fact the Covenant has been neither cancelled nor amended. Moreover, as Arafat himself explained (in a May 3, 1989 interview on Radio Europe, according to A.P.), only the PNC is authorized to do this. Significantly, he has never raised the issue of amending or cancelling the Covenant before this forum of the PLO.

Even though the U.S. has not explicitly demanded that the PLO cancel its Covenant it is clear that the Covenant constitutes a fundamental contradiction to the whole thrust of Arafat's Geneva statement, and its remaining in force is an ongoing violation of the U.S. condition that the PLO recognize Israel's right to exist.

PLO Statements

The State Department report emphasizes statements by key PLO leaders made in the Western press for European and American ears, while ignoring emphatic statements to the contrary made by these same people for domestic consumption in the Arabic press. As such, the report puts forward a skewed perception in which men like Abu Iyad and Naif Hawatmeh are made out as moderates.

PLO Statements on Terrorism

The report quotes PLO leaders selectively and does not present a true picture of their stated opinions.

On page 8 the report cites Naif Hawatmeh as opposing attacks on civilian targets. But other readily available Hawatmeh quotes that convey the contrary message do not appear. For example, on March 2, 1989 Hawatmeh spoke to a Reuter correspondent in Damascus following an attempted DFLP raid on the farming village Zarit. He vowed to mount more attacks against Israel.

The State Department report makes no reference to the Hawatmeh statement even though it was published by a major news wire service.



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Yasser Arafat's encouragement of terrorism found recent expression in his exhortations to shoot new immigrants (Al-Moharer, April 10, 1990). The article appeared after the State Department report was issued. The Paris-based weekly reported on a meeting between Arafat and Western Sector staff in which Arafat ordered Western Sector to open fire on Jewish immigrants to Israel. The Al-Moharer report provides a rare glimpse at the discreet but close coordination between Arafat and Fatah bodies responsible for planning terror attacks.

PLO Statements on the Strategy of Phases

The report quotes Salah Khalaf's (Abu Iyad) article in the Spring 1990 issue of Foreign Policy, in which he endorses a two-state solution. But no mention is made of the following statements by Abu Iyad to the Kuwaiti Arabic-language press:

"At first a small state, and with the help of Allah, it will be made large, and expand to the east, west, north, and south.... I am interested in the liberation of Palestine, step by step."

Al-Anba (December 18, 1988).

"There was no PLO recognition of Israel, neither in the PNC [Palestine National Council] decisions in Algiers nor in Arafat's address to the UN in Geneva."

Al-Watan (February 11, 1989)

Similarly, the report quotes Nabil Sha'ath as a model of moderation. But the report does not cite the following statement made by Sha'ath in the Arabic press:

"Unlike Arafat... the concessions given by Sadat were not rhetorical but were actual. The strategic situation is crystal clear. I want to liberate a part of the Arab soil and that cannot be achieved by war...we shall then have to liberate the rest."

Al-Anba (February 28, 1989)

The report leaves the mistaken impression that only George Habash (page 10) sees a West Bank state as a stepping stone to a larger Palestinian state in place of Israel. In fact, almost all prominent PLO leaders, including Yasser Arafat, have expressed themselves in this vein.



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Conclusion

The PLO has not lived up to commitments made by Arafat in Geneva in December 1988. The State Department report's conclusion "that the PLO has adhered to its commitment" is not based on a complete and disinterested review of the readily available evidence.

The State Department report suffers from many factual inaccuracies. Numerous terror attacks from across Israel's borders as well as inside Israel are not recorded in the report.

Quotations from PLO leaders are presented selectively. The radical statements made by these same personalities in the Arab press do not appear in the report.

The State Department report does not adequately address the pervasive PLO involvement in Palestinian violence against other Palestinians in the occupied territories.

The PLO has never disassociated itself from terror attacks or disciplined its members that were involved. The State Department report broaches this topic only in the most cursory manner.

The State Department report sums up:

"The policy of this Administration is to measure PLO actions and statements against the commitments the PLO undertook in December 1988."

A full review of the facts shows that the PLO has not stood by its commitments, by any standard.



THE PLO: HAS IT COMPLIED WITH ITS COMMITMENTS?

May 1990



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Nearly a year and a half has passed since Arafat's remarks at a press conference in Geneva (December 14, 1988), during which he supposedly renounced terror and recognized Israel's right to exist. His statements became the basis for the U.S. decision to begin a dialogue with the PLO.

On March 19, 1990, pursuant to a law passed by Congress ("The PLO Commitments Compliance Act of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act"), the U.S. State Department submitted to Congress a report which largely dealt with PLO activities and statements since December 1988. The report, however, did not adequately address the PLO's blatant and severe violations of its commitments to the United States. In the ten areas stipulated in the U.S. law, the PLO clearly maintains its fundamental line of terrorism and rejection of Israel's right to exist.

- 1) PLO statements and actions continue to pursue a course of terrorism and the rejection of Israel's legitimate existence.
- 2) PLO terrorists have not been penalized for their actions during the past months, and the PLO continues to advocate the "armed struggle."
- 3) The PLO Covenant stands as the ideological credo of the PLO, and the statements of PLO leaders point out that no attempt has been made by the PNC to repeal the Covenant or change any of its provisions advocating the elimination of Israel.
- 4) The PLO's "Phased Plan" remains the key PLO strategy for implementing its Covenant, and PLO leaders reaffirm that the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories would be just a prelude to expanding such a state in "all of Palestine".
- 5) The PLO has not only refrained from encouraging the Arab states to recognize and negotiate directly with Israel, but has tried to intensify the confrontation of the Arab states with Israel, and even draw them into war.
- 6) The PLO terror units have been reorganized and strengthened.
- 7) All of the PLO factions which participated in the November 1988 PNC have engaged in infiltration attempts since December 1988, and Arafat, instead of trying to halt the terror operations, has endorsed them.
- 8) The PLO has called for escalating the violence of the intifada, and has been responsible for the murder of scores of Palestinian Arabs.



- 9) The PLO has opposed the extradition and prosecution of PLO terrorists wanted for attacks abroad.
- 10) The PLO has refused to acknowledge its responsibility for PLO terrorism, and has not compensated American victims.



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I. INTRODUCTION

At a press conference in Geneva on December 14, 1988, Yasser Arafat made a statement which supposedly met U.S. conditions for initiating a dialogue with the PLO. Among those conditions were the renunciation of terror and recognition of Israel's right to exist.

On December 15, 1988, the United States began contacts with the PLO. At the first U.S.-PLO meeting, the U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia made the U.S. requirements for maintaining the dialogue eminently clear to the PLO:

- * No American Administration could sustain the dialogue if terrorism by the PLO or any of its factions continued;
- * The PLO must publicly disassociate itself from terrorism by any Palestinian group operating anywhere;
- * The PLO was expected to discipline those of its elements responsible for terrorism -- at least by expelling them from the PLO.

The U.S. policy, first enunciated by the Reagan Administration, also found expression in the early months of the Bush Administration. Speaking at a sub-committee of the Senate Appropriations Committee on March 15, 1989, Secretary of State Baker said that the U.S. would have to take a second look at the dialogue and would have serious questions about continuing the dialogue if there was a "resort to terrorism by Arafat and the elements of the PLO which he controls or has the ability to control." Secretary Baker stated, "if the PLO resorted to terrorism, failed to keep their commitment to renounce terrorism, it would be an occasion for the United States to break off its dialogue."

However, subsequent events and PLO statements clearly show that the PLO has violated the commitments it was said to have made. The PLO continues to advocate and carry out acts of terrorism. The PLO continues to seek the elimination of Israel, and in its statements, almost all of them in Arabic, the PLO does not hesitate to say that a Palestinian state would be the instrument for achieving that objective.

On March 19, as required by U.S. law (The PLO Commitments Compliance Act of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act), the U.S. State Department submitted to Congress its report which largely dealt with PLO activities and statements.

The State Department report does take notice of "thirty border and rocket attacks by Palestinian groups against Israel," the "alarming increase in violence by Palestinians against other Palestinians," and "numerous examples of contradictory and ambiguous statements by leading PLO officials and constituent groups." However, the report's observations does not adequately address the PLO's blatant and severe violations of its commitments to the United States.



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In recent weeks, Arafat has encouraged terrorism against Jewish immigrants and the PLO has engaged in an intense campaign, together with the Arab world, against Jewish immigration. Moreover, Arafat has aligned the PLO with the threatening policies of Libya and Iraq. Once again, the PLO is proving that, regardless of what it says in the West, it is an enemy of peace and stability in the Middle East.



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II. PLO STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS

Both in word and deed, the PLO continues to practice and preach terrorism and violence, and seeks to undermine Israel's existence.

Terrorism and Violence

Since Arafat's December 1988 statement, and by early May 1990, no less than 22 infiltration attempts were launched by various PLO factions which had participated in the deliberations of the PNC (the PLO's "Palestine National Council") in November 1988 and had accepted the PNC's decisions. In most cases, the PLO squads, intercepted by the Israel Defense Forces before reaching their targets, were clearly planning to carry out wholesale massacres of innocent civilians. Among the attempted raids was one carried out in Israel's south on December 5, 1989 by a squad belonging to Arafat's FATAH.

Since the adoption of the PLO Covenant, "armed struggle" has been the term used by the PLO to characterize terrorist attacks on innocent civilians. Not only did Arafat say on Austrian television on December 19, 1988, just five days after speaking in Geneva, that he "did not mean to renounce" terrorism, but he and other leading figures in the PLO have on numerous occasions stated that the "armed struggle" has not ended. Only a little over a week after Arafat's Geneva press conference, Salim Zaanoun, Deputy PNC Chairman and member of the FATAH Central Committee said, "The armed struggle must continue, everywhere, against the Zionist enemy and his allies... We have no alternative but to carry out armed activity in order to vanquish the enemy and establish our state" (Al-Anba, Kuwait, December 23, 1988).

Arafat openly contradicted his December 1988 statement "renouncing" terrorism, when on June 6, 1989, at a press conference in Kuwait, he said, "The PLO will not stop the armed struggle" (Associated Press). Arafat told the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Anba on February 12, 1990, that that PLO has not given up the rifle, and that he remains the General Commander of PLO forces.

Arafat's Number Two, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), said on March 28, 1989 (Akhbar Al-Khaleej, Bahrain), "The PLO has no intention of ending the armed struggle." Hani al-Hassan, one of Arafat's closest advisors, told the Qatar newspaper Al-Rayah on January 13, 1990, "The Palestinian armed struggle has not come to an end...."

On August 8, 1989, at the meeting of Arafat's FATAH in Tunis, a resolution was adopted calling for the "continuation, intensification and escalation of the armed struggle in order to liquidate the Zionist occupation of our Palestinian land." On January 31, 1990, the PLO Executive Committee, convening in Tunis, called for a continuation of the armed struggle.

The PLO's supposed renunciation of terrorism is also contradicted by its continuing encouragement of terror and the threats it continues to make. In late March 1990, Arafat gave key FATAH personnel orders to murder Jewish immigrants: "Open fire on the new Jewish immigrants -- be they from the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, or anywhere else. ...It makes



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no difference whether they live in Jaffa or in Jericho" (April 10, 1990, Al-Moharer, Lebanese newspaper published in Paris).

Threats and calls for terror activities have also been made by Arafat's Number Two, Salah Khalaf, who said on January 22, 1990 (Associated Press), "The Middle East peace efforts have reached a stalemate.... The PLO now has no alternative but to escalate armed struggle outside the occupied territories in support of the uprising." Following the gun-and-grenade attack on Israeli tourists in Egypt on February 4, 1990, Salah Khalaf told the Algerian daily Al Sha'ab that if the Israeli mentality is maintained, "they must expect similar operations (in the future)" (Reuter, February 8, 1990).

The PLO has also openly backed PLO terrorism against Palestinian Arabs. PLO death squads have been responsible for many of the murders of Palestinian Arabs since the intifada began, and Arafat himself has openly justified and taken responsibility for ordering such killings.

Rejecting the Existence of Israel

Numerous statements made in past months by leading figures of the PLO have indicated that the PLO has not abandoned its goal of destroying Israel. The PLO insists that the establishment of an independent Palestinian state is the opening move in a strategy for taking over "all of Palestine." Arafat himself recently made this clearly when he said "The Palestinian people's struggle will continue until the complete liberation of the Palestinian land. ...The Palestinian people's struggle ought to be assisted until the complete liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea. ...We will fight until the last bullet, until the last drop of blood, and until the last stone in our land" (May 1, 1990, Libyan News Agency, also quoted by Agence France Presse).

On February 11, 1989, Salah Khalaf said, "There was no PLO recognition of Israel, neither in the PNC [Palestine National Council] decisions in Algiers nor in Arafat's address to the UN in Geneva" (Al-Watan, Kuwait). Sheikh Abd Al-Hamid Al-Sayeh, Chairman of the PNC, said in January 1989 (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Saudi Arabian newspaper published in London, January 13, 1989), "If you read the political statement [of the Algiers PNC] carefully, you will find that what some term recognition of the Zionist entity is untrue."

PLO statements are replete with references to the PLO's "Phased Plan", the program for liquidating Israel in stages. Another indication of PLO intentions is its demands concerning the "right of return", a code for overwhelming Israel with millions of hostile Palestinian refugees opposed to its very existence. Arafat himself has indicated on more than one occasion that the "right of return" is a PLO precondition. On January 13, 1989, Arafat said, "The Palestinian uprising will in no way end until the attainment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return...." (Qatar News Agency). On December 9, 1989, he said on PLO Radio from Baghdad, "There will be no peace other than through realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, first and foremost --



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the right of return, self-determination, and establishment of a Palestinian state, with its capital in Jerusalem."

Rafik Al-Natshe, member of the FATAH Central Committee, explained the PLO's interpretation of the "right of return" when he said in Arafat's presence in Riyadh on January 1, 1989 -- at a commemoration of the 24th anniversary of the beginning of FATAH activities against Israel: "Our return to Palestine and our victory will be possible only with Allah's help and with our return to Faluja, Jaffa, and Haifa" (Saudi News Agency, January 2, 1989). Sheikh Abd Al-Hamid Al-Sayeh, PNC Chairman, said on January 29, 1989, "The PLO is following the path which it must pursue until the return [of Palestinian refugees] is achieved.... We want the whole of Palestine" (Okaz, Saudi Arabia).

The fact that the PLO Covenant, which calls for Israel's destruction, has not been abrogated or even revised provides additional evidence regarding PLO intentions. Arafat's FATAH echoed the Covenant's denial of Israel's legality, when the FATAH conference in August 1989 declared:

"The Zionist conquest came at the beginning of this century to uproot the Palestinian people, end their civilization, and implant a Zionist entity.... The Palestinian people have held out in the face of this Zionist-colonialist barbarism.... The crime was consummated by the partition of Palestine and the establishment of the Zionist entity state in 1948."

The PLO's continued rejection of Israel's right to exist is also embodied in its vociferous campaign against Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel. The PLO opposition to Jewish immigration to Israel is total, regardless of boundaries, and is aimed at depriving Israel of its very *raison d'être* as the home for the Jewish people. While the PLO has, as in other cases, camouflaged its intentions when speaking to Western audiences, the real PLO position on the issue of Jewish immigration is exposed by such PLO spokesmen as Muhammad Daoud Odeh and Mahmoud Abbas.

Muhammad Daoud Odeh (Abu Daoud), Member of the FATAH Revolutionary Council and Member of the PLO's PNC, told the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Qabas on April 23, 1990 that steps must be taken against Jewish immigration since its cessation would lead to the extinction of the Zionist state, i.e. Israel. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Maazen) told the Saudi London-based newspaper Al-Majallah (March 13, 1990) that had the Jews from the Arab countries not emigrated to Israel, leaving the Jewish state with a small population since 1948, Israel would not have lasted: "The immigration for Israel is like an important artery connected to a man's heart, and it nourishes Israel in its economy, soldiers, workers and farmers. Therefore, we consider the immigration to be the most important challenge facing the Arab Nation, without relating to its approach and origin."

PLO aims, vis-a-vis Israel, are also evident in the PLO's desire for coordination with the extremist Islamic fundamentalist organization, HAMAS, also operating against Israelis and Palestinian Arabs in the territories. On PLO Radio, broadcasting from Baghdad on February 13,



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1990, Arafat sent a message calling for strengthened unification with various extremist Palestinian factions, including HAMAS and the "Islamic Jihad" (the "Islamic Jihad" claimed responsibility for the February 14 terror attack on Israeli tourists in Egypt).

In calling for cooperation with HAMAS, the PLO explains that, notwithstanding tactical differences, both organizations share the same ultimate objective. Thus, one of Arafat's closest advisors, Hani al-Hassan, declared, "the disagreement between the PLO and HAMAS is not ideological" (Al-Rayah, Qatar, January 13, 1990). Rafik al-Natshe, a member of the FATAH Central Committee, told the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Qabas in an interview on December 26, 1989, "[HAMAS says] All of Palestine is ours and we want to liberate it from the river to the sea at one go. But FATAH, which leads the PLO, feels that a phased plan must be pursued. Both sides agree on the final objective. The difference between them is the way there."



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PLO Leaders on Terrorism and "Armed Struggle"

Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO:

Q: "Mr. Arafat, last week at this famous press conference you renounced terrorism. Have you done this due to American pressure?"

A: "I did not mean to renounce.... Actually, I only repeated what our Palestine National Council had accepted.... I am still now committed to what I said in Cairo in 1985."

(December 19, 1988, Interview with Viennese TV)

Note : While proscribing terror operations outside of Israel, Arafat's Cairo Declaration of November 1985 said that the PLO would continue to carry out operations inside Israel and the territories. The FATAH, as well as other PLO factions, violated this PLO commitment to abstain from terrorism abroad: one major acts of international terrorism was the April 1986 bombing of a TWA flight over Greece, carried out by the "Hawari Apparatus" of the FATAH.

"The PLO will not stop the armed struggle. I did not ask anybody to refrain from military operations."

(June 6, 1989, Speaking at a press conference in Kuwait, Associated Press)

Note: The PLO has on numerous occasions referred to attacks on innocent civilians as "military operations" against "military targets." This was seen, for example, when FATAH/Arafat terrorists seized a bus on the Beersheba-Dimona highway on March 7, 1988, killing three civilians, including two women.

"Open fire on the new Jewish immigrants -- be they from the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, or anywhere else. ...I want you to shoot, on the ground or in the air, at every immigrant who thinks our land is a playground and who thinks that immigration to it is a vacation or picnic. ...It makes no difference whether they live in Jaffa or in Jericho. I give you explicit instructions to open fire. ...I give you my instructions to use violence against the immigrants. I will jail whoever refuses to do this. My words are not just a threat, they are the reality."

(April 10, 1990, Al-Moharer, Lebanese newspaper published in Paris, quoting Arafat from a speech he made at a meeting with leading FATAH terrorist leaders in late March)

Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Second to Arafat:

"We must concentrate all our thoughts and our plans in order that the 'Palestinian Rifle' will continue and escalate to a greater intensity than ever before ..."

(December 16, 1988, Al-Qabas, Kuwait)

"We have never interpreted [renunciation of] terror as meaning a suspension of military operations."

(March 4, 1989, Radio Monte Carlo)



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Salah Khalaf (cont.):

"The PLO did not agree with the U.S. that the definition of terrorism includes the armed struggle.... The PLO has no intention of ending the armed struggle."

(March 28, 1989, Akhbar Al-Khaleej, Bahrain)

"The PLO adheres to the principle of armed struggle, but its scope is to be determined in accordance with the political circumstances."

(April 17, 1989, Al Ousboa Al Arabi, Lebanon)

"The Middle East peace efforts have reached a stalemate.... The PLO now has no alternative but to escalate armed struggle outside the occupied territories in support of the uprising."

(January 22, 1990, Associated Press)

Farouk Kaddoumi, Head of the PLO's Political Department in charge of the PLO's foreign affairs:

"The rifle is one of the principal and necessary tools of our struggle in the past and in the future.... We change our methods in every phase of our national struggle. However, the rifle will remain in our hands until we regain our land.... We will pitch our tent in those places which our bullets can reach. The extent of the Palestinian People's might will determine the location of this tent, which will then form the base from which we will later pursue the next phase."

(April 4, 1989, Interview with the BBC Arabic Service)

Q: "Arafat has renounced terrorism in Geneva .."

A: "That is a misrepresentation of Chairman Arafat's statements. ... We denounce terrorism, especially the state terrorism by Israel."

Q: "Does that mean that the words that made Shultz begin a dialogue are null and void?"

A: "Shultz can go to hell. I suppose he is already on his way there."

(May 18, 1989, Interview with Politiken, Denmark)

Hani Al-Hassan, Senior Arafat Advisor and Member of the FATAH Central Committee:

"The Palestinian armed struggle has not come to an end and the PLO will not abandon the uprising in the occupied land."

(January 13, 1990, Al-Rayah, Qatar)

Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Maazen), Member of the PLO Executive Committee and Member of the FATAH Central Committee:

"The words 'renewing the armed struggle' leave the impression that we decided to end it -- something that is not true."

(March 4, 1990, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Saudi newspaper published in London)



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Mahmoud Abbas (cont.):

"The peace policy is one thing and the armed struggle another. I want to state and emphasize that we never declared a freeze on the armed struggle and its cessation. That is a big lie and I do not know who is spreading it."

(March 13, 1990, Al-Majallah, Saudi newspaper published in London)

Rafik Al-Natshe, Member of the FATAH Central Committee and PLO Representative in Saudi Arabia:

"There is nothing, beyond the borders of the uprising and beyond the places where the masses are concentrated, to prevent the use of the armed struggle and attacks on Israeli military targets. I include myself among those who believe that weapons must not be used in the uprising, but when Arab land neighboring Palestine is found, through which the Palestinian and Arab leadership will be able to mobilize the military resources of the Palestinian people, then the use of weapons will be natural.

(March 23, 1990, Al-Hawadath, Lebanese newspaper published in London)

Nabil Sha'ath, Senior Political Advisor to Arafat and Chairman of the PNC Political Committee:

"The Palestinian side did not and never will accept any decision to end the armed struggle."

(January 9, 1990, Al Sha'ab, Egypt)

Salim Zaanoun, Deputy PNC Chairman and FATAH Central Committee Member:

"The armed struggle must continue, everywhere, against the Zionist enemy and his allies... We have no alternative but to carry out armed activity in order to vanquish the enemy and establish our state."

(December 23, 1988, Al-Anba, Kuwait)

Muhammad Daoud Odeh (Abu Daoud), Member of the FATAH Revolutionary Council and Member of the PLO's PNC:

"Israel is an imperialist entity. ...We must intensify the attacks and the blows from all sides.In my view, all the Arab fronts surrounding the occupied land are fronts that are open to us, whether they like it or not. ...Even were there to be an Arab state whose border stretches for just two kilometers with the Palestinian land, we would use that border to maintain the armed struggle through it."

(April 23, 1990, the international edition of Al-Qabas, Kuwaiti newspaper)



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Naif Hawatmeh, leader of the DFLP ("Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine"), the PLO's third largest faction":

"We have recently launched a series of attacks against Israel and will launch more. Such attacks are a sacred right for our people."

(May 21, 1989, speaking in Abu Dhabi, quoted by Reuter)

Yasser Abd Rabbo, Deputy Secretary-General of the DFLP and Head of the PLO delegation to the U.S.-PLO talks in Tunis:

"In not a single meeting with the Americans did the PLO promise to adhere to a halt in military operations against Israeli military targets.... The PLO, while expressing its opposition to terrorism, feels that the struggle by all its various methods against the Israeli occupation is not considered to be terrorism."

(June 12, 1989, Middle East News Agency)



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PLO Leaders On Recognition of Israel

Yasser Arafat, PLO Chairman:

"The land of Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinians, and the homeland of the Arab nation from the Ocean to the Gulf. ...The PLO offers not the peace of the weak, but the peace of Saladin."
(January 2, 1989, Saudi News Agency)

Note: In 1192, Saladin concluded a peace treaty with the Crusaders. Soon thereafter, the Moslems attacked the Crusaders and drove them out of the Holy Land.

"The Palestinian uprising will in no way end until the attainment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return...."
(January 13, 1989, Qatar News Agency).

"There will be no peace other than through realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, first and foremost -- the right of return, self-determination, and establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem."
(December 9, 1989, PLO Radio in Baghdad)

"The Palestinian people's struggle will continue until the complete liberation of the Palestinian land. ...The Palestinian people's struggle ought to be assisted until the complete liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea. ...We will fight until the last bullet, until the last drop of blood, and until the last stone in our land."
(May 1, 1990, Libyan News Agency, also quoted by Agence France Presse)

Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Second to Arafat:

"There was no PLO recognition of Israel, neither in the PNC [Palestine National Council] decisions in Algiers nor in Arafat's address to the UN in Geneva."
(February 11, 1989, Al-Watan, Kuwait)

Sheikh Abd Al-Hamid Al-Sayeh, Chairman of the PNC:

"All Palestinian elements and citizens, regardless of their inclinations, must direct their power against the enemy. And when we get rid of him, the Palestinian will then be able to exercise his right to self-determination.

"If you read the political statement [of the Algiers PNC] carefully, you will find that what some term recognition of the Zionist entity is untrue.... Anyone who says that the decisions we made in Algiers contain recognition of Resolutions 181, 242, and 338 is not right and I urge him to read the clause again."
(January 13, 1989, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Saudi newspaper published in London)



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Sheikh Abd Al-Hamid Al-Sayeh (cont.):

"The PLO is following the path which it must pursue until the return [of Palestinian refugees] is achieved.... We want the whole of Palestine."

(Okaz, Saudi Arabia, January 29, 1989).

Hani Al-Hassan, Senior Arafat Advisor and Member of the FATAH Central Committee:

"The disagreement between the PLO and HAMAS is not ideological, but is centered on the manner in which the conflict with the enemy will be conducted."

(January 13, 1990, Al-Rayah, Qatar)

Rafik Al-Natshe, Member of the FATAH Central Committee and PLO Representative in Saudi Arabia:

"Our return to Palestine and our victory will be possible only with Allah's help and with our return to Faluja, Jaffa, and Haifa."

(January 2, 1989, Saudi News Agency)

"[HAMAS says] All of Palestine is ours and we want to liberate it from the river to the sea at one go. But FATAH, which leads the PLO, feels that a phased plan must be pursued. Both sides agree on the final objective. The difference between them is the way there."

(December 26, 1989, Al-Qabas, Kuwait)

Muhammad Daoud Odeh (Abu Daoud), Member of the FATAH Revolutionary Council and Member of the PLO's PNC:

"Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union to occupied Palestine is part of the Zionist philosophy, for Zionism exists at its foundation upon immigration. Zionism is not feasible without immigration, and similarly a Zionist state in Palestine is not feasible without immigration. When immigration will cease, the 'state' will begin a process of disintegration and extinction. ...We must take steps against the immigration; moreover, steps must be taken against every immigrant, everyone who takes in the immigrants, every financier, everyone who helps, and every one through whom or through whose airliners assists in transporting the immigrants."

(April 23, 1990, the international edition of Al-Qabas, Kuwaiti newspaper)



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Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Maazen), Member of the PLO Executive Committee and Member of the FATAH Central Committee:

"In order to understand the danger in this immigration, we must remember that when Israel conquered 78 percent of Palestine, the number of its residents was 600,000, and therefore immigration activities began from Iraq, Yemen, Egypt, and Morocco to close this gap. I am sure that had the number remained as it was in the past, Israel would not have been able to last until now. The immigration for Israel is like an important artery connected to man's heart, and it nourishes Israel in its economy, soldiers, workers and farmers. Therefore, we consider the immigration to be the most important challenge facing the Arab Nation, without relating to its approach and origin."

(March 13, 1990, Al-Majallah, Saudi newspaper published in London)

Zayid Wahbe, FATAH representative in Lebanon:

"When we call for the establishment of a Palestinian state on any part of the land of Palestine -- that does not mean that we have relinquished our historic rights in Palestine. ...If the state will be established in the areas I have indicated [the West Bank and Gaza], and I am a native of the village of Sasa in the Galilee, I will see this as a victory in Safed, Haifa, and Jaffa. My return to my village in the Galilee will draw nearer."

(January 17, 1989, As-Safir, Lebanon)

Muhammad Abbas (Abu Al-Abbas), PLO Executive Committee Member and leader of a faction in the PLF ("Palestine Liberation Front"):

"We certainly consider the land occupied since 1948 a major part of the struggle arena...."

(March 1-7, 1989, Al-Majallah, Saudi newspaper published in London)

George Habash, Leader of the PFLP ("Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine"), the PLO's second largest faction:

"The decisions of the PNC did not mention in any manner whatsoever the recognition of Israel and did not mention in any manner whatsoever the recognition of Israel's right to exist. Please read the leaflets of the uprising which have not stated or recognized that Israel has a right to exist.... We did not recognize Israel."

(April 9, 1989, from a speech in Dubai, PFLP's Al-Hadaf)



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III. NON-PENALIZATION OF TERRORISM

At the outset of the U.S.-PLO dialogue, the United States made clear to the PLO that no American Administration could sustain the dialogue if terrorism by the PLO or any of its factions continued. Indeed, the United States insisted that one of the conditions for maintaining the dialogue would be PLO penalization, at the very least expulsion, of any of its elements engaged in terrorism.

In its book, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988 (published in March 1989), the State Department defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience." Attempted attacks on a kibbutz or bombs planted at bus stops, synagogues, and in parks certainly meet this definition, even if the attack is thwarted in time.

Nevertheless, the PLO refuses to consider the attacks it launches against innocent civilians to be acts of terrorism. Instead, it chooses to use such euphemisms as "armed struggle" and "military operations/target" to characterize its activities. Little wonder, therefore, that the PLO has, since December 1988, been denying that it promised the United States an end to such violence. Certainly, the PLO has taken no action to penalize any of its constituent groups engaged in terrorism.

The stark contrast between the U.S. and the PLO's view of terrorism was evident when on July 6, 1989 a passenger bus was forced off a cliff into a ravine along the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway. The U.S. State Department called that act -- which claimed 16 innocent lives, including an American citizen, and injured 25 passengers, some critically -- an act of terrorism. Leading PLO figures, however, as well as Wafa, the PLO's news agency, did not hesitate to express their support for the act. Bassam Abu Sharif, Advisor to Arafat, said, "This is not terrorism" (July 6, 1989, Radio Monte Carlo), while Wafa termed it "a heroic prelude to a popular revolution" (Associated Press, July 8, 1989).

When asked by a Danish reporter (Politiken, May 18, 1989) about Arafat's renunciation of terrorism in Geneva, Farouk Kaddoumi, in charge of the PLO's foreign affairs, called that assertion "a misrepresentation of Chairman Arafat's statements." Kaddoumi said, "Shultz can go to hell" in answer to a question as to whether Arafat's words that made Secretary of State Shultz begin a dialogue are null and void.

Arafat's Number Two, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), said on March 28, 1989 (Akhbar Al-Khaleej, Bahrain), "The PLO did not agree with the U.S. that the definition of terrorism includes the armed struggle. On February 5, 1990, Salah Khalaf told the Lebanese newspaper Tadamon, "We did not promise the Americans or others to stop the armed struggle, but we decided, in accordance with our wishes, to reduce the scope of the armed actions so that the uprising will be the dominant phenomenon in the eyes of the world." In that same interview Salah Khalaf also added that alongside the intifada, armed actions would be



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carried out to fulfill the national objectives of the Palestinians. He talked about "escalating the armed struggle far from the areas in which the uprising is taking place, a symbiotic relationship existing between them."

Yasser Abd Rabbo, Deputy Secretary-General of the DFLP and Head of the PLO delegation to the U.S.-PLO talks in Tunis said on June 12, 1989, "In not a single meeting with the Americans did the PLO promise to adhere to a halt in military operations against Israeli military targets... The PLO, while expressing its opposition to terrorism, feels that the struggle by all its various methods against the Israeli occupation is not considered to be terrorism" (Middle East News Agency). Radio Monte Carlo reported on February 15, 1989 that Abdallah Hourani, member of the PLO Executive Committee and a member of the PLO delegation to the first talks with the United States, "stressed that the PLO intends to resume its operations against Israel even if these operations arouse U.S. doubts about the PLO's desire for peace... The U.S. remarks which cast doubt on the PLO's credibility and desire for peace, will not make the PLO change its policy toward armed struggle."

Instead of penalizing terrorism, Arafat praises it. Following an attempted terror attack (June 4, 1989) on Kibbutz Misgav Am by a DFLP squad, the Gulf News Agency reported that at a press conference on June 6 in Kuwait, "The PLO Chairman praised the participation of Kuwaiti martyr Fawzi Abd Al Rasul Al Majadi in Sunday's commando raid on Israeli targets in occupied Palestine, saying Fawzi's blood has mixed with that of the two Palestinian martyrs, who died with him in the operation." Early in 1989, Arafat's colleague in the FATAH, Farouk Kaddoumi, said, "The PLO is not prepared to condemn operations which any Palestinian organization or faction undertakes" (Reuter, February 28, 1989).

The PLO factions responsible for attempted terror incursions continue to have a free hand, and no PLO individual or group has been taken to task. Individual PLO terrorists who managed to flee when their squad was intercepted by the Israel Defense Forces have not been punished for their part in attempted raids. On April 21, 1989, Reuter in Damascus was informed by Naif Hawatmeh, the leader of the "Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine" (DFLP) that PLO leaders had met in Tunis and had agreed to coordinate future raids against Israel: "The agreement was endorsed with the presence of all factions of the PLO including FATAH." The twelve infiltration attempts since Hawatmeh's interview attest to the continued adherence to terrorism by all PLO factions, including Arafat's own FATAH.



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IV. ADHERENCE TO THE PLO COVENANT

"The PLO Covenant is the basis of the political and military activity of the PLO." (Al-Watan, Kuwait, January 8, 1989)

The above statement, made by Rafik Al-Natshe, member of the FATAH Central Committee, encapsulates the centrality of the PLO Covenant in PLO doctrine.

The PLO Covenant, with its provisions that call for Israel's elimination, provides that organization with its credo and raison d'être. The articles of the PLO Covenant advocating Israel's elimination include inter alia:

- Article 15 -- "The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national duty and it attempts to repel the Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland, and aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine. Absolute responsibility for this falls upon the Arab nation -- peoples and governments -- with the Arab people of Palestine in the vanguard...."
- Article 19 -- "The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the State of Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time...."
- Article 20 -- "Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history and the true conception of what constitutes statehood. Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own; they are citizens of the states to which they belong."
- Article 21 -- "The Arab Palestinian people, expressing themselves by the armed Palestinian revolution, reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine...."
- Article 22 -- "Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement, and a geographical base for world imperialism placed strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland to combat the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity and progress. ...the liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist and imperialist presence...."
- Article 29 -- "The Palestinian people possess the fundamental and genuine legal right to liberate and retrieve their homeland...."

PLO terrorism (the "armed struggle") is also an integral element of the Covenant as seen in such articles as:

- Article 9 -- "Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it...."
- Article 10 -- "Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This requires its escalation, comprehensiveness and mobilization of all the



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Palestinian popular and education efforts and their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution...."

The PLO has taken no steps to revise, let alone repeal, its Covenant. Only a 2/3 majority of the PNC can make any revisions in the Covenant, and the PNC has not done this.

On June 1, 1989, Salah Khalaf, Arafat's Number Two, told the Kuwaiti daily Al-Seyassah, "Neither Arafat, Salah Khalaf nor any other leader can cancel the Covenant because it belongs to the PNC." As for repealing a particular provision, Salah Khalaf told the Saudi daily Okaz on January 23, 1989, "We in the PLO do not accept the removal of Article 19 from our Covenant."

Arafat's vague "caduc" phraseology in Paris in May 1989 did not constitute a change in the PLO Covenant. Arafat's colleagues in the PLO stressed, as did Arafat himself, that "caduc" has several meanings and that Arafat does not have the authority to abrogate the Covenant.



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PLO Leaders on the Covenant

Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO:

Q: "You said in French that the Covenant is 'caduc', that is to say nullified --"

Arafat: "That is your translation. Would it make sense for me to teach you how to translate?"

Q: "Let's say that it has expired [Arabic: Faata 'alaiha al-zaman]-- "

Arafat: "It has aged [Arabic: Taqaadamat]."

Q: "Fine, the translation is: 'It has aged'?"

Arafat: "The term 'Taqaadamat' appears in many verses in the Koran with regard to other [earlier] verses. Does this mean that these other verses were nullified? No."

(May 3, 1989, Interview with Radio Monte Carlo)

Q: "Why don't you say [that the Covenant is] 'Abrogated'?"

Arafat: "It is not up to me to say that. It is a decision that must come from the Palestine National Council."

(May 3, 1989, Interview with French Radio 'Europe 1', quoted by Associated Press)

"[The term Caduc] was legally the most appropriate description of the current state of this fundamental document.... One of [my] advisors had suggested using the word 'obsolete'. I said no, 'obsolete' is not the right term."

(May 5, 1989, Interview with Agence France Presse)

Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Second to Arafat:

"We in the PLO do not accept the removal of Article 19 from our Covenant."

(January 23, 1989, Okaz, Saudi Arabia)

"Arafat used the French term 'Caduc' at the proper time and in the proper meaning.... As for the abolition of the Covenant, it was not abolished, since only the PNC is empowered to do so.... Arafat did not concede anything to Mitterrand."

(May 29, 1989, Interview with Lebanese newspaper Tadamon, published in London)

"Neither Arafat, Salah Khalaf, nor any other leader can cancel the Covenant because it belongs to the PNC. All the Americans and Israelis who demanded the revocation of the Covenant are trying to escape from the peace initiative."

(June 1, 1989, Al-Seyassah, Kuwait)



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Nabil Sha'ath, Senior Political Advisor to Arafat and Chairman of the PNC Political Committee:

"Arafat did not give up the Covenant. However, its first five articles have become aged.... All Arafat did was to clarify to the Europeans this lack of clarity.... Arafat hasn't the authority to nullify the Covenant, and he did not declare that he had nullified it."

(May 15, 1989, Rose El Youssef, Egypt)

Rafik Al-Natshe, Member of the FATAH Central Committee and PLO Representative to Saudi Arabia:

"The PLO Covenant is the basis of the political and military activity of the PLO."

(January 8, 1989, Al-Watan, Kuwait)

Hakkam Balawi, PLO Representative to the PLO - U.S. Dialogue:

"Yasser Arafat's use of the term 'Caduc' in describing the PLO Covenant doesn't at all mean that the Covenant has been nullified, since this word has many definitions, as is proven in dictionaries. ...The West can choose whichever [definition] it desires. The Palestinian leadership, however, has the right to adhere to the definition which it believes to be correct and which expresses its intentions."

(May 6, 1989, Interview with the Tunisian newspaper Al-Sabbah, quoted by Iraq News Agency)



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V. THE PHASED PLAN

The PLO's "Phased Plan" is a key strategy for achieving Israel's annihilation. The "Phased Plan" grew out of the Arab failure to destroy Israel militarily in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In the wake of that failure, the PLO adopted in Cairo, on June 8, 1974, a three-step program:

- 1 -- Establishment of a Palestinian state in areas vacated by Israel;
- 2 -- Use of that Palestinian state for continuing the war against Israel;
- 3 -- Triggering a general war to annihilate Israel.

The key articles outlining the three steps in the "Phased Plan" are as follows:

- Article 2 -- "The Liberation Organization will employ all means, and first and foremost armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the independent combatant national authority for the people over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated...."
- Article 4 -- "Any step taken towards liberation is a step towards the realization of the Liberation Organization's strategy of establishing the democratic Palestinian state specified in the resolutions of previous Palestinian National Councils."
- Article 8 -- "Once it is established, the Palestinian national authority will strive to achieve a union of the confrontation countries with the aim of completing the liberation of all Palestinian territory...."

The top leaders of the PLO continue to proclaim their adherence to this strategy. Salah Khalaf, Arafat's Number Two, said, just four days after Arafat's Geneva press conference, that the PLO aims to establish "at first a small state, and with Allah's will, it will be made large, and expand to the east, west, north, and south. I am interested in the liberation of Palestine, step by step" (Al-Anba, Kuwait, December 18, 1988). Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the PLO's Political Department in charge of the PLO's foreign affairs, voiced PLO thinking when on April 5, 1989, in an interview with the BBC Arabic Service, he said, "The recovery of but a part of our soil will not cause us to forsake our Palestinian land.... We shall pitch our tent in those places which our bullets can reach.... This tent shall then form the base from which we shall later pursue the next phase."

Sheikh Abd Al-Hamid Al-Sayekh, the Chairman of the PNC, declared, within a few weeks after Arafat's press conference in Geneva, that the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories is just one phase: "In the next phase, after the recognition of the Palestinian state, we will work to implement our sovereignty over the land of Palestine.... Our presence in Palestine is dependent upon the elimination of the other [Zionist] culture" (A-Sharq Al-Awsat, Saudi newspaper published in London, January 13, 1989).

The PLO's activity in the diplomatic arena since late 1988 has been an extension of and cover for its "Phased Plan." This fact was stated by



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Salah Khalaf prior to the convening of the PNC in November 1988 and Arafat's visit to Geneva in December 1988: "We face a stage which requires a fundamental step consistent with current developments.... In view of these developments, we must propose a political initiative which is not new in terms of the Phased Plan.... The initiative will provide a new instrument for moving the Phased Plan along" (Al-Anba, Kuwait, September 7, 1988). Rafik Al-Natshe, a member of the FATAH Central Committee and the PLO's representative to Saudi Arabia, told the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Watan on January 8, 1989, "Our present political approach is rooted in the Phased Plan.... We must aim at harmonizing the various political decisions with the Covenant and the Phased Plan."



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PLO Leaders on the Phased Plan

Yasser Arafat, PLO Chairman:

"The Palestinians are not fighting merely for the sake of fighting, but for a political objective, namely, the liberation of the Palestinian soil and the establishment of a Palestinian state over every part of it from which Israel will be removed."

(March 6, 1989, Qatar News Agency)

"The land of Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinians, and the homeland of the Arab nation, from the Ocean to the Gulf.... The PLO offers not the peace of the weak, but the peace of Saladin."

(January 2, 1989, Saudi News Agency)

"The Palestinian people's struggle will continue until the complete liberation of the Palestinian land. ...The Palestinian people's struggle ought to be assisted until the complete liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea. ...We will fight until the last bullet, until the last drop of blood, and until the last stone in our land."

(May 1, 1990, Libyan News Agency, also quoted by Agence France Presse)

Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Second to Arafat:

"At first a small state, and with the help of Allah, it will be made large, and expand to the east, west, north, and south.... I am interested in the liberation of Palestine, step by step."

(December 18, 1988, Al-Anba, Kuwait)

Farouk Kaddoumi, Head of the PLO's Political Department, in charge of the PLO's foreign affairs:

"The recovery of but a part of our soil will not cause us to forsake our Palestinian land.... We shall pitch our tent in those places which our bullets can reach.... This tent shall then form the base from which we shall later pursue the next phase."

(April 5, 1989, interviewed by BBC Arabic Service)

Sheikh Abd Al-Hamid Al-Sayekh, Chairman of the PNC:

"Even if the PLO succeeds in establishing a state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, this would not prevent a continuation of the struggle until the liberation of all of Palestine... If we succeed in gaining a part of Palestine upon which we will establish a state, we will later be able to demand from the entire world, while positioned upon Palestinian soil, to act to enable us to get our rights as a state and a nation... We are working to achieve what is possible in the present phase, and next, we will demand more."

(December 21, 1988, Al-Seyassah, Kuwait)



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Sheikh Abd Al-Hamid Al-Sayekh (cont.):

"In the next phase, after the recognition of the Palestinian state, we will work to implement our sovereignty over the land of Palestine. ...Our presence in Palestine is dependent upon the elimination of the other [Zionist] culture."

(January 13, 1989, A-Sharq Al-Awsat, Saudi newspaper published in London)

Rafik Al-Natshe, FATAH Central Committee Member and PLO Representative to Saudi Arabia:

"The PLO Covenant is the basis of the political and military activity of the PLO. Our present political approach is rooted in the Phased Plan.... We must aim at harmonizing the various political decisions with the Covenant and the Phased Plan."

(January 8, 1989, Al-Watan, Kuwait)

"[HAMAS says] All of Palestine is ours and we want to liberate it from the river to the sea at one go. But FATAH, which leads the PLO, feels that a phased plan must be pursued. Both sides agree on the final objective. The difference between them is the way there."

(December 26, 1989, Al-Qabas, Kuwait)

George Habash, Leader of the "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine" (PFLP), the PLO's second largest faction:

"The establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza will be the beginning of the downfall of the Zionist enterprise. We will be able to rely on this defeat in order to complete the struggle to realize our entire goal, which is the complete liberation of the national Palestinian soil."

(June 9, 1989, Interview with "Voice of the Mountain" Radio, Lebanon)

"We seek to establish a state which we can use in order to liberate the other part of the Palestinian state."

(April 9, 1989, the PFLP's Al-Hadaf)



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THE PLO AND THE ARAB STATES

The PLO has not called upon the Arab states to recognize and directly negotiate with Israel, or end their economic boycott of Israel. Instead, at Arab League summits, such as the one that was held in Casablanca in May 1989, the PLO actively promotes an atmosphere of confrontation and enmity towards Israel. Every year at the UN General Assembly sessions (and in other UN organizations), the PLO is one of the driving forces behind shrill anti-Israel resolutions as well as the vain Arab attempt to reject the credentials of the Israeli delegation to the General Assembly. The recent frenzied campaign to mobilize the Arab world, as well as others, against Jewish immigration to Israel is another integral component of the PLO's efforts to maintain a hostile atmosphere.

At its conference in Tunis in August 1989, the FATAH/Arafat called for involving the Arab states in the conflict with Israel:

- Resolution 1 -- "The Palestine question is the core of the Arab-Zionist conflict."
- Resolution 4 -- "...respecting the right of the Palestinian revolution to perform its militant tasks through any Arab land."
- Resolution 6 -- "Calling on the Arab countries, especially those on the confrontation lines, to unify their forces and mobilize their masses in order to confront the Israeli aggression."

The PLO, moreover, speak in terms of obtaining Arab support for terror activities across the Arab borders with Israel, confrontation, and war. Thus, George Habash, leader of the PLO's "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine" has urged attacks across Arab borders, "What is now needed is to support the uprising by escalating combat activities through all the Arab borders, and launching attacks and carrying out ambushes outside the areas of the uprising" (Al-Istiqlal, Nicosia-based PLO publication, January 20, 1990).

On April 11, 1989, PLO Radio from Baghdad broadcast the message of Leaflet #38 of the PLO-affiliated "Unified National Command". That leaflet called "upon the Arab regimes to upgrade their methods of supporting the Palestine question through opening their borders to the fighters of the Palestinian revolution so that they can exercise their legitimate struggle rights...."

Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Arafat's Number Two, said on February 8, 1990, "Jewish emigration [to Israel] means the Israelis are thinking of plunging the region into a new war. Hence the need for uniting Palestinian, Jordanian and Syrian efforts to rebuild the Eastern front" (Reuter, February 8, 1990). By calling for the rebuilding of the Eastern Front, the term denoting an Arab military alliance along Israel's eastern borders during a future war against Israel, the PLO is trying to draw the Arab states into such a war.

Hani al-Hassan, Arafat's political advisor, also called for the establishment of an Eastern Front, comprised of Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and "Palestine", and noted that this move would cause Israel immediate



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anxiety (Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Anba, quoted by the Kuwaiti News Agency on February 17, 1990).

The recent tension in the region emanating from Libya's chemical weapons plant at Rabta and Iraq's development of a chemical weapons arsenal, as well as long-range missiles and a nuclear weapons capability, has also exposed the PLO's position.

On March 18, 1990, the Associated Press, quoting Libyan Radio, reported that Yasser Arafat expressed "solidarity with the Libyan Arab People and its leader, who are facing U.S. threats" against the Rabta plant. Arafat added, "We will stand by our people in the great Jamahiriyah [Libya] with our blood."

On March 30, Associated Press reported that Arafat, speaking to a rally in Baghdad on March 29, said "I tell them [the Israeli leaders], we will fight you with stones, with rifles and with Al-Abed" (Al-Abed is the name of the long-range Iraqi missile that was tested in December 1989).

Arafat's Number Two, Salah Khalaf, followed his lead in aligning the PLO with Iraq. Salah Khalaf, Arafat's Number Two, told the Iraqi News Service in Tunis on April 23, that Saddam Hussein knows how to address the needs at every political stage on the basis of permanent and strategic principles, and that the Iraqi President had set the basic lines of confrontation with the "Zionist entity."

The PLO is not adverse to taking the Arab states to task when their support for the PLO is deemed insufficient, and even uses threats in order to obtain that support. This was illustrated when, commenting in January 1989 on the fact that many Arab states have not honored financial pledges to support the intifada, Arafat warned, "If the present situation continues, I will be forced to contemplate aloud other means of convincing them to fulfill their obligations, even though these would not be in keeping with the character of the diplomatic phase, or its present course" (Al-Qabas, Kuwait, January 29, 1989).

Nabil Sha'ath, a close advisor of Arafat and Chairman of the PNC Political Committee, said in January 1990, "We need the Arab position. The Arab forces are enormous and they have no limit. For example, they have not withdrawn one cent from New York banks in order to pressure the United States and in order to stress that the Arabs place the Palestinian problem at the top of their priorities" (Al-Anba, Kuwait, January 16, 1990).

Moreover, on February 13, 1990, in the Bahrain newspaper Akhbar Al-Khaleej, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) called on Egypt to re-examine the validity of its peace treaty with Israel in light of the Jewish immigration to Israel. Abu Iyad's extremist statements, including his support for the gun-and-grenade assault on Israeli tourists in Egypt on February 4, 1990, were not repudiated by anyone in the PLO. They



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did, however, infuriate the Egyptians who, in the Egyptian media, accused Abu Iyad and the PLO leadership of exploiting the Palestinians.



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VII. THE PLO TERROR UNITS

The PLO has not disbanded any of its terror units. On the contrary, it set up a new unit called the "National Security Committee", incorporating groups, such as "Force 17", which over the years have become internationally known for their terrorist activities. The head of the "National Security Committee" is Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), the Arafat's Number Two, and one of Khalaf's two deputies is Hakkam Balawi, who has a leading role in the PLO's dialogue with the United States. While the PLO terror units, such as "Force 17" and the "Hawari Apparatus," are directly responsible for carrying out acts of terror, they derive their authority and have the backing of Arafat and the PLO Executive Committee.

Moreover, PLO terrorists in southern Lebanon, especially in Tyre and Sidon, now number several thousand. Seventeen of the twenty-two infiltration attempts since December 1988 were launched from southern Lebanon.

VIII. THE PLO FACTIONS AND TERROR RAIDS

Virtually every faction of the PLO has engaged in terrorism since Arafat supposedly "renounced" it. Of the 22 infiltration attempts since December 1988:

- 7 were carried out by Naif Hawatmeh's "Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine" (DFLP);
- 4 by the Tala'at Ya'akub faction of the "Palestine Liberation Front" (PLF);
- 3 by the Abu Al-Abbas faction of the "Palestine Liberation Front" (PLF);
- 2 by Samir Ghosha's "Popular Struggle Front" (PSF);
- 2 jointly by Tala'at Ya'akub's PLF faction and George Habash's "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine" (PFLP);
- 2 by George Habash's PFLP;
- 2 by Yasser Arafat's FATAH.

All of the above factions participated in the November 1988 PNC in Algiers and acknowledge the authority of Yasser Arafat.

Moreover, since December 1988, Arafat's FATAH has carried out 13 terrorist attacks against civilians inside Israel's pre-1967 borders. In these attacks, explosives, hand-grenades, Molotov cocktails, and other weapons were used. The attacks included the planting of bombs at:

- a bus stop near Beilinson Hospital in Petah Tikva, a town north-east of Tel Aviv, on March 20, 1989;
- a synagogue in Kfar Avraham (near Petah Tikva) on March 31, 1989;
- the Liberty Bell Park in Jerusalem on May 16, 1989.



PLO Infiltration Attempts and Attacks From Across Israel's Borders
Since Arafat's "Renunciation" of Terrorism in December 1988

A. From Southern Lebanon

- 1) December 26, 1988:
A four-man squad belonging to Samir Ghosha's PSF ("Popular Struggle Front") tried to infiltrate Israel by sea. Bad weather and the failure of an outboard motor swept the boat north. Three terrorists drowned and one was washed ashore.
- 2) December 28, 1988:
Three terrorists from the Tala'at Ya'akub faction of the PLF ("Palestine Liberation Front") were killed after cutting through the border fence while trying to infiltrate Israel near Kibbutz Manara in the north.
- 3) February 5, 1989:
Five terrorists belonging to George Habash's PFLP ("Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine") and the Tala'at Ya'akub faction of the PLF were killed in the southern Lebanon security zone while on their way to seize hostages in one of the Galilee communities.
- 4) February 23, 1989:
A three-man DFLP ("Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine") squad was intercepted and its members killed while making their way towards Israel where they had intended to carry out a major operation against civilians.
- 5) March 2, 1989:
Five DFLP terrorists, on their way to take hostages and murder civilians in Zarit, a civilian farming community in the Galilee, were intercepted. Four of the terrorists were killed; the fifth escaped.
- 6) March 12, 1989:
The Tala'at Ya'akub faction of the PLF claimed responsibility for sending a three-man squad across the Israeli northern border near Kibbutz Manara. The terrorists were killed when intercepted by a patrol of the Israel Defense Forces.
- 7) March 30, 1989:
Five terrorists belonging to George Habash's PFLP, in cooperation with the Lebanese Communist Party", were intercepted while headed towards the Israeli border. Two of the terrorists were killed in the clash.
- 8) April 8, 1989:
A rubber dinghy carrying terrorists on their way towards Israel was spotted by an Israeli navy patrol boat near Rosh Hanikra. The two terrorists aboard the dinghy were killed; leaflets carried by the infiltrators identified them as having been sent by Samir Ghosha's PSF.



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- 9) May 28, 1989:
A Katyusha rocket attack and infiltration attempt were simultaneously launched against Metulla. The rocket wounded an eight-month-old baby, but the heavily-armed terrorist infiltrators were intercepted before reaching their objective and carrying out a wholesale massacre. Two of the terrorists were killed, and two others were captured. The PFLP and the Tala'at Ya'akub faction of the PLF claimed responsibility, and evidence indicated they were also aided by Hizbullah.
- 10) June 4, 1989:
A three-man DFLP squad, on its way to seize hostages, was intercepted by an Israel Defense Forces patrol west of Kibbutz Misgav Am. The terrorists, who were carrying Kalachnikov assault rifles, LAW rockets, grenades and other explosives, were killed in the clash with the patrol.
- 11) August 1, 1989:
Three terrorists belonging to the Tala'at Ya'akub faction of the PLF were intercepted on their way to attack the residents of Kibbutz Manara along Israel's northern border. The terrorists, who were killed in the ensuing clash, carried Kalachnikov assault rifles, dozens of grenades, and LAW rockets.
- 12) August 12, 1989:
A terrorist squad belonging to Naif Hawatmeh's DFLP was intercepted after being spotted two kilometers northwest of Kibbutz Misgav Am. One of the terrorists was wounded in the ensuing clash and apprehended; the others escaped. According to press reports, the captured terrorist admitted that the squad's aim was to carry out a massacre in one of Israel's northern communities.
- 13) October 6, 1989:
A terrorist squad belonging to the Abu al-Abbas faction of the PLF was intercepted on its way to attack the Israeli kibbutz Misgav Am. A leaflet found with the terrorists declared the operation was intended to show that "the Palestinian fighter is capable of reaching into your [the Israelis] own home."
- 14) October 12, 1989:
Three DFLP terrorists were intercepted four kilometers from the Israeli community of Margalioth: one of the terrorists was killed, and two escaped. The weapons and other equipment which they were carrying indicated that they were on their way, according to unverified reports, to carry out a terror strike inside northern Israel.



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- 15) January 26, 1990:
A squad of DFLP terrorists, on its way to attack Kibbutz Misgav Am, fired at a patrol of the Israel Defense Forces and escaped. The next day one of the terrorists was captured. A map carried by the terrorists charting their route to the kibbutz, as well as a statement by the DFLP leadership that Misgav Am was their intended objective provided proof that an Israeli civilian community was the target.
- 16) February 3, 1990:
On their way to attack an Israeli community near the Lebanese border, two PLF (Abu Al-Abbas) terrorists, carrying Kalachnikov assault rifles, grenades, RPGs, and LAW rockets, were intercepted and killed in the clash. Leaflets were found in their possession declaring in Arabic that the only way to "free the Holy Land" is through armed struggle. The PLF also openly claimed responsibility for the intended attack into northern Israel.
- 17) March 16, 1990:
Three heavily-armed terrorists belonging to the DFLP were intercepted and killed while on their way to a raid into Israel. The intended target of the terrorists was the agricultural community of Zarit. The DFLP took responsibility for the attempted incursion.
- B. From Jordan
- 18) March 17, 1989:
A PLO terror squad infiltrated from Jordan near the Israeli community of Hatzeba, thirty miles south of the Dead Sea. Encountering a patrol of the Israel Defense Forces on the way, the squad fled back into Jordan after the clash, and were arrested by the Jordanian authorities. The PLF ("Palestine Liberation Front") faction led by Abu Al-Abbas, who is also a member of the PLO's Executive Committee, claimed responsibility, as did the pro-Syrian faction of the FATAH led by Abu Musa.
- 19) September 2, 1989:
A terrorist crossed the Jordan River near Kfar Rupin and attacked an Israel Defense Forces patrol, killing two Israeli soldiers. The terrorist was killed during the attack. In a communique, the Tala'at Ya'akub faction of the PLF claimed responsibility for the infiltration into "occupied Palestine."
- 20) September 7, 1989:
Katyusha rockets were fired upon Kibbutz Sha'ar Golan in the Jordan Valley. George Habash's PFLP claimed responsibility for the Katyusha attack.



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C. From Egypt

21) March 14, 1989:

Two terrorists, armed with Kalachnikov assault rifles, sub-machine guns, and grenades crossed into Israel southeast of Rafiah in the Sinai. The terrorists, belonging to the "Islamic Jihad" special branch of the FATAH, were apprehended after throwing a grenade on an army position.

22) December 5, 1989:

A five-man FATAH/Arafat squad was intercepted after crossing Israel's southern border at Har Harif in the Negev. Heavily armed and carrying 50 grenades and five Kalachnikov assault rifles, its aim was to carry out a massacre of Israeli civilians.



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IX. THE PLO, THE INTIFADA, AND PALESTINIAN TERRORISM AGAINST PALESTINIANS

The intifada fills another page in the violent history of the PLO. The systematic murder of Palestinian Arabs by PLO death squads is another form of PLO terrorism.

The PLO sees the intifada as another facet of its campaign against Israel. In a leaflet distributed by FATAH operatives in Ramallah on October 23, 1989, the FATAH declared that "the struggle in which our people is engaged is not a struggle for the purpose of reaching a settlement or a political solution and initiatives as others think and feel." The leaflet continued by noting that the PLO's "investing in the diplomatic course and in political events from time to time is a political cover and temporary tactic."

In its leaflets and radio broadcasts, the PLO urges "escalation". In Leaflet #32, the PLO-affiliated "Unified National Command" declared, "[We] call on you to escalate the struggle and the popular resistance with the stone, Molotov cocktails, the war of knives, the setting of the occupation's institutions on fire..." (PLO Radio, Baghdad, January 7, 1989). Leaflet #37, distributed by the "Unified National Command" urged, "All forms of our intifada struggle must be escalated: such as the use of knives, hatchets, Molotov cocktails, and the expanded use of large rocks thrown from rooftops" (PLO Radio, Baghdad, April 1, 1989). In Leaflet #47, distributed in October 1989, the "Unified National Command" designated October 15, 16, and 17 as "days of escalation".

The PLO has also not hesitated to exploit children in its violent activities. Thus a leaflet distributed by PLO operatives in the territories in February 1989 urged, "Every child must carry the stone and throw it at the occupier. The Molotov cocktail heroes of all ages must burn a fire in the face of the enemy and fight him face-to-face." Arafat, interviewed in the Jordanian newspaper Al-Rai on February 12, 1990, said, "Our slogan is that any person who gets tired [of the intifada] should rest and send his children."

The murder of Israeli civilians as a part of the intifada is encouraged by the PLO. When a Palestinian terrorist stabbed two elderly Jews to death and wounded three others in Jerusalem on May 3, 1989, Yasser Arafat justified the incident, saying, "We will continue the uprising with renewed determination. The uprising will continue wave after wave, until the Palestinian flag is hoisted over Jerusalem" (Radio Monte Carlo, May 3, 1989).

PLO leaflets and radio broadcasts have exhorted and instructed local operatives to carry out attacks against Jews and Arabs (referred to as "agents" by the PLO). For example, Leaflet #38, broadcast by PLO Radio on April 11, 1989, designated April 26 as "the 'Day for Executing Judgement Against Agents'". On this day the 'Assault Groups' and the branches of the 'Unified National Command' are to go out and punish the agents and those deviating from the national line, for cooperating with the occupation authorities." On August 17, 1989, PLO Radio from Baghdad broadcast Leaflet #44 which said:



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"More must be done in order to shatter the apparatus of the Civil Administration. More action must be taken against people who are prominent agents in this Administration.... It is necessary to intensify the throwing of rocks and the use of knives and to set on fire the ground below the feet of the soldiers of the occupation and to set on fire his borders, his settlers, and his agents, for the language of strength, the language of causing casualties, is the only language he understands...."

Coercion of Palestinians is one of the tactics used to promote confrontation. Local PLO operatives have, using the threat of vandalism and violence, pressured Arab shopkeepers to close businesses, and -- by causing damage to private Arab vehicles, attacking public transportation, and even burning buses -- have forcibly prevented Arab workers from commuting to their jobs within Israel.

The ultimate form of pressure -- deadly assaults on specific Palestinian individuals and their families -- has also been applied by the PLO. Since the intifada began in December 1987, more than 200 Palestinians were murdered by fellow Palestinians, many by PLO death squads: of the 200, more than 180 were murdered since Arafat's press conference in December 1988, and over 160 since Israel raised, in April 1989, its proposals for elections and a negotiated peace settlement (officially formulated in May 1989 in the Government of Israel's Peace Initiative). Arrogating for itself the title of "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinians, the PLO is trying to ensure that no other alternative will emerge.

Arafat took the lead in calling for such murders when in January 1989, less than a month after his press conference in Geneva, he warned Palestinians, such as Elias Freij, the Mayor of Bethlehem, "Whoever thinks of stopping the intifada before it achieves its goals, I will give him ten bullets in the chest." (On January 19, 1989, the U.S. State Department Spokesman informed reporters at the daily briefing that the U.S. has a tape recording of Arafat's threat.)

On October 10, 1989, Arafat took direct responsibility for authorizing such attacks, saying that such killings are "a decision that was made by the Unified National Command in the Territories and I gave them the authority of the General Commander to sign the execution warrants" (Al-Rai, Jordan). On January 19, 1990, although urging caution in carrying out the killings, Arafat again gave his endorsement, telling the Egyptian newspaper Al-Mussawar, "We tell them: 'If you can, send us the file, and we will examine it. In any case, if this is difficult, then there is no choice but to send the files after the executions, so that they can be examined.'" Arafat's cynicism was illustrated when he added, "After we reviewed the files, we saw that two of the 118 (who were executed) were wronged. We held new investigations, and added them to the martyrs of the uprising."



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The savagery of these murders was illustrated by a PLO-affiliated death squad that was apprehended in the Nablus Casbah (marketplace) on December 1, 1989. The group was responsible for 15 murders (and several murder attempts), including five women and two elderly men. In one case, a woman was axed to death, and in another, a man, who was hospitalized after an attack by masked men, was shot to death in the hospital.



Internecine Palestinian Killings, December 1988 - March 1990

Month	Number of Killings
=====	=====
December 1988	1
January 1989	4
February	2
March	5
April	12
May	12
June	18
July	17
August	15
September	19
October	16
November	14
December	10
January 1990	15
February	19
March	13



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X. THE EXTRADITION AND PROSECUTION OF PLO TERRORISTS

The PLO has opposed the extradition of its terrorists for prosecution. This has been the case with Abu Al-Abbas, responsible for the hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship and the murder of Leon Klinghoffer in 1985, and Muhammad Rashid, who is accused of bombing a Pan Am airliner over Honolulu in 1982.

However, the PLO goes one step beyond opposition to extradition. It gives high honors to its terrorists. Abu Al-Abbas was subsequently made a member of the PLO Executive Committee and was a full participant in the November 1988 PNC.

XI. NO COMPENSATION FOR AMERICAN VICTIMS OF PLO TERRORISM

The PLO has not compensated the American victims of PLO terrorism or their families. Over the years, the PLO has carried out several attacks which have taken a toll in American lives. Arafat, himself, gave the orders for one such act of terrorism in March 1, 1973 when U.S. Ambassador Cleo Noel and another U.S. diplomat were among three Western diplomats murdered by FATAH terrorists who seized the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum. Abd Al-Latif Abu Hijlah headed the PLO office in Khartoum at the time of the attack and served as Arafat's representative in contacts with the Sudan authorities: he was subsequently arrested and the PLO office was temporarily closed by Sudan. Today, Abu Hijlah directs the PLO's Political Department under Farouk Kaddoumi and is also a member of the PLO delegation in dialogue with the U.S.

Although guilty of murdering U.S. citizens, the PLO has consistently evaded acknowledging its responsibility. On the other hand, the PLO has adopted a cynical approach to violent assaults on innocent civilians. Abu Al-Abbas, during the November 1988 PNC, compared the murder of Leon Klinghoffer to an automobile accident and with a half-smile said, "Maybe he was trying to swim for it" (New York Times, November 13, 1988). On December 16, 1988, Abu Al-Abbas told the Lebanese newspaper, Al-Wattan Al-Arabi, published in Paris: "It wasn't us who carried out this [Achille Lauro] operation, but the Americans. They are the ones who made this thing up. The Americans are trying to play the role of 'cowboy.'"

Abu Al-Abbas' attempt to blame others for his act of terror and even make light of it brings to mind another similar expression of PLO cynicism by Farouk Kaddoumi who, speaking in the UN Security Council on October 10, 1985 (S/PV.2619) after the Achille Lauro hijacking, unabashedly suggested that Leon Klinghoffer may have died from illness. Kaddoumi said:

"Is there evidence that those hijackers killed that civilian? Where is that evidence? He was 69 years old and his family stated that he had frequently suffered before from heart attacks. He was also suffering from paralysis."

On December 4, 1985, speaking at an Arab League luncheon at the UN, Kaddoumi told an audience, which included the UN Secretary-General and the General Assembly President, that Klinghoffer was killed by his wife for the insurance money (this statement was reported by the New York Times and Washington Post the next day).



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The same contempt for the victims of terrorism was displayed by the PLO representative in Cairo, Said Kamal, who on February 10, 1990 (Middle East News Agency) accused Israel of having carried out the terrorist attack on Israeli tourists in Egypt on February 4.



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CONCLUSION

The PLO cannot have it both ways. Either it has abandoned terrorism, or it has not. Either it has accepted Israel's right to exist, or it has not.

Clearly the PLO still advocates and carries out acts of terrorism, and the PLO leadership has not disassociated itself from them. Clearly the PLO still advocates the "Phased Plan" which is its strategy for achieving the goals of its Covenant, i.e. the elimination of Israel.

Yasser Abd-Rabbo -- Naif Hawatmeh's Deputy in the "Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine", a PLO faction responsible for six attempted terror raids since December 1988 and such atrocities as the 1974 massacre of schoolchildren at Ma'alot -- has headed the PLO delegation in talks with U.S. representatives. Abd Al-Latif Abu Hijlah, another member of the PLO delegation, was involved in the murder of U.S. diplomats in Khartoum in 1973. At one point in 1989, even Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) had contacts with U.S. Ambassador Pelletreau: the former head of FATAH's "Black September" terror apparatus, responsible for the 1972 massacre of Israeli athletes in Munich and the 1973 attack in Khartoum, Salah Khalaf openly advocates the continuation of terrorism today .

These are Arafat's representatives in talks with the United States. Considering PLO terrorism, past and present, they are very representative of the PLO.

בהול דחיות:	טובס מזרק קשר ניו-יורק דף: 1 מחיר: 4
סיוג: כמס	אל:
תזח: 160900	ע.ס.אן שר האוס ארץ
מס מנדק: 0566	דע:
	מאת: זמנה, ניו יורק

מבקשתך.

המבוא של צבתי חוסין סאבס

יאלה חתם

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ס' ע' ה' ה'

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Saadam Hussein Threatens the U.S and Israel

The following are excerpts, released by the military censor (according to Al - Muharar) of a meeting held on April 19th 1990, between Saadam Hussein and Yasir Arafat, as reported by the Lebanese weekly, Al - Muharar (Paris) on May 10th 1990.

1. The objective behind the President's speech on chemical weapons (May 1st) was to raise the Arab morale, to put an end to the Israeli arrogance, and to break the superpower monopoly on industrial, military and scientific advancement. Iraq is readying itself for an Israeli-American-British trilateral attack resembling the Suez action (1956).

2. There are Israeli targets, military and civilian, as well as American and British naval targets that are all within our range of fire, so that they can be totally destroyed if Iraq is attacked, or in the event that the leadership is harmed or that they harm me personally. My death as a leader will not prevent our staunch reply but will quicken it, whether inside Israel itself or against the foreign battle ships, in the Gulf waters and in other areas.

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3. Iraq is acquainted with every inch of the soil of Palestine, every airport, every air base, every industrial installation and every center of research. We have succeeded in photographing all the targets we need inside the Israeli depth. We began these efforts in the immediate aftermath of the war with Iran. Israel is fully aware of this - and we know that they know.

4. The era of the lightning wars has passed, and if war is to break out, as a result of Israeli stupidity, why then we will not halt the fire at all, even if our war against them continues for a hundred years. We know - and they know - that our victory over them as Arabs will not be achieved in a matter of years but in a matter of months only.

5. One of them came to us and spoke of mediation with Israel and we told him: no. Mediation efforts are worthless as far as we are concerned.

6. Regarding an American attack of any nature against us, its consequences will not be different ... We will succeed, with God's help, in sweeping American influence out of our region ... I received a letter (following the Senators visit) which said that the United States views the Iraqi missiles as a threat to her interests, no more and no less ... Our missiles do not reach Washington. However, had they such a range - we would have struck at it should there have been a need. Yet, we have the capability of reaching Washington by other means, through our interests around the world.

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7. Iraq has superiority over Israel in armaments and supplies ... it is impossible to defeat Iraq. We must put Israel in a state of fear, a situation that does not exist in the Israeli dictionary. As for Jordan and Syria: whoever does not want to resort to war must grant us the opportunity to make use of his territory, for, if Iraq is to advance fifty divisions ... they will need territory abutting Israel.

8. My brother the President, (Arafat), from now on we will not need any concessions or political efforts, which are of no use (Arafat said in response: This is why we gave the United States and Baker an absolutely negative reply, at a time when they set out to damage the Palestinian representation and national rights).

9. (Saadam continues): From now on we must escalate our positions ... I still subscribe to the No's of the Khartoum Arab Summit (1967) and they are: no to peace, no to recognition, and no to negotiations.

10. We must assist the uprising by means of aerial power and the missiles that are capable of striking the enemy and defeating him even without the resort to ground clashes or naval warfare. We have made no cut backs in our military forces, rather, we are steadily developing them.

*

END

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תנן
המברך



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קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
פילדלפיה, פנסילבניה

ג' ניסן תש"ן
29 למרץ 1990
41 - ת.4.251

אל: מר אייל ארד, לשכת סגן השר
מאת: הקונסוליה פילדלפיה

הנדון: כתבה עויינת ב-PHILA. D. NEWS
מכתב 218 מ-19.3.90

שלום אייל,

תודה על תשובתך המפורטת.
העברתי תוכנה לאלן רספטר, מנהל ה-J.C.R.C בצ'רי-היל שהבטיח לשגר
מכתב תגובה לעורך.

בברכה
א.א.א.
אמנון אפרת

העתק: עודד בן חיים, נושג.