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# מדינת ישראל

## משרדי הממשלה

משרד

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מס' תיק מקורי

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מחלקה 101 ת.ק. 101

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

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סיוע.

שמיעת עדויות בועדת החוץ של הסנט. התקיימו שתי ישיבות: 14/4 - הופיע באקלי בלווית גנרל אהמן, ג'וסף ווילר (AID) ורוברט סייר (SAYRE) ראש קבוצה בינמסרדית לענייני טרור.

באקלי הציג תכנית סיוע החוץ ל-83 בכללותה. דבריו דומים לדברי וליוסט בועדת החוץ של הבית (נוסח מלא בדים). תיאר סיוע בטחוני כ- *MOST COST EFFICIENT INVESTMENT* אמר שהתכנית נבדקה בקפדנות ע"י הנשיא. 53 אחוזים מסך כל הסיוע למטרות במדה"ת. בטחון ובריאות כלכלית של ישראל ומצרים צורך להרחבת השלום. הצדיק הבקשות להלוואות בתנאים מיוחדים ( *CONCESSIONAL* ) במצב עומס החובות על המדינות המקבלות ושיעורי הריבית הגבוהים. (לא ציין איזה מדינות סובלות מעומס חובות אך הזכיר מאוחר יותר את תורכיה לה מבקשים להקציב 300 מיליון תלוואה בתנאים מיוחדים. יצוין שגם לגבי ישראל הציעו בסיוע הכלכלי 2/3 בהלוואה בתנאים מיוחדים דבר שנחשב לנסיגה לעומת מענק ל-83 בחוק ההרשאה שכבר אושר). הזכיר מענקים לרכש צבאי לישראל 500 מיליון (לעומת 550 שכבר אושרו) למצרים 400 ולטורן 50. נוסף לנ"ל העלה בקשות לסכומים קטנים יחסית לרשות חדשה שתעסוק בהדרכה בלוחמה בטרור למדינות אחרות, תכנית השתלמויות לאנשי צבא על בסיס הדדיות לפי הסכמים בילטרליים שיסוכמו אחרי האישור והסרת הגבלות מסויימות על סיוע לסיין העמית.

גנרל אהמן אמר שעיקר החוספות המבוקשות הן לצורך הגדלת הסיוע בהלוואות לרכש צבאי לישראל, מצרים, מדינות אחרות. העלה בקשה לאישור מכירת פריטים בטחוניים המיוצרים במתקנים ממשלתיים לחברות מסחריות "כאשר הנוגעים בדבר מסכימים שהמכירה צריכה להיות מסחרית" (הדבר אומר דרשני).

היו"ר פרסי פתח בהודיעו על כוונת הועדה לקיים את ה- *Mark-up* על חוק הסיוע ב-3 במאי (תאריך מוקדם יותר מהערכותינו הקודמות). ציין שיש התנגדות בין חברי הועדה להעלות סכומים מעבר למה שכבר אושר. רמז שאם הממשל רוצה גמישות מצד הועדה אזי טיראה גמישות בבקשת התקציב למשרד ההגנה. לדעת פרסי לא יתכן ששני תקציב אלה (סיוע ומשרד ההגנה) יועלו כאשר נדרשים לקצץ בכל היתר. פרסי שאל (למשל) אם יש הצדקה להקציב לישראל ומצרים 52 אחוזים מסך כל הסיוע כאשר שתי מדינות אלה אינן ממוקדות על בעיות המפרץ. באקלי השיב שעוד אין שלום בין ישראל



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ושכנותיה האחרות ולכן זו "פריסת" מימון חיונית לאינטרסים של ארה"ב. פרטי חזר לשאלתו כיצד אפשר להצדיק העלאת סכומי סיוע חוץ מבלי להציע קיצוץ לקביל מבקשת החקציב של משרד ההגנת. באקלי השיב שאם יש מצית בזדון חופשי (ANSONIST) אין מחסלים את מכבי האש. הסביר שבתוך התוספת פריטים חיוניים כגון 275 מיליון לספרד, 300 מיליון לישראל כדי לעזור לה להתגבר על F-15 שנמכרו לערב הסעודית והתחלת תכנית המכירות לפקיסטן הסמוכה לאפגניסטן. פרטי הביע דעתו שיש להכניס כל סוגי הסיוע (כולל הלואה - FMS) בחקציב. פרטי יציע לדון בכך בוועדת החקציב "ויתכן שזו תהיה השנה האחרונה בה הקונגרס יסכים להעלים סכומי ההלוואות מסך כל החקציב". הסביר שהרי אין בטחון שההלוואות יוחזרו ויש לראותן כהוצאה תקציבית. סנטור פל שאל מדוע הדגש על סיוע צבאי. באקלי השיב שלדעתו הבעיות דורשות פתרונות צבאיים. המגמה להגביר כושר ההרתעה.

סנטור פרטלר אמר שקשה יותר ויותר להצביע בעד סיוע חוץ בזמן קיצוצים מבית. חשוב שהסנט יוכל להטביר לאזרחים מה מושג בסי ע. באקלי השיב ש"אין אנו עוסקים בשליחות אלטרואיסטית, אלא באינטרסים אמריקנים ישירים". פרטלר במשפט אחד כיצד היית מסביר התועלת בסיוע באקלי למנוע הצורך בשיגור חיילים אמריקנים (הביא את תורכיה כדוגמא). "עוצמה קונה שלום". סנטור הלמס הצטרף לדעת פרטי שיש לכלול כל ההלוואות בתקציב. רוב העם אינו יודע שההלוואות נספגות משוק הכספים שמקורוחיו מצטמצמים בסכומים אלה.

15/4 - הופיעו וליוטיס, ווסט, ווילר (AID) וכן נמסרו הודעות על ידי נציגי AIPAC ארגון ערבים אמריקניים (MAAA) וחליגה האמריקנית לבנונית (רוברט באסיל). הופץ חומר של AIPAC ו MAARA שיגיעכם בדים. ישב ראש בושביץ ונכח רק עוד סנטור אחד סרבנס.

בושביץ פתח בציינו שמכירות ציוד צבאי המופיעות בהצעת הסיוע הן רק חלק מהתמונה. יש גם מכירות במזומן מארה"ב ואספקה ממקורות אחרים. למדינות הנפט יש יותר נשק מלנאס"ו.

וליוטיס הקריא דברי הפתיחה (במלואם בדיפ). בין מטרות הסיוע הזכיר המחוייבות לסייע בפתרון סכסוכים. במזה"ת אנו מעילים בטאיפתנו לחשיג שלום כולל, צודק ובר-קיימא מבוסס על הסכמי קמפ-דויד הנובעים מהחלטות 242 338. פועלים במרץ במו"מ לאוטונומיה כשלב חיוני בתהליך השלום. היטוד ההכרחי הוא לאפשר השתתפות פלסטינית הדרושה לממשל מעבר (TRANSITIONAL REGIME) לפי עקרונות התואמים את הסכמי קמפ-דויד.



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מאמינים שהסכם הפסקת האש שהשיג חביב ביולי יכול וימשיך להחזיק. זה חשוב לתהליך הפיוס הפנימי בלבנון הנוהן הסיכוי הטוב ביותר לנסיגה הדרגתית (PHASE) ומסודרת של כוחות סוריה. (בהודעה מאוחר יותר תקף רוברט באסיל הלבנוני את וליוטיס מסקנתו זו ואמר שמצער מאד שמחטי"ד עודם מחזיקים באסליה זו.

וליוטיס המשיך וקבע כאכסיומה שבטחון ישראל ושלומה מרכזיים במדיניות ארה"ב למז"ח. הסיוע ל FMS מיועד לאפשר לישראל להחזיק ביחרונה הטכנולוגי. כן הזכיר וליוטיס בקסה ל-15 מיליון ESF לפרויקטים של מחקר בשתוף פעולה בין ישראל ומצרים ו-4.4 מיליון למתוח בשטחים באמצעות ארגונים וולנטרים.

ווסט ציין שחלק המענקים בסיוע כעת מבכל שנה מאז מלחמת העולם. מעריך את הסיוע הסובייטי למדינות שונות בכפול מהסיוע האמריקני. הסכנות לנפט מאפגניסטן, דרי חימן ואפשרות בצחון איראני. כמו כן ש"פ איראן-סוריה ואולי לוב. העיד הראשון: להבטיח בטחון ישראל ולקדם את השלום. היעד השני: להבטיח המדינות האחרות באיזור מסכנות אחרות באזור. היעד השלישי: להגן מפני התקפה סובייטית. זה תפקיד ה RDF הנשיא חזר על מדיניותו של ישראל צריך להשמר היתרון הטכנולוגי. "אנו מכירים בצורך להגביר שתוף פעולה האטרטגי".

ווילר אמר שישראל עודנה בקשיים כלכליים, אך היא שומרת על רמת חיים ומצליחה גם להמשיך חמושה. למצרים כעת הכנסות של כ-10 ביליון (מהתעלה), מיצוא נפט ומהכנסות עובדים בחו"ל) לעומת 4 ביליון ב-76.

סנטור ברבנס (פנה לוליטיס) אינו מבין את כל צורת ההגשה של הממשל. מדוע מתעלמים מכך שרוב הסיוע כבר אושר ונחתם כחוק על ידי הנשיא ומתחילים מאלף. מדוע לא מתרכזים על החוספת המבוקשת במקום להתחיל בהנמקות מחדש על הסיוע כולו. סרבנס ביקש להפריד סכומי התוספת ולדון בהם. נראה לו שהממשל רוצה לשנות מה שכבר אושר. וליוטיס נכנס למבוכה אך התחיל לפרט התוספות. סרבנס ביקש לדעת אם התוספות לישראל בטך 300 מיליון הנה נסיון כנה לסייע לה. וליוטיס השיב בחיוב. סרבנס המשיך לחקור בענין חלוקת ה ESF לחלק מענק וחלק הלואה וכן מדוע מבקש הממשל לישראל רק 500 מענק ולא 550 שכבר אושרו. וליוטיס (הפעם נוחת דפנסיבי משהיה בחקירה דומה בוועדת הביח) אמר שאכן האישור 550 אך הממשל מבקש רק 500. סרבנס משמעו שאתם רוצים להקטין את המענק. אינני מבין כיצד אתם יכולים לאמור שכוונתכם כנה לסייע לישראל. אני רואה מגמה שחגיביר עוד יותר את המעמסה הכלכלית על ישראל. וליוטיס התשובה היחידה שאני יכול לתת היא שרצינו לאזן את סיוענו לישראל מול הבעיה הכללית של תקציבנו. סרבנס קסה להבין מדוע הממשל מנסה לסגת ממה שכבר השיג. אם נקבע שכל ה-300 יהיו מענק נחזור



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לחלוקה 50-50 שהיתה מקובלת. השאלה היחידה שלפנינו היא לקבוע באיזה הנאים ינתנו ה-300 לישראל. סרבנס המשיך לחקור גם לגבי הסכומים המוצעים למצרים והגיע למסקנה שגם כאן הממשל חוזר בו מתנאים טובים יותר שאושרו (לגבי ESF) לעומת זאת הצביע שגם FMS מבקש הממשל מענק למחצית התוספת (200 מתוך 400) בעוד לישראל אין מבקשים מענק מתוך התוספת. אמר שזה מסר לא נכון לישראל. כיצד על ישראל להבין ז וליוטיס טען שלישראל יש כבר מענק 500 מיליון (100 יותר מלמצרים) סרבנס לא התיחס לזה וסיים באזהרה לממשל שלא ינסה לפתוח מחדש את כל נושא הסיוע. (שיגיש בקשה לתוספות אך לא ישנה מה שכבר אושר). סרבנס חזר לנקודת המסר. אמר לוליוטיס הרי תודה שיש בעיה של תפיסה פוליטית מלבד האימפקט התקציבי. וליוטיס זה לא צריך להיראות כאיתות פוליטי. זו לא כוונתנו. סרבנס זה לא מתקבל כך. וליוטיס הלוואות אינן תקציביות. אני מקווה שכל שינוי, שהקונגרס יעשה לא יהיה על חשבון תכניות אחרות. בושביץ לחלק מהשינויים אין אימפקט תקציבי ולכן זה נתפס כשינוי מדיני. בושביץ (פונה לוויילר) תשלומי ישראל לארה"ב ע"ח ההלוואות יהיו ב-83 יותר מ-800 מיליון. ובעתיד יגדלו. וויילר כמובן שיגדלו כתוצאה מיותר הלוואות. אך אנו מצפים שיהיה ביכולת ישראל להתגבר על התשלומים הגבוהים יותר בעתיד. בושביץ (לוליוטיס) חדווה ואזור קווה נסק רב האם לדעתך לא נסחף היתרון האיכותי. וליוטיס לדעתי כל הדיבורים עלסוף ביתרון חלויים בגורמים אחרים במשוואה ובמתח הזמן. מומחינו סבורים שלישראל ישמר היתרון לזמן מה לעתיד ( SOME TIME ) בושביץ מדגיש מרוץ החימוש הגורם לערעור היציבות לא רק בין ישראל ושכנותיה אלה גם בין השכנים לבין עצמם. וליוטיס מצער שזה כך. אלה הנסיבות המניעות את ארצות האיזור לרצות נסק מודרני. הם רואים בידי מדינות המאיימות עליהם כמויות גדולות של נסק סובייטי. נכון שיש בזה הגיון של מלחמה. לכן אמרנו שמכירות נסק הם חלק בלבד ממדיניותנו. המכירות מיועדות לרכוש השפעה ולקדם את השלום. ברה"מ השתמשה באספקת נסק כאמצעי עיקרי לרכישת השפעה. אנו צריכים להיענות לבקשות של ידידים. אנו מקפידים שבהיענותנו לבקשות ממדינות שכנות לישראל לא ייפגע יתרונה. לפעמים אין הסכמה ביננו והישראלים בהערכת הסיכון. זה טבע הדברים. ווסט הסכים עם ווליוטיס. אכן הפער הכמותי שהיה 6:1 ירד ל-5:1. מאידך מצרים שהיתה אויב עיקרי לישראל ירדה מהספק. יש לישראל יתרונות ברמת התחזוקה וישראל מצטיינת בלחימה מהירה שזו מגמת ההתפתחות הטכנולוגית. בושביץ לי יש ספק בהערכתכם. לפני שנה אמרו המומחים שלכם שאירן לא תדע לחזק ולהתחמש בנסק שבזדה ביעילות וראה כעת. מה בקשר לירדן? ווסט ראשית: ירדן היא מתונה וידידה. נכון שירדן היא מדינת עמות עם ישראל, אך לישראל העלינו את הסיוע ולירדן עדיין ב-75 אחוז פחות משהיה בעבר. לירדן בעיה עם סוריה.



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מס' מברק 201

אלו

בוטביץ מבקש מוליוטיס לספר על ביקורו באזור. וליוטיס לגבי 25/4 מצא הן בישראל והן במצרים שזה תאריך שיצאין התחלה חדשה. "אני בטוח בזה מאד". אין להתפלא שבשתי המדינות קיימת דאגה, מסיבות שונות. בישראל למרות 5 שנים של מגעים עם מצרים זהו צעד לקראת הלא ידוע. כמו כן הטראומה האמיתית של סינוי שארית התושבים מימית. זה יוצר אורה המעוררת שאלות. גם במצרים עולות שאלות, אמנם שונות. במצב זה רק טבעי שארה"ב תמלא תפקידה המלא במתן תשובות לשאלות ותסיר ספקות. זו סיבת ביקורי וביקור סטטל.

בסיום הישיבה בנוכחות קהל מועט הופיעו תום דיין, דויד סאד ( ~~NAAR~~ ) ורוברט באסיל. באסיל הדגיש אי אמונו במאמצי הפיוס הפנימי בלבנון ואמר שכך לא יהיו שם בחירות דמוקרטיות. כדי להבטיח בחירות אמיתיות יש לסלק הסורים, להסתלט על אשיף ולחזק את צבא לבנון. ביקש סיוע לשלוש השנים הבאות בהיקף 100 מיליון בשנה לצבא לבנון ו-100 מיליון לשנה לשנה לשיקום. סאד תקף את היקף הסיוע לישראל שלדבריו עולה למשלם המיסים האמריקני יותר מ-600 דולר לכל ישראלי. תמך בבקשות באסיל לסיוע מבלי להכנס לפרטים. בוטביץ הפסיקו ושאל אם תומך גם בשילוק הסורים מלבנון. סאד התחמק מתשובה. ניכר שלא רצה להתנגס עם באסיל. בוטביץ אמר שחח הועדה שלו תקיים בקרוב שמיעת עדויות על הנוכחות הסורית בלבנון. באסיל הודה לו.

אבילאה

הנה סוכנות ההגנה של ארצות הברית  
היא אחראית על הביטחון של ארצות הברית



MEETING

27/6

THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, MR. MENAHEM BEGIN  
and  
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE USA, MR. WALTER STOESSEL

Thursday, April 15, 1982  
9:10 a.m.

Also participating:

ISRAEL

Foreign Minister Y. Shamir  
Deputy Foreign Minister Y. Ben-Neir  
Mr. D. Kimche  
Mr. E. Rubenstein  
Mr. H. Bar-on  
Gen. A. Tamir  
Gen. Yaari  
Mr. Meridor  
Mr. Uri Popaz  
Mr. Azriel Nevo

USA

Ambassador S. Lewis  
Mr. W. Brown  
Mr. Draper  
Mr. Teicher  
Mr. Matthews  
Mr. Perito  
Mr. Hare  
Mr. Kozak

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MR. BEGIN: Mr. Secretary, may I on behalf of the Government of Israel greet you and your colleagues to this country. We are grateful that you undertook this journey. Perhaps we have to apologize for causing you the trouble, but the situation is serious. I appealed to the Secretary to come over, but I understood that he personally couldn't do so, because now he is involved in a grave international problem, which we hope may be solved without the use of force, although the chances today, this morning" do not seem so good. But the Secretary is really make an almost indescribable personal effort, taking into consideration that he also underwent a certain operation, to travel between Buenos Aires



0/15



which  
and London back and forth is really an effort/should be admired  
by everyone. We do admire him and the effort he is making and we  
understand that he cannot come. You of course as his deputy I believe  
will do your best in order to try to straighten out and to find a  
positive solution for the problems which have arisen, particularly  
in the last ten days.

When we appeal to you as representatives of the Government  
of the U.S., we do so on the basis of the letter written by the  
President of the U.S. of America, Mr. Carter, on March 26, 1979,  
and addressed to me, which reads:


"Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I wish to confirm to you that subject to U.S.  
constitutional processes:

In the event of an actual or threatened violation  
of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and the Egypt,  
the U.S. will, on request of one or both of the parties,  
consult with the parties with respect thereto and will  
take such other action as it may deem appropriate and  
helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty."

Now as one of the parties to the treaty, we declare to you that  
we have such a request, that there was a breach of the Treaty  
of Peace by the government and armed forces of Egypt and that  
should be redressed, and the U.S. should undertake, on the basis  
of their commitment, to bring about the compliance with the peace  
treaty. As the word 'compliance' is used, there are two







possibilities, or in the proper language, one alternative, which of course includes two possibilities. One, compliance by Egypt which will be answered by Israel with compliance, fully, of all the provisions of the peace treaty. As we did in the past, so shall we do in the future. The other possibility is that there will be non-compliance by Egypt. Then we will be forced to answer with non-compliance.

What we prefer, and this I state at the beginning of our deliberations, is the former to the latter. We prefer reciprocal compliance with all the provisions of the peace treaty. And now I will explain what are our complaints, why we think the treaty was not complied with and that breaches were committed.

I will take Article 5 of Annex III, Protocol Concerning Relations of the Parties. Article 5 in section 3 stipulates: "The parties shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and will, accordingly, abstain from hostile propaganda against each other." For many months, we tolerated hostile propaganda by Egypt. We didn't acquiesce to it, but we didn't make an issue of it. I can explain why. We understood that there is a certain process in political life, especially in relations between two people. The Egyptian people were educated for nearly 40 years in absolute hatred of the State of Israel and also the Jewish people. And as the press is controlled there, so is the television and the radio, and there was permanent brain washing - Israel is the devil, Jews are cheaters, Shylocks. That name was applied to me personally for a long time after the visit of President Sadat



to Jerusalem, etc. So we listened to it and we read it. We have the Egyptian press every day. We of course monitor Egyptian radio. And we didn't make an issue of it, because of that attitude. It's passing, time will be the great healer, we have to live together, we shall meet each other, etc. As our wounded men did in El Arish. One of the most moving human scenes which your Ambassador, my friend, Sam Lewis, and I witnessed ourselves, when invalids, Egyptians and Israelis, embraced each other and promised each other never to wage war against each other. Invalids for life, who were fighters. So we believed that this event will be a beginning of coming closer to each other.

I hold here a booklet about Jerusalem which was issued I suppose a year ago, perhaps a year and a half ago. When I read it yesterday I just couldn't believe my own eyes. This booklet, issued by the State Information Service, Cairo, states that actually Israel doesn't have anything in common with Jerusalem. It ended a long time ago. It says: "The Jewish presence in Jerusalem was finally terminated by the Babylonian invasion and the Jews were not able to recover their political entity until 167 B.C." That is almost childish. They came back to Jerusalem from the Babylonian exile; we rebuilt our Temple after the return from the Babylonian exile. An ignoramus wrote those words. And I could quote more, but it's not necessary. I can only say again - hostile propaganda.

But I am coming to recent days. There was a complaint by Syria first and then Jordan, to the Security Council of the United Nations in connection with the events in Judea and Samaria



about two weeks ago. The first complaint was by Syria but then Jordan took over. And the representative of Egypt, Dr. Magid, made a speech to the Security Council, one of the most violent attacks ever from the rostrum of the UN against Israel by any Arab country. So when I wrote on the 25th of March a letter to President Mubarak in reply to his note that he was kind enough to send me, I drew his attention to that speech by the official representative, Dr. Abdul Magid and I wrote to him: "Yesterday in the Security Council, Dr. Magid, whom I met in Ismailia (that was my first visit to Egypt at the invitation of President Sadat) launched a violent attack on Israel in the context of the events which occurred in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. Why should this be so, Mr. President? Those who complained to the Security Council are Jordan and Syria. We both recall how King Hussein suppressed the PLO in Jordan when his army killed thousands of Palestinians by shelling with heavy artillery refugee camps. And but a few weeks ago the Syrian army perpetrated a horrible massacre of the civilian population in - (6,000 people were killed in Hamad by the Syrian army, men, women and children, whole families were wiped out, 3,000 are still missing) - Hamad. Do those two governments have the moral right to accuse Israel? Does any country tolerate riots in which soldiers are attacked with rocks, in which soldiers are stabbed in the back and killed by hand grenades? The answer is implied in the question. I respectfully submit to you, Mr. President, that your delegate in the UN should not have made the speech he delivered yesterday in the Security Council."



Our Ambassador, Mr. Sasson, delivered this note to President Mubarak and the President read it in his presence. When he read that passage, he exclaimed twice: "The Prime Minister is right!" First - "I say to my colleagues or advisors privately, but please keep it confidential - how can Jordan and Syria complain? What did they do to the Palestinians or Syrians? He is right." Then, his second remark was: "Dr. Magid should not have made that speech in the Security Council. I didn't know anything about that speech. Tell the Prime Minister so."

And Saason faithfully reported to me. Of course, I kept it in full confidence.

However, only four or five days passed since that encounter between the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Ambassador of Israel, and the very same Dr. Magid is interviewed by a Kuwaiti newspaper and there he makes a statement which I quote: "After Israel withdraws finally from Sinai, the era of liberation of other occupied Arab territories will begin." So I asked the Ambassador of the US, my dear friend, Sam Lewis, what did he mean by the word "liberation". It's an active concept. Is Egypt going to join other Arab countries in a war against Israel to liberate what he terms "other Arab occupied territories"?

However, the main negative phenomenon from this point of view appeared during the conference of non-aligned countries which also took place in Kuwait, and Dr. Magid made a speech there.




May I ask you, Mr. Secretary, how can I assume that President Mubarak didn't know anything of the speech is official representative was going to make to probably 50 or 60 countries, so-called non-aligned countries of the Third World, when he, Dr. Magid, is the representative of Egypt? I don't know, perhaps Mr. Mubarak didn't hear about the speech in advance but it is very difficult for me to assume that, especially after the remark he made to our Ambassador. He should have been forewarned; at least he should have felt that he had to talk to Dr. Magid.

I remember during the lifetime of President Sadat when I drew his attention to certain behavior by Dr. Ghali, then Minister in Charge of Foreign Affairs, he was very angry and I could have seen how he admonished Dr. Ghali. Whatever President Mubarak did, I will quote to you one sentence now. And I will just remind you of the so-called Egyptian plan of how to solve the Palestinian problem; I will not repeat all those points, because I know you read it while you were still in Washington. Dr. Magid is addressing the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Kuwait and he says: "How else since for the first time in modern history Israel is in the ebb and its forces are withdrawing while an Arab country, which is Egypt, is regaining sovereignty over its own national soil and restoring a beloved part of its land which had remained under foreign occupation for approximately 15 years."

"Israel is in the ebb" - instead of saying to the non-aligned countries - I am glad to inform you that Israel is fulfilling the provisions of the peace treaty and it's going to hand us over







the last part of the Sinai Peninsula, he pictures Israel as being in the ebb because its forces are withdrawing, etc.

If our withdrawal should prove, Mr. Secretary, that Israel is in the ebb, then our non-withdrawal will prove Israel is not. That is a logical conclusion. I must tell you that present there are Arab countries, Asian countries, Latin American countries, African countries, Yugoslavia, I suppose at least--

MR. SHAMIR: 80 countries.

MR. BEGIN: Two-thirds of the UN, 80 countries from all parts of the world, and here stands a representative of our friend, with whom we have to live in peace and understanding and cooperation, normalize our relations. And he tell us now that actually Israel is at the ebb, down. It has to withdraw, it doesn't do it by its own decision and willigly and for the sake of peace, but it is loosing, it is downgraded.

What is that if not hostile propaganda, forbidden unequivocally by Section 3 of Article 5 of Annex III?


Then I will only add again a mention of those 11 points. I'd only like to say I studied them again yesterday. And Mr. Secretary, if you studied those 11 points well, I am sure you will share my impression, if not accept my conviction, that this is a prescription to destroy the State of Israel, not immediately, but by stages. But that is now an old story. Even the PLO would like to see us destroyed by stages. First a state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza but Mr. Arafat adds that we shall strive on of course; now we shall accept such a state. In other words, by stages, not



necessarily in one stroke, but by stages, the destruction of Israel. What does it mean? We should withdraw to the lines of 1967 which is here (pointing to map). The distance between this line and the sea is 8 miles, shorter than Broadway, Mr. Secretary. Now in Lebanon the PLO has already got a Katusha missile with a range of 21 km. and now it is threatening the Shi'ites in Lebanon whom they killed yesterday en masse with artillery, with 130 mm guns, supplied by the Soviet Union, with a range of 27 km. Now the Palestinian state should be on these mountains, Samaria on the north and Judea on the south, and as you can see from each hill you can reach every place in this valley by those missiles and those 130 mm guns. What would it be if not a threat to our existence?

Then of course one of the points is Arab sovereignty over or in Jerusalem. There is a difference in translations, so I leave it in the two versions. That is our capital. Then there should be either a return or compensation of Palestinian refugees starting from 1947 and 1948. Mr. Secretary, we never wanted the refugee problem to be created. In our time, almost all wars create problems of refugees. But in 1947 and '48, we were in this country only 620,000 people. And the attempt was made to destroy us. We lost then 6,000 of our best men, nearly one per cent of the population. Today it would be 33,000 men killed. It would have been a complete national disaster. We couldn't have come out of it any more. We lost 3,000 men during the Yom Kippur war; we still live under








that trauma. It's a small nation; everyone knows everyone else. If you would proportionately make that account with regard to the American people, then everyone would understand the tragedy. It would have meant hundreds of thousands of Americans killed. And one of those 11 points would be either return or compensation, and the decision would be with the people themselves. We didn't want them to flee. They were ordered by their leaders to flee. They were then 300 or 350,000 and now with their progeny they are over a million. If hundreds of thousands should return, the State of Israel would cease to exist. We wouldn't agree to be a Rhodesia.

So in other words when you analyze it point by point, what was presented as an Egyptian plan to solve the Palestinian problem, it means by stages the annihilation of the State of Israel. And that we should hear from Kuwait presented to 80 countries and canvassing for their support. What is it if not the most hostile propaganda anyone can think of, when these statements of polemic are made by Egyptian representatives, two or three weeks before the 26th of April when we have to finalize the withdrawal to which we are committed? Indeed, my colleague, the Defense Minister, asked the question: What are they, fools? Why couldn't they be silent for another few weeks, and then after that, what could we have done? Not so. To quote Shakespeare: there is a method in their madness. Madness it is, as far as relations with Israel are concerned. Because we were not born yesterday, Mr. Secretary. But there is







method to that madness. What was it? Our Egyptian friends assumed for the last few months that the U.S. will take care of Israeli withdrawal. If there should be some people - as you know, we live through a trauma, we had to uproot 1600 families, uproot them, take them out of their homes, give them new homes, a real trauma. So they assumed the U.S. will take care of it. Israel will withdraw, but we shall now make all those declarations. If after that, the Israelis will come to us with recrimination when we do something else, for instance if the Israelis don't agree to our proposals on autonomy, one day Gen. Ali will call in the Ambassador of Israel and tell him go back home, or will recall Ambassador Mortada. What can we do? I admit, nothing. Can we send the army into Sinai because the ambassadors are recalled? I say openly, no. That is a breach of the peace treaty because it says there must be an exchange of ambassadors even after the interim withdrawal. But what <sup>can</sup> we do? But then if we'd come to Mr. Mubarak or to Gen. Ali and say: what did you do, why did you breach the peace treaty? they will say: Didn't you know we stand by these 11 points? Why didn't you pay attention? We said it openly, you heard it and didn't draw our attention to it. You don't want now to have a Palestinian state, etc., etc., so we can't have your ambassador here and you can't have our ambassador in Hertzliya. That is the method to their madness, to place us before a fait accompli and then use it against us.

We made so many sacrifices for the peace with Egypt - oil, airfields, villages and towns. And just on the eve , when we



have to embrace each other and say now this stage is finished, now formalization can be completed; now we can tell the African countries there is no reason for them not to have diplomatic relations with Israel - they used to say Egypt is an African country and you keep under your rule part of Egypt, so we can't have diplomatic relations, it was an excuse but they said it. But now it won't be so, so we can renew diplomatic relations, we can have an exchange of commerce, education, culture, etc. This is the time to be real friends. And here we have the representative of Egypt going to Kuwait saying we are in the ebb and presenting a plan how to destroy the State of Israel.

What I want to sum up now concerning this paragraph - we don't have any doubt whatsoever that the Egyptians in the last few weeks committed the most serious breach of the peace treaty with regard to that section - "the parties shall seek to foster mutual understanding". Excuse me for the light observation, but probably they want to foster mutual misunderstanding - "and tolerance and will, accordingly, abstain from hostile propaganda." And not only didn't they abstain, but they waged hostile propaganda against the State of Israel.


Secondly, there is an organization which calls itself the PLO. Mr. Secretary, whoever listened as I did or read the speeches made lately by Mr. Arafat, in every word there is blood, only bloodshed, in every speech. It is too horrible to listen to or to read. Blood! He is a blood-thirsty two-legged animal, I



wouldn't hesitate to say so, with all this paraphenalia, eith the beard, etc. So he has the PLO. Now, I one day said to President Sadat - then I think we already called each other by our first names - how can it be that some of your people cooperate with the PLO? We are making peace and your people cooperate with them. He said how do we cooperate? I said, well, the PLO smuggles arms from El Arish which we handed over to Egypt, ahead of time, several weeks ahead of time, at the/<sup>re</sup>quest of President Sadat. Later on he told me - that was a turning point in the history of the relations between our two countries and indeed of the position of Egypt in the Middle East. None of the Arab countries every believed that you will give us El Arish. They used to tell us: don't believe the Israelis; it's only atrick. And he said: now thisis the symbol that you mean it and we are going to live in peace. We met in El Arish as good friends and we promised to cooperate. So after that I told him from El Arish come weapons to the Gaza Strip in which there is a PLO of course and they use those weapons to kill our men.

It will suffice if I tell you, Mr. Secretary, that we already captured 700 hand grenades smuggled from El Arish into the Gaza Strip. Let's imagine how many people would have been killed with those 700 grenades. We captured them, through our viligance and also sheer good luck. And it goes on and on. And I spoke about it to President Sadat and he immediately gave ins-ructions to stop it and they did stop it. It only proves






it is a matter of decision by the bureaucracy. President Mubarak sits in Cairo, not in El Arish, but if orders are given and there is the resolve to stop it, it is stopped. If a government wants to stop that traffic of weapons or explosives, it does. If it goes on, it is a proof that the government in question doesn't want to stop it. I will not deny that sometimes even with all the efforts something may happen. But I am speaking about the permanent traffic of explosives or grenades, ammunition, etc. Permanent. So this must be a result of cooperation of certain underlings of President Mubarak with the PLO. And why should they keep a PLO base in El Arish? It is now on the border of Israel. Why should the other side be a PLO base, when everyone knows the PLO is bent on killing our people? That is its raison d'etre.

Now I will read Article III, Section 2:

"Each party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other party. Each party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice."





If this traffic goes on, if there is cooperation between Egypt and the PLO, if there is a PLO base in El Arish on our doorstep, it is a complete violation of this article. A daily violation, permanent violation. Therefore we ask to redress this wrong.

The third point is about the demilitarized zone. Mr. Secretary, We gave up this whole territory, 23,000 square miles, with the greatest strategic importance, if you look at Sharm-el-Sheikh from which we could reach even with our boats Babl-Mandeb which was blocked in 1973, and then towards Africa. We gave it up for the sake of peace. But we made arrangements for our security. First of all, a demilitarized zone, 150 km. to our international border. In a desert, demilitarization is a serious arrangement. In a populated area it is rather a hoax because you can keep a tank in every garage, and this is not theory. But in a desert, where you can take pictures from a satellite or a plane and can see any violations, this is a proper security arrangement. This demilitarized zone is violated. We have now a battalion of Egyptian troops in El Arish airfields. Again, on our doorstep. They shouldn't be there. They do not wear military uniforms. This is an old trick and we cannot be misled by it. You can either dress soldiers in police uniforms or you can dress them even in ties, but they are soldiers. And we have good information, Mr. Secretary. There is a full battalion of trained Egyptian soldiers at the El Arish airfield. They shouldn't be there and they mustn't be there. Egypt undertook not to have in this area, 150 km.



from the international border into the Sinai peninsula, even one soldier of the regular army.

Then there is the forces limitation zone, zone B. and also there they keep more troops than they are allowed to. The demilitarized zone is the essence of the peace treaty, the soul of the security arrangement. If I may say so, at least some compensation for the territory we left, for the strategic depth we lost, is that suddenly we will not be taken by surprise as happened in 1973. We shall see them coming if they should - perhaps not under President Mubarak, I prefer to think so, but perhaps under someone else, who knows who will one day become the leader of Egypt. So at least we will not be taken by surprise. If this is violated, why are we going? It is not a question of the battalion. That Egyptian battalion doesn't threaten the army of Israel. It is question of principle. Today a battalion, tomorrow a brigade, the day after, a division. With tricks you can do much. People can come and be civilians and settle there, or tourists. We know also the trick of tourists from the time before the Second World War. All over Europe there were German tourists. I don't make comparisons, just to remind ourselves about the possibility of using tricks. We don't. We withdrew, we gave up territory. Should the other side be allowed to play tricks upon us? As far as our security is concerned, which means to us the lives of our people.

So these are the three points - the hostile propaganda, the full cooperation with the PLO and smuggling of arms, and the



violations of the demilitarized and forces limitation zones. All these three wrongs should be redressed before we withdraw from the rest of Sinai, on the 26th or 25th of April as stipulated by the peace treaty, three years from the date when we exchanged the instruments of ratification, which took place on the 26th of April, 1979, and next week on Monday it will be three years.

(There is an exchange in Hebrew with Mr. Shamir).

My friend remarks that it might be the 25th. If I am mistaken, I will admit my mistake, but those 24 hours are not of such great importance, changing the course of world history. And we want to carry out this commitment. Yes, indeed, Pres. Reagan said so in the press conference yesterday, I gave him such a pledge. I want you, Mr. Secretary, to inform him of what I have said because I did give him such a pledge and I want to carry it out. However, if those wrongs are not redressed during the few following days, ahead of the 25th or 26th of April, if there is non-compliance by the Egyptians as we informed through your ambassador, we may consider the possibility of postponing our withdrawal until those wrongs are redressed. Not to abolish our commitment. This is our commitment, but until those wrongs are corrected we may postpone it. This is in absolute conformity with international law. If both sides comply with the commitments and provisions of a treaty, it's all right. If one side doesn't, the other side is perfectly entitled to do the same.

So again, I repeat, compliance will meet with compliance; non-compliance with non-compliance. We prefer the first arrangement,



to have full compliance by the Egyptians and then there will be full compliance by Israel.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your attention.

MR. STOESEL: Thank you for your welcome to me, and I want to underline what a pleasure it is for me to be here in your country and to meet with you and your colleagues. As I mentioned earlier, and as you know in response to your request, President Reagan asked the Secretary to send me to discuss these matters with you, in view of the Secretary's preoccupation with the other crisis and you can understand the importance of his efforts in that regard.

But I am here to help Israel and Egypt towards the full implementation of the peace treaty and I do want to underline that we in the U.S., the President and all of the American people, understand the sacrifices which Israel is undergoing, as a result of the withdrawal from the Sinai. And I do want to say that we take our responsibility as a full partner in this process very seriously. We share with you the desire that there be a full implementation, that there be reciprocal compliance, as you very well stated, and that is certainly our view.

I have taken very careful note of what you have told me this morning, and you can be sure that we share these concerns. You have mentioned hostile propaganda, and I can say we are concerned equally about that, and that I will take take this up as the first order of business when I meet with President Mubarak. Now, whether or not the statements which have been made by Egypt represent a change in basic position I think is open to question. To date we do not see them as a signal of Egypt's going back on the commitments



made in the past by President Sadat and by President Mubarak. But certainly what has been said, particularly the speech by Ambassador Magid, has caused great concern, very justifiable concern, and we think that should be cleared up. And I would say we consider that this is not only a matter between Egypt and Israel but also that it concerns <sup>the</sup> relationship between Egypt and the United States.

On some of the other matters, Mr. Prime Minister, which you have mentioned, the PLO, the smuggling of arms, we would agree also that if there are violations here that they are very serious and must be addressed. I understand that Mr. Sharon will be discussing these matters today in Cairo and we hope he can resolve these issues to your satisfaction. If this is not the case, then if we find that indeed Egypt has been less than vigilant in fulfilling its obligations then I certainly am prepared to tell the Egyptians that they must live up to their obligations and that they must take action. The same goes for the activities in the demilitarized zone, of which you spoke. We hope that these will be cleared up also. We will be checking also through our own sources. I will be discussing them in Egypt and we do hope that these can be resolved, and it is necessary that they be resolved.

And I can give you complete assurance that I will report faithfully and accurately to President Reagan what you have told us this morning.

MR. BEGIN: Thank you very much. I would like Gen. Yaari now to present you with some details of these violations.



His father is Meir Yaari. He and I are permanently political opponents, but we respect each other. Especially since when I was a child I was a member of the youth organization of which he is the leader to this very day. But then when I became bar mitzva and got some wisdom, I changed my direction. But Meir Yaari is now 85 years old and still writing articles every week. Last Friday I read his article, criticizing me, and I enjoyed it very much.

GEN. YAARI: The violations we are talking about, I will give to you according to the best of our information and the last date we know of. Maybe something has changed since then, but this is the list. First in Zone A, we have the deployment of elements of 3 battalions framework in addition to the 4 brigades allowed in the Annex of the Treaty, and we are talking of mid-March. About an infantry battalion, in the area of ... which is in the northern axis in Zone A.

Secondly, in the Nagilla area, mid-March, there is a ten company that we relate to a battalion company. Sometimes there is a change in that, but that is the last information. That is for division No. 18. And the first one was also from the same division.

Thirdly, also of mid-March, there was a battalion in the Wadi Sudar area, a battalion of the 119th infantry brigade. This is as far as excess units are concerned.

I just want to add, that we know that the Egyptians are aware of the problem. Sometimes they try to cover it, but they are aware of the problem, and the violation.




In addition, we also saw logistic depots, what we regard and evaluate as army level, east of Ismailia. We know of some checks that were made in the area to the effect that this is a mine store area where they clear mine fields, etc. But according to our best evaluation, this depot is exactly similar to an army level depot that was situated in the Kabir area.

Now in Zone B, we have the following units in excess to the agreement, as of the end of February. An infantry company in the same 18th division, proper infantry, in the Hutamiya area. Another company belonging to another division, also proper infantry, in the area where only the border guards should be situated. In the El Arish area, as of mid-March, we know of the defense battalion that the Prime Minister spoke about, which was situated there around the airfield. We know about engineer units that were in the area. On some of them, at least one of them, there was an agreement that they will do some work in the area and would leave at the end of March. The Prime Minister spoke about an attempt to cover it by dressing them in civilian clothing.

We know, we have good information, on intelligence sigint units in the El Arish area. We know of similar units that may have been taken out, in the Nahal area. In the Bir Gafgafa area, we know of some units of the brigade that are situated there, that has been situated in the airfield which is east of the A Zone. And we know of an engineer company in the northern axis, east of the A line, and that is from February.







Now, we know that both El ARish and Bir Gafgafa airfields have not only the presence but actually the running of those airfields is done not by civilians but by members of the Egyptian air force.

As far as the ground is concerned, we talk about 11 positions that are protruding from the line A into the B area, three of them in the northern axis, 4 of them in the Bir Gafgafa area, 3 south of that in the Gidipass, and one in the Mitla pass. We talk about fences and anti-tank fortifications, two in the Bir Gafgafa area, one in the Gidi area, which crosses into the B zone. And there is one in the Mitla pass. And we talk about a sigint unit, actually an electronic warfare unit, in the Ras Muhammad area which crosses into the line between the lines. Now, in the buffer zone, apart from what I mentioned now, there are the units of the police of the border guards and military police instead of the police units that should be there. And we have knowledge about some of their activities, which is not according to the agreement. These are our basic grievances,

As I say, we know that the Egyptians are aware of them. It was even said that they will actually dismantle the fortifications. From air photography it seems the fortifications are still there. Perhaps nothing was added, but they are still there. And as far as the other violations, units in A and B zones, I dare say the Egyptians are aware and know very well where the violations are. I hope that all this will be rectified but these are the facts that we can present today and according to dates. Thank you.




MR. BEGIN: I will now ask our Deputy Foreign Minister to present to you, Mr. Secretary, a draft document which we prepared. You got it from our ambassador and also through Sam Lewis, but we'd like to present it for your consideration. Of course, it is a draft and we don't stand by every word. There can be changes and corrections.

MR. BEN MEIR: The draft document relates to the various points the Prime Minister raised before and a few others. It is called a Statement of Reaffirmation and reads:

"A. Egypt and Israel reaffirm their adherence to the Treaty of Peace between the two countries and pledge complete and unconditional compliance with all its provisions, including those pertaining to:

- (1) Restrictions and arrangements which Egypt and Israel took upon themselves in Zones A,B,C,D -(Dis an Israeli zone and we have agreed to limitations) - and their commitment not to carry out any breach of the restrictions and arrangements with respect to those Zones. Measures will be taken to ensure that by April 26, 1982, the status of, and in these Zones, will be in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Peace.
- (2) The functioning of the MFO and the performance of its responsibilities as agreed upon and stipulated in the Treaty of Peace, including its duty to prevent any violations of the Treaty in accordance with Annex I of the Treaty, and ensuring the freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran in accordance with Article V of the Treaty.








- (3) The implementation of all the normalization arrangements as agreed upon between Egypt and Israel on the basis of Annex III to the Treaty, and the putting into effect by April 26, 1982, of all the agreements signed since the conclusion of the peace treaty."

And there are a number of specifics:

- <sup>3</sup>(a) Keeping the borders permanently open for travel of persons and the exchange of goods.
- <sup>3</sup>(b) Continuing the maintenance of diplomatic relations at their existing ambassadorial level.
- (4) Refraining from hostile acts and the dissemination of hostile statements in domestic media, in foreign countries or in international bodies.
- (5) Preventing any activity and operation of terrorist organizations from the territory of one country against that of the other, including hostile propaganda, smuggling of arms and other war materials across their respective borders; Also, including the dismantling by April 26, 1982, of the existing infrastructures of those terrorist organizations.

B. Egypt and Israel reaffirm their adherence to the Camp David accords, including the commitment to negotiate continuously and in good faith an agreement concerning full autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip), based upon democratic elections, the establishment and inauguration of the Self-Governing Authority (administrative





council) - (this is from the Camp David Accord) - and the transitional period of five years.

The Parties to the Camp David Accords undertake not to propose or entertain any plan relating to the peace process other than the Camp David Agreement."

MR. SHAMIR: I would like to add that in the last week we are witnessing a certain momentum in the deterioration of the Egyptian attitude towards their obligations under the peace treaty with us, as was expressed in this conference in Kuwait and in the relations with the PLO which are getting closer and closer. It is our impression that the reason for this momentum is the Egyptian assessment, after their last meeting in Washington by President Mubarak and their Minister of War, that the Israeli withdrawal will take place on the 25th or 26th of April. And this is sure. And their assessment that the American reaction to any Egyptian violation of their obligations will not be very harsh. It is the Egyptian assessment. And therefore it is very important for the U.S. to explain to the Egyptians that they are wrong, if they are wrong. Thank you.

MR. LEWIS: Can I ask a question, Mr. Foreign Minister, about that last comment? Is that an assessment of the Egyptian attitude or is it based on intelligence about Egyptian attitudes?

MR. SHAMIR: It is an assessment based on intelligence.

MR. BEGIN: IN other words, it is an intelligent assessment.

MR. STOSSEL: Perhaps I could comment first of all on the suggestion of the reaffirmation. Certainly I said when this was presented to me in Washington by your ambassador, Mr. Arens, that




this is a possible option which we should consider for dealing with the problems before us. It may not be the only option. There may be other ways which we will find to be useful, perhaps even more appropriate. We will have to see. Our objective of course is to bring the commitments which already exist to full life.

I think we have to be wary of trying to put down only certain points of the accords in a reaffirmation. This could cause some confusion if we try and extract only some points from what has already been agreed. But certainly we do see that there could well be value in reaffirming the Camp David commitments. And as far as the U.S. is concerned we would be thoroughly prepared to do that.

I do feel that before we commit ourselves now to a particular form we should explore the whole range of options which would be possible. I think we want to avoid an approach which does take attention away from the real concerns and real challenges which face us. And again, we have to be careful about an approach which might seem to challenge the integrity of either side which could call forth a very determined obdurate stand in favor of national honor. This could raise problems down the road. I would want to study this possible approach very seriously and consider how it can be presented to the Egyptians, and when I come back from my visit there, then I think we will have a better feel for how to approach this problem.

MR. BEGIN: Mr. Secretary, I would like to say now why we made this suggestion, why we prefer it to all other options, although






I do understand there may be other options. We need a reassurance now, and only through a document of reaffirmation can we get that reassurance.

I would like to give certain concrete examples. We have established diplomatic relations in accordance with the peace treaty after the interim withdrawal to this line from which we are supposed to withdraw on the 25th or 26th of April. And there is an Ambassador in Cairo, representing the State of Israel, and an Ambassador in Israel representing Egypt. If one day after the 26th of April, when the whole of Sinai is in the hands of Egypt, and we conduct negotiations with Egypt on autonomy. They for instance suggest that Arabs living in Jerusalem should have the vote for the AC/SGA and we object to that. They have a right to make their suggestion, we have a right to make a different one. But let's assume that we do not reach an agreement, and a foreign minister or president of Egypt decides on that day to say to us: You don't agree to our suggestion to have the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem vote for the autonomy; if so, we can't tolerate your ambassador in Cairo. It makes it impossible to solve the Palestinian problem, which we see as the core of the conflict, etc., etc. And Mr. Sasson has to be, as President Sadat told me about the Soviet ambassador "ordered out." What can we do? I put it to you as a friend, a simple question. I can say that in my opinion we can't do anything. That is not a reason to send our army back into Sinai. I will say immediately that should one day the Egyptian army come into the demilitarized zone, the Israeli army will be in Sinai in a few hours' time, no doubt. This is a beginning of hostilities.





But not because of the departure of the ambassadors. So we can protest. What else can we do? We wouldn't like to face such a possibility. Therefore, inter alia, we put in that reaffirmation that the diplomatic relations will continue to be on the ambassadorial level. One can ask: how do you know that undertaking will be carried out? It is also a piece of paper. But this is a reaffirmation. In the peace treaty it is written but now on the eve of withdrawal the Egyptians renew, promise, pledge, commit themselves that there should be ambassadors. If they breach it, it is a matter for both the U.S. and Israel. Then we shall look for an answer.

So therefore it is important for us that there should be a statement of reaffirmation. We couched it in terms which wouldn't be humiliating for anyone. It is all reciprocity. All the paragraphs apply to both Israel and Egypt. No one's integrity is being attacked.

The second example, even more important I might say, or as important, is the question of smuggling of arms that should be and must be stopped. Mr. Secretary, for the first time since our state was renewed, we made peace with a neighbor, we signed a peace treaty, abolished a state of war, all for the first time, and that boundary will be dripping with blood? It is absurd. We had a boundary with Lebanon for 19 years completely peaceful. The villagers on both sides used to talk to each other and return the cows that got lost. It was pastoral calm, green fields on both sides, with neighbors greeting each other in the morning. For 19 years, without a peace treaty, with a state of war going on. Now that we have a peace treaty with a neighbor and have abolished the state of war, will



that border be bloody? That is absurd. And it must be if grenades are being smuggled and then used and our people get killed or maimed. What can we do but retaliate? So on the other side there must be casualties and casualties on our side. Then where is peace? Then the treaty of peace becomes just a mockery. So we have to have this reassurance not only on paper but in the field, on the ground. That there won't be such a PLO base and no smuggling. If you put several good officers on that border line and some soldiers, they can stop any smuggling. They can if they want to, if they get the instructions, if they are called to book in case they do not fulfill those instructions. It may take time but it can be carried out. No one can say: we can't stop it. If it goes on it means that they are interested in keeping the border boiling, and that is impossible. So what is the treaty of peace for? The whole dream was that we shall have a period of peace. We would like it on all borders, but we can't then at least on one border, peaceful conditions, life, not death.

Again, we have to have this reaffirmation. And of course what happens in the zones as Gen. Yaari explained to you. Because this as I said is the heart of the peace treaty. If the demilitarized zone is going to be militarized it may remind us of the events in Vietnam, Sam. The most military zone in Vietnam was the one called the demilitarized. That is very bad. That is not to be tolerated.

Therefore, I would like you to consider very seriously, Mr. Secretary, a draft. I don't know whether this draft, but a draft for



statement of reaffirmation. We need it, and it's good for Egypt as well. As far as I know the U.S. will be prepared to sign it as a witness as you did the peace treaty. We also have a memorandum of agreement and this letter of the President, etc. But this is not insulting anyone. It is a clear paper. Our minds are open and we are ready to listen to suggestions. But I have to add that time is of the essence. We may have to consider it and clarify it by the middle of next week. Around Tuesday or Wednesday I will have to call a special session of the Cabinet to take a decision. If you come back on Sunday, I will postpone the debate on this issue from the weekly cabinet meeting which takes place on Sunday, which will deal with other matters. After we meet with you and have information from what happened on the other side, then I will call a special session of the cabinet on Tuesday let's say. Until then we will have all the information and then we shall take a decision because it is six days from the date. For many months I used the phrase that we want to carry out our commitments to the dot and to the date. I still say it. We want to, provided that - as I wrote to President Mubarak - both sides are faithful to the peace treaty. He probably didn't pay attention to that proviso.

MR. STOESEL: Let me say that we certainly see that time is of the essence. It is very urgent to clear these things up. That will be my intention, to work as fast and as seriously as possible on this. And we will study the document and see what in our opinion would be the best way to proceed. It is conceivable



that some of the matters we have discussed could be handled in another way, others would be put in writing. But we will see. We will give you our best recommendation on this.

On the question of ambassadors, for example, I see a possible problem here, in that sending an ambassador is a sovereign prerogative of a state. To send an ambassador is in the treaty, but whether he is maintained or not--but perhaps it would be possible to put it as an intention to maintain, something like that.


MR. BEN MEIR: The treaty says to exchange ambassadors.

MR. LEWIS: That was done.

MR. BEGIN: But it can be undone, Sam. I fear that it can be undone. That is the problem. What will I do then? Can you give me, in good Shakespearean English, an "eitza"? If after April 26th, our ambassador is "ordered out", what will I do? I will tell you, I will be forced to do nothing.

MR. STOESEL: You might be unhappy with an Egyptian ambassador for some reason and you might want him to go home.

MR. BEGIN: I won't order him out. We are faithful to every commitment. We proved it. For the last six weeks, we dismantled villages, industrial enterprises, wonderful production facilities, from which we used to send for the last four years vegetables and fruit to Europe during the winter. We dismantled it already completely. All the people left and wept. For God's sake, what more can we do to prove our good will and our faithfulness to our commitments? Every day on the radio and on the TV, these people cried. What else? And we are going ahead with it. During that dispute, today as well. But






we want to be sure of this peace. It is not an ox, for God's sake. Talking to the Arabs, promising them that we are at the ebb!

Dave, would you like to say something?

MR. KIMCHE: I'd like to say one thing. We spent many, many very arduous weeks negotiating with the Egyptians and with your own people regarding the establishment of the multinational force in Sinai. One of the basic points that we said and the Egyptians agreed and your own people were very firm about that, was that the table has to be clean by the time of the withdrawal, by the 26th or 25th of April. The table has to be completely clean. In other words, when the MFO does start its operation, it has to be completely clear that there are no violations and this is one of the basic points we made in these negotiations for the establishment of the MFO. And the MBO will then be responsible for preventing violations, not just reporting on them. One of the articles in the protocol, which you may remember, Mr. Prime Minister, was that they have to redress any violation within 48 hours after notification of such violation. That is one of the points in the protocol which the Egyptians agreed to and of course your own people accepted. This was one of the basic points regarding the prevention of violations in the future. I think we haven't got such a situation at the moment, and I think it is extremely important that the MFO can start performing on the right foot. I'd like to make one other point.

I was now in Egypt and I had a long conversation with El Baz, with Boutrous Ghali and with Gen. Ali. And I made the






point very strongly regarding their actions with the PLO, the fact that they are helping the PLO. I must say that they did not deny it, they were not able to say: this is not true. So it is not a case where we are saying we have this and they are denying it. All they could say was we are trying to prevent this. Well, I think in a country like Egypt if one decides to prevent it, it's a very, very easy thing to do.

MR. STOESSEL: Thank you very much for that. We certainly agree on both points and certainly the MFO should start with a clean slate, a tabula rasa, and then the commitment to follow up, to see that any violations are not only reported but are taken care of.

On Gen. Yaari's report, which we listened to with great attention and interest, we are glad to have these details. I gather that at least on some of them the reports from the Sinai Field Mission may not bear them out as being violations. And I would be interested in any comments you have on that. If there is a possible discrepancy between what the Field Mission is reporting and what your information shows, and is it conceivable that on some of these points there is a disagreement on the meaning of the provisions of the Annex?

GEN. YAARI: As far as the deployment of units is concerned, I can assure you that the Egyptians know where the violations are according to what I said. And they even have been taking steps now that the issue is so strong to abolish or move units.

MR. BROWN: Are they taking such steps?





GEN. YAARI: They may be.

As far as on the ground is concerned, fortifications, mine fields, positions, fences, what we have is air photography and interpretation of air photography. I can assure you that our analysts, whom I know well, once those fortifications, mine fields and fences will not be there, we shall be able to say that they are not there. And I understand that the SFM was checking them and they say the Egyptians are starting to dismantle them. I hope that will be done according to what they said.


MR. BROWN: What is your latest information on that?

GEN. YAARI: The latest is that we saw them in position, unless some changes have taken place. And I said that nothing was done to build more. But the moment they will be taken down we shall know it. It is very easy to see. And as for the other sensitive things I said, signal units, etc, you can be assured I am right.

MR. LEWIS: Why the difference in interpretation on certain issues? There has been a long debate between the Israelis and Egyptians on the military commission, and our people have been present, and there is from our perception a general difference of view about certain aspects.

GEN. YAARI: As far as the excess units, we base our reports on your own photography and read-outs. We don't see the photographs, we see the read-out. Secondly, the SFM deals with major units.

MR. LEWIS: That is what the treaty calls for.





GEN. YAARI: Yes, main elements.


MR. LEWIS: But that is the definition of what is a violation. Minor elements are not a violation by the same token.

GEN. YAARI: What we are talking about are additional units that we see in the area according to the read-out that are regarded not as main elements. And we know very well that they are an addition in the area. They represent not full units but divisions which are west of the canal.

MR. LEWIS: This is one of the areas obviously where the SFM interpretation differs from yours. Where you have made these statements our people have checked and apparently have been assured that in fact these minor elements belong to other main elements in the Sinai. You disagree and I take it that on the basis of your intelligence the Egyptians are lying to the SFM. Is that the heart of the issue here?

MR. BEGIN: Excuse me, may I make one remark? If there is good will, there won't be any misunderstanding. If there is ill will, there will always be. One can say a main element is a division and a brigade is a minor element, but that is ill will and not good will. Main elements means more or less a serious unit starting from a company. A company is a serious unit in the military, it may be 150 men. A battalion may be near 1,000 men, 800 at least.

MR. LEWIS: But there was agreement among the military experts at the time the Annex was drawn up as to main elements, and I think the battalion was the unit.






GEN. TAMIR: The battalion level in the three brigades are not mentioned as a main element. If they have three battalions it is not a violation as long as they keep the number of 22,000 soldiers, 230 tanks, 470 APCs, 7 artillery battalions and 7 anti-aircraft battalions. But we came to an agreement with the Egyptians that they will not exceed 17 battalions, taking into account the three battalions.

MR. LEWIS: That agreement is not in the Annex.

GEN. TAMIR: There are enough violations. I am not saying there were no violations. But the three battalions, according to the treaty the main elements are not including the three battalions, and we had a long discussion in the Madison whether to have an organization table, that is to have an organic division with all the elements, units or so, or whether to go only on main elements. And there was a decision that because it is a peace treaty and not a cease fire agreement, and in armies you change organization from time to time, to take only the main element system as a base for verification of the international force. And Sam is right because the FMS should check according to the main elements, and if the battalions are not mentioned as a main element, theoretically, if they have 22,000 soldiers and 230 tanks, etc., all those main elements, they can organize them as they want. But we came, there was a big struggle and Col. Pianka knows about it. It's not a written agreement but a gentlemen's agreement, not to increase the 17 battalions. And there are enough violations besides these battalions.

MR. BEGIN: Okay, we stand by what Gen. Tamir says.

So you will be going there tomorrow?





MR. STOESSEL: Yes, tomorrow afternoon.

If I could just repeat again on the question of the document. I hope you will permit us to consider options and see what would be best. There could be other forms, I would imagine.

MR. BEGIN : We stand by this draft, but we shall consider all other options.

MR. STOESSEL: I'd also like to make a plea for confidentiality. This will make my own task easier if we can keep all of this out of the press.

MR. LEWIS: I think on that point the chances for getting the sort of document that you would and we would like to have have been somewhat undermined by the mention in the press here, which has been noted by the Egyptians.

MR. SHAMIR: There was a hint.

MR. LEWIS: It was much more than a hint and President Mubarak understood it. The problem is that before he even gets there there may be some problems.

MR. BEGIN: Sadat used to say to me: We have a democracy like in your country. I was silent. Now perhaps Mr. Secretary you will tell them that in Israel there is a democracy like in Egypt. In a democratic society leaks may happen.

And now you can tell the press what you wish. You can say we had friendly talks and I and my colleagues brought before you the problems and there's good hope that a solution will be found.

MR. STOESSEL: Good. We will end on an optimistic note.

--(Meeting adjourned at 11 a.m.)--



INCLUDING UNIDENTIFIED SOLIDARITY OFFICIALS, WERE DISCUSSING  
A REVIVAL OF THE THE UNIONS WITH COMMUNIST PARTY SCHOLARS.

SIMILAR INFORMAL MEETINGS BETWEEN LOW-LEVEL GOVERNMENT  
OFFICIALS AND SOLIDARITY REPRESENTATIVES HAVE BEEN HELD FOR  
ABOUT TWO MONTHS, OFFICIAL SOURCES SAID.

ZBIGNIEW BUJAK, A SOLIDARITY LEADER IN WARSAW PROVINCE  
WHO HAS BEEN IN HIDING, WARNED THE UNIONISTS THAT THE  
AUTHORITIES MIGHT TRY TO DISSOLVE THE UNIONS BUT THE  
GOVERNMENT OFFICE IN THE CHARGE OF THE SUSPENDED LABOR  
MOVEMENT DENIED HIS FEARS.

(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL, BASED ON PRESS REPORTS, IS FOR  
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ITEM

NESA-410 (4/15/82)

TEXT: VELIOTES STATEMENT ON U.S. MIDEAST AID (3,500)  
U.S. ASSISTANCE LINKED TO MIDDLE EAST-SOUTH ASIA SECURITY

WASHINGTON -- NICHOLAS VELIOTES, U.S. ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, STRESSED  
THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IN SUPPORTING  
AMERICAN EFFORTS TO BRING LASTING PEACE AND SECURITY TO THE  
MIDDLE EAST.

ADDRESSING THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE APRIL  
15, VELIOTES SAID THAT THROUGH THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE  
PROGRAM THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ALSO SEEKS TO ADVANCE THE  
WELFARE OF THE POPULATIONS AND THE ECONOMIC HEALTH OF  
COUNTRIES IN THE REGION IN ORDER TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC AND  
POLITICAL STABILITY.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF VELIOTES TESTIMONY:

(BEGIN TEXT)

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INCLUDING UNIDENTIFIED SOLIDARITY OFFICIALS, WERE DISCUSSING  
A REVIVAL OF THE UNIONS WITH COMMUNIST PARTY SCHOLARS.  
SIMILAR INFORMAL MEETINGS BETWEEN LOW-LEVEL GOVERNMENT  
OFFICIALS AND SOLIDARITY REPRESENTATIVES HAVE BEEN HELD FOR  
ABOUT TWO MONTHS, OFFICIAL SOURCES SAID.  
BRIGNIEW BULAK, A SOLIDARITY LEADER IN WARSAW PROVINCE  
WHO HAS BEEN IN HIDING, WARNED THE UNIONISTS THAT THE  
AUTHORITIES MIGHT TRY TO DISSOLVE THE UNIONS BUT THE  
GOVERNMENT OFFICE IN THE CHARGE OF THE SUSPENDED LABOR  
MOVEMENT DENIED HIS FEARS.

(PRECEDING PG MATERIAL, BASED ON PRESS REPORTS, IS FOR  
DISTRIBUTION TO MISSION STAFF ONLY, AND NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

ITEM

WEGA-419 (4415282)

505

TEXT: VELIOTES STATEMENT ON U.S. MIDEAST AID (2,500)  
U.S. ASSISTANCE LINKED TO MIDDLE EAST-SOUTH ASIA SECURITY

WASHINGTON -- NICHOLAS VELIOTES, U.S. ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, STRESSED  
THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IN SUPPORTING  
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FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF VELIOTES TESTIMONY:

(BEGIN TEXT)

PAGE 32 -- VELIOTES TEXT

I AM PLEASED TO HAVE THIS OCCASION TODAY TO TESTIFY IN SUPPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FY 83 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BUDGET REQUESTS FOR THE NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIAN REGION. I SHALL CONCENTRATE MY OPENING REMARKS ON A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE POLICY OBJECTIVES WHICH OUR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO SUPPORT.

SECRETARY HAIG AND UNDERSECRETARY BUCKLEY, IN RECENT TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, HAVE PRESENTED THE OVERALL POLICY GUIDING OUR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR THE REGION.

-- THEY EMPHASIZED THAT FURTHERING THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS REMAINS AMONG THE HIGHEST OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PRIORITIES. THUS, OUR PROGRAM IS DIRECTED AT SUPPORTING OUR EFFORTS TO BRING LASTING PEACE AND SECURITY TO THE MIDDLE EAST. OUR PROGRAM ALSO SEEKS TO ADVANCE THE WELFARE OF THE POPULATIONS AND THE ECONOMIC HEALTH OF THEIR COUNTRIES TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STABILITY. OUR ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT, ALONG WITH OUR AID TO JORDAN, LEBANON, AND THE REGIONAL PROGRAMS, PROVIDES A SECURITY AND ECONOMIC BASE

PAGE 33 -- VELIOTES TEXT

ESSENTIAL TO ULTIMATE STABILITY AND PEACE WITHIN THE REGION.

-- THE SOUTHWEST ASIAN/PERSIAN GULF REGION, A CRITICAL SOURCE OF ENERGY TO THE FREE WORLD, IS SIMULTANEOUSLY THREATENED BY THE SOVIETS THROUGH AFGHANISTAN AND RADICAL FORCES FROM WITHIN THE AREA. THEREFORE, OUR PROGRAM IS DIRECTED AT SUPPORTING OUR EFFORTS TO BOLSTER THE SECURITY OF COUNTRIES BOTH IN THE REGION, AND EN ROUTE, WHICH ARE CRUCIAL FOR U.S. ACCESS TO AND PRESENCE IN THE REGION IN TIMES OF CRISIS. ALMOST ALL OF THE COUNTRIES, FROM PAKISTAN IN THE EAST, TO OMAN AND YEMEN, AND TO TUNISIA AND MOROCCO IN THE WEST, FACE SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL SUBVERSION OR REGIONAL THREATS FROM SOVIET PROXIES. ALL ARE IMPORTANT, NOT ONLY TO OUR STRATEGY FOR THE SECURITY OF



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SOUTHWEST ASIA, BUT, POTENTIALLY TO THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE  
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS WELL.

-- IN SOUTH ASIA, THERE IS A CLEAR HUMANITARIAN NEED FOR  
ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE LOW LEVELS OF PER CAPITA  
INCOME, HIGH POPULATION GROWTH RATES, AND LOW LEVELS OF  
LITERACY. BANGLADESH, INDIA, NEPAL, AND SRI LANKA, ALL HAVE

PAGE 04 -- VELIOTES TEXT

MADE COMMENDABLE PROGRESS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AN  
INVESTMENT IN THE FUTURE WHICH WE SHOULD PROTECT WITH  
CONTINUING ASSISTANCE. VIABLE ECONOMIES AND STABLE  
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ARE ESSENTIAL IF SOUTH ASIA IS TO  
CONTINUE TO DEVELOP AS A SYSTEM OF INDEPENDENT STATES  
CAPABLE OF PLAYING A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS AND  
IN REGARD TO THE MAJOR AREAS OF CONFLICT ON EACH FLANK.  
INDIA, WHICH IS A SIGNIFICANT TRADING PARTNER, AND OTHER  
COUNTRIES IN THIS REGION, ARE CLEARLY IMPORTANT TO BROADER  
U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS.

SECRETARY HAIG HAS ADDRESSED THE NEED FOR RESOURCES  
COMMENSURATE WITH THE RISKS TO AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS  
ABROAD. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT PERSISTENT PURSUIT OF POLICY  
DESIGNED TO STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMIES AND DEFENSE CAPABILITY  
OF KEY COUNTRIES IN THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA IS CRUCIAL:

-- TO PRESERVING A GLOBAL STRATEGIC BALANCE WHICH WILL  
PERMIT FREE NATIONS TO PURSUE THEIR ASPIRATIONS;

-- TO CHECKING THE SPREAD OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THIS  
STRATEGIC REGION;

PAGE 05 -- VELIOTES TEXT

-- TO FULFILLING OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO ASSIST IN THE  
RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS WHICH THREATEN INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AND THE WELL-BEING OF THE NATIONS AND PEOPLES IN  
THE REGION;

-- TO PRESERVING FREE WORLD ACCESS TO THE REGION'S OIL;

-- TO SUPPORTING OTHER MAJOR ECONOMIC INTERESTS SUCH AS;

-- MAINTAINING ACCESS TO IMPORTANT MARKETS FOR AMERICAN  
GOODS AND SERVICES;



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PAGE 64 -- VELLIOES TEXT

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PAGE 65 -- VELLIOES TEXT

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RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS WHICH THREATEN INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AND THE WELL-BEING OF THE NATIONS AND PEOPLES IN  
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-- TO PRESERVING FREE WORLD ACCESS TO THE REGION'S OIL;  
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-- MAINTAINING ACCESS TO IMPORTANT MARKETS FOR AMERICAN  
GOODS AND SERVICES;



-- ASSISTING THE ORDERLY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE LESS WEALTHY COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, AND:

-- COOPERATING WITH WEALTHIER STATES TO MAINTAIN A SOUND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ORDER.

I CANNOT STRESS TOO STRONGLY THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUTHWEST ASIAN SECURITY AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF THIS CONCERN TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE. WE SHARE WITH FRIENDLY STATES THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THREATS TO SECURITY THROUGHOUT THIS REGION POSED BY FACTORS SUCH AS THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, THE UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING IRAN, THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, THE SOVIET POSITION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND IN SOUTH YEMEN,

PAGE 06 -- VELIOTES TEXT

LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND PRESSURES AGAINST NEIGHBORING STATES, AND EFFORTS TO MAGNIFY SUCH THREATS THROUGH THE LIBYAN ALLIANCE WITH ETHIOPIA AND SOUTH YEMEN. IT IS CRUCIAL FOR US TO REMAIN STEADFAST IN POLICIES WITH REGARD TO THE MAJOR CONCERNS IN THE REGION.

IN THE MIDDLE EAST WE ARE ACTIVELY PURSUING A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST, AND LASTING PEACE BASED ON THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS,; WHICH DERIVE FROM U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. IN THIS CONTEXT:

-- WE ARE PURSUING VIGOROUSLY THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AUTONOMY REGIME FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AS A CRUCIAL STAGE IN THE PEACE PROCESS. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IS TO PROVIDE FOR THE PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION NECESSARY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRANSITIONAL REGIME ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, UNDER PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS.

-- THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY THIS MONTH FOR MONITORING THE SECURITY PROVISIONS OF THE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

PAGE 07 -- VELIOTES TEXT

EGYPT AND ISRAEL HAVE EMPHASIZED THEIR MUTUAL COMMITMENTS TO THE CONTINUED STRENGTHENING OF THE PEACE THAT NOW EXISTS BETWEEN THEM.



MA  
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PAGE 66 -- VELLIOES TEXT

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PAGE 67 -- VELLIOES TEXT

EGYPT AND ISRAEL HAVE EMPHASIZED THEIR MUTUAL COMMITMENTS TO THE CONTINUED STRENGTHENING OF THE PEACE THAT NOW EXISTS BETWEEN THEM.

WE ARE ALSO COMMITTED TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AN  
INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN LEBANON. WE ARE PROVIDING  
SUSTAINED SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF LEBANON  
IN WORKING THEIR WAY -- WITH HELP FROM OTHER ARAB STATES --  
TOWARD NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND GREATER SECURITY AS  
IMPORTANT TO PEACE IN THE REGION. WE BELIEVE THAT THE  
CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT AMBASSADOR HABIB WORKED OUT LAST JULY  
CAN AND WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD. THIS IS IMPORTANT FOR THE  
INTERNAL CONCILIATION PROCESS IN LEBANON, WHICH OFFERS THE  
BEST PROSPECT FOR A PHASED, ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN  
FORCES. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS  
WHICH CALLS FOR THE ELECTION OF A NEW PRESIDENT LATER THIS  
YEAR.

WE CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE OUR SUPPORT FOR A PEACEFUL  
RESOLUTION OF THE DEVASTATING WAR BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN ON A  
BASIS WHICH PRESERVES THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL

PAGE 08 -- VELIOTES TEXT

INTEGRITY OF BOTH COUNTRIES. CONTINUATION OF THE WAR  
ENDANGERS THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF ALL NATIONS IN THE GULF  
REGION, AND IN OUR VIEW SERVES NEITHER THE INTERESTS OF IRAQ  
OR IRAN, NOR DOES IT SERVE ANY U.S. INTEREST, OR THOSE OF  
OUR ALLIES.

THE RETURN OF PEACE TO THE SUFFERING PEOPLE OF  
AFGHANISTAN MUST BE ACHIEVED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE  
WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCES, THE RESTORATION OF  
AFGHANISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNED STATUS, THE RIGHT  
OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO FORM A GOVERNMENT OF THEIR OWN  
CHOOSING, AND CREATION OF CONDITIONS WHICH WILL PERMIT THE  
THREE MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES WITH  
HONOR.

IN OUR EFFORTS TO ADVANCE THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS  
AND TO PROMOTE THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS ELSEWHERE IN THE  
REGION, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE NECESSARY SPIRIT OF  
ACCOMMODATION CAN GROW MORE EASILY IF FRIENDLY STATES FEEL  
SECURE AND CONFIDENT OF U.S. SUPPORT.

IMPORTANT STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO BOLSTER THE CONFIDENCE



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OF KEY COUNTRIES IN OUR COMMITMENT TO THEIR SECURITY. IN A TIME OF BUDGET STRINGENCIES, WE HAVE, WITH CONSIDERABLE SACRIFICE, INCREASED THE NATIONAL RESOURCES FOR OUR OWN MILITARY, TO DEVELOP THEIR CAPABILITY TO DETER THREATS TO THE REGION.

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AT THE SAME TIME, OUR PROPOSED OVERALL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE REGION HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED SO THAT STRATEGIC BUT NEEDY STATES CAN BETTER PROVIDE FOR THEIR OWN DEFENSE, RESIST EXTERNAL PRESSURES, IMPROVE THEIR ECONOMIES, AND THUS ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR ORDERLY PROGRESS.

I SHALL BRIEFLY LIST FOR YOU THE HIGHLIGHTS OF OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR THE COUNTRIES IN THE NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIAN REGION (NEA).

-- THE NEA FY (FISCAL YEAR) 83 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REQUEST WILL FUND SIX MAJOR PROGRAMS. THESE INCLUDE:

-- DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TOTALLING 287.243 MILLION DOLLARS FOR THE REGION TO SEVEN COUNTRIES, OF WHICH OVER 200 MILLION DOLLARS GOES TO THE THREE POORER COUNTRIES OF SOUTH

ASIA (INDIA, BANGLADESH, SRI LANKA):

-- PL (PUBLIC LAW) 480 FOOD AID TOTALLING 618.513 MILLION DOLLARS (420 MILLION DOLLARS TITLE I, 198.513 MILLION DOLLARS TITLE II) PROVIDED TO EIGHT COUNTRIES:

-- ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND (ESF) OF 1,768 MILLION DOLLARS, MOSTLY TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT, OUR PRIMARY PARTNERS IN PEACE;

-- FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) FINANCING TOTALLING 3,660 MILLION DOLLARS, 1,030 MILLION DOLLARS OF IT IN DIRECT CONCESSIONAL LOANS, 500 MILLION DOLLARS AND 400 MILLION DOLLARS AS FORGIVEN LOANS FOR ISRAEL AND EGYPT RESPECTIVELY;

-- INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING (IMET) TOTALLING 11.1 MILLION DOLLARS, AND:

-- PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (PKO) TOTALLING 34.474 MILLION DOLLARS, IN SUPPORT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS;



OF KEY COUNTRIES IN OUR COMMITMENT TO THEIR SECURITY. IN A  
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DOLLARS FOR THE REGION TO SEVEN COUNTRIES, OF WHICH OVER 229  
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-- PL (PUBLIC LAW) 480 FOOD AID TOTALING 618.513 MILLION  
DOLLARS (420 MILLION DOLLARS TITLE I, 198.513 MILLION  
DOLLARS TITLE II) PROVIDED TO EIGHT COUNTRIES;  
-- ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND (ESF) OF 1,758 MILLION DOLLARS,  
MOSTLY TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT, OUR PRIMARY PARTNERS IN PEACE;  
-- FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) FINANCING TOTALING 2,669  
MILLION DOLLARS, 1,030 MILLION DOLLARS OF IT IN DIRECT  
CONGRESSIONAL LOANS, 599 MILLION DOLLARS AND 439 MILLION  
DOLLARS AS FORGIVEN LOANS FOR ISRAEL AND EGYPT RESPECTIVELY;  
-- INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING (IMET)  
TOTALING 11.1 MILLION DOLLARS, AND;  
-- PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (PKO) TOTALING 34.474 MILLION  
DOLLARS, IN SUPPORT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS;

27

-- THESE PROGRAMS TOTAL 6,380.33 MILLION DOLLARS FOR FY 83, WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVES IS THE MINIMAL REQUIRED FOR THE U.S. TO PROTECT ITS INTERESTS AND ACHIEVE ITS POLICY GOALS IN THIS VITAL REGION.

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NOW I WANT TO EXPAND ON THESE BROAD FIGURES WITH A FEW

PAGE 11 -- VELIOTES TEXT

SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON EACH OF OUR FY 83 PROPOSALS.

ISRAEL: IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND WELL-BEING ARE CENTRAL TO OUR MIDDLE EAST POLICY. THE 1.7 BILLION DOLLARS IN FMS THAT WE ARE PROPOSING WILL ASSIST ISRAEL IN MAINTAINING ITS TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE IN OVERALL MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE REGION. WE ARE REQUESTING ALSO 785 MILLION DOLLARS IN ESF TO SUSTAIN ISRAEL'S ECONOMY AND FOSTER THE WELFARE OF ITS PEOPLE.

EGYPT: FOR MUCH OF WHAT WE MUST ACCOMPLISH IN THE MIDDLE EAST, EGYPT IS KEY BOTH IN TERMS OF REGIONAL PEACE AND REGIONAL SECURITY. OUR 1.3 BILLION DOLLARS FMS PROGRAM CONTRIBUTES TO EGYPT'S ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF AND HELP ITS NEIGHBORS IN THE FACE OF THE VARIOUS THREATS I HAVE MENTIONED. IT FINANCES A SIGNIFICANT REPLACEMENT OF EGYPT'S SOVIET-SUPPLIED, DETERIORATING MILITARY MATERIAL. THE ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND REQUEST FOR EGYPT TOTALS 750 MILLION DOLLARS, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE DIRECT SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC STABILITY IN THE NEAR TERM WHILE BUILDING THE BASE FOR IMPROVED ECONOMIC GROWTH, PRODUCTIVITY, AND EQUITY UPON

PAGE 12 -- VELIOTES TEXT

WHICH LONG TERM STABILITY MUST DEPEND. THE REQUESTED PL 480 PROGRAM CONSISTS OF 250 MILLION DOLLARS IN PL 480 TITLE I AND 9.9 MILLION DOLLARS TITLE II IN SUPPORT OF PRIVATE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES.

PAKISTAN: PAKISTAN IS A KEY FRONTLINE STATE WHICH REMAINS STEADFAST IN RESISTING GREAT PRESSURES FROM THE SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN. 275 MILLION DOLLARS IN FMS LOANS AND 200 MILLION DOLLARS IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND ESP PROPOSED FOR FY 83 ARE THE FIRST INCREMENT OF THE TOTAL 3.2



82, WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVES IS THE MINIMAL  
REQUIRED FOR THE U.S. TO PROTECT ITS INTERESTS AND ACHIEVE  
ITS POLICY GOALS IN THIS VITAL REGION.  
NOW I WANT TO EXPAND ON THESE BROAD FIGURES WITH A FEW

PAGE 11 -- VETIOTES TEXT

SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON EACH OF OUR FY 83 PROPOSALS.  
ISRAEL: IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND WELL-  
BEING ARE CENTRAL TO OUR MIDDLE EAST POLICY. THE 1.7  
BILLION DOLLARS IN FMS THAT WE ARE PROPOSING WILL ASSIST  
ISRAEL IN MAINTAINING ITS TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE IN OVERALL  
MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE REGION. WE ARE REQUESTING ALSO  
785 MILLION DOLLARS IN ESR TO SUSTAIN ISRAEL'S ECONOMY AND  
FOSTER THE WELFARE OF ITS PEOPLE.

EGYPT: FOR MUCH OF WHAT WE MUST ACCOMPLISH IN THE MIDDLE  
EAST, EGYPT IS KEY BOTH IN TERMS OF REGIONAL PEACE AND  
REGIONAL SECURITY. OUR 1.3 BILLION DOLLAR FMS PROGRAM  
CONTRIBUTES TO EGYPT'S ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF AND HELP ITS  
NEIGHBORS IN THE FACE OF THE VARIOUS THREATS I HAVE  
MENTIONED. IT FINANCES A SIGNIFICANT REPLACEMENT OF EGYPT'S  
SOVIET-SUPPLIED, DETERIORATING MILITARY MATERIAL. THE  
ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND REQUEST FOR EGYPT TOTALS 750 MILLION  
DOLLARS, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE DIRECT SUPPORT FOR  
ECONOMIC STABILITY IN THE NEAR TERM WHILE BUILDING THE BASE  
FOR IMPROVED ECONOMIC GROWTH, PRODUCTIVITY, AND EQUITY UPON

PAGE 12 -- VETIOTES TEXT

WHICH LONG TERM STABILITY MUST DEPEND. THE REQUESTED PL 489  
PROGRAM CONSISTS OF 250 MILLION DOLLARS IN PL 489 TITLE I  
AND 2.9 MILLION DOLLARS TITLE II IN SUPPORT OF PRIVATE  
VOLUNTARY AGENCIES.

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REMAINS STEADFAST IN RESISTING GREAT PRESSURES FROM THE  
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AND 280 MILLION DOLLARS IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND ESR  
PROPOSED FOR FY 83 ARE THE FIRST INCREMENT OF THE TOTAL 3.2

BILLION DOLLAR FIVE YEAR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PACKAGE. THE PROPOSED FMS LEVEL WILL HELP FUND F-16 AIRCRAFT, ARMORED VEHICLES, ARTILLERY, AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT ORDERED IN FY-82 AS WELL AS FOLLOW-ON ORDERS FOR ADDITIONAL QUANTITIES OF SIMILAR EQUIPMENT LATER. OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN IS IN NO WAY DIRECTED AGAINST INDIA. GOOD AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS WITH INDIA REMAIN ONE OF OUR HIGH PRIORITY GOALS. THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND ESF FOR PAKISTAN WILL BE CONCENTRATED IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR WITH ACTIVITIES ALSO IN THE FIELDS OF POPULATION, HEALTH,

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PAGE 13 -- VELIOTES TEXT

ENERGY, AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT. WE ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH PAKISTANI AUTHORITIES TO ASSURE A SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT IN SUPPORT OF THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO REDUCE AND ULTIMATELY ELIMINATE GREEN POPPY PRODUCTION. WE ARE REQUESTING 50 MILLION DOLLARS FOR PL 480 TITLE I.

MOROCCO: THE PROPOSAL OF 100 MILLION DOLLARS IN PMS CREDIT TO MOROCCO WOULD 34.85 SUPPORT OF MAJOR U.S. COMBAT SYSTEMS WHICH MOROCCO HAS ALREADY ACQUIRED, TOGETHER WITH AN ONGOING MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. WE ARE RECOMMENDING CONCESSIONAL TERMS FOR 50 PERCENT OF THIS FMS TO ALLEVIATE A HEAVY DEBT BURDEN RELATED TO ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES LARGELY BEYOND MOROCCO'S ABILITY TO CONTROL (E.G., DROUGHT AND WORLD INFLATION). DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE OF 13.5 MILLION DOLLARS WILL FUND PROGRAMS IN AGRICULTURE, FAMILY PLANNING, NUTRITION, AND ENERGY RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT. THE REQUESTED LEVEL OF PL 480 IS 25 MILLION DOLLARS FOR TITLE I AND 10.5 MILLION DOLLARS FOR TITLE II.

TUNISIA: UNDER DIRECT THREAT FROM LIBYA, TUNISIA REQUIRES A MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WITH HEAVY INITIAL

PAGE 14 -- VELIOTES TEXT

COSTS. OUR FMS CREDITS OF 140 MILLION DOLLARS ARE INTENDED TO CUSHION THE SHOCK OF SUCH LARGE EXPENDITURES. FOR THIS REASON WE ARE FURTHER REQUESTING HALF OF THIS AMOUNT BE IN CONCESSIONAL TERMS. THE FY 83 LEVELS WOULD HELP FUND THE



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PAGE 13 -- VETIOTES TEXT

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CONCESSIONAL TERMS FOR 50 PERCENT OF THIS FMS TO ALLEVIATE A  
HEAVY DEBT BURDEN RELATED TO ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES LARGELY  
BEYOND MOROCCO'S ABILITY TO CONTROL (E.G., DROUGHT AND WORLD  
INFLATION). DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE OF 12.5 MILLION DOLLARS  
WILL FUND PROGRAMS IN AGRICULTURE, FAMILY PLANNING,  
NUTRITION, AND ENERGY RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT. THE REQUESTED  
LEVEL OF PL 480 IS 25 MILLION DOLLARS FOR TITLE I AND 12.5  
MILLION DOLLARS FOR TITLE II.

TUNISIA: UNDER DIRECT THREAT FROM LIBYA, TUNISIA  
REQUIRES A MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WITH HEAVY INITIAL

PAGE 14 -- VETIOTES TEXT

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TO CUSHION THE SHOCK OF SUCH LARGE EXPENDITURES. FOR THIS  
REASON WE ARE FURTHER REQUESTING HALF OF THIS AMOUNT BE IN  
CONCESSIONAL TERMS. THE FY 83 LEVELS WOULD HELP FUND THE



ADQUISITION OF F-5 AIRCRAFT, M60 TANKS AND CHAPARRAL MISSILES, WHICH THE TUNISIANS INTEND TO ORDER IN FY 82. WE ARE REQUESTING 18 MILLION DOLLARS FOR PL 480 TITLE I AND 1.8 MILLION DOLLARS FOR TITLE II.

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JORDAN: OUR FMS PROPOSAL FOR JORDAN REFLECTS AN INCREASE OF 25 MILLION DOLLARS FOR A TOTAL OF 75 MILLION DOLLARS IN FY 83. THROUGH OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT, WE SEEK TO ENHANCE JORDAN'S SECURITY AND ABILITY TO REMAIN A VIABLE, INDEPENDENT, AND CONSTRUCTIVE FORCE IN THE REGION. A STABLE, MODERATE JORDAN DIRECTLY SUPPORTS BOTH OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA OF BUILDING PEACE AND ENHANCING REGIONAL SECURITY BY JORDAN'S ASSISTING OTHER REGIONAL COUNTRIES TO RESIST OUTSIDE AGGRESSION AND REGIONAL SUBVERSION. WE ARE ALSO REQUESTING 20 MILLION DOLLARS IN ESP TO ASSIST THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL WATER SUPPLY AND

PAGE 15 -- VELIOTES TEXT

SEWAGE SYSTEMS -- SYMBOLS OF THE COMMITMENT OF OUR GOVERNMENT TO HELP PEOPLE HELP THEMSELVES -- AND DEVELOPMENT TRAINING. THERE IS ALSO A 256,000 DOLLARS PL 480 TITLE II PROGRAM.

YEMEN: NORTH YEMEN IS PRESENTLY BEING CHALLENGED MILITARILY BY A MARXIST-LED INSURGENT GROUP BACKED BY SOVIET-SPONSORED SOUTH YEMEN. THE NORTH YEMENI MILITARY REQUIRES ESSENTIAL FOLLOW-ON TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE IF IT IS TO CONTINUE TO UTILIZE EFFECTIVELY U.S. EQUIPMENT FUNDED BY SAUDI ARABIA. INCREASED ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS CRITICAL TO OUR SUPPORT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN THE FACE OF PERSISTENT OUTSIDE THREATS. WE ARE ASKING FOR AN INCREASE OF 4 MILLION DOLLARS IN FMS OVER THE FY 82 LEVEL TO A TOTAL OF 15 MILLION DOLLARS AND A MODEST INCREASE IN IMET OVER FY 82. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE OF 27.5 MILLION DOLLARS IS REQUESTED TO MEET BASIC HUMAN NEEDS OF ONE OF THE POOREST NATIONS OF THE REGION.

OMAN: WE HAVE REQUESTED 40 MILLION DOLLARS IN FMS TO BE APPLIED IN PART AGAINST CONTINUING PAYMENT FOR U.S.



ADQUISITION OF F-2 AIRCRAFT, M&S TANKS, AND GHARRAH  
MISILES, WHICH THE TUNISIANS INTEND TO ORDER IN FY 82. WE  
ARE REQUESTING 15 MILLION DOLLARS FOR PL 489 TITLE I AND 1.8  
MILLION DOLLARS FOR TITLE II.

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OF 25 MILLION DOLLARS FOR A TOTAL OF 75 MILLION DOLLARS IN  
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PAGE 15 -- VELLITES TEXT

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OMAN: WE HAVE REQUESTED 45 MILLION DOLLARS IN FMS TO BE  
APPLIED IN PART AGAINST CONTINUING PAYMENT FOR U.S.



EQUIPMENT ACQUIRED OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS. THE REMAINING FUNDS WILL BE USED TO PURCHASE EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR OMAN'S FORCE MODERNIZATION EFFORT. OMAN PLAYS A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE DEFENSE OF THE PERSIAN GULF/INDIAN OCEAN REGION, A ROLE WHICH WE SUPPORT AND WISH TO ENCOURAGE. WE ARE ALSO REQUESTING 15 MILLION DOLLARS IN ESF WHICH WILL SUPPORT DAM CONSTRUCTION, FISHERIES PROJECTS, TRAINING, AND OTHER PROJECTS IDENTIFIED BY THE U.S.-OMAN JOINT COMMISSION.

LEBANON: SMALL INCREASES IN OUR PROPOSED FMS LOAN PROGRAM FOR LEBANON OF 15 MILLION DOLLARS, UP 5 MILLION DOLLARS FROM THE FY 82 LEVEL, REFLECT OUR DESIRE TO CONTINUE TO STRENGTHEN THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND TO HELP THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO DEVELOP THE CAPABILITY TO REDUCE AND EVENTUALLY ELIMINATE CIVIL CONFLICT. AN ESF PROGRAM OF 8 MILLION DOLLARS WILL HELP TOWARD RESTORATION OF ESSENTIAL PUBLIC SERVICES AND A RETURN TO NORMALCY OF LIFE IN THAT VERY TROUBLED COUNTRY. IT WILL INCLUDE SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES AND WILL ASSIST THE PROGRAMS OF THE COUNCIL OF REDEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION. THIS VISIBLE

DEMONSTRATION OF U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE UNITY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON PLAYS A VITAL ROLE IN REDUCING THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT IN THE AREA.

NEAR EAST REGIONAL: WE ARE REQUESTING 15 MILLION DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS AND 4.4 MILLION DOLLARS IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO SERVE OBJECTIVES THAT CANNOT BE MET THROUGH CONVENTIONAL BILATERAL PROGRAMS. THE ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND FINANCES COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH PROJECTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT, AND SMALL SCALE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP, WHICH ARE IMPLEMENTED BY U.S. VOLUNTARY AGENCIES. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROVIDES FOR CONTINUATION OF A SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM AT THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEAR EAST ASSISTANCE PROJECTS.

SOUTH ASIA: IN ADDITION TO OUR PAKISTAN PROGRAM, WE ARE

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PAGE 06 -- NEWS RDP

INCLUDING UNIDENTIFIED SOLIDARITY OFFICIALS, WERE DISCUSSING  
A REVIVAL OF THE THE UNIONS WITH COMMUNIST PARTY SCHOLARS.

SIMILAR INFORMAL MEETINGS BETWEEN LOW-LEVEL GOVERNMENT  
OFFICIALS AND SOLIDARITY REPRESENTATIVES HAVE BEEN HELD FOR  
ABOUT TWO MONTHS, OFFICIAL SOURCES SAID.

ZBIGNIEW BUJAK, A SOLIDARITY LEADER IN WARSAW PROVINCE  
WHO HAS BEEN IN HIDING, WARNED THE UNIONISTS THAT THE  
AUTHORITIES MIGHT TRY TO DISSOLVE THE UNIONS BUT THE  
GOVERNMENT OFFICE IN THE CHARGE OF THE SUSPENDED LABOR  
MOVEMENT DENIED HIS FEARS.

(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL, BASED ON PRESS REPORTS, IS FOR  
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ITEM

NESSA-410 (4/15/82)

*late*

TEXT: VELIOTES STATEMENT ON U.S. MIDEAST AID (3,500)

U.S. ASSISTANCE LINKED TO MIDDLE EAST-SOUTH ASIA SECURITY

WASHINGTON -- NICHOLAS VELIOTES, U.S. ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, STRESSED  
THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IN SUPPORTING  
AMERICAN EFFORTS TO BRING LASTING PEACE AND SECURITY TO THE  
MIDDLE EAST.

ADDRESSING THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE APRIL  
15, VELIOTES SAID THAT THROUGH THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE  
PROGRAM THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ALSO SEEMS TO ADVANCE THE  
WELFARE OF THE POPULATIONS AND THE ECONOMIC HEALTH OF  
COUNTRIES IN THE REGION IN ORDER TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC AND  
POLITICAL STABILITY.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF VELIOTES TESTIMONY:

(BEGIN TEXT)



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PAGE 02 -- VELIOTES TEXT

I AM PLEASED TO HAVE THIS OCCASION TODAY TO TESTIFY IN SUPPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FY 83 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BUDGET REQUESTS FOR THE NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIAN REGION. I SHALL CONCENTRATE MY OPENING REMARKS ON A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE POLICY OBJECTIVES WHICH OUR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO SUPPORT.

SECRETARY HAIG AND UNDERSECRETARY BUCKLEY, IN RECENT TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, HAVE PRESENTED THE OVERALL POLICY GUIDING OUR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR THE REGION.

-- THEY EMPHASIZED THAT FURTHERING THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS REMAINS AMONG THE HIGHEST OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PRIORITIES. THUS, OUR PROGRAM IS DIRECTED AT SUPPORTING OUR EFFORTS TO BRING LASTING PEACE AND SECURITY TO THE MIDDLE EAST. OUR PROGRAM ALSO SEEKS TO ADVANCE THE WELFARE OF THE POPULATIONS AND THE ECONOMIC HEALTH OF THESE COUNTRIES TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STABILITY. OUR ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT, ALONG WITH OUR AID TO JORDAN, LEBANON, AND THE REGIONAL PROGRAMS, PROVIDES A SECURITY AND ECONOMIC BASE

PAGE 03 -- VELIOTES TEXT

ESSENTIAL TO ULTIMATE STABILITY AND PEACE WITHIN THE REGION.

-- THE SOUTHWEST ASIAN/PERSIAN GULF REGION, A CRITICAL SOURCE OF ENERGY TO THE FREE WORLD, IS SIMULTANEOUSLY THREATENED BY THE SOVIETS THROUGH AFGHANISTAN AND RADICAL FORCES FROM WITHIN THE AREA. THEREFORE, OUR PROGRAM IS DIRECTED AT SUPPORTING OUR EFFORTS TO BOLSTER THE SECURITY OF COUNTRIES BOTH IN THE REGION, AND EN ROUTE, WHICH ARE CRUCIAL FOR U.S. ACCESS TO AND PRESENCE IN THE REGION IN TIMES OF CRISIS. ALMOST ALL OF THE COUNTRIES, FROM PAKISTAN IN THE EAST, TO OMAN AND YEMEN, AND TO TUNISIA AND MOROCCO IN THE WEST, FACE SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL SUBVERSION OR REGIONAL THREATS FROM SOVIET PROXIES. ALL ARE IMPORTANT, NOT ONLY TO OUR STRATEGY FOR THE SECURITY OF

SOUTHWEST ASIA, BUT, POTENTIALLY TO THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE  
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS WELL.

-- IN SOUTH ASIA, THERE IS A CLEAR HUMANITARIAN NEED FOR  
ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE LOW LEVELS OF PER CAPITA  
INCOME, HIGH POPULATION GROWTH RATES, AND LOW LEVELS OF  
LITERACY. BANGLADESH, INDIA, NEPAL, AND SRI LANKA, ALL HAVE

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PAGE 04 -- VELIOTES TEXT

MADE COMMENDABLE PROGRESS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AN  
INVESTMENT IN THE FUTURE WHICH WE SHOULD PROTECT WITH  
CONTINUING ASSISTANCE. VIABLE ECONOMIES AND STABLE  
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ARE ESSENTIAL IF SOUTH ASIA IS TO  
CONTINUE TO DEVELOP AS A SYSTEM OF INDEPENDENT STATES  
CAPABLE OF PLAYING A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS AND  
IN REGARD TO THE MAJOR AREAS OF CONFLICT ON EACH FLANK.  
INDIA, WHICH IS A SIGNIFICANT TRADING PARTNER, AND OTHER  
COUNTRIES IN THIS REGION, ARE CLEARLY IMPORTANT TO BROADER  
U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS.

SECRETARY HAIG HAS ADDRESSED THE NEED FOR RESOURCES  
COMMENSURATE WITH THE RISKS TO AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS  
ABROAD. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT PERSISTENT PURSUIT OF POLICY  
DESIGNED TO STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMIES AND DEFENSE CAPABILITY  
OF KEY COUNTRIES IN THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA IS CRUCIAL:

- TO PRESERVING A GLOBAL STRATEGIC BALANCE WHICH WILL  
PERMIT FREE NATIONS TO PURSUE THEIR ASPIRATIONS;
- TO CHECKING THE SPREAD OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THIS  
STRATEGIC REGION;

PAGE 05 -- VELIOTES TEXT

-- TO FULFILLING OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO ASSIST IN THE  
RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS WHICH THREATEN INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AND THE WELL-BEING OF THE NATIONS AND PEOPLES IN  
THE REGION;

- TO PRESERVING FREE WORLD ACCESS TO THE REGION'S OIL;
- TO SUPPORTING OTHER MAJOR ECONOMIC INTERESTS SUCH AS:
- MAINTAINING ACCESS TO IMPORTANT MARKETS FOR AMERICAN  
GOODS AND SERVICES;



-- ASSISTING THE ORDERLY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE LESS WEALTHY COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, AND;

-- COOPERATING WITH WEALTHIER STATES TO MAINTAIN A SOUND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ORDER.

I CANNOT STRESS TOO STRONGLY THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUTHWEST ASIAN SECURITY AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF THIS CONCERN TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE. WE SHARE WITH FRIENDLY STATES THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THREATS TO SECURITY THROUGHOUT THIS REGION POSED BY FACTORS SUCH AS THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, THE UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING IRAN, THE IRAQ-IRAC WAR, THE SOVIET POSITION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND IN SOUTH YEMEN,

PAGE 06 -- VELIOTES TEXT

LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND PRESSURES AGAINST NEIGHBORING STATES, AND EFFORTS TO MAGNIFY SUCH THREATS THROUGH THE LIBYAN ALLIANCE WITH ETHIOPIA AND SOUTH YEMEN. IT IS CRUCIAL FOR US TO REMAIN STEADFAST IN POLICIES WITH REGARD TO THE MAJOR CONCERNS IN THE REGION.

IN THE MIDDLE EAST WE ARE ACTIVELY PURSUING A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST, AND LASTING PEACE BASED ON THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, WHICH DERIVE FROM U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. IN THIS CONTEXT

-- WE ARE PURSING VIGOROUSLY THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AUTONOMY REGIME FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AS A CRUCIAL STAGE IN THE PEACE PROCESS. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IS TO PROVIDE FOR THE PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION NECESSARY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRANSITIONAL REGIME ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, UNDER PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS.

-- THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY THIS MONTH FOR MONITORING THE SECURITY PROVISIONS OF THE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

PAGE 07 -- VELIOTES TEXT

EGYPT AND ISRAEL HAVE EMPHASIZED THEIR MUTUAL COMMITMENTS TO THE CONTINUED STRENGTHENING OF THE PEACE THAT NOW EXISTS BETWEEN THEM.

WE ARE ALSO COMMITTED TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AN  
INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN LEBANON. WE ARE PROVIDING  
SUSTAINED SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF LEBANON  
IN WORKING THEIR WAY -- WITH HELP FROM OTHER ARAB STATES --  
TOWARD NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND GREATER SECURITY AS  
IMPORTANT TO PEACE IN THE REGION. WE BELIEVE THAT THE  
CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT AMBASSADOR HABIB WORKED OUT LAST JULY  
CAN AND WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD. THIS IS IMPORTANT FOR THE  
INTERNAL CONCILIATION PROCESS IN LEBANON, WHICH OFFERS THE  
BEST PROSPECT FOR A PHASED, ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN  
FORCES. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS  
WHICH CALLS FOR THE ELECTION OF A NEW PRESIDENT LATER THIS  
YEAR.

WE CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE OUR SUPPORT FOR A PEACEFUL  
RESOLUTION OF THE DEVASTATING WAR BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN ON A  
BASIS WHICH PRESERVES THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL

PAGE 08 -- VELIOTES TEXT

INTEGRITY OF BOTH COUNTRIES. CONTINUATION OF THE WAR  
ENDANGERS THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF ALL NATIONS IN THE GULF  
REGION, AND IN OUR VIEW SERVES NEITHER THE INTERESTS OF IRAQ  
OR IRAN, NOR DOES IT SERVE ANY U.S. INTEREST, OR THOSE OF  
OUR ALLIES.

THE RETURN OF PEACE TO THE SUFFERING PEOPLE OF  
AFGHANISTAN MUST BE ACHIEVED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE  
WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCES, THE RESTORATION OF  
AFGHANISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNED STATUS, THE RIGHT  
OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO FORM A GOVERNMENT OF THEIR OWN  
CHOOSING, AND CREATION OF CONDITIONS WHICH WILL PERMIT THE  
THREE MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES WITH  
HONOR.

IN OUR EFFORTS TO ADVANCE THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS  
AND TO PROMOTE THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS ELSEWHERE IN THE  
REGION, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE NECESSARY SPIRIT OF  
ACCOMMODATION CAN GROW MORE EASILY IF FRIENDLY STATES FEEL  
SECURE AND CONFIDENT OF U.S. SUPPORT.

IMPORTANT STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO BOLSTER THE CONFIDENCE

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PAGE 09 -- VELIOTES TEXT

OF KEY COUNTRIES IN OUR COMMITMENT TO THEIR SECURITY. IN A TIME OF BUDGET STRINGENCIES, WE HAVE, WITH CONSIDERABLE SACRIFICE, INCREASED THE NATIONAL RESOURCES FOR OUR OWN MILITARY, TO DEVELOP THEIR CAPABILITY TO DETER THREATS TO THE REGION.

AT THE SAME TIME, OUR PROPOSED OVERALL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE REGION HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED SO THAT STRATEGIC BUT NEEDY STATES CAN BETTER PROVIDE FOR THEIR OWN DEFENSE, RESIST EXTERNAL PRESSURES, IMPROVE THEIR ECONOMIES, AND THUS ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR ORDERLY PROGRESS.

I SHALL BRIEFLY LIST FOR YOU THE HIGHLIGHTS OF OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR THE COUNTRIES IN THE NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIAN REGION (NEA).

-- THE NEA FY (FISCAL YEAR) 83 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REQUEST WILL FUND SIX MAJOR PROGRAMS. THESE INCLUDE:

-- DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TOTALLING 287.243 MILLION DOLLARS FOR THE REGION TO SEVEN COUNTRIES, OF WHICH OVER 200 MILLION DOLLARS GOES TO THE THREE POORER COUNTRIES OF SOUTH

PAGE 10 -- VELIOTES TEXT

ASIA (INDIA, BANGLADESH, SRI LANKA);

-- PL (PUBLIC LAW) 480 FOOD AID TOTALLING 618.513 MILLION DOLLARS (420 MILLION DOLLARS TITLE I, 198.513 MILLION DOLLARS TITLE II) PROVIDED TO EIGHT COUNTRIES;

-- ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND (ESF) OF 1,768 MILLION DOLLARS, MOSTLY TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT, OUR PRIMARY PARTNERS IN PEACE;

-- FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) FINANCING TOTALLING 3,660 MILLION DOLLARS, 1,030 MILLION DOLLARS OF IT IN DIRECT CONCESSIONAL LOANS, 500 MILLION DOLLARS AND 400 MILLION DOLLARS AS FORGIVEN LOANS FOR ISRAEL AND EGYPT RESPECTIVELY;

-- INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING (IMET) TOTALLING 11.1 MILLION DOLLARS, AND;

-- PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (PKO) TOTALLING 34.474 MILLION DOLLARS, IN SUPPORT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS;

-- THESE PROGRAMS TOTAL 6,380.33 MILLION DOLLARS FOR FY 83, WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVES IS THE MINIMAL REQUIRED FOR THE U.S. TO PROTECT ITS INTERESTS AND ACHIEVE ITS POLICY GOALS IN THIS VITAL REGION.

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NOW I WANT TO EXPAND ON THESE BROAD FIGURES WITH A FEW

PAGE 11 -- VELIOTES TEXT

SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON EACH OF OUR FY 83 PROPOSALS.

ISRAEL: IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND WELL-BEING ARE CENTRAL TO OUR MIDDLE EAST POLICY. THE 1.7 BILLION DOLLARS IN FMS THAT WE ARE PROPOSING WILL ASSIST ISRAEL IN MAINTAINING ITS TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE IN OVERALL MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE REGION. WE ARE REQUESTING ALSO 785 MILLION DOLLARS IN ESF TO SUSTAIN ISRAEL'S ECONOMY AND FOSTER THE WELFARE OF ITS PEOPLE.

EGYPT: FOR MUCH OF WHAT WE MUST ACCOMPLISH IN THE MIDDLE EAST, EGYPT IS KEY BOTH IN TERMS OF REGIONAL PEACE AND REGIONAL SECURITY. OUR 1.3 BILLION DOLLAR FMS PROGRAM CONTRIBUTES TO EGYPT'S ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF AND HELP ITS NEIGHBORS IN THE FACE OF THE VARIOUS THREATS I HAVE MENTIONED. IT FINANCES A SIGNIFICANT REPLACEMENT OF EGYPT'S SOVIET-SUPPLIED, DETERIORATING MILITARY MATERIAL. THE ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND REQUEST FOR EGYPT TOTALS 750 MILLION DOLLARS, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE DIRECT SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC STABILITY IN THE NEAR TERM WHILE BUILDING THE BASE FOR IMPROVED ECONOMIC GROWTH, PRODUCTIVITY, AND EQUITY UPON

PAGE 12 -- VELIOTES TEXT

WHICH LONG TERM STABILITY MUST DEPEND. THE REQUESTED PL 480 PROGRAM CONSISTS OF 250 MILLION DOLLARS IN PL 480 TITLE I AND 9.9 MILLION DOLLARS TITLE II IN SUPPORT OF PRIVATE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES.

PAKISTAN: PAKISTAN IS A KEY FRONTLINE STATE WHICH REMAINS STEADFAST IN RESISTING GREAT PRESSURES FROM THE SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN. 275 MILLION DOLLARS IN FMS LOANS AND 200 MILLION DOLLARS IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND ESP PROPOSED FOR FY 83 ARE THE FIRST INCREMENT OF THE TOTAL 3.2



BILLION DOLLAR FIVE YEAR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PACKAGE. THE  
PROPOSED FMS LEVEL WILL HELP FUND F-16 AIRCRAFT, ARMORED  
VEHICLES, ARTILLERY, AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT ORDERED IN FY-  
82 AS WELL AS FOLLOW-ON ORDERS FOR ADDITIONAL QUANTITIES OF  
SIMILAR EQUIPMENT LATER. OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO  
PAKISTAN IS IN NO WAY DIRECTED AGAINST INDIA. GOOD AND  
MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS WITH INDIA REMAIN ONE OF OUR  
HIGH PRIORITY GOALS. THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND ESF FOR  
PAKISTAN WILL BE CONCENTRATED IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR  
WITH ACTIVITIES ALSO IN THE FIELDS OF POPULATION, HEALTH,

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PAGE 13 -- VELIOTES TEXT

ENERGY, AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT. WE ARE WORKING  
CLOSELY WITH PAKISTANI AUTHORITIES TO ASSURE A SUBSTANTIAL  
IMPACT IN SUPPORT OF THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO  
REDUCE AND ULTIMATELY ELIMINATE GREEN POPPY PRODUCTION. WE  
ARE REQUESTING 50 MILLION DOLLARS FOR PL 480 TITLE I.

MOROCCO: THE PROPOSAL OF 100 MILLION DOLLARS IN FMS  
CREDIT TO MOROCCO WOULD PERMIT SUPPORT OF MAJOR U. S. COMBAT  
SYSTEMS WHICH MOROCCO HAS ALREADY ACQUIRED, TOGETHER WITH AN  
ONGOING MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. WE ARE RECOMMENDING  
CONCESSIONAL TERMS FOR 50 PERCENT OF THIS FMS TO ALLEVIATE A  
HEAVY DEBT BURDEN RELATED TO ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES LARGELY  
BEYOND MOROCCO'S ABILITY TO CONTROL (E. G., DROUGHT AND WORLD  
INFLATION). DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE OF 13.5 MILLION DOLLARS  
WILL FUND PROGRAMS IN AGRICULTURE, FAMILY PLANNING,  
NUTRITION, AND ENERGY RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT. THE REQUESTED  
LEVEL OF PL 480 IS 25 MILLION DOLLARS FOR TITLE I AND 10.5  
MILLION DOLLARS FOR TITLE II.

TUNISIA: UNDER DIRECT THREAT FROM LIBYA, TUNISIA  
REQUIRES A MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WITH HEAVY INITIAL

PAGE 14 -- VELIOTES TEXT

COSTS. OUR FMS CREDITS OF 140 MILLION DOLLARS ARE INTENDED  
TO CUSHION THE SHOCK OF SUCH LARGE EXPENDITURES. FOR THIS  
REASON WE ARE FURTHER REQUESTING HALF OF THIS AMOUNT BE IN  
CONCESSIONAL TERMS. THE FY 83 LEVELS WOULD HELP FUND THE



ACQUISITION OF F-5 AIRCRAFT, M60 TANKS, AND CHAPARRAL  
MISSILES, WHICH THE TUNISIANS INTEND TO ORDER IN FY 82. WE  
ARE REQUESTING 10 MILLION DOLLARS FOR PL 480 TITLE I AND 1.8  
MILLION DOLLARS FOR TITLE II.

JORDAN: OUR FMS PROPOSAL FOR JORDAN REFLECTS AN INCREASE  
OF 25 MILLION DOLLARS FOR A TOTAL OF 75 MILLION DOLLARS IN  
FY 83. THROUGH OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT, WE SEEK TO ENHANCE  
JORDAN'S SECURITY AND ABILITY TO REMAIN A VIABLE,  
INDEPENDENT, AND CONSTRUCTIVE FORCE IN THE REGION. A  
STABLE, MODERATE JORDAN DIRECTLY SUPPORTS BOTH OUR  
OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA OF BUILDING PEACE AND ENHANCING  
REGIONAL SECURITY BY JORDAN'S ASSISTING OTHER REGIONAL  
COUNTRIES TO RESIST OUTSIDE AGGRESSION AND REGIONAL  
SUBVERSION. WE ARE ALSO REQUESTING 20 MILLION DOLLARS IN  
ESP TO ASSIST THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL WATER SUPPLY AND

PAGE 15 -- VELIOTES TEXT

SEWAGE SYSTEMS -- SYMBOLS OF THE COMMITMENT OF OUR  
GOVERNMENT TO HELP PEOPLE HELP THEMSELVES -- AND DEVELOPMENT  
TRAINING. THERE IS ALSO A 256,000 DOLLARS PL 480 TITLE II  
PROGRAM.

YEMEN: NORTH YEMEN IS PRESENTLY BEING CHALLENGED  
MILITARILY BY A MARXIST-LED INSURGENT GROUP BACKED BY SOVIET-  
SPONSORED SOUTH YEMEN. THE NORTH YEMENI MILITARY REQUIRES  
ESSENTIAL FOLLOW-ON TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE IF  
IT IS TO CONTINUE TO UTILIZE EFFECTIVELY U.S. EQUIPMENT  
FUNDED BY SAUDI ARABIA. INCREASED ECONOMIC AND MILITARY  
ASSISTANCE IS CRITICAL TO OUR SUPPORT OF THE CENTRAL  
GOVERNMENT IN THE FACE OF PERSISTENT OUTSIDE THREATS. WE  
ARE ASKING FOR AN INCREASE OF 4 MILLION DOLLARS IN FMS OVER  
THE FY 82 LEVEL TO A TOTAL OF 15 MILLION DOLLARS AND A  
MODEST INCREASE IN IMET OVER FY 82. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE  
OF 27.5 MILLION DOLLARS IS REQUESTED TO MEET BASIC HUMAN  
NEEDS OF ONE OF THE POOREST NATIONS OF THE REGION.

OMAN: WE HAVE REQUESTED 40 MILLION DOLLARS IN FMS TO BE  
APPLIED IN PART AGAINST CONTINUING PAYMENT FOR U.S.

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EQUIPMENT ACQUIRED OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS. THE REMAINING FUNDS WILL BE USED TO PURCHASE EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR OMAN'S FORCE MODERNIZATION EFFORT. OMAN PLAYS A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE DEFENSE OF THE PERSIAN GULF/INDIAN OCEAN REGION, A ROLE WHICH WE SUPPORT AND WISH TO ENCOURAGE. WE ARE ALSO REQUESTING 15 MILLION DOLLARS IN ESF WHICH WILL SUPPORT DAM CONSTRUCTION, FISHERIES PROJECTS, TRAINING, AND OTHER PROJECTS IDENTIFIED BY THE U.S.-OMAN JOINT COMMISSION.

LEBANON: SMALL INCREASES IN OUR PROPOSED FIVE LOAN PROGRAM FOR LEBANON OF 15 MILLION DOLLARS, UP 5 MILLION DOLLARS FROM THE FY 82 LEVEL, REFLECT OUR DESIRE TO CONTINUE TO STRENGTHEN THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND TO HELP THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO DEVELOP THE CAPABILITY TO REDUCE AND EVENTUALLY ELIMINATE CIVIL CONFLICT. AN ESF PROGRAM OF 8 MILLION DOLLARS WILL HELP TOWARD RESTORATION OF ESSENTIAL PUBLIC SERVICES AND A RETURN TO NORMALCY OF LIFE IN THAT VERY TROUBLED COUNTRY. IT WILL INCLUDE SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES AND WILL ASSIST THE PROGRAMS OF THE COUNCIL OF REDEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION. THIS VISIBLE

PAGE 17 -- VELIOTES TEXT

DEMONSTRATION OF U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE UNITY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON PLAYS A VITAL ROLE IN REDUCING THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT IN THE AREA.

NEAR EAST REGIONAL: WE ARE REQUESTING 15 MILLION DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS AND 4.4 MILLION DOLLARS IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO SERVE OBJECTIVES THAT CANNOT BE MET THROUGH CONVENTIONAL BILATERAL PROGRAMS. THE ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND FINANCES COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH PROJECTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT, AND SMALL SCALE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP, WHICH ARE IMPLEMENTED BY U.S. VOLUNTARY AGENCIES. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROVIDES FOR CONTINUATION OF A SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM AT THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEAR EAST ASSISTANCE PROJECTS.

SOUTH ASIA: IN ADDITION TO OUR PAKISTAN PROGRAM, WE ARE







אל המשרד

דף \_\_\_\_\_ מתוך \_\_\_\_\_ דפים

סיווג בטחוני: \_\_\_\_\_

רמיפות: \_\_\_\_\_ בהלל לרנסר

אל

דף: וושינגטון

152100

תאריך זיהוי: \_\_\_\_\_

מאת: נאום

342/64

מס. מכרס: \_\_\_\_\_

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אליצור, כהנא.

השגריר בלום שוחח הערב עם השגריר ליכנשטיין בהעדר קירקפטריק הסועדת הערב עם הנשיא ריגן.

1. ליכנשטיין הבהיר שנייר העבודה (מברקנו 341/63) עדיין רחוק ממה שהם היו רוצים לראות כנוסח שיהקבל על דעתם. ליכנשטיין הדגיש שהם מוטרדים בעיקר מן הצרוף של ירושלים, שטחים כבושים ואמנת ג'נבה. כריכת שלושת אלמנטים אלה זה בזה כפי שהם מופיעים בנייר העבודה הערבי יוצרת הרושם שירושלים ושטחים כבושים הנם חליפים וכל זאת חתת האיצטלה של אמנת ג'נבה. אין הם מוכנים על כן לחבילה משונה זו.
2. השגריר בלום הוסיף שגם איזכור המועצה המוסלמית העליונה בסעיף 4 נעשה באורח המקנה לה מעמד של מעין ארגון בינלאומי וכמובן שהדבר מגוחך. השגריר חזר על עמדתנו העקרונית שאין כל מקום להתלטה כפי שלא היו החלטות כאשר השתלטו קנאים על המסגד במכה.
3. ליכנשטיין הוסיף שקירקפטריק היתה מעונינת שבמחב"ד יראו תניירות הערביים והיא העבירה אותם בצרוף דברי הסבר חריפים בגנוחם וכן בצרוף המלצותיה השליליות. כן אמר ליכנשטיין כי בכוונה קירקפטריק להעלות הנושא בישיבה הבוקר מחר, של המועצה לבסחון לאומי. ליכנשטיין סיים באמרו שיש לו הרגשה ששוב מציבים הערבים אחגר בפניהם, והדגיש שהם מוכנים לקבל האחגר ולפעול בהצבעתם במועצה כפי שנקטו בהצבעות האחרונות בענייננו.

נאום

שהיה סלמה רהג סורה שהכס הנגל גאנל ואליו ואלה 2  
ראובן וס"ן גלסל וליכנשטיין רמ אלן

מילוא



אל: המסרד, בני-גורק

סוג בטחוני... שטור.....

דחיסות..... מ?ד?

תאריך וז"ח 82151530

מסי מברק 182

אלה

מילוא, כחנא

37 נ/א/יין

מועביס

מסיחה עם וילקוקס, מנהל ארב מדיני.  
ארה"ב מנהלת מו"מ על הנוסח של קבוצת הועידה האיטלאמית. ארה"ב חוששת שוטו אמריקאי יגרום  
למהומות רחוב במדינות ערביות והפגנות נגד שגרירויותיהם.  
לדבריו מתנהל מו"מ עם מדינות אד ערב המתונות להחליש את הביטוי DEPLORES ולמתן הנוסח  
והם "מקווים" שיגיעו לנוסח שלא יחייב הטלת וטו.

שה סטויה מד סויה סהכ אנה א/א סבל או"ב"י או"ב"א יאבינססין  
דלפ"א יאדיכ דלמ ים ויין



ITEM

NESA-413 (4/15/82)

425  
20h

U.S. OFFICIALS LINK NEAR EAST-SOUTH ASIA AID TO SECURITY  
(982)

WASHINGTON -- THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION APRIL 15 CALLED FOR AN INCREASE IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA AS A WAY TO COUNTER THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS IN THE REGION.

FRANCIS J. WEST JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, SAID, "THIS VAST REGION IS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES."

WEST, APPEARING BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, SAID THE LESSON OF AFGHANISTAN IS THAT "THERE IS A DIRECT SOVIET AGGRESSIVE THREAT." HE SAID THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR HAS DRAMATIZED THE DANGERS OF INTRA-REGIONAL CONFLICTS. HE SAID THE ORGANIZATION OF THREE SOVIET PROXIES IN THE AREA (LIBYA, THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMAN AND ETHIOPIA) IN THE MIDDLE EAST "THREATENS THE LEAST STABLE, GYPT AND NORTH YEMEN."

PAGE 02 -- A/D

AND, HE SAID, VICTORIES OF IRAN OVER IRAQI FORCES AND THE RECENT IRANIAN-SUPPORTED COUP ATTEMPT IN BAHRAIN "RAISE THE SPECTRE OF AN IRANIAN THREAT TO THE PERSIAN GULF."

NICHOLAS VELIOTE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA AFFAIRS, TOLD THE COMMITTEE "IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE AREA (AS WITH)

THATHMMSI9\*- "46"55  
MODERN WEAPONS."

BUT VELIOTE'S BACKED UP WEST'S ASSESSMENT.

"WE ARE NOT JUST DEALING WITH THE ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE;  
THERE ARE OTHER THREATS THAT OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA SEE,"  
VELIOTE SAID. "THEY SEE THAT THE PEOPLE WHO ARE





THREATENING THEM HAVE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF MODERN SOVIET WEAPONRY AT THEIR DISPOSAL."

VELIOTES AND WEST WERE RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR RUDY BOSCHWITZ, WHO WAS ACTING AS CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AS IT HELD THE FIRST OF ITS REGIONAL HEARINGS ON THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROPOSALS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1983.

PAGE 03 -- AID

THE ADMINISTRATION HAS REQUESTED 6,400 MILLION DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, AN INCREASE OF 1,200 MILLION DOLLARS OVER THE AMOUNT AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS LAST YEAR.

BOSCHWITZ, NOTING THAT ABOUT THREE FIFTHS OF THE INCREASE - - OR 863 MILLION DOLLARS -- IS IN THE FORM OF FOREIGN MILITARY SALES LOANS, SUGGESTED THAT THERE IS AN ARMS RACE GOING ON IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT AMERICAN WEAPONS ARE ONLY PART OF THE PICTURE, THAT SOVIET ARMS HAVE BEEN BOLSTERING THE ALREADY LARGE SYRIAN AND LIBYAN ARSENALS.

VELIOTES EXPLAINED TO BOSCHWITZ THAT "WE HAVE EMPHASIZED, IN THE ADMINISTRATION, THAT ARMS SALES ARE A PART OF THE OVER-ALL APPROACH -- BY NO MEANS THE ONLY ELEMENT OF OUR POLICY."

HE ASSURED BOSCHWITZ THAT "THIS APPROACH IS DESIGNED TO ACQUIRE INFLUENCE, REASSURE OUR FRIENDS... AND ALSO TO TRY TO MOVE THE AREA TOWARD PEACE."

BUT VELIOTES ADDED THAT IN THESE TRANSACTIONS, WHILE THE

PAGE 04 -- AID

ADMINISTRATIONS IS DOING ITS BEST TO RELATE TO MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES, IT ALSO IS ASSURING THAT "WHAT WE ARE PROPOSING, OR WHAT THEY WISH, DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE THREAT TO ISRAEL AND DOES NOT IMPACT ADVERSELY ON ISRAEL'S QUALITY DEFENSE."

WEST OUTLINED FOR THE COMMITTEE THE FOUR PRIMARY DEFENSE SECURITY GOALS DESIGNED TO SUPPORT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN

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NH

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THE REGION. THEY ARE TO:

-- ENSURE THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL WHILE PROMOTING THE CONTINUATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS.

-- SUPPORT MODERATE FRIENDLY STATES AGAINST OVERT ATTACKS BY RADICAL STATES.

-- SUPPORT MODERATE STATES AGAINST THE THREAT OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND AGAINST SUBVERSION AIDED OR DIRECTED BY OUTSIDE POWERS.

-- LIMIT SOVIET MILITARY INFLUENCE AND LEVERAGE IN THE REGION AND DETER SOVIET ATTACK.

WEST SAID, HOWEVER, THAT SECURITY ASSISTANCE DOES NOT PLAY THE CENTRAL ROLE IN DETERRING SOVIET AGRESSION. THIS,

PAGE 05 -- AID

HE SAID, WILL DEPEND ON THE CAPABILITY AND FUNDING FOR THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE.

NEVERTHELESS, WEST SAID THAT SECURITY ASSISTANCE "WILL ENHANCE THE ABILITY OF U.S. FORCES TO OPERATE ALONGSIDE REGIONAL FORCES IF THEY ARE ARMED BY THE UNITED STATES, EQUIPPED WITH U.S. MATERIAL AND KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT U.S. DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY."

VELIOTES ALSO REPORTED, BRIEFLY, ON HIS JUST-COMPLETED TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

HE SAID THAT APRIL 25, THE DAY SCHEDULED FOR ISRAEL'S FINAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI PENINSULA, WILL MARK A NEW BEGINNING IN THE AREA. "THAT IS THE DATE ON WHICH THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI TREATY WILL BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND WILL SET THE BASIS FOR STRENGTHENING THAT RELATIONSHIP," HE SAID.

VELIOTES DESCRIBED THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY AS "THE BASIS FOR THE UNITED STATES POLICY FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST."

BUT HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD

PAGE 06 -- AID

NOT BE SURPRISED AT CONCERNS EXPRESSED IN BOTH EGYPT AND ISRAEL AS THE TREATY IS IMPLEMENTED.



-- ENSURE THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL WHILE PROMOTING THE

CONTINUATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS.

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OUTSIDE POWERS.

-- LIMIT SOVIET MILITARY INFLUENCE AND LEVERAGE IN THE

REGION AND DETER SOVIET ATTACK.

WEST SAID, HOWEVER, THAT SECURITY ASSISTANCE DOES NOT

PLAY THE CENTRAL ROLE IN DETERMINING SOVIET AGGRESSION. THIS,

PAGE 52 -- AID

HE SAID, WILL DEPEND ON THE CAPABILITY AND FUNDING FOR THE

RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE.

NEVERTHELESS, WEST SAID THAT SECURITY ASSISTANCE "WILL

ENHANCE THE ABILITY OF U.S. FORCES TO OPERATE ALONGSIDE

REGIONAL FORCES IF THEY ARE ARMED BY THE UNITED STATES,

EQUIPPED WITH U.S. MATERIAL AND KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT U.S.

DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY."

VELIOTES ALSO REPORTED, BRIEFLY, ON HIS JUST-COMPLETED

TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

HE SAID THAT APRIL 25, THE DAY SCHEDULED FOR ISRAEL'S

FINAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI PENINSULA, WILL MARK A NEW

BEGINNING IN THE AREA. "THAT IS THE DATE ON WHICH THE

EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI TREATY WILL BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND

WILL SET THE BASIS FOR STRENGTHENING THAT RELATIONSHIP," HE

SAID.

VELIOTES DESCRIBED THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY AS "THE

FOUNDATION FOR THE UNITED STATES POLICY FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN

THE MIDDLE EAST."

BUT HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD

PAGE 53 -- AID

NOT BE SURPRISED AT CONCERNS EXPRESSED IN BOTH EGYPT AND

ISRAEL AS THE TREATY IS IMPLEMENTED.

44



HE SAID IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY IS "SOMETHING OF A  
STEP INTO THE UNKNOWN" AND "THIS LEADS TO AN ATMOSPHERE  
WHERE CONCERNS DO ARISE."

"THEY DO HAVE QUESTIONS," HE SAID OF BOTH EGYPT AND  
ISRAEL, AND "UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT  
THE UNITED STATES BY ITS PRESENCE, BY ITS RELATIONS WITH  
BOTH OF THESE COUNTRIES... WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A FULL ROLE  
IN HELPING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS AND ELIMINATE TENSIONS."

"WE MUST REMEMBER," VELIOTES ADVISED THE COMMITTEE, "THAT  
THE UNITED STATES IS NOT ONLY A PARTNER TO THIS TREATY BUT  
REALLY THE GUARANTOR."

ITEM

NESA-414 (4/15/82)

ALL PRINCIPAL POSTS

FOR PAOS, IOS

FROM PGM/RC

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT WATCH LIST (150)

IN ADDITION TO REPORTING REGULAR WORLD-WIDE AND BILATERAL  
ISSUES, APPRECIATE YOUR SPECIAL ATTENTION TO FOLLOWING  
ITEMS:

1. FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE/HAIG MISSION.
2. CENTRAL AMERICAN ISSUES/NICARAGUAN ACCEPTANCE OF  
MEDIATION/EL SALVADOR/MEETING OF CENTRAL AMERICAN  
DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY FOREIGN MINISTERS IN BOGOTA,  
APRIL 19-20.
3. VISIT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CARLUCCI TO  
PANAMA, VENEZUELA, BRAZIL, ARGENTINA, CHILE AND  
COLOMBIA, APRIL 22-MAY 1.
4. OUTLOOK FOR REAGAN TRIP TO EUROPE/VERSAILLES SUMMIT  
PREPARATORY MEETING IN PROVENCE, FRANCE, APRIL 24-25.

PAGE 02 -- REACTION

5. WASHINGTON PRESS CENTER EVENTS

HE SAID IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY IS "SOMETHING OF A  
 STEP INTO THE UNKNOWN" AND "THIS LEADS TO AN ATMOSPHERE  
 WHERE CONCERNS DO ARISE."  
 "THEY DO HAVE QUESTIONS," HE SAID OF BOTH EGYPT AND  
 ISRAEL, AND "UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT  
 THE UNITED STATES BY ITS PRESENCE, BY ITS RELATIONS WITH  
 BOTH OF THESE COUNTRIES... WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A FULL ROLE  
 IN HELPING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS AND ELIMINATE TENSIONS."  
 "WE MUST REMEMBER," VELIOTES ADVISED THE COMMITTEE, "THAT  
 THE UNITED STATES IS NOT ONLY A PARTNER TO THIS TREATY BUT  
 REALLY THE GUARANTOR."

22

ITEM

NESEA-414 (4/15/82)

ALL PRINCIPAL POSTS

FOR PADS, IOS

FROM PGM/RJC

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT WATCH LIST (150)

IN ADDITION TO REPORTING REGULAR WORLD-WIDE AND BILATERAL  
 ISSUES, APPRECIATE YOUR SPECIAL ATTENTION TO FOLLOWING  
 ITEMS:

1. FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE/NAIG MISSION.
2. CENTRAL AMERICAN ISSUES/NICARAGUAN ACCEPTANCE OF  
 MEDIATION/EL SALVADOR MEETING OF CENTRAL AMERICAN  
 DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY FOREIGN MINISTERS IN BOGOTA,  
 APRIL 19-26.
3. VISIT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CARLUCCI TO  
 PANAMA, VENEZUELA, BRAZIL, ARGENTINA, CHILE AND  
 COLOMBIA, APRIL 22-MAY 1.
4. OUTLOOK FOR REGAN TRIP TO EUROPE/VERMILLES SUMMIT  
 PREPARATORY MEETING IN PROVENCE, FRANCE, APRIL 24-25.









משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\*\* \*\*  
\*\* \*\* 3 תחוך 3 דף \*\*  
\*\* \*\* 32 תחוך 4 עותק \*\*  
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סודי ביותר

\*\* של היהודים הרפובליקאים לקראת הפגישה עם הנשיא. לארץ נוכח \*\*  
\*\* ממחדש שטיקר דאגתם, יוקרתם האישית, ונ"י יאמר מה. מחוך עעתיים \*\*  
\*\* וחצי שהשתתף בפגישה ב- SUZE של מקס פישר \*\*  
\*\* הוקדשו עעתיים לנסיונות גורדי ומקס לברסם במטעם אל שפיגל ורק \*\*  
\*\* בחצי שנה הוקדשה לטהות. \*\*

====]111\*\*

\*\* חפ: שה, טשה, דהט, סרהט, שהבט, טנכל, טמנכל, ר/טרכו, דס, אטן. \*\*  
\*\* מצפא, חפוצות \*\*

דפים \_\_\_\_\_ סתוד \_\_\_\_\_ דף \_\_\_\_\_

סיווג בטחוני: 13/1

דחיסות: 142100

תאריך וזיהוי: 325-59

לשימוש  
מחלקת  
הקשר

אל: פאליש, אושעטאין.

גם עבר:

מאת: לאולף.

אלדג. צקי וקנס.

וואקס: הכ רביג.

1. בהצגת קייקפסטיין מאשפר למחמי רבדה שבה  
סלפוניג עם זיכרטיין וביקשנו אפליג  
אג קייקפסטיין היתנצפתנו אקבאר החמטה כלפי  
א פאולצב קואלד זי.

2. זיכרטיין רביג כי מטעמים שלוינס זפכים או לחלוטין  
מחמט מחויניג כל קבאר החמטה למפיה  
"מקבאר ה הצמ" (Satisfactory) אטק זי  
קושני עם קייקפסטיין מחמטים ביכיווניג זי מחויניג  
רביג שליתנצפתנו אצמ קבאר החמטה מאבא זיפיה  
רמאניקונים מוקדם כל פאולש.

3. ארצת זיכרטיין ארציש עם קייקפסטיין מחמי בקיג

לוח סופיה ריה סורה שיה מוק יאמנס סמנס מחמ רמ אגין  
ארצת גרפא אורה



AND AFGHANISTAN, SUGGESTS CONSIDERABLE HYPOCRISY.

AVOIDING TRAGIC MILITARY CONFRONTATION, AND FINDING A WAY OUT OF THE CRISIS THAT SERVES THE DIGNITY OF BOTH ARGENTINA AND BRITAIN, REQUIRES DELICATE, PERSISTENT AND PURPOSEFUL DIPLOMACY -- NOT PROPAGANDA FUEL FROM THE OUTSIDE THAT COULD MAKE MATTERS EVEN MORE DANGEROUS THAN THEY ARE THIS POINT.

*22*

ITEM

NESEA-310 (4/14/82)

*W/C*

STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14, 1982 ( 00)

NEWS BRIEFING -- DEAN FISCHER, STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN, WAS THE BRIEFER. HE COVERED THE FOLLOWING TOPICS:

HAIG MET STOESSEL, VELIOTES IN LONDON --

FISCHER CONFIRMED THAT SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG MET APRIL 13 IN LONDON WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY WALTER STOESSEL AND WITH NICHOLAS VELIOTES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS.

VELIOTES HAS JUST COMPLETED A VISIT TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND STOESSEL WAS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN TALKS WITH ISRAELI LEADERS APRIL 15. HE WAS SENT TO THE MIDDLE EAST BY PRESIDENT REAGAN TO ASSIST EGYPT AND ISRAEL WITH ARRANGEMENTS LEADING UP TO THE SCHEDULED APRIL 25 ISRAELI FINAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI. AFTER TALKS WITH PRIME

PAGE 02 -- STATE

MINISTER BEGIN AND OTHER ISRAELI OFFICIALS, STOESSEL IS SCHEDULED TO VISIT EGYPT, WHERE HE WILL MEET WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND OTHER OFFICIALS.

ASKED IF SECRETARY HAIG'S RETURN TO WASHINGTON APRIL 13 WAS RELATED TO DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION, FISCHER SAID, "I WOULD NOT ASCRIBE IT AS HAVING TO DO WITH THE SITUATION IN

THE MIDDLE EAST."

FISCHER SAID THE UNITED STATES IS "CONFIDENT" THAT THE APRIL 25 SINAI WITHDRAWAL DATE WOULD BE MET. "PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAS CONSISTENTLY SAID THAT HE FULLY INTENDS TO COMPLY" WITH PROVISIONS OF THE 1979 ISRAEL-EGYPT PEACE TREATY, FISCHER SAID.

23

CHINESE PROTEST SPARE PARTS SALE TO TAIWAN --

FISCHER SAID THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA HAS FORMALLY PROTESTED THE U.S. DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH A 60 MILLION DOLLAR SALE OF MILITARY SPARE PARTS TO TAIWAN.

"IT IS A STRONG, SERIOUS PROTEST, CONSISTENT WITH THEIR

PAGE 03 -- STATE

POSITION ON THIS ISSUE," FISCHER SAID. "OUR DISCUSSIONS ARE CONTINUING AND WE SEEK AN OUTCOME WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES."

HE DECLINED TO PROVIDE ANY OTHER CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PROTEST FROM BEIJING.

FISCHER ALSO DECLINED TO BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT THE ONGOING TALKS. "DISCUSSIONS ARE CONTINUING BETWEEN CHINESE AND U.S. OFFICIALS," HE SAID. IN THE PAST THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED AS "SENSITIVE."

EARLIER, THE STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS OFFICE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE 60 MILLION DOLLAR SALE IS THE FIRST THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS APPROVED WHICH REQUIRES CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION. EARLIER, SMALL-SCALE DELIVERIES HAVE BEEN MADE, BUT THEIR DOLLAR VALUE WAS BELOW THE LEVEL WHICH REQUIRES CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.

THE U.S. CONGRESS HAS 30 DAYS TO ACT ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S REQUEST FOR TAIWAN, WHICH WILL BE APPROVED UNLESS BOTH THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REJECT IT.

PAGE 04 -- STATE



24

IN RESPONSE TO REPORTS THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS DECIDED TO OFFER JORDAN "A COMPROMISE ARMS PACKAGE" INCLUDING F56 JET FIGHTERS, FISCHER SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO "GET INTO THE INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION ON ISSUES WHICH ARE YET TO BE DECIDED."

ON THE QUESTION OF NEW ARMS SALES, HE REITERATED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT RECEIVED "ANY REQUESTS FROM JORDAN."

"AT THE SAME TIME," FISCHER SAID, "WE RECOGNIZE THAT JORDAN HAS LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE NEEDS AND WE WANT OUR LONG-STANDING MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH JORDAN TO CONTINUE."

"OUR FRIENDS IN THE REGION SHOULD BE CONFIDENT THAT WE ARE INTERESTED IN THEIR ABILITY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES," FISCHER SAID. "THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT ANY DECISION ON FUTURE SALES TO JORDAN, OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN THE REGION, WILL BE MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE

PAGE 05 -- STATE

ADMINISTRATION'S FIRM COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND THE NEED TO BRING PEACE TO THE REGION."

U.S. TO HAVE ACCESS TO GOODMAN AFTER INVESTIGATION --

FISCHER SAID ISRAELI AUTHORITIES HAVE ASSURED THE UNITED STATES THAT CONSULAR ACCESS WILL BE GRANTED TO ALAN HARRY GOODMAN "ONCE POLICE COMPLETE THEIR INITIAL INVESTIGATION."

"THIS IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ISRAELI LAW AND HAS BEEN THE USUAL PRACTICE IN ARREST CASES INVOLVING AMERICAN CITIZENS," FISCHER SAID.

GOODMAN HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH MURDER IN CONNECTION WITH THE EASTER SUNDAY SHOOTING INCIDENT AT THE DOME OF THE ROCK MOSQUE IN JERUSALEM. TWO ARABS WERE SHOT TO DEATH AND AT LEAST SEVEN OTHERS WERE WOUNDED IN THE SHOOTING INCIDENT. GOODMAN IMMIGRATED TO ISRAEL ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO AND WAS A RECENT INDUCTEE IN THE ISRAELI ARMY.



25

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, FISCHER SAID THAT A PERSON DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY LOSE U. S. CITIZENSHIP BY PERFORMING A

PAGE 06 -- STATE

GIVEN ACT, SUCH AS SERVING IN FOREIGN ARMED FORCES. HE SAID ALL CASES INVOLVING POSSIBLE LOSS OF U. S. NATIONALITY ARE CONSIDERED INDIVIDUALLY AND DECIDED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.

ITEM

PLEASE STANDBY, MORE ITEMS COMING.....

ORA ORA ORA ORA DE VOA WASHDC CALLING RYRYRYRYRYRYRYR  
NOW IS THE TIME FOR ALL GOOD MEN TO COME TO HIS OFFICE  
RYR  
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 NO..... N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 NO  
RYR YR

ORA ORA ORA ORA DE VOA WASHDC CALLING RYRYRYRYRYRYRYR  
NOW IS THE TIME FOR ALL GOOD MEN TO COME TO HIS OFFICE  
RYR  
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 NO..... N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 NO  
RYR

ORA ORA ORA ORA DE VOA WASHDC CALLING RYRYRYRYRYRYRYR  
NOW IS THE TIME FOR ALL GOOD MEN TO COME TO HIS OFFICE  
RYR  
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 NO..... N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 NO  
RYR YR



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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טודי ביותר

מתוך 1  
מתוך 34

דף 1  
טותק 5

\*\*אל: ווש, קהיר, נר: חוזם 316, מ: המשרד  
\*\*דח: מ, טג: מ, תא: 130482, זח: 1400  
\*\*נד: רהי'מ' - ולי'מ'ט

א.א.

\*\*טודי ביותר/מיידי

\*\*ארנס.

\*\*דע ששון

\*\*שיחת רהי'מ' ואליו'מ'ט לשלנו חוזם 266.  
\*\*לסטיף 5 בקשר לדברי רהי'מ' בתשובה ללואיס י'שאי'ננרהי'מ' (מחנך במקרה הצורך ורק במקרה כזה, לחליפת מכתבים כפי שפורט  
\*\*לעיל י'ראוי שיהיה רשום שרהי'מ' אמר שהמצרים יהיו חייבים

\*\*'TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE LETTER AND ACCEPT ITS CONTENT'.

\*\*--11H--

\*\*תפ: שהח, טשהח, דהמ, טרהמ, שהבט, טנכל, טמנכל, דלמרכו, דס, אמך,  
\*\*מצפא, רו'בי'נשטיין, דיבון, מצרים

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

4780

\*\* יציא

שטר

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אלי: ווא, נר: 315, מ: המשרד  
דח: ד, סג: ש, תא: 130482, זח: 1400  
נד: ביקור משלחת ווייט

2.7.6

שטר/רגיל

אכילאה.

ביקור משלחת ווייט.

1. המודעה ווייט החליף את המודעה פרייס בראשות המשלחת שביקרה מטעם ועדת השירותים המווייטים של בית הנבחרים ב-11 וב-12 דנא. נוכחו שגידר ארהב וטורדיו, טורדי המורשים, ומטעם המשרד ב-און, סידים ויטקב.
2. חברי המשלחת נפגשו עם דהם, שהח וסגן שהח, שהבט וראש אמן, וביקרו בבטיס כרם באופידה.

פראים בדיפי

3. בפגישה עם דוהם הועלו הנושאים להלן: הסכמי ק.ד. הפיינוי מסיני וויחורינו למטן השלום, דאגותינו לגבי הברחת נשק מסיני מטעם אשף לשטחנו והפרות מצדיות של חוזה השלום, המצב בלבנון, מלחמת איראן-טירק, חדירה סובייטית במזרח כולל באמצעות מצבורי ציוד מלחמתי בלב ובסוריה ופטולות ישראל בתגובה להתגרונות ערביות.

4. דוהם נגע בחובכנית מגיד בוטידת כווייט ושאל איך ייתכנו דברים כאלה מצד אחד כאשר מהצד השני חוזר ומצהיר נשיא מצרים שהנו דבק בעקרונות ק.ד.

5. דהם פירט המצב בלבנון וסכנותיו, וגם תיאר הסכנות הנובעות ממלחמת איראן-טירק ובעיקר ההתפשטות הסובייטית האפשרית באזור המפרץ. בנושא חגובותינו ופטולותינו תיאר אמצעי התקשורת בארהב כבלתי-אובייקטיביים ובלתי הוגנים כלפינו שהרי במשך חודשים לא מגיבה ישראל ידוע וכאשר היא מגיבה מאשימים אותנו

7.11



## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ב- OVER REACTING

גם שהח עמד על כך שישראל ממלאת אחד כל התחייבויותיה לגבי הסכם השלום וצפייחנו ליחס דומה מצד מצרים. מצרים מתמודדת ביום עם רצונה לחזור לחיק העולם הערבי ואולי להיות אף מנהיגתו. ולשמירה על הסכם השלום. נשיא מצרים מוטן שחידוש היחסים עם ארצות ערב לא נעשה על חשבון היחסים עמנו אך השאלה ביצד ימוטמו הדברים באורם טעמי והם יבחנו לאחר נסיגתנו אסיני. כיום ישנם סמנים מדאיגים בדעת הקהל המצרית שאינה בלתי קשורה לממסד. יש בעיות בקשר לפידור סיני ולגבי הקשרים עם ארגונים טויינים, לגבי סמון הגבול והצגת תכנית זו הנקודות בכווית אינה מסיימת. שהח מדגיש ההשפעה הרבה שתהיה לעמדת ארהב לגבי המשך תהליך השלום, ובכך שבמצרים ידעו שאם רצונם להמשיך ביחסי ידידות עם ארהב וקבלת סיועה, עליהם להקפיד ולשמור על הסכמי קמפי דיויד ועל השלום כחנאי כל יעבור. שהח הסביר היקף ההערבות האפשרית בגבול הצפון ועמד על מקורות הסיוע לאשף מסעודיה, לוב, ארצות הנפט והגוש הקומוניסטי. בן הדגיש הפרות החוררות ונשנות של הסכם הפסקת האש על ידם והצורך בהתגוננותנו ובשמירה על חיי אזרחינו.

שהח גם הסביר חשיבותו האסטרטגית של הרמה והחלת החוק הישראלי תוך ציון שישראל נכונה לנהל מוס לשלום עם סוריה בלי כל תנאים מוקדמים.

בן עמד על מהות הבעיה הפילשתיןאית ואת מציאת הפתרון ללאומיות הפילשתיןאית בירדן כשתכנית האוטונומיה באה לפתור את בעיתם של תושבי יו"ש וטרה.

בתשובה לשאלה על ההטלכות מעסקת האוזקס לגבינו הסביר שהח הרוייה מעל ומעבר בנשק מתוחכם המצוי באזור הטוח וקונק לשלום ולא לנשק נוסף ואספקתו למדינות עוינות להסכם השלום אינה משרתת את היציבות והשלום באזורנו.

סגן שהח הסביר לדרישת דגים מחברי המשלחת שלא היו מודעים לטהות המשמית של הסכמי קמפי דיויד ותכנית האוטונומיה ואת הסתירה שבחכנית זו הנקודות המצרית בכווית למחוייבותם להסכמי ק.ד.

שד הבטחון וראש אמן עמדו בהרחבה על ההערבות הצבאית של מדינות הטמוח ועל הסכנה שבטרור הערבי כמוקד ובמקדם מלחמה. השר אף ביקר בסארקזיס את החחרות של ספקיות הנשק ממזרח ומערב כאחד מי יצליח למכור בטויות גדולות יותר של נשק מתוחכם לאזור והבעיה שמכירות בלתי אחראיות אלה מציבות בפנינו לשאלת הסנטור ליהי אם הנשק המסופק לחל מארצות ערב אינו מיועד להתגוננות בפני התקפה מהמדינות הרדיקות השיב השר שבשלושים השנים האחרונות לא נלחמו הערבים זה בזה וכל הנשק הופנה בסופו של דבר דק

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

נגדנו. אשר גם הדגיש הסכנה שבבסיס טאבוק בסטודיה שכל יטודו  
הוא אך בלפינו.

שד הבטחון גם טמד בהרחבה על ההתפשטות הסובייטיות במזרח  
ובאפריקה ובצורך למלא את החלל שנתהווה במדינות המתונות  
הופרו-טערביות בסיוע מעדבי אם בתכניות פתוח, אספקת מזון  
ובהערבות הגנתית. הוכיח במיוחד את חשיבותן של זאיר וקמ'יא.

וד הבטחון הביא לידיעת המשתתפים הידיעה בקשר למתקפת הרקטות  
על בנין שגארהב בניירות.

מצפא-===

תפ: שהח, טשהח, דהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, מונבל, ממנבל, ד/מרכו, דס, אמנ,  
ממת, מצפא, דובינשמ'ין



מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

4368/1

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סודי ביותר

מחוך 2

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מחוך 34

עוֹתֵק 6

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סוף

מל: המשרד, נד: 302, מ: נ

מח: ב, סג: מ, תא: 130482, ות: 1530

נד: פגישה עם הנשיא

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סודי ביותר / בהול

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מל: שהח' מנכל . ממנכל . הצפא

דע: שגריר וושי (הועבר)

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אאמול לפני הצהריים קבל הנשיא בבית הלבן משלחת עסקנים

היהודיים במפלגה הרפובליקאית . לצד הנשיא היו סגנו , ג'ורג'י

בוש , ראש המוטצה לבטחון לאומי , קלארק , אד מיו ועוד 3 מצוות

הבית הלבן . במשלחת היהודית השתתפו : מקס פייטר , ג'ורג' קליין

לארי וויינברג , אל שפיגל , גורדי וקס ודיק פוקס . השיחה

ארכה 40 דקות ובסיומה ביקש הנשיא להדגיש שהוא מציט לקיים

דלת פתוחה בבית הלבן לקבוצת מנהיגים זו , כדי שאפשר יהיה

לקיים דו שיח עם הצבור היהודי .

ג'ורג' קליין שדיווח לי זה עתה על מהלך השיחה הטעים , כי הוא

מתרשם שהנשיא ואנשיו מעוניינים ביותר להפיס את דעתה של ישראל

טרב הפינוי הסופי של סיני ולהפיג את חששותיה מהתרחקות מצרים

מההליך השלום . לדעת קליין נועדה פגישה זו להעביר מסר של

הרגעה לישראל , מבלי שיהיה מאחורי הדברים שנאמרו למשלחת

היהודית מחוייבות ממשיה כשהי . קליין סיפר שהנשיא התבטא תוך

הבנה ואהרה למראומה שעוברת על ישראל לקראת פינוי ימית

בהוסיפו שהנו בטוח שישראל ומצרים יכבדו שתייהן את

התחייבויותיהן על פי הסכם השלום .

בכך ניסה הנשיא , לדעת קליין , להדגיש את בטחונו בביצוע

הנסיגה הסופית מסיני . לדבריו אמר הנשיא שהוא מעודד מחילופי

מאגרות שלו עם רהמי בגין ועם נשיא מצרים מובארק . מאגרות

אלו הוא שואב את בטחונו בנכונות שני הצדדים להמשיך בהליך

השלום .

סגן הנשיא התייחס לדאגות כמה מחברי המשלחת לגבי אספקת נשק

אמריקאי בכמויות ובאיכויות למדינות ערב בערב הסעודית וירדן

בוש אמר שזה עתה הושלם סקר שנערך ע"י גורמים בממשל , כולל

הפנטגון , המצביע על עליונותה של ישראל באמצע מכל הסוגים





43/213

1051

נס"מ

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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1051 1051 1051  
נס"מ נס"מ נס"מ

מל: המשרד, נר: 158, מ: 1051  
דח: ב, סג: מ, תא: 130482, זח: 0810  
נד: 1051

א/ה

1051 ביוטר/בהוליי  
רהמ' שהח' שהבט' לעיניהם בלבד.

1. התרשמותי שהאמריקאים מנסים להאיט את קצב המגעים כך שיוכלו  
למנוע כל הצטרפות לא ניתן להגיע לסיכום מוסכם לפני  
תאריך הנסיגה ולכן עלינו לסגת והם ימשיכו לטפל בנושא לאחר  
מכן. סמטל יגיע ארצה ביום רביעי בערב. חושב להמשיך למצרים בסוף  
השבוע. אם הייג בכלל יבוא, אין להניח שיהיה זה לפני אמצע השבוע  
הבא. במידה ויצטרך גם לבקר במצרים כבר הגענו לתאריך הנסיגה.

2. התרשמותי מסמטל, למרות היותו פורמלית איש מספר שניים  
ומהמד', אינו מוכן ואינו מוסמך להתחייב בנושאים משמעותיים.  
3. האמריקאים חושבים שכבר שוכנענו לנטוש את דעיון 'הצהרת  
האישור מחדש' וידברו אתנו על משהו הרבה 'פחות פורמלי'.  
4. אני מציע לדרוש מסמטל שיטפל מיידית בסיכום ההפרות המצריות  
ושמח כאשר במקביל יתנהלו שיחות לקראת חתימה על הצהרת האישור  
מחדש.  
ארנס =

תפ: שהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל





אלי: המשרד, נר: 79, ה: לונדון  
 דח: ד, סג: ב, תא: 130482, ות: 1340  
 נד: ארהב-בריטניה-מות

בלמס/רגיל

אלי: אירופה 2/מצפייא

מאח: הציר/לונדון

ארה"ב - בריטניה והמז"ב

1. הפוראופיס פרסם היום הודעה משותפת שסוכמה עם האחריקנים  
 מזוות הפרק המז"ב בשיחות מוכיך המדינה היג ושה"ח פמ  
 אמתול כלהלן:

IN THE COURSE OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS THEY STUDIED REPORTS OF  
 MOUNTING TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND REVIEWED THE  
 SITUATION THERE. THEY ATTACH THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO  
 THE MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE IN LEBANON AND TO THIS  
 END CALL ON ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE THE MAXIMUM OF  
 RESTRAINT.

חוגים בפוראופיס הדגישו הדיון וההודעה המז"ב בעת ששני  
 השרים עסקו במשבר פלקלנד כבטוי לדאגת שחי המשלות מהמצב  
 המז"ב.  
 2. וולטר טטסל יקבל כאן היום דיווח מוליוטיס החוור מאוורנו  
 ויפגש עם שר המדינה בפוראופיס דאגלס הוד.

בירן

חפ: טהח, טשהח, רהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל, מאח, דמ,

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

אמן, אירא, אירב, מצפא, מעט, הסברה, פורת, ארבל 2



AT KABUL UNIVERSITY, AT LEAST TWO PROFESSORS AND A NUMBER  
OF STUDENTS SAID TO BE INVOLVED IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY WERE  
ARRESTED.

DIPLOMATIC SOURCES SAID THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF INCREASED  
FIGHTING IN VARIOUS AREAS OF THE COUNTRY.

THE SOUNDS OF HEAVY ARTILLERY WERE MORE FREQUENT AND  
CLOSER TO KABUL THAN AT ANY TIME IN RECENT MONTHS. ON TWO

PAGE 03 -- KABUL

SUCCESSIVE NIGHTS LAST WEEK, THE BOOMS OF ARTILLERY BOTH  
NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE CITY WERE SAID TO BE LONG AND  
SUSTAINED. MILITARY CONVOYS CUMBERED THROUGH THE CAPITAL AT  
FREQUENT INTERVALS DURING THE WEEK.

MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE SOMALI AREA NORTH OF KABUL WAS  
SAID TO BE HEAVY BUT DETAILS OF THE FIGHTING WERE NOT  
AVAILABLE. IT APPEARED THAT AREAS CLOSER TO KABUL ARE BEING  
HEAVILY BOMBARDED AS WERE VILLAGES FURTHER NORTH IN RECENT  
WEEKS.

ALTHOUGH THE MUJAHIDIN RESISTANCE FIGHTERS GENERALLY HAVE  
NOT BEEN ABLE TO FEND OFF MAJOR BOMBARDMENTS, THEY ARE SAID  
TO REMAIN IN CONTROL OF SEVERAL STRONGHOLDS AS GULDAK AND  
SHAKARDA TO THE WEST OF THE HIGHWAY LEADING FROM KABUL TO  
THE SOVIET UNION.

IN CENTRAL AFGHANISTAN, SEVERAL SECTIONS OF HAZARJAT  
CONTROLLED BY THE RESISTANCE REMAIN LARGELY UNCHALLENGED  
DESPITE BOMBINGS AND AT LEAST ONE GROUND ATTACK.

THE NEARBY TOWN OF ALRAIZ, RECOVERED FROM A DEFEATIST  
AFGHAN-SOVIET STRIKE EARLIER THIS YEAR, REMAINS FULLY IN

PAGE 04 -- KABUL

MUJAHIDIN HANDS.

ITEM

NESA-011 (4/13/82)

WHITE HOUSE REPORT, TUE DAY, APRIL 13, 1982 (3 8)

OF STUDENTS PAID TO BE INVOLVED IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY WERE  
ARRESTED.

DIPLOMATIC SOURCES SAID THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF INTENSE  
FIGHTING IN VARIOUS AREAS OF THE COUNTRY.

THE SOUNDS OF HEAVY ARTILLERY WERE MORE FREQUENT AND  
CLOSER TO KABUL THAN AT ANY TIME IN RECENT MONTHS. ON TWO

PAGE 83 -- KABUL

SUCCESSIVE NIGHTS LAST WEEK, THE BOOMS OF ARTILLERY IN THE  
NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE CITY WERE SAID TO BE LONG AND  
SUSTAINED. MILITARY CONVOYS RUMBLING THROUGH THE CAPITAL AT  
FREQUENT INTERVALS DURING THE WEEK.

MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE SMALL AREA NORTH OF KABUL WAS  
SAID TO BE HEAVY BUT DETAILS OF THE FIGHTING WERE NOT  
AVAILABLE. IT APPEARED THAT A FEAR CLOSER TO KABUL ARE BEING  
HEAVILY BOMBARDED AS WERE VILLAGES FURTHER NORTH IN RECENT  
WEEKS.

ALTHOUGH THE MOUNTAIN RESISTANCE FIGHTERS GENERALLY HAVE  
NOT BEEN ABLE TO FEND OFF MAJOR BOMBARDMENTS, THEY ARE SAID  
TO REMAIN IN CONTROL OF SUCH STRONGHOLDS AS GULDA AND  
SHAKADABA TO THE WEST OF THE HIGHWAY LEADING FROM KABUL TO  
THE SOVIET UNION.

IN CENTRAL AFGHANISTAN, SEVERAL SECTIONS OF HIGHWAY  
CONTROLLED BY THE RESISTANCE REMAIN LARGELY UNCHALLENGED  
DESPITE BOMBINGS AND AT LEAST ONE GROUND ATTACK.  
THE NEARBY TOWN OF ALAITS, RECOVERED FROM A DEFEAT IN  
AFGHAN-SOVIET STRIKES EARLIER THIS YEAR, REMAINS FULLY IN

PAGE 84 -- KABUL

MUHAMMIDIN HANDS.

ITEM

NEWS-011 (A13282)



NEW BRIEFING -- DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY LA S PEAKE  
BRIEFED ON THESE TOPICS:

21

NO COMMENT ON JORDAN AIRCRAFT SALE --

QUESTIONED ABOUT NEWS REPORTS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION  
WILL SELL F-5 AIRCRAFT TO JORDAN, SPEAKES SAID HE DOES NOT  
DISCUSS PROPOSALS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

"JORDAN DOES HAVE LEGITIMATE SECURITY NEEDS," SPEAKES  
OBSERVED. HE ADDED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS "MADE CLEAR TO  
OUR FRIENDS IN THE REGION" THAT WASHINGTON WOULD ATTEMPT TO  
HELP MEET SUCH LEGITIMATE NEEDS. REAGAN HAS PLEDGED, HE  
SAID, "THAT ANY SALES IN THE AREA WILL BE IN THE CONTEXT OF  
OUR FIRM COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND OUR DESIRE TO  
CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE IN THE REGION."

PAGE 02 -- WHITE HOUSE RPT.

REAGAN BUDGET ROLE OUTLINED --

SPEAKES SAID THE PRESIDENT IS PROVIDING A "GUIDING HAND"  
TO WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF JIM BAKER IN HIS DISCUSSIONS  
WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON PROPOSALS FOR COMPROMISE ON THE  
1983 BUDGET.

SPEAKES SAID BAKER KNOWS THE PRESIDENT "WELL ENOUGH" TO  
KNOW WHAT HE WILL OR WILL NOT ACCEPT...JIM IS BRIEFING THE  
PRESIDENT AND KEEPING HIM A REAST OF THE DISCUSSIONS." BUT  
SPEAKES INSISTED REAGAN IS NOT "CHECKING OFF" ON INDIVIDUAL  
SUGGESTIONS, IDEAS OR PROPOSALS AND WILL RESERVE JUDGMENT  
UNTIL A FINAL COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE IS PREPARED. HE TOLD A  
QUESTIONER THE WHITE HOUSE IS SEEKING A BROAD BIPARTISAN  
COALITION THAN EXISTED FOR THE 1982 BUDGET, WHICH HAS PALE  
AFTER A GROUP OF HOUSE DEMOCRATS, TERMED "BOLL WEEMERS,"  
DESERTED THEIR LEADERSHIP TO BACK REAGAN'S SPENDING  
BLUEPRINT. SPEAKES SUGGESTS THE PRESIDENT WOULD  
PREFER TO HAVE THE HOUSE LEADERS BACK THE 1983

BRIEFED ON THESE TOPICS:

NO COMMENT IN JORDAN AIRCRAFT SALE --

QUESTIONED ABOUT NEWS REPORTS THAT THE OMI TATION WILL SELL F-7 AIRCRAFT TO JORDAN, SPEAKERS SAID HE DID NOT DISCUSS PROPOSALS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

"JORDAN DOES HAVE LEGITIMATE SECURITY NEEDS," SPEAKERS OBSERVED. HE ADDED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS "MADE CLEAR TO OUR FRIENDS IN THE REGION" THAT WASHINGTON WOULD ATTEMPT TO HELP MEET SUCH LEGITIMATE NEEDS. REAGAN HAS PLEDGED, HE SAID, "THAT ANY SALES IN THE AREA WILL BE IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR FIRM COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND OUR DESIRE TO CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE IN THE REGION."

PAGE 02 -- WHITE HOUSE RP.

REAGAN BU GET ROLE OUTLINED --

SPEAKERS SAID THE PRESIDENT IS PROVIDING A "GUIDING HAND" TO WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF JIM BAKER IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON PROPOSALS FOR COMPROMISE ON THE 1983 BUDGET.

SPEAKERS SAID BAKER KNOWS THE PRESIDENT "WELL ENOUGH TO KNOW WHAT HE WILL ACCEPT... JIM IS BRIEFING THE PRESIDENT AND KEEPING HIM A REAR OF THE DISCUSSIONS." SPEAKERS INSISTED REAGAN IS NOT "CHECKING OFF" ON INDIVIDUAL SUGGESTIONS, IDEAS OR PROPOSALS AND WILL RESERVE JUDGMENT UNTIL A FINAL COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE IS PRESENTED. HE TOLD QUESTIONERS THE WHITE HOUSE IS STRIKING A BROAD BIPARTISAN COALITION THAT EXISTED FOR THE 1982 BUDGET, WHICH SPEAKERS SAID AFTER A GROUP OF HOUSE DEMOCRATS, TERMED "BOLL WEIVIL," DESERTED THEIR LEADERSHIP TO BACK REAGAN'S SPENDING BLUEPRINT. SPEAKERS SUGGEST THE PRESIDENT WOULD PREFER TO HAVE THE HOUSE LEADERS BACK THE 1983

21



SUMMED UP THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENT FOR MATTAI GITE  
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

WRITING IN THE NEW YORK TIMES APRIL 13, NITZBERG SAID:

"GIVEN THE CONTINUATION OF THE I BALANCE THAT LED TO THE  
FIRST-USE DOCTRINE IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW  
A RENUNCIATION OF THE DOCTRINE, IN THE ABSENCE OF  
SUBSTANTIAL S VIET REDUCTIONS OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN  
EUROPE, WOULD MAINTAIN THE RECORD OF PEACE IN EUROPE THAT

PAGE 06 -- NA 0

HAS OBTAINED HIGH RIG.

"DETERRENCE HAS WORKED. TO REMOVE THE ESSENTIAL P  
OF  
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE PRIOR TO RE-EVALUATION OF THE CONDITIONS  
THAT LED TO ITS FASHIONING WOULD BE TO TEAR IT. HOW CAN  
IT BE ARGUED THAT A FIRST-USE POLICY POSE IN RISK TO  
TO THE COHERENCE OF THE NATO ALLIANCE AS WELL AS AN  
INCREASED THREAT TO WORLD SAFETY?

"ALLIANCE COHERENCE IS A FUNCTION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF  
DETERRENCE. IF A NO-FIRST-USE POLICY WOULD REDUCE  
DETERRENCE, AS I BELIEVE IT WOULD, THE WORLD SAFETY WOULD  
DECLINE RATHER THAN IMPROVE."

ITEM

NESA-213 (4/13/82)

STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, TUESDAY, APRIL 13, 1982 (587)

NEWS BRIEFING -- ALAN ROMBERG, STATE DEPARTMENT DEPUTY  
SPOKESMAN, WAS THE BRIEFER. HE COVERED THE FOLLOWING  
TOPICS:

STOESSEL SETS TALKS APRIL 15 IN ISRAEL --

ROMBERG SAID THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WALTER  
STOESSEL WAS TO MEET WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR  
EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS NICHOLAS VELIOTE IN LONDON

28

v/c

... AD INITIATIVE'S A REPORT FOR MAT TA I G  
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.  
WRITING IN THE NEW YORK TIMES APRIL 13, WITZBERG  
"GIVEN THE CONTINUATION OF THE BALANCE THAT LED TO THE  
FIRST-USE DOCTRINE IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW  
A RENUNCIATION OF THE DOCTRINE, IN THE ABSENCE OF  
SUBSTANTIAL SURETIES REDUCTIONS OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN  
EUROPE, WOULD MAINTAIN THE RECORD OF PEACE IN EUROPE."

PAGE 06 -- NA 0

HAS OBTAINED HIS RIGHTS.  
"DETERRENCE HAS WORKED. TO REVIEW THE EFFORTS OF  
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE PRIOR TO THE REIFICATION OF THE CONDITIONS  
THAT LED TO ITS FASHIONING WOULD BE TO REJECT HOW COME  
IT BECAME THAT A FIRST-USE POLICY ROSE IN THE FIRST  
TO THE COHERENCE OF THE NATO ALLIANCE AS WELL AS  
INCREASED THE EAST TO WORLD SAFETY  
"ALLIANCE COHERENCE IS A FUNCTION OF THE EFFICACY OF  
DETERRENCE. IF A NO-FIRST-USE POLICY WOULD REDUCE  
DETERRENCE, AS I BELIEVE I WOULD, THE WORLD SAFETY WOULD  
DECLINE RATHER THAN IMPROVE."

ITEM

WEGA-213 (4/13/82)

STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, TUESDAY, APRIL 13, 1982 (CONT.)  
NEWS BRIEFING -- ALAN ROMBERG, STATE DEPARTMENT DEPUTY  
SPOKESMAN, WAS THE BRIEFER. HE COVERED THE FOLLOWING  
POINTS:

STOESSER SETS TALKS APRIL 15 IN IRAQ --

ROMBERG SAID THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WALTER  
STOESSER WILL MEET WITH A SYRIAN DELEGATION FOR THE  
EASTERN AND SOUTHERN PARTS OF THE Golan Heights IN LONDON

Handwritten initials and a diagonal line in the top left corner.



ST ESSEL IS EN ROUTE TO THE MIDDLE EAST AT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INSTIGATION TO OFFER ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL ON THE ARRANGEMENTS LEADING UP TO THE APRIL 25 ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI.

*2/10*

VELIOT S HAS JUST COMPLETED A TRIP TO THE REGION. HE IS TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON AND STOESEL WILL DEPART FROM LONDON TO

PAGE 02 -- STATE

ISRAEL FOR MEETINGS THERE ON APRIL 15. ROMBERG SAID.

"HE WILL BE MEETING WITH SENIOR LEADERS IN BOTH ISRAEL AND EGYPT, INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK," ROMBERG SAID. "AFTER THURSDAY, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S SCHEDULE IS INDEFINITE."

ON APRIL 12, ROMBERG TOLD REPORTERS THAT STOESEL WAS GOING TO THE MIDDLE EAST BECAUSE THERE WERE SOME THINGS WHICH REMAIN "TO BE WORKED OUT" PRIOR TO THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, WHICH HE NOTED WAS "THE LAST CALENDAR DATE" LEADING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

ROMBERG SAID HE HAD NOTHING FURTHER TO SAY BEYOND HIS APRIL 12 REMARKS CONCERNING THE STOESEL MISSION.

"MAXIMUM RESTRAINT" URGED IN WEST BANK --

ROMBERG SAID THE UNITED STATES DEPLORES THE ACTIONS THAT HAVE LED TO ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES IN THE ISRAELI OCCUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA AND URGED ALL CONCERNED TO

PAGE 03 -- STATE

"EXERCISE <sup>M</sup> MAXIMUM RESTRAINT."

ROMBERG SAID THE ISRAELI MILITARY HAS REPORTED THAT TWO PEOPLE INFILTRATED THE WEST BANK FROM JORDAN AND THREW A HAND GRENADE AT AN ISRAELI MILITARY VEHICLE SOMETIME WITHIN THE PAST 24 HOURS.

"THERE WERE NO REPORTED CASUALTIES," ROMBERG SAID. "WE ARE STILL ATTEMPTING TO GET MORE INFORMATION ON THE

ST ESSEL IS EN ROUTE TO THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE REQUEST OF  
REAGAN'S INSISTENCE TO OFFER ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL  
ON THE ARRANGEMENTS LEADING UP TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE  
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI.  
VELTOT HAS JUST COMPLETED A TRIP TO THE REGION. HE IS  
TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON AND ST ESSEL WILL RETURN TO LONDON TO

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ISRAELI FOR MEETINGS THERE ON APRIL 12. ROMBERG SAID  
"HE WILL BE MEETING WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS IN BOTH ISRAEL  
AND EGYPT, INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND PRESIDENT  
MUBARAK," ROMBERG SAID. "AFTER THURSDAY, THE DEPUTY  
SECRETARY'S SOURCE IS UNDETERMINED."  
ON APRIL 12, ROMBERG TOLD REPORTERS THAT ST ESSEL WAS  
GOING TO THE MIDDLE EAST BECAUSE THERE WERE SOME THINGS  
WHICH REMAINED TO BE WORKED OUT PRIOR TO THE START  
OF NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH HE NOTED WOULD BE THE LAST CALENDAR DAY  
LEADING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN  
EGYPT AND ISRAEL.  
ROMBERG SAID HE HAD NOTHING FURTHER TO SAY BEYOND THIS  
APRIL 12 REMARKS CONCERNING THE ST ESSEL MISSION.

"MAXIMUM RESTRAINT" URGED IN WEST BANK --

ROMBERG SAID THE UNITED STATES DEPLORES THE FACTS  
THAT HAVE LED TO ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES IN THE ISRAELI  
OCCUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA AND URGES ALL CONCERNED TO

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"EXERCISE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT."  
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INCIDENT."

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"THERE HAVE BEEN ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES AMONG BOTH ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIAN ARAB AS A RESULT OF ROCK THROWING AND THE USE OF LETHAL FORCE TO DISPERSE DEMONSTRATORS," HE SAID.

ROMBERG SAID REPORTS INDICATED THAT TWO CHILDREN HAD BEEN KILLED BY GUNFIRE IN THE COURSE OF ISRAELI EFFORTS TO

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DISPERSE DEMONSTRATORS.

"WE UNDERSTAND A GIRL OF FIVE DIED OF GUNSHOT WOUNDS RECEIVED AT THE D'HEISHAN REFUGEE CAMP YESTERDAY AND A YOUNG BOY WAS SHOT AND KILLED IN GAZA TODAY," ROMBERG SAID. "WE EXPLORE THE ACTIONS THAT LED TO THESE TRAGIC DEATHS AND EXTEND OUR CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS."

"AND WE AGAIN CALL UPON ALL THOSE IN A POSITION TO DO SO TO EXERCISE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT TO PREVENT FURTHER SUCH SENSELESS DEATHS," ROMBERG SAID.

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, ROMBERG SAID THAT AMERICAN BORER ALAN HARRY GOODMAN, WHO IMMIGRATED TO ISRAEL TWO YEARS AGO, HAS BEEN FORMALLY CHARGED WITH THE MURDER IN THE DOME OF THE ROCK MOSQUE SHOOTING INCIDENT. THE ISRAELI INVESTIGATION CONTINUES, HE SAID.

ITEM

NES--214 (4/13/80)

U.S. TO SELL MILITARY SUPPLIES TO IRAQ (65)

WASHINGTON -- THE U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCED APRIL 13 THAT THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO SELL 60 MILLION DOLLARS

ASKED FOR COMMENT ON THE CONTINUING VIOLENCE ON THE WEST BANK, ROMBERG SAID, "WE'VE HAD THAT PROBABLY 10 MONSTRATIONS AND COMME CIA STRIKES CONTINUE IN THE T SUNDAY'S ATAG BY A D RAGED GUNMAN AT THE DOME OF THE ROCK MOSQUE."

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PAGE 04 -- STAT

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"AND WE AGAIN CALL UPON ALL THOSE IN A POSITION TO DO SO TO EXERCISE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT TO PREVENT FURTHER SUCH senseless deaths," ROMBERG SAID.

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, ROMBERG SAID THAT A MEMBER OF ALAN HARRY GOODMAN, WHO IMMIGRATED TO ISRAEL TWO YEARS AGO, HAS BEEN FORMALLY CHARGED WITH THE MURDER IN THE DOME OF THE ROCK MOSQUE SHOOTING INCIDENT. THE ISRAELI INVESTIGATION CONTINUES, HE SAID.

ITEM

NES--214 (413280)

U.S. TO SELL MILITARY SUPPLIES TO IRAQ (58)

WASHINGTON -- THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE ANNOUNCED APRIL 13 THAT THE UNITED STATES IS TO SELL 60 MILLION DOLLARS

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על

ממנכ"ל. מזמ"א

STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING--APRIL 13, 1982

VELIOTES AND STOESSEL STATEMENT

Ass't Secretary Veliotes will meet with Deputy Secretary Stoessel in London today. Ass't Secretary Veliotes will thereafter return to Washington. And Deputy Secretary Stoessel will proceed to Israel for meetings with senior leaders in both Israel and Egypt including Prime Minister Begin and President Mubarak. After Thursday, the Deputy Secretary's schedule is indefinite and regarding the purposes of the mission, I refer you to what we said yesterday. I really have nothing further to say on that.

PLO INFILTRATORS STATEMENT

We understand that the Israeli military has reported that two people infiltrated into the West Bank from Jordan, and threw a hand grenade at an Israeli military vehicle. There were no reported casualties. We are still attempting to get more information on the incident.

PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE STATEMENT

We understand that sporadic demonstrations and commercial strikes continued in reaction to Sunday's attack by a deranged gunman at the Dome of the Rock Mosque. There have been additional casualties among both Israelis and Palestinian Arabs as a result of rock throwing and the use of lethal force to discourage demonstrators. Reports indicate that the casualties include two young children killed by gunfire in the course of Israeli efforts to disperse demonstrators. We understand a girl of 5 died of gunshot wounds received at the Haisha Refugee Camp yesterday, and a young boy was shot and killed in Gaza today.

We deplore the actions that led to those tragic deaths and extend our condolences to the families of the victims. We again call on all those in a position to do so to exercise maximum restraint to prevent further such senseless deaths.

In Response to Questions:

--Goodman has been charged with murder, and the Israeli investigation continues. I'm not aware that he has gotten consular access.

--As far as the UN is concerned, we understand the Security Council

will convene, or probably did convene in informal session this morning, to consider a request for a Security Council meeting on the subject. There might be a formal council meeting this afternoon.

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טופס מברק צפון

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

דפוס 13 מתוך 1

אל: ממישראל וושינגטון

סיווג בטחוני: סודי ביותר

דחיפות: בהול

תאריך זי"ח: 121545

מס. מברק: 285

לשימוש  
מח  
הקשר

ארכס.

דלהלן רשום שיחתו של רה"מ עם לואיס מאמס, מניח שתוכל להשתמש בשיחתך עם סטאטל.

(קשר נא העבירו הרצי"ב)

בר-און

שהם שטחיה רחב הנפג אלוס



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MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER, THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE DEFENCE MINISTER WITH AMBASSADOR LEWIS, AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S RESIDENCE, JERUSALEM, SUNDAY, APRIL 11, 1982, at 5 p.m.

PRESENT: BROWN, COL. HOGAG, HAIRE, TAMIR, SAGUI, AVNER, DAN MERRIDOR

PM: We have a serious deliberation before us today. We shall deal with weighty problems. The problems are serious because of the developments during the last ten days or so. What happened? We proved our good will, as you know, in connection with the implementation of the peace Treaty. We entered into a grave moral clash with those good people who have to be evacuated from Yamit. Most have already left. Several hundreds are still there of the so-called "Stop the Withdrawal Movement". They are idealistic people. We have almost totally dismantled the Yamit area of its agricultural and industrial enterprises. Now, almost on the eve of the ultimate date of withdrawal - April 26 - the following events have occurred. There have been serious infringements on the ground by Egyptian forces. As the Minister of Defence will soon make clear to you, the demilitarized zone and the forces limitation zone are now, in several places, invested by units of the Egyptian army. Nobody will claim they will march against Israel but their presence is a real infringement of the Peace Treaty. There are cynics who call the Treaty a piece of paper. It is not. But if you ~~respect it~~ don't respect it, it is torn to pieces. Those zones are the gordie of our security. Unlike Judea, Samaria and Gaza we can demilitarize Sinai. It is a desert and it can be checked from the air and by other means to see if the agreement is honored or broken and, if necessary, to redress the wrong so that we live in peace together. If there are violations and they are not redressed, as we recently asked Egypt to do, and lately they do not even listen to us - that is ~~the~~ <sup>a</sup> most serious development. Arik talked them and they don't pay attention. One can say, what is an additional batallion after all? It is not a matter of an armed clash but the principle of upholding the Peace Treaty.

Secondly, during the last ten days, more or less, we have growing information of permanent cooperation between the Egyptian government and the PLO. All of us in this room know what the PLO is. We know that after Ali's visit here he invited a representative of the PLO and reported to him on everything we ~~speak~~ spoke. It is a serious development. It is our implacable enemy. In Kuwait they even rejected the Egyptian plan and demanded the clear condemnation of Camp David. And then, ~~there~~ <sup>friend</sup> goes a ~~friend~~ - and we believe we are friends - and reports to this implacable enemy what he said to us and what the Defence Minister and the Foreign Minister and I said to him.

Thirdly, military hardware is being supplied all the time from Al-Arish to the Gaza Strip.

Defence Minister: Over 500 grenades have been smuggled over since January 1st. During 1981, over a 1000.



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PM: Everybody can imagine what could happen if they are used. It is a permanent traffic and it is an absolute breach of the Peace Treaty (PM reads article III, para. 2 of the Peace Treaty). It is a very serious violation - both the contact with the PLC man and the traffic of explosives, weapons, etc. It has grown immensely in recent days.

Fourthly, there is the political issue which I raised with you on the phone. It was on Wednesday last week that Dr. Meghid appeared in Kuwait at the conference of non-aligned countries and read a speech in which he proposed an Egyptian plan to solve the Palestinian problem. He said Israel "will have" to accept the following things:

1. end of Israeli occupation;
2. the right to return or to compensation according to the United Nations General Assembly resolution No. 194;
3. the right of the Palestinian people to sovereignty over its resources;
4. right of self-determination without exterior intervention;
5. the right to an independent state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the basis of the 1967 borders;
6. the right to sovereignty over the city of Jerusalem and rejection of any geographical or demographical change in the city and any change in its legal status;
7. rejection of any Israeli policy aimed at inserting geographical, demographical and legal changes in the territories occupied in 1967;
8. right to security within the framework of secure borders based on mutual international recognition of this right with the neighboring countries;
9. the right to abolish all steps contradicting the Geneva conventions;
10. the right to liquidate the settlements infringing the international law regarding occupation of the territories;
11. the right to fully apply the Geneva conventions in the occupied territories until a comprehensive arrangement is reached and Israeli withdrawal from them is effected.)

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version

Lewis: On the point dealing with Jerusalem, we received the ~~MEMO~~ MENA and there it says: "To respect their sovereign rights in Jerusalem"

Sagui: We translated it directly from the Arabic.

PM: There is a difference and we shall check ~~mmx~~ it out. I sit here with friends and let's call a spade a spade. These eleven points mean the destruction of Israel - the return to the 67 armistice lines, the giving up of Jerusalem, and the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees who left mainly on orders and who should now come back to Jaffa, Ramlah, etc.; the Jewish majority will disappear and it will spell the end of the State of Israel. A few days before our final withdrawal we read of this prescription for our destruction in stages. People say that Sadat didn't say much different in his Knesset speech. There is some difference but the important thing is that Sadat made his speech before Camp David. You will recall that on the first night at Camp David he brought a plan which he read to Carter and me but which he then withdrew.

Lewis: He made much the same points.

PM: Yes, written by the same authors. I see their handwriting - El-Baz and Ghali. We witnessed the restoration of this document two weeks before we take this plunge into the future, giving up Sharm el-Sheikh and our strategic depth. I would like, Mr. Ambassador, to put to you what is our absolute right and duty, namely, to draw the attention of the American government to these bitter facts on the eve of our withdrawal to <sup>the</sup> international border. If those <sup>infringements</sup> ~~encroachments~~ are not corrected the Government of Israel will consider <sup>counter-steps are</sup> the possibility of postponing our withdrawal. Please pay attention to this carefully worded sentence - we shall consider the possibility of postponing our withdrawal. Why did I turn to the Secretary and expect immediate American action? On March 26th, 1979, President Carter wrote to me a letter (he wrote the same letter to Sadat) .In it he stated: "In the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt, the United States will, on request of one or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties with respect thereto and will take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty." We face such a development now and we request the U.S. that you take the necessary action "to achieve compliance with the Treaty". The Treaty is violated on the ground, by the permanent and full cooperation of Egypt with the PLO, ~~and~~ and is violated by political plans and statements presented by Egypt in international bodies.

We have a constructive <sup>pro</sup> proposal which we deliberated on and formulated. Please find out if all three Parties would sign a "Statement of reaffirmation" - Egypt and Israel would sign as would the U.S, as witness. The signatures could be on the level of the Secretary of State signing with Shamir and Ali or the President with Mubarak and me as chief executives. The following is a draft. It is open for proposals, for changes, corrections, etc.



STATEMENT OF REAFFIRMATION

A. Egypt and Israel reaffirm their adherence to the Treaty of Peace between the two countries and pledge complete and unconditional compliance with all its provisions, including these pertaining to:

- (1) Restrictions and arrangements which Egypt and Israel took upon themselves in Zones A,B,C,D, and their commitment not to carry out any breach of the restrictions and arrangements with respect to those Zones. Measures will be taken to ensure that by April 26, 1982, the status of, and in these Zones, will be in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Peace.
- (2) The functioning of the MFO and the performance of its responsibilities as agreed upon and stipulated in the Treaty of Peace, including its duty to prevent any violations of the Treaty in accordance with Annex I of the Treaty, and ensuring the freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran in accordance with Article V of the Treaty.
- (3) The implementation of all the normalization arrangements as agreed upon between Egypt and Israel on the basis of Annex III to the Treaty, and the putting into effect by April 26, 1982, of all the agreements signed since the conclusion of the Peace Treaty.
- (3a) Keeping the borders permanently open for travel of persons and the exchange of goods.
- (3b) Continuing the maintenance of diplomatic relations at their existing ambassadorial level.
- (4) Refraining from hostile acts and the dissemination of hostile statements in <sup>domestic</sup> local media, in foreign countries or in international bodies.
- (5) Preventing any activity and operation of ~~the~~ terrorist organizations from the territory of ~~the~~ one country against that of the other, including hostile propaganda, smuggling of arms and other war materials across their respective borders;  
Also, ensuring the dismantling by April 26, 1982, of the existing infrastructures of those terrorist organizations.

B. Egypt and Israel reaffirm their adherence to the Camp David Accords, including the commitment to negotiate continuously and in good faith an agreement concerning full autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District

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(The West Bank and the Gaza Strip), based upon democratic elections, the establishment and inauguration of the Self-governing Authority (Administrative Council) and the transitional period of five years.

The Parties to the Camp David Accords undertake not to propose or entertain any plan relating to the peace process other than the Camp David Accords.



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Let me say a word in parenthesis about the diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level. What happens if, say, in May 1982 the man in charge in Cairo decides that the presence of the Israeli Ambassador is a hindrance and he calls him in and tells him to go back home and that the representation will now be on the level of charge d'affaires. Are we then going to send in our army? I admit to you, I don't know what we could then do. I don't think we could then do anything. Which is why we now ask that there be this document which says clearly that the ambassadorial level will continue. Somebody could say in Cairo - a certain el-Baz or Dr. Meguid - that we cannot sever relations completely but a charge is enough. We want to prevent such a development. It was Kissinger who used to say that Israel is giving away tangible things and gets a ~~piece~~ piece of paper in return. To me it is not a piece of paper; it is a word of honor. I speak of our responsibility to our nation. We made very great sacrifices and now everything can burst <sup>at</sup> the seams after April 26th. If they can say those words in Kuwait, could they not ask our Ambassador to go home after April 26th?

Lewis: Do you have concrete intelligence about returning your Ambassador?

PM: No, It is theoretical. What we suggest in accordance with President Carter's letter is that you undertake action and find out in Cairo if they are prepared to sign with us and with you this document of reassurance. We are the party wronged, perplexed and worried. In essence it is a document which redresses a wrong done to us.

Lewis: As you know, after we spoke on Friday I immediately cabled your message to the Secretary and I gave you his response yesterday. He is making arrangements for <sup>Stoessel</sup> ~~Stoessel~~ to come here. <sup>Valiotes</sup> ~~Valiotes~~ arrives tonight from ~~Paris~~ Cairo and ~~xxx~~ he will see you tomorrow. Yesterday, he raised your complaint with Mubarak in general terms and he will report to you tomorrow on that meeting. Then, he must leave early Tuesday morning and <sup>meanwhile Stoessel</sup> ~~meanwhile Stoessel~~

will be coming with a small team including Draper. He plans to leave Washington Monday ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ evening, meet ~~xxxx~~ Valiotes in London and arrive here on Wednesday. Then he will go to Cairo. He is empowered by the Secretary to do whatever possible to carry out our responsibility. Your proposal will fit in well with his intentions. We will cable your proposal immediately. <sup>Stoessel</sup> ~~Stoessel~~ is prepared to stay as long as necessary and if you and he conclude that the Secretary is needed and if ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ he can untangle himself from his present assignment (Britain v. Argentina) he will also come. It is not clear how long his ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ present mediation will last, but if his deputy cannot do what has to be done ~~x~~ he will make every effort to come himself. The Secretary has great ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ confidence in him. <sup>Stoessel</sup> ~~Stoessel~~ has little experience in this part of the world but he is a most seasoned diplomat and is the most senior career officer. He served as our Ambassador in Moscow, Bonn and Warsaw.

Ax



PM: Indeed, a serious diplomat.

Lewis: He is a very experienced and able professional. He will be here on Wednesday and meanwhile they will quickly get your paper to him. I think it is a constructive way to proceed. Certainly, we want to do everything we can to meet our obligations.

Defence Minister: I just wish to add one sentence. I must emphasize that ~~max~~ besides all three Parties signing the document it should be understood ~~max~~ that all violations should be corrected by April 26th. It is not enough to sign the paper but also to take action by April 26th. In the past, we warned the Egyptians of what might happen if there are violations. Three years ago I met Ali for the first time in Alexandria and I discussed the question with him. Kimche went to Cairo on other matters but I asked him to again raise the subject.

Foreign Minister: Without any results.

Defence Minister: A change has taken place. I remember when the Prime Minister discussed the matter of the smuggling of grenades with Sadat in Alexandria in September. Steps were taken. I told the Cabinet today that now there is simply no reaction. There is a real effort by the terrorists to smuggle weapons into Gaza. Today there are 50 kms from the border to Rafaih and we still have a chance to catch them. We have marked the border in the area and built a tiny fence in the built-up section. But what will happen when we withdraw? We won't be able to stop it. We will have to react. We are going to lose the great thing - peace, for small things - the terrorist activities. You have been watching the steps we have been taking now. We have been brought to a situation in which we have not time any more. I was sitting with their Defence Minister and explaining why they shouldn't drag out their response to the last day. How can we proceed towards April 26th and they don't even react. They are sure we will be on this side of the border on April 26th. That's what we want but the situation must be corrected beforehand. Ours is a legitimate demand not to harm the peace but to protect the peace.

Lewis: As you know, we have had for a three-year period our monitoring station in Sinai as well as aerial inspection. After you spoke to me I checked with our records and found the violations of the sort we are monitoring - I got a summary of the reports of the ~~per~~ ~~pet~~ two years. For example, the inspection of October 81 reported two violations of Egypt both of which were rectified. In November there were two violations and these were also rectified. The last violation was reported by our inspectors on December 18th. There was one violation. In January it was no longer there. Since January 1, 82, our inspectors have reported no violation. This does not involve smuggling.

Saqui: There are two kinds of violation. One we can verify on the ground, such as mine-fields and defences in Zone B. There, nothing was really rectified.



Lewis: My understanding is that our people were with the Egyptians when making the line.

Sagui: They are not. They were sent home and told to come back afterwards. The point is there are eleven positions and two fences and minefields which exceed the limit of the agreed line. Another kind of violation is hard to verify. First we <sup>would</sup> get information trying to verify it by air photography. I speak about the exceeding of units and the changing of appearance of units to make them look like civilians. For example, commandos, battalions wearing civilian dress. No commando units may be in Sinai at all. It is agreed that in Zone C there will be <sup>no</sup> military ~~xxxxx~~ personnel, only police. When Sadat visited Santa Catherina special permission was asked for commando units whilst he was there. Near Santa Catherina there are two platoons of border police and in al-Arish only border guards. There is an engineering batallion ~~xxxxxwasxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ and three weeks ago ~~the~~ SMF agreed with us on an excess of units in Zone A. Egypt never established a mechanized division on the west bank of the Suez Canal. They have five brigades on the east side in violation of the Peace Treaty. So, I would say generally, we have two kinds ~~xxx~~ of violations - one can be verified on the ground and the other from the air - which we don't have any more except for the read-out. The other point are the things which the SMF find hard to verify.

Lewis: About al-Arish the SMF understanding is there are 300 engineer troops supposedly improving arrangements there and you supposedly gave permission.

Sagui: We gave permission for <sup>a</sup> maintenance ~~xxx~~ group to maintain al-Arish airport. That's ~~ax~~ the only personnel we know about.

Lewis: Is it not correct that <sup>unarmed</sup> three hundred engineering people are there?

Sagui: Correct, but their arms are in their barracks - Brigade No. 20.

Defence Minsiter: What happened really is instead of complying they camoulfage. When our Chief of Staff <sup>sent</sup> ~~sent~~ his letter on the presence of those troops they suddenly appeared in civilian clothes.

PM: I would like to give you another reference to what I was referring to before with regard to Dr. Meguid's three statements in clear violation of the Peace Treaty - his UN speech, his statement to the press and his eleven points in Kuwait. They are hostile propaganda all of them and in violation of Annex III, article 5, sub-section iii of the Peace Treaty. In other words, basing ourselves on the first paragraph of President Carter's letter to me and on article V of annex III and article III section 2, we k now inform the U.S. Government of serious violation of the Peace Treaty and we have to have an arrangement ~~A~~ by April 26 which will redress the wrongs done and restore the provisions of the Peace Treaty. It is an absolutely necessary step and a just demand according to the Peace Treaty.



Misha Arens told me yesterday of a private remark you made to him in a ~~private~~ talk x between you when he said to you, why should those people be evacuated from Yamit? You reportedly said to him, do you really intend to evacuate them? Mr. Ambassador, we do not look ~~for~~ ~~EXXXXX~~ excuses not to dismantle those settlements. We would ~~not~~ have evacuated those good people had we been looking for excuses. It is inconceivable. We do not deserve such suspicion. I hope we shall find a rectification to the violations. We don't look ~~for~~ ~~EXXXXX~~ for excuses to stop the withdrawal. We want to carry out our commitment. But before we make this plunge - giving up Sharm which leads us to Bab el Mandeb and the strategic depth, as ~~we~~ we intend to do, there must be total compliance with the Peace Treaty. We cannot deceive our nation. Is it peace or a piece of paper to be torn into pieces? I pay attention to the fact that the Secretary understands the seriousness of the situation. So, I am not looking for excuses and we do not deserve suspicion.

Lewis: Since you are so well-informed of my private conversation you will know that I ~~have~~ told every American official from the President down that I am totally convinced you will fulfil your commitment. I suggest to you that you do not rely on private talks.

Sagui: I have the answer to the Ambassador's question concerning the paragraph on Jerusalem in Meguid's eleven points. What you quoted from MENA is not an accurate word for word translation. Our version is from the original Arabic reported on Radio Kuwait and also carried on Radio Monte Carlo from Radio Kuwait. There, it is mentioned clearly, "the sovereignty over the city of Jerusalem." We can provide you with the source.

Lewis: I would like to receive it.

PM: I would now like to inform you that I will send the text of our proposal to Arens to present to ~~tomorrow~~ <sup>Stessal</sup> to ~~Stessal~~ <sup>Stessal</sup> Arens arrives in Washington tonight and will ask for a meeting with ~~Stessal~~ <sup>Stessal</sup> in the morning.

Lewis: I wish now, Mr. Prime Minister, to refer to another matter. When I spoke to you on the phone on Friday I raised with you our concern about the North. Those tensions have increased since Friday and our concerns have increased accordingly.

PM: First, let me tell you what we did not decide. All the reports to the contrary are completely groundless. On Friday we sat for five hours and our Cabinet met today for six hours. We took no decision of the kind given in the sensational headlines. Let us calm those headlines. We are not marching into Lebanon. What did we agree upon with the Secretary? Do you remember President Reagan's letter to me and the correction that was made on both sides. Instead of "a significant scale"- "clear provocation". That is the term the Secretary and I agreed upon.

Lewis: The Secretary questioned ...

PM: Nevertheless I assert that is what was agreed upon - "clear provocation". It has been happening. We have been attacked many times and we did not respond. Many lives have been saved because of vigilance and some times sheer luck. We did not do anything and continued without retribution. But the PLO continued and never stopped. There is a difference of



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interpretation of what cessation ~~of~~ of hostilities mean. The PLO says it applies only to southern Lebanon and northern Israel.

Lewis: That is what they say publicly. Habib says he believes that Arafat understands perfectly well.

PM: I am not a psychaitrist. A day before yesterday we captured two terrorists who crossed Jordan. We withheld publication for 24 hours because of the investigation. I was given the information at 2 a.m. They brought with them an arsenal of arms.

Sagui: They are Fatah men. They came with ten kilograms of ~~explosion~~ <sup>explosives</sup>. They came from Lebanon to Jordan about a month and a half ago. They received their orders and were briefed in Beirut. Their plan was to hide their weapons and explosives on our side of the Jordan, return to the Jordanian side and then come officially across the bridges to pick up their weapons and explosives.

PM: What happened in the last two -three weeks? A handgrenade in the Gaza District , one Seargent killed, three wounded. The PLO in Beirut first accepted responsibility and then they denied it because they were afraid. Then a border policeman - a Druse - was stabbed in the back and died. Then our man in Paris was killed. Then a man of our Security Services had his leg amputated. Then a girl was slightly wounded. For God's sake, our blood was shed. Sometimes ~~xxx~~ you get the impression that after the PLO carries out its treacherous attacks a wall of defence is built around them. The PLO is a terrorist Soviet agent, the enemy of the free world and that world builds a protective wall around it. Everybody says don't touch them. My answer to you is , it is not your blood, it is our blood. Nobody who will shed Jewish blood in our time will enjoy impunity. Never again. Having said this, I again say, we took no decision to enter Lebanon in force.

Leius: I am glad to hear it.

Sagui: The targets of the two terrorists captured were Ramat Eshkol, Jaffa Road and Mahane Yehuda. This group was associated with a Jerusalem Fatah man with a car.

Lewis: There is no doubt there have been violations. It has been a blessing that your restraint has not led to more loss of life. We are again approaching everybody who ~~has~~ <sup>has</sup> ~~and~~ influence with those groups to maintain the ceasefire. You agreed with us all the time that despite weaknesses of the ceasefire, the overall effort has been positive in terms of the reduction of loss of life. The most recent concern has been produced by the concentration of your forces on the border.

PM: You must understand, we must take precautions. The Syrian army is mobilized.

Defence Minister: We have indications that the Syrian army is preparing for war.

I will ask General Sagui to give us details.

Sagui: The indications we see began in mid-September when the Syrians brought back their mechanized divisions from Lebanon to the Golan Heights. In addition they carried out an urgent ~~xxx~~ programme of transforming ~~to~~ infantry divisions into mechanized ones.



There has been a conversion of three out of four armoured divisions from T 52 tanks to T 72's. There has been absorption of self-propelled artillery. SA8 personnel are now being trained in Syria instead of the Soviet Union. The air force is undergoing great changes, absorbing equipment, planning with the Soviets and the Soviets supervising their manouvers. They are carrying out a whole series of manouvers on division scale and below during the winter months. This is unusual. In mid-January they called up their reserves. They still have a full order of battle underway of the reserves. They have to send to Lebanon so many troops that they have built up six brigades of reserves - new tank brigades. They have been keeping these reserves for four months on regular duty.

Lewis: As I recall you discussed this with us a couple of months ago and you kept troops on the Golan. My question is what happened in the last couple of weeks?

Saqui: In the last two weeks they have kept two ~~front~~ <sup>front</sup> line mechanized divisions on high alert. They have made their field artillery ready. Their first division has been put on high ~~isxxxx~~ alert and also their air force.

Lewis: Is this not a reaction to your reinforcement?

Saqui: We are of the same size of order of battle for some three months.

Defence Minister: We recently moved some troops on the northern border but kept their tanks there. The description about the enforcement comes from the press and, maybe, from our opposition, and a great deal from the U.S. media.

Lewis: Our official statements have been careful.

Defence Minister: Yesterday they changed.

Lewis: There has been a lot of movement in the last three days.

PM: So that we should not allow another Yom Kippur. The Syrian army is poised to attack us. We are a civilian army relying heavily on our reserves. The Syrian army is a regular one and we have to be ready for any ~~an~~ eventuality.

Lewis: Usually you come to us. I am not aware you came to us this time at all as you did in the past.

Saqui: I cannot detail ~~immediate plans~~ ~~or~~ detect immediate plans but we have to be ready for any eventuality.

Lewis: Are you saying that all the concerns in the North are a reaction to Syria?

Defence Minister: It is true we exchange information with you all the time but when we see changes on the other side it does not mean we have to rush to you for guarantees and assurances. We have not crossed any borders and we have not moved. If we see something ~~we~~ do we have to rush to you to say, save us, help us? We watch carefully ~~&~~ the exercises ~~xxxx~~ by Syrian commando troops. We don't have to tell you every day about our worries.

Saqui: On the eve of Pessach I sent via a C.I.A. channel a request for information about certain arms on the other side.



13/13

TOP SECRET

Lewis: I feel reassured by what you said, Prime Minister, ~~about~~ <sup>that</sup> our worries in Washington and among ourselves are unfounded.

PM: I repeat, we did not make a decision to enter Lebanon. I want you to report to the Secretary that ~~ixwillixxxx~~ Israel will not acquiesce to the shedding of the blood of its citizens and Jews. That is all I can tell you.

Lewis: We don't want anybody's blood to be shed, least of all your people's.

PM: Are we to be asked to sit idly by and see more and more people killed? ~~xixhaxexax~~ An impression ~~kax~~ is created that the U.S. ties the hands of Israel. So, why shouldn't the PLO carry on murdering people when she has such a "protection". I don't mean this literally of course. There goes Mr. Chausson and says he ~~x~~ saw an Israeli soldier raising his rifle and therefore we are racists. How dare he say this? Where is due process? We <sup>are</sup> vilified by Mr. Chausson and by your media. There is a wall built around the PLO; they can kill our people, attack our people and they enjoy immunity. They bring in more tanks, more missiles from the Soviet Union, Libya, etc. It is too painful even to speak of.

Lewis: Your restraint has been extraordinary. You should continue - that is all the Secretary is saying.

PM: Sam, like every human being I like admiration. But, I don't want an ounce of admiration if a drop of our blood is shed. I say to hell with admiration if a drop of my people's blood is shed.

Lewis: Blood can be spilt in lots of ways with incalculable consequences for you and for us.

PM: I can understand the difficulties to which you refer. But one thing is excluded in our times, the one-sided blood-letting of the Jewish people. It will never ever happen again. We have our own country and our own army and we shall defend our people. No one will program our people any more. What ~~was a pogrom?~~ <sup>is a pogrom?</sup> ~~ixxxxxxxxix~~ the one-sided blood-letting of our people. ~~ixxxxxxxx~~

I repeat, we did not take any decision. I will tell you something: If and when we decide to enter Lebanon, you won't be outside the circle of people who may know. I don't promise to give you details of operation, but a kind of hint.

Lewis: I appreciate it: We will do our best to get the Peace Treaty back on track.

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Meeting adjourned 6.30 p.m.  
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*Handwritten notes in Hebrew:*  
אני רוצה  
התנחלות - פרויקט - שיתוף - תכלית



GOING INTO LEBANON." THIS MIGHT THEN CAUSE THE EGYPTIANS TO  
"SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE ISRAELIS FOR THEIR ATTACK ON AN ARAB  
NATION" AND ULTIMATELY RESULT IN "DRAWING THE EGYPTIANS BACK  
INTO THE ARAB CAMP."

FLORIO SAID THAT HADDAD IS "WORKING FROM THE ASSUMPTION  
THAT IT SERVES NO PLO PURPOSE TO ATTEMPT TO PROVOKE ISRAEL  
BEFORE THE 25TH" BECAUSE THIS MIGHT JEOPARDIZE THE  
POSSIBILITY OF EGYPT'S REGAINING THE SINAI PENINSULA.

THE CONGRESSMAN CITED NEWS REPORTS OF MILITARY BUILDUPS,  
AND HIS OWN APRIL 8 OBSERVATION OF "FOUR OR FIVE TRAILERS,  
EACH ONE CARRYING A TANK AND A HALF TRACK" IN THE AREA OF  
LAKE TIBERIAS AS EVIDENCE OF ISRAELI TROOP MOVEMENTS. HE  
SAID THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND OTHER ISRAELI GOVERNMENT  
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INTENTION TO TAKE ANY MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE PLO BUT  
THAT THEY WERE VIGILANT AGAINST ATTACKS." HE NOTED THAT  
THESE OFFICIALS REGARDED LAST WEEK'S ASSASSINATION OF AN  
ISRAELI OFFICIAL IN PARIS AS THE WORK OF THE PLO.

ASKED IF HE HAD ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THE ISRAELIS MIGHT

PAGE 04 -- FLORIO

INITIATE A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE TO PREVENT AN ARTILLARY BARRAGE  
FROM THE PLO, FLORIO SAID "I HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT  
A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE IS BEING CONTEMPLATED."

ALTHOUGH CONGRESSMAN FLORIO'S TRIP WAS PAID FOR BY A NEW  
JERSEY JEWISH GROUP, HE STRESSED THAT HE CHOSE HIS OWN  
ITINERARY, WHICH INCLUDED THE NORTHERN BORDER, THE JORDANIAN  
BORDER, A SETTLEMENT IN "SAMARIA" AND HEALTH FACILITIES.

ITEM

NESA-109 (4/12/82)

STOESSEL LEAVES FOR TEL AVIV, CAIRO (300)

WASHINGTON -- ALAN ROMBERG, DEPUTY STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS  
SPOKESMAN, ANNOUNCED APRIL 12 THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

14.

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BORDER, A SETTLEMENT IN "SAMARIA" AND HEALTH FACILITIES.

ITEM

WASA-100 (4/12/83)

STOESSER LEAVES FOR TEL AVIV, CAIRO (3MS)

WASHINGTON -- ALAN ROMBERG, DEPUTY STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS  
SPOKESMAN, ANNOUNCED APRIL 10 THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE



WALTER STOESSEL WILL LEAVE APRIL 12 FOR TALKS IN TEL AVIV  
AND CAIRO ON FINAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE APRIL 25 WITHDRAWAL  
OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE SINAI.

HE SAID THAT "WITH THE AGREEMENT OF ALL PARTIES, THE  
PRESIDENT (REAGAN) HAS ASKED DEPUTY SECRETARY STOESSEL TO  
TRAVEL TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO ASSIST EGYPT AND ISRAEL WITH  
THE ARRANGEMENTS LEADING UP TO APRIL 25."

ROMBERG POINTED OUT THAT THE SINAI WITHDRAWAL IS THE  
"LAST CALENDAR EVENT" LEADING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE  
TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

HE TOLD QUESTIONERS THAT STOESSEL IS GOING BECAUSE

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EDLUPCDMGERE ARE SOME THINGS WHICH REMAIN "TO BE WORKED  
OUT." HOWEVER, THE SPOKESMAN DECLINED TO GIVE ANY  
INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT ISSUES WILL BE DISCUSSED OR, THE

PAGE 02 -- STATE

PLANNED LENGTH OF STOESSEL'S TRIP. NEITHER DID HE HAVE  
DETAILS ON STOESSEL'S ITINERARY. ROMBERG SAID THE UNITED  
STATES IS "FULLY CONFIDENT" THAT ISRAEL AND EGYPT WILL  
FOLLOW ALL THE COMMITMENTS OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND  
THEIR PEACETREATY.

WHILE THE MAIN FOCUS OF THE STOESSEL MISSION IS THE APRIL  
25 EVENT, ROMBERG NOTED, OBVIOUSLY THE U.S. OFFICIAL IS  
WILLING TO ADDRESS ALL AREAS OF TENSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

ACCORDING TO THE SPOKESMAN, WHILE EN ROUTE TO THE MIDDLE  
EAST, STOESSEL WILL CONFER IN LONDON WITH NICHOLAS VELIOTES,  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH  
ASIAN AFFAIRS. VELIOTES IS RETURNING TO THE UNITED STATES  
AFTER TALKS ON BILATERAL ISSUES IN ISRAEL AND EGYPT.

ITEM

NESA-110 (4/12/82)

RETRAIT ALONG LEBANON BORDER URGED (250)

15.



WALTER STOSSER WILL LEAVE APRIL 12 FOR TALKS IN TEL AVIV  
AND CAIRO ON FINAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE APRIL 22 WITHDRAWAL  
OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE SINAI.

HE SAID THAT "WITH THE AGREEMENT OF ALL PARTIES, THE  
PRESIDENT (REAGAN) HAS ASKED DEPUTY SECRETARY STOSSER TO  
TRAVEL TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO ASSIST EGYPT AND ISRAEL WITH  
THE ARRANGEMENTS LEADING UP TO APRIL 22."

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PAGE 02 -- STATE

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH  
ASIAN AFFAIRS. VELTOS IS RETURNING TO THE UNITED STATES  
AFTER TALKS ON BILATERAL ISSUES IN ISRAEL AND EGYPT.

ITEM

NSA-115 (41252)



QUESTIONED ABOUT THE INCREASED TENSIONS ALONG THE LEBANON-  
ISRAELI FRONTIER AND POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE IN  
THAT REGION, STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ALAN ROMBERG SAID  
APRIL 12, "WE HAVE RENEWED OUR APPEAL TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED  
AND WITH INFLUENCE ON THOSE INVOLVED TO SHOW THE UTMOST  
RESTRAINT. THIS IS A TIME FOR MAXIMUM CAUTION."

HE NOTED THAT U.S. AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL SAMUEL LEWIS,  
AFTER MEETING APRIL 11 WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, SAID THE  
ISRAELI LEADER "ASSURED ME THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET HAS  
TAKEN NO DECISION TO GO INTO LEBANON IN ANY WAY, SHAPE OF  
FORM."

ROMBERG ADDED, "WE TAKE THE PRIME MINISTER AT HIS WORD."

THE SPOKESMAN SAID IT IS A "FACT" THAT FORCES IN NORTHERN  
ISRAEL HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED, BUT HE GAVE NO OTHER DETAILS.

HE SAID THAT THE INFILTRATION OF TWO EL FATAH GUERRILLAS  
ACROSS THE JORDAN RIVER INTO ISRAEL, FROM INFORMATION

PAGE 02 -- STATE

AVAILABLE, "APPEARS TO BE A VIOLATION" OF THE LEBANON BORDER  
CEASEFIRE. THE PLO GUERRILLAS WERE CAPTURED APRIL 11 BY  
ISRAELI FORCES.

ROMBERG SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONSIDER THIS A  
VIOLATION IF THE TWO GUERRILLAS CAME FROM LEBANON AND USED  
JORDANIA  
TERRITORY TO CROSS INTO ISRAEL.

ITEM

NESA-111 :4/12/82)

VIOLENCE AT MOSQUE CONDEMNED (200)

WASHINGTON -- THE STATE DEPARTMENT CONDEMNED THE  
"SENSELESS ACT OF VIOLENCE" BY AN ISRAELI GUNMAN APRIL 11 AT  
THE DOME OF THE ROCK MOSQUE IN JERUSALEM THAT KILLED TWO  
ARABS AND WOUNDED AT LEAST NINE OTHERS.

BASED ON THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE, A SPOKESMAN SAID, IT  
IS THE U.S. JUDGMENT THAT THE ATTACK WAS THE WORK OF A

16



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ITEM

MEGA-111 (4/12/82)

(208) VIOLENCE AT MOSQUE CONDEMNED

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AND WOUNDED AT LEAST NINE OTHERS.  
BASED ON THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE, A SPOKESMAN SAID, IT  
IS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THAT THE ATTACK WAS THE WORK OF A



"DERANGED INDIVIDUAL."

ISRAELI AUTHORITIES HAVE IDENTIFIED THE GUNMAN AS ALAN GOODMAN, A DUAL AMERICAN-ISRAELI CITIZEN. ALAN ROMBERG SAID, "WE ARE SEEKING CONSULAR ACCESS TO HIM."

HE SAID THERE IS "NOTHING TO SUGGEST THAT HE (GOODMAN) WAS ACTING AS PART OF SOME LARGER CONSPIRACY."

REFERRING TO ARAB RIOTS THAT OCCURRED AFTER THE MOSQUE SHOOTING, ROMBERG SAID IT WAS "UNDERSTANDABLE" THAT THE "OUTRAGEOUS ATTACK" GENERATED STRONG EMOTIONS AND ACTIONS. "IN THIS HIGHLY CHARGED ATMOSPHERE," ROMBERG STRESSED, "WE

PAGE 02 -- STATE

HOPE THAT THOSE IN POSITION TO DO SO WILL SEEK TO CALM PASSIONS AND PREVENT ADDITIONAL TRAGEDIES."

ITEM

NESA-115 (4/12/82)

(PERMISSION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FOR REPUBLICATION AND TRANSLATION OF THE FOLLOWING BY USICA ONLY. THE ARTICLE MUST BE USED IN ITS ENTIRETY AND CREDITED AS INDICATED.)

SOVIET UNION HINTS AT PLUNGE IN GRAIN CROP (850)

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MOSCOW -- THE TRUE DIMENSIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION'S DISASTROUS HARVEST OF LAST FALL ARE NOW BECOMING CLEAR. SOVIET OFFICIALS ARE SAYING THAT THE 1981 GRAIN HARVEST MAY HAVE FALLEN SHORT OF ITS 236 MILLION-METRIC-TON GOAL BY AS MUCH AS 80 MILLION TONS.

THE GOVERNMENT STILL HASN'T RELEASED OFFICIAL FIGURES, BUT IF PRODUCTION WAS INDEED LOWER THAN 160 MILLION METRIC TONS -- AS OFFICIALS NOW INDICATE -- THEN THE SOVIETS AREN'T



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PAGE 82 -- STATE

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ITEM

WGA-115 (REVISED)

(PERMISSION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FOR REPLICATION AND TRANSLATION OF THE FOLLOWING BY USICA ONLY. THE ARTICLE MUST BE USED IN ITS ENTIRETY AND CREDITED AS INDICATED.)

SOVIET UNION HINTS AT PLUNGE IN GRAIN CROP (1988)

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WHITE HOUSE REPORT, MONDAY, APRIL 12, 1982 (750)

NEWS BRIEFING -- DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY SPEAKES BRIEFED  
ON THESE TOPICS:

FALKLANDS TILT DISPUTED --

SPEAKES TOLD A QUESTIONER THAT THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE HAS BEEN "EVIDENT," IN ITS VOTE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, AND IN THE TALKS IT BEGAN WITH BOTH ARGENTINA AND GREAT BRITAIN IN SEARCH OF A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION.

ASKED WHICH SIDE WASHINGTON WILL BE ON IF FIGHTING ERUPTS, SPEAKES REPLIED, "THAT'S AN 'IF' QUESTION AND... IT'S A SITUATION I HOPE I DO NOT HAVE TO ADDRESS."

SPEAKES DECLINED A REQUEST TO CHARACTERIZE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FEELINGS ABOUT THE SITUATION. HE WOULD NOT SAY

PAGE 02 -- WHITE HOUSE REPORT

WHETHER REAGAN FEELS THAT SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG IS MAKING PROGRESS WITH HIS EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE MATTER.

SPEAKES SAID THAT REAGAN HAD BEEN BRIEFED ON THE FALKLANDS MATTER BY NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS ADVISER WILLIAM CLARK AND HAD TELEPHONED HAIG IN LONDON. CLARK AND HAIG ALSO CONFERRED BY PHONE THREE TIMES ON APRIL 12, SPEAKES ADDED.

STOESSEL MISSION EXPLAINED --

SPEAKES SAID THAT WHILE THE UNITED STATES HAS FULL CONFIDENCE THAT ISRAEL WILL COMPLETE ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI ON SCHEDULE, DEPUTY SECRETARY STOESSEL IS BEING DISPATCHED TO TEL AVIV AND CAIRO "TO WORK ON ARRANGEMENTS" FOR THE WITHDRAWAL.

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WHITE HOUSE REPORT, MONDAY, APRIL 12, 1972 (28)

NEWS BRIEFING -- DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY SPEAKES

ON THESE TOPICS:

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SPEAKES TOLD A QUESTIONER THE RISING TENSION ALONG THE ISRAELI-LABANESE BORDER PROBABLY COULD COME UP," A HE D NOTED THAT IF DOES, STOESSEL "IS FULLY PREPARED TO SPEAK FOR THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT" ON THE MATTER.

26

PAGE 03 -- WHITE HOUSE REPORT

SPEAKES SAID HE EXPECTED STOESSEL WOULD CONFER IN LONDON WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE NICHOLAS VELIOTES, WHO HAS BEEN VISITING ISRAEL AND EGYPT IN RECENT DAYS. HE DID NOT INDICATE WHETHER HAIG WOULD JOIN IN THE SESSION.

SPEAKES TOLD A QUESTIONER HE DID NOT EXPECT STOESSEL WOULD REMAIN IN THE MIDEAST THROUGH THE SCHEDULED APRIL 25 ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

REAGAN SPEECH PLANNED --

REAGAN WILL FLY TO CHICAGO APRIL 15 TO ADDRESS THE CONVENTION OF THE NATIONAL CATHOLIC EDUCATION ASSOCIATION. SPEAKES WOULD NOT SAY IF REAGAN WILL USE THE OCCASION TO OUTLINE HIS THINKING ON PROPOSALS TO PROVIDE INCOME TAX CREDITS TO PARENTS OF STUDENTS IN PRIVATE COLLEGES. REAGAN HAD APPROVED THE CONCEPT AS A CANDIDATE.

KIRKPATRICK'S DINNER DEFENDED --

PAGE 04 -- WHITE HOUSE REPORT

SPEAKES, QUESTIONED CLOSELY ABOUT U.N. AMBASSADOR JEANE KIRKPATRICK'S ATTENDANCE AT A DINNER IN THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY THE NIGHT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS INVASION, SAID REAGAN KNEW IN ADVANCE OF THE AMBASSADOR'S PLANS AND RAISED NO OBJECTION.

ASKED ABOUT THE AMBASSADOR'S PRESENCE AT THE DINNER AND HER PARTICIPATION IN TOASTS WHICH THE QUESTIONER SAID "PRAISED THE ARGENTINE REGIME," SPEAKES REPLIED: "THE DINNER HAD BEEN LONG-SCHEDULED. IT WAS IN AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK'S HONOR. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS NO PROBLEMS



ISRAELI-LAVANESSE BORDER PROBABLY COULD COME UP," A  
NOTED THAT IF DOES, STOSSEL "IS FULLY PREPARED TO PREPARE FOR  
THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT" ON THE MATTER.

PAGE 83 -- WHITE HOUSE REPORT

SPEAKER SAID HE EXPECTED STOSSEL WOULD COME TO LONDON  
WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE NICHOLAS VELITZ, WHO HAS  
BEEN VISITING ISRAEL AND EGYPT IN RECENT DAYS. HE DID NOT  
INDICATE WHETHER HE WOULD JOIN IN THE SESSION.  
SPEAKER TOLD QUESTIONER HE DID NOT EXPECT STOSSEL  
WOULD BE IN THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH THE GOVERNMENT'S  
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

REAGAN SPEECH PLANNED --

REAGAN WILL FLY TO CHICAGO APRIL 15 TO ADDRESS THE  
CONVENTION OF THE NATIONAL CATHOLIC EDUCATION ASSOCIATION.  
SPEAKER WOULD NOT SAY IF REAGAN WILL USE THE OCCASION TO  
OUTLINE HIS THINKING ON PROPOSALS TO PROVIDE INCOME TAX  
CREDITS TO PARENTS OF STUDENTS IN PRIVATE COLLEGES. REAGAN  
HAD APPROVED THE CONCEPT AS A CANDIDATE.

KIRKPATRICK'S DINNER DEFERRED --

PAGE 84 -- WHITE HOUSE REPORT

SPEAKER, QUESTIONED CLOSELY ABOUT U.S. AID TO ISRAEL  
KIRKPATRICK'S ATTENDANCE AT A DINNER IN THE AFTERNOON  
EMBASSY THE NIGHT OF THE FALL AND ISLANDS VISIT. AID  
REAGAN KNEW IN ADVANCE THAT AMBA SOR'S PLAN AND REAGAN  
NO OBJECTION.

ASKED ABOUT THE AMBASSADOR'S PRESENCE AT THE DINNER AND  
HER PARTICIPATION IN TOASTS WHICH TOOK PLACE AT THE  
"RAISED THE A GENTLE REGIME," SPEAKER REPLIED: "THE  
INNER HAD BEEN LONGER IN DUBAI. IT WAS THE AMBASSADOR  
KIRKPATRICK'S HONOR. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND PROBLEMS



סגירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

ס ו פ ס  
... 97... מתוך... דפים  
... 177... סוג בטחוני  
... 7... דחיפות  
... 12. 1730... מאריך וזיח  
... 155... מס' מברק

PK

מסנכיל. מצפ"א

STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING--APRIL 12, 1982

TRAVEL OF DEPUTY SECRETARY STOESEL  
STATEMENT:

With the agreement of all the parties, the President has asked Deputy Secretary Stoessel to travel to the Middle East to assist Egypt and Israel with the arrangements leading up to April 25, which, as you know, is the last in the calendar events leading toward full implementation of the treaty of peace.

In response to questions:

--I think he is going basically because there are some things which remain to be worked out in the period ahead. I do not want to get into details, frankly, but we remain fully confident as always that Egypt and Israel will carry out all their commitments under the treaty and the Camp David accords.

--The principle focus is as I have described it, that is, the arrangements leading up to April 25. Obviously, Deputy Secretary Stoessel will be prepared to address all areas of tension. And obviously, also the cease-fire remains essential.

--Valiotes is on quite a different mission and has a calendar of his own that he needs to follow. They will meet, Assistant Secretary Valiotes and Deputy Secretary Stoessel, in London, and thereafter, Ambassador Stoessel will go on to Israel and Egypt. I think that the departure is this evening.

--We have noted before that it is an important moment and all parties simply felt it appropriate for a senior US official to be there.

--Valiotes was in the Middle East basically on bilateral issues. I know of no plans for Ambassador Habib to go to the Middle East. The party with Amb. Stoessel is going to be small, Deputy Assistant Secretary in NEA, Morris Draper; Assistant Legal Advisor, Michael Kosack, and National Security Council Staff Member, Howard Teichner.

--I think that Ambassador Habib's travel and so on is always a question of judgement as to how he could be most effective or when his travel to the area would be most productive. Obviously that judgement has not been made at this moment.

--I would say that both sides, all parties clearly remain committed to and we are confident that they will live up to the provisions of the Camp David Accords.



ס ו ס ס 2

2.97... מתור... 3... דפים

סרוג בטחוני

דחירות

מאריך וז"ח

155... מברק

אל:

--The details of Stossel's itinerary remain unsettled. But we are talking specifically about Egypt and Israel and April 25.

--We remain in touch with Ambassador Habib about the situation regarding his mandate and Lebanon and the cease-fire and so on. But that is a different focus from this.

LEBANON "CRISIS"

In response to questions:

--I would mention what we did last week, that we have renewed our appeal to all those involved, and with influence on all those involved, to show the utmost restraint. This is a time for maximum caution. I would draw you attention to the comment that Ambassador Lewis made following his meeting with Prime Minister Begin, in which he said that "the Prime Minister assured me that the Israeli Cabinet has taken no decision to go into Lebanon in any way shape or form." Now, as has been repeatedly said in the past, we strongly believe that the cease-fire is in the interest of all parties involved.

--I think we certainly take the Prime Minister at his word. But I think the situation certainly has certain delicate elements to it. We have always described the cease-fire as a fragile one that could be upset. So I would simply leave it at that.

--There was a sense that there was a certain higher degree of tension in that border area. And while obviously we welcome that statement and assurances we have received, there is always a degree of fragility and delicacy about the situation.

--I don't think that the tension has at any point dissipated. Obviously it has its higher and lower moments, but I don't think I want to give you a temperature reading on anything in particular.

VIOLATION OF CEASE-FIRE

In response to questions:

From the information we have available, it would appear that the terrorist group infiltration two days ago through Jordan to the Jordan valley represents a violation of the cease-fire. As you know, the cessation-of-hostilities pertains to all military activity from Lebanese territory into Israeli territory and vice-versa. I don't have further details to give you, other than that judgement.

--It is a fact that there has been a strengthening of Israeli forces in the north over the past week. But I do not have details to give you as to how much, two divisions, or whatever.



ס ו ס ס ס כ ר ק

דף 3... מתוך 3... דפים

טווג בטחוני

דחיפות

מאריך וז"ח

155... מס' מברק

אל:

--I'm not sure you were here when Dean (Fischer) went over this at one point. What he made clear was that, and I would refer you to the press office to get the exact words, but let me give you the sense of it. That if such action originated in Lebanese territory, against Israeli territory but went through another area, that that would still constitute a violation in our view, and also the other way.

--A "then what" at the very minimum would be to cause us to reiterate as I have done today, our call for caution and restraint.

DOME OF THE ROCK INCIDENT  
In response to questions:

As you know, we condemned that incident. I think that you probably have that statement from yesterday.

PALESTINIAN DISTURBANCES.  
In response to questions:

Obviously, tensions are very high. We understand that a commercial strike was in effect throughout the Arab inhabited sections of East Jerusalem and in certain towns on the West Bank. There have been outbreaks of violence. We understand that a tourist bus was stoned, and some tourists were injured. And a number of demonstrators have been shot in scattered incidents on the West Bank, and in particular in Gazq. And some prominent Jewish Arabs have been detained for leading an unauthorized but peaceful protests demonstration. We repeat that yesterday's outrageous and tragic violence at the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem has understandably generated strong emotions and passions. We deeply regret the bloodshed resulting from that incident and the disturbances which followed. Again, in this highly charged atmosphere, we hope that those in the position to do so will seek a resolution to prevent additional tragedy. I can confirm that Israeli authorities are holding a dual Israeli-American citizen. Named Alan Goodman who they say was responsible for yesterday's shooting incident. And we are seeking consular access to him, and we have been assured we will be able to visit as soon as the police complete their questioning of him.



Handwritten notes in Hebrew script at the bottom of the page.



משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

טופס מברק צפון

אל: ממישראל וושינגטון

דף 1 מתוך 3 דפים

אל

סיווג בטחוני: שמור

דחיפות: מידי

תאריך וז"ח: 12/16  
מס. מברק: 283

לשימוש  
מח'  
הקשר

ארנט.

אנא העבר את מכתבי התשובה של רה"מ לאגרותיהם של הנשיא רייגן ושל הייג:-  
(קשר נא העבירו הרצי"ב)

בר-און

מה שיש להחזיר אל הא/א לא צבאי



2/3

Jerusalem, April 12, 1982

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I thank you for your Pessach message and for the "political despatch." The Passover greetings of both the President and yourself touched me deeply.

Of the three-thousand-three-hundred Pessach festivals this present one is notably significant in the annals of our ancient people. We are back in the land of our forefathers, we enjoy liberty, we guard democracy, we have a valiant army to defend our men, women and children - their lives, their homes, their human dignity. We have much to be thankful to our Heavenly Father.

We also have our worries, our troubles and even our tragedies. I know, Mr. Secretary, that you will do your utmost to help us overcome the sudden crisis which has arisen in the relations with our good friends, the Egyptians. I believe I do not have to assure you that we do not seek pretexts, but the wrongs already done - which may herald, if not redressed in time, much greater and more dangerous misdeeds - have to be corrected. And on the basis of the letter written to me by the President of the United States on March 26, 1979, it is the task now of the United States, "to achieve compliance with the treaty."

Time is of the essence. I still believe that your presence here will be necessary at the end of this week or, at the latest, at the beginning of the following week. After the shuttle of Mr. Stoessel, your good deputy, I will know what is the real position and I will get in touch with you wherever you are without delay.

Meantime, I wish you, Mr. Secretary, full success in your great peace mission. It is a curious conflict reminding one of many anachronisms. Be this as it may, two war machines are poised against each other and good people throughout the world put their trust in you. We pray for your success.

Yours sincerely,

Menachem Begin

The Honorable  
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
The Secretary of State of the United States of America  
Washington, D.C.



3/3

3/3

Jerusalem, April 12, 1982

Dear Mr. President, Dear Friend,

I thank you from the heart for your Pessach message. It is one of the most moving I have ever received in my life.

Indeed, the Passover is, as we say in the ancient text, "a night different from all other nights." I sometimes ponder in awe the meaning of the word, "Tradition". I know its terminological Latin source, but how great is its strength when it is able to sustain a people, a nation, an unaccountable number of men and women throughout the millenia even as they underwent almost indescribable suffering - and yet make their survival a reality. For some three-thousand-three-hundred years the children of Israel sit together at the Seder service and meal in the most wonderful atmosphere of family and remember the "white" night of bursting forth out of bondage into liberty, into the desert toward the Promised Land. I don't deny, Mr. President, dear friend, that it is a source of great innermost pride to belong to such a people, to speak its language, to know the greatness of the social justice enshrined in the Seventh Day of Rest universally proclaimed for all and to answer the children and say on Passover night: "Once in Egypt we were slaves and God brought us salvation and liberty."

Thus does it go on from generation to generation and so, do we believe, it will continue for all ages to come. This is spiritual eternity and happy are those who know it, even though it is sometimes a heavy burden.

This Pessach is unique even in the history of the Jewish people. We gave sacrifices, we made peace, we have our deep worries, we want to believe in a better, indeed, in a brighter future for our people, for our neighbors, for all mankind. One of our profound consolations is the friendship of the great American people, <sup>and</sup> of your personal friendship, dear Mr. President.

My wife is again in hospital. She asked me to send to you and Mrs. Reagan her thanks and warmest wishes. I join Alisa in extending to you those wishes wholeheartedly.

Yours respectfully and sincerely,

Menachem Begin

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

4427

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שמו

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אל: זוש, נד: 290, מ: המשרד  
דח: מ, סג: ש, חא: 120482, זח: 1700  
נד: רהמי-לואיס

כתב

מייד/שמו

השגריר

שיחה רוהמי - לואיס

בעת הפגישה היום עם משלחת וועדת השדות המוויינים העיר  
רוהמי לשגריר לואיס שבניגוד לנאמר בהודעת מחמי"ד על התקייח  
בהר הבייח בה הוכר שהמקום מקודש נ רק ל איסלם, הרי בעצם  
המקום מקודש קודם כל ליהדות, ואחכ' בסדר כרונוולוגי לנצרות  
ולאיסלם בהיותו מקום המצאם של שני בתי המקדש והאתר המקודש  
ביותר לעמנו. על כן ביקש מהשגריר להעיר על כך למחמי"ד.

==מפא

חפ: שהח, דהט, מנכל, ממנכל, סשהח



טגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אלו המשרד

א.מ.

ט ו פ ס ט ב ר ק

97.....מתוך.....דפים

.....סוג בטחוני...סודי

.....דחופות...בהול

תאריך וזיי 121009 אפריל 82

.....138.....מסי מברק

רוהי"מ. שהי"ח.

פגישתי היום עם טטוסל התקיים בשעה 1600 שעוננו.

ארנס

שה ס/סה היה ממשל האו"ם



שרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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4367/4.

א.כ.ל

מל: המשרד, נר: 154, מ: ווט  
דח: ב, סג: מ, תא: 120482, ות: 1800  
נד: השגריר-סטטל

סודי ביותר/בהול לבוקר.

רהמ' שהמ'

פגישת שגריר והחמ' עם סגן מוכיר המדינה וולטר  
סטטל נכחו: מורי דרייפר, צירלי היל, רובין רפאל ומוכירו האישי  
פל סטטל

השגריר פתח בתאור ההפרות השונות שמצרים מפרה את חוזה השלום  
בהדגישו את רצינות ההפרות והדאגה של ממשלת ישראל. השגריר פרט  
כאן את ההפרות המתמקדות בעיקר בשלש נקודות אלה:-

א. הפרות ביחס להרכב הכוחות המצרים הנמצאים בסיני.

ב. פעילות אשפי במצרים ובסיני הנרחות אמלח' לצוות עוה והכנות  
לפחה' בישראל הכל בידיעתם של המצרים. השגריר ציין כי פעולות  
אלה מהוות הפרה של סעיף 3 (רומי 2) לחוזה השלום.

ג. הצהרות והתבטאויות של מנהיגים ואנשי המשל מצריים בגנותה של  
מדינת ישראל ונהול תעמולה עוינת נגדנו, כן ציין את  
התבטאויותיו של טנדול מגיד באומ' ובכווית וביחוד את תכנית 11  
הנקודות שלו כל אלה מהוות הפרות של חוזה השלום. השגריר צטט את  
סעיף 5 (כ 3) לנספח השלישי לחוזה השלום המסיל על צודים את החובה  
לחפש הבנה הדדית, סובלנות ורצון טוב וכן האנעות מתעמולה עוינת  
וזה כנגד זה.

השגריר הדגיש כי ישראל פונה אל המאדהבי באורח פורמלי על יסוד  
מכתבו של הנשיא קרטל מיום 26.3.79 כדי שהמשל יפעל לתקון  
ההפרות ושמירת חוזה השלום מצד מצרים.

השגריר הדגיש את הדחופות הנדרשת בפעולה מצד המשל. הוא הגיש







שרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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מחוך 3

דף 3

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סודי ביותר

מחוך 30

עותק 9

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\*\* כטסל ציין אחכ' כי הוא יפגש עם וליאופטיס אחר בלונדון ויגיע

\*\* ליראלי במוצאי החג ביום ד' - אחרי שקיעת החמה ביום ו' יטוס

\*\* כטסל למצרים אם הייג יבוא או לאו-תלוי במידת ההתקדמות

\*\* שתושג. כעת הייג נמצא בדרכו מלונדון לארגנטינה.

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\*\* כטסל אמר שהמצרים הופתעו כאשר שמעו על הטענות של ישראל בקשר

\*\* להפרות. הם לא ידעו ולא הבינו את עומק הדאגה בישראל וגם לא

\*\* אופין המדוייקת של הטענות בפי ישראל. במחמד' משוכנעים כי

\*\* מובארק מחויב לתהליך השלום. לדעת סטסל כל המצב נובע מאי הבנה

\*\* ויש לרדו המצרים כדי לתקן המעוות.

\*\* החמ' העיר כי עפ"י מוכר ההסכמהנ MOA מתאריך 26.3.79

\*\* ויין הממשל לבין ממישראל מחויבת ארהב' לעשות כל מאמץ כדי לקדם

\*\* תהליך השלום ולקיים יחסי ידידות בין המדינות ולמנוע הפרות

\*\* חווה השלום. החמ' צטט את הסעיפים 1, 2 ו-3 למוכר. סטסל אמר

\*\* שארהב' מתכוונת לקיים כל מלה עפ"י המוכר.

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\*\* חפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, מנככ, ממנככ, ר/מרכו, רס, אמך.

\*\* מצפא, רובינסטיין, דיבון, מצרים

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נחושטן.



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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סודי ביותר

מחוך 5 דף 1  
מחוך 28 סותק 4

h367/2

סלול

אל: ווש, קהיר, נד: חוזם 260, מ: המשרד  
דח: ב, סג: מ, תא: 120482, זח: 1730  
נד: שהח-וליוטיס

סודי-ביותר/בהול.

השגריר.

פגישה שהיח עם וליוטיס. נכחו: לואיס, כראון והחיים.  
שהיח התחיל בתאור שחוף הפעולה בין מצרים עם אשיפי הוא הדגיש  
כשי שתפי הוה איננו אך ורק בהבדחת הנשק לדצועת טוה אלא נדאה  
שקיים שחוף פעולה מלא ופעיל בין חוגים מצריים רשמיים לבין  
אשיפי ומנהיגותו. אין ספק כי זה בניגוד לחווה השלום. השך  
הזכיר כי הוא דיבר הן עם עלי והן עם מובארק שהודו במגשים  
המדויניים עם אשיפי אך לא ענו על שאלתו של השך מהו הבסיס  
ליחסים אלו. בתשובתם הדגישו המנהיגים המצריים שיחסיהם הם עם  
הפתיח אך כיום ידוע לנו שיש להם יחסים ישירים גם עם ארגונים  
קיצוניים יותר. עד כמה שידוע לנו יחסים אלו הם מבצעיים כולל  
איטונים, אספקה זיהוי וכו'. מבחינתנו המשיך השך נדאה לנו כי  
קשה לחשוב שלמצרים יהיו יחסים דומים עם אשיפי כמו אלו שיש  
לעיראק סוריה או אף ידון שיחסיה היא עם אשיפי נדאים כיום  
פחותים מאלו של מצרים.  
הדגשנו היא אמר השך שאחרי ביקוריהם האחרונים מנהיגים מצריים  
חזרו לקהיר עם תחושה שאין להם מה לתשוש מחגובה אמריקאית  
שליילית אם לא ימלאו אחרי דוחו ולשונו של חווה השלום.  
וליוטיס הגיב באומרו שהדברים שהשך מסד לו הם חידוש עבודו, לו  
מידע זה היה בידיהם יתכן והיחה להם אפשרות לשוחח על כך עם  
המצרים. הוא בהחלט שבין את דאגתנו החמורה ורצוננו להפסיק  
פעילות זו אך קשה לו לדאות שניתן להשיג זאת על ידי מסמך  
חתום.  
השאלה היא איך מפסיקים את הענין. השך השיב כי לפי השקפתו של  
המצרים לדעת ששמידחם בתנאי הסכם קמפי-דיוויד וחווה השלום הוא  
חנאי מוקדם ליחסיהם עם ארצות הבדית. וליוטיס אמר שלדעתו  
המצרים טרים לבך בהחלצ ושהם יודעים שתמיכתה של ארה"ב בהסכמי



# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\*\* \*\*  
\*\* \*\* 5 מתוך 2 דף \*\*  
\*\* \*\* טודי ביוחד 28 מתוך 4 עוחק \*\*  
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\*\*\*\* \*\*  
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\*\* קמפי-דיוויד ובחווה השלום היא חלק חשוב ביותר במדיניותה של \*\*  
\*\* ארה"ב במרחב התיכון וביחסיה עם מצרים. השך המשיך ואמר שלדעתו \*\*  
\*\* מסמך כתוב הוא חשוב לא בגלל זה שהוא יכול לתקן הדברים לגופם \*\*  
\*\* אלא מאחר ועל מנת להגיע אליו יהיה על המצרים ללמוד את המסמך \*\*  
\*\* ואת הסוגיות שהולידו אותו. נראה לשר כי אחת הסיבות לקלות \*\*  
\*\* שבה המצרים נכנסו בשבועות האחרונים להפרות של חווה השלום \*\*  
\*\* הוא בטחונם שהנטיגה היא בטוחה. את התחושה הזו הם קיבלו \*\*  
\*\* מארה"ב אך אם הם יתעוררו לבעיות האמיתיות על ידי כך שהם יהיו \*\*  
\*\* חייבים לדון במסמך יתכן והדברים יגישו לתיקונים. \*\*

\*\* \*\*  
\*\* וליוט'ס עבר כאן לכמה דקות לשיחה על לבנון. הוא אמר שהנשיא \*\*  
\*\* קיבל בדרךנה את התאפקותה הנמשכת של ישראל. השך הגיב כי \*\*  
\*\* התאפקות זו אינה קלה. וליוט'ס בהביטו הבנה לכך חזר על \*\*  
\*\* סיפוקו של הנשיא. השך אמר כי אין הדבר קל עבורנו כי בתחילתו \*\*  
\*\* ייחנך והפסקת האש פעלה לטובתנו אך בשבועות האחרונים אין זה \*\*  
\*\* כך כי היא מצירה את צעדנו למרות ההפרות החוזרות מצד המצבלים. \*\*

\*\* \*\*  
\*\* וליוט'ס חזר לנושא המצרי ומסר על שיחותיו בקהיר. הוא הדגיש \*\*  
\*\* בתחילת דבריו שהמזכיר למרות עיסוקיו האחרים ממשיך להתעניין \*\*  
\*\* בצורה מדוקדקת בעניני האזור. לפני שהמזכיר עזב לסיורו \*\*  
\*\* בארגנטינה ואנגליה הוא שמע תדרוך במשך שלוש שעות מוליוט'ס על \*\*  
\*\* עניני האזור ובמיוחד על בעיות הסכסוך. \*\*  
\*\* וליוט'ס קיבל את המסר שדוהמי העביר למזכיר בהיותו בקהיר \*\*  
\*\* והזנחה על-ידי הייג למסור תוכנה טייד למובארק. בשיחה שהוא \*\*  
\*\* קיים עם מובארק בשבת נכחו אתמדמן ואוסאמה-אל באו. מובארק \*\*  
\*\* היה מופתע לגמרי שהבטיות התפתחו למשבר. בתגובתו היה נראה \*\*  
\*\* מובארק כנה. וליוט'ס הסביר לו את המסר שהוא קיבל כאשר הוא \*\*  
\*\* דיבר על נאומו של מגיד בכויית הגיב מובארק באומרו שטד כמה \*\*  
\*\* שידוע לו מגיד לא אמר שום דבר חדש אך הוסיף לזה כי הוא \*\*  
\*\* מובארק לא קרא את הנאום. בדבריו על הנאום בכויית הדגיש \*\*  
\*\* מובארק כי מצרים בפעם הראשונה בפורום טעין זה קראה לכל \*\*  
\*\* המדינות להגיע לשלום עם ישראל. לדברי מובארק הייתה מטרתם \*\*  
\*\* הטקטית למנוע גינוי של הסכמי ק.ד., הכח הרב-לאומי וחווה \*\*  
\*\* השלום. לדברי מובארק היה נראה לו שטמרה זו הושגה. למחרת \*\*  
\*\* היום כאשר אתמדמן פגש שוב את מובארק יחד עם סנטור ליהי \*\*  
\*\* נסובה השיחה שוב על נאומו של מגיד ואתמדמן אמר למובארק שהוא \*\*  
\*\* בהחלט ירצה להבין את תגובתה של ישראל. יד אתמדמן שאל את \*\*  
\*\* מובארק ל.ק.ד. לא הוזכר בנאום היה נראה מובארק מופתע. \*\*



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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\*\* \*\* 5 מחוך 3 דף \*\*  
\*\* \*\* 28 מחוך 4 עותק \*\*  
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\*\* מובא רק טצא את הדטיון שמצרים תסמוך על השפי' או שרפאת כמגוחך \*\*  
\*\* הוא ולול בשניהם ואמר כי אין לסמוך לא על הארגון ולא על \*\*  
\*\* האיש. הוא חזר והדגיש שמדיניותה של מצרים מושחתת על הסכמי \*\*  
\*\* ק.ד. והוא אישר הסכמים אלו מחדש ואמר כי ה-25 באפריל איננו \*\*  
\*\* סוף השלום אלא למטשה התחלתו. הוא שוב חזר על דבריו בשיחה עם \*\*  
\*\* וליז'טיס ואתרמון שמצרים אומנם מטונינה בשיפר יחסיה עם \*\*  
\*\* מדינות ערב המתונות אך לא על חשבון יחסיה עם ישראל. הוא טען \*\*  
\*\* ששיפור יחסיה של מצרים עם מדינות ערב פועל גם לטובתה של \*\*  
\*\* ישראל מה שהוא מנסה לעשות הוא להקנות לגיטימיות למושג השלום. \*\*  
\*\* בשיחתו עם אתרמון הוא חזר על הנקודות האלו. באותה שיחה הוא \*\*  
\*\* אמר שמצרים ממתינה למדינות ערב לחזור ליחסים עם מצרים וכן \*\*  
\*\* הוא הדגיש שחווה השלום איננו מהווה בעיה בתחושה של רוב \*\*  
\*\* המדינות ערב.

\*\* השר היקשה בנקודה זו ושאל האם הוא דיבר על חווה השלום אך לא \*\*  
\*\* על הסכמי ק.ד. \*\*

\*\* וליז'טיס מצידו אישר הנחתו של השר שמובא רק התייחס לחווה השלום \*\*  
\*\* ולא להסכמי ק.ד. \*\*

\*\* וליז'טיס המשיך ואמר שבאשר הוא הוכיח את הפרוח החווה התרגו \*\*  
\*\* מובא רק. מובא רק שאל או למה דוהמי לא העלה את ההפרוח האלו \*\*  
\*\* במישרין טימו ולמה הוא העלה אותן עם האמריקאים. \*\*

\*\* אתרמון אמר שהוא שוחח על בעיית ההפרוח עם כטאל חסן עלי וזה \*\*  
\*\* האחרון אמר שהוא ידבר על נושא זה בפרוטרוט עם שהבי'ם כאשר השר \*\*  
\*\* יגיע למצרים. \*\*

\*\* וליז'טיס סיפר שביום שהוא הגיע למצרים העתונות המצרית נתנה \*\*  
\*\* פרסום בעמודיה הראשונים להצהרתו של מובא רק בפני חברי קונגרס \*\*  
\*\* אמריקאיים על דבקותה של מצרים בהסכמי ק.ד. \*\*

\*\* הם גם פרסמו בעמודיהם הראשונים את הצהרותיה של מצרים בוועידת \*\*  
\*\* בוויית וכללו בכך ברבות לאדצות הברית על הצלחת ק.ד. וזה למרות \*\*  
\*\* שבנאום עצמו מגיד לא הוכיח הסכמים אלו. \*\*

\*\* לואיס הוכיח בהקשר זה את מכתבו של דוהמי למובא רק שבו הוא \*\*  
\*\* התלונן על נאומו של מגיד במוטבי'ם. השר הוכיח לוליז'טיס \*\*  
\*\* וללואיס את התרשמותו של הייג אחרי ביקורו הראשון בקהיר שהוא \*\*  
\*\* חש שינוי באווירה. \*\*











משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\*\* 4464

\*\* \*\* יוצא

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\*\* אל: זוש, קהיר, נר: חוזם 266, מ: המשרד

\*\* דח: ב, טג: מ, תא: 120482, זח: 1900

\*\* נד: רהמ שהח שהבט-וליוטיס

\*\*

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\*\* סודי ביוח/בהול

\*\*

\*\* השגריר.

\*\*

\*\* נקודות טיקריות מתוך שיחתו של ראש הממשלה, שהח, שהבט' עם

\*\* וליוטיס.

\*\* נכחו לואיס בראון האלופים שגיא ותמיר, טרידור, אבנר, סאלי ובו

\*\* והחמ'.

\*\* 1. בתחילת השיחה דיזוח וליוטיס על שיחותיו במצרים בהתאם

\*\* לקווים שדיזוח עליהם לשהח' נראה שלנו חוזם 266. לדיזוח זה

\*\* הוא הוסיף דיזוח קצר על ביקורו של אבו-גזאליה בווינגטון. הוא

\*\* אמר שאבו גזאליה טיפל בראש ובראשונה בשתי בעיות: טאבה טחד

\*\* ואיראן-טיראק מאידך. לגבי טאבה הדגיש אבו-גזאליה את עניינם של

\*\* המצרים לסיים את הפרשה לפני ה-25 באפריל על מנת לא להשאיר

\*\* בעיות לא פתורות אחרי הנסיגה.

\*\* לגבי איראן-טיראק צייד אבו-גזאליה סנדריות שונות והביט את חששה

\*\* העטוק של מצרים כמה ששוי לקרות למדינות המפרץ אם תהיינה

\*\* הצלחות נוספות של הצבא האיראני. וליוטיס הדגיש כי בעיה זו

\*\* מעסיקה את ההנהגה המצרית ושקיים חשש רציני מהקיצוניות השיעית-

\*\* והשפעה על מדינות המפרץ.

\*\* 2. אחרי דיזוחו על השיחות בקהיר ובמיוחד אלו עם מובארק העלה

\*\* וליוטיס את אותה השאלה שדובר עליה בשיחתו עם שהח' דהיינו האם

\*\* מסטן חתום היא הדרך היחידה לדעת ישראל להתגבר על הבעיות כפי

\*\* שהם התעוררו. כמו כן שאל וליוטיס את דהמ' האם אנו מסתמכים

\*\* פורמלית בפנייתנו לארהב על מכתבו של הנשיא קרטז אל דהמ'

\*\* טה-29 למדץ, 1979, נשאת סעיפו השני הקדיא דהמ' באורני טר

\*\* (וליוטיס). דהמ' השיב על שאלה זו בהן. בתשובה לשאלתו של

\*\* וליוטיס האם אנו רואים במסטן חתום עי' מצרים, ישראל וארצות

\*\* הברית כטדה את הדרך העיקרית לפתרון הבעיה השיב דהמ' שאומנם

\*\* אין זו הדרך היחידה אך זאת ללא ספק דרך טובה. המסטן המוצע

\*\* הינו מסמן הגון בשכל נקודותיו הן לפי חזרה השלום אפשר לשנותו

אלה

4367/3







# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\*\* \*\*  
\*\* \*\* 4 תחן 3 דף \*\*  
\*\* \*\* 28 תחן 4 עותק \*\*  
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\*\* מאחד והזמן שנותר עד ל-26 לאפריל הוא קצו ביותר. דהמי כמו כן  
\*\* חזר והדגיש שתיקון ההפרות בשטח חייב להתבצע מיידית. נד' אמנ'  
\*\* פרט את ההפרות כפי שנמסרו כבר אמט ללואיס בשיחתו עם  
\*\* שהבט', כמו כן אמר שהרמטכ"ל כתב על כל ההפרות האלו לעמיתו  
\*\* המצרי מכתב שטליו לא קיבל תשובה. דהמי העלה את המחשבה ש  
\*\* רצוי שמדינת ישראל לא תאשר תיקונים  
\*\* אלה. שהבט' מצידו אמר שיטנם בסיסים מבצעים של אשפי  
\*\* באל-עריש, קהיר ואלכסנדריה. לואיס מצידו העיר כי יש להבדיל  
\*\* בין מגעים מדיניים בין מצרים ואשפי לבין קיום בסיסים  
\*\* מבצעים.

\*\* 6. וליומיס במשך השיחה הדגיש מספר פעמים שהוא אמר למובארק  
\*\* שאנו עדים כאן למשבר אמון. קביעה שטימה הסכים דהמי. וליומיס גם  
\*\* כן הדגיש מספר פעמים שהן מדיניות הבטחון של ארהב והן זו של  
\*\* ישראל מבוססים על מרכיבות של חוזה השלום ומכאן על שמירתו  
\*\* המלאה.

\*\* 7. דהמי סיכם את הדיון באומרו כי אנו מעוניינים בפתרונות  
\*\* ידידותיים ואנו רוצים להשלים את הנסיגה ב-26 לאפריל. יש  
\*\* להדגיש בפני המצרים שאם אין הם מחוירים אמון מלא בינינו יחכן  
\*\* שנצטרך לעקול שצהל' יישאר בקו הנוכחי. אנו נמשיך בפנינו ימית  
\*\* על כל הכאב שבו כי אין אנו רוצים לא למלאות אחרי החוזה, אנו  
\*\* רוצים למלא את כל ההתחייבויות אך עלינו לדעת מה היא גישתה  
\*\* של מצרים. אנו מבקשים נייר נוסף. נשיא ארהב כתב לי מפורשות  
\*\* והדברים נמצאים במסמכים, נראה לנו כי הקלנו על הבעיה על ידי  
\*\* כך שאנו מציעים נייר נוסף. הצטנו שיוטא שנמצאת בדגט  
\*\* בידיכם. בקהיר אסוד להם לחשוב כי אלה הן מילים ריקות אם לא  
\*\* יהיה תיקון של המטוות ושל ההפרות ייתכן שחיינו יצטרבו להשאר  
\*\* בקווים הנוכחיים. אין אנו רוצים זאת.  
\*\* השפה והמטעים שבהם נוקטים המצרים לאחדונה היא מפתיעה כשהיא  
\*\* באה לפני ה-26 באפריל. השאלה היא למה אנו מותקפים. האם ישנה  
\*\* חשונה למה מגיד דיבר כפי שדיבר כעת וזה דווקא לפני ה-26  
\*\* באפריל. כאמור אין המילים שלנו ריקות, אבל אנו מעוניינים בהסדר  
\*\* ובהחזרת האמון המלא בינינו לבין המצרים.

\*\* 8. וליומיס הגיב על כך באומרו שארהב מבינה את דצינות הבעיה  
\*\* ותפעל בהתאם. אין ארהב יכולה אף לחשוב על פגיעה דצינית בחוזה  
\*\* השלום.  
\*\* הטרה: נשדל להבדיל בהקדם דיווח מפורט יותר משיחה זו.







משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

\*\* 4156

\*\* יוצא

\*\* דף 1 מתוך 4

\*\* סודי ביותר 10 מתוך 10

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אבק

\*\* מל: ווש, נד: 259, מ: המשדר

\*\* דח: ב, סג: ט, תא: 110482, זח: 2000

\*\* נד: לקראת שיחה עם סטסל

\*\* סודי/ביותר/בהול

\*\* השגריר

\*\* ליהלן מראש הממשלה לקראת שיחתך עם סטסל:

\*\* בעיחתך עם מר סטסל הסתמך נא על הפייסקה הראשונה במכתבו של

\*\* הנשיא קרמר לראש הממשלה מה-26.3.79 המתחילה במילים:

\*\* 'IN THE EVENT OF AN ACTUAL OR THREATENED VIOLATION OF THE TREATY OF PEACE...'

\*\* וכו'. כמו כן תצטט לפניו את הפייסקה השנייה בסעיף שלוש לחוזה השלום המחיל במילים:

\*\* 'EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO ENSURE ...' וכן את

\*\* סעיף חמש בנספח שלו סעיף קטן שלוש האומר:

\*\* 'THE PARTIES SHALL SEEK TO FOSTER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND TOLERANCE AND WILL, ACCORDINGLY, ABSTAIN FROM HOSTILE PROPAGANDA AGAINST EACH OTHER'

\*\* סעיף אחרון זה חל, מבחינת הפרט, על כל שלושת ההודעות של

\*\* הוציג המצרי, ד"ר מגיד, במוטצת הבחון, בדאיון בטחון כוויטי

\*\* וובטיקר, אך לא בלבד, לחובות אחת עשרה הנקודות שפרושן-בך

\*\* הואיל לומר-הוא למעשה הכחדת ישראל בשלבים. בהסתמך על הפייסקה

\*\* במכתבו של הנשיא קרמר לראש הממשלה, תציע למר סטסל את שיומח

\*\* המסמך המצורפת, בעוד הרעיון שלנו-אשר לא נדחה ע"י לואיס-הוא

\*\* משלוש המדינות תחומנה על ה- STATEMENT OF

\*\* REAFFIRMATION על דאשית השבוע שלאחר השבוע הבא ולכל המאוחר

\*\* טו ה-26.4.82



משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

\*\* \*\*  
\*\* \*\* 4 מחוץ 2 דף \*\*  
\*\* \*\* סודי ביותר 10 מחוץ 4 חתק \*\*  
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STATEMENT OF REAFFIRMATION

\*\*A EGYPT AND ISRAEL REAFFIRM THEIR ADHERENCE TO THE TREATY \*\*  
\*\*OF PEACE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND PLEDGE COMPLETE AND \*\*  
\*\*UNCONDITIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH ALL ITS PROVISIONS, INCLUDING \*\*  
\*\*THOSE PERTAINING TO: \*\*

\*\*1. RESTRICTIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS WHICH EGYPT AND ISRAEL \*\*  
\*\*TOOK UPON THEMSELVES IN ZONES A, B, C, D, AND THEIR \*\*  
\*\*COMMITMENT NOT TO CARRY OUT ANY BREACH OF THE RESTRICTIONS \*\*  
\*\*AND ARRANGMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THOSE ZONES. MEASURES \*\*  
\*\*WILL BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT BY APRIL 26, 1982, THE STATUS \*\*  
\*\*OF, AND IN THESE ZONES, WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE \*\*  
\*\*PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY OF PEACE. \*\*

\*\*2. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE MFO AND THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS \*\*  
\*\*RESPONSIBILITIES AS AGREED UPON AND STIPULATED IN THE \*\*  
\*\*TREATY OF PEACE, INCLUDING ITS DUTY TO PREVENT ANY \*\*  
\*\*VIOLATIONS OF THE TREATY IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX I OF THE \*\*  
\*\*TREATY, AND ENSURING THE FREEDOM \*\*  
\*\*OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH \*\*  
\*\*ARTICLE V OF THE TREATY. \*\*

\*\*3. THE IMPLIMENTATION OF ALL THE NORMALIZATION ARRANGEMENTS \*\*  
\*\*AS AGREED UPON BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL ON THE BASIS OF \*\*  
\*\*ANNEX III TO THE TREATY, AND THE PUTTING INTO EFFECT BY \*\*  
\*\*APRIL 26, 1982, OF ALL THE AGREEMENTS SIGNED SINCE THE \*\*  
\*\*CONCLUSION OF THE PEACE TREATY. \*\*

\*\*3A. KEEPING THE BORDERS PERMANENTLY OPEN FOR TRAVEL OF \*\*  
\*\*PERSONS AND THE EXCHANGE OF GOODS. \*\*

\*\*3B. CONTINUING THE MAINTENANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AT \*\*  
\*\*THEIR EXISTING CONSULAR LEVEL. \*\*











8841/764

2.7

TOP SECRET

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER, THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE DEFENCE MINISTER WITH AMBASSADOR LEWIS, AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S RESIDENCE, JERUSALEM, SUNDAY, APRIL 11, 1982, at 5 p.m.

PRESENT: BROWN, COL. HOGNOC, HAIRE, TAMIR, SAGUI, AVNER, DAN MERRIDOR

PM: We have a serious deliberation before us today. We shall deal with weighty problems. The problems are serious because of the developments during the last ten days or so. What happened? We proved our good will, as you know, in connection with the implementation of the peace Treaty. We entered into a grave moral clash with those good people who have to be evacuated from Yamit. Most have already left. Several hundreds are still there of the so-called "Stop the Withdrawal Movement". They are idealistic people. We have almost totally dismantled the Yamit area of its agricultural and industrial enterprises. Now, almost on the eve of the ultimate date of withdrawal - April 26 - the following events have occurred. There have been serious infringements on the ground by Egyptian forces. As the Minister of Defence will soon make clear to you, the demilitarized zone and the forces limitation zone are now, in several places, invaded by units of the Egyptian army. Nobody will claim they will march against Israel but their presence is a real infringement of the Peace Treaty. There are cynics who call the Treaty a piece of paper. It is not. But if you ~~respect it~~ don't respect it it is torn to pieces. Those zones are the girdle of our security. Unlike Judea, Samaria and Gaza we can demilitarize Sinai. It is a desert and it can be checked from the air and by other means to see if the agreement is honored or broken and, if necessary to redress the wrong so that we live in peace together. ~~It~~ There are violations and they are not redressed, as we recently asked Egypt to do, and lately they do not even listen to us - that is the most serious development. Arik ~~talked~~ to them and they don't pay attention. One can say, what is an additional batallion after all? It is not a matter of an armed clash but the principle of upholding the Peace Treaty.

Secondly, during the last ten days, more or less, we have growing information of permanent cooperation between the Egyptian government and the PLO. All of us in this room know what the PLO is. We know that after Ali's visit here he invited a representative of the PLO and reported to him on everything we ~~speak~~ spoke. It is a serious development. It is our implacable enemy. In Kuwait they even rejected the Egyptian plan and demanded the clear condemnation of Camp David. And then, ~~there~~ there goes a friend - and we believe we are friends - and reports to this implacable enemy what he said to us and what the Defence Minister and the Foreign Minister and I said to him.

Thirdly, military hardware is being supplied all the time from Al-Arish to the Gaza Strip.

Defence Minister: Over 500 grenades have been smuggled over since January 1st. During 1981, over a 1000.

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22/ - GJ  
 [Handwritten notes and signatures]








PM: Everybody can imagine what could happen if they are used. It is a permanent traffic and it is an absolute breach of the Peace Treaty (PM reads article III, para. 2 of the Peace Treaty). It is a very serious violation - both the contact with the PLO man and the traffic of explosives, weapons, etc. It has grown immensely in recent days.

Fourthly, there is the political issue which I raised with you on the phone. It was on Wednesday last week that Dr. Meghid appeared in Kuwait at the conference of non-aligned countries and read a speech in which he proposed an Egyptian plan to solve the Palestinian problem. He said Israel "will have" to accept the following things:

1. end of Israeli occupation;
2. the right to return or to compensation according to the United Nations General Assembly resolution No. 194;
3. the right of the Palestinian people to sovereignty over its resources;
4. right of self-determination without exterior intervention;
5. the right to an independent state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the basis of the 1967 borders;
6. the right to sovereignty over the city of Jerusalem and rejection of any geographical or demographical change in the city and any change in its legal status;
7. rejection of any Israeli policy aimed at inserting geographical, demographical and legal changes in the territories occupied in 1967;
8. right to security within the framework of secure borders based on mutual ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ recognition of this right with the neighboring countries;
9. the right to abolish all steps contradicting the Geneva conventions;
10. the right to liquidate the settlements infringing the international law regarding occupation of the territories;
11. the right to fully apply the Geneva conventions in the occupied territories until a comprehensive arrangement is reached and Israeli withdrawal from them is effected.)







VERSION

Lewis: On the point dealing with Jerusalem, we received the ~~MMMA~~ MENA<sup>VERSION</sup> and there it says: "To respect their sovereign rights in Jerusalem"

Sagui: We translated it directly from the Arabic.


PM: There is a difference and we shall check ~~MMX~~ it out. I sit here with friends and let's call a spade a spade. These eleven points mean the destruction of Israel - the return to the 67 armistice lines, the giving up of Jerusalem, and the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees who left mainly on orders and who should now come back to Jaffa, Ramlah, etc.; the Jewish majority will disappear and it will spell the end of the State of Israel. A few days before our final withdrawal we read of this prescription for our destruction in stages. People say that Sadat didn't say much different in his Knesset speech. There is some difference but the important thing is that Sadat made his speech before Camp David. You will recall that on the first night at Camp David he brought a plan which he read to Carter and me but which he then withdraw.

Lewis: He made much the same points.

PM: Yes, written by the same authors. I see their handwriting - El-Baz and Ghali. We witnessed the restoration of this document two weeks before we take this plunge into the future, giving up Sharm el-Sheikh and our strategic depth. I would like, Mr. Ambassador, to put to you what is our absolute right and duty, namely, to draw the attention of the American government to these bitter facts on the eve of our withdrawal to <sup>the</sup> international borders. If those <sup>infringements</sup> ~~engagements~~ are not corrected the Government of Israel will consider the possibility of postponing our withdrawal. Please pay attention to this carefully worded sentence - we shall consider the possibility of postponing our withdrawal. Why did I turn to the Secretary and expect immediate American action? On March 26th, 1979, President Carter wrote to me a letter (he wrote the same letter to Sadat). In it he stated: "In the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt, the United States will, on request of one or both of the Parties, <sup>+</sup> consult with the Parties with respect thereto and will take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty." We face such a development now and we request the U.S. that you take the necessary action "to achieve compliance with the Treaty". The Treaty is violated on the ground, by the permanent and full cooperation of Egypt with the PLO, ~~MMX~~ and is violated by political plans and statements presented by Egypt in international bodies.

We have a constructed <sup>IVS</sup> proposal which we deliberated on and formulated. Please find out if all three Parties would sign a "Statement of Reaffirmation" - Egypt and Israel would sign as would the U.S, as witness. The signatures could be on the level of the Secretary of State signing with Shamir and Ali or the President with Mubarak and me as chief executives. The following is a draft. It is open for proposals, for changes, corrections, etc.







11.4.82

STATEMENT OF REAFFIRMATION

A. Egypt and Israel reaffirm their adherence to the Treaty of Peace between the two countries and pledge complete and unconditional compliance with all its provisions, including those pertaining to:

(1) Restrictions and arrangements which Egypt and Israel took upon themselves in Zones A,B,C,D, and their commitment not to carry out any breach of the restrictions and arrangements with respect to those Zones. Measures will be taken to ensure that by April 26, 1982, the status of, and in these Zones, will be in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Peace.

(2) The functioning of the MFO and the performance of its responsibilities as agreed upon and stipulated in the Treaty of Peace, including its duty to prevent any violations of the Treaty in accordance with Annex I of the Treaty, and ensuring the freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran in accordance with Article V of the Treaty.

(3) The implementation of all the normalization arrangements as agreed upon between Egypt and Israel on the basis of Annex III to the Treaty, and the putting into effect by April 26, 1982, of all the agreements signed since the conclusion of the Peace Treaty.

(3a) Keeping the borders permanently open for travel of persons and the exchange of goods.

(3b) Continuing the maintenance of diplomatic relations at their existing ambassadorial level.


(4) Refraining from hostile acts and the dissemination of hostile statements in <sup>domestic</sup> ~~local~~ media, in foreign countries or in international bodies.

(5) Preventing any activity and operation of ~~the~~ terrorist organizations from the territory of ~~the~~ one country against that of the other, including hostile propaganda, smuggling of arms and other war materials across their respective borders;

Also, ensuring the dismantling by April 26, 1982, of the existing infrastructures of those terrorist organizations.

B. Egypt and Israel reaffirm their adherence to the Camp David Accords, including the commitment to negotiate continuously and in good faith an agreement concerning full autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District








(The West Bank and the Gaza Strip), based upon democratic elections, the establishment and inauguration of the Self-governing Authority (Administrative Council) and the transitional period of five years.

The Parties to the Camp David Accords undertake not to propose or entertain any plan relating to the peace process other than the Camp David Accords.

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Let me say a word in parenthesis about the diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level. What happens if, say, in May 1982 the man in charge in Cairo decides that the presence of the Israeli Ambassador is a hindrance and he calls him in and tells him to go back home and that the representation will now be on the level of charge d'affaires. Are we then going to send in our army? I admit to you, I don't know what we could then do. I don't think we could then do anything. Which is why we now ask that there be this document which says clearly that the ambassadorial level will continue. Somebody could say in Cairo - a certain el-Baz or Dr. Meguid - that we cannot sever relations completely but a charge is enough. We want to prevent such a development. It was Kissinger who used to say that Israel is giving away tangible things and gets a ~~piece~~ piece of paper in return. To me it is not a piece of paper, it is a word of honor. I speak of our responsibility to our nation. We made very great sacrifices and now everything can burst up the seams after April 26th. If they can say those words in Kuwait, could they not ask our Ambassador to go home after April 26th?


Lewis: Do you have concrete intelligence about returning your Ambassador?

PM:No, It is theoretical. What we suggest in accordance with President Carter's letter is that you undertake action and find out in Cairo if they are prepared to sign with us and with you this document of reassurance. We are the party wronged, perplexed and worried. In essence it is a document which redresses a wrong done to us.

Lewis: As you know, after we spoke on Friday I immediately cabled your messenger to the Secretary and I gave you his response yesterday. He is making arrangement for Stessil to come here. Valiotas arrives tonight from ~~Rxxxx~~ Cairo and ~~will~~ he will see you tomorrow. Yesterday, he raised your complaint with Mubarak in general terms and he will report to you tomorrow on that meeting. Then, he must leave early Tuesday morning and meanwhile Stessil <sup>Stessil</sup> will be coming with a small team including Draper. He plans to leave Washington Monday ~~xxxxxxx~~ evening, meet ~~xxxxx~~Valiotas in London and arrive here on Wednesday. Then he will go to Cairo. He is empowered by the Secretary to do whatever possible to carry out our responsibility. Your proposal will fit in well with his intentions. We will cable your proposal immediately. Stessil is prepared to stay as long as necessary and if you and he conclude that the Secretary is needed and if ~~xxxxxxx~~ he can untangle himself from his present assignment (Britain v. Argentina) he will also come. It is not clear how long his ~~xxxxxxx~~ present mediation will last, but if his deputy cannot do what has to be done ~~he~~ he will make every effort to come himself. The Secretary has great ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ confidence in him. Stessil has little experience in this part of the world but he is a most seasoned diplomat and is the most senior career officer. He served as our Ambassador in Moscow, Bonn and Warsaw.

Ax







PM: Indeed, a serious diplomat.

Lewis: He is a very experienced and able professional. He will be here on Wednesday and meanwhile they will quickly get your paper to him. I think it is a constructive way to proceed. Certainly, we want to do everything we can to meet our obligations.

Defence Minister: I just wish to add one sentence. I must emphasize that ~~xxxx~~ besides all three Parties signing the document it should be understood ~~xxxx~~ that all violations should be corrected by April 26th. It is not enough to sign the paper but also to take action by April 26th. In the past, we warned the Egyptians of what might happen if there are violations. Three years ago I met Ali for the first time in Alexandria and I discussed the question with him. Kimche went to Cairo on other matters but I asked him to again raise the subject.


Foreign Minister: Without any results.

Defence Minister: A change has taken place. I remember when the Prime Minister discussed the matter of the smuggling of grenades with Sadat in Alexandria in September. Steps were taken. I told the Cabinet today that now there is simply no reaction. There is a real effort by the terrorists to smuggle weapons into Gaza. Today there are 50 kms from the border to Rafaih and we still have a chance to catch them. We have marked the border in the area and built a tiny fence in the built-up section. But what will happen when we withdraw? We won't be able to stop it. We will have to react. We are going to lose the great thing - peace, for small things - the terrorist activities. You have been watching the steps we have been taking now. We have been brought to a situation in which we have not time any more. I was sitting with their Defence Minister and explaining why they shouldn't drag out their response to the last day. How can we proceed towards April 26th and they don't even react. They are sure we will be on this side of the border on April 26th. That's what we want but the situation must be corrected beforehand. Ours is a legitimate demand not to harm the peace but to protect the peace.

Lewis: As you know, we have had for a three-year period our monitoring station in Sinai as well as aerial inspection. After you spoke to me I checked with our records and found the violations of the sort we are monitoring - I got a summary of the reports of the past two years. For example, the inspection of October 81 reported two violations of Egypt both of which were rectified. In November there were two violations and these were also rectified. The last violation was reported by our inspectors on December 18th. There was one violation. In January it was no longer there. Since January 1, 82, our inspectors have reported no violation. This does not involve smuggling.

Sagui: There are two kinds of violation. One we can verify on the ground, such as minefields and defences in Zone B. There, nothing was really rectified.







Lewis: My understanding is that our people were with the Egyptians when making the line. Sagui: They are not. They were sent home and told to come back afterwards. The point is there are eleven positions and two fences and minefields which exceed the limit of the agreed line. Another kind of violation is hard to verify. First we <sup>would</sup> get information trying to verify it by air photography. I speak about the exceeding of units and the changing of appearance of units to make them look like civilians. For example, <sup>to</sup> commandos, battalions wearing civilian dress. No commando units may be in Sinai at all. It is agreed that in Zone C there will be <sup>no</sup> military ~~units~~ personnel only police. When Sadat visited Santa Catherina special permission was asked for commando units whilst he was there. Near Santa Catherina there are two platoons of border police and in al-Arish only border guards. There is an engineering battalion ~~that was in the Sinai~~ and three weeks ago <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ SMF agreed with us on an excess of units in Zone A. Egypt never established a mechanized division on the west bank of the Suez Canal. They have five brigades on the east side in violation of the Peace Treaty. So, I would say generally, we have two kinds ~~of~~ violations - one can be verified on the ground and the other from the air - which we don't have any more except for the react-out. The other point are the things which the SMF find hard to verify.

Lewis: About al-Arish the SMF understanding is there are 300 engineer troops supposedly improving arrangements there and you supposedly gave permission.

Sagui: We gave permission for maintenance ~~xxx~~ group to maintain al-Arish airport. That's ~~the~~ the only personnel we know about.


Lewis: Is it not correct that <sup>unarmed</sup> three hundred engineering people are there?

Sagui: Correct, but their arms are in their barracks - Brigade No. 20.

Defence Minsiter: What <sup>happened</sup> really is instead of complying they camouflage. When our Chief of Staff ~~set~~ his letter on the presence of those troops they suddenly appeared in civilian clothes.

PM: I would like to give you another reference to what I was referring to before with regard to Dr. Meguid's three statements in clear violation of the Peace Treaty - his UN speech, his statement to the press and his eleven points in Kuwait. They are hostile propaganda all of them and in violation of Annex III, article 5, sub-section iii of the Peace Treaty. In other words, basing ourselves on the first paragraph of President Carter's letter to me and on article V of annex III and article III section 2, we ~~k~~ now inform the U.S. Government of serious violation of the Peace Treaty and we have to have an arrangement ~~at~~ by April 26 which will redress the wrongs done and restore the provisions of the Peace Treaty. It is an absolutely necessary step and a just demand according to the Peace Treaty.
















interpretation of what cessation ~~mean~~ of hostilities mean. The PLO says it applies only to southern Lebanon and northern Israel.

Lewis: That is what they say publicly. Habib says he believes that Arafat understands perfectly well.

PM: I am not a psychiatrist. A day before yesterday we captured two terrorists who crossed Jordan. We withheld publication for 24 hours because of the investigation. I was given the information at 2 a.m. They brought with them an arsenal of arms.

Sagui: They are Fatah men. They came with ten kilograms of ~~explosives~~<sup>explosives</sup>. They came from Lebanon to Jordan about a month and a half ago. They received their orders and were briefed in Beirut. Their plan was to hide their weapons and explosives on our side of the Jordan, return to the Jordanian side and then come officially across the bridges to pick up their weapons and explosives.

PM: What happened in the last two -three weeks? A handgrenade in the Gaza District, one Sergeant killed, three wounded. The PLO in Beirut first accepted responsibility and then they denied it because they were afraid. Then a border policeman~~t~~ - a Druse - was stabbed in the back and died. Then our man in Paris was killed. Then a man of our Security Services had his leg amputated. Then a girl was slightly wounded. For God's sake, our blood was shed. Sometimes ~~xxx~~ you get the impression that after the PLO carries out its treacherous attacks a wall of defence is built around them. The PLO is a terrorist Soviet agent, the enemy of the free world and that world builds a protective wall around it. Everybody says don't touch them. My answer to you is, it is not your blood, it is our blood. Nobody who will shed Jewish blood in our time will enjoy impunity. Never again. Having said this, I again say, we took no decision to enter Lebanon in force.

Leiw: I am glad to hear it.

Sagui: The targets of the two terrorists captured were Ramat Esikol, Jaffa Road and Mahane Yehuda. This group was associated with a Jerusalem Fatah man with a car.


Lewis: There is no doubt there have been violations. It has been a blessing that your restraint has not led to more loss of life. We are again approaching everybody who ~~has~~<sup>has</sup> ~~an~~ <sup>an</sup> ~~influence~~ <sup>influence</sup> with those groups to maintain the ceasefire. You agreed with us all the time that despite weaknesses of the ceasefire, the overall effort has been positive in terms of the reduction of loss of life. The most recent concern has been produced by the concentration of your forces on the border.

PM: You must understand, we must take precautions. The Syrian army is mobilized.

Defence Minister: We have indications that the Syrian army is preparing for war. I will ask General Sagui to give us details.

Sagui: The indications we see began in mid-September when the Syrians brought back their mechanized divisions from Lebanon to the Golan Heights. In addition they carried out an urgent ~~xxx~~ programme of transforming ~~the~~ infantry divisions into mechanized ones.







There has been a conversion of three out of four armoured divisions from T 52 tanks to T 72's. There has been absorption of self-propelled artillery. SA8 personnel are now being trained in Syria instead of the Soviet Union. The air force is undergoing great changes, absorbing equipment, planning with the Soviets and the Soviets supervising their manouvers. They are carrying out a whole series of manouvers on division scale and below during the winter months. This is unusual. In mid January they called up their reserves. They still have a full order of battle underway of the reserves. They have to send to Lebanon so many troops that they have built ~~up~~ up six brigades of reserves - new tank brigades. They have been keeping these reserves for four months on regular duty.

Lewis: As I recall you discussed this with us a couple of months ago and you kept troops on the Golan. My question is what happened in the last couple of weeks?

Saqui: In the last two weeks they have kept two ~~line~~ <sup>front</sup> line mechanized divisions on high alert. They have made their field artillery ready. Their first division has been put on higher ~~xxxx~~ alert and also their air force.

Lewis: Is this not a reaction to your reinforcement?

Saqui: We are of the same size of order of battle for some three months.

Defence Minister: We recently moved some troops on the northern border but kept their tanks there. The description about the enforcement comes from the press and, maybe, from our opposition, and a great deal from the U.S. media.

Lewis: Our official statements have been careful.

Defence Minister: Yesterday they changed.

Lewis: There has been a lot of movement in the last three days.

PM: So that we should not allow another Yom Kippur. The Syrian army is poised to attack us. We are a civilian army relying heavily on our reserves. The Syrian army is a regular one and we have to be ready for any ~~on~~ eventuality.

Lewis: Usually you come to us. I am not aware you came to us this time at all as you did in the past.


Saqui: I cannot detail ~~immediate plans~~ or detect immediate plans but we have to be ready for any eventuality.

Lewis: Are you saying that all the concerns in the North are a reaction to Syria?

Defence Minister: It is true we exchange information with you all the time but when we see changes on the other side it does not mean we have to rush to you for guarantees and assurances. We have not crossed any borders and we have not moved. If we see something ~~we~~ do we have to rush to you to say, save us, help us? We watch carefully ~~the~~ the exercises ~~xxx~~ by Syrian commando troops. We don't have to tell you every day about our worries.

Saqui: On the eve of Passach I sent via a C.I.A. channel a request for information about certain arms on the other side.







that

Lewis: I feel reassured by what you said, Prime Minister, ~~about~~ our worries in Washington and among ourselves are unfounded.

PM: I repeat, we did not make a decision to enter Lebanon. I want you to report to the Secretary that ~~xxxxxxx~~ Israel will not acquiesce to the shedding of the blood of its citizens and Jews. That is all I can tell you.

Lewis: We don't want anybody's blood to be shed, least of all your people's.

PM: Are we to be asked to sit idly by and see more and more people killed? ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ An impression ~~xxxx~~ is created that the U.S. ties the hands of Israel. So why shouldn't the PLO carry on murdering people when she has such a "protection". I don't mean this literally of course. There goes Mr. Chausson and says he ~~w~~ saw an Israeli soldier raising his rifle and therefore we are racists. How dare he say this? Where is due process? We <sup>are</sup> vilified by Mr. Chausson and ~~by~~ your media. There is a wall built around the PLO; they can kill our people, attack our people and they enjoy immunity. They bring in more tanks, more missiles from the Soviet Union, Libya, etc. It is too painful even to speak of.

Lewis: Your restraint has been extraordinary. You should continue - that is all the Secretary is saying.

PM: Sam, like every human being I like admiration. But, I don't want an ounce of admiration if a drop of our blood is shed. I say to hell with admiration if a drop of my people's blood is shed.

Lewis: Blood can be spilt in lots of ways with incalculable consequences for you and for us.

PM: I can understand the difficulties to which you refer. But one thing is excluded in our times, the one-sided blood-letting of the Jewish people. It will never ever happen again. We have our own country and our own army, and we shall defend our people. No one will program our people any more. What was a ~~program~~ pogrom? ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ the one-sided blood-letting of our people. ~~xxxxxxx~~


I repeat, we did not take any decision. I will tell you something: If and when we decide to enter Lebanon, you won't be outside the circle of people who may know. I don't promise to give you details of operation, but a kind of hint.

Lewis: I appreciate it. We will do our best to get the Peace Treaty back on track.

Meeting adjourned 8.30 p.m.

Car 2761



















משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

דף 4 מחוך 5 סודי ביותר  
טוחק 4 מחוך 10

לא הנקוט שום צעד שאין ממנו חזרה-בלבנון או ביחס לנושאים  
אחרים-הטלול לפגוע במה שישראל וארה"ב יחדיו ניסו להשיג.  
מובן, אדוני ראש הממשלה, שאני מסכים לבקשתך. ביקשתי מסגן  
המוכיר סמסל להתכוון לנסוע למזרח התיכון, כדי לקיים שיחות  
אתך ועם הנשיא טובאראק. גם נתמול המול מעורר המוכיר וליזוס,  
אשר לו אחריות ראשונית למדיניות ארה"ב, ומעורבות בכל עניני  
המזרח התיכון והנהנה גם מאמוני המלא, נמצא עתה במצרים.

אני מורה לו להטלות בפני הנשיא טובאראק את הנושאים המדויגים  
האותן. הוא יטע אחר כך ביום שני השכם בבוקר לירושלים ויהיה  
מוכן לשיחות אתך  
ביקשתי ממנו לדווח לי במברק ייבהולי, אשר אחריו, אם תסכים,  
ייצא סגן-המוכיר סמסל לאזור. למרבה הצער, מאמצי הנוכחיים,  
הדורשים מסע נוסף, לרבות עוד נסיטה ללונדון אחרי שהיית  
בבואנוס-אייירס נהעשויה להימשך עד יום ראשוננו ואולי חזרה  
לבואנוס-אייירס, משמעם שלא אהיה פנוי לענין עד אמצע השבוע.  
היה בטוח, שלא אהסס לנסוע למזרח-התיכון, אם תחשוב שניסיעה  
כזאת עדיין נחוצה. מכל-מקום, עם או בלי זה, הרשה לי להבטיחך  
שוב כי אני טוקב אחד המצב מידי דגט ולמרות משבר פוקלנדס, אני  
מעורב לגמרי במצב במצרים ובמצב בלבנון, אשר נודעת להם חשיבות  
טליונה.

הרשה לי להוסיף, אדוני ראש הממשלה, כי אני נשאר סמוך ובטוח  
במחוייבותו המוצקה של הנשיא טובאראק לבבד את חזרה-השלום טל  
כל היבטיו ולדבוק בהסכמי קמפ-דייוויד.

למרות כל בעיות הדגט, נותרת המציאות: שלום גדול הושג. הוא  
יחורק ויימשך המהלך לקראת יחסים חיוביים עוד יותר ובטחון  
לישראל.

בכבוד רב,  
אליכסנדר מ. הייג  
דט/ד



משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

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סודי ביותר

מחוך 5  
מחוך 10

דף 5  
טוחק 4

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חפ: שהח, טשהח, דהא, מנכל, ממנכל



# U.S. Reports Israeli Moves Near Lebanese Border

Continued From Page 1

situation through special briefings during his stay in Barbados.

White House officials accompanying the President reportedly briefed him late today on what were described as movements of Israeli reserve units and armor, including captured Soviet-made tanks, into northern Israel. Some of the reserve units were reported to be taking over regular army positions, freeing the regular units for possible use in an invasion, American officials said.

In addition, reports from Israel reaching here indicated that some naval commando reserve units have been called up in the last few days and that some regular army officers and enlisted men have not been given their usual Passover leave.

Two days ago Prime Minister Begin and other Government leaders met with Shimon Peres, the Labor Party leader, and other ranking members of the opposition, but there was no press briefing on the meeting. This follows past practice when military matters were discussed, though it has not always meant that military action followed.

### Heavy Fighting Feared

The Reagan Administration fears that if the Israeli leadership has not already decided to attack P.L.O. bases, any shelling or penetration into Israel by Palestinian units in Lebanon now could set off heavy fighting.

The State Department's appeal to restraint on all sides was taken as urging caution not only on Israel but on Palestinian leaders as well.

In the view of American specialists, the probability of an Israeli assault is relatively high now because Syria, with internal security problems, and Iraq, with its war with Iran, are both in a poor position to oppose such an attack. Also, the muddy season in southern Lebanon, considered a deterrent to an attack for the last few months, is now ending.

A month ago American officials feared that the Israelis might attack in early April, before the scheduled Israeli

pullout from Sinai in April 25. Egypt would be neutralized by the Sinai issue, they reasoned, and Israel could presumably take the steam out of foreign criticism of an incursion into Lebanon by a timely withdrawal.

American officials noted that world attention is now focused on the Falkland Islands dispute; and that Israeli leaders have in the past taken action during crises in 1961, for instance, the Israelis, British and French invaded Egypt during the Hungarian crisis, and last December Israel annexed the Golan Heights after the Polish crackdown began.

President Reagan was reported to have sent Prime Minister Menachem Begin a personal message earlier this week and to have received a reply. The contents of its exchange were not disclosed.

closed, but there were indications that Mr. Reagan had included personal wishes to the Israeli leader, who is suffering from a painful broken hip.

Administration officials said that this week Samuel W. Lewis, the American Ambassador to Israel, conveyed Washington's rising concern about a possible Israeli assault against P.L.O. units in southern Lebanon, where Israel contends there has been a buildup of Palestinian forces in violation of the ceasefire arranged last July 24.

The Israeli Government has told the United States that it blames the P.L.O. for the assassination of an Israeli diplomat in Paris six days ago and also regards the killing as a violation of the cease-fire. American officials say they lack hard evidence that the assassination was the work of the P.L.O.

## ISRAELI UNITS MOVE TO LEBANESE LINE

### U.S. Reporting Army Activity, Fears Attack May Be Near

By HEDRICK SMITH  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 9 — Senior Reagan Administration officials reported today that there had been new Israeli military movements near the Lebanese border over the last 72 hours, causing grave American concern about a possible Israeli assault into southern Lebanon.

The State Department, in response to inquiries about an Israeli military buildup, said through a spokesman that it was aware of the reported movements and "an increase in tension in the last few days."

### Reagan Gets Special Briefings

"Once again we renew our appeal to all of those involved or with influence on those involved to show the utmost restraint," the spokesman, Alan Romberg, said. "This is a time for maximum caution. We, for our part, through our continuing contacts with a number of governments, are working energetically to encourage an end to all actions that contribute to tension and violence."

Although officials emphasized that they could not say an Israeli attack against bases of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon was a certainty, they said President Reagan was being kept abreast of the Middle East

Continued on Page 4, Column 3

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
10/4/82

מחלקת השגר - ניו יורק  
216-11

206

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מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

טופס מברק גלוי

דף \_\_\_\_\_ סתוד \_\_\_\_\_ דפים \_\_\_\_\_

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לינוג בטחוני: \_\_\_\_\_

סידי \_\_\_\_\_

10/230

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43-111

טל

אל: מע"ח, מצט"א, לשכת רוה"מ

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ד: ואשינגטון נאו"ם

מאת: הקונסוליה הכללית ניו-יורק

סקירת עובדות ליום שבת 10.4.82

מזה יומיים מודיעות רשות הטלביזיה, מיד לאחר הדיווח על המשבר בין בריטניה וארגנטינה על איי פולקלנד, על פלישה ישראלית ללבנון כהגמול על רצח הדיפלומט הישראלי. הכתב של רשת אי.בי.סי. סקאלי מתייחס למקורות בואשינגטון לפיהם תפלוש ישראל ללבנון בסוף השבוע. סקאלי גם מתאר את האפשרויות הצבאיות אחת פעולה חלקית בדרום לבנון והאפשרות השנייה חדירה עמוקה עד מרבית ביירות כפעולה זו תטפל ישראל גם בטילים הסוריים. סי.בי.ס. מכתבם רוברט ארנסטרונג מצטט דיווח של אי.פי. לפיו בחשובה לשאלה הצהיר דובר צה"ל שלאש"ף יש סיבה טובה להיות בהסטרית ובפניקה. בואשינגטון מביעים דאגה ופניה לריסון של כל הצבאים וכן שוקלים חידוש שליחותו של השגריר חביב נשיא לבנון מוסר על ריכוז של ארבעים אלף חיילים ישראלים ליד דרום לבנון. רשת אי.בי.ס. מודיעה על שתי דביזיות ישראליות והחלפת יחידות סדירה בחיילי מילואים.

פלישה ללבנון

ני. טיימס-עמוד ראשון הדריק סמית מואשינגטון-יחידות ישראליות נעות לקו לבנון. דיווחים אמריקניים על פעילות צבאית חשש מהתקפה קרובה (מברק). ככל שאר העוונים החיטום לפלישה אפשרית של ישראל ממקורות אש"ף\*\*\*

ספגש הבלתי מזאהות בכונות

ני. טיימס-הנרי טאנר מקהיר-קהיר קיבלה הקטבה מכובדת והצליחה אף להוריד את הטונים של ביקורות על הסכמי דוד קמפ דויד.



טופס מברק גלוי

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

דפים 2 מתוך 2

אל:

סיווג בטחוני:

דחופות:

לע:

מאריך וזמן:

21/43

מס' דיוקן:

מאת:

לעומת זאת הוחקפו אותם חלקים בהסכם קמפ דויד הדנים בחוכניה האוסונומיה  
 הושמעה ביקורה נגד הצבת כוחות אמריקניים באיזור המזה"ת כולל הכח הרב-  
 לאומי בסיוני. בסך הכל ציינה הפגזשה של הבלתי-מזדהות ראשית מגעים  
 בין מצרים ומדינות ערב שניחקו יחסים תהליך ארוך של פיוס. בדיפ.

מויאל


ה + 1 + מלפני נשוא המסמך

מ.ל.

החיסמה:

מאריך: 10.4.82 השולח: ש. מויאל יישור מנהל המחלקה:





# news release

2/2/82

APRIL 9, 1982

## U.S. SENATOR PRAISES SINAI WITHDRAWAL

TEL AVIV -- TODAY, UNITED STATES SENATOR ROBERT W. KASTEN, JR., REPUBLICAN OF WISCONSIN, COMPLETED A FOUR DAY VISIT TO ISRAEL. UPON HIS DEPARTURE, THE SENATOR ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

"I WOULD LIKE TO COMMEND THE ISRAELI PEOPLE FOR THE COURAGE THEY HAVE DISPLAYED DURING THIS VERY TRYING TIME AS THEY CARRY OUT THE PROVISIONS OF THE CAMP DAVID PEACE ACCORDS. THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI IS AN EMOTIONALLY WRENCHING EXPERIENCE, YET THE ISRAELI PEOPLE, GUIDED BY THE VISION OF PEACE, HAVE PROVEN THEMSELVES ABLE TO SEE BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE DIFFICULTIES AND TO RECOGNIZE THE GREAT VICTORY THEY HAVE ACHIEVED.

THE DISCUSSIONS I HAVE HAD OVER THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS WILL ENABLE ME TO HAVE A MUCH CLEARER AND BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIFFICULTIES ISRAEL AND THIS REGION FACE IN THE FUTURE. THE TALKS I HAD WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, FINANCE MINISTER ARIDOR AND OTHERS WERE FRANK, AND THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND INFORMATION WILL BE HELPFUL NOT ONLY TO ME IN MY DUTIES AS A UNITED STATES SENATOR AND CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE, BUT ALSO, I HOPE TO THOSE WITH WHOM I VISITED. I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH ISRAEL IN THE FUTURE ON OUR COMMON INTERESTS AND PROBLEMS."

SENATOR KASTEN IS CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE, THE LEGISLATIVE ARM OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE WHICH OVERSEES AND APPROVES U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL.

SENATOR KASTEN HELD EXTENDED DISCUSSIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN, FOREIGN MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR AND MINISTER OF FINANCE AND COMMUNICATIONS YORAM ARIDOR. IN ADDITION TO THESE MEETINGS, SENATOR KASTEN RECEIVED BRIEFINGS FROM THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND U.S. OFFICIALS IN TEL AVIV AND JERUSALEM. HE ALSO MET WITH LABOR PARTY OPPOSITION LEADER SHIMON PERES.

SENATOR KASTEN ALSO PLACED A WREATH DURING MEMORIAL CEREMONIES AT YAD VASHEM, MADE SITE VISITS TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, THE RAMON AIRBASE AND ETAM, WHERE HE HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH LT. GEN. FREDERIK V. BULL-HANSEN, COMMANDER OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS. SENATOR KASTEN'S VISIT TO ISRAEL IS THE FIRST STOP IN A MISSION HE IS MAKING WHICH INCLUDES VISITS TO JORDAN, EGYPT AND GREECE.

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**Press bulletin**

20k

JERUSALEM, 9 APRIL 1982

TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PRIME MINISTER DEGIN

THE PRIME MINISTER RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, DATED APRIL 7, 1982:

"DEAR MENACHEM:

NO ONE LIVING THIS FAR AWAY CAN FULLY APPRECIATE THE ENORMITY OF SACRIFICE AND PAIN WHICH THE ISRAELI PEOPLE AND YOU AS THEIR LEADER ARE EXPERIENCING OVER SINAI NOW. I WANT, HOWEVER, AS YOUR FRIEND, TO LET YOU KNOW THAT I AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE NEVER FELT SO CLOSE IN SPIRIT AND UNDERSTANDING TO ISRAEL THAN IN THIS TIME OF TRIAL.

IT IS A SAD REALITY THAT IN SINAI MANY FINE LIVES ARE BEING DISRUPTED NOW, BUT IN THE CAUSE OF A LASTING PEACE. TRAGICALLY, AT THIS TIME ISRAELIS AND AMERICANS ALIKE, AS STANDARD-BEARERS OF FREEDOM AND JUSTICE, MUST ALSO FACE ACTS OF COWARDLY TERRORISM.


I AM WRITING THIS ON THE FIRST EVE OF PESACH WHICH MARKS, I KNOW, THE EMERGENCE OF JEWISH NATIONHOOD. IN ISRAEL AND IN AMERICAN HOMES AND AROUND THE WORLD TOO, SEDER WILL AGAIN BE A SOURCE OF JOY AND INSPIRATION TO THE PEOPLE. DESPITE THE TROUBLES OF THE MOMENT WE HAVE CAUSE FOR HOPE AND CONFIDENCE — ESPECIALLY IN THE PRICELESS GIFT OF AN ENDURING PEACE WITH EGYPT WHICH YOUR STATESMANSHIP IS DOING SO MUCH TO ACHIEVE. AHEAD OF US LIE MANY CHALLENGES AND DANGERS, BUT I AM CONFIDENT, THAT THE TOOLS WHICH HAVE SERVED US SO WELL THUS FAR — JUSTICE, JUDGMENT, ENDURANCE AND A STEADY COMMITMENT TO THE COURSE WE HAVE SET TOGETHER — WILL BRING THE COMPLETE PEACE WHICH YOUR PEOPLE SO PASSIONATELY DESIRE AND DESERVE, AND THAT POSTERITY WILL JUDGE THAT WE ACTED WITH WISDOM AND A PATIENT DEVOTION TO HUMANITY. PLEASE REMEMBER THAT MY THOUGHTS ARE WITH YOU AT THIS TIME."

THE LETTER CONCLUDES WITH PERSONAL GREETINGS FROM THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. REAGAN TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND MRS. DEGIN.

/SA

14:00





משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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מל: המשרד, נר: 27, מ: לוטאנגלס  
דח: מ, סג: מ, תא: 090482, וח: 1500  
נד: ויינברג

101 ביוטר/מייד

מל: השגריר (כהועבר)  
מאת: הקונבל

לארי וינברג סיכם כי היום העמדות שינסה להציג ביום שני  
לנשיא. לפגישתו זו עמי לצהרים היום, קדמו שתי התיעצויות שלו  
עם פרופ' סטיב שפיגל וד"ר סטיב רוון. בשתי הפגישות גם יחד לא  
קיבל שום רעיון קונקרטי שיכול היה לאמץ לעצמו כנקודה מרכזית  
לפגישה. לכן בכוונתו להציג לנשיא את תמיכת הקהילה היהודית בו  
בבחירות בהן ניבחר, תמיכה שהיתה מבוססת על מאמרו בווישינגטון  
פוסט והתבטאויותיו החיוביות לפני הבחירות וגם מיד אחריהן.  
הוא מתכוון להמשיך וכצ"ל שמהם חשים שנוי מדיניות שבין  
השאר בא לכלל בטוי בפרשת האוקס בולל באופן ניהול המאבק ע"י  
הממשל. כוונת לארי ליצור את ההרגשה שהקהילה היהודית פתוחה  
לחלוטין לכל שנוי מדיניות כלפי ישראל. אם ניתן הוא רוצה להציע  
שבפגישה נוספת עם אד מיו למשל-יציע AIPAC מספר צעדים  
קונקרטיים לאחרי הקרע ויתקבל כנקודת מפנה.

נבו

מ: 9, שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, מצפא, רהמ, סרהמ, תפוצות, ר/מרכו, 87



משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

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אל: קהיר, וושה, נר: חוזם 151, מ: המשרד  
דח: ט, סג: ט, תא: 090482, זח: 1500

אכז

שמור/מיד

ששון, דט מנכל, נחושחן.

בגלוי מטבידיים כתבה מהוול סטריט ג'ורנל המפרט את המוכנות  
שהמצרים הגישו למושב הנשיאים של הבלמרים בכווים. הדברים  
מדברים בטד עצמם.  
לא קשר עם הדברים שאומרים המצרים בקהיר ושבהם לפי הידיעות  
המחפרסמות הם מוענים שאין כל חדש בדברים שהשטיט מגיד בכווים  
הרי נוצר לפחות במערב הרושם הברור שאנו עדים לטמדה מצרית  
הסופה מהסכמי קמפי די'ור.  
בר און =

פ: שהח, טשהח, דהט, סדהט, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ד'מרכי, דט, אמן,  
טמח, דינון, מצרים



דפים \_\_\_\_\_ מתוך \_\_\_\_\_ 97

אל: מא"ת, מצפ"א, לשכת רוה"ס

סינוג בסחוני:

דחיפות:

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203 פס. סב. ק: }  
לשימור  
מח  
הקשר

מאח: הקונסוליה הכללית ניו יורק

להלן כתבה מהיום 8/4 בוויל סטריט ג'ורנאל על תוכנית 11 הנקודות של מצרים  
לפתרון בעיה הפלשתינים שהוגשה במפגש הבלתי מזדהות בכווית.

### Egypt Outlines Position on Palestinians That Is Likely to Vex the U.S. and Israel

W.S.J.

By DAVID IGNATIUS 9/4  
And TEWFIK MISHLAWI

Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Egypt has unveiled a tough new bargaining position on the Palestinian issue that will be cheered by many Arabs but is likely to cause problems for Israel and the U.S.

The 11-point Egyptian peace plan was announced Tuesday night at a meeting of non-aligned nations in Kuwait by Egypt's ambassador to the United Nations, Ismat Abdel-Maguid. His trip to Kuwait for the meeting, which was called to discuss the Palestinian issue, was the first official visit by a high-ranking Egyptian official to any of the 18 Arab countries that have boycotted Egypt since it signed a peace treaty with Israel three years ago.

The Egyptian proposal is similar to a peace plan announced last August by Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Fahd. It would offer Israel a promise of recognition by Arab states of its right to live within secure borders, in exchange for eventual establishment of a Palestinian state in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza.

The Egyptian plan is the first clear statement of Egypt's intentions on the Palestinian issue after the Camp David agreements with Israel run their course on April 25, when Israel is scheduled to return the last third of the Sinai peninsula to Egypt.

What is worrisome for Israel and the U.S. is that the Egyptians appear to have

significantly toughened their demands. The text of the plan didn't make any mention either of the Camp David agreement or its negotiations over Palestinian "autonomy," which Egypt clearly feels have been a dead end.

Given the certainty that Israel will refuse to negotiate within this framework, the Egyptian proposal is likely to force the U.S. once again to decide how far it is willing to pressure Israel toward a settlement of the Palestinian problem that would be acceptable to America's Arab allies, including Egypt.

Mr. Abdel-Maguid described the plan as "a collective initiative based on mutual and simultaneous recognition between Israel and the Palestinian people." He didn't mention the Palestine Liberation Organization, which is supported by most Arabs but condemned by the Israelis as a terrorist organization.

The key points of the plan include: "an end to Israeli occupation of Arab territories" and "the right to establish an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza within the 1967 boundaries." The proposal also asserts "the right to dismantle all settlements established by Israel in the occupied territories."

Point eight of the proposal urges Arab recognition of Israel in somewhat oblique language, calling for "the right to security within recognized borders on the basis of mutual recognition of this right between Israel and its neighbors."

These proposals, all similar to the Fahd plan, put Egypt squarely in line with moderate Arab opinion on the Palestinian issue and are likely to ease Egypt's reentry into the Arab world. And although the director of the PLO political department, Farouk Khaddoumi, said in Kuwait yesterday that the Egyptian plan wasn't acceptable to the PLO, other PLO sources say the organization could eventually support it.

מחלקת הקשר

החתימה:

אישור פנהל המחלקה:

התאריך: 8.4.82 שולח: מ י אל



משור החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

טופס חברק צפון

אל: רושינגטון

דף 1 מתוך דפים

סיווג בטחוני: סודי ביותר

דחיפות: מידי

תאריך וזיח: 07 1330

מס. מברק: 13

לשימוש  
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בחושתי,

להלן דווח על שיחת ראש הממשלה עם שגריר בארה"ב שהתקיימה ב-6 באפריל,

(קשר - אנא המצי"ב)

עד כאן

בן-אהרן

שהיא סניטה רחג ס(החג שחג) גנב ג/אנב ג צבא רובלסין  
רודרפס רח אלן ב'בין ג צבא

אישור המנכ"ל:

אישור מנהל המחלקה:

תאריך: 7.4.1982 השולח:



TOP SECRET

MEETING BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND AMBASSADOR LEWIS, ON ~~WEDNESDAY~~ TUESDAY,  
APRIL 6, 1982, AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S RESIDENCE, JERUSALEM, AT 1800

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PRESENT: BROWN, AVNER.

(Lewis handed two letters to the Prime Minister)

Lewis: There are several points I have been asked to raise. First, I want to confirm what I told you at our last meeting, that we have put together our team on the Lebanese situation.

PM: You mean on the possibility of a renewed danger to the Christians.

Lewis: Correct. The team will be led by Draper and also on it will be Kemp of the White House, Aimes of the C.I.A. and two or three from the Pentagon.

P.M.: I already informed my colleagues of this, that there should be four people <sup>on</sup> ~~representing~~ our side - from the Defence Ministry, the Foreign Office, <sup>the Prime Minister's office</sup> and the Mosad people.

Lewis: Our tentative thinking is that our team will come on April 20th and will be able to sit with you for a full day on 21st and a part of 22nd.

PM: Thank you, I am glad to hear it.

Lewis: The main thing I want to take up is the Taba beach problem. The Secretary has been reviewing the issue because Mubarak contacted him about it as also did the Egyptian Defence Minister when he visited Washington. The Secretary has asked me to convey to you our growing concern about the difficulties your government and the Egyptian government have encountered on this matter. Now, the Egyptian government has asked us as a full party partner, to use our good offices role. We have no intention in getting into matters of substance but we would like to be of help in resolving this technical issue. We know that you and the Egyptians both feel strongly that the evidence will prove that your respective positions are correct. We are not taking a position. We thought it would be useful that before ~~the~~ April 26th an agreed mechanism be in place to ensure a final settlement of the problem at an early date. The Secretary asked whether you would agree to receive his legal advisor, David Robinson. He would be prepared to come out right away. His task would simply be to try and assist to set up a mechanism to resolve the problem.



We would be ready to put at your disposal any technical assistance you might require. The Secretary has great confidence in Robinson's qualifications. I gather from what I read in the papers about the last Cabinet meeting that Arik will go next week to Cairo. I also read your letter to Mubarak in which you elaborate on your proposal. My impression is that both you and Egypt accept the principle of agreed arbitration. We assume Arik will negotiate this further. Our sense is that the whole issue won't be settled by negotiation and that some arbitration will be required. We are not suggesting ourselves as arbitrator or conciliator but simply to help the process along. If you agree that this is useful Robinson is prepared to come here quickly and suggest procedures.

PM: I will consult with my colleagues either on Friday or Sunday. As you know tomorrow evening Pessah begins. I would like to stress the formula which I consider to be most reasonable which we proposed concerning Taba and the other fourteen locations as far as the international border is concerned. The formula emanates directly from the peace treaty. You will recall that I wrote on this to Mubarak. It seemed to be acceptable at the time when our Egyptian friends were here, but then Ali said that they would have to consult in Cairo. The formula is: sovereignty will be determined through agreement by the two parties in accordance with the peace treaty (negotiations, conciliation, arbitration). In my talk with Ali and Ghali and also in my letter to Mubarak I ~~only~~ emphasized not international arbitration. You will recall that this was suggested to us during the peace negotiations and we rejected it then. Who will arbitrate - the UN or the international Court at the Hague, most of whose members have no relations with us? It was therefore accepted - agreed arbitration. That can mean that either the two sides agree on an arbitrator or that there is a representative of both sides who choose a third member. But first let us exhaust the negotiations. I don't think we have as yet. Egypt claims that particular area and fourteen others, all of which are very small. We claim that as of right they belong to Israel. We are not asking Egypt to give up territory for our benefit. As you know we ~~xxx~~ have transferred to Egypt 23,000 sq. miles. All our specialists and experts say with absolute certainty that as of right the piece of land that is less than a mile belongs to Israel. Let's therefore exhaust negotiations. I suggest we wait with the visit of Mr. Robinson until Arik returns from Egypt.

Lewis: That is reasonable.

PM: Then, I will have a report from Arik by the middle of next week and I will get in touch with you. If negotiations are exhausted we will consider conciliation although I am not sure what it really means.

Lewis: I think the idea is a mediator.

PM: I suppose it is. Perhaps we shall reach that stage or we might jump over it to arbitration. I don't understand why Egypt is so nervous about the matter. The proposal we make is perfectly reasonable. Then we made another suggestion, actually it was Ali's "Norman's land". I didn't like the phrase. In Hebrew it has a bitter connotation.







Please draw the Secretary's attention to this.

As for the radio report to which you refer, it was a leak from the Cabinet. I told you once and I am telling you again, there is no decision of the Cabinet on that practical issue. We will certainly have to deal with it if no solution is found. But personal statements of ministers are not decisions of the Cabinet.

Lewis: I understand.

PM: What you heard was the opinion of the Defence Minister but there are other ministers around the Cabinet table. The Defence Minister knows that the issue must be considered and decided by the Cabinet.

Lewis: I will report this to the Secretary and also what you <sup>say</sup> concerning Dr. Meguid.

PM: I would like a clarification about those statements. Sam, are you observing the trauma infecting our country because of Yamit? Don't keep it a secret, inform the Secretary. The day before yesterday I received news of a threat of the possibility of mass suicide in Yamit. Please understand what it means to us, to me.

(Avner informs the Prime Minister in Hebrew of the phone call he received from the Rabbi of the Kotel, Rabbi Gaetz, that he had received the identical report from a reliable source and that Rabbi Levinger had heard from Rabbi Kook that it was prohibited to raise a hand against Israeli soldiers but that one should be prepared for martyrdom over Yamit).

The report I received from Arik has just been confirmed by Yehuda from another source. I spoke to the Chief Rabbi and he promised to try and persuade the people. I shall speak to him again this evening. I shall invite the Chief Rabbi to see me and to go there and persuade them. It is a real trauma. Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yossef came to see me and to ask me to let the demonstrators in Yamit stay there for Pessah. I told him I would have to consult. Arik agreed provided they are not joined by more people. What I told you before must be kept a complete secret, otherwise it may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. I read Time and Newsweek and I ask myself how can they write what they do at this juncture of real suffering of our people. What is happening at Yamit also hurts Arik terribly. He used to be their hero and now he is cursed by them. They refuse to agree that others will not join them during Pessah and the army will have to act to keep them out.

Lewis: I want you to know that our hearts are fully with you at this moment.

Concerning my talk with Dr. Burg, the Secretary and Fairbanks would like you together with us to think about how to get the autonomy negotiations going again. I suggested to Dr. Burg that we have a combined new round of talks in early May. We would suggest that the meeting set for the working group between May 2nd and 6th be held in Washington and that immediately afterwards the three heads of delegations meet in Washington informally to take stock on where the negotiations are going and try to agree on future progress. The Secretary would like to make a contribution and it is difficult for him to leave Washington. Were the heads of the delegations to come there



they could meet together.

PM: Again, perhaps, I'll be able to respond on Friday after consultation with my colleagues, or on Sunday. I would like to remark that we have no problem with a Washington meeting. That is not the question. The question is that for the first time, Egypt has officially stated - first to our Ambassador to Cairo by Ali and then ~~directly~~ to our Foreign Minister by Mubarak - that Mubarak cannot come to Jerusalem. He ~~said~~ yes, I would like to come to Israel but I cannot come to Jerusalem. In other words, let's say that we submit to that statement, Mubarak would ~~xxxxxxx~~ stay in Tel Aviv or Haifa and I would have to see him there. It is absolutely absurd. Sason was flabbergasted and almost enraged by what Ali told him. I, therefore, say let's agree to have the working group in Jerusalem and then perhaps the ministers can meet in Washington. When our capital is being officially boycotted how can we agree to meet at any other place? It was different with Sadat. At our last meeting in Alexandria I invited him to Israel. We didn't speak about where in Israel, but I have no reason to believe he would not have agreed to come to Jerusalem. He began by visiting in Jerusalem, and then we met in Beersheva, in Haifa; I do not know what other towns he would have wanted to visit, but logically he would have come to Jerusalem. The point is he never said, I'll never visit Jerusalem. Therefore, our suggestion is let's have a meeting in Jerusalem either on the expert or ministerial level and then we will go to Washington. In any case, I will consult on Friday and I will ~~xxxxxxx~~ phone you.

Lewis: I cannot argue with what you <sup>say</sup>. But I do argue that you shouldn't entangle all aspects of the peace process on this matter. The proposal I put to Dr. Burg, that the working group meet in Washington, followed by an informal ~~xxxx~~ meeting by the heads of the delegations, separates the continuation of the peace process from the problem of the venue of the talks.

PM: Why shouldn't the Secretary say to ~~the~~ Ali, let's all meet in Jerusalem, and then Cairo and then Washington. What we are being told is that the Egyptian ~~xxxx~~ capital and the American capital are proper venues but not the capital of Israel. We will not agree to that.

Lewis: We have talked at length to the Egyptians on this and they say they just can't do ~~it~~ at this juncture.

PM: So you confirm my point - boycott. So where will we conduct negotiations? In Cairo and Washington - only not in Jerusalem?

Lewis: In Israel.

PM: But Jerusalem is out. No, we can't keep this separate from the autonomy negotiations. Do we deserve such treatment that our capital be boycotted for an indefinite period - only Washington and Cairo? This is our capital, we have given so much blood for it. I can quote Sadat's words - "my people will stone me."



TOP SECRET

- 6 -

Lewis: One reason we would like to have the ministerial level in Washington is to find an agreed formula with the Secretary. They have what they view a genuine political dilemma.

PM: You said to me we should understand Egypt's problem. Don't you agree that we have a genuine problem? Why should we submit to such a horrible situation?

Lewis: We've never had autonomy negotiations in Jerusalem.

PM: I think we did have. At any rate, even it was not on the agenda they have made a principle of it and this we cannot accept.

Lewis: Another alternative is not to have negotiations but to have an informal ministerial consultation in Washington.

PM: It is not a question of the level. It is Israel's turn and the place is not important if Jerusalem is not intentionally boycotted. That's the issue.

Lewis: If you tie everything into Jerusalem - the whole peace process - ~~xxxx~~ we will achieve nothing.

PM: Our parliamentary opposition is totally in agreement with t us on this principle. You should always remember what Jerusalem is for this nation.

Lewis: Shall we let this drift for a while? Perhaps this is how <sup>we</sup> they should leave it at this juncture.

PM: I will consult my colleagues.

Lewis: One final point. Valiotes will be visiting Egypt next week and the Secretary has asked ~~xxxxxx~~ him to come over here for one day to meet some of the people. I hope you might find the time. He would like to make a courtesy call, ~~xxxxxx~~

PM: By all means.

Meeting adjourned 19.00 hrs.

*Handwritten:* O.P.E. 22/11



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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\*\*ממנכל. מנהל מצפא.

\*\*משיחה עם PETER CONSTABLE, סגנו של ואלינטיס אתמוול:-

1. יש במחמד, ווו כפי הנראה גם דעתו האיטית של קונסטבל,

הטבורים כי מנוי מילסון בתור ראש המנהל האורחי הוא טכסים

שנועד להכשיר הקרקע לספח את יו"ש ועזה.

2. המאמץ שישראל עושה כדי לשחרר את תושבי יו"ש ועזה מהשפעת

אשפי אינו מתקבל במאמץ אמיתי.

3. יש במחמד הרואים במגמה של המנהל האורחי וביחוד הארועים

האחרונים ביו"ש סכנה של דחיפת האוכלוסיה המתונה לעבר

ארדיקליוס, שזה בדיוק מה שאסף רוצה.

4. הסתת תושבי יו"ש מצד אסף ומצד ירדן (בנפרד) מכוונת על

ידיו כל צד לרכוש יוקרה ובבורה בקרב האוכלוסיה ואין ביניהם

תאום

הסכרתי לקונסטבל מה מסתגר מאחורי פעולות ההסתה ומניעה

הבעתי פליאה כי ארהב אינה מוחה בעד הצו שיצא בירדן הקובע דין

מוזר לחברי הוועדים הכפריים. הדגשתי הסכנה הנובעת מכך שירדן

תפרש שתיקת ארהב בענין זה כעודד פעולות ההסתה.

\*\*נחושטנ==



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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סודי ביותר

\*# : פה, ששהח, דהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמך,  
\*# דובינסטיין, מצפא, דיבון, שטחים



Q: DO THERE EXIST IN THESE AREAS SIMILAR THREATS OF TERROR IN 1982?

A: CERTAINLY. IN ADDITION TO THE FLOW OF MONEY THE TERRORIST ARM OF THE P.L.O. OPERATES, AS A DECLARED STRATEGY, GROUPS TO ELIMINATE DISSENTERS AND FOR THE PURPOSE OF HARMING THEM, THEIR PROPERTY AND THEIR FAMILIES. THE PHYSICAL TERROR IS ACCOMPANIED BY IDEOLOGICAL TERROR - THROUGH THE ARAB NEWSPAPERS, SOME OF WHICH ARE INDUBITABLE BASTIONS OF THE P.L.O., IN ADDITION TO INCITEMENT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, THEY HAVE ALSO INDICATED THE TARGETS FOR THE TERRORIST CELLS - BY VIOLENT WRITING AGAINST ANYONE WHO DEVIATES FROM THEIR LINE. THE EAST JERUSALEM AMERICAN CONSULATE IS ACTIVE IN NURTURING THESE EXTREMIST ELEMENTS.

Q: THE USE OF I.D.F. FORCES IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA IS SOMETIMES PERCEIVED AS AN ANTI-DEMOCRATIC MEASURE, AS UNFAIR PRESSURE...

A: ANYONE CLAIMING THAT WE INTERFERE WITH DEMOCRACY IS WRONG. THE THREATS OF THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT ARE AN EXPRESSION OF DEMOCRACY? THAT GOVERNMENT HAS JOINED THE POLICY OF THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. THE PRINCIPLE IN DEMOCRACY IS THAT EVEN IF I DISAGREE WITH YOUR OPINION, I AM READY TO BE KILLED FOR YOUR RIGHT TO EXPRESS IT. THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRORISM IS: THEY ARE WILLING TO KILL SO THAT NO OTHER OPINION IS HEARD. IN ORDER TO BREAK THIS TERRORIST PRINCIPLE, WE WENT OUT AND ACTED. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WILL ISOLATE THE MURDERERS, IN ORDER THAT EVERYONE'S OPINION MAY BE HEARD. AND THERE ARE MANY IN THESE AREAS WHO CLAIM THAT THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ARE NOT THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ARABS OF THE LAND OF ISRAEL - AND THEREFORE THEY ARE PURSUED UP TO THEIR NECKS.

Q: THERE IS AN IMPRESSION THAT THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION, WHICH IS A PARTY TO THE AMERICAN AGREEMENT, IS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION IN JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA, SEEING, AS IT DOES, THE P.L.O. AS A PARTNER TO THE AUTONOMY TALKS.

A: HERE, IN THE LAST TWO DAYS, THE MESSAGES FROM WASHINGTON HAVE ASSUMED A DIFFERENT TONE. IN ANY CASE, THERE DOES EXIST AN ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. - WHICH SIGNED THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT KNOWING FULL WELL THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT AGREE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE IN JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA - AND BETWEEN ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA. AND DESPITE (THE FACT THAT) THE U.S. HAS NOT OFFICIALLY CHANGED ITS DECLARED STAND - IN PRACTICE, IN THE TERRITORIES, THE PICTURE IS DIFFERENT.

Q: HOW IS THIS EXPRESSED?

A: THE EAST JERUSALEM AMERICAN CONSULATE IS VERY ACTIVE, TO THIS DAY, IN CULTIVATING EXTREMIST ELEMENTS. DIFFERENT AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS, SUPPOSEDLY VOLUNTARY, CONTINUE TO AID THE MOST EXTREMIST GROUPS IN JUDEA, SAMARIA AND THE GAZA STRIP. IN MY OPINION, IN A NON-COVERT MANNER, AND WITHOUT FORMALITY DEVIATING FROM THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WANTS TO CREATE IN THESE AREAS A KIND OF SITUATION WHICH WILL CONSTITUTE BASICALLY A FUTURE CORRIDOR LEADING TO A PALESTINIAN STATE.

Q: ALL THIS WITHOUT AN ISRAELI REACTION?

A: WE HAVE DECLARED TO THE ADMINISTRATION, ON MORE OCCASIONS THAN CAN BE COUNTED, THAT THIS IS SOMETHING THAT ISRAEL CANNOT AND WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT IN ANY WAY. IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THE SHORTSIGHTEDNESS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, WHICH KNOWS FULL WELL THAT THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ARE A TOOL IN THE HANDS OF THE U.S.S.R. FOR PREPARING THE GROUND FOR PLANTING ADDITIONAL SOVIET STAKES IN THE MIDEAST, INCLUDING SAUDIA ARABIA AND THE PERSTAN GULF. THESE ORGANIZATIONS, THEY ARE THE REAL DANGER TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS AS WELL. AND MOST IMPORTANT: WE HAVE TAKEN, IN MY OPINION, THE BEST STEPS AGAINST THE CREATION OF A SECOND PALESTINIAN STATE - WE HAVE ESTABLISHED SETTLEMENTS IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA, WHICH CONSTITUTE THE MOST SUITABLE RESPONSE.



SHARON/ 5

Q: HOW DID THE GOVERNMENT GRAPPLE WITH THESE SERIOUS RIOTS AT THE TIME?

A: IT AVOIDED AGGRESSION. IT COMPROMISED WITH TERROR AND ITS REPRESENTATIVES. THE TENDENCY OF THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT IN 1976 WAS "TO PROVE TO THE WESTERN WORLD THAT ELECTIONS WERE BEING HELD WITHOUT OUR INTERFERENCE" AND SO "TO KEEP OUR HANDS CLEAN." THERE WERE NO DEFINED POLITICAL GOALS. NO ONE THOUGHT THEN THAT THE PROBLEM WAS NOT HOW TO PORTRAY THE ELECTIONS TO THE WORLD - BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE WESTERN WORLD WHICH HAD TO CONTINUE TO LIVE WITH THE ARAB POPULATION, BUT WE WHO WOULD HAVE TO CONTINUE TO LIVE WITH THEM. WHOEVER HANDLED THE SUBJECT OF ELECTIONS PREFERRED THE SHORT-TERM VIEW AND GUARDING HIS PERSONAL IMAGE OVER THE CREATION OF CONDITIONS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION ONE DAY. NO POLITICAL SOLUTION IS REALISTIC WHEN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ARE IN CONTROL IN THE TERRITORIES - NOT EVEN THE SOLUTION OF THE "JORDANIAN OPTION" AND "TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE" OF THE ALIGNMENT - WHICH HAVE BECOME OBSOLETE, FORTUNATELY.

Q: WHAT WAS THAT POLICY?

A: IN 1976, UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE UMBRELLA OF PALESTINIAN TERROR IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA, ITS REPRESENTATIVES WERE ELECTED TO CENTRAL, KEY POSITIONS, AND THIS WAY THEY AND THEIR ACTIVITY RECEIVED A KIND OF LEGAL VALIDITY. THE RISE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ON THE SCENE WAS A DIRECT RESULT OF A FAILED POLICY PRIOR TO AND DURING THE 1976 ELECTIONS - A POLICY WHICH IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE THEN - DEFENSE MINISTER AND HIS ASSISTANTS, WHO SHOWED A TOTAL DULLNESS TO THE POINT OF TELLING EVERYONE ON THE EVE OF THE ELECTIONS: "IF P.L.O. SUPPORTERS ARE ELECTED - LET THEM BE ELECTED." NOW WE ARE BUSY ROOTING OUT THE CONTROL OF THE TERRORIST LEADERSHIP FROM THE ARAB STREET. IN ORDER TO MAKE POSSIBLE AT A LATER DATE FREE ELECTIONS. DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN HELD IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA.

Q: THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT CLAIMED THAT THE 1976 ELECTIONS WERE "FREE".

A: THE MAIN DECLARED PURPOSE OF THE ELECTIONS WHICH WERE HELD IN JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA IN 1976, AS IT WAS FORMULATED THEN, WAS - AND I QUOTE: HOLDING "CLEAN" ELECTIONS - WITH NO ISRAELI INTERFERENCE. WHEREAS THE PURPOSE SHOULD HAVE BEEN HOLDING FREE ELECTIONS, WITHOUT ACTIONS OF VIOLENT PRESSURE BY TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. AND THERE WAS NEVER AS DIFFICULT A PERIOD IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA AS IN THE MONTHS FEBRUARY-MARCH 1976, JUST PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN APRIL OF THAT YEAR. VIOLENCE REIGNED AS NEVER BEFORE.

Q: AND THOSE WERE NOT, IN YOUR OPINION, DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS?

A: FREE ELECTIONS DOES NOT MEAN THAT A PERSON CAN CHOOSE FROM A LIST OF DEFINED CANDIDATES WHO HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY DECIDED UPON BY TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. AND THIS WAS THE SITUATION IN 1976. WHEN THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT DESIGNATED AS ITS MAIN GOAL A POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION. DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS MEANS THAT ANY PERSON CAN ELECT AND BE ELECTED, THAT HE IS FREE FROM PRESSURE AND THREATS. SHORTSIGHTEDNESS CHARACTERIZED THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE FREQUENT PILGRIMAGES OF ISRAELI PERSONAGES TO PEOPLE WHO WERE KNOWN AS BELONGING TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, AND AS SUPPORTED BY THEM.



Q: COULD YOU ELABORATE?

A: WITHIN THE TWO YEARS OF '79-80 ALONE, 135 MILLION DOLLARS WERE ALLOCATED BY THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF CAUSING THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT TO FAIL. THE FUNDS DESIGNATED FOR THIS AFTERWARDS WERE ON A MUCH WIDER SCALE. THE MECHANISM OF THE FINANCIAL APPORTIONMENT IS ONE OF POLITICAL EXTORTION. ALL ALLOCATIONS ARE GIVEN IN PAYMENTS, WHEN BEFORE EACH ADDITIONAL PAYMENT THE RECIPIENT IS REQUIRED TO PROVE HIS ACTIONS IN THE TERRORIST RANKS OF THE P.L.O. WE ARE NOT PREPARED FOR THE TERRORIST LEADERS FROM DEIRUT TO DICTATE TO US WHO WILL GOVERN IN JUDEA, SAMARIA, AND THE GAZA STRIP OR IN ANY OTHER PLACE.

Q: IF THIS IS SO, WHY SHOULD ISRAEL ATTEMPT TO DICTATE TO THE PALESTINIAN RESIDENTS WHO THEIR LEADERS WILL BE?

A: THERE IS NO OTHER WAY. THE PURPOSE OF THE OPERATION -- THE CLIMAX OF WHICH WE ARE CURRENTLY EXPERIENCING IN JUDEA, SAMARIA AND THE GAZA STRIP -- IS BY NO MEANS TO IMPOSE ANY ACCEPTANCE OF "OUR CANDIDATES." ANY CLAIM THAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO DICTATE THE CANDIDATES IS FALSE. EVERYTHING WE ARE DOING TODAY IS INTENDED TO ROOT OUT THE LEADERSHIP OF THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS FROM JUDEA, SAMARIA AND THE GAZA STRIP.

Q: IS THE GOVERNMENT OPERATING IN THE TERRITORIES ON A "HIT AND FINISH" TACTIC - OR DOES IT HAVE A DETAILED PLAN?

A: UNDER THE LABOUR GOVERNMENTS NO GOALS WERE ASSIGNED FOR THESE TERRITORIES AND NO POLITICAL AIMS WERE SET. IN CONTRAST TO THEN, THERE EXISTS IN THESE AREAS TODAY A POLITICAL PLAN WHICH HAS BEEN FIXED BY THE LIKUD GOVERNMENT AND WHICH WAS AGREED UPON WITH EGYPT AND THE U.S. DURING THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE PLANS SPEAK, FOR EXAMPLE, OF THE POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING AT A LATER DATE ELECTIONS TO THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY. WE MUST NOT REPEAT PREVIOUS MISTAKES - MISTAKES WHICH MADE POSSIBLE ELECTIONS, AS TOOK PLACE IN 1976, WHICH ELEVATED SUPPORTERS OF THE TERROR ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN SAMARIA, JUDEA AND THE GAZA STRIP TO POWER. WE WILL NOT REPEAT MISTAKES WHICH WERE MADE THAT YEAR INASMUCH AS NO STEPS WERE TAKEN TO INHIBIT THE STRENGTHENING OF THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

Q: THE HEAD OF THE LABOUR PARTY, SHIMON PERES, CLAIMED IN A PUBLIC SPEECH THAT YOUR ENTRY INTO THE HANDLING OF THE ARABS IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA WAS WHAT BROUGHT ABOUT THE UNREST AND AGITATION.

A: WHAT WAS THE HEAD OF THE OPPOSITION SHOCKED ABOUT? MAYORS HAVE BEEN REPLACED IN THE PAST. AND HAS NOT THE MAYOR OF GAZA BEEN RELIEVED OF HIS DUTIES? AND THE MAYOR OF RAMALLAH, AND OTHERS? PERHAPS HE BELIEVES THE PUBLIC HAS A SHORT MEMORY. BUT THE FACTS CANNOT BE ALTERED: SINCE 1976, SIX PERIODS OF ARAB TERRORISM HAVE CHARACTERIZED JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA - AND PERHAPS THE WORST OF THEM WAS DURING SHIMON PERES'S TENURE AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE IN THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT. BETWEEN NOVEMBER 1975 AND MARCH 1976 A WAVE OF DISTURBANCES PLAGUED THE MAIN CITIES IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA, REACHING A CLIMAX IN MARCH 1976. IN THIS PERIOD, AND PARTICULARLY IN JANUARY 1976, PUPILS IN SCHOOLS WENT WILD, CAUSING THE CLOSING OF SHOPS, BURNING TIRES IN THE STREETS, DISTRIBUTING LEAFLETS, AND CLASHING WITH THE SECURITY FORCES. IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY 1976, THE RIOTS INCREASED, AND REACHED A CLIMAX IN MARCH 1976, DURING THE COURSE OF WHICH MONTH THERE WERE MANIFESTATIONS OF REBELLION EVERY DAY, INCLUDING CLASHES WITH THE SECURITY FORCES. THE I.D.F. WAS THEN FORCED TO ENTER SCHOOLS IN ORDER TO PUT DOWN THE DISTURBANCES, AND PUPILS WERE INJURED.



SHARON/ 3

Q: IS THIS WHY THE VILLAGE LEAGUES WERE ESTABLISHED?

A: WE DO NOT INTERFERE WITH THE INITIATIVES OF THE ARAB RESIDENTS IN THEIR WELFARE. THEY REQUESTED WEAPONS FOR THEIR PROTECTION, THE IR ORGANIZATION BEGAN ENTIRELY AT THEIR OWN INITIATIVE, AND I ORDERED THAT THIS INITIATIVE BE GIVEN A POSITIVE RESPONSE. IN THEIR REPEATED APPEALS THE (VILLAGE) LEAGUE MEMBERS CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD A RIGHT TO PROTECT THEIR LIVES. THEY CLAIMED THAT THEY DID NOT WANT TO APPEAR AS IF THEY ARE PROTECTED BY ISRAEL'S BORDER POLICE.

Q: STILL, THEY ARE ACCUSED OF BEING COLLABORATORS.

A: QUISLINGS? COLLABORATORS? COLLABORATORS WITH WHOM? WITH THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, WITH WHOM THEY ARE WILLING TO CONDUCT A DIALOGUE? THE MOST SERIOUS (THING) HAPPENS WHEN JEWS ARE READY TO LEND A HAND TO THOSE WHO STICK A KNIFE IN THEIR BACKS, AND RELATE TO ARABS WHO OPPOSE TERROR AS "COLLABORATORS" OR "QUISLINGS."

WE HAVE NEVER ASKED THEM TO WORK AGAINST THEIR BROTHERS, WE DID NOT DEMAND THAT THEY COOPERATE IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS. WE HAVE NO NEED FOR THAT.

Q: WILL THEY BE WILLING TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL ON AUTONOMY?

A: HAS ANYONE OF THE HEADS OF THE VILLAGE LEAGUES EVER SAID ONCE THAT HE SIDES WITH THE CONTINUATION OF ISRAELI RULE AS IT IS? NOT ONE OF THEM. WE ALSO DID NOT LOOK FOR ANYONE LIKE THIS. IN MY OPINION, THESE MEN ARE CHARACTERIZED BY TWO QUALITIES: FIRST -- THEY ARE WILLING TO STAND UP IN THE OPEN AND IN THE AREA AGAINST THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES, AND SECONDLY, THEY ARE MEN WHO UNDERSTAND THE NEED TO FIND A WAY THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS TO CO-EXISTENCE WITH THE STATE OF ISRAEL, AND IT IS INTERESTING THAT THOSE SAME JEWS WHO LABELLED THEM COLLABORATORS DID NOT FIND IT CORRECT -- IN ALL THEIR HYPOCRISY -- TO SAY EVEN ONE WORD AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY DECREED ON THEM BY THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT.

Q: DO THE DEPOSED MAYORS IN FACT SUPPORT TERRORISM?

A: I AM CONVINCED OF IT, BEYOND ANY SHADOW OF A DOUBT. THEY HAVE NEVER, OF COURSE, ADMITTED ACTUAL MEMBERSHIP IN A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION BUT THEY ADMIT THAT THEY CARRY OUT P.L.O. ORDERS. AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THEY WERE USED AS A CHANNEL FOR CONVEYING THE ORDERS OF THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, FINANCIAL POLICIES AND EVERYTHING CONNECTED WITH THEIR SERIOUS ACTIVITIES. I HAVE NEVER HEARD THEM DISSENT, EVEN TO A MINIMAL EXTENT, FROM ACTS OF CRUEL MURDER, WHOSE VICTIMS WERE ARABS WHO BELIEVED THAT THE TERRORIST P.L.O. DID NOT REPRESENT THEM.

Q: TO WHAT USE HAVE THESE MONIES BEEN PUT?

A: HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS WERE DISTRIBUTED AS INCENTIVE TO SUPPORTERS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, TO THE TERRORISTS THEMSELVES, AND ALSO AS ASSISTANCE TO FAMILIES WHOSE RELATIVES WERE IN PRISON. WHEREAS THOSE WHO DID NOT SUPPORT THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS WERE PUNISHED BY SANCTIONS -- THEY DID NOT RECEIVE ANY ASSISTANCE.

.../4



IT WILL BE RECALLED, GAVE REFUGE IN HIS HOUSE TO THE HEAD OF THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE GAZA STRIP. MY OPPONENTS WERE CONVINCED ONLY AFTER HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE - MOSTLY ARABS - WHO DID NOT COOPERATE WITH TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS - BUT NEITHER (DID THEY) WITH ISRAEL - PAID WITH THEIR LIVES, AND ONLY AFTER THE MURDER OF THE TWO CHILDREN OF THE ARROYO COUPLE.

Q: HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE ORDER OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF JORDAN, MUDAR BADA'NI, OF MARCH 9 OF THIS YEAR, IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY AND CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY ON ANYONE WHO DOES NOT RESIGN WITHIN A MONTH FROM THE VILLAGE LEAGUES?

A: IF THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN CARRIES OUT THIS THREAT IT WILL BE A GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS PUT ITSELF IN THE CATEGORY OF AN ORGANIZATION OF ASSASSINS. A GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD SENTENCE TO DEATH WITHOUT TRIAL A PERSON WHO JOINED A VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATION, AND WHOSE ONLY CRIME IS THAT HE DARED TO STAND UP AGAINST TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS -- THIS IS WHAT JORDAN HAS DONE, IT HAS SURRENDERED TO THE DICTATES OF THE TERRORIST ARMS OF THE P.L.O., WHICH SEES ITSELF AS THE SOLE POSSIBLE LEADERSHIP IN JUDEA, SAMARIA AND THE GAZA DISTRICT.

IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT JORDAN, IN FACT, DOES NOT COOPERATE WITH THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS WHEN IT COMES TO TERRORIST ACTIONS -- BECAUSE IT KNOWS THE PRICE WHICH WOULD BE EXACTED FROM IT -- BUT EVEN SO IT COOPERATES WITH THEM ON A REGULAR BASIS IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY, THROUGH THE JOINT JORDAN-P.L.O. COMMITTEE, WHICH CONVENES REGULARLY IN ANNAN.

Q: WILL ISRAELI ACTIVITY IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA BE INTENSIFIED AS APRIL 9 -- THE DEADLINE OF THE JORDANIAN ULTIMATUM -- APPROACHES?

A: WHOEVER WAS WAITING TO SEE HOW ISRAEL WOULD ACT DURING THIS MONTH IN PARTICULAR -- WHETHER IT WOULD BE DETERRED OR NOT -- HAS ALREADY RECEIVED A CLEAR ANSWER. WE WILL NOT ALLOW ANY TYPE OF TERRORISM TO EXIST, INCLUDING POLITICAL TERROR. OUR ACTIVITY DOES NOT DEPEND ON THIS DATE OR ANOTHER. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT CONSTANT ACTIVITY WHICH REQUIRES OF US PATIENCE, LEVEL-HEADEDNESS AND MAXIMAL DETERMINATION. WE MUST KEEP OUR EYES ON THE LONG-TERM AIM, AND NOT ON THE DAY-TO-DAY DIFFICULTIES: ON THE FUTURE OF THE COEXISTENT LIFE OF JEWS AND ARABS IN THE LAND OF ISRAEL -- SIDE BY SIDE.

Q: DO YOU REALLY BELIEVE THAT THAT TIME WILL INDEED COME?

A: DEFINITELY.

Q: TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE RECENT EVENTS CONNECTED TO THE REALIZATION OF THE AUTONOMY PLAN?

A: AUTONOMY IS AN ISRAELI IDEA, WHICH WAS ACCEPTED BY THE EGYPTIANS AND THE UNITED STATES, WHICH STIPULATES ALSO THAT ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD AT A FUTURE DATE.

IF WE SEE THAT WHAT TOOK PLACE IN 1976 RETURNS TO THESE AREAS, THIS MEANS MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS TO CONTINUE TO DICTATE WHICH NOMINEES ARE ELECTED. THIS IS INCONCEIVABLE. CAN YOU IMAGINE THE EXISTENCE OF A FUTURE LIFE, SIDE BY SIDE, OF JEWS AND ARABS, WHEN THE CANDIDATES FOR MAINTAINING CONTACTS, THE PARTNERS IN DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL, ARE HEADS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS? IN MY OPINION, THERE IS NO WAY TO ACHIEVE NEGOTIATIONS OF THIS SORT WHEN TERROR AND ITS REPRESENTATIVES ARE IN CONTROL OF THE TERRITORIES. IF AND WHEN ELECTIONS TAKE PLACE, WE WILL MAKE CERTAIN THAT THIS TIME THEY ARE ELECTIONS FREE OF INTIMIDATION AND FEAR.



# Selections from the hebrew press

JERUSALEM, 5 APRIL 1982

INTERVIEW WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE ARIEL SHARON

URI DAN ('YOMAN HASHAVUA,' 30.3.82)

Q: WHAT DID YOU LEARN DURING YOUR TOUR OF JUDEA AND SAMARIA LAST WEEK?

A: I TRY TO TOUR THE AREA AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. DEALING WITH THE SUBJECT OF TERROR ACTIVE AROUND AND AMONG A CIVILIAN POPULATION REQUIRES UNCONVENTIONAL ACTIVITIES OF THE TYPE THAT ARMY OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS DO NOT LEARN AS PART OF THEIR MILITARY TRAINING. A COMMANDER MAY BE AN EXCELLENT COMMANDER - AND I.D.F. COMMANDERS ARE - WHO HAS SUCCESSFULLY AND BRAVERLY COMMANDED UNITS IN BATTLE, AND HERE HE COMES UP AGAINST ENTIRELY DIFFERENT PROBLEMS, VERY COMPLEX AND DELICATE ONES. THEIR RESOLUTIONS REQUIRES STRINGENCY, KNOWHOW, MUCH EXPERIENCE AND UNCONVENTIONAL METHODS. IN THIS SITUATION, NO ONE SITUATION IS COMPARABLE TO ANOTHER, NO ONE PLACE TO ANOTHER, NOR ONE EVENT TO ANOTHER. THEREFORE, ANYONE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE FROM HIS EXPERIENCE IN ORDER TO ASSIST THESE ACTIVITIES, TO ADVANCE THEM SO THAT THEY CAN BE CARRIED OUT WITH MAXIMAL FORCEFULNESS AND CAUTION, MUST DO THIS - AND FROM MY POINT OF VIEW A TOUR SUCH AS THIS IS COMPARABLE TO THE VISIT OF A COMMANDER AT THE CRITICAL POINTS OF THE FRONT LINE.

Q: PEOPLE CLAIM THAT THESE METHODS 'WON'T WORK' IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA.

A: IT IS WORTHWHILE REMEMBERING THAT ALSO DURING THE TIME THAT TERROR WAS BEING ERADICATED IN GAZA, IN 1970-71, THERE WERE MANY WHO CLAIMED THAT THE ACTIONS I TOOK THERE WERE DESTINED TO FAIL. BUT AS A RESULT OF PERSEVERING, CLEAR POLICY, STRONG MEASURES AGAINST THE TERROR ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS - WHILE DEFENDING THE POPULATION WHICH DID NOT SUPPORT TERROR AND DID NOT RESORT TO VIOLENT MEANS, AND IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS CONSTITUTED THE PRIME TARGET FOR THE MURDEROUS ACTIVITIES OF THE TERRORISTS - THE PESSIMISTS WERE PROVEN WRONG. IT IS INTERESTING TO POINT OUT THAT, LIKE TODAY, IN THOSE DAYS AS WELL LOUD VOICES WERE HEARD FROM THOSE SAME THROATS AND SAME DIRECTIONS - IN DEMONSTRATIONS, IN THE MEDIA, AND AMONG POLITICIANS. THE VOICES CAME OUT NOT AGAINST THE PERPETRATORS OF THE ACTS OF MURDER, BUT AGAINST THE ACTIONS I TOOK AGAINST THE TERRORISTS IN THE GAZA SALIENT THOSE DAYS.

Q: IS THERE ANY PARALLEL BETWEEN THE SITUATION WHICH OBTAINED IN GAZA STRIP IN THOSE YEARS AND WHAT IS GOING ON TODAY IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA?

A: THERE ALSO, FOR MANY YEARS, THE OPPONENTS OF TERROR WERE ABANDONED TO THE MERCIES OF THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, WHO PUNISHED THEM SEVERELY. THE GOVERNMENT THEN DISPLAYED WEAKNESS, HESITATION IN THE TAKING OF MEASURES, (AND) RELUCTANCE TO TAKE ON THE EXTREMISTS, TO THE POINT OF ABANDONING THE OPPONENTS OF TERROR. IN THE END I SUCCEEDED, AS G.O.C. SOUTHERN COMMAND, IN PERSUADING THE GENERAL STAFF AND THE GOVERNMENT THAT WE HAD TO STOP VIOLING THE SUPPORTERS OF TERROR - AT WHOSE HEAD WAS RASHAD A-SHANNIA, WHO,



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מ.ל. 1787

\*\* 1787 \*\*  
\*\* \*\* 1010 \*\*  
\*\* \*\* סודי ביותר 3 מחוץ 1 דף \*\*  
\*\* \*\* 32 מחוץ 4 עותק \*\*  
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\*\*מל: המשרד, נר: 92, מ: 111  
\*\*דח: ר, טג: מ, תא: 050482, ות: 1800  
\*\*נד: שיחה עם היל

מ/כ

\*\*סודי ביותר /דגיל

\*\*המנכ"ל, רובינשטיין, בוצור

\*\*שיחה עם היל מנהל הדסק הישראלי

\*\*טיראן וסנפיר שלכם 912 (המרצ) 109

\*\*העלית הנושא ומסרתי טיוטא של הנייר לפי שני המברקים. תגובתו  
\*\*היתה מסוייגת מחילה בשעה :

\*\*1. אין מקום לעודד מחלוקות נוספות עתה . 2. הדבר יתפרסם  
\*\*ויגרום לתגובה סעודית

\*\*3. מצבנו לא ישתפר עקב חילופי המכתבים

\*\*4. מצבנו מאובטח ע"י נוכחות כמר"י ולא עפ"י שאלת הריבונות

\*\*5. חילופי המכתבים לא ישפיע על התנהגות עתידית מצדית

\*\*בטעונוי התגובה שמתי הדגש על כך כי איננו מתכוונים לצאת

\*\*במערכה ציבורית אלא חיוני לדעתנו לנטרל את ההוכר לתיק

\*\*מיום 3.2.79. באם לא נעשה זאת ניתן לטעון כנגדנו במועד

\*\*עתיד כי אנו מנועים מלהתנגד לטיעונוי ריבונות סעודית הערת

\*\*כי גם לארהב ייש ענין לתקן המוכיח ממנו משתמע בברור הכרה

\*\*אמריקאית בריבונות סעודית

\*\*הורה שהכרתם הקודמת בריבונות סעודית היתה טעות. שאל אם ניתן

\*\*להספיק בכך שישראל תכניס את חוכן שני המכתבים לאכתב פנייה

\*\*וארהב יאשר קבלת האכתב. הגבתי שהייתי אמליץ להסכים לסדור

\*\*כזה

\*\*היל הבטיח לי לנסות להעביר הנוסחים ולהודיע לנו עמדתם בהקדם

\*\*קבלתי הרושם כי השתכנע בכדאיות התדגיל

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מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

טופס חרוק צפון

דף \_\_\_\_\_ סתוד \_\_\_\_\_ דפים \_\_\_\_\_

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

סיווג בטחוני: שמור

דף: נחושחן / וושינגטון

דהיפוח: מידי

מאת: ס/קונכ"ל ניו יורק

תאריך זי"ח: 051830  
מס. מכרס: 140-27

א.א.ל

דברי סגן הנשיא בוש  
לשלך 117

ב-3 באפריל הופיע סגן הנשיא כוש בבית הכנסת "טמפל - ישראל" בלונג איילנד במסגרת ארוחת צהרים שנערכה לכבוד ג'ק שטיין שהינו חבר בבית הכנסת. בוש הוקיע נמרצות את הדיבורים על האשמות יהודי ארה"ב בנאמנות כפולה. דבריו היו דומים לדברים שהשמיע בועידת צערי המגביה בושינגטון ב-15 במרץ. בוש הדגיש את מחויבות ארה"ב לישראל אותה כינה "בת בריח". כמו כן ציין שמחויבות ארה"ב היא לתהליך קמפ דיוויד בלבד והוסיף שארה"ב לא תכיר באש"פ אלא אם כן יכיר בזכות קיומה של ישראל <sup>לפי</sup> לכהחלטה 242. יחד עם זאת ציין שטיפוח יחסי ארה"ב עם מדינות ערב המתונות חשוב ליצוב המצב במזה"ת ובסופו של דבר יפעל לטובת ישראל. אמר דברים תקיפים בנושא יהדות כרה"מ. בימים הקרובים נקבל את נוסח דבריו ונעבירם בדיפ.

לפני האירוע הזכרנו את הרב ווקסמן, רב הקהילה, ובקשנוהו להדגיש את האינטרס האמריקאי בקיום הסכם השלום ובחיזוקו ואח התנגיית המשך הסיוע למצרים בקיום ההסכם. ווקסמן מסר שהוא אכן ציין זאת בנאומו אך אינו זוכר אם סגן הנשיא הגיב על כך. הוא יבדוק את הדבר בהקלטה ויוודיעני.

בר נר

היה סליחה לנר אמנל אלכא ווינשטיין הארכא אמר  
תפוציו - רחמ סרה רמ

בר נר 5.4.82

האריך: \_\_\_\_\_ השולח: \_\_\_\_\_ אישור מנהל המחלקה: \_\_\_\_\_ החימה: \_\_\_\_\_



סגירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד ירושלים

ס נ פ ס  
ד פ י . . . . . מחוק . . . . . ד פ י  
ס ו ו ג ב ט ח ו נ י . . . . . ס ו ו י  
ד ח י פ ו ת . . . . .  
ת א ר י כ ו ז י י ח 051730 באפריל 82  
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א.כ.ל

מ צ פ " א .

פגישת גדעון רפאל - פרל

גדעון רפאל נפגש לפי בקשתו עם ריצ'רד פרל ע/מזכיר ההגנה למדיניות בטחון בינ"ל. להזמנתו של רפאל נוכחתי בפגישה.

רפאל העלה בעיית מירוץ החימוש והדגיש כי ישראל נכנסת למירוץ חימוש שהינו מעבר לנוחותינו. התפתחה שיחה בנדון.

פרל ציין כי נודע להם ממקורות מודיעין שבניגוד לדעה המקובלת בריה"מ סייעו להודו ולעיראק בתכניותיהם לחימוש גרעיני.

ציין שטעות ארה"ב בעבר היתה בדיקת תכניות חימוש גרעיני של כל מדינה ערבית בנפרד ולא שמו מספיק דגש על אפשרויות שייפ. ציין בכלל זה שייפ עקיטטאני-סיני.

לגבי ירדן ציין שנודע להם לראשונה על תכנית חוסיין לקנות סאם שמונה כאשר פנו אליהם הבריטים ובקשו סיוע אמריקאי למכירת הטיל רייפייר על-מנת לסכל קניית הסאם 8. החילה ארה"ב המייחסה לידיעה כאל תכסיטי בריטי לעידוד מכירת הנשק אך עתה השתכנעו שהירדנים אכן מתכוונים ברצינות.

לשאלה רפאל בענין מדיניות ארה"ב לגבי ערב-הסעודית ציין פרל שלהערכתו אין לארה"ב מדיניות ברורה אך להערכתו ישראל צריכה להיות מודאגת מ"אספקה מופרזת" של מטוסים למצרים ולא מאספקה לסעודים שבין כה אינם מסוגלים להפעיל הציוד.

ס ב ל

שהח ס/שהח רהד ס/הח שהכס דנא ד/אנא ר/וכו ס/ס  
ד/כס ר/וככ ד/ה ר/ס א/מ

202



אל: המשרד

סופס סכר ק  
דף...1...מתוך...5...דפים  
סוג בטחוני...סודי  
דחיות  
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מס' מברק 76

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מצפ"א, ממ"ד  
העיסקה הירדנית.

1. חברת NORTHROP מנהל מטע נמרץ בכדי לשכנע הירדנים לרכוש את המטוס F-5G. החברה לוחצת על הפנטגון לרכוש 20 המטוסים הראשונים מדגם זה בכדי להראותו לקונים פוטנציאליים ואף לאמן צוותים עליו.

2. נשיא נורת'רופ ביקר לאחרונה בסעודיה במסגרת אותו המאמץ ולדעתו קיימות מספר אינדיקציות המצביעות כי סעודיה נוטה לסייע לירדן במימון העיסקה. ההתרשמות האמריקנית הינה כי סעודיה שבעה רצון מהמטוס F-5E ואף מצליחה לקיים כ-70% מעבודות התחזוקה בעצמה. מכאן שסעודיה מהווה גורם העשוי לסייע לנורת'רופ במאמציה לשכנע את הירדנים לרכוש ה F-5G.

3. מקורות בגבעה מתרשמים כי אם ירדן תחליט לבסוף לרכוש את F-5G הדבר יקשה על מאמצי ידידי ישראל לחסום העיסקה באמצעות ווטו של הקונגרס. סנטור פרסי ורביס אחרים סבורים כי רכש ירדני של F-5G יאפשר בעת ובעונה אחת הענות לצרכיה הבטחוניים הלגיטימיים של ירדן וצמצום הנזק לבטחון ישראל.

4. באשר לטילים מקורות בגבעה מעלים הסברה כי ירדן יכולה לקבל במקום הוק נייד, טילי צ'פרל או פטריוט או הגרסה המשופרת של ה Red-eye. מעקב אחרי ההתכתבות בין זרועות הממשל לבין חברי קונגרס מצביע על כך כי הממשל לא סגר שום אופציה והוא למעשה נוטה להענות בחיוב לבקשה הירדנית כאשר חבוא. (רצ"ב תשובת שר ההגנה ויינברגר למורשה דרווינסקי וחילופי המכתבים בין המורשה לנט לבין הבית הלבן).

5. לדעתם של משקיפים שר ההגנה ויינברגר נחוש בהחלטתו למכור ציוד לירדן. לדבריהם ויינברגר מעריך כי לנוכח הכרסום במעמד ישראל בקרב חברי הקונגרס יקשה על הלובי היהודי לחסום העיסקה. כמו כן הגורמים הנ"ל מצביעים על אפשרות של תרגיל ירדני מדיני אשר נועד ליצור אקלים נוח בגבעה.

6. חלוקי הדעות אשר נתגלעו לאחרונה בין חברי הקונגרס הרפובליקנים לבין הממשל בנושא החקציב והתכנית הכלכלית מהווים גורם חדש אשר לא היה קיים לפני שנה בעת המאבק



טגרירות ישראל - ווטינגטון

אל:

ט ר פ ס      ט כ ר ק  
 דף...?... מתוך...<sup>5</sup>... דפים  
 סוג בטחוני... סודי  
 דחיות  
 תאריך וז"ח  
 מס' מברק... **76**

סביב העיסקה הירדנית. יש הסבורים כי הדיסידנטים הרפובליקנים יצביעו נגד  
 הממשל בנושא המרכזי של הכלכלה, המשפיע ישירות על סיכויי השרדותם הפוליטית,  
 ויעדיפו להפגין סולידריות ונאמנות לנשיא בנושאי מדיניות חוץ.

קני-סל

א-י





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

5 JAN 3 93 76

21 JAN 1982

Honorable Edward J. Derwinski  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman:

I thank you for your letter regarding the future of U.S.-Jordanian relations. I think we are in agreement that Jordan's security interests are greatest with regard to the radical and extremist elements in the region, and this is understood by military and defense officials in both countries. However, I do not agree that "Jordan has not shown any progressive attitude or willingness to reach any understanding or accommodation with Israel." In fact, Jordan has long supported a negotiated solution of Arab-Israeli differences, and continues to press for fulfillment of the terms of Resolution 242 as Jordanians believe they were agreed to by all parties at the time. King Hussein has repeatedly assured the United States Government that he is prepared to participate in the peace process at the appropriate time.

Our position as a broker between Israel and its Arab neighbors is enhanced by the credibility, goodwill and close relations that we alone have long enjoyed on both sides. It is in our national interest to be attentive to the legitimate security requirements of our friends in the Middle East. I believe abandonment of this policy would invite a major increase in Soviet diplomatic and military influence, and make the prospects and terms for a negotiated peace much worse from our standpoint.

As you probably are aware, we have received no requests from the Jordanian Government for sale of new aircraft or missiles. Please rest assured that in any future sales of this nature, the Administration will undertake full consultation with the Congress. The State Department initiates such requests, and should one be made for Jordan, the Department of Defense will work with State to ensure such consultation.

Sincerely,

*Jim Huber*

1.



NORMAN F. LENT  
4TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

WASHINGTON OFFICE:  
225 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
TELEPHONE: (202) 223-7888

DISTRICT OFFICE:  
BALDWIN PLAZA BUILDING  
ROOM 300, 2250 GRAND AVENUE  
BALDWIN, NEW YORK 11510  
TELEPHONE: (516) 223-1618

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

March 2, 1962

76  
5 per 93

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY  
AND COMMERCE  
SUBCOMMITTEES:  
COAL, ICE, TRANSPORTATION,  
TOURISM  
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION  
COMMITTEE ON  
MERCHANT MARINE AND  
FISHERIES  
SUBCOMMITTEES:  
PANAMA CANAL AND OUTER  
CONTINENTAL SHELF  
COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:


Recent developments regarding the Middle East have been so alarming and dismaying that I felt I must write to you personally to express my concern. I refer to reports in the New York Times that your Administration is "favorably disposed" to the sale of advanced weapons systems to Jordan and that King Hussein of Jordan plans to request such weapons systems in the "near future".

Mr. President, it is difficult to imagine a foreign policy move with a greater threat to peace in the Middle East than is involved in this proposed arms sale. Supplying Jordan with two highly advanced weapons systems - the F-16 fighter aircraft and the mobile Hawk anti-aircraft missile - poses the gravest threat to Israel's security. Nothing could contribute more to upsetting the Israeli-Arab military balance in this vital area, a balance already adversely affected by the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia. Adding to Jordan's already substantial military capability would further escalate the already dangerous arms race in this highly volatile area, thereby raising new threats to world peace. For this reason alone, Mr. President, you should reject the proposed sale.

But there is another very vital factor involved as well. Six Chief Executives of our great Nation who have preceded you in office, three Republicans, three Democrats, have recognized the strategic importance of a strong and secure Israel in furthering America's vital interests in the Middle East. Their bipartisan goal was to nurture the strong ties of friendship with the one stable and dependable ally the U.S. has in the Middle East. A strong and a secure Israel is a keystone to U.S. Middle East policy. It is distressing to see this long and most positive relationship jeopardized by American moves to increase the military strength of Israel's enemies. Such action, Mr. President, clearly works against the best interests of our Nation.

As one who strongly supported your restoration of firmness and direction to U.S. foreign policy, I urge you in the strongest terms to return to the bipartisan principles of your predecessors in recognizing the vital necessity of assuring a strong and secure Israel as a bulwark to American interests in the Middle East.

With great sincerity,

  
NORMAN F. LENT  
Member of Congress

NFL/cr







משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

2734

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שמו

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אל: וושה, נד: 139, מ: המשדר  
דח: ר, סג: ש, תא: 050482, יח: 1700  
נד: דהמ-לואיס

לפי

שמו/דרגיל

הציר.

שיחה דהיימי - לואיס.

כאשר ליוה לואיס הסנאטור קסטן בעת ביקורו אצל דהיימי, חוד  
השגריר והשמיט תנחומים על הרצח בפריס.

דהיימי הודה לו, והוסיף שבדצוננו גם להודות לאדה'יב על המלח  
הוועו במוטביי'ט תוך איזכור שלא חורר לא ביקש זאת אולם יודע  
להוקיר המעשה.

מצפייא.

תפ: דהמ, שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, דובינשטיין, מצפא, אליצור,  
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DISMISSAL OF ELECTED OFFICIALS HAS SET OFF VIOLENT  
DISTRUBANCES), THE UNIVERSITIES ARE RESISTING THE TIGHTENING  
OF ISRAELI CONTROL. ISRAELI AUTHORITIES SEE THE  
UNIVERSITIES AS POTENTIAL HOTBEDS OF PALESTINIAN  
NATIONALISM...

NEW YORK TIMES, DAVID SHIPLER IN JERUSALEM:

JEWISH MILITANTS OPPOSING ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI  
TRIED TO REACH THE AREA BY BOAT TODAY AFTER THE ARMY CLOSED  
IT TO UNAUTHORIZED CIVILIANS AND SET UP ROADBLOCKS.

FOUR OF FIVE BOATS THAT SET OUT FROM THE TEL AVIV MARINA  
WERE INTERCEPTED BY THE ISRAELI NAVY, AND ONE GOT THROUGH, A  
MILITARY SPOKESMAN SAID. IT ANCHORED OFF THE BEACH AT  
YAMIT, ON THE MEDITERRANEAN, AND ITS PASSENGERS WENT ASHORE  
IN A RUBBER DINGHY, THE SPOKESMAN SAID.

THEY JOINED SEVERAL HUNDRED OTHER OPPONENTS OF THE  
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WHO WERE FORTIFYING ROOFTOPS, APARTMENTS  
AND AN UNDERGROUND SHELTER WITH BARBED WIRE, OLD TIRES,

PAGE 02 -- MIDEAST

SANDBAGS AND OTHER MAKESHIFT BARRIERS IN ANTICIPATION OF A  
RAID BY THE ARMY...

(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

ITEM

NESA-510 (4/02/82)

STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, FRIDAY, APRIL 2, 1982 (250)

ALAN ROMBERG, STATE DEPARTMENT DEPUTY SPOKESMAN, WAS THE  
BRIEFER. HE COVERED THE FOLLOWING TOPICS:

U. S. DEPLORES VIOLENCE ON GOLAN HEIGHTS --

ASKED ABOUT RECENT INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE IN THE GOLAN



HEIGHTS REGION, ROMBERG SAID: "WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE REPORTS OF INCIDENTS THERE. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE THAT THIS SITUATION HAS ARISEN IN AN AREA WHERE PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE BETWEEN THE ARAB INHABITANTS AND ISRAELI AUTHORITIES HAS PREVAILED FOR SO LONG."

18

HE STRESSED THAT THE UNITED STATES HOPES THAT ALL INVOLVED WILL EXERCISE "UTMOST RESTRAINT AND DO WHAT THEY CAN TO AVOID FURTHER BLOODSHED AND RESTORE CALM TO THE AREA."

PAGE 02 -- STATE

D'AUBUISSON HAS NOT APPLIED FOR VISA --

ASKED IF ROBERTO D'AUBUISSON, A RIGHT-WING EL SALVADOR POLITICAL LEADER, WILL VISIT THE UNITED STATES, ROMBERG SAID THAT "IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT HE DOES NOT YET HAVE A VALID VISA. IF AND WHEN HE DOES APPLY, THE APPLICATION WILL BE CONSIDERED ON ITS MERITS AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING AT THAT TIME."

ACCORDING TO A WASHINGTON POST STORY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE THOMAS ENDERS SAID IN A RADIO INTERVIEW THAT D'AUBUISSON -- BANNED FROM THE UNITED STATES SINCE MAY 1980 -- WILL BE PERMITTED "IN THE FUTURE" TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES AND MEET WITH U.S. POLICYMAKERS.

ITEM


NESA-509 (4/2/82)

U.S. URGES ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM FALKLANDS (350)

WASHINGTON -- PRESIDENT REAGAN URGED ARGENTINA APRIL 2 TO WITHDRAW ITS MILITARY FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND TO STOP HOSTILITIES "IMMEDIATELY."

WHITE HOUSE DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY LARRY SPEAKES TOLD





<sup>2-7c</sup>  
**official text**

APRIL 3, 1982

**U.S. STATEMENT ON VETO OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL  
WEST BANK RESOLUTION**

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR CHARLES LICHENSTEIN OF THE UNITED STATES U.N. DELEGATION EXPLAINING THE U.S. DECISION TO VETO THE WEST BANK RESOLUTION:

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. PRESIDENT, THE RECENT EVENTS ON THE WEST BANK HAVE BEEN A SOURCE OF DEEP CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES. IN THE LAST FEW DAYS THE LEVEL OF TENSION AND VIOLENCE HAS SOMEWHAT SUBSIDED, BUT OF COURSE WE ARE AWARE OF THE DANGER OF A RENEWED CRISIS IN THIS COMPLEX AND EMOTIONAL SITUATION. FOR THIS REASON, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S PRIMARY ROLE IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO URGE RESTRAINT ON THE PARTIES TO AVOID A NEW OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE WHICH COULD ENDANGER INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND TO HAVE TAKEN A STEP ON THE ROAD TO PEACE.

WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE JORDANIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION, S/14943, ACHIEVED THAT OBJECTIVE.

LET ME ADDRESS THE DISMISSAL OF THE THREE ELECTED WEST BANK MAYORS, WHICH IS REFERRED TO IN THIS RESOLUTION. MY COUNTRY WAS FOUNDED ON, AND IS PROUD OF ITS SUPPORT FOR, THE CONCEPT OF GOVERNMENT BY FREELY ELECTED OFFICIALS. WE ARE ALWAYS CONCERNED WHEN ELECTED OFFICIALS ARE NO LONGER ABLE TO SERVE THEIR CONSTITUENTS. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS USEFUL TO RECALL THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION ON THE WEST BANK IS THAT OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, SUBJECT TO THE RULES LAID DOWN FOR SUCH REGIMES IN THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION. IT IS A CAREFULLY DRAWN AND BALANCED SET OF RULES SERVING THE INTERESTS OF THE OCCUPIER AND THE OCCUPIED ALIKE.

THERE IS NO PROVISION IN THE GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE ELECTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS, WHICH ISRAEL PERMITTED NONETHELESS IN 1972 AND 1976, THEREBY GOING BEYOND THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONVENTION. IN ANY EVENT, ARTICLE 54 OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION GIVES THE OCCUPYING POWER THE UNRESTRICTED RIGHT TO DISMISS PUBLIC OFFICIALS, WHETHER THEY ARE APPOINTED OR ELECTED. AS WE WOULD NOT WISH ISRAEL TO BE SELECTIVE IN ITS OWN APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, SO WE SHOULD NOT BE SELECTIVE IN OUR CRITICISM--DENOUNCING ISRAEL FOR VIOLATIONS WHERE, IN FACT, NO VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

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THE GOAL, OF COURSE, IS TO MOVE BEYOND A STATE OF BELLIGERENCY TO ONE OF PEACE. THIS IS THE HIGHEST DUTY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE ARE FORTUNATE IN THIS RESPECT IN THAT COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, FORGED BY THIS BODY IN PAST YEARS AFTER FULL DEBATE AND CONSULTATION, PROVIDE AN AVAILABLE, READY-MADE, AND INTERNATIONALLY APPROVED BASIS FOR A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT OF THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES. THESE RESOLUTIONS ARE THE FOUNDATION FOR THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK, AND THEY REMAIN THE ONLY EXISTING BASIS FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION LEADING TO A RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT. WE DEEPLY REGRET THAT THIS RESOLUTION MAKES NO REFERENCE TO 242 OR 338.

WE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE BEFORE US A RESOLUTION THAT WE COULD HAVE SUPPORTED, ONE THAT EXPRESSES IN A NON-CONDEMNATORY WAY THE COUNCIL'S GREAT CONCERN ABOUT THE RECENT TRAGIC EVENTS WHICH HAVE RESULTED IN INJURY AND THE LOSS OF LIFE ON BOTH SIDES. INSTEAD, THIS RESOLUTION USED STRONGLY DENUNCIATORY LANGUAGE AND DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM. NOR WOULD IT HAVE LED US CLOSER TO A SOLUTION. ON THE CONTRARY, IT WOULD HAVE LED US FURTHER AWAY. SINCE THIS RESOLUTION DID NOT PROMOTE THE CAUSE OF PEACE, WHICH SHOULD ALWAYS BE THE PARAMOUNT CONCERN OF THIS COUNCIL, THE UNITED STATES WAS COMPELLED TO VOTE NO.  
END TEXT.

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משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

שומר

2035

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אל: ווש, ני, נר: חוום 834, מ: המשד  
דח: ר, סג: ש, תא: 020482, וח: 1330  
נד: טבה

אלק

שמור/רגיל

הורוביץ, לביא.

טבה.

ראונא מאמרו של סקוודרון בניו יורק טיימס  
נמברק 112 מניו יורק (סקוודרון כותב בו בין השאר:  
... AND A RESORT JUST ACROSS THE EGYPTIAN BORDER, OWEND  
... BY AN ISRAELI WOULD NOT NEED TO BE ABANDONED  
יש להניח שהוא החיטס לטבה, אם כך הדבר נראה לנו שיש להעמידו  
אל העובדות כפי שהן דהיינו שלא מדובר לפי השקפתנו בטריטוריה  
מצרית אלא בישראלית. טבה לפי מיטב הבנתנו איננה בצד המצרי של  
הגבול אלא ההפך הוא נכון.  
ישראל איננה מבקשת ווחורים מצריים על טריטוריה מצרית אלא  
הכרה מצרית בטריטוריה ישראלית.

גר-און ==

מפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרבז, רס, אמך,  
ממח, מצפא, יגר, מעח, הסברה

מוצרי נר ירושלים בנימ 2969 11.80



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משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

תמוז

אל: נ"י, ווט, נר: חוות 821, ה: המשרד  
דח: ר, סג: ט, חא: 020482, וח: 1400

ט/הג

עמור/רג יל

הקונסול הכללי דע צבי הורוביץ

יסודנא את המברק הבא להוארד סקוודרון מראש הממשלה, בתודה וחג  
שנה.  
יהודה אבנר:

DEAR MR SQUADRON,

I THANK YOU FOR YOUR CABLE AND PESSACH GOOD WISHES WHICH I  
RECIPROCATE TO YOU AND YOUR FAMILY. I AM PUZZLED BY YOUR  
PEZZLEMENT YOUR SUGGESTION ABOUT A SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE  
WAS ACCEPTED AND GREATLY APPRECIATED. HOWEVER MAX FISHER  
SUGGESTED IT BE HOLD IN JERUSALEM IN MIDDLE OF JUNE WHEN  
AND WHERE JEWISH AGENCY MEMBERS WILL ASSEMBLE. MY  
SUGGESTION WAS THAT YOU CONFER WITH OUR MUTUAL FRIEND MAX  
FISHER AND REACH AN AGREEMENT ABOUT THE DATE. WHAT CAN BE  
WRONG WITH SUCH A SUGGESTION?  
YOURS SINCERELY

MENACHEM BEGIN

חפ: רהה

מזכ"ר ניר ירושלים בע"מ 11.80 2969



# Press bulletin

ساز

JERUSALEM, 2 APRIL 1982

THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE ANNOUNCES:

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S BUREAU THIS MORNING:

THE HONORABLE CHIEF RABBI OF ISRAEL RABBI SHLOMO GOREN FULFILLED A MOST IMPORTANT NATIONAL MISSION IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, MR. RONALD REAGAN, AND HIS SENIOR ADVISORS.

THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL OWE A DEBT OF GRATITUDE TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF RABBI FOR THIS PRAISEWORTHY TASK.

THE CONCEPT KNOWN AS "THE REACTION TEAM OF THE LABOR PARTY" HAS CONDEMNED THE MEETING OF THE CHIEF RABBI WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, CLAIMING THAT "THIS MEETING BROUGHT NO HONOR TO THE RABBI AND THOSE WHO SENT HIM." THIS IS ARROGANCE. IT WOULD BE BETTER WERE THE LABOR PARTY TO GUARD ITS HONOR IN THAT TWENTY OF ITS MEMBERS OF KNESSET DID NOT, REPEAT, DID NOT, LEND MORAL SUPPORT TO A DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH WERE DISPLAYED SLOGANS SUCH AS "THE GOLAN IS SYRIAN" AND "DOWN WITH THE OCCUPATION," WHEN THE REFERENCE IS TO JUDEA AND SAMARIA, THE CRADLE OF THE HEBREW KINGDOM AND CULTURE.

DG/GB  
INST.

11:00







שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד ירושלים

אליה

ט ד פ ס ס ב ר ק

דפ.../...מחור...4...דפים

סוג בטחוני שטר

דחיפות

תאריך וזי"ח 021300 באפריל 82

מס' מברק

ממ"ד, דע הצפ"א .

נשק למצרים

רצ"ב ההודעה לקונגרס בדבר אספקה 40 מטוסי 16 - למצרים, לרבות ציוד העזר, חלקי חלוף, אימונים. שיווי העסקה 1.4 בליון דולר.

קניטל קניא

הנהלת המשרד ירושלים  
הנהלת המשרד ירושלים  
הנהלת המשרד ירושלים  
הנהלת המשרד ירושלים

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DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

4 year 2 93

53 : 20

23 MAR 1982

In reply refer to:  
I-20042/82

Honorable Jamie L. Whitten  
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 82-50 and under separate cover the classified annex thereto. This Transmittal concerns the Department of the Air Force's proposed Letter of Offer to Egypt for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$1.4 billion. Shortly after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media of the unclassified portion of this Transmittal.

Sincerely,

WALTER B. LIGON  
Acting Director  
Defense Security Assistance Agency

Attachments

Separate Cover:  
Classified Annex



Transmittal No. 82-50

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer  
Pursuant to Section 36(b)  
of the Arms Export Control Act

4 JAN 3 93  
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- (i) Prospective Purchaser: Egypt
- (ii) Total Estimated Value:
- |                          |               |
|--------------------------|---------------|
| Major Defense Equipment* | \$0.8 billion |
| Other                    | \$0.6 billion |
| TOTAL                    | \$1.4 billion |
- (iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered:  
Forty F-16 tactical fighter aircraft with 40 AN/ALQ-131 Electronic Countermeasure pods, initial spare parts and support equipment, depot repair capability, 15 spare engines, ancillary support, and training.
- (iv) Military Department: Air Force (SPA and YBR)
- (v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid:  
None
- (vi) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Articles or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold:  
See Annex under separate cover.
- (vii) Section 28 Report: Included in report for quarter ending 31 December 1981.
- (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: 23 MAR 1982

\* as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.



POLICY JUSTIFICATION

4 Jan 593  
53 : 21

Egypt - F-16 Aircraft

The Government of Egypt (GOE) has requested the purchase of 40 F-16 tactical fighter aircraft with 40 AN/ALQ-131 Electronic Countermeasure pods, initial spare parts and supporting equipment, depot repair capability, 15 spare engines, ancillary support, and training at an estimated cost of \$1.4 billion.

The proposed sale supports the American foreign policy and national security objectives of assisting the GOE in its program of modernizing its armed forces so that it may provide for its own security and self-defense and contribute to regional security and stability. A strong and independent Egypt will be able to participate in the Middle East peace process and resist incursions of the Soviet client states in the region.

The GOE will use these F-16 aircraft to replace aging Soviet-origin equipment that is becoming obsolescent and unmaintainable because of the non-availability of spare parts. This is the second request to acquire F-16 aircraft; 40 were previously purchased.

The sale of this equipment and support will not affect the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be the General Dynamics Corporation of Fort Worth, Texas.

Implementation of this sale will require the assignment of a modest number of U.S. Government or contractor personnel to Egypt to assist the Egyptian Air Force in achieving self-sufficiency in operating and maintaining these aircraft.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this sale.

\*



שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

ת.ד.

ט פ ס

דפ... מחור... דפים

סווג בטחוני... גל?

דחיפות

תאריך וז"ח 1439.1.1 אפריל, 82

מסי מברק... 25

מצפ"א

סיוע.

תח ועדת ההקצבות בראשותו של המורשה לונג קיימה אתמול שמיעת עדויות שנדחתה משבוע שעבר. הופיעו וליוטיס וגברת פורד (AID) וליוטיס השמיע את דברי הפתיחה שהוכנו לישיבה שנדחתה ונוסחם נשלח אליכם בדיפ.

וליוטיס הציג את הצעות הממשל לסיוע לישראל, מצרים, פקיסטן, מרוקו, טוניס, ירדן, תימן, עומאן, ולבנון. רוב השאלות עסקו בענייננו.

המורשה אדוארדס שאל איזה בטחונות קבלה ארה"ב ממדינות ערביות להן נמכר נשק שלא ישתמשו בנשק זה נגד ישראל. וליוטיס השיב שבדרך כלל שבעי רצון עם Assurances שמקבלים. אדוארדס שאל אם נעשו הסכמים באיווקס. וליוטיס השיב בחיוב. המורשה ליהמן ביקש לדעת אם נחתמו הסכמים כאלה. וליוטיס אמר שזה מידע מסווג. ליהמן ביקש מהיו"ר לזמן ישיבה סגורה. אדוארדס חזר לשאלתו על הבטחונות ודרש לדעת טיבם. וליוטיס הגיב שהסכמי המכירה כוללים הדרישות הנורמליות על פי החלק והשמוש מוגבל להגנה עצמית. אדוארדס רצה לדעת עם התנאים הם - IRON CLAD וליוטיס השיב שאינו יכול לומר שזה כך ולכן חשוב שנוסף להסכמים להדק את היחסים עם אותן המדינות.

המורשה מקהיו שאל מה עושה הממשל לקידום תהליך השלום. אמר שנדמה לו שהסיכויים הולכים ונעשים זעומים (Bleak) וכי ישראל מאבדת את אחונה - (Confidence) הנה ארה"ב מכרה אייוקס לסעודיה וכעת מדברים על נשק לירדן. נוסף לזה מקטינים המענק מ-550 מיליון ל-500 מיליון ומחמירים את התנאים בסיוע הכלכלי. (אמנם) מה שקורה בשטחים אינו מסייע להשתתפות פלסטינים במו"מ וחוק הגולן לא עזר, מבקש לדעת מה צעדי הממשל לעירובם של מצרים-ישראל-פלסטינים-ירדן-וסעודיה (בתהליך). אמר שאינו מבין את האסטרטגיה של הממשל מלבד מכירות נשק. וליוטיס התחיל לסקור התקופה מכניסת ממשל ריגאן (20/1/81). אמר שטאדאט הפסיק השיחות אחרי שישראל סיפחה את מזרח ירושלים ואחר-כך לא היו שיחות עד אחרי הבחירות בישראל. מקהיו - הפסיקו אמר שמכיר את ההסטוריה. ביקש לדעת מה יעשה הממשל לקידום התהליך אחרי 25/4. וליוטיס הגיב שאינו מקבל גירסת העתונות כאילו אין לממשל מזיניות חוץ ממכירות נשק. המדיניות היא להדק את היחסים עם המדינות באזור עד אשר יושג השלום. עד אז יעשה הממשל לנורמליזציה, ויחאמץ להגיע להסכם עקרונית. מקוים שזה יביא למשהו שיספק את הערבים המתונים.



ט פ ס ס כ ר ק

דף 2... מתוך 4... דפים

סוג בטחוני.....

דחיפות.....

תאריך וז"ח.....

מס' מברק..... 25

מקהיו שאל אם יש סיבה להאמין שהמתונים יתרמו לתהליך השלום אחרי נסיגת ישראל נסיני. ויליז'טס השיב שזה תלוי בתוצאות המו"מ. מקהיו חאם אני מבין שהמדיניות היא להדק היחסים עם המתונים עד שנוכל לצרפם לתהליך השלום. ויליז'טס זאת אחת הסיבות. נוסף לזה יש איום מאיראן ועוד. מקהיו הישראלים רואים סכנה לעצמם ממכירות נשק לערבים. האם זה לא יקטין נכונותם לויתורים? ויליז'טס איני יודע מה תהיה עמדת ישראל בעתיד, אך אנו מבהירים לערבים שלא נוותר על בטחון ישראל. המורשה קמפ מפריע לי שאין יותר ביטוי לדבקותנו בקמפ-דויד. מדוע לא מזמינים קמפ-דויד 2 כדי להפגין לעולם שאנו משקיעים בשלום. רק כך אני יכול להצדיק כספי הסיוע לבוחרי בבופאלו. עלינו להפגין למדינות ערב שידנו מושטת להם אך הדבר היחיד שאנו רוצים מהם הוא שיתרמו לשלום. אני הומך בסיוע אך יש לנצלו כמנוף.

*Not in the obscene sense -*

אלא לתועלת. למה אנו מציעים: F-16 למי שאינו מכיר ברצונו להשגת שלום. שמעתי את דגרי המלך חוסיין. לא התרשמתי שהוא רואה הסכנה מברה"מ. לדעתו הסכנה היא ממערב. האם אנו באים בדרישות מירדן? ויליז'טס כן. הירדנים העידו שהם מגינים על אינטרסים שלנו. קמפ האם שליחות חביב הצליחה? ויליז'טס בגבולות האפשרי שליחותו היתה הצלחה. הפסקת האש נמשכת. היתה התקדמות לפיוס בין גורמים לבנונים. מקווה שזה יימשך. המבחן יהיה בבחירות. בינתיים אנו מאמינים שקיום הפסקת האש והמשך מעורבותם של ערבים אחרים במו"מ בלבנון מועילים. ליהמן מצטרף לדעות ומוסיף שאם מוברק לא רוצה לבוא לירושלים אולי יבוא לקמפ דויד. ציין שבעוד למצרים הוגדל הסיוע לישראל הוקטן ב-50 מיליון.

ליהמן העיר על נתון בדו"ח ה-AID הנותן רושם מוטעה. ציין האמור שם שכל 100 מיליון שישראל מקבלת מארה"ב עולה לה 22 מיליון. זו הטעיה. מדובר במחיר מימון לכל שנה ולמעשה כל הלואה של 100 מיליון עולה לישראל כמה מאות מיליוני דולרים. זו מעמסה קיצונית. ביקש מויליז'טס להגיש לועדה חישוב מדויק של העלות לישראל. הוסיף שתומך במתן ה-300 מיליון לישראל כמענק. ויליז'טס הבטיח לספק החישוב המפורט. אמר שנמצאים בשנת צנע (*austerity*) ולכן ניסו לצמצם ההוצאה התקציבית. ליהמן אך בכך אנו מטילים על ישראל מעמסה כבדה יותר. ויליז'טס העיר ששינוי המענק ל-500 מיליון היה דבר טכני עבדו על כך עוד לפני שהקונגרס קבע 550 מיליון ולא היתה כוונה להתעלם מרצון הקונגרס. ליהמן בענין הקדמת התשלומים נאחר לנו מהממשל שהמנעות מקיום לשון הקונגרס רפורט (שקבע 550) היתה תגובה לעמדות ישראל. אני שואל אם הקיימו רצוננו אם נשים את המילים בלשון החוק ולא נסתפק בקונגרס רפורט. להבא אציע נסוח כזה שלא יאפשר שינוי הקצבות סיוע כאמצעי ענישה.



ס ו פ ס  
דפ... 3... מתוך... 4... דפים  
סוג בטחוני.....  
דחיפות.....  
תאריך וז"ח.....  
מס' מברק... 25.....

המורשה לואיט שאל את גברת פורד על המצב הכלכלי במצרים. פורד בשלב זה רואים צעדים קטנים בלבד, אך מצפים ליותר. הצעד הראשון שעל מצרים לנקוט צריך להיות פיתוח הלירה המצרית. (מאוחר יותר מהה קמפ על מתן עצות כאלה למצרים. שאל אם מוברק ישאר ידיד ארה"ב אחרי שישמע עצות כאלה).

המורשה גריי שאל מדוע מכירים הגבלות יצוא לעירק, סוריה ותימן. וליוטס היחה אי הבנה בעתונות. הכוונה להורידן מהרשימה לגבי כמה פריטים. זה לא אומר שהרישוי אוטומטי. יהיה צורך לדון לגבי כל מכירה. גריי אך האין בכך שיגור המור הוא נכון. הרי אפשר בקלות לשנות יעודו של ציוד אזרחי כזה לשמוש צבאי. אם המדיניות בסכסוך אירן- עירק היא נטרליות מדוע למכור לעירק ציוד שניתן להסבה. שמעתי שיש כוונה למכור לעירק משאיות ומטוסים אזרחיים בסכום של 10 מיליון. וליוטס לא ידוע לי על כך אצטרך לבדוק. גריי שמעתי על כך ממשרד המסחר. לא יתכן שעירק, סוריה ותימן יקבלו ציוד שניתן להסבה כאשר לא תרמו דבר להתרת המתיתחות באיזור. איני מבין מה עשו עירק, סוריה או תימן שמשביע את רצוננו. הכל נעשה רק כדי שמהו ימכור בכמה דולרים.

המורשה פורטר האפשר שמצרים תפנה לנו עורף אחרי החזרת סיני? וליוטס אנו בטוחים שמצריים מחכוונת בכנות לשלום. אנו נמשיך לבנות על השלום שהושג לנו רמליזציה ואחר כך נעבוד על אוטונומיה. מדיניותנו מאז 79 לעודד פיוט בין מדינות ערב, אך הבהרנו שתנאי הפיוט צריכים להיות שותפות שוה עם עמדת מצרים לגבי השלום. המצריים לא ישנו דעתם על השלום. הישראלים ורוב הערבים המתונים מבינים זאת. פורטר מה מצב המכירה לירדן? וליוטס לירדנים ענין בטילים ניידים ופתוח חיל האויר. אין בידנו בקשה מהם. האמנו כל השנים שיחסינו הצבאיים עם ירדן הם מעניינינו, וכן אינטרס ישראל. ירדן אמנם לא תצטרף מסיבותיה היא לתהליך השלום, לפחות בשלב זה. חוסיין בכל השנים דיבר על שלום. לא הסכים לתנאי הישראלים והישראלים לא הסכימו לתנאיו. הירדנים מונעים חדירת מחבלים משטחם וידידינו הישראלים מבינים זאת. ירדן עובדת אתנו למען יצוב במפרץ. אשר לשאלה אם זה מסכן את ישראל אני יכול רק להגיד שכל פעם שאנו מוכרים נשק למדינה ערבית אנו שוקלים בזהירות ומעריכים הסיכון. אלה שעוסקים בהערכה הם ידידי ישראל. פורטר קשה לראות כיצד מכירת נשק התקפי לשכניהם יכולה להיות בהסכמת ישראל.

קמפ מסכים למדיניות הממשל להידוק היחסים עם מתונים באיזור. מסכים גם שסיוע למצרים חשוב. יש לתת פרס לידידים ולמי שנוטה לשלום. אך הרבה מהדברים שאנו עושים



ט ל פ ס  
דף... 4... מתוך... 4... דפים

אל:

סוג בטחוני.....

דחיפות.....

תאריך וז"ח.....

מס' מברק..... 25

מציקים לי. למשל, שמשתמשים בסיוע להשפעה על מדיניות ישראל. ישראל לקחה את  
הסיכון הבטחוני והכלכלי בטיני והנה אנו רואים הסיוע לישראל מוקטן והסיוע למצרים  
מוגדל. אנו משתמשים בסיוע כפטיש על ראשם. וליוטיס אינני יודע שעושים כך.  
קמפ תסתכל תחת השולחן.

אבילאה

מהו סטטוס דלה טאורט טהנס  
רם אמן אולרה רובי (טטיין)



VIOLENCE ON THE WEST BANK WILL NOT COMPROMISE EFFORTS TO  
REACH A SOLUTION.

-- DECLARED WASHINGTON IS WATCHING EVENTS IN POLAND  
CAREFULLY, AND RECALLED THAT HIS EFFORT IS TO HELP THE  
POLISH PEOPLE -- THROUGH SUCH AGENCIES AS THE CATHOLIC  
CHURCH -- WITHOUT HELPING THE MARTIAL LAW GOVERNMENT IN  
POLAND. HE NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES HAVE  
TAKEN STEPS TO EXPRESS DISAPPROVAL OF EVENTS IN POLAND, AND  
SUGGESTED THERE MAY BE ALLIED INCENTIVES FOR LIBERALIZATION  
BY THE WARSAW REGIME.

15

ITEM

NESA-407 (4/1/82)

NOTE TO ALL POSTS RE APRIL 4 A-M-P FILE (60)

THERE WILL BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE-MEDIA PRODUCT (A-M-P)  
FILE TRANSMITTED THIS SUNDAY, APRIL 4, ON THE SAME  
FREQUENCIES AND AT THE SAME TIME AS THE REGULAR WEEKDAY  
FILES. IT WILL INCLUDE A VACANCY LIST FOR OPEN ASSIGNMENTS,  
A PGM/T FILM/VTR AVAILABILITY LIST, A PGM/P ARTICLE ALERT  
SERVICE ISSUE, THE ECA RECOMMENDED DOCUMENTS AND PAMPHLETS  
LIST, AND AN ECA BOOK LIST.

ITEM

NESA409

27k

STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, THURSDAY, APRIL 1, 1982 (1,200)

NEWS BRIEFING -- DEAN FISCHER, STATE DEPARTMENT  
SPOKESMAN, WAS THE BRIEFER. HE COVERED THE FOLLOWING  
TOPICS:

ATTACK ON ISRAELI EMBASSY CONDEMNED --



REACH A SOLUTION

-- DECLARED WASHINGTON IS WATCHING EVENTS IN POLAND CAREFULLY, AND RECALLED THAT HIS EFFORT IS TO HELP THE POLISH PEOPLE -- THROUGH SUCH AGENCIES AS THE CATHOLIC CHURCH -- WITHOUT HELPING THE MARTIAL LAW GOVERNMENT IN POLAND. HE NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO EXPRESS DISAPPROVAL OF EVENTS IN POLAND, AND SUGGESTED THERE MAY BE ALLIED INCENTIVES FOR LIBERALIZATION BY THE WARSAW REGIME.

ITEM

ME54-407 (4/17/82)

NOTE TO ALL POSTS RE APRIL A A-M-P FILE (60)

THERE WILL BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE-MEDIA PRODUCT (A-M-P) FILE TRANSMITTED THIS SUNDAY, APRIL 4, ON THE SAME FREQUENCIES AND AT THE SAME TIME AS THE REGULAR WEEKDAY FILES. IT WILL INCLUDE A VACANCY LIST FOR OPEN ASSIGNMENTS, A PMVTR AVAILABILITY LIST, A PMVTR ARTICLE ALERT SERVICE ISSUE, THE ECA RECOMMENDED DOCUMENTS AND PAMPHLETS LIST, AND AN ECA BOOK LIST.

ITEM

ME54-09

STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, THURSDAY, APRIL 1, 1982 (1,200)

NEWS BRIEFING -- DEAN FISHER, STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN, WAS THE BRIEFER. HE COVERED THE FOLLOWING

TOPICS:

1/21

503



FISCHER SAID THE UNITED STATES CONDEMNS THE TERRORIST  
ATTACK MARCH 31 AGAINST THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN PARIS. HE  
SAID THE ATTACK INVOLVED MACHINE GUN FIRE DIRECTED AT THE  
ISRAELI EMBASSY ANNEX, ADDING THAT "WE ARE RELIEVED THAT NO  
ONE WAS INJURED."

16

U. S. URGES END TO IRAN-IRAQ FIGHTING --

FISCHER SAID THE UNITED STATES IS FOLLOWING REPORTS  
COMING FROM BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ BUT HE HAD NO COMMENT TO

PAGE 02--STATE

OFFER ON THE STATE OF THE CURRENT FIGHTING BETWEEN THE TWO  
COUNTRIES.

"THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS RESPONSIBLE INTERNATIONAL  
EFFORTS TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO AN END AND THE PARTIES TO  
NEGOTIATIONS," FISCHER SAID IN A RESTATEMENT OF U. S. POLICY.

"WE CONSIDER A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, REAFFIRMING THE  
INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF BOTH COUNTRIES, TO  
BE ESSENTIAL TO THE SECURITY AND WELL-BEING OF THE REGION.  
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD THEREFORE BE SENSITIVE TO  
AND SUPPORTIVE OF OPPORTUNITIES TO PROMOTE AN URGENT  
SETTLEMENT," FISCHER SAID.

U. S. EMBASSY IN GUATEMALA ATTACKED --

FISCHER SAID THE U. S. EMBASSY IN GUATEMALA CITY WAS  
ATTACKED THE EVENING OF MARCH 31.

"THE ATTACKERS, PASSING IN TWO VEHICLES, STRAFED THE  
EMBASSY WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE AND LAUNCHED A ROCKET  
PROPELLED GRENADE AT THE BUILDING," FISCHER SAID. "THERE

PAGE 0--STATE

WAS LITTLE DAMAGE AND NO INJURIES." HE SAID TO THE BEST OF  
HIS KNOWLEDGE, NO ONE HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE  
ATTACK.



10  
FISCHER SAID THE UNITED STATES DENIES THE TERRORIST  
ATTACK MARCH 31 AGAINST THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN PARIS. HE  
SAID THE ATTACK INVOLVED MACHINE GUN FIRE DIRECTED AT THE  
ISRAELI EMBASSY ANNEX, ADDING THAT "WE ARE RELIEVED THAT NO  
ONE WAS INJURED."

U.S. URGES END TO IRAN-IRAQ FIGHTING --

FISCHER SAID THE UNITED STATES IS FOLLOWING REPORTS  
COMING FROM BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ BUT HE HAD NO COMMENT TO

PAGE 02--STATE

OFFER ON THE STATE OF THE CURRENT FIGHTING BETWEEN THE TWO  
COUNTRIES.

"THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS RESPONSIBLE INTERNATIONAL  
EFFORTS TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO AN END AND THE PARTIES TO  
NEGOTIATIONS," FISCHER SAID IN A RESTATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY.

"WE CONSIDER A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, REAFFIRMING THE  
INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF BOTH COUNTRIES, TO  
BE ESSENTIAL TO THE SECURITY AND WELL-BEING OF THE REGION.  
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD THEREFORE BE SENSITIVE TO  
AND SUPPORTIVE OF OPPORTUNITIES TO PROMOTE AN URGENT  
SETTLEMENT," FISCHER SAID.

U.S. EMBASSY IN GUATEMALA ATTACKED --

FISCHER SAID THE U.S. EMBASSY IN GUATEMALA CITY WAS

ATTACKED THE EVENING OF MARCH 31.

"THE ATTACKERS, PASSING IN TWO VEHICLES, STRAFED THE  
EMBASSY WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE AND LAUNCHED A ROCKET  
PROPULSION GRENADE AT THE BUILDING," FISCHER SAID. "THERE

PAGE 0--STATE

WAS LITTLE DAMAGE AND NO INJURIES," HE SAID TO THE BEST OF  
HIS KNOWLEDGE. NO ONE HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE

ATTACK.



ט ד פ ט ט ב ר ק

דף... J... מתוך... 2... דפים

סווג בטחוני... סוד?

דחיפות... ט???

תאריך וז"ח 1171 אפריל 82

מס' מברק... 27

כ.כ.

מצפ"א מרכז

שיחה עם Col. PLUMMER מהדסק הצבאי מדיני של מחמ"ד מז"ח

לדברי פלמר מניחים כי הסיבה האמיתית לבואו הפתאומי של שר ההגנה המצרי לווי' היתה רצונו לבקר את בני משפחתו שנשארו בווי' על מנת לסיים לימודיהם כאן. לכך הוסיפו כמה "משימות" מדיניות מטעם הנשיאות בקהיר.

גאזלה חזר על הדרישות המצריות המוכרות היטב: יותר כסף; תנאי תשלום נוחים יותר; מועדי אספקה קרובים ככל האפשר. בכל שלושת החומים הוסבר לשר המצרי כי אין ביכולתה של ארה"ב לעשות עתה דבר. עדיין נאבקים בגבעה למען אשור סיוע חוץ בתקציב 88 ואין לראות הדבר כמובטח ומאושר. תנאי התשלום מוגדרים בחוק וגם במישור זה כבילות ידי הממשל. באשר למועדי האספקה, ארה"ב "נקרעת" בין הדרישות המועלות מידי יום לזירוז האספקה מצד מדינות שונות. התעשייה הצבאית האמריקאית מתקשה לעמוד אף במועדים שנקבעו מלכתחילה. עייכ ניתן לסכם כי אבו גאזלה עזב את ארה"ב ללא הישג במישור הסיוע הצבאי. (פלמר לא שלל טענותי שבעוד שלושה חדשים יבוא שליח אחד מקהיר עם אותן דרישות ובווי' בוודאי יימצא כאלה שיטענו כי אין אפשרות לסרב להם שוב).

המצרים כמובן מעלים בכל פעם אכזבתם מאופי והיקף הסיוע הצבאי האמריקאי. ארה"ב קבלה העקרון שמצרים זכאיה לקיים עוצמה ואיכות צבאית העונה על מעמדה וצרכיה הבטחוניים. המצרים רואים את הרמה אליה הגיעו באוק' 73 כאמת מידה למילוי הבטחה זו. הקצב האיטי של העברת ציוד אמריקאי לידי המצרים פוגע - לטענת קהיר - בשמירת רמה זו. לדברי הגנרלים-מצרים מוציאה בתקופה נתונה מהמלאי מספר כלים גדול יותר משהיא מקבלת מארה"ב. ווי' הסבירה למצרים שאין ביכולתה להחליף הציוד המזרחי במערכות אמריקאיות וגם בשנים הבאות ייאלצו עדיין להשתמש בכמויות ניכרות של ציוד טוביטי. כאן, "שלף" פלמר דיאגרמה שהוכנה במחמ"ד והמתארת את היחס הצפוי בין ציוד מזרחי למערכות מערביות בצבא המצרי ב-1986. עייפ דיאגרמה זו (לפי מיטב זכרוני היות ופלמר אמר שלא יוכל להשאירה בידי) יהיה היחס בין שני הסוגים כדלקמן: ח"א 50% מערבי; שריון 40%, הגנה אווירית 25%, ארטילריה וים 10%. פלמר הסביר כי לטענת המצרים מצב זה משאיר אותם הרחק מהרמה אליה הגיעו בשנת 73. הגבתי כי לדעתי אין לקבל טענה מצרית זו מאחר שבשני תחומים עיקריים- אוויר ושריון- מצבם לא יורע בהשוואה לשנת 73, אלא ישופר. אין ספק כי ח"א המצויד במחציתו במטוסיים קו ראשון, תוצרת ארה"ב, כדוגמת F-16, מסוקים ומטוסי חובלה, יעלהכושרו של ח"א המצרי







35  
3

סגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד ירושלים

א/כ

1361/2

ט ו פ ט מ ב ר ק

דף...ל...המוך...3...דפיט

סוג בטחוני...טודי ביותר

דחיפות...בהול לבוקר

חאריך וז"ח...012030 באפריל 82

מס' מברק...29

מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, מנהל מצפ"א .

פגישה הציר-סטטל

בהעדרו של השגריר מהעיר, הציר הוזמן להפגש בדחיפות עם ולטר סטטל משנה למזכיר המדינה. הפגישה התקיימה היום בשעה 17:30 וארכה כ-20 דקות. מטעמם נכחו סטטל, וליוטיס והיל. מטעמנו נחושתן והח"מ.

סטטל : פתח בציינו כי הוא קבע הפגישה לבקשת המזכיר וכי המזכיר עצמו היה מקיימה אילמלא היה עטוק בנסיון ליישב הסכסוך בין ארגנטינה ובריטניה בנושא איי הפלקנדר.

סטטל ביקש להתייחס לראיון שנתן שהב"ט לגליון מיום 30.3.82 של כתב-העת "יומן השבוע".

לדברי סטטל, מזכיר המדינה "was Shocked" באשר לצטוט לפיו הקונסוליה האמריקאית בירושלים תומכת באלמנטים קיצוניים (בעתון משפט זה מופיע צמוד לדברי שהב"ט על קיום חוליות רצח של אש"ף). לדברי סטטל הקונסוליה עושה מאמץ רב להיות אובייקטיבית והוגנת ודבריו של שרון הינם Unacceptable.

סטטל המשיך שהמזכיר מבקש גם להתייחס לקטע בכתבה שבו נאמר שארה"ב כיום למעשה זנחה בחשאי את ק.ד. ופועלת להקמת מדינה פלשתינאית וכי ישראל לא חסכים בשום פנים ואופן לקבל מצב דברים זה.

לדברי סטטל חגובת המזכיר לדברים אלו היתה כי אין מקום להטיח דברים אלו כלפי . The U.S. which is a good friend and a good ally



ט פ ס  
 ס ב ר ק  
 דף 2... מתוך 3... דפים  
 סוג בטחוני... סודי ביותר  
 דחיפות  
 תאריך וז"ח  
 מס' חברק... 29

סטסל ציין כי בהמשך לדברים אלו של המזכיר ברצונו להוסיף הערות באשר לנעשה  
בשטחים.

ישראל גרמה למבוכה ציבורית בשימושה בכח ובפיטורי ראשי הערים. ארה"ב מאוד  
מקווה שישראל תמנע מלהמשיך לפטר ראשי ערים המקובלים כמתונים, כדוגמא ראש  
עירית בית-לחם.

ארה"ב נמנעת מלהעיר הערות אלו בפומבי, אך הוא רוצה להביאם לתשומת לבנו.

נחשתן : חגובה פומבית כזו שלכם היתה מעודדה הקיצוניים.

טסל : אנו אמנם אומרים לכם את זה בפרטיות.

נחשתן : ציין שטרם ראה את הכתבה עם ראיון שהב"ט כך שאינו יכול להגיב עדיין,  
עם זאת הוא יעביר כמובן הדברים ארצה.

הציר ציין שנושא הקונסוליה האמריקאית במזרח-ירושלים אמנם מהווה בעייה אך  
הוא בטוח שלא היתה כל כוונה לפגוע אישית בקונכ"ל ובס/קונכ"ל גרוב וקובי,  
או להעלות הנושא לויכוח מעל דפי העתונים.

לגבי ראשי הערים, הציר ציין ש-9 מהוך ה-30 היו נציגי אש"ף. ישראל מנסה להניח  
יטודות למנהיגות מקומית ועובדה זו גורמת דאגה לאש"ף.

מה שאנו רואים עכשיו ביו"ש זה ומלחמה על המטן ההליך השלום והאוטונומיה.

אש"ף חושש שתקום מנהיגות מקומית שתחליף אש"ף.

הציר ציין שאנו מצטערים כי מלבד הערה אחת של המזכיר לא שמענו כל חגובה



ס ד פ ס ס ב ר ק

דף 3... מחור 3... דפים

סוג בטחוני סודי ביותר

זחיפות

תאריך וז"ח

מס' מברק 29

מס' מברק

אמריקאית לגבי ההסחה הפרועה לרצח, מטעם ירדן. הסתח זו ההבטאה גם בצו ירדני שהטיל עונש מוות על כל ערבי שהצטרף לאגודות הכפריות. יותר מ-20 מנהיגים מקומיים נרצחו ע"י אש"ף במשך השנים ולפני יומיים הוטמנה פצצה במכונית מנהיג מקומי בחברון.

שלושת ראשי הערים שפוטרו הודיעו בפומבי שהם אנשי אש"ף, הזניחו תפקידיהם העירוניים וסרבו לשתף פעולה עם רשויות הממשל.

ביחמה האחרונה המצב הולך ונרגע. ישראל משתמשת בכדורי גומי ורק למקרה של הגנה עצמית משתמשים בנשק חם.

פעילות אש"ף היתה קשורה לתסכול אש"ף על אי-יכולתם לפעול מלבנון בצירוף חשש מהקמת מנהיגות מקומית.


עד כאן .

בצאהנו מהפגישה ציין היל בקשר לקונסוליה כי גרוב וקובי נבחרו במיוחד במטרה לשנות האופי של הקונסוליה במזרח-ירושלים ואמנם הקונסוליה הרבה יותר חיובית מאשר היתה בעבר. על כן הם רואים עצמם נפגעים במיוחד מהתקפה על הקונסוליה. יש להם הרגשה שפרופ' מילטון מנהל מלחמה נגד אנשי הקונסוליה ולא ברור להם מדוע הוא עושה זאת.

ס ב ל

שהה ס' אשה מנכ"ל מ/מנכ"ל רה"מ ס' אשה מנכ"ל רה"מ מ/מנכ"ל רה"מ מ/מנכ"ל רה"מ רובינסון





2516

# official text

APRIL 1, 1982

TEXT: VELIOTES STATEMENT ON NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA BUDGET REQUESTS (2500)

WASHINGTON -- FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT DELIVERED MARCH 31 TO THE FOREIGN OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, BY NICHOLAS A. VELIOTES, U.S. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS:  
(BEGIN TEXT)

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH YOU OUR POLICY TOWARD THE NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIAN REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 1983 BUDGET REQUESTS. SINCE I WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A.I.D. ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR ANTOINETTE FORD, I SHALL CONCENTRATE MY BRIEF OPENING REMARKS ON A POLITICAL OVERVIEW INTO WHICH OUR REQUESTS FIT. THIS CAN SERVE AS A FRAMEWORK FOR OUR SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION.

UNDERSECRETARY BUCKLEY IN HIS APPEARANCE BEFORE YOU MARCH 11 HAS SKETCHED THE OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY FRAMEWORK INTO WHICH OUR NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIAN POLICY FITS. HE HAS SPOKEN OF THE NEED FOR A SAFER FUTURE IN WHICH ALL NATIONS CAN LIVE IN PEACE FREE FROM PRESSURES SUCH AS THAT EXERTED BY SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. HE HAS ALSO SPOKEN OF OUR DESIRE TO PROMOTE PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL RIVALRIES AND HOSTILITIES. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT PERSISTENT PURSUIT OF A COMPREHENSIVE AND BALANCED U.S. POLICY IN THE NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIAN REGION IS CRITICAL TO THESE GOALS. IT IS CRITICAL:

-- TO PRESERVING A GLOBAL STRATEGIC BALANCE WHICH WILL PERMIT FREE AND INDEPENDENT SOCIETIES TO PURSUE THEIR ASPIRATIONS

-- TO CHECKING THE SPREAD OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THIS STRATEGIC REGION

-- TO FULFILLING OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO ASSIST IN THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS WHICH THREATEN INTERNATIONAL

01





SECURITY AND THE WELL-BEING OF THE NATIONS AND PEOPLES IN THE REGION

-- TO ASSURING THE SECURITY AND WELFARE OF ISRAEL AND OTHER FRIENDLY NATIONS IN THE REGION

-- TO PRESERVING FREE WORLD ACCESS TO THE REGION'S OIL  
-- TO SUPPORTING OTHER MAJOR ECONOMIC INTERESTS SUCH AS ASSISTING THE ORDERLY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SOME OF THE NEEDY COUNTRIES IN THE REGION; COOPERATING WITH WEALTHIER STATES TO MAINTAIN A SOUND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ORDER; AND GENERALLY MAINTAINING ACCESS TO MARKETS FOR AMERICAN GOODS AND SERVICES.

THERE ARE TWO CENTRAL THEMES TO OUR APPROACH WHICH CAN BE SUMMARIZED IN THE WORDS "PEACE" AND "SECURITY" FOR THE REGION. BOTH PROMOTE OUR OWN POLICY AND THE WELFARE OF THE REGION'S PEOPLE. IN THIS CONTEXT:

-- WE ARE CONTINUING TO PURSUE VIGOROUSLY A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST PEACE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, WHICH IN TURN DERIVE FROM U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242. ARRANGEMENTS ARE NEARLY COMPLETE FOR EMPLACEMENT OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS AND ITS ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY TO MONITOR THE SECURITY PROVISIONS OF THE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT BOTH EGYPT AND ISRAEL ARE COMMITTED TO THE CONTINUED STRENGTHENING OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP.

-- WE ARE ALSO CONTINUING WITH NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AUTONOMY REGIME FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THESE NEGOTIATIONS LOOK TO ACHIEVEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR THE PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION NECESSARY FOR SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF ARRANGEMENTS TO PERMIT ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRANSITIONAL REGIME IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

-- WE ARE CONTINUING OUR SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF LEBANON IN WORKING THEIR WAY - WITH HELP FROM OTHER ARAB STATES - TOWARD NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND GREATER SECURITY. WE ARE COMMITTED TO THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON AND STRONGLY SUPPORT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS WHICH CALLS FOR THE ELECTION OF A NEW PRESIDENT LATER THIS YEAR. AS YOU KNOW AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS JUST RETURNED FROM ANOTHER TRIP TO THE REGION; AND HIS DISCUSSIONS ENCOURAGE US TO BELIEVE THAT THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT HE WORKED OUT LAST JULY CAN AND WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD; THUS WINNING TIME FOR THE INTERNAL CONCILIATION PROCESS IN LEBANON, WHICH OFFERS THE BEST PROSPECT FOR A PHASED, ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES.

-- MOVING TO ANOTHER SERIOUS CONFLICT IN THE AREA; WE SUPPORT THE RESOLUTION OF THE WAR BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN -- WHICH HAS ALREADY CAUSED SO MANY HUMAN CASUALTIES AND EXTENSIVE PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION. THE CONTINUATION OF THIS WAR, WE BELIEVE, SERVES THE INTERESTS OF NEITHER IRAQ NOR



IRAN. IT ENDANGERS THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF ALL NATIONS IN THE GULF REGION. CONSISTENT WITH OUR POLICY OF NEUTRALITY TOWARDS THIS CONFLICT, WE HAVE REFUSED TO SELL OR AUTHORIZE THE TRANSFER OF U.S. CONTROLLED DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES TO EITHER IRAN OR IRAQ. AND WE HAVE URGED THAT OTHERS AVOID ACTIONS WHICH WILL HAVE THE EFFECT OF PROLONGING OR EXPANDING THE CONFLICT. WE HAVE WELCOMED

RESPONSIBLE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO AN END AND THE PARTIES TO NEGOTIATIONS. WE CONSIDER A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, REAFFIRMING THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ, TO BE ESSENTIAL TO THE SECURITY AND WELL-BEING OF THE REGION.

-- WE ALSO SUPPORT THE RETURN OF PEACE TO THE SUFFERING PEOPLES OF AFGHANISTAN. BUT THIS MUST BE PEACE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCES, THE RESTORATION OF AFGHANISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNED STATUS, THE RIGHT OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO FORM A GOVERNMENT OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING, AND CREATION OF CONDITIONS WHICH WILL PERMIT THE THREE MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES.

THIS BRINGS ME TO MY SECOND THEME OF SECURITY. UNDERSECRETARY BUCKLEY IN HIS OWN PRESENTATION SPOKE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUTHWEST ASIAN SECURITY AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF THIS CONCERN TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE. WE SHARE WITH FRIENDLY STATES THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THREATS TO SECURITY THROUGHOUT THIS REGION POSED BY FACTORS SUCH AS THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, THE UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING IRAN, THE SOVIET POSITION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND IN SOUTH YEMEN, LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND PRESSURES AGAINST NEIGHBORING STATES, AND EFFORTS TO MAGNIFY SUCH THREATS THROUGH THE LIBYAN ALLIANCE WITH ETHIOPIA AND SOUTH YEMEN.

INDEED, BOTH IN OUR EFFORTS TO MOVE FURTHER WITH THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND IN OUR EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE THE RETURN OF PEACE WITH SECURITY AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE NECESSARY SPIRIT OF ACCOMMODATION CAN GROW MORE EASILY IF THE STATES CONCERNED FEEL SECURE AND CONFIDENT OF U.S. SUPPORT.

WE HAVE TAKEN IMPORTANT STEPS TO BUILD THE CONFIDENCE OF KEY STATES IN OUR COMMITMENT TO THEIR SECURITY. AT A TIME OF BUDGETARY STRINGENCIES, WE HAVE, WITH CONSIDERABLE SACRIFICE, INCREASED THE NATIONAL RESOURCES FOR OUR OWN MILITARY, TO DEVELOP THEIR CAPABILITY TO DETER THREATS TO THE REGION.

WE HAVE AT THE SAME TIME SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED OUR SECURITY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO FRIENDLY AND



STRATEGICALLY LOCATED STATES IN THE REGION SO THAT THEY CAN BETTER PROVIDE FOR THEIR OWN DEFENSE, RESIST EXTERNAL PRESURES, IMPROVE THEIR OWN ECONOMIES, AND THUS ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR ORDERLY PROGRESS. I SHALL BRIEFLY LIST FOR YOU THE HIGHLIGHTS OF OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR THE COUNTRIES IN THE NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIAN REGION (NEA).

-THE NEA FY 83 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REQUEST WILL FUND SIX MAJOR PROGRAMS. THESE INCLUDE:

-- DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TOTALING 287.242 MILLION DOLLARS FOR THE REGION TO SEVEN COUNTRIES, OF WHICH OVER 200 MILLION DOLLARS GOES TO THE THREE POORER COUNTRIES OF SOUTH ASIA (INDIA, BANGLADESH, SRI LANKA)

-- PL 480 TOTALING 619.513 MILLION DOLLARS, (420 MILLION DOLLARS TITLE I, 99.513 MILLION DOLLARS TITLE II) PROVIDED TO 13 OF THE 15 NEA FOREIGN ASSISTANCE RECIPIENT COUNTRIES.

-- ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND (ESF) OF 1768 MILLION DOLLARS, OF WHICH A SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION GOES TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT, OUR PARTNERS IN PEACE.

-- FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) FINANCING TOTALING 3660 MILLION DOLLARS, 1030 MILLION DOLLARS OF IT IN DIRECT CONCESSIONAL LOANS, 500 MILLION DOLLARS AND 400 MILLION DOLLARS AS FORGIVEN LOANS FOR ISRAEL AND EGYPT RESPECTIVELY.

- INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING (IMET) TOTALING 11.1 MILLION DOLLARS.

- AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (PKO) TOTALING 34.474 MILLION DOLLARS, IN SUPPORT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS.

- THESE PROGRAMS TOTAL 6380.33 MILLION DOLLARS FOR FY 83, WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVES IS THE MINIMAL REQUIRED TO THE U.S. TO PROTECT ITS INTERESTS AND ACHIEVE ITS POLICY GOALS IN THIS VITAL REGION.

- I WOULD NOW LIKE TO OFFER A FEW COMMENTS ON EACH OF OUR FY 83 PROPOSALS.

- ISRAEL: WE ARE COMMITTED TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND WELL-BEING. SECURITY SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL IS CENTRAL TO OUR MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY. THE 1.7 BILLION DOLLARS IN FMS THAT WE ARE PROPOSING WILL HELP ISRAEL MAINTAIN ITS TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE IN OVERALL MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE REGION. WE ARE ALSO

REQUESTING 785 MILLION DOLLARS IN ESF TO REFLECT U.S. SUPPORT TANGIBLY AND FACILITATE A MODEST RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH.

- EGYPT: EGYPT IS KEY TO MUCH OF WHAT WE HOPE TO ACCOMPLISH IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IN TERMS OF BOTH REGIONAL PEACE AND REGIONAL SECURITY. THE 1.4 BILLION DOLLARS FMS PROGRAM CONTRIBUTES TO EGYPT'S ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF AND HELP ITS NEIGHBORS, IN THE FACE OF THE VARIOUS THREATS I HAVE MENTIONED. IT REPLACES A SMALL PORTION OF EGYPT'S AGING, DETERIORATING MILITARY MATERIAL. THE ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND REQUEST FOR EGYPT TOTALS 750 MILLION DOLLARS, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE DIRECT SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC



STABILITY IN THE NEAR TERM WHILE BUILDING THE BASE FOR IMPROVED ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY AND EQUITY UPON WHICH LONG-TERM STABILITY MUST DEPEND. THE REQUESTED PL 480 PROGRAM CONSISTS OF 250 MILLION DOLLARS IN PL 480 TITLE I AND 9.9 MILLION DOLLARS TITLE II IN SUPPORT OF PRIVATE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES.

- PAKISTAN: PAKISTAN IS A KEY FRONTLINE STATE WHICH REMAINS STEADFAST IN RESISTING GREAT PRESSURES FROM THE SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN. OUR FY 83 PROPOSAL OF 275 MILLION DOLLARS IN FMS LOANS IS THE FIRST FMS INCREMENT OF THE 3.2 BILLION DOLLAR, 5-YEAR ASSISTANCE PACKAGE. THIS WILL HELP FUND F-16 AIRCRAFT, ARMORED VEHICLES, ARTILLERY AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT ORDERED IN FY 82 AS WELL AS FOLLOW-ON ORDERS FOR ADDITIONAL QUANTITIES OF SIMILAR EQUIPMENT LATER. OUR ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN IS IN NO WAY INTENDED AGAINST INDIA, GOOD AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS WITH WHOM REMAIN OUR HIGH PRIORITY GOAL. A TOTAL OF 200 MILLION DOLLARS IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND ESF WILL BE CONCENTRATED IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR WITH ACTIVITIES ALSO IN THE FIELDS OF POPULATION, HEALTH, ENERGY, AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT. WE ARE REQUESTING 50 MILLION DOLLARS FOR PL 480 TITLE I.

- MOROCCO: THE PROPOSAL OF 100 MILLION DOLLARS IN FMS CREDIT TO MOROCCO WOULD PERMIT SUPPORT OF MAJOR U.S. COMBAT SYSTEMS WHICH MOROCCO HAS ALREADY ACQUIRED, TOGETHER WITH AN ONGOING MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. CONCESSIONAL TERMS FOR 50 PERCENT OF THIS FMS ARE RECOMMENDED TO ALLEVIATE A HEAVY DEBT BURDEN RELATED TO ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES LARGELY BEYOND MOROCCO'S ABILITY TO CONTROL (E.G., DROUGHT AND WORLD INFLATION). DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE OF 13.5 MILLION DOLLARS WILL FUND PROGRAMS IN AGRICULTURE, FAMILY PLANNING, RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT, AND LOW COST HOUSING. THE REQUESTED LEVEL OF PL 480 IS 25 MILLION DOLLARS FOR TITLE I AND 10.5 MILLION DOLLARS FOR TITLE II.

- TUNISIA: TUNISIA, UNDER DIRECT THREAT FROM LIBYA, REQUIRES A MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WITH HEAVY INITIAL COSTS. OUR FMS CREDITS OF 140 MILLION DOLLARS, HALF OF WHICH WE ARE REQUESTING IN CONCESSIONAL TERMS, ARE INTENDED TO CUSHION THE SHOCK OF SUCH LARGE EXPENDITURES. THE FY 83 LEVELS WOULD HELP FUND THE ACQUISITION OF F-5 AIRCRAFT, M60 TANKS, AND CHAPARRAL MISSILES WHICH THE TUNISIANS INTEND TO ORDER IN FY 82. WE ARE REQUESTING 10 MILLION DOLLARS FOR PL 480 TITLE I AND 1.8 MILLION DOLLARS FOR TITLE II.

- JORDAN : WE PROPOSE AN INCREASE IN FMS FOR JORDON BY 25 MILLION DOLLARS TO A TOTAL OF 75 MILLION DOLLARS. WE



SEEK, THROUGH OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT, TO ENHANCE JORDAN'S SECURITY AND ABILITY TO REMAIN A VIABLE, INDEPENDENT AND CONSTRUCTIVE ACTOR IN THE REGION. A STABLE JORDAN SUPPORTS OUR OBJECTIVE OF BUILDING PEACE IN THE REGION AND ASSISTING COUNTRIES IN ACQUIRING THE CAPABILITY OF RESISTING OUTSIDE AGGRESSION AND REGIONAL SUBVERSION. WE ARE ALSO PREPARING 20 MILLION DOLLARS IN ESF TO ASSIST THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL WATER AND WASTE WATER PROGRAMS, HEALTH PROGRAMS AND AGRICULTURAL AND IRRIGATION PROJECTS. THERE IS ALSO A 256,000 DOLLAR PL 480 TITLE II PROGRAM.

- YEMEN: NORTH YEMEN IS PRESENTLY BEING CHALLENGED MILITARILY BY AN ARMED, MARXIST-LED INSURGENT GROUP BACKED BY SOVIET-SPONSORED SOUTH YEMEN. THE NORTH YEMENI MILITARY REQUIRES ESSENTIAL ADDITIONAL TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE EFFECTIVELY TO UTILIZE U.S. EQUIPMENT FUNDED BY SAUDI ARABIA. FURTHER, IT REQUIRES INCREASED AND SUSTAINED ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE IF WE ARE GOING TO PROVIDE CREDIBLE SUPPORT TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN THE FACE OF THIS PERSISTENT OUTSIDE THREAT. WE ARE ASKING FOR AN ADDITIONAL 5 MILLION DOLLARS IN FMS TO A TOTAL OF 15 MILLION DOLLARS AND A MODEST INCREASE IN IMET OVER FY 82. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE OF 27.5 MILLION DOLLARS IS REQUESTED TO MEET BASIC HUMAN NEEDS IN ONE OF THE POOREST NATIONS OF THE REGION.

- OMAN: THE 40 MILLION DOLLARS IN FMS WILL IN PART BE APPLIED AGAINST CONTINUING PAYMENT FOR U.S EQUIPMENT ACQUIRED OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS. IN LIGHT OF A TIGHTENING INTERNATIONAL BUDGET, THE REMAINING AMOUNT WILL BE USED TO OFFSET THE COST OF THE CONTINUING AND ESSENTIAL OMANI FORCE MODERNIZATION EFFORT. OMAN CONTINUES TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN REGIONAL SECURITY AND IN THE DEFENSE OF THE SOUTHERN GULF-INDIAN OCEAN REGION. AND WE ARE REQUESTING 15 MILLION DOLLARS IN ESF WHICH WILL SUPPORT DAM CONSTRUCTION, FISHERIES AND OTHER PROJECTS IDENTIFIED BY THE U.S.-OMAN JOINT COMMISSION.

- LEBANON: SMALL INCREASES IN OUR PROPOSED FMS LOAN PROGRAM FOR LEBANON OF 15 MILLION DOLLARS, UP 5 MILLION DOLLARS FROM THE FY 82 LEVEL, REFLECT OUR CONTINUED DESIRE TO SEE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT DEVELOP THE CAPABILITY TO REDUCE AND EVENTUALLY ELIMINATE CIVIL CONFLICT, AND WORK FOR RESTORATION OF ESSENTIAL PUBLIC SERVICES AND A RETURN TO NORMALCY OF LIFE IN THAT VERY TROUBLED COUNTRY. AN ESF PROGRAM OF 8 MILLION DOLLARS WILL INCLUDE SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES AND WILL ASSIST THE PROGRAMS OF THE COUNCIL OF REDEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION.



FOR THE POORER COUNTRIES OF SOUTH ASIA WE ARE PROPOSING DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE OF 87 MILLION DOLLARS FOR INDIA, 76 MILLION DOLLARS FOR BANGLADESH, 40.3 MILLION DOLLARS FOR SRI LANKA, AND 13.5 MILLION DOLLARS FOR NEPAL. IN GENERAL THEIR PROGRAMS SEEK TO INCREASE FOOD PRODUCTION AND RURAL EMPLOYMENT AS WELL AS HEALTH AND FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS. AS FOR PL 480, WE ARE REQUESTING 111 MILLION DOLLARS IN TITLE II FOR INDIA; 60 MILLION DOLLARS IN TITLE I AND 20.5 MILLION IN TITLE II FOR BANGLADESH; AND 2.5 MILLION DOLLARS TITLE I AND 5.8 MILLION DOLLARS TITLE II FOR SRI LANKA.

IN SHORT, MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, BOTH THROUGH OUR FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CREDITS AND THROUGH OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE COUNTRIES OF THIS REGION, WE SEEK TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY AND STABILITY, PROMOTE THE PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF OLD OR NEW CONFLICTS, AND ASSIST THOSE COUNTRIES TO PROVIDE A BETTER LIFE FOR THEIR PEOPLES. TO THESE GOALS WE REMAIN COMMITTED. (END TEXT)  
ITEM



שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

א.כ.ל

אל: המשרד

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מס' מברק 24

מצפ"א

המשך פגישות נימוסין של השגריר בגבעה :

1. עם מנהיג הרוב בבית ג'יים רייט:

פגישת נימוסין קצרה שבמהלכה הטביר השגריר בקשתו לסיוע והצורך בהגדלת חלק המענק. בהקשר עסקה ירדנית אמר רייט ששאל במחמ"ד והטיבו לו שאין חכניות למכור לירדן. השגריר הטביר אפשרות שמכירה תוצע אחרי פגישת הועדה הצבאית האמריקנית-ירדנית. הערה: יצויין שעל פי כתבה בעתון מטכסט התבטא רייט בצורה ברורה וחריפה נגד מכירה לירדן.

2. עם מנהיג הרוב בסנט בייקר :

פגישת נימוסין קצרה (הטנטור נקרא לאולם המליאה בקשר לתסבוכת פרלמנטרית). השגריר הטביר עמדתו בענין מכירות לירדן ולמדינות ערב בכלל והחשש שבועולט הערבי חשתנה התפיסה ועלולים לחשוב שיש סיכוי מחודש לאופציה צבאית דבר שיהרוס את תהליך השלום.

3. עם סנטור אינוייה (פהגישה לפי בקשתו)

אינוייה אמר שיש דברים המדאיגים אותו. נראה לו שהמטר היוצא ממדיניות הממשל איננו משרת האינטרס האמריקני או הישראלי והוא אומר זאת לא מפני שהוא דמוקרטי. אינוייה סבור שחל שינוי משמעותי מאד בגישה כלפי ישראל. כשמדברים על שיוויון (וכמוהו - *Even Handedness*) משמעו פחות תמיכה בישראל. זה נשמע ידידותי והוגן אך משמעותו איווקס לסעודיה וטילים לירדן. השגריר אישר שזה מסוכן לישראל. הנשיא אומר שישמרו על היתרון אך (השגריר) נאלץ להסביר לבני שיחו שהיתרון מתמסמס כשאר"ב מוכרת מיטב ציודה לשכנינו. אינוייה אמר שהיה צריך לפעול כעת כשהברזל חם. כוונתו לרגשי אשמה שלדעתו יש בין סנטורים שלא שמחו על תמיכתם במכירת איווקס. על ישראל להשיב שצריך שיוויון בכושר בממון. לישראל אין מה שיש לערב הסעודית. על ישראל לדרוש מענקים ולגייס לכך את הקהילה היהודית. להדגמת חומרת רעיון השיוויון סיפר אינוייה (שלא ליחוס) שסנטור קסטן ביקש לבקר בירדן יום אחד לעומת ארבעה ימים בישראל וארבעה במצרים. על כך התקשר שגירדן לסנטור והתלונן על חוסר השיוויון.







Handwritten notes at the top of the page, including "Call Goren" and "9:55 AM".

MIAMI

I don't wish to comment on what the Chief Rabbi said. Obviously Israel's opposition to the creation of an independent Palestinian state is nothing new. But I have no comment specifically in response to his remarks.

In response to questions:

CHIEF RABBI SHLOMO GOREN IN US

As we have said on many occasions, most recently on March 17th, the US supports responsible international efforts to bring the fighting to an end, and the parties to negotiations. We consider a peaceful settlement reaffirming the independence and territorial integrity of both countries to be essential to the security and well-being of the region. The international community should therefore be sensitive to and supportive of opportunities to promote an urgent settlement.

We've followed the reports coming from both sides, including official statements. We do not ourselves have comment to offer on the state of the current fighting.

In response to questions:

IRANIAN VICTORIES OVER IRAQ

We condemn the terrorist attack yesterday involving machinegun fire directed at the Israeli Embassy annex in Paris, but we are relieved that no-one was injured.

STATEMENT: ATTACK ON THE ISRAELI EMBASSY BUILDING IN PARIS

STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING--APRIL 1, 1982

MIAMI, APRIL 1, 1982

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MIAMI, APRIL 1, 1982

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22/6 (11/11/11) 10/11/11  
Saturday night, Jerusalem, 17 April 1962

Dear Mr. President,

The Security Council of the U.N. is about to wind up its debate on the tragic shooting incident in Jerusalem, on the Temple Mount. At a bitter moment, I called this institution "The High Court of Injustice," but this time it overreached itself. A deranged individual took by surprise all the guards, opened fire, killed and wounded innocent people. He was apprehended. He will face a Court of Justice. Psychiatrists will find out whether he is judicially sane or insane. In accordance with the law of the land, he will be judged by due process.

What else can a civilized nation, a democracy do? However, in this case too, our people fell victim to an ancient and medieval prejudice: the Nation of Israel is being collectively blamed and cynically accused of an individual's crime. It happened for many centuries; we paid for it with rivers of Jewish blood, with torture, with the stake, with pogroms. But that such an outrage should take place at the end of the 20th century, only forty years after the Holocaust, defies human imagination and man's capability of description. Yet, speaker after speaker at the Security Council mounts the rostrum and heaps abuse upon Israel.

As I said in our statement two days ago, the voice of freedom and civilization has not yet been heard. I hope, Mr. President, dear friend, it will soon ring clearly and loudly. And what about the outcome, the vote? Will the bearer of hope, of all freedom-loving nations, allow racist prejudice, revolting bigotry, get the upper hand, through giving support, or withholding resistance, to a condemnation resolution?

Throughout the ages, Mr. President, justice ultimately triumphed, but usually too late ...! Should, in our time, this phenomenon be repeated?

I appeal to you from the bottom of my heart.

Let the American delegation at the Security Council raise its hand against a terrible wrong against a resolution whose source and result, is incitement and hatred.

Let justice be done.

Yours sincerely and respectfully,

Menachem



206

(11/11/11)

11/11/11

Saturday night, Jerusalem, 17 April 1967

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