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Place and Sign

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מס' ת"ק מקור

ANSWERS TO JORDANIAN QUESTIONS

1. DOES THE UNITED STATES INTEND TO BE A FULL PARTNER IN NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION IN GENERAL? AT WHAT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL THE UNITED STATES PARTICIPATE AND IN WHAT ROLE?

YES, THE UNITED STATES WILL BE A FULL PARTNER IN ALL THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, LEADING TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST, LASTING AND COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST PEACE.

THE UNITED STATES WILL USE ITS FULL INFLUENCE TO SEE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE BROUGHT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

PRESIDENT CARTER WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE AN ACTIVE PERSONAL PART IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. WHAT DOES THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT MEAN IN ITS PARAGRAPH (A) 1, WHERE IT REFERS TO "THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE?"

NO COMPREHENSIVE DEFINITION IS ATTEMPTED. IN SOME CASES, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ARE SPECIFIED. IN ONE CASE, IT IS CLEAR THAT "OTHER PALESTINIANS AS MUTUALLY AGREED" REFERS TO REPRESENTATIVES FROM OUTSIDE THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND NEED NOT BE CITIZENS OF EGYPT OR JORDAN. PALESTINIANS WHO ARE CITIZENS OF EGYPT OR JORDAN MAY, OF COURSE, BE MEMBERS OF THE NEGOTIATING TEAMS REPRESENTING THOSE COUNTRIES. IN OTHER CASES, THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY ITSELF IS MENTIONED.

THE UNITED STATES INTERPRETS THE PHRASE "THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE" NOT IN TERMS OF ANY SINGLE GROUP OR ORGANIZATION AS REPRESENTING THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE BUT AS ENCOMPASSING THOSE ELECTED OR CHOSEN FOR PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT THE PURPOSES OF THE NEGOTIATION AS DEFINED IN UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, AND IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SETTLEMENT WILL BE PREPARED TO LIVE IN PEACE AND GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

3. WHY HAS THE DURATION OF FIVE YEARS BEEN CHOSEN FOR THE TRANSITION PERIOD IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA?

THE IDEA OF A FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WAS AN AMERICAN SUGGESTION WHICH WAS FIRST PUT TO THE PARTIES IN THE SUMMER OF 1977. THE KEY POINT IS THE CONCEPT OF A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD -- NOT THE PRECISE DURATION OF FIVE YEARS WHICH HAS BEEN SUGGESTED AND AGREED.

WE BELIEVE A TRANSITIONAL PROCESS OF SEVERAL YEARS -- AT THE OUTSET OF WHICH THE ISRAELI MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ITS CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION WILL BE WITHDRAWN AND A SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY ESTABLISHED FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA INHABITANTS -- CAN DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM A TRANSITION TO PEACE CAN BE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED. WE SEE THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AS ESSENTIAL TO BUILD CONFIDENCE, GAIN MOMENTUM AND BRING ABOUT THE CHANGES IN ATTITUDES THAT CAN ASSURE A FINAL SETTLEMENT WHICH REALIZES THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WHILE ASSURING THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AND OF THE OTHER PARTIES.

4. (A) WHAT IS THE GEOGRAPHICAL DEFINITION OF THE "WEST BANK" AND OF GAZA IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT? IS ARAB JERUSALEM AND ITS SURROUNDING ARAB AREAS INCORPORATED INTO ISRAEL AFTER JUNE 1967 INCLUDED IN THE DEFINITION OF THE "WEST BANK?"

IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES THE TERM "WEST BANK AND GAZA" DESCRIBES ALL OF THE AREA WEST OF THE JORDAN RIVER UNDER JORDANIAN ADMINISTRATION PRIOR TO THE 1967 WAR AND ALL OF THE AREA EAST OF THE WESTERN BORDER OF THE BRITISH MANDATE OF PALESTINE WHICH PRIOR TO THE 1967 WAR WAS UNDER EGYPTIAN CONTROL AND IS KNOWN AS THE GAZA STRIP.

WITH RESPECT TO NEGOTIATIONS ENVISAGED IN THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT, WE BELIEVE A DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE BETWEEN JERUSALEM AND THE REST OF THE WEST BANK BECAUSE OF THE CITY'S SPECIAL STATUS AND CIRCUMSTANCES. WE WOULD ENVISAGE, THEREFORE, A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION FOR THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM THAT COULD BE DIFFERENT IN CHARACTER IN SOME RESPECTS FROM THAT OF THE REST OF THE WEST BANK.

THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDGED BY THE UNILATERAL ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN IN JERUSALEM SINCE THE 1967 WAR. THE FULL UNITED STATES POSITION ON JERUSALEM REMAINS AS STATED BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON JULY 14, 1967, AND BY AMBASSADOR YOST TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON JULY 1, 1969.

4. (B) AT THE END OF THE FIVE YEARS OF TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, WHAT WOULD BE THE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND OF GAZA FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SOVEREIGNTY?

THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, SHOULD BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 IN ALL ITS PARTS IN NEGOTIATIONS AMONG JORDAN, EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WHICH SHOULD BEGIN NOT LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. UNDER THE TERMS OF THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT, THE OUTCOME OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS -- INCLUDING DETERMINING THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY -- SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO A VOTE BY THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA FOR RATIFICATION OR REJECTION.

SINCE THE NEGOTIATION OF THE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN AND THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ARE INTERRELATED, THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN BOTH THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

THUS PALESTINIANS WILL PARTICIPATE IN EACH NEGOTIATION TO RESOLVE THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

4. (C) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION REGARDING THESE QUESTIONS?

THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL DEFINITION OF THE TERM "WEST BANK AND GAZA" IS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 4(A) ABOVE. THE UNITED STATES POSITION REGARDING THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IS EXPRESSED IN PARAGRAPH 4 (B) ABOVE.

4. (D) WILL ANY ISRAELI FORCES REMAIN IN ANY PART OF THE WEST BANK AND OF GAZA AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS? IF SO, BY WHAT RIGHT AND WITH WHAT JUSTIFICATION?

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AFTER THE FIVE-YEAR INTERIM PERIOD IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF THE POSSIBLE RETENTION OF ISRAELI SECURITY PERSONNEL AND THE DURATION OF ANY SUCH PRESENCE, MUST BE DEALT WITH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS

ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA THAT ARE TO BEGIN NO LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD.

4. (E) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION REGARDING THESE QUESTIONS?

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE AGREEMENT ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA MUST MEET THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND PROVIDE FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS. THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT OPPOSE, IF AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES, THE STATIONING IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA OF LIMITED NUMBERS OF ISRAELI SECURITY PERSONNEL IN SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED AREAS, AND WITH A DEFINED ROLE, AS ONE ELEMENT IN PROVIDING FOR THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL.

5. DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, UNDER WHAT HIGHER SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY WOULD THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY OPERATE? WOULD IT BE A UNITED NATIONS OR A SIMILAR NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY? WHAT SOURCE WOULD FINANCE THE BUDGETARY NEEDS OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY? WHAT WOULD BE THE EXTENT OF ITS POWERS? WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE THE LIMITATIONS ON ITS POWERS?

THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES THAT THE PARTIES, I.E., EGYPT, ISRAEL AND JORDAN, WITH PALESTINIANS IN THE EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN DELEGATIONS, "WILL NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL DEFINE THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY TO BE EXERCISED IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA." THUS THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY IN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS ESTABLISHED BY AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT AMONG THE THREE PARTIES. THE AGREEMENT WILL DEFINE THE POWERS OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY AND PROVIDE FULL AUTONOMY FOR THE INHABITANTS. NOTHING IN THE FRAMEWORK EXCLUDES THE PARTIES FROM DECIDING, SHOULD THEY SO AGREE, TO GIVE A SUPERVISORY OR OTHER ROLE TO A UNITED NATIONS OR SIMILAR NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY OR TO DECIDE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY.

IN ADDITION, DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, REPRESENTATIVES OF EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY WILL CONSTITUTE A CONTINUING COMMITTEE WHICH MAY DEAL WITH MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN. METHODS OF FINANCING OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY WERE NOT DISCUSSED AT CAMP DAVID AND REMAIN TO BE SET OUT IN THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES.

6. (A) WHERE THE DOCUMENT REFERS TO THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY WHICH IS TO BE CONSTITUTED IN THE WEST BANK-GAZA AREA, DOES THE JURISDICTION OF THIS AUTHORITY EXTEND TO THE PART OF JERUSALEM WHICH HAD BEEN PART OF THE WEST BANK WHEN IT FELL UNDER OCCUPATION AS WELL AS OTHER ANNEXED AREAS AROUND IT, BOTH IN TERMS OF TERRITORY AND PEOPLE?

AS STATED ABOVE, THE ISSUE OF THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM WAS NOT RESOLVED AT CAMP DAVID AND MUST BE DEALT WITH IN SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. THE QUESTIONS OF HOW THE ARAB INHABITANTS OF EAST JERUSALEM RELATE TO THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY REMAINS TO BE DETERMINED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

6. (B) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON THIS QUESTION?

IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS THE UNITED STATES WILL SUPPORT PROPOSALS THAT WOULD PERMIT ARAB INHABITANTS OF EAST JERUSALEM WHO ARE NOT ISRAELI CITIZENS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS TO CONSTITUTE THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY AND IN THE WORK OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY ITSELF. IT IS PROBABLY NOT REALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT THE FULL SCOPE OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY CAN BE EXTENDED TO EAST JERUSALEM DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, PREJUDGE THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM, WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT ARE TO BEGIN NO LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

7. (A) AT THE END OF THE FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, WHAT WOULD BE THE STATUS OF OCCUPIED ARAB JERUSALEM?

THE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS, AS WELL AS PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN, WILL BE DETERMINED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH A.1(C) OF THE FRAMEWORK. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE STATUS OF THAT PORTION OF JERUSALEM WHICH ISRAEL OCCUPIED IN 1967 SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS.* THE FRAMEWORK ENVISAGES THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL INVOLVE EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

* PROVISIONS REGARDING JERUSALEM COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENTS THAT EMERGE FROM EITHER OR BOTH OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. (B) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON THIS MATTER?

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES ON JERUSALEM IS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 4(A) ABOVE. THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDGED BY THE UNILATERAL ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN IN JERUSALEM SINCE THE 1967 WAR. WHATEVER SOLUTION IS AGREED UPON SHOULD PRESERVE JERUSALEM AS A PHYSICALLY UNDIVIDED CITY. IT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR FREE ACCESS TO THE JEWISH, MUSLIM, AND CHRISTIAN HOLY PLACES WITHOUT DISTINCTION OR DISCRIMINATION FOR THE FREE EXERCISE OF WORSHIP. IT SHOULD ASSURE THE BASIC RIGHTS OF ALL THE CITY'S RESIDENTS. THE HOLY PLACES OF EACH FAITH SHOULD BE UNDER THE FULL AUTHORITY OF THEIR REPRESENTATIVES.

8. (A) WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS DURING AND AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD? WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE PROPERTIES ACQUIRED AND CONSTRUCTION MADE THERE AND WHAT WOULD THEIR STATUS BE?

THE FRAMEWORK DOES NOT DEAL WITH THE STATUS OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS, NOR WITH THE PROPERTIES ACQUIRED OR CONSTRUCTION MADE THERE. THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY, WHICH WILL EXERCISE FULL AUTONOMY ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, WILL BE DEFINED IN AN AGREEMENT TO BE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN AND, AS PROVIDED IN THE FRAMEWORK, PALESTINIANS FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA OR OTHER PALESTINIANS AS MUTUALLY AGREED TO BE ON THE EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN NATIONAL DELEGATIONS. THE QUESTION OF THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, WILL HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH IN THE COURSE OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS. THE FRAMEWORK ALSO PROVIDES FOR A CONTINUING COMMITTEE, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY, WHICH MAY DEAL WITH OUTSTANDING MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

THE QUESTION OF THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND THEIR STATUS AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WOULD BE A MATTER FOR DISCUSSION DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH A.1.(C).

8. (B) WHAT WILL BE ISRAEL'S OBLIGATION, DURING THE COMING PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, REGARDING THE POLICY OF SETTLEMENT?

IT IS THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES THAT ISRAEL SHOULD REFRAIN FROM CREATING NEW SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL DETERMINE THE QUESTION OF EXISTING SETTLEMENTS AS WELL AS ANY NEW SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

8. (C) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION REGARDING BOTH OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONS?

THE UNITED STATES' POSITION IS THAT SETTLEMENTS ESTABLISHED DURING A MILITARY OCCUPATION ARE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR. HOWEVER, IN A RELATIONSHIP OF PEACE, THE PARTIES TO THE PEACE SHOULD DEFINE THE MUTUAL RIGHTS OF INHABITANTS TO DO BUSINESS, TO WORK, TO LIVE, AND TO CARRY ON OTHER TRANSACTIONS IN EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY.

9. (A) WILL THE ISRAELI CITIZENS WHO RESIDE AT PRESENT IN THE SETTLEMENTS BE ELIGIBLE FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY AND ITS SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITIES?

ISRAELI CITIZENS RESIDING IN SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA COULD PARTICIPATE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY ONLY AS MEMBERS OF THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATING DELEGATION; THERE IS NO PROVISION FOR THEIR SEPARATE PARTICIPATION. THEIR PARTICIPATION, IF ANY, IN THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY MUST BE DETERMINED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL REGIME.

9. (B) WHAT WILL BE THE STATUS OF THE ISRAELI CITIZENS RESIDING IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND WILL THERE BE ANY, AND IF SO WHAT WOULD THEIR STATUS BE AFTER THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD?

THE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER PARAGRAPH 1.A. (2) DEFINING THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AUTHORITY WILL DEAL WITH THE STATUS OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND, ACCORDINGLY, WITH THE STATUS OF ISRAELI CITIZENS RESIDING IN THEM.

WHATEVER NUMBER THAT MIGHT REMAIN BEYOND THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, AND THEIR STATUS, WOULD PRESUMABLY BE AGREED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ENVISAGED UNDER PARAGRAPH A.1.(C).

10. (A) AT THE END OF THE FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, WILL THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA EXERCISE IN FREEDOM THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN ORDER TO DECIDE THEIR POLITICAL FUTURE?

THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES FOR THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WILL DETERMINE THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND, IN ADDITION, FOR THEIR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES TO RATIFY OR REJECT THE AGREEMENT REACHED IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS. THE FRAMEWORK FURTHER PROVIDES THAT THE SOLUTION FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR JUST REQUIREMENTS. THE WIDE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE RESULTS OF THIS PROCESS IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL PARTIES AND IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO ITS BEING CARRIED OUT "IN FREEDOM." IN THIS RESPECT, AT THE TIME THE PROCESS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS TAKING PLACE, A STRONG LOCAL POLICE FORCE WILL EXIST AND WILL BE RESPONSIBLE TO THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO INTERFERENCE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS THAT ENSURES THESE RIGHTS.

10. (B) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON THIS QUESTION?

THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR OWN FUTURE, AND BELIEVES THAT THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES FOR SUCH PARTICIPATION IN ALL THE IMPORTANT STEPS IN DETERMINING THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT PARAGRAPH A.1.(C)(2) DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE HOLDING OF AN ELECTION BY THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF ELECTING REPRESENTATIVES TO WHOM THAT AGREEMENT WILL BE SUBMITTED FOR A VOTE.

11. (A) WHAT SOLUTION DOES THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ENVISAGE FOR THE PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIANS LIVING OUTSIDE THE OCCUPIED AREAS AS REFUGEES AND FOR THE RESTORATION OF THEIR RIGHTS?

PARAGRAPH A.4. OF THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES THAT EGYPT AND ISRAEL WILL WORK TOGETHER WITH OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES TO AGREE ON A RESOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROCEDURES AGREED UPON IS TO BE PROMPT, JUST AND PERMANENT.

PARAGRAPH A.3. OF THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES FOR A CONTINUING COMMITTEE TO DECIDE ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ADMISSION TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA OF PERSONS DISPLACED FROM THOSE AREAS IN 1967.

IN ADDITION, AS THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT TAKE SHAPE ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THOSE INSTITUTIONS AND THE PALESTINIANS LIVING OUTSIDE THE AREAS WOULD BE ADDRESSED.

11. (B) WHAT DOES THE UNITED STATES REGARD AS THE BASIS FOR THE SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION? HOW DOES IT DEFINE THESE RIGHTS?

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT A RESOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM SHOULD REFLECT APPLICABLE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS. ANY PROGRAM FOR IMPLEMENTATION MUST PROVIDE THOSE REFUGEES LIVING OUTSIDE THE WEST BANK AND GAZA A CHOICE AND OPPORTUNITY IN SETTLING THEMSELVES PERMANENTLY IN THE CONTEXT OF PRESENT-DAY REALITIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES.

12. WHAT DOES THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ENVISAGE FOR THE FUTURE OF THE REST OF THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES? WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THIS QUESTION?

THE FRAMEWORK STATES THAT IT IS INTENDED TO CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH OF ITS OTHER NEIGHBORS. IT FURTHER STATES THAT THE OBJECTIVE IS A JUST, COMPREHENSIVE, AND DURABLE PEACE AND THAT EACH NEGOTIATION MUST CARRY OUT ALL THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. PARAGRAPH C.1. SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FRAMEWORK SHOULD APPLY TO TREATIES BETWEEN

ISRAEL AND JORDAN, SYRIA, AND LEBANON IN ADDITION TO EGYPT. CONCERNING THE WEST BANK IN PARTICULAR, PARAGRAPH A.1.(C) REQUIRES NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON ALL THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF RESOLUTION 242 WHICH WILL RESOLVE, AMONG OTHER MATTERS, THE LOCATION OF BOUNDARIES. THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO ADVOCATE A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE INVOLVING ALL OF ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS. AS REGARDS THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, THE UNITED STATES WILL SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF ALL THE PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION 242 TO SUCH A SETTLEMENT. //

13. IN THE DEFINITION OF THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN THE AREA, DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ENDORSE THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY ON THESE REQUIREMENTS OR DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REGARD THESE REQUIREMENTS TO BE ONE SIDED ONLY?

THE UNITED STATES FULLY ENDORSES THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY AS APPLIED TO SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE PREAMBLE TO THE FRAMEWORK SPECIFICALLY REFERS TO RECIPROCITY AS THE BASIS ON WHICH THE PARTIES CAN AGREE TO SPECIAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE FRAMEWORK ALSO REFERS TO THE SECURITY CONCERNS "OF ALL PARTIES" AND TO THE SECURITY OF "ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS."

14. AS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 IS STATED TO BE THE BASIS OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE WEST BANK-GAZA AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CONFLICT, WHAT WOULD THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DO IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS BETWEEN THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PREVIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND COMMITMENTS BASED THEREON WHICH WERE THE BASIS OF ACCEPTANCE BY JORDAN OF THE SAID RESOLUTION?

THE UNITED STATES WILL, FIRST, ADHERE TO ITS OWN CONSISTENT INTERPRETATION OF RESOLUTION 242, AND IN PARTICULAR TO ITS INTERPRETATION THAT THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION OF THAT RESOLUTION APPLIES ON ALL FRONTS. IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS AMONG THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES, THE UNITED STATES WILL SEEK, AS IT DID DURING THE INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS AT CAMP DAVID, TO BRING ABOUT A CONSENSUS AMONG THE PARTIES AND WILL MAKE KNOWN ITS OWN INTERPRETATIONS AS REQUIRED TO BRING ABOUT

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JIMMY CARTER

ANSWERS TO JORDANIAN QUESTIONS

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YES, THE UNITED STATES WILL BE A FULL PARTNER IN ALL THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, LEADING TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST, LASTING AND COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST PEACE.

THE UNITED STATES WILL USE ITS FULL INFLUENCE TO SEE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE BROUGHT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

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NO COMPREHENSIVE DEFINITION IS ATTEMPTED. IN SOME CASES, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ARE SPECIFIED. IN ONE CASE, IT IS CLEAR THAT "OTHER PALESTINIANS AS MUTUALLY AGREED" REFERS TO REPRESENTATIVES FROM OUTSIDE THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND NEED NOT BE CITIZENS OF EGYPT OR JORDAN. PALESTINIANS WHO ARE CITIZENS OF EGYPT OR JORDAN MAY, OF COURSE, BE MEMBERS OF THE NEGOTIATING TEAMS REPRESENTING THOSE COUNTRIES. IN OTHER CASES, THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY ITSELF IS MENTIONED.

THE UNITED STATES INTERPRETS THE PHRASE "THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE" NOT IN TERMS OF ANY SINGLE GROUP OR ORGANIZATION AS REPRESENTING THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE BUT AS ENCOMPASSING THOSE ELECTED OR CHOSEN FOR PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT THE PURPOSES OF THE NEGOTIATION AS DEFINED IN UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, AND IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SETTLEMENT WILL BE PREPARED TO LIVE IN PEACE AND GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

3. WHY HAS THE DURATION OF FIVE YEARS BEEN CHOSEN FOR THE TRANSITION PERIOD IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA?

THE IDEA OF A FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WAS AN AMERICAN SUGGESTION WHICH WAS FIRST PUT TO THE PARTIES IN THE SUMMER OF 1977. THE KEY POINT IS THE CONCEPT OF A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD -- NOT THE PRECISE DURATION OF FIVE YEARS WHICH HAS BEEN SUGGESTED AND AGREED.

WE BELIEVE A TRANSITIONAL PROCESS OF SEVERAL YEARS -- AT THE OUTSET OF WHICH THE ISRAELI MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ITS CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION WILL BE WITHDRAWN AND A SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY ESTABLISHED FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA INHABITANTS -- CAN DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM A TRANSITION TO PEACE CAN BE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED. WE SEE THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AS ESSENTIAL TO BUILD CONFIDENCE, GAIN MOMENTUM AND BRING ABOUT THE CHANGES IN ATTITUDES THAT CAN ASSURE A FINAL SETTLEMENT WHICH REALIZES THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WHILE ASSURING THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AND OF THE OTHER PARTIES.

4. (A) WHAT IS THE GEOGRAPHICAL DEFINITION OF THE "WEST BANK" AND OF GAZA IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT? IS ARAB JERUSALEM AND ITS SURROUNDING ARAB AREAS INCORPORATED INTO ISRAEL AFTER JUNE 1967 INCLUDED IN THE DEFINITION OF THE "WEST BANK?"

IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES THE TERM "WEST BANK AND GAZA" DESCRIBES ALL OF THE AREA WEST OF THE JORDAN RIVER UNDER JORDANIAN ADMINISTRATION PRIOR TO THE 1967 WAR AND ALL OF THE AREA EAST OF THE WESTERN BORDER OF THE BRITISH MANDATE OF PALESTINE WHICH PRIOR TO THE 1967 WAR WAS UNDER EGYPTIAN CONTROL AND IS KNOWN AS THE GAZA STRIP.

WITH RESPECT TO NEGOTIATIONS ENVISAGED IN THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT, WE BELIEVE A DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE BETWEEN JERUSALEM AND THE REST OF THE WEST BANK BECAUSE OF THE CITY'S SPECIAL STATUS AND CIRCUMSTANCES. WE WOULD ENVISAGE, THEREFORE, A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION FOR THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM THAT COULD BE DIFFERENT IN CHARACTER IN SOME RESPECTS FROM THAT OF THE REST OF THE WEST BANK.

THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDGED BY THE UNILATERAL ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN IN JERUSALEM SINCE THE 1967 WAR. THE FULL UNITED STATES POSITION ON JERUSALEM REMAINS AS STATED BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON JULY 14, 1967, AND BY AMBASSADOR YOST TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON JULY 1, 1969.

4. (B) AT THE END OF THE FIVE YEARS OF TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, WHAT WOULD BE THE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND OF GAZA FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SOVEREIGNTY?

THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, SHOULD BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 IN ALL ITS PARTS IN NEGOTIATIONS AMONG JORDAN, EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WHICH SHOULD BEGIN NOT LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. UNDER THE TERMS OF THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT, THE OUTCOME OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS -- INCLUDING DETERMINING THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY -- SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO A VOTE BY THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA FOR RATIFICATION OR REJECTION.

SINCE THE NEGOTIATION OF THE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN AND THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ARE INTERRELATED, THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN BOTH THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

THUS PALESTINIANS WILL PARTICIPATE IN EACH NEGOTIATION TO RESOLVE THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

4. (C) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION REGARDING THESE QUESTIONS?

THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL DEFINITION OF THE TERM "WEST BANK AND GAZA" IS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 4(A) ABOVE. THE UNITED STATES POSITION REGARDING THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IS EXPRESSED IN PARAGRAPH 4 (B) ABOVE.

4. (D) WILL ANY ISRAELI FORCES REMAIN IN ANY PART OF THE WEST BANK AND OF GAZA AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS? IF SO, BY WHAT RIGHT AND WITH WHAT JUSTIFICATION?

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AFTER THE FIVE-YEAR INTERIM PERIOD IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF THE POSSIBLE RETENTION OF ISRAELI SECURITY PERSONNEL AND THE DURATION OF ANY SUCH PRESENCE, MUST BE DEALT WITH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS

ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA THAT ARE TO BEGIN NO LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD.

4. (E) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION REGARDING THESE QUESTIONS?

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE AGREEMENT ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA MUST MEET THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND PROVIDE FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS. THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT OPPOSE, IF AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES, THE STATIONING IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA OF LIMITED NUMBERS OF ISRAELI SECURITY PERSONNEL IN SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED AREAS, AND WITH A DEFINED ROLE, AS ONE ELEMENT IN PROVIDING FOR THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL.

5. DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, UNDER WHAT HIGHER SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY WOULD THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY OPERATE? WOULD IT BE A UNITED NATIONS OR A SIMILAR NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY? WHAT SOURCE WOULD FINANCE THE BUDGETARY NEEDS OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY? WHAT WOULD BE THE EXTENT OF ITS POWERS? WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE THE LIMITATIONS ON ITS POWERS?

THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES THAT THE PARTIES, I.E., EGYPT, ISRAEL AND JORDAN, WITH PALESTINIANS IN THE EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN DELEGATIONS, "WILL NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL DEFINE THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY TO BE EXERCISED IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA." THUS THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY IN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS ESTABLISHED BY AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT AMONG THE THREE PARTIES. THE AGREEMENT WILL DEFINE THE POWERS OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY AND PROVIDE FULL AUTONOMY FOR THE INHABITANTS. NOTHING IN THE FRAMEWORK EXCLUDES THE PARTIES FROM DECIDING, SHOULD THEY SO AGREE, TO GIVE A SUPERVISORY OR OTHER ROLE TO A UNITED NATIONS OR SIMILAR NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY OR TO DECIDE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY.

IN ADDITION, DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, REPRESENTATIVES OF EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY WILL CONSTITUTE A CONTINUING COMMITTEE WHICH MAY DEAL WITH MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN. METHODS OF FINANCING OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY WERE NOT DISCUSSED AT CAMP DAVID AND REMAIN TO BE SET OUT IN THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES.

6. (A) WHERE THE DOCUMENT REFERS TO THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY WHICH IS TO BE CONSTITUTED IN THE WEST BANK-GAZA AREA, DOES THE JURISDICTION OF THIS AUTHORITY EXTEND TO THE PART OF JERUSALEM WHICH HAD BEEN PART OF THE WEST BANK WHEN IT FELL UNDER OCCUPATION AS WELL AS OTHER ANNEXED AREAS AROUND IT, BOTH IN TERMS OF TERRITORY AND PEOPLE?

AS STATED ABOVE, THE ISSUE OF THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM WAS NOT RESOLVED AT CAMP DAVID AND MUST BE DEALT WITH IN SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. THE QUESTIONS OF HOW THE ARAB INHABITANTS OF EAST JERUSALEM RELATE TO THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY REMAINS TO BE DETERMINED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. //

6. (B) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON THIS QUESTION?

IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS THE UNITED STATES WILL SUPPORT PROPOSALS THAT WOULD PERMIT ARAB INHABITANTS OF EAST JERUSALEM WHO ARE NOT ISRAELI CITIZENS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS TO CONSTITUTE THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY AND IN THE WORK OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY ITSELF. IT IS PROBABLY NOT REALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT THE FULL SCOPE OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY CAN BE EXTENDED TO EAST JERUSALEM DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, PREJUDGE THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM, WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT ARE TO BEGIN NO LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. //

7. (A) AT THE END OF THE FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, WHAT WOULD BE THE STATUS OF OCCUPIED ARAB JERUSALEM?

THE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS, AS WELL AS PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN, WILL BE DETERMINED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH A.1(C) OF THE FRAMEWORK. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE STATUS OF THAT PORTION OF JERUSALEM WHICH ISRAEL OCCUPIED IN 1967 SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS.* THE FRAMEWORK ENVISAGES THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL INVOLVE EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. //

* PROVISIONS REGARDING JERUSALEM COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENTS THAT EMERGE FROM EITHER OR BOTH OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. (B) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON THIS MATTER?

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES ON JERUSALEM IS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 4(A) ABOVE. THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDGED BY THE UNILATERAL ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN IN JERUSALEM SINCE THE 1967 WAR. WHATEVER SOLUTION IS AGREED UPON SHOULD PRESERVE JERUSALEM AS A PHYSICALLY UNDIVIDED CITY. IT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR FREE ACCESS TO THE JEWISH, MUSLIM, AND CHRISTIAN HOLY PLACES WITHOUT DISTINCTION OR DISCRIMINATION FOR THE FREE EXERCISE OF WORSHIP. IT SHOULD ASSURE THE BASIC RIGHTS OF ALL THE CITY'S RESIDENTS. THE HOLY PLACES OF EACH FAITH SHOULD BE UNDER THE FULL AUTHORITY OF THEIR REPRESENTATIVES.

8. (A) WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS DURING AND AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD? WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE PROPERTIES ACQUIRED AND CONSTRUCTION MADE THERE AND WHAT WOULD THEIR STATUS BE?

THE FRAMEWORK DOES NOT DEAL WITH THE STATUS OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS, NOR WITH THE PROPERTIES ACQUIRED OR CONSTRUCTION MADE THERE. THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY, WHICH WILL EXERCISE FULL AUTONOMY ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, WILL BE DEFINED IN AN AGREEMENT TO BE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN AND, AS PROVIDED IN THE FRAMEWORK, PALESTINIANS FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA OR OTHER PALESTINIANS AS MUTUALLY AGREED TO BE ON THE EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN NATIONAL DELEGATIONS. THE QUESTION OF THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, WILL HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH IN THE COURSE OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS. THE FRAMEWORK ALSO PROVIDES FOR A CONTINUING COMMITTEE, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY, WHICH MAY DEAL WITH OUTSTANDING MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

THE QUESTION OF THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND THEIR STATUS AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WOULD BE A MATTER FOR DISCUSSION DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH A.1.(C).

8. (B) WHAT WILL BE ISRAEL'S OBLIGATION, DURING THE COMING PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, REGARDING THE POLICY OF SETTLEMENT?

IT IS THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES THAT ISRAEL SHOULD REFRAIN FROM CREATING NEW SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL DETERMINE THE QUESTION OF EXISTING SETTLEMENTS AS WELL AS ANY NEW SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

8. (C) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION REGARDING BOTH OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONS?

THE UNITED STATES' POSITION IS THAT SETTLEMENTS ESTABLISHED DURING A MILITARY OCCUPATION ARE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR. HOWEVER, IN A RELATIONSHIP OF PEACE, THE PARTIES TO THE PEACE SHOULD DEFINE THE MUTUAL RIGHTS OF INHABITANTS TO DO BUSINESS, TO WORK, TO LIVE, AND TO CARRY ON OTHER TRANSACTIONS IN EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY.

9. (A) WILL THE ISRAELI CITIZENS WHO RESIDE AT PRESENT IN THE SETTLEMENTS BE ELIGIBLE FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY AND ITS SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITIES?

ISRAELI CITIZENS RESIDING IN SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA COULD PARTICIPATE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY ONLY AS MEMBERS OF THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATING DELEGATION; THERE IS NO PROVISION FOR THEIR SEPARATE PARTICIPATION. THEIR PARTICIPATION, IF ANY, IN THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY MUST BE DETERMINED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL REGIME.

9. (B) WHAT WILL BE THE STATUS OF THE ISRAELI CITIZENS RESIDING IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND WILL THERE BE ANY, AND IF SO WHAT WOULD THEIR STATUS BE AFTER THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD?

THE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER PARAGRAPH 1.A. (2) DEFINING THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AUTHORITY WILL DEAL WITH THE STATUS OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND, ACCORDINGLY, WITH THE STATUS OF ISRAELI CITIZENS RESIDING IN THEM.

WHATEVER NUMBER THAT MIGHT REMAIN BEYOND THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, AND THEIR STATUS, WOULD PRESUMABLY BE AGREED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ENVISAGED UNDER PARAGRAPH A.1.(C).

10. (A) AT THE END OF THE FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, WILL THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA EXERCISE IN FREEDOM THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN ORDER TO DECIDE THEIR POLITICAL FUTURE?

THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES FOR THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WILL DETERMINE THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND, IN ADDITION, FOR THEIR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES TO RATIFY OR REJECT THE AGREEMENT REACHED IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS. THE FRAMEWORK FURTHER PROVIDES THAT THE SOLUTION FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR JUST REQUIREMENTS. THE WIDE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE RESULTS OF THIS PROCESS IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL PARTIES AND IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO ITS BEING CARRIED OUT "IN FREEDOM." IN THIS RESPECT, AT THE TIME THE PROCESS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS TAKING PLACE, A STRONG LOCAL POLICE FORCE WILL EXIST AND WILL BE RESPONSIBLE TO THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO INTERFERENCE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS THAT ENSURES THESE RIGHTS.

10. (B) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON THIS QUESTION?

THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR OWN FUTURE, AND BELIEVES THAT THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES FOR SUCH PARTICIPATION IN ALL THE IMPORTANT STEPS IN DETERMINING THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT PARAGRAPH A.1.(C)(2) DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE HOLDING OF AN ELECTION BY THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF ELECTING REPRESENTATIVES TO WHOM THAT AGREEMENT WILL BE SUBMITTED FOR A VOTE.

11. (A) WHAT SOLUTION DOES THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ENVISAGE FOR THE PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIANS LIVING OUTSIDE THE OCCUPIED AREAS AS REFUGEES AND FOR THE RESTORATION OF THEIR RIGHTS?

PARAGRAPH A.4. OF THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES THAT EGYPT AND ISRAEL WILL WORK TOGETHER WITH OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES TO AGREE ON A RESOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROCEDURES AGREED UPON IS TO BE PROMPT, JUST AND PERMANENT.

PARAGRAPH A.3. OF THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES FOR A CONTINUING COMMITTEE TO DECIDE ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ADMISSION TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA OF PERSONS DISPLACED FROM THOSE AREAS IN 1967.

IN ADDITION, AS THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT TAKE SHAPE ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THOSE INSTITUTIONS AND THE PALESTINIANS LIVING OUTSIDE THE AREAS WOULD BE ADDRESSED.

11. (B) WHAT DOES THE UNITED STATES REGARD AS THE BASIS FOR THE SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION? HOW DOES IT DEFINE THESE RIGHTS?

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT A RESOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM SHOULD REFLECT APPLICABLE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS. ANY PROGRAM FOR IMPLEMENTATION MUST PROVIDE THOSE REFUGEES LIVING OUTSIDE THE WEST BANK AND GAZA A CHOICE AND OPPORTUNITY IN SETTLING THEMSELVES PERMANENTLY IN THE CONTEXT OF PRESENT-DAY REALITIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES.

12. WHAT DOES THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ENVISAGE FOR THE FUTURE OF THE REST OF THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES? WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THIS QUESTION?

THE FRAMEWORK STATES THAT IT IS INTENDED TO CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH OF ITS OTHER NEIGHBORS. IT FURTHER STATES THAT THE OBJECTIVE IS A JUST, COMPREHENSIVE, AND DURABLE PEACE AND THAT EACH NEGOTIATION MUST CARRY OUT ALL THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. PARAGRAPH C.1. SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FRAMEWORK SHOULD APPLY TO TREATIES BETWEEN

ISRAEL AND JORDAN, SYRIA, AND LEBANON IN ADDITION TO EGYPT. CONCERNING THE WEST BANK IN PARTICULAR, PARAGRAPH A.1.(C) REQUIRES NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON ALL THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF RESOLUTION 242 WHICH WILL RESOLVE, AMONG OTHER MATTERS, THE LOCATION OF BOUNDARIES. THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO ADVOCATE A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE INVOLVING ALL OF ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS. AS REGARDS THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, THE UNITED STATES WILL SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF ALL THE PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION 242 TO SUCH A SETTLEMENT. //

13. IN THE DEFINITION OF THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN THE AREA, DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ENDORSE THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY ON THESE REQUIREMENTS OR DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REGARD THESE REQUIREMENTS TO BE ONE SIDED ONLY?

THE UNITED STATES FULLY ENDORSES THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY AS APPLIED TO SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE PREAMBLE TO THE FRAMEWORK SPECIFICALLY REFERS TO RECIPROCITY AS THE BASIS ON WHICH THE PARTIES CAN AGREE TO SPECIAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE FRAMEWORK ALSO REFERS TO THE SECURITY CONCERNS "OF ALL PARTIES" AND TO THE SECURITY OF "ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS."

14. AS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 IS STATED TO BE THE BASIS OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE WEST BANK-GAZA AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CONFLICT, WHAT WOULD THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DO IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS BETWEEN THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PREVIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND COMMITMENTS BASED THEREON WHICH WERE THE BASIS OF ACCEPTANCE BY JORDAN OF THE SAID RESOLUTION?

THE UNITED STATES WILL, FIRST, ADHERE TO ITS OWN CONSISTENT INTERPRETATION OF RESOLUTION 242, AND IN PARTICULAR TO ITS INTERPRETATION THAT THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION OF THAT RESOLUTION APPLIES ON ALL FRONTS. IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS AMONG THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES, THE UNITED STATES WILL SEEK, AS IT DID DURING THE INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS AT CAMP DAVID, TO BRING ABOUT A CONSENSUS AMONG THE PARTIES AND WILL MAKE KNOWN ITS OWN INTERPRETATIONS AS REQUIRED TO BRING ABOUT

RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT. THE INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES REMAIN THOSE IT HAS HELD
SINCE 1967.

JIMMY CARTER

85. King Hussein Ibn Talal of Jordan, Proposal for a United Arab Kingdom, Excerpts, March 15, 1972

We are happy to declare that the bases of the proposed formula for the new phase are as follows:

1. The Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan shall become a United Arab Kingdom and shall bear this name.

2. The United Arab Kingdom shall consist of two regions:

a. The Palestine region which will consist of the West Bank and any other Palestinian territories which are liberated and whose inhabitants desire to join it.

b. The Jordan region which will consist of the East Bank.

3. Amman shall be the central capital of the kingdom as well as the capital of the Jordan region.

4. Jerusalem shall be the capital of the Palestine region.

5. The head of the state shall be the king, who will assume the central executive authority with the help of a central cabinet. The central legislative authority shall be vested in the king and an assembly to be known as the national assembly. Members of this assembly shall be elected by direct secret ballot. Both regions shall be equally represented in this assembly.

6. The central judicial authority shall be vested in a central supreme court.

7. The kingdom shall have unified armed forces whose supreme commander is the king.

8. The responsibilities of the central executive authority shall be confined to affairs connected with the kingdom as an international entity to guarantee the kingdom's safety, stability and prosperity.

9. The executive authority in each region shall be assumed by a governor general from among its sons and a regional cabinet from among its sons as well.

10. Legislative authority in each region shall be assumed by a council to be called the people's council. It shall be elected by direct secret voting. This council will elect the region's governor general.

11. The judicial authority in the region shall be in the hands of the region's courts, and no one will have power over them.

12. The executive authority in each region shall assume responsibility for all the affairs of the region except such affairs as the constitution defines as coming under the jurisdiction of the central executive authority.

Naturally the implementation of this formula and its bases should be according to the constitutional norms in force. It will be referred to the [Jordanian] National Assembly to adopt the necessary measures to prepare a new constitution for the country.

ANSWERS TO JORDANIAN QUESTIONS

1. DOES THE UNITED STATES INTEND TO BE A FULL PARTNER IN NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION IN GENERAL? AT WHAT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL THE UNITED STATES PARTICIPATE AND IN WHAT ROLE?

YES, THE UNITED STATES WILL BE A FULL PARTNER IN ALL THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, LEADING TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST, LASTING AND COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST PEACE.

THE UNITED STATES WILL USE ITS FULL INFLUENCE TO SEE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE BROUGHT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

PRESIDENT CARTER WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE AN ACTIVE PERSONAL PART IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. WHAT DOES THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT MEAN IN ITS PARAGRAPH (A) 1, WHERE IT REFERS TO "THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE?"

NO COMPREHENSIVE DEFINITION IS ATTEMPTED. IN SOME CASES, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ARE SPECIFIED. IN ONE CASE, IT IS CLEAR THAT "OTHER PALESTINIANS AS MUTUALLY AGREED" REFERS TO REPRESENTATIVES FROM OUTSIDE THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND NEED NOT BE CITIZENS OF EGYPT OR JORDAN. PALESTINIANS WHO ARE CITIZENS OF EGYPT OR JORDAN MAY, OF COURSE, BE MEMBERS OF THE NEGOTIATING TEAMS REPRESENTING THOSE COUNTRIES. IN OTHER CASES, THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY ITSELF IS MENTIONED.

THE UNITED STATES INTERPRETS THE PHRASE "THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE" NOT IN TERMS OF ANY SINGLE GROUP OR ORGANIZATION AS REPRESENTING THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE BUT AS ENCOMPASSING THOSE ELECTED OR CHOSEN FOR PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT THE PURPOSES OF THE NEGOTIATION AS DEFINED IN UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, AND IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SETTLEMENT WILL BE PREPARED TO LIVE IN PEACE AND GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

3. WHY HAS THE DURATION OF FIVE YEARS BEEN CHOSEN FOR THE TRANSITION PERIOD IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA?

THE IDEA OF A FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WAS AN AMERICAN SUGGESTION WHICH WAS FIRST PUT TO THE PARTIES IN THE SUMMER OF 1977. THE KEY POINT IS THE CONCEPT OF A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD -- NOT THE PRECISE DURATION OF FIVE YEARS WHICH HAS BEEN SUGGESTED AND AGREED.

WE BELIEVE A TRANSITIONAL PROCESS OF SEVERAL YEARS -- AT THE OUTSET OF WHICH THE ISRAELI MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ITS CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION WILL BE WITHDRAWN AND A SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY ESTABLISHED FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA INHABITANTS -- CAN DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM A TRANSITION TO PEACE CAN BE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED. WE SEE THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AS ESSENTIAL TO BUILD CONFIDENCE, GAIN MOMENTUM AND BRING ABOUT THE CHANGES IN ATTITUDES THAT CAN ASSURE A FINAL SETTLEMENT WHICH REALIZES THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WHILE ASSURING THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AND OF THE OTHER PARTIES.

4. (A) WHAT IS THE GEOGRAPHICAL DEFINITION OF THE "WEST BANK" AND OF GAZA IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT? IS ARAB JERUSALEM AND ITS SURROUNDING ARAB AREAS INCORPORATED INTO ISRAEL AFTER JUNE 1967 INCLUDED IN THE DEFINITION OF THE "WEST BANK?"

IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES THE TERM "WEST BANK AND GAZA" DESCRIBES ALL OF THE AREA WEST OF THE JORDAN RIVER UNDER JORDANIAN ADMINISTRATION PRIOR TO THE 1967 WAR AND ALL OF THE AREA EAST OF THE WESTERN BORDER OF THE BRITISH MANDATE OF PALESTINE WHICH PRIOR TO THE 1967 WAR WAS UNDER EGYPTIAN CONTROL AND IS KNOWN AS THE GAZA STRIP.

WITH RESPECT TO NEGOTIATIONS ENVISAGED IN THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT, WE BELIEVE A DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE BETWEEN JERUSALEM AND THE REST OF THE WEST BANK BECAUSE OF THE CITY'S SPECIAL STATUS AND CIRCUMSTANCES. WE WOULD ENVISAGE, THEREFORE, A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION FOR THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM THAT COULD BE DIFFERENT IN CHARACTER IN SOME RESPECTS FROM THAT OF THE REST OF THE WEST BANK.

THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDGED BY THE UNILATERAL ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN IN JERUSALEM SINCE THE 1967 WAR. THE FULL UNITED STATES POSITION ON JERUSALEM REMAINS AS STATED BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON JULY 14, 1967, AND BY AMBASSADOR YOST TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON JULY 1, 1969.

4. (B) AT THE END OF THE FIVE YEARS OF TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, WHAT WOULD BE THE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND OF GAZA FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SOVEREIGNTY?

THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, SHOULD BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 IN ALL ITS PARTS IN NEGOTIATIONS AMONG JORDAN, EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WHICH SHOULD BEGIN NOT LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. UNDER THE TERMS OF THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT, THE OUTCOME OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS -- INCLUDING DETERMINING THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY -- SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO A VOTE BY THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA FOR RATIFICATION OR REJECTION.

SINCE THE NEGOTIATION OF THE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN AND THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ARE INTERRELATED, THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN BOTH THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

THUS PALESTINIANS WILL PARTICIPATE IN EACH NEGOTIATION TO RESOLVE THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

4. (C) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION REGARDING THESE QUESTIONS?

THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL DEFINITION OF THE TERM "WEST BANK AND GAZA" IS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 4(A) ABOVE. THE UNITED STATES POSITION REGARDING THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IS EXPRESSED IN PARAGRAPH 4 (B) ABOVE.

4. (D) WILL ANY ISRAELI FORCES REMAIN IN ANY PART OF THE WEST BANK AND OF GAZA AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS? IF SO, BY WHAT RIGHT AND WITH WHAT JUSTIFICATION?

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AFTER THE FIVE-YEAR INTERIM PERIOD IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF THE POSSIBLE RETENTION OF ISRAELI SECURITY PERSONNEL AND THE DURATION OF ANY SUCH PRESENCE, MUST BE DEALT WITH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS

ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA THAT ARE TO BEGIN NO LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD.

4. (E) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION REGARDING THESE QUESTIONS?

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE AGREEMENT ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA MUST MEET THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND PROVIDE FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS. THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT OPPOSE, IF AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES, THE STATIONING IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA OF LIMITED NUMBERS OF ISRAELI SECURITY PERSONNEL IN SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED AREAS, AND WITH A DEFINED ROLE, AS ONE ELEMENT IN PROVIDING FOR THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL.

5. DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, UNDER WHAT HIGHER SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY WOULD THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY OPERATE? WOULD IT BE A UNITED NATIONS OR A SIMILAR NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY? WHAT SOURCE WOULD FINANCE THE BUDGETARY NEEDS OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY? WHAT WOULD BE THE EXTENT OF ITS POWERS? WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE THE LIMITATIONS ON ITS POWERS?

THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES THAT THE PARTIES, I.E., EGYPT, ISRAEL AND JORDAN, WITH PALESTINIANS IN THE EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN DELEGATIONS, "WILL NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL DEFINE THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY TO BE EXERCISED IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA." THUS THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY IN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS ESTABLISHED BY AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT AMONG THE THREE PARTIES. THE AGREEMENT WILL DEFINE THE POWERS OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY AND PROVIDE FULL AUTONOMY FOR THE INHABITANTS. NOTHING IN THE FRAMEWORK EXCLUDES THE PARTIES FROM DECIDING, SHOULD THEY SO AGREE, TO GIVE A SUPERVISORY OR OTHER ROLE TO A UNITED NATIONS OR SIMILAR NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY OR TO DECIDE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY.

IN ADDITION, DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, REPRESENTATIVES OF EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY WILL CONSTITUTE A CONTINUING COMMITTEE WHICH MAY DEAL WITH MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN. METHODS OF FINANCING OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY WERE NOT DISCUSSED AT CAMP DAVID AND REMAIN TO BE SET OUT IN THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES.

6. (A) WHERE THE DOCUMENT REFERS TO THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY WHICH IS TO BE CONSTITUTED IN THE WEST BANK-GAZA AREA, DOES THE JURISDICTION OF THIS AUTHORITY EXTEND TO THE PART OF JERUSALEM WHICH HAD BEEN PART OF THE WEST BANK WHEN IT FELL UNDER OCCUPATION AS WELL AS OTHER ANNEXED AREAS AROUND IT, BOTH IN TERMS OF TERRITORY AND PEOPLE?

AS STATED ABOVE, THE ISSUE OF THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM WAS NOT RESOLVED AT CAMP DAVID AND MUST BE DEALT WITH IN SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. THE QUESTIONS OF HOW THE ARAB INHABITANTS OF EAST JERUSALEM RELATE TO THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY REMAINS TO BE DETERMINED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

6. (B) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON THIS QUESTION?

IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS THE UNITED STATES WILL SUPPORT PROPOSALS THAT WOULD PERMIT ARAB INHABITANTS OF EAST JERUSALEM WHO ARE NOT ISRAELI CITIZENS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS TO CONSTITUTE THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY AND IN THE WORK OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY ITSELF. IT IS PROBABLY NOT REALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT THE FULL SCOPE OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY CAN BE EXTENDED TO EAST JERUSALEM DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, PREJUDGE THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM, WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT ARE TO BEGIN NO LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

7. (A) AT THE END OF THE FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, WHAT WOULD BE THE STATUS OF OCCUPIED ARAB JERUSALEM?

THE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS, AS WELL AS PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN, WILL BE DETERMINED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH A.1(C) OF THE FRAMEWORK. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE STATUS OF THAT PORTION OF JERUSALEM WHICH ISRAEL OCCUPIED IN 1967 SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS.* THE FRAMEWORK ENVISAGES THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL INVOLVE EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

* PROVISIONS REGARDING JERUSALEM COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENTS THAT EMERGE FROM EITHER OR BOTH OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. (B) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON THIS MATTER?

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES ON JERUSALEM IS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 4(A) ABOVE. THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDGED BY THE UNILATERAL ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN IN JERUSALEM SINCE THE 1967 WAR. WHATEVER SOLUTION IS AGREED UPON SHOULD PRESERVE JERUSALEM AS A PHYSICALLY UNDIVIDED CITY. IT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR FREE ACCESS TO THE JEWISH, MUSLIM, AND CHRISTIAN HOLY PLACES WITHOUT DISTINCTION OR DISCRIMINATION FOR THE FREE EXERCISE OF WORSHIP. IT SHOULD ASSURE THE BASIC RIGHTS OF ALL THE CITY'S RESIDENTS. THE HOLY PLACES OF EACH FAITH SHOULD BE UNDER THE FULL AUTHORITY OF THEIR REPRESENTATIVES.

8. (A) WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS DURING AND AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD? WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE PROPERTIES ACQUIRED AND CONSTRUCTION MADE THERE AND WHAT WOULD THEIR STATUS BE?

THE FRAMEWORK DOES NOT DEAL WITH THE STATUS OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS, NOR WITH THE PROPERTIES ACQUIRED OR CONSTRUCTION MADE THERE. THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY, WHICH WILL EXERCISE FULL AUTONOMY ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, WILL BE DEFINED IN AN AGREEMENT TO BE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN AND, AS PROVIDED IN THE FRAMEWORK, PALESTINIANS FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA OR OTHER PALESTINIANS AS MUTUALLY AGREED TO BE ON THE EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN NATIONAL DELEGATIONS. THE QUESTION OF THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, WILL HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH IN THE COURSE OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS. THE FRAMEWORK ALSO PROVIDES FOR A CONTINUING COMMITTEE, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY, WHICH MAY DEAL WITH OUTSTANDING MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

THE QUESTION OF THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND THEIR STATUS AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WOULD BE A MATTER FOR DISCUSSION DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH A.1.(C).

8. (B) WHAT WILL BE ISRAEL'S OBLIGATION, DURING THE COMING PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, REGARDING THE POLICY OF SETTLEMENT?

IT IS THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES THAT ISRAEL SHOULD REFRAIN FROM CREATING NEW SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL DETERMINE THE QUESTION OF EXISTING SETTLEMENTS AS WELL AS ANY NEW SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

8. (C) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION REGARDING BOTH OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONS?

THE UNITED STATES' POSITION IS THAT SETTLEMENTS ESTABLISHED DURING A MILITARY OCCUPATION ARE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR. HOWEVER, IN A RELATIONSHIP OF PEACE, THE PARTIES TO THE PEACE SHOULD DEFINE THE MUTUAL RIGHTS OF INHABITANTS TO DO BUSINESS, TO WORK, TO LIVE, AND TO CARRY ON OTHER TRANSACTIONS IN EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY.

9. (A) WILL THE ISRAELI CITIZENS WHO RESIDE AT PRESENT IN THE SETTLEMENTS BE ELIGIBLE FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY AND ITS SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITIES?

ISRAELI CITIZENS RESIDING IN SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA COULD PARTICIPATE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY ONLY AS MEMBERS OF THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATING DELEGATION; THERE IS NO PROVISION FOR THEIR SEPARATE PARTICIPATION. THEIR PARTICIPATION, IF ANY, IN THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY MUST BE DETERMINED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL REGIME.

9. (B) WHAT WILL BE THE STATUS OF THE ISRAELI CITIZENS RESIDING IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND WILL THERE BE ANY, AND IF SO WHAT WOULD THEIR STATUS BE AFTER THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD?

THE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER PARAGRAPH 1.A. (2) DEFINING THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AUTHORITY WILL DEAL WITH THE STATUS OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND, ACCORDINGLY, WITH THE STATUS OF ISRAELI CITIZENS RESIDING IN THEM.

WHATEVER NUMBER THAT MIGHT REMAIN BEYOND THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, AND THEIR STATUS, WOULD PRESUMABLY BE AGREED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ENVISAGED UNDER PARAGRAPH A.1.(C).

10. (A) AT THE END OF THE FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, WILL THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA EXERCISE IN FREEDOM THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN ORDER TO DECIDE THEIR POLITICAL FUTURE?

THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES FOR THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WILL DETERMINE THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND, IN ADDITION, FOR THEIR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES TO RATIFY OR REJECT THE AGREEMENT REACHED IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS. THE FRAMEWORK FURTHER PROVIDES THAT THE SOLUTION FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR JUST REQUIREMENTS. THE WIDE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE RESULTS OF THIS PROCESS IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL PARTIES AND IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO ITS BEING CARRIED OUT "IN FREEDOM." IN THIS RESPECT, AT THE TIME THE PROCESS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS TAKING PLACE, A STRONG LOCAL POLICE FORCE WILL EXIST AND WILL BE RESPONSIBLE TO THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO INTERFERENCE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS THAT ENSURES THESE RIGHTS.

10. (B) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON THIS QUESTION?

THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR OWN FUTURE, AND BELIEVES THAT THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES FOR SUCH PARTICIPATION IN ALL THE IMPORTANT STEPS IN DETERMINING THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT PARAGRAPH A.1.(C)(2) DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE HOLDING OF AN ELECTION BY THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF ELECTING REPRESENTATIVES TO WHOM THAT AGREEMENT WILL BE SUBMITTED FOR A VOTE.

11. (A) WHAT SOLUTION DOES THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT EN-
VISAGE FOR THE PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIANS LIVING OUT-
SIDE THE OCCUPIED AREAS AS REFUGEES AND FOR THE RESTORA-
TION OF THEIR RIGHTS?

PARAGRAPH A.4. OF THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES THAT EGYPT
AND ISRAEL WILL WORK TOGETHER WITH OTHER INTERESTED
PARTIES TO AGREE ON A RESOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE
PROBLEM. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROCEDURES AGREED
UPON IS TO BE PROMPT, JUST AND PERMANENT.

PARAGRAPH A.3. OF THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES FOR A
CONTINUING COMMITTEE TO DECIDE ON ARRANGEMENTS
FOR THE ADMISSION TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA OF
PERSONS DISPLACED FROM THOSE AREAS IN 1967.

IN ADDITION, AS THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF SELF-
GOVERNMENT TAKE SHAPE ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA
THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES THE RE-
LATIONSHIP BETWEEN THOSE INSTITUTIONS AND THE
PALESTINIANS LIVING OUTSIDE THE AREAS WOULD BE
ADDRESSED.

11. (B) WHAT DOES THE UNITED STATES REGARD AS THE BASIS
FOR THE SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION? HOW DOES IT DEFINE
THESE RIGHTS?

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT A RESOLUTION OF
THE REFUGEE PROBLEM SHOULD REFLECT APPLICABLE
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS. ANY PROGRAM FOR IMPE-
LEMENTATION MUST PROVIDE THOSE REFUGEES LIVING OUTSIDE
THE WEST BANK AND GAZA A CHOICE AND OPPORTUNITY IN
SETTLING THEMSELVES PERMANENTLY IN THE CONTEXT OF
PRESENT-DAY REALITIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES.

12. WHAT DOES THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ENVISAGE FOR THE
FUTURE OF THE REST OF THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES?
WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THIS
QUESTION?

THE FRAMEWORK STATES THAT IT IS INTENDED TO CONSTI-
TUTE A BASIS FOR PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH OF
ITS OTHER NEIGHBORS. IT FURTHER STATES THAT THE
OBJECTIVE IS A JUST, COMPREHENSIVE, AND DURABLE
PEACE AND THAT EACH NEGOTIATION MUST CARRY OUT ALL
THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. PARAGRAPH
C.1. SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF
THE FRAMEWORK SHOULD APPLY TO TREATIES BETWEEN

ISRAEL AND JORDAN, SYRIA, AND LEBANON IN ADDITION TO EGYPT. CONCERNING THE WEST BANK IN PARTICULAR, PARAGRAPH A.1.(C) REQUIRES NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON ALL THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF RESOLUTION 242 WHICH WILL RESOLVE, AMONG OTHER MATTERS, THE LOCATION OF BOUNDARIES. THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO ADVOCATE A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE INVOLVING ALL OF ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS. AS REGARDS THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, THE UNITED STATES WILL SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF ALL THE PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION 242 TO SUCH A SETTLEMENT. //

13. IN THE DEFINITION OF THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN THE AREA, DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ENDORSE THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY ON THESE REQUIREMENTS OR DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REGARD THESE REQUIREMENTS TO BE ONE SIDED ONLY?

THE UNITED STATES FULLY ENDORSES THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY AS APPLIED TO SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE PREAMBLE TO THE FRAMEWORK SPECIFICALLY REFERS TO RECIPROCITY AS THE BASIS ON WHICH THE PARTIES CAN AGREE TO SPECIAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE FRAMEWORK ALSO REFERS TO THE SECURITY CONCERNS "OF ALL PARTIES" AND TO THE SECURITY OF "ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS."

14. AS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 IS STATED TO BE THE BASIS OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE WEST BANK-GAZA AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CONFLICT, WHAT WOULD THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DO IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS BETWEEN THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PREVIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND COMMITMENTS BASED THEREON WHICH WERE THE BASIS OF ACCEPTANCE BY JORDAN OF THE SAID RESOLUTION?

THE UNITED STATES WILL, FIRST, ADHERE TO ITS OWN CONSISTENT INTERPRETATION OF RESOLUTION 242, AND IN PARTICULAR TO ITS INTERPRETATION THAT THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION OF THAT RESOLUTION APPLIES ON ALL FRONTS. IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS AMONG THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES, THE UNITED STATES WILL SEEK, AS IT DID DURING THE INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS AT CAMP DAVID, TO BRING ABOUT A CONSENSUS AMONG THE PARTIES AND WILL MAKE KNOWN ITS OWN INTERPRETATIONS AS REQUIRED TO BRING ABOUT

RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT. THE INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES REMAIN THOSE IT HAS HELD
SINCE 1967.

JIMMY CARTER

KING HUSSEIN, THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE TERRITORIES

Pinhas Inbari

Although the international conference initiative has bogged down, this does not mean that the peace process is also frozen. On the contrary, a vigorous, if quiet, political process is underway in the territories. It can be seen as an alternative to the international conference that Foreign Minister Shimon Peres wants so badly. To the extent that it succeeds, the chances for the conference will become more remote while the existing situation will be consolidated. Only if the current process fails will the door to the international conference be opened.

Public declarations notwithstanding, it is doubtful if the present Jordanian government desires an international conference. Jordan fears a comprehensive political process that will result in a Palestinian solution that is undesirable for it -- specifically, consolidation of the PLO's standing. The government of Zeid Rifa'i prefers to offer Israel an alternative process: instead of a comprehensive settlement, partial shared rule in the territories, and practical cooperation against the PLO. In an international conference, Jordan will have to cooperate with the PLO against Israel and Jordan does not trust that Palestinian partner. It has more faith in the Israeli

partner -- against the Palestinians.

Past and present Israeli governments have longed for such a situation and when the opportunity arrived the Israeli leaders had difficulty resisting the Jordanian temptation. Amman in fact proposed implementation of the Allon plan, not in the territorial but in the functional sense: division of the West Bank between Israel and Jordan at the expense of the Palestinians. In 1986 the Labor party accepted the challenge and today an Israeli-Jordanian condominium on the West Bank is already crystallizing. But there is a heavy price to pay: Peres will not be able to advance the idea of an international conference and will get into a new confrontation with the Palestinians in the territories, a rerun of the confrontation that took place in the days of the Village Leagues.* Perhaps this will bring an understanding with Jordan on the conduct of everyday life in the territories, but withdrawal will no longer be a possibility because, in Jordan's conception of this condominium, Israel will have a clear role: Israel will be the stick, the oppressors of the Palestinians, and Jordan will be the carrot, giving aid within the framework of the various five-year plans and sounding the alarm in a mighty voice against the oppression.

* In 1981, Menahem Milson, head of the Israeli Civil Administration in the territories, built up^x the rural-based Village Leagues as an indigenous Palestinian alternative to the urban-based pro-PLO institutions. This effort met with strong opposition from the PLO, Jordan, and certain circles in Israel as well.

As part of this arrangement, there have been a string of understandings with Jordan on the issue of Jerusalem, designed to initiate a joint struggle against the Palestinian power bases and a strengthening of pro-Jordanian institutions, especially the Supreme Moslem Council which is supposed to be the dominant Arab institution in the eastern part of the capital. Israel and Jordan have agreed to divide the city functionally, but not geographically. The municipal services will make a distinction between Arabs and Jews, but in exchange Jordan has ordered the Moslem Council to cooperate with Israeli institutions such as the municipality and the Israeli judicial system, which it has not done in 20 years or more.

In order to provide the pro-Jordanian institutions more room to maneuver, the steamroller is being activated against institutions with a Palestinian character. The Arab East Jerusalem Electric company is the most prominent Palestinian economic institution in East Jerusalem and, therefore, it is fated to destruction or drastic reduction. The new arrangement with the East Jerusalem Electric company, keeping it alive but with its jurisdiction reduced to Jerusalem area Arab neighborhoods, illustrates the character of the emerging condominium. The Likud ministers are correct when they claim that the division of the company's concession so that Arab consumers will continue to receive electricity from an Arab company while Jewish consumers will receive electricity from the Israel Electric company is, in fact,

a partition of Jerusalem.

Needless to say, the Palestinians will not yield easily. The workers' committee composed of PLO supporters will certainly oppose it. The pro-Jordanian management is also opposed, but the arrangement has been agreed to by Israel and Jordan and will be imposed on the company once political agreement is obtained in Israel.

The program of destroying or reducing Palestinian power bases in order to give pro-Jordanian power bases room to maneuver is also being carried out in other spheres in Jerusalem and the territories. In July 1987, two items were published on the same day, on a similar issue, to the point where the Itim (Israel's news agency) correspondent rightly included them both in one report. It said that Mahmud Abu Zuluf, editor of Al-Quds, the most widely-distributed newspaper in the territories, had been served a restriction order. By contrast, the deposed mayor of Gaza, Rashad a-Shawwa, received permission to distribute his own newspaper, called Al-Huda.

Al-Quds was for many years a pro-Jordanian voice, but following King Hussein's major speech over two years ago in which he announced a break with the PLO, Al-Quds, along with many of the leaders of the pro-Jordanian camp such as, for example, Hikmat al-Masri from Nablus, did not express support for him because

* * * חלל: ע. סימניה שלקח את הפסד הפסד ביד - 8 - 8 נוב', חלל - דה דה
 ידן. מן הידן של ידן בחי - החלל
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they did not want to get involved in a confrontation with the PLO. Not only the Jordanians felt betrayed. So did the Israelis who pinned great hopes on King Hussein's new policy. Abu Zuluf had been on excellent terms with senior Israeli politicians and military leaders and his "betrayal" caused a great deal of anger. We would not want to say that the material against Abu Zuluf was fabricated, but the political context is clear: Jordan was very much interested in assisting A-Nahar, the new newspaper which reflects its position, and a blow to the standing of Al-Quds would not cause grief to the Jordanian policy-makers for the territories.

Vigorous Jordanian activity is being carried on in the field of higher education as well. Its purpose, on the model of the understanding regarding the Arab electric company, is to reduce or eliminate the existing universities, the strongholds of Palestinian nationalism, and to establish in their place a new network of universities controlled by Jordan. Abd a-Rahim Sartawi, a director of Jordan's ^{Hittin} ~~Khatin~~ University and a personal envoy of Jordanian Prime Minister Zeid Raza'i, is currently in the West Bank to assist in the establishment of a new network of universities with a view to the coming academic year. It may be assumed that studies at the existing universities will be extensively disrupted during the coming academic year as in the past, whether Israel closes them for prolonged periods of time or their own management does in response to internal political

ferment. Then the students will have an alternative: to register at new universities under Jordanian supervision.

The envoy is handling the establishment of a university in Nablus which will be affiliated with ^{Hittin}~~Khatin~~ university in Jordan. This new institution will be called "university college," a name which indicates the manner in which Jordan seeks to control the student body in the West Bank. Unlike the existing universities, the Jordanian-sponsored universities will not grant degrees in the West Bank; students will have to spend their final academic year in Jordan. That will be the whip that Jordan will use to impose order: students who stand out as being politically active will not be permitted to complete their studies in Jordan and their years of study will go down the drain.

Key pro-Jordanian functionaries have already submitted requests to develop "university colleges" throughout the West Bank. It should be especially noted that in the Hebron region, the request has been submitted by none other than the "distinguished educator" Jamil al-Amla, head of the Village Leagues. The involvement of Village League figures such as al-Amla points to one of the primary weaknesses of the vigorous Jordanian move in the territories. No important pro-Jordanian figures have affiliated themselves with this move, rather second- and third-order functionaries who as a result need Village League support, both in enlisting manpower for their thin ranks and for

armed guards. They also resort to the methods of the Village Leagues in imposing their will on the general population.

The Jordanian minister of occupied lands affairs is Marwan Doudin, who may not have an illustrious reputation in the West Bank, but possesses an almost magnetic influence on the Israeli defense establishment. He is currently carrying out a policy of reaching out to the Village Leagues. It may be assumed that he was deliberately appointed minister of the territories in order to entice the defense establishment to cooperate with Jordan against the PLO, since a Village Leagues-oriented policy still appeals to Israel. If this policy failed in the days of Mustafa Doudin, former head of the village Leagues, because of Jordanian opposition at that time, perhaps it will be more successful now with Jordanian support.

Accordingly, al-Amla reached an agreement in principle with Jordan to the effect that Amman would pardon the Village Leagues and would not implement the decrees against them, provided the Village Leagues disband and join the ongoing pro-Jordanian activities within the framework of the forthcoming pro-Jordanian party, the Jordanian-Palestinian Alignment. This party was to have been unveiled a short time ago, but premature press reports forced the Jordanians to delay the announcement. In the meantime, it is building its foundations: establishing committees in every town, holding secret meetings and recruiting supporters.

התנ"ך ידוע כי תיבחר בקרוב לראש הממשלה
Elections to the Jordanian parliament will soon be held and the
Jordanian-Palestinian Alignment is vigorously involved in the
development of a list of candidates to be appointed from the
West Bank. However, the more this activity deepens the conflict
with the PLO, the more the opposition to it will grow among broad
groups, including leading supporters of Jordan. They fear a
repetition of the situation which prevailed during the days of
the Village Leagues, when anyone who did not support them was
suspected of being a PLO ^{אויב} member and was exposed to measures on
the part of Israel, and this time by Jordan as well.

This Jordanian activity also has many opponents in Jordan. In
the days of the prime ministers preceding Rifa'i, opposition to
the Village Leagues served to unite Jordan and the PLO. Today,
the cooperation being woven between Jordan and the Village
Leagues brings closer the day of conflict between Jordan and the
PLO, to the dismay of those past prime ministers, as well as the
ranking supporters of Jordan in the territories who oppose the
activity of the Jordanian-Palestinian Alignment.

Egypt is also displeased with the developing conflict with the
PLO. The Egyptians understand that Jordanian policy is designed
to reach a settlement with Israel without an international
conference at the expense of a comprehensive settlement in the
Middle East. For the first time, Egypt has recently begun to

take steps in the territories that reflect its dissatisfaction with this policy.

The first step was inviting a delegation of Palestinian figures, most of them PLO supporters supposedly taken from Jordan's "black list." The delegation formulated a memorandum which should be of concern to Jordan, since Egypt in effect was asked by them to replace it as the Arab country with a special status in the territories. Jordan was not mentioned as possessing any sort of function in the territories and Egypt was asked to stand at the head of those Arab countries concerned with respect for human rights in the territories. This memorandum was signed not only by PLO supporters, but also by the leading supporters of Jordan: Rashad a-Shawwa, Elias Freij, and Hikmat al-Masri. The signal to Amman was clear: if it persists with its current policy, in the final analysis it will remain only with the Jordanian-Palestinian Alignment and Jamil al-Amla.

To reinforce the implications of that encounter, Egyptian Ambassador to Israel Mohamed Bassiouny held a special reception for residents of the territories on the occasion of the anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, and in Addis Ababa, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak met with Yasser Arafat.

From Al Hamishmar, 31 July 1987.

* * *

11 בספטמבר 1991
ג' בתשרי תשנ"ב
סימוכין: 7-778-2

ישראל, ירדן והאוטונומיה
מצע לדיון

א. הנחות יסוד

הנחות היסוד שיימנו להלן מתייחסות אך ורק להיבט הירדני של המשא ומתן, אין הן מתייחסות להיבטים הישראלי והפלסטיני שלו.

1. ישראל רואה בירדן שותף לגיטימי, הכרחי ורצוי להסדר ביו"ש ועזה.
2. ישראל מניחה כי קיים מרחב ניכר של שיתוף-אינטרסים בינה לבין ירדן, המאפשר קיום משא ומתן והגעה להסדר בנוגע ליו"ש ועזה, תוך חתימת חוזה שלום בין שתי המדינות.
3. מסמכי היסוד של התהליך המדיני, ובמיוחד הסכם קמפ-דייביד, מספקים את הבסיס להזמנת ירדן להצטרף לתהליך ומעניקים לה מספר תפקידים ספציפיים, אולם הם אינם מספקים ויש להוסיף עליהם תנאים שיאפשרו שילוב ירדן במו"מ ובהסדר.
4. לירדן יש אילוצים - פנימיים ובינעריביים - המכתיבים את פעולותיה ומשפיעים על עמדותיה. על ישראל לקחת אילוצים אלה בחשבון בעת קביעת עמדותיה היא לגבי מהלכי המו"מ ומהות ההסדר.

ב. הבסיס למו"מ עם ירדן

1. תכנית ה-Self-Rule של רה"מ בגין

המונח "אופציה ירדנית" עומד, בתפיסה המקובלת, בניגוד למונח "אופציה פלסטינית", והוא מזוהה בדרך כלל עם המונח "פשרה טריטוריאלית". גילומה של תפיסה זו מצוי בהחלטת הממשלה מיום 21.7.1974 שאמרה: "הממשלה תעשה למען משא-ומתן להסכם שלום עם ירדן. השלום יושג על קיום שתי מדינות עצמאיות בלבד - ישראל ובירתה ירושלים המאוחדת ומדינה ערבית ירדנית-פלסטינאית ממזרח, בגבולות שיקבעו במשא-ומתן בין ישראל לירדן. במדינה זו תבוא לכלל ביטוי הזהות העצמית של הירדנים והפלסטינאים, תוך שלום ושכנות טובה עם ישראל".

תכנית ה-Self-Rule של בגין, מדצמבר 1977, באה למעשה לקעקע תפיסה זו באמצעות הסדר קבע ביו"ש ועזה שיתבסס על מתן תפקיד מוגדר לכל אחד מהגורמים - ישראל,

85. King Hussein Ibn Talal of Jordan, Proposal for a United Arab Kingdom, Excerpts, March 15, 1972

We are happy to declare that the bases of the proposed formula for the new phase are as follows; . .

1. The Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan shall become a United Arab Kingdom and shall bear this name.

2. The United Arab Kingdom shall consist of two regions:

a. The Palestine region which will consist of the West Bank and any other Palestinian territories which are liberated and whose inhabitants desire to join it.

b. The Jordan region which will consist of the East Bank.

3. Amman shall be the central capital of the kingdom as well as the capital of the Jordan region.

4. Jerusalem shall be the capital of the Palestine region.

5. The head of the state shall be the king, who will assume the central executive authority with the help of a central cabinet. The central legislative authority shall be vested in the king and an assembly to be known as the national assembly. Members of this assembly shall be elected by direct secret ballot. Both regions shall be equally represented in this assembly.

6. The central judicial authority shall be vested in a central supreme court.

7. The kingdom shall have unified armed forces whose supreme commander is the king.

8. The responsibilities of the central executive authority shall be confined to affairs connected with the kingdom as an international entity to guarantee the kingdom's safety, stability and prosperity.

9. The executive authority in each region shall be assumed by a governor general from among its sons and a regional cabinet from among its sons as well.

10. Legislative authority in each region shall be assumed by a council to be called the people's council. It shall be elected by direct secret voting. This council will elect the region's governor general.

11. The judicial authority in the region shall be in the hands of the region's courts, and no one will have power over them.

12. The executive authority in each region shall assume responsibility for all the affairs of the region except such affairs as the constitution defines as coming under the jurisdiction of the central executive authority.

Naturally the implementation of this formula and its bases should be according to the constitutional norms in force. It will be referred to the [Jordanian] National Assembly to adopt the necessary measures to prepare a new constitution for the country.

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ניהול פנקסי חשבונות — חובה וגם כדאי

לפני : פנקס עזרי

אבות : אריה אקל

דואר רשמי

מדינת ישראל

ANSWERS TO JORDANIAN QUESTIONS

1. DOES THE UNITED STATES INTEND TO BE A FULL PARTNER IN NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION IN GENERAL? AT WHAT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL THE UNITED STATES PARTICIPATE AND IN WHAT ROLE?

YES, THE UNITED STATES WILL BE A FULL PARTNER IN ALL THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, LEADING TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST, LASTING AND COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST PEACE.

THE UNITED STATES WILL USE ITS FULL INFLUENCE TO SEE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE BROUGHT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

PRESIDENT CARTER WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE AN ACTIVE PERSONAL PART IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. WHAT DOES THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT MEAN IN ITS PARAGRAPH (A) 1, WHERE IT REFERS TO "THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE?"

NO COMPREHENSIVE DEFINITION IS ATTEMPTED. IN SOME CASES, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ARE SPECIFIED. IN ONE CASE, IT IS CLEAR THAT "OTHER PALESTINIANS AS MUTUALLY AGREED" REFERS TO REPRESENTATIVES FROM OUTSIDE THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND NEED NOT BE CITIZENS OF EGYPT OR JORDAN. PALESTINIANS WHO ARE CITIZENS OF EGYPT OR JORDAN MAY, OF COURSE, BE MEMBERS OF THE NEGOTIATING TEAMS REPRESENTING THOSE COUNTRIES. IN OTHER CASES, THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY ITSELF IS MENTIONED.

THE UNITED STATES INTERPRETS THE PHRASE "THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE" NOT IN TERMS OF ANY SINGLE GROUP OR ORGANIZATION AS REPRESENTING THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE BUT AS ENCOMPASSING THOSE ELECTED OR CHOSEN FOR PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT THE PURPOSES OF THE NEGOTIATION AS DEFINED IN UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, AND IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SETTLEMENT WILL BE PREPARED TO LIVE IN PEACE AND GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

3. WHY HAS THE DURATION OF FIVE YEARS BEEN CHOSEN FOR THE TRANSITION PERIOD IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA?

THE IDEA OF A FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WAS AN AMERICAN SUGGESTION WHICH WAS FIRST PUT TO THE PARTIES IN THE SUMMER OF 1977. THE KEY POINT IS THE CONCEPT OF A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD -- NOT THE PRECISE DURATION OF FIVE YEARS WHICH HAS BEEN SUGGESTED AND AGREED.

WE BELIEVE A TRANSITIONAL PROCESS OF SEVERAL YEARS -- AT THE OUTSET OF WHICH THE ISRAELI MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ITS CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION WILL BE WITHDRAWN AND A SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY ESTABLISHED FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA INHABITANTS -- CAN DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM A TRANSITION TO PEACE CAN BE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED. WE SEE THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AS ESSENTIAL TO BUILD CONFIDENCE, GAIN MOMENTUM AND BRING ABOUT THE CHANGES IN ATTITUDES THAT CAN ASSURE A FINAL SETTLEMENT WHICH REALIZES THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WHILE ASSURING THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AND OF THE OTHER PARTIES.

4. (A) WHAT IS THE GEOGRAPHICAL DEFINITION OF THE "WEST BANK" AND OF GAZA IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT? IS ARAB JERUSALEM AND ITS SURROUNDING ARAB AREAS INCORPORATED INTO ISRAEL AFTER JUNE 1967 INCLUDED IN THE DEFINITION OF THE "WEST BANK?"

IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES THE TERM "WEST BANK AND GAZA" DESCRIBES ALL OF THE AREA WEST OF THE JORDAN RIVER UNDER JORDANIAN ADMINISTRATION PRIOR TO THE 1967 WAR AND ALL OF THE AREA EAST OF THE WESTERN BORDER OF THE BRITISH MANDATE OF PALESTINE WHICH PRIOR TO THE 1967 WAR WAS UNDER EGYPTIAN CONTROL AND IS KNOWN AS THE GAZA STRIP.

WITH RESPECT TO NEGOTIATIONS ENVISAGED IN THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT, WE BELIEVE A DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE BETWEEN JERUSALEM AND THE REST OF THE WEST BANK BECAUSE OF THE CITY'S SPECIAL STATUS AND CIRCUMSTANCES. WE WOULD ENVISAGE, THEREFORE, A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION FOR THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM THAT COULD BE DIFFERENT IN CHARACTER IN SOME RESPECTS FROM THAT OF THE REST OF THE WEST BANK.

THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDGED BY THE UNILATERAL ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN IN JERUSALEM SINCE THE 1967 WAR. THE FULL UNITED STATES POSITION ON JERUSALEM REMAINS AS STATED BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON JULY 14, 1967, AND BY AMBASSADOR YOST TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON JULY 1, 1969.

4. (B) AT THE END OF THE FIVE YEARS OF TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, WHAT WOULD BE THE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND OF GAZA FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SOVEREIGNTY?

THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, SHOULD BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 IN ALL ITS PARTS IN NEGOTIATIONS AMONG JORDAN, EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WHICH SHOULD BEGIN NOT LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. UNDER THE TERMS OF THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT, THE OUTCOME OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS -- INCLUDING DETERMINING THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY -- SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO A VOTE BY THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA FOR RATIFICATION OR REJECTION.

SINCE THE NEGOTIATION OF THE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN AND THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ARE INTERRELATED, THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN BOTH THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

THUS PALESTINIANS WILL PARTICIPATE IN EACH NEGOTIATION TO RESOLVE THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

4. (C) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION REGARDING THESE QUESTIONS?

THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL DEFINITION OF THE TERM "WEST BANK AND GAZA" IS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 4(A) ABOVE. THE UNITED STATES POSITION REGARDING THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IS EXPRESSED IN PARAGRAPH 4 (B) ABOVE.

4. (D) WILL ANY ISRAELI FORCES REMAIN IN ANY PART OF THE WEST BANK AND OF GAZA AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS? IF SO, BY WHAT RIGHT AND WITH WHAT JUSTIFICATION?

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AFTER THE FIVE-YEAR INTERIM PERIOD IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF THE POSSIBLE RETENTION OF ISRAELI SECURITY PERSONNEL AND THE DURATION OF ANY SUCH PRESENCE, MUST BE DEALT WITH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS

ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA THAT ARE TO BEGIN NO LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD.

4. (E) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION REGARDING THESE QUESTIONS?

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE AGREEMENT ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA MUST MEET THE LEGITIMATE ~~ASPIRATIONS OF THE~~ PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND PROVIDE FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS. THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT OPPOSE, IF AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES, THE STATIONING IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA OF LIMITED NUMBERS OF ISRAELI SECURITY PERSONNEL IN SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED AREAS, AND WITH A DEFINED ROLE, AS ONE ELEMENT IN PROVIDING FOR THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL.

5. DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, UNDER WHAT HIGHER SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY WOULD THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY OPERATE? WOULD IT BE A UNITED NATIONS OR A SIMILAR NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY? WHAT SOURCE WOULD FINANCE THE BUDGETARY NEEDS OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY? WHAT WOULD BE THE EXTENT OF ITS POWERS? WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE THE LIMITATIONS ON ITS POWERS?

THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES THAT THE PARTIES, I.E., EGYPT, ISRAEL AND JORDAN, WITH PALESTINIANS IN THE EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN DELEGATIONS, "WILL NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL DEFINE THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY TO BE EXERCISED IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA." THUS THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY IN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS ESTABLISHED BY AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT AMONG THE THREE PARTIES. THE AGREEMENT WILL DEFINE THE POWERS OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY AND PROVIDE FULL AUTONOMY FOR THE INHABITANTS. NOTHING IN THE FRAMEWORK EXCLUDES THE PARTIES FROM DECIDING, SHOULD THEY SO AGREE, TO GIVE A SUPERVISORY OR OTHER ROLE TO A UNITED NATIONS OR SIMILAR NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY OR TO DECIDE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY.

IN ADDITION, DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, REPRESENTATIVES OF EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY WILL CONSTITUTE A CONTINUING COMMITTEE WHICH MAY DEAL WITH MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN. METHODS OF FINANCING OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY WERE NOT DISCUSSED AT CAMP DAVID AND REMAIN TO BE SET OUT IN THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES.

6. (A) WHERE THE DOCUMENT REFERS TO THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY WHICH IS TO BE CONSTITUTED IN THE WEST BANK-GAZA AREA, DOES THE JURISDICTION OF THIS AUTHORITY EXTEND TO THE PART OF JERUSALEM WHICH HAD BEEN PART OF THE WEST BANK WHEN IT FELL UNDER OCCUPATION AS WELL AS OTHER ANNEXED AREAS AROUND IT, BOTH IN TERMS OF TERRITORY AND PEOPLE?

AS STATED ABOVE, THE ISSUE OF THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM WAS NOT RESOLVED AT CAMP DAVID AND MUST BE DEALT WITH IN SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. THE QUESTIONS OF HOW THE ARAB INHABITANTS OF EAST JERUSALEM RELATE TO THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY REMAINS TO BE DETERMINED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

6. (B) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON THIS QUESTION?

IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS THE UNITED STATES WILL SUPPORT PROPOSALS THAT WOULD PERMIT ARAB INHABITANTS OF EAST JERUSALEM WHO ARE NOT ISRAELI CITIZENS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS TO CONSTITUTE THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY AND IN THE WORK OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY ITSELF. IT IS PROBABLY NOT REALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT THE FULL SCOPE OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY CAN BE EXTENDED TO EAST JERUSALEM DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, PREJUDGE THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM, WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT ARE TO BEGIN NO LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

7. (A) AT THE END OF THE FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, WHAT WOULD BE THE STATUS OF OCCUPIED ARAB JERUSALEM?

THE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS, AS WELL AS PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN, WILL BE DETERMINED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH A.1(C) OF THE FRAMEWORK. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE STATUS OF THAT PORTION OF JERUSALEM WHICH ISRAEL OCCUPIED IN 1967 SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS.* THE FRAMEWORK ENVISAGES THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL INVOLVE EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

* PROVISIONS REGARDING JERUSALEM COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENTS THAT EMERGE FROM EITHER OR BOTH OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. (B) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON THIS MATTER?

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES ON JERUSALEM IS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 4(A) ABOVE. THE FINAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDGED BY THE UNILATERAL ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN IN JERUSALEM SINCE THE 1967 WAR. WHATEVER SOLUTION IS AGREED UPON SHOULD PRESERVE JERUSALEM AS A PHYSICALLY UNDIVIDED CITY. IT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR FREE ACCESS TO THE JEWISH, MUSLIM, AND CHRISTIAN HOLY PLACES WITHOUT DISTINCTION OR DISCRIMINATION FOR THE FREE EXERCISE OF WORSHIP. IT SHOULD ASSURE THE BASIC RIGHTS OF ALL THE CITY'S RESIDENTS. THE HOLY PLACES OF EACH FAITH SHOULD BE UNDER THE FULL AUTHORITY OF THEIR REPRESENTATIVES.

8. (A) WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS DURING AND AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD? WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE PROPERTIES ACQUIRED AND CONSTRUCTION MADE THERE AND WHAT WOULD THEIR STATUS BE?

THE FRAMEWORK DOES NOT DEAL WITH THE STATUS OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS, NOR WITH THE PROPERTIES ACQUIRED OR CONSTRUCTION MADE THERE. THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY, WHICH WILL EXERCISE FULL AUTONOMY ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, WILL BE DEFINED IN AN AGREEMENT TO BE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN AND, AS PROVIDED IN THE FRAMEWORK, PALESTINIANS FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA OR OTHER PALESTINIANS AS MUTUALLY AGREED TO BE ON THE EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN NATIONAL DELEGATIONS. THE QUESTION OF THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, WILL HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH IN THE COURSE OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS. THE FRAMEWORK ALSO PROVIDES FOR A CONTINUING COMMITTEE, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY, WHICH MAY DEAL WITH OUTSTANDING MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

THE QUESTION OF THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND THEIR STATUS AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WOULD BE A MATTER FOR DISCUSSION DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH A.1.(C).

8. (B) WHAT WILL BE ISRAEL'S OBLIGATION, DURING THE COMING PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, REGARDING THE POLICY OF SETTLEMENT?

IT IS THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES THAT ISRAEL SHOULD REFRAIN FROM CREATING NEW SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL DETERMINE THE QUESTION OF EXISTING SETTLEMENTS AS WELL AS ANY NEW SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

8. (C) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION REGARDING BOTH OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONS?

THE UNITED STATES' POSITION IS THAT SETTLEMENTS ESTABLISHED DURING A MILITARY OCCUPATION ARE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR. HOWEVER, IN A RELATIONSHIP OF PEACE, THE PARTIES TO THE PEACE SHOULD DEFINE THE MUTUAL RIGHTS OF INHABITANTS TO DO BUSINESS, TO WORK, TO LIVE, AND TO CARRY ON OTHER TRANSACTIONS IN EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY.

9. (A) WILL THE ISRAELI CITIZENS WHO RESIDE AT PRESENT IN THE SETTLEMENTS BE ELIGIBLE FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY AND ITS SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITIES?

ISRAELI CITIZENS RESIDING IN SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA COULD PARTICIPATE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY ONLY AS MEMBERS OF THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATING DELEGATION; THERE IS NO PROVISION FOR THEIR SEPARATE PARTICIPATION. THEIR PARTICIPATION, IF ANY, IN THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY MUST BE DETERMINED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL REGIME.

9. (B) WHAT WILL BE THE STATUS OF THE ISRAELI CITIZENS RESIDING IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND WILL THERE BE ANY, AND IF SO WHAT WOULD THEIR STATUS BE AFTER THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD?

THE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER PARAGRAPH 1.A. (2) DEFINING THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AUTHORITY WILL DEAL WITH THE STATUS OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND, ACCORDINGLY, WITH THE STATUS OF ISRAELI CITIZENS RESIDING IN THEM.

WHATEVER NUMBER THAT MIGHT REMAIN BEYOND THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, AND THEIR STATUS, WOULD PRESUMABLY BE AGREED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ENVISAGED UNDER PARAGRAPH A.1.(C).

10. (A) AT THE END OF THE FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, WILL THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA EXERCISE IN FREEDOM THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN ORDER TO DECIDE THEIR POLITICAL FUTURE?

THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES FOR THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WILL DETERMINE THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND, IN ADDITION, FOR THEIR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES TO RATIFY OR REJECT THE AGREEMENT REACHED IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS. THE FRAMEWORK FURTHER PROVIDES THAT THE SOLUTION FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR JUST REQUIREMENTS. THE WIDE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE RESULTS OF THIS PROCESS IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL PARTIES AND IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO ITS BEING CARRIED OUT "IN FREEDOM." IN THIS RESPECT, AT THE TIME THE PROCESS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS TAKING PLACE, A STRONG LOCAL POLICE FORCE WILL EXIST AND WILL BE RESPONSIBLE TO THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO INTERFERENCE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS THAT ENSURES THESE RIGHTS.

10. (B) WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON THIS QUESTION?

THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR OWN FUTURE, AND BELIEVES THAT THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES FOR SUCH PARTICIPATION IN ALL THE IMPORTANT STEPS IN DETERMINING THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT PARAGRAPH A.1.(C)(2) DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE HOLDING OF AN ELECTION BY THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF ELECTING REPRESENTATIVES TO WHOM THAT AGREEMENT WILL BE SUBMITTED FOR A VOTE.

11. (A) WHAT SOLUTION DOES THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ENVISAGE FOR THE PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIANS LIVING OUTSIDE THE OCCUPIED AREAS AS REFUGEES AND FOR THE RESTORATION OF THEIR RIGHTS?

PARAGRAPH A.4. OF THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES THAT EGYPT AND ISRAEL WILL WORK TOGETHER WITH OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES TO AGREE ON A RESOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROCEDURES AGREED UPON IS TO BE PROMPT, JUST AND PERMANENT.

PARAGRAPH A.3. OF THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES FOR A CONTINUING COMMITTEE TO DECIDE ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ADMISSION TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA OF PERSONS DISPLACED FROM THOSE AREAS IN 1967.

IN ADDITION, AS THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT TAKE SHAPE ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THOSE INSTITUTIONS AND THE PALESTINIANS LIVING OUTSIDE THE AREAS WOULD BE ADDRESSED.

11. (B) WHAT DOES THE UNITED STATES REGARD AS THE BASIS FOR THE SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION? HOW DOES IT DEFINE THESE RIGHTS?

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT A RESOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM SHOULD REFLECT APPLICABLE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS. ANY PROGRAM FOR IMPLEMENTATION MUST PROVIDE THOSE REFUGEES LIVING OUTSIDE THE WEST BANK AND GAZA A CHOICE AND OPPORTUNITY IN SETTLING THEMSELVES PERMANENTLY IN THE CONTEXT OF PRESENT-DAY REALITIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES.

12. WHAT DOES THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ENVISAGE FOR THE FUTURE OF THE REST OF THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES? WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THIS QUESTION?

THE FRAMEWORK STATES THAT IT IS INTENDED TO CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH OF ITS OTHER NEIGHBORS. IT FURTHER STATES THAT THE OBJECTIVE IS A JUST, COMPREHENSIVE, AND DURABLE PEACE AND THAT EACH NEGOTIATION MUST CARRY OUT ALL THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. PARAGRAPH C.1. SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FRAMEWORK SHOULD APPLY TO TREATIES BETWEEN

ISRAEL AND JORDAN, SYRIA, AND LEBANON IN ADDITION TO EGYPT. CONCERNING THE WEST BANK IN PARTICULAR, PARAGRAPH A.1.(C) REQUIRES NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON ALL THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF RESOLUTION 242 WHICH WILL RESOLVE, AMONG OTHER MATTERS, THE LOCATION OF BOUNDARIES. THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO ADVOCATE A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE INVOLVING ALL OF ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS. AS REGARDS THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, THE UNITED STATES WILL SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF ALL THE PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION 242 TO SUCH A SETTLEMENT. //

13. IN THE DEFINITION OF THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN THE AREA, DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ENDORSE THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY ON THESE REQUIREMENTS OR DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REGARD THESE REQUIREMENTS TO BE ONE SIDED ONLY?

THE UNITED STATES FULLY ENDORSES THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY AS APPLIED TO SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE PREAMBLE TO THE FRAMEWORK SPECIFICALLY REFERS TO RECIPROCITY AS THE BASIS ON WHICH THE PARTIES CAN AGREE TO SPECIAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE FRAMEWORK ALSO REFERS TO THE SECURITY CONCERNS "OF ALL PARTIES" AND TO THE SECURITY OF "ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS."

14. AS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 IS STATED TO BE THE BASIS OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE WEST BANK-GAZA AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CONFLICT, WHAT WOULD THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DO IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS BETWEEN THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PREVIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND COMMITMENTS BASED THEREON WHICH WERE THE BASIS OF ACCEPTANCE BY JORDAN OF THE SAID RESOLUTION?

THE UNITED STATES WILL, FIRST, ADHERE TO ITS OWN CONSISTENT INTERPRETATION OF RESOLUTION 242, AND IN PARTICULAR TO ITS INTERPRETATION THAT THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION OF THAT RESOLUTION APPLIES ON ALL FRONTS. IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS AMONG THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES, THE UNITED STATES WILL SEEK, AS IT DID DURING THE INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS AT CAMP DAVID, TO BRING ABOUT A CONSENSUS AMONG THE PARTIES AND WILL MAKE KNOWN ITS OWN INTERPRETATIONS AS REQUIRED TO BRING ABOUT

RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT. THE INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES REMAIN THOSE IT HAS HELD
SINCE 1967.

JIMMY CARTER