3

מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

תשרד

מחלקה

מס. ת.ק. מקור

משרד ראש הממשלה

ארכיון המדינה

טופס מראה מקום להוצאת תעודות יחידות*

חטיבה מס': 43.4

מיכל מס': 5021/14

תיק מס': 6

תאריך התעודה: 1987

שם מחבר התעודה:

שם הנמען:

סוג התעודה (סמן √ במקום המתאים):

- ☐ מכתב
- ☑ מברק 23/12/87 30/12/87 30/12/87
- ☐ תזכיר או מיזכר
- ☐ דין וחשבון או זכרון דברים משיחה או דיון
- ☐ פרוטוקול של שיחה, דיון או ישיבה

*הטופס ימולא בשני עותקים. העותק הירוק יוכנס לתיק במקום התעודה שהוצאה; העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

20470 תאריך 30.12.87

** יוצא ** שמור
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**
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חודש:12/20470
אל:ורש/936
מ-:המשרד/תא:301287/דח:2121/דח:מ/סג:ש
נד:ם

שמור/מיידי

ע.ב.ש.

1995

לונדון.

אודה לך אם תבהיר בחודר מהו הסטטוס המדויק של תקון קרנסטון האומר שהסכומים המוקצים לסיוע הכלכלי לישראל לא יבלו מגובה השלומי התרומה (קרן וריבית) שישראל משלמת.

א. האם זו 'כוונה' כי בתוב '...ITS THE INTENTION' או שזה מחייב כשאר חלקי החוק.

ב. קיבלנו זאת במסמך המדבר על סיום החוץ עד לסבטמבר 88' כלומר לשנת התקציב 8-87. האם תקון קרנסטון יבה גם לשנת 89' (או לחילופין האם הוא כלול ב-GR).

מנהל מצב'א

רי
ח

תס: שהח/דהמ/מנכל/מנכל/בירן/מצבא/מינרבי/בלבליתב'/סייבל/
משנס

49

תאריך : 01.01.88

בלמס   נבנב

חוזם:1,49
אל:המשרד
מ-:ג'י,נר:694,תא:311287,זח:1430,דח:ב,סג:ב
נד:8

בלמס/מידי

אל-: מעת

דע-: מצבא, רושינגטון (נר 190)
בטחון
מאת: עתונות/ניו יורק

RCV: 31IM/6.00176 LINE: 6

NEWS SUMMARY DECEMBER 31, 1987

EDITORIALS-

NYT, SENATOR INOUYE GOT CONGRESS TO GIVE \8 MILLION OF REFUGEE FUNDS TO BUILD JEWISH SCHOOLS IN FRANCE FOR NORTH AFRICAN JEWS. THIS WAS DONE FOR OZAR HATORAH, BACKED BY A LARGE CONTRIBUTOR OF HIS. THIS IS A WRONG USE OF SCARCE REFUGEE FUNDS.

DN, FATHER LUCAS IS OUT OF LINE IN HIS ANTI-SEMITIC STATEMENTS. IT IS BLATANTLY UNTRUE AND WILL ONLY INCREASE HOSTILITY. DON'T BLAME JEWS FOR THE SCHOOL PROBLEMS OF BLACK KIDS. THE MAYOR AND THE CARDINAL WERE CORRECT IN THEIR CRITICISM OF LUCAS.

OP-ED-

NYT, BAR-ILLAN, DON'T TAKE A +SNAPSHOT'+ VIEW OF

THE GAZA RIOTS. LOOK AT HISTORY.(CABLED)

NYP, BREINDEL, THE +PLO HAS NO PLACE IN THE US.+(CABLED)

DN, KRAUTHAMMER, ACLU ACTIONS AGAINST A MEMORIAL CROSS ON A CHRISTMAS TREE IN ONE VERMONT TOWN RUINED CHRISTMAS AND MADE PEOPLE HOSTILE TOWARDS A MENORAH IN ANOTHER TOWN. IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE THE MENORAH WAS MORE PURELY THE SECTARIAN SYMBOL. THE FIRST AMENDMENT SHOULDN'T PREFER IRRELIGION.

PRESS REPORTS-

NYT, FRIEDMAN, SHARON'S JERUSALEM APARTMENT CAUSES UNHAPPINESS AMONG HIS ARAB NEIGHBORS. (CABLED)

NYT, FRIEDMAN, NEITHER ISRAEL NOR THE PLO SEEM TO HAVE CREATIVE LEADERS WHO CAN BREAK THROUGH SET IDEAS. (CABLED)

NYT, KIFNER, ARAB LAWERS ARE BOYCOTTING THE MILITARY TRIALS. 10 LETTER BOMBS MAILED FROM TURKEY TO ISRAEL.(CABLED)(NYP, ND)

NYT, ROSENBAUM, MOST OF THE PRESIDANTIAL CANDIDATES CRITICIZE REAGAN'S MIDEAST POLICY. KEMP, DUPONT AND HAIG SAID HIS CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL IS NOT RIGHT. JACKSON CONDEMNED ISRAEL AND WANTS ITS TROOPS OUT. BABBITT AND SIMON BOTH CRITICIZED ISRAEL BUT FOUND EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES. DUKAKIS ASKED ISRAEL TO REVIEW ITS PROCEEDURES, WITHOUT CONDEMNING. HART SAID THE US SHOULD PRESSURE ISRAEL TO FIND A SOLUTION.

ND, ISRAELI IMMIGRATION, INCLUDINGAND INCREASE IN SOVIET JEWS, WAS UP 35 PERCENT IN 1987.

ND, IRAQ CLAIMED TO HIT A TANKER AND IRAN ACCUSED IRAQ OF KILLING CHILDREN.

NYT, COWELL, THE DROUGHT IN THE NILE HEADWATER AREA OVER THE LAST SEVEN YEARS MAY BE A REAL THREAT

TO THE LIFE OF EGYPT WHICH IS TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON THE RIVER FOR AGRICULTURE TO SUPPLY FOOD AND LIVLIHOOD FOR ITS RAPIDLY GROWING POPULATION.

WSJ, BECAUSE OF LOWER OIL PRICES SAUDI ARABIA WILL BE BORROWING AS MUCH AS \6 BILLION TO HELP FINANCE ITS BUDGET.

WSJ, BROOKS, THE MEDIEVAL CITY OF SANAA, NORTH YEMEN HAS PERHAPS THE OLDEST SKYSCRAPERS. REMAINING ONES ARE SEVEN OR EIGHT STORIES,BUT OLD ONES WERE HIGHER. IT IS A QUAINT PLACE WITH MANY INTERESTING CUSTOMS.

WSJ, TANNER, OPEC MUST CUT PRODUCTION OR PRICES EVEN THOUGH THERE SEEMS TO BE A TEMPORARY FLOOR UNDER PRICES. OIL COMPANIES ARE REFUSING TO BUY AT CURRENT PRICES, BUT THE HEATED UP GULF WAR AND SOME AD HOC LIMITS ON PRODUCTION, AS WELL AS WINTER NEEDS LIMIT THE DROPIN PRICES. THE SAUDIS ARE THE BIG PUZZLE.

NYT, LOHR, IN ENGLAND, CHIEF RABBI IMMANUEL JAKOBOVITS HAS BEEN MADE A LIFE PEER. HE CAN NOW SIT IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, ALONG WITH THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY.

DN, MCCOY. CARDINAL O'CONNOR REBUKED FATHER LUCAS FOR HIS ANTI-SEMITIC REMARKS YESTERDAY. BLACK LEADERS CONTINUED TO GIVE HIM STRONG SUPPORT AT A RALLY.(NYP) (ED.THE DN CALLED THE REBUKE MILD THE NYP CALLED IT A +SHARP+ DENUNCIATION)

LETTERS-

ND, NOVICK, SICK ARAB BABIES FROM THE GAZA HOSPITAL WERE SLEEPING NEXT TO ORTHODOX BABIES IN HADASSAH HOSPITAL. NO ARAB HOSPITAL WOULD TAKE THESE CHILDREN.

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,אמן,קלדרי,מעת,
הסברה,לעמ,דוצ-ים,דרצ,כדנר,צבדרצבאי,מצבא,מזתים,מתאמשטחים,
ברנ,מנבצות

בלמס בכנס

תרזם:12/20630
אל:המשרד
מ-:לוסאנגלס/נר:115/תא:301287/זת:1500/דת:מ/ג:ב
נד:מ

בלמס/מידי

אל:מצפא

דע:הסברה וושינגטון

מאת:הסברה לוס אנגלס

אירועי השטחים - הפגנה

הפגנה שניה במספר התקיימה היום מול הקונסוליה בזמת ארגון נשים פלסטיני לגאורה. מרבית המפגינים נשישים במספר, היו ילדים ונוער
ששולהבו ע"י מבוגרים וקראו סיסמאות בזנות אשן ובגנות הצירנות בהנינס דגלי אשן. כן השתתפו בומר נרקביטריאני הידוע בדעותיו האנטי ישראליות הקיצוניות ורב דמורמי הפעיל בניו גואיש אגנדה.

המפגינים שהגישו לנו עצומה, נרסו ע"י התקשורת.

אנו התראיינו בהגובה.

אילן אלגר.

הפ: שהח,רהס,שהבט,מנבל,המנבל,ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,ממד,ליאור,מזהים, בירן,מצפא,בהנא,אבינל,מעת,הסברה

20377

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 30.12.87

כככב בלמס

חוזם:12,20377
אל:המשרד
מ-:ניו,נר:650,תא:301287,זח:1200,דח:מ,סג:ב
נד:8

בלמס/מידי

אל-: מעת

דע:בנחרך

דע-: מבנא, וושינגטון (נר 103)

מאת: עתונות/ניו יורק

NEWS SUMMARY DECEMBER 30, 1987

OP-ED-

DN,NELSON, BY LABELLING THE PLO AND ALL REBELLIOUS ARABS AS +TERRORISTS+ THERE IS NO ONE FOR ISRAEL TO TALK TO.(CABLED)

PRESS REPORTS-

NYT, KIFNER, ISRAEL WILL STRESS RIOT TRAINING FOR ITS SOLDIERS AND IS STILL DEBATING DEPORTATION OF SOME PALESTINIANS.(CABLED) (ND)

NYP, ISRAEL'S UN AMBASSADOR, NETANYAHU, SAID THAT THE RIOTS WERE NOT SPONTANEOUS AND WERE INCITED BY THE PLO.

NYT, COWELL, PALESTINIANS TRAPPED IN CAMP CANADA EGYPT, NEXT TO GAZA, ARE ISOLATED FROM THEIR FAMILIES AND THE WORLD.(CABLED)

NYT, THE POPE HAS NAMED MICHAEL ASSAD SABBAH TO BE PATRIARCH OF JERUSALEM. HE IS THE FIRST ARAB TO HOLD THIS POST IN 300 YEARS.

ND, DEMJANJUK CONTRADICTED A DEFENCE WITNESS TODAY IN CONTINUING CONFUSION ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES DURING WWII. (ED. REVIEW OF THE CASE SO FAR)

NYT, COWELL, THE GULF ARAB NATIONS URGED SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN IN AN EFFORT TO GET HER COMPLIANCE IN THE UN ORDERED CEASE FIRE. THE LANGUAGE USED WAS SOFTER THAN THE STATEMENT THAT CAME OUT OF THE ARAB SUMMIT LAST MONTH.(ED- EXTENSIVE QUOTATION FROM THE GULF STATEMENT) (ND, DN)

NYT,PHOTO, TWO LITTLE BELGIAN GIRLS HELD BY THE ABU NIDAL TERRORIST GROUP IN BEIRUT MAY BE RELEASED WITH THEIR MOTHER SOON.(DN)

ND, 100 US CONGRESSMEN SIGNED A PAID AD IN LE MONDE ASKING MITTERAND TO PERMIT THE 12 EXPELLED IRANIANS TO RETURN FROM THEIR EXILE IN GABON.

ND, IRAQ AND SYRIA ARE OPENING A LONG-CLOSED BORDER POST AS ONE OF A SERIES OF MOVES DESIGNED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM.

NYT, MAYOR KOCH CRITICIZED A BLACK ROMAN CATHOLIC PRIEST FOR BOTH ANTI- WHITE AND ANTI-SEMITIC STATEMENTS DURING A RALLY FOR A SCHOOL BOARD HEAD. FATHER LUCAS HAD SAID THAT THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, WHICH IS KILLING OUR KIDS IN THE CLASSROOM LOOKED LIKE THE KNESSET IN ISRAEL. THIS IS PART OF GENERAL PROBLEMS WITH BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS IN THE CITY. (ND, DN, NYP)

OBITUARIES- ND, RABBI MURRY LIEBERMAN, A PROMINANT ORTHODOX EDUCATOR DIED FRIDAY, DEC. 27.

ITONUT NYK

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,אמן,קלדררי,מעת,
הסברה,לעמ,דרצ-יס,דוצ,פזבר,צבזדרצבאי,מצבא,תפוצות,ברנ,מדהינ,
מתאמשטחים

54

*תאריך : 01.01.[illegible]
*דף 1 מתוך 3
*עותק 4 מתוך 32 סודי ביותר נכנס **

1. [illegible]
~~2. [illegible]~~

*חוזם:4/54
*אל:המשרד
*מ-:ושינגטון,נר:275,תא:311287,זח:1600,דח:מ,סג:סב
*בד:8

*סודי ביותר/מידי

*אל:מנהל מדיני

*סמנכל צפא

*ארה'ב-מזי'ת

*להלן שיחה עם. דג'רג'יאן.

*האגף המזרחי טרוד בימים אלו בעיקר בנושא אפגניסטן והמפרץ.
*באפגניסטן מתוך הכנה לביקורו של ארמקוסט בשבוע הבא
*לפקיסטאן ובמפרץ מתוך כך שמזכיר ההגנה קרלוצ'י נוסע לשם
*.את הבעיה אצלם לגבי המצב באזורבו הגדיר ''בגרוד בראש''
*ותכנס רעיונות שעד כה לא התגלו.מאז ברור להם שאינם יכולים
*להביא למצב להמשיך דמאידך באמרו לא העלו רעיונות חדשים .
*המלך חוסיין אמר להם כי אי אפשר היה שלא לצפות לארועים
*אלו שהצדיקו את כל מה שהוא טען בעבר אך לא נראה
*לאמריקאים שהוא בעל היום למהלך החורג ממסגרת התנאים
*הידועים שהציב. עד היום לא ברור להם הדוע סרב המלך להצעת
*הביקור המצומצם במסגרת הפסגה והם מניחים שהוא חשש מכך
*שיוותר לבדו אחרי הנבחרה ההתחלתית של שני הגדולים מול
*נציגי ישראל שלא יקבלו מהלך הקאנון הבינ'מי בתוכם ,לתת לו
*גבר.לדבריו קשה גם להבין את הסובייטים על שאינם מגלים
*בשלב זה גמישות רבה יותר ביחסם לישראל, להערכתו הדבר נובע
*מהטראומה שממנה הם סובלים עד היום בעקבות הגרוש ממצרים ב-
*1972 והחשש מתגובה ערבית. זאת על אף שלדברי גורבצ'וב לאסד
*באפריל בענין היחסים עם ישראל לא באה תגובה ערבית
*רצינית.להערכתו אין מה לסובייטים לחשוש במידה מוגזמת בזו
*עכך בעקבות נסיגה האפגניסטאן והחלטה נוספת בענין איראן

*דף 2 מתוך 3
*עותק 4 מתוך 32

*יחול שינוי במעמדו בעולם הערבי כך שהוא יוכל לאזן נזק
*העלול לצמוח מצעדי משמעותי ביחסים שבין מוסקבה וירושלים .
*גם כך רואה דג'רג'יאן שינוי בעמדה של בריה'מ' בארצות
*ערב ובמיוחד במצרים ובירדן . אגב
*דג'רג'יאן סיפר שבשיחה שניהל עם אנשי משה'ח הספרדי
*בעניני מזית סיפרו לו אלו שהסובייטים התענינו אצלם
*לדעת מה היתה תגובת הערבים לחידוש היחסים עם ישראל וקיבלו
*תשובה שהיחסים עם מדינות ערב השתפרו אחרי המהלך ...

*[illegible] מנת להוסיף לפרק זה של השיחה אציין שמשתי שיחות עם
*ארקלי ורוס נראה לי שהם מקדישים יותר מחשבה לנושא.
*הנחתם היא שבשלב זה לבחות אין סיכוי לשינוי משמעותי
*בגישות המעורבים ומתוך כך לועידה הבינלאומית. בדיון
*שהתקיים לפני עשרה ימים בינם לבין הרפי הם שיכנעו
*אותו,לדבריהם, להתיחס ביתר רצינות לפעולות בשטח או למה
*שקרוי ''איכות החיים '' ולהתחיל לפעול הן באזור עצמו והן
*בורשינגטון להשגת משאבים והסכמה לכך .

*אם לשפוט מענין זה נראה לי שבורשינגטון מחכים הן לשכוך של
*השתקבים המרכזיים מגמרת סוף השנה האזרחית,הן להתבהרות
*המצב ביש'ע והן לשיחות עם מנהיגים ונציגים בכירים של
*המדינות באזור על הבה להתחיל ולגבש רעיונות . לפי
*דג'רג'יאן ,אם לא יחול שינוי דרסטי באזור,יהיו נושאי
*מערב- מזרח, אמלט אפגניסטאן והתקציב בראש מעייני הממשל אך
*הנשיא לא שכח את התכנית הרשומה על שמו.

*כאמור מעסיק ענין אפגניסטאן את האגף. הם קיבלו איתותים
*ברורים מהסובייטים על כוונות לנסיגה תוך 12 חודש ובשיחות
*גורבצ'וב בפקיסטאן , שיחות ארמקוסט עם עמיתו הסובייטי
*ושיחות הקרבה [illegible] יבקשו לבדוק אם כוונה זו אינה
*תלויה בהסדרים מדיניים אחרים באפגניסטאן . גם הסדרי
*הנסיגה, כלומר כוונת הסובייטים להסיג כבר בשלבים
*הראשונים את עיקר הכוחות הלוחמים (בניגוד לכוחות העוסקים
*בתפקידי עזרה משניים) מהווה מבחן.
*לדעת דג'רג'יאן המאמץ המלחמתי הכבד באפגניסטאן רק הדגיש
*את הנטל שכל הענין מהווה עבור בריה'מ' שנאלצה לגייס 20 אלף
*חייל לצרך רק על מנת לכסות ולפתוח את הכביש לחוסט. לדבריו
*משקיעים הסובייטים מאמץ זה על מנת לכסות ולהתדיין על נושא
*הנסיגה מעמדה של כח.

*דף 3 מתוך 3
*עותק 4 מתוך 32

*גם לאמריקאים דילמה מסוימת בהסכמה על שלבי הנסיגה הקשורה
*לצורך של שמירת כח המוג'הדין . לדברי דג'רג'יאן, מצבם
*הצבאי הנוכחי טוב ואפשר יהיה למצוא דרכים לשמור להם על
*אספקה במקום קרוב כך שאם יפרו הסובייטים ההסכם ,אם יושג,
*ניתן יהיה לחמש המוג'הידין במהירות. בנושא המפרץ מאמינים
*האמריקאים שהלחץ הערבי מחד והלחץ האמריקני מאידך הביא
*לריכוך מסוים בעמדה הסובייטית אם כי המדובר בעיקר בשלב
*הניסוח ועדיין לא בשלב הביצוע.
*לדבריו מוכנה בריה'מ' גם להקריב את ההסכמה שהושגה עם איראן
*למשל בנושאים כלכליים כדי להגביר אהדה ביחסים עם מדינות
*ערב.

*ערן

*תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכ,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,בירן,מצפא

(1)

ADDRESS BY

STUART E. EIZENSTAT

AT

DAYAN CENTER, TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY

TEL AVIV, ISRAEL

December 28, 1987

"The Next Four Years: The Future of Strategic Cooperation"

INTRODUCTION

The United States and Israel are about to enter the year of national elections, likely to coincide, and which are certain to affect U.S.-Israel relations. At the same time, America readies itself for the post-Reagan era. This makes it propitious for the two nations to formalize and broaden their evolving strategic relationship from one of ad hoc strategic cooperation to one of a regularized strategic partnership, so that it cannot be easily undone by the next President of the United States.

The goal should be, in the words of Secretary of State George Shultz, "To build institutional arrangements so that eight years from now, if there is a Secretary of State who is not

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positive about Israel, he will not be able to overcome the bureaucratic relationship between Israel and the U.S. that we have established."1/ This goal cannot be achieved with business as usual, nor will it be sustained without the willingness of both countries to undertake obligations. The time to act is now.

There is a unique window of opportunity. I am concerned as an American and a friend of Israel that Israel may fail to utilize it because of a sense of satisfaction at the unusually warm, tension-free relationship with the U.S. enjoyed during most of the Reagan era, and the U.S. may fail to grasp it because of unfounded fears of a negative Arab reaction.

Israel should never lose sight of the role of personalities in American decisionmaking. To a greater degree than most parliamentary democracies, such as Israel's, with their strong political parties, well developed and long-held platforms, and powerful Cabinet ministers, the individual at the top in American politics can make the difference. The personal attitudes and world view of the next President of the United States--whether a Democrat or Republican--will count for a great deal in the American government's official policies toward Israel. Of course, he will be bound by the precedents of his predecessors, the weight of past decisions, the domestic political pressures exacted by the friends of Israel, Jew and non-Jew alike, and the countervailing power of a Congress which over the years has generally been more supportive of Israel than the Executive Branch. None of the presidential candidates, with the possible exception of Jesse Jackson, can be justly considered antithetical to close relations with Israel.

Nevertheless, the personality of the next President--and his Secretary of State--will mean a great deal. Will he bring the missionary zeal for a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem of Jimmy Carter, seeing the Palestine problem as the essential ingredient? Will he try to employ the even-handed Realpolitik of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger era? Will he have the Arab tilt characterized by the Eisenhower-Dulles years?

While no one can be certain until we see the next President in action, it is highly doubtful the next President and Secretary of State will bring the same uniquely positive attitude and worldview of Ronald Reagan and George Shultz.

President Reagan's policy toward Israel has been characterized by three facts: a deep emotional commitment to Israel as a Jewish state; a strong sense that Israel is an ally which serves the strategic interests of the United States in the Middle East as part of a broader East-West conflict; and a passivity with respect to solving the Arab-Israeli and

Palestinian problems. It is more likely than not that the next President will put greater energy into resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute than into invigorating the budding strategic relationship between the United States and Israel.

There is no immutable law written onto the tablets at Mount Sinai requiring the next American President to view Israel as a strategic asset. Until the Reagan presidency, the general view of American administrations, unfortunately, was to see Israel more as a moral responsibility and diplomatic burden than as a strategic asset. The next President could revert to this view.

As we reflect on the history of the first two Jewish commonwealths, there is a sense of urgency to lock in the historic steps made toward strategic cooperation and to build upon them.

Relationships between countries, and certainly between the U.S. and Israel, never remain static. They either expand and deepen or they contract and stagnate. Their temperature never remains exactly the same: they either warm up or cool down.

HISTORIC CONFLUENCE OF EVENTS: A UNIQUE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

The Reagan era ends and a new one will dawn with the confluence of an historic set of circumstances. These permit a significant enhancement of the strategic cooperation which has served the interests of both countries without threatening America's important strategic interests in the Arab world. A unique window of opportunity exists which must be pursued while it remains open.

1. The United States continues to have the worldwide responsibilities of a superpower and leader of the Free World. But, it is increasingly strapped for the resources to enable it to fulfill its role. The days of post-World War II worldwide economic hegemony are over for the U.S., yet it must play a worldwide role. In 1960 it produced 43 percent of the western world's G.N.P.; today it produces only 37 percent. The U.S. devotes about 7 percent of its own G.N.P. to defense--much of it to the defense of countries which devote far smaller percentages of their own substantial economic output to their own defense--3.5 percent for West Germany and only 1 percent for Japan.2/ This has led to a growing frustration in Washington with those allies unwilling to do more to pay for America's defense umbrella, as exemplified by the shot-across-the-bow by Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), a pro-defense Senator, to reduce U.S. troops in NATO.

Nothing better exemplifies America's fiscal plight in trying to support its far-flung commitments than the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Act of 1985. This Act was passed in the shadow of unprecedented $200 billion budget deficits, a national debt that doubled in seven years over what had taken 200 years to accumulate, and huge trade deficits which made the U.S. a debtor nation for the first time since 1914. It mandates, as amended in 1987, a balanced budget by Fiscal Year 1992. This year Congress has whacked $30 billion off the deficit, with $45 billion next year, during an election. Taxes will be raised by $23 billion over two years; $14 billion alone in 1988. After enormous increases in 1981 and 1982 of over 12 percent, under the pressures of Gramm-Rudman, budget authority for national defense has leveled off and actually declined in Fiscal Year 1986 ($289.1 billion) and 1987 ($292.9 billion) compared to 1985 ($294.6 billion). In Fiscal Year 1988 it will rise less than inflation.3/ The foreign aid budget function has declined from $20 billion in 1985 to $15 billion in 1988. The recent budget summit requires the Pentagon to reduce its projected Fiscal Year 1989 level by $33 billion. In a dramatic news conference on December 7, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William (Will) Howard Taft IV stated that military budgets planned for the five years beginning in 1990 would be 11 to 12 percent less than those drafted a year ago and that the armed forces would be cut by 100,000 people due to budget pressures. In a remarkable revelation, he said that the U.S. "might not be able to fulfill commitments in some places around the world" and "would not be able to meet certain contingencies or risks."4/

U.S. resources in the Mediterranean are stretched further by the need to concentrate on the Persian Gulf. American forces are weakest in the eastern Mediterranean area where Soviet power is greatest.

This will mean inevitably that if the U.S. is to fulfill its extensive missions it will have to rely increasingly on countries like Israel which have strong defense and intelligence capabilities and are prepared to use them for the benefit of the West in general and America in particular.

2. NATO's soft underbelly has long been its southern flank. This is exacerbated by an unfriendly leftist government in Greece more concerned with Turkey than with the defense of western interests and by difficult base rights negotiations with both Greece and Spain. It seems clear that Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez will insist on at least a reduction of American F-16s at Torrejon Air Base, which will require America to look elsewhere in the Mediterranean for an F-16 base. Israel, as a Mediterranean as well as Middle Eastern power, can play an increasingly important role in shoring up U.S. interests in the

eastern Mediterranean as America's NATO allies in the Mediterranean become shakier.

3. The rise of radical Islamic fundamentalism and the threat of an Iranian victory in the Iran-Iraq war pose a clear and present danger to moderate and traditionalist Arab regimes. This has pushed Arab concerns about Israel to the back burner and led several Arab regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, to develop closer, albeit still private, defense relationships with Washington than they preferred to have before. The recent Amman Summit underscored the preoccupation of most of the Arab world with the real threat of Iranian fundamentalism rather than the ephemeral threat of Israeli Zionism, with little mention of the Palestinian problem.

This is transforming the old Arab-Israel confrontation into more of an internal communal struggle by the former residents of mandatory Palestine.

The re-entry of Egypt--on its terms and without concessions regarding its peace with Israel--into the Arab fold, which followed the Arab Summit, demonstrated a tacit acceptance of the notion of peace with Israel, an acceptance of the reality of Israeli existence, if not Israel's right to exist.

The dramatic turn of events in the Arab world from the Iran-Iraq war, the violence in Mecca by radical Iranians, the declining influence of the PLO, and the threat to Persian Gulf oil exports from Iranian attacks provides the United States with the latitude to improve its relations with non-radical Arab states without doing so at the expense of Israel. But it likewise provides an opportunity for improved American strategic ties with Israel without jeopardizing traditional American interests in the Arab world.5/ Traditionalist Arab states need U.S. muscle for the survival of their regimes.

Moreover, the dramatic decline in oil prices over the past few years, from $32 per barrel in 1982 to $16 per barrel today has not only been a blessing to the U.S. and Israeli economies, it also has mirrored a decline in Arab leverage over United States policy in the Middle East I witnessed in the White House. This likewise provides more freedom of movement for U.S. policy towards Israel.

In point of fact, Israeli and traditionalist Arab regimes have a convergence of strategic interests because of Iran. Khomenei threatens them as his Hezbullah in Lebanon threatens Israeli tranquility on her northern borders and as his picture in the West Bank and Gaza houses signals a radicalization of many young Palestinians in Israel's back door.

Moreover, these common strategic concerns even extend to oil, once a weapon used against the U.S. and Israel. Within a short time, a new pipeline in Saudi Arabia will permit the export of up to 4 million barrels of oil per day from the Red Sea. Iraq depends on a pipeline linkage as well. These will be possible targets of Iranian terrorists and can be implicitly protected by Israeli intelligence capabilities. Military hardware for Iraq pours through the Jordanian port of Aqaba, just across the Red Sea from Eilat. Israel and non-radical Arab states have a common interest in Red Sea security.

The regional environment is significantly different than in years past. In its early years, Israel had to reach to the periphery of the Middle East for friends--Iran, Ethiopia, Turkey. Now with the change of regimes in Iran and Ethiopia, the formal peace with Egypt, the de facto state of non-belligerence with Jordan, and the points of implicit Israeli-traditionalist Arab strategic convergence, Israel's opportunities exist more readily with her immediate neighbors.

The U.S. can have a strategic partnership of the proper proportions with Israel and strengthen its ties to traditionalist Arabs if both countries recognize the opportunities rather than exaggerate risks.

4. The rise of Mikhael Gorbachev has led to a more aggressive, sophisticated, and subtle Soviet policy in the Middle East which, over time, could place strains on the budding U.S.-Israel alliance, unless steps are taken to solidify it, because America may feel pressured to compete with the Soviets for Arab affections. It has been a prime tenet of U.S. strategic policy in the Middle East for years to be the indispensable third party between the Arabs and Israelis, the only genuine broker.6/ It seems clear that the Soviet Union has similar designs. Gorbachev's stern public warning to Syrian President Assad in his 1987 Moscow visit that the absence of Soviet relations with Israel was an "abnormal" situation and the low-level diplomatic group sent to Israel are the beginnings of a modest opening to Israel. On the Arab side, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Oman and the United Arab Emeritus, its increased contacts with Saudi Arabia, its proposed arms sale to Jordan after the U.S. turn down, and its write down of Egyptian military debt show a dynamic effort to woo pro-western, anti-Communist regimes.

The successful conclusion of the Washington summit throws a further question mark into future Middle East policies by the superpowers. Will it entice the U.S. into another joint U.S.-Soviet peace effort, such as the abortive one in 1977 under President Carter? Will the ultimate price of a restructure of

Soviet diplomatic relations with the U.S. be an insistence on a more neutral Israel as in its earliest years? Israel, of course, must be sensitive to offending the Soviet Union as it looks toward a possible restoration of relations and as it holds the trump card of Soviet Jewry. But a more benign Soviet-American climate may likewise make possible closer Israeli-U.S. cooperation without jeopardizing future relations with the U.S.S.R. There can be no Soviet misunderstanding even now that Israel is firmly in the western camp. Any decision to release more Soviet Jews--50,000 were released in 1979 when I was in the White House--will depend much more on the perceived advantage this may provide the Soviets in America, where they seek access to greater trade benefits and a Jackson-Vanik waiver, than on any calculation of its impact on relations with Israel. In order to continue to pursue a deepening of the strategic relationship while this Administration remains in office it is important to recognize that despite a recent leveling off of Soviet sophisticated weaponry for Syria, there has been an enormous growth in Soviet military presence in Syria. There can be no question Syria is the principle strategic asset and partner of the Soviets in the Middle East. The Soviets have a major naval base at Tartus in the Mediterranean, forward airbases, a coordinated air defense system with sophisticated Soviet missiles with the range to strike at the heart of Israel and an increased Soviet airlift capability in Syria.

5. There is still one year left in the Reagan Administration to consolidate Israel's strategic gains, and the 1988 election season in the United States will lead our presidential candidates of both parties to propose politically attractive policies toward Israel to appeal to Israel's friends in the U.S.

Campaign pledges are a crucial factor in what eventually become presidential policies. Already Senator Bob Dole (R-Kans.), the Republican Minority Leader, proposed in a speech to the National Jewish Coalition that the United States "begin exploring with Israel in a more comprehensive and concrete way--and in cooperation with our NATO and Asian allies--a new level of strategic partnership."7/

Rather than the sterile repetitions of pledges to move the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, the 1988 American presidential campaign should see the candidates discuss America's strategic interests in Israel and ways to assure that the progress of the Reagan years is not cast aside, either willfully or through neglect.

But just as a great debate--on the Israeli side as well as the U.S. side--should begin on concrete ways to strengthen U.S.-Israeli relations, it should not be forgotten that the Reagan Administration still has twelve months to run. The President and Secretary Shultz may have a special interest in locking in their legacy with Israel.

A PRIMER ON U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS

To discuss the future of United States-Israel relations it is necessary to have an understanding of their evolution since the founding of the new State 40 years ago.8/ Of course, it would take a separate speech, indeed a book, to do it justice. I have provided as an Attachment to my speech a thumbnail sketch of the crucial periods of the relationship. I simply will make two general points here about the history of this most unique relationship between history's most powerful democracy and one of its smallest.

First, the bilateral relationship has evolved from one of initial coolness to one of increasing warmth from President to President without compromising American interests in the Arab world. What was once a thin and fragile thread connecting the two countries has grown thicker and stronger over the decades, until it has been woven into a beautiful coat of many colors which cloaks the special relationship between the countries. Despite the tensions and disagreements which arise in every Administration, there has been a basic continuum of improved relations. Yet better U.S. relations with Israel did not damage the legitimate American interests in the Arab world. If anything it has led Arab countries to press the U.S. for comparable benefits more than to insist they be denied to Israel.

The first phase I call "the distant years",9/ from 1948 to 1960, when Israel was kept at arms length. President Truman is revered--and properly so--for recognizing Israel shortly after its declaration of independence in 1947. This was done over the vehement objection of perhaps America's greatest Secretary of State, George Marshall, who argued that it would threaten U.S. economic and security interests in the Arab world.

It is less remembered that he imposed an arms embargo on Israel during its time of maximum peril, later embodied in the 1950 Tripartite Declaration.

The guiding force behind U.S. foreign policy at the time was the idea of "containment"--limiting the Soviet sphere of influence. In 1947, Ben Gurion and Sharett met at a secret conference in Washington with Truman, Acheson, and Morgenthau. There the Israeli officials accepted the "Morganthau-Acheson

Plan"--a proposal to cement a pact between Arab states and Israel to keep communism out of the Middle East. Although the policy did not evolve further, it underscored the East-West, rather than regional, focus of the U.S.10/ This may be perhaps the earliest evidence of strategic cooperation, although it was aborted.

The Eisenhower years were chilly ones as the Eisenhower-Dulles policy, at the height of the Cold War, was to organize Arab and Moslem countries into the Baghdad Pact to fight Soviet penetration. An Israeli request in 1953 for a $75 million loan was rejected. The vehemence of President Eisenhower's reaction to the Israeli action at Suez in 1956 showed little sensitivity to Israel's security concerns and he required an Israeli withdrawal without asking for Egyptian peace concessions. Nor did he respond to Soviet threats against Israel, which included a diplomatic note to Israel that questioned its future existence.

1961 to 1980 were "the evolving years" when a deeper, closer relationship between the U.S. and Israel developed.11/ Yet Israel remained more a moral burden than a perceived asset. President Kennedy symbolized the evolving relationship by breaking the arms embargo with the sale of defensive Hawk surface-to-surface anti-aircraft missiles to Israel; yet he would only see Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion in a private capacity in New York.

President Johnson moved the relationship forward with Texas-sized strides. He hosted Levi Eshkol in the first public visit by an Israeli prime minister; sold offensive weapons to Israel; and reacted to Israel's occupation of Arab territories after the 1967 Six Day War in ways that contrasted sharply with Eisenhower at Suez a decade earlier. Now Israeli withdrawal would be contingent on Arab recognition and secure and recognized boundaries--a quantum advance. Soviet threats were met by movement of the Sixth Fleet, not by the silence of the Eisenhower Administration.

The Nixon-Ford-Kissinger period, which former Ambassador Sam Lewis calls the period of "Realpolitik"12/ was another chapter in the evolution of warmer and more intimate relations. The U.S. used Israel for the first time in 1970 to directly advance America's strategic interests by asking Israel to take steps to quell the threat of a Syrian invasion of Jordan, thereby protecting a pro-American Arab regime still in an official state of war with Israel. This demonstrated Israel's strategic value for the first time. It also eased the sale of arms to Israel, which, even after the arms embargo was ended had been a source of great controversy.

After the initial decision, President Nixon ordered the most massive U.S. airlift since the Berlin blockade--566 flights from the U.S. carrying 72,000 tons of equipment--at the height of Israel's peril in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Soviet threats at Israel were met by a virtually unprecedented worldwide troop alert from President Nixon. A 1975 Memorandum of Agreement between Secretary of State Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon committed the U.S. not to negotiate with the PLO unless it recognized relevent U.N. resolutions and recognized Israel, and provided assurances against an oil cut-off. Moreover, the U.S. became a tacit guarantor of the first and second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreements in January 1974 and September 1975, with U.S. aerial reconnaissance missions and other verification responsibilities. But Realpolitik did not include a systematic view of Israel as an on-going strategic asset to the U.S.

The Carter years, despite the tensions between President Carter and Prime Minister Begin, further solidified the U.S.-Israel relationship. The Sixth Fleet paid a post-Camp David visit to Israel in 1978--a first. The 1979 Memorandum of Agreement between the Defense Secretary Harold Brown and Defense Minister Ezer Weizman initiated the significant amount of Israeli arms sales to the Pentagon. That same year, the United States effectively acted as a guarantor of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, agreeing to provide support to Israel if an Egyptian violation of the treaty occurred.

A brief look at financial assistance levels underscored the progress in America's relations with Israel. Between 1948 and 1971, total U.S. aid to Israel averaged about $60 million per year, for a total of $1.5 billion overall, of which $1.35 billion was economic and only $162 million was military in nature--almost all in loans rather than grants.

The watershed was the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Immediately before the war, in Fiscal Year 1973, Israel received $417 million in assistance. Immediately after the war, Congress voted an emergency appropriation to Israel, including a $1.5 billion grant in military aid to rebuild the severely damaged Israeli military infrastructure.13/ A new era began.14/

"Between 1974 and 1981, total U.S. aid to Israel amounted to $18 billion--twelve times more than the country received from 1948 to 1973, a period three-and-one-half times as long. Of this amount, $12.8 billion was for military assistance and $5.2 billion for economic aid."15/

By 1985 Israel was receiving $2.6 billion and received an unprecedented emergency assistance grant of $1.5 billion to help it over its financial crisis. Israel today receives $3 billion

annually, $1.8 billion in military aid, and $1.2 billion in economic assistance. Israel gets one in every five dollars the U.S. provides the entire world in foreign aid.

But it is not only the huge increase in dollars which marks the dramatic improvement in the state of bilateral relations. The terms of the aid punctuate their uniqueness:16/

o Israel was the first country to receive highly favorable terms for repaying U.S. loans for military assistance.

o Since 1974, Israel has received "cashflow financing" so Israel can pay for its U.S. weapons purchases in installments, something many countries may not do.

o Israel was authorized to spend all of its U.S. grants before it uses any loan money, rather than having to spend them proportionately.

o Since 1975, all of Israel's economic aid is provided by direct cash transfer rather than earmarked for specific purposes as is done with most countries.

o Restrictions have been loosened for Israel on how American security assistance can be spent, permitting Israel to spend some $300 million in U.S. miltary aid in Israel to bolster its defense industry.

o Israel is now permitted to reduce the cost of weapons purchased with U.S. military aid by "offset" arrangements under which U.S. defense contractors selling to Israel must buy Israeli goods in return.

o Just a few weeks ago, an amendment became a part of the Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing Resolution, sponsored by Senators Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii) and Kasten (R-Wisc.), which would allow Israel, and other countries, to restructure their outstanding debt to the U.S., which could save Israel $150 million per year.

The Reagan years, from 1981 through 1987, have been the "strategic years." President Reagan was the first American President to appreciate the possibilities of Israel making a major contribution to America's strategic interests.17/ His Administration added a strategic dimension to an increasingly close relationship. No one should understate the way in which the U.S.-Israel relationship changed under President Reagan and his two Secretaries of State, Haig and Shultz. Although relations between the two countries had warmed considerably, no President before Ronald Reagan called Israel an ally or saw it as a strategic asset. Some of President Carter's aides urged

repeatedly that he use these terms in describing Israel. But he, like his predecessors, refused. Once President Carter mentioned, presumably inadvertently, the term ally when he accepted Ambassador Evron's credentials,18/ but the White House press office quickly backpedaled. In point of fact, recent Presidents, including Jimmy Carter, did recognize and nurture a special relationship with Israel, but it tended to be a sentimental, charitable attitude one would have toward a weak sibling; a relationship which represented an important and necessary, but nevertheless a moral and diplomatic burden.

Ronald Reagan broke from this traditional American view of Israel.19/ His preoccupation with the conflict with the Soviet Union and its allies in every region of the world--Latin America (Nicaragua, El Salvador), Africa (Angola, Mozambique), and Asia (Cambodia, Afghanistan)--led him to see Israel as a reliable anti-Communist ally in the Middle East. He enunciated his distinctive view of Israel and the Middle East in various campaign speeches in 1979 and 1980, well before he was elected. Without denigrating his personal sympathies for Israel, he was primarily motivated by the notion that "the paramount American interest in the Middle East is to prevent the region from falling under the domination of the Soviet Union" and that "America's position in staving off Soviet penetration would be weaker without the political and military assets Israel provides." He disputed American policymakers who "downgrade Israel's geopolitical importance...as a military offset to the Soviet Union." He said bluntly that "the more critical issues dividing Arab states actually have little to do with Israel.20/ And he openly called Israel a "major strategic asset to America."21/ These were all major departures from prevailing U.S. governmental wisdon and marked a sharp departure from the notion that while the U.S. had an obligation to protect Israel, that Israel in turn had little to offer the U.S., and that the obligation, while essential, interfered with U.S. interests in the Arab states. This was reinforced by disappointment over the reluctance of traditionalist Arab regimes, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, to support the President's 1982 peace plan and their unwillingness to assist the U.S. effort in Lebanon.

A joint Memorandum of Understanding was signed on November 30, 1981, pledging the two countries "to act cooperatively" to deal with "the threat to peace and security of the region caused by the Soviet Union or Soviet-controlled forces." While this MOU was unilaterally suspended within two weeks, before the ink was barely dry, due to the decision by Israel to apply Israeli law to the Golon Heights, it nevertheless signaled a new phase in the bilateral relationship.

Two years later, overruling Secretary of Defense Weinberger and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had argued--incorrectly--that it would damage relations with the Arab world, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 111 establishing the guidelines for strategic cooperation. In his departure statement for visiting Prime Minister Shamir, President Reagan announced the establishment of a Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) to consider "combined planning, joint exercises, and requirements for prepositioning of U.S. equipment in Israel."

What has been accomplished since is little short of phenomenal and would be almost unimaginable only a decade ago:22/ a bureaucratic stake has been created in the U.S. government in continued strategic cooperation with Israel as the Pentagon appreciated for the first time the strategic role Israel can play in shoring up western defenses in the eastern Mediterranean area.

o The JPMG has met twice a year since 1984. A Joint Security Assistance Planning Group established in 1986 meets annually to discuss aid levels in advance of the President's budget submission to Congress; a Joint Economic Development Group established in 1985 has provided a valuable forum for the discussion of Israel's economic problems.

o The U.S. Navy now makes regular port calls in Haifa.

o Joint air and sea exercises, including anti-submarine exercises, have been conducted on a regular basis.

o Following the debacle in Lebanon where Secretary Weinberger refused to permit Israel to provide military aid to U.S. servicemen, an agreement was signed to permit Israeli medical assistance, and joint medical evacuation exercises have been held.

o Israel agreed to the location of a major Voice of America (VOA) transmitter to be used to beam information into the Soviet Union.

o Israel became one of the first countries to join in the Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

o A unique Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1984 providing tariff-free access, over time, for the goods of each country in the other--the first such agreement with any nation. The Israeli agreement has now set the stage for the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement recently completed.

o U.S. Navy fighter pilots from the U.S. Sixth Fleet train at Israeli bombing ranges in the Negev.23/

o The Defense Department Authorization bill recently passed by Congress authorizes $75 million for an ATBM system in which Israel will participate.

o Israel was designated a "major non-NATO ally" by the Administration in January, 1987, pursuant to the DOD authorization bill for fiscal year 1987.

o In 1986 there were $200 million in Israeli defense exports to the U.S. and this year the final figures may reach $300 million.

o Steps are being taken to prepare buildings and facilities for the pre-positioning of U.S. materiel in Israel, and negotiations continue on ways to assure U.S. use of Israeli military installations in a time of crisis, including appropriate contractual arrangements.

o And last, only two weeks ago in Washington, Secretary of Defense Carlucci and Defense Minister Rabin signed an important Memorandum of Understanding which substantially improves Israeli industry access to the Pentagon market by waiving Buy America requirements from all products from Israel, except those specifically excluded, thereby changing the burden of proof in Israel's favor.

Strategic cooperation itself is not a panacea nor does it always produce sound judgments. Indeed, one of the lessons of the Iran-Contra scandal and the arms sales to Iran must surely be that at times strategic cooperation can lead to decisions which are not in the strategic interest of either country. From the U.S. standpoint, the Iran-Contra affair exposed an effort to trade arms for hostages and to deal with a regime which had long since proven to be untrustworthy and opposed to American interests in the region--all contravening President Reagan's longheld policy of not dealing with terrorists. From Israel's standpoint, Israel was cooperating with a regime whose radical, fundamentalism directly threatened to destabilize the entire Middle East, radicalize the Shiites in Lebanon, and foment trouble on the West Bank.

It is important to recognize that there is a <u>second facet to the U.S.-Israel relationship</u> besides a continuous progression to a budding strategic partnership. <u>While U.S. and Israeli strategic interests overlap and are symmetrical at many levels, they are not identical and indeed diverge at times, even today. The U.S. is a superpower with broad strategic interests in</u>

projecting its influence around the globe. Israel is a regional power with immediate concerns of security in her own region. It has been American strategic doctrine long before the birth of the State of Israel, and it remains a prime tenet of strategic doctrine today, that the U.S. maintain close relations with Israel's enemies in the Arab world for reasons of trade, military markets, access to oil resources, geopolitical balance, and competition with the Soviet Union. The U.S. has used arms sales as a major factor in maintaining its influence in the Arab world.

U.S.-Israeli interests clash when America takes actions, such as the sale of F-16 and AWACs planes to Saudi Arabia, which Israel considers detrimental to her security or when Israel takes actions which threaten American interests in pro-western Arab nations. It is this divergent interest which resulted in sharp differences at Suez in 1956; the Nixon-Kissinger insistence that Israel not destroy the Egyptian 3rd Army in 1973; the Ford-Kissinger "reassessment" of U.S. military sales to Israel in 1975; various U.S. votes in the U.N., particularly the U.S. support for what was perceived as an anti-Israel resolution in 1980; the objections over the Israeli strike at the Iraqi nuclear facility, the application of Israeli law to the Golon Heights, and Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

Only in two instances has a major disagreement between the countries arisen for reasons unrelated to the direct action of one or the other relating to the Arabs--the inadvertent attack on the U.S.S. Liberty and the Pollard affair.

It is important to remember that the interests of the Reagan Administration in strategic cooperation with Israel were animated not by the Administration's concerns about the Arab threat to Israel--Israel's greatest strategic concern--but rather by the Reagan team's concerns about Soviet penetration in the Middle East. The 1981 MOU and the 1983 Reagan declaration are both explicitly directed at the need "to deter all threats from the Soviet Union to the region" (1981 Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation) and "to the threats to our mutual interests posed by increased Soviet involvement in the Middle East" (1983 Reagan Declaration).

It is the different interests and attitudes of the two nations toward the Arab world which will continue to present a cloud, however small, over the U.S.-Israel relationship; which will make it difficult to achieve a full-blown alliance, at least until a comprehensive peace is reached between Israel and her Arab neighbors; and which will provide the potential for disagreements and friction.

Yet what is most remarkable about the unique bilateral relationship is that it has continued to flower despite such disparate views on such a central matter--relations with an Arab world much of which is threatening to Israel yet on friendly terms with the United States. The ties which bind the U.S. to Israel are rooted so deeply they have not been disturbed in a fundamental way by the different attitudes each has toward the Arabs. This is because what binds the U.S. and Israel together is a partnership of peoples united behind common values, not only overlapping security interests, as important as these are.

But what is equally important is that the increasingly intimate U.S.-Israel relationship has become more a matter of Arab envy than Arab anger. Even increasingly visible joint military exercises have not harmed U.S. interests in the Arab world. The sky will not fall in on U.S.-Arab relations so long as joint U.S.-Israel strategic cooperation is done in ways not designed to be provocative or embarrassing to the Arab states. The Arab world has adapted to the special relationship between the U.S. and Israel and to the strategic dimension which has developed over the past several years.

For those who measure relationships by cost-benefit analyses, the benefits of the strategic relationship with Israel were significantly underestimated and the costs to U.S. relations in the Arab world substantially overestimated. Iranian fundamentalism has enhanced Arab-U.S. cooperation at the very time Israeli-U.S. relations are at an all-time high.

The Arab world has been wary of overt military and political cooperation and alliances with the United States throughout the post-War period, even during times of distant U.S.-Israel ties. The fact is that Israel notwithstanding, traditionalist Arab states like Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Gulf countries, must rely on the defense umbrella of the United States to offset Soviet pressure or threats from radical Arab nations, like Syria and Libya.. This is particularly evident now with the rising threat of Iranian fundamentalism.

THE FUTURE--A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Despite the significant progress made over the past several years it should be the goal of the two nations to move from a rather narrowly based strategic cooperation to a broader strategic partnership and, ultimately over time, to a formal strategic alliance when and if a comprehensive peace can be reached with Israel's neighbors.

Progress in the direction of closer strategic relations must be done with care and prudence, being certain at each stage that the bureaucracies of the two nations are made to see the advantages of moving forward and that each step comports with the perceived strategic interests of the two countries. But this will not happen by itself or as the result of inertia. It can only come with the type of political leadership and clear political and policy signals President Reagan and Secretary Shultz have given to the U.S. bureaucracy.

The collapse of the 1981 MOU over Israel's Golon Heights law resulted not only from Israel's unilateral action which embarrassed the U.S. in the Arab world at a time it had elevated relations with Israel. It also resulted from having tried to take too great a leap forward before the U.S. bureaucracy was ready and without adequate groundwork having been laid; from the political judgments outrunning bureaucratic realities; and nervousness in the State and Defense Departments over Arab reactions. The strategic relationship cannot be artificially force-fed.24/

Formalizing a Strategic Partnership

But it is my belief that the unique confluence of events I have outlined, the steps taken to date on strategic cooperation, and the generally benign Arab attitude toward the U.S.-Israel cooperation make it both feasible and desirable from America's national security interests in the region and in a more secure Israel--and I believe in Israel's as well--to move to a broader strategic partnership now. It is also important to move now, because of the impending change in U.S. Administrations.

The view of Israel as a strategic asset and the concept of strategic cooperation between the two countries was not engraved for all time on the tablets at Mount Sinai. It is not God-given. It is a very new concept. It has come because of the personal outlook of this President and his Secretary of State, which the Reagan Administration, unlike its predecessors, to deemphasize solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to put the Palestinian problem on the back burner. There is no certainty, particularly with warming U.S. relations with the Soviet Union on the horizon, that the next President will see the Middle East in the same East-West context as President Reagan. He will more likely revert to the more traditional bureaucratic view of Israel as part of a regional Arab-Israeli conflict with the Palestinian problem at its core. He may feel the need to appoint a Special Negotiator to invigorate the peace process.

Strategic cooperation with Israel is not likely to be abandoned, regardless who the next President may be, because the U.S. bureaucracy and the American military have found that it is beneficial to their interests. But it can take the back seat now reserved by this Administration for the Palestinians and the peace process. We can depend on the next President to be friendly toward Israel. We cannot depend upon him viewing Israel in the same strategic light as President Reagan. By emphasizing Israel's contribution to western defenses in the eastern Mediterranean and the Soviets' significant presence in Syria, it is to be hoped that the next President will continue to value the budding strategic relationship, even if he does not share President Reagan's harsh view of Soviet intentions--or at least the views he held before the Gorbachev Summit. In addition, it must be remembered that most Arab states, including Egypt, have generally sought neutrality in the East-West conflict and have played the U.S. off against the Soviet Union. Israel, on the other hand, has long sought closer relations with Washington.

But the time to act is now to concretize, formalize, and broaden the strategic relationship and to prevent any backsliding by the next Administration.

Strategic cooperation rests on a narrow and fragile underpinning of military and intelligence cooperation, without adequate diplomatic, political and legal grounding, a view held even by some in the Administration who helped conceive it. Although it was crucial to start with military cooperation aimed at hostile threats to both the U.S. and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean, a stronger diplomatic and political underpinning is essential to develop a desirable strategic partnership and a sense of common purpose--as NATO has built up over time. A political dialogue is essential to develop a common strategic conception about the Middle East, both with respect to external threats to and internal changes in the area. Currently, the only regular political dialogue between the two countries occurs once a year between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry. A more high-level and intensive framework should be established.

A Memorandum of Understanding should be signed between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel--or the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister--which would create a United States/Israel Council chaired by the Secretary of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Council should meet at least semi-annually and serve as the focus of high-level regularized Joint Political Talks. The Council would institutionalize a regular, top-level, political dialogue designed to develop common assessments of evolving problems and dangers and to help assess prospects for peace in the region and

between Israel and their Arab neighbors. It would provide an over-arching political framework to the current ad hoc and parallel group of communities which have no formal status. Currently, the Israeli Foreign Ministry has had to fight to be represented on existing Committees. Thus, the Council would have subcommittees consisting of the existing Joint Political-Military Committee, Joint Security Assistance Planning Group, and Joint Economic Development Group. Over time, the Council might have a small permanent secretariat drawn from both governments.

High-level, formalized political talks could also serve as a useful forum to encourage the U.S. to take the lead in promoting quiet trilateral strategic coordination involving not only the U.S. and Israel, but countries like Turkey and Egypt, which share common interests with both countries regarding western interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism to the stability of the region.

The new Memorandum of Understanding would enumerate and consolidate what now exists largely in the rhetorical form:

-- The U.S. would recognize Israel formally as an ally and a strategic asset and Israel would signal its support for the U.S. in the eastern Mediterranean.

-- The current joint military, medical, and intelligence sharing criteria would be endorsed as a permanent part of the relationship, as would access by the U.S. to Israeli military facilities;

-- The commitment given verbally by various Administrations to maintain Israel's qualitative advantage in military equipment would be firmly stated;

-- The new Joint Political Talks and the current ad hoc committees would be institutionalized and formalized.

-- Israel would be treated as a NATO country for purposes of purchases to and from the U.S. government and for technology transfer25/;

In addition, this strategic partnership could be formalized by having Congress incorporate the new Executive Agreement into statutory form, modeled after the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed with Spain in 1982.

An MOU and accompanying statute would have many advantages:

o It would assure consolidation of the current strategic cooperation and continuation of the newly-formed mechanisms of cooperation, and could serve to formally supercede the suspended 1981 MOU. By creating a formal mechanism for diplomatic, political, and military discussions, a formal partnership agreement will help avoid fiascos like the Iranian arms sale. One of the lessons of that sad episode in U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation is that decisions were made by both countries without going through formal governmental channels in either country. Thus, in the U.S., a Colonel on the National Security Staff could circumvent the Departments of State and Defense, and individuals in Israel could avoid the Foreign and Defense Ministries and set up a semi-private network to transfer arms to a hostil regime.

o It would add a much needed political dimension to the current narrowly-based cooperation.

o It would send a non-provocative signal to the Soviet Union and to the Arab world of U.S. support of Israel, even though it would not constitute a direct mutual security agreement.

o By treating Israel as a NATO ally for procurement purposes, Israel would avoid having to pay the non-recurring costs on major weapons systems like the F-16, which increases the price per plane by over 7 percent, and would have access to high technology transfers on less restrictive terms.

o It would give a greater legal underpinning to the current designation of Israel as a "major non-NATO ally," for Israel is declared an "ally" without any of the formalities required of one. The concept emerged from a May 1986 meeting between Defense Minister Rabin and Senators Nunn (D-Ga.) and Warner (R-Va.) as a way to provide Israel access to existing Defense Department funds and joint R&D efforts without increasing aid levels. Ths idea was incorporated into the Fiscal Year 1987 DOD authorization bill, but Israel was not actually mentioned. The Administration must designate the countries under this rubric each year by letters from the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. Nothing requires it to include Israel each year. The Administration, wanting to appear even-handed, added the term "and friends" so that Egypt could be included, along with Israel, South Korea, Australia, and Japan.

Moreover, a formalized U.S.-Israeli strategic partnership would help give impetus to progress on a variety of other important areas, some of particular importance to Israel's battered aircraft industry: co-production of American military products; more flexible restrictions on Israel's use of American security assistance, so additional funds, up to $400 million per

year, could be spent in Israel; support for Israel's anti-tactical ballistic missile system (ATBM) as part of the President's "Star Wars" program; continuation of $150 million in offsets by U.S. defense contractors in return for the sale of these products to Israel; a realistic opportunity to competitively bid for maintenance and service work on American NATO-based equipment now open only to European companies; additional funds for cooperative R&D with the United States; greater American flexibility on Israel's export of military products with U.S. components--such as Israel's interest in exporting the Kfir to Argentina; a separate line item appropriation for the Israeli standoff Popeye missile; and access by Israeli companies to the same classified Requests for Proposal provided for NATO countries.26/

No other individual item is of greater potential strategic value to both countries than finalizing the prepositioning of U.S. equipment in Israel, including re-supply and cost-sharing arrangements, and readying Israeli military facilities for U.S. use, for example, hardened runways for American airplanes. This will help the U.S. respond to crises in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. It can help assure Israel against the near catastrophic delay during the Yom Kippur War in airlifting U.S. equipment to Israel, an airlift difficult to do directly from the U.S. because of landing right restrictions by American allies.27/ A formalized strategic partnership would make it easier for Israel to obtain the same right South Korea has to use the U.S. equipment itself in times of emergency.

Many of the Israelis with whom I have talked eschew a more formalized relationship, believing that it would only represent a "scrap of paper" hardly worth the effort. They point to the suspension of the 1981 MOU and to the empty Eisenhower assurance during the 1956 Suez crisis to help keep the Straits of Tinen open--as assurance disregarded when Egyptian President Nasser closed the Straits to Israeli shipping in 1967. I disagree. The U.S., unlike Israel, is a nation whose history began with a piece of paper, the U.S. Constitution. We Americans are legalistic in our approach to matters. Documents and agreements matter. For sure, an agreement between nations must constantly be reinvigorated and given meaning, as the suspended 1981 MOU underscored. But it is far harder and the costs far greater for a country like the United States, which attaches such importance to written commitments, to walk away and abandon written promises. than from mere verbal assurances. Indeed, one of the problems in 1967 wsa the absence of a formalized, written understanding between the two countries after the Suez invasion.

The defense-related MOU's of 1979, 1984, and 1987, provide evidence of the value of written agreements. But the agreement most frequently used by Israel has been the 1975 Kissinger-Allon MOA on non-recognition of the PLO. So too the type of MOU and statute I have suggested is harder for a subsequent President of the United States to ignore than the current arrangements.

The U.S. respects our standing treaty obligations, like the Rio Treaty, which Presidents from John Kennedy to Ronald Reagan have expressly invoked in situations like the Cuban Missile Crisis and the invasion of Grenada.

My discussions with top current and former officials on both sides make it clear that neither sees this in its interests.

American officials object because:

o A mutual security agreement to be of significant value to Israel would have to involve U.S. guarantees against Arab attack and would be seen as a direct provocation to the Arab world, as the U.S. taking sides in advance of hostilities;

o It would involve the U.S. in a major new security obligation at a time of shrinking U.S. resources;

o Such an obligation would require extremely difficult judgments by the United States given the uncertainty of Israel's boundaries, the murky area of civil insurrections, and Israel's use of preemptive defensive measures.

o For all of America's support for Israel, stationing of U.S. troops in a Middle East nation, at least before a final peace was achieved, would engender strong domestic opposition in the U.S.

Israelis tell me almost unanimously that Israel:28/

o Does not wish to be obligated to defend U.S. interests in Europe or around the world in case of a superpower conflict, although there is no question it would assist America.

o Fears such an agreement would undercut its own sense of self-confidence and independence, and sees a pact as a sign of weakness.

o Believes a pact would limit Israel's flexible and expansive concept of self-defense, which includes preemptive action like the bombing of the PLO headquarters in Tunis, the Iraqi nuclear facility strike, or the invasion of Lebanon, by requiring explicit or tacit prior U.S. approval.

o Thinks it would create tensions with the U.S. over a host of issues, including Israeli handling of the low-intensity civil warfare on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the presence of a large scale U.S. contingent of soldiers in a small country.

o Recognizes the value of such a pact would arise only if it directly protected Israel against an Arab attack, something the U.S. is unlikely to provide in writing.

o Is concerned it could impede a restoration of relations with the Soviet Union.

o Sees such a pact as being conditioned on major territorial concessions, thereby substituting vague "guarantees" for the additional territory necessary for self-defense. In addition it would require a definition of Israel's final boundaries.

All of this is somewhat ironic from the Israeli perspective because in Israel's early years one of Prime Minister Ben Gurion's chief ambitions was to achieve just such a security guarantee from the U.S., which he considered indispensable to Israel's security. He proposed an alliance to the Eisenhower Administration in 1955. The Israeli Cabinet at the time indicated "Israel will continue to demand guarantees in a mutual treaty in which each side promises to come to the assistance of the other if attacked." American Jewish leaders and the Israeli Ambassador pressed for a U.S. guarantee of Israel's borders.29/ The change in attitude resulted from the acquisition of additional territories after the 1967 War, which gave Israel more defensible borders, and a growing military might.

There have been several instances in which American Administrations have offered a security guarantee, but they were tied to territorial concessions by Israel. The first was from Secretary of State Dulles in August, 1955, who indicated that after an agreement on boundaries and other problems President Eisenhower "would recommend that the United States join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors."30/ Another was made in 1968 in the aftermath of the Six Day War by President Johnson to Eppie Evron, then the D.C.M. at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, via Hal Saunders, then a member of the National Security Council.31/ A third was made by President Carter to Prime Minister Begin, in my presence, in 1978, as an inducement to flexibility on future peace talks. During the 1978-1979 period there was a top-level in-house exercise by the Carter State Department, initiated by Secretary of State Vance, to draft a mutual security treaty. Various

models were studied to see which would be appropriate. Secretary Vance and the late Moshe Dayan, then Israeli Defense Minister, specifically discussed the possibility. Because Congress would never ratify a security treaty which created a totally self-enforcing security guarantee and the most the U.S. could commit to do was consult and obtain congressional approval for an intervention, Dayan lost interest in the proposition.32/ In each case, Israel turned the offer down because it appeared to trade generalized American guarantees for defensible borders. Indeed, Israelis with good memories--and that is most Israelis--will remember that some Americans who were early supporters of security guarantees for Israel were never known as champions of Israel, such as Senator J. William Fulbright. Senator Fulbright in 1970 proposed dual guarantees--a bilateral security pact by the U.S. to defend Israel by military force, if necessary, within her 1967 boundaries, linked to a second U.N. guarantee.33/

Nevertheless, there may well come a time when America bases and/or a mutual security treaty are important as an additional measure of assurance to Israel--if Israel wished to have it. But this would be as part of a comprehensive peace treaty, not in lieu of but to supplement bilateral peace agreements involving defined and defensible borders for Israel. This would be much less provocative to Arab nations willing to sign a peace treaty with Israel, when internationally accepted borders are established. Moreover, since the 1967 War, U.S. policy has supported security guarantees, but only as a supplement to not a substitute for security arrangements acceptable to Israel written into a peace settlement.34/ The basic security had to be provided by the agreement between the parties. This would be much less provocaative to Arab nations willing to sign a peace treaty with Israel when internationally-agreed borders are established.

This is in effect what happened with the first and second Egyptian-Israeli Sinai disengagement agreements and now in the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. America became a de facto guarantor of the disengagements, with aerial reconnaissance by the U.S., and verification of Israeli and Egyptian early warning stations in the Sinai.35/

After the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in 1982, the U.S. increased its involvement in Sinai peace keeping activities, as part of the Multinational Force and Observers. The MFO operates checkpoints and reconnaissance patrols and observation posts; verifies compliance with the Treaty at least twice a month; and insures free navigation through the Strait of Tiran.

This is a model which could be used in the Golon Heights and in the territories as an adjunct to peace treaties if a territorial settlement were worked out. Even an Israeli-Jordanian joint condominium on the West Bank could adopt features of the MFO plan.

In any event, the inapplicability of a full-blown mutual security treaty in today's environment should not serve as an excuse to fail to promptly formalize a strategic partnership through an MOU and accompanying statute.

CONCLUSION: ISRAELI OBLIGATIONS

As the U.S.-Israeli strategic relationship hopefully matures and grows over the next several years, it inevitably will raise the issue of Israeli obligations. In a strategic partnership both sides must bring something to the table--and both now do. The U.S. supplies money and equipment as well as political and moral support. Israel supplies firm support for U.S. foreign policies in the United Nations, in the Middle East and Gulf regions, important intelligence information on Soviet activities, radical Arab intentions, and terrorist groups in the area, access to Israeli facilities, like the Port of Haifa, and field testing of Soviet weapons.36/

But as the U.S. is asked to contribute more, for example in defense purchases from Israel, as the missing diplomatic and political dimension is added, and as the U.S. and Israel move closer to an actual partnership, de facto or formal, three things must be recognized clearly.

First, a strategic partnership can only flourish in an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence. The Pollard affair was a serious setback. As Israel and the U.S. begin to see each other as true allies, they must act like it by not spying on each other. Allies do collect as much information as they can about other allies through regular channels. But using a paid spy in the employ of the U.S. government is beyond the pale. Mechanisms must be created in Israel to prevent future incidents from occurring, just as the U.S. must not do so in Israel (if, the U.S. ever did so at all, as Senator David Durenberger (R-Minn.), former Chairman of the Senate Committee alleged). The psychology of the Jewish underground, in which no one on the outside is considered a true ally and everyone is suspected, ws justified in the past. It may still be justified for many other countries. But it is a damaging mindset in dealing with the U.S., which has shown its loyalty and friendship for so many years. The Pollard affair cost Israel dearly. It complicated the already grave budget problems with the 1986 efforts of Senators Inouye and Kasten to reduce Israel's blended average interest rates on its

U.S. debt to then-prevailing lower rates, with a potential savings of over $250 million annually. More generally, it created a sense of mistrust within the very U.S. bureaucracies whose support is so critical to the future of the strategic relationship between Israel and America.

Second, while Israel should not cede its freedom of action and must have the flexibility to respond swiftly and surely to security threats, and to express its political opinions in the U.S. on U.S. policy it considers damaging to its security needs, the views and strategic interests of the U.S. must be carefully weighed in the balance. While this is certainly done now, the more intimate the relationship becomes the more the need becomes for factoring in the interests of the other partner. A husband tells more to his wife than to his mother-in-law and considers his brother's interests above those of a more distant cousin.

In this respect, as the strategic partnership develops, Israel must be willing to consider a more expansive view of American interests in the region, particularly its long-standing interest in maintaining close relations with pro-western, if overtly anti-Israel, Arab states. This does not mean acquiescing in U.S. actions which Israel, in the exercise of its hard-won sovereignty, believes are directly detrimental to her interests. But it does mean recognizing the difference between the proposed sale of F-16's to Jordan, right on Israel's doorstep, from the proposed sale of 16 Stinger missiles to Bahrain, a non-contiguous state, at a time the U.S. is working hard at achieving Gulf State cooperation--and not opposing each with equal vociferousness. Israel will need to be more discriminating on the issues on which it decides to go to the mat with the U.S. It also must appreciate the contradictory, Janus-like nature of U.S. policy in the Middle East, seeking friendship on the one hand with Israel and on the other with pro-western Arab countries in a state of war with Israel.37/ In this respect, it was heartening to hear Prime Shamir's public endorsement of the Reagan Administration's Gulf policy in his November visit to Washington even though this entailed close cooperation with Kuwait and other Arab Gulf states.

Neither a partnership nor a full-blown alliance means a forced agreement on every issue. The U.S. has major differences with her NATO allies on many important matters. But it does mean making a maximum effort to support the interests of the other partner where that does not directly effect one's own vital interests. Currently, no mechanism exists to develop a shared approach to the region and it is that toward which a U.S.-Israel Council should devote its energies.

Third, it must always be remembered that the relationship between the two nations rests on something more intangible, yet more fundamental than guns and bullets, strategy and tactics, intelligence and military cooperation, or common enemies--that is shared Judeo-Christian values and principles.38/ These are the democratic values for which the United States for 200 years and Israel for 50 have stood--majority rule, free speech and open expression, respect for human dignity, due process of law, protection of the rights of minorities.

After all, the U.S. shares strategic interests outside its NATO alliance with countries from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan, from South Korea to Egypt. Israel's strategic importance to the U.S., while very real and very important, is shared by other countries. But its relationship with Israel has a special, even mystical quality, matched only by U.S. affection with America's motherland, England.

It was a special relationship well before President Reagan introduced a strategic dimension to it, a strategic dimension policy elites understand better than the public at large. It is special because the American people recognize Israel's biblical ties to a Holy Land which play on the heartstrings of Jew and non-Jew alike in America; because of Israel's rebirth from the ashes of a World War America helped win and whose death camps American soldiers saw face-to-face; and because Israel represents the values America holds so dear in a region where the disregard for these values is so evident by Israel's neighbors. In a cruel and compromising world, Israel is seen as trying to fulfill Isaiah's admonition to be a "light unto the nations." When Israel has taken actions it felt necessary which were at cross-purposes with its own strategic interests, it has been the foundation stone of shared beliefs which has maintained positive relations. This was demonstrated, as one Israeli scholar noted, when a close relationship endured during the time the Reagan Administration was attempting to build a strategic consensus and Israel took steps detrimental to that effort--from bombing the Iraqi nuclear reactor to the application of Israeli law to the Golon Heights and to the invasion of Lebanon.39/

As Israel struggles with its own future, its boundaries, its security concerns, its Palestinian dilemma, its dealings with Israeli Arabs, indeed as Israel defines its own identify, it is crucially important that its democratic values not be compromised; for this in turn would compromise Israel's strategic relationship.

It is for this reason that American friends of Israel are so concerned by proposals to solve the Palestinian problem by mass expulsions or payments to Palestinians to leave, as some in Israel have suggested.

It is not my place to tell Israel how to solve its Palestinian problem or how to define its boundaries. But I can tell you that policies which are perceived by Americans as anti-democratic will make it difficult for a strategic partnership to flourish as it should. Americans recognize that Israel faces a unique problem of maintaining security and democracy at the same time, making perfection impossible, as the recent Shin Beth disclosures made clear. But as the broader Arab-Israeli conflict abates and turns into more of a communal dispute between Israelis and Palestinians, Israel's friends in the United States will wait with great anticipation to see Israel solve its problems while remaining both a Jewish state and a democratic bastion.

The support for Israel in America does not derive, as some of Israel's enemies believe, from the power of American Jews. It rests on the broad shoulders of American public opinion. It is upon these shoulders that the Reagan Administration and Israeli leaders have begun to erect a strategic relationship. It is upon these shoulders that we must broaden, deepen, and formalize that budding relationship into a full-scale partnership.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. and Israel should use the concluding months of the Reagan Administration to put into place the superstructure for a broadened strategic partnership which will be durable enough to transcend different Presidents and the inevitable divisions which arise inevitably between any two nations. This would be fitting legacy for the Reagan-Peres-Shamir years.

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FOOTNOTES

1. See speech by Thomas A. Dine, "The Revolution in U.S.-Israel Relations," April 6, 1986, p. 8.

2. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government--Fiscal Year 1988. January 5, 1987. Reprinted in CRS Report No. 87-16F, p. 14.

3. Ibid, p. 16.

4. The New York Times, December 8, 1987, p. A29. The portion quoted is the paper's paraphrase of his comments. Mr. Taft himself was quoted as stating that these reductions "will result in a defense program that will have more risks than we would like to see and a smaller, less capable force than we would like to see."

5. See Daniel Pipes, speech of "The Mideast's New No. 1 Problem," The New York Times, November 29, 1987, p. E7.

6. Conversation with Joseph Sisco, former UnderSecretary of State for Political Affairs, former Assistant Secretary for the Near East, United States Department of State, December 16, 1987.

7. Senator Bob Dole, National Jewish Coalition, April 30, 1987, p. 1, "U.S.-Israeli Relations: Exploring the Strategic Relationship."

8. See for an insightful analysis, Samuel Lewis, "An American Perspective on Strategic Cooperation," Strategy and Defense in the Eastern Mediterranean: An American-Israeli Dialogue (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), July 1986, pp. 89-104.

9. Address by Stuart E. Eizenstat, "The United States and Israel's Economic Crisis," to the Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations of the American Jewish Committee, Jerusalem, January 31, 1985; see also address by Stuart E. Eizenstat, Ben Gurion Memorial Ceremony, Sde Boker, November 13, 1985.

10. I. Rabinovich and J. Reinharz, Israel in the Middle East, pp. 76-77.

11. Former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis calls the period from 1960 to 1980 one of "friendly evenhandedness" in his excellent analysis of the history of U.S.-Israel relations.

12. Ibid, p. 95.

13. Kenneth Jacobson, U.S. Aid to the Middle East: A Look Back, A Look Ahead, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (January 1983), p. 6.

14. The huge debt burden created for Israel as a result of the military loans which followed became an economic albatross around Israel's neck and were one factor in Israel's economic crisis in the early 1980's. See my article, "Israel's Economic Crisis: What Israel Must Do," Commentary magazine, Vol. 79, No. 4, April 1985.

15. Ibid, p. 15.

16. Congressional Quarterly, December 29, 1984, p. 3163; see also, Stuart E. Eizenstat, "Israel's Economic Crisis: What Israel Must Do," Commentary magazine, Vol. 79, No. 4, April 1985, pp. 15-21.

17. For an excellent description of the military benefits the U.S. derives from Israel, see Steven L. Spiegel, "U.S. Relations With Israel: The Military Benefit," Orbis, Vol. 30, No. 3, Fall 1986, pp. 475-497.

18. Conversation with Ambassador Ephraim Evron, December 7, 1987.

19. See speech of Vice President George Bush, Neshiva University, December 15, 1985, New York City, p. 5.

20. Article by Ronald Reagan in The Washington Post, August 5, 1979, collected in The Reagan Administration and Israel, Toby Dershowitz, editor, 1987, pp. 3-6; speech by Ronald Reagan, March 8, 1980.

21. Ibid, pp. 6-9.

22. For a comprehensive chronology since 1983, see Policy Focus, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Issue Number 3, September, 1986, p. 2.

23. Speech by Thomas A. Dine, "The Revolution in U.S.-Israel Relations," April 6, 1986, p. 7, Washington, D.C.

24. See Menachem Meron, "An Israeli Perspective on Strategic Cooperation," Strategy and Defense in the Eastern Mediterranean: An American-Israeli Dialogue, (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), July 1986, Jerusalem, Israel, p.108; Samuel Lewis, "An American Perspective on Strategic

Cooperation," Ibid, p. 101-102.

25. It would likewise be useful to have a parallel diplomatic Memorandum of Understanding to help reassure Israel as both the U.S. and Israel look forward to the predictable effort the next Administration will make at the beginning of its term to reinvigorate the peace process. In advance of a serious effort at peace talks a separate MOU would estalish certain parameters and likewise codify what various Presidents have verbally pledged over the years: non-recognition of the PLO; opposition to the creation of an independent Palestinian state; U.S. opposition to an imposed solution in the region; and involvement of only those nations or entities in any Middle East peace process agreed upon by both the U.S. and Israel.

26. See speech of Thomas A. Dine, "A New Direction in U.S.-Israel Relations," Chicago, Illinois, November 1, 1987, pp. 3-4.

27. Only the airbase of Portugal in the Azores was made available in 1973 at the height of Israel's worst military threat since the War of Independence.

28. See Yitzhak Rabin, "The Principles of the U.S.-Israel Relationship," Strategy and Defense in the Eastern Mediterranean: An American-Israeli Dialogue, (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), July, 1986, Jerusalem, Israel, pp. 81-82.

29. Conversation with Professor Avner Yaniv on December 1, 1987; see Avner Yaniv, Deterrence Without the Bomb (Lexington Books), 1987, pp. 48-54, 88-96, 152-157, 214-222. See N. A. Pelcovits, "Security Guarantees in a Middle East Settlement," Sage Policy Papers, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1976, p. 13.

30. Cited in N.A. Pelcovits, "Security Guarantees in a Middle East Settlement," Sage Policy Papers, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1976, pp. 3-4.

31. Conversation with Ambassador Ephraim Evron, December 7, 1987.

32. Conversation with former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Sam Lewis, November 25, 1987.

33. N. A. Pelcovits, supra, p. 4.

34. N. A. Pelcovits, supra, pp. 8-9.

35. Ibid, p. 10.

36. For an excellent, in-depth analysis of many of the ways Israel contributes to U.S. strategic interests, see AIPAC Papers on U.S.-Israel Relations, particularly AIPAC Paper No. 1, "The Strategic Value of Israel," by Steven J. Rosen; AIPAC Paper No. 4, "Israel and the U.S. Navy," by W. Seth Carus; AIPAC Paper No. 5, "Israeli Medical Support for the U.S. Armed Forces," by Stephen P. Glick; AIPAC Paper No. 8, "U.S. Procurement of Israeli Defense Goods and Services," by W. Seth Carus. These provided powerful intellectual arguments to the concept of an Israeli-U.S. strategic relationship.

37. Shai Feldman, "The United States as a Challenge for Israeli Policy," speech in Tel Aviv, June 28-July 1, 1987. See Shai Feldman, "The United States as a Challenge for Israeli Policy," speech in Tel Aviv, June 28-July 1, 1987, for an excellent discussion of the importance of Israel's democratic values.

38. See Yitzhak Rabin, Ibid, pp. 84, 87.

39. Ibid, Feldman, p. 5.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Mr. Eizenstat is also indebted to the following people who thoughtfully discussed with me their perspectives on the issues in this paper: Nimrod Novick, a top aide to Israeli Foreign Minister Peres; Dr. David Naveh, Technion (Israel Institute of Technology); Steve Rosen, Howard Kohn, Doug Bloomfield, Alan Platt of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee; Zvi Rafia, a former official of the Israeli Foreign Ministry; Phil Wilcox, the head of the Israeli Desk at the U.S. Department of State; Samuel Lewis, former U.S. Ambassador to Israel; John Ritch, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff; Avner Yaniv, Department of Political Science, Haifa University; Oded Eran (Deputy Chief of Mission), Pinchas Dror (Economic Minister), Neville Lamdan (Congressional Relations) of the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C.; Martin Indyk and Seth Camus of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dennis Ross, who directs Middle East policy for the National Security Council; Hanon Bar-On, former Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry of Israel; Nat Pelcovits, a former research fellow at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Joseph Sisco, former UnderSecretary of State for Political Affairs and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. However, the views and recommendations in this paper were purely those of Mr. Eizenstat.

CHRONOLOGY OF U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS

1946: President Truman includes Israel in a regional arms embargo. The Soviet Union allows Czechoslovakia to sell Israel weapons.

October 4, 1946: Truman calls in "Yom Kippur speech" for a compromise between the British partition plan and the Zionist plan.

1947: Ben-Gurion and Sharett hold a secret conference with Truman, Acheson and Morgenthau: agree on the "Morgenthau-Acheson plan" -- a proposal to forge a pact between Israel and Arab states to keep communism out of the area. No serious diplomatic attempt followed.

November 1947: U.S. votes in UN General Assembly for partition of Palestine.

May 14, 1948: President Truman recognizes the State of Israel.

May 25, 1950: Tripartite Declaration: U.S.-British-French effort to coordinate arms sales to the Middle East. It proclaimed their determination to act within and outside the U.N. to oppose attempts to modify the armistice boundaries by force; to prevent any imbalance in armaments; and a promise to supply Israel and the Arab countries with enough weapons to meet their self-defense needs and the defense of the area as a whole.

1952: U.S. and Israel enter into a formal military assistance relationship.

1953: Israel's request for a $75 million loan is turned down; U.S. withholds the disbursal of economic aid because of Israel's noncompliance with a U.N. Truce Supervision Commission injunction to halt work on a Jordan River hydroelectric project.

1954: NATO turns down an Israeli request for membership; the U.S. declines a formal proposal for a mutual defense treaty.

1955: U.S.-supported Baghdad Pact (Britain-Turkey-Pakistan-Iran) enters into effect.

1956: Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal in April; concludes an arms deal with the Soviets; U.S. attempts to appease Nasser by financing the Aswan dam; U.S. defers arms to Israel; October 29, 1956, Israel invades the Sinai; October 30, the French and British intervene against Egypt. The U.S. leads in U.S. opposition to the French-British-Israeli actions. Israel withdraws from occupied territory and U.S. grants a commitment to stand by Israel's right of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. Eisenhower Administration is silent on Soviet threat to Israel.

1959: A U.S.-Israel military loan program begins.

1963: President Kennedy tells Golda Meir that the U.S. views Israel as an ally, although there is no treaty to this effect; Kennedy publicly approves the sale of Hawk antiaircraft missiles.

1964: President Johnson sells the first "offensive" weapons -- tanks and A-4 Skyhawk jetfighters -- to Israel.

May 31, 1964: Prime Minister Eshkol visits President Johnson: first official visit of an Israeli Prime Minister.

July 20, 1965: U.S.-Israeli defense procurement agreement re: Israeli bids to U.S. Department of Defense.

1966: The U.S. agrees to ensure the sale of arms to Israel, if not from Western sources, then from the U.S.

March 23, 1967: Memorandum of Agreement establishing U.S. Israeli Educational Foundation for financing exchange programs.

June 6, 1967: The Six Day War begins. Johnson orders the Sixth Fleet to the Syrian coast in response to Soviet threats against Israel; U.S. votes against an unconditional Israeli withdrawal (in the U.N. General Assembly).

June 8, 1967: Israel attacks the U.S.S. Liberty.

November 22, 1967: U.N. Resolution 242 is adopted.

1968: Johnson approves the sale of 50 Phantom fighter-bombers to Israel.

December 9, 1969: Secretary of State Rogers announces the U.S. position (the Rogers Plan): a binding peace agreement and Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 boundaries, except for the Gaza Strip; repatriation or resettlement of Palestinian refugees; free navigation and security provisions; and international assurances.

1970: The U.S. and Israel sign the Master Defense Development Data Exchange Agreement, permitting the exchange of information important to the development of military systems.

September 20, 1970: U.S. asks Israel to formulate plans for a joint American-Israeli intervention to thwart the September 19 Syrian invasion of Jordan. Israel prepares to open a massive air strike against the Syrian troops and to move Israeli columns from the Golan to the Jordan Valley. September 22, the Syrian tanks pull back.

October 1973: During the Yom Kippur War, the U.S. responded with a massive airlift and alerted the Strategic Air Command and American forces around the globe.

December 21, 1973: Geneva Conference convened to preserve the cease-fire and to symbolize the pursuit of peace; both Egypt and

Jordan sent high-level representatives, opening the door to peace.

January 18, 1974: First Israeli-Egyptian Sinai Agreement: both countries agree to a cease-fire and to a U.N. buffer zone along the Suez; the U.S. is de facto guarantor of the agreement and participates directly for the first time by having its aircraft and satellite monitor compliance with the provisions .

1974: Israel becomes the first beneficiary of the cash flow method of financing, which gives more flexibility in the procurement of U.S. military goods.

Israel becomes the recipient of more FMS assistance than any other country.

The 1974 emergency aid for Israel included the first military grant aid.

1975: All of Israel's economic aid is provided by direct loans and cash transfer, rather than earmarked for specific projects or purposes.

September 4, 1975: Second Israeli-Egyptian Sinai Agreement signed at Geneva: U.S. stations American personnel in the buffer zone; agrees to a package of assurances, undertakings and commitments to Israel; undertakes publicly to make the aerial reconnaissance missions' results available expeditiously to Israel and to verify use of Israeli-operated and Egyptian-operated early warning surveillance systems.

September 1, 1975: The U.S. and Israel sign a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) under which the U.S. agrees not to recognize or negotiate with the PLO so long as it does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

September 1, 1975: The U.S. commits itself in a MOA to meet Israel's needs for oil for 5 years; to vote against any Security Council resolution that affects or alters the 1975 Egypt-Israel Agreement; and to support Israel's right to free passage through the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and Gibralter.

February 27, 1976: MOA on the Geneva Peace Conference. The U.S. and Israel will reconvene the Peace Conference and the U.S. will not recognize or negotiate with the PLO so long as it does not recognize Israel's right to exist and accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

March 3, 1976 (and May 18, 1977): A MOA establishes the U.S.-Israeli Binational Industrial Research and Development Foundation (BIRD-F) for non-defense activities.

October 25, 1977: MOA to establish U.S.-Israeli Agricultural

Research and Development Fund (BARD-F) to promote agricultural activities.

September 17, 1978: President Carter and Prime Ministers Begin and Sadat sign the Camp David Agreement.

March 19, 1979: The U.S. and Israel sign a MOA representing a Defense Trade Initiative to develop Israel's defense production and technological base.

March 26, 1979: Agreement between U.S. and Egypt implementing the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty: the U.S. agrees to take appropriate action in the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty; MOA between Israel and the U.S. re: oil supply arrangement of 1975 (providing for 15 years); MOA between U.S. and Israel recognizing that withdrawal from the Sinai imposes heavy security, economic and military burdens; the U.S. will act against violations threatening the security of Israel or its rights to navigation and overflight. The U.S. agrees to provide support and supplies if a violation of the Treaty occurs.

October 17, 1980: MOA re: contingency implementing arrangements regarding the supply of oil (also in the March 26, 1979 MOA); delineates when the U.S. will make oil available to Israel.

1981: Economic Support Fund (ESF) aid to Israel becomes all grant transfer.

June 7, 1981: Israeli planes bomb the Iraqi nuclear plant at Osirak; U.S. calls the raid "shocking"; November 11, the UN General Assembly calls the attack a serious threat to peaceful nuclear energy development. Only Israel and the U.S. vote against it.

August 3, 1981: Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) established; begin moving into place March 20, 1982. Nine nations joined 1,200 American troops for the Sinai.

November 30, 1981: The U.S. and Israel sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding continued consultation and cooperation and outlining issues for joint working groups.

December 14, 1981: Israel extends its law to the occupied Golan Heights. December 17 the U.S. joins in a unanimous U.N. Security Council resolution condemning the Israeli move, declaring the annexation "null and void". December 18 the U.S. State Department suspends the November 30 MOU.

April 25, 1982: MFO assumes peacekeeping responsibilities for implementation of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.

September 1, 1982: President Reagan states the U.S. will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza nor Israeli sovereignty or permanent

control over those territories. Calls for a resumption of autonomy talks; election of the Palestinian self-governing authority in the occupied territories; an Israeli freeze on new settlements and on dismantling existing settlements; and for Palestinian and Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist.

December 10, 1982: The U.S. and Israel enter into a Defense: Security of Information agreement (signed July 30) concerning protection of classified information between the two governments.

April 17, 1983: Pentagon announces approval of Israeli use of American components and technology to build the Lavi fighter aircraft.

October 29, 1983: President Reagan signs National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 111 setting up guidelines for strategic cooperation, including joint military exercises, provisions for use of Israeli military bases and other cooperation.

November 29, 1983: Prime Minister Shamir and Reagan establish a Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) to enhance U.S.-Israel cooperation, and they implement most of the provisions of the 1981 MOU. Also established are the Joint Economic Development Group (JEDG) and the Joint Security Assistance Planning Group (JSAP).

November 1983: Prime Minister Shamir and President Reagan agree to the establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA); formally approved in May 1985.

1984: The U.S. and Israel engage in joint air and sea military exercises; joint emergency medical evacuation exercises begin; the U.S. Navy announces 12 Israeli Kfir C-1 jets will be used to simulate Soviet MiG's in-flight training.

January 16, 1984: U.S. and Israel sign a MOA between the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs for cooperation in the field of social services and human development.

March 19, 1984: The U.S. and Israel sign a MOU expanding Israel's access to conventional defense equipment, R&D, and procurement. A special committee is established: a joint Department of Defense-Ministry of Defense committee.

June 1984: First joint emergency medical evacuation exercise conducted by the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the IDF.

June 3, 1984: Department and Ministry of Energy enter into an agreement regarding cooperative R&D and activities.

December 16, 1984: U.S.-Israeli joint anti-submarine warfare (ASW) maneuvers in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Spring 1985: U.S.-Israeli discussions begin re: Israeli sales of American equipment and weapons (HAWKs and TOWs) to Iran; July: McFarlane, Shultz, and Weinberger become involved in further negotiations; August 30: 100 TOWs are sent from Israel to Iran; September 14: 408 more TOWs are delivered.

May 6, 1985: MOA between Department of HHS and the Ministry of Health of the State of Israel for cooperation in the field of health.

May 1985: Free Trade Agreement formally approved.

May 6, 1986: Defense Minister Rabin and Secretary of Defense Weinberger sign a secret agreement under which Israel enters the R&D programs of SDI (along with West Germany, Great Britain, and Italy).

September 1986: Joint Political Military Group (JPMG) and Joint Security Assistance Planning Group (JSAP) meet to discuss strategic cooperation.

October 1986: initial press reports detail U.S. arms sales (via Israel) to Iran.

November 5, 1986: The U.S. and Israel sign a $5.1 million agreement concerning Israeli research on the Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) project.

November 6, 1986: MOA between Department of Labor to Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs for cooperation in the field of labor.

January 23, 1987: Israel is designated a major non-NATO ally, allowing it to participate in U.S. military and R&D projects and upgrading defense ties (becomes law in the FY 1987 Defense Authorization Bill).

March 27, 1987: President Reagan and Israeli Minister of Communications Yaacobi sign a Voice Of America (VOA) agreement permitting construction of a relay transmitter in Israel.

November 10, 1987: Israeli President Chaim Herzog visits President Reagan; first State visit of an Israeli official.

December 14, 1987: Secretary of Defense Carlucci and Defense Minister Rabin sign an arms agreement expanding Israel's arms procurement privileges, allowing Israeli defense companies to compete equally with U.S. and NATO firms for defense contracts.

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*DC: ABU/LBO/DCCZ                                                      *
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*NLL                                                                   *
*                                                                      *
*CLL ZBLKLN BUBZAI BUZLCB BXBNLI                                       *
*ZNLL CZ BNOLL ZBAZ/CLNB ZL BAL BAAB ZBALB BNWX QALLBL                 *
*                                                                      *
*BUBZAI BOLLCB TBOBI -BLCB BALLB                                       *
*ZLCB BCLCDLLB BZ BUBZAI LZLBB BNBLBCLB BCCBLB NB                      *
*BLNALCB BZ BB CLBI LBLB ZBLCB ZBLCB TBLBLB BB BBBAZ                   *
*BCYLLBB TBZ CLBB ZBBZAI BBLLCB-CLNB ZL BLB TBBLLB                     *
*XL BZ YLLBBB NBLLB -BZLBI LXBLI ZBBLI LCLBLLL CBL                     *
*TBLNLL LLLBB CLNB BXLLCL /CBBL ZLLLBLB -NB BZ BBBAZ                   *
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* BLBZ 01   BBLI 21                                                    *
* LD 2    BBLI 2                                                       *
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TYPE REQUIRED-PRINT FORM

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*BLKBBI *                                                              *
*LNBL BBBAZ BBLCBB BLD BBCB- BNZLB NZL BLNZLCB TBZLN                    *
*XLI ZL BCZ BBB BLCL BZ BZLCCLB BCYLB LBB BLCB BZ                      *
*                                                                      *
*ZBBLN TBZLB BBBAZB LBLNZ BBBLB LLLLBLB BLBLB*                         *
*ZLBB CL CZ LLLLLCL TBBAZ LBBLX ZBBAZ CLBL- BXCLB                      *
*CL NCLL ZBBLZ TZBX BNLLLBLB BNBLLCLB /NI BZLCL                        *
*Z* CLLL ZL BLBZ LNCL BLLB BZ CI CCZ BBCLBNLB CLBCLB                   *
*                                                                      *
*LBBBLB CBNBCLL ZLLBLI BBCBLI LBLNZ-BLC*                               *
*LBZL CBCLBLLBLB CZLLB CLZCB BZ BBBAZ BZ BLCL LLLBB                    *
*9* ZLBLB BLBCLB LNBLCLB BBBLBBLLB BLCLZLCLB ZCBLNLB                   *
*                                                                      *
*BCCLCLB BBBAI ZBBLL CBLCL BLNLCLL BZ BBBAZ CLLCL*                     *
*BNZB BLCLLLLB XBZ  CNBXBLB BLLLBLB ZBBBCLLLLB CCL                     *
*                                                                      *
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*BBBAI LBBL BLCL XBBBL BBZBLLB LCLBLL BBBAZ BLLB                       *
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*CLLL BCLLB LBNXLBBI * CLLNCL ZBCZ CBBXLB BZ BBLBLB                    *
*CBZLB BLLCLBL BZ LLL LLCLL BBBAZ LBLN-BLCLLB BBCBLZ                   *
*C* CBZC BBLLLL CXBLI ZBBBLLL CNBXL CLLBL BBLXC ZCL                     *
*                                                                      *
*BLBLB LBCCLLB ZBBLLI BBNZB BCZ*                                       *
*BLNZ BNBLLLB ZBBZLB CLBL BLX LCBBLCB-BLZB - BXBLB                     *
*BZ LNBL BBLCLB/CLBCLB LBLLCLB CL BLCBZB BBB BZ                        *
*LCCL BBBI BBBZAI BBLLCL LBBLLI BBNZB BCZBBLCLB*BLLBBB                 *
*>LBCL CBLBLB BZLLCLB BLN:- BBL BXBBBLB BZ LBLNZ                       *
*" 4" BBNZB BBLZB BBB CCZ BLLCLBB LNBL BBBAI ZZLLB                     *
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*BBCB BBLCB CBBBZB LBLNZ LLCZ BXBLLB BCCZBL BZ LLLCL                   *
* BCLLBBB BZ LLL BBLBLLI CBZCLB BCCLBB BCZ BCLBB                       *
*CLCL BLBC CCCLBBB BB LNB BLBLLI BCBLNLB C-12 LCN*BBLLBB               *
*BCLCB LLNCB LCB CZCC LNBL BNLCLCLB BBBLLLLB*BLCL                      *
*C* BNLBBZB BBZLLL BZ BLLLLLB BZ BNLLLBB CNLX CLBL                      *
*                                                                      *
*NL CL BBBBLB BZBLLLBBZZB BBLLCL BZN ZBBCBN*                           *
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* BLBZ 01   BBLI 21                                                    *
* LD 2    BBLI 2                                                       *
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TYPE REQUIRED-PRINT FORM

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*BBCBXLLLLBL BZ BCL BZLCCLB ZL BBZZBCI BBLBB CLZLLBLB                  *
*                                                                      *
*BZXCC LCZCZB LBBLCCLB NLBC CNBLC,1*                                   *
*BBB BZ BLCB BNBLLLI ZBCL XNBB ZBCLB BX-BBLZI CCLBNL                   *
*CBCCB NL BBLCB CBBLBCL* BCLL BZLCCLB BLL BBLZBB                       *
*C*NLI ZBCLB BLBZL BBCBNLLLB BXL BCBLLLB LBCLL ZLCCLB                  *
*                                                                      *
*BCLLLL BLLCCB BLT-LLLLLBLB BZ NLBC*                                   *
* BZLBB CBLLNB BLLLLBL NBXBL BBZBLLB LCCLLBLBB BZ                      *
*ZBLLB ZBLCBB BLLBLB NZN LLBL CBCLCB BZ BZBXLB BBLCBZLL               *
*ZN CBZ BNLCB BXC CCLBBB BZ BBBBZ CL BLLBLBLBB LLCZL                   *
*BLLBLB BBBBZ-BI BZ BCLB BZLI LBI BZ BBBBL-CLLBBL                      *
*                                                                      *
*BLBLBB  BZ LBLNZ CNLB,I*                                              *
*BNBLLBCLB  CBZLCB BCZ- BBNLLL BBBB BZLLZ BNL BZ                       *
* BBBLCLB BZBLB LBCLLLBZLLB NLBI LNL XLCB BBZLLLLB                     *
*LBBBBLB BBCCLCB BZ LLLLBL NBXBL-BBZBLLB BBNLX LCBLLBL                *
*                                                                      *
*LBLB*                                                                 *
*LBBB ZNBL BNLLLBLB BZ BBLLBLLB BNBLLLCLB CLL,B                        *
*BBLCB BBXC LZBZI BBCCBB CLLBLLB BNBLLLCLB BZ LCLBB                    *
*                                                                      *
*B*L*C                                                                 *
*                                                                      *
*B,B, LBB, LBB,B                                                       *
*                                                                      *
*LNB BBBBZB                                                            *
*                                                                      *
*CLLL CLLBL/BLLL                                                       *
*                                                                      *
*                                                                      *
*                                                                      *
*                                                                      *
*CL:B                                                                  *
*B-:LLB/CL:CBZ/BB:B:BI/12DD:BI/241287:NB/TCS:BI1-B                     *
*XZ:BBBLL                                                              *
*BCLCD:CZ/12557                                                        *
*                                                                      *
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*                                                                ** *
*                                                               **  *
* BLBZ 01   BBLI 21          BLLL CLLBL          CCCB **          *
* LD 1    BBLI 2                                                      *
*   BNLLI : 12.12.2                                                    *
* 12557                                                                *
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TYPE REQUIRED-PRINT FORM

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

17557 תאריך : 25.12.87
דף 1 מתוך 3
עותק 7 מתוך 12 סודי ביותר נכנס

חוזם:12,17557
אל:המשרד
מ-:ווש,נר:705,תא:241287,זח:1200,דח:מ,סג:סב
נר:@

סודי ביותר/מיידי

ראש הממשלה

מ'מ' רהמ' ושה'ח

ח.ר.ב.

הערכת המצב דלהלן התגבשה בימיים האחרונים של רגיעה
בשטח לאחר האירועים של השבועיים האחרונים ביו'ש
ועזה.

1.ההשפעה המצטברת של דיווחי אמצעי-התקשורת מהארץ ובמיוחד
התמונות הקשות והברוטליות אותן ראו צופי הטלויזיה
האמריקניה בתקופה הנל- השאירו משקע שלילי מאד על
תדמיתה של ישראל בארה'ב.

הודעות הממשל-הן של הבית הלבן והן של מחמד-פורטמן
לא בשל הערכת מצב פנימית של הממשל כי הודעותיהם יובלו
לתרום להרגעת הרוחות אלא יותר בתגובה על הלחצים שהופעלו
עליהם בתוצאה מדיווחי אמצעי התקשורת ופניותיהם של
שגרירי מדינות ערב-ידידותיה של ארהב.

2.אין לפרש היעדר התבטאויות מצד סנטורים וחברי קונגרס
כהבנה או תמיכה בעמדתנו. חברי הקונגרס היו עסוקים
ממש עד הרגע האחרון לפני צאתם לפגרת חג-המולד בנושאי
תקציב ובכלכלה ומדיניות ארהב באמרכ'ז.

התבטאויותיו של חבר הקונגרס לי המילטון שהיתה ביקורתית
שיקפה לדעתי הלך-רוח בקרב מרבית חברי הבית והסנט

דף 2 מתוך 3
עותק 7 מתוך 12

אף כי מטעמים טקטיים-חלקם העדיפו שלא להתבטא.

3. האימפקט השלילי של הדיווחים על האירועים בארץ גרמו
מבוכה ודאגה רבה בקרב ראשי הארגונים היהודיים.הדבר
ניכר היטב בפגישתי עם ראש מועדון הנשיאים ב-21 דנא.ההודעה
שפורסמה על ידי המועדון בעקבות הפגישה הנל הביעה
אמנם תמיכה בממשלת ישראל ובכל הצעדים שננקטו על ידינו
אך עלי לציין כי הרגשתי לא מעט מהמבוכה והבקורת
הקשה שבאה לידי ביטוי בשאלותיהם של ראשי הארגונים
היהודיים על שאין אנו נותנים תשומת לב מספקת לדאגותיהם
4. השאלה שעולה עתה בכל חריפותה ואשר תמשיך ללוות
אותנו בחודשים הקרובים היא:- מהן הצעותיה של ישראל
לגבי המשך התהליך המדיני ופתרון השאלה הפלשתינית.התרשמתי
של ראשי מערכות,פרשנים ועורכים כי מוטלת עתה על
ישראל האחריות להעלות ביתר מרץ ובמשנה-תוקף - הצעות
חדשות ותכניות לפתרון השאלה הנל.

5. בשלב המיידי נצטרך להתמודד באתגר פרסומי המוצג לנו
במלוא חריפותו על ידי דוברי הממשל והיא-סוגיית הטיפול
בפיזור הפגנות ומאבקיהן . בבואנו לטפל במעצרם של מסיתים
ומארגני ההפגנות מן הראוי לקחת בחשבון שעתה יותר
מתמיד יהיו עיני אמצעי התקשורת ונציגי הממשל ערים
וקשובים לכל פעולה של מערכת הבטחון

שאלת הצטיידות צהל באמצעים הדרושים להתמודדות נגד
מפגינים תמשיך לעמוד במרכז טיעוניו של הממשל נגדנו.

6. קיימים סימנים ראשונים שהמועמדים הדמוקרטים לנשיאות
יעלו בהודעותיהם בקורת נוקבת על הממשל על חוסר יוזמה
והתמדה במאמציו ליישוב הסכסוך ישראל-ערב.

7. ברור לי היטב ואני חוזר על כך בכל התבטאות פומבית
כי אסור לפעול בלחץ האירועים האחרונים ,אך עלינו
לדעת כי כל ידידינו בממשל ומחוץ לממשל כאחד- מצפים
לשמוע בהקדם מממשלת ישראל מחשבות ויוזמות חדשות.

אין לי ספק שעם שובו של הקונגרס מפגרה ועם שובם של
ראשי הממשל מחופשת סוף השנה- שאלות אלו תועלינה במלוא
עוצמתן .

דף 3 מתוך 3
עותק 7 מתוך 12

בהיעדר יוזמה בזאת מצידנו ,בחשש ליוזמות -אם של הממשל
או של גורמים אחרים -עליהן נצטרך להגיב ונצטייר כמי
שנגררים בעל כרחם לתהליך המדיני.נראה לי שגם במחצית
הראשונה של 88 ניתן יהיה להגיע להבנה בסיסית עם הממשל
לגבי הפרמטרים של התהליך ולבסס העקרונות המנחים את
התהליך המדיני במסמך -הבנה משותף

לאור כל האמור לעיל,נראה לי שזו השעה לעשות מאמץ מיוחד
כדי להוציא התהליך המדיני מקפאון

ארד

תפ: שהח,רהמ,מנכל

17560

תאריך : 25.12.87
דף 1 מתוך 2
עותק 5 מתוך 32 סודי ביותר נכנס

הודעה:12/17560
אל:המשרד
מ-:רש/נר:703/תא:241287/דת:1800/דת:מ/סג:סב
נד:@

(1) [illegible]
(2) [illegible]
(3) [illegible]

סודי ביותר/מידי

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני

דע - מנכ"ל ממרחם
ומנכ"ל צנ"א -

נגישת ראשי מועדון הנשיאים עם סגן המזכיר ווייהאז

משלחת של מועדון הנשיאים בראשות מוריס איירם אשר
נללה ב-35 מראשי האירגון נפגשה הבוקר עם סגן המזכיר
ווייטהאז

נכחו:- מוכי, וילקוקס והירש.

איירם פתח בהצהרה שהגיעה תמיכה במאמצי ישראל להרגיע
את המצב בשטחים תוך הגלת האחריות הבלעדית של המסיתים
והמתפרעים. בדבריו ביקר קשות הודעת הבית הלבן והודעת
מחמ"ד וציין הסתייגותם ואכזבתם מעמדת הממשל.

בתגובתו ציין ווייטהאד כי ידאי שמר לב שהודעת מחמ"ד
היתה יותר מאוזנת מהודעת הבית הלבן וכי על אן הבקורת
- היזיזות והתמיכה בישראל-בממשל- איתנה. עם זאת המצב
בשטחים היום מדאיג מאוד. ההפגנות לדעת ארה"ב היו
ספונטניות. הוא ביקר השימוש בנשק חם בנסיון לעצור ההפגנות.
הוסיף כי זה בשנה שארה"ב מליצה בפני ישראל לרכוש
גיוד לניפול בהפגנות וכי ישראל לא הגיבה להמלצות
אלה. הם מבקשים שישראל תגלה התאפקות מירבית בטיפולה
בהפגנים. לדברי ווייטהאד מדינות אחרות מפעילות שיטות
יותר' בטיפולן בהפגנות רבות משתתפים.

דף 2 מתוך 2
עותק 5 מתוך 32

בעקבות דבריו של וייטהאד התפתח דיון בו דחה אייבס
את הערותיו של וייטהאד על היחס הבוקשה מצד ישראל.

בחלק זה של השיחה ציין וייטהאד שעמדת ארה"ב היא שהסטטוס
קוו אינו יכול להימשך ויש להפשיר את הקפאון ולהתחיל
התהליך מחדש.

בתשובה לשאלה השיב מרפי כי אין לארה"ב מדיניות אחרת
אלא 242.

בסיכום ציין וייטהאד כי על אף המתח הנוכחי-ארה"ב לא
תרשה לאירועים אלה לקלקל היחסים המיוחדים עם ישראל.

בשלב האחרון של השיחה הוא פנה לנוכחים וציין כי מאחר
ויודע לו כי השפעתם בישראל רבה וממשלת ישראל מגלה
ארזן קשבה לדבריהם הוא קורא להם לפעול בלבי במשלה
ישראל בדי שהיא תמצא דרכים הומניות יותר לטפל במצב
ולבמצם האלימות.

בתור כן פנה אליהם להביא את ממשלת ישראל המאוחדת לחידוש
התהליך השלום ולעיין מחדש באפשרות כינוסה של ועידה
בינלאומית.

ארז.===

תפ: שהת,רהם,שהבט,מנכל,מנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,נירן,מצפא

24.12

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

מה/כ"מ
מ"מ קבוע.
אריה

יד' כסלו תשמ"ח
8 בדצמבר 1987

נפת ה

1830

אל : מר אריה מקל, היועץ המדיני, לשכת רה"מ

מאת : יהודית ורנאי-דרנגר, ס/מנהל מחלקת צפון אמריקה, משה"ח

הנדון: ביקור יו"ר בית הנבחרים באמריקני - JIM WRIGHT

1. ב- 21.12.87 יגיע ארצה לביקור פרטי, יו"ר בית הנבחרים האמריקני ג'ים רייט וישהה בארץ עד ה- 28.12.87.

רייט יטול חלק בישיבת הנעילה של ועידת "פורום קירקפטריק" ואח"כ הביע רצונו להשאר בארץ כדי להשתתף במיסת בית-לחם ב- 24/12 ולטייל בארץ.

2. בגלל מעמדו הרם של האורח (השלישי בחשיבותו בארה"ב - לאחר הנשיא וסגן הנשיא) ובשל היותו של ביקור זה , הביקור הראשון של יו"ר בית הנבחרים בישראל, נודה על הסדרת פגישה עם רה"מ .

התאריך המועדף הוא יום ד' 23/12.

3. רייט מגיע ארצה בלוויית רעייתו וזוג חברים. החברים לא ישתתפו בפגישה אך ככל הנראה יבקשו להצטלם בחברת רה"מ.

4. עורכת התכנית במשה"ח היא הגברת חנה דביר ממאו"ר , טלפון: 303-651 .

ב ב ר כ ה,
יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.
יהודית ורנאי-דרנגר

ISRAEL ישראל

מדינת ישראל

תאריך 10-12-1987

אל: מתן

מאת: לשכת ראש־הממשלה. / רמ"י

תנ"ל בתיר, מאוד:

הייתי בקשר לפגישת
רה"מ עם מר ריטן, דובר
בית הנבחרים האמריקאי.

בסביבת
הדברים
מקום לפורום
מן קיקה אחרון

מתקשים לרוסיל לבקשה –
הוא מקום לא לבדו
אלא עם פמלייה גם
חברי קונגרס, שרים, עוצרים,
פלמ"ידים ובעיות השטחים שבד.

בלמס ידנא

מדדם:12/17239
אל:בי/1044/ורש/749
מ-:המשרד/תא:241207/זת:1739/רח:1/מ:ב
נד:6

בהול/בלמס

אל: ניו יורק - ידיד
וושינגטון - נעים, גל

הקלטת דברי ערפאת ברדיו בגואד.

איתרנו ההקלטה ומעבירים ברגע זה ברדיו-טלפון למרכז הרדיו. תשומת לבכם שמדובר בקריין המקריא את המסר של ערפאת בתאריך 10.12.87 ולא בקולו של ערפאת עצמו. במסר קורא ערפאת בין היתר לאוכלוסיה המקומית להתמיד בנחישותה, להגביר המהלומות ולהלחם מלחמת קודש עד שיונף דגל פלשתין וגו'.

מנהל הסברה

ר.י.

תס: שהח/רהמ/מבכל/ממנכל/שהבט/ליאור/מזתים/אביטל/מעת/הסברה/
בהנא/ר/מרכז/ממד/בירן/מצפא

16636 תאריך : 24.12.87

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בלתם בנס

תדזס:12/15636
אל:המשרד
מ-:לוסאנגלס/נר:90/תא:231257/זת:1000/דת:מ/סג:ב
נד:0

בלמס/מידי

אל:מצבא
דש:הסברה רוש

מאת:הסברה לוסאנגלס

הנדון:הפגנה

אתמול התקיימה בחזית הקונסוליה הפגנה של כמאתיים איש בגנות טיפוליבו במהלכה בשנתים. עפ"י הערכות היו בשלושה רבעים מהמשתתפים ערבים. בין האחרים היתה גם כנופיה של הניו גואיש אגנדה,שהגישה לנו אגרת מתאה.

המפגינים נשאו כרזות בגנות ישראל הבזכות אשן, שאת דגלו הניפו.

ההפגנה זכתה לכיסוי במסגר תחבות טלויזיה ורדיו מקומיות.

אנו התראיינו בהגובה.

אלגר.

הע: שחה,רהם,נבל,מסנבל,שהבס,בירן,מצבא,אביסל,משת,הסברה,
בהנא,ליאור,מזתים,מתאמשנחים

16588 תאריך : 24.12.87

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

נכנס בלמס

חוזם:15688,12
אל:המשרד
מ-:נ'י,נר:711,תא:231287,זח:1600,נח:מ,סג:ב
בד:@

בלמס/מידי

אל-: מעת

דע-: מצפא, וושינגטון (נרדן 151)

דע בנחון
מאת: עתונות/ניו יורק

RCV: 31IM/6.00174 LINE: 6

NEWS SUMMARY DECEMBER 23,1987

EDITORIALS-

NYP, ATTENTION IRANIAN BAZAARS, KHORASSANI, THE FORMER UN AMBASSADOR IS A PETTY THIEF, SAVED BY DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY WHEN CAUGHT SHOP LIFTING.

OP-ED-

NYT, SAFIRE, PALESTINIANS HOPE VIOLENCE WILL PAY OFF. SOMEDAY THERE WILLBE ARABS WILLING TO DEAL TO GET A SAFE LAND SETTLEMENT.(CABLED)

NYP, BUCHANAN, CAN ISRAEL REMAIN DEMOCRATIC AND JEWISH? SHE CAN'T DIGEST ALL THE UNHAPPY ARABS. SHE CAN+T HAVE GAZA INDEPENDENT.(CABLED)

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

PRESS REPORTS-

NYT, SHIPLER, REAGAN PUBLICALLY CRITICIZED ISRAEL OVER TROOP BEHAVIOR. (CABLED)(ND,DN,NYP,WSJ)

NYT, KIFNER, ISRAELI LEADERS ARE STICKING TOGETHER IN THE FACE OF THE OUTSIDE THREAT.(CABLED)

NYT, P. LEWIS, THE UN ADOPTED A RESOLUTION +DEPLORING+ ISRAELI HANDLING OF THE DISTURBANCES. THE US ABSTAINED.(CABLED)

ND, GOODMAN, +THE ANGER, HATRED AND FEROCITY+ OF THE GAZA KIDS IS DIFFERENT THAN BEFORE AND SEEMS TO MARK A CHANGE IN RELATIONS WITH OCCUPIED PALESTINIANS. THE KIDS FEEL DESERTED BY PLO INACTIVITY AND ARAB DOWNPLAYING OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND ARE CREATING MARTYRS AND FEEL THEY HAVE NOTHING TO LOOSE. ISRAELI LEADERS ARE STYMIED AND SEE EARLIER DREAMS FADING. IN VIEW OF THE GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY OF GAZA ISRAELIS SEE NO SOLUTIONS.THINGS WILL GET WORSE UNLESS A SOME LEADER FINDS SOME WAY OUT.

ND, IRAQI JETS MADE A RARE LONG-RANGE RAID ON FOUR TANKERS USEDAS STORAGE NY IRAN. IRANIAN GUNBOATS ATTACKED A SWEDISH TANKER.(NYP,NYT, DN)

NYT, ARMS DEALINGS BY FRANCE WITH IRAN BAGAN IN 1983 ANDARE REPORTED TO HAVE CONTINUED THROUGH THIS SUMMER, UNDER CHIRAC AS WELL AS MITTERAND. CHIRAC SAID NO RANSOM WAS PAID FOR THE HOSTAGE RELEASE.

WSJ,TANNER J POWER, OIL PRICES JUMPED ON REPORTAS THAT OPEC WAS CUTTING BACK ONPRODUCTION. OPEC MONITORS SAID THEY HAVE SEEN NO SIGN OF A DECREASE.

NYT, GERMAN TV TALK SHOW HOST, WERNER HOFER QUIT AFTER HIS NAZI PAST WAS DISCUSSED IN MAGAZINE. THIS WAS NOT NEW INFORMATION. MANY FEEL HE SHOULD STAY, AS HE A ATONED FOR HIS PAST.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ITONUT - NEW YORK

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,אמן,קלדררי,מעת,
הסברה,לעמ,דרצ-ים,דוב,בדנר,צנזוררצבאי,מצפא,ברנ,תפוצות,
ממאבטחים,דרב-ים,צנזוררצבאי

ביקרינס מאוזלה
מכשן לאומי

SIDE B

CHAIRMAN

I invite the Honorable Mr. Thomas Pickering the Ambassador from the United States to talk on possible changes in the political economic relations between the U.S. and Israel as a result of the recent economic situation in the U.S. Please

THOMAS PICKERING

Since a certain amount of this has already been covered I am going to try and put this in a framework in which we can compress a little bit what I had to say. I feel a little bit like the man in the famous story, who one evening was found by a policeman looking at the ground intensively underneath the street lights, the policeman said what are you looking for He said, I lost my dollar, I can't find it he said let me help you where did you lose it, he said way down the street over there, and he said, why are you looking here, and he said well the lights are tremendous amount better here.
So we have a little bit of the same problem, in trying to deal with the situation. I think that at the bedrock of how these influences are likely to affect you is basically the situation with respect to our relationship. I don't need to repeat for this group, many of whom I have already repeated this before to ad nauseum, the basis for our relationship. It is a friendship that is important we have shared values, we have democracy , we have acommon religious and ethical heritage, we have a common experience in struggles for freedom and human rights both of us strongly support democratic government , individual rights, in a fair judicial system, a sense of pioneering spirit

THOMAS PICKERING, cont'd

and a common heritage. We also have a shared desire for security for stability, and freedom in this area, and that is a basic area for our cooperation. Our strategic and intelligence cooperation is well known. Israel is a major name, non-nato ally, the recent memorandum of understanding signed in Washington, by Minister Rabin, is an indication of the furthering of our strong defense relationship. We have informal cooperation, but we also have very important official formal cooperation, we have institutionalized cooperation. That means basically we have regular meetings and regular groups at pre-planned basis to discuss and deal with important issues.
Some of those military, military assistance, military strategic cooperation, but also economic planning and economic consultation. Something called the joint economic development group. Which has a great deal to do and say about basically some of the issues which you are discussing.
You participate in a lot of our business and we in a lot of yours, and I mean in the business business, not the political business. SDI, Hi-tech programs of cooperation, programs of joint defense research, the US military and economic support for Israel, is an important part of the relationship. You buy most of what we produce in the defense field, without interruption. You get 3 billion dollars worth of assistance, that is of course an important factor in the future thinking on this question. And we give you lots of diplomatic coopeeation and support, despite the fact that we differed with you last evening on an important vote

THOMAS PICKERING, cont'd

in the UN, the basis of our support is a biding and important and in far out ways the areas where we have differences, a key factor is obviously the support on the important question, social, political economic and ethical of Soviet Jewry. I don't expect this relationship, which is fundamental is likely to change in significant, catastrophic, or other ways in the future. Sure we have some serious problems, particularly in the economic area, and in fact, we share some serious problems in the economic area, we have just been hearing about them.

Despite the strong econony in a basic sense, the U.S., shares a similar series of difficulties with Israel. We precede in that strong economy from a growth rate of 3.7% in the first 9 months, of this year. An inflation rate of about 4%, for 1987, and we hope that level or less for 1988, unemployment level in the U.S. down to 6%, one of the lowest we had in many years. Our problems are like your problems, however, we have a tremendous trade deficit, we have a budget deficit, with which threatens the future of our economy, we have a military in the defense burden which sops up a very large share of our resources, and this burden very much like your own, is not one we can find easy ways to postpone. Or to ignore.

Recently, the dollar is continued to weaken against the major currencies. An 8-9% drop since just mid-October. The stock market as we all know, painfully declined roughly 20% in one day, and it continues to fluctuate about a dollar average of about 1800 or 1900 or so. And we are all increasingly concerned, as you have heard about problems of recession.

THOMAS PICKERING= cont'd

Clearly, all of us are trying to work in ways to avoid a major recessionary crisis. In the months and the years ahead. We have a depressed investment spending in 1987, which could well lead to lower growth in the U.S. in 1988. Our savings rate is low. Around 3%. We have a problem of uncertainty in monetary policy, which can affect interest rates in liquidity, the situation which is not absolutely unknown in th is country. And the severity of our budget deficit has caused the congress to impose upon itself the automatic application of cuts under the Gram Rudman Hallings Law. The automatic cuts, I am happy to say, at least as of now, have been avoided by the president's signature, late yesterday of a budget law, but they remain looming, and obviously if we are unable to work out the details of how to h andle our revenues and our budget cuts, in the years ahead, and in the months ahead, this automatic mechanism we have imposed on ourselves, will continue to have affect. For example, if we had had to implement sequestration, the automatic cuts under Gram Rudman Hallings, we would have had to cut foreign assistance across the board. Much further than it is already been cut. Including programs for Israel and Egypt, which h a ve heretofore been ear marked or protected against such cuts in the regular budget. Our problems are causing changes in ways that have already begun to affect you in this country. Some are inadvertent, and some are universal in that sense the weaker dollar, clearly affects your export picture, your trade deficit and your foreign debt picture.

THOMAS PICKERING, cont'd

The weaker dollar erodes the buying power of your record level of foreign exchange reserves. The deficit reenforces, unfortunately protection is sentimets in the public and in the congress and in the U.S., in areas where those people would seek to restrict access, by Israel and many others to U.S. markets.

The stock market decline may well make it difficult to proceed as aggressively; as rapidly, and as forthrightly as some wish to do in Israel on privatization.

Some are conscious and specific issues, which have begun to affect you. Particularly changes or possible changes in the assistance program of the U.S. Given previous budget cuts in the last 3 years, we have already, today, seen a reduction in the total resources available for foreign assistance, from 23 billion dollars, 3 years ago, to around or less than 14 billion dollars now. An enormous drop. This has severely restricted our ability to meet our commitments and pursue our security in economic and humanitarian, and political and military interests around the world.

In Nato, for example, we have slashed aid to Spain, by 73%

Our assistance to Greece and Turkey has dropped by hundreds of millions of dollars, below the level that the administration believes is necessary for th em to meet their defense commitments under the Nato treaty.

Our assistance to Portugal is short 62M dollars. In Philippines in an area of continuing crisis, we are falling short of our commitments on aid. In Central America, a preoccupation very

THOMAS PICKERING, cont'd

close to home, we are more than 500M dollars behind the target assistance levels, which we felt we should meet. I n Africa, we can meet only 30% of our foreign assistance commitments.
So far, we have been able to meet our commitments to Israel and to Egypt. And it is the intention of this administration to meet the promises which it has made to Israel for the next year until it is term of office is over.
The Free Trade Agreement maintains and strengthens bi-lateral ties, between our two countries, despite the protection and sentiments which are growing in the U.S.
Now how will changing events in th e United States, further affect Israel? It is becoming obvious that in the face of future cuts, it is going to be harder and harder for us to shelter the Israeli and the Egyptian programs. Most likely assistance will continue to decline in real terms, in any event. The affects of inflation have already been felt for 2 years, in the Israel program. It is possible assistance could decline in nominal terms. Israel and Egypt have already 65 to 7% of the total of all remaining U.S. military assistance world wide. It is not happy necessarily, to be seen as being a half or more of the 65% remaining. Alternative forms of assistance, lump sum, economic stabiliazation or security fund payments had at the beginning of the year. Increased endowments for bilateral foundations, maybe increasingly hard for Israel and the United States to manage.
Our fortunes specifically are economic fortunes clearly, directly affedt this country.

THOMAS PICKERING, cont'd

in the first place, there are regional political and security concerns. Such questions as the peace and stability of Nato, of what is happening in Egypt, of what is going on in Africa, are likely to impact on the overall peace and security of the Middle East region.

The war in the Persian Gulf, clearly is one of those factors.

Secondly, with respect to Israel's national security concern, our ability to continue to provide the grant resources for foreign military sales, to Israel, is a key factor in the development of both your security and your economic health.

At the same time, that these factors are important, I want to assure you that we are very sensitive to the difficulties, which your own military industry and employment has suffered following the decision to cancel the Lavi. In that sense, we have already carried forward a number of positive steps to deal with this issue.

In what I call the first tier of steps. The immediate reaction.

We h ave continued our commitment through the life of this administration to provide 1.8 billion dollars in the fiscal years 88 and 89. We gave immediate agreement that U.S. foreign military sales funds, could be used to pay the termination costs for the Lavi contracts. We increased from 300 million dollars to 400 million dollars, the amount of U.S. assistance money that could be used directly here in Israel.

We kept along despite a very carefully considered decision to cut it out 150 million dollars each year, as against zero which was our projection for directed off sets in connection with our military program.

THOMAS PICKERING, cont'd

Those were the immediate steps, what I call the second tier. Which is now being worked on.

The second tier was to provide you with an F16 pricing arrangement which was competitive with the F16'swhich you bought in the beginning in 1983, and up until now, the proposals that have been made have either beaten or equaled the prices which Israel was offered in 1983.

We have given you direct for the first time assistance, on the part of the United States in the negotiations with the various companies in the United States involved in terminating the Lavi contracts. We have given you access to a number of new American systems in the military field. Air to air missiles, special targeting equipment, for advanced aircraft, and just last week we agreed to a very advantageous split on th e costs for a research program in the area of Air tight tactical ballistic missiles.

The third tier, what is now in work, and what has come already as the result of the Minister's visit in the last 2 weeks.

The third tier is that we have a new memorandum of understanding. Which is a more equitable, I think very advantageeus for Israel 2 way street, on further defense acquisitions.

We have completed, or almost completed a very important program in the modernization of the basic artillery weapon, which is central to your forces and ours.

We have agreed to participate in financing and purchasing in Israel, a very important program updating one of our best attack

THOMAS PICKERING, cont'd

helicopters. We have purchased Israeli, remotely piloted vehicles for the U.S. Navy, and other services are interested. WE are working together on a new modern combat engineering vehicle, and we have begun the process of purchasing a number of advanced Israeli weapons in the aerial standoff area, which will be very important to the future of the U.S.

The key for you all in the future, from our point of view, hinges around the question of growth, and growth in the main, in our projection and at least in our assessment, for Israel and its economy, hinges on the growth in exports.

There are already some existing mechanisms in place to deal with this question. The free trade agreement continues to stand, and U.S. markets ought to remain open to Israel despite growing protection and sentiment. The weaker dollar of course, erodes the value of some of your export earnings, but it does increase your competitevness in the non dollar markets around the world.

On going efforts, which we support in this area , clearly involves such questions as privatization, which we feel is an important potential contributing area to growth in your economy. This requires obviously, a long term overhaul or restructuring of some of your views, on h ow the public economy works, in order to reinvograte the private sector, with the advantages we think that brings.

Capital market reforms. The government is clearly seeking to reduce administrative strictures, and government reliance on the capital market, as efforts to find ways to free up more capital

THOMAS PICKERING, cont'd

resources for private investment.

Tax reform, the reordering of the tax structure for both direct and indirect taxes in our view, could contribute to revatilazation of the economic system, increase social equity and enhance revenues. We think the Usshinsky Committee is an important second step to the decisions already taken last year, but hopefully it would not be the last and final word, as you move ahead.

What can happen next? Clearly we believe you have excellent economists, and indeed excellent politicians, who will find the right course to growth. In the area of investment, the government could well streamline the investment bureacracy. Encourage venture capital to come to this country, and attract more service industries which will support the capital market.

You can complete the promises of the 1985 stabilization program, by continuing to reduce public employment, curtail public expenditure, and examine the delivery of social services.

What can Israel expect from the U.S.? Economically, it is in the long term interests of both of our states, to lessen the heavy economic dependence of Israel upon the U.S.

Most important to the United States in th is sense, is that Israel economic independence, assures Israel as a future self-relient partner and ally for the United States. My boss, Secretary Schultz, himself, with something of a reputation as an economist, has taken upon himself a personal interest in stgengthening your own economy. The U.S. over the past years has given very strong encouragement and special financial aid

THOMAS PICKERING: cont'd

to your own efforts, to reform the economic structure, the efforts which concentrate on the programs that I just mentioned. Capital market, reform, privatization in tax reform.

Many prominent, international economists, including Milton Friedman, continue to believe that aid shelters a country. And it keeps it from standing on its own 2 feet.

For Israel, a stronger economy is essential to a strong defense, and we believe that Israel can best negotiate a secure peace treaty from a position of strength.

For us, of course, there would be decreased pressure on our own budgetary resources. Politically, we continue to believe that only a secure peace, can assure a long term future.

We just celebrated the 10th anniversary of the Sadat visit here, and the historical landmark of peace with Egypt.

END OF SIDE B

MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS AND PLANNING

23.12.87

THOMAS PICKERING (continued)

We are proud of what we have been able to do in the past in helping to bring peaceful relations with your neighbors. We remain committed to nurture peace and to try to expand the family of peace partners. We are committed to seeking out all possible avenues, as the Secretary told the Prime Minister recently, including an international conference as a need to achieve bilateral negotiations. Both the Secretary and Frank Calucci have felt for a long time that we are pursuaded that Jordan needs an international mechanism to get the bilateral talks, which we and Israel and Jordan all agree are necessary. In the Arab world there have been changes too, which are likely to affect these situations. The Amman Summit eight years after the peace treaty permitted the Arab states to resume bilateral relations, including the fact that now two thirds of the members of the Arab League have diplomatic relations with Egypt, while the peace treaty stands. They have demonstrated that they recognize that the peace with Egypt is a permanent and compatible question with Egyptian Arab world relations. The Summits also, in our view, again for moderate voices in the Arab world. The communique condemned terrorism and called for a negotiated peace with Israel and the PLO's own fortunates declined. We continued to believe that the Lebanon experience demonstrated that military success alone is not the way to bring peace to Israel. It probably can't do it. Just as military defeats have not destroyed Palestinian demands to participate in shaping their own future.
A way must be found, and we continue to be dedicated to looking at the possibilities to move toward peace, both to meet your security needs and legitimate Palestinian rights.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS AND PLANNING

23.12.87

Recent events in this area and in the territories show that there is no valid status quo option. Without progress we undergo increased risks of turmoil, discontent, frustration, conflict and even war. Our economic fortunes will not affect our own concern for either the peace process or for the quality of life in the territories. We made a commitment and we intend to keep it in that particular area. We look at two pillars of our policy to proceed. One, active efforts and peace; secondly, trying to find ways to continue to improve the quality of life. The quality of life effort is not in our view a substitute for the peace process, but an accompanyment. To achieve this we have already provided $76 million to fund projects over the last few years of private organizations in the West Bank and Gaza. These funds are in the area of health and social services development, long term economic development and employment creation. The major impediment to furthering these activities is our own inability to fund a program adequately. In 1987 we hope to put in $18 million, we only got 8.5. In 1988 we asked for twelve, and if we receive less than that from the Congress, clearly, we cannot undertake all of the projects that are ready.

We have also been supporting the Jordan program, which focuses on infrastructure development, education and agriculture. They have put in 18.5 million since 1985. We are asking this year for up to 30 to be our contribution to that program.

If we cannot fund these programs we will not drop our commitment, but obviously, our capacity to deliver will decline. We also seek to keep options open as we search for a way to get to direct negotiations. We have urged steps to improve opportunities and to ease the restrictions of

life under occupation. These two are not a substitute for peace negotiations, but they can assist in the process of getting negotiations started and obviously, peace in the area would have enormous effects on the economic future of Israel and the region as a whole.

Some of the steps we have taken in a non-monetary area include encouraging Israel to appoint more Arab mayors; the reestablishment of an Arab bank in the West Bank; and the expansion of the number of branches in that bank; finding ways to increase Palestinian opportunities to external trade, and in expanding that possibility.

Stability in the area, in our view, requires hope for political progress as well. We, in that sense, have fully supported the efforts of the European Economic Community to open up direct trade for the Palestinians in the area of agriculture, between them and the West Bank and Gaza and the outside world. And we continue to remain as concerned in human rights terms about the reunification of families from the Soviet Union, as we do about the reunification of Palestinian families.

Of deep concern concern to us is the increasing despair among people who see little hope for the future. It's an important, and I think significant, psychological factor in the present situation.

We continue, obviously, as we said last evening, to oppose violence from any side. We believe that the tensions in the territories have been compounded by the actions which the security forces have had to take. But even if there were not the dangers of increasing despair, the prospect of Israel remaining in control of a large and ever growing minority population is of great security concern to the United States, as well as it ought to be, in our view, to Israel and obviously that has economic consequences.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS AND PLANNING

23.12.87

This brings me back to the beginning of my remarks. Our shared values and our common goal of a negotiated peace between Israel and all of its neighbors will have an important, indeed salient influence, on the future of the area. We continue to be dedicated to finding ways that economic freedoms and many more can mark the close special relationship which we share. We continue to be joined with you in the search for security and for peace, and we'll do all that we can not only out of consideration of our own vital interests in the region, but because the basis of our relationship continues close and friendly and because, as President Reagan recently said, we feel we have a moral imperative to do this. Certainly all of our progeny deserve no less.

Thanks for the chance to speak to you about these important questions andf I appreciate the invitation to come.

16288 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 23.12.87

יוצא ** שמור
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חוזם:12,16288
אל:רוש/707
מ-:המשרד,תא:231287,זח:1749,דח:מ,סג:ש
נד:פ

שמור/מיידי

השגריר.

דע:שר התיירות,ראש העיר ירושלים,מנכל מדיני משה'ח.

TRAVEL ADVISORY

א.בשיחה הבוקר עם פיקרינג וסובר (שזומנה ביוזמתם
לנושאים אחרים) העליתי,על דעת רוה'מ,בהמשך לדברי
ראש העיר בתקשורת ולקונכל ארה'ב,את הנושא.
אמרתי כי הדבר איננו מוצדק מכל וכל,הם מענישים
בזאת את תעשיית התיירות ואת אזרחי העיר - במובן
יהודים וערבים כאחת.וזאת כאשר העובדות מדברות בעדן
וירושלים אינה פחות בטוחה מכל עיר בארה'ב שיש בה
לפעמים תקרית.

ב. פיקרינג אמר כי יש אהדה לנושא וכי הוא זה שלחץ,
כשהודיעו לו מוושינגטון ברגע האחרון על הכוונה לכך,
להשתמש בהנחיה מ-1982 ולא לפרסם חדשה.על זאת,לדבריו
מע עד כה כי אין ביטולים בבתי המלון,ועלינו להבין
את אחריותם לאזרחיהם וכו'. השבתי כמתבקש.

ג.אמרתי כי עליהם למצוא דרך לתקן את הדברים בימים
הקרובים.אמר שאם במשך הימים הקרובים כולל חג המולד
ישרור שקט,ישתדל לעשות משהו בכיוון זה.נחיה ונראה.

ד.ניתן על-ידינו פומבי לעצם הפניה אל השגריר,אך לא
לתוכן השיחה מעבר לכך.

א.רובינשטין

צש

תפ: שהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,בירן,מצפא,שרהתיירות,מנכלתיירות,
מזכירהממשלה,פטדיקולק

** NXTT ELTN **
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12/16345:DTTN
714/BTT:ZN
0:20/0:07/1540:07/231287:NJ:TTMDM:-M
E:T2

HDLLTED TO ZN ERLECL ,ULODLU,"
ULOLLEDP UDLYTEU TEL LRLNZ ZLLMECTOLL' ULE LRUEZED
TMEWUD ZCZ DCELUEL TNRL ZULLMEU DRLCL' LUEN DDLLE CE
DUZEDED MZ UDCEU TZCECL" DEDLECY NUL CE LU,Z TMCU
ULODUE CE MLEL MEMDZE LLCLE NLU,T ULDT ZCCE RUD
TECUEUL" UICLUE LCLE UCMEN ULRLY TDML ZUDMLLU"
HDERLCEED DULULE UDULDLU' CMUDZLLLLU DZTEU INU TMXD
T" TDUMI UMEUU NULUE CE URULLY NLU,T UMLIEU NU

DUZEY MZ ,DLTZDLLU,"
UULZU ZMXLL NZ UDUDLMED LLUEU UDDLD NUL LUEU" DLDL
ZUCLEI DLNM MZ TLLLMED LDMXLED ZLCUZEED LCL, NZN
DEDLECY LDLCL ULDECL' CE TO TNRL ZXTLED' MLEL MZN
TLLDU ZCDLLI MCLCM TMCEI IU TLLED DLLLNU ZUMZ"
XU,Z UZNI TCL MEM UDED ZCMIL ZNXXMED ZN DDZCLED'
MLMZ ULECELU MD' NI DNI CE ULN ZCDU ZMCLM NU NCMZ
TLTM UDULMDLLLU DMLU MDMNLLLU UDZLCLU UDZLLLLU MZ
ULLLMLU ZUD ULDT" DEDLECY NUCD ULLU CE UZD UDLLLED
UCLCLU' ULCLED DMLD NLCD ULCCLD TDUUMT TMLTLLU
NULUE CE ULTL TEI UMNL' TLTL NU UNULD UNDLLDCE MZ
XMLCL TDML ZUXULLUMED ZUZCLUI LDUXCMUD TLUMT,D"
ZCLMNED NULED) UMZLUE NU NE UCDU UMZLDU MZCL LNU
N" TMEUU MD DEDLECY ULED TUMUDDLU DLDL (MILXCU

LL,M MIU LCL, - UCLZ UUXULLU UNDLLDCELU

UMYLEL' UXEL

DLLE / DLLLE

15296

** NXTT ** MULL

** ** ** **

12/15296:DTTN
NZ:LLB/999
U-:UUMLT/UN:Z82122/IU:059/TU:U/DT:B
TL:B

ZZTLLLD LUTMUL UZLU LLUCL UCI MLLLMZLD CCZZU TLMLUU
UTCLUU ZZLCCZ,Z MMLL T-5961 CCMUU ZZLCCZ TNT LLND

UTCLU ZMMLU CI*
TZMUU MMNCLL LCLLD NZL ZLLYLD UCCLUUD TUMLLL LUZLCCZ

MZ ULLCL*
UNCMLL ULXNLD ZUUD TULLLLU LIL LXNU COYMU UUCLIU IL
TO YLLUU ZCYZ CZCZL LC LCULLUL ZCYIL UMLCL NML LCLD
ULLMU LLCL UUUI ZN LZ ULXLNU LLCUU MZ UMLL TLCLD/NZN
TMML ULLLLD LCUZLUUU NULLD TMLL*
TUZLNL CNML UCMLN LUUZLUL TLZLL CCCULU UZCL TUL UCLZ
LCCCLLD NULLD*TLZLLL MZ CMLN NUZLU MZUULLU UUUZUULU MCL
TUULCLUD NCMLD UCZ UZZU UMLL MLCLD/CLXLLD/NCML CUULLU
ZCCLL UY UUCLCU LUMCU UNILUUU NZLU ULLUCL LCNL
CCLD MMLI LNM UMLLLU TLLD MCL U-21*12(LLD UMCLUU)
MLCLLD LCCZZD ZUMLL*UZLCCZ ULU MI ZCI CNML UMUUL CZCZU
UUZLI TUILU UMLL (NLCMLZLCLLCZ)LCCL MUZLCC,Z LUCL
UMLL CULUU LUUZLLLD CMLD TULCMLLU CCL MUMLLLD UCCZZL TUL
ULMZZU ZUMZUU UMLL LCUZLCUL NLCU ULNUU NU UUXT CMUU*
ULCMUL CCCLL MUUCLNLU LLCL UUUI CCLMN ZN ULMZZU LZN
LLCL UUU,I CCLMN CUULI UUZLLLU CLD*
LUCMUL CCCLL NU UUNUL UULLCU MZ LNM UMLLLU MZ UCCLNLU
ZCZMU LNM UMLLLU CCYMUL ULLD MD ZLCC,Z NLUC, CLD*

UUCC,Z CLLI/ UXCN

NZ: UMYLLL LLM

MULL/ULLL

15387 **משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר** תאריך : 12.87

שמור

** יוצא
**
**
**

חוזם:12,15387
אל:ררש/681
מ-:המשרד,תא:221287,זח:1804,דח:מ,סג:ש
נד:8

שמור / מיידי

א.ב. 128

הציר

א. העברנא לגורם מתאים במחמ'ד הסתייגות ראש עיריית ירושלים מדברי הדוברת מחמ'ד ב-21/12 שהגדירה ירושלים באזור לגביו חל TRAVEL ADVISORY ומומלץ לאזרחי ארה'ב לקיים ברור מוקדם בטרם יבקרו בה.

ראש העיר סבור שדברים אלה אינם תואמים המציאות בשטח ובוודאי שאינם תורמים להרגעה הרצויה. הם אף עלולים להתפרש ע'י גורמים קיצוניים בעידוד למעשיהם.

במציאות, ולמרות ההפגנות והנסיונות להפרת הסדר, בכל ממשיכה העיר לקיים חייה הרגילים, תיירים ממשיכים לבקר ולהנות בה וההכנות לקראת חג המולד והשנה האזרחית נמשכות כסדרן כשהמלונות מדווחים על תפוסה גבוהה.

[illegible]. לידיעתכם פניה לקונסוליה האמריקנית בירושלים, כמומלץ ע'י דוברת מחמ'ד, ע'י אזרח אמריקני בבקשת הדרכה נענתה בתשובה שהכל פתוח ובטוח והוא יכול לבקר במקומות הקדושים בירושלים ובית לחם כרצונו.

ג. עם זאת ברור שהודעת דוברת מחמ'ד עלולה לפגוע בתיירות ארצה. קשה להניח שיסוגו מהודעתם אך שמא ניתן לגרום לכך שהדובר יודיע או ישיב לשאלה כי בעקבות בדיקת הנושא הוא יכול לאשר שניתן להמשיך ולבקר בירושלים ובמקומות הקדושים וכי ההכנות לחג המולד בהן נמשכות

כסדרן.

מצפ'א

שש

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,בירן,מצפא,ליאור,מזתים,כהנא,
/גרבז,ממד,אבנת/עיריה

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*USE: MBU/LBD/DCC4/DCCC4/MBCD/CLCM/NLTZD/CLLI/UKCN                  *
*                                                                   *
*                                                                   *
*                                                                   *
*NLLB DZZ-ZMCU LBD,                                                 *
*                                                                   *
*CLLUL*                                                             *
*ZMCD   JA ZMUCMCLU/LIMU ZZN MLMCU/CLLLI UNCLMLZ                    *
*LBD,   UCLLB   MLC/ZCLLD/MMCL  DUCMCD   LLCCD                      *
*                                                                   *
*MUI ZMLLLU*                                                        *
*UCDULL  TDMC/LMUMCMU  CCL LMLNZ TZLMUD,O/LZ UCDCL                  *
*LCLL  LLBD,  ZLLB, LZMCCL  MUZ  MLCLL TMZLDU CLULZ                 *
* UMZZLDMD TDZLLLLLLD*UCN  UCDLU  ZUMCLL  ZNZUL NU                  *
*CLMLLCC  DML  MUMZLLL  TNLUC, ULMDM MU  UNL  ZL                    *
*                                                                   *
* UMLCDMD UNZU*                                                     *
*CLMLLCC  UCDL NLCCL UCCL DUL UUCLZ UDDMZ CCL MCL                   *
*ZZ-   DEPLORE  /NC  CL                                             *
*LDUMCMDD CLLB, LLLCLD  MZ MLCLL  UDLCU   NWBONOD                   *
*LNU/CLLB,  LMCD UNZU  MLLUDLD  ZUCCMU CCL UUMMU                    *
* LCL  UCN UMCLL/CMCLB  UNULLI/UMLCCU LLDLZ ZLLB,*DD                *
*CLMLLCC  UMLC  MUCN  ZCLI  UCDC NZ  LCLL  LLDZ,                    *
*                                                                   *
*L UCCL UMLLL LMZU LCDU*                                            *
*LCLML ZUDDCU/ZLZ UNUMMLD UNZU CCUL  ZMCCM NU NLUC,                 *
*                                                                   *
* MLUZ 4    UUII 02                                                 *
* LD 1    UUII 2                                                    *
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*UZLMUC,O   UUZDU   ZCCLU    NU LMLNZ/UZLCLCLLD                      *
*LUUULCLD LLUL  ULMMLD ZUUCCL  ZUD*ND   UUDCZ                       *
*MZZZLLU*DCUCCL UCLLLI  UMZZZL NMZCL UD UZLCUCLDDLD                 *
*LNUZZL NLUC, ZCCZ LNU-ZN LMLU MLD UCMLZ ZUUCUULLLU                 *
*LUU,  NUL  MLL  AND ULMUC,O UUZLD ZCCLU  NU  LMLNZ                 *
*                                                                   *
*LLUD  LZZZU/CLL ZMCLL NU UUULCLU LUUUCLMLLLU*                      *
*DLLL* JLLDLU  ULCULU  MMLDNU LNCMLL MLCLLD MUU                     *
*CLCCL-ZCLL UUULCLU UZZL/MNLCL NZN LLI CLDDU MZ                     *
* MZ  MUZL UMDULD-LCMCLL IU LM CLLLM ULZZLZ LMLU                    *
*LUU,  CLLL  MNLI ZML CLL MULU NLUC, ZCCL  UULZ,                    *
*                                                                   *
*UMLD ZNUCLLD LZDCCLU UCLLMLD CLLUL*                                *
*CZ MCLUI/CLL ZN ZCLLD MDLCLU LULD- LINU CNML ULN                   *
*CMLLD MULU CLUC  CNLCLZ CU  LC/LUZU ULCI ZMMLI                     *
*NLLLLD ZUUCI  UZZ NLD*LUU, ULCLD MNLI MLL KCN CZMUL                *
*MZ LZM UMLCLU  MCLULU UCDULI MZCL MLMLD UNUCLD                     *
*LLUZ, NUL CL ULN UUZMU ZUCLI NU UDLCLU ZMULU UNUL,                 *
*                                                                   *
*UNZUCDLD UZLCLCLLD CDDULD LCLMLNZ*                                 *
* NLUC,/MZN   ZUCCL   ZMULLU UMLCLD/UMLLL NU CZ                     *
*MZ UCCMUU UNCMLLU MZ   NLUC,/MCI   CZ  MULU  MZ                    *
* ULLI CDLMUC,O  LNUL CL ULN ULLNZ MI ULLLLUD                       *
*CCMLMU  UCLD  MD ULUL LCLZLLCC UMZU LLUU, NU  CLMN                 *
*                                                                   *
*UCLMUC,O                                                           *
*                                                                   *
*NZ:UUMLLL/CNL,D (ULMCL CCL 906)/ UMCLLL LLM                        *
*                                                                   *
*LLL CLLUL/CUZZ                                                     *
*                                                                   *
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*                                                                   *
*CL:B                                                               *
*D-CUMLLI/UN:ZDDLLZ/LU:DCCU/LU:C/DC:DC                              *
*NZ:LLM/ZZZ                                                         *
*ULLDD:CCLMN/CL                                                     *
*                                                                   *
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*                                                                 ** *
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* MLUZ 4    UUII 02          CLLL CLLUL            LLMN **          *
* LD 1    UUII 2                                                    *
*   UNLLI  ZZ-ZL LL                                                 *
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בלמס נבנס

מרדם:12,14972
אל:המשרד
מ-:בי,נר:627,תא:211287,חת:1500,דח:מ,מג:ב
נד:מ

מס/מידי

אל-: מעת

דע-: מצפא, רשינגטרן (נר 128)

מאת: שתרגרת/ניו יורק

NEWS SUMMARY DECEMBER 21, 1987

OP-ED-DN (NELSON) +ISRAEL IS NOW AT PEACE-OR CAN'T YOU TELL?+ (CABLED)

PRESS REPORTS
NYT, KIFNER (FRONT PAGE STORY WITH PHOTO) FACE OF RAGE IN GAZA: FRUSTRATED YOUTH+(CABLED) (ND,DN NYP).

NYT, +PALESTINIAN DEATHS STRAIN ISRAEL'S TIES WITH EGYPT+ (CABLED)

DN, THERE ARE MANY PLEAS BY VARIOUS GROUPS TO LIMIT THE CHRISTMAS FESTIVITIES IN BETHLEHEM AS A PROTEST TO SHOOTINGS IN THE AREA.(NYP)

NYP, BOTH SIDES CLAIMED VICTORY IN BORDER WARFARE BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN.(ND)

WSJ, CHINESE SILKWORM MISSILES ARE APPARENTLY ON

THE WAY TO IRAN DESPITE US PROTESTS.

ND, J. FRIEDMAN, IRAN'S RETIRING ABASSADOR TO THE UN, KHORASANNI, WAS INTERVIEWED AT LENGTH ABOUT HIS MANY DEALINGS, HIS PERSONAL LIFE, ETC.

ND, CHAD REPELLED LIBYAN FORCES ATTEMPTING TO INFILTRATE
WSJ, TANNER, LAST WEEKS DROP IN OIL PRICES SIGNALS THE END OF OPEC PRICE SETTING. THE LONG TIME FLOUTING OF OPEC PRICES BY MEMBER STATES HAS FINALLY REACHED A POINT OF NO RETURN.

OBITUARIES,-

NYT, RABBI LEO JUNG, 95, DIED.(SEE 12-20 CABLE)

LETTERS-

DN, DERID, STOP OBJECTING TO THE PLO IN THE UN. SOUTH AFRICA IS WORSE.

חפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,אמן,קלורי,מעת,
הסברה,לעם,דרצ-ים,דוצ,פדנר,צנדרצבאי,מצפא,נרנ,תפוצות,
מתאשטחים,מזתים

BATCH: MMOL DMLCU LMOL LLLMLU*
,, BL41 XJIOWCL,, - TOOL BATCH : CUTCU NUU * TOOL

BATCH: ALLLL 4N LLLN*
,,NLLIICU LDT4JJ,, - TOOL BATCH: CUTCU NUU* TOOL

: AUL CUTLU *
TOOL BATCH AA CUTCU LLLLMLU JXLCU * TOOL BATCH
B4 BALA TLIOL LDLJJOLLU NLOKU)* ,,LLLJL CLLL,,
* TOOL BATCH :9 CUTCU B4LA B4 IL DLOL / XLL- NL
NLD NL NUL/ LMMU B4 IL DLOL LNUL B4 K,L4O LLOD)
,,OLLMO,, - TOOL BATCH : 6 CUTCU (MMOL DMLCU /
* 4UB4 BDLLLD:
BL41 NJIOWCL,, ,, LLLJL CLLL,, L,,NLLIICU LDT4JJ,,
BMULCUD BDLCIIJLD TNIILCL: ,, 4LONDT4O DLLMO,, ,,
1* MU-21 LMI U-12 LCN BLDLMI 92 BUJMOLLJLU TNLTMU

4UB4 DJCLD LCLLLD B4 BMUDCLU BNLLMJLD TUDBLLU BODLMJLU*

BCLLL: BNLLMJLD TMOUJD

MMU: N4TL/ 4LONDT4O

LM: MM,,U

LM: BATCH-- LLMJLCTOLL--

N4: MXO,,N

T4OO/MJJJL

CL:0
0-:4LONDT4O/CL:77/MN:87/211287:NM/1200:M1/0X:I
N4:MMOL1
BLLO:0269:21

12/14917:מרון
יומן:אל
ב:מ:מ:מ/1500:מר/211287:אמ/626:מב/מב:-מ
מ:מב

מרכז מידע-ישראל יומן

NEWS SUMMARY DECEMBER 19-20
DECEMBER 19-
EDITORIALS-

NO/ THE PALESTINIAN DEMONSTRATIONS ARE AN EXPECTED ATTEMPT TO FOCUS THE ATTENTION LOST BY THE AMMAN SUMMIT. THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXPECTED. WHY NOT FOLLOW REAGAN'S SUGGESTION TO USE RUBBER BULLETS AND AVOID MAKING THE LONGED FOR MARTYRS. ISRAEL HAS A DILEMMA IN OCCUPYING THE AREA. NEGOTIATE. (CABLED)

PRESS REPORTS-

NYT/ KIFNER/ THREE PALESTINIAN DEMONSTRATORS WERE SHOT IN CLASHES THAT DASHED THE GOVERNMENT'S HOPES THAT REINFORCEMENTS WOULD END THE VIOLENCE. MOSLEM FRIDAY PRAYERS WERE ANTI-ISRAELI RALLIES. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM SEEMS TO BE A BIG FACTOR IN THE DEMONSTRATIONS. (DN/ND/NYP)

מרכז מידע-ישראל יומן

NYT/ REAGAN EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE GAZA VIOLENCE.

NYP/ PHOTOS OF SOME US HOSTAGES WERE DISTRIBUTED TO A BEIRUT PAPER. THREATS WERE MADE BY THE ISLAMIC JIHAD FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE SAYING THAT THEY WOULD +USE ALL THE CARDS IT HOLDS+ IF THE SHOOTING OF PALESTINIANS WAS NOT STOPPED.(DN)

NYT/ IRANIANS ATTACKED TWO MORE TANKERS IN THE GULF
ONE NORWEGIAN AND ONE LIBERIAN.

NYP/ LAGNADO/ IVAN BOESKY HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY STUDYING JUDAISM AT THE JTS.

ND/ SOME JEWISH NURSING HOME RESIDENTS HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING THE CUSTOM OF BIKOR CHOLIM AT A NEARBY HOSPITAL.

OBITUARIES-

ND/ RABBI LEO JUNG/ 95/ PROMINENT TALMUDICIST/ AUTHOR TEACHER/ AND LONG TIME RABBI OF THE NEW YORK JEWISH CENTER DIED SATURDAY.

LETTERS-

NYT/GUSMANO/ NIETSCHE WAS NOT ANTI-SEMITIC.IT IS MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISUSE BY NAZIS AND OTHER ANTISEMITES.

NYT/ SASSANZEDEH/ FRANCE SHOULD ALSO (LIKE THE US) BE CONDEMNED FOR DEALING WITH IRAN FOR THE RELEASE OF HOSTAGES. IT WON'T STOP UNTIL THE DEMOCRACIES STOP DEALING WITH IRAN.

ND/ COANGELO/ WE MUST TRUST THE RUSSIANS BECAUSE THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE IF WE WANT TO AVOID NUCLEAR WAR.

DECEMBER 20-

EDITORIALS-

מרכז מידע-ישראל יומן

NYT/ VIRGIN/ ITS HIGH TIME THAT THE US AND THE USSR MATURED IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP. THE INF TREATY IS ONLY A START.

NYT/ WORONZOFF-DASHKOFF ET AL. WE DON'T LIKE OR TRUST GORBACHEV AND ARE PUZZLED AT THE NAIVTE OF THE OTHER AMERICANS.

NYT/ WINSTON PRESS COVERAGE OF RAISA WAS POOR.
SHE IS A STRONG INQUISITIVE WOMEN.

NYT/ COURTNEY/ REPORTERS HOUNDED AND LOOKED FOR +FROST+ BETWEEN THE FIRST LADIES.

DN/ THE TREATY IS A GOOD SIGN OF THE PEACE OF THE SEASON.

DN/ STEURER/ GORBACHEV IS A BETTER ACTOR THAN REAGAN.

NYT/ GAZA PALESTINIANS ARE NOT REGARDED AS FULL HUMANS WITH RIGHTS BY THE WORLD. ARAB STATES/ INCLUDING EGYPT/ DON'T WANT THEM. ISRAEL

OFFERS NO SOLUTION. ISRAEL COULD ONLY THINK TO SEND TROOPS. EVERYONE TELL EVERYONE WHOT TO DO.
GAZA BLEEDS(CABLED)

PRESS REPORTS

NYT/ KIFNER/ RIOTS HIT JERUSALEM TODAY WITH ATTACKS ON BANKS AND STREET TAKEOVERS. THERE ARE FEARS FOR BETHLEHEM AS CHRISTMAS APPROACHES. THE SHARON HOUSE IS INFLAMING ARABS. THINGS ARE WORSE THAN PEOPLE EXPECTED. IN WEST JERUSALEM ALL WAS NORMAL INCLUDINGTHE ANTI- MOVIE RIOTS BY ULTRAORTHODOX JEWS. (CABLED)

DN/ MEISELS/ +GAZA SMOLDERS AS RIOTING EBBS.+

NYT/ CHERTOK/(WEEK IN REVIEW)+ THE PALESTINIANS HAVE EARNED A SHARE OF SOVEREIGNTY.+ THERE IS PAIN ON BOTH SIDES IN ENCOUNTERS WITH ARABS IN ISRAEL. THE PLO HAS BEEN UGLY. SOME ON BOTH SIDES HOPE THE OTHER WILL BLOW AWAY/ LEAVING THE WEST BANK TO THEMSELVES. PEOPLE LIVING UNDER MILITARY OCCUPATION DO HAVE GRIEVANCES. FAIRNESS IS NOT THE ISSUE. SOMEDAY THERE WILLBE A PALESTINIAN STATE AND LOTS OF PROBLEMS FOR ISRAEL.(CABLED)

DN/ IRAN HIT A DANISH TANKER.

DN/ OIL PRICES TUMBLED THIS WEEK BECAUSE OF OPEC'S FEEBLE PACT.

NYT/ CIVIL LIBERTIES ORGANIZATIONS ARE FIGHTING A LUBOVITCHER MENORAH PUT UP ON PUBLIC LAND IN BURLINGTON VERMONT.

LETTERS-

חדשה:12,13974
אל:
אתונה/237,בון/336,בריסל/302,תאג/239,דנדון/355,פריס/615,
רומא/392,מדריד/222,ניקוסיה/200,ניירובי/112,סינגפור/194,
אנקרה/120,איסטנבול/108,פרטוריה/174,גנבה/251,וינה/257,
אדסלו/149,בוקרשט/165,ברן/189,הלסינקי/93,קופנהגן/187,
שטוקהולם/123,ליסבון/152,טוקיו/283,קנברה/162,סידני/103,
ביירות/470,ברזילה/291,מנסיקו/263,קרקס/254,ריו/180
מ-:המשרד,תא:181287,דח:1738,דח:מ,עב:ב
נד:ם

BALMAS/MIYADI

SHAG

LEHALAN HATZATA LETGUVA AL MAAMAR BENOSER SHEHECHANU
AVUR ACHAT HAKONSULYOT BEARTZOT HABRIT
HATEXT MUAVAR GAM ELECHEM LESHIMUSHCHEM BEET HATZORECH.

TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE DISTURBANCES IN THE TERRITORIES

IN VIEWING THE VERY GRAPHIC IMAGES CURRENTLY APPEARING ON TELEVISION SCREENS,THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE WORTH KEEPING IN MIND:

ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT BE PERCEIVED OTHERWISE,THE SECURITY FORCES ARE UNDER THE STRICTEST ORDERS REGARDING PROCEDURES TO RESTORE ORDER AND THE USE OF WEAPONS. BEFORE ENTERING THE AREAS OF TENSION,THE SECURITY PERSONNEL ARE INSTRUCTED ON THE PROPER RULES OF CONDUCT WHICH THEY MUST FOLLOW. WEAPONS MAY BE FIRED ONLY WHEN THE SOLDIERS' LIVES ARE IN DANGER,AND EVEN THEN,ONLY AS

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

A LAST RESORT.WHEN FACING A VIOLENT GROUP OF DEMONSTRATORS THAT ARE THREATENING THEIR SAFETY, THE SOLDIERS MUST FIRST USE ORAL WARNINGS, TEAR GAS, OR RUBBER PELLETS TO STOP THE DEMONSTRATORS.
IF THAT DOES NOT SUCCEED,WARNING SHOTS MAY THEN BE FIRED INTO THE AIR.

AS FOR IMPRESSIONS CREATED ON TELEVISION,THE SHOOTING OF RUBBER PELLETS,TEAR GAS CANNISTERS,OR LIVE AMMUNITION ARE ALL FIRED FROM A RIFLE. WHEN SEEN EVEN FROM A SHORT DISTANCE,IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THEM.

TELEVISION VISUALS CAN EASILY BE MISLEADING,SINCE THEY CREATE AN IMAGE OF A DAY PACKED WITH RIOTS AND DISTURBANCES IN ALL AREAS, EVEN WHEN SUCH DISTURBANCES OCCUR IN ONLY A FEW LOCATIONS.
MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, THE 45 SECONDS SHOWING STONE-THROWING AND SCREAMING CROWDS ARE THE PRODUCT -- UNKNOWN TO THE VIEWER -- OF A 10-12 HOUR WORKDAY IN WHICH THE TV CREW TRAVELS FROM ONE LOCATION TO ANOTHER, TAPING SEGMENTS OF DEMONSTRATIONS AND RESPONSES, THEN CONCENTRATES THEM INTO THE MOST NEWSWORTHY, ACTION-PACKED PIECE.
MOREOVER, THERE HAVE BEEN INSTANCES IN WHICH THE SUDDEN APPEARANCE OF A TV CREW INTO A CALM AREA TRIGGERS OFF DEMONSTRATIONS, FOR SOME ELEMENTS OF THE LOCAL POPULATION SEE THIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE A POINT.

ADYEM-ARABSAH

הע: שהם,נכנל,ממנכל,שמנכל,רהמ,שהבט,ארקיאניה,מצרים,מצא,
איראן,איראן,אסיה,מאמ,אמלט,מזתים,ארבל,איראן,מעת,המברה,מצר

חרזם:12,13594
אל:המשרד
מ-:ניו יורק:588,תא:181287,זת:1400,דת:מ,סג:ב
נד:ם

בלמס/מידי

אל-: משת

דע-: מצפא, רשינגטון (נר 119)

מאת: שחרורת/ניו יורק

NEWS SUMMARY DECEMBER 18, 1987

EDITORIALS-

NYP, BEFORE CRITICIZING ISRAEL OVER ITS QUELLING OF THE RIOTS, WE SHOULD ASK WHAT CHOICE ISRAEL HAS WITHOUT NEGOTIATIONS? ISRAEL WAS ALWAYS READY TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. (CABLED).

PRESS REPORTS-

NYT,KIFNER, DESPITE AN ISRAELI CRACKDOWN, SCATTERED DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUE. SHARON HOUSE AN IRRITANT (CABLED)(ND,DN,WSJ)

WSJ, LESCAZE,RABIN SAYS IN AN INTERVIEW THE GAZA RIOTS ARE AN EFFORT TO CALL ATTENTION TO THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT.(CABLED)

ND, A +CIVILLIAN+, SHOWN ON ISRAELI TV SHOOTING IN GAZA, IS A SHIN BET AGENT WHO WAS NOT FOLLOWING

PRESCRIBED PROCEEDURES IN FIRING. AN INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN ORDERED.

NYT, ISRAELI SOLDIERS KILLED 3(6INDN) GUERRILLAS WHO ATTACKED A POSITION NEAR MT. HERMON.(DN)

ND, A TRUCK BOMB EXPLODED IN BEIRUT KILLING OR INJURING THE DRIVER, HIS FAMILY AND SOME PASSERSBY.

NYT,ENGELBERG, A NEWLY DISCOVERED POINDEXTER MEMO RELEASED TODAY, SAID BUSH WAS SOLIDLY BEHIND THE IRAN ARMS SALE. ANOTHER NOTE, ALSO FROM POINDEXTER REFLECTED FEARS THET +ISRAESLIS ARE SUCKING US IN ON THE ARMS TRANSFER.+(WSJ,DN,ND,NYP)

NYT, FEDER, OPEC OVERPRODUCTION WILL BENEFIT US CONSUMERS BY LEADING TO LOWER PRICES FOR GASOLINE AND OTHER PETROLEUM PRODUCTS. THIS SHOULD REDUCE INFLATION FEARS.

NYT, IRANIAN GUNBOATS ATTACKED A MALDIVAN CARGO SHIP SETTING IT AFIRE. IT WAS AGAIN FIRED ON ALONG WITH A FIREFIGHING BOAT AND A CBS HEILICOPTER IN THE AREA. THE US NAVY ASSISTS MARINERS IN DISTRESS AS WALL AS AMERICAN FLAG VESSELS.(DN)

NYT, SHIPLER, MANY WASHINGTON OFFICIALS ARE PUTTING AS SPIN+ ON THEIR ACCOUNTS OF THE SUMMIT UNDERSTANDING TO SUIT THEIR OWN PURPOSES. THIS HAS MOSTLY AFFECTED SDI AND AFGHANISTAN ISSUES.

LETTERS-

NYT, FLACKS(ZOA), ZIONIST ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD ALSO HAVE A PART IN JEWISH-CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE.

13086 תאריך : 19.12.87

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

** יוצא סודי
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**
**

הדזם:12,13086
אל:בי/855,ודש/594
מ-:המשרד,תא:181287,זת:1949,דת:ב,סג:ס
נד:8

סודי/בהול

א.ב. 184

אל:נאו'ם
וושינגטון

נתניהו,ארד.

מושבי'ם.

1.ביקרינג התקשר למנכ'ל המדיני ומסר לו שהדוח הנושבת בוושינגטון היא בכוון של המנעות.הוסיף כי ממשיך לנסות ולשכנע להצביע נגד.

2.הוחלט שלא לפנות לדרג גבוה יותר בנושא.

לשכת מנכ'ל

א/ב

תפ: שחח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,שהבט,בירן,מצפא,בדנש,אדבל27

** נכנס   שמור
**
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חוזם:12,13537
אל:המשרד
מ-:ווש,נר:502,תא:181287,זח:0930,דח:מ,סג:ש
נד:8

שמור/מידי

אל:ממ"ד ערב 1

דע:שגקהיר

מאת:אלי אבידן, ווישינגטון

מצרים

משיחה עם טרסיטה שייפרס (מצרים/NEA)

1. הסדר תשלום החובות המצריים. שייפרס הסבירה, תוך הדגשה שהסכם עם ארה"ב הסדיר (הבנתה אותנו לממ' הבלגית) שהעקרון המנחה את הסדרי החוב המצרי במסגרת 'מועדון פאריס' משותף לכל המדינות בו. נקבע שההסדר יהיה ל 10 שנים עם תקופת חסד ל-5 שנים ושיקיף את החובות בתקופה שבין ינואר 87 ליוני 88. זהו סידור מיוחד למצרים שכן בדרך כלל מתייחסים לתקופה של עד שנה ואילו הפעם מדובר ב-18 חודשים כנ"ל.

2. העקרון השני שנקבע הוא של 'הסכם סלי' דהיינו כל סוגי החובות אזרחי וצבאי שמצרים אמורה היתה לפרוע בתקופה זו. החוב לארה"ב בתקופה זו עד כמה שזכור לה (העדיפה שלא להתחייב) נע בגבולות 800 מ' דולר, כולל מרכיב ה- FMS והוא גם הגדול ביותר בהשוואה לזה שחייבת ליתר חברי מועדון פאריס.

3. עקרון נוסף נוגע למירווח הריבית. העקרון שנתקבל ע"י מדינות 'מועדון פאריס' הוא שיש להבחין בין שני

סוגי ריבית. חובות שניתנו בריבית הנחה (CONCESSION RATE), כגון זה ל- AID שניתן בריבית של 2 אחוז ימשיכו במסגרת ההסכם לשאת את אותו אחוז ואילו החובות שניתנו בריבית מסחרית או חובות במסגרת ה- FMS יחשבו מעתה ע"פ ריבית השוק הנהוגה בכל מדינה. פרוש המעשי הוא שהריבית הנ"ל תוקטן בצורה משמעותית ותעמוד בגבולות ה-3 אחוז, בתנודה לכאן או לכאן ע"פ המדינות השונות.

4. התשלומים המצרים יעשו בשתי צורות בתקופה של 18 חודש הם ישלמו אך ורק את הריבית על החובות בתקופה הנ"ל ע"פ החישוב החדש ואילו לאחר מכן התשלומים יכללו גם את תשלומי הקרן לרבות הריבית. פרוש הדבר שבתום המועד הנ"ל החישוב יהיה ע"פ ריבית דריבית.

5. שייפרס מציינת שהמצרים למעשה 'קנו זמן' וזה לא שיאפשר להם מרווח נשימה בטווח הקצר אך לא יוכלו להימלט מהכבדה ככל שיחלוף הזמן. הסידור הנ"ל הוא חד פעמי והיא איננה חושבת שניתן יהיה לחזור עליו פעם נוספת. המצרים מודעים לכך ולכן גם ההתבטאויות (למשל אבו גאזלה) שנושא ה- FMS טרם הוסדר. המוצא שבידי מצרים ע"מ לעמוד בתשלומים הגבוהים הוא אחד מן השניים (א) הגברת הייצוא המצרי וכן פעולות תקציביות ורפורמות שיבטלו הפער הגדול שילך ויווצר בין יכולת התשלום המצרית לגובה החוב החיצוני. (ב) הכנסה ממקור חיצוני - סיוע ערבי. שייפרס בטוחה באשר לשניהם שכן מדובר בסכום גבוה מאוד.

6. מצב זה מעלה את נושא הסיוע הערבי למצרים

שייפרס הסבירה שקיימת ציפיה מצרית גבוהה לסיוע מהמפרציות לאחר חידוש היחסים בעקבות פסגת עמאן. נושא זה, כך מניחה ללא הסתכנות מיותרת יעמוד בשיחותיו של אבו גזלה בכווית ובמאע"מ וכן במפגשים הבאים בין מצרים למדינות הנ"ל. אין בידיה שום מידע בנידון שכן זהו נושא חסוי שהמצרים מעולם לא משוחחים עליו עם האמריקאים. קשה גם להעריך מידת ההענות הערבית והאם תצדיק ציפיה זו מעבר לקיים. מדגישה שגם אם הדבר יקרה קשה לעקוב אחר העברות במסגרת זו. האמריקאים הגיעו למסקנה ע"פ נסיון העבר שכל חישוב הוא כמעט בלתי אפשרי. ברור להם למשל שאי אפשר להמנע מרישום מספר פעולות הנוגעות

למעשה לאותו תשלום/העברה שכן הוא מופיע בד"כ בשלוש צורות אפשריות (א) הליך האישור (ב) העברת הצ'ק (ג) ביצוע הפעולה.

7. המו"מ עם 'מועדון פאריס' עדיין נמשך והמצרים לא נחפזים לסיימו. זהו הדגישה מו"מ 'מזה"ת טיפוסי'.

המצרים חוזרים ובודקים כל שלב מחכים לאישור ו/או הבהרה מהבית ורק אח"כ מאשרים, וגם זה לא תמיד עדיין סופי. במקביל ממשיך מעקב גורמי קרן המטבע הבינ"ל אחר ביצוע הסכם הרפורמות. מסתבר שגם תהליך זה לא פשוט כפי שנשמע, ההסכם היה על עקרונות אך חסר נתונים (FIGUERS) מדוייקים. הקרן לוחצת לקיצוץ בסובסידיות אך המצרים משיקולים פוליטיים אינם מוכנים לכך ומעדיפים העלאת מחירים (אנרגיה) אך לא באותה רמה שהקרן דורשת בקיצוץ הסובסידיות. מצב זה מאריך את המעקב מצד הקרן ומעכב הוצאת דו"ח ביניים מטעמה.

8. שאלתי לאן פני מצרים לאחר פסגת עמאן והאם צפויים תכנים חדשים ביחסים עם מדינות ערב מעבר לפורמליזציה שבחידוש. השיבה שיש פנים לכאן ולכאן. מחד ישנה ציפיה ספציפית מצד מדינה כווית למעורבות יתר מצרית בנושא הגנת המפרץ, היא מכירה בכך אך קשה לה להעלות על הדעת מעבר חריף מצד מצרים מעבר לפרמטרים של סיוע והדרכה צבאית. יש גם לזכור שיחסי מצרים ומדינות ערב הנזכרות לא החלו עם פיסגת עמאן ובמשך השנים הם מילאו גם הרבה רב כן ע"פ לצבות יותר לצד הפורמלי מאשר התכני. מאידך אין לה ספק שמצרים חרצה להחזיר לעצמה תפקיד והנהגת המחנה הערבי. בנושאים המוגדרים כבעלי אופי כלל ערבי יקבלו מעתה תשומת לב והדגשה מצד מצרים. הדבר יתבטא בצד הרטורי של הצגת קו 'לאומי' יותר. ברור לה שאם תהליך כזה יקרה ישראל בארה"ב תצטרכנה מעתה לקלם מחיר מסוים של חזרת מצרים לעולם הערבי, שלא לשכוח הציפיות (והמחיר) המצריות לסיוע ערבי. היא מקווה שימצא איזון בין שני הפרמטרים שאפשר לחיות עמו.

9. אין לה מידע באשר למערכת המגעים שגורמים ערבים ובעיקר חוסיין מנהלים בקשר למצרים. גם לאזניה הגיעו שמועות על דיונים להקמת מפקדה צבאית להתערבות מהירה במפרץ (אגב רעיון ישן של חסין במסגרת שת"פ הצבאי עם מצרים) אך היא מגדירה זאת בטרם זמנו (PREMATURE) ועוד חזון למועד, ביחוד באשר למעורבות כזו במפרץ.

באשר לסוריה ידוע לה על מגעים בדרג נמוך (לא פרטה) אך הכדור הוא בידי אסד. ידועים לו תנאי מצרים המוקדמים להתפייסות על בסיס הקיים, דהיינו שלמצרים יש הסכם שלום עם ישראל. מפקפקת אם אסד יעשה צעד משמעותי לעבר מובארך ממנו יתקבל פרוש שסוריה מוכנה להשלים עם מצב של הסכם נפרד עם ישראל. הדגישה שזו בגדר דעה פרטית שכן איננה רואה עצמה כמומחית לסוריה.

אלי אבידן.

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל/ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,ליאור/מצרים,
בירן,מצפא,מינרבי,כלכליתא'

13522 תאריך : 16.12.87

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

** דחוף שדר
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מדדם:12/13522
אל:דרש/536/נר/534
מ-:המשרד/תא:161287:זת/2037:מת/נבנ:
נמס

שהדר/בהול

נעים, גל

בינה

1. מתקבל ראשוני של האירועים בעזה היום מתברר, שהקש לעקרית בה בחדר שבו מעניינים, היה, כי בעת יציאתם, בראה המגנד, השליכו כ-10 בקבוקי תבערה של בוחות מה'ל. נראה שמעבר האבנים גרם קטעה מ-ם.

2. המידע טרם ארמה ואינו משתחרר לפירסום אלא לידיעתכם בלבד. ברגע שיאומת נבריקכם.

הסברה

/אא

תס: שהם/רהם/מבבל/מבבל/שבבם/אביטל/נשה/הסברה/ליאור/מבבא/
נזהים/סייבל/ביבך/שבבא/ר/ברבד/מבד/מהאבשמים

13607 תאריך : 15.12.67

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

** דחוף עדיפות

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תדרוש:12/13607

אל:בוסטון/72/611/586/641

מ-:תל אביב/תא:181287/חת/2154:חת/חבוש/חבוש

נדפס

עמוד/בהול

בוסטון אבנון

דע דרשבגטון-נשיא/בינה

ניו יורק-בינה/גן

בהמשך לתגובה לתאור ב'בזוקה' מבינים לא לגיין מדע
הרכבה בטעיף שלנו אלא להסתמך בביטוי FROM THE SAME RIFLE

הסברה

תס: שהת/רשם/מכבל/תמכבל/מבוא/ליאור/מדהים/אביטל/מעה/הסברה/
ביקר/מבצא/ד/הרכז/תמר

12/13412:מדיה
020/12/576/611/67/[illegible]:אל
[illegible]:מ-מ
ב:מ

BALMAS/DAHUL

AVNON

DA NAIM/GAL/BINA/GAN

KATAVA BAGLOB

LEHALAN HATZATEYNU LETGUVA LEDIVUACH BANOSE.

TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE DISTURBANCES IN THE TERRITORIES

IN VIEWING THE VERY GRAPHIC IMAGES CURRENTLY APPEARING ON TELEVISION SCREENS,THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE WORTH KEEPING IN MIND:

ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT BE PERCEIVED OTHERWISE,THE SECURITY FORCES ARE UNDER THE STRICTEST ORDERS REGARDING PROCEDURES TO RESTORE ORDER AND THE USE OF WEAPONS. BEFORE ENTERING THE AREAS OF TENSION,THE SECURITY PERSONNEL ARE INSTRUCTED ON THE PROPER RULES OF CONDUCT WHICH THEY MUST FOLLOW. WEAPONS MAY BE FIRED ONLY WHEN THE SOLDIERS' LIVES ARE IN DANGER,AND EVEN THEN,ONLY AS A LAST RESORT.WHEN FACING A VIOLENT GROUP OF DEMONSTRATORS THAT ARE THREATENING THEIR SAFETY, THE SOLDIERS MUST FIRST USE ORAL WARNINGS, TEAR GAS, OR RUBBER PELLETS TO STOP THE DEMONSTRATORS.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

IF THAT DOES NOT SUCCEED,WARNING SHOTS MAY THEN BE FIRED INTO THE AIR.

AS FOR IMPRESSIONS CREATED ON TELEVISION,THE SHOOTING OF RUBBER PELLETS,TEAR GAS CANNISTERS,OR LIVE AMMUNITION ARE ALL FIRED FROM AN M-16 RIFLE. WHEN SEEN EVEN FROM A SHORT DISTANCE,IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THEM.

TELEVISION VISUALS CAN EASILY BE MISLEADING,SINCE THEY CREATE AN IMAGE OF A DAY PACKED WITH RIOTS AND DISTURBANCES IN ALL AREAS, EVEN WHEN SUCH DISTURBANCES OCCUR IN ONLY A FEW LOCATIONS.
MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, THE 45 SECONDS SHOWING STONE-THROWING AND SCREAMING CROWDS ARE THE PRODUCT -- UNKNOWN TO THE VIEWER -- OF A 10-12 HOUR WORKDAY IN WHICH THE TV CREW TRAVELS FROM ONE LOCATION TO ANOTHER, TAPING SEGMENTS OF DEMONSTRATIONS AND RESPONSES, THEN CONCENTRATES THEM INTO THE MOST NEWSWORTHY, ACTION-PACKED PIECE.
MOREOVER, THERE HAVE BEEN INSTANCES IN WHICH THE SUDDEN APPEARANCE OF A TV CREW INTO A CALM AREA TRIGGERS OFF DEMONSTRATIONS, FOR SOME ELEMENTS OF THE LOCAL POPULATION SEE THIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE A POINT.

.דד

[illegible]

** יוצא שגרר ✓
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מדוח:12/12824
אל:ניו יורק/785
מ:המשרד/מא:171287/זת:2337/דת:נ/סג:ש
נד:ב

מגרר/בהול

נאו"ם - ביירן.

המכ"ל הודיעני שרחת הערב עם שג' ארה"ב אשר הסביר מצידו להתקשר לוושינגטון להעביר את טיעוניו. מיקרינג השיב למכ"ל שעשלתם בניו יורק קיבלה הוראה להשיג 'A RIASONABLE AND BALANCED RESOLUTION'. הוא מבידו איבץ שהדבר שהצבעה אמריקנית נגד הצעת ההחלטה תסיים בייצוב המצב כאן ובהרגעת הרוחות. הוא מסר להם שהשלטונות כאן נרשלים להרגעת המצב. להערכתו יש סיכוי שיצביעו נגד, מדינה במרכז בנושא הסדנו. ביקש שנעמוד בקשר בתקרה של התפתחויות לא רצויות.

ברגע.

הפ: שחר/רהמ/שפבט/מנכל/המנכל/ר/מרכז/רם/אמן/ממד/ברגע/ארבל/
ליאור/מדהים/ביירן/מבנא/מתאשטהים

מבצע
12/12623:מרוח
17:30
1:30/0:מ:מ/1200:מר/171287:אמ/535:מ/1:-0
8:13

NEWS SUMMARY DECEMBER 17,1987

ED-

NYP, +FRANCE SUBMITS TO HOSTAGE BLACKMAIL.+ FRANCE HAS BEEN BLACKMAILED BY IRAN INTO ABANDONING IT COMMITMENT TO POLITICAL ASYLUM.

WSJ, +HILLEL FOR PRESIDENT+(ED.AN EDITORIAL ON THE NEW US ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT LEADS OFF WITH THE QUOTE FROM HILLEL, +IF I AM NOT FOR MYSELF...+)

OP-ED-

NYT, A. LEWIS, ISRAEL'S POLICY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IS REPRESSION.(CABLED)

NYP,BRIENDEL, THE ADMINISTRATION'S BLUFF ON ZERO OPTION WAS CALLED BY GORBACHEV SO NOW WE ARE STUCK WITH THE INF TREATY. NOW STAUNCH ANTI- COMMUNISTS MUST SAY WHAT THEY WANT THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE

SOVIETS TO BE: NO ARMS LIMITATION TREATIES, THEY NEVER WORK, NO REGIONAL TRADEOFFS, NO TRADE.

NO, BUCHWALD, A HUMOROUS COLUMN ABOUT A DIALOGUE BETWEEN RONALD THE LIONHEARTED AND MIKHAIL THE MAGNIFICENT.

NYT, KIFNER, +ISRAELIS REINFORCE GAZA STRIP TROOPS.+ (CABLED), (NYP,ND,DN)

NYT, +HOME FOR SHARON AMID ARABS+ (CABLED)

WSJ, ISRAEL'S ARMS INDUSTRY IS UNDER FIRE FROM CHEAPER IMPORTS, CLOSED MARKETS+(CABLED)

ND,(PHOTO) RABIN LAID A WREATH ON THE TOMB OF COL. DAVID MARCUS, HERO OF 1948, AT WEST POINT.

NYT, HIJAZI, SYRIAN TROOPS ARRESTED MANY CHRISTIAN YOUTHS AS SUSPECTED TERRORISTS IN A CAMPAIGN TO DRIVE SYRIA OUT OF NORTHERN LEBANON. THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF UNREST PARTICULARLY AMONG CHRISTIANS IN THE AREA WITH MANY CALLS FOR OPPOSITION TO SYRIA.(ED MUCH REVIEW OF PAST EVENTS.)

DN, AN IRANIAN GUNBOAT SHOT AT A GREEK TANKER. DAMAGE WAS MINOR.

WSJ, OIL PRICES FELL BELOW $16 REFLECTING STRONG SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF THE OPEC ACCORD.(NYT -LONG ANALYSIS BY IBRAHIM-CABLED)

NYT, THE +ARYAN NATIONS HOUR+ BROADCAST FROM UTAH HAS BEEN CANCELLED BECAUSE OF THREATS AND LOSS OF ADVERTISERS. THE SHOW, BY A MEMBER OF THE ANTI-SEMITIC, ANTI-BLACK HATE GROUP HAD DRAWN PROTESTS FROM MANY KINDS OF ORGANIZATIONS.

LETTERS-

WSJ, HORWIN, THE SOVIETS HAVE UNLEASHED FORCES THAT MAY END THE +COLD WAR.+ THE WALL MAY COME DOWN

IN BERLIN AND US TROOPS COULD COME HOME FROM EUROPE.

WSJ, HELLMUTH,DISPITE GLASNOST THE RUSSIANS STILL HAVE THEIR SAME STRATEGIC GOAL FOR HEGEMONY AND A NEUTRALIZATION OF US SUPERIORITY.

NYP, ED. A SERIES OF LETTERS ON THE SUMMIT. SEVEN ARE STRONLY ANTI- RUSSIAN AND ONE IS ANTI- REAGEN.

11983 תאריך: 17.12.87

נכנס בלמס

חוזם:12,11983
אל:המשרד
מ-:נ',נר:524,תא:161287,זח:1600,דח:מ,סג:ב
נד:@

בלמס/מ'ד'

אל-: מעת

דע-: מצפא, וושינגטון (נר101)

מאת: עתונות/ניו יורק
חלק ב.

ND, AL-LIWAA STATED THAT TERRY WAITE AND THREE FRENCH HOSTAGES AND ONE COLLEGE EDUCATOR HOSTAGE WILL SOON BE FREED.

NYP, AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI APPEARED ON IRANIAN TELEVISION IN A APPARENT EFFORT TO QUASH RUMORS OF HIS BEING IN A COMA. HE APPEARED FRAIL AND DID NOT SPEAK BUT DID WALK FROM THE BALCONY.(DN)

WSJ,TANNER J PETZINGER, THE OPEC MINISTERS ALL VOWED NOT TO CHEAT ON THEIR QUOTAS AS THEY LEFT FOR HOME. THE MARKETS SHOWED SKEPTICISM BY LOWERING OIL FUTURES PRICES. (NYT,ND)

NTY, BARRINGER, ALTHOUGH THEY AGREED ON MANY ISSUES REPRESENTATIVES TO THE INDEPENDENT HUMAN RIGHTS SEMINAR IN MOSCOW DISAGREED ON HOW TO RELATE TO THE SOVIET STATE. TIMOFEYEV WANTS TO SEEK +CONSTRUCIVE DIALOGUE+ WITH THE STATE, WHILE GRIGORYANTS SAYS THIS WILL ONLY MUDDY THE MOVEMENT. THE SEMINAR

HAD MANY FREEWHEELING DISCUSSIONS AND WAS ATTENDED AS WELL BY AN INTERNATIONAL CONTINGENT. THE MOST SERIOUS ISSUE WAS THE CONTINUED IMPRISONMENT OF 20 FOR ANTI-SOVIET AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA.

NYT,(ED. NOTE) THERE WAS A FRONT PAGE PICTURE OF LIGHTING A HANUKA MENORAH AT A DAY CARE CENTER.

LETTERS-

NYP AGOSTON, THE ONLY TRUE +PERESTROIKA+ IS ABOLISHING COMMUNISM.

AD KAN ITONUT NYK

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,אמן,קלוורי,מעת,
הסברה,לעמ,דוצ-ים,דוצ,פזנר,צנזורצבאי,מצפא,פרנ,תפוצות,
מתאמשטחים

11967 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 17.12.87

[illegible] בלמס

חוזם:12,11967
אל:המשרד
מ-:ני,נר:522,תא:161287,זח:1600,דח:ר,סג:בל,ב:
נדב:

ם/מידי

אל-: מנת

דע-: מנכא, רדאיגעדן (כר 100)

מאת: עתונות/ניו יורק
חלק א.המשך יבוא.

NEWS SUMMARY DECEMBER 16,1987

EDITORIALS-

NYT, REAGAN SEEMS TO BE SABOTAGING THE SUMMIT BY MISREPRESENTING HIS CONVERSATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN AND STAR WARS AND BY FAILING TO MENTION HIS KNOWLEDGE OF NEW SOVIET MILITARY AID TO NICARAGUA. THIS ENDANGERS THE GAINS OF THE SUMMIT.

DN- CHANUKAH IS ABOUT HOLDING BACK EVIL, PERSECUTION AND DESPAIR. NON- JEWS SHOULD THANK JEWS FOR THE REMINDER.

OP-ED-

NYT, BAKER, HUMOROUS COLUMN ABOUT SUMMIT TRIVIA REDUNDANT COLUMNISTS AND LONG WINDEDNESS.

WSJ,MORRIS ABRAM, THE SOVIETS HAVE PLEDGED TO UPHOLD

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

THE RIGHT TO EMMIGRATE IN THREE INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS SO MANKIND OR REAGAN HAS THE +MORAL RIGHT..TO BE THE TEACHER+, OR PROSECUTOR, OR JUDGE OF SOVIET FAILURE TO LIVE UP TO THE PLEDGES. SOVIET LAWS ARE BECOMING MORE RESTRICTIVE FOR JEWS AND DEMONSTRATIONS WERE ROUGHLY BROKEN UP. THE TIDE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CANNOT BE STOPPED.

DN, GORBACHEV GAVE V.P. BUSH A BIG BOOST AS A RESULT OF THEIR SUMMIT CONTACTS. IT MAY NOT LAST IF THINGS GO SOUR.

PRESS REPORTS-

NYT,KIFNER, VIOLENCE AND RIOTING WORSENED TODAY MOSTLY IN GAZA. YOUTHS TAUNTED AND DARED ISRAELI TROPS IN FRONT OF A GAZA HOSPITAL. FOUR-SIX PALESTINIANS WERE KILLED. MOBS WERE RIOTING WILDLY AND REFORMING AFTER THE ARMY SCATTERED THEM. WOMEN IN HEAD SCARVES GATHERED ROCKS FOR THROWING. WESTERN JOURNALISTS, INCLUDING THIS REPORTER, HAVE BEEN BEATEN OR WOUNDED. THE ARMY IS FRUSTRATED AND HAS DONE SOME THINGS WHICH CAN ONLY INCREASE HATRED. (DN,ND,NYP(PHOTO ONLY))

NYT, THE US CALLS FOR ISRAELI RESTRAINT IN HANDLING DISORDERS.

ND, KATZ, + IN GAZA CITY, A HOSPITAL OF HORROR+ THERE IS BLOOD AND WOUNDED ALL OVER THE PLACE. EMERGENCY ROOMS ARE WORKING OVERTIME. PEOPLE DEAD AND WOUNDED FROM GUNSHOTS ABOUND. EARLIER, SOLDIERS STORMED THE HOSPITAL. WITH HELICOPTERS DROPPING TEAR GAS, THE SOLDIERS, ARMED WITH GUNS AND TRUNCHONS BEAT THE PROTESTERS ACCORDING TO WITNESSESS. A PIOUS HEAD SCARFED NURSE SHOWED A BRUISE FROM A BEATING.

NYT, HIJAZI, +ISRAELIS IN TANKS AND HELICOPTERS RAID GUERRILLA BASES IN LEBANON.+ TROOPS RAIDED VILLAGES AND HIDEOUTS NE OF THE +SECURITY ZONE.+ THEY REPORTEDLY CAPTURED 20 MEMBERS OFTHE PARTY

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

OF GOD. THEY REPORTEDLY WOUNDED SIX GUERRILLAS. THE PLO HAS BEEN ON ALERT SINCE THE GLIDER ATTACK. (ND)

NYT, ISRAELI REPORTS OF THE RAID SAY ONE ISRAELI WAS SLIGHTLY WOUNDED. THERE WAS A HEAVY EXCHANGE OF GUNFIRE. ISRAELIS DOWN PLAYED THE CLASH, SAYING IT WAS ROUTINE.

NYT, IN ITALY, THE TRIAL OF THE SOLE SURVIVING GUNMAN FROM THE ATTACK ON AN EL AL PLANE IN ROME WENT BEGAN. IT IS EXPECTED TO PRODUCE INFORMATION ONTHE WORKINGS OF THE ABU NIDAL TERRORIST GROUP.(LP. MUCH BACKGROUD INFORMATION IS GIVEN.)

HEMSHECH YAVO

ADKAN ITONUT NYK

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכ,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממנכ,רם,אמן,קלדורי,מעת,
הסברה,לעמ,דוב-ים,דוב,נתיב,בנזדר,ראמ,אמצ,מזר,פרס,תפוצות,
מתאמשטחים

TWPN MPMD-PIMA-TTWB: IPNA
11559 NLTN ** TTDW MOLL
12/11359:DTTN
698/93,480/BTT:TN
N4:TTA/DB:A/15:2:MT/16128?:MA:TTWMA-N
B:AD/1:MT/15:2:MT:A/D:B
TL:0

TWPN MPMD-PIMA-TTWB

TALI/WKDN/ZLNLL/DAUAD/DUNDRDUAD
WD: RUU/LWU/RUTO/WCCZ/UUCCZ/L/DLC1/LD/NUI/UUL/TLCM/NLTZZ/

1.Z

UCUZ NLC.Z 2

TAZRCL DALZU TO TCALLW UNULLU RZ UCLLU ULMC.D.

UCLZCN ULKNLU RLUUI TUZLD LCRZLZ UUAI DALZUCL RZ D.UI.

9.UC.Z NUL UULLMXLU RD UUCC.Z UULLCL LRC.L UCULUL.

UULMCLLD NZLCD CNLDI RLDL.
5.RZ UCLLUAD ZUULUALU UZZDI LMLCLLU NULLU LNU UULLLCAD

UALL-LMID-DUZZU LCAL

RLUNLD ZCLLCLUCL UCLZDALU LUUMUZUALU RZ NR.D.
TUUZDU UKN ZUCXLU UCLRN LZUU DUU ZULLLR UUULUZU CLKM
UCCL LLLZ/ UCCZ ZULDLL TO RCLLCU DRCL 9 NLCLDLCL
4.CCLDL ZC.Z LZLCLLD UUXLDDLD TDMLDLD 2/4/5 RZ UUCLZ

ZCLDCUAD DULU ULLDLD UCL UZZDI ZCDUDL RZ UCLDU UZLLD.
NZ ZNLU.C ZUUDUCU NO UMLCLD LYZL .DUCCLU, LLDCLUL
CIU RLUIZ NU NR.D LMZLZ ZCYLM JRU CUUZLI URZLD. ZCL
UMUCZUAU-DLZLDLU LLKNU UYLL UCYLZ. RZ NLU.C ZUCLM ULMY
TDLMCL.D RUMCLZ ZC RUU/ CRLLZLUL CRDZ/ UXZUU
UMLC ZMLCLD LZNR.D.NR.D LDUDZ CMXD UULMY RZ ZCCZ UUZDU
5.CCZRI ZUDCLL ZULDL RUCLDU UCLLLZ RZ UUUZDU NLCL CU

RZLLLD ZUCLR CUXRI.
CL 26 UU-15 CLXUCL) LCI CYL CZ CLDU .ULLCI, NUL RUMLCLD
UULDX CRZC IU RZ ULLLCLD (YLLD ZUCLZ CZL LLLZ NZLCD
2.CRLUUCD/ RZLI ZLLLR UUCL RNLU.C UXCLM CYL UCLDU

UXCMU NLU.C RZ UUUZDU UXDLLU CDLMCL.D.
1.CCZRI ZUDCLR CCZ UUZLD TO DLDL LZUMZLU CDCLL CLRN

DLMCL.D-UUXC CRDULD.

LM: CUCLUL/ CLLI

RLI

210.2/197 N.1

RULL/CUZZ

CL:0
D-:UUMLL/UN:ZLNLL/MT/16128?:MA:TTWMA-N
B:AD/1:MT/15:2:MT:A/D:B
NZ:TTA/DB/480/698
12/11359:DTTN

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

10677 תאריך 15.12.87

יוצא בלמס

חודם:12,10677
אל:ודש/464
מ-:המשרד,תא:151287,זח:1653,דח:ד,סג:ב
נד:@

בלמס/רגיל

אל: וושינגטון

בפי לביקור וולטרס בסוריה ומרפי בלבנון

עפ"י העתון 'אלבאיאדר אלסיאסי' (ירושלים, 12.12):

א. נציג ארה"ב באו"ם, וירנין וולטרס, יבקר בסוריה בקרוב בדי לקיים שיחות עם האחראים הסוריים להידוק היחסים הבילטראליים ולדון עמם במאפייני שה"מ בין סוריה לארה"ב.

ב. עוזר שר החוץ האמריקני לענייני המזה"ת, ריצ'ארד מרפי, יבקר בלבנון בדי לדון עם האחראים הלבנוניים בדרכים לפתרון הבעיה הלבנונית.

עד כאן.

רנז/סוריה-לבנון.

מא

תפ: שהה,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,ממד,בירן,מצפא,
ברנע,ארבל2,ליאור,מזתים,לוברני

10673

תאריך : 15.12.87

יוצא **
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שמור

הרדם:12,10673
אל:ורש/462
מ-:המשרד,תא:151287,זח:1639,דח:מ,סג:ש
נד:§

שמור / מיידי

ע.ב.ש. 1896

ערן, מתני, אבידן

הפסגה

סאליבן משגארה''ב בקר במחלקה אתמול ומסר דיווח על פסגת רייגן-גורבאצ'וב. העלה נושאים הבאים:

א. זכויות אדם - הנושא נדון במשך 12 שעות בכל דרגי השיחות. רואים בכוונה סובייטית גוברת לדון בנושא וסעיפיו השונים: הגירה, דיון במקרים ספציפיים, ברשימות, דיון על החוקים הסובייטים הנוגעים לענין, חופש דת, המתרחש במוסדות פסיכיאטרים, עיכוב יציאה ''מסיבות בטחוניות''. האמריקנים שמו לב לגדול במספר היוצאים מקרב המיעוט הגרמני והארמני, עליה מתונה יותר ביציאת יהודים. מעבר לכוונות לדון, הסובייטים ממשיכים להפגין קו קשוח המכשיר, אם בכלל, באיטיות רבה.

ב. אפגניסטאן - ארה''ב הדגישה כי נסיגה חייבת להיות המפתח לכל התפתחות חיובית. בריהמ' קבעה LINKAGE בין נסיגה (שתתבצע במשך שנה) להפסקת משלוחי נשק למורדים. לא הועלו רעיונות חדשים.

ג. מפרץ - הסובייטים מודים בכך שאיראן מתחמקת מביצוע החלטת מועבי''ט 598 בעוד שעיראק מקבלת ההחלטה. הצעתם להקמת כוח אומ' במפרץ נדחתה ע''י ארה''ב. יש אינדיקציות שבריהמ' תסכים להצטרף ליידוע החלטת המשך במועבי''ט.

ד. מז''ת - הנושא נדון בקצרה בין שני המנהיגים וכן בקבוצת העבודה הנמוכה בהתאם לקוי הדיווח שלכם. בשגרירות ארה''ב ממתינים לדיווח על פגישת מרפי-פרס.

ה. INF - START - התחילו לדון בפרמטרים ראשונים לקראת שיחות יותר מפורטות בנושא START. האמריקנים רואים הסכם שכזה כ-PROBABLE, בנתיים לא כ-POSSIBIBLE.

ו. בנושאים אחרים שהוזכרו: SDI, נשק כימי, נשק קונבנציונלי, אין חידושים מעבר להודעות הרשמיות.

בכלל משתקף מהדיווח הרושם שההשג העיקרי טמון בחתימת INF והאוירה הטובה שתסייע לחיזוק האמון בין שני הצדדים בתקווה שזה ימשיך להניב פירות גם בעתיד בשטחים נוספים.

מצפ''א

מ/א

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,ממד,בירן,מצבא,
אירג

11086 15.12.87 : TTNT -

DJJJ DM7J

12/11056:DTTN
TTWDM:7%
J:JD/M:MT/15002:MT/15128Z:KM/454:TJ/TJ:-D
E:TJ

DMD: MUTTLN/TAT TTTP

LT-: DXDX/ LTMTCTDTT (TL 69)

NZ-: DUM

TZDD/DDT1

DN/ MUTTLN/TAT TTTP

NYT/ A US SPOKESPERSON/ OAKLEY/ SAID THAT THE US EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER THE CONFLICT . IT SHOWS THE NEED FOR RESOLUTION OF THE STATUS OF THE TERRITORIES TO REDUCE TENSIONS.

ND/KATZ/ ISRAELI TROOPS SHOT AND KILLED ONE MAN TODAY AND ANOTHER WAS REPORTED TO HAVE DIED AFTER BEING WOUNDED. CONFLICTING REPORTS/ ACCOUNTS STATEMENTS/ AND ANALYSES WERE RECIEVED FROM ISRAEL/ WIRE SERVICES/ PLO AND OTHER SOURCES LIKE SARI NUSSEIBEH AND RAFI YISRAEL.

ND/ ARIEL SHAROV PLANS TOLICHT CHANUKKAH CANDLE INHIS NEW HOME INTHE MOSLEM QUARTER OF OLD JERUSALEM. DEMONSTRATIONS ARE EXPECT AND THE HOME WILL BE HEAVILY GUARDED. <OLLECK REFUSES TO GO AND SAYS THAT SHARON PROVIDES FODDER FOR EXTREMIST PALESTINIANS.

NYP/ WORD FROM LOVDON IS THAT KHOMEINI IS IN A COMA. HIS ILLNESS IS DEVIED BY IRANIAN SOURCES. RUMORS

OF HIS ILLNESS HAVE BEEN AROUND SEVERAL DAYS.HE HAS DISAPPEARED FROM VIEW IN THE PAST OVLY TO REAPPEAR.

NYT/ MARKHAM/ IN THE LONGEST FRENCH STATEMENT SO FAR ON THE MATTER/ CHIRAC SAYS THAT THEY PAID NO RANSOM OR ARMS FOR THE RELEASED HOSTAGES. FRANCE WILL NOT WITHDRAW ITS SHIPS FROM THE GULF. THEY WILL NOT RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN UNTIL THERE IS NO DOUBT OF ANY POSSIBLE IRANI LINK TO THE HOSTAGES. THE 17 WERE EXPELLED LAST WEEK BECAUSE OF FEAR OF TERRORIST REPRISALS IF THEY STAYED. THEY WERE NOT/ THEMSELVES/ TERRORISTS.

NYT/ E MEN DIED AND 20 ARE MISSING FROM A NORWEGIAL TANKER HI BY IRAQIS LAST WEEK. (DN/ND)

DN/ IRAN ATTACKED TWO GREEK TANKERS LAST FRIDAY. LITTLE DAMAGE RESULTED.

WSJ/PETZINGER J TANNER/ OPEC/ WITHOUT IRAQ/ REACHED A +FLIMSEY+ PRICE AND PRODUCTION AGREEMENT TO KEE? EVERYTHING AT CURRENT LEVELS . PRICES OF OIL TUMBLED AND ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO FALL. THERE WAS A NEW NON-ARAB-IRAN GROUP THAT ASSERTED ITSELF AT THIS MEETING PERHAPS AT THE EXPENSE OV THE ARABS AND IRAN. IRAQ WILL NOT HAVE A QUOTA/ BUT

OBVIOUSLY WILL CONTINUE TO PRODUCE OVER ITS OLD QUOTA. THE NON-ARAB GROUP REFUSED TO ALLOW IRAQ TO HAVE AN INCREASED QUOTA AND IRAN DID NOT GET THE PRICE INCREASE IT REQUIRED BUT SIGNED ANYWAY.(NYT/ ND)

NYP/ JAN LACHMAN/ THE UN HAS IMPROVED IT SECURITY OF THE NAZI FILES AFTER LAXNESS WAS REPORTED. THEY ALSO ADMITTED THAT THERE HAD BEEV A A BURGLARY OF THE AREA AROUND THE TIME RUMORS ABOUT WALDHEIM WERE BEGINNING. JNLY A TYPEWRITER WAS REPORTEDLY STOLEN.

DN/ CHANUKAH BEGINS TONIGHT WITH ONE CANDLE. SEVERAL GROUPS INCLUDING THE LINCOLN SQAURE SYNAGOGUE AND

THE LUBOVICHERS WILL BE LIGHTING PUBLIC/ OUTDOOR MENORAHS (NYP)

LETTERS-

NYT/MOORE/ +HANDING TOUGH+ WITH GORBAVHEV IS OK UNLESS YOU THINK THERE IS SOMETHING TO LOOSE BY THIS POLICY.

NYT/ NIKOLIC/ LIKES AND DISLIKES DON'T COUNT IN DEALIN WITH OTHER NATIONS/ INTERESTS COUNT.

NYT/ A. HAIG/ I NEVER SAID THE SOVIETS HAD TO GIVE UP STUFF AS A PRCNDITION FOR THE TREATY/ I SAID THE US SHOULDN'T GIVE UP ALL ITS INF MISSLES UNTIL SOVIET CONVENTIONAL WAR AND STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY WAS REDUCED.

ND/ KULICK/ REAGAV DION'T JUST SEND IRAV ARMS SINCE 1985. I AM SURE THEY HAVE BEEN GOING SINCE 1981 AND THAT REAGAN PROMISED THLM TO KHOMEINI BEFORE HIS ELECTION SO THAT THE HOSTAGES WOULDV'T BE RELEASED TOO SOON.

DN/ RUSSIANS PRAISING THE PLO SHOULD REMEMBER THAT THEIR'S WAS THE FIRST VOTE TO ESTABLISH ISRAEL AND IT WAS THE RIGHT THING TO DO.

DN/ RAMPACEK/ DON'T TRUST THE RUSSIANS.

NYP/ RITT/ IT'S WRONG TO SAY THAT THE 230,000 DEMONSTRATORS WERE ANTI- SUMMIT. WATTENBERG WAS RIGHT/ TO BE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DOESN'T MEAN THAT THE TWO SUPERPOWE RS SHOULDN'T MEET.

NYP/ FISH/ MEMB. OF CONGRESS/ THE INF TREATY DOESV'T ELIMINATE ANY WEAPONS AIMED AT THE US. IT DOESN'T DO ANYTHING ABOUT SOVLET ICBM SUPERIORITY. IT LEAVES THE US NAKED. THE SENATE SHOULDN'T VOTE FOR IT.

11085 תאריך : 16.12.8

גבגב בלמס

חוזם:12,11065
אל:המשרד
מ-:ני,נר:483,תא:151287,זח:1700,דח:מ,סג:ב
נד:@

בלמס/מידי

אל-: מעת

דע-: מצפא, ושינגטון (נר 68)

מאת: שתרבות/ניו יורק

NEWS SUMMARY DECEMBER 15,L987

EDITORIALS-

NO, LET THE PLO STAY IN NY, NO TIME FOR DEMOGOGUERY. WE SHOULDN'T ABROGATE OUR AGREEMENT WITH THE UN. NO ONE FROM THE PLO MISSION HAS DONE TERRORISM SO THERE IS NO SECURITY ISSUE. ITS BAD FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS AND FOR THE QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR COMMITMENT TO THE UN.

OP-ED-

NYT, A.M.ROSENTHAL, REAGAN REFERRED TO THE DEATH OF ELENI GATZYIANNIS IN 1948 BY SPEAKING OF HER DEATH CRY FOR PEACE FOR ALL CHILDREN. HE FAILED TO MENTION THAT IT WAS THE COMMUNISTS WHO KILLED HER FOR SAVING HER CHILDREN FROM DEPORTATION. IN AFGHANISTAN CHILDREN ARE STILL BEING TAKEN FROM THEIR FAMILIES FOR INDOCTRINATION SCHOOLING.

NYT, I.F.STONE, SOVIET LEADERS, INCLUDING STALIN HAVE ALWAYS WOOED WESTERN INTELLECTUALS WHILE GIVING THEIR OWN THE BACK OF THE HAND.+ HOW CAN YOU HAVE DIALECTIC WITHOUT DEBATE.

WSJ. BRZEZINSKI, LAST WEEKS SUMMIT WAS A SOVIET DEFEAT THICKLY VEILED AS A VICTORY+ AS A RESULT OF GORBACHEV'S PERSONAL IMPACT. THE ZERO- ZERO OPTION WAS REAGAN'S. START WAS PUSHED FORWARD BECAUSE OF SOVIET FEARS OF SDI, THE SOVIETS SOFTENED THEIR POSITION ON BOTH CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND A PULLOUT FROM AFGHANISTAN. THIS WAS DUE TO REAGANS FIRMNESS. DON'T GET SMUG AND LOOSE FLEXIBILITY NOW WHEN THE SOVIETS NEED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BOOST GOOD PUBLIC RELATIONS CAN BRING TO A SECOND RATE ECONOMIC POWER.

NO, GOODMAN,THE +HEADY + QUALITY OF THE SUMMIT COMES FROM THINKING ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A WORLD WITHOUT WAR. NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE ALREADY TAUGHT US THAT YOU CAN'T USE ALL YOU'VE GOT IN ARMS. WE NOW HAVE +SMALL+ WARS WITHOUT WINNERS AS TRADITIONALLY ENVISAGED. PERHAPS WE CAN LEARN TOHAVE NO MORE WARS.

PRESS REPORTS- THERE IS STILL CONSIDERABLE SUMMIT NEWS, PRIMARILY HEAVY ANALYSYS OF WEAPONS INVOLVED IN THE INF TREATY AND AND THE START TALKS ALONG WITH SOME CLARIFICATION BY BOTH LEADERS OF WHAT THEY REALLY SAID.(ED)

NYT,KIFNER, TWO MORE PALESTINIANS DIED TODAY AS A RESULT OF THE ONGOING RIOTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. AGAIN HUNDREDS OF PALESTINIAN YOUTHS FOUGHT ISRAELI TROOPS WITH ROCKS AND BARRICADES. STRIKES CONTINUED. LITANI OF THE JP WAS QUOTED ABOUT DISPAIR OF THE YOUTHS AND THAT MORE PEOPLE ARE INVOLVED. (ED. NOTE, THERE FOLLOWS A REVIEW OF THE LAST FEW DAYS AND QUOTES FROM ISRAELI PRESS AND SPOKESPEOPLE .)

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,אמן,קלרורי,מעת,
הסברה,לעמ,דרצ-ים,דוצ,בדבר,צנזורצבאי,מצפא,ברנ,תפוצות,
מתאמשטחים

10214 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 15.12.87

נכנס בלמס

חוזם:12,10214
אל:המשרד
מ-:ני,נר:420,תא:141287,זח:1700,דח:מ,סג:ב
נר:6

בלמס/מיידי

אל-: מעת

דע-: מצפא, וושינגטון (נר 77)

מאת: עתונות/ניו יורק

NEWS SUMMARY DECEMBER 11, L987

EDITORIALS-

WSJ, GORBACHEV SOUNDS GOOD ON GLASNOST, BUT IN THE PAST WHEN THE SOVIETS HAVE LET UP ON REPRESSION +DESTABILIZATION+, LIKE THE PRAGUE SPRING HAS ARISEN. THIS HAS LEAD TO RE-REPRESSION. LET'S WAIT AND SEE.

WSJ, THERE ARE SERIOUS DISCREPANCIES REGARDING THE NUMBER OF SOVIET SS- 20 MISSILES. THERE IS MUCH OPPORTUNITY FOR SWITCHING TO UNLIMITED MISSILES USING THE SAME LAUNCHERS. THE RUSSIANS CAN KEEP THE SAME CAPABILITY EVEN WITHOUT CHEATING.

NYT, +FRENCH WHINES+ FRANCE IS GIVING INTO IRANIAN DEMANDS BECAUSE OF COERTION. THEY SHOULD REMEMBER THEIR OWN HUMAN RIGHTS DECLARATION OF 1789 AND SHOULD NOT SEND REFUGEES TO A +COUNTRY WHERE THEIR LIFE OR FREEDEM WOULD BE THREATENED.

ND, THINK OF THE SUMMIT AS A GLASS HALF FULL. ITS NOT PERFECT, MOMENTUM IN ARMS CONTROL, NONE IN REGIONAL ISSUES. GIVE IT A CHANCE TO BE A BEGINNING.

NYP, GORBAVHEV IS NOT WHAT HE SAYS HE IS. HE IS A CAGEY, WILY, PRISON WARDEN. IT'S WRONG TO SAY THE USSR IS ALMOST THE SAME MORALLY AS THE US.

OP-ED.-

WSJ, GIGOT, +SOVIETS MASTER MEDIA, BUT MESSAGE IS FLAWED+-

NYT, A.M.ROSENTHAL, GORBACHEV'S ATTITUDE TO HUMAN RIGHTS DISCUSSION IS+STAY OUT OF OUR BUSINESS+. SOVIETS BY SAYING THEY HAVE NO POLITICAL PRISONERS. THERE IS NO RIGHT TO CRITICIZE THE SYSTEM. LOOK AT THE CRACKDOWN OF THE LAST FEW DAYS. DON'T BELIEVE RUSSIAN GAMES PROMISING TO OPEN THE PRISON GATES.

NYT, HOWARD PHILLIPS, THE US IS IN DANGER FROM THE SELLOUT TREATY. REAGAN IS ONLY A SPEECH READER FOR THE APPEASERS AND THOSE WHO SOLD OUT PANAMA. CONSERVATIVIES HAVE BEEN BETRAYED BY MANY, INCLUDING NANCY. KILL THE TREATY OR, AT LEAST, PUT UP A STRONG OPPOSITION.

NYT, F. LEWIS, THS SOVIETS ARE IN A HURRY TO GET SETTLEMENTS FROM REAGAN FOR INTERNAL REASONS AND TO AVOID A LONG DELAY WITH A NEW PRESIDENT. THEY FEEL THAT THE WORLD IS AT A CROSSROADS OF SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT AND WE MUST ACT TO KEEP IT FROM BEING USED MILITARILY.

ND, KEMPTON, THE SUMMIT IS REGARDED AS A SUCCESS BECAUSE IT HAS NO UNEXPECTED EVENTS. REAGAN IS A +LAME DUCK+ BUT GORBACHEV IS ON A TIGHTROPE TRYING TO MAKE CHENGES WITHOUT FALLING OUT OF POWER.

DN, NELSON, DON'T BELIEVE THE HOOEY DISHED OUT BY GORBACHEV LIE: HE MIGHT HAVE TROUBLE WITH RATIFICATION , RUSSIANS AND AMERICANS SHARE THE SAME VALUES AND FREEDOMS. THE ECONOMY RUNS BY COMMAND. THERE ARE NO FREE ELECTIONS WITH CHOICE. WE CAN'T FIND TRUE COMMONALITIES AS LON AS THE RUSSIANS KEEP PRETENDING.

DN, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION DOESN'T ACT LIKE THE OLD ANTI-SOVIET REAGAN. HE IS WRONG NOW.THE SOVIETS ARE STILL OUT TO BURY US.

DN, GRADY, GROBACHEV IS THIN-SKINNED AND SHOWS IT ON TWO SUBJECTDS: SOVIET JEWS AND AFGHANISTAN. . HE WILL ALWAYS BE ANGERED BY OUR FREELY QUESTIONING PRESS AND PLENTIFUL DEMONSTRATORS.

NYP, KERRISON, THE SUMMIT WAS A WASHOUT. NOTHING NEW HAPPENED. PEOPLE KEPK GROVELLING TO THE GORBACHEVS AND GORBACHEV TRAMPED ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE SUMMIT WA A SUCCESS FOR HIM.

NYP, EVANS I NOVAK, CONSERVATIVIES ARE DISMAYED OVER THE SUMMIT BECAUSE IT WAS A +HUGGY+ WHILE AFGHANS BURNED. THE SOVIETS SET THE TONE AND MILKED THE PRESS WELL. THE AMERICANS LOOKED FLAT FOOTED. CIVILAN SECURITY EXPERTS FEAR THE LACK OF RESTRAINT. REAGAN NOW COMMUNICATES THAT THE MORAL DIFFERENCES DON'T MATTER IF THE BOMB NUMBER COME DOWN.

NYP,RABINOWITZ. ISN'T IT FUNNY HOW ALL THE ANALYSES OF MEDIA AND COMPARATIVE SOVIET AND AMERICAN EDUCATION , TEXTBOOKS ET.AL., CAME UP SHOWING THE RUSSIANS IN SUCH A GOOD LIGHT AND THE AMERICANS IN SUCH A BAD ONE?

PRESS REPORTS-

THE SUMMIT

ALL PAPERS STILL CARRIED EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF THE SUMMIT WITH PLENTY OF ANALYSIS AND SOME LIGHT ARTICLES. BANNER HEADLINES WERE FEW.

NYT, BOTH LEADERS SAID THE SUMMIT WAS A SUCCESS. THERE HAS BEEN +SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS+ TOWARDS A STRATEGIC ARMS TREATY. OTHER ISSUES LIKE AFGHANISTAN AND STAR WARS WERE NOT SETTLED, ALTHOUGH STAR WARS WILL NOT STAND IN THE WAY OF A NEW AGREEMENT. PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO MEN SEEMS IMPROVED. NO DATE HAS BEEN SET FOR A NEW MEETING, BUT IS WILL PROBABLY BE IN THE SPRING. THERE WAS MUCH SECRECY AND SCURRYING AT THE END OF THE MEETINGS. THERE WERE NO SURPRISES AND BOTH MEN WANT TO LOOK GOOD AT HOME. GORBACHEV TALKED TO LOTS OF DIFFERENT AMERICAN GROUPS. HE FEELS HE HAS MADE A CONCESSION ON STAR WARS. (WSJ,DN,ND,NYP)

NYT,BARRINGER +90 MEET IN MOSCOW AT RIGHTS SEMINAR BUT THEY LOSE THEIR HALL AND SOME LEADERS AS SOVIET HARRASSES THE GROUP.+LEADER TIMOFEYEV FEELS IT IS GOOD THAT IT IS TAKING PLACE AT ALL. MANY HAVE BEEN PREVENTED FROM GETTING TO THE MEETING INCLUDING FOREIGNERS STOPPED AT THE BORDER.

OPEC

WSJ, PETZINGER I TANNER, OPEC APPEARED CLOSE TO AN AGREEMENT ON PRICE AND QUOTA TODAY= \15PER BARREL FOR 17.5 MILLION BARREL A DAY. IRAN IS STILL TREATENIN G TO BOYCOTT IF PRICES ARE NOT RAISED. IT WILL NOT ACCEPT AN INCREASE IN THE IRAQI PRODUCION QUOTA. MANY ARE WILLING TO SIGN A FAST AGREEMENT EVEN IF IRAN IS NOT IN IT. (NYT)

ISRAEL

NYT, ISRAELI SOLDIERS KILLED A 17 YEAR OLD PALESTINIAN TODAY AND WOUNDED 15 OTHERS IN INCIDENTS IN BOTH GAZA, WHERE A 17 YEAR OLD WAS KILLED YESTERY, AND THE WEST BANK. YOUTHS WERE PELTING THE TROOPS WITH IRON BARS AND ROCKS THE ARMY SAID. A WOMAN TRIED TO STAB A BORDER POLICEMAN, BUT WAS STOPPED.THE ARMY IS INVESTIGATING. POLICE AND YOUTHS WERE INJURED NORTH OF JERUSALEM.(DN)

PERSIAN GULF

ND, THE FIRST TANKER TO SINK WENT DOWN YESTERDAY FOUR DAYS AFTER IT WAS HIT BY AN IRANIAN SPEEDBOAT.

NYT,P. LEWIS, THE UN CHIEF SAYS THAT IRAN'S REJECTION OF THE CEASE-FIRE PLAN UNDERMINES THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST ACT TO BACK UP ITS DECREE IF IT WANTS TO GET SAOMETHING DONE..

NYT, IRAQ BOMBED WESTERN AND SOUTHWESTERN IRAN TODAY.

NAZI'S

NYP, FETTMANN I LAGNADO, UN OFFICIALS ARE EXPECTED TO ANNOUNCE THAT HAVE TURNED UP THE MISSING 400 NAZI FILES. STEINBERG OF THE WORD JEWISH CONGRESS SAYS IT IS A SCANDAL

LETTERS-

NYT,EDWARD FEIGHAN, CONGRESSMAN 19TH DIST. OHIO IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY THAT ARAB PRIORITIES HAVE CHANGED. WHEN THE GULF PROBLEMS END ISRAEL WILL BE BACK ON TOP OF THE AGENDA. ISRAEL MUST GET ITS NEGOTIATING ACT TOGETHER. ARABS NOW REALIZE MILITARY STRATEGY HAS FAILED AND THE US WILL CONTINUE TO BACK ISRAEL.

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,אמן,קלדררי,משעה,
הסברה,לעמ,דוב-ים,דוב,בדבל,צנזורצבאי,אירג,מצפא,נרך,הפרצות,
מתאמטים

11096 16.12.87 : יום ג

עמוד 1 עמוד 2

12/11096:מרכז
מערכת
1:אב/מ:מר/1760:מר/141287:אמ/422:מב/מ:-מ
ב:מב

מערכת/מדע

מבוא: -מע

(79 מב) מבנה/מדע אמצע :-מד

מבוא: מערכת/מדע מדע

DECEMBER 13,

EDITORIALS-

NYT, HIGH EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE SUMMIT SHOULD NOT DIM THE REAL ACHIEVEMENTS LIKE A TREATY, MOVEMENT TOWARDS ANOTHER AND GOOD DISCUSSION ON OTHER SUBJECTS. THERE ARE STILL UNSETTLED ISSUES ON ARMS, BUT NOTHING WAS ALLOWED TO DISCOLOR THE MEETING. CLEARHEADED MATURITY MARKED THE MEETING AND COULD SPREAD TO AFGHANISTAN.

NO, INTERNATIONAL STABILITY SHOULD BE THE PRIORITY OF THE TWO LEADERS. CUTTING MISSILES BY 50= MAY INCREASE INSECURITY BECAUSE OF FEARS OF NOT HAVING A RESPONSE TO A FIRST STRIKE. MOBILE MISSILES AND MORE, SMALLER SUBS COMBINED WITH FEWER WARHEADS IS GOOD.

DN, WITH ALL THE HOOPLA, DON'T FORGET THE RUSSIANS ARE NOT LOOKING FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THEIR

SYSTEM. THERE IS STILL NO REGARD FOR INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY. THE TREATY SEEMS SOUND AND IS A FIRST FOR WEAPONS DESTRUCTION. DON'T EXPECT MORE LIBERTY.

OP-ED-

NYT GEORGE SHULTZ, THE INF TREATY OPENS PROMISE. THERE ARE FOUR GOOD THINGS AS A RESULT: US DEFENSE STRATEGY IS SOUND, NEGOTIATIONS CAN WORK, THE TREATY HAS OPENED DOORS, AND ARMS REDUCTIONS HAVE OPENED HEALTHY DEBATE IN THE US AND EUROPE. +I BELIEVE THAT THE SENATE WILL RECOGNIZE A GOOD THING WHEN IT SEES ONE.

NYT, SAFIRE, GORBACHEV SPENT MORE TIME ON PUBLIC RELATIONS THAN HE SPENT MEETING WITH REAGAN. ALL THE FAWNING OVER HIM WAS UNSEEMLY. HE DIDN'T DISCUSS THE THINGS HE DIDN'T WANT TO DISCUSS LIKE BUGGING ETC. HE SCOLDED REPORTERS FOR QUESTIONS ON ISSUES OF REPRESSION OF DISSIDENTS AND REFUSENIKS. WHAT MADE REAGAN +SLIP HIS STRATEGIC MOORING5?+

NYT, LEWIS, GORBACHEV IS TWO MEN, CHARMING AND TRUCULENT SHIFTING FROM HAND SHAKING TO BRISTLING WHEN ASKED ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS. RUSSIA'S HISTORY IS ONE OF SMALL GROUP RULE, WITH THOSE IN POWER FEARFUL OF ANARCHY. GORBACHEV CAN'T UNDERSTAND OUR CONCERNS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. WE ALSO MUST KNOW THAT MANY THINGS IN OUR SOCIETY, LIKE WIDE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RICH AND POOR ARE NOT VIEWED AS GOOD BY THE REST OF THE WORLD.

DN, WILL, THE SOVIETS DON'T TALK OF WORLD COMMUNIST DOMINATION ONLY BECAUSE THEY ARE TOO WEAK TO ACHIEVE IT. DETENTISTS AND REAGAN ARE WRONG IF THEY THINK THERE IS REAL CHANGE IN SOVIET THINKING. LENINISTS KNOW THAT THE CAPITALIST US IS DOOMED. LOOK AT GORBACHEV'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS HUMAN RIGHTS.

DN, ADELMAN, SUMMIT ATMOSPHERES ARE LIKE A SPORTS EVENT. THERE WERE NO BREAKTHROUGHS AND LAST MINUTE HARDNES BY THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS SHOW THAT THEY

ARE STILL MUSH THE SAME. GORBACHEV'S CHARM MASKS THE DIGH DIFFERENCES IN THE TWO SOCIETIES. THERE IS NO MORAL EQUIVALENCE. GORBACHEV IS VO CONFUSED AND WE MUST NOT LET HIM CONFUSE US OR THE WORLD. BE ON GUARD.

NO, KEMPTON, GORBACHEV IS NOT KRUSHCHEV BECAUSE THE USSR HAS LOST CONFIDENCE. THE US TOO IS FEELING OLDER AND MORE CNOWING. THE +JUICES+ ARE NOT FLOWING IN EITHER NATIOV AS THEY DID EARLIER. KRUSHCHEVS ZEST AND ENTHUSIASM VERSUS GORBACHEV'S +PUBLIC RELATIONS+ MAKE A SYMBOLIC CONTRAST.

PRESS REPORTS-

NYT, REAGAN IS ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE SUMMIT. HE SAYS STAR WARS IS STILL A POINT OF DISPUTE. GORBACHEV IS CHARMING BUT TOUGH. (ND,DN)

NYT, ISRAELI TROOPS SHOT AND WOUNDED 5 IN GAZA WHILE THE WEST BANK STREETS WERE EMPTY OF CIVILIANS. MEETINGS ARE BEING HELD TO TRY TO STOP THE VIOLENCE AND CURFEWS WERE OBSERVED. THERE WERE PROTESTS AT BIR ZEIT AND ROCK THROWING IN HEBRON. PROTESTERS HAVE FOUND WAYS TO COPE WITH TEAR GAS.

NYT, EGYPT PROTESTED TO ISRAEL ON THE ARMED ACTIOV AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS. INCREASED CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE PLO WERE DISCUSSED.

NYT, CUSHMAN, A US WARSHIP RESCUED THE CREW OF A CYPRIOT TANKER HIT BY AN IRANIAN GUNBOAT, IN A DRAMATIC EVENT. THIS CULMINATED A WEEK OF DRAMATIC IRANIAN ATTACKS OV GULF SHIPPING. (DN,ND)

NYT, GREENHOUSE, THERE IS MUCH CRITICISM OF FRANCE FOR HER EXPULSION OF IRANIAN LEFTISTS SOOON AFTER THE HOSTAGE RELIEF. INTERIOR MINISTER PASQUA SAID THEY WERE ISSUING THREATS AND HE DENIES ANY DEALS WITH THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT.

NYT,DELANY, THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN TUNIS IS LIBRALIZING

10215 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 12.87

נכנס בלמס

חוזם:10215,12
אל:המשרד
מ-:ניו,נר:421,תא:141287,זח:1700,דח:מ,סג:בב
בד:ם

בלמס/מיידי

אל-: מעת

דע-: מצפא, וושינגטון (נר 72)

מאת: עתונות/ניו יורק

NEWS SUMMARY DECEMBER 12 3 13

DECEMBER 12

EDITORIALS-

NYT, THE SUMMIT HAS LEFT US-SOVIET RELATIONS IN A BALANCE BETWEEN EUPHORIA AND DESPAIR. THE EUPHORIA DURING THE WEEK MASKED THE +STABILIZING SUBSTANCE.+ THE RESULTS ARE NOT FLASHY, BUT SOUND.

NYP, THE UN NOW SAYS IT NEVER SAID THE FILES WERE MISSING. THEY ARE LIARS AND ARE INSENSITIVE TO THE WHOLE NAZI ISSUE. THEY HAVE HIDDEN BEHIND FUNNY DEFINITIONS AND SEQUESTRATION.

OP-ED-

NYT, GEIGER, TO A PHYSICIAN THE TREATY MEANS LESS CAPACITY FOR BLAST BURNS, AND RADIATION AND WASTE= 32,000 FEWER HIROSHIMAS, 300 MILLION FEWER ABLE TO BE

KILLED. IT IS A BEGINNING BUT WE HAVE 46 000 WEAPONS YET TO GET RID OF.

NYP,LERNER, THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM IS NOT WORKING AND GORBACHEV, LIKE PETER THE GREAT WANTS TO +WESTERNIZ E+, BUT PAYS HOMAGE TO HIS REVOLUTIONARY PAST BY NOT WEARING A TUXEDO. THE BIG QUESTION IS, DOES HE REALLY WANT TO JOIN THE MORAL COMMUNITY OR IS IT A GIANT HOAX.

PRESS REPORTS-

NYT, ROBERTS, REAGAN IS ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE NEW RELATIONSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE SUMMIT. HE MET WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AND EXPECTS THE TREATY TO BE RATIFIED AND HAS BRIEFED ALLIES. HE SAID THAT HE COULD GO AHEAD WITH STAR WARS, BUT A SENIOR ARMS CONTROL ADVISOR DISAGREED. ANOTHER ADVISOR IS DISAPPOINTED THAT THERE WAS NO MOVEMENT ON AFGHANIST AN OR HUMAN RIGHTS. REAGAN THINKS THAT GORBACHEV IS A HARD BARGAINER, MORE TRUSTWORTHY THAN HIS PREDECESSORS. (ND, DN,NYP)

NYT, DOWD, CASPAR WEINBERGER REMAINS CYNICAL ABOUT GORBACHEV AND THE SUMMIT. HE EVEN USED THE PHRASE +EVIL EMPIRE+ IN AN INTERVIEW AND MADE REFERENCES TO MUNICH AND CHAMBERLIN. HE FEELS THE SOVIETS ARE STILL +ADVENTURERS+ SEEKING NEW OVERSEAS BASES ETC.

NYT, AT LEAST THREE MORE PALESTINIANS WERE KILLED IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TODAY, BRING THE TOTAL TO SIX IN THE LAST FEW DAYS. THE US IS UNHAPPY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET. THE DISTURBANCES STARTED OVER A TRUCK ACCIDENT. RESIDENTS THINK THE KILLINGS ARE REPRISALS FOR THE STABBING OF AN ISRAELI SALESMAN. THE SHOOTINGS ACCURED DURING ROCK AND IRON BAR BASHING. A NAVAL CLASH BETWEEN ISRAEL AND GUERILLAS FROM LEBANON OCCURED WITH DIFFERING ACCOUNTS FROM BOTH SIDES.(ND,DN)

NYT, P. LEWIS, THE UN COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATTERS VOTED 100-1 TO SAY THE PLO HAS A RIGHT TO MAINTAIN ITS OBSERVER MISSION. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IS ALSO EXPECTED TO SAY THIS. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

DISAGREES WITH CONGRESS AND DOESN'T WANT CONGRESS TO CLOSE THE MISSION. THOSE WHO SUPPORT THE MISSION CLOSING SAY THE PLO ARE TERRORISTS.

NYT, IBRAHIM, IRAN SAID THAT FRANCE HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO END ITS BOYCOTT OF IRANIAN OIL AS A PART OF THE HOSTAGE RELEASE DEAL. OPEC OFFICIALS DOUBTED THAT AN OIL DEAL WITH FRANCE WAS CLOSE. IRAN SAID

NONSENSE AND THE BOYCOTT ISN'T WORKING. THE US IS DISTURBED, THE FRENCH ARE HEDGING THEIR ANSWERS. FRANCE'S RELATIONS WITH IRAN HAVE BEEN A CONTROVERSY SINCE THE RELEASE OF TWO FRENCH HOSTAGES.

NYT, IBRAHIM, +DISCORD IN OPEC DEEPENS ON 3RD DAY OF MEETING.+ NO AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED AND PEOPLE DISAGREE ON RAISING IRAQ'S QUOTA AND ARE UPSET THAT OPEC IS THE VICTIM OF THE ARAB-IRAN FIGHTING.(NYP)

NYP, PIERSON 3 FETTMANN, THE UN ADMITTED THAT THE MISSING NAZI FILES WERE IN THE ARCHIVES ALL ALONG. 8 ARE STILL MISSING. ARAD, FROM THE ISRAELI MISSION SAID THAT'S WHY WE NEED THE PRESS TO LOOK INTO THINGS. MANY REPORTERS LAUGHED WHEN A UN OFFICIAL SAID THAT WE NEVER SAID THE FILES WERE MISSING. IT IS HARD TO EXPLAIN THE MISSING FILES SAID ARCHIVIST ERLANDSSON.

NYP, DAN, THE UN FILES HAVE FOUND A FORMER NAZI GUARD, PETER QUINTUS LIVING IN MICHIGAN. THERE IS ALSO A FILE ON SCHWAMMBERGER, A MASS MURDERER.

ENTERTAINMENT-

DN, THERE IS A CHANUKAH CRAFTS FAIR AT TEMPLE ANSCHE CHESED.

NYT, A NEW GENERATION IS BOTH PUTTING ON AND ATTENDING YIDDISH THEATER IN NEW YORK.

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,אמן,[illegible],מעת,
הסברה,לעמ,[illegible],[illegible],[illegible],[illegible],מצבא,מרכ,[illegible],
מתאמשטחים,אירג

נכנס

בלמס

חוזם:12,10213
אל:המשרד
מ-:ני,נר:419,תא:141287,זח:1700,דח:מ,סג:ב
נד:פ

בלמס/מיידי

אל-: מעת

דע-: מנכא, וושינגטון (נר 76)

מאת: עתונות/ניו יורק

NEWS SUMMARY DECEMBER 14,1987

EDITORIALS-

NYT, FOR THE SAKE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH DON'T CLOSE THE PLO MISSION.(CABLED)

WSJ, +SUMMIT SCORE CARD+-ARMS CONTROL-YES. SDI UNDECIDED. HUMAN RIGHTS-0. REGIONAL ISSUES 0.

NYP, THE WORST PART OF THE SUMMIT WAS TO AGREE TO HAVE ANOTHER. IT IS AN ARTIFICIAL DEADLINE FOR A START TREARY. THIS SUMMIT WAS ALL MOSCOW'S, NO RIGHTS, NO AFGHANISTAN. REAGAN SHOULD BE AWARE THAT GORBACHEV IS NO +NEW+ SOVIET LEADER.

NYP, +MAKE N.Y. A SAFER PLACE-KICK OUT THE PLO.+ JACK KEMP SAYS DISPITE UN CLAIMS, THE US HAS A LEGAL RIGHT UNDER PUBLIC LAW 80-357 TO SHUT DOWN THE MISSION TO SAFEGUARD ITS SECURITY, AND CONTROL ALIENS. TERRORISTS ARE SECURITY THREATS.

OP-ED.-

NYT, AARON,TO A TV WATCHER THE SUMMIT WAS FULL OF COMPETITION BETWEEN EXPERTS FOR AIR TIME, WITH INTERVIEWERS INTERVIEWING EACH OTHER. THERE WAS TASTELESSNESS AND SHALLOW QUESTIONS. DID ANYONE REALLY EXPECT GORBACHEV TO ANNOUNE A NEW POLICY TOWARDS EITHER JEWS OR AFGHANISTAN IN WASHINGTON?

ND, LONGSTRETH, BOTH SIDES WON THE SUMMIT. REAGAN HAS A NEW IMAGE AS PEACEMAKER, WHILE CHARMING GORBACHEV GAVE NOTHING ON AFGHANISTAN OR RIGHTS. STAR WARS IS NOT SETTLED. THERE IS PROGRESS TOWARDS START WITH SUBCEILINGS. WE MUST BE CAREFUL WITH THE REST OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO ENSURE A BALANCE IN ARMS COMPROMISE.

ND, PFAFF, EUROPE SHOULD NOT FEAR THE SUMMIT RESULTS. IT WAS NO YALTA. AMERICANS ARE ALWAYS THEATRICAL IN PUBLIC LIFE. JUST LOOK AT THE FORTY YEARS OF US CONSTANCY IN RELATION TO EUROPE. DON'T EXPECT SUMMITS TO PROVIDE +MORAL UPLIFT+ OF THE USSR, JUST SOME MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.

ND,CANNON, THE INF TREATY SHOULD HAVE INTERESTING EFFECTS ON THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE US. IN THE GOP THERE IS A DIVISION BETWEEN THE CENTERIST TREATY SUPPORTERS AND THE NEVER-TRUST-THE-RUSSIANS CAMP. THIS HISTORY GOES BACK TO BEFORE WW II. BUSH NOW CARRIES THE INTERVENTIONIST BANNER.

DN, BUCKLEY, REAGAN IMPLIES THAT GORBACHEV WOULDN'T HAVE STARTED IN AFGHANISTAN IF HE HAD BEEN PREMIER IN 1979. IF SO, WHY HASN'T HE GOTTEN OUT IN THE LAST THREE YEARS? SOVIET RHETORIC DOESN'T MATCH SOVIET ACTIONS. WHERE ARE THE SIGNS THAT THE AIM FOR WORLD COMMUNIST DOMINATION IS NO LONGER THE AIM?

ND, NELSON, US SECURITY MEN AND THE WASHINGTON POLICE ACTED LIKE THE KGB DURING THE SUMMIT AND AT OTHER TIMES PUSHING PEOPLE AROUND AND ARRESTING JEWISH AND AFGHANI PROTESTERS NEAR THE SOVIET EMBASSY. I KNOW THERE ARE

THREATS AND LUNATICS, BUT WATCH OUT= SECURITY NEVER DECREASES.

NYP, KERRISON, IN A PHONE CONVERSATION WITH PIMONOW AS SOVIET

DISSIDENT, HE SAID PEOPLE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN MISSILES, BUT IN GETTING SOME FOOD AND CLOTHES. PEOPLE CAN'T GET OUT BECAUSE THEY ARE +SECURITY RISKS.+ NOTHING HAS CHANGED UNDER +GLASNOST.+ DON'T TRUST THE SOVIETS.

NYP,LATHEM, BOTH SIDES WERE WINNERS AT THE SUMMIT. REAGAN GOT A POLITICAL BOOST AND +HIGH MARKS+ FOR FOR DIGNITY DESPITE RUSSIAN RUDENESS. GORBACHEV GOT A POLITCAL BOOST AT HOME TOO. THE PERSHING MISSILES ARE GONE AT THE HOME AUDIENCE LIKED ALLL THE FAWNING OVER HIM.

PRESS REPORTS-

NYT, PALESTINIANS CONTINUE TO BE WOUNDED BY ISRAELI TROOPS AND ROCKS AND STONES IN BOTH THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AS RIOTS CONTINUE. MANY EVENTS OCCURRED INCLUDING A GASOLINE BOMB IN EAST JERUSALEM. THERE WAS A SECRET MEETING OF THE ISRAELI MINISTERIAL DEFENSE COMMITTEE. THE UNREST IS THE MOST SEVERE IN SEVERAL YEARS. SHAMIR SAYS THAT IT SHOWS A FAILURE OF TERRORISTS TO HARM ISRAELI SECURITY AND THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION WANTS PUBLIC ORDER. A CABINET COMMUNIQE SAID THE ARMY HAS CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. ARAFAT SAID 23 ARABS HAVE BEEN KILLED AND 270 WOUNDED AND THE UN SHOULD CONDEMN THIS.IN ISRAEL THERE ARE MANY DIFFERING OPINIONS VOICED. (ND,DN,NYP)

ND, KATZ, +DEATH CAMP TRIAL NOW DRAWS YAWNS FROM MOST ISRAELIS+ THE TRIAL OF ACCUSED TREBLINKA GUARD DEMJANJUK SEEMS TO BE DRAWING TO A CLOSE.

NYT, THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE IN JIDDA URGED THE UN TO INTERVENE TO PROTECT PALESTINIANS.

ND, AN IRAQI ATTACK ON A NORWEGIAN TANKER KILLED 21 INCLUDING THE CAPTAIN. (DN)

WSJ. GULF POLITICS HAS TEMPORARILY HALTED AN AGREEMENT ON LEAVING OIL PRICES UNCHANGED. ALL MEMBERS BUT IRAQ AND IRAN HAVE AGREED TO A STAUS QUO VIZ-A VIZ PRICES AND PRODUCTION. THIS AGREEMENT ITSELF DOESN'T DO ANYTHING TO FIX OVERPRODUCTION AND FALLING PRICES. IT MAY GO ON WITHOUT THE TWO WARRING STATES. FRIDAY IT HAD LOOK LIKE IRAN WAS BACK BECAUSE SEVERAL MEMBERS REFUSED TO INCREASE IRAQ'S QUOTA. IRAQ THEN BACKED OUT. LATER IRAN BACKED OUT OVER WANTING TO DECREASE TOTAL PRODUCTION TO FIRM PRICES.(NY T,DN,ND)

NYT,BLUMENTHAL,+U.N. REPORTS NEARLY ALL NAZI FILES ACCOUNTED FOR+(CABLED)

NYP, DAN J FETTMANN, UN OFFICIALS WERE WARNED AS MUCH AS TWO YEARS AGO THAT THE SECURITY ON THE NAZI FILES WAS LAX AND ANYONE COULD GET IN TO TAMPER WITH THEM.

ND, BAUM, RELIGIOUS PRACTICE IS STILL DIFFICULT IN THE OFFICIALLY ATHEISTIC USSR. GORBACHEV IS ALERT TO WHAT THE WEST IS INTERESTED IN AND FAIR TO NOTE THAT THE ONE ISSUE THAT GOT MOST PEOPLE AROUSED IN THE US WAS SOVIET JEWRY FOR WHOM 200 000 MARCHED. ONLY THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH HAS GAINED FROM GLASNOST.ITS STILL TOO EARLY TO TELL IF ANYTHING WILL REALLY INPROVE.

NYT, ROBBINS, THE +ARYAN NATIONS HOUR+ IS BEING BROADCAST FROM UTAH, MARKING THE BEGINNINGS OF A CHAPTER OF THE ANTI-SEMITIC, ANTI-BLACK HATE GROUP IN THIS STATE. THE FIRST TWOPROGRAMS HAVE DEALT WITH

SEGREGATION BY RACE.

ND, 1000 HASIDIC JEWS STAGED A PROTEST OUTSIDE THE WALDORF WHERE PERES WAS SPEAKING. THEY WERE OBJECTING TO POLICE BRUTALITY IN RECENT MONTHS IN JERUSALEM DURING DESECRATION OF THE SABBATH DEMONSTRATIONS. THE RALLY WAS PEACEFUL.

ND, MANY ORGANIZATIONS ARE OBSERVING CHANUKAH IN MANY WAYS, MOSTLY BY HELPING THE UNFORTUNATE.

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,אמן,קלדרי,מעת,
הסברה,לעמ,דרצ-ים,דרצ,בזנבר,צנזדרצבאי,מצפא,ברנ,תפוצות,
מתאמשטחים,אירג

11083 כ   תאריך : 16.12.87

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

** נכנס   סודי
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חוזם:12,11083
אל:המשרד
מ-:ווש,נר:372,תא:141287,זח:2230,דח:מ,סג:ס
גד:ש

סודי/מידי לבוקר

ל:מנכ'ל מדיני

סמנכ'ל צפ'א

יועץ מדיני לרה'מ

דע אורי סביר-ברזילה (לעיונך בלבד)

שיחת ממרוה'מ ושה'ח עם מרפי (12.12- בניו יורק)

א. מרפי פתח שדווח על הפסגה באומרו שהנושאים האזוריים לא הועלו בדרג המנהיגים.

1. אפגניסטאן. לא שמעו למעשה דבר חדש. הרגשתם של האמריקאים היתה שבעקבות נאומו של נג'יבללה בג'רג'ה היה מקום לצפיה לשינוי מהותי בעמדה הסובייטית ושגורבצ'וב יעשה את הצעד. בסופו של דבר הבהיר גורבצ'וב שבריה'מ מוכנה אומנם לסגת תוך 12 חודש אך תלה זאת בהשגת פיוס לאומי. האמריקאים אמרו שאם הנסיגה תלויה בכך שהפיוס הוא תהליך הרי שלא תהיה לעולם נסיגה. שה'ח שאל האם היה לינקג' אצל הסובייטים בין נסיגה לבין הפסקת אספקת הנשק למוג'אהידין ונענה על ידי מרפי שדובר על 12 חודשים אך לא נאמר מתי. הערכתו של מרפי היא שאחרי שהסובייטים יחליטו על יציאתם מאפגניסטאן זה יהיה ענינם שלהם לעשות זאת במהירות האפשרית על מנת לא לסבול אבדות מיותרות. האמריקאים מצפים שבשיחות בג'נבה בפברואר יבואו הסובייטים עם הצעות קונקרטיות יותר. גורבצ'וב הוסיף מרפי, אמר ברגע מסוים שיש קשר בין איראן ואפגניסטאן היינו, שפעילות סובייטית כנגד

איראן עלו, לתרום להחרפת הפעילות של המוג'אהידין בהשראת טהרן. ארה'ב אמר מרפי המליצה בפני מוסקבה על הדברות ישירה עם פקיסטאן אך ההצעה נדחתה ולדעתו הסובייטים מעדיפים 'חלוקת עבודה' בין המעצמות כאשר כל אחת 'מטפלת' בבנות בריתה תוך כדי שהם מבקשים להוכיח שהאמריקאים הם שאחראים להמשך הקונפליקט.

2. איראן -עיראק:-ארה'ב ממשיכה לדחוף החלטה שניה אחרי 598. לדעתה אמברגו הוא הצעד המעשי היחיד אם כי לא יהיה לו אפקט מיידי. מזה 4 שנים שארה'ב דוחפת את נושא STAUNCH ולהערכתם זה חוסם ב-50-60 אחוז מהעסקות. בספטמבר הבין מזכיר מהסובייטים כאילו יהיו מוכנים לפעול בכוון החלטה שניה אך דבר לא קרה והאיראנים הצליחו בפעולת ההשהיה שלהם. משיחות הפיסגה ברור שהסובייטים לא שינו עמדתם.

העמדה האיראנית היא שהם יסכימו באופן בלתי פורמלי להפא'ש אם יוקם גוף בינלאומי שיחקור מיהו האחראי למלחמה ויקבלוה פורמלית כאשר ימצא האחראי. הנסיגה תעשה, לפי עמדת האיראנים כאשר יוחלט על הפיצויים שעיראק חייבת להם בגין המלחמה.

מרפי אמר שנפגש עם פרימקוב פעמים לפני שהפיסגה התחילה ושמע ממנו גירסת שונות מאלו ששמעו מגורבצ'וב (אף כי פרימקוב טען בשיחות אלו שלא מדבר בשם ממשלתו אלא כאזרח פרטי) פרימקוב אמר שהם WILLING TO BEGIN PREPARING החלטה שניה. הסובייטים רוצים למשוך זמן ולנהל מגעים עם שני הצדדים תוך השארת דלת פתוחה הן לטהרן והן למדינות ערב. מרפי מעריך שתוצאות הועידה בעמאן והמגעים עם מדינות ערב מתחילים לתת אותותיהם. הסובייטים ניסו להחדיר את הענין צי או'מ ומבחינת ארה'ב אין זה מעשי ונאמר לסובייטים ור הטיה מהרעיון של אמברגו וארה'ב מעוניינת להתחיל במבצע STAUNCH גלובלי כאשר ארה'ב 'מטפלת' בבנות בריתה ואילו בריה'מ באלו שלה.

אולי זה לא יהיה אמברגו מושלם אך גם תוצאות חלקיות תסייענה לסיום המלחמה. גם הערכתו של וולטרס היא שהסובייטים זזים לאיטם.

שה'ח אמר כי יש גירסה מעניינת שהסורים מציגים ולפיה הם באו לעמאן מתוך מחשבה שחוסיין וצדאם חוסיין מנסים לגייס העולם הערבי נגד איראן והם הצליחו למנוע עמדה מוחלט בין איראן והעולם הערבי תוך בקשה מהמתכנסת בעמאן לנסות

ולהביא לסיום המלחמה בדרכי שלום. הסורים טוענים שהצליחו והוא, שה'ח לא יהיה מופתע אם יתברר שגם הסובייטים בתמונה ופעלו בכוון זה. יתכן מאוד שמקור החשיבה הזו, של מניעת עימות בין איראן ומדינות ערב, הוא במוסקבה.

מרפי אמר שמסקנתו שלסוריה נגישות מוגבלת בטהרן והעובדה היא שהטיל האיראני נפל בכווית סמוך לכינוס הועידה בעמאן. הערכתו של מרפי שיש CONSIDERABLE DISARRAY בדמשק בנושא האיראני.

ב. תהליך השלום בפגישה הראשונה עם פרימקוב שאלו איננו רוצה להתחיל ופרימקוב אמר ללא הסוס שבמכרץ ושוחח עליו שעתים. בפגישה השניה דנו בתהליך ובאפגניסטאן. פוליאקוב אמר המשלחת הקונסולרית בישראל מקיימת מגעים רגילים וכי היעדר חסים לא ימשך ללא סוף. לא היה יותר ספציפי בנושא.

מרפי אמר ששאל פוליאקוב האם יש תשובה לשאלת מיולי. פוליאקוב פנה לדירקובסקי ושאלו מה המצב. דירקובסקי ענה ששלח שלוש פעמים תזכורות למוסקבה אך לא קיבל תשובה.

שה'ח אמר שפנה לשברדנדזה בזמנו בענין החיילים הנעדרים ולפני כשבועיים התשובה (הסורים אמרו שאין בידיהם חיילים ישראלים) הועברה על ידי המשלחת הקונסולרית. חוץ מפעילות זו גם באו אלינו בשאלה האם נתיר לסובייטים להשתתף במכרזים על הקמת מסילת ברזל בישראל. בסה'כ המשלחת משועממת מובטלת ומרפי העיר שמסיבה מוזרה ולא ידועה הם עדיין בישראל.

שה'ח ציין גם ששגריר בריה'מ באו'ם ופרימקוב בראיון ל'קול ישראל' לא הועילו לקידום התהליך. מרפי אמר שאין כל ידיעה אם היתה התיחסות למזה'ת במפגש ריגן גורבצ'וב להוציא התיחסות בודדת ב'וושינגטון טיימס' לפיה הנשיא ריגן הביע תמיכה בועידה הבינלאומית. וליקוקס ציין כי היתה התיחסות כללית למזה'ת, כלאזורים אחרים בהודעה המסכמת.

מרפי חזר לתיאור שיחתו עם פרימקוב והאחרון גילה דאגה מהתפשטות הפונדמנטליזם בעוד שבקיץ בשנפגשו אמר שהאמריקאים מגזימים בהערכת הסכנה.

הסובייטים לפי פרימקוב מתנגדים למו'מ אלא במסגרת הועידה הבינלאומית שצריכה להיות סמכותית. פרימקוב הביע התנגדות לעסקות נפרדות והביא לדוגמא את כשלון הסכם לבנון ישראל. מרפי אמר לו שארה'ב מחפשת כל דרך. הועידה איננה מטרה בפני

עצמה והיא תוכל לכפות או להטיל וטו. ברור, הוסיף מרפי, שהנושא המזה'תי לא בראש מעייני הסובייטים.

ג. מצרים

מרפי אמר שמובארק יבוא בסוף ינואר ואבו גזאלה לפניו במחצית ינואר. המצרים במובן שבעי רצון מהצלחתם בעמאן. אייב סופר יגיע למצרים ולישראל ויבדוק מה ניתן לעשות בענין טאבה.

שה'ח אמר כי להערכתו ישארו המצרים במחויבותם לשלום והם רואים בהחלטת עמאן נצחון לעמדתם. בלא שיאלצו להיכנע לדרישה הסורית. מעבר לכך השאלה היא כיצד הם יכולים בו זמנית לתמוך בירדן ובאש'פ ובכל הנראה תבקש מצרים להאשים את ישראל בקפאון המדיני. חידוש היחסים הדיפלומטיים יעשה המצרים ערים יותר לרגישויות הערבים ואף כי לא ינתקו יחסיהם עם ישראל הם עלולים לגלות הסתייגות מישראל. שה'ח אמר כי הוא מודאג מהמצב ואפילו אם יוכתרו בהצלחה המאמצים בנושא איכות החיים הם לא ימנעו הבעיות. המאורעות ביהודה שומרון ועזה מוכיחים חוסר שביעות רצון בקרב התושבים. שה'ח חזר ואמר שיש משום סתירה בין עמדת מצרים התומכת בירדן לבין נכונותה לפתח מחדש משרדי אש'פ בקהיר ואפשר לנחש שהפתיחה מכוונת לדעת מצרים, להקל על החזרה לעולם הערבי.

לשאלת מרפי אם רואה נסיגה בעמדת מצרים ענה שה'ח שיש מעין הדרדרות ביחסים ומה שנותר הוא נחלת השיגרה של השנים הקודמות. לדעת שה'ח צריך לעשות מאמץ לשמור את היחסים והוא שה'ח ניסה לאחרונה לקדם היחסים בתחומים המדעי והכלכלי. שה'ח סיפר גם על שיחתו עם שיראק וקוהל שגילו ענין תכנית סיוע הכלכלי למזה'ת והסכימו להעלות הנושא על סדר היום של המתועשות, אף כי ירדן ומצרים מהססות לגלות תמיכה ברעיון פן ישמש תחליף לתהליך המדיני.

מובארק, מעריך שה'ח, בודאי מרגיש שמצבו השתפר לאור ההצלחות בועידה האיסלאמית, בועידה בעמאן ובבחירות במצרים

בענין תהליך השלום הבהיר מובארק באגרת לרה'מ שמיר שאין כל דרך לעשות שלום אלא באמצעות ועידה בינלאומית. ספק אם הוא רואה הצלחה בתוצאות ועידת עמאן בנקודה זו ויש להניח שיתרכז יותר בצד החלטה בענין חידוש היחסים. יש להניח שמצרים קיבלה סיוע נדיב לפני ואחרי עמאן.

השגריר א שאל האם היו הבהרות נוספות של חוסיין לאמריקאים אחרי הפגישה שלו, של מרפי בעמאן. מרפי ענה שאין כל חידוש ושה'ח העיר שזה ה-J'ACCUSE של חוסיין. מרפי הוסיף שהמלך אמר שהוא נאמן למה שסוכם אך איננו רואה טעם בהמשך הדיבורים על הפרוצדורה וכאשר ארה'ב תחליט אם היא תומכת בועידה הוא יהיה מוכן להידבר עמה.

השאלה אמר שה'ח לאן פונים מכאן. המלך חוסיין באופוריה הוא מטייל בין בירות ערב ויסע בקרוב למוסקבה. הוא מתלונן על וושינגטון ומרגיש כמאהב מאוכזב המנסה למצוא נחומין בגישור בין סוריה ועיראק (מרפי: חבל על האנרגיה שלו). אש'פ הגביר את הטרור והאלימות אם כי המלך חוסיין עדיין נהנה מתמיכה והעובדה היא שיצאה עצומה שעליה חתומים 600-700 שתומכת ועידה הבינלאומית, דבר שבעבר לא הצליחו לעשות.

ערן.===

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,בירן,מצפא,אירג,
ממד

** דחוף ** שמור
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חדש:12/8440
אל:ורש/359
מ-:המשרד/תא:111287/זת:1555/דת:מ/מג:ש
נד:מ

שמור/מידי

השגריר

חבר הכנסת משה ארנס מגיע ביום שני (14.12.87) לורש'.
אנא הסדירו לו/בתיאום עמו/בגישות עם המועמדים המרכזיים
לנשיאות/משתי המפלגות.הוא יתקשר אתך עם הגיעו

מנכ"ל משרד רה"מ'

א/ב.י

תפ: רהמ

8073 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 11.12.87

נבנס בלמס

מרדם:12,8073
אל:המשרד
מ-:נו,נר:347,תא:101287,דת:1600,דת:מ,מ,ב:
נד:ם

מס/מידי

אל-: מעת

דע-: המנאי, רוש'נגטון (נר 60)

מאת: שתרגת/נ'ר ירדק

NEWS SUMMARY DECEMBER 10, 1987

EDITORIALS-

NYT, +TRUST BUT VERIFY+-THE NEW TREATY'S DETAILED VERIFICATION, SIGNALING A CHANGE IN SOVIET BEHAVIOR HOLDS GREAT PROMISE, AS WELL AS THE RISK OF PETTINESS OR TERRORISM. IT IS GOOD ON BALANCE.

OP-ED.-

NYT,WICKER, THE +FURY ON THE RIGHT+ IS CAUSED BY 3 THINGS= THE TREATY IS TO LEAD TO BIGGER TREATIES TREATY MAKING IS A SIGN THAT THE CONSERVATIVE +MOMENT IN THE SUN+ IS PASSING, AND EVEN REAGAN HERO OF THE RIGHT, HAS MOVED TO THE CENTER.

NYT, HUNTER, EUROPE, WITH SOME JUSTIFICATION IS UNEASY ABOUT US STEADFASTNESS AS A RESULT OF THE TREATY. REAGAN SHOULD REASSURE HER BY PERSONAL BRIEFINGS AND PUSHING FOR REDUCTIONS IN THE CONVENTIONA

L ARMS IMBALANCE.

NYT, A. LEWIS, ALTHOUGH IT IS FOOLISH TO GUSH OVER SOVIET OPENESS IN VIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, THERE HAS BEEN REAL CHANGE. UNDERSTAND THAT IT MAY NOT LAST, BUT USE THE OPPORTUNITIES. GIVE CREDIT TO REAGAN FOR +SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY.+ HE UNDERSTOOD GORBACHEV'S NEED FOR CHANGE.

WSJ,HODDING CARTER, DON'T FEAR ALL THE PRAISE AND POPULARITY OF GORBACVHEV AND THE SOVIETS. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE NOT DUPED AND ARE NOT BUYING THAT THERE IS NO MORAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SYSTEMS. AS LONG AS ALL THE FACTS CONTINUE TO BE PRESENTED, THE PEOPLE WILL +CUT THROUGH THE BALONEY.+

NYP, BREINDEL, +SUMMIT REALITY: GORBY CALLED THE SHOTS+ THE US HANDED THE SUMMIT TO THE RUSSIANS. IT WAS THEIR AGENDA FROM THE REAL EXCLUSION OF AFGHANISTAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE TYPE OF ARMS DISCUSSED. THE US HAD THE ADVANTAGE, BUT LOST IT JUST AS IT DID IN POST-WAR EASTERN EUROPE. FROM NOW ON US, REVERSE COURSE.

NYP, ROWAN, +THE FACT REMAINS: TO BE A SOVIET CITIZEN IS TO BE A PRISONER IN YOUR OWN COUNTRY.+ THERE IS NO COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. WE ARE FREE AND HAVE THE BENEFITS OF A CAPITALISTIC ECONOMY, WHILE THERE IS NO FREEDOM IN RUSSIA, EITHER ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL.

ND, COLLINS, AT FIRST, THE PRESS TALKED AS IF THE SIGNING OF THE INF TREATY WAS UNCERTAIN. LATER WHEN ASSURED, IT TALKED OF A START TREATY AS BEING ALMOST READY TO COME FROM THE SUMMIT. BOTH WORLD LEADERS CONSCIOUSLY WORKED TO COOL THESE HOPES AND THE PRESS FOLLOWED THEIR LEAD. THE PRESS FEARS +SURPRISES+ AS IT SHOWS UP THEIR IGNORANCE OF EVENTS.

DN, WILL, THE INF TREATY IS IMPORTANT FOR ITS POLITICAL CONTEXT AS SHOWN BY THE COMING 50= STRATEGIC WARHEAD REDUCTION. IT WILL SET UP NEW DEFENSIVE NEEDS

SO THAT IS ONE REASON THE SOVIETS SAY SDI IS A DEFERRABLE ISSUE. TEMPORARY DELAYS, CONGRESS AND THE DEFICIT WILL KILL IT AND THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE ACHIEVED THEIR STRATEGIC ENDS.

סוף חלק ראשון

חב: שחר,רחם,שחבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,אמן,קלוורי,מעת,
ברה,לעם,דרג-ים,דרג,פזנר,נזרצבאי,מצפא,פרנ,תפרצות,
מאמשטחים

8075 תאריך : 11.12.87

נבנס בלמס

חדשה:12/8075
אל:המשרד
מ-:נר:348/תא:101287/זת:1600/דת:מ/סג:ב
נד:ב

בלמס/מידי

אל-: משת

דע-: מצבא/וושינגטון (נד 61)

מאת: שהרנרת/ניו יורק

להלן חלק שני ואחרון

PRESS REPORTS-

SUMMIT

WSJ, SEIB J WALCOTT, ALTHOUGH THE MOOD IS CONGENIAL THERE IS NO APPARENT PROGRESS ON SDI OR AFGHANISTAN. THERE IS SOME INDICATION THAT +SPARKS ..HAVE FLOWN.+ GORBACHEV SAID THAT THEY ARE TALKING LESS IN PLATITUDES BUT HE IS TIRED OF BEING LECTURED ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS BY REAGAN. HE +ISN'T ON TRIAL HERE.+ LAWMAKERS MEETING HIM ARE IMPRESSED WITH HIS CANDOR. SDI IS SO FAR BEING LEFT TO A WORKING GROUP. CONVENTIONAL ARMS IN EUROPE WERE DISCUSSED. SCHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE SIGNED A PACT EXPANDING COMMERCIAL AIR SERVICE.(ND,DN,NYT)

NYT, SOME FROSTINESS AND COMPETITION SEEMS TO EXIST BETWEEN THE TWO FIRST LADIES. AS A RESULT THERE WAS SOME SNAPPING AT REPORTERS.

NYT, GORDON, ACCORDING TO A CONFIDENTIAL TREATY ANNEX, IT APPEARS THAT THE USSR HAS FEWER MEDIUM RANGE MISSLES THAN PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT. IT IS BECAUSE THE USSR IS CUTTING THE NUMBER OF SS-4'S. WHY THEY ARE DOING THIS IS NOT KNOWN. ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF SHORT RANGE MISSLES APPEARS TO BE TO LOW.

MIDDLE EAST

NYT, NASSER'S SON MAY BE MIXED UP IN LEFTIST TERRORIST CELL, THIS IS AN EMBARASSMENT TO EGYPT'S GOV'T. HE IS CURRENTLY IN LONDON, MAYBE WITH GOV'T AIDE. AL-MISSAWAR'S EDITOR DEMANDS HIS EXTRADITION. (CABLED).

NYT, ISRAEL TROOPS KILLED A PALESTINIAN AND WOUNDED 16 AFTER GAZOLINE BOMBS WERE THROWN IN GAZA. THIS IS THE SECOND INCIDENT THIS WEEK. THERE HAS BEEN POLITICAL DEBATE. PERES RECOMMENDS DEMILITARIZATION OF THE AREA. SETTLERS AND SHAMIT OBJECT.

WSJ, KAMM, DASSAULT AVIATION IS DISCUSSING SELLING MIRAGE F-1'S TO IRAQ AT A TIME WHEN FRANCE IS TRYING TO BUILD ITSELF UP WITH IRAN. DASSAULT SAYS ONLY MONEY IS DELAYING THE DEAL, WHILE OTHERS WORRY THAT IT WOULD UPSET IRAN. AN OFFICIAL OF THE FRENCH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SAID HE THOUGHT THE SALE WOULDN'T GO THROUGH, BUT THE STORY WAS TO REASSURE MODERATE ARABS.

OPEC

WSJ, TANNER & PETZINGER, OIL MINISTERS ARE SETTING A DEADLINE OF SATURDAY TO REACH AND ACCORD ON PRICES. THEY BELIEVE IRAN WILL COME ACCROSS QUICKLY OR NOT AT ALL. THERE IS WORRY THAT CHEATING ON QUOTAS WIL DESTROY A PRICE PACT. IRAN HAS THREATENED TO DOUBLE ITS PRODUCTION, BUT MANY DOUBT ITS CAPACITY BECAUSE OF THE WAR. THE PROBLEM HINGES ON FACE SAVING BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN OVER QUOTA SIZES.

NYT, IBRAHIM, IRAN'S THREAT TO DOUBLE ITS PRODUCTION IS VIEWED AS HOLLOW BECAUSE OF THE WAR AND BOYCOTTS. KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA ARE BACKING IRAQ IN ITS REQUEST FOR AN INCREASED QUOTA. IRAN IS MAKING ALL KINDS OF ACCUSATIONS. PRICES HAVE BEEN HEAVILY DISCOUNTED LATELY. MANY FEEL THAT INCRIASING IRAQ'S QUOTA WILL GET HER TO STOP OVERPRODUCING. THE SAUDIS DON'T WANT TO BE THE SWING PRODUCER. THEY ARE WORRIED ABOUT MARKET SHARE. (NYP,ND)

NAZIS

NYP, FETTMANN, JN ARCHIVISTS BEGAN A SEARCH FOR THE MISSING 400 DOCUMENTS. THERE ARE ALL KINDS OF RUMORS, BUT NO HARD INFORMAION. (CABLED) (ND DN)

ENTERTAINMENT- NYP, THERE ARE ALL KINDS OF ARTISTIC CHANUKAH LAMPS TO ENCHANCE THE CELEBRATION.(WSJ).

תנ: שהם,רהם,שהבט,מנבל,מנבל,סמנבל,מגד,רם,אמן,קלרורי,מעת,
הסברה,לעמ,ודצ-ים,דוצ,כזבר,נבדרבאי,מצא,כרנ,תקרצרת,
מתאמשמחים


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2* WDCOW UTLLD - WMLCWC WLN MLP 001 MDLMD TMPTLLLW
MD,L CCLLW LMLCWLW MMCI WL DLCLI TCWLCL
CLCCLD TPCLM UNWLLI LWLCCLD ZWJLL LZTLLD WZLLD
1* CCLMN UYZLLW WDLLLLW - WDLTLLCWD MWLLL SI MDLLD

T* DLLTLD

WMLCLD MWLMZL LZWW WMLTLW*
LWL MD 1NW WDLTLLCWD TLZL CCLCLW ZLTL PZ WCLMNLD
(ZN DTLNW TLLZW)*
MLCCWL MTCL WLLD MDW MWLW TPMWLW 3IZ1MK JMEMR ON SA

N* CZZL

ZWZI LLLLW MLCCWL ZMLL MLI PZ WMLWLW TCLMN

CCYW - LWLLL TLW,W*

WNW:LLPLCYCWLI

NLLI -ZLD NCY,ZD
TLIZ / CZL LLLD
WMYLLL NLI-CZL LLLD - ZMLCZL TZTL
UCC,Z DLLCL
NZ:CWLT

CLLL / WLLLL

TL:0
0-:LLW/TL:ZS2/WN:ZT/10120:MT/10:0M:M/0:0
NZ:WMLT
WLLD:1515/ZI

מדור

12/7060:מרום
1777מ:7מ
2:40/מ:מ7/1700:מ7/091287:מא/310:72/72:-מ
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מערכת/חדשות

מנו: 7מ

(54 72) 7מדיניות ,מקומי (דל 54)

מנו: מרכז ,ירושלים ,ירושלים

מנו: מערכת/דת ,דתות

"מרעדות 7מ 7מא7 מדע 7מ7מ

NEWS SUMMARY DECEMBER 9, 1987

EDITORIALS-

NYP, +THE MISSING UN WAR CRIMES FILES+ STIR SUSPICION.
(CABLED)

DN, +BUZZ OFF, ARAFAT+ THE UN PROTECTS PLO TERRORISTS.(C
ABLED)

NYT, PLANS FOR THE NEXT TREATY CALL FOR LARGE REDUCTIONS
IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IS THIS NECESSARILY GOOD?
BE CAREFUL ABOUT MOVING TOO FAST.

NYT, JEWISH AND NON-JEWISH DISSIDENTS PLAN AN UNOFFICIAL
HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW. HOW THE KREMLIN
RESPONDS WILL SAY A LOT.

WSJ, THE WEST WILL DEBATE THE INF TREATY AND WHAT

IT MEANS WHILE THE SOVIETS WILL GO HOME AND WORK
ON IMPROVING THEIR MILITARY MACHINE.

WSJ EDITORIAL NOTE: REAGAN'S WORDS ON THE INF TREATY
ARE NOT ORIGINAL, THEY ECHO THOSE OF NIXON ON THE
BILOGICAL WEAPONS TREATY IN 1972.

ND, +FAR BETTER THAN WRECK-JAVIK.+ THE TONE OF THIS
SUMMIT IS BETTER THAN THE LAST ONE, BUT BEWARE.
STYLE IS NOT SUBSTANCE.

OP-EDS-

NYT, STRUM 1 BRICKNER,+LEAVE THE PLO OFFICES OPEN.
CLOSING THE OFFICE WOULD BE A BLOW TO MID-EAST
PEACE AND FREE SPEECH. TRUST PEOPLE TO EVALUATE
PLO INFORMATION. (CABLED) (SKIRA EDITOR'S NOTE
BRICKNER IS A RABBI)

NYT, SAFIRE, BEWARE OF THE SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE
WHICH WOULD LULL US INTO THINKING THERE IS NO +ENEMY+.
IT IS STILL WITH US. LOOK AT THE WORLD.

NYT, MURAVCHIC, THE INF TREATY IS A VICTORY FOR
THE +HAWKS+ AS IT IS A RESULT OF THEIR HARD LINE
VIZ-A-VIZ THE DEPLOYMENT OF SS-20S. HAWKS SHOULD
SUPPORT IT.

NYP, EVANS 1 NOVAK, GORBACHEV IS PREPARED FOR A
TOUGH US STAND ON SDI AND PLANS TO FLANK THEM BY
DISCUSSING A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN AND GAIN WORLD
APPROVAL IF THE US HESITATES AS IT MUST BECAUSE
OF VERIFICATION PROBLEMS.

NYP, BUCHANAN, +CONSERVATIVES, DON'T DESPAIR= SOOVER
OR LATER, SOVIETS WILL REAR THEIR UGLY HEADS.+

WSJ, KEYES, THE SOVIET REFUSAL TO LINKAGE BETWEEN
ARMS CONTROL AND SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN THE THIRD WORLD
LETS THEM CONTINUE TO HAVE SUCCESS THERE AND TO
THREATEN US INTERESTS BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC.

ND, KEMPTON, BOTH SUPER POWERS ARE SOFT= RUSSIA
HAS LOST CONTROL OF THE REVOLUTION AND THE US HAS
LOST CONTROL OF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION, SO THEY
HAVE NOTHING BETTER TO DO THAN MAKE A TREATY.

DN, NELSON, GORBACHEV IS PLAYING FOR HIGH PERSONAL
AND NATIONAL STAKES HERE. HE NEEDS US TECHNOLOGY
AND WESTERN MARKETS TO LEAD TO ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT
AT HOME. SO FAR HE HAS DONE WELL WITH A REVIVAL
OF DETENTE.

NYT, BAKER, THIS HUMOROUS COLUMN SAYS IT WON'T BE
ABOUT THE SUMMIT, BUT IS.

ND, BUCHWALD,(12-8), HIS HUMOROUS COLUMN CONTAINS
+LETTERS+ THAT GORBACHEV DIDN'T ANSWER.

מדור 7מ 7מ7 מדע 7מ7מ

מנו: מערכת/חדשות ,מקומי ,ירושלים ,ירושלים
מנו: מרכז ,ירושלים ,ירושלים
מנו: 7מ
מנו: מערכת/דת ,דתות
מרעדות 7מ 7מא7 מדע 7מ7מ

בבבב בבבב

12/7061:בתרן
ראשון:יא
1:30/מ:מ1/1700:מ1/091287:אמ/311:מ1/ר1:-מ
ב:מ1

ר1/מ1:מ1

מבא :-יא

(55 מ1) מבצע ראגן :-מ1

ר1ר/מ1מ1מ :אמ

מ1מ מבר מ1 ר1ר מ1ר מ1ר 1מר

PRESS REPORTS-

NAZI FILES

NY/ BLUMENTHAL/ THE UN WILL INVESTIGATE THE MISSING FILES. PERHAPS THEY WERE NEVER RECEIVED.(CABLED)

ND/J. FRIEDMAN/ THE UN WILL INVESTIGATE THE MISSING FILES.(CABLED)

NYP/ BANNER HEADLINES AND MANY STORIES ON THE MISSING FILES.(CABLED)

WALDHEIM

NY/ SCHMEMANN/ AUSTRIANS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY EMBARRASSED WITH THEIR SINKING POSITION IN WORLD ESTEEM AS A RESULT OF THE WALDHEIM AFFAIR. SOME FEAR THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO HIS

PAST. MANY WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIM RESIGN BUT DOUBT HE WILL DO SO. LIKE NIXON/ HE IS UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND WHAT HE HAS DONE WRONG. IT IS LEADING TO BOTH A REVIVAL OF ANTS-SEMITIAM AND A CLOSER LOOK AT THEIR NAZI PAST.

SUMMIT

SKIRA EDITOR'S NOTE: THE SUMMIT AND THE TREATY SIGNING CONTINUE TO DOMINATE THE NEWS TODAY WITH BANNER HEADLINES AND MANY NEWS STORIES IN EACH PAPER. THERE IS PLENTY OF HOOP-LA OVER THE +GORBY SHOW+ BUT THERE IS STILL ROOM FOR EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF THE UN NAZI FILE SCANDAL.

WSJ/ SEIB/ THERE IS A FEAR THAT A SMALL GROUP IN THE SENATE COULD SO AMEND THE TREATY THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE RENEGOTIATION. ALTHOUGH 70= OF REPUBLICANS SUPPORT IT/ MANY THINK THAT REAGAN WILL HAVE TO TEAM UP WITH SENATE DEMOCRATS.

WSJ/ WALCOTT] SEIB/ GORBACHEV SEE THE INF TREATY AS A START. REAGAN AGREES/BUT IS MORE CAUTIOUS. REAGAN IS SETTING A HARMONIOUS TONE. TALKS ARE GOING SMOOTHLY. OFFICIALS DISCUSSED VERIFICATION AND SOME SENATE LEADERS ARE STILL FENCE-SITTING. (NYT/NYP/ND/DN)

WSJ/ GREENBERGER/ CONSERVATIVES OBJECT TO THE TREATY FOR 3 MAIN REASONS= IT WILL +DECOUPLE+ THE US AND EUROPE/ IT HAS VERIFICATION PROBLEMS / AND THE SOVIETS ARE UNTRUSTWORTHY. MANY REPUBLICANS LIKE IT BUT MANY DON'T.

NY/DOWD/ THE SOVIETS ARE HAVING TROUBLE GETTING ORGANIZED AND SEEING TO IT THAT SCHEDULES OF PRESS MEETINGS ARE KEPT. IT IS CONFUSION/ NOT INTENTION TO CONFOUND. THERE IS MUCH HEADY NONSENSE/ BUT SOME KEEP THEIR COOL. THE SOVIETS LIKE CAR MAGAZINES AND THE US PRESS OFFICE MADE SOME BLOOPERS TOO.

NY/ (PART OF A LONG ARTICLE) FITZWATER SAID THAT

THERE WERE DISCUSSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS TODAY AND A GROUP IS BEING SET UP ON THE TOPIC. REAGAN MADE LITTLE REFERENCE TO RIGHTS TODAY.

ND/ GUTMAN +A POINT BY POINT INSPECTION OF THE PACT+ THIS IS A DETAILED LISTING OF THE PACT PROVISIONS.

NY/ BARRINGER/ SOVIET AUTHORITIES DETAINED SEVERAL PEOPLE ON THEIR WAY TO THE UNOFFICIAL HUMAN RIGHTS MEETING IN MOSCOW. ALL WERE RELEASED AND FORBIDDEN TO GO. THIS IS PART OF A GENERAL CRACKDOWN ON PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS. 14 JEWS WERE DETAINED YESTERDAY AS THEY GATHERED. SUNDAY A DEMONSTRATION WAS BROKEN UP."THE MEETING/ AN INTERNATIONAL ONE HAS NO CONNECTION WITH THE DEMONSTRATIONS.

MIDDLE EAST

NY/ FRANCE EXPELLED 14 ANTI-KHOMEINI IRANIANS AND 3 TURK TO GABON. THE GOVERNMENT DENIED IT HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE RECENT HOSTAGE RELEASE.ON MONDAY/ HOWEVER/ A SENIOR FRECH DIPLOMAT SAID THAT IT WAS A SMALL PRICE TO PAY FOR THE RELEASE. (ND)

ND/ IRAQ ATTACKED AN IRANIAN TANKER AND IRAN CLAIMED TO SHOOT DOWN AND IRAQI JET WITH A STINGER. IT IS BELIEVED THE STINGER MAY HAVE COME FROM AFGHANI REBELS.

WSJ/ AN OPEC PANEL WANTS TO FREEZE PRICES AT $18 A BARREL/ BUT PRICES CONTINUED TO FALL. IRAN OBJECTS TO A COMPROMISE PLAN TO ALLOW IRAQ THE SAME QUOTA AS IRAN IN AN EFFORT TO GET IRAQ INTO COMPLIANCE. FINANCIAL MARKETS DON'T THINK OPEC CAN GET ITS ACT TOGETHER. (NYT/ND)

ENTERTAINMENT-

NYT/ NYP AND DN ALL HAVE COLOUR STORIES ON HANUKKAH IN ISRAEL AND NEW YORK.

12/5204:DTTM
TTWDM:YN
1:40/0:MT/1700:NT/081287:KM/252:TJ/TJ:-0
8:TJ

YTYD/0071

MUD :-YN

(49 TJ) TTDJ:WTT /YJJD :-UT

PTTT TTJ/MTTMW :MKD

MTTPDM YW M PYM TYM7

NEWS SUMMARY DECEMBER 8, 1987

EDITORIALS-

NYT, THE SOVIETS BETTER UNDERSTAND THE FEELINGS OF AMERICANS TOWARD THE RIGHT TO EMMIGRATE, REINFORCED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND U.S. HISTORY AS A +MOTHER OF EXILES.+ AMERICANS HAVE BEEN PROTESTING RUSSIAN PERSECUTION OF THE JEWS SINCE 1820= THE SOVIETS ARE NOW NOT EVEN TALKING ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS AND DESPITE FREEING SOME WELL KNOWN PRISONERS, ARE NOT LIVING UP TO THE HELSINKI AGREEMENTS. LISTEN TO THE 200,000.

WSJ, THE SOVIETS, ALTHOUGH TALKING ABOUT LEAVING AFGHANISTAN, ARE NOT DOING SO. ONLY CONTINUED PRESSURE AND SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS WILL HELP.

ND, EUROPEANS SHOULDN'T FEAR THE INF TREATY AS

THE U.S. IS NOT DESERTING THEM NOR IS THE ARMS IMBALANCE AS BAD AS IS THOUGHT.

DN, THE TREATY IS THE FIRST REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR ARMS. DON'T WORRY THAT REAGAN MIGHT GIVE AWAY THE STORE, AS GORBACHEV WANTS STABILITY AND GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. FOR A LONG TIME.

NYP, REAGAN SHOULD BE WARY OF GORBACHEV. JUST LOOK AT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON SUNDAY.

OP-EDS-

NYT, F.LEWIS, WASHINGTON HAS A RIGHT DO FEEL THE EXCITEMENT IT DOES OVER THE SUMMIT. PERHAPS IT COULD BE A WATERSHED AS WE ENTER A NEW CENTURY. PERHAPS IDEOLOGICAL WAR COULD WITHER AWAY AS EUROPEAN RELIGIOUS WAR DID IN THE 17TH CENTURY. THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN TALKING THIS WAY, BUT THE U.S. STILL TALKS FEARFULLY. LETS TALK, CAUTIOUSLY, BUT HOPEFULLY.

NYT, A.M. ROSENTHAL, GORBACHEV'S GOAL IS TO ACHIEVE MORAL EQUALITY IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD WITHOUT CHANGING THE INTERNAL SOVIET SYSTEM. HE IS WEAKENING THE AWARENESS OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AMERICAN FREEDOMS AND SOVIET REPRESSION AND IMPERIAL DICTATORSHI P. DON'T THINK OF OPPOSITION TO HIS SMOOTHNESS AS NARROW. REMEBER THE PRISON CELL AND UNFREE JOURNALIST. WE MUST REMEMBER THAT THERE IS NO MORAL EQUALITY EVEN IF IT IS A DICTATORSHIP WITH +VELVET ON THE BARS.+

WSJ, KRISTOL,+ FACING CLASNOST SERIOUSLY+ MEANS THAT IT WILL AFFECT THE INTERNAL SOVIET SYSTEM NOT JUST REDUCE EXTERNAL CONFRONTATIONAL AND IMPERIAL BEHAVIOR. AFTER 70 YEARS, THE SYSTEM NEEDS HELP EVEN IN MARXIST-LENINIST TERMS. LOOK AT YUGOSLAVI A AS AN EXAMPLE. NO ONE KNOWS WERE IT COULD LEAD BUT INTERNAL CHANGE MAY BE IN THE AIR.

WSJ, GAFFNEY, MOSCOW EXPECTS TO PLAY AN OFFENSIVE

12/5205:מרמן
1'TWמ:7N
1:מ0/מ:מ7/1700:מ1/081287:NM/253:T1/'מ:-מ
8:T1

מ'מ7מ/מ0מ7מ

N7-: מ0מ

מ0מ :-7N

(49 T1) 1'T0מ'W11 /'מ0מ :-מ1

מ'11' מ'מ/מ'מ1'מW :מ0מ

מ'מ'מ7מ 7W מ מ7מ 1'מ7

PRESS REPORTS-
THE SUMMIT

THE SUMMIT AND GORBACHEV'S ARRIVAL COMPLETELY DOMINATES THE NEWS HERE. ALL PAPERS HAVE FRONT PAGE BANNER HEADLINES AND EXTENSIVE COVERAGE FROM NEWS ACCOUNTS AND HEAVY ANALYSIS TO HUMAN INTEREST AND PRETTY WIFE STORIES. THE FOLLOWING IS ONLY A SMALL SAMPLING.

NYT/ DOWD/ WASHINGTON IS +SEEKING A HOPEFUL SYMBOL+ TO MATCH THE SOARING MOOD. BOTH U.S. AND USSR DIGNITARIES AND JOURNALISTS ARE PUTTING ON A HAPPY MOOD ON PEACE AND THE SUMMIT. LOCAL STORES BUBBLING ABOUT IT ALL.

NYT/ A.ROSENTHAL/ AN AMERICAN OFFICIAL SAID THAT THE SOVIET ANTI- ZIONIST AENCY WILL BE CLOSED. THIS LOOKS LIKE A TACIT ADMISSION THAT THE FOUR YEAR OLD AGENCY WAS A MISTAKE. SOVIET SOURCES HAVN'T

COMMENTED. S ZIVS/ HEAD OF THE AGENCY IS THE MAN WHO STATED THAT ALL SOVIET JEWS WHO WISHED TO LEAVE HAD ALREADY LEFT. MANY RECENT EMIGRES MADE STATEMENTS ABOUT THE AGENCY.

NYT/ GORDON/ CO.. GEN NIKOLAI F. CHERVOV SAID THAT THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IS FLAWED AS IT DOES NOT APPLY TO WEAPONS IN WHICH THE WEST HAS AN ADVANTAGE, BUT ONLY TO WEAPONS IN WHICH THE WARSAW PACT NATIONS ARE STRONG. THIS IS THE FIRST RESPONSE TO AMERICAN PROPOSALS.

NYT/ WEINRAUB, PROTESTERS OF ALL SORTS, FROM AFGHANS TO NUCLEAR DISARMERS WERE ALL OVER THE PLACE IN WASHINTON TODAY MAKING THEIR VIEWS KNOWN.

NYT/ 10,000 IRAELIS DEMONSTRATED TODAY. PERES AND HERZOG SPOKE.

NYT/ ITEMS OTHER THAN ARMS THAT ARE ON THE SUMMIT AGENDA ARE AFGHANISTAN, THE PERSIAN GULF AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION.

NYT/ KIFNER/ IN AFGHANISTAN EVERYBODY, HUMAN OR ANIMAL LOVES TO FIGHT. CAMELS AND DOGS ARE URGED TO FIGHT. TRIBAL TRADITIONS ARE BELLICOSE. ALL SPORTS ARE VIOLENT. EVEN CHILDREN'S KITES HAVE GLASSON THE STRING TO CUT LOOSE THE OTHER FELLOWS KITES.

THE PLO OFFICE.

NYT/ P.LEWIS/ THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL JOINED ARAB REPRESENTATIVES IN PROTESTING A CONGRESSIONAL MOVE TO SHUT THE PLO OBSERVER MISSION (CABLED)

THE GULF WAR

NYT/ IBRAHIM/ THE FRENCH/ ALREADY CRITICIZED FOR MAKING CONCESIOVS TO IRAN FOR HOSTAGES/ ARE ROUNDING UP IRANIAN LEFTISTS WHO OPPOSE KHOMEINI. THEY DENY PAYING RANSOME AND DENIED THAT THE DEAL CALLS FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF THE FRENCH FLEET PATROLLING THE

GULF FOR IRANIAN MINES. THE GROUP ARRESTED HAS THE HIGHEST PROFILE AMONG IRANIAN DISSENTERS.
(ND)

NYT/ IRAN FIRED A SILKWORM MISSLE AT KUWAIT BUT IT HIT A DECOY BARGE AND DID NO HARM. KUWAIT REGISTERED A PROTEST WITH IRAN. A TANKER HIT SUNDAY IS SINKING.
(ND)

ISRAEL-MIDEAST

ND. ISRAEL IS NOW SUPPLYING ELECTRICITY TO THE JEWISH AREA OF EAST JERUSALEM FORMERLY SUPPLIED BY AND ARAB-RUN COMPANY THAT IS A SYMBOL OF ARAB NATIONALISM.

ND/ SHAMIR SAID THAT BOTH THE U.S. AND THE USSR ASKED ISRAEL NOT TO RETALIATE FOR THE GLIDER ATTACK BUT HE WON'T BE PRESSURED.

OPEC

WSJ/ TANNER 1 PETZINGER/ RUNAWAY PRODUCTION THREATENS OPEC WITH A PRICE COLLAPSE. WITH INCREASED PRODUCTION PARTICULARLY BY IRAQ/ AND DECREASING DEMAND IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO HOLD AT $18 A BARREL. OFFICIALS SAY IRAN AND LIBYA WON'T GET THE INCREASE THEY WANT. IRAQI PRODUCTION IS THE KEY.

NAZIS

NYP/ DAN/ MORE THAN 400 SEALED NAZI FILES ARE MISSING FROM THE FILES RECENTLY OPENED BY THE UN.(CABLED)

ENTERTAINMENT-

NYT/O'CONNOR/ A TV SHOW ABOUT ELI COHEN/+THE IMPOSSIBLE SPY/+ FILMED IN ISRAEL AND STUDIED BY ISRAELI CENSORS IS A FIVE PROGRAM SHOWING SYMPATHY FOR BOTH COGEN AND PARTICULARLY FOR THE SYRIAN GENERAL HE USED.

LETTERS-

PRESS REPORTS-
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NYT/ MSGR. OESTERREICHER/ HE IS GLAD SEIGMAN/ HEAD OF THE AJC/ DIDN'T OVERREACT TO THE REPORTS OF CARDINAL RATZINGER. CONCERNS SHOULDN'T BE AIRED IN PUBLIC.

NYP/ H.HADDAD/ ZIONISM DOESN'T PREACH RACISM.

ADS-

NYT/ ANOTHER FULL PAGE AD BY JEWS FOR JESUS

.TWO TO
TT CNT.
MUTTLU

סודי ** יוצא **

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חוזם:12,5650
אל:ווש/263
מ-:המשרד,תא:081287,זח:1746,דח:מ,סג:ס
בד:8

סודי / מיידי

א.ב. 162

אל: וושינגטון

השגריר לנמען בלבד.

סטינגרים לבחרין . למברקי בנושא.

הממונה האמריקני בקש משר הבטחון התחשבות ישראל בצרכיה ואינטרסיה של ארה"ב תוך הבטחת מניעת העברת הסטינגרים לידים עוינות. מסר לשר הודעת דובר הבית הלבן בנושא מ-2 דנא.
שר הבטחון הבהיר לו שאיננו יכולים לשנות מדיניותנו המסורתית של התנגדות לאספקת אמצעי לחימה למדינות ערב וציין העובדה שסטינגרים מצויים בידי המחבלים. ציין שלכל היותר יכולים האמריקנים לצפות לאי נקיטת יוזמה מצד שגרירותנו בוושינגטון אך גם היא בשתאלץ להגיב תגיב על פי המדיניות הנקוטה.

בירן.

רד

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,בירן,מצפא,ממד

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*                                                 12/5607:תדזם      *
*                                                      אל:המשרד     *
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*                                                      נד:ם         *
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*                                                 סודי ביותר/מידי   *
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*                                                אל:יועץ מדיני לשהח *
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*                                                 סדריה.שלן 207.    *
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*                                       תס: שהח/רהמ/שהבט/מנבל/בירך *
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אל:ווש,נר:197,מ-:המשרד.
דח:ב,מ0:מ0,סב,תא:071287:זח:1700

סודי ביותר/בהול

ע.ר. 109

השגריר

מכירת סטינגרים לבחריין

1. מסרתי לממונה האמריקני שקבלנו מסר וילקוקס אליך והוא נלמד על ידינו. שמחנו על איזכור החבילה המוכנת לקראת בקור שר הבטחון בנושא ה-F 16 אך תמהנו על הקשר איזכור זה.

2. הממונה יוז הגיב תחילה שמניח כי איזכור החבילה הוא בהקשר עובדתי וכמקריות של עתוי. בשלב שני הוסיף שמניח שבדיונים פנימיים אצלם יש המעלים שאלת הרדיות התועלת בשתוף בינינו. התייחס גם להצגתו המפורטת של וילקוקס את נושא מכירות הנשק לערבים בשיחות גאות ובקש בכך לתת לי להבין שיש אצלם הטוענים כי בעוד הם מתחשבים באינטרסינו במסגרת השיתוף האסטרטגי אין אנו משיבים להם באותה מטבע בהקשר זה.

3. הממונה נפגש אמש עם שר הבטחון והעלה הנושא עמו. לשכת שר הבטחון תבריקכם תשובת השר.

בירן.

תפ:
שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,בירן,מצפא*

4885 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 12.87

דף 1 מתוך 2

** יוצא ** סודי ביותר עותק 4 מתוך 12

חוזם:12,4885

אל:בטחון/104

מ-:המשרד,תא:071287,זח:1637,דח:ר,סג:סב

נד:פ

סודי ביותר/רגיל

ח. ר. ב.

אל:רושינגטון, השגריר

מאת:יועץ מדיני לשהח'.

הנדון:מעורבות סוריה בטרור

בעקבות פניות שגריר ארהב' בנושא הנ"ל אנא הבא לידיעת
מחמ"ד (בצינור ובדרג שתקבע בהתיחס לפנייה המקורית) את
תשובת ממ' רוהמ' ושה"ח(על דעת רהמ' ושהבט') בהתבסס
על הנוסח הבא:

1.THE GOVERMENT OF ISRAEL HAS TAKEN NOTE OF THE COMMUNICATION OF AMERICAN AMBASSADOR T.PICKERING CONCERNING THE TERRORIST ATTACK IN NORTHERN ISRAEL.

2.MR.PERES WISHES TO THANK SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ FOR THE EXPRESSION OF GRIEF AT THE CASUALTIES AND CONDEMNATION OF THE PERPETRATORS.

3.INDEED,ISRAEL VIEWS WITH UTMOST GRAVITY THIS NEW EVIDENCE OF SYRIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,SPONSORSHIP OF ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST ISRAEL AND CYNICAL EFFORT TO PROJECT AN IMAGE OF INNOCENCE.

NIMROD NOVIK

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 2

עותק 4 מתוך 12

תפ: שהח,רהמ,מנכל,בירן

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM

BUREAU OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

לשכת המנהל הכללי

מ ב ר ק

סודי ביותר - בהול לקוד

אל רחל שמרלינג

מכירת סטינגרים לבחריין.

1. להלן מסר מוילקוקס, מחמ"ד, לשגרירנו בוושינגטון היום יום א':

המחשל הודיע לקונגרס על כוונתו למכור לבחריין 70 סטינגרים ו-17 משגרים. הדבר נדחה בהצבעה ומצפים להצבעה מחודשת בנושא במליאת הועדה ביום ג' הקרוב. שר ההגנה ויו"ר המטות המשולבים פעלו אישית בנושא ומפעילים השפעתם לאישור המכירה.

ללא עזרת בחריין לא היתה ארה"ב יכולה לפעול בחודשים האחרונים במפרץ כפי שפעלה והיא מיחסת למכירה זו חשיבות רבה ביותר. מכירה זו חלוות הסדרים חמורים לבקורת על האחסנה והשימוש וכדי למנוע כל העברה לגורם אחר.

ארה"ב איננה מאמינה שהם מהווים איום על ישראל, מה גם שבאיזור נמצאים כ-20.000 SA 7 רוסיים [redacted]

כידוע אנו פועלים לקראת ביקור שר הבטחון למען השגת חבילה שתקל על רכישת F-16 ע"י ישראל. אנו יודעים שהשגרירות לא פעלה בענין מסויים זה אך גורמים ידידותיים לכם פעלו בנושא זה בחרץ. היינו רוצים שתביעו את החשיבות שאנו מייחסים לנושא ושתמנעו מהתנגדות. אנו יודעים ומכבדים עמדתכם העקרונית לגבי אי מכירת נשק למדינות שאינן ביחסי שלום עמכם אך היינו מבקשים במקרה זה לא לנקוט עמדה.
עד כאן.

2. לשגריר נמסר ממקור ב-NSC שקרלוצ'י שגר את ארמיטג סגנו לבחריין להרגיעם ולהבהיר שהצבעה האחרונה בקונגרס אינה המילה האחרונה בנושא.

בירן

לשמ/480
6.12.87

מבוקש: רחל, עמיר, בירן | רחל שמרלינג
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