

מדינת ישראל

משרד הממשלה

משרד

9

151187 - 1 (A) (9) 201187

201187 - 2b

תאריך

תאריך

מדינת ישראל
גנרל המדינה

4432/1-A



שם תיק: ארצות הברית כרד א'

4432/1-A

מוהה פיו:

מוהה פריט: R0002q1p

כתובת: 2-111-1-8-8

28/07/2020 תאריך הדפסה

05:04

המשרד

טו ע ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מחוד דפים

סווג בטחוני גלרי

דחיסות מידי

תאריך/ז"ח 1400 20 נוב 87

מס' מברק

1/2

495

אל :- מצפויא, מעיח
דע :- לשכח רהי"מ

בקור רהי"מ

להלו תדרור לעתונאים של ריצ'ארד מרפי עם תום שיחות רהי"מ והנשיא רייגן.

יוסי גל

3 רה"מ, רה"מ, רה"מ
1 שהקט
3 אמ"ש
1 אמ"ש
1 ר' א' סכס
4 אמ"ש
1-3-1 ד"ר א' א' א' א'
4 ק' א' א' א'
1 ק' א' א' א'
2 אמ"ש

WHITE HOUSE BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON THE VISIT OF ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1987
10:30 A.M., EST

495
2
P

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: (In progress) ... The briefer will be
*****. This briefing is on background.

Q Why is it on background?

Q Why isn't it on the record? We want the briefing on the
record.

Q What is wrong with that?

Q Why isn't the briefer able to talk on the record?

Q That is absolutely --

Q See, this briefing is being boycotted by three major news
organizations because it's not on the record. Boycotted --

Q Are you afraid to have your name on what you say today?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, not afraid. But, I welcome any
boycott of my presence.

Q But you won't upstage the President, I assure you.
(Laughter.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The last thing from my thoughts.

All right. This was a relatively brief meeting between Prime
Minister Shamir and the President. The President was accompanied by
Secretary Shultz, Mr. Carlucci, and the Prime Minister by his
personal staff and, of course, the Ambassador of Israel. The
subjects covered included our policy in the Persian Gulf; covered
the question of Soviet Jewry, our efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry;
comments on the recently concluded Arab summit; comments sharing
mutual concerns about our respective deficits; and -- let's see,
those are the general components.

The Prime Minister, I believe outside, made a remark about our
Persian Gulf policy, that he had agreed with our efforts in the
Gulf. He was most explicit about that in the private meeting. He
thought that that had had -- that the stand the United States has
taken in the Gulf made the message very clear to the Arab states
that what concerned -- when it is a matter concerning their own
stability, they can rely on the United States. He thought that this
had influenced positions taken by Arab leaders at the Arab summit.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 2-1

WH BKRD/SHAMIR VISIT-11/20/87 2-1

He expressed appreciation to the President for our support for direct negotiation as the way of getting to peace. And, well, there was a brief exchange on the upcoming US-Soviet summit.

Soviet Jewry: the President said this remained a major subject in our discussions with the Soviets, that we do hold very strongly to the principle of freedom of choice, in keeping with our commitments at Helsinki, not that this was in any sense designed to interfere with the emigration direct to Israel.

Let's see -- (pauses) -- in terms of Arab summit, of course, both expressed great pleasure at the return to diplomatic relations between -- I guess it is now eight Arab states and Egypt.

Those were the -- that was the range of the topics covered. (to staff) Have I missed anything?

Q Do you know anything about a report that Silkworm missiles from China to Iran reached there by being transhipped through Israel arms dealers? China has maintained publicly that it never shipped -- that it never sold missiles to Iran. And there's a report that in fact, China had been selling the missile to Israeli arms dealers who then resold them to Iran. Is that correct?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, I'm not familiar with that particular report. The President did express his pleasure at the categorical statements by the Israeli leadership, that they were not engaged -- that Israel was not engaged in arms trafficking with Iran.

Q Well, that -- I take it that --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: But this particular report, I don't know.

Q (off-mike) -- the Israeli government?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, we have spoken very directly, very bluntly to the Israeli government, and through the Israeli government, we -- they have told us that they have checked out, to the extent they can, as far as they can, their private citizens who are engaged in arms sales, as arms agents, and that there is no ongoing traffic that is against government policy and there's no ongoing traffic.

Q So you think --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: They can't rule it out as a 100 percent

CONTINUED ON PAGE 3-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
COPYRIGHT (C) 1987, FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

685
4
9

WH BKRD/SHAMIR VISIT-11/20/87

guarantee that there aren't some private citizens involved in fencing -- fencing arms.

Q Would you take that to be a representation as far as the government can ascertain, private arms dealers are not engaging in what I suggested --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yes, they -- they told us they had made a very serious, very far-ranging effort with those citizens. And these are known to the government because they are licensed to deal. Now there are other citizens perhaps, who are free -- entirely free lancers, that they don't have knowledge of.

Q Is there a suggestion in the works for a sort of Israeli-Jordanian-Syrian meeting within the context of the US-Soviet summit?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, there are no plans. No plans for that.

Q Was this discussed at all? And what exactly was discussed about the upcoming Soviet meeting with Gorbachev?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: On the latter part of the question, what was -- it was an expression of support for the President's success as he headed into the meetings with the General Secretary. There wasn't any detail other than the President assuring the Prime Minister that we would follow, as always, the issue of the emigration of Soviet Jewry, and the right to pursue a life in freedom within the Soviet Union if they don't choose to emigrate. But in the first --

Q The topic of the international Peace Conference, and how the Soviets -- what role they would play, that was not discussed this morning?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: It was not discussed this morning. I assume that there'll be a number of -- of that issue of the meetings will come up with the Secretary in his longer sessions later today.

Q When you said that there were direct -- that the President spoke of direct talks between Israel and the Arab States, did the President try to move him off of dead center against this conference?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: There wasn't any discussion of that -- of the conference and how to move ahead. Our commitment to move things ahead and --

Q You said direct talks. Did the President buy his idea of only having direct talks?

✱

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That wasn't -- that was not debated between the two of them. But the President did assure him we were going to keep our efforts going and find a way to get to the direct negotiations, which we do think is the only way to go.

Q Can you confirm the report that Dr. Webster has terminated intelligence sharing

495 5
8

CONTINUED ON 4-1



with Israel -- CIA intelligence sharing?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I know of no such report that we've terminated intelligence or not. Other than that --

Q (Inaudible.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: -- there is no termination of intelligence sharing with with Israel. No.

Q You say categorically there is no termination --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: There is no termination.

Q Do you have a way of assessing whether the US policy of keeping the Gulf open for shipping has increased Iran's ability to ship and take in revenues and prosecute the -- (inaudible). Is that a side effect? Is there any way of measuring that?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That's hard, and it's hard to conclude -- for the 6-week period back last July, August, when the Iraqis stood down from their attacks on the tankers, the Iranian revenues went up. Now, the Iraqis -- after a 6-week standdown, they resumed, and I don't think that the presence of our fleet and the allied units in the Gulf has affected Iranian income positively or negatively. But it was, yes. They had a free run for those six months -- six weeks, but not after that.

Q Back to the international conference. Was there ever a serious idea discussed for having King Hussein and Prime Minister Shamir come to meet in Washington during the Reagan-Gorbachev summit?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well --

Q It was reported in the Israeli press.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I've seen those reports. However, there are no plans for such --

Q Was it true?

Q Was it ever discussed? Was the idea ever discussed?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I can't think of an idea that hasn't been discussed on the Middle East.

Q So I guess, yes, it was discussed?

Q Does the administration --

Q Can I have an answer to that question, please?

485 2/8

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: He shook his head.

Q You're saying that, yes, it was discussed?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: We've had a lot of ideas. We don't get into paternity suits at the department.

Q Does the administration see what former-President Jimmy Carter is doing in Atlanta in trying to get representatives of several Mideastern countries to come there to I'm not quite sure what, but to hammer out some sort of an agreement, as being an interference in the conduct of US foreign policy?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No. Nothing at all. The -- President Carter(?) has held now two major conferences. I think the first was two years ago -- two or three years ago. That is a very serious forum for airing views of

CONTINUED ON PAGE 5-1

LPS 8/8

not only the parties in the region, but of a number of European countries. I think, on this occasion, there was, in fact, one panel involving not official members of the governments in each case, but they spoke as five -- representing the five permanent members' views at the Security Council. You had a Chinese representative, Soviet representative, US, French --

Q Are you not now contemplating -- I'm sorry --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: -- ventilating ideas, debating out in public, as -- in that forum that President Carter has organized, is a plus.

Q I understand the kind of forum you just outlined. But is he not now contemplating -- at least I thought he said publicly -- some convocation in which government officials actually come to see if they can't solve some of their differences -- in a serious negotiating stance.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I wasn't down there. Is this something that came out of --

Q I may be wrong. I'm not quite clear.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I know President Carter has, each time, invited senior members of the government, some were able to come, some were not. In the case of each of the governments this time, I think their representatives were at least by their ambassador. But I don't believe he's seen it as an effort to, in any sense, to cross wires with the administration. He sees it --

Q He's not communicated with the Speaker and Central America? (Laughter.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: President Carter has seen it as a way to have some cross-fertilization of ideas, and to -- it's a very important educational forum on Middle Eastern issues, as he designs it.

Q Why is Shamir here?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Shamir was -- his visit was some months back scheduled, to address a major conference down in Miami, which he did last night. And, the visit with the President, the meetings with the Secretary, were arranged several weeks back. But the initial point in his schedule was to address the Miami conference.

MODERATOR: One more from further back there.

Q Thank you. The Speaker of the Iranian parliament, I believe Rafsanjani, is quoted as saying that his country is working on a defense treaty

CONTINUED ON PAGE 6-1

485 8/8

with the Soviets, or there are some negotiations. Did that come up today, either in context of your discussions on the Gulf or the Gorbachev visit, and is it true?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: It didn't come up today. The President spoke very strongly about our policy in the Gulf as designed to assist the moderate forces in the region, and to defend against Iranian expansionism. There has been what some of us call "a flirtation" between Tehran and Moscow over the last several months. You are seeing efforts to open up economic projects, senior level visits back and forth that, in fact, have (out?) the gap between the Soviets and the Iranians and most of their policies as manifest towards all.

But the Iranians are interested in facing down the pressures in the Gulf today, obviously, they are trying to court the Soviets today, and we very much hope that isn't going prove to be a successful effort. We think that staying together with the Soviets and others of the permanent five in the Security Council in getting the diplomatic process into a, for instance, specifically a second resolution, is the way to go.

Q But are there formal discussions that you are aware of --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Not that I'm --

Q -- defense?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: About a defense treaty, not that I'm aware of.

Thank you very much.

END OF BRIEFING

YITZHAK SHAMIR, PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL
 REMARKS TO PRESS OUTSIDE THE WHITE HOUSE
 FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN

484
 2/3

10:25 A.M. (EST)
 FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1987

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Good morning. It was a very good conversation with the President. I conveyed to him the wishes of the Israeli people and the Israeli government to succeed in his coming summit talks with the Soviet leaders. I congratulated him on the great American success in the Persian Gulf. It shows the situation in our area. Now all the people living in this area, and including the other people, see that they have to rely on all what is concerning their stability and security, only on the United States. And they are getting this necessary help from the United States.

I wished him also, and I expressed our gratitude for what the American government is doing for the liberation of the Soviet Jewry. It is a great battle, and we are certain that these American efforts will be fruitful.

Then, of course, we have expressed our worries about the coming cuts in the American budget. We would like that this problem is solved for the benefit of the United States, and we have also our own worries about it because we need this very important and vital assistance that serves the interests of the free world and the United States.

Q What did the President say when you raised that concern?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, he is also concerned about it, and he has his struggle, and we hope he will win.

Q What is your view of the Arab summit that was just held?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, there is some different assessments about this summit. There is some signs of moderation, and I think that the impact of the American activity in the Persian Gulf was very clear in this summit, and the upper end (?) was -- belongs to all these moderate countries that are working together with the United States. We have seen in this summit a very important -- a very clear weakness of the PLO and the other extreme Arab countries, and on the other end, this decision to resume relations with Egypt by the Arab countries, in spite of the fact that Egypt continues to respect and to keep the peace treaty with Israel, is also a sign of some moderation and acceptance of the facts of life.

Q Mr. Shamir, did you talk about the possibility of a summit between Jordan, Syria and Israel?

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
 COPYRIGHT (C) 1987, FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION
 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

[Handwritten mark]

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: No, I have not raised now this problem. I will discuss the situation in the Middle East and all the details in my talks today with the Secretary of State.

Q Is there a proposal for such a summit at the same time as the Reagan-Gorbachev summit?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: We will discuss all the possibilities. Thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

495
3
3

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
COPYRIGHT (C) 1987, FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

*

שגרירות ישראל / רושינגטון

ס ו ס ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מחוד _____ דפים

סוג בטחוני בלחט

דחופות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ח 1800 20 נוב 87

מס' מברק _____

1/9

אל: המשרד.

498

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ח
מאת: - עזרוב רושינגטון

בקור רח"מ

להלו נוסח ההרצאה ופרק השו"ת של רח"מ לפני הי"מכון הרושינגטוני.
^{נחלקי}

בואנה
רוסי גל

2 שיה 3 היה שיהט 1 3 1 1 4 1-3-1 4
בין מנפלו 2 אקוסט 1 1 2 2 1 4
הסביבה פלג

ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR
REMARKS TO WASHINGTON CENTER FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
GRAND HOTEL, WASHINGTON, DC

498 2/9

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1987

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Madame Chairlady, ladies and gentlemen, I have just concluded a series of very satisfactory and friendly talks with President Reagan, Secretary of State George Shultz, and some of their assistants. We had opportunity of hearing reports from Mr. Kampelman on the demilitarization talks, from Mr. Whitehead on human rights issues, and from Mr. Armacost on the regional matters that were raised with the Soviets. We conducted a review of our bilateral relations. We exchanged views on the situation in the Middle East, and we discussed subjects that will be raised in the forthcoming summit meeting between the President and Secretary Gorbachev.

On the latter subject, the question of the right of Soviet Jews to repatriation as figured centrally in our talks with the US administration. I believe we see eye to eye on the substance and on the importance of this matter. In the context of the new Soviet policy of glasnost, or openness, we expect the Soviet government to live up to its international commitments, and to permit those Jews who wish to do so to leave the USSR and come to Israel.

On a number of occasions, I explained to our friends in the United States administration

CONTINUED ON PAGE 2-1

K

that the Soviet Jews merit special treatment on two counts. First, they are the only national group in the Soviet Union out of over 100 that has been totally denied any kind of expression in regard to their language, culture, literature, origin. Second, they claim the right of repatriation to the land of their forefathers to Israel, and this right might be recognized and counted to them.

We have, therefore, asked our friends in the West, especially here in Washington, to impress upon the Soviet authorities the obligation to permit all Jews to leave the Soviet Union and come to Israel. Those who remain, or until they leave, should be granted the same rights as other groups, including permission to establish schools, synagogues, and other facilities to study Hebrew, exercise their faith, and conduct cultural activities.

The American administration, and especially the President and Secretary Shultz, have reacted very positively to our requests. For this, Israel and the Jewish people owe them a debt of gratitude. While we wish the summit talks will be successful for the sake of

CONTINUED ON PAGE 3-1

498 4/8

SHAMIR-11/20/87

all humanity. We hope that Secretary Gorbachev will come away with the understanding and conviction that Soviet Jews must be given their rights. After so many years of striving and suffering for these rights, it is high time that Soviet Jewry will finally be granted their freedom and permitted to come to Israel. We expect the Soviet government to adopt a policy that befits a world power and fulfills its undertakings in the field of human rights.

In our talks today, we discussed the situation in the Middle East at some length. The war between Iraq and Iran is nothing less than crazy. Unfortunately, the world has become so apathetic to this senseless and endless carnage that it is (inaudible) of views of chemical warfare. The strongest support on American action to prevent this ugly war from spilling over into the international (?) on the gulf, like international terrorism, the tendency to wage war on the back of innocent people, in this case, of international shipping, should be checked and prevented by concerted action by the community of the free nations.

CONTINUED ON 4-1

488

5/P

SHAMIR-11/20/87

As you know, we've had to contend with Khomeini's vile, cheap terrorism directed against our northern borders, Lebanon. It is fanatical, totally devoid of scruples. We've scored some successes in checking it, but clearly, we have to maintain a high profile of vigilance to prevent it from striking at our citizens. It should be remembered that this blood terrorism in Lebanon is functioning under a protective umbrella provided by Syria. Without Syrian tolerance and support, they would have not have been able to entrench themselves and build up their terror bases on Lebanese soil in proximity to the Syrian border. The recent Arab Summit Conference in Amman took place a short time before the tenth anniversary of President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Nine years ago the same forum decided to condemn Egypt and expel it from the Arab League for having signed the Camp David accords with Israel.

It is therefore significant that the Amman summit decided to permit its member states to resume formal diplomatic relations with Egypt. It is a vindication of peace, of direct negotiations as the only means of achieving peace in our region. And of the validity and logic of the Camp David accords. Since then I have reiterated my call to other neighbors, especially Jordan's King Hussein, to come to the negotiating table and work together with us for the conclusion of a peace treaty. I am convinced that negotiations will inevitably lead to mutual understanding and agreement.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 5-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
 COPYRIGHT (C) 1987, FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION
 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

X

498 6/8

sooner or later. I am equally convinced that an international conference will move us away from peace, will serve to sharpen and heighten our differences, will invite intervention of outside factors that will complicate the situation immeasurably. As long as the international conference idea hovers somewhere on the agenda, our Arab neighbors will hesitate to come forward and talk to us directly. The reason is simple: the conference will enable them to evade the need to take the kind of hard decision, and show the responsibility that is necessary in direct negotiations.

Until our neighbors come around to accepting the way of direct negotiations, we are ready to strengthen our bilateral relations with Egypt, and (inaudible) -- an effective peace with Jordan. Now that Egypt is in the process of resuming its formal relations with the Arab states, we expect the Egyptian government to help establish a negotiation framework with Jordan. I am sure President Mubarak knows that we are more than willing to expand the peace process and conclude an agreement with Jordan. Likewise, he appreciates the hard-won experience both our countries have acquired in achieving our peace treaty and in tackling many problems that arose between our countries since then. None of the problems would have found a solution through any means other than direct negotiations.

Egypt can resume a leadership role by exercising its influence on Jordan, and on the other Arab governments,

CONTINUED ON PAGE 5-1

4

to discard the barren idea of an international conference and to talk with us directly.

Our bilateral relations with the US are excellent. Our special relations with the US derives from our common faith in democracy and the similarity of views we hold on developments in the international arena. Although we have occasional differences of view on approaches to certain issues, both our governments recognize that the interests and basic methods is beneficial to our countries and to the Middle East. Our strategic cooperation has progress considerably and is encompassing a wide range of subjects. We continue to hold the view that the US can help us advance the peace process in our region, because it enjoys a high degree of trust and credibility among the Middle Eastern states.

As we approach the forthcoming summit conference between President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev, we pray that its talks will end in success and that an agreement from the limitation of nuclear arms will be reached. All of us have a stake in this vital issue, but speaking for the Jewish people, who are dispersed in countries of the East and the West, I might add that the prevention of global conflict

CONTINUED ON PAGE 7-1

✂

498

will be a blessing and an achievement of the highest order.
Thank you. [Applause]

MODERATOR: If you would like to remain here, I will ask the questions. This is from the Washington correspondent of Al-Ahram. Do you welcome an invitation to be extended from the superpower summit of Washington to you, King Hussein, and Hafiz al-Assad to meet in Washington as an international umbrella?

8/p

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, I don't know about any such proposal, but I'm ready always to meet King Hussein, with President Mubarak and other Arab leaders at any time and at any place.

MODERATOR: Now that the Soviets have indicated that they will not insist on PLO participation at an international peace conference, would you consider modifying your opposition to the idea? Martin Seid, Washington Times.

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, I don't know that there is such a Soviet view about PLO participation, but not this problem, this position about PLO participation, is the only reason for my opposition to an international conference. I think, and I've explained it in my introduction, that such a conference will not settle the cause of peace with the Soviets or without the Soviets. We believe only in direct negotiations between the parties of the conflict.

MODERATOR: Douglas Phyte(?). Regarding treaty compliance, the

CONTINUED ON PAGE 8-1



LPS 9/8

There already was the problem of demography. And it was our duty to handle this problem in many ways. And I think that in spite of the existence of this problem thousands of years ago, we still exist. And, we are again back in Israel. Therefore, I don't think it's a real problem. We think that there will be a bigger Jewish immigration, than it is now. And we don't think to make of the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, Israeli citizens. It's not our planning. We are faithful to our commitments in Camp David. And therefore, I don't see that this problem is a real danger or a real problem.

MODERATOR: Can you comment on problems in finalizing post-Lavi commitments by the United States Defense Department to Israel, from Eric Rosen of Near East Report.

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, this decision to -- not to continue the development of the Lavi airplane was a very painful decision and a very painful experience. And we have asked the American government that was a partner in this undertaking to compensate us on

CONTINUED ON PAGE 10-1

Ⓢ

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
COPYRIGHT (C) 1987, FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

END

סנידורח ישראל / נושיןגטון

1987-11-21 04:59

המשרד

סופס מברק

דף 1 מחוד דפים

סוג בטחוני גלוי

דחיסות מידי

תאריך/ז"ח 1400 20 נוב 87

מס' מברק

1/3

494

אל :- מצפייא, מעייח
דע :- לשכת רהי"מ

בקר רהי"מ

להלן נוסח דבריו של רהי"מ לעתונות בחום פגישתו עם הנשיא רייגן.

יוסי גל
(Handwritten signature)

2 שנה 3 כהן 3 שוקט 1 אש 3 אש 1 האכס 4 יאמ 4 1-3-1 רמ 4 אל 4
קיסן מרשם אביסל, מאי הפברה פסגה

1987-11-21

YITZHAK SHAMIR, PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL
REMARKS TO PRESS OUTSIDE THE WHITE HOUSE
FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN

484
2/3

10:25 A.M. (EST)
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1987

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Good morning. It was a very good conversation with the President. I conveyed to him the wishes of the Israeli people and the Israeli government to succeed in his coming summit talks with the Soviet leaders. I congratulated him on the great American success in the Persian Gulf. It shows the situation in our area. Now all the people living in this area, and including the other people, see that they have to rely on all what is concerning their stability and security, only on the United States. And they are getting this necessary help from the United States.

I wished him also, and I expressed our gratitude for what the American government is doing for the liberation of the Soviet Jewry. It is a great battle, and we are certain that these American efforts will be fruitful.

Then, of course, we have expressed our worries about the coming cuts in the American budget. We would like that this problem is solved for the benefit of the United States, and we have also our own worries about it because we need this very important and vital assistance that serves the interests of the free world and the United States.

Q What did the President say when you raised that concern?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, he is also concerned about it, and he has his struggle, and we hope he will win.

Q What is your view of the Arab summit that was just held?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, there is some different assessments about this summit. There is some signs of moderation, and I think that the impact of the American activity in the Persian Gulf was very clear in this summit, and the upper end (?) was -- belongs to all these moderate countries that are working together with the United States. We have seen in this summit a very important -- a very clear weakness of the PLO and the other extreme Arab countries, and on the other end, this decision to resume relations with Egypt by the Arab countries, in spite of the fact that Egypt continues to respect and to keep the peace treaty with Israel, is also a sign of some moderation and acceptance of the facts of life.

Q Mr. Shamir, did you talk about the possibility of a summit between Jordan, Syria and Israel?

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
COPYRIGHT (C) 1987, FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

✱

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: No, I have not raised now this problem. I will discuss the situation in the Middle East and all the details in my talks today with the Secretary of State.

Q Is there a proposal for such a summit at the same time as the Reagan-Gorbachev summit?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: We will discuss all the possibilities. Thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

484
3
3

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
COPYRIGHT (C) 1987, FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

*

ס. נ. פ. ס. מ. ב. ד. ק

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור

דחופות מייד

תאריך/ז"ח 1415 20 בנוב' 87

מס' מברק

1/2

396

491

המשרד + נא 76810

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א

דע: לשכת מנכ"ל האוצר; מל"ח, נא 76810
ציר, ציר כלכלי, נספח צה"ל.

קונגרס: שיחות תקציביות

לשלנו 345 (למצפ"א ולשכת מנכ"ל אוצר)

א-כללי

1) לשעת תבוא מברק זה (14.00, שעות מקומי) נראה שיש סוף היום (20.11) יושג הסכם בשיחות החקציביות בין הקונגרס והבית הלבן. עם זאת, הקיצוצים האוטומטיים בתקציב (ה-SEQUESTER) ייכנסו לתוקף מלא בחצות.

2) למשך כחודש ימים (מאז המפולת בבורסה) דנו נציגי שני בתי המחוקקים עם נציגי הממשל על פרכים לקצץ את התקציב הפדרלי בסך מינימלי של 23 בליון דולר ע"מ למנוע הפעלה מנגנון ה-SEQUESTER. חרף האיתנות החמורים מהבורסות ברחבי חבל, שכש' לון בשיחות אלה, 1.8.87 - גרוע מזה, השיחות התקדמו בעצלתיים ונתקלו בקשיים רבים - וזאת בעיקר בשל סיבוך פוליטי: הונגדות הנשיא והמפלגה הרפובליקאית למסים חדשים מזה, ורתיעת הדמוקרטים מלגעה במענקי הסעד והרנוחה, ואף לשבור את שיטת ההצמדות (COLA) מזה. אף על פי כן, לובנו מספר עמדות יסוד בשיחות - כגון הצורך לסכם תכנית קיצוצים שבמשך השנתיים הקרובות תביא לצמצום הגרעון הפדרלי ב-80-70 בליון דולר; שהקיצוצים האלה יהיו אמיתיים, ולא "משחקי חשבונאות"; שאין לשנות את שעורי המס שנקבעו בחוק המס החדש דאשתקד (1986), ועוד. המשתתפים בשיחות התקשו לתרגם עמדות אלה למספרים קונקרטיים - בין היתר בגלל אי-נכונות הנשיא לערב את עצמו בפרטי הדיון ולגלות גמישות מהתחלה, רק אתמול (19.11) הוביע רביגן בפעם הראשונה שיהיה מוכן לתמוך בפשרה החקציבית המסתמנת, "אשר לא יספק כל מה שרצייתי ואף לא כל מה שהקונגרס רצה", כדבריו.

3) כעת צפוי שעוד הינם יסתיימו השיחות בפירסום "הסכם" בנוסח "הצהרת כוונות" ו-"קביעת עקרונות". צפוי גם שה-"הסכם" יצביע על קיצוצים ב-1988 בסדר גודל של 30 בליון דולר (11 מליון ק"ה הכנסות חדשות"; 8 בליון ממכירת נכסים; 6 בליון מקיצוצים מתכונות. 1987; 4.9 -

ש"ח 76810 + נא 76810

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מתוך דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

481
386
2/2

בליון מחקציב הבטחון). בשלב זה לא יפרטמו המספרים החדשים לסעיפים הראשיים בהקציב, אך באשר לפונקציה 150 (עניינים בין-לאומיים) אנו קולטים שמועות (מבוססות, ככל הנראה) כאילו הוחלט להגביל את הקיצוץ בסעיף זה ל-600 מליון דולר (פירוש הדבר, להקטין את גודל הקיצוץ לנוכח הקיצוצים העמוקים שסעיף זה ספג בשנתיים האחרונות).

ב-החטריט לצעדים הבאים:

1) לפי חוק גרהם-רודמן, עומדים לרשות המחוקקים 10 ימי עבודה (LEGISLATIVE DAYS) בהם ניתן לבטל את ה-SEQUESTER ולהחליפו בסיכומים אחרים שישיגו את הקיצוץ בגרעון המתבקש ל-1988 (23 בליון דולר). אי-לכך, חוזים לויז כדלקמן:

א- יוצאים לפגרה (לרגל "יום ההודיה") מה-20 ועד ה-30 בנובמבר.

ב- יחזילו לספור את "ימי העבודה" מהראשון בדצמבר, ובמהלכם חברי ועדות התקציב בשני הבתים יתבקשו לקבוע את "התקרות" החדשות לסעיפים הראשיים בתקציב, בעוד שחברי ועדות ההקצבות יכינו את ה-APPROPRIATIONS השונים (לרבות תקציב הבטחון וסיוע חוץ), שיאומצו לתוך החלטת ההמשך (CONTINUING RESOLUTION) לשת"א 1988.

ג- כעת המשרדים הממשלתיים מתפקדים בכוח "החלטת המשך קצרה" שהיא תקפה עד ה-15.12. המטרה היא איפוא להפוך את ההסכם העקרוני שיודיעו עליו היום לשפת המעשה במחצית הראשונה של דצמבר, ואף להעביר את החלטת ההמשך ליתרת השנה התקציבית 1988 (שתיגמר ב-30.9.1988) עד ה-15 בחודש. אם יעשו זאת, ה-SEQUESTER יתבטל מעצמו.

ד- קיים עוד מפלט טכני, שבמידת הצורך יאפשר למחוקקים להמשיך לעבוד עד ה-22 בדצמבר (ועד בכלל) בכדי לבטל את ה-SEQUESTER, אך אין זה המקום לפרט אותו, וכאמור כיום היעד הוא להשלים את המלאכה התקציבית עד ה-15.12. פירוש הדבר, שבועיים מפרכים למדי בחחילת דצמבר (עת הפיסגה עם גורבצ'וב וביקור שר הבטחון).

למדו
נס

UNITED NATIONS

0667

2/8

S



Security Council

Distr. GENERAL

S/19263
13 November 1987

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE

(for the period 18 May-13 November 1987)

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
INTRODUCTION	1
I. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE	2 - 9
A. Composition and command	2 - 4
B. Deployment	5 - 7
C. Rotation.....	8
D. Discipline	9
II. LOGISTICS	10
III. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE	11 - 19
A. Functions and guidelines	11 - 12
B. Freedom of movement	13
C. Maintenance of the cease-fire	14
D. Supervision of the Agreement on Disengagement with regard to the areas of separation and limitation	15 - 17
E. Mines	18
F. Humanitarian activities	19

/...

CONTENTS (continued)

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS	20
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 (1973)	21 - 22
VI. OBSERVATIONS	23 - 26
<u>Map.</u> UNDOF deployment as of November 1987	

4/8

0667

INTRODUCTION

1. This report describes the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) for the period 18 May to 13 November 1987. Its purpose is to provide the Security Council with an account of the activities of UNDOF in pursuance of the mandate entrusted to it by the Council in resolution 350 (1974) of 31 May 1974 and extended by subsequent resolutions, most recently by resolution 596 (1987) of 29 May 1987.

I. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE

A. Composition and command

2. The composition of UNDOF as of 5 November 1987 was as follows:

Austria	531
Canada	227
Finland	410
Poland	<u>155</u>
	<u>1 323</u>
United Nations military observers (detailed from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization)	<u>7</u>
	<u>1 330</u>

3. In addition to the above, observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) assigned to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission assist UNDOF as the occasion requires.

4. Command of the Force continues to be exercised by Major-General Gustaf Welin.

B. Deployment

5. UNDOF personnel remain deployed within and close to the area of separation, with base camps and logistic units located nearby; UNDOF headquarters is located at Damascus. The UNDOF deployment as of November 1987 is shown on the attached map.

6. At present, the Austrian battalion mans 19 positions and 7 outposts and conducts 28 patrols daily at irregular intervals on predetermined routes in the area of separation north and inclusive of the Damascus-Quneitra road. The Finnish battalion mans 16 positions and 7 outposts and conducts 27 patrols daily at irregular intervals in the area of separation south of the Damascus-Quneitra road. In the area of separation or in its close vicinity, 11 observation posts are manned by UNTSO military observers under the operational control of UNDOF.

/...

7. The Austrian battalion base camp is located near Wadi Faouar, 8 kilometres east of the area of separation. The Finnish battalion base camp is located near the village of Ziouani, west of the area of separation. The Austrian battalion continues to share its base camp with the Polish logistic unit, and the Finnish battalion shares Camp Ziouani with the Canadian logistic company. The Canadian signal unit has detachments at Camps Ziouani and Faouar as well as at Damascus and Quneitra. Military police detachments are located at Damascus, Tiberias and Camp Ziouani.

C. Rotation

8. The Austrian contingent carried out partial rotations on 2 and 11 June and on 3 and 10 September 1987. The Finnish contingent rotated partially on 19 August 1987. The Polish logistic unit rotated on 1 and 10 June 1987. The Canadian logistic unit rotated partially on 15 and 22 June and on 15 and 22 September 1987.

D. Discipline

9. The discipline, steadfastness and understanding of all members of the Force have been of a high order, reflecting credit on the soldiers and their commanders as well as on the countries contributing contingents to the Force.

II. LOGISTICS

10. Second- and third-line logistic support continues to be provided by the Canadian and Polish logistic units. The Damascus international airport continues to serve as the UNDOF airhead for rotation. The ports of Latakia and Tartous are used for sea shipments. An air movement control organization operates at Damascus, and sea shipments are handled by local agents. In-theatre air support is provided by UNTSO on special request.

III. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

A. Functions and guidelines

11. The functions and guidelines of UNDOF as well as its tasks remain as outlined in the Secretary-General's report of 27 November 1974. 1/

12. UNDOF has continued, with the co-operation of the parties, to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it. This has been facilitated by the close contact maintained by the Force Commander and his staff with the military liaison staffs of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic.

B. Freedom of movement

13. The Protocol to the Agreement on Disengagement provides for all contingents to operate with the freedom of movement that is necessary for their mission; however, the problem of restrictions on the freedom of movement still exists. The Secretary-General will continue to exert all possible efforts to correct this situation.

C. Maintenance of the cease-fire

14. UNDOF continues to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. The cease-fire has been maintained and there have been no serious incidents during the period under review.

D. Supervision of the Agreement on Disengagement with regard to the areas of separation and limitation

15. UNDOF continues to supervise the area of separation to ensure, in accordance with its mandate, that there are no military forces within it. This is carried out by means of static positions and observation posts, which are manned 24 hours a day, and by foot and mobile patrols operating at irregular intervals on predetermined routes by day and night. In addition, temporary outposts are established and patrols are conducted from time to time to perform specific tasks. Under a programme undertaken by the Syrian authorities (see S/17177, para. 17), civilians have continued to return to the area of separation. UNDOF has adjusted its operations accordingly so as to carry out effectively its supervisory tasks under the Agreement on Disengagement.

16. In accordance with the terms of the Agreement on Disengagement, UNDOF continues to conduct fortnightly inspections of armament and forces in the area of limitation. These inspections are carried out with the assistance of liaison officers from the parties, who accompany the inspection teams. UNDOF also lends its assistance and good offices on request from the parties. In carrying out its tasks, UNDOF has continued to receive the co-operation of both parties, although restrictions on movement and inspection are placed on its teams in certain areas by both sides. UNDOF continues to seek the lifting of these restrictions so as to guarantee its freedom of access to all locations on both sides.

17. The safety of Syrian shepherds who graze their flocks close to and west of the A-line (see map) continues to be of concern to UNDOF. The intensified patrolling of new mine-cleared patrol paths and, from time to time, the establishment of standing patrols in these areas have helped to prevent incidents. The grazing security fence in the southern part of the area of separation has continued to be effective in reducing the number of incidents. New patrol paths along the A-line are under construction in the area of separation.

E. Mines

18. Mines continue to pose a threat to members of the Force and to the growing population in the area of separation. The Force is continuing its efforts, in consultation with the parties, to make the area of operation safe from mines. During the period under review, four Polish mine-clearing teams cleared a total area of 39,325 square metres. They found and destroyed 11 anti-tank mines, 4 anti-personnel mines, 18 artillery shells, 10 hand-grenades, 78 mortar rounds and 2 anti-tank rounds, as well as large quantities of small-arms ammunition and fuses. Another 6,250 square metres of patrol tracks were rechecked.

F. Humanitarian activities

19. During the reporting period, UNDOF assisted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with facilities for handing over parcels and mail and for the passage of persons and personal effects across the area of separation.

IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

20. As indicated in paragraph 9 of the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly of 13 October 1987, 2/ the costs of UNDOF beyond 30 November 1987 are estimated at \$2,944,000 gross (\$2,893,000 net) per month, should the Security Council renew its mandate beyond that date and assuming continuance of its existing strength and responsibilities.

V. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 (1973)

21. In deciding, in its resolution 596 (1987), to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months, the Security Council also called upon the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973), and requested the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of the period, a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement that resolution.

22. The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and, in particular, the efforts undertaken at various levels to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973) have been dealt with in the Secretary-General's report on the situation in the Middle East, 3/ submitted in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 41/162 A of 4 December 1986. The Secretary-General has continued to maintain contacts on the matter with the parties and interested Governments.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

23. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, which was established in May 1974 to supervise the cease-fire called for by the Security Council and the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces of 31 May 1974, has continued to perform its functions effectively, with the co-operation of the

parties. During the period under review, the situation in the Israel-Syria sector has remained quiet and there have been no serious incidents.

24. Despite the present quiet in the Israel-Syria sector, the situation in the Middle East as a whole continues to be potentially dangerous and is likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached. I continue to hope that determined efforts will be made by all concerned to tackle the problem in all its aspects, with a view to arriving at a just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973).

25. In the prevailing circumstances, I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, until 31 May 1988. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has given its assent to the proposed extension. The Government of Israel has also expressed its agreement.

26. In concluding the present report, I wish to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops to UNDOF and to those which provide UNTSO military observers assigned to the Force. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to Major-General Gustaf Welin, Commander of the Force, to the officers and men of the Force, to its civilian staff and to the UNTSO military observers assigned to UNDOF. They have performed with exemplary efficiency and devotion to duty the important tasks assigned to them by the Security Council.

Notes

1/ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1974, document S/11563, paras. 8-10.

2/ A/42/642.

3/ A/42/714-S/19249.

*

ת"ח: מילדי סוג כספתי: סודי תז"ח: 2015 -	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	ר"מ: 1 מחור: 2
נר: 0670		א.ל.: המשור ד.ע.: מאת: נאו"ם

אל : ארבל 2
 דע : ממ"ר פריפריה : מצרים
 מאת : יששכרוף

שיחה עם קמרון הום (ארה"ב) ואכול גהייט (מצרים)

המפרץ

- הום מוסר שלפי דיווחי מודיעין של ארצו, ניכרת תנועה והזזת כוחות איראנים ועירקים משני עברי הגבול לכיוון הדרום. להערכתם, צפויה ההתקפה לקראת סוף דצמבר באיזור כצרה. בינתיים אין התפתחות משמעותית במישור מאמצי המזכ"ל לקדם פתרון מדיני בין הצדדים.
- דו"ח המזכ"ל על מצב במז"ח: הום סיפר שנודע להם ממקור בכיר במזכירות, שאש"ף והסובייטים מחו בפני המזכ"ל על הדו"ח הנ"ל, שהופץ אתמול. כנראה, הסובייטים אינם סבורים שמגמת המזכ"ל המשתמעת מהדו"ח, עולה בקנה אחד עם החלטות העצרת השונות בסוגיה. מכל מקום, סבור הום כי הדו"ח היה יחסית מתון ולא ישמש בסיס להחרפת הדיון השנח בעצרת סביב נושא הועידה הבינ"ל. בשלב זה, נכנס לשיחה אכול גהייט (מצרים) אשר ציין שאין להוציא מכלל אפשרות שלנוכח דו"ח המזכ"ל יהיה נסיון מצד אש"ף לחזק (להחריף) את לשון ההחלטה על הועידה הבינ"ל בשאלת פלסטין (דבר שלא דווקא לרעתנו).
- אכול גהייט :

בשיחה נפרדת עם אכול גהייט, האיש היה כמובן מאד זוהר מהאירועים בשבוע החולף לאחר חירוש היחסים עם מצרים, שכינה, החזרת העולם הערבי לארצו. עם זאת, ציין כי לולא מצרים הייתה מקבלת הסיוע האמריקני למשך אותו עשר שנים, היא לא הייתה מסוגלת להחזיק מעמד וכל עוד סיוע זה יתקיים, תוכל מצרים לעמוד איחנה על עקרונותיה מול שאר מדינות ערב. ציין החשיבות שישראל ומצרים יפעלו יחד על מנת לשמור על סיוע זה. כן חזר על השקפתו שהשמיע בשיחתו האחרונה, על כמה שישראל חייבת לעשות "REASSESSMENT" של תנאי האיזור ויחסה למדינות ערב לעומת יחסה למדינות הפריפריה, קרי איראן.



תאריך:	שם השולח:	אישור:
1	2	3
3	1	3

1/1
 4/3
 4
 1

דף: 2	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	חטיפוח:
מחור: 2		סוג כסחונני:
א ל:		תז"ח:
ד ע:		נר: 0670
מאח:		

הזכיר הדוגמא, שבזמנו, כאשר נודע למודיעין הישראלי על חוכניות להחנקש
 בנשיא סאדאת, החליט רח"מ בגין דאז להעביר את המידע ישירות למצרים במקום
 באמצעות האמריקנים. (יוזכר שבשיחתנו האחרונה דיבר על אפשרות סיוע מודיעיני
 ישראלי לעירק). השבתי לגבי רישומנו מתוצאות פסגת רבת עמון, תוך הדגשת
 העובדה, שחידוש היחסים עם מצרים, מצדיק, בדיעבד הדרך של שלום שבחרת.

נאו"ם

תאריך: 20.11.87 שם השולח: ג' יטשכרוף אישור:

05:04

טוסס מברק

דף 1 מחוד דפים

סווג בטחוני גלרי

דחיסות מידי

תאריך/זייח 1400 20 נוב 87

מס' מברק

1/2


495

המשרד

אל :- מצפויא, מעיח
דע :- לשכת רה"מ

בקר רה"מ

להלו חדרור לעתונאים של ריצ'ארד מרפי עם חום שיחות רה"מ והנשיא רייגן.

 יוסי גל

3 רה"מ
1 שהקט
3 אמ"ש
1 אמ"ש
1 האמ"ש
4 האמ"ש
1-3-1 דם
4 אמ"ש
1 קטן
2 אמ"ש
3 רה"מ
1 שהקט
2 אמ"ש
1 אמ"ש
1-3-1 דם
4 אמ"ש
1 קטן
2 אמ"ש

WHITE HOUSE BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON THE VISIT OF ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1987
10:30 A.M., EST

495
2/9

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: (In progress) ... The briefer will be
****. This briefing is on background.

Q Why is it on background?

Q Why isn't it on the record? We want the briefing on the record.

Q What is wrong with that?

Q Why isn't the briefer able to talk on the record?

Q That is absolutely --

Q See, this briefing is being boycotted by three major news organizations because it's not on the record. Boycotted --

Q Are you afraid to have your name on what you say today?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, not afraid. But, I welcome any boycott of my presence.

Q But you won't upstage the President, I assure you.
(Laughter.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The last thing from my thoughts.

All right. This was a relatively brief meeting between Prime Minister Shamir and the President. The President was accompanied by Secretary Shultz, Mr. Carlucci, and the Prime Minister by his personal staff and, of course, the Ambassador of Israel. The subjects covered included our policy in the Persian Gulf; covered the question of Soviet Jewry, our efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry; comments on the recently concluded Arab summit; comments sharing mutual concerns about our respective deficits; and -- let's see, those are the general components.

The Prime Minister, I believe outside, made a remark about our Persian Gulf policy, that he had agreed with our efforts in the Gulf. He was most explicit about that in the private meeting. He thought that that had had -- that the stand the United States has taken in the Gulf made the message very clear to the Arab states that what concerned -- when it is a matter concerning their own stability, they can rely on the United States. He thought that this had influenced positions taken by Arab leaders at the Arab summit.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 2-1

WH BKRD/SHAMIR VISIT-11/20/87 2-1

He expressed appreciation to the President for our support for direct negotiation as the way of getting to peace. And, well, there was a brief exchange on the upcoming US-Soviet summit.

Soviet Jewry; the President said this remained a major subject in our discussions with the Soviets, that we do hold very strongly to the principle of freedom of choice, in keeping with our commitments at Helsinki, not that this was in any sense designed to interfere with the emigration direct to Israel.

Let's see -- (pauses) -- in terms of Arab summit, of course, both expressed great pleasure at the return to diplomatic relations between -- I guess it is now eight Arab states and Egypt.

Those were the -- that was the range of the topics covered. (to staff) Have I missed anything?

Q Do you know anything about a report that Silkworm missiles from China to Iran reached there by being transhipped through Israel arms dealers? China has maintained publicly that it never shipped -- that it never sold missiles to Iran. And there's a report that in fact, China had been selling the missile to Israeli arms dealers who then resold them to Iran. Is that correct?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, I'm not familiar with that particular report. The President did express his pleasure at the categorical statements by the Israeli leadership, that they were not engaged -- that Israel was not engaged in arms trafficking with Iran.

Q Well, that -- I take it that --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: But this particular report, I don't know.

Q (off-mike) -- the Israeli government?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, we have spoken very directly, very bluntly to the Israeli government, and through the Israeli government, we -- they have told us that they have checked out, to the extent they can, as far as they can, their private citizens who are engaged in arms sales, as arms agents, and that there is no ongoing traffic that is against government policy and there's no ongoing traffic.

Q So you think --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: They can't rule it out as a 100 percent

CONTINUED ON PAGE 3-1

695 4/9

WH BKRD/SHAMIR VISIT-11/20/87

guarantee that there aren't some private citizens involved in fencing -- fencing arms.

Q Would you take that to be a representation as far as the government can ascertain, private arms dealers are not engaging in what I suggested --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yes, they -- they told us they had made a very serious, very far-ranging effort with those citizens. And these are known to the government because they are licensed to deal. Now there are other citizens perhaps, who are free -- entirely free lancers, that they don't have knowledge of.

Q Is there a suggestion in the works for a sort of Israeli-Jordanian-Syrian meeting within the context of the US-Soviet summit?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, there are no plans. No plans for that.

Q Was this discussed at all? And what exactly was discussed about the upcoming Soviet meeting with Gorbachev?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: On the latter part of the question, what was -- it was an expression of support for the President's success as he headed into the meetings with the General Secretary. There wasn't any detail other than the President assuring the Prime Minister that we would follow, as always, the issue of the emigration of Soviet Jewry, and the right to pursue a life in freedom within the Soviet Union if they don't choose to emigrate. But in the first --

Q The topic of the international Peace Conference, and how the Soviets -- what role they would play, that was not discussed this morning?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: It was not discussed this morning. I assume that there'll be a number of -- of that issue of the meetings will come up with the Secretary in his longer sessions later today.

Q When you said that there were direct -- that the President spoke of direct talks between Israel and the Arab States, did the President try to move him off of dead center against this conference?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: There wasn't any discussion of that -- of the conference and how to move ahead. Our commitment to move things ahead and --

Q You said direct talks. Did the President buy his idea of only having direct talks?



WH BKRD/BHAMIR VISIT-11/20/87

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That wasn't -- that was not debated between the two of them. But the President did assure him we were going to keep our efforts going and find a way to get to the direct negotiations, which we do think is the only way to go.

Q Can you confirm the report that Dr. Webster has terminated intelligence sharing

495 5
8

CONTINUED ON 4-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
COPYRIGHT (C) 1987, FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

*

with Israel -- CIA intelligence sharing?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I know of no such report that we've terminated intelligence or not. Other than that --

Q (Inaudible.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: -- there is no termination of intelligence sharing with with Israel. No.

Q You say categorically there is no termination --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: There is no termination.

Q Do you have a way of assessing whether the US policy of keeping the Gulf open for shipping has increased Iran's ability to ship and take in revenues and prosecute the -- (inaudible). Is that a side effect? Is there any way of measuring that?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That's hard, and it's hard to conclude -- for the 6-week period back last July, August, when the Iraqis stood down from their attacks on the tankers, the Iranian revenues went up. Now, the Iraqis -- after a 6-week standdown, they resumed, and I don't think that the presence of our fleet and the allied units in the Gulf has affected Iranian income positively or negatively. But it was, yes. They had a free run for those six months -- six weeks, but not after that.

Q Back to the international conference. Was there ever a serious idea discussed for having King Hussein and Prime Minister Shamir come to meet in Washington during the Reagan-Gorbachev summit?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well --

Q It was reported in the Israeli press.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I've seen those reports. However, there are no plans for such --

Q Was it true?

Q Was it ever discussed? Was the idea ever discussed?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I can't think of an idea that hasn't been discussed on the Middle East.

Q So I guess, yes, it was discussed?

Q Does the administration --

Q Can I have an answer to that question, please?

495 7
P

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: He shook his head.

Q You're saying that, yes, it was discussed?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: We've had a lot of ideas. We don't get into paternity suits at the department.

Q Does the administration see what former-President Jimmy Carter is doing in Atlanta in trying to get representatives of several Mideastern countries to come there to I'm not quite sure what, but to hammer out some sort of an agreement, as being an interference in the conduct of US foreign policy?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No. Nothing at all. The -- President Carter(?) has held now two major conferences. I think the first was two years ago -- two or three years ago. That is a very serious forum for airing views of

CONTINUED ON PAGE 5-1

LPS 8/8

not only the parties in the region, but of a number of European countries. I think, on this occasion, there was, in fact, one panel involving not official members of the governments in each case, but they spoke as five -- representing the five permanent members' views at the Security Council. You had a Chinese representative, Soviet representative, US, French --

Q Are you not now contemplating -- I'm sorry --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: -- ventilating ideas, debating out in public, as -- in that forum that President Carter has organized, is a plus.

Q I understand the kind of forum you just outlined. But is he not now contemplating -- at least I thought he said publicly -- some convocation in which government officials actually come to see if they can't solve some of their differences -- in a serious negotiating stance.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I wasn't down there. Is this something that came out of --

Q I may be wrong. I'm not quite clear.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I know President Carter has, each time, invited senior members of the government, some were able to come, some were not. In the case of each of the governments this time, I think their representatives were at least by their ambassador. But I don't believe he's seen it as an effort to, in any sense, to cross wires with the administration. He sees it --

Q He's not communicated with the Speaker and Central America? (Laughter.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: President Carter has seen it as a way to have some cross-fertilization of ideas, and to -- it's a very important educational forum on Middle Eastern issues, as he designs it.

Q Why is Shamir here?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Shamir was -- his visit was some months back scheduled, to address a major conference down in Miami, which he did last night. And, the visit with the President, the meetings with the Secretary, were arranged several weeks back. But the initial point in his schedule was to address the Miami conference.

MODERATOR: One more from further back there.

Q Thank you. The Speaker of the Iranian parliament, I believe Rafsanjani, is quoted as saying that his country is working on a defense treaty

CONTINUED ON PAGE 6-1

485 8/8

with the Soviets, or there are some negotiations. Did that come up today, either in context of your discussions on the Gulf or the Gorbachev visit, and is it true?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: It didn't come up today. The President spoke very strongly about our policy in the Gulf as designed to assist the moderate forces in the region, and to defend against Iranian expansionism. There has been what some of us call "a flirtation" between Tehran and Moscow over the last several months. You are seeing efforts to open up economic projects, senior level visits back and forth that, in fact, have (out?) the gap between the Soviets and the Iranians and most of their policies as manifest towards all.

But the Iranians are interested in facing down the pressures in the Gulf today, obviously, they are trying to court the Soviets today, and we very much hope that isn't going prove to be a successful effort. We think that staying together with the Soviets and others of the permanent five in the Security Council in getting the diplomatic process into a, for instance, specifically a second resolution, is the way to go.

Q But are there formal discussions that you are aware of --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Not that I'm --

Q -- defense?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: About a defense treaty, not that I'm aware of.

Thank you very much.

END OF BRIEFING



2c

1038
90/130

MTZ57.PRT

סודי/מיידי

ע.ב.ש.

1699

רושינגטון.

השגריר.הציר.

הממונה הירוז היה אצל בילין והעלה הנושאים הבאים:-

1. מוברק עואד : הגיש NON-PAPER כדלקמן:

-- WE ARE DISMAYED BY GOI LOGIC IN ACTING AGAINST MUBARAK AWAD.

מסומן
[

-- IN SEEKING TO EXPEL AWAD, THE GOI LENDS SUPPORT TO CHARGES THAT ARABS ARE PUNISHED FOR THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS, EVEN WHEN THEY ADVOCATE NON-VIOLENCE, AND THAT ISRAEL APPLIES DIFFERENT STANDARDS TO FORMER RESIDENTS BASED ON THEIR ETHNIC BACKGROUNDS.

-- THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-VIOLENCE IS DEEPLY RESPECTED THROUGHOUT THE CIVILIZED WORLD.

-- PUNISHING MODERATE, NON-VIOLENT LEADERS FRUSTRATES THEIR POTENTIAL ADHERENTS AND GREATLY ENHANCES THE APPEAL OF THE RADICALS.

-- WE STRONGLY URGE THAT NO HASTY ACTION BE TAKEN TO FORCE MUBARAK AWAD TO LEAVE JERUSALEM, ISRAEL OR THE WEST BANK. TO DO SO WILL STRENGTHEN THE PERCEPTION THAT HE IS BEING SINGLED OUT FOR EXPULSION BECAUSE OF HIS POLITICAL BELIEFS.

-- THE FACT THAT AWAD WAS GIVEN LESS THAN 72 HOURS TO LEAVE, THE POSSIBLE MISDIRECTION OF THE LETTER OF NOTIFICATION TO HIM NOTWITHSTANDING, IS UNREASONABLE.

-- WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE EXPLANATIONS WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN THUS FAR FOR EXPELLING AWAD AND ASK THAT YOU DESIGNATE AN APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL TO DISCUSS AWAD'S CASE FURTHER WITH US PRIOR TO ANY ACTION BEING TAKEN AGAINST HIM.





- 2 -

בקש לדחות את הגרוש שנועד להיום 20/11. טען שההודעה על אי הארכת רשיון שהותו הגיעה לביתו באחור בגלל טעות של הדואר.

יש להותיר זמן לדיון בינינו בנושא. ספר שאמר דברים דומים לשהב"ט שהפנה אותו למפנים. היוז טען שהענין יוצר אורה ביקורתית בושינגטון שעלולה לפגוע בבקורו של רה"מ. הברקנו הדברים לרה"מ.

2. היוז ספר כי העלה עם שהב"ט נושא דו"ח ועדת לנדוי ונוהלי פתיחה באש בשטחים ואת התחושה בושינגטון שיש שמוש רב מדי באש חיה. שהב"ט אמר (לדברי היוז) כי הוא בודק אפשרות של משפטים חוזרים בכמה מקרים בעקבות דו"ח לנדוי.

3. נושאים אחרים שעלו בשיחה:

א. התחושה שועידת עמאן חיזקה את המלך וכך גם את הלגיטימציה שלו בשטחים.

ב. עלו שיחות ויטהד, שיפטר, ארמקוסט עם הרוסים והתחושה שהרוסים מפיצים את הגרסה שארה"ב היא זו שאינה מעוניינת בקידום התהליך. היוז ספר שהבריקו לשיפטר מספר שמות של יהודים שכדאי שיתענין בהם במיוחד בשעת בקורו.

4. סכר המקרון:

היוז ספר שהם שריינו כסף להתקנת מכשיר מדידה קבוע לכמויות המים אך הצד הישראלי נראה עתה כמתנגד למדידה כזו. אמר שלדעתם חשובה המדידה ליצירת אמון הדדי. ביילין אמר שנבדוק.

5. לבסוף אמר היוז שהם שמחים על תוצאות דו"ח אירן וכי אין ליחס חשיבות רבה מדי לדו"ח המעוט שכל תכליתו "להרים קצת אבק".

עד כאן.

מנהל מצפ"א
20 בנובמבר 1987



Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including the number '2' and various illegible scribbles.

מילדי	חיפות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	ר: 1
סוג כטחוני:	שמור		מת: 2
תז"ח:	2019-	א ל : מע"ת, מצפ"א	
נר : 0675 93-811 בטחון - 44		ד ע : יועץ תקשורת לרה"מ, יועץ תקשורת לשהב"ס, לע"מ, דו"צ, קש"ח וושינגטון, רמשי"ן ניו יורק	
		מאת : עתונות, ניו-יורק	

דו"ח תקשורת 20/11/87

דומה שלאחר תקופה ארוכה של שקט שבה התקשורת לעסוק בעניינינו. הסיפור המרכזי מכינתנו השבוע לא היה פרסום דו"ח פרשת איראן-קונטראס. אמנם קיבלנו מספר מצומצם של קריאות טלפוניות אך לא נחבקשנו כלל להגיב, אלא "לחלק מחשבות" עם בני שיחנו. בדרך כלל עולים השבחים להם זכתה ישראל בדו"ח, אך יש גם נימת ביקורת. עורך בכיר כ-"ניוזוויק", למשל, הזכיר לי השבוע שבעבר כינה ככתבה שלו את ישראל בשם-"THE TEFLON COUNTRY", שכן דבר אינו דבק בה.

דו"ח הועדות לא עלה, למשל, כשיחת התדרוך שקיים רה"ם עם צמרת השבועון "ניוזוויק", אם כי עלה, בין שאר הנושאים, בארוחת הבוקר עם בכירי התקשורת למחרת. גם ב-GOOD MORNING AMERICA פתחה המראיינת, ג'ון לנדן, בשתי שאלות מנומסות על הדו"ח, אך עברה מיד לדון בנושא התהליך המדיני.

הדו"ח מצליף בממשל ובנשיא בעיקר; מאמרי המערכת עויינים לנשיא מאד (למעט נצח מהיום), וכאמור ישראל אינה לוקה במיוחד. אולם כמה מכני שיחי הצביעו (מי בדאגה ומי בצפיה מסויימת) על הסכנה הטמונה בדו"ח עבורנו. קשירתנו הטוטאלית עם ממשל כושל ומכשיל עלולה להיות לנו לרועץ, יותר מעצם מעורבותנו החלקית כפרשה עצמה.

התהליך המדיני הוא נושא לו נדרשת התקשורת תדירות, כמידה משתנה של עניין. כעת גבר העניין לאחר פסגת עמאן ונצחון המתונים. מאמרי המערכת לא אחרו לציין את המשמעות שיש לשיבת מצרים לגבי המשך התהליך. ההתעניינות בנושא גברה לאחר ראיונו של אבא אבן לתום פרידמן ולקראת ביקור רה"מ. יש באויר ציפיה מישראל, שבאה לידי ביטוי, למשל, בכתבת CBS אתמול שצטטה עתונים ישראליים לפיהם חלה הגמשה בעמדת רה"מ.

ובהקשר זה, יום העשור לביקור סאדאת עבר בקול ענות חלושה. על אף עניין ראשוני שהביעו עורכי עמודי המערכת ככל עתוניה של ניו יורק, ארציים כמקומיים, לכתוב לציין התאריך, הרי שבסופו של דבר לא עשה זאת איש עד כה. הסיבה לכך היא כמובן פרסום דו"ח ועדות הקונגרס יום קודם לכן.

212

תאריך: 20.11.87 שם השולח: ב. כינה אישור:

7+1+1021 פה תפוצת נא לאטמאט

0675 / 93/44

2/2

באמור, התקשורת שבה לעסוק בנו ובעניינים שונים. הספור המרכזי השבוע, שאף עלה כעת ארוחת הצהרים של רה"מ במערכת "ניוזוויק", היה הכתבה שפורסמה ב-VILLAGE VOICE (אותה הברקנו בו ביום) המצטטת מסמך FBI לפיו איננו משתפים פעולה עם ה-FBI כחקירת אנשי JDL בקשר לרצח אלקס עודה כקליפורניה לפני כשנתיים ומחצה. הכתב, רוברט פרידמן, בוגר האוניברסיטה האמריקנית בביירות, מוכר לנו אישית כאדם הנעול לרעיון הוקעתה של ישראל מעל כל במה אפשרית. יוזכר הסיפור שכתב בשעתו בירחון "MOTHER JONES" על הדרך בה 'מזפעלים' קציני העתונות של ישראל את התקשורת האמריקנית. לרוע המזל הוא מקובל בחוגים רבים כמומחה לענייני ישראל וזוכה לאמינות גם בעתונים רציניים כגון THE NATION או COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW. בדרך כלל הוא מנהיג את הסלור השנתי שמקיים ה-NATION לישראל. אולם, דמותו של הכתב היא משנית כעת שכן עד כה נבצר מאתנו להגיב סובסטנטיבית. הדבר מצער שבעתיים שכן האיש בא בדברים עם אנשי משטרה ומשרד המשפטים, ולו היינו מתבשרים על כך מפיהם כי אז יכולנו, אולי, להעריך מראש למתן תגובה הולמת ובזמן מתאים. סיפור מבראק עוואד הולך ותופס תאוצה ויש לחשוש ממצוקה תקשורתית בנושא בקרוב, שנ הכתבות מהארץ הן לחלוטין אוהדות לאיש, לתורתו ולבעייתו. (בוב סיימון השווה אותו אתמול ב-CBS לגנדי, ואותנו לבריטים). השורה התחתונה הנשארת אצל הצופה היא שהאיש מגורש מישראל כשל היותו אזרח אמריקני, וכן שישראל אינה מסוגלת להתמודד עם "איום השלום". קונוטציה בעייתית נוספת היא שיהודים אמריקנים מופלים לטובה על פני אמריקנים אחרים.

ברוך כינה

UNITED NATIONS

0667

2/3

S



Security Council

Distr. GENERAL

S/19263
13 November 1987

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE

(for the period 18 May-13 November 1987)

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
INTRODUCTION	1
I. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE	2 - 9
A. Composition and command	2 - 4
B. Deployment	5 - 7
C. Rotation.....	8
D. Discipline	9
II. LOGISTICS	10
III. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE	11 - 19
A. Functions and guidelines	11 - 12
B. Freedom of movement	13
C. Maintenance of the cease-fire	14
D. Supervision of the Agreement on Disengagement with regard to the areas of separation and limitation	15 - 17
E. Mines	18
F. Humanitarian activities	19

/...

CONTENTS (continued)

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS	20
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 (1973)	21 - 22
VI. OBSERVATIONS	23 - 26
<u>Map.</u> UNDOF deployment as of November 1987	

4/8

0667

INTRODUCTION

1. This report describes the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) for the period 18 May to 13 November 1987. Its purpose is to provide the Security Council with an account of the activities of UNDOF in pursuance of the mandate entrusted to it by the Council in resolution 350 (1974) of 31 May 1974 and extended by subsequent resolutions, most recently by resolution 596 (1987) of 29 May 1987.

I. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE

A. Composition and command

2. The composition of UNDOF as of 5 November 1987 was as follows:

Austria	531
Canada	227
Finland	410
Poland	<u>155</u>
	<u>1 323</u>
United Nations military observers (detailed from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization)	<u>7</u>
	<u>1 330</u>

3. In addition to the above, observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) assigned to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission assist UNDOF as the occasion requires.

4. Command of the Force continues to be exercised by Major-General Gustaf Welin.

B. Deployment

5. UNDOF personnel remain deployed within and close to the area of separation, with base camps and logistic units located nearby; UNDOF headquarters is located at Damascus. The UNDOF deployment as of November 1987 is shown on the attached map.

6. At present, the Austrian battalion mans 19 positions and 7 outposts and conducts 28 patrols daily at irregular intervals on predetermined routes in the area of separation north and inclusive of the Damascus-Quneitra road. The Finnish battalion mans 16 positions and 7 outposts and conducts 27 patrols daily at irregular intervals in the area of separation south of the Damascus-Quneitra road. In the area of separation or in its close vicinity, 11 observation posts are manned by UNTSO military observers under the operational control of UNDOF.

/...

7. The Austrian battalion base camp is located near Wadi Faouar, 8 kilometres east of the area of separation. The Finnish battalion base camp is located near the village of Ziouani, west of the area of separation. The Austrian battalion continues to share its base camp with the Polish logistic unit, and the Finnish battalion shares Camp Ziouani with the Canadian logistic company. The Canadian signal unit has detachments at Camps Ziouani and Faouar as well as at Damascus and Quneitra. Military police detachments are located at Damascus, Tiberias and Camp Ziouani.

C. Rotation

8. The Austrian contingent carried out partial rotations on 2 and 11 June and on 3 and 10 September 1987. The Finnish contingent rotated partially on 19 August 1987. The Polish logistic unit rotated on 1 and 10 June 1987. The Canadian logistic unit rotated partially on 15 and 22 June and on 15 and 22 September 1987.

D. Discipline

9. The discipline, steadfastness and understanding of all members of the Force have been of a high order, reflecting credit on the soldiers and their commanders as well as on the countries contributing contingents to the Force.

II. LOGISTICS

10. Second- and third-line logistic support continues to be provided by the Canadian and Polish logistic units. The Damascus international airport continues to serve as the UNDOF airhead for rotation. The ports of Latakia and Tartous are used for sea shipments. An air movement control organization operates at Damascus, and sea shipments are handled by local agents. In-theatre air support is provided by UNTSO on special request.

III. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

A. Functions and guidelines

11. The functions and guidelines of UNDOF as well as its tasks remain as outlined in the Secretary-General's report of 27 November 1974. 1/

12. UNDOF has continued, with the co-operation of the parties, to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it. This has been facilitated by the close contact maintained by the Force Commander and his staff with the military liaison staffs of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic.

B. Freedom of movement

13. The Protocol to the Agreement on Disengagement provides for all contingents to operate with the freedom of movement that is necessary for their mission; however, the problem of restrictions on the freedom of movement still exists. The Secretary-General will continue to exert all possible efforts to correct this situation.

C. Maintenance of the cease-fire

14. UNDOF continues to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. The cease-fire has been maintained and there have been no serious incidents during the period under review.

D. Supervision of the Agreement on Disengagement with regard to the areas of separation and limitation

15. UNDOF continues to supervise the area of separation to ensure, in accordance with its mandate, that there are no military forces within it. This is carried out by means of static positions and observation posts, which are manned 24 hours a day, and by foot and mobile patrols operating at irregular intervals on predetermined routes by day and night. In addition, temporary outposts are established and patrols are conducted from time to time to perform specific tasks. Under a programme undertaken by the Syrian authorities (see S/17177, para. 17), civilians have continued to return to the area of separation. UNDOF has adjusted its operations accordingly so as to carry out effectively its supervisory tasks under the Agreement on Disengagement.

16. In accordance with the terms of the Agreement on Disengagement, UNDOF continues to conduct fortnightly inspections of armament and forces in the area of limitation. These inspections are carried out with the assistance of liaison officers from the parties, who accompany the inspection teams. UNDOF also lends its assistance and good offices on request from the parties. In carrying out its tasks, UNDOF has continued to receive the co-operation of both parties, although restrictions on movement and inspection are placed on its teams in certain areas by both sides. UNDOF continues to seek the lifting of these restrictions so as to guarantee its freedom of access to all locations on both sides.

17. The safety of Syrian shepherds who graze their flocks close to and west of the A-line (see map) continues to be of concern to UNDOF. The intensified patrolling of new mine-cleared patrol paths and, from time to time, the establishment of standing patrols in these areas have helped to prevent incidents. The grazing security fence in the southern part of the area of separation has continued to be effective in reducing the number of incidents. New patrol paths along the A-line are under construction in the area of separation.

E. Mines

18. Mines continue to pose a threat to members of the Force and to the growing population in the area of separation. The Force is continuing its efforts, in consultation with the parties, to make the area of operation safe from mines. During the period under review, four Polish mine-clearing teams cleared a total area of 39,325 square metres. They found and destroyed 11 anti-tank mines, 4 anti-personnel mines, 18 artillery shells, 10 hand-grenades, 78 mortar rounds and 2 anti-tank rounds, as well as large quantities of small-arms ammunition and fuses. Another 6,250 square metres of patrol tracks were rechecked.

F. Humanitarian activities

19. During the reporting period, UNDOF assisted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with facilities for handing over parcels and mail and for the passage of persons and personal effects across the area of separation.

IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

20. As indicated in paragraph 9 of the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly of 13 October 1987, 2/ the costs of UNDOF beyond 30 November 1987 are estimated at \$2,944,000 gross (\$2,893,000 net) per month, should the Security Council renew its mandate beyond that date and assuming continuance of its existing strength and responsibilities.

V. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 (1973)

21. In deciding, in its resolution 596 (1987), to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months, the Security Council also called upon the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973), and requested the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of the period, a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement that resolution.

22. The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and, in particular, the efforts undertaken at various levels to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973) have been dealt with in the Secretary-General's report on the situation in the Middle East, 3/ submitted in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 41/162 A of 4 December 1986. The Secretary-General has continued to maintain contacts on the matter with the parties and interested Governments.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

23. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, which was established in May 1974 to supervise the cease-fire called for by the Security Council and the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces of 31 May 1974, has continued to perform its functions effectively, with the co-operation of the

parties. During the period under review, the situation in the Israel-Syria sector has remained quiet and there have been no serious incidents.

24. Despite the present quiet in the Israel-Syria sector, the situation in the Middle East as a whole continues to be potentially dangerous and is likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached. I continue to hope that determined efforts will be made by all concerned to tackle the problem in all its aspects, with a view to arriving at a just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973).

25. In the prevailing circumstances, I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, until 31 May 1988. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has given its assent to the proposed extension. The Government of Israel has also expressed its agreement.

26. In concluding the present report, I wish to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops to UNDOF and to those which provide UNTSO military observers assigned to the Force. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to Major-General Gustaf Welin, Commander of the Force, to the officers and men of the Force, to its civilian staff and to the UNTSO military observers assigned to UNDOF. They have performed with exemplary efficiency and devotion to duty the important tasks assigned to them by the Security Council.

Notes

1/ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1974, document S/11563, paras. 8-10.

2/ A/42/642.

3/ A/42/714-S/19249.

*

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מתוך דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

481 2/2
386

בליון מחקציב הבטחון). בשלב זה לא יפרטמו המספרים החדשים לסעיפים הראשיים בהקציב, אך באשר לפונקציה 150 (עניינים בין-לאומיים) אנו קולטים שמועות (מבוססות, ככל הנראה) כאילו הוחלט להגביל את הקיצוץ בסעיף זה ל-600 מליון דולר (פירוש הדבר, להקטין את גודל הקיצוץ לנוכח הקיצוצים העמוקים שסעיף זה ספג בשנתיים האחרונות).

ב-החסריט לצעדים הבאים:

1) לפי חוק גרהם-רודמן, עומדים לרשות המחוקקים 10 ימי עבודה (LEGISLATIVE DAYS) בהם ניתן לבטל את ה-SEQUESTER ולהחליפו בסיכומים אחרים ששייגו את הקיצוץ בגרעון המחקש ל-1988 (23 בליון דולר). אי-לכך, חוזים לויז כדלקמן:

א- יוצאים לפגרה (לרגל "יום ההודיה") מה-20 ועד ה-30 בנובמבר.

ב- יחזילו לספור את "ימי העבודה" מהראשון בדצמבר, ובמהלכם חברי ועדות התקציב בשני הבתים יחבקשו לקבוע את "התקרות" החדשות לסעיפים הראשיים בתקציב, בעוד שחברי ועדות ההקצבות יכינו את ה-APPROPRIATIONS השונים (לרבות תקציב הבטחון וסיוע חוץ), שיאומצו לתוך החלטת ההמשך (CONTINUING RESOLUTION) לשנת 1988.

ג- כעת המשרדים הממשלתיים מתפקדים בכוח "החלטת המשך קצרה" שהיא תקפה עד ה-15.12. המטרה היא איפוא להפוך את ההסכם העקרוני שיודיעו עליו היום לשפת המעשה במחצית הראשונה של דצמבר, ואף להעביר את החלטת ההמשך ליתרת השנה התקציבית 1988 (שתיגמר ב-30.9.1988) עד ה-15 בחודש. אם יעשו זאת, ה-SEQUESTER יחבטל מעצמו.

ד- קיים עוד מפלט טכני, שבמידת הצורך יאפשר למחוקקים להמשיך לעבוד עד ה-22 בדצמבר (ועד בכלל) בכדי לבטל את ה-SEQUESTER, אך אין זה המקום לפרט אותו, וכאמור כיום היעד הוא להשלים את המלאכה התקציבית עד ה-15.12. פירוש הדבר, שבועיים מפרכים למדי בחחילת דצמבר (עת הפיסגה עם גורבצ'וב וביקור שר הבטחון).

3NS Fol.
ל מ ד 1

מחלקת הקשר ניו יורק

טופס מברק

רפ:

מחור:

יחידות:
מילרדי

סוג כסחוני:
שמו

תז"ח:

2014

אל : המשרד

נר :

0664

ד ע :

מאח : נאו"ם

אל : ר' אגף ארכל, ארכל 2

מאת : מלמר

דו"ח המזכ"ל על "המצב במז"ח". לשלנו 620.

1. להלן מספר הערות על הדו"ח, שהכנתי בשיתוף עם יששכרוף:
 א) מדגיש (סעיף 32-37) רצונו של המזכ"ל להמשיך במאמץ המיוחד כדי לקדם השגת הסכמה מלאה על כינוס ועידה בינלאומית בחסות האו"ם. מדבר במרומז (סעיף 35) גם על רצונו להמשיך ולקיים "תהליך של מו"מ" עוד לפני שתושג ההסכמה על ועידה בינ"ל (כשמטרתו כנראה למנוע החרפת המתיחות באיזור).
 ב) מתייחס אמנם לאש"ף כ"אחד הצדדים לסכסוך" שעמט קיים המזכ"ל מגעים (סעיף 25), אך מצד שני מתעלם מאש"ף ומדבקותו בנוסח C/58/38, כאשר הוא מדבר על התגברות ההסכמה לוועידה בינ"ל בחסות האו"ם (שלא ע"י נוסח ההחלטה הנ"ל).
 ג) לעומת זאת, נכנע כנראה למחאות מצד אש"ף כאשר הוסיף התייחסות לזכויות הלגיטימיות ולהגדרה עצמית (סעיף 37) וכאשר כינה סבל העם הפלשתינאי כ"לב הסכסוך" (סעיף 36), למרות שהערכות אלו נעדרו מדו"חו על "מצב העולם" מחודש ספטמבר (מברק נאו"ם 253 מיום 10.9.87).

ד) מגדיר חוסר ההסכמה בתוך ממ' ישראל לוועידה בינ"ל כ- THE MAJOR OBSTACLE (סעיף 33) לקיומם הוועידה ומתעלם או לפחות ממעיט בערכם של מכשולים אחרים.

2. בסה"כ נייר דו"ח שהמזכ"ל אמנם משתדל לשמור על איזון (בהתחשב בנסיבות הירדועות באו"ם), אך נטייתו זו לא תשנה באופן משמעותי העמדות שהתגבשו בשנים האחרונות ומצאו ביטויין בהחלטות מאז C/58/38 עד C/43/41 וזו שתתקבל בעצרת הנוכחית. מצד שני, יש לצפות, במישור האופרטיבי, להמשך פעילות המזכ"ל לקידום הרעיון של ועידה בינלאומית בחסות האו"ם, כמתכונת מוסכמת על כל הצדדים.

אישור:

שם השולח:

20.11.87

תאריך:

משה מלמד

Handwritten routing notes at the bottom of the page, including the word "END" and various numbers and names.

מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	דף: 1 מחור: 2
מילדי סווג כמחנכי סודי	אל : המשור
חז"ח: 2015 -	ד ע :
נר : 0670	מאת : נאו"ם

אל : ארבל 2
דע : ממ"ר פריפריה : מצרים
מאת : יששכרוף

שיחה עם קמרון הום (ארה"ב) ואכול גהייט (מצרים)

המפרץ


1. הום מוסר שלפי דיווחי מודיעין של ארצו, ניכרת תנועה והזזת כוחות איראנים ועירקים משני עברי הגבול לכיוון הדרום. להערכתם, צפויה ההתקפה לקראת סוף דצמבר באיזור כצרה. בינתיים אין התפתחות משמעותית במישור מאמצי המזכ"ל לקדם פתרון מדיני בין הצדדים.
2. דו"ח המזכ"ל על מצב במז"ח: הום סיפר שנודע להם ממקור בכיר במזכירות, שאש"ף והסובייטים מחו בפני המזכ"ל על הדו"ח הנ"ל, שהופץ אתמול. כנראה, הסובייטים אינם סבורים שמגמת המזכ"ל המשתמעת מהדו"ח, עולה בקנה אחד עם החלטות העצרת השונות בסוגיה. מכל מקום, סבור הום כי הדו"ח היה יחסית מתון ולא ישמש בסיס להחרפת הדיון השנה בעצרת סביב נושא הועידה הבינ"ל. בשלב זה, נכנס לשיחה אכול גהייט (מצרים) אשר ציין שאין להוציא מכלל אפשרות שלנוכח דו"ח המזכ"ל יהיה נסיון מצד אש"ף לחזק (להחריף) את לשון ההחלטה על הועידה הבינ"ל בשאלת פלסטין (דבר שלא דווקא לרעתנו).
3. אכול גהייט: כשיחה נפרדת עם אכול גהייט, האיש היה כמובן מאד זוהר מהאירועים בשבוע החולף לאחר חידוש היחסים עם מצרים, שכינה, החזרת העולם הערבי לארצו. עם זאת, ציין כי לולא מצרים הייתה מקבלת הסיוע האמריקני למשך אותו עשר שנים, היא לא הייתה מסוגלת להחזיק מעמד וכל עוד סיוע זה יתקיים, תוכל מצרים לעמוד איחנה על עקרונותיה מול שאר מדינות ערב. ציין החשיבות שישראל ומצרים יפעלו יחד על מנת לשמור על סיוע זה. כן חזר על השקפתו שהשמיע בשיחתו האחרונה, על כמה שישראל חייבת לעשות "REASSESSMENT" של תנאי האיזור ויחסה למדינות ערב לעומת יחסה למדינות הפריפריה, קרי איראן.

האריך: 3
שם השולח: 3
אישור: 2
1
3
4
4
4

ת"ח:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	דף: 2
סוג כסחוני:		מחור: 2
ת"ח:		א ל:
נר: 0670		ד-ע:
		מאח:

הזכיר הרוגמא, שבזמנו, כאשר נודע למודיעין הישראלי על תוכניות להחנקש
 בנשיא סאדאת, החליט רח"מ בגין דאז להעביר את המידע ישירות למצרים במקום
 באמצעות האמריקנים. (יוזכר שבשיחתנו האחרונה דיבר על אפשרות סיוע מודיעיני
 ישראלי לעירק). השבתי לגבי רישומנו מתוצאות פסגות רבת עמון, תוך הדגשת
 העובדה, שחידוש היחסים עם מצרים, מצדיק, כדיעבר הדרך של שלום שבחור.

נאו"ם



אישור:	שם השולח: ג' י. ששכרוף	תאריך: 20.11.87
--------	------------------------	-----------------

3 ק"מ

טופס מברק צפון

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

י' - 1030

1033

דף 1 מתוך 5 דפים

אל : ווש', מיאג
מנכ"ל מש' רה"מ
עבור רה"מ

סיווג בטחוני : סודי ק"מ
דחיפות : בהול/ק"מ
לשימוש } תאריך וזמן רישום: 19/11/87
מח' הקשר } מס. מברק : 1033

ההס/ס/ק"מ

אגרות מהנשיא ומזכיר המדינה

1. יוז העביר היום אגרת מהנשיא לרה"מ. יוז ציין שאגרות דומות הועברו גם למנהיגי מדינות נאט"ו וכן למנהיגי אוסטרליה, יפאן ודרום-קוריאה.
2. יוז העביר היום גם אגרת ממזכיר המדינה לרה"מ. להלן האגרות.

(קשר - אנא הרצ"ב)

אריה מקל, לשכת רה"מ

השולח : אריה מקל, לשכת רה"מ אריה מקל
 אישור מנהל מחלקה :
 אישור לשכת המנכ"ל : ()
 תאריך וזמן חיבור (יחולא ע"י השולח) 19.11.87

לשימוש הקשר בלבד

התפוצה :

הנושא :

2 3 3

2
5
MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN
November 18, 1987

S E C R E T

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As planning begins in Washington for my meeting in early December with General Secretary Gorbachev, I wanted to share with you my own thoughts about what might be achieved, to solicit your views as to how we might best accomplish our common goals.

I view the coming meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev as an important step in the process that began in January 1984 and accelerated in November 1985 in Geneva. The purpose of that process is to achieve sustained improvement in East-West relations based on greater Soviet moderation at home and abroad. This is a long-term effort, in which there will be inevitable difficulties and disappointments, and toward which we must show both resolution and patience.


I plan to take up with General Secretary Gorbachev the same four-part agenda -- human rights, bilateral relations, regional affairs, and arms reductions -- that we have been discussing since before Geneva. We will review progress in each area to date, and consider what practical steps can be taken in the period ahead.

In the area of human rights, I intend to urge the Soviet Union to translate into lasting institutional changes the encouraging signs we have seen regarding increased emigration levels, resolution of cases involving divided families, and internal reforms. I will stress that the Soviet Union has a long way to go before it meets well-established Western criteria for progress in this area.

On bilateral matters, we would hope to broaden the range of our contacts and resolve problems relating to our Embassy.

On regional affairs, we have regularized the dialogue between our two countries, making clear to senior Soviet policymakers our concerns about Soviet actions throughout the world. Now it is my hope that this dialogue can move beyond exchanges of views to serious consideration of ways to help bring conflicts to an end. I shall emphasize to General Secretary Gorbachev the need for a date certain to start the rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, rather than mere statements of an intent to withdraw. I shall seek progress in resolving the

S E C R E T



3/5

S E C R E T

2.

conflicts in Angola and Cambodia. I shall see if a way can be found to expedite an end to the Iran-Iraq war and halt the Soviet Union's effort to divert attention from Iran's aggressive actions in the Gulf and its preparation for another major offensive against Iraq, even as the Soviets falsely claim that the U.S. naval presence is somehow responsible for the high level of tension.

My approach to arms reduction will be equally straightforward, based on the realization that disarmament is not an end in itself, but a means by which Western security can be enhanced. Our negotiators in Geneva are working hard to finish an effective and verifiable INF treaty, and it is my hope that the first item of business at the Washington summit will be to sign this agreement with General Secretary Gorbachev. This would open the door for important work done in the area of deep and stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive forces. There are still substantial differences between the U.S. and Soviet Union on this subject, particularly with regard to sublimits on ballistic missile warheads, verification, and our respective approaches to strategic defense. My objective with General Secretary Gorbachev will be to discuss all these questions thoroughly, so that we might move ahead. Whether this proves possible depends in large part on General Secretary Gorbachev's willingness to accept that the U.S. will continue with its vigorous research effort -- the SDI program.

I expect that General Secretary Gorbachev and I will also discuss other important arms control issues -- chemical weapons, conventional force stability in Europe, nuclear non-proliferation, and negotiations on nuclear testing which the U.S. and Soviet Union began this month in Geneva.

All this should make for an ambitious series of meetings. It is important that we -- and our publics -- remain realistic about the tasks ahead, and modest in our expectation of results. I myself approach the talks with optimism, confident of your support and assistance.

I have asked Secretary Shultz to consult with each of your governments, before and after the summit. Such consultations are an invaluable source of advice for me, and a source of strength for our common alliance.

S E C R E T

4
5

S E C R E T

3.

I hope you will take the time not only to reply to this letter but also to convey directly to Secretary Shultz your views and suggestions about the U.S.-Soviet summit. It is through such exchanges that we can demonstrate together the cohesion and vitality of the West. I look forward to working with you and having the benefit of your advice and counsel.

Sincerely yours,
Ronald Reagan

S E C R E T

S/S

S E C R E T

Dear Yitzhak:

Thank you for your recent letter concerning Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel. The arrival of Ida Nudel, the Slepaks and other refuseniks in Israel makes us all the more conscious of those who remain behind. Thus, human rights in the Soviet Union, and especially the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate, are very much in our thoughts as we prepare for the President's December meeting with Gorbachev.

We are profoundly aware of Israel's historic role in Jewish life, and that for you the issue of the final destination of Soviet Jews is as fundamentally important as the freedom to emigrate. In this context, it has also been suggested to us that the Soviets should discuss Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union directly with Israel. As you know, we have encouraged the Soviets to reestablish relations with Israel and to expand contacts at all levels on all issues. Thus, we will encourage the Soviets to discuss Jewish emigration directly with you. For our part, we will continue our dialogue with the Soviets and press them on the fundamental human right of freedom of emigration. We will also make a special effort to raise our profound concern that those Jews who remain in the Soviet Union be free to realize and express their Jewish identities.

Sincerely,
George

S E C R E T

מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	דף: _____
טופס מברק	מתוך: _____
תז"וו: 191605	אל המשדר
כר: 0617	דע:
	מאת: נאו"ם

אל : אירופה ג
 דע : ארבל 2, קב"ט כאן
 מאת : אסעד

כמהלך הדיון במיוחדת ניגש אלי VLADIMIR I. GORYAYER יועץ במשלחת הסובייטית ואמר שתוצאות פסגת עמאן היו חיוביות מבחינתה של ישראל בהקשר איראן, תהליך השלום וחידוש היחסים עם מצרים.

קמפ' דיויד

סיפר שלמרות שארצו התנגדה להסכמי קמפ' דיויד (כגלל תרחיקתה מההליך השלום במזח"ת), הם מודעים לעובדה שיש מדינות ערביות חירשו יחסיהם הדיפלומטיים עם מצרים. הערתי לו כי ארצו היא שהרחיקה את עצמה בנוקטה במדיניות חד צדדית, שנתקת יחסיה עם ישראל ב 1967. ענה כי אנחנו הולכים לקראת תקופה חדשה ושוב חזר על דברי גורבצ'וב לנשיא סוריה בהקשר היחסים עם ישראל.

נאו"ם

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including a large scribble on the left and several lines of text with numbers 1-5 above them.

תאריך:	שם השולח: אסעד	אישור:
--------	----------------	--------

טווי

** ירצא

**

**

**

חוזם: 11,14221

אל:מיאמי/89

מ-:המשרד,תא:191187,זח:1708,זח:ב,טג:ט

נד:2

טווי/בהרל להזעיק

הקונכל מיאמי

אנא מסור מיד לראש הממשלה כולקמן:

ביקר הממונה האמריקני היוז אצל בילין וביקש על מי הוראות
 מושינגטון לעכב את גירושו של מובאראק עואד. רשיון שהותו של
 עואד נג מחר. לזברי היוז הולך וגובר הלחץ הציבורי מצד מחוקקי

ומצד התקשורת ובאינטרנט של שתי המדינות למנוע התפרצות העניין
 בימי ביקורו של רוהמ. הם מבקשים לזכות למי שעה את הגירוש
 לימים מטבר ולקיים דיון טווי ומקיף על האיש וטכנותיו בטרם
 תיפול ההכרעה הסופית

היוז הגיש נון-מיימר ולהלן נוסחו

WE ARE DISMAYED BY GOI LOGIC IN ACTING AGAINST MUBARAK
 AWAD

IN SEEKING TO EXPEL AWAD, THE GOI LENDS SUPPORTS TO CHARGES
 THAT ARABS ARE PUNISHED FOR THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS, EVEN
 WHEN THEY ADVOCATE NON-VIOLENCE, AND THAT ISRAEL APPLIES
 DIFFERENT STANDARDS TO FORMER RESIDENTS BASED ON THEIR
 ETHNIC BACKGROUNDS

THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-VIOLENCE IS DEEPLY RESPECTED
 THROUGHOUT THE CIVILIZED WORLD

THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

[Illegible text block]

Very respectfully,
[Illegible Signature]

[Illegible text block]

[Illegible text block]

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

PUNISHING MODERATE, NON-VIOLENT LEADERS FRUSTRATES THEIR
POTENTIAL ADHERENTS AND GREATLY ENHANCES THE APPEAL OF THE
RADICALS

WE STRONGLY URGE THAT NO HASTY ACTION BE TAKEN TO FORCE
MUBARAK AWAD TO LEAVE JERUSLAEM, ISRAEL OR THE WEST BANK. TO
DO SO WILL STRENGTHEN THE PERCEPTION THAT HE IS BEING
SINGLED OUT FOR EXPULSION BECAUSE OF HIS POLITICAL BELIEFS

THE FACT THAT AWAD WAS GIVEN LESS THAN 72 HOURS TO
LEAVE, THE POSSIBLE MISDIRECTION OF THE LETTER OF
NOTIFICATION TO HIM NOTWITHSTANDING, IS UNREASONABLE

WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE EXPLANATIONS WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN THUS
FAR FOR EXPELLING AWAD AND ASK THAT YOU DESIGNATE AN
APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL TO DISCUSS AWAD'S CASE FURTHER WITH
US PRIOR TO ANY ACTION BEING TAKEN AGAINST HIM

ת.פ. ש.ח.ה. מ.נ.כ.ל. מ.נ.כ.ל. ב.י.ר.ן. מ.צ.מ.א

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-442611)
FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-100000) (P)
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (NY 100-100000)
RE: [REDACTED] (NY 100-100000)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סוג בטחוני סודי

דחיפות מדי

תאריך/ז"ח 18:30 - 11.87

מס' מברק

474
אל : המשרד ,
373
דמחן

למכותבים בלבד

אל : אלוף (מיל.) ר. ורדי - *גמח* דלדלונא
דע : מזכירות הממשלה
מנכ"ל מדיני

דריח המיעוט

בפגישת ערן והח"מ עם חבר הקונגרס צ'ייני, יו"ר הקבוצה הרפובליקנית, העלינו במפורט את אכזבתנו מנוסח ההתייחסות בעמוד 440 לדריח. צ'ייני הבין את התרעומח והודה שהיו צריכים לגלוח יתר רגישות. להלן הסביר מה שאירע על רקע המחלוקת עם הדמוקרטים שנפלנו אליהן קרבן, והסכים מייד להתייחס לכך ולבטא את שביעות רצונו המלאה משיתוף הפעולה שלנו לעתונאי שרופנה על-ידינו.

א-סקה קינ
רובינשטיין

Handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom of the page, including a large signature on the right and some scribbles on the left.

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מתוך 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

2/13

472

מצרים, היא חוצר הפנה עתה את מבטא נמיתה רבה מזרחה לעבר המפרץ הנראה לה ככר פעולה נרחב מבחינתה, לא רק ברמה הרטורית, אלא גם ברמה האסטרטגית - עבאית. מתכונת פעילותה בעיראק עשויה להיות מועתקת למשל עתה, גם לגבי כוונות-סיוע עבאית, הדרכה בנושא חיה"א ועוד. עומד לפניו מגוון של אפשרויות ותפריטים.

3. ברמה האופרטיבית פסגת עמאן לא הולידה יש מאין. ההתבשמות של חוגים שונים במערב ובעיקר בארה"ב מבטאת למעשה את הפתעתם שמה שהיה צפוי, אך קרה. "הנס הוא שהבלתי צפוי לא התרחש". ישנה הגזמה בכך שירדן, עם כל ההערכה לגבי בה חוסיין ניווט את הועידה בתפקיד קדמי של "המוביל הלאומי הערבי". אין זה מיקומה הטבעי, היא לא מסוגלת לכך וחסין אף לא שואף לכך מכיוון שאין לו שום סיכוי להגיע למעמד כזה. הסיטואציה הנוכחית שיחקה לידיו בכך שהגוש המרכזי הערבי מיקד את סדר עדיפותיו בסוגיית המפרץ ועמד על כך שהמוקד לא יוסע לעבר סוגיית הסכסוך הערבי-ישראלי. לפסגה כגוף לא היה עניין בכך, לדעתה של גלספי, משום שאין התפתחות כזו המעריכה טיפול הפסגה בה, התוצאה הטבעית, וכך קרה, שאש"פ יצא מוכה וחבול, יטען מה שיטען ערפאת. הפסגה שאינה ממוקדת בנושא הסכסוך אין לו מה למכור או לקנות ואילו בנושא המפרץ אין לו נגיעה ישירה. החרמתו את הסעודה למנהיגי ערב טעות גסה מצידו שעוד הוסיפה לעובדה שהוא לא מצא את מקומו שם. סעודיה אמנם יצאה בשלום והשיגה את מה שרצתה, אך לא נגנה שם כינון ראשון. מקום זה שמור אצל גלספי לסודיה ועיראק.

4. סוריה כאמור מהווה עבודה ח'99. איגלטון כבר דיווח מדמשק שהאנשים ברחוב ע"פ תגובותיהם למהלך הפסגה "הוכו בתדהמה" למראה הויתורים שעשה אסד בעמאן. אין לה גס'ספק שגורמים בתנהגה הסורית מחכים להסברים בניידון. היא חרזה שמפלגת הבע"ת עשויה להיות הכמה לכך, חשוב יהיה לעקוב אחר המתרחש שם. היא בניגוד לאחרים, כך הדגישו, בדעה שאסד מחשיב מאד את המפלגה מעבר למה שבד"כ מייחסים לו, זוהי המסגרת המעניקה לו את הלגיטימציה, לכיסוס דבריה היא מביאה את עניין הטיפול בנושא הכלכלי, אין לה ספק שלו אסד היה רוצה לפעול בשדטה של "טיפול שורש" היה עליו להסירה כמכשול הצידה ולהעניק לגורמים הכלכליים שמחוץ למפלגה לטפל במצוקה הכלכלית, תחת זאת הוא מעדיף להשאיר את המצב הנוכחי בתחום זה ולא לפגוע במפלגה. היא מעלה את נושא המפלגה כאינדיקציה למה שעשוי להתפתח, אם וכאשר, בסוגיית היחסים עם עיראק. נדמה לה, לפי שעה על בסיס של תחושה בלבד שהנושא לא סגור ונותרה פדנה כלשהי ממנה עשוי משחר להתפתח. אסכירה תחושה זו בכך שלפי שעה התעמולה (כשתי המדיניות) מרסנת עצמה, אך בעיקר שאסד מתחיל לחשוב גם בעקבות מה שארע בפסגה בסוגיית המפרץ.

סגרירות ישראל / ווסינגטון

ט ו ס ס מ ב ר ק

דף 3 מתוך דפים

סוג בסחוני

דחיסות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

3 / 3

472

עם זאת מוקדם מדי לחרוץ משפטי על גילויי חולשה סורית (א) עצם אישור השתתפות סוריה בנוכחותו האישית של אסד זמן רב לפני התכנסותה ואי השארת ההחלטה סמוך לכך מלמדים שאסד ידע מה צפוי לו שם והוא לא נשאר שום מקום או ספק בקשר "להפתעות" (ב) לא היה בכוחו לשנות דבר בנושא איראן גם אם רצה בכך וכל התנהגות אחרת היתה בבחינת "שחיה נגד הזרם". (ג) אין ביטויים בשטח שיכולים להעיד על נזק שנגרם לו. הודעת הסיכום בנושא הסכסוך במזה"ת עדיין מעניקה לו מרווח תמרון ע"פ הקולות הבוקעים כבר מדמשק. בסופו של דבר מה שהכריע את עמדתו בפסגה היתה השאיפה שלא לפרוש מהקונצנזוס הערבי, כל עוד הוא יכול לחיות עמו ע"מ שלא להקלע לעמדת בידוד. אפשרות זו הפכה לטראומה אע"פ אותה חש בתחום אחר, נושא הטרור הכינ"ל התחומים בהם ניתן יהיה לעמוד על עמדת סוריה בעקבות הפסגה הם לפי סדר עדיפויות (א) לבנון (ב) איראן - המשך זרימת הנפט (ג) סוגיית היחסים עם עיראק, אך בטווח ארוך מאד.

אלי אבידן

l.k.

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טופס מברק

דף 2 מחוד 2 דפים

סווג בטחוני

דחיות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

2
/
2

461-פ'

356-67

187 - 'j

2: הפרופסור גארי מילהולן מאוניברסיטת וויסקונסין עמל במשך השבוע האחרון קשות להפנות אלינו את כל החקירות בעקבות מאמרו ב- FOREIGN POLICY, בעקרון חוזר מילהולן על טענותיו שישראל נצלה המיס הכבדים שרכשה מנורבגיה ומארה"ב לייצור פצצות גרעין. למזלנו כי רב, הספור כמעט לא תפש בעתונות הגדולה, אם כי שרותי הטוכנויות נתנו פרסום רחב לספור ולחוסר תגובתנו.

3. האשמות ה-FBI, כפי שבאו לידי ביטוי במסמך שהודלף ל- VILLAGE VOICE, על חוסר שחוף פעולה בחקירת גורמים המקורבים לליגה להגנה יהודית, נפלו כאן על קרקע פוריה וגררו אחריהם מספר רב של ספורים (העברנו לכס הספורים ב"וושינגטון פוסט" וב"א. טיימס"). חוסר תגובתנו בענין די מביך ורק גורר אחרינו המשך חטוט בספור. כפי שראיתם מהדיווחים הקונוטציה המיידית לספור הוא חוסר ש"פ שלנו בפרשת פולארד.

עד כאן.

מחר מגיע רה"מ שמיר לווישינגטון והחקשורת מגלה ענין בבקור. רה"מ יופיע

בתכנית FACE THE NATION של CBS.


יוסי גל

שגרירות ישראל / זושנינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף מחוך דפים

סווג בטחוני

דחופות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

471

2/2

הנטל הכלכלי מעיק במיוחד באזור מסגר זה, בעיקר בתחום האבטלה ואיסר מקורות העסוקה.

3. מדיניות החוץ תשען על אותם הקווים שקבע בורג'נה אך בצורה מאוזנת יותר. הצנע המערבי כלפי חוץ יהיה פחות בולט, בעיקר בתקופת המעבר וההתבססות. באקווש נועד זמן קצר לאחר כינון הממשלה החדשה עם השגריר פלטר והבטיח לו בשפה ברורה שהוא שואף להרחיב את שה"פ עם ארה"ב. המזכיר יוצא לסיור במגרב ב-16.12 בתום דיווחיו לחברות נאטו בבריסל על הפסגה בוושנינגטון ואחרי שיבקר בשתי מדינות בסקנדינביה. המסלול יכלול לפי הסדר את אלג'יריה, תוניסיה ומרוקו. כל המסע למגרב ארך 3-4 ימים בלבד.

4. הנושא האזורי, קרי מערכת היחסים במגרב מטרידה את שליטיה החדשים של תוניסיה, ובעיקר הגורם האלג'יראי שבה. אין להם קריאה טובה של הכיוונים המסתמנים שם כלפי המשטר החדש. במונחים ספציפיים הם מודאגים מהדיבורים המיוחסים לאלג'יריה על צרופה של לוב לברית המשולשת בין אלג'יריה - תוניסיה - מאורטניה. ארה"ב מעידה הדגישה אוניל **MADE A STRONG POINT** באלג'יר ובנואקאשוט מה היא חושבת על זיווג כזה והזכירה לשניים שהמדובר במשטר העוסק בחתרנות ובטרור ושאת הדבר יקרה ארה"ב לא תוכל לעבור על כך לסדה"י. יהיה בכך הפרת האיזון לטובת ק'דאפי. כאשר להיבט של המשטר התוניסאי החדש על לוב, מעוינת אוניל את תבונתו של בן עלי בכך שבה'לג'ו שר הפנים חשף בהצלחה בשעתו מעטפות הנפץ שעשו דרכם מל'ב. מודע לסכנה הלובית מחד, ופעילותו לפתיחת הגבול במסגרת הס יניות שלא לתת עילה לק'דאפי לטפל בתוניסיה מאידך, חס מזיגה נכונה של האלמנטים המשמיטים את השטיח מתחת ק'דאפי. אין לה ספק שהצוות החדש בתוניס חפתיע את ק'דאפי בכך שהחילופין לא גררו מהומות ואי שקט ושלא עלה שליט שהיה יכול להחשב כטריפולי כעריין, שני מצבים שהיו נוחים לאפשרות של ניצול הזדמנויות מצדו.

5. לשאלתי כיצד תשפיע הפסגה בעמאן על מערכת יחסייה הינארה'י ס' תוניסיה, השיבה שאין לצפות לחידוש יחסים עם מצרים מהסיבה שתוניסיה מארחת את משכן משרדי הלוגה הערבית. אין לה ספק שבנטיבות אחרות תוניסיה היתה מצטרפת לשורה שחדשה יחסים עם קהיר.

אלי אבידן

1.10

רחיטות: מלידי סורג בטחוני: שמו	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	דף: --- מתור: ---
תו"ח: 1915	אל : המשרד	
גר : 0610	ד ע :	
מאת : נאו"ם		

אל : ארכל 2
מאת : יששכרוף

אונדו"ף

1. מסרתי לגולדינג על אישורה של ישראל לחידוש מנדט אונדו"ף תוך בקשה שדבר הסכמתנו יופיע בדו"ח המזכ"ל כנהוג.
2. הודה ואמר שדו"ח המזכ"ל יהיה זהה לאחרון כנקודה זו.

נאו"ם

Handwritten notes and signatures in Hebrew, including the word "אישור" (Approval) and various initials and numbers.

אישור:

שם השולח: ג. יששכרוף

תאריך: 10.11.70

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף _____ מחוד _____ דפים

שמור

סווג בטחוני

מייד

דחיסות

470

תאריך/ז"ח 1800 19 בנוב' 7

מס' מברק

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, טמ"ד

מאת: אלי אבידן, וושינגטון

המזכיר ידעא ככל הנראה בשבוע הבא לג' נבה לפגישה נוספת עם שברנדזה.
הכוונה לנסות ולדלג. מעל המכשולים שעדיין נותרו בנושא ה- INF. האמריקאים רוצים
להבטיח ככל שביכולתם שהחסמט יהיה מוכן לחתימה טרם פתיחת הפסגה ושלא תארע
שום תקלה שתמנע בואו של גורבע'וב, אף שאין לכך כל סימן, אך ברקע טרם נמחק
כאן פרשת שיחת המזכיר במוסקבה.

אלי אבידן

א.ל.

מ.ה. 9
הח. 3
הנ. 3
ה/הנ. 1
ה/הנ. 1
הנ. 2
הנ. 1
הנ. 4
הנ. 4



SECRET ENCLOSURE

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tel Aviv

November 19, 1987

Excellency:

Secretary of State Shultz has asked me to deliver the enclosed message to you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Arthur H. Hughes", followed by a long horizontal flourish.

Arthur H. Hughes
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosure: as stated--classified SECRET

His Excellency
Yitzhak Shamir
Prime Minister of the
State of Israel
Jerusalem

SECRET ENCLOSURE

S E C R E T

Dear Yitzhak:

Thank you for your recent letter concerning Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel. The arrival of Ida Nudel, the Slepaks and other refuseniks in Israel makes us all the more conscious of those who remain behind. Thus, human rights in the Soviet Union, and especially the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate, are very much in our thoughts as we prepare for the President's December meeting with Gorbachev.

We are profoundly aware of Israel's historic role in Jewish life, and that for you the issue of the final destination of Soviet Jews is as fundamentally important as the freedom to emigrate. In this context, it has also been suggested to us that the Soviets should discuss Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union directly with Israel. As you know, we have encouraged the Soviets to reestablish relations with Israel and to expand contacts at all levels on all issues. Thus, we will encourage the Soviets to discuss Jewish emigration directly with you. For our part, we will continue our dialogue with the Soviets and press them on the fundamental human right of freedom of emigration. We will also make a special effort to raise our profound concern that those Jews who remain in the Soviet Union be free to realize and express their Jewish identities.

Sincerely,
George

S E C R E T

מלון ריג'נס 212-759-4100

טיוטא מספר 5

תכנית ביקור רה"מ בארה"ב

יום ד' - 18.11.87

- 01:00 - המראה לניו-יורק - LY-005
- 05:50 - הגעה לניו-יורק - למלון ריג'נס
- 13:00 - ארוחת צהריים במערכת "ניוזוויק"
- 17:00 - תדריך על המצב בארה"ב

יום ה' - 19.11.87

- 07:45 - ראיון ל-ABC
- 08:00 - ארוחת בקר עם עורכי עתונים
- 09:30 - תדריך כתבים ישראלים
- 11:58 - המראה למיאמי (מלה-גברדיה) - EA-017
- 14:43 - הגעה למיאמי
- 19:00 - ארוחת ערב עם ראשי הפדרציה
- 20:15 - הופעה בפני כנוס מועצת הפדרציות היהודיות
- 22:30 - המראה לושינגטון - למלון גרנד

יום ו' - 20.11.87

- 09:00 - פגישה עם מזכיר ההגנה קרלוצ'י - במלון (?)
- 10:00 - פגישה עם הנשיא ריגן - בבית הלבן
- 11:30 - פגישה עם מזכיר המדינה שולץ + ארוחת צהריים
- 15:00 - הופעה ב-WASHINGTON IUSTITUTE M.E. POLICY - מלון גרנד
- 16:00 - פגישה עם העתונאים הישראלים

יום שבת - 21.11

- 12:30 - ארוחת צהריים פרטית - במלון
- 19:00 - מפגש עם קהילת ושינגטון בבית-הכנסת "בני-ישראל"

יום א' - 22.11

- 07:30 - ראיון טלוויזיה (NETWORK) ²⁴⁸
- 10:30 - המראה לניו-יורק (מנשנל) - PA-256
- 14:30 - הגעה לניו-יורק (ללה-גורדיה)
- 17:00 - עצרת עם בקווינס - באודיטוריום של הקוינס קולג'
- 20:00 - Z.O.A - "קבלת אות הרצל"

יום ב' - 23.11.87

08:00 - ארוחת בוקר עם מערכת "וול סטריט ג'ורנאל"
09:30 - כתבים ישראלים
11:00 - GREATER NY BOARD OF RABBIS - במלון
12:30 - ארוחת צהריים עם FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION במלון וולדרוף אסטוריה
17:00 - ועידת הנשיאים - במלון
18:30 - פגישה מצומצמת (מ. הונליין)
23:30 - המראה לארץ - LY-006

יום ג' - 24.11.87

16:50 - הגעה לנתב"ג

S E C R E T

Dear Yitzhak:

Thank you for your recent letter concerning Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel. The arrival of Ida Nudel, the Slepaks and other refuseniks in Israel makes us all the more conscious of those who remain behind. Thus, human rights in the Soviet Union, and especially the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate, are very much in our thoughts as we prepare for the President's December meeting with Gorbachev.

We are profoundly aware of Israel's historic role in Jewish life, and that for you the issue of the final destination of Soviet Jews is as fundamentally important as the freedom to emigrate. In this context, it has also been suggested to us that the Soviets should discuss Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union directly with Israel. As you know, we have encouraged the Soviets to reestablish relations with Israel and to expand contacts at all levels on all issues. Thus, we will encourage the Soviets to discuss Jewish emigration directly with you. For our part, we will continue our dialogue with the Soviets and press them on the fundamental human right of freedom of emigration. We will also make a special effort to raise our profound concern that those Jews who remain in the Soviet Union be free to realize and express their Jewish identities.

Sincerely,
George

S E C R E T

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ס ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

ד פ 1 מתוך 3 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 19 1200 19 19

מס' מברק

המשרד

1
3

445

אל - מצפ"א, מעיית

כל הקונסוליות - ~~ה~~ - פסיד עמ

Good Morning America

להלן תמליל הופעת רה"מ בתכנית

(19.11.87)

באתר
יוסי גל

2 1 1 2 1 3 3 2
 סמיה סמיה סמיה סמיה סמיה סמיה סמיה סמיה
 סמיה סמיה סמיה סמיה סמיה סמיה סמיה סמיה
 4 1 1

445 2
7

JOAN LUNDEN
INTERVIEW WITH:
YITZHAK SHAMIR, PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1987

MS. LUNDEN: Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has arrived for talks with President Reagan and Secretary Shultz, among others. The Prime Minister joins us this morning.

It's nice to have you with us. Before we get into diplomacy, very much in the news this morning, the Iran-contra report. And it says that, while the United States was of course ultimately responsible for its decisions, it also says, and I will quote, "It was the Israelis who first suggested and engaged in arms sales. Israel was more than a conduit." Is that a fair characterization of your country's role?

MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, I don't think it's up to me to give an assessment of the conclusions of the Congressional Committee. But, what we did, is to fully cooperate with the Congressional Committees, in giving all the facts known to us in this investigation of this affair. And we did it, it was appreciated by the Committees, and we are satisfied with it.

MS. LUNDEN: But, going back farther in time, before the investigation when it was all going on, looking back at it now, is there anything that your country should have done differently?

MINISTER SHAMIR: I don't think -- you know, our role in all this operation was to help our American friends in implementing a humanitarian mission for saving hostages. And we did it in full cooperation with our American allies.

MS. LUNDEN: Well, the report also says that many times, the Israelis interests didn't always coincide with those of the US, that you actually viewed Iraq as a bigger threat than Iran. Would that be --

MINISTER SHAMIR: It was not motivated by any political (inaudible, one word). We very simply -- we have helped and assisted our American friends in this operation.

MS. LUNDEN: On another matter. The Arab League, of course, concluded a summit last week at which it barely mentioned the Arab-Israeli conflict. And they also ended their ostracism of Egypt for having restored relations with Israel. Are you hopeful now, that the Arabs may now be interested -- more seriously interested in serious negotiations with Israel?



CBS/SHAMIR-11/19/87

-2-

445 3/3

MINISTER SHAMIR: I would like to think so (laughs). And we are interested in full negotiations, and direct negotiations with all our Arab neighbors about peace with us. And we are ready to do it in every time, whatever place. But, I think the main subject of this conference -- this summit, was the war between Iraq and Iran. And therefore, our conflict was not described in detail by the resolution of this summit. But, anyhow, the main aim of our foreign policy, is to get peace.

MS. LUNDEN: Well, on that note, on another topic, you meet tomorrow with President Reagan and with George Shultz, Secretary of State. There are reports of another peace plan in the works, negotiations -- direct negotiations between Israel and Jordan, possibly having some Palestinians, under the auspices of the United States and the USSR. How close is that proposal to becoming a reality, in your opinion?

MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, I don't know about the details of such proposals. What I know is, that we will discuss with President Reagan and with Secretary Shultz, the prospects and the efforts for peace between us and our neighbors. What we're seeking, is direct negotiations. And we are always ready to get the help of the United States in these negotiations, because the United States has the experience and has the confidence of all the parties in these negotiations.

MS. LUNDEN: And under what circumstances would you allow Palestinians to be part of the Jordan -- the Jordanian delegation?

MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, we have declared many times, that we are ready to talk with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. It means that in this delegation, some Palestinians will participate on the condition that they are not members or partners of the PLO.

MS. LUNDEN: And under what conditions would you allow the Soviet Union? You said, you're very much looking forward to the United States taking part. What about the Soviet Union?

MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, you know, the Soviet Union doesn't have any normal relations with Israel. What (the/they whole?) -- until now, in the situation in the Middle East, was a negative one, that they have close relations with the most extreme elements in our area, and well, I don't about such proposals.

MS. LUNDEN: You think -- okay. Well, thank you very much, Prime Minister, for being with us.

END

✱

END



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tel Aviv

November 19, 1987

Excellency:

President Reagan has asked me to deliver the enclosed message to you. Presidential messages have been delivered to the leaders of the NATO countries as well as Australia, Japan and South Korea.

I would be pleased to transmit your reply to the President.

With highest regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Arthur H. Hughes', followed by a large, stylized flourish.

Arthur H. Hughes
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosure: as stated--classified SECRET

His Excellency
Yitzhak Shamir
Prime Minister of the
State of Israel
Jerusalem

MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN
November 18, 1987

S E C R E T

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As planning begins in Washington for my meeting in early December with General Secretary Gorbachev, I wanted to share with you my own thoughts about what might be achieved, to solicit your views as to how we might best accomplish our common goals.

I view the coming meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev as an important step in the process that began in January 1984 and accelerated in November 1985 in Geneva. The purpose of that process is to achieve sustained improvement in East-West relations based on greater Soviet moderation at home and abroad. This is a long-term effort, in which there will be inevitable difficulties and disappointments, and toward which we must show both resolution and patience.

I plan to take up with General Secretary Gorbachev the same four-part agenda -- human rights, bilateral relations, regional affairs, and arms reductions -- that we have been discussing since before Geneva. We will review progress in each area to date, and consider what practical steps can be taken in the period ahead.

In the area of human rights, I intend to urge the Soviet Union to translate into lasting institutional changes the encouraging signs we have seen regarding increased emigration levels, resolution of cases involving divided families, and internal reforms. I will stress that the Soviet Union has a long way to go before it meets well-established Western criteria for progress in this area.

On bilateral matters, we would hope to broaden the range of our contacts and resolve problems relating to our Embassy.

On regional affairs, we have regularized the dialogue between our two countries, making clear to senior Soviet policymakers our concerns about Soviet actions throughout the world. Now it is my hope that this dialogue can move beyond exchanges of views to serious consideration of ways to help bring conflicts to an end. I shall emphasize to General Secretary Gorbachev the need for a date certain to start the rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, rather than mere statements of an intent to withdraw. I shall seek progress in resolving the

S E C R E T

conflicts in Angola and Cambodia. I shall see if a way can be found to expedite an end to the Iran-Iraq war and halt the Soviet Union's effort to divert attention from Iran's aggressive actions in the Gulf and its preparation for another major offensive against Iraq, even as the Soviets falsely claim that the U.S. naval presence is somehow responsible for the high level of tension.

My approach to arms reduction will be equally straightforward, based on the realization that disarmament is not an end in itself, but a means by which Western security can be enhanced. Our negotiators in Geneva are working hard to finish an effective and verifiable INF treaty, and it is my hope that the first item of business at the Washington summit will be to sign this agreement with General Secretary Gorbachev. This would open the door for important work done in the area of deep and stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive forces. There are still substantial differences between the U.S. and Soviet Union on this subject, particularly with regard to sublimits on ballistic missile warheads, verification, and our respective approaches to strategic defense. My objective with General Secretary Gorbachev will be to discuss all these questions thoroughly, so that we might move ahead. Whether this proves possible depends in large part on General Secretary Gorbachev's willingness to accept that the U.S. will continue with its vigorous research effort -- the SDI program.

I expect that General Secretary Gorbachev and I will also discuss other important arms control issues -- chemical weapons, conventional force stability in Europe, nuclear non-proliferation, and negotiations on nuclear testing which the U.S. and Soviet Union began this month in Geneva.

All this should make for an ambitious series of meetings. It is important that we -- and our publics -- remain realistic about the tasks ahead, and modest in our expectation of results. I myself approach the talks with optimism, confident of your support and assistance.

I have asked Secretary Shultz to consult with each of your governments, before and after the summit. Such consultations are an invaluable source of advice for me, and a source of strength for our common alliance.

S E C R E T

3.

I hope you will take the time not only to reply to this letter but also to convey directly to Secretary Shultz your views and suggestions about the U.S.-Soviet summit. It is through such exchanges that we can demonstrate together the cohesion and vitality of the West. I look forward to working with you and having the benefit of your advice and counsel.

Sincerely yours,
Ronald Reagan

S E C R E T

RICHARD N. GOLDMAN
ALCOA BUILDING • ONE MARITIME PLAZA
SAN FRANCISCO 94111

November 18, 1987

The Honorable Yitzhak Shamir
Prime Minister of Israel
Hakirya
Jerusalem, Israel


Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

During a visit with Minister of Tourism and Justice Abraham Sharir on November 15, we discussed among other things the pending replacement of Yaacov Sella as Consul General in San Francisco who is scheduled to return to Israel in the summer of 1988. I hope you will encourage him to stay an extra year to secure the fine work he has been undertaking.

I mentioned to Minister Sharir that Consul General Sella has been the finest representative of Israel in San Francisco since the Consulate was opened, and that it is vitally important that he be followed by someone of equal capability when he leaves his post.

An exceptionally well-qualified representative makes an important difference. If I can be of assistance, please let me know.

Respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Richard Goldman". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned below the typed name.

RNG/dmb

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף _____ מתוך _____ דפים

סווג בטחוני _____

דחיסות _____

תאריך/ז"ח _____

מס' מברק _____

2/2

413

- 2 -

בשהותו בניו-יורק נפגש הנשיא עם מושל מדינת ניו-יורק, מריו קומו, עם הקרדינל או'קונר ועם ראש העיר אד קוצ'.

היום האחרון של הביקור בבוסטון הוקדש לטקס קבלת-תואר דוקטור-כבוד מטעם אוניברסיטת ברנדייס - אשר זכה לטיקור נרחב מטעם תחנות הטלביזיה ועתוני בוסטון וכן מטעם העתונות היהודית.

בסיכום: ביקור מוצלח ביותר עם הדים חיוביים מאד ותרומה חשובה ביותר לתדמיחה החיובית של ישראל.


ארד

17

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו ס ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מחוד 2 דפים

סווג בסיוני גלוי

דחיסות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ח 1700 18 נוב 87

מס' מברק

1/2

בט

המשרד

340

437

אל :- מעיית, מצפ"א, מזכיר הממשלה

צט :- ת"ם/עבאר כ' תבא - ת/68 - (בטמן העבירונא)

להלן מתוך מסיבת העיתונאים עם פרסום דו"ח ועדות הקונגרס בנושא איראן -

קונטרה.

בואו קר
יוסי גל

Q Mr. Chairman, what is your (inaudible) secrecy in the Executive branch? Are you folks now ready to reveal the secret agreement the committee reached with representatives of Israel as to what you promised representatives of Israel and what they promised you? I've asked (inaudible) copies of the secret agreement with the Israeli representatives.

SEN. INOUE: I should --

Q (Inaudible) -- agree to have the investigation (inaudible) conducted by the government of Israel?

SEN. INOUE: There was no agreement on the part of this committee and any other government. In our dealings with the state of Israel, we did so in the proper fashion, through our State Department. Thirdly, I would like to say for the record that we believe that the state of Israel was most cooperative. If you place the situation in the converse,

Handwritten notes in Hebrew at the bottom of the page, including numbers 1, 2, 3 and various words like 'בואו קר', 'יוסי גל', 'המשרד', 'בט', 'ת"ם/עבאר', 'ת/68', 'מסיבת העיתונאים', 'פרסום דו"ח', 'ועדות הקונגרס', 'בנושא איראן', 'קונטרה', 'מס' מברק', 'תאריך/ז"ח', 'סווג בסיוני', 'דחיסות רגיל', 'דף 1 מחוד 2 דפים', 'ט ו ס ס מ ב ר ק'.

2/2
340
NI
437

and if the state of Israel had attempted to subpoena the Attorney General of the United States, I think we would have in unison rose in contentious anger. But in this case, the state of Israel was willing to provide us with secrets of the highest nature, of the highest classification, and we were able to meet with some of the public -- government officials.

SEN. RUDMAN: And I would add, the most detailed of chronologies, both factual and financial, which were, obviously, we were able to corroborate with certain other evidence. Those two documents were extraordinarily helpful to what we did.

Q (off-mike)

SEN. RUDMAN: Say again?

Q Will you release a copy of the agreement that you reached with the Israeli representative?

SEN. RUDMAN: We didn't reach an agreement with the Israeli government that I would call an agreement. We had an understanding of what they would furnish us, and we have stated that publicly. There has been no secret about that. The Committee has never felt it ought to subpoena the employee of a foreign government. We don't think that's our privilege.

*

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

דף מתוך דפים

סוג בטחוני בלמס

דחופות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

1/3

אל: המשרד, בטחון, ניו יורק

115 338 436

אל: מעיית, יועץ שהביט לתקשורת

דע: מצפ"א; ניו יורק

STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING

תדרוך דובר מחמ"ד ליום 18, נובמבר 1987

Q On regional issues, it's been reported that the Minister of the Jordanian Court, Mr. Alawadi (?), in Atlanta, claimed that Secretary Shultz proposed to King Hussein, when he met him in London, a sort of mini-summit between Hussein, Assad of Syria and Shamir in Washington during the summit, to be under the auspices of both Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev. Would you care to comment on the authenticity of this claim?

MR. REDMAN: No. In keeping with the stance that the Secretary adopted throughout his conversations during his most recent trip to the Middle East, and even before that, I'm not going to comment on any reports concerning specific proposals or conversations. Those are things we believe remain best kept among the parties.

Q (Off-mike) -- King Hussein to the United States?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have anything on that.

Q (Off-mike) -- that something -- that there is a precedent for answering, because the Secretary said, when asked after he left the Middle East, yes, Shamir was coming; yes, he had invited the Saudis -- or maybe it was the Egyptians. But he said he had not invited Hussein. Since then, has Hussein been invited?

STATE DEPT. -11/18/87

2-2

MR. REDMAN: I'm not quarreling with the precedent for talking about visits to the US, since obviously we announced those visits across the whole world. But in response to this particular question, I just don't have anything on it.

Q Well, if we can separate it from this report, I mean, in his last fling at Middle East diplomacy, it was clear that Mr. Shultz thought it was the right time to invite the Israelis and the other players, but not to talk to Hussein about coming to Washington. And I'm asking you if since then it has become appropriate to have Hussein come here again.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew at the bottom of the page, including the number 115 338 436.

MR. REDMAN: First, that summary is a summary of your impressions. But in

2/3

N'
436

any case, I just don't have anything to add to it.

Q Chuck, would you say that this report is erroneous? I mean, the publication of this information at the present time by someone who is very close to King Hussein? What say --

GR
338

MR. REDMAN: That I have no comment on reports of any kind.

YJ
115

Q As long as you're in that area, we're into discussions, are you able today to shed any light at all on this so-called memorandum of understanding that Peres has alleged to have talked to

MR. REDMAN: I can shed a lot of light on that. As I said yesterday, my immediate reaction was that it didn't ring any bells. And, after further checking, I can say that that was indeed a correct impression. There has been no such proposal.

Q Okay. Now that story or report came in various versions. The persistent version, which I think you're denying, is that the Israelis had assurance of stabilized aid on May 12th from the US that they would agree to some sort of a conference. There's no basis for that?

MR. REDMAN: No.

Q All right. But another part of the story --

MR. REDMAN: The fact of the matter is, just to go to that one aspect of that question it is a fact of life that AID appropriations are made on an annual basis and approved and appropriated by the Congress on an annual basis. So, even the underlying thrust of that story has --

Q Well, one pathetic case --

MR. REDMAN: There is nothing to that story.

Q One very prominent --

MR. REDMAN: Let me finish, Jim.

Q One very prominent, active former secretary of state habitually greased Middle East diplomacy with great globe of aid. He was able to offer the parties, meaning Israel and Egypt, at least promise them large increases in aid in order to make them feel more secure, let us say, to proceed with the kind of diplomacy he was pushing at the time.

MR. REDMAN: Seldom have I given a more definitive answer.

Q All right. But let's get to the other part of the report. The report also says that the US is prepared to -- you want to go on that.

Q There's a more recent press release than that which is Camp David. There was an aid commitment that went straight forward through several administrations and was accepted as a commitment by several administrations.

3/3

Nr
436

Q2
338

YJ
115

MR. REDMAN: I've answered your question and that report in no uncertain terms. What can I do more?

Q No crime. But we're just trying to make the point that it is unprecedented that US aid is used as an instrument of diplomacy even though Congress has the job of appropriating aid even if the requests do initiate with the executive branch. But one part of the

story which sounds a little more in line with what we're familiar with is a guarantee of some sorts, that Shultz has assured the Israelis that if any kind of a conference gets to be really unpleasant and unfair that the United States will walk out or will support Israel in objecting to a conference jiggered on, you know, against them.

MR. REDMAN: That seems to be a totally different story.

Q No, no. It was wrapped into one of these stories. In fact, one of the leads was that assurances

of US guarantees that Israel will be free to --

MR. REDMAN: The only thing I see in common between those two stories is the use of the word "guarantee."

Q Well.

MR. REDMAN: But concerning our point of view toward international conference -- if that's what your question is --

Q Yeah.

MR. REDMAN: Then the Secretary is clearly on the record any number of times on that issue and that has not changed.

Q While you're talking about foreign aid in Congress, Chuck, do you have any comment on Dan Burton from -- Republican from Indiana, proposal to the Congress that all funds to the United Nations agencies -- three leading agencies, will be frozen until the PLO office will be closed in Section 405, I think, in the Foreign(?) Aid Program?

MR. REDMAN: You know what our position has been on the PLO Observer Mission. Is that the office we're talking about in this case?

Q Yes, today, which is -- I think they are working on it now in the Congress, or something like that.

MR. REDMAN: I've spoken to that any number of times.

Q No, this is something new which was on the agenda, on today's agenda of the Congress, I think, for discussion about three agencies, you know, United Nations Development Program, United Nations Children(?) Fund, and United Nations Environment(?) Program to hold \$222,264,000 from the United Nations funds --

MR. REDMAN: Well, first, I haven't seen that particular bit of legislation. But secondly, as I have said on the question of the PLO Observer Mission in New York, I have stated and restated how we view that issue.

ddddddd.

23

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טופס מכרז

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני גלוי

המשרד

1/2

דחיסות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ס 1538 18 נוב 1987

434

מס' מברק

אל: מצפ"א

בית הנבחרים-סיוע חוץ

ב-11.18 פתחה בית הנבחרים את הדיון בחוק סיוע החוץ לשנים 88-89 תוך צפיה שהיום יושלם הדיון בכמחצית הפרקים שבחוק. המשך הדיון מתוכנן לשבוע המתחיל ב-7.12.

- אחרי דיון בן שעה ובו התבטאו דמוקרטים בעד הצעת החוק כפי שגבשה ועדת החוץ, בעוד הרפובליקנים משבחים את התחליף הרפובליקני, החל הדיון המעשי:

יו"ר ועדת החוץ, פאסל, הגיש קבוצת תיקונים **EN Bloc**. זו כללה תיקון של דייב אובי שיתיר מימון החטר בקרן **G.R.F.** מתוך כספי סיוע החוץ, ושלוש שני תיקונים (לווין וסמית) בנושאי נשק, במיוחד הסטינגר. התיקון הזה יאסור על מכירה ממשלתית של טילי סטינגר אלא למדינות נאט"ו ובנות ברית עקריות שאינן חברות בנאט"ו להוציא מקרה חרום מיוחדים או מצבים שזה אמצעי ההגנה היעיל היחיד.

סמית ולויין הסבירו הרקע לתיקון: כלי יעיל ונייד זה מוצא זרכו לגופים ואזורים שונים בעולם ועלול לסכן אמריקנים, המטרה היא להגביר הפיקוח אך מאפשר גמישות מטויימת לממשל, אוסר רק על מכירות גלויות ובזאת הינו הרע במעוטו.

- סטיב סולארז ביקש לחקן את התיקון באופן שיחזיר למכור לבחריין סטינגר: הוא ביקש להוציא מן הכלל מדינות המספקות תמיכה מעשית לכוחות אמריקנים או מאפשרות גישה לבסיסים. לדבריו, עד לפני הצהרים היה סבור שתיקון לניין-סמית המשולב לא יחול על בחריין שתרומתה לכוחות אמריקנים בנפרץ חיונית. כשהתברר לו שאין הדבר כך ביקש רשות לחקן את התיקון. לדבריו לבחריין סדורים למנוע נפילת הטילים בידי מחבלים.

-מטיבות פרוצדורליות לא החקיימה ההצבעה על הצעת סולארז והוא ינסה לחפש מסגרת אחרת במהלך הדיון להוציא את בחריין מהכלל.

אשר לתיקון אובי, מלכתחילה התנגדו לו דמוקרטים ובהם היו"ר אולם אחרי הערכת התמיכה בו, לרבות מחברי ועדת ההקצבות בשני הבתים, הוחלט שלא להתנגד.

2 3 1 3 1 2 1 4 4 4
שהיה רהב שהיא אונא אונא אונא אונא אונא אונא אונא אונא אונא אונא

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מחוד 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

2/2

434

- הדיון על התיקון המשולב של פאסל לא נמשך זמן רב והתיקון על כל סעיפיו עבר ברב של 322 מול 93.

- יתר הדיווח בהמשך.

טובה הרצל
טובה היצ

אגרי נשיב הדבויים הנחמס באיזוה אלושק הדיון בחוק
מתי (19) אן השלמה טו צפוייה לפני דצמבר (אם בכלל).

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט פ ס מ ב ר ק

דפו מתוך 1 דפים

סוג בסחוני שמור

דחיפות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ח 1030 18 נוב 1987

מס* מברק

המשרד

409

אל: מצפ"א
ארב"ל 1
מצרים
דע: לשכת שרת הבריאות

קונגרס: שרת הבריאות
-לשל מחני 376 מאתמול

במהלך ביקורה נפגשה עם הנרי ווקסמן, יו"ר ועקת המשנה לבריאות בבית הנבחרים (שיזם תיקון הממון פרויקטים משותפים בין ישראל ומצרים). העלתה גם באזניו הצורך להמריץ המצרים שיפ בנושאי בריאות. ווקסמן הביע נכונות לפעול כמתבקש כלפי המצרים. הוא מתכוון לבקר בארץ בינואר (לכינוס הפרלמנטרים היהודים) ולצרף לכך ביקור במצרים. מבקש לפני כן רשימה אופרטיבית של פרויקטים שיוכל להגיש למצרים.

ד/קאונים
טובה הרצל

1 1 2 1 1 3 3 2
1 1 2 1 1 3 3 2
1 1 2 1 1 3 3 2
1 1 2 1 1 3 3 2

נכנס **
**
**
**

טודי

הודעת: 11,13672

אל: המשרד

מ-: לוש, נר: 391, תא: 171187, זח: 1630, זח: מ, טג: ט

נד: 8

טודי/מידוי

אל: טמנבל מזתי

זע: מצמא, מצרים, משפט

השגריר - קהיר


הקציו במר'

למכתבן מה- 8.11

א. במובן ניהון לפעול בקונגרס, אך לנוכח המצוקות הכלכליות והאלוצים התקציביים כאן ספק רב אם יהיה אפשר להגדיל את תקציב הבח. בנוסף, בשל הסיבות המפורטות בהמשך, ספק גם אם מענייננו לפעול בכיוון זה.

ב. למען הדיוק, אין מדובר ב'קיצוץ' כפי שהקציו הכמרי שנתיים הקודמות - מדובר בהמשך ההקצבה ברמה הנוכחית של השנה התקציבית 1987 (שהסתיימה ב-30.9.87). הממשל ביקש אמנם 30 מליון דולר לשת"א 1988 דל-1989 (לעומת הוצאות במושל של 24.4 ב-1987), אך הקונגרס לא נענה לבקשה זו, ועזמו להתמיד בהקצבה של 24.4 מליון דולר. רק אם מסתכלים על בקשת הממשל, ניהון לדבר על 'קיצוץ', אך כידוע בקונגרס אין מתיחסים לבקשת הממשל ברצינות ולמעשה ה'קיצוץ' כביכול, הינו פיקטיבי מאחר והוא קיצוץ מתון מספר שאיננו אלא בקשה.

ג. מעבר לזאת, כפי שעולה ממכתב מנבל כמ'ר למנכ"ל מה-18.9 (העתק נמסר לנו ע"י הממונה על כמ'ר במחמ"ד)



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

נבר הודיע קונסטבל שהכח יוכל להסתדר במסגרת הקצבה של 24.4 מליון דולר בשנתיים הבאות. קונסטבל מעלה האפשרות של "קיצוצים גדולים עוד יותר" (בטעוין השני מהסוף) ומן הסתם כוונתו לאפשרות של "SEQUESTER" (קיצוצים אוטומטיים בכל הסעיפים הבלתי מוגנים בתקציב ארה"ב), אך כפי שדווח במדו"קנו 345 למצפא, וכנכון לעת חיבור מדו"ק זה, נראה שיושג בימים הקרובים הסדר שימנע בצורך ב- SEQUESTER .

ד. קונסטבל ביקר ברושיונגטון לפני כחודש, ואישר גם באדני האחרים במחמד להכנת התקציב שלו שיוכל להסתדר במסגרת נל. הדבר נודע בקונגרס, ושוב מאשימים את הכמ"ר בקריאת "זאבי" לשווא פעם נוספת (ראונוא מכהבי מה 28.9 למנהל מצרים). מעשיית קונסטבל שמת במו ידיו את הבטיס שהוא עומד עליו. קונסטבל היה גם אצל הציר שרן וגם לו אישר שיוכל להיות עם התקציב של אשתקד.

ה. ואם אין די בכך, עלינו לקבוע קדימויות. בעת אנו פועלים בקונגרס למען הגדלת השתתפות ארה"ב בתקציב יוניפיל. הסכום החסר אינו מיקטיבי ומסתכם בכדי 18 מליון דולר. לדעתנו מוטב שנדו"ק במטרה זו ולא נפזר את מאמצינו. הנל על דעת הציר.

למדן

הפ: שהח, והמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממככל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ממד, ליאור, מזחיים, מצרים, בירן, מצפא, סייבל, משפט, שחור

Faint, illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. The text is scattered across the page and is difficult to decipher due to its low contrast and the grainy texture of the paper.

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

סגירות ישראל / וושינגטון

דף 1 מחוד 3 דפים

סוג בטחוני גלוי

חמסרד

דחיסות רגיל

1/3

356

תאריך/ז"ח 87 17 0900

מס' מברק

אל - : מצפ"א, מע"ח

דע - : לשכת רה"מ

מא - : יוסי גל - א"מ

שני המאמרים דלהלן הופיעו בעמוד המערכת של "וושינגטון פוסט"

היום 17.11.87

בואנה
יוסי גל

Richard Cohen

Israel Is Not Trying Hard Enough . . .

The Middle East is the home office of duplicity, of the double cross, of words that can simultaneously mean everything and nothing, with either one cause for men to kill and nations to go to war. Now, though, something new has entered the Middle East picture: paradox. The disunity of the Arabs has been replaced by the disunity of the Jews:

Given the history of the region, you can count on the situation to change. But for the moment, the Arab states—with the exception of Libya—have found common cause: Iran. They fear it and they do so with such intensity that Iran has replaced Israel as the pariah state of the region. Like the prospect of one's hanging, a genuine threat marvelously focuses the mind. In the Middle East, the ayatollah looms with a noose.

Maybe out of fear of Iran, maybe out of weariness and maybe out of maturation, the Arab states have collapsed into unity. Meeting in Jordan recently, the Arab League took some dramatic steps. It not only denounced Iran, it also endorsed a Middle East peace conference and authorized any Arab state to restore diplomatic relations with Egypt, the sole Arab nation to have made peace with Israel. In addition, the usual anti-Israel vitriol—as much a fixture at these meetings as dark, sweet coffee—was missing.

"Suddenly, moderation has swept the Arab world like a dry wind from the desert."

On the other side of the Jordan River, though, there is no such unity. Israel's ironically named unity government remains divided on the question of an international peace conference. The Labor Party and Shimon Peres want one. The Likud bloc and Yitzhak Shamir do not—especially one in which the Soviet Union would participate. Unfortunately for both Peres and the cause of peace, Shamir is the prime minister. Among other things, he will not bargain away any of the West Bank in return for peace. To him, as to many Israelis, these are the ancient Hebrew lands of Judea and Samaria. On certain matters, Shamir takes instruction only from the Bible.

Consistency is to be admired, and Shamir is nothing if not consistent. But as he tenaciously clings to his position, the Arab world is in flux. Iraq, a rabid Israel hater, is fighting for its life against non-Arab Iran. Syria, the other hard-line regime, has economic miseries and is on the dole from more moderate Saudi Arabia. As for Syria's ally, the Soviet Union, it has said it will

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including the words "התקן", "הסכמה", "השקפה", "התקן", "השקפה", "התקן", "השקפה".

countenance no aggressive war against Israel. Even the Palestine Liberation Organization seems to have lost ground. The English version of the Arab League's final declaration failed to refer to it as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." A fuming Yasser Arafat hit the roof.

Most important, the Arab states endorsed an international peace conference. This is the brainchild of King Hussein of Jordan, the first Arab leader to have resumed diplomatic relations with Egypt after the Camp David accords. Hussein was ebullient at the conclusion of the meeting. He had a right to be. Suddenly, moderation has swept the Arab world like a dry wind from the desert. Egypt, probably the most powerful of the Arab countries, but an outcast for making peace with Israel, is being welcomed back into the fold. When it comes to Iran, the Arabs can use all the muscle they can get.

Of course, nothing is simple in the Middle East. The Arab League's final declaration, while fairly brimming with moderation, insists on the

"recovery of all the occupied Arab territories, including 'Al Quds Al Sharif,' " which happens to be Jerusalem. On Jerusalem, there is no division in Israel. It will not be returned to Arab control. It is the heart and soul of the nation—the beacon that for ages the most distant Diaspora Jew could see clearly. Not an inch of it will be ceded.

The Arab language on Jerusalem might just be boilerplate, or it might be sincere. Either way, it's an issue for negotiators. But there won't be any of them if Shamir persists in missing what might be the best opportunity for a Middle East peace in years. He's a stubborn man, but he's also a national leader. He can be influenced, and no one is in a better position to do that than the United States, Israel's main benefactor—not to mention protector. Now is the time for the Reagan administration to lean on Israel. Billions in aid should not buy servility, but it ought to buy something.

For years, Israel's foremost ally in the Middle East was the disunity of its Arab enemies. No matter how innocuous a peace proposal was, some Arab state would take offense and Israel could, with justification, say it tried. Now through the efforts of King Hussein, the Arabs have a modicum of unity, and it's Israel that's not trying. As a turn of events for the Middle East, this is more than a paradox. It's a tragedy.

X

*

356

2/3

Norman Podhoretz

... No, It's Not to Blame

TEL AVIV—As always when I am in Israel, people ask me what I think should be done about their conflict with the Arabs. As always, I try to fend them off. Under the Law of Return, I say, any Jew like myself who lives in any other country can become a citizen of the state of Israel automatically and overnight. By choosing Israel automatically and overnight, I consider that I am, not to claim that right, I consider that I am, simultaneously, forfeiting the right to weigh in on an issue that is literally a matter of life and death to those of my fellow Jews who have put their own bodies on the line in the building and defense of a Jewish state. Making the same point a little less melodramatically, I say that giving advice from the safety of New York seems to me presumptuous. It is also unserious, like playing poker with matchsticks.

There are Israelis who love hearing an American Jew talk that way. They are usually politicians in power and intellectuals who are winning the internal political debate. By contrast, the losing factions, hoping to enlist the support of American Jews, will invariably encourage us to speak up. Naturally, once they themselves are in power, these same Israelis are likely to change their minds about the desirability of what will then strike them as unnecessary or impertinent interference from ill-informed outsiders.

At the moment, at any rate, with the right-of-center Likud Party led by Yitzhak Shamir occupying the prime minister's office, it is the left-of-center Labor Party led by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres that has been most active in "electioneering" among American Jews.

Peres is pushing for an international conference, in which the Soviet Union would be included, as the only path to negotiations between Israel and Jordan. Shamir opposes such a conference. Not only does he consider it a great risk to invite the Soviets in; he also sees the whole idea as a prelude to pressures on Israel for even riskier unilateral concessions.

Behind and below this dispute is the issue of whether Israel can or should withdraw from some or all of the territories it first occupied in fighting back against a Jordanian attack during the Six-Day War of 1967. The Labor Party favors what it calls "territorial compromise." The Likud Party favors maintaining the status quo.

During the question period following a lecture I deliver at Tel Aviv University on the subject of neoconservatism in America, I am pressed to take a position on the issue of the territories. The questioner acknowledges my reluctance to do so. But surely, he suggests, I can have no objection to speculating on how an Israeli neo-conservative (if there were such a creature) might look at the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Caught in this cunning trap, I surrender. An Israeli neoconservative, I reply, would probably see the Arab-Israeli conflict much as an American neoconservative sees the U.S.-Soviet conflict. That is, he would reject the idea that his

"Until the Arabs give up their dream of wiping the Jewish state off the map, no clever initiatives by Israel will bring peace any closer."

own country and its enemies are morally equivalent. Instead he would affirm the superiority of Israel, as a free democratic society, to the repressive autocracies surrounding it.

Beyond this, an Israeli neoconservative would deny that Israel is in any sense to blame for the war that the Arab world has been waging against it from the day of its birth nearly 40 years ago. He would point out that since this war was launched in 1947, it cannot be about the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. Nor, for the same reason, can the cause be Israel's opposition to a Palestinian state in those territories.

In short, unlike many on the left in Israel and elsewhere, an Israeli neoconservative would refuse to forget that what enrages the Arabs is the existence of a sovereign Jewish state in "their" part of the world—and not the current boundaries of that state or anything it has done or failed to do.

From this fundamental reality, an Israeli neo-conservative would conclude that until the Arabs give up their dream of wiping the Jewish state off the map, no clever initiatives by Israel will bring peace any closer. Conversely, as Egypt under Anwar Sadat proved, the minute the Arabs do decide to reconcile themselves to

the existence of the Jewish state, no clever initiatives will be necessary to bring peace about.

Having gone this far, I am forced to stop talking for lack of time. But my mind will not stop, and it races ahead to the reflection that the Israelis, who once seemed so complacent, have in the past few years become much too hard on themselves.

It is a case, I find myself thinking, of battle fatigue. Israel is just approaching its 40th anniversary as a state, and all this time it has lived under siege, surrounded by enemies sworn to destroy it and by a wider world that has never fully accepted its legitimacy. The only days of respite it has enjoyed have been those separating periodic outbreaks of armed hostilities. Now, frustrated by their inability to call off this 40-year war against them, the Israelis have begun blaming one another. In truth, however, they are all equally the victims of a relentless and murderous aggression.

As such, they are confronted wherever they turn with unacceptable alternatives. Holding on to territories in which so many Palestinian Arabs live is dangerous because it could eventually compromise the Jewish character of Israel, its democratic character or both. But giving up the territories is also dangerous because it could compromise Israel's physical security and make it mortally vulnerable to military assault.

356
3
3

Which of these two dangers is greater cannot be known in advance. But I continue to believe that it is a question that only those whose lives depend on the answer have any right to decide.



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

12718

* תאריך :

* דף 1 מתוך 1

* עותק 3 מתוך 12

סודי ביותר

נכנס

**
**
**

* חוזם: 11,12718

* אל: המשרד

* מ-: נוש, נר: 369, תא: 171187, זח: 1300, דח: מ, סג: סב

* נד: 2


* סודי ביותר/מיד

* אל: ראש הממשלה. ממ' ראש הממשלה ושהח

* בעת השיחה אמר שולץ כי הוא שמח לראות שהשגריר
* ארד שוחף בשיחות שהיו לו בארץ הן עם ראש הממשלה והן
* עם ממרס ושהח זכי רואה בזאת תופעה חשובה.

* ערן

* תפ: שהח, רהמ, מנכל



שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

18

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ס

דף _____ מתוך _____ דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור

מלידי

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח 1530 17 בנוב' 87

מס' מברק

376

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, ארבי"ל 1, מצרים

דע: לשכת שרת ~~המזכיר~~ הבריאות

מאת: הציר-יועץ, וושינגטון

פגישה שרת הבריאות עם סגן עוזר המזכיר

שרת הבריאות פגשה היום את פיליפ וילקוקס, סגן עוזר המזכיר, בהעדרו של מרפי שנאלץ ברגע האחרון להיות מחוץ לבנין.

בשיחה כללית וידידותית פרטה השרה את מטרות ביקורה, את שיתוף הפעולה הקיים עם ארה"ב בנושאי בריאות, את המשותף בשתי המדינות בטיפול בנושאי בריאות נוכח קיצוצים תקציביים.

כן העלתה השרה שני נושאים אופרטיביים:

1) סיועה מאחורי הקלעים של ארה"ב להזיז נושא ש"פ בנושאי בריאות עם מצרים, נושא שהשרה העלתה בחודש מאי השנה עם שר הבריאות המצרי, דאודי, בפגישתם בג'נבה. וילקוקס הבטיח לפעול בעינן.

2) השרה פרטה חשיבות הפעולות הנמרצת למען המועמד הברזילאי למנכלות אבי"ע והסבירה החשיבות שבראש הארגון יעמוד מנכ"ל מקצועי. עדיף היה, כמובן שד"ר מאהלר ימשיך בתפקידו לשנה-שנתיים, וילקוקס אמר שיבדוק במקביל לפגישה שנקבעה גם לי/עם בויר, הממונה על נושא אבי"ע באגף ארבי"ל.

מתני

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including a large number '3' and several lines of text in Hebrew, some with numbers 1, 2, 3 written above them.

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ק

דף 1 מחוך 2 דפים

אל; המשרד

14

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ח 0950 17 נוב' 87

מס' מברק

1/2

363

אל: מצפ"א. לשכת שרת הבריאות

מאת: דני בלור, וושינגטון

הנדון: פגישות שרת הבריאות בושינגטון

שרת הבריאות הגיעה שלשום לושינגטון כאורחת מזכיר הבריאות ונתקבלה בנמל התעופה ע"י היועץ המשפטי של משרד הבריאות רוז רוברטסון שיוצג את המזכיר. אחה"צ פתחה השרה את הכינוס המשותף של שני המשרדים בענייני גריאטריה המתקיים במכון הלאומי לבריאות N.I.H. בערב ערך לכבודה עוזר מזכיר הבריאות לענייני בריאות הציבור ד"ר רוברט וינדום קבלת פנים. אתמול קיימה השרה פגישות במרכז הבריאות הלאומי וכן במינהל המזון והתרופות של ממשלת ארה"ב.

לפני הצהריים נפגשה עם הרופא הראשי של משרד הבריאות ד"ר אברט קופ ודגו בשיתוף פעולה ישראלי-אמריקני בנושאי רפואה מונעת. ד"ר קופ יבוא לישראל בשנה הקרובה לנהל סדנא בנושא זה, תוך דגש על נושא העישון. לדעת ד"ר קופ פעולות מניעה וחינוך בארה"ב גרמו להפחתת התמותה והתחלואה של לב, סרטן ושכץ, גוסף על חסכון כספי ניכר וצמצום בתאונות. ד"ר קופ ציין שעיקר זמנו מוקדש עכשיו לנושא ה"איידס", שכל עוד לא נמצאה לו תרופה וחיסון, אין דרך אלא חינוך והסברה. חבייה חעיקרית היא בעייתם של מזריקי הסמים, שהם ברובם אנשי מיעוטים, תושבי גטאות, חסרי השכלה, שאי אפשר להגיע אליהם בפעולות חינוך והסברה. לדעת ד"ר קופ מצבה של ישראל בנושא ה"איידס" טוב יחסית, שכן בעיית "מזריקי סמים" קטנה בהיקפה, ואילו אצל הומוסקסואלים נבלמה התפשטות המגיפה הודות לפעולות חינוך, ואין סימנים לעליה ניכרת בשעורי המחלה אצל האוכלוסיה ההטרוסקסואלית.

בפגישה עם מזכיר הבריאות ד"ר בואן נדון בעיקר נושא מנכ"ל אב"ע (הוברק בנסרד). שרת הבריאות הודתה לד"ר בואן על שיתוף הפעולה של משרדו עם ישראל בענייני בריאות, והמזכיר הביע תקווה להמשיך השיתוף והרחבתו. שרת הבריאות גם העלתה את הצורך ביזמה אמריקאית ליצירת שיתוף פעולה בנושאי בריאות בין ישראל ומצריים, מעבר לפעולה המצומצמת שנעשתה ע"י אוניברסיטת ברנדייס. ד"ר בואן וסגנו דון ניומן הבטיחו לנסות ולפעול בנושא זה. בין היתר ע"י העלאת הנושא בפניה של ד"ר בואן אל שר הבריאות המצרי.

1 1 2 1 1 3 3 2
סה"ח 102 / 102 / 102 / 102 / 102 / 102 / 102 / 102

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מתוך 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

363 $\frac{2}{2}$

בארוחת ערביים מטעם סגן המזכיר דון ניומן נדוננו הצעות ספציפיות להמשר
תכניות שיתוף הפעולה בענייני בריאות בין ישראל לארה"ב. ניומן גם התעניין בתרופה
שפותחה במכון וייצמן, והמנוסה עתה בקליפורניה לטיפול בחולי "איידס".
אל שרת הבריאות נלווה המשנה למנכ"ל משרד הבריאות דון ניומן. ובשיחות
עם מזכיר הבריאות, טגנו ועם ד"ר קופ השתתף גם החתום מטה.

דני בלור
דני בלור

31

ט ז פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מחוד 3 דפים

סוג בטהוני סודי

1/3

המשרד

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח 1000 17 נוב. 87

368

מס' מברק

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני

להלן משיחתך עם ארמקוסט (9.11)

א. מפגש ארמקוסט וורונצוב - ארמקוסט אמר שמתכוון להעלות את אפגניסטאן, עיראק- איראן ותהליך השלום. במפגש שולץ שברדנדה בוושינגטון דובר בשני הנושאים הראשונים. מאז חלה נסיגה בכל הקשור להחלטת מועבייט שניה על הסכסוך במפרץ. בעת המפגש האחרון במוסקבה בין שולץ לשברדנדה היתה קבוצת עבודה שעסקה רק בצורה קצרה בנושא מז"ת ולא נראה שהסובייטים מעוניינים ביוזמות. עיקר עניינם באפגניסטאן ובמפרץ וסיור וורונצוב היה מיועד להוכיח שוב את יכולתם לקיים דיאלוג עם שני הצדדים.

בעניין המז"ת עמדת הסובייטים עדיין מעורפלה בכל הקשור ליצוג הפלשתינאי ותפקיד הועידה ויש מקום ללחץ עליהם לקבל הבהרות לגבי הרעיונות שהוצגו בפניהם ביולי בשיחות מרפי - פוליאקוב. הערכתו שהמדיניות הסובייטית בכמה נושאי חוץ היא מדיניות דינמית הפותחת אפשרויות אך לא בהכרח לניצול מידי. פיקרינג שנוכח בשיחה אמר שלא יחזור הדיווחים שיש עניין סובייטי רב להעלות את נושא מז"ת. הם נתנו תשובה מעורפלה במוסקבה, במפגש קבוצת העבודה, לגבי הנקודות של מרפי לפוליאקוב והוסיפו שיש להם הסתייגויות אף כי לא פרטו. ארמקוסט הוסיף שהסובייטים מבקשים לקבל תדמית של היוחס *feasible* אך לא עושים מאמץ והדבר בולט במיוחד באפגניסטאן שם הם משתמשים בסיסמה *בנאוטרליזציה* אך לא מציגים כל לוו"ז לנסיגה או צעדים קונקרטיים אחרים. כמובן, הוסיף ארמקוסט שמאחר והם רוצים בהסכם על פרוק נשק אבל לכאורה ללחוץ עליהם בנושאים אחרים אך השאלה היא עד איזה נקודה אפשר לעשות זאת בלי לגרום לנזק לעניין פרוק החימוש.

ב. סין

ארמקוסט סיפר על שיחות קשות שהיו לו עם הסינים בביקורו האחרון שם בנושא הסילקוורם. הסינים מכחישים כמובן מכירתם והסכימו לעשות מאמץ כדי למנוע מכירות נשק סיני ממדינות שלישיות. לפחות, אומר ארמקוסט, הוא קיבל תשומת לב. בשלב זה לא הוחלט על צעד תגמול נגד סין וארה"ב תמשיך לבדוק בצנורות המודיעין שלה באם מכירות כלשהן מתבצעות בין סין ואיראן.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew at the bottom of the page, including the word 'feasible' and other illegible text.

ט ז ע ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מתוך 3 דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

2/3

368

הסילקוורם הוא אמנם נושא בפני עצמו בשל יכולתו להפוך את הסכסוך לבינלאומי אך יש בעיות גם עם ספקים אפשריים אחרים כמו ישראל וקימת רגישות עצומה לגבי נשק הבא מידידים והעלול לפגוע בחיילי ארה"ב. ארמקוסט הוסיף שצ'כיה בולגריה צפון קוריאה שולחות נשק וברור שלסובייטים יש מה לומר בנקודה זו וארה"ב תמשיך ללחוץ עליהם.

ג. נושאי ארבי"ל.

1. UNEP - המנכ"ל המדיני ביקש סיוע ארה"ב כנגד בצוע החלטת הארגון להת סיוע לפלשתינאים באמצעות אש"ף. ארמקוסט הבטיח לבדוק.

2. WHO - המנכ"ל המדיני מבקש התנגדות ארה"ב למועמד הסעודי ג'זאירי. ישראל תעדיף הברזילאי. ארמקוסט אמר כי לא בקי במי המועמד המועדף עליהם ורושם בקשתו.

3. WTO - המנכ"ל המדיני ביקש התנגדות ארה"ב למן מעמד משקיף לאש"ף. ארמקוסט אמר שבודאי שלא יתמכו.

ד. דרא"פ.

המנכ"ל המדיני הסביר בקצרה החלטות הממשלה בנידון. ממשלת דרא"פ טוענת שישראל נכנעה ללחץ אמריקאי וכמובן שאין לכך כל שחר. ישראל פועלת להבאת מנהיגים ופעילים בעיקר מ"קוסטו" לקורסים בארץ. התגובות הן חיוביות ומעודדות. ארמקוסט אמר שזו פעילות חשובה בכיוון של בניה מנהיגות.

ה. מוזמביק

המנכ"ל המדיני מסר שהמוזמביקים מעוניינים בש"פ אך שאין כסף לכך. ארמקוסט אמר שהבעיה העיקרית של מוזמביק היא העדר כח אדם מיומן ברמות הביניים. לדעתו מוזמביק חשובה יותר למערב מאשר אנגולה והיא פעל לשכנוע בריטניה פורטוגל ומדינות אחרות במערב שתסייענה למוזמביק. ממשלת בריטניה הוליסה להשקיע כ- 30 מיליון שטרלינג בכביש מהגבול הדרא"פי למבורו.

ו. זכניות משותפות ישראל - מצרים.

A.I.D.

המנכ"ל המדיני ביקש סיוע ארמקוסט בהשגת מימון

BBV

טופס מברק

דף 3 מחוך 3 דפים

3/3

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

368

ד. תכנית מרשל למזי"ח.

המנכ"ל המדיני מסר לארמקוסט על שיחת שהי"ח עם שיראק ועל כך שהאחרון יעלה זאת בפני קובל מחוך מגמה שהנושא ידון במפגש הבא של 7 המתועשות הגדולות. ארמקוסט אמר שהם תומכים עקרונית בתוכנית והתקדמות בתהליך השלום בודאי תסייע לתכנית הכלכלית.

ערן

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף מתוך דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות בהגל לבוקר

390

המשרד

תאריך/ז"ח


~~17-11-87~~

מס' מברק

אל: מנכ"ל תקשורת

V.O.A

מאנשי איפא"ק במסר לנו כי יש בעיות עם אנשי V.O.A בנושא התחנה בישראל. בעקבות מידע זה שוחחתי הערב עם מורט סמית. לדבריו חזרו בסוף השבוע שישה מהנדסים של "קול אמריקה" מישראל ומסרו לו כי ישראל מעלה מחדש את נושא התפרעות האלקטרו-מגנטיות בצורה המטילה ספק רב לגבי יכולת ביצוע הפרוייקט. מעבר לכך, אומר מורט סמית, מכריח אותם קונגרסמן ציל סמית שהוא יו"ר תת הועדה בבית הנבחרים לתקציב מחמ"ד לבחור בין הפרוייקט הישראלי לבין פרויקטים אחרים בשל אילוצים תקציביים. להערכתי יש כאן נסיון של "קול אמריקה" להתחמק מבצוע הפרוייקט הישראלי והיה רצוי מאוד שתדרכו אותנו בהקדם האפשרי לגבי מהות ורצינות הבעיה הטכנית. קצין הקשור לקונגרס מר למדן מצביע על כך שהחלטה לא תיפול אלא בתחילת דצמבר אך שיש צורך בתדרוך שלכם על מנת שנוכל לפעול בקרב חברי בית הנבחרים והסנט על מנת שלא לאבד את הנוסח שכבר הושג בסנט בנושא שלנו.

ערו


3 2 1 3 2
 מה דא א/א/א א/א/א א/א/א
 מה דא א/א/א א/א/א א/א/א
 מה דא א/א/א א/א/א א/א/א

countenance no aggressive war against Israel. Even the Palestine Liberation Organization seems to have lost ground. The English version of the Arab League's final declaration failed to refer to it as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." A fuming Yasser Arafat hit the roof.

Most important, the Arab states endorsed an international peace conference. This is the brainchild of King Hussein of Jordan, the first Arab leader to have resumed diplomatic relations with Egypt after the Camp David accords. Hussein was ebullient at the conclusion of the meeting. He had a right to be. Suddenly, moderation has swept the Arab world like a dry wind from the desert. Egypt, probably the most powerful of the Arab countries, but an outcast for making peace with Israel, is being welcomed back into the fold. When it comes to Iran, the Arabs can use all the muscle they can get.

Of course, nothing is simple in the Middle East. The Arab League's final declaration, while fairly brimming with moderation, insists on the

X

"recovery of all the occupied Arab territories, including 'Al Quds Al Sharif,' " which happens to be Jerusalem. On Jerusalem, there is no division in Israel. It will not be returned to Arab control. It is the heart and soul of the nation—the beacon that for ages the most distant Diaspora Jew could see clearly. Not an inch of it will be ceded.

The Arab language on Jerusalem might just be boilerplate, or it might be sincere. Either way, it's an issue for negotiators. But there won't be any of them if Shamir persists in missing what might be the best opportunity for a Middle East peace in years. He's a stubborn man, but he's also a national leader. He can be influenced, and no one is in a better position to do that than the United States, Israel's main benefactor—not to mention protector. Now is the time for the Reagan administration to lean on Israel. Billions in aid should not buy servility, but it ought to buy something.

For years, Israel's foremost ally in the Middle East was the disunity of its Arab enemies. No matter how innocuous a peace proposal was, some Arab state would take offense and Israel could, with justification, say it tried. Now through the efforts of King Hussein, the Arabs have a modicum of unity, and it's Israel that's not trying. As a turn of events for the Middle East, this is more than a paradox. It's a tragedy.

X

356

2/3

Vertical line of text, possibly a page number or header.

Vertical line of text, possibly a page number or header.

Norman Podhoretz

... No, It's Not to Blame

TEL AVIV—As always when I am in Israel, people ask me what I think should be done about their conflict with the Arabs. As always, I try to fend them off. Under the Law of Return, I say, any Jew like myself who lives in any other country can become a citizen of the state of Israel automatically and overnight. By choosing not to claim that right, I consider that I am, simultaneously, forfeiting the right to weigh in on an issue that is literally a matter of life and death to those of my fellow Jews who have put their own bodies on the line in the building and defense of a Jewish state. Making the same point a little less melodramatically, I say that giving advice from the safety of New York seems to me presumptuous. It is also unserious, like playing poker with matchsticks.

There are Israelis who love hearing an American Jew talk that way. They are usually politicians in power and intellectuals who are winning the internal political debate. By contrast, the losing factions, hoping to enlist the support of American Jews, will invariably encourage us to speak up. Naturally, once they themselves are in power, these same Israelis are likely to change their minds about the desirability of what will then strike them as unnecessary or impertinent interference from ill-informed outsiders.

At the moment, at any rate, with the right-of-center Likud Party led by Yitzhak Shamir occupying the prime minister's office, it is the left-of-center Labor Party led by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres that has been most active in "electioneering" among American Jews.

Peres is pushing for an international conference, in which the Soviet Union would be included, as the only path to negotiations between Israel and Jordan. Shamir opposes such a conference. Not only does he consider it a great risk to invite the Soviets in; he also sees the whole idea as a prelude to pressures on Israel for even riskier unilateral concessions.

Behind and below this dispute is the issue of whether Israel can or should withdraw from some or all of the territories it first occupied in fighting back against a Jordanian attack during the Six-Day War of 1967. The Labor Party favors what it calls "territorial compromise." The Likud Party favors maintaining the status quo.

During the question period following a lecture I deliver at Tel Aviv University on the subject of neoconservatism in America, I am pressed to take a position on the issue of the territories. The questioner acknowledges my reluctance to do so. But surely, he suggests, I can have no objection to speculating on how an Israeli neo-conservative (if there were such a creature) might look at the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Caught in this cunning trap, I surrender. An Israeli neoconservative, I reply, would probably see the Arab-Israeli conflict much as an American neoconservative sees the U.S.-Soviet conflict. That is, he would reject the idea that his

"Until the Arabs give up their dream of wiping the Jewish state off the map, no clever initiatives by Israel will bring peace any closer."

own country and its enemies are morally equivalent. Instead he would affirm the superiority of Israel, as a free democratic society, to the repressive autocracies surrounding it.

Beyond this, an Israeli neoconservative would deny that Israel is in any sense to blame for the war that the Arab world has been waging against it from the day of its birth nearly 40 years ago. He would point out that since this war was launched in 1947, it cannot be about the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. Nor, for the same reason, can the cause be Israel's opposition to a Palestinian state in those territories.

In short, unlike many on the left in Israel and elsewhere, an Israeli neoconservative would refuse to forget that what enrages the Arabs is the existence of a sovereign Jewish state in "their" part of the world—and not the current boundaries of that state or anything it has done or failed to do.

From this fundamental reality, an Israeli neo-conservative would conclude that until the Arabs give up their dream of wiping the Jewish state off the map, no clever initiatives by Israel will bring peace any closer. Conversely, as Egypt under Anwar Sadat proved, the minute the Arabs do decide to reconcile themselves to

the existence of the Jewish state, no clever initiatives will be necessary to bring peace about.

Having gone this far, I am forced to stop talking for lack of time. But my mind will not stop, and it races ahead to the reflection that the Israelis, who once seemed so complacent, have in the past few years become much too hard on themselves.

It is a case, I find myself thinking, of battle fatigue. Israel is just approaching its 40th anniversary as a state, and all this time it has lived under siege, surrounded by enemies sworn to destroy it and by a wider world that has never fully accepted its legitimacy. The only days of respite it has enjoyed have been those separating periodic outbreaks of armed hostilities. Now, frustrated by their inability to call off this 40-year war against them, the Israelis have begun blaming one another. In truth, however, they are all equally the victims of a relentless and murderous aggression.

As such, they are confronted wherever they turn with unacceptable alternatives. Holding on to territories in which so many Palestinian Arabs live is dangerous because it could eventually compromise the Jewish character of Israel, its democratic character or both. But giving up the territories is also dangerous because it could compromise Israel's physical security and make it mortally vulnerable to military assault.

356
3
3

Which of these two dangers is greater cannot be known in advance. But I continue to believe that it is a question that only those whose lives depend on the answer have any right to decide.



שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

17

ט ו ס ס מ ב ד ק

דף 1 מחוד 1 דפים

סווג בטחוני שמר

דחיסות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ח 0910 17 נוב' 87

מס' מברק

אל: המשרד

362

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני. מנהל מצפ"א.

מאת: דני בלור, וושינגטון

הנדון: בחירות 88

אין שינויים דרמטיים בשבועות האחרונים במשאלים הכלל ארציים בשתי המפלגות. אך בשתי המפלגות ראיות לציון מספר תופעות:

רפובליקנים: כוש מוסיף להוביל אך בהצבעה נסיונית בלתי מחייבת בפלורידה הצליח פט רוברטסון להגיע למקום שני, בהפרש קטן מבוש. הוכחה נוספת לכוחו הארגוני הרציני, היכול להפתיע בקוקוטיס או במדינות שבהן שעורי ההצבעה כפרימריז אינם גבוהים. דת המועמדים מלבד כוש ורוברטסון לא הקדישו מאמץ מיוחד לפלורידה.

דמוקרטים: במשאלים האחרונים באיובה תופס הסנטור פול סיימון את המקום הראשון כאשר הוא דוחק את ריצ'רד גפהארדט מהמקום הראשון לשלישי. בעוד דוקקיס שומר על המקום השני. הסנטור גור החליט לצמצם את פעילות מטהו באיובה למינימום בהנחה שאין לו שם כל סיכוי, ומבחנו העיקרי הוא בפרימריז" חדרומיים.

ראויה לציון התופעה של התחזקות פול סיימון, תופעה המתחילה ליצור מומנטום משלה. כמה משאלים בדרום מוכיחים על תמיכה לא מבוטלת בסימון, למרות השקפותיו הליברליות סיימון מנסה ליצור לעצמו תדמית של מעין הארי טרומן חדש, של מי שמשלב שמרנות וליברליות יחד עם סמכותיות ותקיפות, ולהבנות על כך שבחרים מקבלים אותו כאישיות אמינה אף אם לא מסכימים בהכרח עם כל השקפותיו. (תופעה דומה לרייגן ב - 84).

ג'סי ג'קסון בחר בוילי גראון, ה"ספיקר" של בית הנבחרים של קליפורניה ליד"ר מקה הבחירות שלו, למנהל המטה שלו מינה את ריצ'רד אוסטין (לבן) שהיה מנהל מטה הבחירות של מושל אוהיו ריצ'רד סלסט.

דני בלור
האגף
1
2
3
3
2

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

DES ETATS UNIS: CE, APRES QU'UN EMISSAIRE SPECIAL SOIT VENU REMETTRE LES NOTES DU GOUVERNEMENT D'ISRAEL ET LA LETTRE DE PREMIER MINISTRE ALTERNAT ET MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES D'ISRAEL AU CONSEILLER FEDERAL CHEF DU DEPARTEMENT DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, LE 3.11.87. NOUS SOUHAITERIONS RECEVOIR L'EXPLICATION QUI NOUS A ETE DONNE CONCERNANT L'IMPOSSIBILITE POUR LES AUTORITES SUISSES DE RETARDER, POUR LE MOINS, LA LIVRAISON DES DOCUMENTS CONTENANT LES INFORMATIONS EN QUESTION JUSQU'A CE QUE LE GOUVERNEMENT SUISSE DEBATE ET ARRIVE A UNE NOUVELLE DECISION A PROPOS DE LA DEMANDE DU GOUVERNEMENT D'ISRAEL A CE SUJET.


LE GOUVERNEMENT D'ISRAEL CONSIDERE LE MODE D'ACTION ENTREPRIS PAR LES AUTORITES SUISSES CONCERNANT LA DITE DEMANDE COMME ETANT EN OPPOSITION AVEC LES REGLES FONDAMENTALES DES RELATIONS ENTRE ETATS SELON LE DROIT ET LES USAGES, CE, EN PARTICULIER AU VU DES RELATIONS D'AMITIE MUTUELLE QUI EXISTENT ENTRE L'ETAT D'ISRAEL ET LA CONFEDERATION SUISSE. D'AUTANT PLUS, LORSQU'IL S'AGIT DU SECRET BANCAIRE AUQUEL LA SUISSE A TOUJOURS ETE FIDELE, DE TELLE SORTE QUE LE GOUVERNEMENT D'ISRAEL AIT CRU QU'IL SERAIT PRESERVE SELON LA TRADITION EN VIGUEUR EN SUISSE ET AILLEURS.

DANS LES CIRCONSTANCES CREEES SUITE A LA LIVRAISON DES INFORMATIONS EN QUESTION AUX REPRESENTANTS DU JUGE D'INSTRUCTION SPECIAL ET DANS L'HYPOTHESE QUE CELA NE REPRESENTE PAS UN PRECEDENT, LE GOUVERNEMENT D'ISRAEL A L'HONNEUR D'INFORMER DORES ET DEJA LE GOUVERNEMENT SUISSE QU'IL EST POSSIBLE QUE LE DEPARTEMENT DE LA JUSTICE DES ETATS UNIS S'ADRESSE AU DEPARTEMENT DE LA JUSTICE ET A LA POLICE FEDERALE AUX TERMES DE LA CONVENTION D'ASSISTANCE JUDICIAIRE DE 1973 ENTRE LES ETATS UNIS ET LA SUISSE ET DEMANDE DES INFORMATIONS ET DES DOCUMENTS AFFECTANT AUX PROPRES COMPTES DU GOUVERNEMENT D'ISRAEL, OU A D'AUTRES TRANSFERTS EN PROVENANCE OU EN DIRECTION DE CES COMPTES DANS DES BANQUES SUISSES. LE GOUVERNEMENT D'ISRAEL NE SAURAIT CONCEVOIR QUE DES DOCUMENTS OU DES INFORMATIONS QUI CONSTITUENT POUR LUI DES SECRETS D'ETAT ET AUXQUELS S'APPLIQUENT LES REGLES D'IMMUNITE DE L'ETAT SOUVERAIN, PUISSENT ETRE TRANSMIS A UN PAYS TIERS. AFIN QU'IL NE

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

סדף חלק א של האיגרת

תפ: רהמ, שהח, מנכל, נבר/ממרהמ, מזכירהממ שלה



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

INFORMATION LE CONCERNANT NE SOIT LIVREE AU DEPARTEMENT DE LA JUSTICE DES ETATS UNIS.

15-18.9.87 - UNE DELEGATION DU GOUVERNEMENT D'ISRAEL NEGOCIE A WASHINGTON AVEC DES REPRESENTANTS DU JUGE D'INSTRUCTION SPECIAL EN VUE D'UN ACCORD DE CONCOURS A L'INSTRUCTION. CE A LA SUITE D'UNE DEMARCHE DU DEPARTEMENT FEDERAL SUISSE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES AUPRES DE WASHINGTON. DES LE DEBUT DE LA NEGOCIATION LE GOUVERNEMENT D'ISRAEL DEMANDE AU GOUVERNEMENT SUISSE DE REPORTER LE DEBAT SUR SA DEMANDE JUSQU'AU TERME DE LA NEGOCIATION.

5-7.10.87 - POURSUITE DE LA NEGOCIATION A WASHINGTON DE LA DELEGATION ISRAELIENNE. LA NEGOCIATION ECHOUE SUITE A DES EXIGENCES DU JUGE D'INSTRUCTION SPECIAL CONSIDEREES COMME IRRECEVABLES ET QUI RISQUENT DE PORTER ATTEINTE A LA SOUVERAINETE DE L'ETAT D'ISRAEL.

7.10.87 - NOTE DU GOUVERNEMENT D'ISRAEL AU GOUVERNEMENT SUISSE L'INFORMANT DE SES EFFORTS EN VUE D'UN ACCORD DANS LE CADRE DES NEGOCIATIONS EN COURS AVEC LE JUGE D'INSTRUCTION SPECIAL DE LEUR INTERRUPTION AINSI QUE DU RENOUELLMENT DE LA DEMANDE FAITE AU GOUVERNEMENT SUISSE D'AGIR CONFORMEMENT A SES NOTES EN QUESTION.

20.10.87 - LETTRE DE L'AMBASSADEUR D'ISRAEL A BERNE AU DEPARTEMENT FEDERAL DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES AVEC DES INDICATIONS SUPPLEMENTAIRES COMMENT DISTINGUER LES COMPTES DU GOUVERNEMENT D'ISRAEL.

29.10.87 - 1) ANNONCE DU DEPARTEMENT FEDERAL DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES A L'AMBASSADEUR D'ISRAEL A BERNE CONCERNANT LA DECISION DU GOUVERNEMENT SUISSE RELATIVE A LA DEMANDE DU GOUVERNEMENT D'ISRAEL.

2) ANNONCE DE L'AMBASSADEUR AU DEPARTEMENT FEDERAL DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES QU'UN EMISSAIRE SPECIAL EST ATTENDU PORTEUR D'UNE NOTE DE RESPONSE AU GOUVERNEMENT SUISSE. UNE RECONTRE EST FIXEE ENTRE L'EMISSAIRE ET LE DIRECTEUR GENERAL DU DEPARTEMENT FEDERAL DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES POUR LE 3.11.87 A 11 HEURES 30. L'AMBASSADEUR DEMANDE

1917-1918



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

QUE RIEN NE SOIT DIVULGUE JUSQU'APRES LA MISE AU POINT
LORS DE LA RENCONTRE ET LA REMISE DE LA NOTE, LE
DEPARTEMENT FEDERAL DES AFFAIRS ETRANGERES PROMET QU'IL
EN SERA AINSI.

2.11.87 - 1) L'AMBASSADEUR D'ISRAEL A BERNE APPREND PAR
LA PRESSE LOCALE QUE LA REMISE DES DOCUMENTS PAR LE
DEPARTEMENT FEDERAL DE LA POLICE AUX REPRESENTANTS DES
ETATS UNIS A ETE FIXEE POUR LE MARDI 3.11.87 A 15 HEURES.

חלק ב' .

תפ: רחמ, ששה, מנכ"ל, נכ"ר/ממרה, מזכ"ר, מממשלה

11964

תאריך : 17.11.87 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

** 11964

טדדי

**
**
**

תרגום: 11,11964

מל: ברך/128, בטחון/271

מ-: חת"מ, תא: 171187, דח: 1221, דח: מ/טג:ט

ג:דג

11/מיוני טפל

לחן חלק ג'

2) DEMARCHE DE L'AMBASSADEUR D'ISRAEL A BERNE AUPRES DU DEPARTEMENT FEDERAL DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES AFIN DE VERIFIER L'INFORMATION. LE CONSEILLER JURIDIQUE DU DEPARTEMENT CONFIRME L'INFORMATION. L'AMBASSADEUR D'ISRAEL EXPRIME SA STUPEFACTION ET SON INQUIETUDE QUE L'INFORMATION NE LUI A PAS ETE COMMUNIQUEE LORS DES CONTACTS PRECEDENTS ET DE LA DECISION DE REMETTRE LES DOCUMENTS A UN MOMENT AUSSI PROCHE DE LA RENCONTRE AVEC L'EMISSAIRE SPECIAL.

3.11.87 09 HEURES 30 - LE DEPARTEMENT FEDERAL DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES INFORME L'AMBASSADEUR QUE LE PRESIDENT DE LA FEDERATION SUISSE, CHEF DU DEPARTEMENT DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, M. AUBERT RECEVRA L'EMISSAIRE PORTEUR DE LA NOTE DU GOUVERNEMENT D'ISRAEL ET DE LA NOTE DU PREMIER MINISTRE ALTERNANT ET MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, M. PERES, AU CHEF DU DEPARTEMENT FEDERAL DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES.

3.11.87 11 HEURES 30 - ENTRETIEN ENTRE L'EMISSAIRE SPECIAL, LE GENERAL DE DIVISION)RES(RAFAEL VARDI, L'AMBASSADEUR D'ISRAEL M. RIVLIN, LE CONSEILLER DE L'AMBASSADE, M/ ANTEBI ET LE CHEF DU DEPARTEMENT FEDERAL DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, LE DIRECTEUR GENERAL DU DEPARTEMENT, M. BRUNNER)?(, LE CONSEILLER JURIDIQUE DU

888
מכ"מ 11/11/87

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

RESULTATS DE L'ENTRETIEN.

3.11.87 13 HEURES 30 - M. KRAFT)?(APPELLE L'AMBASSADE ET DEMANDE SI LE NOM DE LA BANQUE OU EST DEPOSE LE COMPTE D'ISRAEL SUFFIT A IDENTIFIER LES COMPTES COMME ETANT CEUX DU GOUVERNEMENT D'ISRAEL. IL RECOIT UNE REPONSE AFFIRMATIVE.

3.11.87 13 HEURES 40 - IL EST TRANSMIS PAR TELEPHONE A M... COLLABORATEUR DU PRESIDENT, LE NOM D'UNE AUTRE BANQUE OU SONT DEPOSES D'AUTRES COMPTES COMME INDIQUE.

סוף חלק ג.

ת.פ: רהמ, ששהח, מנכ"ל, נב"ר/ממרהמ, מזכירהממשלה

11976

תאריך : 17.11.87 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

סדר

**
**
**

פרוט: 11,11976
מל: ברן/129, בטחון/272
מ: המשרד, תא: 171187, זח: 1245, דח: מ, סג: ס
8: דג

11/170 מירי טמל

להלן חלק ד'

3.11.87 14 HEURES 15 - M. KRAFT)? COMMUNIQUE QUE LES DOCUMENTS Y COMPRIS LES INFORMATIONS QU'ISRAEL AVAIT DEMANDE DE NE PAS DIVULGUER ONT DEJA ETE TRANSMIS AUX REPRESENTANTS DES ETATS UNIS ET QUE LE CHEF DU DEPARTEMENT FEDERAL DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES N'A PAS REUSSI A JOINDRE LE CHEF DU DEPARTEMENT FEDERAL DE LA JUSTICE, CELLE-CI ETANT MALADE ET SON MEDECIN LUI AYANT INTERDIT TOUTE ACTIVITE Y COMPRIS DE REPENDRE AU TELEPHONE.

M. KRAFT)? DEMANDE AU GENERAL VARDI CE QU'ILS DOIVENT FAIRE MAINTENANT

1. DEMANDER AUX ETAT UNIS LA RESTITUTION DES DOCUMENTS PERTINENTS OU BIEN DEMANDER D'EFFACER LES DETAILS IDENTIFIANT LES COMPTES DU GOUVERNEMENT D'ISRAEL.

2. OU BIEN TOUTE AUTRE ACTION.
IL LUI EST DONNE LA REPONSE.

1. EXIGER LA RESTITUTION DES DOCUMENTS PERTINENTS ET Y EFFACER LES DETAILS D'IDENTIFICATION.

2. EXIGER D'EMPECHER LEUR SORTIE DE SUISSE JUSQU'A EXECUTION DES OPERATIONS INDIQUEES.

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

L'AMBASSADE ET ANNONCE QUE L'ENTRETIEN AVEC L'AMBASSADEUR DES ETATS UNIS A EU LIEU ET QUE LES DEMANDES LUI ONT ETE PRESENTEES. L'AMBASSADEUR A INDIQUE QU'IL LES SOUMETTRAIT AU CONSEILLER JURIDIQUE DU DEPARTEMENT D'ETAT, M. SOFAER

4.11.87 14 HEURES 15 - N'AYANT RECU AUCUNE ANNONCE DU DEPARTEMENT FEDERAL DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES CONCERNANT LES DEBATS DU CONSEIL FEDERAL, L'AMBASSADEUR APPELLE M. KRAFT)?(. CELUI-CI INDIQUE QU'IL ETAIT SUR LE POINT DE LE CONTACTER ET PRIE LE GENERAL VARDI ET L'AMBASSADEUR DE VENIR A SON BUREAU Y RECEVOIR LEUR REPOSE.

4.11.87 15 HEURES - ENTRETIEN AVEC M. KRAFT)? (A SON BUREAU (IL INDICUA QUE M. BRUNNER (?), QUIDQUE TRES OCCUPE, SE JOINDRAIT POUR QUELQUES INSTANTS A L'ENTRETIEN, CEPENDANT, CE DERNIER NE VINT PAS). M. KRAFT (?) TRANSMET LA TENEUR ET L'ESPRIT DE LA DECISION DU CONSIEL FEDERAL.

A) NE PAS DEMANDER LA RESTITUTION DES DOCUMENTS.

B) TRANSMETTRE AUX ETATS UNIS UNE DEMANDE DE NE PAS UTILISER LES INFORMATIONS AU SUJET DES COMPTES DANS LE CADRE D'UNE PROCEDURE JUDICIAIRE OU AUTRE AUX ETATS UNIS SELON LA DEMANDE DU GOUVERNEMENT D'ISRAEL.

C) DEMANDE DU GOUVERNEMENT SUISSE AU GOUVERNEMENT DES ETATS UNIS D'EXAMINER CETTE QUESTION A LA LUMIERE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL.

M.KRAFT (?) INSISTE SUR LE FAIT QUE LE GOUVERNEMENT SUISSE S'ABSTIENT DE DONNER SON AVIS EN CE QUI CONCERNE L'INTERVENTION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN CE CAS. A LA QUESTION DU GENERAL VARDI QUELLES SONT LES ATTENTES DU GOUVERNEMENT SUISSE EN CE QUI CONCERNE LA RESPONSE DES ETATS UNIS A SA DEMARCHE ET EST-CE QU'IL SERA DONNE INSTRUCTION A LEUR AMBASSADEUR A WASHINGTON DE DIRE QU'ILS ATTENDENT UNE RESPONSE FAVORABLE M. KRAFT (?) REPOND QUE CE CI N'EST PAS INCLUS DANS LA DECISION DANS LA DECISION DU CONSEIL FEDERAL.

LE GENERAL VARDI EXPRIME SA STUPEFACTION FACE A CETTE

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

MANIERE D'AGIR ET REITERE LA DEMANDE D'UN ENGAGEMENT
EXPLICITE DU GOUVERNEMENT SUISSE DE S'ABSTENIR DE LIVRER
LES COMPTES D'ISRAEL AUX ETATS UNIS COMME INDIQUE PLUS
HAUT.

ררר

עוד כאן תרונן האיגרת בשלימותה - שימונה לב שיש בידכם ארבעה ח
לקים)

תפ: רהת, שהה, מככל, נבר/ממרהה, מזכירהממשלה

* תאריך : 17.11.87 *
* דן 1 מתוך 2 *
* עותק 3 מתוך 30 *
* * * * *

* סודי ביותר *
* * * * *

* חוזם: 11/11860 *
* אל: המשורר *
* מ-: רוש, נר: 320, תא: 161187, דח: 1000, דח: מ, טג: טב *
* נד: 8 *
* * * * *

* סודי ביותר/מידוי *
* * * * *

* אל: ממנכ"ל מדינו *
* * * * *

* יוטץ מדינו לשה"ח *
* * * * *

* שיחה עם זוטוב *
* * * * *

* השיחה נערכה בביתה של ג'ודית קיטר ב-14.11 והיו נוכחים *
* אחרים נן שקשה היה לדון בפרטים . *
* * * * *

* א. זוטוב אמר שהתרחשות היא שהאמריקאים לא דוחפים *
* את נושא המז"ח. *
* * * * *


* ב. אמר מאיזן שהוא ואחרים בורג שלו מתקשים להעלות *
* את הנושא לרמת מדיניות גבוהה למרות שמצד הממונים *
* עליו אין כל התנגדות שהוא יעלה הנושא ויציע רעיונות *
* שונים . *
* * * * *

* ג. לגבי הרעיון של חסות שתי המעצמות הגדולות אמר שאיש *
* לא הציג להם זאת עדיון. לא היה בקי כלל בתגובת השגריר *
* הסובייטי בעמאן. *
* * * * *

* ד. הביט עניין בהערכות לגבי המצב הבין-מפלגתי בארץ *
* ונזכר מתוך שאלותיו שהערכתם שקיט תיקו המונע אפשרות *
* של התקומות. *
* * * * *

* ה. יתכן ואמגוש בו עם תום הנכס באטלנטה. *
* * * * *

* טרן. == *
* * * * *



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 2
עותק 3 מתוך 30

תפ: שחח, רהמ, מנכל, מסנכל, בירן, מצמא, ר/מרכז, רט, אמן

* 11861

302/1

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* תאריך : 17.11.87

* דן 1 מתוך 2

* עותק 3 מתוך 32

סודי ביותר

**
**
**

* חוזם: 11,11861

* אל: המשרד

* מ-: רוש, נו: 321, תא: 161187, דח: 1000, דח: מ, טג: טב
* נד: &

* סודי ביותר/מידוי

* אל: ממנכ"ל מדיני

* שיחה עם זניס רוט (14.11)

* א. פטגה עמאן

* ארה"ב רואה בתוצאותיה הצלחה עצומה למלך חרסין. בנושא
* איראן הוא הצליח להביא לקובצנות כמעט מקסימלי בגינרו
* איראן, בנושא היחסים עם מצרים אי אפשר לצפות ליותר
* בהתחשב בנכחות אסד בועידה ואילו בנושא ההליך השלום
* מנט כמעט כל נזק פרנציאלי. ההחלטה אינה חוזרת על
* החלטות העבר כמו מאז, היא אינה מתיחסת לפתרון ספצימי
* זה או אחר ואילו הנוסחה לגבי אש"ף מעורפלה מבהינה
* זו שהיא לא עומדת בתירה לגבי יודן וגם במסגרת משלחת
* ירונית פלשתינאית. אין ספק אומר רוט שהאירוס האיראני
* גרם לטפטוש חילוקי הדעה הבטיסטיים וההסטוריים בין
* מדינות ערב וכן למשל ברור כבר היום שבקרוב יהיו צעדי
* קרוב בין סוריה ועיראק.

* 1. השפעת הפטגה על ההליך השלום

* כרגע אין ספק אומר רוט שירדן באופוריה מוחלטת. השאלה
* שהמתמל עומד לבדוק ביחס הקרובים (הבנתי שלא הוחלט
* עדיין באיזה דרג דמיון) היא מה המשמעות המשנית של
* התחושה הזו ומה היתה משמעות התשובה של המלך לשולץ
* בלונדון כרגע נסיעת המזכיר למרסקבה. אם התשובה השלילית
* היתה על מנת להמנע ממצב מבין בעת הפטגה בעמאן הרי
* יש לצפות שהמלך יתן אינדיקציה בכרוך זה. רוט אומר

1948

1948-1949

1948-1949

1948-1949

1948-1949

1948-1949

1948-1949

1948-1949

1948-1949

1948-1949

1948-1949

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 2
עותק 3 מתוך 32

* שלמלך היו סיבות להאמין שכל תשובה אחרת היתה מקבלת
* מרטוט שעלול היה לחבל בכל המאמצים שהוא השקיע על
* מנח להשיג את ההצלחות שבהן הוא זכה בדמות ההודעה
* המסכמת.

* רוס מרזה שהוא יותר מסיסי ולהערכתו המלך החליט ששד
* 1989 התנאים המדיניים בארה"ב ובאזור לא יאפשרו תכונה
* מדינית משמעותית. המלך אומר דנים רוס נרטע לבריה"מ
* בדצמבר והוא לא יקבל החלטה עד אז. לאחרונה הגיעו
* אליהם ידיעות שהמלך משמיץ (BADMOUTHING)
* את ארה"ב על שאינה משקיעה מאמץ בתהליך והצעותיה אינן
* רציניות. היתה לו גם אפשרות לבקר בארה"ב לפני צאתו
* למוסקבה והוא דחה אותה. לשאלתי מדוע אם כן היתה החלטה
* עמאן כה חשובה למלך בנושא הנעידה השיב רוס שהמלך
* לפני טאנריו מסימי זה רוצה להמצא במצב ב-1989 שיאפשר
* להמשיך מאותה נקודה בה נעצר התהליך בלא לאבד את ההישגים
* שאליהם נבר הגיע.


* חרטיין מוסיף רוס יעביר את כובד משקל מעילוהו למעילות
* בין מערבית מתוך הערכה שטרורו הקצר הוא יקטוף שם
* יותר מירות כולל סיוע וזאת גם מתוך הערכה שבמצבה
* התקציבי הנוכחי לא נשקף סיכוי לתוספת סיוע משמעותית
* מארה"ב.

* ג. בריה"מ

* הערכתו שבריה"מ אינה מיוחסת עדיפות גבוהה למזה"ת.
* אין במצב הנוכחי תמריץ מספיק להקדשת מאמץ או כסילות
* טיכונים. בכל המגעים בשבועות האחרונים והוא שוחח
* ארוכות עם זוטרו אתמול (האחרון במצא בורכו לכנס קרט
* באטלנטה) לא נראה שהטוביטים מיוחסים דחיפות או מחשבה
* עמוקה לנושא. לשאלתי אם האמריקאים עצמם לא חרמים
* לגישה טוביטית זו אמר רוס שהם עשו כל מה שניתן לעשות
* במסגרת מדיניותם הכוללת בין השאר רצון ללכת על תוכנית
* שתקבל את מקסימום החמיכה בישראל ולא תתן לסובייטים
* אפשרות לנכות פחרון או להטיל וטו על מה שיוטנס בין
* הצדדים.

* ערן.===

* תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהוט,מנכל,ממנכלר/מרכז,רס,אמן,גירן,מצפא



* תאריך : 17.11.87 **החוק-מחלקת הקשר** *

* 11868

3852/3

* דף 1 מתוך 2 *

** נכנס

סודי ביותר

* עותק 3 מתוך 32 *

* חוזם: 11,11868 *

* אל: המשרד *

* מ-: וו, נר: 352, תא: 161187, זח: 2000, דח: מ, סג: סב *

* נד: 8 *

* סודי ביותר/מיד *

* אל: רהמ', ממרהמ' ושהח. *

* להלן משיחת השגריר ארד עם המזכיר (16.11.87). *

* השגריר פתח בהבעת תודה לנשיא רייגן ולמזכיר על קבלת
* הפנים החמה והלבבית לנשיא הרצוג. הנשיא יצא מרוצה
* מביקורו. המזכיר אמר כי הוא נהנה מאוד מהביקור ובמיוחד
* מהאורח ורעייתו. 'קל מאוד לארח אורחים כאלו שיש להם
* כל כך הרבה ידידים פה' אמר המזכיר.

* השגריר ארד ציין כי המזכיר בודאי שם לבו לתגובות של
* ראש הממשלה וממלא מקום ראש הממשלה בעקבות פסגת עמאן
* ובמיוחד לקטע בהודעה המשותפת בדבר חידוש היחסים עם
* מצרים והיוזמה שננקטה כבר על ידי חלק ממדינות ערב
* בנושא. זו התקדמות מעודדת. המזכיר אמר כי זו גם דעתו. השגריר
* המשיך באומרו שבאזירה שנוצרה בעקבות הפסגה יש משום
* הזדמנות לבדיקת האפשרויות להמשך בתהליך השלום מה
* גם שהמלך חוסיין חוזק במעמדו בעקבות הפסגה.

* המזכיר ענה באומרו שההחלטה בדבר חידוש היחסים עם מצרים
* היתה חיונית והיא נעשתה בחכמה שכן אין בה משום כפיה. ארהב
* מרוצה גם מלשון ההחלטה בנושא מלחמת עירק-אירן. הנסיך
* בנדר הסב את תשומת לבם גם למשפט חיובי בענין הטרור.

* המזכיר אמר כי הקטע בענין תהליך השלום היה מאכזב קמעא
* אף כי הערבים חוזרים

* רמסבירים אותו כחלק מתהליך נמשך. בו עידת
* פאז הם קבלו החלטה המבטלת את 'שלושת הלאומים', מכירה

11888:0177
11888:0177
11888:0177

11888:0177
11888:0177

11888:0177

11888:0177
11888:0177
11888:0177
11888:0177
11888:0177

11888:0177
11888:0177
11888:0177
11888:0177
11888:0177
11888:0177
11888:0177
11888:0177
11888:0177
11888:0177

11888:0177
11888:0177
11888:0177
11888:0177
11888:0177

11888:0177
11888:0177
11888:0177
11888:0177
11888:0177

משוד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 2
עותק 3 מתוך 32

* בישראל ובצורך לנהל עמה משא ומתן. החלטת עמאן היא
* יותר אופרטיבית אף כי אינה בדיוק מה שארheb צפתה לו.
* נראה שמוקד הועידה היה בכל זאת סכסוך עיראק-איראן
* ציין המזכיר ואת הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי הוסיפו רק כדי
* לרצות את סוריה ולהביאה לעמאן מתוך רצון לשנות במידת
* האפשר את עמדתה ביחס לסכסוך העיראקי-איראני.

* המזכיר הוסיף שהמלך היה מאוכזב אמנם מהעדרו של המלך
* פהד אך סיים את הועידה בהצלחה אישית מרשימה. כחלק
* מהצלחה זו יש לראות את המפגש בין צדאם חוסיין ואסד.

* המזכיר עבר לנושא יהודי בריהמ' וציין כי אכן קבל וקרא
* את מכתביהם של ראש הממשלה וממלא מקום ראש הממשלה. וייטהד
* קיים שיחות במוסקבה בנדון אך הוא לא דווח לו, למזכיר.
* ארמקוסט, קמפלמן וויטטהד חלקו ביניהם את הטיפול בנושאים
* השונים שעל הפרק בין שתי המעצמות וכולם יחזרו הנה
* לקראת סוף השבוע ויוכלו לדווח ישירות על תוצאות שיחותיהם.
* השגריר ארד חזר והדגיש, בעקבות מכתבי רהם וממרהם את
* חשיבות הטיסות ישירות מבריהם לישראל.

* המזכיר סיפר כי מיד עם תום הפסגה הוא ייצא לדווח לשהח
* של נאטו על תוצאותיה ואחכ' יבקר בדנמרק נורבגיה, מרוקו
* אלג'יר ותוניסיה.

* נכחו בשיחה מרפי פיקרינג והירש.

* ערן

* תפ: שהח, רהם, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, בירן, מצפא

THE FIRST PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE WORK DONE DURING THE YEAR. IT IS DIVIDED INTO SEVERAL SECTIONS, EACH OF WHICH DEALS WITH A DIFFERENT ASPECT OF THE RESEARCH. THE SECOND PART OF THE REPORT IS A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE EXPERIMENTAL WORK DONE DURING THE YEAR. IT IS DIVIDED INTO SEVERAL SECTIONS, EACH OF WHICH DEALS WITH A DIFFERENT ASPECT OF THE RESEARCH.

THE THIRD PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL WORK. IT IS DIVIDED INTO SEVERAL SECTIONS, EACH OF WHICH DEALS WITH A DIFFERENT ASPECT OF THE RESEARCH. THE FOURTH PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL WORK.

THE FIFTH PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL WORK. IT IS DIVIDED INTO SEVERAL SECTIONS, EACH OF WHICH DEALS WITH A DIFFERENT ASPECT OF THE RESEARCH. THE SIXTH PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE REFERENCES CITED IN THE REPORT. THE SEVENTH PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE APPENDICES.

THE EIGHTH PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL WORK. IT IS DIVIDED INTO SEVERAL SECTIONS, EACH OF WHICH DEALS WITH A DIFFERENT ASPECT OF THE RESEARCH. THE NINTH PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE REFERENCES CITED IN THE REPORT.

TENTH PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE APPENDICES.

1945

THE ELEVENTH PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE REFERENCES CITED IN THE REPORT. THE TWELFTH PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE APPENDICES.

מספר הסמל	מספר הבטוח - ת"א מכ"ק	בר (לשם המברק)	סלון השולח
מספר	ראש האגודה מר הכתוב	מאריך וזמן הביר	
מספר	מספר - 2755	דרגת דחיפת	
מספר	מספר - 2755	סוג בטוח	
מספר	מספר - 2755	בתשובה לשלח	
מספר	מספר - 2755	בזמנך לשלח	
מספר	מספר - 2755	סמל המברק	

מס קטנים מתקנים בזה וזה
 הקולות, ככל הנראה בצורה הטובה
 הלקוחים ממוחזרים אל הקולות
 והבנה יתפרסם קודם - 17

א א

3

מ 2
מ 3
מ 1

מספר 1

ס ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף מחוד (4) דפים

סוג בטחוני סודי

343

א -

מס' הבטחון

דחיפות בהול

87 16 1000 נוב.

מאיד/ז"ח

בהול

1/45

267

מס' מברק

אל: ר. ורדי - ממרה"מ ת"א - בטחון העבירו נא.

דו"ח הקונגרס

להלן החומר שהגיענו הבוקר ממרק בלניק.

זיכרון
ערן

DANIEL K. INDIYE HAWAII CHAIRMAN
 WARREN RICHMAN NEW HAMPSHIRE VICE CHAIRMAN
 GEORGE J. MITCHELL MAINE JAMES A. MCCUNE IDAHO
 SAM NUNN GEORGIA BRIN G. HATCH UTAH
 PAUL S. SARBANES MARYLAND WILLIAM S. COHEN MAINE
 HOWELL H. HERRILL ARIZONA PAUL S. TIBBLE JR VIRGINIA
 DAVID L. BOWEN OKLAHOMA
 ARTHUR L. LIMAN
 CHIEF COUNSEL
 MARK A. BELNICK
 EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
 TO THE CHIEF COUNSEL
 PAUL BARBADORO
 DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL
 MARY JANE CHECCH
 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
 ASSOCIATE COUNSELS
 CH. ALBRIGHT JR
 DANIEL F. ANN
 CH. HOLMES
 CHARLES M. KERR
 JAMES E. KAPLAN
 MEL P. LISKER
 RICHARD D. PARRY
 JOHN D. SAKUN
 TERRY A. SMILJANICH
 TIMOTHY F. WOODCOCK

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY
 ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510

November 1⁵/₂, 1987

343

2/45

By Hand

267

Major General (Res.) Rephael Vardi
 c/o Embassy of Israel
 3514 International Drive, NW
 Washington, DC

Dear General Vardi:

Pursuant to the Agreement between the Senate and House Select Committees and the Government of Israel (GOI), I am enclosing excerpts of page proofs from the Committees' forthcoming Report which contain information derived from and/or citations to the GOI material.

The enclosed excerpts are from the following chapter of the Report:

1. "Appendix C, Organization and Conduct of the Committees' Investigation."

It is currently anticipated that the Report will be issued on Tuesday, November 17.

Let me once again express sincere thanks on behalf of the Committees to the GOI and to you and Mike for your cooperation and assistance.

Warm regards.

Sincerely, _____

Mark A. Belnick
 Executive Assistant
 to the Chief Counsel

MAB:cp

Enclosure

"TOP SECRET WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURE"

3/45

243

267

**Appendix C Organization and Conduct of the
Committees' Investigation**



4/95

363

267

Cooperation from Other Governments

✓ The Committees received unprecedented cooperation from the State of Israel. Israel entered into an agreement with the Committees to prepare and provide extensive financial and historical chronologies detailing the role of Israel and individual Israelis in the Iran initiative from 1985 through 1986. Israel was unwilling to waive its privileges of State secrecy and sovereign immunity and permit its officials and citizens to be questioned by the Committees. In lieu of interviews or testimony, and without waiver, Israel agreed to obtain and review relevant documents from Israeli participants and to interview Israeli nationals. ✓ With the specific agreement of the Government of Israel, information from the Israeli chronologies is used in this Report. The Committees used this material sparingly and only where it was the best or only evidence of relevant facts.

~~Handwritten mark~~

DANIEL K. INOUE HAWAII CHAIRMAN
 WARREN RUDMAN NEW HAMPSHIRE VICE CHAIRMAN
 GEORGE J. MITCHELL MAINE
 SAM NUNN GEORGIA
 JAMES A. MCCLURE IDAHO
 ORRIN D. HATCH UTAH
 WILLIAM S. COHEN MAINE
 PAUL S. Trible, Jr. VIRGINIA
 PAUL S. SARBANES MARYLAND
 HOWELL T. Heflin ALABAMA
 DAVID L. BOREN OKLAHOMA

ARTHUR L. LIMAN
 CHIEF COUNSEL

MARK A. BELNICK
 EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
 TO THE CHIEF COUNSEL

PAUL BARBADORO
 DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL

MARY JANE CHECCHI
 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
 ASSOCIATE COUNSELS

L.H. ALBRIGHT, JR.
 DANIEL FANN
 CH. HOLMES
 CHARLES M. KIRK
 JAMES J. KELLY

WELP. FISHER
 RICHARD D. PARRY
 JOHN D. SAXON
 LARRY A. SMILANICH
 TIMOTHY C. WOODCOCK

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY
 ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510

November 15, 1987

267

5/45

By Hand

Major General (Res.) Rephael Vardi
 c/o Embassy of Israel
 3514 International Drive, NW
 Washington, DC

Dear General Vardi:

Pursuant to the Agreement between the Senate and House Select Committees and the Government of Israel (GOI), I am enclosing excerpts of page proofs from the Committees' forthcoming Report which contain information derived from and/or citations to the GOI material.

The enclosed excerpts are from the following chapter of the Report:

1. "The Iran Arms Sales: The Beginning."

It is currently anticipated that the Report will be issued on Tuesday, November 17.

Let me once again express sincere thanks on behalf of the Committees to the GOI and to you and Mike for your cooperation and assistance.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

Mark A. Belnick
 Executive Assistant
 to the Chief Counsel

MAB:cp

Enclosure


"TOP SECRET WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURE"

243
267

6/45

Chapter 9

The Iran Arms Sales: The Beginning



7/45

267

343

Ghorbanifar Tries Again

At Khashoggi's initiative members of the Israeli team met with Hashemi and Ghorbanifar in London, Geneva, and Israel in early spring. Weapons sales to Iran were discussed but the meetings produced nothing concrete.¹⁸ In late April, Ghorbanifar proposed to one of the Israelis that he be permitted to purchase U.S.-manufactured TOW antitank missiles from Israel, and, in return, he would obtain the release of CIA Beirut Chief of Station Buckley, then a hostage in Lebanon.¹⁹

X

8/45

Lange
Cay
Ledeen Gets Involved

267

353

Ledeen traveled to Israel in early May.²⁵ On May 3 he met with Prime Minister Peres and then with a former senior official of the Israel Defense Forces.²⁶ During the meetings, Ledeen said he was acting on McFarlane's behalf, although in a private rather than official capacity, and expressed interest in sharing intelligence on Iran. According to Ledeen, the Americans held hostage in Lebanon were not discussed at these meetings in early May.²⁷ An Israeli official, however, recalls Ledeen's telling him about offers by various Iranians to help get the hostages released.²⁸

W.S.
According to Ledeen, the Prime Minister asked him to advise McFarlane that Israel wanted to sell artillery shells or pieces to Iran but would do so only if it received United States approval.²⁹

9/45

343

267

Larger
Caps

The Discussions Continue

While the Secretaries of State and Defense were opposing any relaxation of the arms boycott of Iran, Israel was receiving different signals from the NSC staff. Ledeen testified that McFarlane had authorized him to tell Prime Minister Peres that Israel could engage in a one-time arms sale to Iran of artillery shells or pieces, "but just that and nothing else."⁴⁴ One of the Israeli participants reported to another Israeli participant, however, that the authorization conveyed by Ledeen from McFarlane was for a transfer of TOW missiles.⁴⁷

By early June, the Israelis were considering a transaction linking the sale of TOWs to the release of the American hostages.⁴⁸ However, the Israelis were unwilling to proceed without evidence of a clear, express and binding consent by the U.S. Government to the proposed transaction.⁴⁹

On June 19, Ghorbanifar, accompanied by Furmark, met in Israel with the Israeli team. Ghorbanifar proposed that the Israelis sell 100 TOWs to Iran through him. He also agreed to set up a meeting with an Iranian official.⁵⁰

The Israelis reported these developments to McFarlane. In late June, according to McFarlane's testimony, David Kimche, the Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, became involved in the project. Kimche had an established relationship with McFarlane and Ledeen.⁵¹ While in Washington for another purpose in early July, he briefed McFarlane on the ongoing contacts of Israeli and Iranian officials, and the Iranians' interest in establishing contact with the United States.⁵² Kimche recommended that the discussions with the Iranians continue. McFarlane told Secretary Weinberger about the meeting, and Weinberger's assistant, Colin Powell, recalled that McFarlane discussed both the sale of arms to Iran and the hostages.⁵³

On July 8, 1985, members of the Israeli team met in Hamburg with Ghorbanifar, Khashoggi, Khashoggi's son-in-law, and the First Iranian. Before the meeting, Ghorbanifar told the Israelis that the sale of 100 TOWs was essential to enhance his credibility with Iran, and claimed that the sale would be followed by the release of the American hostages.⁵⁴

Ghorbanifar described the First Iranian as a politically powerful individual in his own right, with close personal connections to Khomeini, and a leader of one of Iran's revolutionary organizations.⁵⁵

At the meetings, the First Iranian spoke of the need for a party who could act as a bridge between Iran and the United States, of the threat of Soviet influence in Iran, and of the risks he had taken in meeting with Israel in order to promote an opening with the United States. The participants also discussed missiles and hostages.⁵⁶ The First Iranian promised to present a comprehensive written proposal within a week.

Shortly after that meeting, according to Ledeen's testimony, Schwimmer flew to Washington and met with Ledeen on July 11, 1985. He briefed Ledeen on Ghorbanifar's proposal to obtain the release of the American hostages in exchange for TOW missiles.⁵⁷ Ledeen then wrote McFarlane, "The situation [concerning Iran] has fundamentally changed for the better."⁵⁸ On July 13, he briefed McFarlane orally on the Israeli talks with the Iranians.⁵⁹

After meeting with Ledeen, McFarlane cabled Secretary Shultz with a summary of the proposal conveyed by Israel:

The short term dimension concerns the seven hostages; the long term dimension involves the establishment of a private dialogue with Iranian officials on the broader relations . . . (They [the Iranians] sought specifically the delivery from Israel of 100 TOW missiles.)⁶⁰

McFarlane recommended to Shultz that the U.S. go forward with a tentative show of interest, although his admonition proved to be prophetic:

Then one has to consider where this might lead in terms of our being asked to up the ante on more and more arms and where that could conceivably lead. . .⁶¹

Shultz responded to the proposal with caution, recommending that "we should make a tentative show of interest without commitment."⁶²

In the meantime, Israel awaited the United States response on whether it was authorized to sell the TOWs.

The President Is Informed

10/45

353

267

10/45

The Israeli Arms Sales Are Authorized

On August 2, according to McFarlane's testimony, Kimche flew to Washington to meet with McFarlane and to obtain the specific U.S. position on Israel's sale of the TOWs. The meetings occurred on August 2 and 3. McFarlane made no memorandum of the meetings, and recollections differ. All agree, however, that the Israelis asked for permission to sell 100 TOWs, and that McFarlane agreed to present the issue to the President.⁶⁶

McFarlane testified that the Israelis were informed that the President was unwilling to allow the United States to supply arms directly to Iran.⁶⁷ Ledeer testified, however, that, in accordance with McFarlane's instructions, he informed the Israelis that the President approved in principle the sale of TOWs by Israel subject to further review of the details.⁶⁸

But Israeli Defense Minister Rabin would not proceed unless he received assurances that the Secretary of State knew of the plan and that the President unequivocally approved. The Israelis were concerned that the initiative could become public; and without specific American approval, Israel would be the target of criticism. In the meantime, the Israelis had received the First Iranian's written proposal, dated July 16, 1985, which was passed on to Ledeer. The proposal was general, promising a more concrete plan in the near future. It contained no commitment for the release of the hostages.⁶⁹

The Israelis insisted on meeting with Ghorbanifar to secure a commitment for the release of the American hostages in return for the shipment of 100 TOWs.⁷⁰ The meeting took place in Israel on July 25. Ghorbanifar stressed the need for the 100 TOWs and, for the first time, mentioned spare parts for anti-aircraft missiles.⁷¹ He also said that the Iranians needed other weapons as well. Ghorbanifar stated that the weapons would not only strengthen his and the First Iranian's credibility in Iran, but also win the support of the military. The Israelis told Ghorbanifar that they could recommend that their government supply the missiles only if secrecy would be maintained and the hostages released. Ghorbanifar stated that within 2 to 3 weeks of delivery of the missiles, the hostages would be released, although he warned that the Iranians might want to keep a few of the hostages for leverage.⁷² On July 28, the Israelis briefed Ledeer on the meeting with Ghorbanifar, and on the Israeli decision not to proceed unless U.S. authorization was more unequivocal. Ledeer reportedly said the Israelis had already received sufficient authorization from the response that the President had given in the hospital. But the Israelis were insistent on confirmation.⁷³

⁶⁶Regan Test., 7/3/87, at 10.

Insert with red dots



4/45

333

267

11/45

of Defense eventually received \$3 million from an Israeli intermediary for the 504 TOWs in March 1986.⁹¹

Israel Ships 96 TOWs—But No Hostage Is Released

On August 19, Ghorbanifar returned to Israel where he met with the Israeli team. Ghorbanifar advised that he had made payments in Iran but he was not certain how many hostages would be released. As for CIA Station Chief Buckley, Ghorbanifar said that the Iranians recognized his "special value" and, therefore, would return him last.⁹² That same day, the DC-8 transport aircraft arrived in Israel, and was loaded with 96 (rather than 100) TOW missiles.⁹³ In the early morning hours of August 20, the plane left Israel bound for Iran, with Ghorbanifar on board. The TOWs were then delivered and the aircraft returned to Israel late that same day.⁹⁴

But no hostages were released. Ghorbanifar had an explanation: contrary to his plan, delivery of the missiles was taken by the Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards rather than by the Iranian faction for whom they were intended.⁹⁵ Still, Ghorbanifar remained hopeful that he could produce the hostages. With McFarlane's assent, Ledeen met with Kimche in London on August 20 to discuss ways to bring the hostages out of Lebanon.⁹⁶

From London, Ledeen flew to California, where the President was vacationing, to brief McFarlane on his meeting with Kimche and to obtain McFarlane's authorization for a meeting in Europe with Ghorbanifar and the Israelis.⁹⁷ On August 22, McFarlane approved another trip to Europe for Ledeen.⁹⁸ On August 30, McFarlane arranged for the State Department to provide NSC staff member Oliver L. North with a passport in the name of William P. Goode for use in "a sensitive operation in Europe in connection with our hostages in Lebanon."⁹⁹ On August 27, the Government of Iran transferred \$1,217,410 to Ghorbanifar's Swiss account. On August 29, Ghorbanifar repaid Khashoggi the \$1 million loaned by Khashoggi on August 7.¹⁰⁰ Khashoggi told the Israelis that, because he had been repaid for the first loan, he would agree to loan \$4 million to permit Ghorbanifar to purchase an additional 400 TOWs from the Israelis.¹⁰¹

400 More TOWs for 1 Hostage

On September 4 and 5, Ledeen met in Paris with Ghorbanifar and members of the Israeli team. Since no hostages had been released despite the delivery of the 96 TOWs on August 20, severe arguments occurred at the meeting.¹⁰² Ghorbanifar indicated that one hostage would be released provided the Israelis sold Iran an additional 400 TOW missiles. We are satisfied from our review of all the evidence that the

Preparations for the Delivery

In early August, the Israelis began to make the necessary arrangements to obtain the 100 TOWs through the Israeli Ministry of Defense.⁹⁰ Ghorbanifar, in the meantime, was meeting with Khashoggi in Spain to arrange financing for the initial TOW purchase. The Israeli Ministry of Defense was unwilling to supply the TOWs until payment had been deposited. Iran, on the other hand, was unwilling to pay until the missiles were delivered. Ghorbanifar asked Khashoggi to bridge this gap by lending him \$1 million, which Ghorbanifar could then deposit with the Israelis and repay upon payment by Iran. Khashoggi agreed.⁹¹ On August 7, Khashoggi ordered the transfer of \$1 million into an Israeli intermediary's account.⁹² Back in Washington, McFarlane asked Ledeen to coordinate with the Israelis on the release of the hostages in Lebanon.⁹³

The Israelis did not agree on the price the Ministry of Defense would receive until after the missiles were delivered to Iran. The Ministry of Defense wanted \$12,000 per missile, which it calculated to be the replacement cost per missile. The Israeli intermediaries maintained that they could only pay \$6,000 per missile, because the remainder of what they received from Ghorbanifar was required for heavy shipping costs and other substantial expenses.⁹⁴ The Ministry

reference to check books. VFN

12/45

President was informed and approved of the transaction in the hope that the hostages would be released. The second shipment was approved by Prime Minister Peres and Defense Minister Rabin on September 9.¹⁰⁵ On September 10, Khashoggi ordered the transfer of \$4 million into an Israeli intermediary's account to finance Ghorbanifar's purchase of the 400 TOWs.¹⁰⁶ The money reached the Israeli account on September 13 and Ghorbanifar repaid Khashoggi that \$4 million the following day.¹⁰⁷

The aircraft used to transport the second shipment of TOWs to Iran arrived in Israel on September 14. The DC-8 was loaded with 408 missiles (bringing the total of TOWs shipped to 504), and, early the next morning, it flew to Tabriz to make delivery. On board was Ghorbanifar's Iranian assistant, Mahadi Shahiara. Tabriz, rather than Tehran, was used as the Iranian delivery point to prevent this shipment from falling into the hands of the Revolutionary Guards.¹⁰⁸

Reply
don't
The Iranians made it clear that this was an arms-for-one-hostage bargain. They gave McFarlane the choice of any hostage other than Buckley.¹⁰⁷ Ghorbanifar told the Israelis that Buckley was too ill to be released.¹⁰⁸ In fact, Buckley had died in June of a pulmonary condition brought on by prolonged interrogation, torture, and mistreatment.

On September 15, American hostage Reverend Benjamin Weir was released near the U.S. Embassy in Beirut.¹⁰⁹

On September 17, the Israeli intermediary's account received an additional \$290,000 from Ghorbanifar for the expense of transporting the 504 TOWs to Iran,¹¹⁰ and on September 18, Iran transferred \$5 million to Ghorbanifar's Swiss account for the additional TOWs.

Despite the fact that all the TOWs were delivered, only one hostage had been produced, not the group that Ghorbanifar originally had promised. Still, the President continued to receive optimistic reports on the initiative. However, no other hostages were released for the 504 TOWs.

343

267

12/45

The Initiative Continues: The Ante Is Upped

Despite Ghorbanifar's failure to secure the release of the four or five hostages originally promised, discussions of further arms deals continued. In late September, Ghorbanifar met with members of the Israeli team and Ledeen in Paris. This time, Ghorbanifar asked for anti-aircraft missiles, including a new HAWK missile to attack high-flying aircraft. (The HAWKs do not have that capability, but apparently none of the participants was aware of this.) Ledeen reportedly consented to a HAWK transaction with Iran, but demanded that the hostages be released.¹¹⁴ Ledeen recalls that McFarlane approved the sale of HAWKs before November, but Ledeen could not recall when.¹¹⁷ Nor could he recall this Paris meeting.¹¹⁸



B/45

343

267

Meeting In Europe, October 1985

By other accounts, however, such political discussions are not all that transpired at the late October meeting. According to one of the Israeli intermediaries, the Iranian official emphasized that efforts must be continued for the release of the four remaining hostages in exchange for arms, particularly HAWK missiles. Also according to the Israeli intermediary, Ledeer was pressing, on behalf of the U.S. President, for all four hostages to be released as soon as possible and all at once, and he promised that following their release the U.S. would assist Iran as far as it could.¹²



11/4/15

Endnotes:

363
267

18. Israeli Historical Chronology. Classified information from the Israeli Chronologies is used in this Report pursuant to specific agreement between the Government of Israel and the Committee. See, Appendix —, "Organization and Conduct of the Committee's Investigation."
19. *Id.*

25. Lodeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 14, 16.
26. *Id.* at 16-20.
27. *Id.* at 17-19; Lodeen Dep., 6/19/87, at 40-43.
28. Israeli Historical Chronology.
29. Lodeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 17-19; Lodeen Dep., 6/19/87, at 40-43.

46. Tower at B-6.

47. Israeli Historical Chronology.

48. *Id.* In early June 1985, Khashoggi advised the Israelis that Khashoggi would deal directly with Ghorbanifar and the Israelis, to the exclusion of Hashemi (Israeli Historical Chronology). When, in June, Khashoggi excluded Hashemi, Hashemi reacted by trying to market Ghorbanifar to the CIA, through one of Director Casey's close friends, John Shaheen.

On or about June 16, 1985, Shaheen called Casey and relayed a message from Hashemi offering to set up a meeting in Europe with a high-ranking Iranian official to discuss Iran's interest in acquiring U.S. TOW missiles and Iran's ability to help obtain the release of American hostages held in Lebanon. Before talking to Casey, Shaheen had dismissed part of Hashemi's proposal, telling him, "no weapons, no ~~Dr.~~ was." (Memo to CIA Chief of the Near East Division from Casey re Release of the Hostages, 6/17/85, C 8965-66, 6/17/85)

Hashemi had tried to deal with Casey before without success. However, this time, Casey agreed to Shaheen's proposition, and directed the Chief of the Near East Division of the CIA's Operations Directorate to pursue the matter. The State Department was told that Casey was "very anxious to move ahead on a proposal" for a meeting with an Iranian representative; but, as outlined in a memorandum to Under Secretary of State Michael Armacost, the proposal made no mention of any arms sales. By June 24, Armacost had approved a plan by which a meeting would be set up between foreign intermediaries and the Iranian contact to be produced by Hashemi. ~~Memo to Armacost from~~ Richard Murphy re Possible Iranian Contact, 6/22/85, S 3812-13. In early July, Hashemi identified his Iranian contacts as the Second Iranian, described by Hashemi as Deputy Prime Minister of Iran, and Manucher Ghorbanifar, described by Hashemi as a ranking Iranian intelligence officer. CIA Memo for the Record re John Shaheen and Hashemi, 7/9/85, C 9083-84; CIA Memo for the Record on John Shaheen and Hashemi, C 9082. The CIA recognized the Second Iranian as a significant Iranian official and Ghorbanifar as a "fabricator" with whom it did not wish to do business. The Agency suspected a scam but was nonetheless prepared to pursue a meeting between foreign intermediaries and the Second Iranian. Efforts in that regard continued through July and August. CIA Cable on Possible Contacts with Iranian Government Reps., 7/85, C 1475-77; CIA Memo for the Record on Hashemi, 7/23/85, C 9072; CIA Cable, 7/85, C 9073; CIA Cable re the Second Iranian Meeting, C

7/9/85, sub

17/45

343

267

9074; CIA Memo for the Record on Hashemi, 7/15/85, C 9075-76; CIA Memo for the Record on Hashemi, 7/15/85, C 9077-78; CIA Memo for the Record on Hashemi, 7/23/85, C 9079; S 3812-16. However, no meeting with the Second Iranian occurred at that time. C 9059-60; George Tower, 5/11/87, at 266-267; Former Chief/NE (CIA) Dep., 4/28/87, at 26-53.

49. Israeli Historical Chronology.
50. *Id.*

51. McFarlane, 5/11/87, at 103-04.
52. McFarlane, 5/11/87, at 104.
53. Powell Dep., 7/19/87, at 5-7.

54. Israeli Historical Chronology.
55. *Id.*
56. *Id.*

57. Ledeen Dep., 6/19/87, at 51. Approximately two months prior to the meeting with Schwimmer, Shackley told Ledeen about a meeting Shackley had had with an "Iranian in Europe" who offered to "arrange the ransom of Buckley and possibly other American hostages." Shackley also gave Ledeen a memorandum describing the proposal, N 7452-56. Although Shackley was describing his meeting with Ghorbanifar in November 1984, *see* pp. 4-6, and the memorandum mentions Ghorbanifar by name, Ledeen testified that he passed the memorandum on to North without reading it and that he had never heard of Ghorbanifar before meeting with Schwimmer on July 11. Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 28-30.

58. Note to McFarlane from Wilma Hall, his secretary, on Schwimmer and Ledeen, 7/11/85, N 10579.

59. Ledeen also gave McFarlane a document written by Khashoggi that advocated an overture toward Iran.

60. Ex. GPS-9.
61. *Id.*

62. Ex. GPS-10 (Test.) (Test.)

67. *Id.*
68. Ledeen Dep., 9/10/87, at 27-28.

69. Israeli Historical Chronology.

70. *Id.*
71. *Id.*

72. *Id.* (Test.)

73. *Id.*
74. McFarlane, 5/11/87, at 116-17; Israeli Historical Chronology. (Test.)

90. Israeli Historical Chronology.
91. *Id.*

92. Buckley died in June 1985 after long interrogation and torture. But the U.S. Government believed that he was still alive as late as the fall of 1985, and was seeking his release.

93. The TOWs were packed in pallets of 12 missiles each, and no unpacked missiles were shipped for safety reasons. Israeli Historical Chronology.

94. *Id.* The Tower Board Report states that the first shipment by the Israelis of 100 TOWs occurred August 30, 1985. See Tower at B-26. The Board's source for that date is not apparent from the text of the Report. The August 20 date from the Israeli Chronology appears accurate given the context of related events.

95. *Id.* at 27.

96. Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 52; Ledeen Dep., 6/19/87, at 66-68.

100. Israeli Historical Chronology. Only the \$1 million repayment figure is derived from the Israeli Chronology.

101. *Id.*
102. *Id.*

103. *Id.*

104. Israeli Historical Chronology; Israeli Financial Chronology.

105. Israeli Financial Chronology.

106. Israeli Historical Chronology.

107. McFarlane, 5/11/87, at 122-23. (Test.)

108. Israeli Historical Chronology.

109. *Id.*

110. Israeli Financial Chronology. The Tower Report's analysis of this transaction differs from that provided by the Israelis. According to Tower, Ghorbanifar initiated the transaction with a \$4 million check to Khashoggi. Khashoggi transferred \$4 million to the Israeli account on September 14. The Iranians transferred \$5 million to Ghorbanifar's Swiss account on September 18. Ghorbanifar then notified Khashoggi to negotiate the \$4 million check. Ghorbanifar paid later an additional \$250,000 to the Israeli account for "additional eight TOW missiles." Tower at B-176-177

86. Israeli Historical Chronology.

87. Furrmark Dep., 7/22/87, at 75-76.

88. Israeli Financial Chronology.

89. Ledeen Dep., 6/19/87, at 66; Ledeen Dep., 6/19/87, at 61-65.

116. Israeli Historical Chronology.

117. Ledeen Dep., 9/10/87, at 17.

118. *Id.* at 16-17.

119. 10645.



26/45

26/45

343

16/45

267

129. Israeli Historical Chronology.



DANIEL K. INOUE HAWAII CHAIRMAN
WARREN RUDDMAN NEW HAMPSHIRE VICE CHAIRMAN
GEORGE J. MITCHELL MAINE
SAM DUNN GEORGIA
PAUL S. SARBANES MARY AND
HOWELL T. HERRN ALABAMA
DAVID L. BOPEN OKLAHOMA
JAMES A. MCCLURE OHIO
WALTER D. DORTCH IOWA
WILLIAM S. COHEN MAINE
PAUL S. TIBBLE W. VIRGINIA

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

ARTHUR L. LIMAN
CHIEF COUNSEL
MARK A. BELNICK
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
TO THE CHIEF COUNSEL
MARY JANE CHECCHI
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
ASSOCIATE COUNSELS
C. R. ALBRIGHT, JR.
DANIEL FINN
C. M. HOLMES
CHARLES M. HERR
JAMES F. LYNCH
JEL P. SYER
RICHARD D. PERRY
JOHN D. SAKON
LENN E. SMITH
MORTY L. WOODCOCK

35 November 13, 1987

17/45 By Hand

17/45

Major General (Res.) Rephael Vardi
c/o Embassy of Israel
3514 International Drive, NW
Washington, DC

267

Dear General Vardi:

Pursuant to the Agreement between the Senate and House Select Committees and the Government of Israel (GOI), I am enclosing excerpts of page proofs from the Committees' forthcoming Report which contain information derived from and/or citations to the GOI material.

The enclosed excerpts are from the following chapter of the Report:

1. "The Enterprise."

It is currently anticipated that the Report will be issued on Tuesday, November 17.

Let me once again express sincere thanks on behalf of the Committees to the GOI and to you and Mike for your cooperation and assistance.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

Mark A. Belnick
Executive Assistant
to the Chief Counsel

MAB:cp

Enclosure

"TOP SECRET WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURE"

18/45

363

267

Chapter 22 The Enterprise

~~*~~

19/45

343

267

AE The Mideast: Expenditures for the Iran Operations⁷⁰

¶ The Enterprise was involved in every NSC-connected shipment of weapons to Iran from November 1985 on. The net surplus generated by these transactions for the benefit of the Enterprise was \$16.1 million.

The first transaction, the Israeli November 1985 HAWK shipment, generated a net surplus of \$850,317. The transaction began when an Israeli intermediary deposited \$1,000,000 into the Lake Resources account on November 20, 1985. Eighty Israeli

~~SE~~

20/45

20/45

267

343

owned HAWKs were to be transported by the Enterprise to Iran in four separate shipments. Only 18 HAWKs were delivered, however, before the Iranians terminated the transaction. The Enterprise incurred charter expenses of \$127,700 for the delivery of the 18 HAWKs, and \$21,983 for a private jet for Secord. This left the Enterprise with \$850,317. According to Secord, the Israelis told North that the extra money could be used for "whatever purpose we wanted."⁷¹ After discussing the matter with North, Secord agreed to use the money for the Contras and testified that he did so.⁷²

The Enterprise's role in the next transaction — the sale of the 1,000 TOWs in February — was more active. The Enterprise was the "commercial cut-out" for the CIA, receiving the money for the missiles from Ghorbanifar, paying the CIA for them, and delivering them to Iran. The net surplus from this transaction was approximately \$5.5 million. As it did with the Galero arms sales, the Enterprise received payment to cover the cost of the arms before the arms were purchased. Between February 7 and 18, 1986, Khashoggi (who was financing Ghorbanifar) transferred a total of \$10 million to the Lake Resources account for the shipment. On February 10 and 11, Secord directed a total payment of \$3.7 million to the CIA for the TOWs. In addition, payments totaling \$484,000 were made to Southern Air for the delivery of missiles from the United States to Israel; one payment of \$185,000 was made to the Israeli Ministry of Defense to transport the TOWs from Israel to Iran; another payment of \$100,000 was made to the Israeli Ministry of Defense for other related activities; and \$31,500 was paid to an Israeli bank for miscellaneous expenses.

The Enterprise's role was the same in the third transaction — the deliveries of the HAWK replacement parts to Iran in May and August 1986, and the shipment of TOWs to Israel to replenish the TOWs sold to Iran in September 1985. The net surplus from this transaction was approximately \$8.3 million.

Khashoggi financed the May transaction for Ghorbanifar, transferring \$15 million to the Lake Resources account on May 14 and 16, 1986, for the HAWK parts. On May 15 and 16, the Israeli Ministry of Defense transferred a total of \$1,685,000 to the Lake Resources account for the TOWs.⁷³ After Khashoggi's first payment was received, Secord directed the Enterprise to pay \$6.5 million to the CIA to cover the cost of the HAWK spare parts and the TOWs. In order to pay for the delivery of the HAWK parts, the TOWs, and McFarlane's trip to Iran, the Enterprise paid \$667,000 to Southern Air and \$447,250 to the Israeli Ministry of Defense. Dutton received \$40,000 to cover the cost of the crew and other expenses on the Israel-to-Iran leg of the mission. Secord also appears to have received \$260,000 which was apparently related to the Iran transactions.⁷⁴

Finally, the Enterprise paid \$205,015 for expenses of chartering corporate aircraft for Secord and North in connection with their negotiations with the Iranians.

The fourth and final transaction consisted of the shipment of 500 TOWs from U.S. stocks to Iran through the Second Channel. The net surplus was \$1.4 million. The Second Channel advanced \$3.6 million to Hyde Park Square on October 29, 1986, for the TOWs. Hyde Park, in turn, paid the CIA \$2,037,000 for the missiles and incurred other expenses aggregating \$161,240.

Lyphon

don't know name

don't know name

343

8/1/45

267

21/45

343

70. The description herein is based upon the CSF ledgers and supporting bank documents and is confirmed, with respect to the transfers to and from the Israeli accounts, by the Israeli Financial Chronology. See Table 0-0 Enterprise Expenditures, and supporting documentation referred to therein. See also Second Test, Hearings, 100-1, at 95 (first transaction) 105-06.



22/45

267

22/45

343

178 (second transaction), 119, 180 (third transaction), 123 (fourth transaction).
71. Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, 5/6/87, at 95.
72. Id.
73. On May 16, 1986, \$225,000 was paid from the Enterprise accounts to an unknown party. The CSF Ledgers indicate that the \$225,000 came from the \$1,685,000 deposit.
74. According to North's notebook, North met with Secord on May 19, 1986, and informed Secord of the need to bring \$260,000 in cash to Israel. North Notebooks, 5/19/86, Q2155. Two days later, \$260,000 was withdrawn from the Lake Resources account. Bank Record, H518.

✱

DANIEL K. MOULDER HAWAII CHAIRMAN
WARREN RUSSMAN NEW HAMPSHIRE VICE CHAIRMAN
GEORGE J. MITCHELL MAINE
SAM NUNN GEORGIA
PAUL S. SARBAWES MARYLAND
HOWELL T. HIFLIN ALABAMA
DAVID L. BORER OKLAHOMA
JAMES A. MCCLURE IDAHO
DORRIS G. HATCH UTAH
WILLIAM S. COHEN MARYNE
PAUL S. Trible JR. VIRGINIA

ARTHUR L. LIMAN
CHIEF COUNSEL

MARK A. BELNICK
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
TO THE CHIEF COUNSEL

PAUL BARBADORO
DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL

MARY JANE CHECCH
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
ASSOCIATE COUNSELS

CH. ALBRIGHT JR.
DANIEL FINN
CH. HOLMES
CHARLES M. KERR
JAMES S. KAPLAN

JOEL P. LISHER
RICHARD D. PARRY
JOHN D. SAXON
TERRY A. SMILJANICH
TIMOTHY C. WOODCOCK

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

November 15, 1987

83/45
By Hand

763
267

23/45

Major General (Res.) Rephael Vardi
c/o Embassy of Israel
3514 International Drive, NW
Washington, DC

Dear General Vardi:

Pursuant to the Agreement between the Senate and House Select Committees and the Government of Israel (GOI), I am enclosing excerpts of page proofs from the Committees' forthcoming Report which contain information derived from and/or citations to the GOI material.

The enclosed excerpts are from the following chapter of the Report:

1. "Taken to the Cleaners: The Iran Initiative Continues."

It is currently anticipated that the Report will be issued on Tuesday, November 17.

Let me once again express sincere thanks on behalf of the Committees to the GOI and to you and Mike for your cooperation and assistance.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

Mark A. Belnick
Executive Assistant
to the Chief Counsel

MAB:cp

Enclosure

"TOP SECRET WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURE"

24/45

343

267

"Taken to the Cleaners": The Iran Initiative Continues*

Only days after the Tehran mission ended, Ghorbanifar was on the phone with an Israeli official seeking a meeting. Ghorbanifar blamed the failure of the Tehran trip on internal rivalries within the Iranian Government and complained about McFarlane's refusal to accept the offer to release two hostages for the HAWK parts. The Israeli official restated the U.S. position: there could be no further discussions unless all the hostages were released first.

(Apt)
(R.L.) The Bartering Continues

GA

25/45

14-1st
Head

Trying for an Independence Day Present

Since the Iranians' complaints rested on the microfiche list, Cave asked for proof of the overcharge. In the meantime, Ghorbanifar and an Israeli official attempted to keep the initiative alive. The Israeli hoped to gain the release of at least one hostage in time for the July 4 Independence Day celebration of the Statue of Liberty's 100th anniversary.⁹ Ghorbanifar told the Israelis that he could deliver¹⁰ and, on July 2, Nir called North and predicted the release of an American hostage in time for the celebration.¹¹ North immediately dispatched an interagency team to Wiesbaden. But when the release did not occur, Poin-dexter criticized North for falsely raising expectations and North, in frustration, let it be known to Nir that he would not take any more calls from him until further notice.¹²

343

25/45

267

On July 26, Ghorbanifar and the Israelis registered a success: the Reverend Lawrence Jenco was released. The Israeli contact had forced the issue, telling Ghorbanifar after the July 4 disappointment that the initiative was over unless a hostage was released. Shortly thereafter, Ghorbanifar announced that Jenco would be freed.¹⁶ Although welcome, the release of Father Jenco generated confusion and concern; it was unclear what Ghorbanifar had promised to gain his release.

14-1st
Head

The next day North and Cave met in Frankfurt with Ghorbanifar and an Israeli official to clarify matters. Ghorbanifar described the arrangements he had made with the Iranians to obtain the release of Fr. Jenco. These included the sequential release of the hostages and the delivery of arms to Iran. Ghorbanifar also told the group that, on his own accord, he had promised the Iranians that if they could prove the claim that they had been overcharged by \$10 million for the HAWK spare parts, the United States would make up for it by giving Iran 1000 free TOWs.¹⁷

AT

26/45

343

267

The decision in Tehran not to ship the parts unless all the hostages were released first had been reversed. On August 4, 1986, the HAWK parts were flown into Iran. Secord provided the crew and Israel provided the airplane.²⁸

26/45

*

29/45

343

27/45

267

Although North apparently agreed to the proposal, he told Ghorbanifar that it was subject to approval in Washington.⁴⁶

14 pt (red) ✓ A New Deal In London /

The Microfiche Arrives /

14 pt (red)

The dispute about overcharging remained unresolved. By August 6, the Israelis had received the microfiche list from Iran.⁴⁷ It consisted of pages showing prices as of November 1, 1985 and was authentic.⁴⁸

122

✱

28/45

28/45

363

267

~~14-12-77~~ Nir Suspects

North prepared "Talking Points" for Poindexter's September 10 meeting with Nir. At the meeting, among other things, Poindexter told Nir that the United States would continue seeking the release of the hostages held in Lebanon; that the United States developed the Second Channel; that the Second Channel was connected with Speaker Rafsanjani; and that the President had approved proceeding with a meeting with the Rafsanjani representative.¹⁰⁴

Nir left the United States on September 15. Before departing, he met again with Poindexter and North.¹⁰⁵ North's notes indicate that Nir stated that Ghorbanifar was trying to finance a deal large enough to entice the Iranians into gaining the release of all the hostages simultaneously. Two days after he left, Nir reported to North that Ghorbanifar was having little luck financing the deal. Appeals to the Second Iranian for the release of the hostages were likewise unsuccessful.¹⁰⁶

~~X~~

29/45

363

267

Preparations for Frankfurt

*

30/45

343

267

30/45

With Potindexter's approval, Secord met Nir on October 5 in Israel. He delivered a letter from President Reagan to the Israeli Prime Minister thanking him for his efforts in furthering the Iran initiative and lauding Nir's work. Secord assured Nir that he would continue to be consulted, and he conveyed the President's reaffirmation of his commitment to the Prime Minister that the Iran initiative continued to be a joint venture.

X

3/45

343

267

(14-pt) Arms Transfer Preparations

But the price quoted to the Second Channel was part of the deal for the hostages and could not be renegotiated. Instead, Nir and North discussed instructing Secord to tell the Relative that the low price was an "undercharge" that would have to be increased on the next shipment.²²⁸

North, Secord and an Israeli official met in Geneva on October 22 to iron out the details of the next arms shipment to Iran. They agreed that the 500 TOWs sent to Iran would be taken from the 508 sent to Tzahal in May and rejected as inadequate by the Israeli Defense Forces, and that the United States would supply Israel with another 500 replacement missiles. On October 27, the flight crew that Secord had retained arrived in Israel. The next day, an Israeli plane delivered the substitute 500 TOWs to Iran.²²⁸

read paragraph

*

22/45

343

267

The Circle Opens

(14-17)

*

11/15/88

343

267

North called Nir on November 23 and informed him that he had been interviewed by Attorney General Meese. North said that Meese had asked him about the diversion of some of Iran arms money to Nicaragua. North then asked Nir to have Israel accept responsibility for the plan but Nir rejected the request. North's notes quote Nir as saying: "I cannot back this story."

107

~~*~~

34/45

343
267

Endnotes: "Taken to the Cleaners"

(2. Israeli Historical Chronology.)

(46. Israeli Historical Chronology.)

(9. Israeli Historical Chronology.)

ISRAELI

(10. Id.)

(11. North Notes (Q 2243). According to the Israeli Chronology, Nir expressed doubts to North as to whether the ~~Assassins~~ would effect the release.

(12. Allen Dep., 6/29/87, at 476.

(50. Israeli Historical Chronology.)

(51. Allen Dep., 9/23/87, at 7-8; Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 106-07.)

(16. Israeli Historical Chronology.)

(17. Id.)

(24. Israeli Historical Chronology.)



35/45

343
267

104. Israeli Historical Chronology. Memorandum to Poin-
dexter from North on Meeting with Nir, 9/9/86 (N 44515-
16).

105. Id.

106. North Notes (Q 2413).

158. Israeli Historical Chronology.

*

38/45

340

267

226. Id. at Q 2539.
227. Israel Historical Chronology.
228. Id.

~~*~~

38/45

267

353

303. North Notes (Q 2650); Israeli Historical Chronology. According to the Israeli Chronology, Nir was astonished by North's request and replied that Israel would not lie but would state only the truth, that Israel never transferred money to the Contras.

*

DANIEL K. WOLFE HAWAII CHAIRMAN
 WARREN RUSSMAN NEW HAMPSHIRE VICE CHAIRMAN
 GEORGE J. MITCHELL MAINE JAMES A. MACCLURE IDAHO
 SAM NUNN GEORGIA ORRIN G. HATCH UTAH
 PAUL S. SARIBAKIS MARYLAND WILLIAM S. COHEN MAINE
 HOWELL T. HIFLIN ALABAMA PAUL S. TIBBLE JR. VIRGINIA
 DAVID L. BORNHAY OKLAHOMA
 ARTHUR L. LIMAN
 CHIEF COUNSEL
 MARK A. BELNICK
 EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
 TO THE CHIEF COUNSEL
 PAUL BARBADINO
 DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL
 MARY JANE CHEECH
 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
 ASSOCIATE COUNSELS
 CH. ALBRIGHT JR.
 DANIEL FINN
 CH. HOLMES
 CHARLES M. KERR
 JAMES S. KAPLAN
 JOEL P. LISHER
 RICHARD D. PARRY
 JOHN D. SAXON
 TERRY A. SMILANICH
 TIMOTHY C. WOODCOCK

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY
 ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510

November 15, 1987

38/45

267

363

38/45

By Hand

Major General (Res.) Rephael Vardi
 c/o Embassy of Israel
 3514 International Drive, NW
 Washington, DC

Dear General Vardi:

Pursuant to the Agreement between the Senate and House
 Select Committees and the Government of Israel (GOI), I am
 enclosing excerpts of page proofs from the Committees'
 forthcoming Report which contain information derived from and/or
 citations to the GOI material.

The enclosed excerpts are from the following chapter of the Report:

1. "Arms Sales to Iran: The United States Takes Control."

It is currently anticipated that the Report will be issued on Tuesday, November 17.

Let me once again express sincere thanks on behalf of the
 Committees to the GOI and to you and Mike for your cooperation
 and assistance.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

 Mark A. Belnick
 Executive Assistant
 to the Chief Counsel

MAB:cp

Enclosure

"TOP SECRET WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURE"

[Handwritten mark]

39/45

39/45

343
267

Chapter 12 Arms Sales to Iran: The United States Takes Control



20/45

343
267

40/45

? / New Doubts About Ghorbanifar

[Handwritten mark]

4/1/45

353
267

While Nir was promoting Ghorbanifar to the CIA, Nir and North were discussing how to divide up the profits from the sale of HAWK spare parts. An entry in North's notebooks related a conversation with Nir: "price data on 240 . . . timing per acquisition . . . need to know residuals on — price per unit (\$6068), price in Aaron's place, how much is left for use by Israelis." "Aaron" was the code name for DOD official Neel Koch; "Aaron's place" was, presumably, the Pentagon. The conversation reflects the Israelis' desire to know how much of the residuals would be available to finance the Israelis' purchase of the 504 replacement TOWs.

(C/NE)

Ghorbanifar Visits Washington

On April 2, 1986, Ghorbanifar and an Israeli official met in London to discuss financial arrangements for shipping the HAWK spare parts.

*

42/45

267

343

Another Meeting in London

Cave had his first telephone conversation with the Second Iranian Official while he was in London. He described a "major snag" that arose regarding the sequence of the spare parts delivery. The Second Iranian Official was allegedly adamant that all the parts be delivered simultaneously with the arrival of McFarlane in Tehran. The Second Iranian Official finally agreed that when the American delegation arrived in Tehran with as many spare parts as the aircraft could hold, an Iranian delegation would be dispatched to Lebanon to barter for the release of the hostages. When the hostages were released, the remaining spare parts were to be delivered. An Israeli present during the meeting later confirmed this agreement. 13

*

Chapter 12

Final Planning for Tehran

360
267

43/45


On May 22, a Southern Air Transport 707 airplane delivered 13 pallets of HAWK missile spare parts to Israel. The following day, Southern Air Transport flight crews arrived in Israel for the trips to Tehran.¹⁷⁸

*

44/45

267

763



Hib-

90. North, Personal Notes, 1/28/86.
91. Israel Financial Chronology.
92. Israel Chronology.

*

*
*

*

156. Israel Historical Chronology.


*

*

us/us.

267

343




p

istorical

*

... Israel Chronology.

*



*

DANIEL K. HOULYER HAWAII CHAIRMAN
WARREN RUDDMAN NEW HAMPSHIRE VICE CHAIRMAN
GEORGE J. MITCHELL MAINE
SAM MURNIN GEORGIA
PAUL S. SARIBANIS MARYLAND
HOWELL T. HELVIN ALABAMA
DAVID L. BOREN OKLAHOMA

JAMES A. MCCLURE IOWA
ORRIN G. HATCH UTAH
WILLIAM S. COHEN MAINE
PAUL S. TIBBLE JR VIRGINIA

ARTHUR L. LIMAN
CHIEF COUNSEL

MARK A. BELNICK
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
TO THE CHIEF COUNSEL

PAUL BARBADORO
DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL

MARY JANE CHECCHI
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
ASSOCIATE COUNSELS

CH. ALBRIGHT JR
DANIEL FINY
CH. HOLMES
CHARLES M. RERR
JAMES E. KAPLAN

JOEL P. LISZER
RICHARD D. PARRY
JOHN D. SAXON
TERRY A. SMILJANICH
TIMOTHY C. WOODCOCK

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

November 15, 1987

2/14
By Hand

Major General (Res.) Rephael Vardi
c/o Embassy of Israel
3514 International Drive, NW
Washington, DC

268

342

Dear General Vardi:

Pursuant to the Agreement between the Senate and House Select Committees and the Government of Israel (GOI), I am enclosing excerpts of page proofs from the Committees' forthcoming Report which contain information derived from and/or citations to the GOI material.

The enclosed excerpts are from the following chapter of the Report:


1. "Clearing Hurdles: The President Approves A New Plan."

It is currently anticipated that the Report will be issued on Tuesday, November 17.

Let me once again express sincere thanks on behalf of the Committees to the GOI and to you and Mike for your cooperation and assistance.

" Warm regards.

Sincerely,


Mark A. Belnick
Executive Assistant
to the Chief Counsel

2. "Origins of this Report."

MAB:cp

Enclosure

"TOP SECRET WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURE"

*

3/4

268

362

Chapter 11 Clearing Hurdles: The President Approves A New Plan

*

*

4/14

268

342

North Looks for Weapons

During the first few days of December, North had separate meetings with Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard L. Armitage and Israeli Ministry of Defense officials.¹⁰ The purpose of these sessions was to establish liaison between the Pentagon and the Israelis and to identify methods of obtaining weapons to ship to the Iranians or to replenish Israeli stocks following Israeli shipments.¹¹ One of the Israeli officials met Armitage at the Pentagon on December 2.¹² Armitage testified that he could not recall whether he met with the official or what they discussed.¹³ Armitage testified that he warned North of resistance to the plan within the Defense Department, noting that Secretary Weinberger would be "appalled" if he knew North was dealing with Iranians.¹⁴ Nonetheless, after this meeting, Armitage asked Dr. Henry Gaffney, Director of Plans, Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), to prepare a paper on I-HAWKS and I-TOWs and directed Glenn A. Rudd, Deputy Director of DSAA, to prepare a paper on the legal methods for transferring TOW and HAWK missiles to Iran.¹⁵

X

5/14

352

North Raises Contra Diversion with Israelis

On the day after the President signed the Finding, December 6, North remarked during a meeting with Israeli officials that the United States wanted to use profits from the upcoming arms sale to Iran to fund U.S. activity in Nicaragua. The meeting, which was held in New York, concerned replenishment of Israeli TOWs. One of the Israeli officials made handwritten notes of this meeting on December 12, 1985. According to these notes, the Israelis were told by North that not only did the United States have no budget to pay for the 504 TOW missiles (and planned on the Israeli Government's receiving this money from the Israeli intermediaries), but that in the future the United States wanted to generate profits from this transaction in order to finance part of its activity in Nicaragua. According to the Israeli Historical Chronology, North had a position paper with him at the meeting that he said was to be presented to the President at a meeting the following day.

North testified that he recalled no such conversation, though he could not rule it out:

My recollection was that the first time it [the diversion] was specifically addressed was during a [later] meeting with Ghorbanifar. It may well have come up before, but I don't recall it."

North testified that his "clearest recollection" was that the notion of using the residuals for the Contras was first suggested by Ghorbanifar in January 1986."

[Handwritten mark]

Two of the Israeli officials at the De-

6/14

268

342

* member 6 meeting, who did not take notes, did not recall the remarks of North recorded by the other Israeli official in his notes. Israeli Historical Chronology 287.

*

7/14

352

Acceleration of the Initiative:

January 1986 Israelis Add a New Element to the Negotiations: The Southern Lebanon Army Prisoners

In mid December, 1985, Amiram Nir, adviser to the Prime Minister of Israel, became involved in the Iran operation; he later became the liaison to the Americans and Ghorbanifar. Nir, who reportedly was unaware of the secret Iranian arms deals prior to this time, had spent the last month exploring whether American hostages in Lebanon would be released if the Southern Lebanon Army freed Shiite prisoners. Nir proposed to his superiors that he discreetly get the reaction of the Americans to a hostage release initiative along these lines.¹⁰

After being briefed on the U.S.-Israeli Iran operation, Nir began work on a plan linking that operation with his own plan. He presented to high-ranking Israeli officials a proposal that included: (1) a direct sale of TOWs out of Israeli arsenals to Iran and the simultaneous release of American hostages; (2) a purchase by Israel from the United States of replacement arms, using the proceeds from the Iran sale; (3) exerting Israeli influence to obtain the release of prisoners held by the Southern Lebanon Army; (4) the handling of all logistics by the Israelis to enable the Americans to deny any involvement; and (5) the construction of a convincing cover story to explain the release of the hostages and the prisoners.¹¹ Nir then went to London in late December to meet, for the first time, with Ghorbanifar and one of the Israeli intermediaries. The three hammered out a detailed — but tentative — plan embodying these elements. The Israeli Government authorized Nir to present this plan to the United States but made clear that the transaction could occur only with U.S. agreement to the entire concept and that Israel would assist in whatever way the Americans requested, but not play a leading role.¹²

Nir Comes to Washington

On January 2, 1986, Nir flew to Washington to meet with Poindexter and North at the request of Prime Minister Peres.¹³ In an opening meeting with North in a hotel, Nir said that he had an idea about how to improve the progress of the Iranian operation.¹⁴ Nir met later that morning with Poindexter, North, and Don Fortier, Poindexter's deputy, and laid out his plan.¹⁵ The central features of the proposal were recorded by Poindexter in his notes: the Israelis would ship to Iran 4,000 "unimproved TOWs"; after the delivery of the first 500, all five American hostages would be released; simultaneously the Southern Lebanon Army would release "20-30 Hizballah prisoners who don't have blood on their hands."¹⁶ If the American hostages were released, Israel would ship to Iran the other 3,500 TOWs and Iran would "confirm" its agreement for "no more hostages (and) terror."¹⁷ Under the plan, the United States would replace the TOWs only if the hostages were released. If the hostages were not released, replenishment was not required and Israel would have lost 500 TOWs. If they were freed, then the United States would replace the 4,000 TOWs, plus the 500 TOWs the Israelis had shipped in 1985.¹⁸ Rapid replacement of the TOWs was of particular concern to Nir. He emphasized that the number of TOWs would decrease Israel's arsenal when tension with Syria increased the urgency to keep Israel's arsenal at full strength. To address Israel's concerns about readiness, Nir called for the United States to "preposition" substitute TOWs near Israel as soon as possible in case a sudden need for them occurred. Thereafter, the United States was to proceed with "regular steady replacement" of the TOWs by sale to Israel. The Israelis also wanted a U.S. commitment that, if the operation were exposed, the United States would say it knew of the operation and did not object.¹⁹

Nir and North Discuss Use of Residuals

Nir's proposal included another feature: generating profits that could be diverted to other covert projects. This was not a new concept: Nir and North had talked generally about joint covert operations in November, and North had told other Israelis in December that the United States wanted to use profits from the arms sale under discussion at that time to finance U.S. activities in Nicaragua. Poindexter recalled that at either the January 2 meeting or another meeting with Nir a few days later, "[t]here was also a very brief, general discussion about some other cooperative activities."²⁰ North — who talked alone with Nir several times during the first days of January — testified to a more specific discussion about uses for the "residuals":

8/14

268

/ 342

I recall that we met New Year's day or the day after . . . and it was his [Nir's] proposal at that point to use the profits by the arrangement they envisioned, selling Israeli TOWs at a profit, replenishing them with part of that money, using part of that money for other operations. . . . I do not believe he mentioned contras at that meeting, but my recollection is we began to talk in early January about other joint U.S.-Israeli, and in some cases unilateral Israeli operations of a certain kind¹²⁰

X

9/14

268

1362

/ North Proceeds With Plans for Replenishment /

~~*~~

10/14

268

342

Nir told North that Israel could not use the money the Iranians had paid for the 504 TOWs shipped in 1985 to buy replacements because this money was not available. On this point, North's notes state: "Regarding the first 504, it was agreed that the \$ was used for other purposes."¹⁵⁶ Over the next few days, Nir told North that Israel could pay only \$5,000-\$5,500 per missile and that the Department of Defense, using a replacement cost figure, was demanding that Israel pay more.¹⁵⁷

11/14

268

342

- * 10. Israel Historical Chronology; North Notebook, 12/2/85, Q1367.
- * 11. Israel Historical Chronology, to the extent the passage refers to replenishment of Israeli stocks.
- 12. Id.
- 13. Armitage Dep., 7/22/85, at 169, 173.
- 14. Armitage Dep., 7/22/87, at 174.
- 15. Gaffney Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 65-67; Extract from Gaffney Work Diary, Ex. DOD-8, Hearings, 100-6; Gaffney-Rudd Dep., 6/22/87, at 2-7.
- 46. Israel Historical Chronology. *
- 47. North Test., Hearings 100-7, Part I, at 295.
- 48. North Test., Hearings, 100-7, Part I, at 106, 294-95.

~~*~~

12/14

268

342

X

- 113. Israeli Historical Chronology.
- 114. Id.; Poindexter Test, Hearings, 100-8, at 27-29.
- 115. Poindexter Handwritten Notes, 1/2/86, Ex. JMP 23, Hearings, 100-8, at _____.
- 116. Id.
- 117. Id.
- 118. Id.
- 119. Poindexter Test, Hearings, 100-8, at 57.
- 120. North Test, Hearings, 100 7, Part I, at 296. The Israeli Chronologies do not corroborate this version.

X

X

X 109. Israeli Historical Chronology.
 110. Id.
 111. Id.
 112. Poindexter Handwritten Notes, 1/2/86, Ex. JMP-23, Hearings, 100-8, at _____

X 156. Id. The Israeli Historical Chronology does not support this note.
 157. North Notebook, 1/9/86, Ex. OLN-69A, Hearings, 100-7, Part III, at _____; Israeli Historical Chronology.

X

X

13/14

268

342

Origins of this Report

*

14/14

268

342

The Committees also received unprecedented cooperation from a sovereign nation, the State of Israel. Although not willing to allow its officials to be examined, the Government of Israel assembled and furnished the Committees with extensive materials and information, including information affecting its national security.

[Handwritten mark]

14

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מחוד 1 דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מיידית

תאריך/ז"ח 1600 16 נוב 1987

מס' מברק

המשרד

345

אל: מצפ"א

דע: לשכת מנכ"ל באוצר

תקציב ארה"ב

-לשלכם 523

(1) לפי כל הסימנים יושג הסכם עוד השבוע בין הקונגרס והבית הלבן לקצץ 23 בליון דולר מתקציב ארה"ב לשתיא 1988.

(2) חייבים להשיג הסכם זה עד ה-20 דנא, ייכנס המנגנון לקיצוצים אוטומטיים לתוקף סופי.

(3) מעריכים איפוא שמוקדם יפעל עוד לפני סוף השבוע הזה, ואזי יחפזר עד יום ב' ה-30 דנא (דהיינו עד לאחר יום ההודיה).

(4) שמועות נהשערות לגבי תוכן ההסכם יש למכביר, אך מידע בדוק יש רק בצמחוסטנסה לקבל פרטים לגבי גורל סעיף 150 (ענינים בינלאומיים, כולל סיוע חוץ ותקציר מחמי"ד) ועוד נדרוש.

סול אמר
למדן

Handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom of the page, including the word "אמ"ל" and various initials and numbers.

תכנית ביקור רה"מ בארה"ב

יום ד' - 18.11.87

- 01:00 - המראה לניו-יורק - LY-005
- 05:50 - הגעה לניו-יורק - למלון ריג'נסי
- 13:00 - ארוחת צהריים במערכת "ניוזוויק"
- 17:00 - תדרוך על המצב בארה"ב

יום ה' - 19.11.87

- 07:00 - ראיון ל-ABC
- 08:00 - ארוחת בקר עם עורכי עתונים
- 09:30 - תדרוך כתבים ישראלים
- 11:58 - המראה למיאמי (מלה-גברדיה) - EA-017
- 14:43 - הגעה למיאמי
- 19:00 - ארוחת ערב עם ראשי הפדרציה
- 20:15 - הופעה בפני כנוס מועצת הפדרציות היהודיות
- 22:30 - המראה לושינגטון - למלון גרנד

יום ו' - 20.11.87

- 10:00 - פגישה עם הנשיא ריגן - בבית הלבן
- 11:30 - פגישה עם מזכיר המדינה שולץ + ארוחת צהריים
- 15:00 - הופעה ב-WASHINGTON IUSTITUTE M.E. POLICY - מלון גרנד
- 16:00 - פגישה עם העתונאים הישראלים

יום שבת - 21.11

- ארוחת צהריים פרטית עם מספר בעלי טורים - במלון
- סנטורים וחברי קונגרס - במלון
- מוצאי שבת-מפגש עם קהילת ושינגטון-בלטימור

יום א' - 22.11

- 11:00 - ראיון טלוויזיה (NETWORK)
- 14:30 - המראה לניו-יורק (מנשנל) - PA-256
- 15:30 - הגעה לניו-יורק (ללה-גורדיה)
- 17:00 - עצרת עם בקווינס - באודיטוריום של הקווינס קולג'
- 20:00 - Z.O.A - "קבלת אות הרצל"

יום ב' - 23.11.87

08:00 - ארוחת בוקר עם מערכת "וול סטריט ג'ורנאל"
11:00 - GREATER NY BOARD OF RABBIS
12:30 - ארוחת צהריים עם FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION במלון וולדרוף אסטוריה
~~15:30 - ראיון ל"מקניל/להרר" או ל-CNN~~
16:00 - 16:30 - פגישה אישית
17:00 - ועידת הנשיאים
18:30 - פגישה מצומצמת (מ. הונליין)
23:30 - המראה לארץ - LY-006

יום ג' - 24.11.87

16:50 - הגעה לנתב"ג



כג' חשוון תשמ"ח
15 בנובמבר 1987

1661

אל : לשכת השר

מאת : מצפ"א

הנדון: המגבית וחוק "מיהו יהודי"

רצ"ב דיווח של הקונסוליה באטלנטה על התגובות הקשות בקרב היהדות האמריקנית לגבי חוק מיהו יהודי.

ב ב ר כ ה,

אכ 1987

לאה סידיס

העתק: לשכת ראש הממשלה, ירושלים ✓
הקונכ"ל, אטלנטה



קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
 CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30365-3801

Phone (404) 875-7851

805 Peachtree St., N.E.
 Suite 656

אטלנטה, י"ג חשוון תשמ"ח
 5 נוב' 1987
 294 / 367

אל : אשר נעים, וושינגטון
 מאת : אטלנטה

הנדון : המגבית היהודית ושאלת "מיהו יהודי"

1. בעת האחרונה, יותר ויותר מובע חשש מפי ראשי הפדרציות היהודיות ופעילי ה- ABA על ירידה הצפויה בהיקף גיוס הכספים השנה עקב אי שביעות רצון של הקונסרבטיבים והרפורמים מהעלאת הנושא של "מיהו יהודי" לדיון בכנסת. חשש זה נבע הן מדיבורים "מאחורי הקלעים" אך גם מדברים שנעשו בשטח.

2. להלן 2 דוגמאות בולטות מהשבועיים האחרונים:

(א) התברר לי בעת ביקור בצ'לסטון, דרום קרוליינה, שהרב של ביה"כ הרפורמי בעיר פנה בדרשת יום כיפור(1) אל הקהל וביקש מהם להקטין את תרומתם השנה ב-10 אחוז, ובכך להביע בפני מנהיגי מדינת ישראל את מורת רוחם על עצם העלאת הנושא לדיון (ולמרות שההצעה לא עברה).
 (ב) "נייר עמדה" של הפדרציה היהודית באטלנטה בנושא התקבל ב-27.10.87 (רצ"ב). עיתוי ההצעה אינו מיקרי וודאי קשור לקמפיין המתחיל בימים אלה ולחשש לירידה בהתחייבויות לתרומות.

3. אם אכן תהיה ירידה בסך התרומות השנה, יהיה ודאי מי שיתלה את כל האשם בכך על ירידת הבורסה והמשבר הכלכלי. עם זאת, יש להערכתי להתייחס לבעיה בכובד ראש ולצאת במסע הסברה חינוכי שלפחות יסביר את המצב לאשורו בארץ. מצאתי שלא מעט יהודים רפורמים מאמינים שאפילו הם (ולא רק גרים רפורמים) אינם מוכרים כיהודים בארץ.

4. עקב האמור לעיל, אודה אם נוכל לקבל מסמך (באנגלית) המתאר בקצרה את המצב בנושא חוק "מיהו יהודי" ובעיקר את מעמדם של שלושת זרמי היהדות בישראל, ע"מ שנפיצו לפדרציות באזור.

ב ב ר כ ה

 ארתור קול
 סגן קונסול

העתק: גבי קולט אביטל, ראש אמית"ק
 מר יעקב לוי, מנהל הסברה
 מצפ"א
 מכו"ל

ATLANTA JEWISH FEDERATION

POSITION STATEMENT

In recent months there have been several attempts in the Israeli Knesset to amend the Law of Return. This has been described as the "Who is a Jew" issue.

Although a vote to amend the Law of Return is not imminent, the leadership of the Atlanta Jewish Federation believes that it is important to relate to this issue because of the potential for damage to the concept of "Klal Yisrael"--the peoplehood of Jews worldwide.

The Atlanta Jewish Federation leadership reaffirms our support of the centrality of Israel for the Jewish people, recognizes the stake each one of us has in the future of the State of Israel, and restates our commitment to the unity of our people and the interdependence between Israel and the Diaspora.

Because of this interdependence, we believe we have both the right and the obligation to speak out when there is a threat to our unity. Amending the Law of Return will drive a wedge between the Israeli and Diaspora communities. Therefore, we strongly urge the leadership of the various Israeli political institutions to agree to remove this issue of "Who is a Jew" from their political agendas. This issue is a religious matter which does not lend itself to resolution in a political forum.

Further, the Board of Trustees of the Atlanta Jewish Federation urges the implementation of an action plan which would include the following elements:

- 1) dissemination of this statement to the appropriate bodies within the United States;
- 2) dissemination of this statement to the various political bodies in Israel as well as key political leadership;
- 3) education of Federation leadership on this issue;
- 4) education of mission participants on this issue so they may be able to share our concerns with appropriate Israeli leadership; and
- 5) a broad community education program to maximize the knowledge of Atlanta Jewry on this issue.

Approved by Board of Trustees, October 27, 1987

ET1022



קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
 CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30365-3801

Phone (404) 875-7851

805 Peachtree St., N.E.
 Suite 656

אטלנטה, י"א חשוון תשמ"ח
 3 נוב' 1987
 292 / 368

Handwritten signature

אל : לשכת שר החוץ
 דע : ציר הסברה, וושינגטון
 מאת : הקונסול אטלנטה

נכבדי,

אתמול 2.11.87 נתקבל מכתבה של הגב' בטי ג'יקובסון - נשיאת הפדרציה היהודית באטלנטה, מצורף לו הצהרת-מנהיגי הקהילה היהודית במקום, כפי שסיכמו בפגישתם האחרונה של חבר הנאמנים, ובה מזהירים מפני הסכנות שבנסיונות שינוי החוק - חוק השבות, בדבר "מיהו יהודי".

מצורף בזה העתק המכתב וההצהרה, המדברים בעד עצמם.

מפגישותי עם מנהיגי הקהילה ורבניה, נראה שזה חשש אמיתי, ומדאיג אותם.


אבקש להעביר תוכן ההודעה לגורמים המדיניים בממשלת ישראל.

בכבוד רב ונברכה

מומחד וסארנות
 קונסולון כללי

Handwritten signature

העתק: סמנכ"ל צפ"א - יואב בירן
 סמנכ"ל הסברה - קולט אביטל
 מנהל מצפ"א
 מנהל תפוצות



Atlanta Jewish Federation

1753 Peachtree Road, Northeast/Atlanta, Georgia 30309/404-873-1661

October 30, 1987

Consul General Muhammed Massarwa
Consulate of Israel
805 Peachtree St., Suite 656
Atlanta, GA 30365

Dear Consul General Massarwa:

At the October Board meeting of the Atlanta Jewish Federation, approval was given to the attached statement. This action was taken out of growing recognition of the concern that large numbers of our community have about this issue. We are asking that the various political institutions within the State of Israel remove the item of "Who is a Jew" from their political agendas. It is hoped that by taking this action, we will be able to continue the close relationship between the Israeli and Diaspora communities.

Please share this document with the leadership of the Israeli government and other relevant bodies. Thank you for your assistance in transmitting this item.

Sincerely,

Betty R. Jacobson

Betty R. Jacobson
President

BRJ:et

DIS1030

see letter 368

PRESIDENT—Betty R. Jacobson/FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT—William E. Schatten/VICE PRESIDENTS—S. Perry
Brickman, Herbert R. Elsas/TREASURER—Gilbert Bachman/ASSISTANT TREASURER—Martin Isenberg
SECRETARY—Billie Feinman/ASSISTANT SECRETARY—Martin M. Pollock/EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR—David I.
Sarnat

ATLANTA JEWISH FEDERATION

POSITION STATEMENT

In recent months there have been several attempts in the Israeli Knesset to amend the Law of Return. This has been described as the "Who is a Jew" issue.

Although a vote to amend the Law of Return is not imminent, the leadership of the Atlanta Jewish Federation believes that it is important to relate to this issue because of the potential for damage to the concept of "Klal Yisrael"--the peoplehood of Jews worldwide.

The Atlanta Jewish Federation leadership reaffirms our support of the centrality of Israel for the Jewish people, recognizes the stake each one of us has in the future of the State of Israel, and restates our commitment to the unity of our people and the interdependence between Israel and the Diaspora.

Because of this interdependence, we believe we have both the right and the obligation to speak out when there is a threat to our unity. Amending the Law of Return will drive a wedge between the Israeli and Diaspora communities. Therefore, we strongly urge the leadership of the various Israeli political institutions to agree to remove this issue of "Who is a Jew" from their political agendas. This issue is a religious matter which does not lend itself to resolution in a political forum.

Further, the Board of Trustees of the Atlanta Jewish Federation urges the implementation of an action plan which would include the following elements:

- 1) dissemination of this statement to the appropriate bodies within the United States;
- 2) dissemination of this statement to the various political bodies in Israel as well as key political leadership;
- 3) education of Federation leadership on this issue;
- 4) education of mission participants on this issue so they may be able to share our concerns with appropriate Israeli leadership; and
- 5) a broad community education program to maximize the knowledge of Atlanta Jewry on this issue.

Approved by Board of Trustees, October 27, 1987

ET1022

10836

תאריך : 15.11.87 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ירצא

בלמט

קרום: 11,10836

אל:מיאמי/71

מ-:המשרד,תא:151187,זח:1934,דח:מ,סג:ב

ב:ד:ב

בלמט/מיוזי

קונכיל

שלן 41.

ביקור רה"מ.

מקבלים ההצעה בברכה.

בן-אהרון

י.7

ת.פ: רהמ

10741

תאריך : 15-11-87 מעורר החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

שומר

** יצא

**

**

**

חוזם: 11,10741

אל: לוסאנגלס/101

מ: המשרד, תא: 151187, זח: 1711, דח: ד, סג: ש

נד: 8

שומר/דגיל

ע.ב.ש.

1668

קדנכ"ל שלך 66

עבור מי מבקש בלצברג אוח ההוקרה מטעם דה"מ ושה"ח.
לעצמו?

מצפ"א

ח.פ.

תפ: שהח, דהמ, בירן, מצפ"א

** יוצא

טורי

**

**

**

חוזם: 11,10767

אל: רוש/532

מ-: המשודר, תא: 151187, זח: 1747, זח: מ, ט: ג: ט:

נד: ט

טורי/מיוזי

השגריר

גבי שימרון

ביקור רוה"מ

שלכם 250 ו-304

א. בעניין הפגישה עם ארמנד המר השבנו כבר לציד ערן בטלפון.


ב. משאירים פתוחה השעה 09:00 לפגישה אפשרית עם מזכיר ההגנה החדש. אין מניעה לקיום הפגישה גם בטרם יאושר מינויו של ידי הסנאט.

ג. גבי שמיר לא תיסע למיאמי בכל מקרה.

ד. לטיסה ממיאמי לוושינגטון יתלוו לרוה"מ: מזכיר אחימאיר, הורוביץ, צלם העיתונות, העיתונאי נקדימון, הח"מ, השגריר ארז, וכך אנשי האבטחה שלנו ושל המארחים כפי שיוקבע בתיאום ביניהם.

ה. הרוב הממליה לשיחה ולארוחת הצהריים עם המזכיר שולץ: ח"כ מרידור, מזכיר הממשלה, מנכ"ל רוה"מ, השגריר, תא"ל ע. נבו, מזכיר והציר.

ו. לארוחת הערב בליל שבת תצטרף כל הממליה המתלווה לרוה"מ.



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בן אהרן

גע

תפ: דהמ, שהח, מנבל, בירן, מצמא

מדינת ישראל

תאריך 15/11/87

אל: מנהל מ"ה הווסקיה/מלג"ה

נוחת: לשכת ראש-חממשה.

כה"מ חקש למציון אי-
הפיסום הכ"ב ג' אל הנצי"א ו-

~~לשכת ראש-חממשה~~
ועד אגודת ישראל ומועצה
אירובי-
אניו הצ"כ ויו"ר הא"ת ש
הא"ת.

קרום
איו"מ

WOJAC

הארגון העולמי של יהודים יוצאי ארצות ערב
المنظمة العالمية لليهود المنبشرين من البلدان العربية
WORLD ORGANIZATION OF JEWS FROM ARAB COUNTRIES
ORGANISATION MONDIALE DES JUIFS ORIGINAIRES DES PAYS ARABES

RESOLUTIONS OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WOJAC
THE WORLD ORGANISATION OF JEWS FROM ARAB COUNTRIES

OMNI SHOREHAM HOTEL, WASHINGTON D.C. 28th OCTOBER 1987

WHEREAS:

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 of November 29th 1947 was rejected by the Arab League, which waged war against Israel, and this war gave rise to an exchange of populations between Palestine Arabs and Jews from Arab countries

WHEREAS:

Some Arab States still deny human rights to Jews, in violation of basic international instruments, including "the right to leave", as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

WHEREAS:

More than 900,000 Jews who left Arab Countries as refugees, those who today number nearly half the Jewish population of Israel and those living in other countries constitute a major Middle East refugee movement that has not been adequately recognised.

WHEREAS:

Israel, having limited resources, absorbed the Jewish refugees from Arab countries at a cost of over \$11 billion dollars.

WHEREAS:

The Arab League rejects a humanitarian solution to the Palestinian Arab refugee problem.

WHEREAS:

The State of Israel has declared, in a resolution adopted by the Knesset on October 26th 1987, that "Israel, for its part, has made it known that within the framework of a peace settlement, it will be prepared to compensate the Arabs who left Israel", and

WOJAC

הארגון העולמי של יהודים יוצאי ארצות ערב
المنظمة العالمية لليهود النازحين عن البلدان العربية
WORLD ORGANIZATION OF JEWS FROM ARAB COUNTRIES
ORGANISATION MONDIALE DES JUIFS ORIGINAEL DES PAYS ARABES

2

WHEREAS:

UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 stipulated that a comprehensive solution of the Arab Israel conflict must necessarily include " a just settlement of the refugee problem", which includes the claims of Jewish refugees from Arab countries.

THE WORLD ORGANISATION OF JEWS FROM ARAB COUNTRIES urgently calls upon those Arab governments concerned, particularly Syria, Iraq and Yemen, to cease persecution of those Jews living in their midst and to grant them their basic rights, and permit those who wish to emigrate to do so without hindrance; at the same time, the conference notes with appreciation those Arab governments which have adopted a moderate attitude toward their Jewish Citizens.

WOJAC calls upon Syria to permit all those Jews who wish to emigrate to do so, and particularly to grant exit permits to Jewish women wishing to leave, in accordance with the promise made by President Hafez Al Assad to President Jimmy Carter in Geneva in 1977 and in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and urges the International community and other governments to press negotiations with Syria that would further these objectives.

WOJAC calls upon the Arab States:

to meet their international obligations by providing full compensation and indemnification for property and assets, as well as their cultural patrimony of which Jews were deprived.

to return to Jewish ownership and administration all religious and cultural properties.

to cease the political exploitation of the Palestinian Arab refugees and to work for a prompt humanitarian solution.

WOJAC reaffirms its solidarity to Israel's ongoing efforts to implement the Peace Treaty with Egypt and to develop friendly relations and establish a lasting peace with other Arab States.

WOJAC

הארגון העולמי של יהודים יוצאי ארצות ערב
المنظمة العالمية لليهود النازحين من البلدان العربية
WORLD ORGANIZATION OF JEWS FROM ARAB COUNTRIES
ORGANISATION MONDIALE DES JUIFS ORIGINAIRES DES PAYS ARABES

3

WOJAC appeals to Jews throughout the world to support its struggle on behalf of Jews from Arab countries for the realisation of their legitimate rights.

WOJAC appeals to the International Community, as well as to the United States government, presently negotiating for the release of hostages held in the Lebanon, not to forget the tragic plight of the Lebanese Jewish hostages, nine of whom have already been executed.

to use its influence upon Arab governments to fulfill their obligations for the protection of their Jewish minorities and to support the legitimate rights and claims of Jewish refugees from Arab Countries.

WOJAC appeals in particular to the government and people of the United States of America to intensify their efforts to resolve the longstanding problems of Arab and Jewish refugees and to facilitate the absorption and integration of Arab refugees into their respective societies.