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3/0 קי.א.ת.ג

מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

המ"מ

מס' תיק

סוכנו חברה מבנקים וולגריס

מאגזינים שלום בונטנטי/באניניס
מפוי"מ.

2.1.4.1982 - 16.4.1982

4160/5 - א.

מס' תיק מקורי

5



שם תיק: ארה"ב

4160/5-א

טווח פיו

טווח פריט: R00068f00

כתובת: 3-312-1-6-3

16/07/2020

תאריך הדפסה

מחלקה לתת המ"מ

ט ר פ ס מ כ ר ק

דף!... מתוך!... דפים

סדוג בטחוני... צלנני...

דחיתות... דחנת...

תאריך 21.4.82 אמריל 82

מס' סכום... 308

אלה

אל: המטרה

ממנכ"ל. מצפ"א

STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING--APRIL 21, 1982

This statement was issued simultaneously at the White House and State Department Briefings today:

There have been a number of actions recently which have threatened or violated the cease-fire, including violence against Israelis and the Israeli airstrikes into Lebanon. The U.S. deplors these actions and remains committed to the maintenance of the cease-fire which serves the interests of all the parties. It calls upon the parties involved to exercise the utmost restraint and to avoid actions which would prolong or escalate the violence.

The U.S. strongly urges all concerned to respect scrupulously the spirit as well as the terms of the Cease-fire which is of such importance to the stability and welfare of the peoples of the entire region.

עמנונה

מנהל סוכנות הביטחון הישראלית

סגירות ראל - וושינגטון

אלו המסרד

ס ר ס ס כ ר פ

דפוס... 4... מחור... 4... דפים

סוג בסחוני... גלני...

דחיפות.....

תאריך וז"ח... 20.2.2002... אסכ. 82

מסי מברק... 306...

יגר. גלבו. בנצור. נעים. דע: אבנר - לכת רוח"ם.

היום בצהרים הסתיים כנס וועידת הנפלאים בושינגטון. הכנס זכה לסיקור בתקשורת. מסלחת מטעמם נמסרה עם בוש, בייקר, מרסי, ג'קסון ואחרים. רוח הכנס והחלטותיה בהודעה לעתונות שתפורסם על ידם ב-22 אפריל (עד אז מוסל אמברגו על ההודעה).

WASHINGTON, April 21 -- Jewish leaders from across the country, concluding a two-day "solidarity with Israel" conference on the eve of the Sinai pull-out, called on the Reagan Administration today to "ensure that Israel's sacrifices for peace will not be in vain" and to "reward only those Arab states willing to live in peace with Israel"

The statement was adopted at a meeting sponsored by the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, composed of 34 national Jewish secular and religious groups. Some 600 Jewish leaders took part in the meeting, which included sessions with Vice President George Bush, Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker, Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Charles Percy and Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd. The group also was briefed by Israel Ambassador Moshe Arens.

In a resolution, the Conference of Presidents said that in giving up all of the Sinai to Egypt, "the people of Israel are betting their lives on the peaceful intentions of their former enemy. No other people has ever risked so much or paid so staggering a price for peace," the resolution stated, adding:

"We salute the leaders of Israel for their commitment to the peace process. We honor the courage of the people of Israel for placing at risk their own lives and the lives of their children in the search for peace.

"We call on our own government, as a full partner in the peace process, to ensure that Israel's sacrifices for peace will not be in vain and to adopt a Middle East policy that rewards only those states willing to live in peace with Israel."

Howard M. Squadron of New York, chairman of the Conference of Presidents, said in a keynote address to the delegates:

"There is a deep and growing concern in the U.S. Jewish community at the direction of American policy in the Middle East."

This policy, he said, is based on "two erroneous assumptions: first, that Saudi Arabia is the key to American interests in the region; and second, that military sales to Arab states opposed to the Camp David process will encourage them to make peace."

"In both instances, we believe, the contrary is true."

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 306
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Earlier, at a meeting with Vice President Bush, Mr. Squadron criticized what he called "Administration plans to sell F-16 jets and mobile Hawk missiles to Jordan in the face of King Hussein's continuing refusal to sit at the negotiating table with Israel, just as it sold AWACS and other sophisticated military equipment to Saudi Arabia, which denounced the Camp David peace process."

Vice President Bush did not confirm that the Administration planned to sell arms to Jordan but said that the U.S. sought by its policy toward "moderate" Arab regimes to "encourage more of them to do what President Sadat did in making peace with Israel."

Byrd Warned Haig on Selling Arms to Jordan

Senate Democratic Minority Leader Byrd told the Conference of Presidents that Israel was "justified in annexing the Golan Heights to protect its security" and that the White House was "wrong if it thought it could win support for Defense Secretary Weinberger's proposed arms sale to the Kingdom of Jordan." He declared:

"Jordan is not threatened by the Soviet Union, and selling King Hussein arms would be a mistake of serious dimensions."

Senator Byrd said he had warned Secretary of State Haig: "If that sale goes to the Hill, it'll be the AWACS battle all over again."

He continued: "The Administration's whole Middle East approach creates problems, rather than solving them."

"Instead of criticizing Israel for what it did on the Golan, we should praise it, for the Golan Heights in Israeli hands decreases the chances of Arab attack and renewed war in the Middle East."

"Instead of reducing the level of grant aid to Israel by \$50 million in the foreign military sales program -- as the Administration proposes -- we should increase it, in recognition of the enormous financial burden Israel is assuming in giving up the Sinai."

"Instead of signalling our willingness to sell arms to Jordan -- as Mr. Weinberger has done -- we should insist that King Hussein negotiate with Israel."

"Instead of trying to create an Arab-Israel consensus to deter Soviet intrusion into the region, we should first bring the Arab world into the Camp David process. Today the Gulf states perceive their main threat to be Israel, not the USSR. Until that perception changes, they will never take part in an anti-Soviet coalition. The way to bring about that change is to pursue the Camp David process. Arab-Israel peace must come before any Arab-Israel cooperation aimed at preventing Russian mischief in the area."

Senator Byrd said he had "personally pleaded" with King Hussein of Jordan and

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מחור 4... ד... 97

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך וז"ח

מס' מברק 306

President Assad of Syria to join the Camp David peace talks in 1978, only to be rebuffed by both Arab heads of state.

"Arab refusal to accept the legitimacy of Jewish statehood in the Middle East," he said, "means that Israel is not secure without the United States. But it is also true that the United States is not secure without Israel."

For this reason, he concluded, "it is in the American interest to stand by Israel as we would stand by West Virginia."

Meeting With Vice President Bush

During their hour-long meeting with Vice President Bush in his home Tuesday, the Jewish leaders took up the questions of arms sales to Arab states, the plight of Soviet Jewry and the charges of anti-Semitism that arose during the AWACS debate last fall.

Responding, Vice President Bush said he and President Reagan had been "deeply offended" by anti-Jewish sentiments raised in questioning the loyalty of those who opposed the President. Mr. Bush said he was "not convinced that the issue has been laid to rest." Both he and the President, Mr. Bush said, would continue to reject any attempt to question the loyalty of individuals or groups that challenged Administration policy.

On Jews in the USSR, Vice President Bush said the matter was "always on the Administration agenda when we meet with Russian leaders." He said he would urge that the question of the right of Jews to emigrate from the Soviet Union be raised during the forthcoming U.S.-Soviet talks in Vienna concerning possible resumption of U.S. wheat sales.

The Vice President defended the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia, asserting that it had served to strengthen the role of the Saudi regime as a "moderating" force in the area.

Rabbi Schindler: 'Don't Try to Distinguish Begin from Israel'

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler of Westport, Conn., president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, said in an address to the meeting that "there is an attempt being made to divide Begin from Israel, to distinguish somehow between the Prime Minister and the people, to insinuate that the so-called 'hard-line' of Begin does not represent the true feelings of the citizens of Israel." He added:

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ד. ד. 4. מחור. 4. ד. מ. י. ס.
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..... דחירות
..... מאריך נד"ח
..... מ. ט. מ. כ. ר. 306

"This is a slander against one of the great statesmen of our time. Menachem Begin is the democratically-elected leader of the Israel Government. He articulates the genuine consensus of the overwhelming majority of the Israeli people, both in his commitment to the Camp David process and in his determination to protect Israel's security; both in the concessions for peace which his government has made and in his refusal to deal with the PLD terrorists who express their vow to destroy the Jewish state by murdering Jewish willians, in Israel or Paris or Brussels or Vienna, and by assassinating any Palestinian Arab who is willing to live and work in peaceful coexistence with Israel."

Rabbi Schindler, head of an organization representing 750 Reform synagogues in the U.S. and Canada and a former chairman of the Conference of Presidents, declared:

"Prime Minister Begin is a proud man, a blunt man, often an abrasive man. But in the leadership he has given for peace and the commitment he has demonstrated to the security of the Jewish state, he has won a lasting place in the history of the Jewish people."

Rabbi Miller on Jerusalem

Rabbi Israel Miller of New York, another former chairman of the Conference of Presidents, told the Jewish leaders that Jerusalem must remain "undivided and under Israel sovereignty." "Only since Israel regained Jerusalem and unified it have all faiths been guaranteed access to their holy places," he said. "Only since Israel began its enlightened administration of the city has it blossomed and prospered. Only if it remains the capital of Israel will it continue to flourish."

Yehuda Hellman Calls for Priority Campaign Against Jordan Arms Sale

Yehuda Hellman, executive director of the Conference of Presidents, said the possibility of U.S. arms sales to Jordan represented "a grave threat to the security of Israel and an alarming peril to the cause of peace and the long-range strategic interests of our own country." He called for "an all-out campaign against any such sale," in which he said the Conference of Presidents would take the lead on the American Jewish scene, making it "a priority item on the Jewish agenda for 1982."

4/21/82

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חורביץ

מ. ט. מ. כ. ר. 306
מ. ט. מ. כ. ר. 306

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סגירות ישראל - ווסינגטון

אל: המשרד

ט ו פ ס ס כ ר ק
 דף... מתוך... דפים
 סוג בשחובי... שמור
 דחיפות
 תאריך זי"ח... 21 אפריל, 82
 314
 מסי מברק...

צד

עסקה - 100 - ל עירק.

1. המורטים פנוויק ובינגהאם יזמו מכתב לעמיתיהם ובו הביעו צערם כי הממשל החליט להסיר את עירק מרשימת המדינות החומכות בטרור. המכתב מחייחם לעיתוי החלטת הממשל למכור מטוסי 100 - ל עירק ומכנה אותו כגרוע משום שהדבר -

- א. מהווה נקיטת צד במלחמה בין עירק לבין אירן.
- ב. מגביר דאגותיה של ישראל.
- ג. מחלישה המאמץ להתנגד לטרור הבינלאומי.

2. התקיימו מגעים עם המורטים ביל ארצ'ר וטוני הול להצטרף ליוזמה זו. מכתב ברוח הנ"ל נשלח לבית הלבן.

קני-טל
 11.11

שיהיה סליחה מה שכתבתי לך ביום שישי האחרון...

ביטחון המדינה 50 שנה

ביטחון המדינה 50 שנה

ביטחון המדינה 50 שנה

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

6539

יצא

סמור

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מל: ווט, נר: 489, מ: המשרד
דח: מ, סג: ט, תא: 200482, וח: 1400
נד: סנפיר וטיראן

א.ה.ל

סמור/מייד

סבל

דע: הסגיר, הציר

סנפיר וטיראן

אנא פנה שוב למחמייד כי הומן קצר. תוכל לומר שאתה פונה לפי הנחיות.
רובינסטיין==

ח: שח, טשה, רהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, רט, אמן,
חמ, מצפא, דיבון, מצרים, רובינסטיין, מספט

H.R. 51406

JOHN JOSEPH MOAKLEY
1ST DISTRICT, MASSACHUSETTS

DEPUTY WHIP

COMMITTEE ON RULES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
RULES OF THE HOUSE

CHAIRMAN

DEMOCRATIC STAFFING AND
POLICY COMMITTEE

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

JOHN WEINPETER
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
211 CONNOR BUILDING
(617) 223-2179
ROGER KINEAVY
DISTRICT MANAGER
1900-JFK BUILDING
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02202
(617) 223-2719

March 24, 1982

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285

Dear Colleague:

Yesterday, I introduced a resolution opposing the sale of F-16 fighter aircraft, mobile HAWK air-to-ground missiles or any other advanced weapons to Jordan. The resolution also reaffirms America's commitment to ensure that Israel's military forces continue to maintain a qualitative edge in the Middle East. This is a companion resolution to S. Res. 332, which was introduced in the Senate by Senator Kennedy and Senator Heinz.

I strongly believe that to sell such weapons to Jordan would severely jeopardize Israel's security. The security of Israel is something which must be assured if the Middle East peace process is to progress. Furthermore, the security of Israel is in the national interest of the United States; Israel is the most stable and democratic nation in the Middle East as well as the United States most reliable ally in the region. Jordan, on the other hand, has opposed the Camp David accords; it has joined forces with Iraq, a nation pledged to the destruction of Israel. Jordan has, also, implicitly threatened to pursue additional arms from the Soviet Union if the United States does not supply them.

The United States, in pursuing a policy of working towards a lasting peace in the Middle East while ensuring the security of all the nations in the region, should not yield to Jordanian pressure and refuse to reward Jordan's obstructive tactics aimed at undermining the peace process.

I hope that you will join me in opposing this dangerous arms sale and in ensuring that Israel's qualitative military edge is maintained. If you wish to co-sponsor this resolution, (attached) please contact Jim McGovern at extension 5-8273.

Sincerely,

Joe Moakley
JOHN JOSEPH MOAKLEY
Member of Congress

3 Jan 73

285

To assure Israel's security and to oppose advanced arms sales to Jordan.

Resolution

To assure Israel's security and to oppose advanced arms sales to Jordan.

Whereas Israel is a stable, democratic, and reliable ally of the United States;

Whereas Jordan has opposed the Camp David peace process and joined forces with Iraq, whose Government is committed to the destruction of Israel;

Whereas Jordan is intending to purchase additional advanced weapons from the Soviet Union; and

Whereas the sale of United States advanced fighter aircraft and mobile antiaircraft missiles to Jordan would jeopardize the security of Israel: Now, therefore, be it

RESOLVED, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that

(1) the United States should not sell advanced fighter aircraft, mobile antiaircraft missiles, or any other advanced weapons to Jordan because they threaten the security of Israel; and

(2) the United States should ensure that Israel retains its qualitative military edge in the Middle East.

* 910 *

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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סודי ביוטר

מחוך 1

מחוך 34

דף 4

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מאל: המשרד, נד: 286, מ: 110
דח: מ, סג: מ, מא: 200482, רח: 1600
נד: מאנה

ס/ת

סודי ביוטר/מידי

בר-און, רובינשטיין, בנצור

מאנה

דו הודל נטחמייד סיפר לי כי הערכת מחמד שאם ניגש לבודרות
בנוצא מאנה, ישראל תפסיר.

סנל=

פ: שה, טשה, דהם, טרהם, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, אטרבו, דם, אמן,
די בון, מצרים, רובינשטיין, מצפא

מגדרות ישראל - רוסינגטון

ט ר פ י ס מ ב ר ק

ד-...!...!...! דפים

סוג כסחונג גלג

דחיסות רגיל

מאריך דה"ח 20 1730 אפריל 82

מס' סברק 298

אל: המסרד.

אבז

מסוכ"ל מצט"א.

STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING--APRIL 20, 1982

SOESS

STOESSEL IN MIDDLE EAST

In response to questions:

On Deputy Secretary Stoessel's plans, simply to note that he will be going to Jerusalem today for talks with Prime Minister Begin and his colleagues. I don't have anything beyond that.

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

In response to questions:

The Security Council informally convened late this morning for consultations on its schedule and it is possible that a formal meeting will be held this afternoon at which time a vote of the Islamic resolution may take place. However, we don't yet know the result of this morning's informal consultations.

מסוכ"ל מצט"א. דוח המסרד. 20 1730 אפריל 82

Handwritten mark

NESA-281 (4/28/82)

HEREWITH NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA WIRELESS FILE NO 75 TUESDAY,
APRIL 28, 1982

ITEM

NESA-282 (4/28/82)

(FOLLOWING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

NO SOUTH ASIA REPORTING IN THE U.S. PRESS (33)

THERE WERE NO SOUTH ASIA ITEMS OF AREA-WIDE INTEREST IN
THE APRIL 28 PRESS.

(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

ITEM

NESA-283 (4/28/82)

Handwritten mark

U.S. PLANS SALE OF PLANES TO BAHRAIN, MISSILES TO SAUDIA
(358)

WASHINGTON -- THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HAS INFORMED
CONGRESS OF PLANS TO SELL SIX FIGHTERS AIRCRAFT TO BAHRAIN
TO SUPPLEMENT THAT NATION'S GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM.

A MEMORANDUM RELEASED BY THE PENTAGON APRIL 19 SAID

482A-281 (A129122)

HEREWITH BEAR EARLY SOUTH ASIA WIRELESS FILE NO 22 TUESDAY
APRIL 28, 1982

ITEM

482A-282 (A129122)

(FOLLOWING IS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
NO SOUTH ASIA REPORTING IN THE U.S. PRESS (33)

THERE WERE NO SOUTH ASIA ITEMS OF AREA-WIDE INTEREST IN
THE APRIL 28 PRESS.

(FOLLOWING IS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

ITEM

482A-283 (A129122)

U.S. PLANE SALE OF PLANES TO BAHRAIN, MISSILES TO SAUDIA
(383)

WASHINGTON -- THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HAS INFORMED
CONGRESS OF PLANS TO SELL SIX FIGHTER AIRCRAFT TO BAHRAIN
TO SUPPLEMENT THAT NATION'S GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM.
A MEMORANDUM RELEASED BY THE PENTAGON APRIL 19 SAID

CONGRESS HAS BEEN INFORMED OF A PROPOSED LETTER OF OFFER TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BAHRAIN FOR THE SALE OF FOUR F-5E AND TWO F-5F AIRCRAFT WITH ASSOCIATED SUPPORT EQUIPMENT, SPARE PARTS AND 68 AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES. THE PROPOSAL ALSO WILL INCLUDE TRAINING AND TECHNICAL SERVICES, WHICH WILL REQUIRE ASSIGNMENT OF 18 U.S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL AND THREE U.S. CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVES TO BAHRAIN FOR TWO YEARS. NORTHROP CORPORATION IS THE PRIME CONTRACTOR.

THE ESTIMATED COST IS 114 MILLION DOLLARS.

THE MEMORANDUM SAID, "BAHRAIN, ALTHOUGH A SMALL NATION IN THE INCREASINGLY VOLATILE PERSIAN GULF AREA, IS A MEMBER OF

PAGE 82 -- BAHRAIN

THE RECENTLY CREATED GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL AND SEEKS A MODEST DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT WITHIN THIS CONTEXT. A MODERATE VOICE IN THE REGION, BAHRAIN IS A LONG-TIME FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES AND ALLOWS THE U.S. NAVY ACCESS TO FACILITIES IN THE COUNTRY."

ACCORDING TO THE PENTAGON, THE SALE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE U.S. POLICY OF ASSISTING OTHER NATIONS TO PROVIDE FOR THEIR OWN DEFENSE AND SECURITY BY THE TRANSFER OF REASONABLE AMOUNTS AND TYPES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, BUT IT WILL NOT AFFECT THE BASIC MILITARY BALANCE IN THE REGION.

"THE AIRCRAFT WILL BE USED BY THE BAHRAIN DEFENSE FORCE TO ENHANCE ITS AIR ARM," THE MEMORANDUM SAID. "IT WILL PROVIDE THE COUNTRY WITH A MODEST AIRBORNE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY TO SUPPLEMENT ITS GROUND AIR SYSTEMS."

THE PENTAGON ALSO ANNOUNCED THE PROPOSED SALE OF 2,818 TOW ANTI-ARMOR MISSILES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA AT AN ESTIMATED COST OF 22 MILLION DOLLARS.

THE SALE "WILL DEMONSTRATE THE CONTINUING WILLINGNESS OF THE U.S. TO SUPPORT SAUDI ARABIA WHICH IS AN IMPORTANT FORCE

PAGE 83 -- BAHRAIN

FOR MODERATION IN THE REGION," THE PENTAGON SAID.

THE MISSILES WILL BE USED TO MAINTAIN WAR RESERVE STOCK LEVELS AND WILL SUPPORT THE MODERNIZATION OF THE SAUDI

CONTRACTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED OF A PROPOSED LETTER OF OFFER TO
THE GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA FOR THE SALE OF FOUR F-5E AND TWO
F-5E AIRCRAFT WITH ASSOCIATED SUPPORT EQUIPMENT. PART PART
AND 62 AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES. THE PROPOSAL ALSO WILL INCLUDE
TRAINING AND TECHNICAL SERVICES, WHICH WILL REQUIRE
ASSIGNMENT OF 10 U.S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL AND THREE U.S.
CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVES TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR TWO YEARS.
FORTHROP CORPORATION IS THE PRIME CONTRACTOR.
THE ESTIMATED COST IS 114 MILLION DOLLARS.
THE MEMORANDUM SAID, "SAUDI ARABIA, ALTHOUGH A SMALL NATION IN
THE INCREASINGLY VOLATILE PERSIAN GULF AREA, IS A MEMBER OF

PAGE 02 -- SAUDI ARABIA

THE RECENTLY CREATED GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL AND SEEKS A
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"THE AIRCRAFT WILL BE USED BY THE SAUDI ARABIA DEFENSE FORCE
TO ENHANCE ITS AIR ARM," THE MEMORANDUM SAID. "IT WILL
PROVIDE THE COUNTRY WITH A MODERN AIRBORNE AIR DEFENSE
CAPABILITY TO SUPPLEMENT ITS GROUND AIR SYSTEMS."

THE PENTAGON ALSO ANNOUNCED THE PROPOSED SALE OF 2,916
TOW ANTI-TANK MISSILES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA AT
AN ESTIMATED COST OF 62 MILLION DOLLARS.
THE SALE "WILL DEMONSTRATE THE CONTINUING WILLINGNESS OF
THE U.S. TO SUPPORT SAUDI ARABIA WHICH IS AN IMPORTANT FORCE

PAGE 03 -- SAUDI ARABIA

FOR MODERATION IN THE REGION," THE PENTAGON SAID.
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LEVELS AND WILL SUPPORT THE MODERNIZATION OF THE SAUDI

טופס מנדט צפון

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

דף מס' _____ מס' _____

63 אל: המשרד

שם _____

דע: דושינגטון

מס' _____

מאת: השגריר נאו"ם

201130

456/80

לשירות
הקשר

אס

אליצור. דע: ארנס

מועב"ם : הר הבית

בהמשך למברקנו 456/80 מאהמול.

סמוך לחצוה שוחחתי אמש עם קירקפטריק שמסרה לי כי המליצה להצביע נגד ואף הורתה כבר למשלחת להכין הסבר הצבעה בהחלט.

קרה סתמה ימים סתמה
לא צפוי רוב נשקן קלאיז
אנל נ/ל אליצור ארנס 2

בלום

(TEXT) AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK ON U.N. MOSQUE RESOLUTION
(658)

U.S. CHARGES MOSQUE RESOLUTION DOES NOT CURB MIDEAST
TENSIONS

UNITED NATIONS -- JEANE KIRKPATRICK, THE U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, SAID APRIL 26 THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE RECENT ATTACK ON THE DOME OF THE ROCK MOSQUE DOES NOTHING TO DECREASE TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE UNITED STATES VETOED THE RESOLUTION, WHICH WAS INTRODUCED BY JORDAN AND MOROCCO. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK SAID THE VETO WAS CAST DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES "PROFOUNDLY REGRETS AND STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE SENSELESS ACT OF VIOLENCE" APRIL 11 AT THE MOSQUE.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION WAS 14 IN FAVOR AND ONE VETO.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF KIRKPATRICK'S REMARKS:

PAGE 82 -- KIRKPATRICK

(BEGIN TEXT)

THE UNITED STATES PROFOUNDLY REGRETS AND STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE SENSELESS ACTS OF VIOLENCE THAT OCCURRED APRIL 11, 1982, AT ONE OF ISLAM'S MOST SACRED MOSQUES, THE DOME OF THE ROCK. WE EXTEND OUR CONDOLENCES TO ALL THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED PHYSICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY FROM THIS ACT.

LAST FRIDAY, APRIL 16, PRESIDENT REAGAN MET WITH SIX AMBASSADORS DELEGATED BY THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES REPRESENTED IN WASHINGTON. I SHOULD LIKE TO READ THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THAT MEETING.

PRESIDENT REAGAN, IT SAID, "EXPRESSED HIS DEEP PERSONAL SORROW AND THAT OF ALL AMERICANS OVER LAST SUNDAY'S VIOLENCE AT THE HANDS OF A DERANGED INDIVIDUAL IN AN AREA SACRED TO

28
c. 2/c

(TEXT) AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK ON U.N. MORQUE RESOLUTION

(END)

U.S. CHARGES MORQUE RESOLUTION DOES NOT CURB MIDEAST

TENSIONS

UNITED NATIONS -- JEANE KIRKPATRICK, THE U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, SAID APRIL 22 THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE RECENT ATTACK ON THE DOME OF THE ROCK MORQUE DOES NOTHING TO DECREASE

TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE UNITED STATES VETED THE RESOLUTION, WHICH WAS INTRODUCED BY JORDAN AND MOROCO. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK SAID THE VETO WAS CAST DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES "PROFOUNDLY REGRETS AND STRONGLY CONDEMS THE BOMBERLESS ACT OF VIOLENCE" APRIL 11 AT THE MORQUE.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION WAS 14 IN FAVOR AND ONE VETO.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF KIRKPATRICK'S REMARKS:

PAGE 02 -- KIRKPATRICK

(BEGIN TEXT)

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Handwritten notes in the top left corner, including the number "28" and some illegible scribbles.

THREE OF THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS SYMPATHY WITH THE CONCERN OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD OVER THE DISRUPTION OF THE TRANQUILITY OF ONE OF ITS MOST HOLY SHRINES. THIS CONCERN IS SHARED BY MEMBERS OF ALL FAITHS.

29
HE REITERATED HIS CONVICTION THAT THE PEACE OF THE HOLY

PAGE 23 -- KIRKPATRICK

PLACES OF JERUSALEM MUST BE MAINTAINED AND CONFIRMED THE DEDICATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO ENCOURAGING THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR THE WELL-BEING OF THOSE WHO DRAW THEIR SPIRITUAL INSPIRATION FROM THAT CITY. THE PRESIDENT CALLED UPON ALL THE GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO WORK TO DECREASE TENSIONS IN THE AREA AND PREVENT FURTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND LOSS OF LIFE."

WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS GOAL TO DECREASE TENSIONS IN THE AREA AND PREVENT FURTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND LOSS OF LIFE IS ALSO THE CHIEF OBJECTIVE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE HAVE CONSIDERED IT (THE RESOLUTION) CAREFULLY IN MY GOVERNMENT (AND) REGRETABLELY WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE RESOLUTION BEFORE US HELPS TO ACHIEVE THE STATED OBJECTIVE.

FOR THESE REASONS WE FEEL IT SERVES NO CONSTRUCTIVE PURPOSES BUT WILL FURTHER ENBITTER THE PEOPLES OF THE REGION AND DEEPEN THE DIVISIONS THAT COULD LEAD TO CONFLICT.

THUS, AS MUCH AS WE CONDEMN THE ACT OF VIOLENCE THAT OCCASTONED THE DEBATE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WE MUST OPPOSE THIS RESOLUTION WHICH IN OUR VIEW WOULD MAKE NEW ACTS

PAGE 24 -- KIRKPATRICK

OF VIOLENCE MORE, NOT LESS, LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE IN THE FUTURE.

WE VOTED AGAINST THE RESOLUTION BECAUSE IT CONTAINS LANGUAGE IN THE PREAMBULAR AND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS WHICH IMPLIES THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS HORRIBLE EVENT LIES NOT WITH THE INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INCIDENT, BUT WITH THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES WHO HAVE UNEQUIVOCABLY DENOUNCED THE ACT.

THE TEXT ALSO IMPLIES THAT ISRAEL HAS ALSO HINDERED THE

THREE OF THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS
SYMPATHY WITH THE CONCERN OF THE ISRAELI PEOPLE OVER THE
DISRUPTION OF THE TRANQUILITY OF ONE OF ITS MOST HOLY
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"HE REITERATED HIS CONVICTION THAT THE PEACE OF THE HOLY

PAGE 23 -- KIRKPATRICK

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PAGE 24 -- KIRKPATRICK

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THE TEXT ALSO IMPLIED THAT ISRAEL HAD ALSO HINDERED THE

EFFORTS OF THE HIGHER ISLAMIC COUNCIL TO PERFORM ITS
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE HOLY PLACES,
WHEREAS THE EVIDENCE IS THAT ISRAEL HAS IN THE MAIN
CAREFULLY RESPECTED THE COUNCIL'S ROLE.

TO ELIMINATE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING, I MAY ADD THAT OUR
VOTE DOES NOT AFFECT OUR LONGSTANDING POSITION ON THE STATUS
OF JERUSALEM. AS PRESIDENT REAGAN EXPLAINED TO THE MOSLEM
AMBASSADORS LAST FRIDAY, THE U.S. POSITION REMAINS AS
PREVIOUSLY STATED -- THAT IS THAT THE FINAL STATUS OF
JERUSALEM CAN ONLY BE DETERMINED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AMONG


PAGE 05 -- KIRKPATRICK

ALL CONCERNED PARTIES.

(END TEXT)

ITEM

Element	Isotope	Abundance (%)	Atomic Weight
Hydrogen	¹ H	99.985	1.0078
	² H	0.015	2.0141
Carbon	¹² C	98.906	12.0000
	¹³ C	1.094	13.0034
Nitrogen	¹⁴ N	99.632	14.0031
	¹⁵ N	0.368	15.0031
Oxygen	¹⁶ O	99.762	15.9949
	¹⁷ O	0.038	16.9991
Sulfur	³² S	95.023	31.9721
	³⁴ S	4.977	33.9679
Chlorine	³⁵ Cl	75.77	34.9689
	³⁷ Cl	24.23	36.9659
Bromine	⁷⁹ Br	50.69	78.9183
	⁸¹ Br	49.31	80.9163
Iodine	¹²⁷ I	100.00	126.9045
	¹³¹ I	0.00	130.9051
Cesium	¹³³ Cs	100.00	132.9055
	¹³⁷ Cs	0.00	136.9055
Barium	¹³⁷ Ba	68.80	136.9055
	¹³⁸ Ba	31.20	137.9053
Strontium	⁸⁷ Sr	7.00	86.9089
	⁸⁸ Sr	93.00	87.9056
Zinc	⁶⁴ Zn	48.60	63.9291
	⁶⁶ Zn	27.70	65.9260
Cadmium	¹¹² Cd	24.10	111.9040
	¹¹⁴ Cd	75.90	113.9033
Mercury	²⁰⁰ Hg	23.50	199.9244
	²⁰¹ Hg	76.50	200.9242
Lead	²⁰⁶ Pb	24.10	205.9745
	²⁰⁸ Pb	75.90	207.9766



SAID. FORTY PERCENT TRAVELED FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN FAMILY REUNIFICATION. IN THE FUTURE, TOURIST TRAVEL TO CUBA WILL BE PROHIBITED, AND CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ARE NO LONGER ALLOWED TO HANDLE TRANSACTIONS FOR SUCH TRAVEL.

"CUBA WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO EARN HARD CURRENCY FROM AMERICAN TOURISTS AT A TIME WHEN CUBA IS ACTIVELY SPONSORING ARMED VIOLENCE AGAINST OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES," WALKER SAID. "BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS ALSO WILL NOT BE ALLOWED. THERE IS AN EMBARGO AGAINST U.S. TRADE WITH CUBA, WHICH IS BEING TIGHTENED, AND THIS IS A PART OF THIS TIGHTENING PROCESS."

TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS CONCERNING CUBA WERE IN EFFECT FROM 1963 UNTIL 1977, WHEN THEY WERE WAIVED BY THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. SINCE THEN, ALL TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA HAVE BEEN REGULATED BY THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL.

WALKER SAID THAT "THERE WERE NO ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS BETWEEN 1963 AND 1977," AND THAT THE UNITED STATES IS

PAGE 83 -- CUBA

EXPECTING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE WITH THE NEW REGULATIONS. UNDER THE TRADING-WITH-THE-ENEMY ACT, PERSONS VIOLATING THE NEW RULES COULD BE PENALIZED WITH A 10,000 DOLLAR FINE AND TEN YEARS IN PRISON, HE SAID.

ITEM

WESA-215 (4/28/82)

REAGAN CALLS ISRAELI RETURN OF SINAI A 'NOBLE EXPRESSION'
(S-2)

BY ALEXANDER SULLIVAN

USICA WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENT

WASHINGTON -- THE RETURN OF THE FINAL PORTION OF THE SINAI PENINSULA IS "A MAGNIFICENT ACT OF FAITH BY ISRAEL FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE," PRESIDENT REAGAN ASSERTED APRIL 28.

THE RETURN OF THE TERRITORY TO EGYPT, SCHEDULED TO TAKE

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PAGE 63 -- CUBA

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ITEM

REGA-SIS (ANSA/SIS)

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(S)

BY ALEXANDER SULLIVAN

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4/28
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PLACE APRIL 23, IS A NOBLE EXPRESSIO BY A PEOPLE WHO
SUFFERED SO MUCH," THE PRESIDENT DECLARED. IT WILL
REINFORCE "OUR STRONG COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY," HE
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REAGAN'S REMARKS CAME DURING A CEREMONY COMMEMORATING THE
HOLOCAUST, THE EXTERMINATION OF SIX MILLION EUROPEAN JEWS
AND OTHERS BY THE NAZI REGIME DURING WORLD WAR TWO.

THE PRESIDENT LINKED THAT EXPERIENCE OF A GENERATION PAST
TO THE PRESENT, RECALLING THAT ISRAEL WAS BORN "FROM THE

PAGE 32 -- HOLOCAUST

ASHES OF THE HOLOCAUST." HE TERMED ISRAEL A "COUNTRY THAT
RIGHTFULLY NEVER TAKES ITS SECURITY OR ITS SURVIVAL FOR
GRANTED."

HE SAID ALL PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE "SHOULD APPLAUD ISRAEL
-- AND EGYPT -- FOR WHAT THEY HAVE DONE... WE FERVENTLY PRAY
THAT THE RETURN OF THE SINAI WILL BE ACCEPTED FOR WHAT IT
IS, A MAGNIFICENT ACT OF FAITH BY ISRAEL FOR THE SAKE OF
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THE CEREMONY WAS PART OF A NATIONWIDE OBSERVANCE OF "DAYS
OF REMEMBRANCE" OR YOM HASHOAH, HELD IN APRIL BECAUSE MANY
OF THE NAZI DEATH CAMPS WERE LIBERATED BY ALLIED TROOPS IN
APRIL 1945 AND BECAUSE THE UPRISING OF JEWS IN THE VARSAV
GHETTO ALSO TOOK PLACE DURING THE MONTH OF APRIL.

REAGAN PAID TRIBUTE TO BOTH THE VICTIMS AND THE SURVIVORS
OF THE EXTERMINATION CAMPS, INCLUDING RAOUL WALLENBERG, A
SWEDISH NATIONAL WHO, REAGAN SAID, "IS A VICTIM, YET MAY
ALSO BE A SURVIVOR."

REAGAN SAID THAT IF WALLENBERG IS ALIVE "AS SOME SUGGEST,
LET HIS CAPTORS KNOW THAT THEY WILL BE FORGOTTEN LONG BEFORE

PAGE 33 -- HOLOCAUST

RAOUL WALLENBERG IS FORGOTTEN." WALLENBERG HELPED ENGINEER
THE ESCAPE OF THOUSANDS OF JEWS FROM EUROPE.

SOME EMIGRES FROM THE SOVIET UNION CLAIM THAT WALLENBERG
HAS BEEN IMPRISONED BY SOVIET AUTHORITIES SINCE THE END OF
WORLD WAR TWO. SEVERAL EMIGRES CLAIM TO HAVE SEEN HIM IN
RECENT YEARS, ALTHOUGH MOSCOW'S POSITION IS THAT IT HAS NO

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PAGE 52 -- HOLOCAUST

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PAGE 53 -- HOLOCAUST

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44/1

REASON TO BELIEVE WALLEBERG IS IN THE SOVIET UNION.

REAGAN SAID THE HUMAN FAMILY "NOW FACES THE THREAT OF A DIFFERENT KIND OF HOLOCAUST, A NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST. MAY THE REMEMBRANCE OF PAST VICTIMS OF MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN STRENGTHEN OUR RESOLVE TO SEEK A JUST AND DECENT WORLD FOR OURSELVES AND OUR POSTERITY."

THE PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD BEEN GIVEN AN EASIER GIFT SHORTLY BEFORE COMING TO THE CEREMONY. HE SAID IT HAD BEEN HANDMADE IN SECRET BY A PRISONER DETAINED IN A POLISH CAMP AND CONTAINED A MESSAGE THANKING HIM FOR WHAT THE UNITED STATES IS "DOING ON THEIR BEHALF."

REAGAN CALLED THE GIFT EASTER EGG A "REMINDER...THAT THE THINGS THAT BRING US TOGETHER HERE ARE STILL POSSIBLE IN THE

PAGE 24 -- HOLOCAUST

WORLD."

HE TERMED THE HOLOCAUST "A TRAGEDY OF SUCH PROPORTIONS THAT EVEN NOW WE CAN'T GRASP THE HORROR OF IT." NOTING THE FACT THAT THE NAZIS CLAIMED MILLIONS OF VICTIMS IN THE DEATH CAMPS, REAGAN ADDED, "SUCH VAST FIGURES HAVE A WAY OF BLINDING US TO THE HUMANITY BEHIND THE NUMBERS."

THE PRESIDENT CITED THE LOST TALENTS OF THE VICTIMS, ADDING, "ONLY GOD UNDERSTANDS HOW DIFFERENT THE WORLD WOULD BE" IF THOSE KILLED "HAD BEEN PERMITTED TO LIVE. WE MISS THESE PEOPLE, THOUGH WE WERE NEVER PERMITTED TO KNOW THEM."

ITEM

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PAGE 2A -- HOLOCAUST

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ITEM

WESA-217 (04/20/82)

53

TEXT: STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT ON U.N. MOSQUE RESOLUTION
(350)

1.7/6

WASHINGTON -- THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MOSQUE RESOLUTION WAS RELEASED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT APRIL 20:

(BEGIN TEXT)

THE U.S. VOTE AGAINST THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING THE SHOOTING INCIDENT APRIL 11 AT THE DOME OF THE ROCK MOSQUE IN JERUSALEM IN NO WAY DIMINISHES THE SHOCKING CONCERN WE FEEL OVER THIS INCIDENT. AS THE PRESIDENT HAS STATED, HE AND ALL AMERICANS FELT DEEP PERSONAL SORROW AT THIS ATTACK ON ONE OF ISLAM'S MOST SACRED SHRINES.

WE SHARE THE OUTRAGE THAT THIS CRIMINAL ACT HAS EVOKED FROM PEOPLE OF ALL FAITHS. WE SYMPATHIZE WITH THE UNIVERSAL CONCERN IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD OVER THIS SACRILEGE, AND WE EXTEND OUR SYMPATHY TO ALL THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED

PAGE 02 -- VOTE

PHYSICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY FROM THIS CRIME.

WE OPPOSED THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BECAUSE IT CONTAINED LANGUAGE IMPLYING THAT PART OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCIDENT LAY WITH THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES, WHEREAS ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT IT WAS THE SOLITARY ACT OF AN INDIVIDUAL. THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ALSO IMPLIED THAT ISRAEL IN SOME UNSPECIFIED WAY HAD HINDERED THE HIGHER ISLAMIC COUNCIL IN JERUSALEM FROM CARRYING OUT ITS DUTIES IN ITS ADMINISTRATION OF THE HOLY PLACES.

THE EVIDENCE IS THAT OVER THE YEARS ISRAEL'S RECORD IN THIS REGARD HAS BEEN A GOOD ONE. THEREFORE, THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT ACCEPT A TEXT WHICH WE FELT WAS BIASED IN

TEXT: STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT ON U.S. MOSQUE RESOLUTION (858)

1. 2/10

WASHINGTON -- THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MOSQUE RESOLUTION WAS RELEASED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT APRIL 28:

(BEGIN TEXT)

THE U.S. VOTE AGAINST THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING THE SHOOTING INCIDENT APRIL 11 AT THE DOME OF THE ROCK MOSQUE IN JERUSALEM IN NO WAY DIMINISHES THE SHOCKING CONCERN WE FEEL OVER THIS INCIDENT. AS THE PRESIDENT HAS STATED, HE AND ALL AMERICANS FEEL DEEP PERSONAL SORROW AT THIS ATTACK ON ONE OF ISRAEL'S MOST SACRED SHRINES.

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PAGE 02 -- VOTE

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THE EVIDENCE IS THAT OVER THE YEARS ISRAEL'S RECORD IN THIS REGARD HAS BEEN A GOOD ONE. THEREFORE, THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT ACCEPT A TEXT WHICH WE FELT WAS BIAS IN

THESE WAYS. ITS ADOPTION WOULD HAVE BEEN INCONSISTENT WITH
THE DUTY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACT IN A WAY THAT
DECREASES TENSION AND PREVENTS FURTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE.

OUR VOICE AGAINST THIS RESOLUTION DOES NOT AFFECT OUR
LONGSTANDING POLICY ON THE STATUS OF THE HOLY CITY OF
JERUSALEM. OUR POSITION REMAINS AS PREVIOUSLY AND

PAGE 03 -- VOTE

CONSISTENTLY STATED, THAT IS, THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM
CANNOT BE DECIDED UNILATERALLY BUT MUST BE DETERMINED
THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AMONG ALL CONCERNED PARTIES.

(END TEXT)

ITEM

NSA-219 (84/21/82)

(PROFILES) ASTRONAUTS GUION BLUFORD, SALLY RIDE (550)
FIRST BLACK, FIRST WOMAN SCHEDULED FOR SPACE FLIGHT
BY GAIL HAMER BURKE
USICA STAFF CORRESPONDENT

THE FIRST BLACK AMERICAN IN SPACE WILL BE A CREW MEMBER
ABOARD THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER, SCHEDULED FOR LAUNCH IN
JULY 1983.

NAMED TO THE FOUR-MAN CREW OF THE EIGHTH SHUTTLE FLIGHT
SCHEDULED FOR JULY 4, 1983 WAS U.S. AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT
COLONEL GUION S. BLUFORD, JR., 39, WHO HOLDS A DEGREE IN
ENGINEERING FROM PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY. HE IS FROM
PHILADELPHIA.

SALLY K. RIDE, A 32-YEAR OLD ASTROPHYSICIST, WILL BECOME
THE FIRST AMERICAN WOMAN IN SPACE AS A CREW MEMBER OF THE
SEVENTH SHUTTLE FLIGHT IN SCHEDULED FOR APRIL, 1983. RIDE,
A CIVILIAN, HOLDS A DOCTORATE IN ASTROPHYSICS FROM STANFORD
UNIVERSITY IN CALIFORNIA. SHE IS FROM ENCINO, CALIFORNIA, A

PAGE 02 -- ASTRONAUTS
SUBURB OF LOS ANGELES.

THESE WAY, ITS ADOPTION WOULD HAVE BEEN INCONSISTENT WITH
THE DUTY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACT IN A WAY THAT
DECREASES TENSION AND PREVENTS FURTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE.
OUR VOTE AGAINST THIS RESOLUTION DOES NOT AFFECT OUR
LONGSTANDING POLICY ON THE STATUS OF THE HOLY CITY OF
JERUSALEM. OUR POSITION REMAINS AS PREVIOUSLY AND

PAGE 03 -- VOTE

CONSISTENTLY STATED, THAT IS, THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM
CANNOT BE DECIDED UNILATERALLY BUT MUST BE DETERMINED
THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AMONG ALL CONCERNED PARTIES.

(END TEXT)

ITEM

NEGATIVE (CANCELED)

(PROFILES) ASTRONAUTS GUNION BLUFORD, EARLY RIDE (250)
FIRST BLACK, FIRST WOMAN SCHEDULED FOR SPACE FLIGHT
BY GAIL HANER-BUXE
USIA STAFF CORRESPONDENT

THE FIRST BLACK AMERICAN IN SPACE WILL BE A CREW MEMBER
ABOARD THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER, SCHEDULED FOR LAUNCH IN
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PAGE 02 -- ASTRONAUTS
GURBA OF LOS ANGELES.

ITEM

NE SA-108 (4/19/82)

ff

STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, MONDAY, APRIL 19, 1982 (900)

NEWS BRIEFING -- ALAN ROMBERG, DEPUTY PRESS SPOKESMAN,
WAS THE BRIEFER. HE COVERED THE FOLLOWING TOPICS:

25/6

U. S. "PLEASED" WITH STOESSEL MISSION --

ROMBERG SAID THE UNITED STATES WAS "PLEASED" WITH THE
REPORTS OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WALTER STOESSEL'S
MISSION TO THE MIDEAST TO DISCUSS FINAL DETAILS OF THE APRIL
25 ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI. STOESSEL IS IN ISRAEL
NOW, HE SAID, AND MAY GO TO CAIRO ON APRIL 19.

WHEN ASKED IF THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD RESTRICT
AMERICANS GOING TO THE SINAI, REPORTERS NOTED THAT SOME
AMERICANS ARE AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE THREATENED SUICIDE IF THE
SINAI IS TURNED OVER TO EGYPT -- ROMBERG SAID THAT HE KNOWS
OF NO U. S. EFFORT TO PROHIBIT AMERICAN CITIZENS FROM GOING
THERE. HE SAID THAT "OTHER PARTIES" MIGHT RESTRICT ENTRY

PAGE 02 -- STATE
INTO THAT REGION.

ROMBERG SAID THE UNITED STATES IS "CONFIDENT" THAT THE
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI WILL TAKE PLACE.

REAGAN INVITES GANDHI--

ROMBERG ANNOUNCED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS INVITED
INDIAN PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI TO VISIT THE UNITED
STATES IN JULY. THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT GANDHI HAS ACCEPTED
THE INVITATION IN PRINCIPLE, BUT EXACT DATES HAVE NOT BEEN
DETERMINED.

U. S. REVIEWING NICARAGUAN REPLY --

1524-108 (4/19/82)

STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, MONDAY, APRIL 19, 1982 (900)

NEWS BRIEFING -- ALAN ROMBERG, DEPUTY PRESS SPOKESMAN, WAS THE BRIEFER. HE COVERED THE FOLLOWING TOPICS:

slay

U.S. "PLEASED" WITH STOSSSEL MISSION --

ROMBERG SAID THE UNITED STATES WAS "PLEASED" WITH THE REPORTS OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WALTER STOSSSEL'S MISSION TO THE MIDEAST TO DISCUSS FINAL DETAILS OF THE APRIL 25 ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI. STOSSSEL IS IN ISRAEL NOW, HE SAID, AND MAY GO TO CAIRO ON APRIL 19.

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PAGE 02 -- STATE

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U.S. REVIEWING NICARAGUAN REPLY --

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

טופס מברק צנון

דף _____ מסודר _____ דפים _____
 סיווג כטחוני: _____
 תחומים: _____
 תאריך זיהוי: 1976-
 מס. מברק: 432

לשימוש
 מח'
 הקשר

סלול

אל: המסרד
 דע:
 מאת: נאו"ם

ארב"ל 2. פר"נ.

עצרת פירוק הנשק - הזמנת רוח"ם.
 לשלכם 282, בהמשך למברק השגריר 390 מה-16 באפריל.
 מבקר.

1. לשלכם 2: לסיטב ידיעתנו לא קיים פרס עלוב ע"ש שוויצר. יש לעוסה זאח פרס שלוב, שהחלו בו לפני כ-3 שנים, ע"ש אלברט איינשטיין.
2. לשלכם 3: כפי שדווחנו היחה אומנט כוונח לפנוה לשגרירות ברושינגטון. כפי הנראה החליטו, מכיוון שהקרן בניו יורק והמדובר גם בעצרת או"ם לפירוק נשק, שעדיף להעביר ההזמנה באמצעות נציגות ישראל לאו"ם.
3. בשלב זה בדעתנו להעביר לקרן השובה נימוסין מטעם השגריר ובה תודה על ההזמנה וציון העכרתה לירושלים וכו'. ע"ש המלצת השגריר נפתין להחבתרוח מצב הפנינים מביב הצטוי בעצרת פירוק הנשק וגדרוח סחדש.
4. בדיע סכתב נוסף ובו מידע כללי על קרן אלברט שוויצר שהעבירה אלינו כנהלח הקרן הגב' אסטל לינדר.

נאו"ם

לרות סלמה רחה סלמה רחה
 קרן אלה סלמה רחה

תאריך: 19.4.82 השולח: א. בקר אישור כנהל המחלקה: תחומה:

סגירות ישראל - ווסידנגסטון

אל: המשרד

אח

ט ר פ ס ס נ ר ק

97... מתוך... נשים

סוג בשחוני... עוגי...

דהיפות... רגיל...

תאריך רז"ח: 19.1700. אסריל 82

מס' טברק... 274

פורת - לשכת רוה"מ, דע: ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, הטברה

מס"ע - ראש הממשלה.

מתוך ניתוח המחרט בכלי התקשורת ובדעת הקהל פה - מציע לסקול האפשרות לקיים מסיבת עיתונאים בארץ עם הדרג הבכיר . רצוי ראש הממשלה.

הופעה כזו בתחילת השבוע הבא (בהנחה כי הנסיגה תושלם במועדה - ובודאי אם לא תושלם) חתן פרטום מירבי לעמדותיה של ישראל בעידן שלאחר כיצד רואה היום ישראל את השלום עם מצרים, את המשך תהליך השלום, את המצב באיזור בכללותו.

נדמה לי כי די והותר נושאים אקטואליים הקשורים בישראל עומדים על סדר היום - והופעה כזו עשויה לענות על הענין הקיים בהם.

הצעה זו נראית לי תקפה גם בהחשב בחכנית MGBT THE PRESS שבה יופיע רוה"מ ביום אי הקרוב.

מה שאתם רוצים לדעת אנא נא לייד את המכתב שלי

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס ס ב ר ק

דף...ל...שתוך...!...דפים

סוג נטחוני...טודני..

דחיפות.....רגול....

תאריך נד"ח: 19.1630.19. אפריל 82

מס' סברק 273.....

אל: המסוד

273

המנכ"ל. מצפ"א. מע"ת

סיכום תקשורת.

בשבועות האחרונים עוסקת התקשורת בהרחבה בנושאים ישראליים ומזה"ח. הנושא היסודי מהמודד ובהצלחה בכל נושא ב"ל העולה על סדר היום, כולל מרכז אמריקה והמסבר באיי פולקלנד.

המהומות בשטחים, המתיחות בגבול הצפון, הירי על הר הבית, פינוי סיני ויחסי ישראל - מצרים מספקים כותרות ראשיות וכתבות ארוכות לכלי התקשורת הארציים והמקומיים.

הסיקור בכללותו - שלילי. נדמה לי כי אפילו הפינוי מסיני, אשר אמור היה להנחיל לנו כמה נקודות זכות בדעת הקהל נבלע באוירה הכללית ורישמו הכללי - דער.

מאחר שטלכתחילה דאגו פה לפרנס את דעת הקהל בחשבות כי אין בכוונת ישראל לסגת מסיני באמת ובתמים - הרי קשיי הרגע האחרון החקבלו בדיוק על רקע זה. המתלקחות בשטחים והמתיחות בצפון מתקבלים גם הם בספקנות ומתוך שאלה האם אין ישראל מתכוונת בדרך זו להסיט את שימת הלב מן ההתחייבות לסגת מסיני.

הקושי העיקרי הוא כמובן בדיווחי הטלוויזיה ובצילומי העתונות. אלה מרבים להביא תמונות מן העימותים ביו"ש ובעזה בין חיילים ישראלים לבין מפגינים ערביים.

לכל הידוע היה המימשל בתדרוכיו השונים זהיר מאוד-בהתבטאויות גלויות ולרקע-על המצב בשטחים. לעומת זאת, כאשר החריף המצב בצפון הופעלה מערכת של אזהרות שהגיעו לעיתונאים ופרשנים - ובהם הובחרו. לישראל ההשלכות השונות של פעולה צבאית בלבנון.

בנושאים האמורים לעיל שוחחנו באופן שוטף עם כתבים ופרשנים כדי לנסות ולאזן הרושם השלילי. השגריר תדרך בשבוע שעבר את מערכת ה"ניו-יורק טיימס" בושינגטון והיום את מערכת ה"וול סטריט ג'ורנל" בניו-יורק. כמו כן הופיע בראיונות לחכנית Nightline (עימות עם השגריר הסעודי) ולתכניתו השבועית של דויד ברינקלי ביום א'.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew and Arabic script at the bottom of the page.

262 $\frac{2}{2}$

27/0

Americans back Israel 3 to 1, poll shows

By Joseph Polakoff
Special to The Jewish Week

Under the heading "Americans Still Support Israelis Strongly over Arabs," a report by ABC News-Washington Post on its latest poll of views on Arabs and Israelis said that "despite the widely publicized disagreements between Israel and America in recent months," Americans say, by a three to one margin, that they are more sympathetic to Israel than the Arab states.

A majority—51 per cent—say Israel is striving more than the Arab states to bring peace in the Middle East, that 75 per cent of Americans believe the Palestine Liberation Organization is "a force for war rather than peace," and that 49 per cent approve President Reagan's handling of the Middle East situation, according to the poll.

The poll report, which accompanied three pages of statistics, resulted from 1,672 interviews in the period March 3-8. ABC News aired the report March 10 but the Washington Post has set it aside. Upon inquiry by this reporter as to why The Post has not published its own findings, an editorial source at The Post said that the subject is "dealing with issues most people don't think about" and that "numbers by themselves are not always helpful." He added that the pollsters may "come back later with the same questions to see if there is a trend." The Post is antagonistic toward Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who was reported in the poll as favored by nearly two-thirds of those with an opinion, and it favors a Palestinian state.

Following is the text of the ABC News-Washington Post report:

"Despite the widely publicized disagreements between Israel and America in recent months, the American public still strongly backs the state of Israel," the ABC-Post poll shows.

"By a three-to-one margin Americans

say their sympathies are more with Israel than the Arab countries, and a majority (51 per cent) say Israel is striving more than the Arab nations to bring about peace in the Middle East."

"Fifty-one per cent of the public also feels we should not lessen our ties to Israel to insure an adequate oil supply from the Arabs."

"Of those having an opinion of controversial Israeli Prime Minister Begin, nearly two-thirds are favorable toward him, though about a quarter of the sample said they have grown less favorable toward him during the past year."

"But a greater portion of the public thinks the situation in the region has deteriorated in the past year which saw the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat. Forty-three per cent of the public say things have changed for the worse over the past year. Only one in ten think things have gotten better, and the rest don't think there's been much change."

"The public seems to feel the spirit of Camp David survives with 59 per cent saying it is at least fairly likely that Egypt and Israel will remain at peace with one another. But a substantial one-third think they won't."

"Of the people who know what the Palestine Liberation Organization is, 75 per cent believe it to be a force for war rather than peace in the Middle East. By a two-to-one margin Americans say the PLO does not represent the point of view of a majority of the Palestinian people."

"The public approves of the way Reagan is handling the situation in the Middle East by a 49 to 34 per cent margin, despite reported policy disagreements between top advisers Haig and Weinberger. On handling foreign affairs in general, Reagan scores a more negative 43 per cent disapproval rating. Only 45 per cent approve of his handling of foreign affairs overall."



טגירות ישראל - וטינגטון

אל: המטרד

טופס סברי

דף... 1... מחוק... 2... דפים

טווג בטחוני... גלוי

דחיפות.....

תאריך וז"ח 18.500 אפר. 82

מסי מברק... 262

יגר. נעים. בנצור. גלבווע. דע: לשכת רוהיים.
להלן מהעתון היהודי המקומי.

צ. הורביץ

הורביץ

שהיה סטמטאגאנא^{הגד} אגאנא אצבא תאצט יאה אג המדיה פארט

12/16
22

MORE U.S. FUNDS SOUGHT FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE (600)

WASHINGTON -- THE U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HAS CALLED FOR INCREASED CONSTRUCTION FUNDS FOR SOUTHWEST ASIA TO SUPPORT THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE AND TO IMPROVE READINESS OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE REGION.

AT A JOINT HEARING APRIL 19, TWO SENATE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION SUBCOMMITTEES HEARD TESTIMONY FROM DOUGLAS FARBROTHER, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR FACILITIES. FARBROTHER CALLED FOR 474 MILLION DOLLARS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL CONTINGENCY CONSTRUCTION IN EGYPT, OMAN, KENYA, AND SOMALIA AND BOTH CONTINGENCY AND ROUTINE SUPPORT FACILITIES IN DIEGO GARCIA AND LAJES, PORTUGAL, IN THE AZORES.

FARBROTHER TOLD THE SUBCOMMITTEES THAT, THE FUNDS REQUESTED FOR FISCAL YEAR 1983 COUPLED WITH THOSE REQUESTED IN LAST YEAR'S SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET "WILL PROVIDE THE INITIAL STAGING CAPABILITY FOR THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK

PAGE 02 -- DEFENSE
FORCE."

"RECOGNIZING THE ALMOST COMPLETE LACK OF SUPPORT FACILITIES WE FACED IN 1981," FARBROTHER ADDED, "THE EFFORTS TO DATE AND THE COMPLETION OF THE PROJECTS IN THESE REQUESTS WILL PROVIDE A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN SUPPORT CAPABILITY FOR OUR RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES AND WILL PROVIDE THE BASIC BUILDING BLOCKS FOR SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE THE SOUTHWEST ASIA AREA."

THE MONEY FOR SOUTHWEST ASIA IS PART OF AN 8,300 MILLION DOLLAR APPROPRIATIONS PACKAGE AND A 7,800 MILLION DOLLAR REQUEST IN AUTHORIZATION BASED ON A REVIEW OF PRESENT AND FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS, CONDITION OF EXISTING FACILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS FOR MODERNIZATION OF MILITARY FACILITIES. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS ALSO REQUESTING SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS OF 199 MILLION DOLLARS AND A NEW

copy

MORE U.S. FUNDS SOUGHT FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE (600)

WASHINGTON -- THE U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HAS CALLED FOR INCREASED CONSTRUCTION FUNDS FOR SOUTHWEST ASIA TO SUPPORT THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE AND TO IMPROVE READINESS OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE REGION.

AT A JOINT HEARING APRIL 19, THE SENATE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION SUBCOMMITTEE HEARD TESTIMONY FROM DOUGLAS FARROTHER, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR FACILITIES. FARROTHER CALLED FOR \$74 MILLION DOLLARS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL CONTINGENCY CONSTRUCTION IN EGYPT, OMAN, KENYA, AND SOMALIA AND BOTH CONTINGENCY AND ROUTINE SUPPORT FACILITIES IN DIEGO GARCIA AND LAJES, PORTUGAL, IN THE AZORES.

FARROTHER TOLD THE SUBCOMMITTEES THAT THE FUNDS REQUESTED FOR FISCAL YEAR 1985 COULDED WITH THOSE REQUESTED IN LAST YEAR'S SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET WILL PROVIDE THE INITIAL STAGING CAPABILITY FOR THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK

PAGE 05 -- DEFENSE
FORCE

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THE MONEY FOR SOUTHWEST ASIA IS PART OF AN \$8,500 MILLION OMB APPROPRIATIONS PACKAGE AND A \$2,800 MILLION DOLLAR REQUEST IN AUTHORIZATION BASED ON A REVIEW OF PRESENT AND FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS, CONDITION OF EXISTING FACILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS FOR MODERNIZATION OF MILITARY FACILITIES. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS ALSO REQUESTING SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS OF 199 MILLION DOLLARS AND A NEW

סגירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המסרד

טל

ט ו פ ס ס כ ד ק
... 97... מחון... דפים
... סווג בשחזר...
... דחיסות...
... 19 1129 אמריל, 82
... 252... מט' מברק...

מצפ"א, ממ"ד

מחוך שיחה עם דריו הרקר (ועדת השירותים המזויינים של הסנט)

1. שר ההגנה הלבנוני, הנמצא בבקור פרטי בארה"ב, נפגש לשיחה עם סנטור טאור.
המקור נכח בשיחה אשר התמקדה בבוזירות לנשיאות ובטכנה של פלישה ישראלית ללבנון.
שר ההגנה הלבנוני הביע דאגתו העמוקה לנוכח האפשרות של פלישה ישראלית -

based on less than a very clear provocation


2. שר ההגנה הלבנוני לא העלה בשיחתו עם טאור נושאי רכש. הרקר סיפר לי כי בזמנו
נחנה ארה"ב הסכמתה להעברת 80 טנקים מדגם M-48 הנמצאים ברשות הצבא הירדני ללבנון.
סביב העברת הטנקים נוצרו בעיות בשל התנאים המלווים העברה זו (לא פירוט). הרקר
הוסיף כי למרות רצונה של ארה"ב לחמור בבינוי הצבא הלבנוני, המהווה לדבריו אחד
המוטדות הלאומיים המעטים במדינה, ישנו חשש שמא חלק מהציוד שיטופק יפול בידיים
עויינות. שאלתי את הרקר באם לאחרונה התעוררו קשיים בהעברת טנקים מירדן ללבנון
(המורשה המילטון רמז על קשיים כאלה בעת עדות במרץ ש.ז.). הרקר הכחיש כי ארה"ב
מקור הקשיים שנוצרו והדגיש, וושינגטון נמנה הסכמתה להעברה זו.

3. שאלתי את הרקר האם יוכל לפרט יותר על הועדה הצבאית המשותפת למצרים ולארה"ב.
מסר כי ועדה זו הקרויה: US-Egypt Military Coordinating Committee
הוקמה בשנה שעברה. עד כה נפגשה הועדה פעם אחת, בינואר 1982. ארה"ב יוצגה ע"י
עוזר מזכיר ההגנה, ווסט. הפקיד הועדה לדון בכל קשת הנושאים הקשורים לרכש, תכניות
אמונים, מודרניזציה של הצבא המצרי. צנור זה נועד לדון גם בקשיים הנובעים מקליטת
ציוד אמריקני בצבא המצרי.

4. הרקר שאל מה תהיה עמדת ישראל לנוכח ההחלטה למכור מטוסי F-5G לירדן. הדגיש
כי מצבה של NORTHROP קשה והעיסקה יכולה להצילה. התרשמות מומחי הועדה
שמטוס F-5G אינו מקטין העליונות הישראלית הניכרת.

הערה: מאחר ונשאלנו רבות לגבי האיומים האפשריים הצפויים ממכירת מטוסי F-5G
לירדן אודה באם תשלחו, בהקדם, נייר טעונים בנדון עם דגש עם הסיכונים הצבאיים.

קני-טל
... ..



סגירות ישראל - רוטינגטון

אל. המשרד

מלך

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מצפ"א, ממ"ד

מכירת מטוסי L-100 לעירק.

1. פקידי משרד המסחר ואנשי מחמ"ד קיימו לפני כשבוע חדרין לעוזרים בוועדת החוץ של שני הבתים ובו הודיעו על כוונת הממשל למכור 6 עד 12 מטוסי L-100 מתוצרת המפעל לוקהיד. הפקידים הנ"ל מסרו כי רשיון היצוא ינתן ב-30/4. פקידים הדגישו כי מסרו התדרין כמחווה לקונגרס, מאחר ולפי דרישת החוק אין צורך בכך.

2. במיחה עם אנשי איפא"ק חקרנו דרכים אפשריות לפעול נגד הנ"ל. הדרך היחידה הינה חקיקה מפורשת שתעבור אח שני הבתים ותובא לנשיא לחתימה. קשה להניח כי:

א. חקיקה כזו אפשרית בנסיבות הקיימות היום בקונגרס. פרטי מסוגל לעכב ואף לחסל העניין כשהוא עוד בדיון בתוך-הועדה.

ב. גם אם באופן חיאוורטי נניח כי החקיקה תעבור ספק באם הנשיא יכנע לקונגרס. סביר יותר כי הנשיא יטיל וטו.

קני-טל 1100

לרוב סלמה. רמת סלמה שלום מ/מ מ/מ מ/מ מ/מ מ/מ מ/מ מ/מ מ/מ מ/מ מ/מ

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MEETING

THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL, MR. MENAHEM BEGIN

and

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE USA, MR. WALTER STOESEL

Friday, April 16, 1982
10:15 a.m.
Prime Minister's Office

Participating:

Israel

Foreign Minister Y. Shamir
Defense Minister A. Sharon
Mr. Y. Ben-Meir
Gen. A. Tamir
Gen. Yaari

USA

Ambassador S. Lewis
Mr. William Brown
Mr. N. Draper

(Note: The verbatim record of this meeting commenced after the meeting had already started)

MR. BEGIN: ... with a rifle and start shooting. It can happen any place--

MR. STOESEL: He killed a guard too.

MR. BEGIN: Anywhere in the world, and in no time two people got killed and others wounded. Of course, we took precautions and we shall take precautions. Are we the guilty party?

We have, Mr. Secretary, in our history this constant blood libel. Since ancient times the Jewish people was being accused of using blood for matzot, and usually during Pesach we used to suffer programs throughout the world, in the Middle East even in

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antient times. There was an infamous blood libel in Damascus. There was also in Italy. One of the Popes, hundreds of years later, decreed that it was a blood libel, it was a lie. And people were tortured, hanged, hacked into pieces, our people. All because they were accused of taking a Christian boy, killing him and taking his blood and putting it into matzot. It's something you can't even comprehend, but it's a fact. This blood libel accompanies us since we became a nation. Now it is being done on an international scale. Again, I say a crazy man went there; the two rabbis condemned him in the sharpest words, I did also and sent condolences to the bereaved families. What else can a nation do? It can happen any time.

And yet now we are in the Security Council in the dock, and that resolution is absolutely unacceptable. So I'd like to ask you to take it up with Mrs. Kilpatrick.

MR. STOESEL: I will do that directly. We have been in touch already and I know she is working to do everything possible.

MR. BEGIN: She is a wonderful woman. It would be unjust. If the resolution passes that would be interpreted throughout the Moslem and Arab world as if Israel were guilty. That is too dangerous because people incite them all the time, and there were strikes. King Khaled called for a strike throughout the Moslem world. A strike - against whom? What did we do?

There was an Australian Christian who tried to burn down the El Aksa Mosque, because he read in the Bible that the Temple should be rebuilt when Christ will come again. What can we do?

He was a crazy man and he tried to burn down the mosque, and we put the fire out with great efforts. But it happens. And again, in those days we were accused. So you can see what problems we have.

MR. STOESEL: Terrible.

MR. BEGIN: There are almost fantastic stories, but it is reality, it's a part of our life. I am sorry that I took the time to bring such problems before you.

MR. STOESEL: No, I am glad to hear it from you and to understand what this means. And whatever we can do to help, you know we want to.

MR. BEGIN: But about the UN Security Council, you will take steps? Thankyou.

Now, we have with us the Defense Minister who was in Cairo yesterday, where he met with President Mubarak, with Kamal Hassan Ali, with the Egyptian Defense Minister, with Dr. Boutrous Ghali, and with El-Baz. He had talks with all of them. Now suddenly yesterday evening, the Foreign Minister informed me that Dr. Ghali informed him that he is coming today and he has a special personal letter from the President addressed to me. I will see him at 12 o'clock. When are you leaving?

MR. STOESEL: At 3:15.

MR. BEGIN: So I will phone Sam and inform him of the contents of the letter and my reactions, so that the Secretary will know in advance. I didn't expect this, but if Mubarak sends an emissary, of course I will receive him. And it's a good opportunity also

5/30

for me to tell him about compliance and vice-versa, both sides complying, then it's all right. But I will let you know before you go about the contents of the letter.

But since there are some things we might not want to talk about in the large meeting, I suggest that the Defense Minister report to us in this small group.

MR. SHARON: I had three meetings in Cairo. The first was with the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kamal Hassan Ali. Together with him with Aburzala. At that first meeting, I raised three problems. One is the cooperation with the terrorist organizations, which I would say politically was known to us even during the late Sadat's time. But in the last month or three weeks, it took on an entirely different shape, where cooperation has been initiated not by the terrorist organizations but by the highest Egyptian authorities - and this is what I told them yesterday - and included information given to the terrorists, collected by the Egyptian Embassy here, in Israel. It was general information about Israel, and specific information about Israeli preparations against the terrorist organizations in Lebanon. And of course, I gave them a list of events. I had to be careful because many of the sources are secret or top secret. But I gave them as much as I could.

Then I raised the second problem, which is the violations in Sinai in forces and ground violations in Zone B. (Unfolding map). I showed them the map, but I'd like to emphasize that already in

6/30

the car going from the airport to the Sheraton Hotel - and I decided to make everything close and not waste time because I had only a few hours - Gen. Ali told me in the car that every violation will be removed immediately and that they take upon themselves to remove violations within three days. But when coming there, I put up the map and showed it to them.

Then I raised the third problem which was the question of the demarcation of the international boundary, with these 15 places where there are certain areas under dispute. We talked for almost an hour and then we left to see President Mubarak.

I raised the same problems with him; it was a long conversation, an hour and a half. And again I emphasized and said that of course we have some other problems which the Prime Minister will be discussing through you or any other channels, and that of course is the political side, and those famous 11 points. About the 11 points he said again: I never saw them; I don't want to see them. I said: Maybe you will see them, and he said: No, I don't want to see them.

I came out very strongly about the point of cooperation with the terrorist organizations. I explained to them again, although I did it many, many times already in the past, how this terrorist activity in the past, back in the '50s, really brought about the circle of war that Egypt and Israel and the rest of the Arab countries were involved in. It all started from terrorist activity. Because in 1949 - 1950 we were closer to peace than in 1977. So

7/30

I repeated this theory and they heard that. Talking about cooperation with the terrorist organizations, I emphasized of course the operational cooperation and then the smuggling of arms and explosives, grenades from El Arish to the Gaza District. I gave them the figures that from the 1st of January this year until the last days, we managed to capture 500 grenades, but we didn't catch all of them, it's only a part of them. From the beginning of last year, it was about 1500, tremendous numbers of hand grenades being smuggled, when we know and emphasize to them that in the past they were allowing only one terrorist organization, that is the Fatah, but now they made it more liberal and added two other organizations to this circle.

They have a base in El Arish which is known, and the people are known, etc. And of course that is a very complicated situation, especially when we are supposed to come to the international boundary, where it is heavily populated, and where you don't have the 50 km. to cross and a desert where we can still catch someone. It is on the border and sometimes you can just throw it to the other side. And in order not to destroy buildings in Rafiah, our defensive system is a very thin one. So we have a severe problem. And I demanded very strongly that it be stopped immediately.

On this subject, again, President Mubarak said he could not believe they had this contact, and so on. But we know, and they know they do. He then decided and gave instructions to create and establish a closer contact between our intelligence people and theirs. And that as a matter of fact, is what our Prime Minister asked the late President Sadat when we were together in Alexandria

in August 1981, and as a matter of fact in the beginning when Sadat was still alive, that started to work, but then it stopped. And as a result, Gen. Abdulla, who is the head of Military Intelligence of Egypt, was instructed later the same day, in the third meeting I had with them, to come today to Israel. And he is here now. He was to land at 10.

MR. STOESEL: Did he come with Boutrous?

MR. SHARON: They are coming on the same plane. But don't take it that we are satisfied with this result, because that all in all doesn't say anything. I mean they understood that Israel will not accept a situation where they become supporters of the PLO, and not ideologically, because we know there are contacts in Europe, sometimes your people have contacts with the PLO people which we don't like but it's a fact - but I am speaking about information given, about certain logistic support, which we couldn't discover what kind of support. Of course we get this information from Lebanon, and again it was an Egyptian initiative to promise them certain logistical support which we don't know what, but they know. So they understood that Israel looks upon it as one of the most dangerous situations that may develop, and we have known Gen. Mahmud Abdalla for a long time. It is important that they took this step because we learned that they understood that Israel takes these things seriously, and that is important. But I wouldn't go farther than that. Maybe that is the only achievement meanwhile when it comes to this cooperation with the terrorist organizations.

9/30

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Then I put this map on the table and he immediately said he would not like to discuss it; he instructed Gen. Aburazala, who was in a very bad mood - although he got the highest rank of field marshal; I don't know if there is any other army in the world now, maybe the Soviets have it, but he now has the highest rank, so he should have been very happy, but I found him in a very bad mood. But I think that was for other reasons that we know about, and I wouldn't like to go farther than that. Anyway, he said: Field Marshal Aburazala, you solve it. Then they exchanged some words in Arabic, and Ali said they will remove and correct that, etc.

Then I raised the third problem, which is the question of the border, and I said that our Prime Minister came with a proposal, which was very forthcoming and I think a very good one. I think it was probably the most moderate solution one could have expected. He said he will not accept that, they are not going to give one centimeter, etc. I said: we are not asking you to give any of your land as a matter of fact. It is not the land, because what they are trying to do now is of course to take advantage of several demarcations that took place since the last time they did it. They started in October 1906 and finished in February 1907, but since then the border was marked several times, and there is a reason at each point why they want to sit on this mountain or the other one.

They didn't accept it, and I said in my capacity I had only the possibility to bring our Prime Minister's proposal which was approved by the Government. Then he said: In this case, Ali will

10/13

becoming here to discuss it again and he is waiting for our sign to come, and that Monday might be the day he'd like to come.

MR. STOESEL: Did he bring another proposal from their side?

MR. SHARON: They spoke about freezing and some other things that we made very clear we will not accept. We had discussed it so many times I didn't even have to discuss it with them. I said it is not within my capacity or possibility; I just had to bring them our proposal, which was so nicely presented already on the 16th of March by the Prime Minister to Ali and Dr. Ghali here in this room. We could not add anything, and I hope we are not going to add anything. Because I don't see what we can add. What more can we give? We said we will withdraw to the line where the Egyptians think the border was; they will advance to the line where we think the border was, and in between there is going to be the MFO, and life will go on. And of course then we turn to Article 7 of our agreement with Egypt and the U.S. of course, which speaks about negotiations, about conciliation and about agreed arbitration. And I made it very clear that Israel will not accept any international arbitration because we know our position in the world, and we made it clear.

MR. BEGIN: The Egyptians already accepted the concept of agreed arbitration.

MR. SHARON: And they sent with me two non-paper papers which I gave yesterday to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign

11/30

Affairs, and these two non-paper papers are nothing that we can accept. I think nothing could be better than what we proposed. So these were the three subjects.

MR. STOESEL: On that question, Sam talked to you, Mr. Prime Minister, about Haig's idea of sending Davis Robinson, our legal advisor, if you would feel this could be useful at some point in helping to set up a procedure of arbitration.

MR. BEGIN: I asked Sam to postpone that until we make it clear. I wouldn't exclude a visit by Mr. Robinson. I suggest I listen today to Ghali. Perhaps he will bring me some information, and before you leave I will let you know.

MR. SHARON: I have one problem I'd like to add, about the terrorist cooperation, what I call cooperation in terrorism. We have here today Gen. Abdulla. They did that in order to show that they took it seriously. It is important, but it will not stop it. Unless the Egyptians will decide that they don't want to do it. As a matter of fact, they will show you a list of their achievements, in how many cases they caught terrorists, etc. And the list as far as I know might be accurate. But I would like to emphasize, and that's what I told them, when it comes to explosives that are smuggled into Egypt they are doing a beautiful job. In Egypt, they have no manpower problem. If they need 1,000 policemen for El Arish, they will have it; there are so many. So when this smuggling goes towards Israel, their eyes are closed. When it goes towards Egypt, they are very active. So they will give a list, we received a list too.

12/3

On this question of the violations, they had said they need three days, but then they said they'd like to do it earlier and will finish it by Saturday. Now here we come to a problem, which I have discussed with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. We need your help, and immediately. In the past, the SFM observers have failed in finding violations. They managed to find very few. Now, you have this operation under the code name of Olive Harvest, that is a U-2 high altitude air photography. We want this area to be photographed. Let's say I will give you the dates we thought out, maybe you will have to give them another day. We suggest the 18th, in order to leave them Saturday to do it. To cover the whole of the Sinai area. Now you know we usually don't get these photographs, but because of a special case, something which must give us the confidence that Sinai is clean of any violations, so in this case we ask you to photograph and to give us the photos in order to check them thoroughly. That of course will be done secretly, you don't have to announce that, I don't think they would like it. But otherwise we have no other possibility to be sure of that. Because what are we going to do? We have to send these SFM people to certain places, but Sinai is 60,000 sq. km.

MR. LEWIS: You have also asked for a special inspection.

MR. SHARON: Yes. And these people are trying but they cannot give us the assurance. If they will say for instance that everything is clean, we cannot accept it. We know in the past there were things they never managed to find. We don't know ourselves if the map we gave them includes everything.

MR. LEWIS: So you want both done, in fact.

MR. SHARON: Yes. One is a normal thing, there is a mechanism.

MR. LEWIS: ON the SFM point, the director, Mr. Trinka, is here now in the other room. He has gotten the request but it is not as precise as would be helpful to SFM, in knowing what the major concerns are that you want to look at. So he asked to get more details from your people while he is here. That would be very helpful.

MR. SHARON: If I had to sum up about my trip to Egypt, what I have learned it is that suddenly - it took them a long time - you ought to know what all these subjects were discussed many times, for instance, the smuggling of arms. The Prime Minister himself on the 16th of March talked here in this room to Ali about that and he mentioned numbers. I asked the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was in Cairo ten days ago, to bring it up. I talked to Sam about it, many, many times. I gave our Parliamentary Committee on Security and Foreign Affairs a list of dates when we discussed this subject with Egypt, between 40 to 50 different dates and meetings where we discussed the question of violations, and in many of them the smuggling of arms into Gaza was talked about. It is not new. One of the important meetings took place in January when I discussed that with the Minister of Defense and he then explained that they have a problem because the army is the only loyal sector of the population to the regime there, and if they have to force them to move and so on, it will

be a sort of offense, etc. So I told Gen. Aburazala then: I understand it, you have time, but don't leave it to the last minute because we won't be able to accept that. And this conversation took place in Cairo in January 1982.

And of course it is very important that it be clean, because we regard the MFO not as an element that should report about violations, but they have to prevent them. But if the area will not be clean, they won't be able to do it.

MR. STOESSEL: No, they should start with a clean slate.

MR. LEWIS: Maybe that is why Aburazala is in a bad humor.

MR. SHARON: Other reasons. I am afraid he might be removed from his post.

MR. STOESSEL: They kicked him upstairs first.

MR. LEWIS: That is what they did with his predecessor.

MR. BEGIN: Gamassy said to Ezer Weisman: I will never forget what Sadat did to me. And Gamassy was still the Commander in Chief of the Egyptian Army when he said to Ezer: I am a candidate for assassination.

MR. STOESSEL: I was very glad to hear your report, Mr. Minister, and I am encouraged by it. At least they seem to be taking these things seriously. I will go over this also when I go and talk to them.

MR. BEGIN: Perhaps Gen. Yaari has something new to say to us.

GEN. YAARI: Only that according to the information, which is being checked, that what was said in the meeting is being taken seriously and they intend to do it.

MR. LEWIS: Arik, can you tell us anything about Mubarak's mood? How did he react to the whole situation? I think it would be helpful for Walt if he has a sense of what he is getting into.

MR. SHARON:

חיסיון מתוקף חוק אחר

For instance, one of the "secret weapons" he had and said by that he was going to convince the Prime Minister that we are wrong - he took a book which we had already talked about, by Martin Gilbert, a very interesting book, not written in Israel, an atlas with historical maps. He instructed El Baz to bring the book, and it was marked in several places. I said: Oh, yes, in this book on such and such a page it is worth reading that it says that Israel suffered so and so many people killed in the '50s due to Arab terrorism. But he hadn't read the book. He had a map with a scale of one to ten million there, and he said: Do you see the map, do you see where Taba is? So I told him: You are known in our country to be one of your best pilots and I don't think you could have gone far with this map. Everyone there laughed, and El Baz became red. I think he prepared this material. It is not even a map, but a sketch. I don't know if you have this book.

MR. LEWIS: Yes. It's a very interesting book.

MR. SHARON: But I also told him: Mr. President, even in our map we never pretended to say that Taba is in our hands. Even according to us, it is in your hands. Taba is the name of a place,

not a district. Therefore when you appointed a governor for Taba, I accepted that, because the ruins of Taba according to our map are in your area, the well, all the ruins, that is on your side, according to our map. And that is what you see in the map.

But I think he of course would like to see Israel withdraw. He is pressing. He pressured Gen. Abadalla to come immediately and Ghali will come immediately.

We met later in a third meeting and I tried to cheer him up but it was very hard. He told us as a matter of fact that he is going to send you a letter, but he didn't say he was sending it with Dr. Ghali. I believe he wants to make every effort so we will be out of the area by the 25th, so he instructed them. Gali will come with a message, and Abdulla will be here and Ali will come to discuss the border points in order to show that they are taking steps. And he instructed Aburazala to take all the steps; I believe he will do that. That of course says nothing about the future. And I believe about the future we need some other things. Therefore I only mentioned the paper but they didn't know about it, so I didn't talk about it.

MR. BEGIN: They heard something about the paper and they said they won't sign it.

MR. SHARON: No, he said they heard David Levy talking about a paper, and he will not sign it because that would mean abolishing Camp David. I said it is an entirely different thing, but as you don't have the paper, and that is not one of the problems I came

to discuss, so I left it open.

MR. STOESSEL: We will discuss that of course with them and see what that situation is. As we said yesterday, maybe there are other ways to handle the situation.

MR. BEGIN: I suggest we don't leave our colleagues waiting too long and that we discuss this political situation with all of them. There was a certain leak already, nothing tragic. The Ha'Aretz wrote about our suggestion of a paper, but it is also written that we didn't put it as a condition.

This is the statement issued yesterday, Mr. Secretary. Read it before we go into the other room.

MR. LEWIS: I had the impression that Matti Golan was under the table yesterday during the meeting when I read the article this morning.

MR. BEGIN: But it was very light. He said it is not put like a demand or an ultimatum. A proposal, and that Israel can also accept others. It didn't push the Egyptians into a corner.

MR. LEWIS: All I will say is that it could be a lot worse. I think it would be a lot better not to have it written though.

MR. STOESSEL: We will look into the Olive Harvest thing.

MR. LEWIS: It may be just an operational problem. If there is a plane, weather conditions, etc. If they can't do it on Sunday, for our reasons not yours, they might have to do it on Monday.

MR. STOESSEL: It sounds like a good idea.

12/30

MR. BROWN: This must be kept most secret because we promised the Egyptians way back that we would never provide either side with photography.

MR. LEWIS: Yes, to give you the photography violates our commitments to the Egyptians. All I am saying is if we do it, you have to keep it out of the press. You have to use censorship on this.

GEN. YAARI: It is very important to ask why all these violations exist to begin with. Now they will abolish them, but what happens later?

MR. STOESSEL: One more word about Lebanon, although it is not the subject really of my mission. I just wanted to say that we have observed the restraint which you have shown in this situation, we know how difficult it is. We know there was fighting yesterday and there are great tensions there. But I wanted you to be aware that in the U.S we note this restraint. We do attach great importance to the preservation of the cease fire, particularly in this time when so many other things are at issue. I just wanted to say that.

MR. BEGIN: I only want to repeat what I said to the Ambassador. No decision was taken to enter Lebanon with the Israeli army. I even went so far as to tell him that if we take such a decision, I wouldn't be able to say anything about our operational plans but I may be able to give him a hint, if such a decision is taken. If it becomes unavoidable. For instance, if our northern villages are shelled, we cannot permit our population to be under such an attack.

19/3

We cannot have our blood being shed, but it is not a matter of invading Lebanon. The fact is that nothing happened. And it was not easy.

MR. STOESSEL: WE appreciate that.

MR. LEWIS: Purely for information, Mr. Prime Minister, we understand through our channels, you probably have the same kind of reports, that the extreme factions in the PLO, the DFLP, Habash people, and some of the Fatah, the extreme left-wing of the Fatah are against Arafat, are pressing very hard to get Arafat to change his appearance, and he is resisting. So there is a struggle going on which could produce some additional things.

MR. BEGIN: I'd like to describe to you the following picture. The day before yesterday the Defense Minister called me and told me the following amazing story. There is a running battle between the Shi'ites and the PLO and some other leftist groups, communists, pro-communists, etc. The Shi'ites were atrociously bombarded by PLO artillery, so they threatened that if it is not stopped they will break the cease fire agreement; they will bombard the Khadad area and Northern Israel, so that we will hit the PLO. Imagine our position. We are not a party to all these battles. And to try and entangle us they were going to bombard Israeli townships so Israel would have to act. So they said. But it didn't materialize. Still they continue to fight all the time.

MR. YAARI: Yes, until this morning, fighting went on. And it covers from Beirut to Southern Lebanon.

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MR. LEWIS: It is also Iraqi-Syrian related; groups controlled by the Iraqis going after those controlled by the Syrians.

--(The small room meeting is adjourned at 11:05 and reconvened in the large room, with the added participation of:

Israel

Mr. E. Rubinstein
Mr. H. Bar-On

USA

Mr. G. Matthews
Mr. R. Perito
Mr. Hare
Mr. N. Walker
Mr. M. Kozak
Mr. Pianka

MR. BEGIN: Mr. Secretary, at 12 o'clock, I will see Dr. Ghali who comes to me on very short notice with a letter from President Mubarak. Of course, I will study it and between 1 and 2 I will get in touch with Ambassador Lewis and give you full information about the document Dr. Ghali is going to deliver to me and any information I have to add.

Let us now consider our suggestion of a statement of reaffirmation. The Egyptians probably don't know the contents of our draft and they think we want to force them to sign a document that will humiliate them. As you know, the Egyptians also made a comment during the visit of our Defense Minister that if such a document were signed, the Camp David agreement will be put aside or abolished. On the contrary, what we are asking for is a reaffirmation of adherence to Camp David with all its provisions.

Now, of course, this is a draft and obviously there can be corrections. But we would like to hear from you what objections one could have to such a statement. We would prefer to have a statement made by Egypt and Israel and signed by the U.S. as a witness, as happened with the Camp David agreement originally and with the peace treaty, the letters addressed by President Carter to President Sadat and myself, etc. So if you have any suggestions to our draft, Mr. Secretary please let's have them.

MR. STOESEL: We have studied the draft which was presented by you yesterday. We felt that the Egyptians probably will have difficulties with it. However, it is certainly my intention to discuss it in Cairo when I go there. And I think before we ourselves make up our minds as to the best way of approaching this problem, and we see it is a problem and it is desirable to have a document, something in writing of reassurance, I think we accept that - but before we make up our own minds as to the best or most advisable way to proceed, it is useful if I talk first with the Egyptians to see what their attitude is on this matter and then come back to it when I return from Egypt. So we can have another discussion about it.

We had felt, as I said yesterday that there are some aspects of your draft, in that they seem to pull out certain questions from the previous agreements, which could cause confusion, could cause objections from the Egyptian side. Maybe there are other things

29/30

they would like to emphasize, and we could get into an argument with them about what should go into such a document. So we will have to see. As I mentioned, we feel that there are some other possible options. One we had thought of would be the possibility of a letter which could be sent to you and to President Mubarak from Secretary Haig, in which he would set forth his understanding-

MR. BEGIN: If you think the letter should be sent to President Mubarak and to me it should be signed by the President, or by the Secretary of State to the Foreign Ministers.

MR. SHAMIR: But it would be better by the President.

MR. SHARON: Would the letter include the points mentioned in our paper?

MR. BEGIN: We don't discuss the letter yet. This is a suggestion. I would like to know, Mr. Secretary, where do you find the possibility of Egyptian objection, because whatever we put in is exactly a repetition or reaffirmation of what is written both in the Camp David agreement and in the peace treaty. The Egyptians may try to add things which do not appear in either document, they may, but that is a different story. If we have points that go out of those documents, we would like to know and we are prepared to reconsider them.

MR. LEWIS: I think the point here is that there are a lot of things in the Camp David Agreement which were very important to the Egyptians that aren't touched on here that they would propose, we assume, putting into any such document. Things you didn't like

very much but which you accepted.

MR. BEGIN: If it is written, we accept Camp David as it is. In toto. Of course, it is useless to repeat the whole agreement.

MR. LEWIS: That is the problem. We have gotten into this same situation in the autonomy negotiations which you recall in trying to frame that memorandum of principles or agreement, and whenever we have taken material which you have particularly wanted to emphasize they have wanted to insert material which they wanted to emphasize, and ultimately you end up with practically the whole agreement to restate. This is an issue, that is all I suggest.

Also one observation, and it follows on what I said I think the first time you passed this to me. I have a feeling that it would be easier, I maybe wrong, that it would be easier to get agreement to reaffirm key sections of the peace treaty, where this issue I have just referred to doesn't arise so much. That is, in the peace treaty, the interests are perhaps more totally balanced psychologically. In the broader question of the Camp David accord, with the whole focus on language about the rights of the Palestinians and inadmissibility, and all those things, it seems to me, if you bring this in--

MR. BEGIN: I would accept your suggestion, Sam, that we concentrate on the peace treaty, were it not for those 11 points. What we would like to stress in that short sentence about the Camp David agreement and our adherence to it is that there is a plan -

94/30

the autonomy. And suddenly speak in their 11 points about withdrawal to the lines of 1967, a Palestine state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, not mentioned; Jerusalem, not mentioned. So we want to hear from the Egyptians that although Dr. Magid made that speech in Kuwait, Egypt adheres to the Camp David agreement because that is the only agreement that exists between the three countries - the U.S., Egypt and Israel. That is the point, that's why we put in the paragraph about Camp David. Otherwise, I would have agreed that our mutual relations are based on the peace treaty.

MR. LEWIS: This leads to a question perhaps we can defer until after you see what Dr. Ghali has brought you. For example, it is possible in my mind that you could deal with these ^{two} issues differently. You can deal with the peace treaty issue in a document; you could deal with the recommitment to Camp David in a unilateral letter from President Mubarak to you. And maybe the letter Ghali is bringing may have such a commitment in it. There are various ways of differentiating and dealing in writing with these kinds of issues. Just a thought.

MR. STOESEL: Or a general declaration.

MR. BEGIN: Anyhow, Mr. Secretary, you will take it up with President Mubarak. I think in any case a document is necessary. Not to hurt anyone, not to humiliate anyone. It is mutually based on reciprocity, on all the phraseology already used in both documents, in the peace treaty and the Camp David agreement. But it is necessary I suppose; President Sadat was killed, there is a new president, we are about to take the decisive step from the point

of view of territory, on the eve of that, what is wrong with reassuring each other? Not the Egyptians reassuring us, but we reassure them as well by the fact of our withdrawal on time. So we reassure them and they reassure us. That there will be diplomats, peace, normalization of relations, etc. Nothing wrong with that.

MR. STOESEL: Well, we certainly agree that there is a need for a document or perhaps several documents. Reassurance on the eve of this important event.

MR. SHARON: I just want to ask. It is not that we are talking already about a letter because we of course prefer this document that should be signed by the three of us, but when you speak about a letter, I would understand then that both sides should confirm that they accept it.

MR. STOESEL: Yes, that would have to be.

MR. BEGIN: That they accept its contents, of course. Otherwise, it is meaningless.

MR. SHARON: For instance, we added here the paragraph talking about the MFO and we thought about that after hearing from the commander of the force that he thought his duty was to report about violations or diversions from the military annex to the agreement.

MR. BROWN: I spoke with the Director-General of the force by telephone last night and brought his attention to your concerns in this regard. He told me that the statement attributed to Gen. Bull Hansen was only partial. Whatever the report was it was only partial, it did not contain all of what he said and he is well aware, Mr. Defense Minister, of your concerns.

MR. STOESEL: It is quite clear in the agreement itself.

MR. LEWIS: I had a chance to talk to Gen. Bull Hansen about your concern and I told him privately and informally that I had to tell him that his statement had aroused a good deal of worry. He assured me categorically that his modus operandi, his concept of operations precisely reflects the protocol negotiated between Egypt and Israel and the U.S. and the wording in that protocol is his mandate. He said: I was not properly quoted; there are sensitivities on the Egyptian side that I have to take care of also, but I intend to carry out precisely what that protocol says; and I wanted you to know that.

MR. BEGIN: Eli, do you have the protocol, do you remember it? Please read out what is written there. We won't ask for anything more, but no less.

MR. RUBEINSTEIN: It is the annex to the Protocol, Article 8: "The mission of the MFO should be to undertake the function and responsibilities stipulated in the treaty for the UN forces and observers. The MFO shall supervise the implementation of Annex 1 and employ its best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms."

MR. BEGIN: Yes, that is the key sentence - not to report violations but to prevent violations. Thank you very much.

MR. STOESEL: Yes, it is very clear. There is no doubt the commander will follow that.

MR. SHARON: Of course, here in the document that was presented to you, Mr. Secretary, I think the commitment that no

97/30

other plan but the Camp David agreement and autonomy will be discussed in future is very important. Because we hear from all directions about other plans. I don't want to mention again these 11 points, but we hear it from everywhere. It should be very clear that the only plan that exists is the Camp David and the autonomy plan. Therefore, we emphasized it again in our paper.

MR. BEGIN: It is a fact. President Reagan said the only plan is the Camp David agreement, and there is no other. It should be stressed by all parties.

I just got a note from Ghali saying he also wants to raise the point of Taba.

MR. STOESEL: On the Camp David points we should find a way to take care of that, that this is the only existing basis.

MR. SHARON: Also for the United States.

MR. STOESEL: Yes.

MR. BEGIN: The President made that statement.

MR. STOESEL: Mr. Prime Minister, I have a note here saying that Boutros Ghali would like to come back to Cairo on my plane, after he meets with you, to give us a chance to talk before my arrival in Cairo. I think that is all right unless you--

MR. BEGIN: If you give him your hospitality, I won't object at all. It's up to you. I wish him God speed on your plane.

MR. SHARON: I got a message now from our Intelligence. We have been watching the Egyptians now, moving some of their troops from Zone B to Zone A. They are taking the troops from the trenches and fortifications, but what they have to do is destroy

8/30

them because the troops will be out of there for the visit of the SFM, and then they will enter back. So I would like you, Mr. Secretary, when you talk to the Egyptians to make it clear that correction of these violations should include complete destruction of these defensive positions, and that includes barbed wire fences, trenches and mine fields. Because what we see now is that they are moving and just taking the soldiers, moving to the other side of the line B and will be waiting there until this report we are going to get from the SFM. I asked Gen. Yaari to give the commander of the SFM the map of the violations. All the points should be checked, according to the map, all of them, because you may go to one or two of them and then we won't be sure.

GEN. YAARI: We gave all the details to the Americans yesterday.

MR. LEWIS: If they have dug some trenches across the line, are they forbidden according to the annex?

MR. SHARON: Of course. I will explain. If these trenches are part of the trenches for the 4,000 border guards that are allowed to be in Zone B, that is one story. But when you take the area of the Mitla Pass, the Gidi pass and Birgafgafa, when they move forward with their defensive positions up to about a mile eastward of line A, that is not part of these trenches that the border guard should have somewhere in this area. And that is a complete change in the situation and then of course they must remove them, and the SFM knows that very well because we discussed that with them many times before. There cannot be a kind of trick that they will do it and then there will be a visit and the next day they will come back and laugh.

29/30

We are not going to accept that. We know all these tricks.

MR. STOESEL: Did you raise that specific point about the fortifications in your talks?

MR. SHARON: I think we raised it many times. I don't remember if I emphasized it yesterday. ^{But} as you are going there, Mr. Secretary, please do that for us.

MR. SHAMIR: About this point of the cooperation with the PLO it is not yet solved by their sending this official. I think it is worthwhile to underline that because for us it is one of the most important worries we have. I don't know what can be the solution, but a formal announcement of the Egyptian government on this issue I think is very important. If they can include it, for instance, in such a document, I don't think it is easy for them, but it can be very useful.

MR. SHARON: I think it is very important. There should be a commitment that they are against terrorist activities, against any support to terrorist organizations, that should be emphasized. Otherwise, we don't have anything in our hand son that. So the General will be here, very nice, etc.

MR. LEWIS: Has he been here before?

MR. SHARON: He served as the commander of the paratroopers. We know him for many years. He paid a visit here when General Ali was Minister of Defense and brought with him a group of high officers, he was among them. But since then he was appointed as director of military intelligence. He is the man behind all these contacts.

30/30

MR. LEWIS: So he is the right man to talk to.

MR. SHARON: Yesterday he refused to come, but Gen. Ali told him in Arabic that it's an order.

MR. BEGIN: As for the statement to the press, you could say you are bringing on behalf of the Government of Israel constructive proposals to President Mubarak, or positive proposals, or whatever language you choose. And that you will be back here and we'll meet again on Sunday at 6 p.m.

MR. STOESSEL: And that we have a feeling of confidence that the problems can be resolved.

MR. LEWIS: Tactically, I would recommend to Mr. Stoessel that he not talk about bringing Israel proposals. Just to say we had a good discussion, and he is bringing ideas for discussion, but not to call them Israeli proposals.

MR. BEGIN: All right I can accept that.

Mr. Secretary, I want to express our gratitude to you for taking the trouble to come to us. Our talks were really held in the most friendly attitude as of course befits our two nations which are friends. You contributed very much to the spirit of friendship. I believe now more than two days ago in a positive solution and that is thanks to you. Let's hope for the best.

--(Meeting adjourned at 11:40 a.m.)--



משרד החוץ

ט/הג
18.4.44

בברכה

מאת

המנהל הכללי


כבוד גאון ישראלי

המחלל
בית המדרש
למחזור

בכבוד רב

ד. קמחי

1. The U.S., being a full partner to the Protocol establishing the MFO, undertakes to ensure the compliance with the security arrangements in accordance with the Treaty of Peace, including ensuring the freedom of navigation and overflight of the Straits of Tiran.
2. The U.S., being committed to the security of Israel will, in the case of violations of the security provisions of the Treaty of Peace, provide emergency supplies to Israel.
3. Recognizing the strategic importance of Israel and its heavy burdens, the Government of the United States will make every effort to be responsive on a continuing and long-term basis to Israel's defence and economic assistance requirements with a view to maintaining Israel's qualitative and quantitative advantage.
4. Cognizant of the friendship existing between the two countries, the U.S. will at an early date proceed with the implementation of the mutually-agreed measures for strategic cooperation.
5. The U.S., cognizant of the dangers facing Israel in the event of a violation of the security provisions of the Treaty of Peace, will provide Israel with means to prevent it from being taken by surprise by an armed attack.



MEETING

THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL, MR. MENAHEM BEGIN

and

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE USA, MR. WALTER STOESSEL

Sunday, April 18, 1982

6 p.m.

At the Prime Minister's residence, Jerusalem

Participating:

ISRAEL

Foreign Minister Y. Shamir
Defense Minister A. Sharon
Mr. Y. Ben-Meir
Gen. A. Tamir
Gen. Y. Sagi
Mr. D. Kimche
Mr. E. Rubenstein
Mr. H. Bar-on
Col. A. Nevo
Mr. D. Meridor
Mr. U. Porat
Maj. O. Shamir

USA

Ambassador S. Lewis
Mr. William Brown
Mr. N. Draper
Mr. G. Matthews
Mr. H. Teicher
Mr. M. Kosak
Mr. B. Perito
Mr. Hare
Col. Pianka
Mr. J. Dietrich
Mr. John Scott
Mr. N. Walker
Mr. F. Trinko
Ms. P. Post

- - -

MR. BEGIN: Welcome back to Jerusalem, Mr. Secretary.
We'd like to hear your report from the capital of Egypt.

MR. STOESSEL: I will be glad to do that, Mr. Prime Minister.
It is good to be back and to meet with you and your colleagues
again.

We had very thorough discussions in Cairo with President
Mubarak this morning and twice with the Foreign Minister and
several times with Boutros Ghali. So we had quite a range of

discussions. And I must say that I feel a sense of continuing confidence that the problems can be resolved. I have that feeling very much after the talks.

First, just on a personal note, I would like to mention that President Mubarak this morning spoke very warmly of you and his respect for you, as a man and as a man of peace. And he said I have respect for him, and he spelled it out - r-e-s-p-e-c-t, respect. He said he had been concerned about your health; he understood from Mr. Sharon that you were walking well and he was very pleased to hear that. He wanted to pass this to you. He was very warm.

If I may, I will go through some points here. I feel that now we have a combination of both actions and written words which should meet the concerns of both parties. Mr. Mubarak I believe has made clear both by his actions and his words his reaffirmation of all of the documents that Egypt has signed. Now, I had not previously seen the full text of his letter to you. We received that this morning.

MR. BEGIN: I gave Sam on the phone the main sense of the letter

MR. STOESEL: Sam passed your views about it on to me. I felt it was a helpful and positive letter and it did reconfirm his commitment to Camp David and to the Treaty of Peace. And in that letter he made a commitment to adhere to every document

... And I must say that I feel a sense of confidence
that the problem can be resolved. I have that feeling
that you will bring the matter.

... But on a personal note, I would like to mention that
President Nixon's this evening made very clearly of you and the
regard for you, as a man and as a man of peace. And he said I
have respect for him, and he smiled to me - respect -
respect. He said he had been concerned about your health, as
indicated from Mr. Sperry that you were suffering and he was
very pleased that you had returned to you. He
was very kind.

... I say, I will go through some other cases. I feel that
now we have a collection of both sides and other words that
should not be concerned with politics. Mr. Nixon, I believe
has made clear both by his actions and by his position
of all of the documents that were sent to you. I feel that
everyone's seen the full text of the letter to you. We received
that this morning.

... I say that on the other side the main part of the
MR. STONER: That would be about 11 or 12. I
felt to me a neutral and positive letter and I will continue
his comment to you, and to the party of peace. And in
- that fact he made a statement to adhere to every document

that Egypt has signed. And he sees this as a moral and legal commitment. I might say on Camp David, that ^{he} was very strong in my talk with him this morning, reaffirming Camp David as the only basis on which to proceed. He authorized me to say this to the press when I left. And I did that. I said President Mubarak has stressed to me his adherence to Camp David and his commitment to it as the only existing framework for the peace process. So I think that was a useful assertion on his part.

He mentioned, and the Foreign Minister mentioned the great number of normalization agreements, over 40 agreements which have been concluded in one form or another. Mubarak also specifically committed himself to remove all of the reported violations of the military annex. And both he and the Defense Minister gave us specific assurances that all of these alleged deviations would be taken care of and would be immediately corrected. We have seen the report from the Sinai Field Mission, the inspection which was made yesterday. We have seen the results today, and I think that indicates that most of the deviations have been corrected. There are perhaps one or two that remain to be done but the others of which you spoke and the Defense Minister spoke I believe have been corrected. And I believe that we should allow the technical mechanism of the joint military commission a few days to work out the remaining questions.

The SFM will be gain conducting a regular three-day inspection beginning tomorrow, and they should be able to give further confir-

mation of the corrections. The Olive Harvest flight which you requested has been accomplished. And I understand that about 70% of the Sinai was free of clouds so that covered most of it. If some of the sensitive areas were not able to be seen because of clouds then we could consider having another one. I understand that the results of this mission will be available on Tuesday night.

Now, as I say, I think based on the conversation with Mubarak and with Aburazala, we can be confident that they will move promptly to take care of any remaining problems in this area.

On normalization, I believe Mubarak in his letter has given assurances on normalization, that the bonds between Israel and Egypt will continue to be strengthened following the withdrawal from Sinai. On one of the specific points, on the question of open borders, the Egyptians showed us normalization agreements which establish a border regime and the various transit facilities. They assured me that they have no intention of closing the border.

On the matter of continuing ambassadorial representation at the ambassadorial level, I raised this point with the Foreign Minister, and I have to tell you that Gen. Ali said it was his solemn intention to maintain relations at the ambassadorial level. Now, as I recall we discussed this point earlier, and I predicted that the Egyptians would point out that this matter of ambassadors is something which pertains to the sovereign right of a country, and that to obtain a written commitment that there will always

... of the correction. The Olive Harvey Light which you
 requested has been accomplished. And I understand that about
 10% of the signal was lost at about 1000 feet covered more or
 less of the sensitive areas were not able to be read because of
 clouds then we could consider having another one. I understand
 that the results of this trial will be available on Monday night.
 Now, as far as I think based on the conversation with
 Harvey and with Andrews, we can be confident that they will
 give promptly to take care of any remaining problems in this
 area.

On domestication, I believe Harvey in his letter has given
 evidence of domestication, that the birds between large and
 small will continue to be distinguished following the situation
 on the island. On one of the specific points, on the question of
 open waters, the Karyons showed no domestication response
 which implies a border within and the various small islands.
 They assumed we that they have no intention of closing the border.
 On the matter of cognitive subcortical reorganization
 at the anatomical level, I raised this point with the
 Minister, and I have to tell you that he will not be able
 to give information to make a relation at the anatomical level.
 Now, as I recall we discussed the point earlier, and I realize
 that the Karyons would not be able to be read at this point in response
 to research which relates to the behavior of a colony,
 and that to obtain a better command that there will always

be ambassadors would not be feasible. AH confirmed that to me, but he made it very clear that his own personal commitment is that the ambassadorial level would be maintained. That is his intention. He has no intention of changing that. So I was reassured by that.

On the matter of the hostile propaganda, we talked about that. I raised with him the mutual concern, your concern and our concern about the speech which had been made by Abdul Magid in Kuwait. And Ali told me and Mubarak told me that neither one had seen that speech before it was given. They explained to me the tactical reasons why such a speech had been made and their efforts to avoid criticism of the MFO and Camp David.

Ali told me that the day after Magid's speech, he himself had given a press statement to reaffirm Egypt's commitment to Camp David, and I have noted that Magid himself has in the last few days also given an interview in which he speaks of Camp David and the commitment of Egypt to Camp David.

MR. BEGIN: Where?

MR. STOESEL: We can get a copy of that for you. I don't think I have it with me but we will see that you get it.

MR. BEGIN: We hear about that for the first time.

MR. STOESEL: I have a record of that.

MR. SHARON: Mr. Secretary, may I just ask, if that is not the Egyptian position and President Mubarak and the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs never had seen it before, why didn't they deny it? The only thing they have to do

be and actions would not be feasible. All considered that to be
have made it very clear that his own personal conviction
that the organizational level would be maintained. That is the
intention. He has no intention of changing that. As I was
reassured by that.

On the matter of the hostile propaganda, we talked about that.
I talked with him the mutual concern, your concern and our concern
about the speech which had been made by Abdul Majid in London.
and Ali could not repeat what he had said but rather one had seen
that speech before it was given. They explained to me the
factual reasons why such a speech had been made and their efforts
to avoid repetition of the KPO and Camp David.

All told we know the day after Hajji's speech, he himself
had given a press statement to reaffirm Hajji's commitment to
Camp David and I have noted that Hajji himself has in the last
few days also given an interview in which he speaks of Camp
David and the non-acceptance of Hajji to Camp David.

MR. TROTT: Yes.

MR. TROTT: We can get a copy of that for you, I don't
think I have it with me but we will see that we get it.
MR. TROTT: I have a record of that.

MR. TROTT: The Secretary and I just saw it and it is not
the Egyptian position and I understand that the Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs never had seen it
before. We didn't see it until it was only three days ago to be

is to say that is not the Egyptian approach. That is what should be done very clearly, to say that these 11 points are not the Egyptian position. And they are in contradiction to the Egyptian Position and their intentions.

MR. STOESEL: I think these interviews which I have mentioned were designed at least to correct the earlier impression of a focus on the 11 points.

MR. DRAPER: The information on the Magid statement was apparently published in an English Language weekly called "Monday Morning" in Beirut.

MR. BEN MEIR: There is such a weekly.

(Mr. Bar-on hands Mr. Begin the April 18th issue of "Maariv").

MR. BEGIN (reading from newspaper and translating): "What was new about my statement in Kuwait was that we said in the face of Arab representatives that it is a duty to recognize the right of Israel to exist within recognized boundaries and in the framework of mutual security " it goes on to say that this is a state made by Abdul Magin in a signed article. IN the article he criticizes the media which in his opinion distorted his words. He then says: "The way we chose is difficult, to bring about peace between the Palestinians and Israel is not a picnic but we chose the way of realism. Israel and the Palestinians are in the region and will stay there. It is time that we shall talk about common arrangements for the sake of peace."

This was reprinted from a New York newspaper, and is in a cable from the New York correspondent of "Maariv."

is to say that the Russian position... This is what should
be done very clearly, for my part I think are not the
Russian position, and they are in contradiction to the Russian
position and their interests.

MR. STANLEY: I think these two views which I have mentioned
are distinct and clear in contrast to the earlier discussion of a
single point.

MR. STANLEY: The information on the Russian position was
published in an English language weekly called "London Review".

MR. STANLEY: There is such a weekly
published in London.

MR. STANLEY: I think the Russian position and translation
was the subject of a statement in English which was published in
the "London Review". It is a duty to translate the
Russian position to make it clear to the English people and to the
American people.

MR. STANLEY: I think the Russian position is a very
important one and it is a duty to translate it into English
and to make it clear to the English people and to the
American people.

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important one and it is a duty to translate it into English
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important one and it is a duty to translate it into English
and to make it clear to the English people and to the
American people.

I have translated into English what I read in Hebrew. It is a faithful translation.

MR. STOESSEL: I believe that. I have a more complete text in the office and we will provide that to you.

Ali told me also that he will be on the David Brinkley show today in the U.S., live, which is a very popular program, and he also planned to make a firm statement about Camp David and adherence to it. So I think that would be helpful.

Now, I should say that we heard in Egypt, from Mubarak and also from Ali that they have their own concerns about what ^{they} think of as hostile propaganda coming from Israel. They mentioned some statements made by Israeli ministers which they say called into question the commitment of Israel to comply with the obligation to withdraw. They noted that in Mubarak's letter to you he calls explicitly for both countries to refrain from statements which could be disturbing to the other, that there should be sensitivity to the concerns of others. He said that he himself is aware of this, he has tried himself to avoid disturbing statements and he noted that you also had avoided that kind of statement. He expressed his appreciation for that.

We talked with Mubarak about terrorist activities. They said that of course for them they had no intention of allowing terrorist activity on their territory, that this would be foolhardy. Terrorism is as much a threat to Egypt as it is to Israel. They outlined for us the specific and practical steps that they have

I have translated into English what I said in Hebrew. It is a
literal translation.

MR. STORSEN: I believe that I have a more complete copy
of the article and we will provide that to you.

He told me also that he will be on the David Greenglass show
today in the U.S., live, which is a very popular program, and he
also planned to make a live statement about the Navy and education
to it. So I think that would be helpful.

Now, I should say that we heard in Egypt, from the press and
also from all that they have their own comments about what they
of an hostile propaganda coming from Israel. The mentioned
some statements with by Israeli citizens, which they say cited
face question the commitment of Israel to equality with the population
in Palestine. They noted that in the past, a letter to you by
called explicitly for both countries to refrain from statements
which could be disturbing to the other, that there should be
sensitivity to the concerns of others. He said that he himself
is aware of this, he has tried himself to avoid disturbing
statements and he noted that you also had avoided that kind of
statement. He expressed his appreciation for that.

We talked with Nubawi about terrorist activities. They
said that of course for them they had no intention of allowing
terrorist activity in their territory, that this would be for them
terrorist in an such a sense as to Israel. They
outlined for us the specific and practical steps that they have

taken to deal with the problem. And I understand that Gen. Abdulla when he was here discussed these steps with you.

MR. BEGIN: Gen. Sagi, will you be able to report to us about your discussions with Gen. Abdullah?

GEN. SAGI: If you like, yes sir.

MR. STOESEL: And he committed himself, as he did also in the letter, to cooperation between Egypt and Israel to prevent the smuggling of arms, as well as on all other matters relating to security. We received a full report on arms picked up by the Egyptians in their efforts to stop this type of smuggling. And they expressed the hope that there could be good cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of both nations. So we hope that Gen. Abdullah's visit has been a useful step in that direction. They seem to feel that it had been.

So, as I say, I am pleased with the progress that has been made. I think there has been progress in meeting concerns which you expressed in writing and orally.

Now, Mr. Prime Minister, I have delivered the draft document which you presented to me to the Egyptians, to Foreign Minister Ali. He told me when I delivered the letter that he already had instructions from President Mubarak not to receive the documents. There had been publicity given to this in the press that there would be a document that I would be bringing, and he said it was simply not possible to consider it.

taken to deal with the problem. And I understand that Gen.

Abdel Wahab has been invited to discuss these things with you.

MR. WALKER: Gen. Wahab will be able to assist you in about

your discussions with Gen. Abdel Wahab.

MR. WALKER: It you like, we are

MR. STEWART: And he described himself as he did also in

the letter, the cooperation between Egypt and Israel to prevent

the outbreak of arms, as well as in all other matters relating

to security. We received a full report on this subject by

the Egyptian in their efforts to stop this type of smuggling.

and they expressed the hope that there could be good cooperation

between the two nations in the area of each nation. So we hope

that Gen. Abdel Wahab's visit has been a useful one in that direction.

It has been good that it has been.

So, as I say, I am pleased with the progress that has been

made. I think there has been progress in meeting concerns which

you expressed in writing and orally.

MR. WALKER: I have delivered the draft document

which you requested to me to the Egyptian, to Foreign Minister

Abdel Wahab. He told me that I delivered the letter that he already

had instructions from President Nasser not to receive the

document. There had been initially given to him in the press

that there would be a document that I would be bringing, and he

said it was almost not possible to consider it.

I raised it this morning directly with President Mubarak. I explained the reason why you felt the document would be an appropriate measure, and he repeated to me in very firm tones that he could not consider accepting or signing such a document. And I think frankly the fact that it had come out in the press beforehand was one element at least in this attitude. He felt that if they were to accept this type of document it would be seen as giving in to a demand from Israel, it would be seen as a sign of weakness on his part. He also said that he did not see the need for reaffirming again the obligations which Egypt has solemnly signed, that he had sent you a letter which made his views very clear about his adherence to all of his agreements, and therefore he did not think it was necessary to have such a document. Some of the other Egyptian officials also felt that there was a problem with the document in that it seemed to extract from the Treaty certain elements of particular interest to Israel and did not cover other elements, that this difference of emphasis was also a problem. And as you recall, when we first discussed this, I had a similar concern. He does feel very strongly, as I say, that he has provided you with the reassurance that you sought, that on the military side steps have been taken to correct the deviations which Israel has reported.

Now, we heard a great deal about the issue of Taba. And it was clear to me that Taba is a matter of great emotional content in Egypt. It has historical content, historical significance.

I raised it before morning directly with President Nasser.

I explained the reason why you felt the document would be an appropriate measure, and he reacted to it very positively. That he could not consider anything or signing such a document. And I think frankly the fact that it had come out in the press surprised him one element at least in this respect. He felt that if there were to accept this type of document it would be seen as a sign of a change in our attitude from Israel. It would mean an admission on his part. He also felt that he did not see himself for re-signing again for obligations which Syria had already signed, that he had seen you a letter which said his view very clear about his attitude to all of his agreements, and therefore he did not think it was necessary to have such a document. Some of the other Egyptian officials also felt that there was a problem with the document in that it seemed to extract from the Treaty certain elements of particular interest to Israel and did not cover other elements, that this difference of emphasis was also a problem. And as you recall, when we first discussed this, I had a similar concern. He does feel very strongly, as I say, that he has provided you with the reassurance that you sought, that on the military side there have been no changes to contract the negotiations which Israel has reported.

Now, we heard a great deal about the issue of Iraq. And it was clear to me that Iraq is a matter of great regional concern in Egypt. It has historical content, historical significance.

And they feel very strongly about it. I do feel that as we said when we spoke last, that it is very important to try and clear up this matter, at least to agree on a way towards resolution of it before April 25th. We should not allow this issue to be something which could prejudice a withdrawal.

We conveyed this also in Egypt, stressing the need to deal with this matter promptly. We understand that Boutrous Ghali when he was here conveyed to you certain Egyptian proposals on an approach to resolving this question. We have looked at these proposals ourselves. A number of aspects of their proposals seem to us at least to be constructive. We do feel that the essential thing is to agree on a procedure before April 25 which would be a guarantee to all concerned that the problem would be resolved in a reasonable period of time. It should not be allowed to go on indefinitely. There is the question of the hotel under construction there and I think it is clear that it is not fair to those involved in that construction that this matter be allowed to go unresolved for an indefinite period.

They emphasized to us that their aim is to try and avoid any potential friction with Israel on this question. I know that you have characterized the problem as a technical one and not a political one. So our strong hope is that a procedure can be worked out with the Egyptian representatives to ensure a fair technical solution to the problem.

As you know, Foreign Minister Ali is prepared to come to Israel to attempt to finalize a procedure. He told me he would

and they feel very strongly about it. I do feel that as we said
 when we spoke last, that it is very important to try and clear
 up this matter, at least to agree on a way towards resolution of
 it before April 15th. We should not allow this issue to be some-
 thing which could prejudice a withdrawal.

We conveyed this also in Kyoto, emphasizing the need to deal
 with this matter promptly. We understood that your Committee
 when the two have conveyed to you certain Russian proposals
 on an approach to resolving this question. We have looked at
 these proposals ourselves. A number of aspects of these proposals
 seem to us at least to be constructive. We do feel that the
 essential elements to agree on procedures before April 15 which
 would be a guarantee to all concerned that the problem would be
 resolved in a reasonable period of time. It should not be allowed
 to go on indefinitely. There is the question of the hotel under
 construction there and I think it is clear that it is not fair
 to postpone in that connection that this matter be
 allowed to be unresolved for an indefinite period.

Now essential to us that that be a to try and avoid
 any potential friction with Israel on this question. I know that
 you have characterized the problem as a technical one and not a
 political one. So our strong hope is that a procedure can be
 worked out with the Russian representatives to ensure a "fair
 technical solution to the problem.

As you know, Foreign Minister Aili is prepared to come to
 Israel to attempt to finalize a procedure. He told us he would

be prepared to come tomorrow, although it is an Egyptian holiday. But he said Boutrouf Ghali would be prepared to come. And I urged them to do so, that this would be a useful move. I said to the Egyptians, as I said here, that we would be prepared ourselves to play a useful role in establishing a procedure if this found desirable by both parties. We discussed some aspects of a possible procedure for conciliation or arbitration within a fixed period of time. I think that is very important, that there be a fixed period of time for both of these considerations, and this seems to be acceptable to the Egyptians. So we hope very much that if the Foreign Minister comes that you will be able to find an agreement with him. If this does not prove to be possible, then we are prepared to do what we can to be of assistance, and you know of our offer to have our legal advisor become involved in this if it seems appropriate.

Now, finally, Mr. Prime Minister, just to mention that obviously there is one basic issue which no one really can guarantee with certainty which concerns mutual trust and confidence between the parties. I think steps have been taken in this direction. It is something that will require time to accomplish. And all of us hope very much that this can develop and the necessary confidence and trust can develop. And I want to assure you on the part of the U.S. we will continue to be a full partner in the process, to work with you and Egypt to resolve the outstanding problems. That is my report.

is granted to some countries, although it is an Egyptian holiday.
 But the Egyptian Staff would be present to some. And I would
 like to do so, that this would be a matter of course. I said to the
 Egyptians, as I said here, that we would be prepared ourselves
 to give a useful role in establishing a procedure in this form
 desirable on both parties. We discussed some aspects of a possible
 procedure for consultation or collaboration within a fixed period of
 time. I think that the very important, that there be a fixed
 period of time for both of these considerations, and this seems
 to be acceptable to the Egyptians. So we have very much that is
 the Egyptian Minister comes that you will be able to find an
 agreement with him. If this does not prove to be possible, then
 we are prepared to do what we can to be of assistance, and you
 know of our offer to have our legal-aid-lawyer before involved
 in this if it seems appropriate.

Now, finally, Mr. Brian Minister, just to mention that
 obviously there is one basic factor which no one really can
 disagree with certainly which concerns mutual trust and confidence
 between the parties. I think there have been cases in this
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 And all of us hope very much that this can develop and the
 necessary confidence and trust can develop. And I want to repeat
 you on the part of the U.S. we will continue to be a full partner
 in the process, to work with you and Egypt to resolve the
 outstanding problems. That is my report.

MR. BEGIN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I have before me the letter of President Mubarak in English. I read it in the leave given to me by Dr. Ghali; also our Defense Minister and Foreign Minister read it page by page, so they know its contents. And I on the spot reacted to a certain passage, and I will read it here in an language that everyone understands:

" In the past few weeks, certain developments took place that could have generated sharp exchanges of polemics and criticism. However, we applied maximum restraint and remained composed. Again, we were focussing on the future in so doing. What counts is that peace should gain more converts steadily. As I mentioned to you in my letter of March 21, 1982, several statements made by high ranking Israeli officials did not seem to be geared to serve our common purpose. I reminded you, in that letter, of our firm pledge to work for peace forever between our nations. I am glad that your letter of March 25 carried a reaffirmation of that pledge. This being the case, officials on both sides should be more careful in their public pronouncement. Specifically, there should be no reference whatsoever, explicitly or implicitly, to the prospect of non-withdrawal on time. Believe me, such threats, be they overt or veiled, are extremely detrimental to our goal. They create the kind of ill-feeling we have been striving to eliminate. As I stated several times before, let us look beyond the 25th of April. Let us not be immobilized by such a date that will soon belong to the past."

I drew the attention of Mr. Ghali to that passage. And then I told him, in conformity with the facts, that the chronological order is different. My colleagues didn't make any statements

until after Dr. Magid brought to the non-aligned countries an Egyptian plan of 11 points on how to solve the problem which is called the Palestinian problem or the problem of the Palestinians. And I later brought Dr. Ghali to the map in my office and told him that that plan, called the Egyptian plan, officially by Dr. Magid, the spaker, means actually the destruction of Israel by stages. Because on the mountains there would be a Palestinian state, we would again be back within the lines of June 4, 1967 which means 8 miles from the seashore, and in that narrow strip of land, there is a concentration of two-thirds of our civilian population, which can be hit by the weapons at the disposal of the PLO from every point in those mountains and hills of Judea and Samaria. I told him no one can imagine that we shall ever agree to such a proposal, but you made a statement on behalf of the Government of Egypt to that effect. He didn't say anything. Then we went back to continue our discussion.

What I want to state at least for the sake of historical truth, is that before any of my friends said one word, an official representative of the United Republic of Egypt went to an international conference and brought before them an Egyptian plan and the plan is in contradiction to the Camp David agreement, absolutely. There is no doubt whatever about that contradiction, because in the Camp David agreement we don't have a Palestinian state, we don't have withdrawal to the lines of June 1967, we don't have the ^{term of} self-determination used again and again in

until after Mr. Khalil brought to the non-aligned committee an
 Egyptian plan of a return or how to solve the problem which is
 called the Palestinian problem or the problem of the Palestinians.
 And I later brought Dr. Khalil to the room in my office and told him
 that that plan, called the Egyptian plan, officially by Dr. Khalil,
 the speaker, means actually the destruction of Israel by stages.
 because on the assumption that would be a West Bank state,
 we would again be back within the lines of June 4, 1967 which
 means 8 miles from the east bank, and in that narrow strip of land,
 there is a concentration of two-thirds of our civilian population,
 which can be hit by the weapons at the disposal of the PLO
 from every point in those mountains and hills of Judea and
 Samaria. I could find no one can imagine that we shall ever agree
 to such a proposal, but you were a statement on behalf of the
 Government of Egypt to that effect. He didn't say anything. Then
 we went back to continue our discussion.
 And I want to state at least for the sake of historical
 study, that before any of my friends said one word, an
 official representative of the United Republic of Egypt went to
 an international conference and brought before them as a matter
 of fact the plan for the concentration of the two-thirds of our
 population. There I am doubtful whether about that concentration,
 because in the Camp David agreement we don't have a Palestinian
 state, we don't have withdrawal to the lines of June 1967, we
 don't have the full demarcation and again and again to

those 11 points, which means a state of course. In parentheses, I would like to add that I had an official admission by a European Foreign Minister who is no longer in office, but he used it at the Venice European declaration; he was the author of that declaration. I refer to Lord Carrington, and when I said to him: WHY do you conduct a campaign of propaganda for a Palestinian state; you should know that a Palestinian state will not kill Britains but it will kill many Israelis. How can you make such suggestions? It is our lives! Our security and our future, and you try to dictate to us an arrangement which will endanger our very existence as a nation. He said: We never used the word Palestinian state; we always said self-determination. So I said then, with all due respect, we cannot play with words; self-determination means a state. And then he said: that's right. Of course, it is right. We said so to President Sadat in Ismailia more than three years ago. When his advisors - Dr. Magid was one of them - suggested to write self-determination, we said it is unacceptable to us because it is a synonym for a state. That would mean a mortal danger to us.

Coming back to the talk with Dr. Ghali, having opened the parentheses, I again repeat that this passage of recrimination against my colleagues by President Mubarak is absolutely unjustified. Whereas he doesn't even mention the statement made by Dr. Magid to the non-aligned countries conference. He doesn't even explain or even say that that plan doesn't exist. He didn't say so to you.

These 11 points, which remain a state of affairs, in parentheses,

I could like to add that I had an official resolution by a

European Council Minister who is no longer in office, the Mr

and it is the same European declaration, he was the author

of that declaration. I refer to that declaration, and what I

would like to say to you concerns a number of paragraphs but

the first paragraph, you should know that a Palestinian state will

not kill Israelis but it will kill any Jew. How can you

take such a suggestion? It is our duty, our security and our future,

and you try to suggest to us an arrangement which will endanger

our very existence as a nation. He said: He never said the word

Palestinian state: he always said self-determination. So I said

then, with all the respect, we cannot play with words: self-

determination means a state. And then he said: that's right, but

never, it is right, he said to me: he said to me: he said to me:

more than 100 years ago. When the British - Dr. Gold was

one of them - suggested to write self-determination, he said it

is unacceptable to us because it is a synonym for a state. That

would mean a moral danger to us.

Coming back to our talk with Dr. Gold, having heard the

speeches, I again remind you that the passage of resolution

was not by consensus but by a vast majority in an official assembly.

But he doesn't even mention the statement made by Dr. Gold

to the non-aligned countries conference. He doesn't even explain

or even say that British Jewish state, the thing is so to you,

What he said, Mr. Secretary, is that he, or for that matter, Gen. Ali didn't know about the plan. That is so curious an explanation. We speak about a country with which we want and have to live in peace. There goes a gentleman that represents that country to the UN as the official emissary of Egypt to 80 other countries, he presents a plan and explains it. And the President of his country doesn't know anything about it! And the Foreign Minister doesn't know anything about it. I will never suspect a man of telling an untruth. Why should I? I don't have the basis for it. So let's assume that neither the President nor the Foreign Minister ever heard about even one of these 11 points. What kind of reliance can we have as a nation? What kind of explanation is it? Especially since in my letter of March 25, which President Mubarak mentions, I drew the President's attention to a certain speech made by Dr. Magid at the Security Council and I characterized it as a violent attack against Israel, and said expressly that Dr. Magid shouldn't have made the speech he delivered to the Security Council. And I have the report of our Ambassador telling me that President Mubarak interrupted him and said: On this the Prime Minister is right, he shouldn't have made that speech!

Then only several days later, the same person, Dr. Magid, goes to an international conference, presents an Egyptian plan, and we have to take as an explanation for that piece of most hostile propaganda, a breach of the peace treaty, that it was

that he said, Mr. Secretary, in that he, or for that matter,
 Gen. All didn't know about the plan. That is an obvious an-
 swer. We speak about a country which we want and have
 to live in peace. There were a gentleman that represented
 country to him as the official embassy of Egypt, we do not
 consider, he presents a plan and explains it. And the President
 of his country doesn't know anything about it. And the foreign
 minister doesn't know anything about it. I will never suggest
 a man of Italian origin. We should be I don't have the
 right for it. So far a degree that nothing the President nor
 his foreign minister ever heard about even one of these 11 points.
 This kind of relationship we have as a matter of fact of
 information. Let's say the last of March 1955,
 when President Eisenhower visited, I saw the President's
 attention to a certain speech made by Mr. Nasser at the Security
 Council and I characterized it as a violent attack against Israel.
 and held extremely harsh. I don't think I have made the speech
 in delivered to the Security Council. And I have the record
 of our ambassador calling at the President's residence
 in and with the Prime Minister, the President's brother,
 have made that speech.

Then only several days later, the same person, Mr. Nasser,
 goes to an international conference, presents an Egyptian plan,
 and we have to take an explanation of the principles of world
 hostile propaganda, the theory of the great unity, that it was

not known at all to the President and to the Foreign Minister. Mr. Secretary, I must tell you I have heard many absurd declarations during my long lifetime. I don't remember such a paradoxical statement from a statesman or the leader of a country. If they didn't know, how can that statement stand? At least they should say it's a private statement or whatever, but if it's a statement on behalf of Egypt, how can I explain it? I am at a loss to comprehend this explanation. Either they did know and don't want to say so, or they really didn't know and gave carte blanche to Dr. Magid to say whatever he wishes as the spokesman of Egypt.

There are other points. There is a point about living in security. I always used to say to my colleagues this is the only positive point. Still there are the 11 points which we can always read out. It is' a very complicated situation, Mr. Secretary. I don't think my colleagues and I will be able to accept such an explanation at all. After my forewarning, to say he didn't know anything about it and still leave the document in force!

Now, I would like to say something about their refusal to receive the document from your hands. What kind of attitude is that? Egypt expects us to withdraw from the whole of Sinai but they don't even want to accept from the hand of the Deputy Secretary of State of the U.S. a proposal; they give it back. Again, I would like us to reason together what should be our reaction.

not known at all to the President and to the Foreign Minister.

Mr. Secretary, I want to call your attention to my statement.

During my long lifetime, I don't remember such a situation.

Situation for a statement on the part of a country. At the

same time, how do you get that statement? At least they should

not be a private statement or statement, but it is a statement

on behalf of a people, how can I explain that I am as a boy in

company of this explanation. It is not my own and don't want

to say, but they really didn't know and give some pleasure to

look to my secretary to advise me the spokesman of that.

There are other things, there is a point about living in

country. I always want to say to my colleagues that is the only

point of view. Still, they are the 14 points which are of great

importance. It is a very complicated situation, Mr. Secretary. I don't

think my colleagues will be able to discuss such an explanation

at all. After my explanation, he said that's your own

thing to do and still have the document in force.

Now, I would like to say something about their refusal to

release the document from your hands. What kind of attitude

is that? I have expected to get it from the hands of the

Secretary of State of the U.S. I proposed that they should

release it to me, but they don't want to accept from the hands of the Secretary

of State. I would like to know whether they should not

release it.

I would like to dwell now on a certain point made today by some of our newspapers. They reminded me of the fact that it was my predecessor, Mr. Rabin, who suggested at the assassination of President Sadat that there should be a new summit meeting between President Reagan, President Mubarak and myself and then we should reaffirm our adherence to the Camp David Agreement. And I didn't accept that suggestion. I really didn't. Because my explanation was, and it still is today, and I said it at the Cabinet meeting this morning, that such a summoning of a summit meeting would mean that we say in Israel that we signed a document, a peace treaty, the Camp David agreement with a man, and not with the country. And that is not true. Of course, the people who signed are individuals, but they did sign on behalf of their countries. And we would invoke a doubt whether it is on behalf of the country if we summon or take the initiative to summon such a summit meeting. I stand by that. But in those days there was no Egyptian plan how to solve the issue of the Palestinians in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. Now there is such a plan and it is in complete contradiction to the Camp David agreement.

Here is our suggestion of a common document of adherence that applies to all sides, and President Mubarak gives instructions to his Ministers not even to accept the document from you. It is up to you to judge, Mr. Secretary, but this is also a very serious step for our consideration. We have on Wednesday an extraordinary session of our Cabinet. We usually have our weekly cabinet meeting

I would like to dwell now on a certain point which today is
 some of our newspapers. They reminded me of the fact that it was
 my predecessor, Mr. Kellie, who suggested at the inauguration of
 President Soder that there should be a joint annual meeting between
 President Hoover, President Johnson and myself and that we should
 reaffirm our adherence to the Camp David Agreement. And I didn't
 accept that suggestion. I really didn't. Because my explanation
 was, and it still is today, and I still it as the United States
 side writing, that such a meeting at a purely meeting would mean
 that we are in fact that we signed a document, a peace treaty,
 the day that a treaty was signed, and not in the country.
 And that is not true. Of course, the people who signed are
 individuals, but they did sign on behalf of their countries.
 And we would have a double check it is on behalf of the country.
 It was not on behalf of the individuals to whom such a treaty would
 be made by them. But in time there will be a separate plan
 for to solve the issue of the Palestinians in Israel, Jordan and
 the West Bank. Now there is such a plan which is in development
 and which is the Camp David Agreement.

There is one suggestion of a second document of adherence
 that applies to all sides, and President Johnson gave instructions
 to the Israelis not even to accept the document from you. It is
 up to you to Judge Mr. Secretary, but it is also a very serious
 step for our country. We have no religiously motivated
 reason for our position. We usually have our own religious reasons

on Sunday but I already informed my colleagues, assuming that until Wednesday we shall have all the facts before us to take a decision on the issue which is on the agenda. Of course, I cannot now say anything about the contents of that decision.

If Gen. Ali wants to come tomorrow, he may. Only the day after tomorrow he cannot because it is the our mourning day of the Holocaust and Hercism. That is the date of the uprising of the Warsaw Ghetto. On that day we wouldn't be able to conduct political discussions with anyone. The Egyptians had informed us he could not come tomorrow, so we had suggested Wednesday. But if you tell us he can come tomorrow we can get in touch with the Egyptians and tell him to come.

MR. STOESEL: I think in view of the time schedule, the urgency, it would be desirable.

MR. BEGIN: Yes, we can send a cable to Sasson and say he should arrive as early as possible so we can have as much time as possible for our discussions.

Now I'd like to refer to Taba. What is characteristic to me is that the Egyptians told you that it is a very emotional problem because of the historic links of Egypt with a place called Taba. I vouch that if you'd ask ten people in any country int he world, nine will tell you they never heard about that place, in any country in the world, including the United States. You want to say that in the U.S. ten people will say they never heard of it?

on Sunday but I didn't inform my colleagues, assuming this was
Wednesday we shall have all the facts before us to make a decision
on the issue which is on the agenda. Of course, I cannot say any
anything about the contents of that decision.

Mr. G. All want to come tomorrow, he says. Only the day
after tomorrow he cannot because it is the next morning day of
the Holocaust and Yom Kippur. That is the last of the day of
the Israel. On that day we wouldn't be able to conduct
political discussions with anyone. The Russians had informed
us he could not come tomorrow, as we had suggested yesterday.
But if you tell us he can come tomorrow we can get in touch with
the Russians and tell him to come.

MR. STOLBERG: I think in view of the time schedule, the
arrangement would be desirable.

MR. BROTH: Yes, we can send a cable to Moscow and see if
should arrive as early as possible so we can have as much time

as possible for our discussion.

Now this is to refer to the fact that is characteristic to us
is that the Russians told us that it is a very emotional problem
because of the historic link of Jews with a place called Israel.

I think that it would be very good if any country that is world
should tell you they never heard about that place in any country
in the world, including the United States. You want to say that in
the U.S. response will be the answer, head of it.

MR. LEWIS: Everyone in the State Department has because of all the cables I have sent on it. But outside the State Department no one has.

MR. BEGIN: But the lack of feeling for Jerusalem in that plan for all points where Magid speaks about Arab sovereignty in or over Jerusalem, again it's a question of translation, but let's say in Jerusalem - Arab sovereignty, in Jerusalem. May I say when speaking about history, our King David more than 3,000 years ago transferred the seat of his kingdom there from Hebron; so it is written in the Book. And there is no understanding of this historic link between a nation and its capital, where the two Temples were erected and the prophets gave the vision of eternal peace and other great visions of human justice. That is not understood in Egypt, only the historic link between Egypt and Tabat. Well, we will have to understand history differently from the time we studied it.

But now I would like to explain, again for the sake of the record. What was the gist of this discussion between Dr. Ghali and myself and my two colleagues? We suggested to them when Dr. Ghali was here together with Gen. Ali several weeks ago the following formula: that there will be an area over which sovereignty will be decided by agreement between the parties in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Treaty. In the interim period, life will go on. No country will send its armed forces into the area. The MFO will take care of law and order. And what is the term

Mr. Lurie: Everyone in the Peace Department has learned of all the things I have said on it. But outside the Peace Department he has not.

Mr. Brown: But the lack of feeling for Jerusalem in that plan to it points where I had asked about Arab sovereignty in or over Jerusalem, again it's a question of translation, but let's say in Jerusalem - Arab sovereignty, in Jerusalem. Now I say when speaking about history, our King David some 3,000 years ago transferred the seat of his kingdom there from Hebron; so it is written in the book. And there is no understanding of this historic link between a national, its capital, where the two peoples were united and the prophets gave the vision of eternal peace and unity - great vision of human justice. That's not understood in the U.S., only the historic link between Jews and Arabs. Well, we will have our own history differently from the time we started it.

But now I would like to repeat, again for the sake of the record. That was the gist of the discussion between Dr. Chai and I and my two colleagues. It suggested to them when Dr. Chai was here together with me, all various needs and the following formula: that there will be an Arab over which sovereignty will be established by agreement between the parties in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Treaty. In the interim period, the U.S. will act as a neutral arbitrator and will coordinate the area. The U.S. will take care of law and order. And that is the term

life will go on? I suggested let's have a sub-commission. We have so many joint sub-committees of four men, two and two on behalf of each country. What else can we suggest? In accordance with the peace treaty that means as it is written - negotiation, conciliation or arbitration, Article 7.

So I asked Dr. Ghali last Friday, what about negotiations, do you think they are exhausted and it will be futile to continue? And he said: yes. I said: all right, I accept that, so we won't proceed with negotiations. Then it is written conciliation. So I suggest to have during the next stage conciliation. What does it mean? Ghali said it is an interpretation. To me, it is not an interpretation; it is just the international term of conciliation, that both sides have representatives, one or a commission of three, and they read the maps, pertaining documents, etc. and ultimately after deliberations they give a judgement. Now the judgement in a conciliation procedure can be accepted or rejected by either party. If it is accepted, there is no more problem. If it is rejected then we still have arbitration. Arbitration is a different arrangement because either side takes upon itself a commitment to abide by the decision of the arbitrators. Sowe shall pass over to arbitration.

What did Dr. Ghali say to me? No, no conciliation, right to arbitration. I asked him: Why, explain to me logically why. It is witten in the peace treaty that we have such an arrangement, conciliation or arbitration. So of course we can agree together

like will be one. I suggested that we have a sub-commission. We
 have so many other sub-commissions of four, five and two on
 behalf of each country. That also can be suggested. In accordance
 with the peace treaty that means as to its written - negotiation
 consultation or arbitration, Article 17.

So I asked Dr. Ghail that he would like about negotiations,
 do you think they are exhausted and do you think the commission
 and he said yes. I said: although I need to say, as we have
 proceed with negotiations, that is in written consultation. So
 I suggest to have during the next stage consultation. That does
 it mean? Ghail said it is an interpretation. To say it is not
 an interpretation; it is just the international terms of consultation
 that both sides have recommended, one or a committee of three
 and they read the same, pertaining documents, and, and ultimately
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 party. If it is approved, there is no reservation. It is in
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 arrangement because either side takes upon itself a commitment
 to abide by the judgment of the arbitrator. Some will have even
 to arbitration.

What did Dr. Ghail say to me? No, no consultation, right to
 arbitration. I asked him: Why, explain to me logically why. It
 is written in the peace treaty that we have such an arrangement,
 consultation or arbitration. So of course we can agree together

that we discard conciliation, but I don't suggest we do that. I don't agree; you can't impose upon Israel to give up conciliation. We suggest it not from our heads but from the peace treaty. It didn't help. He stood by the demand of Egypt to which we have to submit, not to have conciliation because he doesn't like it. I just didn't understand him. Ultimately he made a curious statement. He said: Mr. Prime Minister, assume this is an Egyptian obsession, take it into consideration. I said: What am I a psychiatrist to deal with obsessions?

But this is not the way to arrange things. We are faithful to the peace treaty. We say all right, you say the negotiations are exhausted. It is not true, I wouldn't say so, but you say so, so we accept that. Let's go to conciliation. And if conciliation doesn't bring the result of an agreement, but after it is investigated -- we know for instance that in London there is a document pertaining to the arrangement of 1906 that they, the British, didn't want to deliver either to the Egyptians or to us, and that is a very curious matter, because since 1906, 76 years have passed. It is much more even than the limit of 50 years for secret document but now they have changed it and have a limit of 30 years, so it is twice that number. They refuse to give to the Egyptians that specific document and they said as we didn't give it to them we can't give it to you. We will have to use some persuasion with the British. We want to have the document; why they refuse to give it, I don't understand. But anyhow,

there will be documents, there will be maps, etc. and perhaps we shall be able to accept the "verdict" of the conciliation. It is not excluded. It is a possibility that either side won't, but then we still have arbitration. That is the normal procedure, again, stipulated by the peace treaty, and we are asked to jump over a certain arrangement.

MR. STOESEL: On that, I think we made some progress and they now accept conciliation.

MR. BEGIN: They do? Mazal tov.

MR. STOESEL: And the idea would be a conciliation process to be completed within a certain time, not to go on indefinitely. That there will be a selection of conciliators, and a judgement rendered within a fixed time frame. If that is not acceptable then to go on to arbitration again within a fixed time frame. So I think you will find Ali agreeable to that procedure.

MR. BEGIN: The question of time is an Egyptian suggestion. They gave me a paper which they call a non-paper, and there is a limit of three months. We didn't accept it, and I explained to Ghali that we don't accept so-called target dates. There was a great debate between all of us, Americans, Egyptians and Israelis, about a target date of one year concerning the autonomy, and it was proved that we were right, because we did not reach agreement during that year, and it was changed in the joint letter of President Carter to President Sadat and myself, and it is not written in the peace treaty. It doesn't oblige us at all;

there will be documents, there will be maps, etc., and perhaps we shall be able to secure the "rights" of our organization. It is not excluded. It is a possibility that either side would be there we shall have arbitration. That is the normal procedure, retained by the space treaty, and is not subject to any over a certain arrangement.

MR. BIVINS: On that, I think we have some progress.

They now accept consultation.

MR. WOOD: The day, March 1st.

MR. FOSTER: And the idea would be a consultation system to be conducted with a certain class, not to be immediately that there will be a session of consultation and a document prepared within a fixed time frame. If that is not acceptable then to you on an arbitration basis within a fixed time frame. So I think you will find it acceptable to that procedure.

MR. BAKER: The question of time in an arbitration procedure.

They give me a paper which will call a manager, and there is a limit of 100 minutes. We think 100 minutes is a reasonable goal that we don't accept so-called "quick dates". That was

a great debate between all of us, Americans, Europeans and

Japanese about a target date of one year concerning the program. It was proven that in one year, however, we did not reach agreement during that year, and was granted in the joint letter of President Carter to President Reagan and myself, and I do not believe in the space treaty. The recent talks as well.

We shall not accept a time limit. It is not necessary; they will work at the pace they can. We will not limit them, we will not say bring your judgement after six months if you can bring it after a month, you will. But why limit them to three months or two months? It is not logical and it is not written in the treaty. The Egyptian cannot impose upon us an arrangement not mentioned in the Treaty. And they try to impose upon us conditions which are absolutely fantastic. IN any case, I am glad the Egyptians agree already to conciliation, because this is the way to solve the problem. Let's have conciliation; not time limit whatsoever, neither on conciliation or arbitration. It's not written or mentioned in the peace treaty, nor ever mentioned in the negotiations.

MR. STOESEL: Their concern here is that in the past there have been cases for arbitration which have gone on for four or five, even ten years. They want to avoid that.

MR. BEGIN: Mr. Secretary, it is in the hands of the three gentlemen. We don't tell them to deal with it for five years, neither can the Egyptians say deal with it in three weeks. It is in their hands. We can't limit them and we won't. But anyhow it is good that they accept the arrangement of conciliation and arbitration. That will make it easier for us to reach agreement tomorrow with Ali on that historic place, Taba.

They asked us to freeze the construction of the hotel. Why should we? I asked Dr. Ghali, under the Turkish law there was a custom that if you build a house and you have the roof already built then the police never destroy it. As long as the roof was

We shall not accept a time limit. It is not necessary; they will
 work as long as they can. We will not limit them, we will not say
 being your judgment after six months if you can bring it after
 a month, we will. But we limit them in three months or two
 months. It is not logical and it is not within limits. There
 The Egyptian cannot impose upon us an arrangement not mentioned
 in the treaty. And they try to impose upon us conditions which
 are absolutely fantastic. In any case, I am afraid the Egyptians
 are already in conflict. Because this is the way to solve
 the problem. We have concluded that this limit was necessary,
 rather on consideration of justice. It is not written in the treaty
 in the peace treaty, nor was it mentioned in the negotiations.
 Mr. TROTTER: Their concern here is that in the past there
 have been cases for retaliation which have gone on for years or
 five, six, ten years. They want to avoid that.
 Mr. TROTTER: Mr. Secretary, is it in the hands of the United
 States, we don't tell you to deal with it for five years,
 neither can the Egyptians say that it is in three years. It
 is in their hands. We can't limit them but we can't say
 it is good that they accept the six-month limit and
 arbitration. That will make it easier for us to reach agreement
 together with all of that historic peace talks.
 They asked us to fix the date of the conclusion of the treaty. The
 treaty was. I asked Mr. Tamm, under the Turkish law there was a
 question that if you built a house and you have the roof already
 built then the police never destroy it. As long as the roof was

lacking, they could destroy the whole house. Let's have a roof on the hotel. How many floors are built already?

MR. RUBINSTEIN: Seven or eight. I think all the floors are finished.

GEN. TAMIR: They'll open the hotel this coming August.

MR. BEGIN: Why freeze a hotel? And we decided in our talks to give complete sovereignty to ? on the beach. Let's give them a place to rest.

I must say, the situation after the replies you brought to us - you did your best of course - but the situation is quite serious. We will have to deal with it and consider it seriously but especially that gesture by the Egyptians not to even accept the document, not even to have a look at it. After Dr. Magid made that speech and Ghalil explained to us: we didn't know anything about that speech. So what is it, an Egyptian declaration or a non-paper? At least let us hear about it from the Egyptians, is it an Egyptian document or not. The solution should be, if the President and Foreign Minister didn't know, then it's no document, so let them say so. If it's a document in spite of the fact that they didn't know anything, then we have to know. With that document, that we should take all the risks upon ourselves! Why? Is it fair? The document states - in private they whisper into your ear we didn't know anything, because we are not going to publish anything. What about the paper? That was published.

... they could destroy the whole thing. Let's have a look

at the picture. How many things are there already?

... Seven or eight. I think all the things

are finished.

... They'll open the hotel this coming August.

... we decided to have a look at the picture.

... of the picture. Let's give

them a piece to eat.

... the situation at the station was pretty bad

... but we had to have a look at the situation in other

... and we had to have a look at the situation in other

... but we had to have a look at the situation in other

... the situation. Let's have a look at the picture.

... and we had to have a look at the situation in other

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... but we had to have a look at the situation in other

Nothing was published. I read it in Ha'Aretz - just a kind of three party declaration, perhaps a letter, and not an ultimatum, not a demand. Nothing wrong with that as far as the Egyptians are concerned.

MR. STOESEL: On that again I would just repeat what Mubarak told me this morning, that he is firmly attached to the Camp David procedures, there is no other plan, no Fahd plan, nothing. He asked me to assure you of this. And he felt that in his letter to you he made this clear.

MR. BEGIN: We shall check this letter together, passage by passage and we shall see what is there and what isn't. If it's in there, why shouldn't I accept it? For instance, the Egyptian plan suggested to the non-aligned countries is not mentioned at all in that letter, although the letter was written on the 16th of April.

The Defense Minister wants to add something.

MR. SHARON: Mr. Secretary, first of all, of course I support every word the Prime Minister said and I think that we have to look at the situation in which the Egyptians did not agree even to receive the document. I think the Egyptians maybe even prefer to sit on the present line of El Arish - Ras Muhamad. Maybe it is easier for them to sit on this line than to receive the paper. I think again the Egyptians do not realize - and I told President Mubarak the other day, they don't read correctly the map in Israel. So I think they will have to decide to accept the

Nothing was published. I read it in the States - just a kind of
Banks' party declaration, perhaps a letter, and not an ultimatum.
not a demand. Nothing wrong with that as far as the situation
was concerned.

MR. STORRELL: On that point I would just repeat what I have
said in this morning, that he is strictly attached to the camp.
Banks' procedure, there is no other plan, no other plan, nothing. He
asked me to review your report. And he said: What is the latest on
you he wants the clear.

MR. HARRIS: We shall check this letter together, perhaps by
private and we shall see what is there and what Mr. St. J. is
in there, the situation I suppose. For instance, the situation in
attached to the non-aligned countries is not mentioned at all.
In this letter, although the letter was written on the last
of April.

The Bureau further wants to add something.
MR. SHANNON: Mr. Secretary, first of all, of course I report
every word the Prime Minister said and I think that we have to
look at the situation in which the situation did not arise even
to receive the document. I think the situation was very great
to be on the present line of affairs. Mr. St. J. has to
in order for them to see on this line that to receive the report.
I think again the situation is not positive - and I think treatment
whatever the letter is, they don't seem to be connected, the way is
trivial. So I think they will have to decide to accept the

paper or to sit on the present borders. They have to take a decision.

I heard your words, Mr. Secretary, and of course all of us appreciate your efforts, but I understand that you are very much impressed by the actions and words being done and said by the Egyptians in the last two days or so. I must tell you that when I came back from Cairo on Thursday evening and we were talking on Friday morning, I was much more optimistic than I am now. And I will call on Gen. Sagi to describe some of the actions that were done in the last two days. And I will say it very carefully but we have the impression, and beyond an impression, that what has been done is a deception, an operation of deception. And I would like to call upon Gen. Sagi and he will try carefully to describe how we see the actions that the Egyptians took. I must tell you it was in such contradiction to the efforts that the Egyptians were putting in order to give us the impression that they are correcting the situation, the violations, etc. That is one point.

I would like again to tell you about my impression. Coming from President Mubarak's office, we had a short press conference there. I said two sentences, that I came on behalf of the government and will report to the Prime Minister on the results of these discussions. And Gen. Ali said some more words, and the press had only one question: Are you going to withdraw on the 25th of April? And again all the questions, the subject is all the time around the withdrawal of the 25th of April.

power on the part of the government. They have no power

to do so.

I will now turn to the second question, and I will

begin with the first. I understand that you are

interested in the subject of the law, and I will

begin with the first. I will now turn to the second

question, and I will begin with the first. I will

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begin with the first. I will now turn to the second

Mr. Secretary, we don't owe any withdrawal to anyone, to anyone. We only owe one thing and the Egyptians owe the same, and that is to stick to the Camp David accords. That is the only thing. We don't owe any withdrawal to anyone. And suddenly everything is going around one thing - are you going to withdraw on the 25th? I don't know if we are going to withdraw on the 25th. I would not recommend to the government to withdraw, when I see the Egyptian attitude but as the Prime Minister said we have a cabinet meeting on Wednesday and we will discuss it again. The question is not the date of withdrawal, that is not the question. Don't pressure us. We don't owe anything to anyone. We implemented every point in the agreement, every point, to the last one. We are facing deception, violations, support to Arab terrorism. That is what we are facing, so the question is not one of withdrawal. I don't know why you have to ask us all the time: are you going to withdraw. That is not the point at all. The point is are the parties to the agreement going to stick to the agreement. That is the point, not withdrawal.

I will ask Gen. Sagi to say some words, and we have to be very careful and will try to be. I must tell you, Mr. Secretary, that I had certain optimism on Thursday and Friday. I lost it, watching what has been happening since. I don't have it anymore. You should know that.

GEN. SAGI: I must say that the Egyptians made an effort to let's say cancel some of the violations in the last few days. But of course the question is not what has been corrected up to now, but what happened with those violations that stayed in the area, and the way they are dealing with them. Let's take some examples. Let's take this engineering battalion in El Arish. It has been removed to the A line; the equipment has been left behind. The intention is to bring it back at the end of the month or the beginning of next month. The equipment was camouflaged, which means numbers have been changed, colors, and all those things. Let's take another example, ^{one of} the infantry companies in Zone B, and you remember the SFM did meet it and reported correctly. They met a border guard company, but this was an outcome of changing uniforms, not of really changing the troops. I have several examples like this. That is the intention and that is what bothers us.

I'd like to go for a moment to the excess deployment which in most cases the SFM visited and reported correctly. Those are only trenches in the ground with no soldiers in them, that's right. Because mostly on Friday night the troops were moved west of A line. The question is are the Egyptians going to demolish the trenches or leave them and return back whenever they decide to. In one place, in the Gidi pass, the SFM did find the fences and the fields and insisted that they be dismantled. And as far as we know, the Egyptians are now busy for the next inspection to remove those mine fields and fences. So, as I said at the beginning,

UN. SAC: It is necessary that the Egyptian work in Egypt to
 let's say cancel some of the violations in the last few days. Not
 of course the question is not what has been expected up to now,
 but what happened with those violations that stayed in the area,
 and the way they are handled with them. Let's take some examples.
 Let's take the experimental violation in Al Arish. It has been
 removed to the A line. The movement has been left behind. The
 violation is to be done in such at the end of the month or the first
 of next month. The situation was somewhat, which means numbers
 have been changed, colors, and all those things. Let's take another
 example. The military companies are one B and you remember the
 way it was it was reported correctly. They had a border guard
 ready, but this was an outcome of changing information, not of really
 changing the troops. I have several examples like this. That is
 the intention and that is what happens.

I'd like to go for a moment to the recent developments which in
 most cases the Egyptian and reported correctly. Those are
 only examples taken from the ground with no soldiers in them, that's right.
 Because some of the things which were somewhat west of A line,
 the question is are the Egyptians going to demolish the trenches
 or leave them and retreat back whenever they decide to. In any
 place in the field, for example, for the trenches and the
 fields and looked that they're dismantled. And as far as we
 know, the Egyptians are now busy for the next inspection to remove
 those also fields and trenches, so I said at the beginning.

the Egyptians have been doing a lot of work during these two days. Troops are moved very fast. But the question of course is what will happen next, if the intention is trying to camouflage what is remaining behind.

We did have a very long session with Gen. Abdullah. I must say it was mostly one-sided. Because although we think, that is our perception, that Gen. Abdullah knows exactly what we are talking about, he was listening and we made all the presentations. And I tried to make Gen. Abdullah quite sure that our capabilities of knowing are very good. And I asked him a very straight question about, let's say, the electronic warfare station in Ras Muhamad, and he said: no, there isn't one there. I asked: Are you updated? He said: yes, I was there a week ago. So I put on the table an enlargement of this position which showed clearly the vehicles with the antennas. So we passed on to the next point, and the same thing happened. I thought on the third point, he will give up and say, okay, I'd like to check it. But no, we went through all those violations, and the outcome of the visit was orders to camouflage and scatter the vehicles, because they are expecting the Olive Harvest photography. So that's to the best of our knowledge. And that is what I reported, as I should and did to the Defense Minister.

MR. BEGIN: I'd like to add another remark which I forgot to make earlier. Gen. Ali, when you brought him the question of the level of diplomatic representation, said: It is my intention

to keep it on the ambassadorial level. And you added that he gave you a personal reassurance that it will continue so. But still my third ear heard that he was not prepared to tell you it is going to be so, objectively. Then I have to say the following: what kind of reassurance is it? To the contrary, I think it weakens even the commitment under the peace treaty in which the ambassadorial level is written. What is it? A personal commitment by Gen. Ali? Today he is Foreign Minister, tomorrow he can be a private person. We know for instance of certain dismissals which took place lately in Egypt in high ranking posts. That may happen to Gen. Ali as well. I don't wish it. He is a fine man, and we like him here in Israel. And Arik says that is why he is so dangerous because he is a likeable person.

MR. SHARON: We really like him.

MR. BEGIN: But he can be out of office. He couldn't even tell you yes, there will be the ambassadorial level. That must arouse thoughts, that I don't know when after the 25th of April, when we are on the international border, they will order out our ambassador, order back their ambassador and we suddenly face a new situation as far as diplomatic relations are concerned. He left such a possibility theoretically at least. So where is the reassurance? Even on that we have now a weakened position.

But again, I repeat, you know the central point to us now is that Egyptian document. It is a document that was read out to the representatives of 80 countries, nearly half of the UN.

to keep it on the ambassadorial level. And you added that he
 gave you a personal assurance that it will continue so.
 But still in your ear heard that he was not prepared to call you
 it is going to be an objective, then I have to say the follow-
 ing: what kind of assurance is it? In the contrary, I think
 it would be even the assurance under the same terms in which
 the ambassadorial level is stated. What is it? A personal
 commitment by you, Mr. Ambassador, to the Minister, Secretary
 he can be a private person. He knows for instance of certain
 situations which you think I have to have in mind, regarding
 those. That may happen to you, Mr. Ambassador, I don't know it.
 He is a free man, and we like him here in Israel. And with you
 that is why he is so devoted because he is a likable person.
 Mr. Ambassador, it really like him.
 Mr. Ambassador, but he can be out of office. He couldn't even
 call you yet, there will be the ambassadorial level. Then what
 those phrases, that I don't know when after the 25th of April
 they are on "ambassadorial level", they will order out our
 ambassador, order back their ambassador and we suddenly face
 a new situation in the diplomatic relations are concerned.
 We felt such a possibility characteristically at least. We were
 in the assurance, even so that we have now a needed hospital.
 But a kind of report, you know the central point is in you
 in the Egyptian document. It is a document that was read out
 to the representatives of 20 countries, partly half of the UN.

MR. BEN MEIR: More than half.

MR. BEGIN: It was read out to them and they took note. And we don't hear anything about it. Now I read this letter again. There is not a word of recommitment to Camp David. The Camp David agreement is mentioned as a way to reach a comprehensive peace settlement with other Arab countries, but there is no reassurance that this is the only document to which we shall be faithful. The word autonomy is not mentioned in this letter at all. I will ask Mr. Meridor to read the whole letter out.

(MR. MERIDOR reads out full text of April 16th, 1982

letter from President Mubarak to Prime Minister Begin).

MR. BEGIN: Now we have heard the whole letter, and let's see if there is any reassurance. I will start with the positive side. There is a reassurance about stopping smuggling in clear words. Now of course it is a matter of the facts on the ground. But he writes here: "You may rest assured that Egypt will not condone any smuggling of arms or explosives through its territory. We find such illicit acts injurious to our own interest and a threat to our security. There is no reason for us to tolerate such activities. An Egyptian police delegation visited Israel late last month and agreed with your authorities to cooperate closely on such matters as well as other areas related to security and justice."

So I accept this. But the question is on the ground. Gen. Sagi, did you raise that with Gen. Abdullah?

MR. BROWN: Now, Mr. ...

MR. BROWN: I am sure that you will find that the ...

There is no question of responsibility in this case.

and a very careful analysis of the facts will show that

there is no question of responsibility in this case.

responsibility in this case is not shared by any of the

parties. The only responsibility is that of the person

who is mentioned in the letter as the

(Mr. ...)

person who is mentioned in the letter as the

MR. BROWN: Now, Mr. ...

and it seems to me that the person who is mentioned in the

letter is a person who is mentioned in the letter as the

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letter is the person who is mentioned in the

GEN. SAGI: Yes, the head of Shabak was with me and he did raise this point as the first point of the meeting. Gen. Abdullah listened to all the details; he didn't comment. He said the same thing as is written in this letter, that is not in Egypt's interest. So the head of Shabak gave him some names including the names of one very active PLO head of base in El Arish. And we are waiting to see what will happen.

MR. BEGIN: Anyhow, as far as the letter is concerned, it is a reassurance. However, Arik I'd like you to pay attention to the following sentence in the letter of President Mubarak to me: "Some reports alluded to alleged violations on our part of our commitments under the Military Annex. Here also, I believe that the media is not the proper channel for dealing with such matters. Therefore, I was pleased when the issue was raised by Minister Sharon as I received him today. He will certainly report to you that Field Marshal Abu-Gazala explained to him in detail that we are not violating our commitments. Nor do we intend to commit any violations in the future."

Did the Field Marshal explain to you?

MR. SHARON: On the contrary. It is very interesting. We have been complaining about violations since the beginning of 1980, about two years now, and during ^{all} that time the Egyptian authorities were denying that they were violating. When I came to Cairo this time, I entered the car and was going together with Ali, and he told me immediately: We are going to correct any

... the head of the ... was with me and he ...
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violations that you will point out. And as a matter of fact, they were busy now for the last three days moving their troops whose existence there they were denying for the last two years.

I would like to say that I never had any word by Field Marshal Abu-Gazala denying any presence of these troops. On the contrary, what I was told there is that they are going to move these troops immediately. And I asked how many days do you need for that, so he said we would like to finish it by Saturday, because we'd like the Israeli cabinet that meets on Sunday to know already that we have done it. These were the only words I was told. None of them said a word or denied the fact that there were violations.

MR. STOESEL: Mr. Prime Minister, on that if I may, Field Marshal Abu-Gazala told me that he was aware of the charges of violations, ^{that} they do not accept that they were violations, but that in accordance with instructions from President Mubarak they would take action to clear up any misunderstandings, any alleged violations. That he was under instructions to do that, and he would do it. I mentioned the fortification question, as you asked me to. He said that is being taken care of, these fortifications in any case will be sanded over very quickly, but he will get the bulldozers and will do that. And I think the Sinai Field Mission report shows that some of those trenches at least were destroyed already.

MR. SHARON: In one place.

violations that you will point out, and as a matter of fact, they were busy for the last three days making their reports whose existence there they were denying for the last two weeks. I would like to say that I never had any word by Field Marshal Spychalski during my presence at these troops. On the contrary, what he was told there is that they are going to have these troops immediately. And I asked how many days do you need for that, he said we would like to finish it by Saturday, because we'd like the Marshal's cabinet that means on Sunday to know already that we have done it. These were the only words I was told. None of them said a word or denied the fact that there were violations.

Mr. STOROSZ: Mr. Brian Mahoney, on the 15th of July, 1953, Field Marshal Spychalski told me that he was aware of the charges of violations, they do not mean that they were violations, but that in accordance with instructions from President Komar, they would take action to clear up any misbehaviour, any alleged violations. That he has under instructions to do that, and he would do it. I recalled the "official" question as was asked me for details that is being taken care of. These alleged violations in any case will be taken care of very quickly, and he will receive full reports and will do that. And I think you should know that without your help some of these troops are being sent to the front.

E. SHAW: In one place.

MR. STOESEL: He said there was a question about the border guard, are they really border guards or in uniforms of border guards. He said they are really border guards but to remove any possible doubt we will remove that company and will put in border guards who have been known for years to be border guards.

I had the impression from talking to him and Mubarak that they were sincere in wanting to clear up these misunderstandings.

MR. SHARON: What is the misunderstanding? I'd like to come back to a conversation with General Abu-Gazala, then still a general, in January 1982 in his office in Cairo. We were sitting like this in deep armchairs, and I was talking to him about the violations. So he explained the situation to me. He said after the assassination of President Sadat, the army are the only ones who really back the regime and he said: if we are going to instruct them now immediately to evacuate their positions in zone B, they might be offended. And he would not like now at the present time to offend the only loyal people whose loyalty they are sure of. So I replied to him then that I understood that, and I told him: you still have time, because that was in January, but I asked him - if you want to do it gradually, step by step, you can do it, but don't drag it to the last minute. Because we would not be able to accept it. And he understood it. So the attempt now in this letter to deny the fact that there were violations, after we were discussing them, and the Egyptian Minister of Defense himself asked us to understand their problems

Mr. ROYER: He said there was a question about the border guard, are they really border guards or is it uniform of border guard. He said they are really border guards but to receive any possible doubt we will assume that company and will put in border guards who have been known for years as the border guards.

I had the impression from talking to him and finding that they were almost in waiting to discuss these international...
 Mr. SHAW: What is the... I'd like to come

back to a conversation with General... then will a...
 general, in January 1988 in his office in... He was...
 like this in deep... and I was... He said after...
 the... He explained the... He said after...
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and to allow them to withdraw step by step, in order not to offend or hurt the feelings of the military troops that are loyal to the regime. I mean we have to draw conclusions from that.

MR. BEGIN: In any case, we have here a live witness. I read out this passage in which President Mubarak tells me that my friend, the Defense Minister, is convinced or heard from Field Marshal Abu-Gazala an explanation that "we are not violating our commitments." And our Defense Minister says in our presence that Gen. Abu-Gzala didn't say so. He might have said that to you, but he didn't say that to our Defense Minister.

Now, logically, if there are no violations, what does he have to correct? It's a simple question. If he corrects, probably there were some acts not in conformity with the military annex. This is no reassurance.

MR. SHARON: When talking to the Committee of Security and Foreign Affairs of our Parliament, I brought a list of about 40 different dates when we were discussing on different levels the violations in Sinai. I gave them the dates, I brought the reports and the places where we were discussing that.

MR. BEGIN: Now, I come again to the main point, Mr. Secretary. Here in another passage, President Mubarak writes to me: "We have honored all our commitments under the Treaty." I reject this statement. It is untrue. The Egyptians did not carry out all their commitments in good faith. If they had done so, Dr. Magid

and to allow them to identify step by step, in order not to miss
 or miss the feeling of the subject those that lead to the
 subject. I have no doubt as to the importance of this.
 Mr. BODIN: In any case, we have had a live witness. I read
 the passage in which President Johnson called me out to trial.
 The Johnson document, as discussed in great detail by the
 ABC-CBS and explained in great detail by the Johnson document
 center." And our former director says in our records that
 Johnson didn't say so. Johnson never said that to you, but he
 didn't say that to our Defense Counsel.

Now, logically, if there is no violation, then there is
 no charge. It's a simple question. If it's correct, probably
 there were some good reasons for conformity with the military manual.
 This is my statement.

Mr. BODIN: When talking to the Counselors of Security and
 the Attorney General of our Parliament, I brought a list of about 50
 violations that we were discussing on different levels of the
 violation in itself. I have them on tapes. I brought the records
 and the plans that were discussed then.

Mr. BODIN: Now, I would like to see the main notes, Mr. Secretary.
 Here are another message, President Johnson's order to me. We
 have placed all our commitments under the Treaty. I reject
 that commitment. It is in the Treaty. The Secretary did not carry out
 their commitments in good faith. If they had, they would have

wouldn't have made that speech to the non-aligned countries and wouldn't have presented that plan.

The Camp David accord is mentioned in general terms: "At Camp David, our two countries took a daring and pioneering step on the road to peace", etc. This explains to me that the whole intention is to have a comprehensive peace between Israel and other countries in the area. But that is exactly what Dr. Magid said to the non-aligned countries, and he put down the conditions how that comprehensive peace can be achieved - withdrawal to the lines of '67, though the creation of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District, through the right to return or receive compensation according to resolution 194, and all the other stipulations. Which I have already said is an attempt to destroy the State of Israel, not immediately but in stages. Where is this in compliance? It is unfounded.

MR. LEWIS: Could I make just one brief observation about the reference to comprehensive peace, etc. Certainly, the Camp David Agreement starts out with just that purpose, and citing a reference to the desire to achieve a comprehensive peace between all the parties is totally consistent with the Camp David Framework. You are coupling it with the 11 point plan. That is a separate issue, I agree with you. But just the reference to the Camp David agreement and linking it with these words "...the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace

wouldn't have made that speech to the pro-aligned countries and
wouldn't have presented that plan.

The Camp David accord is mentioned in general terms. "At

the same time, our two countries look a certain and blossoming state
of the road to peace, and. This explains to me that the

his intention is to have a comprehensive peace between Israel and
other countries in the area. Our main message is that we
will go to the independent countries, and we put forward the conditions
for that comprehensive peace and be satisfied - withdrawal to the
lines of 1947, through the creation of a Palestinian state in Judea,
Samaria, and the West Bank, through the right to return of
refugee camps and an agreement on Jerusalem, and all the other
settlements. Which I have already said is an attempt to destroy
the State of Israel, and immediately we are in danger. There is
this in our interest. To be understood.

MR. FINE: Could I ask you just one brief question about

the reference to comprehensive peace, etc. Certainly, the Camp

David Agreement starts with just those words, and during a

reference to the desire to achieve a comprehensive peace between all

the parties is usually contained with the Camp David Agreement.

You are possible it with the Camp David, is that a separate

issue, I agree with you, but that the reference to the Camp

David Agreement and finding it with these words. The parties

are determined to reach a just, comprehensive and durable settlement

of the Middle East conflict through the cessation of force

treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, in all their parts," etc. That is a perfectly legitimate connection.

MR. BEGIN: You are wrong, I don't accept your remark. I will explain why. Of course these sentences are included, but what is the practical arrangement of the Camp David agreement except the Treaty of Peace between the two countries, Egypt and Israel? Autonomy. The striving^{is} to have a comprehensive peace treaty but the practical arrangement is to have autonomy, a transitional period, the establishment of a self-governing authority/ administrative council, withdrawal of the military government, withdrawal of our military forces, the remaining forces to be redeployed in specified security locations, etc. No mention of it. If you take these three phrases out of context and don't even mention the practical arrangements, you take the soul of the whole Camp David agreement out. Let me say that if that preamble stands alone what does it mean? Nothing. We have to conduct negotiations for a comprehensive peace treaty. But it is meaningless without the context.

You always say to me: your paper - actually you didn't use that word - is to a certain extent one-sided because there are other provisions that the Egyptians think are serious and necessary. And I said: you want me to repeat other statements? I will. What I suggest is to have a reaffirmation of the contents of the Camp David accord. The Camp David accord means practically and realistically - autonomy, transitional period, and all the other arrangements I already mentioned. There is not a word about that in

created based on Security Council Resolution 242 and UN...
 their part, I see. There is a historical Egyptian connection.
 Mr. DILLI: You're wrong, I don't accept your term, I
 understand that. Of course these sentences are included, but what
 is the practical arrangement of the Camp David agreement does the
 treaty of peace between the two countries, Egypt and Israel. Accordingly,
 the article to have a comprehensive peace treaty but the practical
 arrangement is to have autonomy, a transitional period, the establish-
 ment of a self-governing authority administrative council, withdrawal
 of the military government, withdrawal of our military forces, the
 remaining forces to be redeployed in special security operations,
 and the return of it. If you take these three phases out of
 context and don't understand the practical arrangements, you
 take the body of the whole Camp David agreement out. Let us say
 that if these articles stand alone what does it mean? Nothing.
 We have to conduct negotiations for a comprehensive peace treaty.
 That is the meaning without the context.
 You always say to me: your paper - actually you didn't use
 that word - is to a certain extent one-sided because there are other
 provisions that the Egyptians think are serious and necessary. And
 I said: you must be to respect other resolutions. I will. What is
 I suggest is to have a reaffirmation of the contents of the Camp
 David accord. The Camp David accord means practically and really
 treaty - autonomy, transitional period, and all the other arrange-
 ments I already mentioned. There is no word about that in

this letter and then he rejects the paper and doesn't even want to read it. Did we ever do such a thing to you, Mr. Secretary, the representative of the United States? Do you have in your career of nearly five years a case, Sam, that I rejected a paper given to me by you or any other representative of the U.S.? Do you remember such a case?

MR. LEWIS: I think I do, but I don't think we should argue about it now.

MR. BEGIN: I would be very curious to know when it happened. Why shouldn't we argue about it now?

MR. LEWIS: You remember when you gave us that document and we were discussing how it might be received in Cairo, I said - I won't put this on Mr. Stoeessel - I said, because I have been in too many of these games here the last several years - that if the Egyptians read in the newspapers that you had prepared a document to put to them and he was bringing it, it would be absolutely sure they'd turn it down.

MR. BEGIN: Why don't you remind me of the occasion when I refused a paper you brought? I didn't ask you to repeat that statement. You said I behaved with you as President Mubarak behaved with the Assistant Secretary of State. Remind me of that.

MR. LEWIS: With your permission, I'd like to take that up with you another time.

MR. SHARON: About this trick of publishing in the press, that is a very known trick of Egypt. They used the same trick when

and I think that the report and report's even want to
read it. It is not as such a thing for you, Mr. Secretary, the
representative of the United States. Do you have in your report
of nearly five years ago, that I rejected a permit given to
me by you or any other representative of the U.S.? Do you remember
such a thing?

MR. LAMAR: I think I do, but I don't think we should argue
about it now.
MR. BROWN: I would be very anxious to know when it happened.
Why shouldn't we argue about it now?

MR. LAMAR: You remember when you gave us that document and
we were discussing how it should be received in China, I said I
don't put this on Mr. Stowessal. I said, because I have been
in the many of those cases here the last several years - that is
the situation here in the past and you had prepared a document
to put to them and he was thinking it would be specially and
they'd come to some.

MR. BROWN: The day you turned up of the occasion when I
gained a permit for property. I don't ask you to repeat that statement.
You said I behaved with you as a friend towards the people of the
country. I don't think that is a fair statement of that.

MR. LAMAR: With your permission, I'd like to take thirty
with you another time.
MR. BROWN: About this talk of publishing in Chinese, that
is a very known trick of yours. They used the same trick when

it came to the visit of President Mubarak in Israel. Again, the same thing, it was published. That is a trick.

MR. LEWIS: Why is it a trick?

MR. SHARON: It's an Egyptian trick. You know, people, you don't read the situation here. Do you think that Israel would have sent a secret paper under the carpet? We also have people here who worry about the Egyptian steps who see Egyptian deception all along the line.

MR. LEWIS: The issue is not a secret document. The issue is negotiating in secret before you have a document to publish.

MR. SHARON: It is a known Egyptian trick.

MR. STOESEL: I had a feeling that Mubarak had a general political problem also at home.

MR. SHARON: We also do.

MR. STOESEL: With all of the problems and sensitivities here we have to realize that there are some on their side too. And that Mubarak has some problems, and he felt in a situation here that he really could not. I am just explaining his motivation.

MR. BEGIN: You remember from your service in Moscow - we have to go into his "palyzhenye" (which means situation) but he doesn't understand our "pizhenye". I have just received two announcements in connection with the Yamit problem, the most terrible I received in my life. I have to deal with it tonight.

He asks all the time that I should understand his situation. And we don't have problems? I don't want to reveal now the contents of this note, but it's the most bitter I have ever received in my

It goes to the state of President Karamanlis in Istanbul. Again, the same thing, it was published. That is correct.

MR. LAWRENCE: Why is it a priority?

MR. SHAW: It's an Egyptian thing. You know, people, you don't read the Egyptian press. Do you think that Egyptian press have sent a secret paper under the name of... We also have people here who work about the Egyptian press who see Egyptian documents all along the line.

MR. LAWRENCE: The press is not a secret document. The press is not a secret document. You have a look at the press.

MR. SHAW: It is a known Egyptian thing.

MR. SHAW: I had a feeling that Karamanlis is a general

political problem also at home.

MR. LAWRENCE: It is also an

MR. SHAW: With all of the troubles and negativities

there we have to realize that there are some on their side too. And

that Karamanlis has some problems, and he is in a situation where

perhaps really could not. I am just talking about motivation.

MR. LAWRENCE: You remember from your service in Moscow - you

have to be very careful about things. (Which means situation) but he

doesn't understand and our "Egyptians". I have just received one

announcement in connection with the new problem. The new

problem is related to the life. I have to deal with it tonight.

MR. LAWRENCE: All the time that I should understand the situation.

And we don't have anything. I don't want to reveal how the contacts

of this case, but it's the case that I have ever received in my

life. So everyone has his "palyzhenye."

Again, I want to repeat that we are very grateful to you for your efforts, and we shall have a special cabinet session on Wednesday to take our decisions. We invited Gen. Ali to come tomorrow, and I hope we shall find a solution for the Taba problem.

MR. STOESEL: On that question of Taba and the conciliation/arbitration, I said the Egyptians had accepted conciliation as a step. However, I think I should make clear for the record that in their minds this is tied to a time limit. If you remove the time limit, then they may change their views. I don't know.

MR. BEGIN: The Egyptians will not impose on us any condition. We are faithful to the peace treaty. There is no time limit in the peace treaty and there will be none. If they go back on their acceptance of conciliation, there won't be any arrangement.

MR. STOESEL: We hope there will be an agreement. If we can be helpful, we want to be. My own plan will be to remain here in Jerusalem tomorrow, and if we can be of any assistance with regard to the talks with the Egyptians, I am at your disposal. I will see thereafter whether I should remain longer in the area or go back to Cairo. We can take those decisions later.

MR. SHARON: About Taba, all the time I hear these talks about Taba, I have the feeling that people are trying to say that Israel is trying to take some of Egypt's land. That is not the case at all. The Egyptians are trying to take some of our land. It is not that we are trying to take their land. As a matter of fact, it is

...the evidence was his "discovery."

...again, I want to repeat that we are very grateful to you for your efforts, and we shall have a special cabinet session on Wednesday to take our decision. We decided that all to come...

...and I hope we shall find a solution for the whole problem.

...On that question of Taha and the constitution... I said the Egyptian had accepted constitution as a... However, I think I should make clear for the record... in their minds that he also had this right. It is very necessary... that they may change their views. I don't know.

...The Egyptian will not depend on us any condition... we are limited to separate treaty. There is no time... power clearly and there will be none. If they do not... announced constitution, that was a big mistake.

...The Egyptian will be an agreement. It is... cannot be denied, we must be able to deal with... in detail tomorrow, and it would be of my... to the talks with the Egyptian, I am at your disposal. I will... see themselves... back to Cairo. We can take some decisions later.

...About Taha, all the time I hear these things about... I have the feeling that people are trying to see... is trying to take some of Egypt's... The Egyptians are trying to take some of our... but we are trying to take their... As a matter of fact, it is...

not only the question of Taba. There are 15 points along the border where Egypt wants to change the line of the border, and I can explain the reason in each of these places why they are trying to do that.

People come to us about Taba. Are we to be blamed? The Egyptians are to be blamed for the attempt to take part of our land. So don't try to convince us about Taba. In my opinion, we don't even have to discuss this thing. We know exactly where the border is. There is an attempt all the time to try and show that Israel is trying to take advantage of this Taba case in order to postpone withdrawal or demand other things. That is not the case. The Egyptians are trying to improve their positions in the area. They would like to sit in Taba. As a matter of fact, Taba, the place, stays in their hands according to our map. What they want is to sit on the ridge there, because from this ridge they can over look Elath. That is what they want.

So really, I ask you, don't try to give the impression that we are trying to hold certain parts of Egyptian land. The Egyptians are trying to take part of our land, that is the situation.

MR. STOESEL: We are not taking a position on the merits of this; what we want is to see a procedure established to resolve a dispute which seems to exist.

MR. SHARON: We are there and we are not moving from there.

--(Meeting adjourned at 7:55 p.m.)--

not only the question of... there was no notice along the border
where there would be change of the border, and I can
explain the reason in each of these places why they are trying to do
that.

People come to an agreement, and we do it already. The Egyptian
are to be blamed for the attempt to take part of our land, so don't
try to convince us about that. In addition, the Don't want have
to discuss this thing. We know exactly where the border is. There
is an attempt all the time to try and show that Israel is trying
to take advantage of this fact and is order to maintain windows
or defend other things. That is not the case. The Egyptians are
trying to improve their position in the area. They would like
to see in fact. As a matter of fact, they, the ones, always in
their hands according to our map. What they want to do is on the
ridge there, because from this ridge they can see over the
land in that they want.

So, this, I ask you, how can you give the impression that
we are trying to hold certain parts of Egyptian land. The Egyptian
are trying to take part of our land, that is the situation.
MR. STONE: I am not taking a position on the merits of
this, what we want to do is a procedure established to resolve
dispute which seems to exist.
MR. SHAW: We are there and we are not leaving from there.

מל: המשרד, נד: 17, ט: אמלנמה
 דח: ר, סג: ב, מא: 200482, רח: 1250
 נד: ראיון קרט

ס/מ

דג'ל/בלטס

מזפא

המגרינוח ווט

להלן מראיון ג'יימי קרט לאמלנמה גודנל קונסטיטיוטן 18

FORMER PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT AFTER SINAI TRANSFER HE MIGHT BECOME PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN SECOND PHASE OF PEACE PROCESS - NEGOTIATIONS FOR PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY. +I'LL USE MY INFLUENCE, WHATEVER IT IS, TO CONTINUE PROCESSM PARTICULARLY IN EGYPT, AND I THINK TO MAJOR DEGREE IN ISRAEL, I'M STILL TRUSTED+, CARTER SAID. +AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN WORKING IN PROPER WAY, I'LL USE MY INFLUENCE IF TIME OF TROUBLE COMES. + HE SAID INVOLVEMENT MIGHT INCLUDE SEVERAL TRIPS TO MIDDLE EAST, BUT IT +WILL NOT BE GOVERNMENTAL IN NATURE. +

HE CLEARLY INDICATED HIS BELIEF THAT PRESENT ADMINISTRATION'S INACTION GIVES APPEARANCE OF ABANDONING U.S. COMMITMENT TO PEACE PROCESS.

+WHEN I WAS PRESIDENT, ON THREE OCCASIONS ISRAELIS WERE ON VERGE TAKING ACTION ANNEX GOLAN HEIGHTS. WE EXPLAINED TO ISRAELIS ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES AND ON THREE OCCASIONS WE PREVAILED+M2
 BEGIN DECIDED TO TAKE THAT STEP, AS THEY DIDN'T HAVE CLEAR SIGNAL FROM WASHINGTONM

PLO IS PALESTINIANS VOICE. MOST PALESTINIANS RECOGNIZE IT AS SUCH. I TRIED TO INTRODUCE PLO TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

RIGHT TO EXIST AND HONOR 242 AS BASIS FOR PEACE. THEY
WOULD NEVER DO THIS, SO THAT IS THE MAJOR PROBLEM. +
THEY'RE STILL DEDICATED TO THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL.

AS I'VE NEVER BEEN IN FAVOR OF A PALESTINIAN STATE... THE
BEST THING PALESTINIANS COULD DO TO ADOPT CAMP DAVID AS
BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION.

GIVING UP SINAI IS CULMINATION OF A MAJOR PHASE OF PEACE
EFFORT WE LAUNCHED WITH BEGIN AND SADAT. I THINK IT WAS
WELL-CONCEIVED PLAN FOR ISRAEL AND EGYPT, AND BOTH
NATIONS SEE IT AS SUCH....

דובר מחלקת המדינה סרב להתייחס לראיון
החומר במלואו בדי"פ'

שריגוד==

הפ: שהח, טשהח, להח, טרהח, שהח, טנכח, טמנכח, טטנכח, טטח, רח,
אח, טצפא, טטח, הטכרה, פורח

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

5581

י' 51

ממור

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אל: ני , נוש , נר: חוים 489 , מ : המשרד
דח: מ , סג: ש , תא: 170482 , וח: 0100
נד: מועבים-הר הבית

ס/ג

ממור/מידי

בלום ארנס

מועבים- הר הבית

1. דוהמ' העלה הבוקר באוני סססל ענין ההחלטה האמורה להתקבל
גמועבים. חנן דיבר עם לואיס.

2. בטקבות הנל השמעת' פרמי ניווקינו לשליכת הנוסח האסלאמי ()
נבטלכס 341/63 באוני היר, וביקסתי להעבירן לוושינגטון
ולניו יורק.

אליצור. =

מפ: שהח, סשהח, הונכל, מהונכל, רהח, סרהח, אליצור, ארבל, הצפא,
וובינסטיין, ר/מרכו, מהח

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

5728

MS1

שומר

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מל: ווס, נ"י, נד: חוום 494, מ: המשרד
דח: ב, סנ: ט, תא: 170482, זח: 2015
נד: שדר רוה"מ כריגן

אלב

שומר/נהוג

ארנס. דע: בלוס.

בהתאם לשיחתו הטלפונית של בלוס עם שה"י, להלן שדר מרה"י
כנשיא, שהנך מתבקש להעביר מיד:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS IS ABOUT TO
WIND UP ITS DEBATE ON THE TRAGIC SHOOTING INCIDENT IN
JERUSALEM, ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT.

AT A BITTER MOMENT I CALLED THIS INSTITUTION 'THE HIGH
COURT OF INJUSTICE', BUT THIS TIME IT OVERREACHED ITSELF.
A DERANGED INDIVIDUAL TOOK BY SURPRISE ALL THE GUARDS,
OPENED FIRE, KILLED AND WOUNDED INCOCENT PEOPLE. HE WAS
APPREHENDED. HE WILL FACE A COURT OF JUSTICE WHOSE
PSYCHIATRIST WILL FIND OUT WHETHER HE IS JUDICIALLY SANE
OR INSANE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW OF THE LAND HE WILL
BE JUDGED BY DUE PROCESS.

WHAT ELSE CAN A CIVILLIZED NATION, A DEMOCRACY DO? HOWEVER
IN THIS CASE TOO, OUR PEOPLE FELL VICTIM TO AN ANCIENT AND
MEDEAVAL PREJUDICE:

THE NATION OF ISRAEL IS BEING COLLECTIVELY BLAMED AND
CINICALLY ACCUSED OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CRIME. IT HAPPENED
FOR MANY CENTURIES: WE PAID FOR IT WITH RIVERS OF JEWISH
BLOOD, WITH TORTURE, WITH THE STAKE, WITH POGROMS, BUT

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

THAT SUCH AN OUTRAGE SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT THE END OF THE
TEWENTIETH CENTURY, ONLY FORTY YEARS AFTER THE HOLOCAST,
DEFIES HUMAN IMAGINATION AND MAN'S CAPABILITY OF
DESCRIPTION.

YET SPEAKER AFTER SPEAKER AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL MOUNTS
THE ROSTRUM AND HEAPS ABUSE UPON ISRAEL.

AS I SAID IN OUR STATEMENT TWO DAYS AGO, THE VOICE OF
FREEDOM AND CIVILIZATION HAS NOT YET BEEN HEARD.

I HOPE, MR. PRESIDENT, DEAR FRIEND, IT WILL SOON RING
CLEARLY AND LOUDLY, AND WHAT ABOUT THE OUTCOME, THE VOTE ?

WILL THE BEARER OF HOPE, OF ALL FREEDOM LOVING NATIONS,
ALLOW RACIST PREJUDICE REVOLTING BIGOTRY, GET THE UPPER
HAND, THROUGH GIVING SUPPORT, OR WITHHOLDING RESISTANCE,
TO A CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTION?

THROUGHOUT THE AGES, MR. PRESIDENT, JUSTICE ULTIMATELY
TRIUMPHED, BUT USUALLY TOO LATE. SHOULD, IN OUR TIME,
THIS PHENOMENON BE REPEATED?

I APPEAL TO YOU FROM THE BOTTON OF MY HEART: LET THE
AMERICAN DELECTION AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL RAISE ITS HAND
AGAINST A TERRIBLE WRONG, AGAINST A RESOLUTION WHOSE
COURCE AND RESULT IS INCITEMENT AND HATRED.

LET JUSTICE BE DONE.

YOURS SINCERELY AND RESPECTFULLY
MENACHEM

טו באן

חנן בר חון

ממ, אליצור, לובינסטיין, ארבל, מצפא
ממ, טשה, רהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, מנככ, ממנככ, ר/מרכו, רט, אמן.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

1914

נבנס

מחון 1

דף 1

סודי ביותר

מחון 10

עותק 3

4369/1

מל: המשרד, נד: 225, מ: 111
דח: מ, סג: מ, תא: 170482, רח: 1800
נד: ארגנטינה

סודי ביותר / מיידי

בוטע


ט.ל.ט

ראש המטעלה, שר החוץ, שר הבטחון.
לעינייהם בלבד.

ארגנטינה.

לאחר שיחתו של השגריר עם סגן המזכיר איגלברג בנושא מועבים
ביקש איגלברג מהשגריר להישאר לשיחה בארבע עיניים בו מסר:

באם המחלוקת על איי פיקלנד תהפך לעימות צבאי בין ארגנטינה
לבריטניה חאלץ ארה"ב לתמוך בבריטניה.



תפ: שה, רהט, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אלו: המשדר, ניו יורק

א.ה.ג.

ט ר ט ס
ז"ף... מתוך... דפים
סוג בטחוני מוגה...
זחיפות... בהגל לבוקה...
תאריך וז"ת 17/4/82, 1733...
מסי מברק... 224

49 - נ/א.אין

שר החוץ
אליצור, כהנא, מצפ"א
בלום

שדר רה"מ לנשיא - מועב"ט (שלכם ח/494)

בשעה 1600 בפגישה במחמ"ד הגיש השגריר הסדר לאיגלברגר סגן מזכיר המדינה וביקש ממנו להעבירו לנשיא.

בפגישה נכחו וליוטיס, היל והח"מ.

השגריר: ציין שיש נושאים לגביהם קיימים חילוקי דעות בין ארה"ב וישראל אך פרט הרצח בהר הבית אינו נמנה ביניהם. אין כל מחלוקת לגבי העובדה שאין כל דופי במעשי ישראל. יש כאן נסיון של מדינות ערביות לחזור על חרגיל ההסתה שעשו ב-69 בפרשת השריפה באל-אקצה.

ישראל מניחה איפוא כי תגובת ארה"ב תהיה להתנגד לנסיונות לעשות הון פוליטי מהנושא.

יש כאן נסיון להסית פונדמנטליסטים איסלאמיים להפגנות ואנוי-כבר ראינו הפגנות כאלו ביו"ס.

סגן המזכיר: ארה"ב לא תצביע בעד החלטה שיש בה משום גינוי לישראל או המצביעה על אחריות ישואלית למעשה.

ארה"ב עושה מאמץ עם נציגי מדינות ערב להשיג נוסח החלטה שחגנה את המעשה בלבד.

איגלברגר הוסיף כי לדעתו אין כל סיכוי שמדינות ערב תסכמנה לנוסח "מתון" ועל כן אין לישראל מה לדאוג.

הוסיף כי העולם הערבי כבר נמצא ב-TURMOIL וישנה סכנה גדולה שבאם ארה"ב תצביע נגד הצעה יפגינו המונים נגד שגרירויות ארה"ב בעולם הערבי. שקול זה לא יכריע אין תצביע ארה"ב אך חייבים לשקול גם זאת. כבר קבלו דווחים מישראל כי בגדה המערבית מזהים את ארה"ב עם התקרית.

איגלברגר ביקש שוב להדגיש כי לא יקבלו הצבעתם על בסיס שיקול זה אך השיקול משפיע על הטקטיקה.

וליוטיס: מהשדר של רה"מ ניתן להבין שהבקשה היא שנתנגד רק לנוסח הבא לגנות את ישראל.

השגריר: בקשתנו אינה מכוונת נגד ניסוח זה או אחר אלא נגד נסיונות לקשור את ישראל לפרשה.

אנו יודעים מניעי מנחמי ההצעה. כל הרמזים הם ע"ם לרמוז שישראל אחראית למעשה.

תאריך וז"ח

224... 49-1/1

אנו ערים לדאגתכם לגבי שלום אנשיכם אך כדי לשמור על בטחונם חייבים לבלום
ההסתה כבר עכשיו ולא לחת לה להתפשט.
איגלברגר: הבטיח לבקש מקלוק להעביר הסדר מייד לידיעת הנשיא.

מחוץ לחדר הסיב וליוטס לשאלחנו כי כוונת ביטויו של איגלברגר "שאר"ב לא תצביע
בעד" פירושה הצבעה נגד ולא המנעות, אך הוסיף רק במקרה שמדובר בנוסחה המגנה את ישראל.

סבל

לה סלמה ויה סארה שרה. של מלמה ממה ספ
אמן אל-יש אורב, ממשו רוצי, ספ

ז' 1 סמור 2 זכ"ס
 סיווג כסחוגי: 310
 דהיפוח: כה"ל לבקר
 תאריך וז"ח: 172130
 מס. מברק: 407/72

לשימוש
 סוד
 הקשר

אל: בר און, אלוזר

ד: אקס-ווינגטון
 מאת: האלום/ניו יורק

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מועבייט דר הביח.

1. התמרתהי הבוקר אל קירקפטוריק והשמעהי באזניה - בצד התנגדותנו לקבלת החלטה כלשהי - גם את הערותינו בכשר לנייר העבודה המתומן מאמש (מברקנו 397/70).
2. סיפרה כי הערבים מוכנים להשמיט את סעיף מצע 2 וכן הדייחסוה כצחייל בסיפא של סעיף המבוא השביעי. כנ מסדה לי על מספר הצעות חמייד לריכוכ נוספ של הנייר, וביניהנ השמטח המילה - ENCOURAGEMENT מישא של סעיף מצע 3.
3. חזרהי באזניה על מוענותינו נגד הנייר כשאני מחמד בנסיונ הערבי להדביק שוב לירושלים תו של שטח כרוש. הזכרהי לה בהמשך זה כי גם לאור הסתייג מהכללת ירושלים בחביכה זו לאחר כבלה החלוח מועבייט 465 וכן את דברי הנשיא על ירושלים בפני ועידת בני בריח ספטמבר 1980 ובפני קבוצת מנהיגים יהודיים בנובמבר 1981.
4. כנ הדגשתה את התועייה המכוונת שבנוסח שהכליתה ליצוד הרושמ כאילו היתה שורה של מעשי חלול קודש בעוד שהמדובר במעשיו של אדם אחד (ראה במיוחד סעיפי המבוא השלישי והשביעי). כנ ציינהי בפניה את הבדל בין כיפת הסלע והינ אל-אסצה והעמדתה אורה על הכזב שנמענהה סאילו היו פגיעוה במחפליים בחוכ מסגד אל אקצה. הקשר זה הפניהי אורה גם אל המענה הכוזבת בסיפא של סעיף מצע 1 ראשונ.
5. קירקפטוריק הביעה דעהי שלנוכח הלחצ רכנד המופעל עליהם מצד הערבים והמוסלמים, כולל ראשי מדינות, היה רצוי שגם רוהיימי יפנה אל הנשיא רייגן וכי היא מבקשה שאעביר הצעה זו כהמלצה ראישיה, מסרהי את הוכנ השיחה והמלצת קירקפטוריק לשהייה.
6. במשכ הבוקר בימשווי באמצעוה ליכנשמיין להעמיד את קירקפטוריק גנ על השימוש החוזר בנייר במונה ייחראם אל שריפיי שגם הוא בעל ניטה פרובושייבית מכוונה ושנעדר מהחלטה מועניי מ-1969 בעניין השריפה במסגד אל אקצה.
7. לאחר ארוחת הצהריים שקיימה קירקפטוריק עם קבוצה שגרירים ערביים מוסלמים (הנארה שגירדנ נוסיימה הביא עמו גם את שגירדנ בוושנגטון וכן נסחו מה שגמצרים מגיד, שגפכיסאנ נאיק ושגמרומו זנמיאר) דהנשרה קירקפטוריק כדי למסור לי שסוכמ בינה ובין השגרירים הערביים שעניין הגשח הנייר יעוכב למספר ימים. היא הבדירה לבני שיחה כי בהעדר המזכיר מושינגטון אין לאוהייב עמדה מוסמכת בנדון משעה זו, אך מכל מקום לא הוכל לטמוכ ידיה על הנוסח הכימי. השמיעה באזניהם את ההמרייגויה מנייר הקיים.

דף 2 מתוך 2 דפים

סיווג בטחוני:

דחופות:

תאריך וזיחה:

407/72

מס. מברק:

לשימוש
מחלקת
הקשר

אל:

דל:

מאת:

8. לדברי קירקפטריק היתה לנו כוחותם של השגרירים האחרים (וביחוד של שגירדן בווינגמון) השפעה ממתנה בעליל על נוסיהם. לדבריה, סיכא גם היום מגיד המצרי הפקיד חיובי במהלך השיחה כשהוא חוזר ומדגיש שאין להטיל על ישראל וממשלתה אחריות על מעשיו של יחיד מופרע.

9. כאשר נשמע מפיו של שגפיקסואן נאיק רמז להצתת שגדירות ארה"ב במקיסטאן בזמן פרשת בני הערובה במיראן, נתנה לו קירקפטריק להניח שארה"ב לא תנהל את מדיניות החוץ שלה בצל איומים מסוג זה לדבריה אלא זאת הנשיא אהמול גם לקבוצה של אנשי מחמיד שהביעו דאגה בכוון זה.

10. קירקפטריק שמעה מפי שגמרוקו זנפאר כי הייג עומד לבקר במרוקו כדי לשוחח עם חסאן על ענייני זה היא משערת שהכוונה לביהור נמהלכ טיסתו המתוכננת של הייג מבואנוס איירס ללונדון.

11. טיפחה שבימנה האחרונה פנו ישירות לנשיא חסאן המרוקאי זיא הפכיסטאני וחוסיינ הירדני. לכן שמוחה על אגרת רוהימי לנשיא שעל מסירותו נבר מסר לה איגלבורגר.

מלום.

עיה סלמה ריה סלמה סלמה סלמה סלמה סלמה סלמה סלמה סלמה סלמה
אלמא רוב, אלמא רוב, אלמא רוב, אלמא רוב, אלמא רוב, אלמא רוב, אלמא רוב, אלמא רוב, אלמא רוב, אלמא רוב

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

1891

נכנס

סודי ביוחזר

מחוך 1
מחוך 7
מחוך 10

4369/2

א

אל: המשרד, נד: 190, ט: 111
דח: ר, סג: ט, חא: 160482, זח: 1430
נד: ויינברגר

סודי ביוחזר/רגיל

רה"ט' שהי"ח. שהבטחה עוברת-לטיניהם בלבד.
אמא במפגש חרותי אשר לי מוכיח ההגנה ווינברגר שרצה לבקר בארץ
כחודש טאי אך מוכיח המדינה הייג שמו על כך שהביקור יידחה
בטענה שהתאריך אינו מתאים. הביקור מתוכנן להתקיים בספטמבר.
ארנס==

פ: שהח, קשהח, מוכל, מטנכל, רהט

סגרירות ישראל - ווסינגטון

אל: המסד , ניו-יורק

אמ

ט ו ט ס ט כ ר ק
דף.....! מתוך.....! דפים
סוג בשחוני סמור
דחיפות... בהול לבוקר
תאריך וז"ח 1600 אפר' 82
מס' מברק... 183

38-1/1/1/1

אליצור, כהנא, בלום

דיון מועביט.

הסגריר ביקש לדבר עם וליוטים, אולם בהעדרו (ממסד וליוטים נמסר שהוא בדרך לניו-יורק לדיון במועביט) ובהעדר דרייסר, דיבר עם היל, מנהל המח' הישראלית אשר חשמש כמים. הסגריר ציין כי מגמה החצעה האיטלאמית היא להגביר המתיחות ומהטתה והזכיר התנהגות ערב הטעודית לאחר פרשת השריפה באל אקסה שם קראו מפורשות למלחמת ג'יהאד. הסגריר ביקש מארה"ב להצביע נגד התחלטה. היל הגיב כי לדעתם אין כל מקום לגינוי ישראל, אך באשר להגברת המתיחות ארה"ב חוששת דווקא מתגובות בעולם הערבי במקרה של וטו אמריקאי על הצעה "מתרנח". לדבריו רק אח"צ יהיה נוסה שלגביו ארה"ב תצטרך לנקוט עמדה, וההחלטה אז תהיה של איגלברגר או אולי חייג (הנמצא בארגנטינה), הבטיח לתעביר לאיגלברגר בקשת ישראל.

סיה סלטה רה ס/רה גנט שהכס ג/גנס סבל י/לניס ללר רס ו/גן
ג/לס י/זוי ו/רבא 2 ר/בינסטין ג/לסו

**
**
**
**

אכ: נ"י, ו"ש, נר: חו"ס 479, מ: האשרד
דח: מ, סג: ס, תא: 160482, ו"ח: 1800
נר: רהמ-2000

אכ"ל

סודי מייד

השגריר

רוהמ' העלה הנוקר בשיחתו עם שטוסל נ שעליה יוברק בנפרד (את
הדיון
הנוכחי נמוטבט ועמד על החומרה שבה אנו רואים את עלילת הדם
על העם
היהודי בשיחה מאוחרת יותר עם שטוסל ולואיס עם ס'שהח והחמ'
העלה
הנושא פעם נוספת ועמדנו לא רק על החומרה אלא גם על הצורך
לסכל החלטה המגנה את ישראל ומטיחה דופי כלשהוא בה. שטוסל
ולואיס

, שלא היה ביום עד לשיחה זו דיווח מעודכן מניו יורק, אמרו
שהם
בהחלט מבינים את טענותינו אך העלו באונינו גם את הסכנות
העשיות
להגרס כאמריקאים בארצות מוסלמיות אם וכאשר ארה"ב תסיל ווטו
על
החלטה במועבי"ט. הם הוכירו את אשר התרחש בפקיסטן בעקבות
הדליקה
באל אקצה ב-1968. יחד עם זאת הדגישו את הבנתם לטיעונים
שהושמעו
במיוחד על רוהמ',

בר און ===

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

התח. מצפא, אלי צור, ארנל 2

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

5342

**

יצא

שחור

**

**

**

אל: פריס , וויט , לונדון , נר: חוים 445 , ה : המשרד
דח: כ, סג: ש, מא: 160482, וח: 1330
נד: הודעת רהמ

אהל

שמור/בהול טפל

השגריר.

רוהמי מבקש שהודעתו בעניין עליית הדם נגד העם היהודי -
בריוני מועצת הבטחון תמסר לידי הוכיר המדינה האמריקאי , נשיא
צרפת ורוהים בריטניה, במידת האפשר עוד לפני ההצבעה במועביים.
הנוסח במברק בנפרד.
לשכת המנכל==

מפ: שהח, טשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, רהמ, סרהמ, אליצור, מרוז, בנחורין,
מצפא, ארבל, אירא, אירב, יגר, מעת, הסברה, ר/מרכו, ממת

אל: המשרד

דע:

מאת: השגריר נאו"ם

דף _____ מסודר _____ ימי

סיווג בטחוני: _____ שמור _____

דחיפות: _____ רביל _____

תאריך נתיחה: 16/4/82

מס. מברק: 390

לשימוש
המקשר

אל

אמב"ל ב, חר"ן

הזמנה לרוה"מ ע"י קרן שווייצר.

שלכם 282 מיום 12 באפריל.

1. במקרה ^{לפי} יהיה לרוה"מ עניין לבקר בארה"ב בחודש יוני, ניתן יהיה להשתמש בהזמנה קרן שווייצר לתכלית זו. לא נראה לי כי הזמנה זו כשלעצמה הצדיק את הביקור.
2. כמובן יהיה צורך לשקול עניין זה גם על רקע המסכת הרחבה יותר של עצרת פרוק הנשק. כאשר התגבש יותר רשימת ראשי המדינות וראשי הממשלות המערביים שיבואו לעצרת, יהיה קל יותר גם בשבילנו לחוות דעה בנדון.
3. מכל מקום נראה לי שכדאי לעכב החלטה בעניין זה בשלב הנוכחי ולשוב לנושא בסביבות מחצית חודש מאי.

נחה שיש להגיש מ/א והמספרים אליהם אלט ראינו
אשר טי/פ'ת

בלום

סגרירות י ל - וסינגטון

אל: המסרד

ס ד ס ס א ב ר ק

דף.....מתוך.....דפים

סוג בטחוני. סמור

מדי

תאריך וז"ח 161300

אפריל 82

189

מסי מברק

2/6

מנכ"ל. ממנכ"ל.

מכתבי רה"ם אל הנשיא רייגן ומזכיר המדינה הייג מה-12/4 נמסרו לתעודתם
בו ביום.

לשכת הסגרי

ממ/ס שיהיה רחם אנה ג/אנה ג 232

מס' סדר 3
 מס' סדר
 סידורי לכו"ר.
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395

אל: הסדר
 57:
 מאה: נאו"ם

אנ

ארבל 2.

מועב"ס-ירושלים.

1. כשיחה עם יועץ משלוח ארה"ב ספר כי קבלו הבוקר כשבגירוחם בתל-אביב את עמדת רוח"ם כגיין בעניין הדיון במועב"ס. היועץ הקריא מתוך ספרק השגרירות בו צויין שרוח"ם מחנבד לכל הצעת החלטה בנושא.

2. האמריקני ציין שעמדה ישראל גורמת להט "להחלבסוידנת קשרת" זאת מאחר ולא היו רוצים "לאכזבנו", מאידך הצעת החלטה כצורתה כנייר עבודה, קיימת והם אף נמצאים בתהליך של משא ומתן עם הקבוצה הערבית על שפתה וניסוחיה. הוסיף שעדיין הם רוצים לעשות מאמץ נוסף על מנת להסגוע מהצורך להטיל וסו שכן "לא יהיה זה מענינן של ארה"ב וישראל". סתרהי דכריו באומרי שדוקא וסו אמריקני יצביע על כך שארה"ב איננה מוכנה להגדר אחר האשמה קולקטיביות והסחה דחיה.

נאו"ם.

מה שכתבתי בדיון היום הוא שיש לה
 להחליט על הצעת החלטה זו

Mr

Handwritten signature

תאריך: 16.4.82. הסולח: י. מילוא.

x

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דד מחוד
סיווג בטחוני:
רשימות: סיירי לבוקר.
262045
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תאריך וזיהוי: }
מס. סמ. ק: }
לשימוש
פני
הקשר

אל: המשרד

דפ:

מאח: נאר"ס.

אלכ

ארבל 2. מנפ"א.
הר הבינה.

להלן הודעה הבינה הלבן על פגישה הנשיא ריגן עם קבוצה של גוררים מסרינוח איסלמיות.

THE WHITE HOUSE

OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY

For Immediate Release

April 16, 1982

The President today met with six Ambassadors delegated by the Islamic countries represented in Washington. On this occasion, he expressed his deep personal sorrow and that of all Americans over last Sunday's violence at the hands of a deranged individual in an area sacred to three of the world's great religions.

The President expressed his sympathy with the concern of the Islamic world over the disruption of the tranquility of one of its most holy shrines. This concern is shared by the members of all faiths. He reiterated his conviction that the peace of the holy places of Jerusalem must be maintained and confirmed the dedication of the United States to encouraging the conditions necessary for the well-being of all those who draw their spiritual inspiration from that city.

The President called upon all the governments and peoples of the Middle East to work to decrease tensions in the area and prevent further acts of violence and loss of life.

The six Ambassadors were:

- Ambassador Omer Salib Eissa, Sudanese Ambassador to the United States
- Ambassador Ali Bengelloun, Moroccan Ambassador to the United States
- Ambassador Faisal Alhegellan, Saudi Ambassador to the United States
- Ambassador Ejaz Azim, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States
- Ambassador Azraai Zain, Malaysian Ambassador to the United States
- Ambassador Andre Wright, Niger Ambassador to the United States

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38 = /א

Handwritten notes in Hebrew at the bottom of the page.

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

א.כ.ל

ס ו ס ס ק כ ר ק
 דף.....מחור.....דפים
 סודי
 סוג בטחוני
 דחיפות. ק"נ?
 תאריך וז"ח..161200..אפריל 82
 מס' מברק...194...44/


מנכ"ל. ממנכ"ל. דע בלום ניו-יורק

בטיחת טלפון הבוקר עם וליוסיס הוא דיווח לי שששה שגרירים ממדינות
 איסלמיות יתקבלו אצל הנסיא היום בקשר להצעתם במועצת הבטחון ושהנסיא יוציא
 הודעה לאחר מכן. הבטיח לי שהודעה זו לא תשגשג בנו.

חזרתי על דרישתנו שארה"ב תסרב להתייחס להצעה כלשהי בנדון והוא השיב
 שטרם התקבלה החלטה אך אינו יכול גם להבטיח דבר בשלב זה.

ארנס

שרת סלמה מר סלמה סלמה סלמה סלמה
 ר/אויב מר רמ אמן



לקראת מועד הנסיגה ב-26 באפריל

ישראל דורשת הצהרה משולשת בכתב לאישור מחדש להסכמי השלום וקמפ דייוויד

הייג עשוי לבוא לאישור לפני 26 באפריל; מצרים התחייבה לתקן הפרות הסכם השלום; נשארו בעינם חילוקי הדעות על סימון הגבול; שר החוץ המצרי יבוא בתחילת השבוע הבא



מנכ"ל משרד החוץ, ד"ר יצחק מרדכי, מציג את תוכנית ההצעה...

שר החוץ המצרי יבוא בתחילת השבוע הבא לקראת מועד הנסיגה ב-26 באפריל; מצרים התחייבה לתקן הפרות הסכם השלום; נשארו בעינם חילוקי הדעות על סימון הגבול; שר החוץ המצרי יבוא בתחילת השבוע הבא

מובארק לשרון: יש לשמור על קור רוח והאמון ההדדי

מקורות רשמיים בקהיר סבורים: ייצא פתרון לטענות הישראליות על הפרות

בניסוח חלק פעיל במסגרת ההסכמים... מובארק לשרון: יש לשמור על קור רוח והאמון ההדדי

כוחות משטרה ומג"ב מתוגברים ביבטיחו היום הסדר במסגדים במזרח-ירושלים

בעקבות זיזעות מודיעינית על כוונה לגרום נזקים ארומות; באחרונה תקשרת את גודמן להריגת שומר המסגד בלכוד; נבדקת האפשרות של פציעת אנשים מיריות חיילים

במסגרת תוכנית הביטחון... כוחות משטרה ומג"ב מתוגברים ביבטיחו היום הסדר במסגדים במזרח-ירושלים

נפצעו חייל וששה אזרחים בעת הפגנות ברצועת עזה

ראשי מוסדות ציבור במזרח-ירושלים קוראים להקמת מדינה פלשת'נית בהנהגת אש"ף; נמשכת שביתת המסחר; אוניברסיטת ביר זית תיפתח ביום שני הקרוב

במסגרת תוכנית הביטחון... נפצעו חייל וששה אזרחים בעת הפגנות ברצועת עזה

מגמה מעורבת

בחקר מניית אור, 44 מניית בניין... מגמה מעורבת

במסגרת תוכנית הביטחון... מגמה מעורבת

במסגרת תוכנית הביטחון... מגמה מעורבת

מאמר: חילוקי הדעות על ההסכמים

ההסכמים הם תוצאה של תהליך... חילוקי הדעות על ההסכמים

מאמר: חילוקי הדעות על ההסכמים

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ההסכמים הם תוצאה של תהליך... חילוקי הדעות על ההסכמים

מדד מארס עלה ב-5.1%

האצה בהתיקרויות ברבעון ראשון השנה לעומת אשתקד

משפחה עירונית ממוצעת נזקקת במארה ל-13,000 שקל; משפל: שיעור העליה מצדק טיעוניה של ההסתדרות

הסכמי בנייה ההסתדרות - לשכת התיאום שכירים יקבלו תוספת יוקר 16.6 אחוזים לינואר - מארס

המחלקת על תוספת שחוקה - בעינה, משלחת ההסתדרות תיוועד היום עם שר האוצר

מאמר: חילוקי הדעות על ההסכמים

ההסכמים הם תוצאה של תהליך... חילוקי הדעות על ההסכמים

מאמר: חילוקי הדעות על ההסכמים

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מאמר: חילוקי הדעות על ההסכמים

ההסכמים הם תוצאה של תהליך... חילוקי הדעות על ההסכמים

Broadway 80 advertisement featuring a man smoking a cigarette and a pack of cigarettes.

מתאים לי... BROADWAY 80

Advertisement for 'Mouda Achta' (Mouda Migia) featuring a chicken and text about fresh meat.

BITTER LEGACY.

PRESIDENT REAGAN ALSO ASKED FOR FLEXIBILITY AND RESTRAINT BY ALL PARTIES IN THE DAYS AHEAD. WITH THAT, HE SAID, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO GET THROUGH THIS TOGETHER. WE STILL HAVE A WAYS TO GO, HE ADDED, BUT HE IS HOPEFUL THAT WE CAN FIND A JUST AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THIS VERY SERIOUS MATTER.

21

PAGE 03 -- REAGAN

THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID THAT SECRETARY HAIG, HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, WOULD BE ARRIVING IN BUENOS AIRES IN A FEW HOURS TO CONTINUE THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

AS HE HAD IN A PREVIOUS CONVERSATION, PRESIDENT GALLIERI REAFFIRMED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN HIS PERSONAL DESIRE FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE.

(END TEXT)

TEXT

WESA-517 (4/15/82)

(FOLLOWING IS MATERIAL, BASED ON PRESS REPORTS, IS FOR DISTRIBUTION TO MISSION STAFF ONLY AND NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

NEWS ROUNDUP, FRIDAY, APRIL 16, 1982 (4500)

20/4

TRUCE ENFORCED IN BEIRUT --

BEIRUT WAS REPORTED RELATIVELY QUIET APRIL 15 IN THE WAKE OF FIVE DAYS OF CLASHES BETWEEN LEBANON'S WHITE MUSLIM MILITIA AND LEFTIST GUNMEN. SYRIAN REACTIVATING FORCES ENFORCED A TRUCE IN SEVERAL DISTRICTS OF THE LEBANESE CAPITAL, AND ONLY OCCASIONAL SNIPER FIRE WAS HEARD FROM THE BATTLED NEIGHBORHOODS.

*1.2.113
מסמך מן 20.4
1982*

PRESS DISPATCHES REPORTED THAT AT LEAST 50 PERSONS HAD BEEN KILLED AND MORE THAN 120 INJURED SINCE THE CLASHES ERUPTED IN BEIRUT AND IN SOUTHERN LEBANON EARLIER THIS WEEK.

IN ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT, UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN SHOT AND KILLED A FRENCH EMBASSY EMPLOYEE AND HIS WIFE LATE APRIL 15

... PRESIDENT REAGAN ALSO ASKED FOR FLEXIBILITY AND RESTRAINT
BY ALL PARTIES IN THE DAYS AHEAD. WITH THAT, HE SAID, WE
SHOULD BE ABLE TO GET THROUGH THIS TOGETHER. WE WILL HAVE
A WAY TO GO, HE ADDED, AND HE IS HOPEFUL THAT WE CAN FIND A
SOMEHOW TO BRIDGE THE DIVIDE BETWEEN VERY DIFFERENT VIEWS.

Handwritten scribbles and lines in the top left corner.

PAGE 12 -- REAGAN

... THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID THAT SECRETARY HAIG, HIS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE, WOULD BE ARRIVING IN PHOENIX AT 11:30 PM
TODAY TO CONTINUE THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
AS HE HAD IN A PREVIOUS CONVERSATION, THE PRESIDENT
STATED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN HIS PERSONAL DESIRE FOR A
SOMEHOW TO BRIDGE THE DIVIDE OF THE NATION.

(END TEXT)

WEST-517 (ALWAYS)

... FOLLOWING MATERIAL, BASED ON NEWS REPORTS, IS FOR
YOUR INFORMATION TO ASSIST YOU IN YOUR PUBLICATIONS.

WASHINGTON, FRIDAY, APRIL 14, 1983 (AP)

THE PRESIDENT IN PHOENIX

... ABOUT THE REPORTS RELATIVELY CLOSE TO THE VAST
OF THE CASE OF CLARENCE STEVEN LEANOR, WHOSE MURDER
WAS THE SUBJECT OF THE REPORT. THE PRESIDENT
STATED A REPORT IN SEVERAL INSTANCES OF THE PRESIDENT
... AND ONLY OCCASIONAL MURDER CASES FROM THE
... REPORTED MURDERERS.
... REPORTED THAT AT LEAST 20 PERSONS HAVE
... BEEN KILLED AND MORE THAN 100 INJURED. THE CLARENCE
... REPORTED IN PHOENIX AND IN SEVERAL INSTANCES EARLIER THIS WEEK.
... IN ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT, UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN SHOT AND
KILLED A FORMER EMBASSY EMPLOYEE AND HIS WIFE LATE APRIL 13

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PAGE 22 -- NEWS RDP.

AT THEIR APARTMENT IN WEST BEIRUT. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT
CONDEMNED THE CRIME, AND AN EMBASSY SPOKESMAN IN BEIRUT
CALLED IT AN ACT OF TERRORISM.

22

VIOLENCE CONTINUES ON WEST BANK --

VIOLENCE CONTINUED APRIL 15 IN THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED WEST
BANK AND GAZA -- THE FIFTH DAY OF A GENERAL STRIKE BY
PALESTINIANS PROTESTING THE ATTACK APRIL 14 AT THE DOME OF
THE ROCK MOSQUE IN JERUSALEM.

AT LEAST ONE PALESTINIAN REPORTEDLY WAS KILLED WHEN
ISRAELI TROOPS OPENED FIRE ON DEMONSTRATORS OUTSIDE A MOSQUE
IN GAZA. SOME 14 OTHERS WERE WOUNDED IN THE INCIDENT.

MEANWHILE, 16 PALESTINIANS REPORTEDLY WERE ARRESTED APRIL
15 IN A DEMONSTRATION IN THE WEST BANK. AND IN JERUSALEM,
ISRAELI TROOPS ENFORCED STRICT SECURITY OUTSIDE THE DOME OF
THE ROCK AND AL AQA MOSQUES.

SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIERS KILLED IN NAMIBIA --

PAGE 23 -- NEWS RDP.

SIX SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN CLASHES
WITH A LARGE SWAPO (SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S
ORGANIZATION) GUERRILLA FORCE IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA.

SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING A SWEEP TO
DRIVE OUT THE SWAPO GUERRILLAS, WHO HAVE PENETRATED ABOUT
200 KILOMETERS INTO NAMIBIA IN ONE OF THEIR LARGEST
OPERATIONS IN RECENT TIMES.

SOUTH AFRICA REPORTED THAT TWO SWAPO GUERRILLAS WERE
KILLED DURING THE OPERATION.

CEAUSESCU COMMENTS ON SINO-SOVIET TIES --

ROMANIAN PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU SAID IN BEIJING APRIL 16 HE

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AT THEIR APARTMENT IN WEST BEIRUT. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT
CONDEMNED THE CRIME, AND AN EMERGENCY PROGRAM IN BEIRUT
CALLED IT AN ACT OF TERRORISM.

VISITORS CONTINUED ON WEST BANK --

VIOLENCE CONTINUED APRIL 15 IN THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED WEST
BANK AND GAZA -- THE FIFTH DAY OF A GENERAL STRIKE BY
PALESTINIANS PROTESTING THE ATTACK APRIL 14 AT THE HOME OF
THE BOOK WORMS IN JERUSALEM.

AT LEAST ONE PALESTINIAN REPORTEDLY WAS KILLED WHEN
ISRAELI TROOPS OPENED FIRE ON DEMONSTRATORS OUTSIDE A SCHOOL
IN GAZA. SOME 14 OTHERS WERE WOUNDED IN THE INCIDENT.
REVENUE, 16 PALESTINIANS REPORTEDLY WERE ARRESTED APRIL
15 IN A DEMONSTRATION IN THE WEST BANK, AND IN JERUSALEM,
ISRAELI TROOPS ENFORCED STRICT SECURITY OUTSIDE THE HOME OF
THE BOOK WORMS AND NEAR MOSQUES.

SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIERS KILLED IN NAMIBIA --

PAGE 03 -- NEWS-001

SIX SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN CLASHES
WITH A FIGHT SQUAD (KOP) WITH ARMS PROBLEMS
OPERATIONS, SQUADS LA FORT IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA.
SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING A SWEEP TO
DRIVE OUT THE SWAPO TROOPS, WHO HAVE BEEN FIGHTING ABOUT
ONE KILOMETER INTO NAMIBIA IN ONE OF THEIR LATEST
OPERATIONS IN RECENT YEARS.
SOUTH AFRICAN REPORTED THAT TWO SWAPO GUERRILLAS WERE
KILLED DURING THE OPERATION.

CEAUSCESCU COMMENTS ON SINO-SOVIET TIE --

ROMANIAN PRESIDENT CEAUSCESCU SAID IN BEIJING APRIL 14 HE

THE END OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR, PROGRESSED THROUGH THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND CULMINATED WITH THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE CONVENTION OF STATES ON SEPTEMBER 17, 1787. THUS, LAW DAY U.S.A., 1982, CELEBRATES NOT ONLY 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, BUT ALSO 200 YEARS OF PROGRESS.

25th

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RONALD REAGAN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PROCLAIM SATURDAY MAY 1, 1982, AS LAW DAY U.S.A. AND INVITE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO MARK THE OBSERVANCE WITH PROGRAMS THAT STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION TO OUR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS AND OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT.

I URGE CLERGY OF ALL FAITHS TO BRING THE MORAL AND ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE LAW TO PUBLIC ATTENTION THROUGH SERMONS AND SUITABLE PROGRAMS.

I CALL UPON STUDENTS AND TEACHERS AT ALL LEVELS TO STUDY AND TEACH THE EVENTS AND DOCUMENTS THAT LED TO THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION IN 1787 AND ITS RATIFICATION ON JUNE 21, 1788, SO THAT THE 200TH ANNIVERSARY OF OUR CONSTITUTION MIGHT BE MARKED BY LEARNED DISCOURSE ON THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THIS GREAT CHARTER OF FREEDOM.

I ALSO CALL UPON PUBLIC OFFICIALS TO DISPLAY THE FLAG OF THE UNITED STATES ON ALL GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS OPEN ON MAY 1, 1982.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MY HAND THIS SIXTEENTH DAY OF APRIL, IN THE YEAR OF OUR LORD 1982, AND OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THE 106TH.

(SIGNED) RONALD REAGAN

س/ا/ر

(END TEXT)

ITEM

NEGA-512 (4/15/82)

THE END OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR, PROCEEDED THROUGH THE
ARTICLE OF CONFEDERATION AND CULMINATED WITH THE ADOPTION
OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE CONVENTION OF STATES ON SEPTEMBER
17, 1787. THIS, LAW DAY U.S.A., 1982, CELEBRATES NOT ONLY
25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, BUT ALSO 200 YEARS OF PROGRESS.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RONALD REAGAN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, PROCLAIM SATURDAY MAY 17, 1982, AS LAW DAY
U.S.A. AND INVITE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO MARK THE OCCASION
WITH PROGRAMS THAT STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION
TO OUR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT.

I URGE CLERGY OF ALL FAITHS TO BRING THE MORAL AND
ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE LAW TO PUBLIC ATTENTION THROUGH
SERMONS AND SUITABLE PROGRAMS.

I CALL UPON STUDENTS AND TEACHERS AT ALL LEVELS TO STUDY
AND TEACH THE EVENTS AND DOCUMENTS THAT LED TO THE ADOPTION
OF THE CONSTITUTION IN 1787 AND ITS RATIFICATION ON JUNE 21,
1788, SO THAT THE 200TH ANNIVERSARY OF OUR CONSTITUTION
MIGHT BE MARKED BY LEARNED DISCOURSE ON THE HISTORY AND
PURPOSE OF THIS GREAT CHARTER OF FREEDOM.

I ALSO CALL UPON PUBLIC OFFICIALS TO DISPLAY THE FLAG OF
THE UNITED STATES ON ALL GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS OPEN ON MAY 17,
1982.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HERETO SET MY HAND THIS
SIXTEENTH DAY OF APRIL, IN THE YEAR OF OUR LORD 1982, AND OF
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THE 82TH.

(SIGNED) RONALD REAGAN

(END TEXT)

TEXT

MEGA-218 (A1252)

Handwritten: 11/10/82

Handwritten: 1/10/82

WASHINGTON -- PRESIDENT REAGAN MET WITH AMBASSADORS FROM SIX ISLAMIC COUNTRIES WHO CAME TO SEE HIM TO PROTEST LAST WEEKEND'S VIOLENCE AT THE DOME OF THE ROCK MOSQUE IN JERUSALEM.

THE COUNTRIES REPRESENTED WERE MOROCCO, SAUDI ARABIA, PAKISTAN, MALAYSIA, SUDAN AND NIGER.

REAGAN EXPRESSED HIS "DEEP PERSONAL SORROW AND THAT OF ALL AMERICANS OVER LAST SUNDAY'S VIOLENCE AT THE HANDS OF A DERANGED INDIVIDUAL IN AN AREA SACRED TO THREE OF THE WORLD'S GREATEST RELIGIONS."

THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE ALSO SAID THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS SYMPATHY WITH THE CONCERN OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD "OVER THE DISRUPTION OF THE TRANQUILITY OF ONE OF ITS MOST HOLY SHRINES."

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT:

PAGE 02 -- AMBASSADORS

THE PRESIDENT TODAY MET WITH SIX AMBASSADORS DELEGATED BY THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES REPRESENTED IN WASHINGTON. ON THIS OCCASION, HE EXPRESSED HIS DEEP PERSONAL SORROW AND THAT OF ALL AMERICANS OVER LAST SUNDAY'S VIOLENCE AT THE HANDS OF A DERANGED INDIVIDUAL IN AN AREA SACRED TO THREE OF THE WORLD'S GREAT RELIGIONS.

THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS SYMPATHY WITH THE CONCERN OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD OVER THE DISRUPTION OF THE TRANQUILITY OF ONE OF ITS MOST HOLY SHRINES. THIS CONCERN IS SHARED BY THE MEMBERS OF ALL FAITHS. HE REITERATED HIS CONVICTION THAT THE PEACE OF THE HOLY PLACES OF JERUSALEM MUST BE MAINTAINED, AND CONFIRMED THE DEDICATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO ENCOURAGING THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR THE WELL-BEING OF ALL THOSE WHO DRAW THEIR SPIRITUAL INSPIRATION FROM THAT CITY.

THE PRESIDENT CALLED UPON ALL THE GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES OF THE MIDDLE EAST TO WORK TO DECREASE TENSIONS IN THE AREA AND PREVENT FURTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND LOSS OF LIFE.

WASHINGTON -- PRESIDENT REAGAN MET WITH AMBASSADORS FROM
SIX ISLAMIC COUNTRIES WHO CAME TO SEE HIM TO PROTEST LAST
WEEKEND'S VIOLENCE AT THE DOME OF THE ROCK MOSQUE IN
JERUSALEM.

THE COUNTRIES REPRESENTED WERE MOROCCO, SAUDI ARABIA,
PAKISTAN, MALAYSIA, JUDAN AND NIGER.
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AND CONTINUED THE DEDICATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO
ENCOURAGING THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR THE WELL-BEING OF
ALL THOSE AND DRAW THEIR SPIRITUAL INSPIRATION FROM THAT
CITY.

THE PRESIDENT CALLED UPON ALL THE GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLE
OF THE MIDDLE EAST TO WORK TO DECREASE TENSIONS IN THE AREA
AND PREVENT FURTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND LOSS OF LIFE.

PAGE 23 -- AMBASSADORS

AMBASSADOR OMER SALIB EISSA, SUDANESE AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

AMBASSADOR ALL ALI BENGELLOUN, MOROCCAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

AMBASSADOR FAISAL ALHEGELAN, SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

AMBASSADOR EJAZ ARIM, PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

AMBASSADOR AZHAAL ZAIN, MALAYSIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

AMBASSADOR ANDRE WRIGHT, NIGER AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

ITEM

WESA-515 (4/15/82)

STATE DEPARTMENT REPORTS, FRIDAY, APRIL 16, 1982 (1,388)

NEWS BRIEFING -- ALAN ROMBERG, STATE DEPARTMENT DEPUTY SPOKESMAN, WAS THE BRIEFER. HE COVERED THE FOLLOWING TOPICS:

STOESSEL TO MEET MUBARAK APRIL 17 --

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WALTER STOESSEL LEFT ISRAEL APRIL 16 FOR CAIRO, WHERE HE WILL MEET WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND OTHER EGYPTIAN LEADERS ON APRIL 17, ROMBERG SAID.

"THEREAFTER, HE WILL BE RETURNING TO ISRAEL TO CONTINUE HIS DISCUSSIONS THERE," ROMBERG SAID. "FOLLOWING HIS MEETINGS YESTERDAY (AFTER COMMITMENTS UNDER THE EGYPT-ISRAEL PEACE TREATY.

24

PAGE 17 -- AMBASSADORS

AMBASSADOR OTHMAN SALIH IISA, SUDANESE AMBASSADOR TO THE

UNITED STATES

AMBASSADOR ALL ALI BENBELLOUN, MOROCCAN AMBASSADOR TO THE

UNITED STATES

AMBASSADOR FAISAL ALMEGALAY, SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR TO

THE UNITED STATES

AMBASSADOR ELIAS ABU, PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED

STATES

AMBASSADOR AZHAR TAINI, MALAYSIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED

STATES

AMBASSADOR ANDRE VRIHNI, HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED

STATES

ITEM

WASA-212 (REVISED)

STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, FRIDAY, APRIL 14, 1983 (1,288)

NEWS BRIEFING -- ALAN ROSENBERG, STATE DEPARTMENT DEPUTY

SECRETARY, WAS THE BRIEFER. HE COVERED THE FOLLOWING

TOPICS:

AGREED TO MEET MUBARAK APRIL 17 --

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WALTER STERNBERG LEFT ISRAEL

APRIL 16 FOR CAIRO, WHERE HE WILL MEET WITH PRESIDENT

MUBARAK AND OTHER EGYPTIAN LEADERS ON APRIL 17. ROSENBERG

SAID.

"HEREAFTER, HE WILL BE RETURNING TO ISRAEL TO CONTINUE

HIS DISCUSSIONS THERE," ROSENBERG SAID. "FOLLOWING HIS

MEETING YESTERDAY (APRIL COMMITMENTS UNDER THE EGYPT-

ISRAEL PEACE TREATY.

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28

ROMBERG REITERATED THAT HE WOULD HAVE NO COMMENT ON ANY ISSUE RELATED TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA AS LONG AS SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG IS ENGAGED IN HIS MISSION OF TRYING TO ASSIST THE TWO COUNTRIES IN THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THEIR DISPUTE.

HAIG ARRIVED IN BUENOS AIRES LATE APRIL 15 AND HELD TALKS WITH PRESIDENT LEOPOLDO GALTIERI AND OTHER ARGENTINE OFFICIALS APRIL 16. ROMBERG SAID HE HAD NO INFORMATION ABOUT THE SECRETARY'S ITINERARY. HE SAID THAT TO HIS KNOWLEDGE, NO DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN ON WHETHER HAIG WILL RETURN TO LONDON.

WHEN ASKED FOR COMMENT ON A REPORT BY THE SOVIET NEWS AGENCY TASS THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS USING THE FALKLANDS

PAGE 23 -- STATE

DISPUTE AS A RUSE TO SECURE U.S. MILITARY BASING RIGHTS THERE, ROMBERG SAID HE HAD NO WRITTEN GUIDANCE ON THE SUBJECT.

"BUT I FEEL FAIRLY CONFIDENT IN TELLING YOU THAT IS ABSURD," HE DECLARED.

ROMBERG ALSO DECLINED COMMENT ON ALLEGED CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN SECRETARY HAIG AND PRESIDENT REAGAN CONCERNING THE FALKLANDS CRISIS. SYNDICATED COLUMNIST JACK ANDERSON BROADCAST TAPES APRIL 16 SAID TO BE RECORDINGS OF A RADIO-TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE TWO. ASKED IF A BREACH OF SECURITY WAS INVOLVED, ROMBERG SAID THE QUESTION OF COMMUNICATIONS WAS "A SENSITIVE AREA" AND THAT HE WOULD NOT COMMENT ON IT.

EAGLEBURGER MEETS WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR --

ROMBERG CONFIRMED THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR ANATOLIY DOBRYNIN MET APRIL 16 WITH ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER. HE DESCRIBED THEIR DISCUSSIONS "AS

12
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HOMBERG REITERATED THAT HE WOULD HAVE NO COMMENT ON ANY
ISSUE RELATED TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE BETWEEN
BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA AS LONG AS SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG IS
ENGAGED IN HIS MISSION OF TRYING TO ASSIST THE TWO COUNTRIES
IN THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THEIR DISPUTE.
HAIG ARRIVED IN BUENOS AIRES LATE APRIL 13 AND HELD TALKS
WITH PRESIDENT LEOPOLDO GALLERÍ AND OTHER ARGENTINE
OFFICIALS APRIL 14. HOMBERG SAID HE HAD NO INFORMATION
ABOUT THE SECRETARY'S ITINERARY. HE SAID THAT TO HIS
KNOWLEDGE, NO DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN ON WHETHER HAIG WILL
RETURN TO LONDON.

HE WAS ASKED FOR COMMENT ON A REPORT BY THE SOVIET NEWS
AGENCY TASS THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS USING THE FALKLANDS

PAGE 02 -- STATE

DISPUTE AS A PUSSE TO SECURE U.S. MILITARY BARRING RIGHTS
THERE. HOMBERG SAID HE HAD NO WRITTEN GUIDANCE ON THE
SUBJECT.

"BUT I FEEL FAIRLY CONFIDENT IN TELLING YOU THAT IN
ANSWER," HE DECLARED.

HOMBERG ALSO DECLINED COMMENT ON ALLEGED CONVERSATIONS
BETWEEN SECRETARY HAIG AND PRESIDENT MENENDEZ CONCERNING THE
FALKLANDS CRISIS. SYNDICATED COLUMNIST JACK ANDERSON

BROADCAST TALKS APRIL 14 SAID TO BE RECORDING OF A RADIO-
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE TWO. ASKED IF A BREACH
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COMMUNICATIONS WAS "A SENSITIVE AREA" AND THAT HE WOULD NOT
COMMENT ON IT.

FALLENBERGER MEETS WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR --

HOMBERG CONFIRMED THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR ANATOLIY
DOBRYNIN MET APRIL 15 WITH ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE
LAWRENCE FALLERBERGER. HE DESCRIBED THEIR DISCUSSION "AS

2/37
430/a

MEETING

THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, MR. MENAHEM BEGIN
and
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE USA, MR. WALTER STOESEL

Thursday, April 15, 1982
9:10 a.m.

Also participating:

ISRAEL

Foreign Minister Y. Shamir
Deputy Foreign Minister Y. Ben-Ze'ir
Mr. D. Kimche
Mr. E. Rubenstein
Mr. H. Bar-on
Gen. A. Tamir
Gen. Yaari
Mr. Meridor
Mr. Uri Pappas
Mr. Azriel Revo

USA

Ambassador S. Lewis
Mr. W. Brown
Mr. Draper
Mr. Teicher
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Peitto
Mr. Hare
Mr. Kozak

MR. BEGIN: Mr. Secretary, may I on behalf of the Government of Israel greet you and your colleagues to this country. We are grateful that you undertook this journey. Perhaps we have to apologize for causing you the trouble, but the situation is serious. I appealed to the Secretary to come over, but I understood that he personally couldn't do so, because now he is involved in a grave international problem, which we hope may be solved without the use of force, although the chances today, this morning do not seem so good. But the Secretary is really make an almost indescribable personal effort, taking into consideration that he also underwent a certain operation, to travel between Buenos Aires

3/37
430/n

- 2 -

which
and London back and forth is really an effort/should be admired
by everyone. We do admire him and the effort he is making and we
understand that he cannot come. You of course as his deputy I believe
will do your best in order to try to straighten out and to find a
positive solution for the problems which have arisen, particularly
in the last ten days.

When we appeal to you as representatives of the Government
of the U.S., we do so on the basis of the letter written by the
President of the U.S. of America, Mr. Carter, on March 26, 1979,
and addressed to me, which reads:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I wish to confirm to you that subject to U.S.
constitutional processes:

In the event of an actual or threatened violation
of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and the Egypt,
the U.S. will, on request of one or both of the parties,
consult with the parties with respect thereto and will
take such other action as it may deem appropriate and
helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty."

Now as one of the parties to the treaty, we declare to you that
we have such a request, that there was a breach of the Treaty
of Peace by the government and armed forces of Egypt and that
should be redressed, and the U.S. should undertake, on the basis
of their commitment, to bring about the compliance with the peace
treaty. As the word 'compliance' is used, there are two

4/37

430/n

- 3 -

possibilities, or in the proper language, one alternative, which of course includes two possibilities. One, compliance by Egypt which will be answered by Israel with compliance, fully, of all the provisions of the peace treaty. As we did in the past, so shall we do in the future. The other possibility is that there will be non-compliance by Egypt. Then we will be forced to answer with non-compliance.

What we prefer, and this I state at the beginning of our deliberations, is the former to the latter. We prefer reciprocal compliance with all the provisions of the peace treaty. And now I will explain what are our complaints, why we think the treaty was not complied with and that breaches were committed.

I will take Article 5 of Annex III, Protocol Concerning Relations of the Parties. Article 5 in section 3 stipulates: "The parties shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and will, accordingly, abstain from hostile propaganda against each other." For many months, we tolerated hostile propaganda by Egypt. We didn't acquiesce to it, but we didn't make an issue of it. I can explain why. We understood that there is a certain process in political life, especially in relations between two people. The Egyptian people were educated for nearly 40 years in absolute hatred of the State of Israel and also the Jewish people. And as the press is controlled there, so is the television and the radio, and there was permanent brain washing - Israel is the devil, Jews are cheaters, Shylocks. That name was applied to me personally for a long time after the visit of President Sadat

5/37

430/n

- 4 -

to Jerusalem, etc. So we listened to it and we read it. We have the Egyptian press every day. We of course monitor Egyptian radio. And we didn't make an issue of it, because of that attitude. It's passing, time will be the great healer, we have to live together, we shall meet each other, etc. As our wounded men did in El Arish. One of the most moving human scenes which your Ambassador, my friend, Sam Lewis, and I witnessed ourselves, when invalids, Egyptians and Israelis, embraced each other and promised each other never to wage war against each other. Invalids for life, who were fighters. So we believed that this event will be a beginning of coming closer to each other.

I hold here a booklet about Jerusalem which was issued I suppose a year ago, perhaps a year and a half ago. When I read it yesterday I just couldn't believe my own eyes. This booklet, issued by the State Information Service, Cairo, states that actually Israel doesn't have anything in common with Jerusalem. It ended a long time ago. It says: "The Jewish presence in Jerusalem was finally terminated by the Babylonian invasion and the Jews were not able to recover their political entity until 167 B.C." That is almost childish. They came back to Jerusalem from the Babylonian exile; we rebuilt our Temple after the return from the Babylonian exile. An ignoramus wrote those words. And I could quote more, but it's not necessary. I can only say again - hostile propaganda.

But I am coming to recent days. There was a complaint by Syria first and then Jordan, to the Security Council of the United Nations in connection with the events in Judea and Samaria

6/37
430/n

- 5 -

about two weeks ago. The first complaint was by Syria but then Jordan took over. And the representative of Egypt, Dr. Magid, made a speech to the Security Council, one of the most violent attacks ever from the rostrum of the UN against Israel by any Arab country. So when I wrote on the 25th of March a letter to President Mubarak in reply to his note that he was kind enough to send me, I drew his attention to that speech by the official representative, Dr. Abdul Magid and I wrote to him: "Yesterday in the Security Council, Dr. Magid, whom I met in Ismailia (that was my first visit to Egypt at the invitation of President Sadat) launched a violent attack on Israel in the context of the events which occurred in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. Why should this be so, Mr. President? Those who complained to the Security Council are Jordan and Syria. We both recall how King Hussein suppressed the PLO in Jordan when his army killed thousands of Palestinians by shelling with heavy artillery refugee camps. And but a few weeks ago the Syrian army perpetrated a horrible massacre of the civilian population in - (6,000 people were killed in Hamad by the Syrian army, men, women and children, whole families were wiped out, 3,000 are still missing) - Hamad. Do those two governments have the moral right to accuse Israel? Does any country tolerate riots in which soldiers are attacked with rocks, in which soldiers are stabbed in the back and killed by hand grenades? The answer is implied in the question. I respectfully submit to you, Mr. President, that your delegate in the UN should not have made the speech he delivered yesterday in the Security Council."

7/37
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- 6 -

Our Ambassador, Mr. Sasson, delivered this note to President Tobarak and the President read it in his presence. When he read that passage, he exclaimed twice: "The Prime Minister is right!" First - "I say to my colleagues or advisors privately, but please keep it confidential - how can Jordan and Syria complain? What did they do to the Palestinians or Syrians? He is right." Then, his second remark was: "Dr. Magid should not have made that speech in the Security Council. I didn't know anything about that speech. Tell the Prime Minister so."

And Sasson faithfully reported to me. Of course, I kept it in full confidence.

However, only four or five days passed since that encounter between the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Ambassador of Israel, and the very same Dr. Magid is interviewed by a Kuwaiti newspaper and there he makes a statement which I quote: "After Israel withdraws finally from Sinai, the era of liberation of other occupied Arab territories will begin." So I asked the Ambassador of the US, my dear friend, Sam Lewis, what did he mean by the word "liberation". It's an active concept. Is Egypt going to join other Arab countries in a war against Israel to liberate what he terms "other Arab occupied territories"?

However, the main negative phenomenon from this point of view appeared during the conference of non-aligned countries which also took place in Kuwait, and Dr. Magid made a speech there.

8/37
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May I ask you, Mr. Secretary, how can I assume that President Mubarak didn't know anything of the speech his official representative was going to make to probably 50 or 60 countries, so-called non-aligned countries of the Third World, when he, Dr. Magid, is the representative of Egypt? I don't know, perhaps Mr. Mubarak didn't hear about the speech in advance but it is very difficult for me to assume that, especially after the remark he made to our Ambassador. He should have been forewarned; at least he should have felt that he had to talk to Dr. Magid.

I remember during the lifetime of President Sadat when I drew his attention to certain behavior by Dr. Ghali, then Minister in Charge of Foreign Affairs, he was very angry and I could have seen how he admonished Dr. Ghali. Whatever President Mubarak did, I will quote to you one sentence now. And I will just remind you of the so-called Egyptian plan of how to solve the Palestinian problem; I will not repeat all those points, because I know you read it while you were still in Washington. Dr. Magid is addressing the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Kuwait and he says: "How else since for the first time in modern history Israel is in the ebb and its forces are withdrawing while an Arab country, which is Egypt, is regaining sovereignty over its own national soil and restoring a beloved part of its land which had remained under foreign occupation for approximately 15 years."

"Israel is in the ebb" - instead of saying to the non-aligned countries - I am glad to inform you that Israel is fulfilling the provisions of the peace treaty and it's going to hand us over

9/37
420/10

- 8 -

the last part of the Sinai Peninsula, he pictures Israel as being in the ebb because its forces are withdrawing, etc.

If our withdrawal should prove, Mr. Secretary, that Israel is in the ebb, then our non-withdrawal will prove Israel is not. That is a logical conclusion. I must tell you that present there are Arab countries, Asian countries, Latin American countries, African countries, Yugoslavia, I suppose at least--

MR. SHAHIR: 80 countries.

MR. BEGIN: Two-thirds of the UN, 80 countries from all parts of the world, and here stands a representative of our friend, with whom we have to live in peace and understanding and cooperation, normalize our relations. And he tell us now that actually Israel is at the ebb, down. It has to withdraw, it doesn't do it by its own decision and willingly and for the sake of peace, but it is losing it is downgraded.

What is that if not hostile propaganda, forbidden unequivocally by Section 3 of Article 5 of Annex III?

Then I will only add again a mention of those 11 points. I'd only like to say I studied them again yesterday. And Mr. Secretary, if you studied those 11 points well, I am sure you will share my impression, if not accept my conviction, that this is a prescription to destroy the State of Israel, not immediately, but by stages. But that is now an old story. Even the PLO would like to see us destroyed by stages. First a state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza but Mr. Arafat adds that we shall strive on of course; now we shall accept such a state. In other words, by stages, not

10/37
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- 9 -

necessarily in one stroke, but by stages, the destruction of Israel. What does it mean? We should withdraw to the lines of 1967 which is here - (pointing to map). The distance between this line and the sea is 8 miles, shorter than Broadway, Mr. Secretary. Now in Lebanon the PLO has already got a Katusha missile with a range of 21 km. and now it is threatening the Shi'ites in Lebanon whom they killed yesterday en masse with artillery, with 130 mm guns, supplied by the Soviet Union, with a range of 27 km. Now the Palestinian state should be on these mountains, Samaria on the north and Judea on the south, and as you can see from each hill you can reach every place in this valley by those missiles and those 130 mm guns. What would it be if not a threat to our existence?

Then of course one of the points is Arab sovereignty over or in Jerusalem. There is a difference in translations, so I leave it in the two versions. That is our capital. Then there should be either a return or compensation of Palestinian refugees starting from 1947 and 1948. Mr. Secretary, we never wanted the refugee problem to be created. In our time, almost all wars create problems of refugees. But in 1947 and '48, we were in this country only 620,000 people. And the attempt was made to destroy us. We lost then 6,000 of our best men, nearly one per cent of the population. Today it would be 33,000 men killed. It would have been a complete national disaster. We couldn't have come out of it any more. We lost 3,000 men during the Yom Kippur war; we still live under

11/37
430/n

- 10 -

that trauma. It's a small nation; everyone knows everyone else. If you would proportionately make that account with regard to the American people, then everyone would understand the tragedy. It would have meant hundreds of thousands of Americans killed. And one of those 11 points would be either return or compensation, and the decision would be with the people themselves. We didn't want them to flee. They were ordered by their leaders to flee. They were then 300 or 350,000 and now with their progeny they are over a million. If hundreds of thousands should return, the State of Israel would cease to exist. We wouldn't agree to be a Rhodesia.

So in other words when you analyze it point by point, what was presented as an Egyptian plan to solve the Palestinian problem, it means by stages the annihilation of the State of Israel. And that we should hear from Kuwait presented to 30 countries and canvassing for their support. What is it if not the most hostile propaganda anyone can think of, when these statements of polemic are made by Egyptian representatives, two or three weeks before the 26th of April when we have to finalize the withdrawal to which we are committed? Indeed, my colleague, the Defense Minister, asked the question: What are they, fools? Why couldn't they be silent for another few weeks, and then after that, what could we have done? Not so. To quote Shakespeare: there is a method in their madness. Madness it is, as far as relations with Israel are concerned. Because we were not born yesterday, Mr. Secretary. But there is

12/37
430/n

- 11 -

method to that madness. What was it? Our Egyptian friends assumed for the last few months that the U.S. will take care of Israeli withdrawal. If there should be some people - as you know, we live through a trauma, we had to uproot 1600 families, uproot them, take them out of their homes, give them new homes, a real trauma. So they assumed the U.S. will take care of it. (Israel will withdraw, but we shall now make all those declarations. If after that, the Israelis will come to us with recrimination when we do something else, for instance if the Israelis don't agree to our proposals on autonomy, one day Gen. Ali will call in the Ambassador of Israel and tell him go back home, or will recall Ambassador Mortada. What can we do? I admit, nothing. Can we send the army into Sinai because the ambassadors are recalled? I say openly, no. That is a breach of the peace treaty because it says there must be an exchange of ambassadors even after the interim withdrawal. But what ^{can} we do? But then if we'd come to Mr. Mubarak or to Gen. Ali and say: what did you do, why did you breach the peace treaty? they will say: Didn't you know we stand by these 11 points? Why didn't you pay attention? We said it openly, you heard it and didn't draw our attention to it. You don't want now to have a Palestinian state, etc., etc., so we can't have your ambassador here and you can't have our ambassador in Hertzliya. That is the method to their madness, to place us before a fait accompli and then use it against us.

We made so many sacrifices for the peace with Egypt - oil, airfields, villages and towns. And just on the eve, when we

13/37
420/n

- 12 -

have to embrace each other and say now this stage is finished, now formalization can be completed; now we can tell the African countries there is no reason for them not to have diplomatic relations with Israel. - they used to say Egypt is an African country and you keep under your rule part of Egypt, so we can't have diplomatic relations, it was an excuse but they said it. But now it won't be so, so we can renew diplomatic relations, we can have an exchange of commerce, education, culture, etc. This is the time to be real friends. And here we have the representative of Egypt going to Kuwait saying we are in the ebb and presenting a plan how to destroy the State of Israel.

What I want to sum up now concerning this paragraph - we don't have any doubt whatsoever that the Egyptians in the last few weeks committed the most serious breach of the peace treaty with regard to that section - "the parties shall seek to foster mutual understanding". Excuse me for the light observation, but probably they want to foster mutual misunderstanding - "and tolerance and will, accordingly, abstain from hostile propaganda. And not only didn't they abstain, but they waged hostile propaganda against the State of Israel.

~~Secondly~~ Secondly, there is an organization which calls itself the PLO. Mr. Secretary, whoever listened as I did or read the speeches made lately by Mr. Arafat, in every word there is blood, only bloodshed, in every speech. It is too horrible to listen to or to read. Blood! He is a blood-thirsty two-legged animal, I

14/37

430 / n

- 13 -

wouldn't hesitate to say so, with all this paraphernalia, with the beard, etc. So he has the PLO. Now, I one day said to President Sadat - then I think we already called each other by our first names - how can it be that some of your people cooperate with the PLO? We are making peace and your people cooperate with them. He said how do we cooperate? I said, well, the PLO smuggles arms from El Arish which we handed over to Egypt, ahead of time, several weeks ahead of time, at the ^{re}quest of President Sadat. Later on he told me - that was a turning point in the history of the relations between our two countries and indeed of the position of Egypt in the Middle East. None of the Arab countries ever believed that you will give us El Arish. They used to tell us: don't believe the Israelis; it's only a trick. And he said: now this is the symbol that you mean it and we are going to live in peace. We met in El Arish as good friends and we promised to cooperate. So after that I told him from El Arish come weapons to the Gaza Strip in which there is a PLO of course and they use those weapons to kill our men.

It will suffice if I tell you, Mr. Secretary, that we already captured 700 hand grenades smuggled from El Arish into the Gaza Strip. Let's imagine how many people would have been killed with those 700 grenades. We captured them, through our vigilance and also sheer good luck. And it goes on and on. And I spoke about it to President Sadat and he immediately gave instructions to stop it and they did stop it. It only proves

15/37

430/n


- 1 4

3

it is a matter of decision by the bureaucracy. President Nubarak sits in Cairo, not in El Arish, but if orders are given and there is the resolve to stop it, it is stopped. If a government wants to stop that traffic of weapons or explosives, it does. If it goes on, it is a proof that the government in question doesn't want to stop it. I will not deny that sometimes even with all the efforts something may happen. But I am speaking about the permanent traffic of explosives or grenades, ammunition, etc. Permanent. So this must be a result of cooperation of certain underlings of President Mubarak with the PLO. And why should they keep a PLO base in El Arish? It is now on the border of Israel. Why should the other side be a PLO base, when everyone knows the PLO is bent on killing our people? That is its raison d'etre.

Now I will read Article III, Section 2:

"Each party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other party. Each party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice."



16/37

430/n

- 15 -

If this traffic goes on, if there is cooperation between Egypt and the PLO, if there is a PLO base in El Arish on our doorstep, it is a complete violation of this article. A daily violation, permanent violation. Therefore we ask to redress this wrong.

The third point is about the demilitarized zone. Mr. Secretary We gave up this whole territory, 23,000 square miles, with the greatest strategic importance, if you look at Sharm-el-Sheikh from which we could reach even with our boats Dabl-Mandeb which was blocked in 1973, and then towards Africa: We gave it up for the sake of peace. But we made arrangements for our security. First of all, a demilitarized zone, 150 km. to our international border. In a desert, demilitarization is a serious arrangement. In a populated area it is rather a hoax because you can keep a tank in every garage, and this is not theory.. But in a desert, where you can take pictures from a satellite or a plane and can see any violations, this is a proper security arrangement. This demilitarized zone is violated. We have now a battalion of Egyptian troops in El Arish airfields. Again, on our doorstep. They shouldn't be there. They do not wear military uniforms. This is an old trick and we cannot be misled by it. You can either dress soldiers in police uniforms or you can dress them even in ties, but they are soldiers. And we have good information, Mr. Secretary. There is a full battalion of trained Egyptian soldiers at the El Arish airfield. They shouldn't be there and they mustn't be there. Egypt undertook not to have in this area, 150 km.

17/37

430/n

- 16 -

from the international border into the Sinai peninsula, even one soldier of the regular army.

Then there is the forces limitation zone, zone B, and also there they keep more troops than they are allowed to. The demilitarized zone is the essence of the peace treaty, the soul of the security arrangement. If I may say so, at least some compensation for the territory we left, for the strategic depth we lost, is that suddenly we will not be taken by surprise as happened in 1973. We shall see them coming if they should - perhaps not under President Mubarak, I prefer to think so, but perhaps under someone else, who knows who will one day become the leader of Egypt. So at least we will not be taken by surprise. If this is violated, why are we going? It is not a question of the battalion. That Egyptian battalion doesn't threaten the army of Israel. It is question of principle. Today a battalion, tomorrow a brigade, the day after, a division. With tricks you can do much. People can come and be civilians and settle there, or tourists. We know also the trick of tourists from the time before the Second World War. All over Europe there were German tourists. I don't make comparisons, just to remind ourselves about the possibility of using tricks. We don't. We withdrew, we gave up territory. Should the other side be allowed to play tricks upon us? As far as our security is concerned, which means to us the lives of our people.

So these are the three points - the hostile propaganda, the full cooperation with the PLO and smuggling of arms, and the

12/37

430 / D

- 19 -

violations of the demilitarized and forces limitation zones. All these three wrongs should be redressed before we withdraw from the rest of Sinai, on the 26th or 25th of April as stipulated by the peace treaty, three years from the date when we exchanged the instruments of ratification, which took place on the 26th of April, 1979, and next week on Monday it will be three years.

(There is an exchange in Hebrew with Mr. Shamir).

My friend remarks that it might be the 25th. If I am mistaken, I will admit my mistake, but those 24 hours are not of such great importance, changing the course of world history. And we want to carry out this commitment. Yes, indeed, Pres. Reagan said so in the press conference yesterday, I gave him such a pledge. I want you, Mr. Secretary, to inform him of what I have said because I did give him such a pledge and I want to carry it out. However, if those wrongs are not redressed during the few following days, ahead of the 25th or 26th of April, if there is non-compliance by the Egyptians as we informed through your ambassador, we may consider the possibility of postponing our withdrawal until those wrongs are redressed. Not to abolish our commitment. This is our commitment, but until those wrongs are corrected we may postpone it. This is in absolute conformity with international law. If both sides comply with the commitments and provisions of a treaty, it's all right. If one side doesn't, the other side is perfectly entitled to do the same.

So again, I repeat, compliance will meet with compliance; non-compliance with non-compliance. We prefer the first arrangement,

19/37

430/n

- 18 -

to have full compliance by the Egyptians and then there will be full compliance by Israel.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your attention.

MR. STÖESSEL: Thank you for your welcome to me, and I want to underline what a pleasure it is for me to be here in your country and to meet with you and your colleagues. As I mentioned earlier, and as you know in response to your request, President Reagan asked the Secretary to send me to discuss these matters with you, in view of the Secretary's preoccupation with the other crisis and you can understand the importance of his efforts in that regard.

But I am here to help Israel and Egypt towards the full implementation of the peace treaty and I do want to underline that we in the U.S., the President and all of the American people, understand the sacrifices which Israel is undergoing, as a result of the withdrawal from the Sinai. And I do want to say that we take our responsibility as a full partner in this process very seriously. We share with you the desire that there be a full implementation, that there be reciprocal compliance, as you very well stated, and that is certainly our view.

I have taken very careful note of what you have told me this morning, and you can be sure that we share these concerns. You have mentioned hostile propaganda, and I can say we are concerned equally about that, and that I will take take this up as the first order of business when I meet with President Mubarak. Now, whether or not the statements which have been made by Egypt represent a change in basic position I think is open to question. To date we do not see them as a signal of Egypt's going back on the commitments

20/37

420/n

- 19 -

made in the past by President Sadat and by President Mubarak. But certainly what has been said, particularly the speech by Ambassador Magid, has caused great concern, very justifiable concern, and we think that should be cleared up. And I would say we consider that this is not only a matter between Egypt and Israel but also that it concerns ^{the} relationship between Egypt and the United States.

On some of the other matters, Mr. Prime Minister, which you have mentioned, the PLO, the smuggling of arms, we would agree also that if there are violations here that they are very serious and must be addressed. I understand that Mr. Sharon will be discussing these matters today in Cairo and we hope he can resolve these issues to your satisfaction. If this is not the case, then if we find that indeed Egypt has been less than vigilant in fulfilling its obligations then I certainly am prepared to tell the Egyptians that they must live up to their obligations and that they must take action. The same goes for the activities in the demilitarized zone, of which you spoke. We hope that these will be cleared up also. We will be checking also through our own sources. I will be discussing them in Egypt and we do hope that these can be resolved, and it is necessary that they be resolved.

And I can give you complete assurance that I will report faithfully and accurately to President Reagan what you have told us this morning.

MR. BEGIN: Thank you very much. I would like Gen. Yaari now to present you with some details of these violations.

21/37

430/n

His father is Meir Yaari. He and I are permanently political opponents, but we respect each other. Especially since when I was a child I was a member of the youth organization of which he is the leader to this very day. But then when I became bar mitzva and got some wisdom, I changed my direction. But Meir Yaari is now 85 years old and still writing articles every week. Last Friday I read his article, criticizing me, and I enjoyed it very much.

GEN. YAARI: The violations we are talking about, I will give to you according to the best of our information and the last date we know of. Maybe something has changed since then, but this is the list. First in Zone A, we have the deployment of elements of 3 battalions framework in addition to the 4 brigades allowed in the Annex of the Treaty, and we are talking of mid-March. About an infantry battalion, in the area of ... which is in the northern axis in Zone A.

Secondly, in the Hagilla area, mid-March, there is a ten company that we relate to a battalion company. Sometimes there is a change in that, but that is the last information. That is for division No. 13. And the first one was also from the same division.

Thirdly, also of mid-March, there was a battalion in the Wadi Sudar area, a battalion of the 119th infantry brigade. This is as far as excess units are concerned.

I just want to add, that we know that the Egyptians are aware of the problem. Sometimes they try to cover it, but they are aware of the problem, and the violation.

22/37

430/n

- 21 -

In addition, we also saw logistic depots, what we regard and evaluate as army level, east of Ismailia. We know of some checks that were made in the area to the effect that this is a mine store area where they clear mine fields, etc. But according to our best evaluation, this depot is exactly similar to an army level depot that was situated in the Kabir area.

Now in Zone B, we have the following units in excess to the agreement, as of the end of February. An infantry company in the same 18th division, proper infantry, in the Hutamiya area. Another company belonging to another division, also proper infantry, in the area where only the border guards should be situated. In the El Arish area, as of mid-March, we know of the defense battalion that the Prime Minister spoke about, which was situated there around the airfield. We know about engineer units that were in the area. On some of them, at least one of them, there was an agreement that they will do some work in the area and would leave at the end of March. The Prime Minister spoke about an attempt to cover it by dressing them in civilian clothing.

We know, we have good information, on intelligence signal units in the El Arish area. We know of similar units that may have been taken out, in the Nahal area. In the Bir Gafgafa area, we know of some units of the brigade that are situated there, that has been situated in the airfield which is east of the A Zone. And we know of an engineer company in the northern axis, east of the A line, and that is from February.

23/37

430/n

Now, we know that both El ARish and Bir Gafgafa airfields have not only the presence but actually the running of those airfields is done not by civilians but by members of the Egyptian air force.

As far as the ground is concerned, we talk about 11 positions that are protruding from the line A into the B area, three of them in the northern axis, 4 of them in the Bir Gafgafa area, 3 south of that in the Gidipass, and one in the Mitla pass. We talk about fences and anti-tank fortifications, two in the Bir Gafgafa area, one in the Gidi area, which crosses into the B zone. And there is one in the Mitla pass. And we talk about a signal unit, actually an electronic warfare unit, in the Ras Muhammad area which crosses into the line between the lines. Now, in the buffer zone, apart from what I mentioned now, there are the units of the police of the border guards and military police instead of the police units that should be there. And we have knowledge about some of their activities, which is not according to the agreement. These are our basic grievances.

As I say, we know that the Egyptians are aware of them. It was even said that they will actually dismantle the fortifications. From air photography it seems the fortifications are still there. Perhaps nothing was added, but they are still there. And as far as the other violations, units in A and B zones, I dare say the Egyptians are aware and know very well where the violations are. I hope that all this will be rectified but these are the facts that we can present today and according to dates. Thank you.

MR. BEGIN: I will now ask our Deputy Foreign Minister to present to you, Mr. Secretary, a draft document which we prepared. You got it from our ambassador and also through Sam Lewis, but we'd like to present it for your consideration. Of course, it is a draft and we don't stand by every word. There can be changes and corrections.

MR. BEN MEIR: The draft document relates to the various points the Prime Minister raised before and a few others. It is called a Statement of Reaffirmation and reads:

"A. Egypt and Israel reaffirm their adherence to the Treaty of Peace between the two countries and pledge complete and unconditional compliance with all its provisions, including those pertaining to:

- (1) Restrictions and arrangements which Egypt and Israel took upon themselves in Zones A, B, C, D - (D is an Israeli zone and we have agreed to limitations) - and their commitment not to carry out any breach of the restrictions and arrangements with respect to those Zones. Measures will be taken to ensure that by April 26, 1982, the status of, and in these Zones, will be in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Peace.
- (2) The functioning of the HFO and the performance of its responsibilities as agreed upon and stipulated in the Treaty of Peace, including its duty to prevent any violations of the Treaty in accordance with Annex I of the Treaty, and ensuring the freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran in accordance with Article V of the Treaty.

(3) The implementation of all the normalization arrangements as agreed upon between Egypt and Israel on the basis of Annex III to the Treaty, and the putting into effect by April 26, 1982, of all the agreements signed since the conclusion of the peace treaty."

And there are a number of specifics:

- ³(a) Keeping the borders permanently open for travel of persons and the exchange of goods.
- ³(b) Continuing the maintenance of diplomatic relations at the existing ambassadorial level.
- (4) Refraining from hostile acts and the dissemination of hostile statements in domestic media, in foreign countries or in international bodies.
- (5) Preventing any activity and operation of terrorist organizations from the territory of one country against that of the other, including hostile propaganda, smuggling of arms and other war materials across their respective borders; Also, including the dismantling by April 26, 1982, of the existing infrastructures of those terrorist organizations.

B. Egypt and Israel reaffirm their adherence to the Camp David accords, including the commitment to negotiate continuously and in good faith an agreement concerning full autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip), based upon democratic elections, the establishment and inauguration of the Self-Governing Authority (administrative

council) - (this is from the Camp David Accord) - and the transitional period of five years.

The Parties to the Camp David Accords undertake not to propose or entertain any plan relating to the peace process other than the Camp David Agreement."

MR. SHAMIR: I would like to add that in the last week we are witnessing a certain momentum in the deterioration of the Egyptian attitude towards their obligations under the peace treaty with us, as was expressed in this conference in Kuwait and in the relations with the PLO which are getting closer and closer. It is our impression that the reason for this momentum is the Egyptian assessment, after their last meeting in Washington by President Mubarak and their Minister of War, that the Israeli withdrawal will take place on the 25th or 26th of April. And this is sure. And their assessment that the American reaction to any Egyptian violation of their obligations will not be very harsh. It is the Egyptian assessment. And therefore it is very important for the U.S. to explain to the Egyptians that they are wrong, if they are wrong. Thank you.

MR. LEWIS: Can I ask a question, Mr. Foreign Minister, about that last comment? Is that an assessment of the Egyptian attitude or is it based on intelligence about Egyptian attitudes?

MR. SHAMIR: It is an assessment based on intelligence.

MR. BEGIN: IN other words, it is an intelligent assessment.

MR. STOSSEL: Perhaps I could comment first of all on the suggestion of the reaffirmation. Certainly I said when this was presented to me in Washington by your ambassador, Mr. Arens, that

3

this is a possible option which we should consider for dealing with the problems before us. It may not be the only option. There may be other ways which we will find to be useful, perhaps even more appropriate. We will have to see. Our objective of course is to bring the commitments which already exist to full life.

I think we have to be wary of trying to put down only certain points of the accords in a reaffirmation. This could cause some confusion if we try and extract only some points from what has already been agreed. But certainly we do see that there could well be value in reaffirming the Camp David commitments. And as far as the U.S. is concerned we would be thoroughly prepared to do that.

I do feel that before we commit ourselves now to a particular form we should explore the whole range of options which could be possible. I think we want to avoid an approach which does take attention away from the real concerns and real challenges which face us. And again, we have to be careful about an approach which might seem to challenge the integrity of either side which could call forth a very determined obdurate stand in favor of national honor. This could raise problems down the road. I would want to study this possible approach very seriously and consider how it can be presented to the Egyptians, and when I come back from my visit there, then I think we will have a better feel for how to approach this problem.

MR. BEGIN: Mr. Secretary, I would like to say now why we made this suggestion, why we prefer it to all other options, although

28/37

430/n

- 27 -

I do understand there may be other options. We need a reassurance now, and only through a document of reaffirmation can we get that reassurance.

I would like to give certain concrete examples. We have established diplomatic relations in accordance with the peace treaty after the interim withdrawal to this line from which we are supposed to withdraw on the 25th or 26th of April. And there is an Ambassador in Cairo, representing the State of Israel, and an Ambassador in Israel representing Egypt. If one day after the 26th of April, when the whole of Sinai is in the hands of Egypt, and we conduct negotiations with Egypt on autonomy. They for instance suggest that Arabs living in Jerusalem should have the vote for the AC/SGA and we object to that. They have a right to make their suggestion, we have a right to make a different one. But let's assume that we do not reach an agreement, and a foreign minister or president of Egypt decides on that day to say to us: You don't agree to our suggestion to have the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem vote for the autonomy; if so, we can't tolerate your ambassador in Cairo. It makes it impossible to solve the Palestinian problem, which we see as the core of the conflict, etc., etc. And Mr. Sasson has to be, as President Sadat told me about the Soviet ambassador "ordered out." What can we do? I put it to you as a friend, a simple question. I can say that in my opinion we can't do anything. That is not a reason to send our army back into Sinai. I will say immediately that should one day the Egyptian army come into the demilitarized zone, the Israeli army will be in Sinai in a few hours' time, no doubt. This is a beginning of hostilities.

29/37

430/n

- 28 -

3
But not because of the departure of the ambassadors. So we can protest. What else can we do? We wouldn't like to face such a possibility. Therefore, inter alia, we put in that reaffirmation that the diplomatic relations will continue to be on the ambassadorial level. One can ask: how do you know that undertaking will be carried out? It is also a piece of paper. But this is a reaffirmation. In the peace treaty it is written but now on the eve of withdrawal the Egyptians renew, promise, pledge, commit themselves that there should be ambassadors. If they breach it, it is a matter for both the U.S. and Israel. Then we shall look for an answer.

So therefore it is important for us that there should be a statement of reaffirmation. We couched it in terms which wouldn't be humiliating for anyone. It is all reciprocity. All the paragraphs apply to both Israel and Egypt. No one's integrity is being attacked.

The second example, even more important I might say, or as important, is the question of smuggling of arms that should be and must be stopped. Mr. Secretary, for the first time since our state was renewed, we made peace with a neighbor, we signed a peace treaty, abolished a state of war, all for the first time, and that boundary will be dripping with blood? It is absurd. We had a boundary with Lebanon for 19 years completely peaceful. The villagers on both sides used to talk to each other and return the cows that got lost. It was pastoral calm, green fields on both sides, with neighbors greeting each other in the morning. For 19 years, without a peace treaty, with a state of war going on. Now that we have a peace treaty with a neighbor and have abolished the state of war, will

30/37

430/n

- 29 -

that border be bloody? That is absurd. And it must be if grenades are being smuggled and then used and our people get killed or maimed. What can we do but retaliate? So on the other side there must be casualties and casualties on our side. Then where is peace? Then the treaty of peace becomes just a mockery. So we have to have this reassurance not only on paper but in the field" on the ground. That there won't be such a PLO base and no smuggling. If you put several good officers on that border line and some soldiers, they can stop any smuggling. They can if they want to, if they get the instructions, if they are called to book in case they do not fulfill those instructions. It may take time but it can be carried out. No one can say: we can't stop it. If it goes on it means that they a r e interested in keeping the border boiling, and that is impossible. So what is the treaty of peace for? The whole dream was that we shall have a period of peace. We would like it on all borders, but we can't then at least on one border, peaceful conditions, life, not death.

Again, we have to have this reaffirmation. And of course what happens in the zones as Gen. Yaari explained to you. Because this as I said is the heart of the peace treaty. If the demilitarized zone is going to be militarized it may remind us of the events in Vietnam, Sam. The most military zone in Vietnam was the one called the demilitarized. That is very bad. That is not to be tolerated.

Therefore, I would like you to consider very seriously, Mr. Secretary, a draft. I don't know whether this draft, but a draft for

31/37

430/n

- 30 -

statement of reaffirmation. We need it, and it's good for Egypt as well. As far as I know the U.S. will be prepared to sign it as a witness as you did the peace treaty. We also have a memorandum of agreement and this letter of the President, etc. But this is not insulting anyone. It is a clear paper. Our minds are open and we are ready to listen to suggestions. But I have to add that time is of the essence. We may have to consider it and clarify it by the middle of next week. Around Tuesday or Wednesday I will have to call a special session of the Cabinet to take a decision. If you come back on Sunday, I will postpone the debate on this issue from the weekly cabinet meeting which takes place on Sunday, which will deal with other matters. After we meet with you and have information from what happened on the other side, then I will call a special session of the cabinet on Tuesday let's say. Until then we will have all the information and then we shall take a decision because it is six days from the date. For many months I used the phrase that we want to carry out our commitments to the dot and to the date. I still say it. We want to, provided that - as I wrote to President Mubarak - both sides are faithful to the peace treaty. He probably didn't pay attention to that proviso.

MR. STOESEL: Let me say that we certainly see that time is of the essence. It is very urgent to clear those things up. That will be my intention, to work as fast and as seriously as possible on this. And we will study the document and see what in our opinion would be the best way to proceed. It is conceivable

that some of the matters we have discussed could be handled in another way, others would be put in writing. But we will see. We will give you our best recommendation on this.

On the question of ambassadors, for example, I see a possible problem here, in that sending an ambassador is a sovereign prerogative of a state. To send an ambassador is in the treaty, but whether he is maintained or not--but perhaps it would be possible to put it as an intention to maintain, something like that.

MR. BEN MEIR: The treaty says to exchange ambassadors.

MR. LEWIS: That was done.

MR. BEGIN: But it can be undone, Sam. I fear that it can be undone. That is the problem. What will I do then? Can you give me, in good Shakespearean English, an "eitza"? If after April 26th, our ambassador is "ordered out", what will I do? I will tell you, I will be forced to do nothing.

MR. STOESEL: You might be unhappy with an Egyptian ambassador for some reason and you might want him to go home.

MR. BEGIN: I won't order him out. We are faithful to every commitment. We proved it. For the last six weeks, we dismantled villages, industrial enterprises, wonderful production facilities, from which we used to send for the last four years vegetables and fruit to Europe during the winter. We dismantled it already completely. All the people left and wept. For God's sake, what more can we do to prove our good will and our faithfulness to our commitments? Every day on the radio and on the TV, these people cried. What else? And we are going ahead with it. During that dispute, today as well. But

we want to be sure of this peace. It is not an ox, for God's sake. Talking to the Afabs, promising them that we are at the ebb!

Dave, would you like to say something?

MR. KINCHE: I'd like to say one thing. We spent many, many very arduous weeks negotiating with the Egyptians and with your own people regarding the establishment of the multinational force in Sinai. One of the basic points that we said and the Egyptians agreed and your own people were very firm about that, was that the table has to be clean by the time of the withdrawal, by the 26th or 25th of April. The table has to be completely clean. In other words, when the MFO does start its operation, it has to be completely clear that there are no violations and this is one of the basic points we made in these negotiations for the establishment of the MFO. And the MFO will then be responsible for preventing violations, not just reporting on them. One of the articles in the protocol, which you may remember, Mr. Prime Minister, was that they have to redress any violation within 48 hours after notification of such violation. That is one of the points in the protocol which the Egyptians agreed to and of course your own people accepted. This was one of the basic points regarding the prevention of violations in the future. I think we haven't got such a situation at the moment, and I think it is extremely important that the MFO can start performing on the right foot. I'd like to make one other point.

I was now in Egypt and I had a long conversation with El Baz, with Boutros Ghali and with Gen. Ali. And I made the

point very strongly regarding their actions with the PLO, the fact that they are helping the PLO. I must say that they did not deny it, they were not able to say: this is not true. So it is not a case where we are saying we have this and they are denying it. All they could say was we are trying to prevent this. Well, I think in a country like Egypt if one decides to prevent it, it's a very, very easy thing to do.

MR. STOESEL: Thank you very much for that. We certainly agree on both points and certainly the MFO should start with a clean slate, a tabula rasa, and then the commitment to follow up, to see that any violations are not only reported but are taken care of.

On Gen. Yaari's report, which we listened to with great attention and interest, we are glad to have these details. I gather that at least on some of them the reports from the Sinai Field Mission may not bear them out as being violations. And I would be interested in any comments you have on that. If there is a possible discrepancy between what the Field Mission is reporting and what your information shows, and is it conceivable that on some of these points there is a disagreement on the meaning of the provisions of the Annex?

GEN. YAARI: As far as the deployment of units is concerned, I can assure you that the Egyptians know where the violations are according to what I said. And they even have been taking steps now that the issue is so strong to abolish or move units.

MR. BROWN: Are they taking such steps?

GEN. YAARI: They may be.

As far as on the ground is concerned, fortifications, mine fields, positions, fences, what we have is air photography and interpretation of air photography. I can assure you that our analysts, whom I know well, once those fortifications, mine fields and fences will not be there, we shall be able to say that they are not there. And I understand that the SFM was checking them and they say the Egyptians are starting to dismantle them. I hope that will be done according to what they said.

MR. BROWN: What is your latest information on that?

GEN. YAARI: The latest is that we saw them in position, unless some changes have taken place. And I said that nothing was done to build more. But the moment they will be taken down we shall know it. It is very easy to see. And as for the other sensitive things I said, signal units, etc. you can be assured I am right.

MR. LEWIS: Why the difference in interpretation on certain issues? There has been a long debate between the Israelis and Egyptians on the military commission, and our people have been present and there is from our perception a general difference of view about certain aspects.

GEN. YAARI: As far as the excess units, we base our reports on your own photography and read-outs. We don't see the photographs, we see the read-out. Secondly, the SFM deals with major units.

MR. LEWIS: That is what the treaty calls for.

GEN. YAARI: Yes, main elements.

MR. LEWIS: But that is the definition of what is a violation. Minor elements are not a violation by the same token.

GEN. YAARI: What we are talking about are additional units that we see in the area according to the read-out that are regarded not as main elements. And we know very well that they are an addition in the area. They represent not full units but divisions which are west of the canal.

MR. LEWIS: This is one of the areas obviously where the SFM interpretation differs from yours. Where you have made these statements our people have checked and apparently have been assured that in fact these minor elements belong to other main elements in the Sinai. You disagree and I take it that on the basis of your intelligence the Egyptians are lying to the SFM. Is that the heart of the issue here?

MR. BEGIN: Excuse me, may I make one remark? If there is good will, there won't be any misunderstanding. If there is ill will, there will always be. One can say a main element is a division and a brigade is a minor element, but that is ill will and not good will. Main elements means more or less a serious unit starting from a company. A company is a serious unit in the military, it may be 150 men. A battalion may be near 1,000 men, 800 at least.

MR. LEWIS: But there was agreement among the military experts at the time the Annex was drawn up as to main elements, and I think the battalion was the unit.

37/37

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- 36 -

GEN. TAMIR: The battalion level in the three brigades are not mentioned as a main element. If they have three battalions it is not a violation as long as they keep the number of 22,000 soldiers, 230 tanks, 470 APCs, 7 artillery battalions and 7 anti-aircraft battalions. But we came to an agreement with the Egyptians that they will not exceed 17 battalions, taking into account the three battalions.

MR. LEWIS: That agreement is not in the Annex.

GEN. TAMIR: There are enough violations. I am not saying there were no violations. But the three battalions, according to the treaty the main elements are not including the three battalions, and we had a long discussion in the Madison whether to have an organization table, that is to have an organic division with all the elements, units or so, or whether to go only on main elements. And there was a decision that because it is a peace treaty and not a cease fire agreement, and in armies you change organization from time to time, to take only the main element system as a base for verification of the international force. And Sam is right because the FMS should check according to the main elements, and if the battalions are not mentioned as a main element, theoretically, if they have 22,000 soldiers and 230 tanks, etc., all those main elements they can organize them as they want. But we came, there was a big struggle and Col. Pianka knows about it. It's not a written agreement but a gentlemen's agreement, not to increase the 17 battalions. And there are enough violations besides these battalions.

MR. BEGIN: Okay, we stand by what Gen. Tamir says.

So you will be going there tomorrow?

טגרירות ישראל - ווסינגטון

אל: המסרד. ניו-יורק

אבל

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דף.....מתוך.....דפים

סווג בסחונני...סודי

דחיפות...מייד

תאריך וז"ח...16,1300 אפריל 82

מס' מברק...188

42 - נ/ו/י

מנכ"ל. ממנכ"ל. דע בלום ניו-יורק

בשיחה טלפונית עם איגלברגר הוא מוסר:

1. הנשיא, לאחר הפגישה עם ששת השגרירים ממדינות איסלמיות, יודיע לאמצעי החקטורה על הפגישה, יוקיע את מעטיו של אדם לא שפוי בדעתו, יביע הבנה לדאגת המדינות האיסלמיות ויפנה לכל המדינות באיזור לפעול להרגעת המצב.

2. ארה"ב תנסה להתבטס על הודעה זו כדי לדחות את הדיון במועבייט לשבוע הבא ולראות אם לא ניתן להגיע להצעת החלטה ברוח ההודעה. הוא מעריך את הסיכויים לכך כפחות מחמישים אחוז והבטיח שארה"ב לא תיחן את ידה להחלטה שחפצו בנ.

ארכ

לרוג ס/שהה שהה ס/שהה אנט ה/אנט ה/אנט ה/אנט קלניץ ה/ה

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M E E T I N G

THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL, MR. MENAHEM BEGIN

and

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE USA, MR. WALTER STOESSER

Friday, April 16, 1982
10:15 a.m.
Prime Minister's Office

Participating:

Israel

Foreign Minister Y. Shamir
Defense Minister A. Sharon
Mr. Y. Ben-Meir
Gen. A. Tamir
Gen. Yaari

USA

Ambassador S. Lewis
Mr. William Brown
Mr. N. Draper

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(Note: The verbatim record of this meeting commenced after the meeting had already started)

MR. BEGIN: ... with a rifle and start shooting. It can happen any place--

MR. STOESSEL: He killed a guard too.

MR. BEGIN: Anywhere in the world, and in no time two people got killed and others wounded. Of course, we took precautions and we shall take precautions. Are we the guilty party?

We have, Mr. Secretary, in our history this constant blood libel. Since ancient times the Jewish people was being accused of using blood for matzot, and usually during Pesach we used to suffer programs throughout the world, in the Middle East even in

ancient times. There was an infamous blood libel in Damascus. There was also in Italy. One of the Popes, hundreds of years later, decreed that it was a blood libel, it was a lie. And people were tortured, hanged, hacked into pieces, our people. All because they were accused of taking a Christian boy, killing him and taking his blood and putting it into matzot. It's something you can't even comprehend, but it's a fact. This blood libel accompanies us since we became a nation. Now it is being done on an international scale. Again, I say a crazy man went there; the two rabbis condemned him in the sharpest words, I did also and sent condolences to the bereaved families. What else can a nation do? It can happen any time.

And yet now we are in the Security Council in the dock; and that resolution is absolutely unacceptable. So I'd like to ask you to take it up with Mrs. Kilpatrick.

MR. STOESEL: I will do that directly. We have been in touch already and I know she is working to do everything possible.

MR. BEGIN: She is a wonderful woman. It would be unjust. If the resolution passes that would be interpreted throughout the Moslem and Arab world as if Israel were guilty. That is too dangerous because people incite them all the time, and there were strikes. King Khaled called for a strike throughout the Moslem world. A strike - against whom? What did we do?

There was an Australian Christian who tried to burn down the El Aksa Mosque, because he read in the Bible that the Temple should be rebuilt when Christ will come again. What can we do?

He was a crazy man and he tried to burn down the mosque, and we put the fire out with great efforts. But it happens. And again, in those days we were accused. So you can see what problems we have.

MR. STOESEL: Terrible.

MR. BEGIN: There are almost fantastic stories, but it is reality, it's a part of our life. I am sorry that I took the time to bring such problems before you.

MR. STOESEL: No, I am glad to hear it from you and to understand what this means. And whatever we can do to help, you know we want to.

MR. BEGIN: But about the UN Security Council, you will take steps? Thankyou.

Now, we have with us the Defense Minister who was in Cairo yesterday, where he met with President Mubarak, with Kamal Hassan Ali, with the Egyptian Defense Minister, with Dr. Boutrous Ghali, and with El-Baz. He had talks with all of them. Now suddenly yesterday evening, the Foreign Minister informed me that Dr. Ghali informed him that he is coming today and he has a special personal letter from the President addressed to me. I will see him at 12 o'clock. When are you leaving?

MR. STOESEL: At 3:15.

MR. BEGIN: So I will phone Sam and inform him of the contents of the letter and my reactions, so that the Secretary will know in advance. I didn't expect this, but if Mubarak sends an emissary, of course I will receive him. And it's a good opportunity also

for me to tell him about compliance and vice-versa, both sides complying, then it's all right. But I will let you know before you go about the contents of the letter.

But since there are some things we might not want to talk about in the large meeting, I suggest that the Defense Minister report to us in this small group.

MR. SHARON: I had three meetings in Cairo. The first was with the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kamal Hassan Ali. Together with him with Aburzala. At that first meeting, I raised three problems. One is the cooperation with the terrorist organizations, which I would say politically was known to us even during the late Sadat's time. But in the last month or three weeks, it took on an entirely different shape, where cooperation has been initiated not by the terrorist organizations but by the highest Egyptian authorities - and this is what I told them yesterday - and included information given to the terrorists, collected by the Egyptian Embassy here, in Israel. It was general information about Israel, and specific information about Israeli preparations against the terrorist organizations in Lebanon. And of course, I gave them a list of events. I had to be careful because many of the sources are secret or top secret. But I gave them as much as I could.

Then I raised the second problem, which is the violations in Sinai in forces and ground violations in Zone B. (Unfolding map). I showed them the map, but I'd like to emphasize that already in

the car going from the airport to the Sheraton Hotel - and I decided to make everything close and not waste time because I had only a few hours - Gen. Ali told me in the car that every violation will be removed immediately and that they take upon themselves to remove violations within three days. But when coming there, I put up the map and showed it to them.

Then I raised the third problem which was the question of the demarcation of the international boundary, with these 15 places where there are certain areas under dispute. We talked for almost an hour and then we left to see President Mubarak.

I raised the same problems with him; it was a long conversation, an hour and a half. And again I emphasized and said that of course we have some other problems which the Prime Minister will be discussing through you or any other channels, and that of course is the political side, and those famous 11 points. About the 11 points he said again: I never saw them; I don't want to see them. I said: Maybe you will see them, and he said: No, I don't want to see them.

I came out very strongly about the point of cooperation with the terrorist organizations. I explained to them again, although I did it many, many times already in the past, how this terrorist activity in the past, back in the '50s, really brought about the circle of war that Egypt and Israel and the rest of the Arab countries were involved in. It all started from terrorist activity. Because in 1949 - 1950 we were closer to peace than in 1977. So

I repeated this theory and they heard that. Talking about cooperation with the terrorist organizations, I emphasized of course the operational cooperation and then the smuggling of arms and explosives, grenades from El Arish to the Gaza District. I gave them the figures that from the 1st of January this year until the last days, we managed to capture 500 grenades, but we didn't catch all of them, it's only a part of them. From the beginning of last year, it was about 1500, tremendous numbers of hand grenades being smuggled, when we know and emphasize to them that in the past they were allowing only one terrorist organization, that is the Fatah, but now they made it more liberal and added two other organizations to this circle.

They have a base in El Arish which is known, and the people are known, etc. And of course that is a very complicated situation, especially when we are supposed to come to the international boundary, where it is heavily populated, and where you don't have the 50 km. to cross and a desert where we can still catch someone. It is on the border and sometimes you can just throw it to the other side. And in order not to destroy buildings in Rafiah, our defensive system is a very thin one. So we have a severe problem. And I demanded very strongly that it be stopped immediately.

On this subject, again, President Mubarak said he could not believe they had this contact, and so on. But we know, and they know they do. He then decided and gave instructions to create and establish a closer contact between our intelligence people and theirs. And that as a matter of fact, is what our Prime Minister asked the late President Sadat when we were together in Alexandria

in August 1981, and as a matter of fact in the beginning when Sadat was still alive, that started to work, but then it stopped. And as a result, Gen. Abdulla, who is the head of Military Intelligence of Egypt, was instructed later the same day, in the third meeting I had with them, to come today to Israel. And he is here now. He was to land at 10.

MR. STOESEL: Did he come with Boutrous?

MR. SHARON: They are coming on the same plane. But don't take it that we are satisfied with this result, because that all in all doesn't say anything. I mean they understood that Israel will not accept a situation where they become supporters of the PLO, and not ideologically, because we know there are contacts in Europe, sometimes your people have contacts with the PLO people which we don't like but it's a fact - but I am speaking about information given, about certain logistic support, which we couldn't discover what kind of support. Of course we get this information from Lebanon, and again it was an Egyptian initiative to promise them certain logistical support which we don't know what, but they know. So they understood that Israel looks upon it as one of the most dangerous situations that may develop, and we have known Gen. Mahmud Abdalla for a long time. It is important that they took this step because we learned that they understood that Israel takes these things seriously, and that is important. But I wouldn't go farther than that. Maybe that is the only achievement meanwhile when it comes to this cooperation with the terrorist organizations.

Then I put this map on the table and he immediately said he would not like to discuss it; he instructed Gen. Aburazala, who was in a very bad mood - although he got the highest rank of field marshal; I don't know if there is any other army in the world now, maybe the Soviets have it, but he now has the highest rank, so he should have been very happy, but I found him in a very bad mood. But I think that was for other reasons that we know about, and I wouldn't like to go farther than that. Anyway, he said: Field Marshal Aburazala, you solve it. Then they exchanged some words in Arabic, and Ali said they will remove and correct that, etc.

Then I raised the third problem, which is the question of the border, and I said that our Prime Minister came with a proposal, which was very forthcoming and I think a very good one. I think it was probably the most moderate solution one could have expected. He said he will not accept that, they are not going to give one centimeter, etc. I said: we are not asking you to give any of your land as a matter of fact. It is not the land, because what they are trying to do now is of course to take advantage of several demarcations that took place since the last time they did it. They started in October 1906 and finished in February 1907, but since then the border was marked several times, and there is a reason at each point why they want to sit on this mountain or the other one.

They didn't accept it, and I said in my capacity I had only the possibility to bring our Prime Minister's proposal which was approved by the Government. Then he said: In this case, Ali will

becoming here to discuss it again and he is waiting for our sign to come, and that Monday might be the day he'd like to come.

MR. STOESEL: Did he bring another proposal from their side?

MR. SHARON: They spoke about freezing and some other things that we made very clear we will not accept. We had discussed it so many times I didn't even have to discuss it with them. I said it is not within my capacity or possibility; I just had to bring them our proposal, which was so nicely presented already on the 16th of March by the Prime Minister to Ali and Dr. Ghali here in this room. We could not add anything, and I hope we are not going to add anything. Because I don't see what we can add. What more can we give? We said we will withdraw to the line where the Egyptians think the border was; they will advance to the line where we think the border was, and in between there is going to be the MFO, and life will go on. And of course then we turn to Article 7 of our agreement with Egypt and the U.S. of course, which speaks about negotiations, about conciliation and about agreed arbitration. And I made it very clear that Israel will not accept any international arbitration because we know our position in the world, and we made it clear.

MR. BEGIN: The Egyptians already accepted the concept of agreed arbitration.

MR. SHARON: And they sent with me two non-paper papers which I gave yesterday to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign

Affairs, and these two non-paper papers are nothing that we can accept. I think nothing could be better than what we proposed. So these were the three subjects.

MR. STOESEL: On that question, Sam talked to you, Mr. Prime Minister, about Haig's idea of sending Davis Robinson, our legal advisor, if you would feel this could be useful at some point in helping to set up a procedure of arbitration.

MR. BEGIN: I asked Sam to postpone that until we make it clear. I wouldn't exclude a visit by Mr. Robinson. I suggest I listen today to Ghali. Perhaps he will bring me some information, and before you leave I will let you know.

MR. SHARON: I have one problem I'd like to add, about the terrorist cooperation, what I call cooperation in terrorism. We have here today Gen. Abdulla. They did that in order to show that they took it seriously. It is important, but it will not stop it. Unless the Egyptians will decide that they don't want to do it. As a matter of fact, they will show you a list of their achievements, in how many cases they caught terrorists, etc. And the list as far as I know might be accurate. But I would like to emphasize, and that's what I told them, when it comes to explosives that are smuggled into Egypt they are doing a beautiful job. In Egypt, they have no manpower problem. If they need 1,000 policemen for El Arish, they will have it; there are so many. So when this smuggling goes towards Israel, their eyes are closed. When it goes towards Egypt, they are very active. So they will give a list, we received a list too.

On this question of the violations, they had said they need three days, but then they said they'd like to do it earlier and will finish it by Saturday. Now here we come to a problem, which I have discussed with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. We need your help, and immediately. In the past, the SFM observers have failed in finding violations. They managed to find very few. Now, you have this operation under the code name of Olive Harvest, that is a U-2 high altitude air photography. We want this area to be photographed. Let's say I will give you the dates we thought out, maybe you will have to give them another day. We suggest the 18th, in order to leave them Saturday to do it. To cover the whole of the Sinai area. Now you know we usually don't get these photographs, but because of a special case, something which must give us the confidence that Sinai is clean of any violations, so in this case we ask you to photograph and to give us the photos in order to check them thoroughly. That of course will be done secretly, you don't have to announce that, I don't think they would like it. But otherwise we have no other possibility to be sure of that. Because what are we going to do? We have to send these SFM people to certain places, but Sinai is 60,000 sq. km.

MR. LEWIS: You have also asked for a special inspection.

MR. SHARON: Yes. And these people are trying but they cannot give us the assurance. If they will say for instance that everything is clean, we cannot accept it. We know in the past there were things they never managed to find. We don't know ourselves if the map we gave them includes everything.

MR. LEWIS: So you want both done, in fact.

MR. SHARON: Yes. One is a normal thing, there is a mechanism.

MR. LEWIS: ON the SFM point, the director, Mr. Trinka, is here now in the other room. He has gotten the request but it is not as precise as would be helpful to SFM, in knowing what the major concerns are that you want to look at. So he asked to get more details from your people while he is here. That would be very helpful.

MR. SHARON: If I had to sum up about my trip to Egypt, what I have learned it is that suddenly - it took them a long time - you ought to know what all these subjects were discussed many times, for instance, the smuggling of arms. The Prime Minister himself on the 16th of March talked here in this room to Ali about that and he mentioned numbers. I asked the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was in Cairo ten days ago, to bring it up. I talked to Sam about it, many, many times. I gave our Parliamentary Committee on Security and Foreign Affairs a list of dates when we discussed this subject with Egypt, between 40 to 50 different dates and meetings where we discussed the question of violations, and in many of them the smuggling of arms into Gaza was talked about. It is not new. One of the important meetings took place in January when I discussed that with the Minister of Defense and he then explained that they have a problem because the army is the only loyal sector of the population to the regime there, and if they have to force them to move and so on, it will

be a sort of offense, etc. So I told Gen. Aburazala then: I understand it, you have time, but don't leave it to the last minute because we won't be able to accept that. And this conversation took place in Cairo in January 1982.

And of course it is very important that it be clean, because we regard the MFO not as an element that should report about violations, but they have to prevent them. But if the area will not be clean, they won't be able to do it.

MR. STOESEL: No, they should start with a clean slate.

MR. LEWIS: Maybe that is why Aburazala is in a bad humor.

MR. SHARON: Other reasons. I am afraid he might be removed from his post.

MR. STOESEL: They kicked him upstairs first.

MR. LEWIS: That is what they did with his predecessor.

MR. BEGIN: Gamassy said to Ezer Weiamann: I will never forget what Sadat did to me. And Gamassy was still the Commander in Chief of the Egyptian Army when he said to Ezer: I am a candidate for assassination.

MR. STOESEL: I was very glad to hear your report, Mr. Minister, and I am encouraged by it. At least they seem to be taking these things seriously. I will go over this also when I go and talk to them.

MR. BEGIN: Perhaps Gen. Yaari has something new to say to us.

GEN. YAARI: Only that according to the information, which is being checked, that what was said in the meeting is being taken seriously and they intend to do it.

MR. LEWIS: Arik, can you tell us anything about Mubarak's mood? How did he react to the whole situation? I think it would be helpful for Walt if he has a sense of what he is getting into.

MR. SHARON:

חיסיון מתוקף חוק אחר

For instance, one of the "secret weapons" he had and said by that he was going to convince the Prime Minister that we are wrong - he took a book which we had already talked about, by Martin Gilbert, a very interesting book, not written in Israel, an atlas with historical maps. He instructed El Baz to bring the book, and it was marked in several places. I said: Oh, yes, in this book on such and such a page it is worth reading that it says that Israel suffered so and so many people killed in the '50s due to Arab terrorism. But he hadn't read the book. He had a map with a scale of one to ten million there, and he said: Do you see the map, do you see where Taba is? So I told him: You are known in our country to be one of your best pilots and I don't think you could have gone far with this map. Everyone there laughed, and El Baz became red. I think he prepared this material. It is not even a map, but a sketch. I don't know if you have this book.

MR. LEWIS: Yes. It's a very interesting book.

MR. SHARON: But I also told him: Mr. President, even in our map we never pretended to say that Taba is in our hands. Even according to us, it is in your hands. Taba is the name of a place,

not a district. Therefore when you appointed a governor for Taba, I accepted that, because the ruins of Taba according to our map are in your area, the well, all the ruins, that is on your side, according to our map. And that is what you see in the map.

But I think he of course would like to see Israel withdraw. He is pressing. He pressured Gen. Abadalla to come immediately and Ghali will come immediately.

We met later in a third meeting and I tried to cheer him up but it was very hard. He told us as a matter of fact that he is going to send you a letter, but he didn't say he was sending it with Dr. Ghali. I believe he wants to make every effort so we will be out of the area by the 25th, so he instructed them. Ghali will come with a message, and Abdulla will be here and Ali will come to discuss the border points in order to show that they are taking steps. And he instructed Aburazala to take all the steps; I believe he will do that. That of course says nothing about the future. And I believe about the future we need some other things. Therefore I only mentioned the paper but they didn't know about it, so I didn't talk about it.

MR. BEGIN: They heard something about the paper and they said they won't sign it.

MR. SHARON: No, he said they heard David Levy talking about a paper, and he will not sign it because that would mean abolishing Camp David. I said it is an entirely different thing, but as you don't have the paper, and that is not one of the problems I came

to discuss, so I left it open.

MR. STOESSEL: We will discuss that of course with them and see what that situation is. As we said yesterday, maybe there are other ways to handle the situation.

MR. BEGIN: I suggest we don't leave our colleagues waiting too long and that we discuss this political situation with all of them. There was a certain leak already, nothing tragic. The Ha'Aretz wrote about our suggestion of a paper, but it is also written that we didn't put it as a condition.

This is the statement issued yesterday, Mr. Secretary. Read it before we go into the other room.

MR. LEWIS: I had the impression that Matti Golan was under the table yesterday during the meeting when I read the article this morning.

MR. BEGIN: But it was very light. He said it is not put like a demand or an ultimatum. A proposal, and that Israel can also accept others. It didn't push the Egyptians into a corner.

MR. LEWIS: All I will say is that it could be a lot worse. I think it would be a lot better not to have it written though.

MR. STOESSEL: We will look into the Olive Harvest thing.

MR. LEWIS: It may be just an operational problem. If there is a plane, weather conditions, etc. If they can't do it on Sunday, for our reasons not yours, they might have to do it on Monday.

MR. STOESSEL: It sounds like a good idea.

MR. BROWN: This must be kept most secret because we promised the Egyptians way back that we would never provide either side with photography.

MR. LEWIS: Yes, to give you the photography violates our commitment to the Egyptians. All I am saying is if we do it, you have to keep it out of the press. You have to use censorship on this.

GEN. YAARI: It is very important to ask why all these violations exist to begin with. Now they will abolish them, but what happens later?

MR. STOESEL: One more word about Lebanon, although it is not the subject really of my mission. I just wanted to say that we have observed the restraint which you have shown in this situation, we know how difficult it is. We know there was fighting yesterday and there are great tensions there. But I wanted you to be aware that in the U.S we note this restraint. We do attach great importance to the preservation of the cease fire, particularly in this time when so many other things are at issue. I just wanted to say that.

MR. BEGIN: I only want to repeat what I said to the Ambassador. No decision was taken to enter Lebanon with the Israeli army. I even went so far as to tell him that if we take such a decision, I wouldn't be able to say anything about our operational plans but I may be able to give him a hint, if such a decision is taken. If it becomes unavoidable. For instance, if our northern villages are shelled, we cannot permit our population to be under such an attack.

We cannot have our blood being shed, but it is not a matter of invading Lebanon. The fact is that nothing happened. And it was not easy.

MR. STOESSEL: WE appreciate that.

MR. LEWIS: Purely for information, Mr. Prime Minister, we understand through our channels, you probably have the same kind of reports, that the extreme factions in the PLO, the DFLP, Habash people, and some of the Fatah, the extreme left-wing of the Fatah who are against Arafat, are pressing very hard to get Arafat to change his appearance, and he is resisting. So there is a struggle going on which could produce some additional things.

MR. BEGIN: I'd like to describe to you the following picture. The day before yesterday the Defense Minister called me and told me the following amazing story. There is a running battle between the Shi'ites and the PLO and some other leftist groups, communists, pro-communists, etc. The Shi'ites were atrociously bombarded by PLO artillery, so they threatened that if it is not stopped they will break the cease fire agreement; they will bombard the Khadad area and Northern Israel, so that we will hit the PLO. Imagine our position. We are not a party to all these battles. And to try and entangle us they were going to bombard Israeli townships so Israel would have to act. So they said. But it didn't materialize. Still they continue to fight all the time.

MR. YAARI: Yes, until this morning, fighting went on. And it covers from Beirut to Southern Lebanon.

MR. LEWIS: It is also Iraqi-Syrian related; groups controlled by the Iraqis going after those controlled by the Syrians.

--(The small room meeting is adjourned at 11:05 and reconvened in the large room, with the added participation of:

Israel

Mr. E. Rubinstein
Mr. H. Bar-On

USA

Mr. G. Matthews
Mr. R. Perito
Mr. Hare
Mr. N. Walker
Mr. M. Kozak
Mr. Pianka

)--

MR. BEGIN: Mr. Secretary, at 12 o'clock, I will see Dr. Ghali who comes to me on very short notice with a letter from President Mubarak. Of course, I will study it and between 1 and 2 I will get in touch with Ambassador Lewis and give you full information about the document Dr. Ghali is going to deliver to me and any information I have to add.

Let us now consider our suggestion of a statement of reaffirmation. The Egyptians probably don't know the contents of our draft and they think we want to force them to sign a document that will humiliate them. As you know, the Egyptians also made a comment during the visit of our Defense Minister that if such a document were signed, the Camp David agreement will be put aside or abolished. On the contrary, what we are asking for is a reaffirmation of adherence to Camp David with all its provisions.

Now, of course, this is a draft and obviously there can be corrections. But we would like to hear from you what objections one could have to such a statement. We would prefer to have a statement made by Egypt and Israel and signed by the U.S. as a witness, as happened with the Camp David agreement originally and with the peace treaty, the letters addressed by President Carter to President Sadat and myself, etc. So if you have any suggestions to our draft, Mr. Secretary, please let's have them.

MR. STOESEL: We have studied the draft which was presented by you yesterday. We felt that the Egyptians probably will have difficulties with it. However, it is certainly my intention to discuss it in Cairo when I go there. And I think before we ourselves make up our minds as to the best way of approaching this problem, and we see it is a problem and it is desirable to have a document, something in writing of reassurance, I think we accept that - but before we make up our own minds as to the best or most advisable way to proceed, it is useful if I talk first with the Egyptians to see what their attitude is on this matter and then come back to it when I return from Egypt. So we can have another discussion about it.

We had felt, as I said yesterday that there are some aspects of your draft, in that they seem to pull out certain questions from the previous agreements, which could cause confusion, could cause objections from the Egyptian side. Maybe there are other things

they would like to emphasize, and we could get into an argument with them about what should go into such a document. So we will have to see. As I mentioned, we feel that there are some other possible options. One we had thought of would be the possibility of a letter which could be sent to you and to President Mubarak from Secretary Haig, in which he would set forth his understanding-

MR. BEGIN: If you think the letter should be sent to President Mubarak and to me it should be signed by the President, or by the Secretary of State to the Foreign Ministers.

MR. SHAMIR: But it would be better by the President.

MR. SHARON: Would the letter include the points mentioned in our paper?

MR. BEGIN: We don't discuss the letter yet. This is a suggestion. I would like to know, Mr. Secretary, where do you find the possibility of Egyptian objection, because whatever we put in is exactly a repetition or reaffirmation of what is written both in the Camp David agreement and in the peace treaty. The Egyptians may try to add things which do not appear in either document, they may, but that is a different story. If we have points that go out of those documents, we would like to know and we are prepared to reconsider them.

MR. LEWIS: I think the point here is that there are a lot of things in the Camp David Agreement which were very important to the Egyptians that aren't touched on here that they would propose, we assume, putting into any such document. Things you didn't like

very much but which you accepted.

MR. BEGIN: If it is written, we accept Camp David as it is. In toto. Of course, it is useless to repeat the whole agreement.

MR. LEWIS: That is the problem. We have gotten into this same situation in the autonomy negotiations which you recall in trying to frame that memorandum of principles or agreement, and whenever we have taken material which you have particularly wanted to emphasize they have wanted to insert material which they wanted to emphasize, and ultimately you end up with practically the whole agreement to restate. This is an issue, that is all I suggest.

Also one observation, and it follows on what I said I think the first time you passed this to me. I have a feeling that it would be easier, I maybe wrong, that it would be easier to get agreement to reaffirm key sections of the peace treaty, where this issue I have just referred to doesn't arise so much. That is, in the peace treaty, the interests are perhaps more totally balanced psychologically. In the broader question of the Camp David accord, with the whole focus on language about the rights of the Palestinians and inadmissibility, and all those things, it seems to me, if you bring this in--

MR. BEGIN: I would accept your suggestion, Sam, that we concentrate on the peace treaty, were it not for those 11 points. What we would like to stress in that short sentence about the Camp David agreement and our adherence to it is that there is a plan -

the autonomy. And suddenly speak in their 11 points about withdrawal to the lines of 1967, a Palestine state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, not mentioned; Jerusalem, not mentioned. So we want to hear from the Egyptians that although Dr. Magid made that speech in Kuwait, Egypt adheres to the Camp David agreement because that is the only agreement that exists between the three countries - the U.S., Egypt and Israel. That is the point, that's why we put in the paragraph about Camp David. Otherwise, I would have agreed that our mutual relations are based on the peace treaty.

MR. LEWIS: This leads to a question perhaps we can defer until after you see what Dr. Ghali has brought you. For example, it is possible in my mind that you could deal with these ^{two} issues differently. You can deal with the peace treaty issue in a document; you could deal with the recommitment to Camp David in a unilateral letter from President Mubarak to you. And maybe the letter Ghali is bringing may have such a commitment in it. There are various ways of differentiating and dealing in writing with these kinds of issues. Just a thought.

MR. STOESSEL: Or a general declaration.

MR. BEGIN: Anyhow, Mr. Secretary, you will take it up with President Mubarak. I think in any case a document is necessary. Not to hurt anyone, not to humiliate anyone. It is mutually based on reciprocity, on all the phraseology already used in both documents, in the peace treaty and the Camp David agreement. But it is necessary I suppose; President Sadat was killed, there is a new president, we are about to take the decisive step from the point

of view of territory, on the eve of that, what is wrong with reassuring each other? Not the Egyptians reassuring us, but we reassure them as well by the fact of our withdrawal on time. So we reassure them and they reassure us. That there will be diplomats, peace, normalization of relations, etc. Nothing wrong with that.

MR. STOESSEL: Well, we certainly agree that there is a need for a document or perhaps several documents. Reassurance on the eve of this important event.

MR. SHARON: I just want to ask. It is not that we are talking already about a letter because we of course prefer this document that should be signed by the three of us, but when you speak about a letter, I would understand then that both sides should confirm that they accept it.

MR. STOESSEL: Yes, that would have to be.

MR. BEGIN: That they accept its contents, of course. Otherwise, it is meaningless.

MR. SHARON: For instance, we added here the paragraph talking about the MFO and we thought about that after hearing from the commander of the force that he thought his duty was to report about violations or diversions from the military annex to the agreement.

MR. BROWN: I spoke with the Director-General of the force by telephone last night and brought his attention to your concerns in this regard. He told me that the statement attributed to Gen. Bull Hansen was only partial. Whatever the report was it was only partial, it did not contain all of what he said and he is well aware, Mr. Defense Minister, of your concerns.

MR. STOESSEL: It is quite clear in the agreement itself.

MR. LEWIS: I had a chance to talk to Gen. Bull Hansen about your concern and I told him privately and informally that I had to tell him that his statement had aroused a good deal of worry. He assured me categorically that his modus operandi, his concept of operations precisely reflects the protocol negotiated between Egypt and Israel and the U.S. and the wording in that protocol is his mandate. He said: I was not properly quoted; there are sensitivities on the Egyptian side that I have to take care of also, but I intend to carry out precisely what that protocol says; and I wanted you to know that.

MR. BEGIN: Eli, do you have the protocol, do you remember it? Please read out what is written there. We won't ask for anything more, but no less.

MR. RUBEINSTEIN: It is the annex to the Protocol, Article 8: "The mission of the MFO should be to undertake the function and responsibilities stipulated in the treaty for the UN forces and observers. The MFO shall supervise the implementation of Annex 1 and employ its best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms."

MR. BEGIN: Yes, that is the key sentence - not to report violations but to prevent violations. Thank you very much.

MR. STOESSEL: Yes, it is very clear. There is no doubt the commander will follow that.

MR. SHARON: Of course, here in the document that was presented to you, Mr. Secretary, I think the commitment that no

other plan but the Camp David agreement and autonomy will be discussed in future is very important. Because we hear from all directions about other plans. I don't want to mention again these 11 points, but we hear it from everywhere. It should be very clear that the only plan that exists is the Camp David and the autonomy plan. Therefore, we emphasized it again in our paper.

MR. BEGIN: It is a fact. President Reagan said the only plan is the Camp David agreement, and there is no other. It should be stressed by all parties.

I just got a note from Ghali saying he also wants to raise the point of Taba.

MR. STOESEL: On the Camp David points we should find a way to take care of that, that this is the only existing basis.

MR. SHARON: Also for the United States.

MR. STOESEL: Yes.

MR. BEGIN: The President made that statement.

MR. STOESEL: Mr. Prime Minister, I have a note here saying that Boutros Ghali would like to come back to Cairo on my plane, after he meets with you, to give us a chance to talk before my arrival in Cairo. I think that is all right unless you--

MR. BEGIN: If you give him your hospitality, I won't object at all. It's up to you. I wish him God speed on your plane.

MR. SHARON: I got a message now from our Intelligence. We have been watching the Egyptians now, moving some of their troops from Zone B to Zone A. They are taking the troops from the trenches and fortifications, but what they have to do is destroy

them because the troops will be out of there for the visit of the SFM, and then they will enter back. So I would like you, Mr. Secretary, when you talk to the Egyptians to make it clear that correction of these violations should include complete destruction of these defensive positions, and that includes barbed wire fences, trenches and mine fields. Because what we see now is that they are moving and just taking the soldiers, moving to the other side of the line B and will be waiting there until this report we are going to get from the SFM. I asked Gen. Yaari to give the commander of the SFM the map of the violations. All the points should be checked, according to the map, all of them, because you may go to one or two of them and then we won't be sure.

GEN. YAARI: We gave all the details to the Americans yesterday.

MR. LEWIS: If they have dug some trenches across the line, are they forbidden according to the annex?

MR. SHARON: Of course. I will explain. If these trenches are part of the trenches for the 4,000 border guards that are allowed to be in Zone B, that is one story. But when you take the area of the Mitla Pass, the Gidi pass and Birgafgafa, when they move forward with their defensive positions up to about a mile eastward of line A, that is not part of these trenches that the border guard should have somewhere in this area. And that is a complete change in the situation and then of course they must remove them, and the SFM knows that very well because we discussed that with them many times before. There cannot be a kind of trick that they will do it and then there will be a visit and the next day they will come back and laugh.

We are not going to accept that. We know all these tricks.

MR. STOESEL: Did you raise that specific point about the fortifications in your talks?

MR. SHARON: I think we raised it many times. I don't remember if I emphasized it yesterday. ^{But} as you are going there, Mr. Secretary, please do that for us.

MR. SHAMIR: About this point of the cooperation with the PLO, it is not yet solved by their sending this official. I think it is worthwhile to underline that because for us it is one of the most important worries we have. I don't know what can be the solution, but a formal announcement of the Egyptian government on this issue I think is very important. If they can include it, for instance, in such a document, I don't think it is easy for them, but it can be very useful.

MR. SHARON: I think it is very important. There should be a commitment that they are against terrorist activities, against any support to terrorist organizations, that should be emphasized. Otherwise, we don't have anything in our hand son that. So the General will be here, very nice, etc.

MR. LEWIS: Has he been here before?

MR. SHARON: He served as the commander of the paratroopers. We know him for many years. He paid a visit here when General Ali was Minister of Defense and brought with him a group of high officers, he was among them. But since then he was appointed as director of military intelligence. He is the man behind all these contacts.

MR. LEWIS: So he is the right man to talk to.

MR. SHARON: Yesterday he refused to come, but Gen. Ali told him in Arabic that it's an order.

MR. BEGIN: As for the statement to the press, you could say you are bringing on behalf of the Government of Israel constructive proposals to President Mubarak, or positive proposals, or whatever language you choose. And that you will be back here and we'll meet again on Sunday at 6 p.m.

MR. STOESEL: And that we have a feeling of confidence that the problems can be resolved.

MR. LEWIS: Tactically, I would recommend to Mr. Stoessel that he not talk about bringing Israel proposals. Just to say we had a good discussion, and he is bringing ideas for discussion, but not to call them Israeli proposals.

MR. BEGIN: All right I accept that.

Mr. Secretary, I want to express our gratitude to you for taking the trouble to come to us. Our talks were really held in the most friendly attitude as of course befits our two nations which are friends. You contributed very much to the spirit of friendship. I believe now more than two days ago in a positive solution and that is thanks to you. Let's hope for the best.

--(Meeting adjourned at 11:40 a.m.)--